FIRST EDITION _June_ 1893_Reprinted_ _June_ 1893SECOND EDITION _July_ 1911THIRD EDITION _January_ 1912 A LEAP IN THE DARK A CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLES OFHOME RULE AS ILLUSTRATED BYTHE BILL OF 1893 By A. V. DICEYK. C. , HON. D. C. L. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE; FORMERLY VINERIAN PROFESSOR OF ENGLISHLAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD; AUTHOR OF 'ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINSTHOME RULE, ' 'THE VERDICT, ' 'AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAWOF THE CONSTITUTION' LONDONJOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1912 TO IRISH UNIONISTS WHOSE NOBLE AND STRENUOUS DEFENCE OF THEIR OWNRIGHTS AND LIBERTIES AS CITIZENS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND WILL ITRUST PRESERVE THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION This book is not a disquisition on the details of the Home Rule Bill. Itis an examination into the leading principles of the Bill with a view toestablishing two conclusions. The first is, that the Home Rule Bill, though nominally a measure for the government of Ireland, contains inreality a New Constitution for the whole United Kingdom. The second is, that this New Constitution must work injury both to England and toIreland, and instead of 'closing a controversy of seven hundred years, opens a constitutional revolution. The whole aim, in short, of the bookis by the collection together of arguments which separately have beenconstantly used by Unionist statesmen, to warn the people of Englandagainst a leap in the dark. A. V. DICEY. OXFORD: _May_ 1893. CONTENTS CHAPTER IOLD AND NEW CONSTITUTION Home Rule Bill a New Constitution for United Kingdom, p. 1. --The presentconstitution, p. 2: 1. Effective authority of Parliament throughoutUnited Kingdom, p. 2: Distinction between supremacy of Parliament inUnited Kingdom and supremacy of Parliament in Colonies, p. 4: 2. Absenceof federalism, p. 6: The New Constitution, p. 8: 1. Abolition in Irelandof effective authority of Imperial Parliament, ib. : 2. Introduction offederalism, p. 13. --Features of federalism, p. 15: Restrictions on Irish(State) Parliament, ib. : Imperial (federal) Parliament, ib. : Means forenforcement of federal compact, ib. : Recognition of federal spirit, p. 17. --Importance of change in constitution, p. 19. --The New Constitutionan unknown constitution, p. 19. CHAPTER IITHE NEW CONSTITUTION The four essential characteristics of the New Constitution, p. 21. --Supremacy of Parliament maintained, p. 22. --What is meaning ofsupremacy of Imperial Parliament? p. 23: What it does not mean, ib. :What it does mean, p. 24. --Real effect of reserved supremacy, p. 28. --Peril arising from ambiguity of supremacy of Parliament, p. 30. --Retention of Irish members at Westminster, p. 32. --Change ofGladstonian opinion, p. 33. --Presence of the Irish members involves ruinto Ireland, pp. 33, 34. --Mr. John Morley's opinion, p. 39. --Weakness ofEngland, p, 41. Mr. Morley's opinion, p. 41. --Manner in which Englandweakened, p. 43: 1. Irish vote determines composition of BritishCabinet, ib. : 2. System of Cabinet Government destroyed, p. 45: 3. Irishmembers changed into an Irish delegation, p. 46: 4. British Parliamentnot freed from Irish questions, p. 47. --Inducements to accept plan, p. 48. --Maintenance of Imperial supremacy, p. 49. --English management ofEnglish affairs, ib. --England does not really obtain management ofEnglish affairs, ib. --Minority tempted to unfairness, p. 51. --Minority, without intentional unfairness, may be oppressive, p. 52. --Plan ofretaining Irish members for all purposes, p. 53. --Comparison with powerhitherto held by or offered to Great Britain, p. 55. --Authority ofEngland before 1782, p. 55. --Authority of England under Grattan'sConstitution, p. 56. --Authority of England since the Union, p. 57. --Authority offered to England under Bill of 1886, p. 58. --Why shouldEngland accept in 1893 a worse bargain than was offered her in 1886? p. 59: Two alleged reasons, p. 60: First reason, Retention of Irish membersconcession to Unionists, p. 60: Futility of plea, ib. : Second reason, England will not suffer any greater evil than she does at present, p. 63: Answer. Fallacy of statement, ib. --Explanation of Gladstonianpolicy, p. 65. --Powers of Irish Government, p. 66: I. Irish Executive, ib. : Importance of Executive, p. 68: Powers of Irish Executive, p. 68:Position of military forces, p. 74: II. The Irish Parliament, p. 73: Itspower to appoint the Irish Government, ib. : Its legislative power, p. 76. --Legislation in opposition to English policy, p 78. --Power to passresolutions, p. 79. --The Restrictions, etc, p. 80: I. Their nature, ib. :1. No restriction on power of Executive, p. 83: 2. No prohibition ofActs of Indemnity, ib. : 3. No prohibition of _ex post facto_ law, p. 84:4. No safeguard against violation of contract, p. 85: II. Enforcement ofRestrictions, p. 88. --The Veto, p. 88. --The Privy Council, p. 90. --Powerto nullify Irish Acts, ib. --Power as final Court of Appeal to treatIrish Acts as void, p. 91. --How arrangement will work, p. 94. --Presumptions on which working of Constitutions depends false, p. 97: 1. Presumption that restrictions do not irritate, p. 98: Itsfalsehood, ib. --Financial arrangements certain to cause discontent, p. 100. --The Customs, ib. --Charges in favour of England on Ireland, p. 102. --Irish objection to financial proposals, p. 103. --Presumption thatIreland cannot nullify Restrictions. Its falsehood, p. 104. --Summary ofcriticism, p. 110. CHAPTER IIIWHY THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BEA SETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION New Constitution is intended to be final settlement of Irish Question, p. 112: But will not settle Irish Question for three reasons, p. 113: I. New Constitution does not satisfy Ireland or England, ib. : Ireland notsatisfied, ib. : New Constitution detested by influential minority, p. 114: Irish Home Rulers not wholly satisfied, p. 115: New Constitutionwill cause discontent of whole Irish people, p. 118: England notsatisfied, p. 119: 2. New Constitution rests on unsound foundation, p. 121: Belfast subjected to Dublin, p. 122: England subjected to Ireland, p. 123: 3. New Constitution based on ambiguity, p. 125. --The nature ofthe ambiguity, ib. --The result of the ambiguity, ib. The NewConstitution cannot last, p. 127. --Irish discontent leading either toFederation or Separation, p. 128. --English discontent threatensreaction, p. 130. CHAPTER IVPLEAS FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTION Gladstonian apology, p. 132. --As to general considerations, ib. --GeneralGladstonian objections, ib. : I. Strictures are prophecy, p. 133: 2. Anomalies already exist in English Constitution, p. 135. --As to specificarguments for Home Rule, p. 138. --Necessity, p. 138. --Argument fornecessity, ib. --Answer: argument invalid, 140. --Premises unsound, p. 141. --Premises do not support conclusion, p. 145. --No necessity forHome Rule, ib. --True meaning of necessity forgotten, p. 146. --No danger, p. 148: I. Safeguards, p. 149: Their unreality, ib. : 2. Grattan'sConstitution, ib. : No precedent, p. 150: 3. Success of Home Rule inother countries, p. 152. --Instances of 'Home Rule' which need not beconsidered, ib. --Cases of 'Home Rule' which require consideration, p. 154. --Federal Government, p. 155. --Colonial independence, p. 156. --Neither federal government nor colonial independence compatiblewith the authority required in Ireland by Imperial Government, p. 157. --Weakness of law in case of federation, p. 158. --Weakness of law incase of colonies, pp. 161, 162. --Policy of trust, p. 163. --Trust inIrish leaders impossible, p. 164. --History of the Irish agitators, p. 164. --Gladstonian guarantee of trustworthiness worthless, p. 167. --Trustin teaching of power, 169. --Answer. Fallacy exposed by Mr. Bryce, ib. --Trust in the people and effect of Home Rule, p. 171. --Answer. Political changes do not ensure content, pp. 171, 172. --Gladstonianpleas are pleas for policy of Home Rule, but not pleas for newConstitution, p. 173. CHAPTER VTHE PATH OF SAFETY The impending danger, p. 175. --Peril concealed by trust in Mr. Gladstone, ib. --Peril concealed by peculiar condition of opinion, p. 178. --The path of safety and true policy, p. 180. --Policy ofseriousness, ib. --Seriousness of question at issue, ib. --Danger of civilwar, p. 181. --Policy of simplicity, p. 183. --Strenuous opposition toBill, ib. --Cry of obstruction futile, p. 184. --Details not to be madetoo prominent, p. 185. --No appearance of concession allowable, p. 186. --Policy of appeal to the nation, p. 187. --House of Lords mustensure dissolution, ib. --House of Lords may be called upon to enforceReferendum, p. 188. --Conclusion, p. 191. APPENDIX PAGES GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL 195-223 ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES 195, 196 1. Establishment of Irish Legislature, p. 197--2. Powers of Irish Legislature, ib. --3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature, ib. --4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature, p. 198. --5. Executive power in Ireland, ib. --6. Composition of Irish Legislative Council, p. 199. --7. Composition of Irish Legislative Assembly, ib. --8. Disagreement between two Houses, how settled, p. 200. --9. Representation in Parliament of Irish counties and boroughs, ib. --10. As to separate Consolidated Fund and Taxes, p. 201. --11. Hereditary revenues and income tax, p. 202. --12. Financial arrangements as between United Kingdom and Ireland, p. 203. --13. Treasury Account (Ireland), ib. --14. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund, p. 204. --15. Irish Church Fund, p. 205. --16. Local loans, ib. --17. Adaptation of Acts as to Local Taxation Accounts and Probate, etc. , duties, ib. --18. Money bills and votes, p. 206. --19. Exchequer judges for revenue actions, election petitions, etc. , ib. --20. Transfer of post office and postal telegraphs, p. 207. --21. Transfer of savings banks, p. 208. --22. Irish appeals, p. 209. --23. Special provision for decision of constitutional questions, ib. --24. Office of Lord Lieutenant, p. 210. --25. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government, ib. --26. Tenure of future judges, ib. --27. As to existing judges and other persons having salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund, ib. --28. As to persons holding civil service appointments, p. 211. --29. As to existing pensions and superannuation allowances, p. 212. --30. As to Police, ib. --31. Irish Exchequer Consolidated Fund and Audit, p. 213. --32. Law applicable to both Houses of Irish Legislature, ib. --33. Supplemental provisions as to powers of Irish Legislature, ib. --34. Limitation of borrowing by local authorities, p. 214. --35. Temporary restriction on powers of Irish Legislature and Executive, ib. --36. Transitory provisions, ib. --37. Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, etc. , p. 216. --38. Appointed day, ib. --39. Definitions, ib. --40. Short title, p. 217. SCHEDULES 218-223 1. Legislative Council 2182. Irish Members in the House of Commons 2203. Finance 222 INTRODUCTION Irish Unionists have pressed for a republication of _A Leap in theDark_. They hold that it will be of some service in their resistance tothe Coalition of Home Rulers, Socialists, and Separatists formed toforce upon the people of England and of Scotland a virtual dissolutionof the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. It would in any casehave been a pleasure to afford aid, however small, to the IrishUnionists, whether Protestants or Catholics, engaged in the defence atonce of their own birthright and of the political unity of the UnitedKingdom. Yet for a moment I doubted whether the republication of aforgotten criticism of a forgotten Bill would be of essential service tomy friends. On reflection, however, I have come to see that, though theUnionists of Ireland probably overrate the practical value of my book, yet their hope of its serving the cause whereof they are the mostvaliant defenders is based on sound reasons. _A Leap in the Dark_ is a stringent criticism of the Home Rule Bill, 1893. [1] But the book has little to do with the details and intricaciesof that Bill. _A Leap in the Dark_ was published before the Home RuleBill of 1893 had reached the House of Lords, or had assumed that finalform, which made patent to the vast majority of British electors that ameasure which purported to give a limited amount of independence toIreland, in reality threatened England with political ruin. My criticismis therefore in truth an attack upon the fundamental principles of HomeRule, as advocated by Gladstone and his followers eighteen years ago. These principles, moreover, have never been repudiated by the HomeRulers of to-day. Some members of the present Cabinet, notably the PrimeMinister and Lord Morley, were the apologists of the Bill of 1893. Inthat year _A Leap in the Dark, or Our New Constitution_, was, I ventureto say, accepted by leading Unionists, such as Lord Salisbury, the Dukeof Devonshire, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Henry James (now LordJames of Hereford), as, in the main, an adequate representation of theobjections which, in the judgment of such men and thousands ofUnionists, were fatal to the acceptance of any scheme whatever of HomeRule for Ireland. The battle over Home Rule lasting, as it did foryears, and ending with the complete victory of the Unionists, has beenforgotten by or has never become known to the mass of the presentelectors. It is well that they should be reminded of the solid groundsfor the rejection by the Lords of the Home Rule Bill of 1893. It is wellthat they should be reminded that this rejection was in 1895 ratified bythe approval of the electorate of the United Kingdom _A Leap in theDark_ will assuredly remind my readers that in 1893 the hereditary Houseof Lords, and not the newly elected House of Commons, truly representedthe will of the nation. This is a fact never to be forgotten. It is ofspecial import at the present moment. Another equally undoubted factdeserves attention. Home Rulers themselves despair of carrying a HomeRule Bill until they shall have turned the Parliament Bill into theParliament Act, 1911, and my readers ought never to forget that thepassing of the Parliament Bill into law destroys, and is meant todestroy, every security against the passing of any Home Rule Billwhatever which the present majority of the House of Commons choose tosupport. This gives an ominous significance to the obstinate refusal ofthe Government to alter or amend any of the material enactmentscontained in this ill-starred measure. _A Leap in the Dark_, combinedwith a knowledge of the Parliament Bill and the legislative dictatorshipwith which it invests the existing Coalition, suggests at least fourconclusions which must at all costs be forced at this moment upon theattention of the nation. They may be thus summed up: _First_. --If the Parliament Bill passes into law the existing majority of the House of Commons will be able to force, and will assuredly in fact force, through Parliament any Home Rule Bill whatever (even were it the Home Rule Bill of 1893), which meets with the approval of Mr. Redmond, and obtains the acquiescence of the rest of the Coalition. The Coalition need not fear any veto of the House of Lords. There will be no necessity for an appeal to the electors, or in other words to the nation. The truth of this statement is indisputable. The legal right of the majority of the House of Commons to pass any bill whatever into law, even though the House of Lords refuse its assent, is absolutely secured by the very terms of the Parliament Bill. That the leaders of the Coalition, such as Mr. Asquith, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. John Redmond, will press their legal right to its extreme limits is proved to any man who knows how to read the teaching of history, by the experience of 1893. Mr. Gladstone used every power he possessed, and used it unscrupulously, to drive a Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons. He was a man trained in the historical traditions of Parliament. He assuredly did not relish the use of the closure and the guillotine. He was supported in the Commons by a very narrow majority, never I think exceeding forty-eight, and often falling below that number. The power of the party system, or as Americans say, the "Machine, " was admittedly much less in 1893 than it has become in 1911. Yet Mr. Gladstone used such power as he possessed to the utmost. He hurried through the House of Commons a Bill which had not in fact received the assent of the nation. He made the freest use of every device for curtailing freedom of debate. A large and most important portion of the Home Rule Bill was not discussed at all in the Commons. And this Bill contained provisions, not appearing in its original form, for the retention of eighty Irish members at Westminster with full authority to take part in every kind of legislation which might be laid before Parliament; though Mr. Gladstone himself held the fairness to England of this provision dubious[2] and Mr. (now Lord) Morley had in 1886 demonstrated by reasoning which to my mind is absolutely conclusive that under a system of Home Rule the presence of Irish representatives in the Imperial Parliament at Westminster would work fatal injury to Ireland and gross injustice to England. [3] Can any man able to draw from political precedents their true meaning believe that Mr. Asquith, and the allies who are his masters, will be more scrupulous in forcing the next Home Rule Bill through the House of Lords than was Mr. Gladstone in forcing the Home Rule Bill of 1893 through the House of Commons? Mr. Asquith is supported by a large though incongruous majority. His almost avowed aim in pushing the Parliament Bill, unchanged and unchangeable, through the Houses of Parliament is to force the Home Rule Bill on the people of Great Britain against their will. Hesitation to make use of this dictatorial authority, should he ever obtain it, will to himself mean political ruin; to his English supporters it will seem political pusillanimity; by his Irish confederates it will be denounced as breach of faith and treachery. As certainly as night follows day the passing of the Parliament Act will be succeeded by the attempted passing of a Home Rule Act. _Secondly_. --Mr. Redmond and the Home Rulers, or Separatists, of whom he is the leader, will exact under any Home Rule Bill of say 1912 or 1913, at lowest, every advantage which was demanded by Irish Nationalists in 1893. Why, in the name of common sense, when Irish Nationalists are absolute masters of the situation, should they demand lower payment for their support than was offered to them twenty years ago when the Home Rule majority was every day losing strength, when every one knew that nothing but the show of moderation gave the slightest chance of a Home Rule Bill escaping the veto of the House of Lords, when every one, except perhaps Mr. Gladstone, foresaw that the next General Election would give to Unionists a crushing majority? Every advantage conceded in 1893 to Irish Separatists at the expense of England will assuredly reappear in one form or another in the next Home Rule Bill. Thus Ireland will, we may anticipate, under the next Home Rule Bill send to the Parliament at Westminster at least eighty members armed with the fullest legislative authority, so that, to revive the language current eighteen years ago, Ireland will govern and tax England whilst England will retain no right either to govern or to tax Ireland. _Thirdly_. --Every question to which in 1893 Gladstonians could discover no answer satisfactory to Unionists or to the electorate of Great Britain requires an answer in 1911 as much as in 1893. The answer favourable to Home Rule has not as yet been discovered. Is it possible to combine the effective supremacy of the Imperial Parliament with Home Rule or the substantial legislative independence of Ireland? Can Ireland, close to the shore of Great Britain, occupy the position of a self-governing colony, such as New Zealand, divided from Great Britain by thousands of miles of sea? Is it possible to create, or even to imagine, a Court which shall decide whether a law passed by the Irish Parliament violates the provisions of the proposed Home Rule Act? Above all, can the wit of man devise any scheme of constitution which shall at once satisfy the aspirations of Irish Nationalism and the patently just demand of Ulster that Protestants shall retain the freedom and the rights secured to them as citizens of the United Kingdom? Is there any form of Home Rule which will satisfy the desire of Irish Nationalists for something approaching national independence without the urgent peril of rousing civil war between Ulster and the Parliament at Dublin? All these inquiries, and others like them, harassed the Parliament of 1893; they were all answered by Unionists, that is by the majority of the British electors, with a decided negative; they will all be raised and will all need an answer when the leaders of the Coalition condescend to produce their next Home Rule Bill or even to reveal its fundamental principles. _Fourthly_. --England in the circumstances of to-day is threatened with two perils which did not exist in 1893, and yet are of stupendous gravity. The first is, that in the case of a measure of Home Rule the opportunities for discussing its provisions which are contained in the Parliament Bill may turn out nominal rather than real. It is not at all certain that for such a Bill, even though it be abhorred by the electorate of the United Kingdom, the House of Lords will be practically able to secure the delay and elaborate discussion to which Mr. Asquith professedly attaches immense importance. Unionists will believe that the measure passed by a large majority of the House of Commons is detested by the majority of the British electors. But how will it be possible to carry on the government of Ireland, to maintain order, or to save a loyal minority from gross oppression after a Home Rule Bill applauded by Separatists has been passed through the House of Commons, and for the first time has been rejected by the House of Lords? Every official in Ireland, down from the Lord Lieutenant to the last newly appointed member of the Irish Constabulary, every Irishman loyal or disloyal, will know that the Bill will within a year or two become law and that Irish Nationalists will control the Parliament and the government of Ireland. Will not the House of Lords be urged by every alleged consideration of good sense and humanity to close without delay a period of uncertainty which is threatening to turn into a reign of anarchy or of terror? The question supplies its own answer. The second peril is one whereof nobody speaks, but which must occur to any man who has studied the history of the past eighteen years or reflects upon the condition of public opinion. The peril, to put the matter plainly, is that Home Rulers will not stop at attaining Home Rule for Ireland, and that they may, and probably will, attempt to undermine the political predominance of England. Everything points in this direction. The agitation for Home Rule has fostered in Ireland, and to a very limited extent in certain other parts of the United Kingdom, a feeling approaching to jealousy of English power. England or Great Britain is the predominant partner. England is wealthy, England is prosperous. England, as the language of common life imports, is the leading member of the United Kingdom. Lord Rosebery announced with wise foresight that Home Rule in Ireland could hardly be established with benefit to the United Kingdom until the assent thereto of the predominant partner had been obtained by force of argument. The idea was grounded on common sense. Will it not suggest to Irish Nationalists that their moment of authority must be used for obtaining far greater privileges for Ireland than the extravagant political power offered by Gladstonians in 1893? Is it not natural for Home Rulers to think that the predominant partner ought to be deprived of his predominance? The conduct of the Coalition and some of its leaders points in this direction. They will have obtained through the Parliament Act temporary, but strictly unlimited and dictatorial, power. They will have obtained it by intrigue; they have rejected and treated with scorn the idea of an appeal to the people. They have claimed, not for Parliament but for the existing House of Commons, an absolute legislative power superior to that of the nation, a power which I assert with confidence is not possessed by the elected Assemblies of the United States, or of the French Republic, or of the Swiss Confederation: And by a strange combination of circumstances one method for depriving the predominant partner of legitimate authority may seem to a Home Ruler to lie near at hand. Raise the cry of 'Home Rule all round, ' or of 'Federalise the British Empire. ' Turn England into one State of a great federation, let Wales be another, Scotland a third, the Channel Islands a fourth, and for aught I know the Isle of Man a fifth. Let the self-governing Colonies, and British India, send deputies to the Imperial or Federal Parliament. You may thus for a moment, under the pretence of uniting the Empire, not only divide the United Kingdom, but deprive England or Great Britain, in form at least, of that political supremacy and predominance which is the real bond of union and peace not only throughout the United Kingdom, but also throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire. I do not tremble for the power--the lawful and legitimate power--of England. Political devices, however crafty, break down whenever they are opposed to the nature of things. I know that unity is increasing throughout the Empire not through the cunning or the statecraft of politicians, but through the whole course of events. One part of our Imperial system becomes daily under the effect of railways, steamers, telegraphs, and the like, nearer and nearer to every other part. The sentiment of unity which is more valuable than any law aiming at formal federation each year gains strength. What I do fear and insist upon is the danger that a legislative dictatorship conferred on a party, and therefore necessarily taken away from the nation, should be employed in the attempt, vain though it ultimately must be, to deprive the predominant partner of a predominance requisite for the maintenance both of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire. The four reflections at any rate which may be suggested by _A Leap inthe Dark_ are well worth the consideration of the loyal citizens of theUnited Kingdom. A. V. DICEY. FOOTNOTES: [1] Its technical title as given in the Bill is the Irish GovernmentAct, 1893. [2] See _Annual Register_, 1893 (New Series), p. 180. [3] See especially pp. 39, 40, 41-43 _post. _ A LEAP IN THE DARK[4] FOOTNOTES: [4] My readers are earnestly recommended to study Mr. Cambray's _IrishAffairs and the Home Rule Question_. It brings the history of the HomeRule movement well up to date, and strengthens almost every argumentagainst Home Rule to be found in _A Leap in the Dark. _ The notes insquare brackets are new. CHAPTER I OLD AND NEW CONSTITUTION The Home Rule Bill[5] contains a New Constitution for the whole UnitedKingdom. [6] The Bill bears on its face that its object is 'to amend the provisionfor the Government of Ireland'; it is entitled 'The Irish GovernmentAct, 1893'; it is in popular language known as the Home Rule Bill. Butall these descriptions are misleading. It is in truth a measure whichaffects the government alike of England, of Scotland, and of Ireland. It changes, to some extent the form, but to a far greater extent theworking, and the spirit of all our institutions. It is a bold attempt toform a new constitution for the whole United Kingdom; it subverts thevery bases of the existing constitution of England. The present constitution of the United Kingdom is marked and has longbeen marked by two essential characteristics, the one positive and theother negative. The positive characteristic is the absolute and effective authority ofthe Imperial Parliament throughout the length and breadth of the UnitedKingdom. To this characteristic Englishmen are so accustomed that they hardlyrecognise its full importance. A government may make its power felt inthree different ways--by the action of the Executive, including underthat head all the agents of the Executive, such as the judiciary and thearmed forces--by legislation--and by the levying of taxes. Take any ofthese tests of authority, and it will be found that the BritishParliament is not only theoretically, but actually and effectively, supreme throughout the whole of Great Britain and Ireland. The Cabinetis virtually appointed by the Houses of Parliament; the army, thejudges, the magistracy, all officials who throughout the countryexercise executive power in any form whatever are directly or indirectlyappointed by Parliament, and hold office subject to the will ofParliament Of the legislative authority of Parliament as regards theUnited Kingdom it is scarcely necessary to speak. Any law affecting theUnited Kingdom not only lawfully may, but can in fact, be changed by theImperial Parliament. Of the unlimited legislative authority ascribed to, and exercised by, Parliament in the United Kingdom the Home Rule Billitself is sufficient evidence; and the Gladstonian Ministry, at anyrate, see no reason why Parliament should not within the course of a fewweeks remodel the fundamental laws of the realm. The right to imposetaxes is historically the source of Parliamentary power, and in allmatters of taxation Parliament has absolute freedom of action from oneend of the United Kingdom to the other; whether the income tax is to belowered, raised, or abolished, whether some new duty, such as the cartand wheel tax, shall be imposed, whether the United Kingdom shallmaintain free trade, or return to protection, how taxes shall be raisedand how they shall be spent--all matters in short connected with revenueare throughout the United Kingdom determined and determinable in thelast resort by Parliament alone. Hence, as things now stand, no kind of governmental action in any partof Great Britain and Ireland escapes Parliamentary supervision. Thecondition of the army, the management of the police, the misconduct ofa judge, the release of a criminal, the omission to arrest a defaultingbankrupt, the pardon of a convicted dynamiter, the execution of amurderer, the interference of the police with a public meeting, or theneglect of the police to check a riot in London, in Skye, or inTipperary, any matter, great or small, with which the executive isdirectly or indirectly concerned, is, if it takes place in any part ofthe United Kingdom, subject to stringent and incessant Parliamentarysupervision, and may, at any moment, give rise to debates on whichdepend the fate of ministries and parties. If there be such a thing assupreme actual and effective authority, such authority is throughout thewhole of the United Kingdom exercised by the Imperial Parliament, notoccasionally and in theory, but every day and in the ordinary course ofaffairs. This exertion of actual and effective power by the Imperial Parliamentthroughout the United Kingdom is a totally different thing from thesupremacy or sovereignty exercised by Parliament throughout the wholeBritish Empire. As a matter of legal theory Parliament has the right tolegislate for any part of the Crown's dominions. Parliament may lawfullyimpose an income tax upon the inhabitants of New South Wales; it maylawfully abolish the constitution of the Canadian Dominion, just as someyears ago it did actually abolish the ancient constitution of Jamaica. But though Parliament does in fact exert a certain, or rather a veryuncertain, amount of power throughout the whole Empire, we all know thatthe Imperial Parliament neither exercises, nor claims to exercise, in aself-governing colony such as New Zealand, [7] that kind of effectiveauthority which Parliament exercises in the United Kingdom. The Cabinetof New Zealand is not appointed at Westminster; the action of a NewZealand Ministry as regards the affairs of New Zealand is not controlledby the English Government. Not a pennyworth of taxation is imposed onthe inhabitants of New Zealand, or of any colony whatever, by theImperial Parliament. Even the imposition of customs, though it has animportant bearing on the interest of the Empire, is in a self-governingcolony determined by the colonial, and not by the British, Parliament. It is the Parliament of New Zealand, and not the Parliament of England, which governs New Zealand. The Imperial Parliament, though for Imperialpurposes it may retain an indefinite supremacy throughout the BritishEmpire, has, as regards self-governing colonies, renounced, for allother than Imperial purposes, executive and legislative functions. Tolabour this point may savour of pedantry. But the distinction insistedupon, whilst often overlooked, is of extreme importance. We risk beingdeceived by words. The Imperial Parliament is supreme in the UnitedKingdom, it is also supreme in New Zealand. But the supremacy of theImperial Parliament is a misleading expression; it means one thing inthe United Kingdom, and another thing in New Zealand or in Canada. Inthe United Kingdom it means the exercise of real, actual, effective andabsolute authority. In New Zealand it means little more than the claimto regulate matters of a distinctly and exclusively Imperial character. The distinction is vital. The essential feature of the Englishconstitution is the actual and direct government of the whole UnitedKingdom by the Parliament at Westminster. No change could be morefundamental than a change which, in England, Scotland, or Ireland, reduced this actual authority to the ultimate or reserved sovereigntyexercised, or rather claimed, by Parliament in Canada or in New Zealand. The negative characteristic of the English constitution is the absenceof federalism or of the federal spirit. The spirit of institutions is as important as their form, and the spiritof English Parliamentary government has always been a spirit of unity. The fundamental conditions of federal government are well known. Theyare first the existence of States such as the Cantons of Switzerland orthe States of Germany, which are capable of bearing in the eyes of theirinhabitants an impress of common nationality, and next the existenceamong the inhabitants of the federalised country of a very peculiarsentiment, which may be described as the desire for political unionwithout the desire for political unity. [8] This condition of opinionleads to a division of powers between the federal or national governmentand the States. Whatever concerns the nation as a whole is placed underthe control of the federal power. All matters which are not primarily of common interest remain in thehands of the States. Now each of these conditions upon which federalismrests has, as a matter of history, been absolutely unknown to the peopleof England. In uniting other countries to England they haveinstinctively aimed at an incorporative not at a federal union. Thisabsence of the federal spirit is seen in two matters which may appear ofsubordinate, but are in reality of primary, consequence. Every member ofParliament has always stood on a perfect equality with his fellows; therepresentatives of a county or of a borough, English members, Scottishmembers, Irish members, have hitherto possessed precisely equal rights, and have been subject to precisely the same duties. They have been sentto Parliament by different places, but, when in Parliament, they havenot been the delegates of special localities; they have not been Englishmembers, or Scottish members, or Irish members, they have been simplymembers of Parliament; their acknowledged duty has been to consult forthe interest of the whole nation; it has not been their duty tosafeguard the interests of particular localities or countries. Henceuntil quite recent years English parties have not been formed accordingto sectional divisions. There has never been such a thing as an Englishparty or a Scottish party. Up to 1832 the Scottish members were almostwithout exception Tories; since 1832 they have been for the most partLiberals or Radicals; they have kept a sharp eye upon Scottish affairs, but they have never formed a Scottish party. The same thing has, to agreat extent, held good of the Irish members. The notion of an Irishparty is a novelty, and in so far as it has existed is foreign to thespirit of our institutions. Hence further, the Cabinet has been neitherin form nor in spirit a federal executive. No Premier has attempted toconstitute a Ministry in which a given proportion of Irishmen orScotchmen should balance a certain proportion of Englishmen. Englishpoliticians have as yet hardly formed the conception of an Englishparty. Not a single Prime Minister has claimed the confidence of thecountry on the ground that his colleagues were, or were not, English, Scottish, or Irish. That a Premier should glory in his pure Scottishdescent is an innovation; it is an innovation ominous of revolution; itbetrays a spirit of disintegration. If at the moment it flattersScottish pride, Scotchmen and Irishmen would do well to recollect thatit is a certain presage of a time when some Englishman will rise topower and obtain popular support on the ground of his staunch Englishsympathies and of his unadulterated English blood. Now place the new constitution side by side with the old. Assume, as Ido assume throughout this chapter, that our new Gladstonian policy worksin accordance with the intentions of its authors. The new constitution abolishes in Ireland the actual and effectivecontrol and authority of the Imperial Parliament. The government of Ireland is under the Home Rule Bill[9] placed in thehands of an executive authority, or, in plain terms, a Cabinet, undoubtedly to be appointed by the Irish Legislature, in the same sense inwhich an English Cabinet is appointed by the British Parliament, or aNew Zealand Cabinet is appointed by the Parliament of New Zealand. [10]For the first time in the whole course of history the administration ofIrish affairs is placed in the hands of an Irish Ministry, in theselection of which the Imperial Parliament has no hand or concernwhatever. Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Healy, Mr. Redmond, Mr. Davitt, any leader, known or unknown, loyal or disloyal, who commands the confidence of theIrish Legislature, or, as I will venture to term it, the IrishParliament, [11] will naturally become the Premier of Ireland, and, together with his colleagues, will possess all the authority whichbelongs to a Parliamentary Executive. On the action of this IrishCabinet the Bill places, with rare exceptions, either no restrictions atall or restrictions which are only transitory. [12] Speaking generally, we may lay down that, except as to the control of the army, if that bean exception, the Irish Cabinet will, when the constitution gets intofull working order, occupy in Ireland the position now occupied by theBritish Cabinet in regard to the whole United Kingdom. The appointmentof officials, the conduct of Irish affairs, all the ordinary functionsof government will, with certain exceptions meant for the most part toprotect the rights of the Imperial Parliament, be exercised by IrishMinisters responsible to the Irish Parliament; and the British orImperial Parliament will, in the ordinary course of things, have no moreto do with the administration of affairs in Ireland than it has to dowith the administration of affairs in New Zealand. The Irish, not theBritish, Cabinet will decide what are the steps to be taken for theprotection throughout Ireland of the rights of property or of personalliberty; the Irish and not the English Cabinet will determine by whatmeans the payment of rent is to be enforced; the Irish and not theEnglish Cabinet will decide what persons are to be prosecuted for crime;the Irish and not the English Cabinet will determine whether the meansfor enforcing the punishment of crime are adequate, and whetherIreland, or some part of Ireland, say Belfast, requires to be governedby means of a Coercion Act; the Irish and not the English Cabinet willdecide with what severity wrong-doers are to be punished, and whether, and under what circumstances, convicted criminals deserve either pardonor mitigation of punishment. It is patent that under the new constitution the Irish Parliament and, under ordinary circumstances, the Irish Parliament alone will legislatefor Ireland. For the Irish Parliament can, subject to certainRestrictions, [13] pass any law whatever 'for the peace, order and goodgovernment of Ireland, in respect of matters exclusively relating toIreland or some part thereof'[14]; and, subject to the sameRestrictions, may repeal any law which, before the Home Rule Billbecomes law, is in force in Ireland. Under the new constitution theIrish Parliament and not the Imperial Parliament will, it is clear, as arule legislate for Ireland. Under the new constitution the IrishParliament may enact a Coercion Act, applying say to Ulster, or mayrepeal the existing Crimes Act. It may abolish trial by jury[15]altogether, put any restraints it sees fit on the liberty of the press, or introduce a system of administrative law like that which exists inFrance, but is totally foreign to English notions of jurisprudence. Under the new constitution, again, the financial relations of GreatBritain and Ireland are made the subject of an elaborate arrangementwhich may fairly be called a contract[16]. Ireland takes over certaincharges[17], and speaking very generally, whilst all the duties ofcustoms levied in Ireland are collected by and paid over to theExchequer of the United Kingdom, as Ireland's contribution to Imperialexpenditure, all the other taxes are, as a general rule, paid over tothe Irish Exchequer. The justice or the policy of these financialarrangements is for my present purpose immaterial. All that need beobserved is that the ordinary taxation of Ireland passes from the handsof the Imperial Parliament into the hands of the Irish Parliament, andthat under the new constitution this arrangement is a settlement whichthe Imperial Parliament is morally bound to respect for a period of atleast fifteen years[18]. In Ireland therefore the new constitution abolishes the effectiveexercise of authority by the Imperial Parliament in matters ofadministration, in matters of legislation, in matters of finance; everyconcern which affects the daily life of Irishmen will be under thecontrol of the Irish Cabinet and the Irish Parliament. The relation ofthe Imperial Parliament towards Ireland will not be the relation whichit now occupies towards the whole United Kingdom, and which under thenew constitution it will still occupy towards Great Britain. TheImperial Parliament, it is true, retains considerable reserved powers;what are the effect and nature of these powers shall be considered inits due place. The matter upon which I now insist is simply this: thenew constitution does in any case transfer the effective government ofIreland from the Imperial Parliament to the Irish Parliament. Theauthority reserved to the Imperial Parliament may be termed supremacy, or sovereignty, or may be described by any other fine-sounding namewhich we are pleased to use, but the fact remains unaltered that, aslong as the new constitution stands and works, the Imperial Parliamentwill not govern Ireland in the sense in which it governs England andScotland, and that such authority as it exerts in Ireland will beanalogous not to the power which it now exercises there, but to theinfluence which it possesses in Canada or in New Zealand. [19] The new constitution is at bottom a federalist or semi-federalistconstitution; it introduces into English institutions many of the formsof federalism and still more of its spirit. The Parliament sitting at Westminster becomes for the first time aFederal Congress. Of its members, 567 will represent Great Britain; 80 will representIreland. The exact numbers are for the present purpose insignificant. The serious matter is that the Imperial Parliament undergoes anessential change of character. The British members will have, or areintended to have, no concern with the government of Ireland. The Irishmembers ought to have nothing to do with the government of GreatBritain. On Imperial subjects the Imperial Parliament, or, to call it byits proper name, the Federal Congress, votes as a whole; on Irishsubjects it does not vote at all; on British topics its British membersonly vote. The British and the Irish members, in short, alike represent, though in a very clumsy fashion, the States of a Confederacy. Though thefact be artfully concealed, we have under the new constitution already, in germ at least, a British State and an Irish State, a BritishParliament and an Irish Parliament, and a third body consisting of thesetwo Parliaments, which is the Imperial or Federal Parliament. [20] The different features of federalism make their appearance though understrange forms. The constitution imposes Restrictions on the powers of the StateGovernments and of the Federal Government. This appears unmistakably in the limitations placed upon the authorityof the Irish Parliament. These Restrictions, be they wise or unwise, politic or impolitic, areperfectly in keeping with the constitutional arrangements of a FederalGovernment, but are absolutely unknown to the theory and practice ofEnglish parliamentary government. The powers of the Imperial Parliament, it may be said, are under the newconstitution subject to no limitations. In words this assertion is true, in substance it is false. If the constitution works properly theImperial Parliament will clearly be subject to the terms of theGovernment of Ireland Act, 1893, or, in other words, of the FederalConstitution. This subjection is not absolute; it is moral, not legal, still it exists. A breach of the federal compact will be no lightmatter. The constitution again, as one would expect under a federal scheme, provides for the enforcement of the compact. In the case of Ireland this is manifest. The royal veto, [21] the powerof the Courts, and ultimately of the Privy Council, to pronounce on theconstitutionality of any Irish Act, and treat it as void if it is inexcess of the authority bestowed upon the Irish legislature, theprovisions for the legal determination of constitutional questions, [22]the arrangements as to the payment of the Irish customs into theImperial Exchequer, the special and very anomalous position of theExchequer Judges, are all attempts, whatever be their worth, to restrainthe Irish legislature and government, or in effect the Irish people, from the undue assertion of State rights. Restraints again are placed on the unconstitutional action of theImperial or Federal Parliament. They are less obvious, but at least asreal and effectual as the safeguards against the breach of theconstitution by the Irish government or legislature. They are all summedup in the presence of the Irish representatives at Westminster. The onlylegitimate reason, if legitimate reason there be, for their presence isthe guardianship of Irish rights under the constitution. It is for themto see that these rights are held sacred. No diminution thereof can takeplace without either the assent of the Irish members or else theexistence of such a majority in the Parliament at Westminster as mayoverride the protests of Ireland. [23] No doubt this is not an absolutesecurity. But whoever considers the habits of English political lifewill conclude that, except in the event of the Imperial Parliament beingresolved to suspend or destroy the constitution, there exists thehighest improbability that any inroad should be made upon the privilegesconferred under the new constitution upon Ireland. The security, thoughnot absolute, is a good deal better than any safeguard given by the Billthat the State rights of Great Britain shall be duly respected by therepresentatives from Ireland. Assume, however, that the constitutionworks properly, and that all parties respect the spirit of itsprovisions. The result is that the new constitution forms a fundamentallaw, fixing the respective rights of Ireland, of Great Britain, of theIrish Parliament, and of the Imperial Parliament. [24] The federal arrangements which, utterly unknown as they are to ourinstitutions, form the foundation of the new constitution, are asnothing compared with the recognition and fostering of the federalspirit. Great Britain and Ireland constitute for the first time in history aconfederation. The difference or opposition of their interests receiveslegislative acknowledgment: each country is to possess in reality, though not in name, State rights; each must rely upon the constitutionfor the protection of these rights; each may suffer from theencroachments of the Imperial or central power. Ireland may complainthat the Imperial Parliament by legislation, or the Privy Council byjudicial interpretation, encroaches on her guaranteed rights. GreatBritain may complain either that Irish members intermeddle in Britishaffairs, and thus British rights are violated, or that the Privy Councilso interprets the constitution that the prerogatives of the CentralGovernment (which be it remembered must in practice be identified withthe power of England) are unduly diminished. To imagine such complaintsis not to assume that the constitution works badly. They are ofnecessity inherent in the federal system. There exists no federalgovernment throughout the world where such complaints do not arise, andwhere they do not at times give rise to heart-burnings. It is wellindeed, judging from the lessons of history, if they do not producebitter conflicts, or even civil war. Let us take, however, the mostsanguine view possible. Let us grant that both in England and in Irelandevery minister, every legislator, every judge, is inspired with a spiritof perfect disinterestedness and absolute fairness. This concession, immense though it be, does not exclude vital differences of opinion. Inour new confederacy, as in every other, there will arise the contestbetween State rights and federal rights, between the authority of theCentral Government and of the State Government. In any case, a wholeclass of new difficulties and questions of a totally new descriptionwill make their appearance in the field of English politics, and callfor the exercise on the part both of English and of Irish statesmen ofextraordinary wisdom and extraordinary self-control. The newconstitution in short, in virtue of its federal tendencies, willrevolutionise the public life of the United Kingdom. From whatever side the matter be considered we arrive at the sameresult. The Home Rule Bill is a new constitution; it subverts the basesof the English constitution as we now know it, for it destroysthroughout Ireland the effective authority of the Imperial Parliament, and turns the United Kingdom into a federal government of a new anduntried form. The change may be necessary or needless, wise or unwise. The first andmost pressing necessity of the moment is that every elector throughoutthe United Kingdom should, realise the immense import of the innovation. It is a revolution far more searching than would be the abolition of theHouse of Lords or the transformation of our constitutional monarchy intoa presidential republic. The next point to which the attention of every man throughout the landshould be directed is, that the new constitution offered to us foracceptance is unknown to any other civilised country. Parts of it areborrowed from the United States; some of its provisions are importedfrom the British colonies, whilst others are apparently the inventionsof the unknown and irresponsible Abbé Siéyès, who is the ingeniousconstitution-maker of the Cabinet. But the new polity as a wholeresembles in its essence neither the American Commonwealth nor theCanadian Dominion, nor the Government either of New Zealand or of anyother self-governing colony. It is an attempt--its admirers may think anoriginal and ingenious attempt--to combine the sovereignty of anImperial Parliament with the elaborate limitation and distribution ofpowers which distinguish federal government. The whole thing is anexperiment and an experiment without precedent. Its novelty is not itsnecessary condemnation, but neither on the other hand is innovation ofnecessity the same thing as reform. The institutions of an ancient realmare not exactly the _corpus vile_ on which theorists hard pressed by thepractical difficulties of the political situation can be allowed to tryunlimited experiments. We are bound to scrutinise with care everyprovision of this brand-new polity. We are bound to consider what willbe their effect according to the known laws of human nature and underthe actual circumstances of the time. It is vain to tell us that many ofour institutions remain untouched. The introduction of new elements intoan old political system may revolutionise the whole; the addition of newcloth to an old garment may, we all know, rend the whole asunder. Thereis no need for panic; there is the utmost need for prudence. FOOTNOTES: [5] References made in this treatise to the Home Rule Bill are, unlessotherwise stated, made to the Bill as ordered to be printed by the Houseof Commons, February 17, 1893. _A Leap in the Dark_ was published monthsbefore the Bill was sent up as amended to the House of Lords. [6] This is true of both of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bills, and mustnecessarily be true of any Bill which satisfies even for a time thewishes of Home Rulers. [7] I have substituted New Zealand for Victoria as the example of atypical self-governing colony; the position of Victoria has since 1900been complicated by the country having become a State of the AustralianCommonwealth or Confederation. [8] See Dicey, _Law of Constitution_ (7th ed. ), ch. Iii. Pp. 136-140. Compare Mill, _Rep. Government_, ch. Xvii. [9] For the sake of convenience I throughout this treatise refer to the'Bill to amend the provision for the government of Ireland' under itspopular name of the Home Rule Bill, 1893, or simply the Bill. See theBill in Appendix. [10] Bill, clause 5. [11] (The constitutional history of Victoria affords a curiousillustration of what will certainly happen in Ireland. ) In Victoria theLegislature, though not termed a Parliament in the Constitution Act, 18& 19 Vict, c. 54, has assumed, under a Victorian Act, the title of theParliament of Victoria. See Jenks, _Government of Victoria_, p. 236. Whocan doubt that the Irish Legislature will, by an Irish Act, give itselfthe title of the Parliament of Ireland? I have therefore throughoutthese pages called the Irish Legislature the Irish Parliament. Fewthings are more absurd and more noteworthy than the deliberate refusalof English Gladstonians to call the Irish Parliament by its right name. They are willing to create an Irish Parliament; they are not willing toadmit that they have created it. See debates of May 9, in _The Times_, May 10, 1893. [12] See Bill, clauses 19, 27, 28, 30. [13] Bill, clauses 3, 4. [14] Bill, clause 2. [15] This will perhaps be disputed. Trial by jury, it will be said, issaved by the expression 'due process of law, ' in clause 4, sub-clause(5). But this contention is, in my judgment, unfounded, and its validitymust in any case be held open to extreme doubt. [16] See Bill, clauses 10-19, and note especially clause 12, sub-clause(I). [17] _Ibid_, clauses 14-16. [18] _Ibid_, clause 12, sub-clause (3). [19] I am aware that to this statement moderate Gladstonians may takeexception. What may be the effect of the preamble which reserves thesupreme authority of Parliament or of Bill, clause 33, which recognisesthe right of the Imperial Parliament to legislate for Ireland will bemost conveniently considered in the next chapter. In this chapter, be itnoted, I am concerned only with the constitution as it is intended towork, and most Gladstonians will admit that as long as the Government ofIreland, including in that expression both the Cabinet and theParliament, keeps within the terms of the Act, it is not intended thatthe British Cabinet or Parliament shall, except in certain exceptedcases, intervene in Irish affairs. [20] All the provisions which under clause 9 of the Home Rule Bill, 1893, in its earliest form, were intended to restrain Irish Peers, ormembers representing Irish constituencies, from deliberating or votingon any Bill or motion the operation of which should be confined to GreatBritain, were swept away by the Gladstonian majority before the HomeRule Bill was sent up to the House of Lords. The unfairness of giving toIreland a Parliament intended to legislate on all, or nearly all, Irishaffairs, and at the same time retaining eighty Irish members atWestminster with full power to legislate on all English and Scottishaffairs, secured in 1895 the enthusiastic approval by the Britishelectorate of the rejection of the Home Rule Bill of 1893 by the Houseof Lords. [21] See Bill, clause 5 (1). [22] Bill, clauses 22, 23. [23] 'The Imperial Parliament was supreme, but he held the passing ofthe Home Rule Bill, reserving certain subjects to the ImperialParliament and committing others to the Parliament of Ireland, asamounting to a compact which would be observed by men of common sensethat there would be no capricious or vexatious interference by thisParliament with an action within the appointed sphere of the Parliamentof Ireland. If such interference were attempted, the presence in thisParliament of eighty Irish members--a number which had been found to besufficient to initiate an Irish constitution--would be found sufficientto protect an Irish constitution when it was given. '--Mr. Sexton, Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates, _ p. 318. [24] For evidence that the power of the Imperial Parliament is intendedunder the new constitution to be subjected to at any rate a moral limit, the reader should note particularly the terms of the Home Rule Bill, clause 12, sub-clause (3). CHAPTER II THE NEW CONSTITUTION A critic of the new constitution, intent on ascertaining how it affectsthe relation of Great Britain and Ireland, will do well to divert hisattention from the numerous details of the Home Rule Bill, important asmany of them are, [25] and fix his mind almost exclusively upon the fourleading features of the measure. These are:-- _First_. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. _Secondly_. The retention of the Irish members in the Parliament at Westminster. _Thirdly_. The powers of the Irish Government, in which term is here included both the Irish Executive and the Irish Parliament. _Fourthly_. The Restrictions (popularly known as the safeguards) and the obligations imposed upon the Irish Government. These features are primary and essential; everything else, howeverimportant in itself, is subsidiary and accidental. A. _The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament_[26] The Home Rule Bill asserts in its preamble the inexpediency of'impairing or restricting the supreme authority of Parliament'; and inclause 33, apparently[27] assumes the right of the Imperial Parliamentafter the passing of the Home Rule Bill to enact for Ireland laws whichcannot be repealed by the Irish Parliament. The new constitution therefore maintains the supremacy of the ImperialParliament. What, however, is the true meaning of this 'supreme authority, ''supremacy, ' or 'sovereignty, ' if you like, of the Imperial Parliament? The term, as already pointed out, [28] is distinctly ambiguous, andunless this ambiguity is cleared up, the effect of the Home Rule Bill, and the nature of our new constitution, will never be understood. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament may mean the right and power ofParliament to govern Ireland in the same sense in which it now governsEngland, that is, to exercise effective control over the wholeadministration of affairs in Ireland, and for this purpose, through theaction of the English Government, or, when necessary, by legislation, todirect, supervise and control the acts of every authority in Ireland, including the Irish Executive and the Irish Legislature. If this werethe meaning of the expression, the Imperial Parliament would, after thepassing of the Home Rule Bill, as before, be as truly supreme in Irelandas in England, in Scotland, in the Isle of Man, or in Jersey. The IrishExecutive and the Irish Parliament would, of course, be bodiespossessing large--and it might be very dangerous--delegated powers, butthey would stand in the same relation to the Imperial Parliament as doesthe London County Council, which also possesses large delegated powers, which administers the affairs of a population as large as that ofScotland and which, very possibly, may receive from Parliament as timegoes on larger and more extended authority than the Council nowpossesses. This is the sense which many Gladstonians, and someUnionists, attribute to the term 'supremacy of Parliament. ' It is notthe sense in which the expression 'supreme authority of Parliament' isused in the Home Rule Bill. The supremacy of Parliament may bear quite another sense; it may meanthat Parliament, whilst completely giving up the management of Irishaffairs (subject of course to the Restrictions contained in the HomeRule Bill) to the Irish Executive and the Irish Legislature, retains inIreland, as elsewhere throughout the Empire, reserved sovereignty, orthe theoretical right (which exceptionally though rarely may be put intopractice) of passing laws for Ireland and of course, among other laws, an Act modifying or repealing the terms of the Home Rule Bill itself. Ifthis is the meaning of the expression 'supreme authority of Parliament, 'the Imperial Parliament will, after the passing of the Home Rule Bill, stand in substance in the relation to Ireland which Parliament occupiestowards any important self-governing colony, such as is the CanadianDominion or New Zealand. The Irish Executive and the Irish Parliamentwill on this view constitute the real substantial government of Ireland, just as the Ministry and the Parliament of New Zealand constitute thereal and substantial government of New Zealand. No doubt the ImperialParliament will retain the theoretical right to legislate for Ireland, _e. G. _ to pass an Irish Coercion Act, just as Parliament retains thetheoretical right to legislate for New Zealand or Canada. So theImperial Parliament has the legal right to repeal or override any lawpassed by the New Zealand Parliament, to tax the inhabitants of NewZealand, or finally, by the repeal of the New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. C. 72, to abolish the constitution of New Zealandaltogether. But these things Parliament will not, and to speak trulycannot, do in New Zealand. The inhabitants of New Zealand possess asregards their internal affairs for practical purposes completeindependence. They are governed from Wellington, they are not governedfrom Westminster. If in short the supremacy of Parliament means underthe Home Rule Bill in Ireland what it means under 15 & 16 Vict. C. 72 inNew Zealand, the inhabitants of Ireland will, when the Home Rule Billpasses into law, be governed from Dublin, they will not be governed fromWestminster. Every Irish Home Ruler, be he Parnellite orAnti-Parnellite, [29] believes that the supremacy of Parliament isintended to mean in Ireland what it means in New Zealand, and the IrishHome Rulers are right. Any one will see that this is so who reflects onthe meaning of the policy of Home Rule, who studies the authoritativeutterances of Gladstonian leaders, such as Mr. Gladstone[30] himself, Mr. Asquith, [31] or Mr. Bryce. [32] Gladstonian statesmen wrap up theirmeaning in vague generalities; they insist, and in one sense with truth, that the sovereignty of Parliament is reserved. They do not wish toalarm their English followers. It is possible that they conceal evenfrom themselves how completely the Imperial Ministry and Parliamentsurrender the practical government of Ireland into the hands of theIrish Parliament and its leaders. But for all this, their own languageand the Bill itself prove that the supreme authority of Parliament isunder the new constitution to be taken in its limited, and what for thesake of distinction we may call its 'colonial' sense. This is proved, ifevidence were wanting, by the provision[33] that after fifteen years fromthe time when the Bill passes into law the financial relations betweenEngland and Ireland may be revised in pursuance of an Address to theCrown from the House of Commons or from the Irish legislative assembly. If the Imperial Parliament retains an effective or practically unlimitedsupremacy, the provision is futile and needless. What necessity is therefor enacting that a sovereign Parliament, which institutes, may alter ascheme of taxation? But the provision is intelligible enough on onesupposition, and on one supposition only. It is both intelligible and inplace if Parliament gives up the real right of governing Ireland andoccupies towards what is now a part of the United Kingdom the position, or something very like the position, which Parliament occupies towards aself-governing colony. It then embodies a compact between England andIreland, and institutes a regular method for revising their financialrelations. But this very compact proves that as regards Ireland theImperial Parliament, if it reserves to itself ultimate sovereignty, hasfor practical purposes surrendered the reality of control. There is no need to assert that this supremacy of the ImperialParliament means nothing. The assertion would not be true. Thereservation of sovereign authority means something, but it does not meanmuch. It does not mean the power or the right to govern Ireland; itmeans at most the legal and moral right to modify, or put an end to, thenew constitution if ever it works badly. The power, indeed, to abolish the constitution can neither be given nortaken away by Acts of Parliament, by the declarations of Englishstatesmen, or the concessions of Irish leaders, whether authorised ornot to pledge the Irish people. It is given to Great Britain, not byenactments, but by nature; it arises from the inherent capacity of astrong, a flourishing, a populous, and a wealthy country to control orcoerce a neighbouring island which is poor, divided, and weak. [34] Thisnatural supremacy will, if the interests of Great Britain require it, beenforced by armies, by ironclads, by blockades, by hostile tariffs, byall the means through which national predominance can make itself felt. All reference to superior power is, in controversies between citizens, hateful to every man endowed with a sense of humanity or of justice. Butin serious discussions facts must be faced, and if, for the sake ofargument, I contrast, much against my will, the power of Great Britainwith the weakness of Ireland, let it be remembered that the conceptionof a rivalry or conflict is forced upon Unionists by the mere proposalof Home Rule. As long as we remain a United Kingdom, there is no moreneed to think even of hypothetical or argumentative opposition betweenthe resources or interest of England and of Ireland than there is toconsider what in case of a contest may be the relative force of Londonand of the Orkneys. What, then, the new constitution secures is not the power, but the legalright to abolish the new constitution. It is a right to carry through afundamental change by lawful means. The Bill legalises revolution. Thisis well, for it is desirable that in a civilised State every change ofinstitutions should be effected by constitutional methods. But shouldthe circumstances ever arise under which Great Britain is resolved, inspite of the wishes of the Irish people or a large portion thereof, toabolish Home Rule and exercise the right of reserved sovereignty, thereis no reason to expect that Irishmen who oppose British policy willadmit that her use of sovereign power is morally justifiable. By force, or the threat of force, the controversy will, we must expect, in thelast instance, be decided. However this may be, we must now realise whatthe supremacy of Parliament, at any rate to the Irish leaders who acceptit, really means. It means nothing but the right of the ImperialParliament of its own authority to repeal the Home Rule Bill and destroythe new constitution. The right may be worth having. But it is not theright to govern Ireland or to control the Irish Government; it is not ameans of government at all: it is a method of constitutional revolution, or reaction. Some critic will object that this supremacy of Parliament means to hima good deal more than the mere right to abolish the constitution. So beit. Let the objector then tell us in precise language what it does mean. If his reply is that the term is ambiguous, that its meaning must beconstrued in accordance with events, and may, according tocircumstances, be restricted or extended, then he suggests thatParliamentary supremacy is not only an empty right, but an urgent peril. Nothing can be more dangerous than a compact between England and Irelandwhich the contracting parties construe from the very beginning indifferent senses. If by asserting the supreme authority of ParliamentEnglish statesmen mean that Parliament reserves the right to superviseand control the government of Ireland, whilst Irishmen understand thatParliament retains nothing more than such a kind of supremacy orsovereignty as it asserts, rather than exercises, in New Zealand, thenwe are entering into a doubtful contract which lays the sure basis of aquarrel. We are deliberately preparing the ground for disappointment, for imputations of bad faith, for recriminations, for bitter animosity, it may be for civil war. If there be, as is certainly the case, a fairdoubt as to what is meant by the supremacy of Parliament, let the doubtbe cleared up. This is required by the dictates both of expediency andof honour. Meanwhile we may assume that the supremacy of Parliament, orthe 'supreme authority of Parliament, ' means in substance the kind ofsovereignty which Parliament exercises, or claims to exercise, in everypart of the British Empire. For the maintenance of such supremacy, be it valuable or be itworthless, Great Britain pays a heavy price. For the sake of 'anoutward and visible sign of Imperial supremacy' we retain eighty Irishmembers in the Imperial Parliament. [35] B. _The Retention of the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament_ This is now[36] an essential, or at least a most important part of theministerial policy for Ireland, yet it is a proposal which even itsadvocates must find difficult of defence. In 1886 every Gladstonianleader told us that it was desirable, politic, and just to exclude Irishmembers from the Parliament at Westminster; this exclusion was pressedupon England (plausibly enough) as a main advantage to be derived fromthe concession of Home Rule to Ireland. In 1893 every Gladstonian leadertells us that it is desirable, politic, and just to retain the Irishmembers at Westminster, and their presence is, for some reason not easyto explain, treated as removing every objection to the concession ofHome Rule to Ireland. This astounding variation of opinion in thedoctors of the State savours of empiricism, not to say quackery. Asurgeon who tells a patient that he will not live unless his leg isamputated may be right, and may be worthy of trust; another surgeon whoasserts that amputation is unnecessary may be right, and worthy oftrust. But the surgeon who one moment insists that amputation isnecessary to the preservation of his patient's life, and the next momentthat it is unnecessary and may be fatal, is not the kind of adviser whoinspires confidence in his wisdom. Let the ingenuity of Gladstonians reconcile, as best it can, thedoctrine of 1886 with the doctrine of 1893. To a man of sense who weighsthe matter without reference to considerations of party, one thing willsoon become apparent: the retention at Westminster of eighty, or indeedof any Irish members at all, means under a scheme of Home Rule the ruinof Ireland and the weakness of England. As to Ireland. --The presence of Irish members at Westminster robsIreland of the one advantage which Home Rule might by any possibilityconfer upon that country. Any man in order to see that this is so has only to consider, first, what may under favourable circumstances be the benefit of Home Rule toIreland, and next what is the natural result of summoning Irish membersto the Parliament at Westminster. The best conceivable result of Home Rule is that it may detach Irishmenfrom interest in English politics, and induce the most respected andrespectable men in Ireland to take matters into their own hands andmanage for themselves all strictly Irish affairs. For the last twentyyears, at least, Ireland has been represented, or misrepresented, byeighty and more politicians, nominated in the main by Mr. Parnell. Noone supposes for a moment that the Nationalist leaders who appearedbefore and were condemned by the Special Commission are fair samples ofthe Irish people. They are, take them at their best, reckless agitators. They were chosen by their patron, Mr. Parnell, not on account of theirworth or talent, but because they were apt instruments for carrying outa policy of parliamentary intrigue, reinforced by a system of lawlessoppression. [37] These men are the product of a revolutionary era; theyno more represent the virtues and the genius of the Irish people thanthe demagogues or fanatics of the Jacobin Club represented the geniusand the virtues of the French nation. We all know that Ireland aboundsin citizens of a very different stamp. She has never lacked among hersons, and does not lack now, men of virtue, of vigour, and of genius. Throughout the length and breadth of the country you will find hundredsof men of merit--landlords whose lives have been honourable tothemselves, and a blessing to their tenants; merchants as honest andsuccessful as any in England or in Scotland; small landowners and tenantfarmers who have paid their rent and paid their way, who have cultivatedtheir land, who have never insulted or boycotted their neighbours, andhave never been driven by intimidation into meanness and fraud. Add tothese lawyers, thinkers, writers, and scholars, who rival or excel thebest representatives of their class in other parts of the UnitedKingdom. These good men and true are not peculiar to any one creed orparty; they are not confined to any one province, or to any one class;they are scattered through every part of the land; they are the truebackbone of Ireland; they have saved her from utter ruin; they may stillby their energy raise her to prosperity. But they have been thrust outof politics by the talkers, the adventurers, the conspirators. It ispossible that if Home Rule compels Irishmen to turn their whole mindsto Irish affairs, the so-called representatives who misrepresent theircountry may be dismissed from the world of politics, and the Parliamentat Dublin be filled with members who, whether they come from the Northor from the South, whether Unionists or Home Rulers, whether RomanCatholics or Protestants, whether landowners, tenant farmers, ministersof religion, merchants, or tradesmen, represent the real worth andstrength of the country. If this should happen, Home Rule would stillentail great evils on the whole United Kingdom. But even zealousUnionists might hope that for these evils Ireland at least will obtainsome compensation. This hope, if the Irish members are retained atWestminster, will never be fulfilled. For even the occasional presence[38]--which will in practice be thefrequent presence--of the Irish members at Westminster destroys everyhope that Ireland will be governed by her best citizens. The reasons whythis is so are various; some of them may be shortly stated. The system, in the first place, of double representation, under which members of theIrish Parliament must flit to and fro between Ireland and England, anddebate one day about Irish matters in Dublin, and the next aboutImperial, or in truth British, matters in England, makes it impossiblefor quiet hard-working Irishmen, who carry on the real business ofIreland, to take part in politics. The political centre of interest, inthe second place, will after, as before, the passing of the Home RuleBill, be placed in London and not in Dublin. The humdrum local businesswhich under a system of Home Rule ought to be discussed in the IrishParliament, may vitally concern the prosperity of every inhabitant ofIreland, but it will not in general lend itself to oratory, or arousepopular excitement. The questions, on the other hand, to be discussed inthe Imperial Parliament at Westminster, as, for example, whether Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salisbury shall be head of the British Cabinet, whether the royal veto on Irish legislation shall be exercised on theadvice of the English or of the Irish Ministry, are matters which do notin reality greatly affect the happiness of ordinary Irishmen. But theygive room for management, for diplomacy, for rhetoric, and are certainon occasions to arouse both the interest and the passions of the Irishpeople. We may take it for granted that the character of the Irishrepresentation at Westminster will govern the character of theParliament at Dublin. [39] Hence arises a third and fatal obstacle to theactive participation in Irish public life of Irishmen who are notprofessional politicians. The Home Rule Bill of 1893 professes torestrain on every side the action of the Irish government andParliament. These Restrictions are the comfort of English Gladstonians;they are thought to be safeguards, though in reality there is nothingwhich they make safe. But Restrictions which delight Gladstonians arehateful to Irish Home Rulers. Their watchword is, 'Ireland a nation. ' Tothis cry every Home Ruler will rally, and so too will, if once theUnion is broken up, many an ardent loyalist, converted by anger atEngland's treachery into an extreme Nationalist. Irishmen will wish foran Irish army; they will wish for a protective policy; they will desirethat Ireland shall play a part in foreign affairs, and will claim forher at least the independence of such a colony as New Zealand. To allthese wishes, and to many more, some of which under a system of HomeRule are quite reasonable, the terms of the Home Rule Bill are opposed. Home Rulers, and probably enough the whole Irish people, will insistthat the Bill, which will then have become an Act, must be modified. Howis the modification to be obtained? How is Home Rule to be made areality? By one method only: that is, by the freest use of those arts Ofintrigue and obstruction by which Home Rule will have been gained. Butfor the carrying out of such a policy the agitators and intriguers whofor the last twenty years have weakened and degraded the ImperialParliament are the proper agents. For this work they, and they alone, are fit. The quiet, industrious, stay-at-home merchants or lawyers, whomight be sent to Dublin for a month or two in the year to manage Irishbusiness on business-like principles, will not be sent to Westminster tohold the balance between English parties. They cannot leave theirevery-day work; were they willing to forsake their own business, theyare not the men to conduct with success the parliamentary game of brag, obstruction, and finesse. Keep, in short, the Irish members atWestminster, and you ensure the supremacy in Ireland of professionalpoliticians. By a curious fatality the Gladstonian policy which weakensEngland ruins Ireland. Let no one fancy that this is the delusion of anEnglish Unionist. Sir Gavan Duffy is an Irish Nationalist of a farhigher type than the men who have drawn money from the Clan-na-Gael. In'48 he was a rebel, but if he was disloyal to England, he was alwayscareful of the honour and character of Ireland. He, at least, perceivesthe danger to his country of retaining Irish members in a Parliamentwhere they had ceased to have any proper place. 'For my own part, ' hesays, 'I should not care if they did not attend [the ImperialParliament] for a generation, which will be needed for the manipulationof their own affairs. ' All this, I shall be told, is prophecy; Gladstonian hopes are asreasonable as Unionist fears. So be it. But in this matter mypredictions have a special claim on the attention of the Ministry, theycoincide with the forecast, or the foresight, of the present[40] ChiefSecretary for Ireland. 'Let us suppose that these Irish representatives for Imperial purposesare not chosen by the legislative body, but are chosen directly by Irishconstituencies. You have already, according to our plan, two sets ofconstituencies. You have the 103 constituencies that return the popularbranch of the legislative body, and you have those other constituenciesup to seventy-five which return the elective members of the other branchof the legislative body. You have, therefore, got already on our plantwo sets of constituencies. Now, if you are going to send members toWestminster for Imperial purposes to the number of forty-five or to thenumber of ninety-five, you must mark out a third set ofconstituencies--you must have a third set of elections. A system of thatkind does not strike me at least as being exactly the thing for acountry of which we are assured that before everything else its primewant is a profound respite from political turmoil. There are plenty ofother objections from the Irish point of view, which I am not now goingto dwell upon. Depend upon it that an Irish Legislature will not be upto the magnitude of the enormous business that is going to be cast uponit unless you leave all the brains that Irish public men have got to doIrish work in Ireland. Depend upon this, too, that if you have one setof Irish members in London it is a moral certainty that disturbingrivalries, disturbing intrigues would spring up, and that the naturaland wholesome play of forces and parties and leaders in the IrishAssembly would be complicated and confused and thrown out of gear by theseparate representatives of the country. All this is bad enough. '[41] These are the words of my friend Mr. Morley. [42] They were spoken atNewcastle on April 21, 1886. He was then, as now, responsible for thegovernment of Ireland. Nothing can add to their gravity; nothing can addto their force; they were true in 1886, they remain as true to-day asthey were seven years ago. [43] As to England. --The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is onthe face of it a gross and patent injustice to Great Britain. It isabsurd, it is monstrous, that while the Irish Parliament and the IrishParliament alone settle whether Mr. Healy, Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. Redmond, orMr. Davitt is to be head of the Irish government, and England, thoughvitally interested in the character of the Irish Executive, is not tosay a word in the matter, eighty Irishmen are to help in determining, and are often actually to determine, whether Lord Salisbury or Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Balfour or Mr. Chamberlain, is to be Prime Minister anddirect the policy of England. Here again 1 can rely on the invaluableaid of Mr. Morley. He has denounced the effect on England of retainingIrish members at Westminster with a strength of language and a weight ofauthority to which it is impossible for me to make any pretension. 'But there is a word to be said about the effect on our own Parliament, and I think the effect of such an arrangement--and I cannot helpthinking so till I hear of better arrangements--upon our own Parliamentwould be worse still. It is very easy to talk about reducing the numberof the Irish members; perhaps it would not be so easy to do. It is veryeasy to talk about letting them take part in some questions and not inothers, but it will be very difficult when you come to draw the line intheory between the questions in which they shall take a part and thosein which they shall not take a part. But I do not care what precautionsyou take; I do not care where you draw the line in theory; but you maydepend upon it--I predict--that there is no power on the earth that canprevent the Irish members in such circumstances from being in the futureParliament what they were in the past, and what to some extent they arein the present, the arbiters and the masters of English policy, ofEnglish legislative business, and of the rise and fall of BritishAdministrations. You will have weakened by the withdrawal of able menthe Legislature of Dublin, and you will have demoralized the Legislatureat Westminster. We know very well what that demoralisation means, for Ibeg you to mark attentively the use to which the Irish members wouldinevitably put their votes--inevitably and naturally. Those who makemost of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster are also thosewho make most of there being what they call a real and effective and afreely and constantly exercised veto at Westminster upon the doings atDublin. You see the position. A legislative body in Dublin passes aBill. The idea is that that Bill is to lie upon the table of the twoHouses of Parliament in London for forty days--forty days in thewilderness. What does that mean? It means this, that every question thathad been fought out in Ireland would be fought out over again by theIrish members in our Parliament. It means that the House of Lords herewould throw out pretty nearly every Bill that was passed at Dublin. Whatwould be the result of that? You would have the present block of ourbusiness. You would have all the present irritation and exasperation. English work would not be done; Irish feeling would not be conciliated, but would be exasperated. The whole efforts of the Irish members wouldbe devoted to throwing their weight--I do not blame them for this--firstto one party and then to another until they had compelled the removal ofthese provoking barriers, restrictions, and limitations which oughtnever to have been set up. I cannot think, for my part I cannot see, howan arrangement of that sort promises well either for the condition ofIreland or for our Parliament. If anybody, in my opinion, were to movean amendment to our Bill in the House of Commons in such a direction asthis, with all these consequences foreseen, I do not believe such anamendment would find twenty supporters. '[44] This was the opinion of Mr. John Morley in 1886. A word in it here orthere is inapplicable to the details of the present Bill; but inprinciple every syllable cited by me from his Newcastle address formspart of the Unionist argument against summoning as much as a singleIrish member to Westminster. His language is admirable, it cannot beimproved. All that any one who agrees with Mr. Morley can do in order toforce his argument home is to point out in a summary manner the ways inwhich the Irish delegation at Westminster will enfeeble the ImperialGovernment. _First_. The Irish members, or rather the Irish delegation, will have avoice and often a decisive voice in determining who are the men thatshall constitute the English Cabinet; on the Irish vote will dependwhether Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, or Socialists shalladminister the government of England. It is vain to tell us Irishmembers will be restrained, whether by law or custom, from voting onBritish affairs when they will vote on the most important of all Britishaffairs, the composition and the character of the body which is togovern England. That the Irish members will thus vote on a matter of special and vitalimportance to England is admitted. But things stand far worse than this. The vote of the Irish delegation will and must be swayed by an interestadverse to the welfare of Great Britain; for the interest of GreatBritain, or, to use ordinary language of England, is that the EnglishGovernment should be strong, and should represent the majority of theEnglish or British electors. The direct interest of the Irish delegationis that the English Government should be weak, and represent theminority of English electors. That this is so is obvious. The weaker theBritish Government, the greater the weight of the Irish representatives. But if the English Cabinet represents a minority of the British people, and are kept in office only by the votes of their Irish allies, then theinfluence of the Irish representatives and the weakness of the EnglishGovernment will have reached its extreme point. The effect therefore ofthe arrangement which brings Irish members to Westminster is to placethe administration of English affairs in the hands of the party, whichever it be, that does not represent the wishes of the Englishpeople. This master stroke of Gladstonian astuteness ensures thatRadicals shall be in office when the opinion of England is Conservative, and that Conservatives shall be in power when English opinion tendstowards Radicalism. _Secondly_. The retention of the Irish members breaks up our wholesystem of Cabinet government. This system has some inherent defects, butit cannot work at all with any benefit to the country unless the Cabinetcan depend on the support of a permanent majority. The result of whathas happily been described as the 'in-and-out plan, ' that is the schemefor allowing Irish members to vote on some subjects and not on others, will be the constitution of two majorities, and it is more than possiblethat the one majority may belong to one party and the other majority toanother. Look at the effect on the transaction of public affairs. TheIrish members and the English Liberals combined may put in office aLiberal Cabinet. On English matters, _e. G. _ the question ofDisestablishment, or of Home Rule for Wales, the British majorityconsisting of British members of Parliament only may constantly defeatthe Gladstonian Cabinet, and thus force into office a ConservativeCabinet which could command a majority on all subjects of purely Britishinterest, but would always be in a minority on all matters of Imperialpolicy, _e. G. _ on the conduct of foreign affairs. Which Cabinet wouldhave a right to retain power? The sole answer is--neither. The proposedplan, in short, undermines our whole scheme of government. _Thirdly_. The Irish members who are now simply Irish members of theImperial Parliament will be transformed into a very different thing--anIrish delegation. The importance of this change cannot be over-rated. The essential merit of our present system of government is that theExecutive, no less than the Parliament of the United Kingdom, representsthe country as a whole. Our Premier may be a Scotsman, but we know of nosuch thing as a Scottish Premier. Englishmen may form the majority ofthe Cabinet, but we have never had an English Cabinet as contrasted witha Scottish or an Irish Cabinet. It has never been contended, hardly hasit been hinted, that a Ministry ought to be made up of members taken incertain proportions from each division of the kingdom. But from themoment that sectional representation, and with it open advocacy ofsectional interests, is introduced into the House of Commons, there willarise the necessity for the formation of sectional Cabinets. The demand will be made, and the demand will be granted, that in theadministration no less than in the House there shall be a system ofrepresentation; that England, that Scotland, that Ireland shall eachhave their due share in the Ministry. But this state of things must befatal both to the capacity and to the fairness of the government. Thetalent of the Cabinet will be diminished, because the Prime Ministerwill no longer be able to choose as colleagues the ablest among hissupporters without reference to the now irrelevant question whether theyrepresent English, Scottish, or Irish constituencies. The character ofthe Executive will be lowered because the Cabinet itself will representrival interests. It may seem that I am advocating the special claims ofEngland. This is not so. I am arguing on behalf of the efficiency of thegovernment of the United Kingdom. My argument is one to which Scotsmenand Irishmen should give special heed. If once we have cabinets andparties based upon sectional divisions, if we have English ministriesand English parties as opposed to Scottish ministries or Irishministries, and Scottish parties and Irish parties, it is not in thelong run the most powerful and wealthy portion of what is now the UnitedKingdom which will suffer. It is hardly the interest of Scotsmen orIrishmen to pursue a policy which suggests the odious but inevitable cry'England for Englishmen. ' _Fourthly_, as long as Irish members remain at Westminster the EnglishParliament will never be freed from debates about Irish affairs. This is a point there is no need to labour. Unless (what no honest mancan openly propose) the 80 or 103 members from Ireland are to be takenfrom one Irish party only, they must represent different interests anddifferent opinions. Some few at least will represent the wishes, thecomplaints, or the wrongs of Ulster. But if this be so, it is certainthat the controversies which divide Ireland will make themselves heardat Westminster. Can any sane man fancy that if the Dublin Parliamentpasses an Act for the maintenance of order at Belfast, if the people ofBelfast are suspected of intending to resist the Irish government, ifIrish landlords, rightly or not, fear unfair treatment at the hands ofthe Irish Ministry or the Irish Parliament, none of these things will beheard of at Westminster? The supposition is incredible. Let Irishmembers sit at Westminster and Irish affairs will be debated atWestminster, and will often be debated when, under a system of HomeRule, it were much better they should be passed over in silence. Admit, what is not certain, that Home Rule in Ireland will occasionallywithdraw a few Irish questions from discussion in England, it must beremembered that a new crop of Irish questions will arise. The federalcharacter of the new constitution must produce in one form or anotherdisputes and discussions as to the limits which bound the respectiveauthority of the Imperial and of the Irish Governments. The ImperialParliament will, for the first time, be harassed by the question ofState rights. Add to this that at every great political crisis the Houseof Commons will have before it an inquiry which must produceinterminable debates, namely whether a given bill is or is not a measurewhich concerns only the interest of Great Britain. Two inducements are offered to England for the adoption of a plan theevils whereof were so patent in 1886 that it then could not, if we areto believe Mr. Morley, [45] have commanded twenty supporters in the Houseof Commons. The first inducement is that the presence of eighty Irish members atWestminster is an outward and visible sign of the supremacy of theImperial Parliament. [46] On this point it is needless to say much; fewEnglishmen will on consideration think it worth while to dislocate allour system of government in order that the British Parliament may retainin Ireland the kind of sovereignty which it retains in New Zealand. Weare rightly proud of our connection with our colonies, but no one wouldseriously propose to retain nominal sovereignty in Canada at the priceof a perilous and injurious change in the constitution of England. The second inducement is that Great Britain will be allowed theexclusive management of British affairs. This sort of spurious Home Rule for England turns out however to be asillusory a blessing as the maintenance of parliamentary supremacy. Great Britain is, under the new constitution, not allowed to appoint theBritish Cabinet. Great Britain is forbidden to determine for herself anymatter of legislation or administration which, however deeply itconcerns British interests, trenches in the least degree on any Irish orImperial interest. Any matter of finance, which comes within the widehead of Imperial liabilities, expenditure, and miscellaneousrevenue, [47] falls within the competence of the Irish members. Questionsof peace or war, our foreign relations, every diplomatic transaction, isa matter on which the Irish delegation may pronounce a decision. Theconjecture is at least plausible[48] that Irish members will have aright to discuss and vote upon any subject debated in the Parliament atWestminster which involves the fate of a British Cabinet. Let it begranted that, if the provisions of the Home Rule Bill be observed, noIrish representative can vote 'on any Bill, or motion in relationthereto, the operation of which Bill or motion is confined to GreatBritain. '[49] But then when is the operation of a Bill confined to GreatBritain, or, to use popular language, what is a British Bill? This is aninquiry in the decision whereof the Irish members will take part. TheIrish members, therefore, at Westminster will be judges of their ownrights, and in the only cases in which it is of practical importance toGreat Britain that the Irish representatives should not vote, will beable with the aid of a British minority to fix the limits of their ownjurisdiction. [50] Let the Irish members and a British minority boldlyvote that the operation of a Bill, say for the Disestablishment of theEnglish Church, is not confined to Great Britain, and they can boldlyvote that the Bill do pass, and no Court in Great Britain or the BritishEmpire can question the validity of a law enacted in open defiance ofthe spirit or even the words of the Constitution. [51] The right ofBritish members to the management of even exclusively British affairswill depend not upon the law of the land, but upon the moderation andsense of equity which may restrain the unfairness of partisanship. For a parliamentary minority will, if only it throw scruples to thewinds, be constantly able to transform itself into a majority by theunconstitutional admission of the Irish vote. This is not a power whichany party, be it Conservative or Radical, English, Scottish, or Irish, ought to possess. Partisanship knows nothing of moderation. And thereason of this blindness to the claims of justice is that the spirit ofparty combines within itself some of the best and some of the worst ofhuman passions. It often unites the self-sacrificing zealotry ofreligious fanaticism with the recklessness of the gambling table. Let anassailant of the Contagious Diseases Act, a fanatic for temperance, aprotectionist who believes that free trade is the ruin of the country, an anti-vivisectionist who holds that any painful experiment on liveanimals is the most heinous of sins; let any man who has come to believethat his own credit, no less than the salvation of the country, dependson the success of a particular party, know that the triumph of his causedepends upon his voting that a particular measure operates beyond GreatBritain, and we know well enough in which way he will vote. He will votewhat he knows to be untrue rather than sacrifice a cause which hebelieves to be sacred. He will think himself both a fool and a traitorif he sacrifices the victory which is within his grasp to themaintenance of technical legality, or rather to respect for a rule ofconstitutional procedure. Suppose, however, that I have underrated the equity of human nature, andthat no faction in the House of Commons ever attempts to violate thespirit of the Constitution. The supposition is bold, not to say absurd;but even if its reasonableness be granted, this does not suffice for theprotection of England's rights. The question whether a given Bill doesor does not operate exclusively in Great Britain may often give rise tofair dispute, and (what should be noted) this dispute will always bedecided against Great Britain in the only instances in which itsdecision is to Great Britain of any importance whatever. An example bestshows my meaning. Let a Bill be brought forward for establishing HomeRule in Wales. Is the operation of the Bill confined to Great Britain?An English member, unless he is a Home Ruler, will answer with anundoubted affirmative. An English, or Irish, or Welsh Home Ruler willwith equal certainty, and equal honesty, give a negative answer. Thequestion admits of fair debate, but we know already how the debate willbe decided. If the Unionists constitute a majority of the House, theIrish vote will be excluded. But in this case its exclusion is of nopractical importance. If the Unionists constitute indeed a majority ofBritish representatives, but do not constitute a majority of the House, the Irish vote will be included. The Irish representatives will decidewhether Wales shall constitute a separate State, and the right of GreatBritain to manage British affairs will not prevent the dismemberment ofEngland. Home Rule, such as it is for England, means at best a totallydifferent thing from Home Rule for Ireland. In the case of England itmeans a limited and precarious control of legislation for Great Britainby British members of Parliament. In the case of Ireland it means thereal and substantial and exclusive government of Ireland by an IrishMinistry and an Irish Parliament. But will the advantage of even this modified half-and-half Home Rule bereally offered to England? Gladstonians, it is rumoured (and before these pages are in print therumour may turn out to be a fact), have their own remedy for some of theonly too-patent absurdities of the 'in-and-out system' embodied inclause 9 of the Home Rule Bill. A suggestion is made which would beamusing for its irony, were it not revolting for its cynicism, that thedifficulty of the double majority should be removed by the allowingmembers not only to remain at Westminster in their full number, but alsoto vote there on all matters whatever, including those affairs whichexclusively concern the interests of Great Britain. This is no doubt aremedy for some of the evils of an unworkable proposal. It is a curewhich to any Englishman of sense or spirit will seem tenfold worse thanthe disease. It is a cure in that sense only in which a traveller may besaid to be relieved from the fear of robbery by a highwayman shootinghim dead. The irregular interference of the Irish delegation in theformation of the British Cabinet, and other matters which indirectlyconcern England, is to be regularised (if I may use the term) byallowing to Irish members permanent despotism over England in matterswhich, on a system of Home Rule, concern England alone. Irish membersmay disestablish the Church of England, though England is to have novoice in the pettiest of Irish affairs. Irish members are to be allowedto impose taxes on England, say to double the income tax, though ofthese taxes no inhabitant of Ireland will pay a penny; the Irishdelegation--and this is the worst grievance of all--is to be enabled, incombination with a British minority, to detach Wales from England, or tovote Home Rule for Scotland, or to federalise still further the UnitedKingdom by voting that Man, Jersey, and Guernsey shall send members tothe Imperial Parliament. Note that all this may be done by the Irishdelegation, though, under the new Constitution, England will not have aword to say on such questions as whether the right of electing membersfor the Parliament at Dublin shall or shall not be extended to everyadult, or whether Ulster shall, or shall not, be allowed Home Rule ofits own. The absurdity of this policy ought to prevent its ever beingadopted; but in these days absurdity seems to tell as little againstwild schemes of legislation as their injustice. All this consideration of haggling and trafficking between Great Britainand Ireland is loathsome to every true Unionist who considers Englishmenand Irishmen as still citizens of one nation. But, when Gladstonianspropose to divide the United Kingdom into two States, it is as essentialas it is painful to weigh well what is the gain of Great Britain in thenew scheme of political partnership. If the matter be looked at fromthis point of view, it is easy to see how miserable are the offerstendered to England. Compare for a moment the authority to be given herunder the new constitution with the authority she has hithertopossessed or the authority tendered to her under the Home Rule Bill of1886. Up to 1782 the British Parliament held in its own hands the absolutecontrol not only of every British affair, but every matter of policyaffecting either Ireland or the British Empire. The British Parliament, in which sat not a single representative of any Irish county or borough, appointed the Irish Executive. The British Parliament, whenever itthought fit, legislated for Ireland; the British Parliament controlledthe whole course of Irish legislation; every Act which passed theParliament of Ireland was inspected, amended, and, if the EnglishMinistry saw fit, vetoed in England. The system was a bad system and anunjust system. It is well that it ended. But as regarded the control ofthe British Empire it corresponded roughly with facts. The Empire was inthe main the outcome of British energy and British strength, and theBritish Empire was governed by Great Britain. The constitution of 1782 gave legislative independence to Ireland, butdid not degrade the British Parliament to the position which will beoccupied by the Imperial Parliament under the constitution of 1893. TheBritish Parliament remained supreme in Great Britain; the BritishParliament controlled the Imperial policy both of England and ofIreland. The British Parliament, or rather the British Ministry, virtually appointed the Irish Executive. The British Parliamentrenounced all rights to legislate for Ireland[52]; the BritishParliament technically possessed no representatives in the Parliamentat Dublin. But any one who judges of institutions not by words but byfacts will perceive that in one way or another the influence and thewishes of the British Government were represented more than sufficientlyin the Irish Houses of Parliament. Grattan's constitution, in short, left the British Parliament absolutely supreme in all British andImperial affairs, and gave to the British Ministry predominating weightin the government of Ireland. This is a very different thing from theshadowy sovereignty which the English Parliament retains, but abstainsfrom exercising, in our self-governing colonies. It is a very differentthing from the nominal power to legislate for Ireland which the newconstitution confers upon the Imperial Parliament. Since the Union England and Ireland have been politically one nation. The Imperial or British Government has controlled, and the ImperialParliament has passed laws for, the whole country. Nor has the presenceof the Irish members till recent days substantially limited theauthority of Great Britain. Till 1829 the Protestant landlords ofIreland who were represented in the Imperial Parliament shared theprinciples or the prejudices of English landowners. Since the grantingof Catholic emancipation Roman Catholic or Irish ideas or interests haveundoubtedly perplexed or encumbered the working of British politics. But the representatives of Ireland have been for the most part dividedbetween the two great English parties, and it was not till Mr. Parnell'sinfluence united the majority of Irish representatives into a partyhostile to Great Britain that any essential evil or inconvenienceresulted from their presence at Westminster. This inconvenience, whatever its extent, has been the price of the Union. The gain has beenworth the payment: the action of Parliament has been hampered, but itsessential and effective authority throughout the realm has beenmaintained. In 1886 Mr. Gladstone framed a constitution which was meant to be afinal and a just settlement of the questions at issue between Englandand Ireland. Under the constitution of 1886 Great Britain surrendered toIreland about the same amount of independence as is offered her underthe proposed constitution of 1893. But the difference in the position ofGreat Britain under the two constitutions is immense. Under the constitution of 1886 Great Britain was offered a position ofthe highest authority. To the British Parliament (in which was to sit not a single Irishmember) was to fall the appointment of the British or Imperial Ministry. The British Parliament received absolute control of all British, colonial, Imperial, and foreign affairs. Perfect unity was restored tothe spirit of her government, and predominance in the British, or, touse ordinary language, in the English, Parliament was given to theconservative elements of English society. Great Britain became mistressin her own home; she became much more than this; she was enthroned asundisputed sovereign of the British Empire. [53] Under the constitution, in short, of 1886, if Great Britain was weakenedon one side she was strengthened on another. Her Parliament obtained animmense accession of authority, and was all but entirely freed both fromthe necessity for considering Irish questions and from the damage ofIrish obstruction. Ireland surrendered to England all share in thegovernment of the Empire, and the further dismemberment of Great Britainwithout the assent of the British people became difficult, if notimpossible. It does not lie in the mouth of Gladstonians to say that themeasure of 1886 was unjust. It was laid before the country as acompromise which was just to England and to Ireland. The Irish leaders, we were told, accepted the proposal, just as we are told that theyaccept the proposed constitution of 1893. If the acceptance was honest, then in 1886 they agreed to a bargain far more favourable to Englandthan the contract now pressed on our acceptance. If their acquiescencewas a mere pretence, what trust can we place in the assertion that theyaccept the arrangement of 1893? However this may be, it is clear that England is now offered a positionof weakness and of inferiority such as she has never occupied during thewhole course of her history. What is the meaning or justification of theproposed surrender by England of every compensation for Irish Home Rulewhich was offered her in 1886? For this surrender Gladstonians assign but two reasons. The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is, it is said, aconcession to the wishes of Unionists. This plea, even were it supported by the facts of the case, would befutile. It might pass muster with disputants in search of a verbaltriumph, but to any man seriously concerned for the welfare of thenation must appear childishly irrelevant. The welfare of the Statecannot turn upon the neatness of a _tu quoque_; retorts are not reasons, and had every Unionist, down from the Duke of Devonshire to the presentwriter, pressed in 1886 for the retention of the Irish members atWestminster, the controversial inexpertness of the Unionists seven yearsago would not diminish the dangers with which, under a system of HomeRule, the presence of the Irish members at Westminster actuallythreatens England. But the plea, futile as it is, is not supported byfact. It rests on a misrepresentation of the Unionist position in 1886. 'The case in truth stands thus:--Mr. Gladstone was [in 1886] placed ineffect in this dilemma: "If you do not, " said his opponents, "retain theIrish representatives at Westminster, the sovereignty of the BritishParliament will be, under the terms of your Bill, no more than a name;if you do retain them, Great Britain will lose the only materialadvantage offered her in exchange for the local independence ofIreland. " Gladstonians, in substance, replied that the devices embodiedin the Government of Ireland Bill at once freed the British Parliamentfrom the presence of the Parnellites and safeguarded the sovereignty ofthe British, or (for in this matter there was some confusion) of theImperial Parliament. On the latter point issue was joined. The otherhorn of the dilemma fell out of sight, and some Unionists, rightlybelieving that the Bill as it stood did not preserve the supremacy ofthe British Parliament, pressed the Ministry hard with all thedifficulties involved in the removal of the Irish members. In the heatof debate speeches were, I doubt not, delivered in which the argumentthat you could not, as the Bill stood, remove the Irish members fromWestminster and keep the British Parliament supreme in Ireland, wasdriven so far as to sound like an argument in favour of, at all costs, allowing members from Ireland to sit in the English Parliament. Thosewho appeared to fall into this error were, it must be noted, but afraction of the Unionist Party, and their mistake was little more thanverbal. When the Ministry maintained that the removal of the Irishmembers from Westminster was a main feature of their Home Rule policy, opponents naturally insisted upon the defects of the scheme laid beforethem, and did not insist on the equal or greater defects of a plan whichthe Government did not advocate. Mr. Gladstone, we are now told, haschanged his position, and assents to the principle that Ireland must berepresented in the British Parliament. If this assent be represented asa concession to the demands of Unionists, my reply is that it is no suchthing. It is merely the acceptance of a different horn of anargumentative dilemma. Grant for the sake of argument (what is by nomeans certain) that the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is reallysaved. The advantage offered to England in exchange for Home Rule isassuredly gone. My friend, Mr. John Morley, used to argue in favour ofHome Rule from the necessity of freeing the English Parliament fromParnellite obstruction. As a matter of curiosity, I should like to knowwhat he thinks of a concession which strikes his strongest argumentativeweapon out of his hands. My curiosity will be satisfied on the same daywhich tells us Lord Spencer's reflections on the surrender of the policyrepresented by the Land Purchase Bill. Meanwhile, I know well enough thethoughts of every Unionist who is not tied by the exigencies of hispolitical antecedents or utterances. To say that in the eyes of such aman the proposed concession is worthless, is to say far too little. Itis not a concession which he rates at a low price; it is a proposalwhich he heart and soul condemns. '[54] These words were not written to meet the present condition of thecontroversy; they were published in 1887 at a time when no Gladstonian, except Mr. Gladstone (if indeed he were an exception), knew whether theretention in the Parliament at Westminster, or the exclusion from theParliament at Westminster, of the Irish members, was an essentialprinciple of Home Rule. England again, it is alleged, suffers without murmuring all theinconvenience caused by the Irish vote at Westminster; and she may well, under a system of Home Rule, bear without complaint evils which she hastolerated for near a century. The answer to this reasoning is plain. It is a sorry plea indeed for adesperate innovation that it leaves the evils of the existing state ofthings no worse than they now are. For the sake of the maintenance ofthe Union, which Unionists hold of inestimable value, England has bornethe inconvenience caused to her by the Irish vote. It argues simplicity, or impudence, to urge that England should continue to bear theinconvenience when the national unity is sacrificed for the sake ofwhich it was endured. But the reply does not stop here. The presence ofIrish members at Westminster under the new constitution increases andstereotypes the evils, whatever their extent, now resulting from theexistence of 103 Irish members in the House of Commons. The evils areincreased because the Irish members are turned into a delegation fromthe Irish State, and their action ceases to be influenced, as it now is, by the consideration--a very important one--that the Imperial Parliamentnot only in theory but in fact legislates for Ireland, and that theEnglish Cabinet controls the Irish administration and directs the courseof political promotion in Ireland. The sentiment and the interest of theIrish members will be changed. Whether they come from North or Souththey will be representatives of Ireland, and will naturally and rightlyconsider themselves agents bound in every case to make the best bargainthey can for Ireland as against the United Kingdom, or, in plainlanguage, as against England. They will no longer feel it their interestto keep in power the English party which they think will best governIreland, for with the government of Ireland the Imperial Parliamentwill, as long as the new constitution stands, have no practical concern. No honest Home Ruler supposes that, if the Home Rule Bill passes intolaw, the Imperial Parliament will, even should the tragedy of thePhoenix Park be repeated in some more terrible form, pass a Crimes Actfor Ireland; to the Irish Government will belong the punishment of Irishcrime. No interest will therefore restrain the Irish delegation fromswaying backwards and forwards between the two English parties, inorder to obtain from the one or the other some momentary advantage, orsome lucrative concession, to the Irish people. Intrigue will bepardonable, diplomatic finesse will become a duty. This evil no doubt insome degree exists, but under the present state of things it admits ofdiminution. A just redistribution of the franchise will undoubtedlylessen the number of Ireland's representatives, whilst it will increasethe relative importance, if not the actual numbers, of loyalists in therepresentation of Ireland. The gradual settlement of the land question, as Unionists believe, will further strike at the true root of Irishdiscontent, and in removing the true grievance of the Irish tenants willdiminish the strength of the party which depends for its power on therevolutionary elements in Irish society. But all chance of mitigatingthe inconvenience inflicted upon England by the presence of the Irishmembers vanishes for ever when they are changed into an Irishdelegation, and are compelled by their position to be the meremouthpiece of Ireland's claims against England. The alleged reasons for the weakening of England are untenable, and, were they tenfold stronger than they are, could not remove the flagrantcontradiction between the Gladstonian policy of 1886 and the Gladstonianpolicy of 1893. But a contradiction which cannot be removed may be explained. The withdrawal of the Irish members from Westminster might give Irelandthe chance of obtaining some of the benefits, and compensate England forsome of the evils, of Home Rule. But however this may be, one result itwould produce with certainty; it would dash the Gladstonian party topieces. The friends of Disestablishment, the Welsh, or the Scottish, Home Rulers, the London Socialists, all the revolutionists throughoutthe country, know that with the departure of the Irish representativesfrom Westminster their own hopes of triumph must be indefinitelypostponed. England is the stronghold of British conservatism, and anarrangement which leaves the fate of England in the hands of Englishmenmay be favourable to reform, but is fatal to revolution. Has this factarrested the attention of Gladstonians? I know not. It is an unfortunatecoincidence that the least defensible portion of an indefensible policyshould, while it threatens ruin to England, offer temporary salvation tothe party who rally round Mr. Gladstone. [55] C. _The Powers of the Irish Government_ I. _The Irish Executive_. At the head of the Irish Executive willnominally stand the Lord Lieutenant; he will however in reality occupythe position of a colonial Governor, and be, for most purposes, littlemore than the ornamental figure-head of the Irish Administration. Thereal executive government of Ireland[56] must be a parliamentaryMinistry or Cabinet[57] chosen in effect, though not in name, by theIrish Parliament, or rather by the Irish Legislative Assembly, or Houseof Commons, just as the English Cabinet is appointed in effect by theEnglish House of Commons. Allowing then for the occasional interventionof the Lord Lieutenant as the representative of the Imperial Parliamentto protect either the interests of the Empire or the special rights ofthe United Kingdom, [58] the Irish Ministry is to occupy in Ireland theposition which the New Zealand Ministry occupies in New Zealand, andwill for most purposes as truly govern Ireland as the New ZealandMinistry governs New Zealand, or as Mr. Gladstone's Ministry governsEngland. The Irish Ministry will be the true Government of Ireland. This is a fact to which the attention of the English public ought to besedulously directed. The creation of an independent Irish Parliamentstrikes the imagination; it is seen to be an innovation of primaryimportance. The creation of an independent Irish Cabinet or Ministry istaken as a matter of course, and neither Unionists nor Gladstonians seeits full import. Yet in Ireland, as elsewhere, the character of theExecutive is of more practical consequence than the character of theLegislature. A country may dispense, for a long time, with legislation;no country can dispense with good government. This principle holds good even in an orderly country such as England, where the sphere of the administration is far less extended than it isin most States. We might get on for a good while prosperously enoughwithout a Parliament, or without new laws, but if anything deprived useven for a week of an Executive, or if, for any reason, the whole spiritof the public administration were changed, every Englishman would feelthis portentous revolution in every concern of his daily life. Theprotection of the Government, of the army, of the police, of the lawcourts, are with us so much matters of course, that we never realise howmuch the comfort and prosperity of our existence hang upon it, nor do wereflect that the aid we derive from the Courts is in the last instancedependent upon the decisions of the judges being actively supported bythe forces at the command of the executive power. Again, we are so usedto the preservation on the part of the Executive and the Courts of anattitude of perfect impartiality and to the extension of their aid toall citizens alike, that we can hardly even in imagination conceive whatwould be the condition of things if the public administration favouredparticular classes and looked askance on the rights of one class, whilstit enforced with rigour the rights of another. Yet events which havebeen passing before our eyes may show any one how absolutely dependentwe may be, at any moment, for our enjoyment of life, property, orfreedom upon the authority and the equity of the Executive. Consider thestrike at Hull. Practically the legal rights and personal freedom ofevery inhabitant of the city depend upon the action of the Government. It is as plain as day that if the Government had taken actively andunfairly the side of one party or the other to the contest, the partywhich the Government favoured would at once have won. Suppose, thoughthe supposition is a very improbable one, that the Home Secretary haddirected the police to put down every form of picketing and to arrestevery one who counselled the free labourers to desert their employment, the strike would come at once to an end. Suppose on the other hand--thesupposition is also a wild one--that the Home Secretary had declined toprotect the rights of the free labourers, that the troops had beenwithdrawn, and that the police had been inactive; suppose, in short, that the Government had been careless to maintain order. The TradeUnionists would at once have become supreme, and freedom of contract, aswell as liberty of person, would have been at once abolished. Even inEngland then the power to exercise our rights as citizens has its sourcein the constant, though unobserved, intervention of the executive power. What is true of England is truer still of countries where the sphere ofthe administration is more widely extended than with us, and what istrue of every civilised country is truest of all of Ireland. Ireland isa country where the sphere of the administration is large, and where itwill probably be increased. Ireland is divided by hostile factions nottoo much prone to respect the law. Even as things stand, the IrishExecutive finds it hard enough to hold a perfectly even and levelcourse, and the whole state of the country depends upon the spirit inwhich the law is enforced. One of the very gravest defects of ourpresent system is that in Ireland a change of government means, to acertain extent, a change in the administration of the law. Yet both Mr. Balfour and Mr. Morley have enforced the law, and have meant, accordingto their lights, to act towards all citizens with equitableimpartiality. And Mr. Balfour, Mr. Morley, or any statesman appointed bythe Imperial Parliament, is likely to act with more fairness than at thepresent moment would any Executive chosen by any Irish Parliament. Onething, at any rate, is certain. An independent Irish Executive willpossess immense power. It will be able by mere administrative action orinaction, without passing a single law which infringes any Restrictionto be imposed by the Irish Government Act, 1893, to effect a revolution. Let us consider for a moment a few of the things which the Irish Cabinetmight do if it chose. It might confine all political, administrative, orjudicial appointments to Nationalists, and thus exclude Loyalists fromall positions of public trust. It might place the Bench, [59] themagistracy, the police wholly in the hands of Catholics; it might, byencouragement of athletic clubs where the Catholic population weretrained to the use of arms, combined with the rigorous suppression ofevery Protestant association suspected, rightly or not, of preparingresistance to the Parliament at Dublin, bring about the arming ofCatholic and the disarming of Protestant Ireland, and, at the same time, raise a force as formidable to England as an openly enrolled Irish army. But the mere inaction of the Executive might in many spheres producegreater results than active unfairness. The refusal of the police forthe enforcement of evictions would abolish rent throughout the country. And the same result might be attained by a more moderate course. IrishMinisters might in practice draw a distinction between 'good' landlordsand 'bad' landlords, and might grant the aid of the police for thecollection of reasonable, though refusing it for the collection ofexcessive rents, and might at last magnanimously recognise the virtuesof Mr. Smith-Barry, whilst passing a practical sentence of outlawry onLord Clanricarde. Is there anything absurd or unreasonable in thesupposition that a Ministry of Land Leaguers chosen by a Parliament ofNationalists should attempt to enforce the unwritten law of the LandLeague? A Gladstonian who answers this question in the affirmativeentertains a far lower opinion than can any candid Unionist of Mr. Gladstone's Irish allies. It would be the grossest unfairness to suggestthat every man convicted of conspiracy by the Special Commission addedto criminality and recklessness a monstrous form of hypocrisy, and that, whilst urging Irish peasants to boycott evictors and land-grabbers, hefelt no genuine moral abhorrence of evictions and land-grabbing. But if, as is certainly the case, the founders of the Land League reallydetested the existing system of land tenure, and considered a landlordwho exacted rent a criminal, and a tenant who paid it a caitiff, it isas certain as anything can be that they will be under the greatesttemptation, not to say, in their own eyes, under a stringent moralobligation, to strain the power of an Irish Executive for the purpose ofabolishing the payment of rent. Nothing, at any rate, will seem to anIrish Ministry more desirable than that within three years[60] from thepassing of the Bill landlords and tenants should come to an arrangement, and nothing is more likely to produce this result than the withdrawalfrom the landlords of the aid, if not the protection, of the law. Myargument, however, at the present point does not require the assertionor the belief that an Irish Ministry will be guilty of every act ofoppression which it can legally commit. All that I insist upon is thatan Irish Ministry will exercise immense power, and that withoutviolating a letter of the constitution, and without passing a single actwhich any Court whatever could treat as void, the Ministry will be ableto change the social condition of Ireland. The Irish Cabinet, remember, will not be checked by any Irish House of Commons, for it will representthe majority of that House. It will not need to fear the interpositionof the Imperial Ministry or the Imperial Parliament, for if theauthorities in England are to supervise and correct the conduct of theIrish Cabinet, Home Rule is at an end. Mr. Asquith has repudiated allidea of creating two Executives in Ireland[61] for the ordinary purposesof government, and from his own point of view he is right. The notion ofa dual control is preposterous; the attempt to carry it out must involveanarchy or revolution. The Irish Ministry must in ordinary matters be atleast as free as the Ministry of a self-governing colony. Theindependence of the Irish Executive is indeed a totally new phenomenonin Irish history, and is, as I have said, a far more important matterthan the independence of the Irish Parliament, but it is an essentialfeature of Home Rule, and every elector throughout England should try torealise its import. One check, indeed, is placed upon the power of the Irish Cabinet. Themilitary forces of the Crown, and the Royal Irish Constabulary andDublin Metropolitan Police (as long as they exist[62]), are subject tothe control of the Imperial or English Ministry. [63] The result is thatthe English Cabinet will have the means of using force in Ireland forthe maintenance of order, for the execution of the law, or for themaintenance of the authority of the Imperial Parliament. But thisadvantage is after all purchased at the price of placing the countryunder the rule of something very like two Executives. If the policy ofthe Irish Cabinet, _e. G. _ as to suppressing a riot at Dublin or Belfast, should differ from the policy of the English Cabinet, the ordinarypolice may be called into action whilst the army or the royalconstabulary stand by inactive, or the army may disperse a meeting whichthe Irish Ministry hold to be a lawful assembly. II. _The Irish Parliament. _ The authority of the Irish Parliament, whilst acting within the limits of the constitution, is extremelywide. [64] The Parliament appoints the Irish Government of the day; it willdetermine whether Mr. M'Carthy or Mr. Redmond, Mr. Healy or Mr. Davitt, directs the Irish Administration. In this matter the British Governmentwill have no voice. The English Ministry are under the new constitutionexpected in many ways to co-operate with the Irish Ministry, yet it isquite conceivable that the Ministers of the Crown at Dublin may be menwhose whole ideas of expediency, of policy, of political morality, maybe opposed to the ideas of the Ministers of the Crown at Westminster. The Irish Parliament, again, even if every Restriction on its powersinserted in the Home Rule Bill should pass into law, will be found tohave ample scope for legislative action. [65] It can repeal[66] any Act affecting Ireland which was enacted before thepassing of the Home Rule Bill. Thus it can do away with the right to thewrit of _habeas corpus_; it can abolish the whole system of trial byjury; it can by wide rules as to the change of venue expose anyinhabitant of Belfast, charged with any offence against the IrishGovernment, to the certainty of being tried in Dublin or in Cork. If anIrish law cannot touch the law of treason or of treason-felony, theleaders of the Irish Parliament may easily invent new offences notcalled by these names, and the Parliament may impose severe penalties onany one who attempts by act or by speech to bring the Irish Governmentinto contempt. A new law of sacrilege may be passed which would makecriticism of the Irish priesthood, or attacks on the Roman Catholicreligion, or the public advocacy of Protestantism, practicallyimpossible. The Irish House of Commons may take the decision of electionpetitions into its own hands, and members nominated by the priests maydetermine the proper limits of spiritual influence. Thus the partydominant at Dublin can, if they see fit, abolish all freedom ofelection; nor is this all that the Irish Parliament can accomplish inthe way of ensuring the supremacy of an Irish party. After six yearsfrom the passing of the Home Rule Bill--let us say in the year 1900--theIrish Parliament can alter the qualification of the electors and thedistribution of the members among the constituencies. Parliament can infact introduce at once universal suffrage, and do everything which theingenuity of partisanship can suggest for diminishing therepresentation of property and of Protestantism. If, further, in anypart of Ireland there be reason to fear opposition to the laws of theIrish Parliament, a severer Coercion Act may be passed than any whichhas as yet found its way on to the pages of the English or the IrishStatute Book. Worse than all this, the Irish Parliament has the right tolegislate with regard to transactions which have taken place before thepassing of the Home Rule Bill. An Act inflicting penalties onmagistrates who have been zealous in the enforcement of the Crimes Act, an Act abolishing the right to recover debts incurred before 1893, anAct for compensation to tenants who had suffered from obedience to thebehests of the Land League, are all Acts which, however monstrous, theIrish Parliament is, under the new constitution, competent to pass. My assertion is, be it noted, not that all or any of such laws would bepassed, but that the passing of them would, under the new constitution, be legal. The Irish Parliament could further by its legislation pursuelines of policy opposed to the moral feeling and political judgment ofGreat Britain, and this too where Irish legislation practically affectsGreat Britain. State lotteries might be re-established, gambling tablesmight be re-opened at Dublin. If the imposition of protective duties onimported goods is forbidden, there is nothing apparently to prevent thereintroduction of Protection into Ireland by the payment of bounties;there is certainly nothing to prohibit the repeal or suspension of theFactory Acts, so that English manufacturers might be compelled tocompete with Irish rivals who are freed from the limits imposed uponexcessive labour by the humanity or the wisdom of England. The power ofthe Irish Parliament to pass laws which in the eyes of Englishmen areunwise or inequitable, is, it will be urged, an essential part of thepolicy of Home Rule. I admit that this is so. But this makes it the morenecessary that English electors should realise what this essentialcharacteristic of Home Rule means, or may mean. The Nonconformistconscience exposed Irish Home Rulers to painful humiliation and possibleruin by forbidding them to follow the political leader of their choiceto whom they had deliberately renewed their allegiance. Is it certainthat Englishmen who could not tolerate the official authority of Mr. Parnell will bear the official leadership, say of Mr. Healy, if employedto carry out the economical principles of Mr. Davitt? The legislative powers, ample as they are, of the Irish Parliament arein some respects restricted, but what the Parliament cannot accomplishby law it could accomplish by resolution. The expressed opinion of alegislature entitled to speak in the name of the people of Ireland mustalways command attention, and may exert decisive influence. Suppose thatthe Irish House of Commons asserts in respectful, but firm, language, the right of the Irish people to establish a protective tariff; supposethat when England is engaged in a diplomatic, or an armed, contest withFrance, the Irish House of Commons resolves that Ireland sympathiseswith France, that Ireland disapproves of all alliance with Germany, thatshe has no interest in war, and wishes to stand neutral; or supposethat, taking another line, the Irish Parliament at the approach ofhostilities resolves that the people of Ireland assert their inherentright to arm volunteers, or raise an army in their own defence. NoEnglish Minister can allege with truth that these resolutions or a scoremore of the same kind are a breach of the constitution; yet suchresolutions will not be without their effect in England; they cannot bewithout their effect abroad; in many parts of Ireland they will havemore than the authority of an Act of Parliament. Assume, for the purpose of my argument, that the Irish Parliament alwaysacts absolutely within the limits or the letter of the constitution, though to make this assumption is to substitute unreasonable hopes forrational expectations. What Englishmen should note, because they do notyet understand it, is that within the limits of the constitution theIrish Cabinet and the Irish Parliament possess and must possess the mostextensive powers, and that these powers may be used in ways which wouldsurprise and shock the British public, and impede and weaken the actionof the Imperial, or English, Government. D. _The Restrictions (or Safeguards) and the Obligations_ I. _Their Nature_. The limitations on the power of the Irish Legislatureare of a twofold character. The Restrictions contained in clause 3 of the Bill are intended torestrain the Irish Parliament from acting as the representative body ofan independent nation. This clause invalidates for example acts withrespect to the Crown or the succession to the Crown, with respect topeace or war, with respect to the naval or military forces of the realm, with respect to treaties or other relations with foreign states, andwith respect to trade with any place out of Ireland, which apparentlyincludes the imposition of a protective tariff. The Restrictions[67] contained in clause 4 may be roughly divided intothree heads; first, prohibitions intended to ensure the maintenance ofabsolute religious equality[68]; secondly, prohibitions intended toprevent injustice to individuals, such as deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, denial of equal protection ofthe law, the taxing of private property without due compensation, or theunfair treatment of any existing corporation; thirdly, a provisionprohibiting any law which deprives any inhabitant of the United Kingdomof equal rights to public sea fisheries. [69] On these Restrictions it were easy to write an elaborate treatise. Should our new constitution ever come into force, they will give rise toa whole series of judgments, and to lengthy books explanatory thereof. The language in which the Restrictions are expressed is in many casesexceptionable. No lawyer will venture to predict what for instance maybe the interpretation placed by the Courts on such expressions as 'dueprocess of law, ' 'just compensation, ' and the like, and it is more thandoubtful whether the so-called safeguards are so expressed as to carryout the intention of their authors, or, even in words, adequately toprotect either the authority of the Imperial Parliament or the rights ofindividuals. But it is not my purpose to criticise the Restrictions, orthe Bill itself, in detail. The drafting of the Government of IrelandBill needs much amendment, but at the present juncture it is waste oftime to criticise defects removable by better draftmanship or by slightchanges in the substance of the measure. My object is to dwell on suchpoints relating to the Restrictions as show their bearing on thecharacter of the new constitution. [70] _First. _ The Restrictions are one and all of them limits upon thepowers of the Irish Parliament; they are none of them limits upon thepowers of the Irish Executive. The new constitution does notcontain--from its nature it hardly could contain--a single safeguardagainst abuse of power by the Irish Ministry or its servants. Yet in allcountries there is far more reason to dread executive than parliamentaryoppression, and this is emphatically true of Ireland. _Secondly. _ The Restrictions contain no prohibition against the passingof an Act of Indemnity. Yet of all the laws which a Legislature can pass an Act of Indemnity isthe most likely to produce injustice. It is on the face of it thelegislation of illegality; the hope of it encourages acts of vigour, butit also encourages violations of law and of humanity. The tale ofFlogging Fitzgerald in Ireland, or the history of Governor Eyre inJamaica, is sufficient to remind us of the deeds of lawlessness andcruelty which in a period of civil conflict may be inspired byrecklessness or panic, and may be pardoned by the retrospective sympathyor partisanship of a terror-stricken or vindictive Legislature. Circumstances no doubt may arise in Ireland, as in other countries, under which the maintenance of order or the protection of life mayexcuse or require deviation from the strict rules of legality. But thequestion, whether these circumstances have arisen, will always bedecided far more justly by the Parliament at Westminster than it can bedecided by the Parliament at Dublin. Can any one really maintain that aParliament in which Mr. Healy, or, for that matter, Col. Saunderson, might be leader, would be as fair a tribunal as a Parliament under theguidance of Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salisbury for determining whether anofficer who, acting under the direction of the Irish Government and witha view to maintain order at Belfast or at Dublin, should have put anagitator or conspirator to death without due trial, had or had not donehis duty. _Thirdly. _ There is among the Restrictions no prohibition against thepassing of an _ex post facto_ law. Yet an _ex post facto_ law is theinstrument which a legislature is most apt to use for punishing theunpopular use of legal rights. There is not a landlord, there is not amagistrate, there is not a constable in Ireland, who may not tremble infear of _ex post facto_ legislation. There is no reason, as far as theHome Rule Bill goes, why the gaoler who kept Mr. William O'Brien inprison or the warders who attempted to pull off his breeches, should notbe rendered legally liable to punishment for their offences against theunwritten law of Irish sedition. No such monstrosity of legal inequitywill, it may be said, be produced. I admit this. But the very object ofprohibitions is the prevention of outrageous injustice. The wisefounders of the United States prohibited both to Congress and to everyState legislature the passing of _ex post facto_ legislation. If any manhint that it be an insult to Ireland to anticipate the possibleinjustice of an Irish Parliament, my reply is simple. No Irishman needresent as an insult prohibitions which were not felt to be insultingeither by the citizens of America or the citizens of Massachusetts. _Fourthly. _ The Restrictions on the powers of the Irish Parliament donot contain any safeguard against legislation which sets asidecontracts. This is remarkable, not to say ominous. The Gladstonian constitution hasbeen drawn up by legislators who profess to profit by the experience ofAmerica. Under the Constitution of the United States[71] no State canpass any law 'impairing the obligation of a contract. ' This provisionhas kept alive throughout the Union the belief in the sacredness oflegal promises. It embodies a principle which lies at the bottom of allprogressive legislation. It gives the best guarantee which aconstitution can give against the most insidious form of legislativeunfairness; it embodies a doctrine which all legislatures are likely toneglect and which an Irish Parliament is more likely to neglect than anyother legislature, for in Ireland there exist contracts which do notcommand popular approval, and the Imperial legislation of twenty yearsand more has taught the Irish people that agreements which do notcommand popular approval may, without breach of good faith, be set asideby legislative enactment. We all know further that reforms, orinnovations, are desired by thousands of Irishmen which cannot becarried into effect unless the obligation of contracts be impaired. Why, then, have statesmen who borrow freely from the Constitution of theUnited States omitted the most salutary of its provisions from our newconstitution? The official reply is at any rate singular; it is apparently[72] thatthe section of the United States Constitution which invalidates any lawimpairing the obligation of a contract has given much occupation to theCourts of America. This answer is on the face of it futile; it urges theproved utility of a law as a reason for its not being enacted; as wellsuggest that because the criminal courts are mainly occupied with thetrial of thieves there ought to be no law against petty larceny, or thatbecause the labours of the Divorce Court increase year by year, the lawought not to permit divorce. The absurdity of the official replysuggests the existence of some reason which the defenders of thisstrange omission are unwilling clearly to allege. The true reason whythe founders of the new constitution have omitted in this instance tocopy a polity which they profess to admire is not hard to discover. Anenactment which enjoined an Irish Parliament to respect the sanctity ofa contract would be fatal to any remodelling of the Irish land law whichtended towards the spoliation of landowners. Yet this very fact makesthe matter all the more serious. That British statesmen should underthese circumstances deliberately decline to insert an injunction torespect the sanctity of plighted good faith is much more than anomission. It amounts to the suggestion, almost to the approval, oflegislative robbery; it is a proclamation that as against landlords, asagainst creditors, as against any unpopular class, the ImperialParliament sanctions the violation of good faith. To the IrishParliament the authors of the new constitution in effect say: 'You mayraise no soldiers, you may not yourselves summon volunteers for thedefence of your country, you shall not impose customs on foreign goods, and are therefore forbidden to follow a policy of protection approved ofby every civilised State except England; you shall neither establish norendow a church, you shall not by providing salaries for your priesthoodat once lighten the burdens of the flock, and improve the position ofthe pastor; these things, not to speak of many others, you are forbiddento do, though there are many wise statesmen who deem that the courses ofaction from which you are debarred would conduce to the dignity and theprosperity of Ireland; but there is one thing which you may do, you maysanction breach of faith, you may encourage dishonesty, you may enjoinfraud, you may continue to teach the worst lesson which the vacillationof English government has as yet taught the Irish people, you may drivehome the conviction that no man need keep a covenant when the keepingthereof is to his own damage. ' This is the message of political moralitywhich the last true Parliament of the United Kingdom hands over to thefirst new Parliament of Ireland. II. _Their Enforcement. _ The nature of the Restrictions imposed uponthe Parliament, and indirectly upon the Government of Ireland, is of farless importance than are the means provided for their enforcement. A lawwhich is not enforceable is a nullity; it has in strictness noexistence. The methods provided by the Home Rule Bill for keeping the IrishParliament within its proper sphere of legislative activity are two innumber--the veto of the Lord Lieutenant, and the action of the Courts. _The Veto. _ This is little more than an empty sham, for it must ingeneral be exercised on the advice of the Irish Cabinet; in other wordsit will never be exercised at all. [73] Were the matter not so seriousthere would be something highly amusing in the conduct ofconstitution-makers who, intending to provide against unconstitutionallegislation on the part of the Irish Parliament, provide that the IrishCabinet, who are practically appointed by the Irish Parliament, and whodirect its legislation, shall have power to veto Bills passed by theIrish Parliament presumably on the advice of the Irish Cabinet. The English Ministry no doubt may, if they see fit, instruct the LordLieutenant to veto a given Bill. So also the Imperial Parliament hasauthority to repeal or override any Act, constitutional orunconstitutional, passed by the Irish Parliament. Each power stands onthe same footing, neither is meant for ordinary use; either is a meansof legal revolution. The veto of the Crown means little in New Zealand;it will at best mean no more in Ireland; but in truth it will mean agood deal less. New Zealand sends no member to Westminster to stay thehand of the Imperial Government whenever it attempts by way of veto orotherwise to put in force the reserved powers of the ImperialParliament. [74] _The Privy Council and the Courts_. The English Privy Council[75] maynullify the effect of Irish legislation in two ways. It may as an administrative body give a decision that an Act isvoid. [76] This power can by exercised only upon the application of theLord Lieutenant or a Secretary of State, and it is a power which we mayexpect will be but rarely employed, for its use would at once give riseto a direct conflict between the Irish Parliament and the English PrivyCouncil. Let it be noted in passing that this provision for the decisionof constitutional questions is foreign to the habits and traditions ofEnglish Courts; no judge throughout the United Kingdom ever pronouncesa speculative opinion upon the extent, operation, or validity of an Actof Parliament. It is the inveterate habit of our judges to deal withparticular cases as they come before them, and with particular casesalone. They will find themselves greatly perplexed when they come topronounce judgment upon abstract questions of law. This is not all. Theproposed arrangement is as foreign to the spirit of American Federalismas it is to the spirit of English law. The Supreme Court of the UnitedStates never in strictness pronounces an Act either of Congress or of aState Legislature void. What the Court does is to treat it as void inthe decision of a particular case. Tocqueville and other critics havedirected special attention to the care with which the Federal tribunals, by dealing only with given cases as they arise, avoid as far as possiblecoming into conflict with any State. They determine the rights ofindividuals; they do not determine directly what may be the legislativecompetence of the State, or for that matter of the Federal, Legislature. [77] The extraordinary power given to the Privy Councilviolates a fundamental principle of federalism, which by the way isviolated in other parts of the Home Rule Bill. It brings, or tends tobring, the central power, represented in this case by the Privy Council, into direct conflict with one of the States of the Federation. [78] The English Privy Council, or, in strictness, the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council, is under the new constitution constituted a FinalCourt of Appeal from every Court in Ireland. [79] The Privy Council also is the Court of Appeal from a new kind ofImperial, or as one may say 'Federal, ' judiciary, specially formed forthe determination of matters having relation to the competence of theIrish Parliament. This Imperial or Federal judiciary consists of the two Exchequer Judgesof the Supreme Court in Ireland; they are appointed under the Great Sealof the United Kingdom, and therefore by the English Ministry. Theirsalaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, andthey are removable only on an address to the Houses of the ImperialParliament. They constitute therefore an Imperial not an Irish Court. Before this Court may be brought on the application of any party theretoany legal proceedings in Ireland which _inter alia_ 'touch any matternot within the power of the Irish Legislature, or touch any matteraffected by a law which the Irish Legislature has not power to repeal oralter. '[80] With the details of these arrangements I need not trouble myreaders; the point to notice is that, whenever in any proceeding inIreland the validity or constitutionality of an Irish Act can come intoquestion, the matter may, at the wish of any party concerned, and inmany cases apparently must be, brought before an Imperial or in effectBritish Court--the Exchequer Judges--and be determined by them subjectto an appeal to another Imperial or British Court, viz. The PrivyCouncil. Note further that to the Exchequer Judges are given specialpowers for the enforcement of any judgment of their Court. If theSheriff does not give effect to their judgment, they may appoint anyother officer with the full rights of a Sheriff to enforce it. [81] Here then we have the machinery of the Imperial, or Federal, Judicature. To put the matter simply, the Restrictions imposed on the IrishParliament depend for their effectiveness on judgments of the PrivyCouncil enforced by the Exchequer Judges. Consider how the whole arrangement will work. [82] The theoreticaloperation of the scheme is clear enough. _A_ sues _X_ in an Irish Court, say, to simplify matters, before the Exchequer Judges, for £1, 000 due to_A_ for rent. _X_ bases his defence on an Act of the Irish Parliament, drawn by Irish statesmen, and approved presumably by Irish electors. _A_questions the constitutionality of the Act. The Exchequer Judges aredivided in opinion. The matter at last comes before the Privy Council. The Privy Council pronounce the Act void, and give judgment in _A's_favour. He has a right to recover the £1, 000 from _X_. The wholequestion in theory is settled. The law is unconstitutional, the law isvoid; _A_ has obtained judgment. But can the judgment be enforced? Thisis the essential question; for the object of a plaintiff is to obtainnot judgment but payment or execution. What then are the means forenforcing the judgment of the Privy Council when it is not supported byIrish opinion, when it sets aside an Act of the Irish Parliament, andwhen it may possibly be opposed to the decision, in a similar case, ofan Irish Court? The means are the action of the Sheriff. What if theSheriff is a strong Nationalist, and makes default? The only thing to bedone is to appoint an officer empowered to carry out the decree of theCourt. Of course if the Irish Ministry are bent on enforcing thejudgment, if the Exchequer Court, whose judgment, it may be, has beenoverruled, is zealous in supporting the authority of the Privy Council, if the Irish people are filled with reverence for tribunals which arereally English Courts, all will go well. But Mr. Gladstone himselfcannot anticipate that novel constitutional machinery will work withease, or that on the passing of the Home Rule Bill the disposition, thetraditional feelings, and the sympathies of the Irish populace will bechanged. Suppose that _A_ is Lord Clanricarde; suppose that _X_ is anevicted tenant. It is not common sense to believe that the judgment inhis lordship's favour will as a matter of course take effect. At thepresent moment the Irish Courts, backed by the whole authority of theImperial Government and the Irish Executive, often find a difficulty inenforcing their judgments. Will English Courts find it easy to giveeffect to a judgment in Ireland if the Irish Executive and its servantsstand neutral or hostile? What if the Irish House of Commons turn out asunwilling that force should be used for enforcing the decree of thePrivy Council as are some English Radicals that force shall be employedfor the protection of free labourers against Trades Unionists? What ifthe officer of the Court is in fact some bailiff trembling for his ownlife? He may, I am told, call in the military. Of his authority to dothis I am not quite sure. He must, I suppose, in the first instanceapply to the Irish Home Secretary. The Irish Minister pressed by theopposition turns a deaf ear to the appeal of the bailiff. Applicationmust then be made in some form or other to the English Ministry. TheImperial Cabinet will think more than once before horse, foot, andartillery are, against the wish of the Irish Government, put in movementto enforce the judgment of a British Court, and to obtain £1, 000 forLord Clanricarde. The matter will have become serious; the dignity ofthe Irish nation will be at stake; the complaints of the plaintiff willbe drowned by the indignant clamours of eighty members at Westminster. The essential principle of the new constitution is that there shall bebut one Executive in Ireland. The moment that the British Governmentintervenes to support the judgment of British Courts, we have in Irelandtwo hostile Executives. We tremble on the verge either of legalrevolution or of civil war. An English Cabinet, I suspect, will hardlyenforce the unpopular rights of a hated plaintiff by use of arms. Why, it will be said, assume that the Irish Government and the Irishpeople will not enforce the law? The assumption, I answer, is justifiednot only by the history of Ireland, but by general experience. In allfederations, even the best ordered, difficulties constantly arise as tothe sphere of the Federal Government and the State Governments, and asto the enforcement of judgments delivered by Federal Courts. Theauthority of the federal tribunals has not always been easily enforcedeven in the United States. Serious difficulties hamper the action of theSwiss federal authorities. Even in England enthusiasm or convictionoccasionally triumphs over legality. English clergymen are at least asreasonable as excited politicians, yet Ritualists have not invariablysubmitted to the authority of the Privy Council. Why should Irishmen bemore reasonable than other men? In Ireland we are trying an entirelynovel and dangerous experiment; we are fostering the spirit ofnationality under the forms of federation. The Privy Council, hide thematter as you will, represents British power. If Ireland is a nation, the Government of Great Britain is an alien Government; the judgments ofthe Privy Council are the judgments of an alien Court, and reasonforbids us to expect more submission to the decisions of an alientribunal than to the laws of an alien legislature. Suppose, however, that British judgments are enforced by the Britisharmy. Is this a result in which any Englishman or Irishman couldrejoice? Can we say that the new constitution works well when its realand visible sanction is the use of British soldiers? The plain truth isthat arrangements for legally restraining the Irish Parliament withinthe due limits of its powers must be ineffective and unreal and, if theprinciple of Home Rule be once admitted, the widest must be the wisestform of it. Colonial independence is better for Ireland and safer forEngland than sham federalism. [83] Grant, however, that the judgments of the Privy Council can be enforcedmore easily than I suppose, still even Gladstonians would admit that theproper working of the new constitution depends on two presumptions. Theone is that the Irish people are under no strong temptation to opposethe Restrictions or to throw off the obligations imposed upon the IrishParliament or Government. The other that they possess no ready means fornullifying these Restrictions or obligations. Each of these assumptions is false. Restraints ineffective for the protection either of British interests orof individual freedom may be intensely irritating to national sentiment. The limitations imposed on the powers of the Irish Parliament, or, inother words, of the Irish people, are opposed to the spirit ofnationality and independence which Home Rule, it is hoped, will appeaseor satisfy. They will be hateful therefore not only to that multitudewhom Gladstonians call the Irish people, but to every Irishman who isbidden by Gladstonians to consider himself a member of the Irish nation. The Irish are a martial race; they excel in the practice, and delight inthe pageantry, of warfare, but they are forbidden to raise a regiment orman a gunboat. They cannot legally raise a regiment of volunteers, theycannot save their country from invasion. Will they permanently acquiescein restraints not imposed on the Channel Islands? Irishmen, Unionists noless than Home Rulers, are mostly Protectionists, and believe thattariffs may give to Ireland, not indeed a 'plethora of wealth, ' for ofthis no man out of Bedlam except Mr. Gladstone dreams, but reasonableprosperity. Vain to argue that Protection is folly. Englishmen think so, and Englishmen are right. But English doctrine is not accepted inGermany, in France, in the United States, or in the British Colonies;why should Irishmen be wiser than the inhabitants of every civilisedcountry, except England? The fact, in any case, cannot be altered thatmost Home Rulers are Protectionists, and that many of them desire HomeRule mainly because they desire Protection for Ireland. Yet Protection, at any rate in the form of a tariff, they cannot have. [84] Take againthe Restrictions imposed on the endowment of religion. All EnglishNonconformists, and many English Churchmen, hold these Restrictions tobe in themselves politic and just. But the one strong reason for theconcession of Home Rule is that Irishmen disagree with English notionsof policy and of justice. No one can assign any reason why Irishstatesmen, Catholics or Protestants, might not feel it a matter of dutyor of policy to endow the priesthood, to level up instead of levellingdown, to enter into some sort of concordat with Rome. It is a policywhich is distasteful to English Nonconformists and to most IrishProtestants. But under a system of Home Rule, at any rate, EnglishNonconformists have no right to dictate the policy of Ireland. There isnot the remotest reason why Restrictions on the endowments of religionand the like should not be hateful to Irishmen. The limitations, in short, on the competence of the Irish Parliament areinconsistent with the fundamental principle of Gladstonian statecraft. It is a policy we are told of trust in the people, the limitations aredictated by distrust of the Irish people; Home Rule is to be granted inorder that Irishmen may give effect to Irish ideas; the Restrictions areenacted to check the development of Irish ideas, and to impose Englishideas upon the policy of Ireland. As though, however, the Restraints were not enough to cause firstirritation and then agitation, the financial provisions contemplated bythe Bill are in themselves certain to generate, not future, butimmediate discord. Of the financial arrangements instituted under the new constitution, mypurpose is to say very little. My object is not to show that Mr. Gladstone's financial calculations are wrong, or that they are ruinousto Ireland or unfair to England. All this is for my present purposeimmaterial. My aim is to insist that, in their very nature, they are acause of conflict; and that they bring the interest, and, even more, the sentiment, of Ireland into direct opposition with the power ofEngland. [85] All the customs payable at every Irish port are to be regulated, collected, and managed by, and to be paid into, the Exchequer of theUnited Kingdom. Not a penny of these customs benefits Ireland; they areall--and this is certainly the light in which they will appear to mostIrishmen--a contribution to the revenue of the United Kingdom, that is, of England. If every taxable article were smuggled into Ireland, so thatnot one pound of Irish customs were paid to the English treasury, theImperial power would lose, but the Irish State would gain. Ireland wouldbe delivered from a tax which will soon be called a tribute. If, moreover, Ireland continues to be treated as financially a part of theUnited Kingdom, then free smuggling, which is free trade, would makeIreland a free port, where might be landed untaxed the goods required bythe whole United Kingdom. It is easy to see how the English revenuewould suffer, but it is equally easy to see that Irish commerce mightflourish. If I am told that the ruin of the British revenue may beaverted by the examination of goods brought from Ireland to GreatBritain--this, of course, is so. But then freedom of trade within theUnited Kingdom is at an end. We are compelled, in substance, to raise aninternal line of custom houses; we abolish at one stroke one greatbenefit of the Treaty of Union. The mode, again, in which the customs are levied outrages every kind ofnational sentiment. Coast-guards, custom-house officers, and gaugers arenever popular among a population of smugglers; they will not be the morebeloved when every custom-house officer or coastguard is therepresentative of an alien power, and is employed to levy tribute fromIreland. Another leading feature of the financial arrangements is the chargingupon the Irish Consolidated Fund of various sums rightly due and payableto the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. [86] They are made a first chargeupon the revenue of Ireland. They are to be paid in the last resort uponthe order of the Lord Lieutenant, acting as an Imperial officer. Thenecessity for some arrangement of this kind is clear. Millions have beenlent to Ireland, and these millions must be repaid. But if the need forsome such arrangement be certain, its desperate impolicy is no lesscertain. England and Ireland, the English Government and the IrishGovernment, are brought into direct hostile collision. The rich EnglishGovernment appears in the light of an imperious creditor the IrishGovernment stands in the position of a poverty-stricken debtor. Note, and this is the point which should be pressed home, that in allconfederations the difficulty of exacting the money needed by thefederal government from any state of the confederacy has been found allbut insuperable. Study the history of the thirteen American coloniesbetween the time of the acknowledgment of their independence by Englandand the formation of the United States. This has been termed 'thecritical period' of American history. The colonies were united byrecollections of common suffering and of common triumph, they were notdivided by race or religion; no State aspired to separate nationality, yet they drifted rapidly towards anarchy; they were discontented athome, they were powerless abroad, above all, they nearly made shipwreckon the financial arrangements. Congress was never able, for thesatisfaction either of national needs or of national honour, to obtainfair contributions from the different States. [87] Already, further, before the Home Rule Bill has passed from the hands ofthe House of Commons Mr. Gladstone's very moderate demands, as they seemto Englishmen, are held by some Irish Nationalists to be outrageous. [88]The difference, moreover, is not a matter of calculation, to be settledby accounts and balances, or disposed of by auditors. No one can readthe statements of Nationalists such as Mr. Redmond or Mr. Clancy withoutseeing that the real difference of view lies very deep. These typicalNationalists do not regard the United Kingdom as a nation. Ireland isthe nation. They doubt what is her interest in the British Empire; theybelieve, and already hint, that the financial arrangements between thetwo countries cannot be treated as a mere pecuniary transaction. Irelandhas been overtaxed and overburdened. She has claims for compensation. All the feelings or convictions which inspired hatred of Irish landlordsare already being aroused with regard to the Imperial power. A campaignagainst tribute may become as popular as a campaign against rent. Thetwo campaigns indeed have a close affinity; a large portion of thetribute is in reality payment in respect of rent, and the instalmentswhich an Irish farmer pays to buy his land will, to him at any rate, appear rent or tribute payable to Great Britain. The rent or tributewill be collected under the new constitution by the IrishGovernment. [89] No Irish Ministry will relish the position of collector. It would have been difficult for a landlord to collect rent after hisagent had publicly announced that it was excessive and unjust. Yet alandlord could dismiss his agent; the English Cabinet cannot dismiss theIrish Government. It is certain too that the Irish Ministry will notfind the collection of rent easy. Should the Irish Government state thatthe rent is iniquitously high, and refuse to collect it, what will bethe position of the British Ministry? It must either set theconstitution aside or undertake for itself the collection of rent inopposition to, or, at any rate, unaided by, the Irish Executive and theIrish Parliament. No more odious task was ever undertaken by agovernment. Suppose, however, that things do not come to the worst, thefinancial arrangements of the Bill ensure that Ireland will soon demandmodifications of its provisions. Opposition is a probability, discontentis a certainty. Ireland is provided under the new constitution with the readiest meansof nullifying the Restrictions. The Irish Cabinet and its servants canat any moment reduce an unpopular law to a nullity. Even in England aresolution of the House of Commons may be enough to turn a law into adead letter. The Imperial Cabinet at this moment could go very nearmaking the Vaccination Acts of no effect, and by declining to havetroops sent to Hull could, as I have already pointed out, give victoryto the Trades Unionists. Nor is it necessary that the Cabinet shoulddecline sending forces to Hull for the support of the law. An intimationthat persons accused of intimidation would either not be prosecuted atall, or if prosecuted and convicted, would be pardoned, would besufficient of itself to make the strike successful. In no country couldthe Executive do more to render laws ineffectual than in Ireland. TheIrish Cabinet might by mere inaction render the collection of rentimpossible; they might, as I have already pointed out, give tacitencouragement to smuggling. If the people regarded a coastguard as anenemy, if he and his family were left severely alone, if he were oftenmaltreated and occasionally shot, his position might be a difficult one, even if supported by the whole force of the state. But if smuggling wereregarded as no crime, if the smuggler were looked upon as the patriotwho deprived an alien power of a revenue to which England had no right, it is clear that nothing but the energetic support of all the centraland local authorities in the country could give a revenue officer theremotest chance of victory in his contest with smugglers. But supposethe national government were apathetic, suppose that the Irish Ministrylooked with favourable eye on the diminution of English revenue; supposethat no Irish official gave any aid to a custom-house officer; supposethat, if a British coastguardsman were murdered, Irish detectives madeno effort to discover the wrong-doer; and that when the culprit wasdiscovered the Irish law officers hesitated to prosecute; suppose thatwhen a prosecution took place the Attorney-General showed that his heartwas not in the matter, and that the jury acquitted a ruffian clearlyguilty of murder, is it not as clear as day that smuggling wouldflourish and no customs be collected? In the same way the Irish Ministrymight by mere apathy, by the very easy process of doing nothing, nullifythe effect of judgments delivered by the Exchequer judges, and the IrishMinistry would show very little ingenuity if they could not without anyopen breach of the law impede the carrying out of executions against thegoods of persons whom popular feeling treated as patriots. The Irish Executive might, as already pointed out, [90] easily raise anIrish army. Drilling countenanced or winked at by the Irish Ministrycould never be stopped by the British Government. Prussia at the periodof her extreme weakness, and under the jealous eye of Napoleon, sentevery Prussian through the ranks. Bulgaria raised an army whilepretending to encourage athletic sports. The value of the precedent isnot likely to escape an Irish Premier. The Irish Parliament cannot legally repeal a single provision of theconstitution, but an Irish Parliament might render much of theconstitution a nullity. The Parliament might pass Acts which trenchedupon the Restrictions limiting its authority. Till treated as void suchstatutes would be the law of the land. Such voidable Acts, and evenparliamentary resolutions, [91] would go like a watchword through thecountry and encourage throughout Ireland popular resistance to Imperiallaw. A profound observer has remarked that people do not reckon highlyenough the importance at a revolutionary crisis of any show orappearance of legality. [92] Revolution acquires new force when maskedunder the form of law. This is a point which Englishmen constantlyoverlook. They know the moral influence of leagues and combinations;they do not reflect that a Parliament or House of Commons in sympathywith resistance to Imperial demands would possess tenfold the moralauthority of any National League. Note too that the Irish Ministry andthe Irish Parliament would play into one another's hands, and wouldfurther be strengthened by their Irish allies at Westminster, as also bythe Irish electoral vote in England. For the true stronghold of the Irish Government lies, under the newconstitution, at Westminster. [93] There they would command at least eighty votes: the Irish members couldstill, as now, and far more effectively than now, coerce under ordinarycircumstances any Ministry disposed to enforce the rights of theImperial Government, or, in other words, of England. Take a concrete case to which I have already referred. [94] Irish farmerswho have purchased under the Ashbourne Act grow weary of payinginstalments which are equivalent to rent. The Irish Cabinet refuses tocollect the rent; it urges its absolute inability to pay the sums due tothe Imperial Exchequer and asks for remission. Meanwhile the Irish Houseof Commons passes a resolution supporting the conduct of the IrishGovernment. The British Ministers are stern, and reject the request ofthe Irish Cabinet. The Cabinet at Dublin retire from office. Nosuccessors can be appointed who command the support of the IrishParliament. The Lord Lieutenant advises the Government at home thatthings have come to a deadlock and that a dissolution will changenothing. Thereupon the Irish members at Westminster begin to move; theythreaten general hostility to the British Ministry. They proffer their support to the Opposition. It may of course happenthat the British Ministry can, like the Unionist Government of 1886, defy the Opposition and the Irish members combined. If so the EnglishCabinet can risk a constitutional conflict in Ireland, though it is aconflict likely to end in disturbance or civil war. But judging thefuture by the past the eighty members will hold the balance of power. Ifso their course is clear. They expel from office the Ministers who haveprotected the rights of the Imperial Government. A weak Ministrydepending on Irish votes rules, or rather is ruled, at Downing Street. Every one knows how, under the supposed conditions, the affair willend. There will be a transaction of some sort, and we may be certainthat such a transaction will be to the advantage of the IrishGovernment, and will weaken or discredit Imperial or English authority. We come round here to the root of the whole matter. Were theRestrictions on the power of the Irish Parliament real and easilyenforceable, were the obligations imposed upon or undertaken by theIrish people obligations of which an English Ministry could at oncecompel the fulfilment, Restrictions and obligations alike would berendered futile and unreal by the presence of the Irish members atWestminster. Every Home Rule scheme which can be proposed is impoliticand is as dangerous as Separation; but the most impolitic of allpossible forms of Home Rule is the scheme embodied in the Bill of 1893. Its special and irremediable flaw is the retention of the Irish membersat Westminster. This governs and vitiates all the leading provisions ofthe new constitution. Under its influence every conceivable safeguard, the supreme authority of Parliament, the veto, the legal restrictions onthe competence of the Irish legislature melt away into nothing. They are some of them capable of doing harm, they are none of themcapable of doing good. Cast a glance back at the leading features of the new constitution. The Imperial Parliament remains in form unchanged, and retains theattribute of nominal sovereignty. But in Ireland the Imperial Parliamentsurrenders all, or nearly all, the characteristics of true and effectivepower; it retains in fact in Ireland nothing more than the right toeffect under the semblance of a legal proceeding a revolution whichafter all must be carried out by force. For practical purposes it has nomore power at Dublin than it has at Melbourne, _i. E. _ it retains atDublin scarcely any real power whatever. For the sake of this nominal and shadowy authority the ImperialParliament is itself transformed into a strange cross between a BritishParliament and the Congress of an Anglo-Irish Federation. The Irish Executive and the Irish Parliament become under the newconstitution the true and real Government of Ireland. But the IrishGovernment and the Irish people are fettered by Restrictions which wouldnot be borne by the Government or the people of a self-governing colony. These Restrictions are ineffective to bind, but they are certain togall, and if taken together with onerous financial obligations to GreatBritain, which whether just or not must have an air of hardness, andwith the habitual presence in Ireland of a British army under thedirection of the British Executive, lay an ample foundation for the mostirritating of conflicts. The new constitution, lastly, places in the hands of the Irish peopleample means for constitutional or extra-constitutional resistance toImperial, or in fact to English, power, and almost ensures the successof Ireland in any constitutional conflict. The presence of the Irishmembers at Westminster saves, or proclaims, the nominal sovereignty ofthe Imperial Parliament; but their presence in truth makes thissovereignty unexercisable, and therefore worthless, and while increasingthe apparent power ensures the real weakness of England. FOOTNOTES: [25] Thus little, if anything, is said in these pages on theconstitution of the Irish Legislature, though it is in several points, and especially in the character of the Legislative Council, open tograve criticism. Little, again, is said of the financial arrangements intheir fiscal character. The topic is of the highest importance, but itmust be debated in the main by experts. My remarks upon thesearrangements refer almost exclusively to the way in which they mayaffect the working of the constitution. The inclusion of Ulster withinthe operation of the Bill and the refusal to give weight to the demandof Ulster that the Act of Union should not be touched, are of coursematters of primary importance. They ought never to be distant from thethoughts of any one concerned with the policy or impolicy of Home Rule;they dominate, so to speak, the whole political situation; they areconstantly referred to in these pages; but they do not form part of thenew constitution so much as conditions which affect the prudence orjustice of creating the new constitution. [26] Bill, 1893, Preamble, and clauses 33, 37. [27] The language of clause 33 is vague, but, according to the bestinterpretation I can put upon it, its effect as to laws made for Irelandafter the Home Rule Bill becomes law will be this: The ImperialParliament will be able to pass enactments of any description whateverwith regard to Ireland, and the Irish Legislature will not be able torepeal or alter any enactments so enacted by the Imperial Parliamentwhich are expressly extended to Ireland. Thus the Irish Parliamentmight, it is submitted, on the Home Rule Bill passing into law repealthe Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict. C. 20. But if, after the Home Rule Bill passed into law, the Criminal Law andProcedure (Ireland) Act, 1887, were continued, or after its repeal bythe Irish Parliament were re-enacted, by the Imperial Parliament, thenthe Irish Parliament could not repeal the Act or any part of it. Stillclause 33 of the Home Rule Bill is much too vaguely expressed. What, forexample, is the effect of an Act of the Imperial Parliament which is'impliedly' extended to Ireland? If my interpretation of the clause isthe right one, the meaning of the clause ought to be made perfectlyclear; ambiguity in such a matter is unpardonable. [28] See pp. 4-6 _ante_. This ambiguity underlies and vitiates almostevery argument used by Home Rulers, whether English or Irish, in favourof Home Rule. English Home Rulers emphasise and exaggerate the extent ofthe control, or the so-called supremacy, which, after the establishmentof an Irish Parliament, can and will be exerted in Ireland by theImperial Parliament at Westminster. Irish Home Rulers, when addressingEnglish electors, or the Imperial Parliament, often use language whichresembles the phrases of their English allies. But assuredly Irish HomeRulers, when addressing Irishmen, or when collecting subscriptions fromAmerican citizens of Irish descent, speak the language of IrishNationalists and cut down the effective supremacy of the ImperialParliament after the granting of Home Rule so as to make it consistentwith the war cry of 'Ireland a Nation. ' (Compare Cambray's _IrishAffairs and the Home Rule Question_, pp. 48-65. ) [29] Mr. Sexton, Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 319;Mr. Redmond, Feb. 14, 1893, _ibid_. Pp. 350-52; and April 13, 1893, _ibid_. P. 414. Compare especially language of Mr. Redmond, _IrishIndependent, _ Feb. 17, and note that all the arguments for Home Ruledrawn from its success or alleged success in the British Colonies implythat the relation of the Imperial Parliament to Ireland shall resembleits relation to the Colonies. See generally, debate of May 16 in _TheTimes, _ May 17, pp. 6-8. [30] Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 303. [31] April 14, 1893, _ibid_. Pp. 439, 440. [32] Feb. 14, 1893, _ibid_. Pp. 340, 341, 343. [33] Bill, clause 12, sub-clause (3). [34] This is the only sense in which the sovereignty of the ImperialParliament is inalienable. This should be noted, because a strange andabsurd dogma is sometimes propounded that a sovereign power such as theParliament of the United Kingdom, can never by its own act divest itselfof sovereignty, and it is thence inferred or hinted that there is noneed for the Imperial Parliament to take measures for the preservationof its supremacy. The dogma is both logically and historicallyuntenable. A sovereign of any kind can abdicate. A Czar can lay down hispower, and so also can a Parliament. To argue or imply that becausesovereignty is not limitable (which is true) it cannot be surrendered(which is palpably untrue) involves the confusion of two distinct ideas. It is like arguing that because no man can while he lives give up, dowhat he will, his freedom of volition, so no man can commit suicide. Asovereign power can divest itself of authority in two ways. It may putan end to its own existence or abdicate. It may transfer sovereignauthority to another person, or body of persons, of which body it may, or may not, form part. The Parliaments both of England and of Scotlanddid at the time of the Union each transfer sovereign power to a newsovereign body, namely the Parliament of Great Britain. The BritishParliament did in 1782 surrender its sovereignty in Ireland to the IrishParliament. In 1800 both the British Parliament and the Irish Parliamentalienated or surrendered their sovereign powers to the Parliament of theUnited Kingdom. Compare Dicey, _Law of the Constitution_ (7th ed. ), note3, p. 65. [35] It may, I am quite aware, be argued that the presence of Irishrepresentatives is not requisite for the maintenance of parliamentarysupremacy. In theory it is not. An arrangement might quite conceivablybe made (which if Home Rule were to be conceded might be the leastobjectionable method of carrying out a radically vicious policy) underwhich it should be distinctly agreed that Ireland should occupy theposition of a self-governing colony with all the immunities anddisadvantages thereof, and should cease to be represented atWestminster, whilst the British Parliament retained the right toabolish, or modify, the Irish constitution. Such an arrangement would, however, make it perfectly plain that the sovereignty of the BritishParliament meant in Ireland what the sovereignty of the ImperialParliament now means in New Zealand. But 'the retention of the Irishmembers is a matter of great public importance' (at any rate in theopinion of Mr. Gladstone) 'because it visibly exhibits that supremacy'(_i. E. _ the supremacy of Parliament) 'in a manner intelligible to thepeople. '--Mr. Gladstone, Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 306. See as to Home Rule in the character of colonial independence, _England's Case against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 197-218. [36] _i. E. _ at the moment when these pages are written. What parts ofthe Government of Ireland Bill may or may not be officially deemedessential by the time these pages appear in print, no sensible man willundertake to predict. Mr. Gladstone's own language is mostextraordinary. On the retention of the Irish members, which in the eyesof any ordinary man affects the whole character of the new constitution, and essentially distinguishes the Home Rule policy of 1886 from the HomeRule policy of 1893, he uses (_inter alia_) these words: 'On theimportant subject of the retention of the Irish members I do not regardit, and I never have regarded it, as touching what may be called theprinciples of the Bill. It is not included in one of them. But whetherit be a principle of the Bill or not, there is no question that it is avery weighty and, if I may say so, an organic detail which cuts ratherdeep in some respects into the composition of the Bill. '--Mr. Gladstone, Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, pp. 305, 306. Thisstatement, with the whole passage of which it forms part, is asastounding as would have been a statement by Lord John Russell onintroducing the great Reform Bill, that he could not say whether thedisfranchisement of rotten boroughs did or did not form a principle ofthe measure. [37] Compare Report of Special Commission, pp. 18, 19. [38] Under the Home Rule Bill of 1893 as sent up to the House of Lords, it would have been the 'constant presence. ' [39] The division of parties in an American State is governed not byquestions concerning the internal affairs of the State, but by thequestions which divide parties at Washington. State politics depend uponfederal politics. 'The national parties have engulfed the State parties. The latter have disappeared absolutely as independent bodies, andsurvive merely as branches of the national parties, working each in itsown State for the tenets and purposes which a national party professesand seeks to attain. ' See Bryce, _American Commonwealth_, ii. P. 194. [40] _i. E. _ in 1893. [41] Mr. Morley at Newcastle, _The Times_, April 22, 1886. [42] Now Lord Morley of Blackburn. [43] _i. E. _ in 1893, and as they continue to be in 1911. [44] Mr. Morley at Newcastle, _The Times_, April 22, 1886. [Morley'sargument applied primarily, no doubt, to the Home Rule Bill of 1886; itsforce, however, was infinitely strengthened as applied to the Home RuleBill of 1893 by the change which retained eighty Irish members atWestminster with unrestricted powers of legislation. The tenor of hisargument applies, I contend with confidence, to any Home Rule Bill whichshall propose to give Ireland a real Irish Parliament led by an IrishCabinet, and at the same time to retain representatives of Ireland asmembers of the British Parliament. ] [45] See p. 43, _ante_. [46] See Motley's speech, _Times_, April _22_, 1886. [47] See Bill, Third Schedule. [48] This is at any rate the opinion of Mr. Redmond expressed in the_Nineteenth Century_, Oct. 1892. [49] Bill, clause 9, sub-clause (3). [50] The authors of the Home Rule Bill foresee the possibility of suchan erroneous decision. They have carefully provided that such an errorshall have no legal effect. Clause 9, sub-clause (4), 'Compliance withthe provisions of this section shall not be questioned otherwise than ineach House in manner provided by the House, ' is in reality a provisionsanctioning the grossest unfairness. Its effect is that a British Billpassed solely by virtue of the Irish vote is, on its becoming an Act, good law, in spite of its having been passed in violation of theconstitutional rule laid down in clause 9, sub-clause (3), that an Irishmember shall not be entitled to deliberate or vote on any Bill theoperation of which is confined to Great Britain. [51] Compare Bill, clause 9, sub-clause (3), and sub-clause (4), whichprovides that 'compliance with the provisions of this section shall notbe questioned otherwise than in each House in manner provided by theHouse. ' [52] 23 Geo. III. C. 28. [53] The reader, in order to understand this account of the proposedconstitution of 1886, should remember that under that constitution therewere in effect, though not in name, constituted three differentParliaments, which must be carefully distinguished. 1. The British Parliament at Westminster, containing no Irish members, which was to legislate for Great Britain and for the whole British Empire except Ireland. 2. The Irish Parliament at Dublin, containing no British representatives, which was to legislate for Ireland, but which was not to legislate for England, Scotland, or for any other part of the British Empire, and was not to have any voice whatever in the general policy of the Empire. 3. The Imperial Parliament also sitting at Westminster, and comprising both the British and the Irish Parliament. This body would have corresponded nearly, if not exactly, with the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom, and was intended to come together only on special occasions and for a special purpose, namely the revision or the alteration of the Gladstonian constitution. For the fuller explanation of the whole of this subject see _England's Case against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 234, 238 Note that England gains little or nothing (as compared with what wasoffered to her under the Home Rule Bill of 1886) by the ImperialParliament retaining the power to legislate for Ireland, for even underthat Bill the Imperial Parliament (_i. E. _ the Parliament at Westminsterwhen consisting both of British and of Irish members) could legislatefor Ireland. [54] _Unionist Delusions_, pp. 6-9. [55] The following passage from the writings of a man whose words, whilst he was yet amongst us, Unionists and Gladstonians alike alwaysheard with the respect due to sense, to ability, to knowledge, and tofairness, deserves attention:-- 'In Mr. Gladstone's proposed measure of Home Rule' _[i. E. _ the Bill of 1886]' the Parliament sitting at Westminster was no longer to contain Irish members. I hold this to be an essential feature of the scheme, an essential feature of any scheme of Home Rule. By Mr. Gladstone's scheme, Ireland was formally to exchange a nominal voice, both in its own affairs and in common affairs, for the real management of its own affairs and no voice at all in common affairs. This is the true relation of Home Rule. As dependent Canada has no representatives in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, so neither would dependent Ireland have representatives in the Parliament of Great Britain. I am unable to understand why this provision, which seemed so naturally to follow from the rest of the scheme, awakened so powerful an opposition among Mr. Gladstone's own supporters. I believe the Irish have no wish to appear in the British Parliament. They wish to manage their own affairs, and are ready to leave Great Britain to manage its own affairs and those of the "Empire" to boot. It is very hard to see in what character the Irish members are to show themselves at Westminster. If they may vote on British affairs, while the British members do not vote on Irish affairs, surely too great a privilege is given to Ireland; it is Great Britain which will become the dependency. If they are to vote on "Imperial" affairs only, to say nothing of the difficulty of defining such affairs, it will be something very strange, very novel, very hard to work, to have members of Parliament who are only half-members, who must walk out of the House whenever certain classes of subjects are discussed. ' (E. A. Freeman, 'Irish Home Rule and its Analogies, ' _The New Princeton Review_, vi. Pp. 194, 195. ) Mr. Freeman's language proves that I have not overrated the essentialdifference or opposition between the Home Rule policy of 1886 and theHome Rule policy of 1893. [56] It is styled in the Home Rule Bill 'an Executive Committee of thePrivy Council of Ireland. ' [57] If there were reason to expect (which there is not) that the HomeRule Bill would pass into law, it would be worth while to considercarefully a question which has not yet engaged the attention of Englishstatesmen: Is it desirable that under a system of Home Rule the IrishExecutive should be a Parliamentry Ministry? The answer to this questionis by no means clear. Both in the United States, and in every State ofthe Union, the executive power is lodged in the hands of an official whois neither appointed nor removable by the Legislature. The same remarkapplies to the Executive of the German Empire. In Switzerland theMinistry, or Council of State, is indeed appointed, but is not removableby the Federal Assembly or Parliament. Arguments certainly might besuggested in favour of creating for Ireland an Executive whose tenure ofoffice might be independent of the will of the Irish Parliament. Ireland, in short, like many other countries, might gain by thepossession of a non-parliamentary Executive. See as to the distinctionbetween a parliamentary and a non-parliamentary Executive, _Law of theConstitution_ (7th ed. ), App. P. 480. [58] See Bill, clause 14. [59] This would apparently approve itself to Dr. Nulty, Roman CatholicBishop of Meath. Of Mr. Justice Andrews he seems to have written that'this Judge is a Unitarian, ' and that it appears to the Bishop that 'theman who denies the divinity of our Lord is as incompetent to form clear, correct, and reliable conceptions of the feelings, the instincts, theopinions, and the religious convictions of an intensely Irish populationas if they were inhabitants of another planet. ' See _The Times_, April3, 1893, p. 8, where a correspondent from Ireland purports to give theeffect of a pamphlet by Dr. Nulty. The Bishop wrote, I suppose, with aview to Mr. Justice Andrews' opinions as to priestly influence atelections, but the Bishop's words suggest the inference that thegovernment of a Catholic country ought to appoint Catholic Judges. Whyshould we be surprised at this? Religious toleration is not a doctrineof the Roman Catholic Church. [60] See Home Rule Bill, 1893, clause 35, p. 214, _post_. [61] 'I am not suggesting for a moment that we are going to set up inIreland two independent and separate Executives. I think the granting ofHome Rule in any intelligible sense would be entirely incomplete if itwere not supplemented by the granting of executive power, and in myjudgment the Executive in Ireland is intended to be and must bedependent upon and responsible to the Irish Legislature in Irishaffairs. But that does not in the least prevent the retention in theCrown of the executive government of the United Kingdom, as it providedin this Bill such executive authority as is necessary for the executionof the Imperial laws' (sic). Mr. Asquith, April 14, 1893, _TimesParliamentary Debates_, p. 440. Compare _Hansard_, vol. Xi. Same date, p. 348. [62] Bill, clause 30. [63] This is technically expressed in the Bill by the provision that'the two forces [viz. The Royal Irish Constabulary and the DublinMetropolitan Police] shall, while they continue, be subject to thecontrol of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty. ' As to themilitary or naval forces of the Crown, the Bill contains no provision, but it cannot, it is submitted, be doubted that they will remain subjectto the Imperial Government, and, except with the sanction of theImperial Government, will not be subject to the control of the IrishExecutive. [64] See Bill, clauses 1-5, and as to the Restrictions on itslegislative power, see pp. 80-110, _post_. [65] See two excellent articles in the _Spectator_ of February 25 andMarch 4, 1893. [66] Of course all these statements are to be taken subject to theRestrictions placed on the powers of the Irish Legislature by Bill, clauses 3, 4, pp. 197, 198 _post_. [67] These Restrictions, or safeguards, deprive Ireland of powers infact possessed by the Legislature of any self-governing colony, and Ibelieve by the Isle of Man or Jersey. [Compare the Home Rule Bill 1893, clause 3, sub-clause (3) (p. 197, _post_, ) as it appears in the originalBill, with the same clause as amended by the House of Commons and sentup to the House of Lords. The original clause forbids the IrishParliament to make any law in respect (_inter alia_) of 'naval ormilitary forces or the defence of the realm. ' The clause as amended bythe House of Commons forbids the Irish Parliament to make any law inrespect of '(3. ) Navy, Army, Militia, Volunteers, and any other militaryforces, or the defence of the realm, or forts, or permanent militarycamps, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, orany places purchased for the erection thereof. ' In 1893, Unionists and Gladstonians alike were determined that on nopretence whatever should an Irish Parliament be allowed to raise anIrish army, even of volunteers. The very name of 'volunteers, ' and thehistory of 1780-82, explain and justify their prudence. [68] Clause 4, sub-clause (1) to (4). [69] For the details of the Restrictions contained in clauses 3 and 4the reader should study carefully the terms of the Bill itself. SeeBill, in Appendix. [70] In more than one case it is pretty clear that the Restrictions arein themselves ineffective. Take these instances:-- 1. The Restrictions do not really prevent the drilling of an armed force. The Act which makes drilling illegal is a statute of 1819, 60 Geo. III. 1 Geo. IV. C. 1. This Act applies to Ireland and cannot (it is submitted) be repealed by the Irish Parliament. But this statute of 1819 might easily be evaded, for by sec. 1 meetings for training and drilling may be allowed by any two Justices of the Peace. The Irish Executive might, and probably would, appoint plenty of justices who were willing to allow training and drilling. The men thus trained and drilled could not, I conceive, technically be made a volunteer force, but they might, for all that, be a very dangerous armed body. 2. It is not certain what is the real effect of the provisions whereby no 'person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. ' Does it, for example, preserve a right to trial by jury? I doubt whether it does. American judgments on the same words in United States Constitution, Amendments, art. 14, would of course have no legal authority in the United Kingdom, and there is a special reason why they often could not be followed. No process would (it is submitted) be considered in an Irish or British Court as not a 'due' process, for which a parallel could be found in the legislation of the Imperial Parliament. But the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, sec. 1, to instance no other enactment, took away the right to trial by jury in cases of trial for treason, murder, etc. 3. Private property might still in fact be taken without just compensation. The Privy Council would not apparently have to consider whether in any given case property was taken without just compensation, but whether a particular law was a law whereby it might be taken without just compensation. Suppose, for example, Sir James Mathew and the commissioners who sat with him were constituted by an Irish Act a Court for determining what compensation should be given for the taking of certain property for public use, and the Act itself provided that just compensation must be given. It is very doubtful how far the Privy Council could treat the Act as invalid, or could in any way enter upon the question whether just compensation had been given. Yet it is plain that such a Court might give very far from just compensation, say to Lord Clanricarde. [71] Constitution, art. I sect. 10. [72] See Mr. J. Morley, April 18, 1893, _Times Parl. Deb. _, p. 500. [73] See Bill, clause 5, sub-clause (3). The language of this clausedisposes of the contention put forward by at least one Gladstoniancandidate at the last general election [_i. E. _ of 1892], that the vetomust of necessity be exercised under the control of the British Cabinet;an arrangement too futile for an ardent Gladstonian to contemplate aspossible is therefore actually enacted in the Government of IrelandBill. [74] It is to be presumed that the Crown, or in effect the BritishCabinet, does not in the case of Ireland retain the power of'disallowance' under which the Crown occasionally annuls colonial Actswhich have received the assent of a colonial Governor. The power todisallow an Irish Act which, though not unconstitutional, has workedinjustice, might be of advantage. But in truth the parliamentary methodsfor enforcing the Restrictions or safeguards are utterly unreal; they donot repay examination; whether there be two sham modes of enforcement, or one, must be to a sensible man a matter of indifference. As to thedisallowance of Acts see Rules and Regulations published for the use ofthe Colonial Office, chap. Iii. ; Legislative Councils and Assemblies, Rules 48-54; British North America Act, 1868, sections 55-57; _England'sCase against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), p. 33. [Compare Dicey, _Law ofConstitution_ (7th ed. ), pp. 111-114. ] [75] The appeal to the English Privy Council, both under clauses 19, _22_, and 23 of the Bill, appears to be in each case an appeal to theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council. [The particular provisionscontained in the Home Rule Bill, 1893, as to an appeal to the PrivyCouncil, etc. , are now of little direct importance, but they are worthstudy as showing the extreme difficulty of providing any satisfactorybody for acting as a Court called upon to decide the numerousconstitutional questions, as to the legislative power of an IrishParliament, which must be raised under any Home Rule Act whatever. ] [76] See Bill, clause 23. [77] See Tocqueville, _Démocratie en Amérique_, i. Chap. Viii. Pp. 231-250; Bryce, _American Commonwealth_, ii. (1st ed. ) p. 45; _ibid. _ i. Ch. 23. [78] Compare _England's Case against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 257, 258. [79] Compare Bill, clauses 19, 22, pp. 206, 209, _post. _ [80] Bill, clause 19, sub-clause(4). [81] Clause 19, sub-clause (5). The whole of the provisions as to theExchequer Judges are extremely obscure. The jurisdiction and the powersof the Court, should it ever be formed, will need to be defined by aspecial Act of Parliament. There are special laws regulating the actionof the Federal Judiciary both in the United States and in Switzerland. As the matter at present stands the jurisdiction of the Exchequer Judgesand of the Privy Council as a Court of Appeal from them may apparentlybe thus described. It extends to all legal proceedings in Ireland which (i) are instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs, or any of their officers, or (ii) relate to the election of members to serve in [the Imperial] Parliament, or (iii) touch any matter not within the powers of the Irish Legislature, or (iv) touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish Legislature have not power to repeal or alter. It is possible that sub-clause (4) gives the Exchequer Judges a muchwider jurisdiction than is intended by the authors of the Home RuleBill, and the strictures which have been made on this sub-clause deserveattention. My purpose, however, is not to criticise the details of theHome Rule Bill or to suggest amendments thereto. Its fundamentalprinciple is, in the eyes of every Unionist, unsound, and the Billitself therefore unamendable. My object is simply to describe andcriticise the general constitutional provisions of the Bill and to showtheir bearing and effect. [82] Compare _England's Case_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 258, 259. [83] See _England's Case_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 214-218. [84] See Home Rule Bill, clause 3, sub-clause (7) (p. 198, _post_), andcompare same clause slightly amended, in Bill, as sent up to the Houseof Lords, sub-clause (8). [85] These strictures on the financial arrangements which were to existbetween England and Ireland apply directly to the Home Rule Bill asintroduced into the House of Commons, but they are less applicable tothe Bill as amended, more or less in favour of Ireland, before the Billwas sent up to the House of Lords. Compare clause 10 of the originalBill with clause 11 of the Bill as amended and brought up to the Houseof Lords. [86] Bill, clauses 14, 15, and 16. [Compare with these clauses of theoriginal Bill clauses 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the Bill as amended beforebeing sent to the House of Lords. ] [87] See Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_, chs. Iii. And iv. [88] See, _e. G. _, letter of Mr. Clancy, M. P. , on the Financial Clauses ofthe Home Rule Bill, _Manchester Guardian_, April 4, 1893. [89] Bill, clause 15. [90] See pp. 72 and 82, _ante_. [91] See pp. 79, 80, _ante_. [92] _Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville_, p. 63. [93] The reader should note the history of the insurrection in Ticinoduring 1891. It is quite clear that the Liberals of Ticino who haddistinctly broken the law were more or less comforted or protected bythe Liberal party in the Swiss Federal Assembly. Compare Hilty, _Separatabdruck aus dem Politischen Jahrbuch der SchweizerischenEidgenossenschaft_ (_Jahrgang_ 1891). [94] See p. 103, _ante_. [The force of this illustration has beenincreased by every Land Act passed since 1893. 'The Imperial Exchequer[_i. E. _ in effect Great Britain] has made a free grant of £17, 000, 000towards furthering land purchase; moreover to that end it has expressedits willingness to pledge its credit to the amount of £183, 000, 000 ofwhich over £35, 000, 000 has already been raised. The Imperial Exchequerlooks to the Irish tenant purchaser for the interest and sinking fund onthat loan. '--Cambray, _Irish Affairs_, p. 214. ] CHAPTER III WHY THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BE ASETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION '_We believe that this measure [the Home Rule Bill] when improved inCommittee will be, at all events in our time, a final settlement of theIrish question_. '[95] 'Five speeches were made from the Irish benches ... There was not one ofthose speeches which fell short of what we have declared to be in ouropinion necessary for the acceptance of this Bill. That is where welook for a durable and solid statement as to finality. We find the word_finality_ not even eschewed by the generous unreserve of the honourablemember for North Longford[96] who attached the character of finality tothe Bill.... What said the honourable member for Kerry[97] last night?He said, "_This is a Bill that will end the feud of ages_" This isexactly what we want to do. That is what I call acceptance by the Irishmembers of this Bill.... _What we mean by this Bill is to close and burya controversy of seven hundred years. '_[98] This hope of ending the feud of ages has been for years dangled byGladstonians before the English electorate. It has gained thousands ofvotes for Home Rule. But it is doomed to disappointment. The newconstitution will never be a settlement of the Irish question: and thisfor three reasons, which can be definitely stated and easily understood. _First. _ The new constitution satisfies neither Ireland nor England. It does not satisfy Ireland. Ulster, Protestant Ireland, and indeed, speaking generally, all men ofproperty in Ireland, whether Protestant or Catholic, detest Home Rule. They hate the new constitution, they protest against the newconstitution, they assert that they will to the utmost of their abilityresist the introduction and impede the working of the new constitution. Their abhorrence of Home Rule may be groundless, their threats may bebaseless; their power to give effect to their menaces may have noexistence. All that I now contend is that the strongest, and the mostenergetic, part of Irish society is in fact and in truth bitterlyopposed, not only to the details, but to the fundamental principle, ofthe new polity. It avails nothing to urge that the Protestants and theeducated Catholics are in a minority. This plea shows that in Parliamentthey can be outvoted; it does not show that they will, or can, bepacified by a policy which runs counter to their traditions, theirinterests, and their sentiment. You cannot vote men into content, youcannot coerce them into satisfaction. Let us look facts in the face. Themeasure which is supposed to gratify Ireland satisfies at most amajority of Irishmen. This may be enough for a Parliamentary tactician, it is not enough for a far-seeing statesman or a man of plain commonsense. When we are told a minority are filled with discontent, we mustask who constitute the minority. When we find that the minority consistsof men of all descriptions and of all creeds, that they represent theeducation, the respectability, the worth, and the wealth of Ireland, wemust be filled with alarm. Wealth, no doubt, is no certain sign ofvirtue, any more than poverty can be identified with vice; a rich manmay be a scoundrel, and a poor man may be an honour to the human race, but the world would be much worse constituted than it is, if thepossession of a competence were not connected with honesty, energy, adherence to duty, and every other civic virtue. When it is said oradmitted by Gladstonians that the propertied classes of Ireland areagainst Home Rule we know what this means; it means that the energy ofIreland is against Home Rule, that the honesty of Ireland is againstHome Rule, that the learning of Ireland is against Home Rule, that allthat makes a nation great is against Home Rule, and that the Irishmenmost entitled to our respect and honour implore us not to force uponthem the curse of Home Rule. This is no trifle. Let us at any rate havedone with phrases; let us admit that the satisfaction of Ireland meansmerely the satisfaction of a class, though it may be the most numerousclass of Irishmen, and that it also means the bitter discontent of theone class of Irishmen who are specially loyal to Great Britain. If weare closing one feud we are assuredly opening another feud which it mayat least be as hard to heal. But is it true that even the Home Rulers of Ireland are satisfied? Theirrepresentatives indeed accept the new constitution. Their acceptance maywell, as far as intention goes, be honest. Mr. Davitt, I dare say, whenhe sentimentalises in the House of Commons about his affection for theEnglish democracy, is nearly, though not quite, as sincere as when heused to express passionate hatred of England. [99] But acquiescence isone thing, satisfaction is another. There is every reason why the Irishmembers should acquiesce in the new constitution. They obtain much, andthey gain the means of getting more. Quite possibly they feel grateful. But their gratitude is not the gratitude of Ireland, and gratitude ishardly a sentiment possible, or indeed becoming, to a nation. England saved Portugal and Spain from the domination of France. Do wefind that Portuguese and Spaniards gladly subordinate their interests tothe welfare of England? France delivered Italy from thraldom to Austria;French blood paid the price of Italian freedom. Yet France is detestedfrom one end of Italy to the other, whilst Italians rejoice in thealliance with Austria. In all this there is nothing unreasonable andnothing to blame. Policy is not sentimentality, and the relations ofpeoples cannot be regulated in the same manner as the relations ofindividuals. Thirty, twenty, ten, five years hence all the sentiment ofthe year 1893 will have vanished. Irish content and satisfaction must, if it is to exist at all, rest on a far more solid basis than the hopes, the words, the pledges, or the intentions of Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. Sexton, or Mr. Davitt. Note that their satisfaction is even now of a limitedkind. It absolutely depends on the new constitution being worked exactlyin the way which they desire. The use of the veto, legislation forIreland by the Imperial Parliament, any conflict between the wish ofEngland and the wish, I do not say of Ireland, but of the IrishNationalists, must from the nature of things put an end to all gratitudeor content. But we may go further than this: the new constitutioncontains elements of discord. It denies to Ireland the rights of anation; it does not concede to her the full privileges of colonialindependence. No genuine Nationalist can really acquiesce in theprohibition of Ireland's arming even in self-defence. Where, again, isthe Nationalist who is prepared to say that he will not if the Bill ispassed demand that every conspirator and every dynamiter, who issuffering for the cause of Ireland, shall be released from prison? Is itcredible that the Land Leaguers have forgotten what is due to thewounded soldiers of their cause? Are they prepared to forget theimperative claims of evicted tenants or imprisoned zealots?[100] Icannot believe it. But if they are so base as to forget what is due to their friends andvictims, what trust could England place in the permanence of anysentiment expressed by such men with however much temporary fervour andhowever much apparent honesty? If, as I am convinced, the Irish leadersare not prepared to betray the fanatics or ruffians who have trusted andserved them, then with what content does England look on the prospect ofa general amnesty for criminals or of lavish rewards for breach ofcontract and the defiance of law? But in truth the new constitution provides for the general discontent, not of one class of Irishmen, but of the whole Irish people. Home Rule is at bottom federalism, and the successful working of afederal government depends on the observation by its founders of twoprinciples. The first is that no one State should be so much morepowerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with thewhole, or even with many of them combined. [101] The second is that thefederal power should never if possible come into direct conflict withthe authority of any State. Each of these well-known principles has, partly from necessity and partly from want of skill, been violated bythe constructors of the spurious federation which is to be miscalled theUnited Kingdom. The confederacy will consist of two States; the one, England, to use popular but highly significant language, in wealth, inpopulation, and in prestige immensely outweighs the other, Ireland. Andby an error less excusable because it might have been avoided, the powerof the central government will be brought into direct conflict with theauthority of the Irish State. Read the Bill as it should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the working of the new constitution, andthroughout substitute 'England' for the term 'United Kingdom. ' Note thenwhat must be the operation of the constitution in the eyes of anIrishman. The federal power is the power of England. An English Viceroyinstructed by an English Ministry will veto Bills passed by an IrishParliament and approved by the Irish people. An English court will annulIrish Acts; English revenue officers will collect Irish customs, andevery penny of the Irish customs will pass into the English Exchequer. An English army commanded by English officers, acting under the ordersof English ministers, will be quartered up and down Ireland, and, in thelast resort, English soldiers will be employed to wring money from theIrish Exchequer for the rigorous payment of debts due from Ireland toEngland. Will any Irishman of spirit bear this? Will not Irishmen of allcreeds and parties come to hate the constitution which subjects Irelandto English rule when England shall have in truth been turned into analien power? The new constitution does not in any case satisfy England. That England is opposed to Home Rule is admitted on all hands; thatEngland has good reason to oppose the new form of Home Rule with veryspecial bitterness is apparent to every Unionist, and must soon becomeapparent to any candid man, whether Gladstonian or Unionist, whocarefully studies the provisions of the new constitution, and meditateson the effect of retaining Irish representatives in the Parliament atWestminster. For my present purpose there is no need to establish thatEnglish discontent is reasonable; enough to note its existence. A consideration must be here noticed which as the controversy over HomeRule goes on will come into more and more prominence. We are engaged inrearranging new terms of union between England and Ireland; this is thereal effect of the Home Rule Bill; but for such a rearrangement GreatBritain and Ireland must in fairness, no less than in logic, be treatedas independent parties. Whether you make a Union or remodel a Unionbetween two countries the satisfaction of both parties to the treaty isessential. Till England is satisfied the new constitution lacks moralsanction. That the Act of Union could not have been carried without, atany rate, the technical assent both of Great Britain and Ireland isadmitted, and yet the moral validity of the Treaty of Union is, whetherrightly or not, after the lapse of ninety-three years assailed, on theground that the assent of Ireland was obtained by fraud and undueinfluence. But if the separate assent of both parties was required forthe making of the treaty, so the free assent of both must be requiredfor its revision, and the politicians who force on Great Britain theterms of a political partnership which Great Britain rejects, repeat in1893 and in an aggravated form the error or crime of 1800. [102] _Secondly_. The new constitution rests on an unsound foundation. It is a topsy-turvy constitution, it aims at giving weakness supremacyover strength. The main, though not the sole, object of a well-constituted polity is toplace political power (whilst guarding against its abuse) in the handsof the men, or body of men, who from the nature of things, _i. E. _ bywealth, education, position, numbers, or otherwise, form the mostpowerful portion of a given state. The varying forms of the EnglishConstitution have, on the whole, possessed the immense merit of givingat each period of our history political authority into the hands of theclass, or classes, who made up the true strength of the nation. Righthas in a rough way been combined with might. Wherever this is not thecase, and genuine power is not endowed with political authority, thereexists a sure cause of revolution; for sooner or later the naturalforces of any society must assert their predominance. No institutionwill stand which does not correspond with the nature of things. Vainwere all the efforts of party interest or of philanthropic enthusiasm togive to the Blacks political predominance in the Southern States. Votes, ballot boxes, laws, federal arms, all were in vain. By methods which noman will justify, but which no power could resist, the Whites havere-acquired political authority. The nature of things could not be madeobedient to the dogmas of democratic equality. Now the gravest flaw ofthe new constitution, the disease from which it is certain to perish, isthat, in opposition to the forces which ultimately must determine thedestiny of the United Kingdom, it renders the strong elements of thecommunity subordinate to the weak. In Ireland Dublin is made supreme over Belfast, the South is made notthe equal, but in effect the master of the North; ignorance is givendominion over education, poverty is allowed to dispose of wealth. IfIreland were an independent state, or even a self-governed Britishcolony, things would right themselves. But the politicians who are torule in Dublin will not depend upon their own resources or be checked bya sense of their own feebleness. They will be constitutionally andlegally entitled to the support of the British army; they willconstitute the worst form of government of which the world has hadexperience, a government which relying for its existence on the aid ofan external power finds in its very feebleness support for tyranny. Murmurs are already heard of armed resistance. These mutterings, we aretold, are nothing but bluster. It is at any rate that sort of "bluster"at which the justice and humanity of a loyal Englishman must take alarm. I have not yet learnt to look without horror on the possibility of civilwar, nor to picture to myself without emotion the situation of brave mencompelled by the British army to obey rulers whose moral claim toallegiance they justly deny and whose power unaided by British arms theycontemn. Civil warfare created by English policy and despotismmaintained by English arms must surely be to any Englishman objects ofequal abhorrence. But in England no less than in Ireland our new constitution givesartificial power to weakness. At Westminster the Irish members, be they80 or 103, will have no legitimate place. Mr. Gladstone on this pointis, for aught I know, at one with the Unionists. In 1886 he withoutscruple, and therefore no doubt without any sense of injustice, expelledthe representatives of Ireland from the British Parliament. In 1893 hebrings them back to Westminster. But his words betray his hesitation. Heexpects, may we not say he hopes, that they will remain in Ireland andon their occasional visits to London have the good sense and good tastenot to interfere in British affairs. Few are the persons who share theseanticipations. If they are to be realised they must be embodied in theconstitution; the Premier might at this moment without shame, andwithout regret, revert to the better policy of 1886. On his presentpolicy we all know that his expectations will not be fulfilled. Thevoluntary absence of the Irish members from Westminster is as vain adream as the fancy that Ireland under Home Rule may suffer from aplethora of money. To Westminster the Irish members will come. If theydo not come of their own accord they will be fetched by allies who needtheir help. At Westminster they will hold the balance of parties, andwill while the constitution lasts rule the destiny of England with asole regard at best to the immediate interest of Ireland, at worst tothe interests of an Irish faction. To Ireland will be given powerwithout responsibility, to England will belong responsibility withoutpower. Nor will the unnatural subjection of a great, a flourishing, awealthy, and a proud country to a weaker and poorer neighbour berendered the more bearable by the knowledge that the ill-starredsupremacy of Ireland means, in England, the equally unnatural andequally ominous predominance of an English faction, which, since itneeds Irish aid, does not command England's confidence. Radicals orrevolutionists will in the long run have bitter cause to regret anarrangement which identifies their political triumph with England'shumiliation. _Thirdly_. The new constitution is based on a play of words whichconceals two contradictory interpretations of its character. [103] The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament means to Irish Home Rulers andto most Gladstonians that Ireland shall possess colonialindependence. [104] It means to Unionists and to many electors who canhardly be called either Unionists or Gladstonians, that the BritishParliament, or, in other words, England, shall retain the real, effective, and even habitual control of Irish affairs. In the one senseit means only that Ireland shall remain part of the British Empire, inthe other that Ireland shall still be part of the United Kingdom. And, what is of great importance, the mass of Englishmen waver between thesetwo interpretations of Imperial supremacy. When they think of Home Ruleas satisfying Ireland, they hold that it gives Irishmen everything whichthey can possibly ask. When they think of Home Rule as not dismemberingthe United Kingdom, they fancy that it leaves to the British Parliamentall the real authority which Parliament can possibly require. This difference of interpretation lays the foundation ofmisunderstanding, but it does far more harm than this. It must keepIrish Nationalists alarmed, and not without reason, for the permanenceof the independence which they may have obtained. A change of feeling ora change of party may cause the Imperial Parliament to assert itsreserved authority. England keeps her pledges. [105] Yes, but here it isnot a mere question of good faith. When two contractors each from thebeginning put _bona fide_ a different interpretation upon theircontract, neither of them is chargeable with dishonesty for acting inaccordance with his own view of the agreement. The spirit of Unionismand the spirit of Separation will survive the creation of the newconstitution. Under one form or another Unionists will be opposed toFederalists and it is more than possible, should the Bill pass, that thedivision of English parties may turn upon their reading of the IrishGovernment Act, 1893. The possibility, again, that the Parliament at Westminster may assertits reserved authority, if it raises the fears of Irishman, may excitethe hopes of English politicians. If at any time the supremacy ofIreland becomes unbearable to British national sentiment, or if thecondition of Ireland menaces or is thought to menace English interests, the new constitution places in the hands of a British majority aready-made weapon for the restoration of British power. The result mightbe attained without the necessity for passing any Act of Parliament, orof repealing a single section of the Irish Government Act, 1893. Astrong Viceroy might be sent to Ireland; he might be instructed not toconvoke the Irish Parliament at all; or, having convoked, at once toprorogue it. He might thereupon form any Ministry he chose out of themembers of the Irish Privy Council. The Imperial Parliament would atonce resume its present position and could pass laws for Ireland. Thismight be called revolution or reaction. For my argument it matters nottwo straws by what name this policy be designated. The scheme sketchedout is not a policy which I recommend. My contention is not that itwill be expedient--this is a matter depending upon circumstances whichno man can foresee--but that it will be strictly and absolutely legal. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, combined with the presence ofthe Irish members at Westminster, will thus by a curious fatality turnout a source at once of permanent disquietude to Ireland and ofimmediate, if not of permanent, weakness to England. Our New Constitution is not made to last Home Rule does not close acontroversy; it opens a revolution. No one in truth expects that the new constitution will stand. Its verybuilders hesitate when they speak of its permanence, [106] and aregrateful for the generous credulity of a friend who believes in itsfinality. Nor is it hard to conjecture (and in such a matter nothing butconjecture is possible) what are the forces or tendencies which threatenits destruction. If Ireland is discontented Irishmen will demand either the extension offederalism or separation. In every federal government the tendency ofthe States is to diminish as far as possible the authority of thefederal power. But this tendency will be specially strong in thegrotesque Anglo-Irish federation, since the federal power will benothing but the predominance of England. The mode of weakening thefederal authority is only too obvious. 'The more there is of the more, 'says a profound Spanish proverb, 'the less there is of the less. ' Themore the number of separate States in the confederacy, the less will bethe weight of England, and the greater the relative authority ofIreland. Let England, Scotland, and Wales become separate States, letthe Channel Islands and Man, and, if possible, some colonies, be addedto the federation, and as the greatness of England dwindles so theindependence of Ireland will grow. Some seven years ago Sir Gavan Duffy predicted that before ten years hadelapsed there would be a federation of the Empire. [107] Like otherprophets he may have antedated the fulfilment of his prediction, but hisdictum is the forecast of an experienced politician--it points to apressing danger. Home Rule for Ireland menaces the dissolution of theUnited Kingdom, and the unity of the United Kingdom is the necessarycondition for maintaining the existence of the British Empire. Home Ruleis the first stage to federalism. But Irish discontent, should it not find satisfaction in a movement forfederalism, will naturally take the form of the demand for colonial orfor national independence. You cannot play with the spirit of politicalnationality. The semi-independence of Ireland from England, combinedwith the undue influence of Ireland in English politics, is certain toproduce both unreasonable and reasonable grounds for still furtherloosening the tie which binds together the two islands. The cry 'Irelanda nation' is one of which no Irishman need be ashamed, and to whichNorth and South alike, irritated by the vexations of a makeshiftconstitution, are, as I have already insisted, likely enough to rally. Nor is it certain that Irish Federalists or Irish Nationalists will notobtain allies in England. The politicians who are content with a lightheart to destroy the work of Pitt may, for aught I know, with equallevity, annul the Union with Scotland and undo the work of Somers, or bysevering Wales from the rest of England render futile the achievement ofthe greatest of the Plantagenets. Enthusiasts for 'Home Rule all round'would appear to regard their capacity for destroying the United Kingdomas a proof of their ability to build up a new fabric of Imperial power, and to fulfil their vain dreams of a federated Empire. Sensible men maydoubt whether a turn for revolutionary destruction is any evidence thatpoliticians possess the rare gift of constructive statesmanship. Andshould the working of the new constitution confirm these doubts, personsof prudence will begin to perceive that Irish independence is for bothEngland and Ireland a less evil than the extension of federalism. The natural expression however of English discontent or disappointmentis reactionary opposition. Reaction, or the attempt of one party in astate to reverse a fundamental policy deliberately adopted by thenation, is one of the worst among the offspring of revolution, and isalmost, though not entirely, unknown to the history of England. Yetthere is more than one reason why if the Home Rule Bill be carried, reaction should make its ill-omened appearance in the field of Englishpublic life. The policy of Home Rule, even should it be for the momentsuccessful, lacks the moral sanctions which have compelled Englishstatesmen to accept accomplished facts. The methods of agitation in itsfavour have outraged the moral sense of the community. Mr. Gladstone'svictory is the victory of Mr. Parnell, and the triumph of Parnellism isthe triumph of conspiracy, and of conspiracy rendered the more basebecause it was masked under the appearance of a constitutional movement. Neither the numbers nor the composition of the ministerial majority areimpressive. The tactics of silence, evasion, and ambiguity may aid ingaining a parliamentary victory, but deprive the victory of that respectfor the victors on the part of the vanquished which, in civil contestsat any rate, alone secures permanent peace. But the pleas andjustifications for reaction are rarely its causes. If Englishmen attemptto bring about the legal destruction of the new constitution, theiraction will be produced by a sense of the false position assigned toEngland. No device of statesmanship can stand which is condemned by thenature of things. The predominance of England in the affairs of theUnited Kingdom is secured by sanctions which in the long run can neitherbe defied nor set aside; the constitution which does not recognise thispredominance is doomed to ruin. That its overthrow would be just no onedare predict; the future is as uncertain as it is dark. A main reasonwhy a wise man must deprecate the weak surrender by Englishmen ofrightful power is the dread that, if in a moment of irritation theyreassert their strength, they may exhibit neither their good faith northeir justice. FOOTNOTES: [95] J. M'Carthy, April 10, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 354. No part of these quotations is italicised in the report. [96] J. M'Carthy. [97] Mr. Sexton. [98] Mr. Gladstone, April 21, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 565. [99] At Bodyke, June 2, 1887, Mr. M. Davitt said:--'Our people, however, who so leave Ireland are not lost in the Irish cause, for they will jointhe ranks of the Ireland of retribution beyond the Atlantic; and whenthe day shall again come that we have a right to manage our own affairs, the sun may some day shine down upon England when we here in Irelandwill have the opportunity of having vengeance upon the enemy for itscrimes in Ireland. '--_Freeman's Journal_, June 3, 1887. See 'Notes onthe Bill, ' published by the Irish Unionist Alliance, p. 368. Theseexpressions were used after the union of hearts. [100] 'But all these matters are, as it were, minor details. They allsink into comparative insignificance before the one great demand--and Ialmost apologise for mentioning them--because I want you to concentrateyour attention on the one great demand which we make, and the oneunalterable statement we intend to adhere to, that whether guilty orinnocent, these men, according to their lights and their consciences, were trying to serve Ireland; that any of them who were guilty weredriven into this course by the misgovernment of Ireland, and theoppression of Ireland by an outside power, and that if we are asked tosettle this Irish question, if we are asked to let peace reign wherediscord and hatred reign at present, there must be no victims--that ifthere is to be peace there must also be amnesty. I don't discuss thequestion of guilt or innocence. For the sake of argument I will say thatthere are some men in jail who are guilty. They must come out as well asthe innocent, because their guilt is due to misgovernment in thepast. '--Mr. Pierce Mahony, _Irish Independent_, April 5. See 'Notes onthe Bill, ' p. 423. 'There is no use in deceiving ourselves upon this matter; we would befools if we thought that in the next few weeks, or within the next fewmonths, we would succeed in getting our brethren out of prison. I don'tbelieve we will; ... But I am convinced of this, that there is not a manamongst them who will ever be called upon to serve anything like theremainder of his sentence. I am convinced that in a short time--and theextent of its duration depends upon other circumstances--every one ofthese men will be restored to liberty if only we conduct this agitationwith determination, with resolution, and I would say above all withmoderation and with wisdom. '--Mr. John Redmond, M. P. , _Dublin IrishIndependent_, April 5. See 'Notes on the Bill, ' p. 424. [101] See Mill, _Representative Government_, 1st ed. P. 300. [102] Of course I do not for a moment dispute the legal right ofParliament to repeal all or any of the articles of the Treaty of Unionwith Ireland. I am writing now not upon the law, but upon the ethics ofthe constitution. My contention is, that, as things stand, the undoubtedassent of Great Britain (or even perhaps of England, in the narrowersense) is morally requisite for the repeal or at any rate for theremodelling of the Treaty of Union. Note that Ireland would standmorally and logically in a stronger position if demanding Separationthan when demanding a revision of the Act of Union. An example shows mymeaning. _A, B_, and _C_ form a partnership. _A_ is by far the richest, and _C_ by far the poorest of the firm. _C_ finds the terms ofpartnership onerous. He may have a moral right to retire, but certainlyhe cannot have a moral, and would hardly under any system of law have alegal, right to say, 'I do not want to leave the firm, but I insist thatthe terms of partnership be remodelled wholly in my favour. ' Nor againis it conceivable that _B_ and _C_ by uniting together could in fairnessclaim to impose upon _A_ disadvantages the burden of which he had neverintended to accept. [103] See pp. 22-31, _ante_. [104] 'But who proposed that Ireland should be anything else than anintegral part of the United Kingdom (Ministerial cheers), or rather ofthe Empire?' (Opposition cheers). --Mr. Sexton, April 20, 1893, _TimesParliamentary Debates_, p. 522. The confusion of ideas and thehesitation implied in Mr. Sexton's expressions are noteworthy. [105] England adhered with absolute fidelity to her renunciation of theright to legislate for Ireland. Whatever were the other flaws in theTreaty of Union, it was no violation either of 22 Geo. III. C. 63, or of23 Geo. III. C. 28. The worst features of the method by which the Act ofUnion was carried would have been avoided had the English Parliamentresumed the right to legislate for Ireland. The Treaty of Union dependson Acts both of the British and of the Irish Legislature. This iselementary but has escaped the attention of Mr. Sexton (see _TimesParliamentary Debates_, Feb. 13, 1893, p. 319), whose investigationsinto the history of his country are apparently recent. [106] "The plan that was to be proposed was to be such as, at least inthe judgment of its promoters, presented the necessarycharacteristics--I will not say of finality, because it is a discreditedword--but of a real and continuing settlement. "--Mr. Gladstone, Feb. 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 303. [107] See Mr. Gladstone's Irish Constitution, _Contemporary Review_, May, 1886, p. 616. CHAPTER IV PLEAS FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTION Gladstonians when pressed with the manifest objections to which the newconstitution is open rely for its defence either upon generalconsiderations intended to show that the criticisms on the newconstitution are in themselves futile, or upon certain more or lessspecific arguments, of which the main object is to establish that thepolicy of Home Rule is either necessary or at least free from danger, and that, therefore, this policy and the new constitution in which it isto be embodied deserve a trial. My object in this chapter is to examine with fairness the value both ofthese general considerations and of these specific arguments. The general considerations are based upon the alleged propheticcharacter of the criticisms on the new constitution or upon theanomalies to be found in the existing English constitution. Ministerialists try to invalidate strictures on the Home Rule Bill, suchas those set forth in the foregoing pages, by the assertion that theobjections are mere prophecy and therefore not worth attention. This line of defence may, as against Home Rulers, be disposed of at onceby an _argumentum ad hominem_. No politicians have made freer use ofprediction. Every Gladstonian speech is in effect a statement that is aprophecy of the benefits which Home Rule will confer on the UnitedKingdom. Gladstonian anticipations no doubt are prophecies of futureblessings; but whoever foretells the future is equally a prophet, whether he announces the end of the world or foretells the dawn of amillennium. And history affords no presumption in favour of the prophetwho prophesies smooth things. The prognostics of a pessimist may be asmuch belied by the event as the hopes of an optimist. But for oneprophet to decry the predictions of another simply as prophecies is adownright absurdity. Even among rival soothsayers some regard must behad to fairness and common sense; when Zedekiah, the son of Chenaanah, smote Micaiah on the cheek, he struck him not on the ground that heprophesied but that his gloomy predictions were false. Zedekiah was animposter, he was not a fool, and after all Micaiah, who prophesied eviland not good, turned out the true prophet. But an _argumentum ad hominem_ is never a satisfactory form ofreasoning, and it is worth while considering for a moment what is thevalue of prophecy or foresight in politics. Candour compels theadmission that anticipations of the future are at best most uncertain. Cobden and Bright foretold that Free Trade would benefit England; theyalso foretold that the civilised world would, influenced by England'sexample, reject protective tariffs. Neither anticipation wasunreasonable, but the one was justified whilst the other was confuted byevents. All that can be said is that on such anticipations, untrustworthy though they may be, the conduct no less of public than ofprivate life depends. Criticism on anything that is new and untried, whether it be a new-built bridge or a new-made constitution, is ofnecessity predictive. But there is an essential difference betweenforesight and guessing. The prevision of a philosophic statesman isgrounded on the knowledge of the past and on the analysis of existingtendencies. It deals with principles. Such, for example, was theforesight of Burke when he dogmatically foretold that the FrenchConstitution of 1791 could not stand. [108] Guessing is at best based onacute observation of the current events of the day, that is of thingswhich are in their nature uncertain. On January 29, 1848, Tocquevilleanalysed the condition of French society, and in the Chamber of Deputiesforetold the approach of revolution. On February 21, 1848, Girardin said that the monarchy of July would notlast three days longer. February 24 verified the insight and foresightof the statesman, and proved that the journalist was an acute observer. The difference is worth consideration. Tocqueville's prophecy would inall probability have been substantially realised had Louis Philippeshown as much energy in 1848 as in 1832, and had the Orleanist dynastyreigned till after his death. Girardin's guess would not have been evena happy hit if one of a thousand accidents had averted the catastropheof February 24. The worth of the arguments against or for the newconstitution depends upon the extent to which they are based upon amastery of general principles and upon a sound analysis of theconditions of the time, and in these conditions are included thecharacter of the English and of the Irish people. But to object tocriticisms simply as prophecies is to reject foresight and to forbidpoliticians who are creating a constitution for the future to considerwhat will be its future working. Another Gladstonian argument is that because the English constitutionitself is full of paradoxes, peculiarities, and anomalies, therefore thecontradictions or anomalies which are patent in the new constitution(such for example as the retention of the Irish members at Westminster)are of no importance. The fact asserted is past dispute. Our institutions are based uponfictions. The Prime Minister, the real head of the English Executive, isan official unknown to the law. The Queen, who is the onlyconstitutional head of the Executive, is not the real head of theGovernment. The Crown possesses a veto on all legislation and neverexercises it; the House of Lords might, if the House pleased, rejectyear by year every Bill sent up to it by the House of Commons; yet sucha course of action is never actually pursued and could not be dreamt ofexcept by a madman. There is no advantage in exemplifying further acondition of things which must be known to every person who has theslightest acquaintance with either the law, or the custom, of theconstitution. But the inference which Gladstonian apologists draw fromthe existence of anomalies is, in the strict sense of the word, preposterous. On the face of the matter it is a strange way of reasoningto say that because the constitution is filled with odd arrangementswhich no man can justify in theory, you therefore, when designing a newconstitution, should take no care to make your arrangements consistentand harmonious. But the Gladstonian error goes a good deal deeper thanis at first sight apparent. The anomalies or the fictions of theconstitution are in reality adaptations, often awkward enough inthemselves, of some old institution, and are preserved because, thoughthey look strange, they are found to work well. Thus the King of Englandwas at one time the actual sovereign of the State, or at any rate themost important member of the sovereign power, and the Ministers were inreality, what they are still in name, the King's servants. The powers ofthe Crown have been greatly diminished, and have been transferred ineffect to the Houses of Parliament, or rather to the House of Commons, and the Ministers taken from the Houses are in fact, though not in name, servants of Parliament. This arrangement leaves an undefined andundefinable amount of authority to the Crown. It is not an arrangementwhich any man would have planned beforehand; but it is kept up, notbecause it is an anomaly, but because it has, as a matter ofexperience, turned out convenient. What even plausible argument canthence be drawn to show that a new constitutional arrangement, on theface of it awkward and inconvenient, will for some unknown reason turnout workable and beneficial? He who reasons thus, if reasoning it can becalled, might as well argue that because an old shoe which has graduallybeen worn to the form of the foot is comfortable, therefore a shoemakerneed not care to make a new shoe fit. These two general replies to strictures on the new constitution are inthemselves of no worth whatever. They deserve examination for tworeasons only. They are, in various shapes, put forward by politicians ofeminence, they exhibit further in a clear form a defect which mars agood deal of Gladstonian reasoning. Ministerialists seem to think thatarguments good for the purpose of conservatism are available for thepurpose of innovation. This is an error. A conservative reasoner mayurge the uncertainty of all prevision, or the fact that the actualconstitution, though theoretically absurd or imperfect, works well, asreasons of some weight, though not of overwhelming weight, for leavingthings as they are, but it must puzzle any sensible man to see howeither the uncertainty of prevision or the fair working of existinginstitutions can be twisted into reasons for taking a political leap inthe dark. Let us dismiss then objections which as they are fatal to all criticismare in reality ineffective against any criticism of our newconstitution. When this is done it will be found that the Gladstonianpleas in favour of Home Rule, for such are in reality their apologiesfor the new constitution, may be brought under two heads. They areintended to show, first, that the concession of parliamentaryindependence to Ireland is a necessity, and, secondly, that at worst itinvolves no danger. [109] A. _Necessity for Home Rule_. That the concession of Home Rule toIreland is a necessity, forms the implied, if not always the asserted, foundation of the case in favour of Gladstonian policy. Ireland, it is argued, has for generations been discontented anddisloyal. Every sort of remedy has been tried. The rule of the ordinarylaw, coercion, Protestant supremacy, Catholic relief, thedisestablishment of the Anglican Church, the maintenance of the Englishland tenure and English landlordism, the introduction of a new system ofland tenure unknown to any other country in the world and morefavourable to tenants than the land law of any other State in Europe, the removal of every grievance which could be made patent to theImperial Parliament, every plan or experiment which could approve itselfto the judgment of English politicians has been tried, and no scheme, however plausible, has ended in success. Concession has proved asuseless as severity, and the existence in the Statute Book of apermanent Coercion Act is a standing proof of failure. He who assertsthat Irish disloyalty or discontent has not declined understates thecase. It has increased. Grattan was a statesman of a more exalted typethan O'Connell, and Grattan was more zealous for connection with Englandthan was the Roman Catholic tribune. And though in Grattan's time thegrievances of Ireland were in every man's judgment far more intolerablethan, even on the showing of Home Rulers, are the wrongs which Irelandnow endures, the Ireland of Grattan was loyal to England. O'Connell wasa nobler leader than Parnell, and it would be absurd to suppose that anyParnellite or Anti-Parnellite exerted a tenth of O'Connell's influence. Yet Parnell and Parnell's followers have achieved a feat which the heroof Catholic emancipation could never accomplish; O'Connell neverobtained for Repeal more than half the votes of Ireland's parliamentaryrepresentatives; Parnell and his followers have rallied the vastmajority of Irish members in support of Home Rule. Meanwhile year byyear the government of England is weakened, and (though the argumentcomes awkwardly from the mouth of English constitutionalists who areallies and friends of conspirators and boycotters) the morality ofEnglish public life has been undermined, by the presence at Westminsterof Irish members who, regarding the English Parliament as an alienpower, weaken its action, despise its traditions, and degrade itscharacter. One remedy for Irish miseries and for English dangers has notbeen tried. No English statesman before Mr. Gladstone (it is urged) hasoffered to Ireland the one thing which Ireland desires--the boon orright of parliamentary independence. Be the desire for Home Rulereasonable or not, it is Home Rule for which Ireland longs. Irelandfeels herself a nation. Satisfy then Ireland's wish, meet the feeling ofnationality, and Ireland will be at rest. This experiment must at leastbe tried; its perils must be risked. The present situation isintolerable, the concession of Home Rule to Ireland is a necessity. This, to the best of my apprehension, is the Gladstonian argument. Myaim has certainly been to state it fairly and in its full force. Is the argument valid? Is the plea of necessity made out? The answer maybe given without hesitation. It is not. The allegations on which thewhole train of reasoning rests are tainted by exaggeration ormisapprehension, and the allegations, even if taken as true, do notestablish the required inference; the premises are unsound, and thepremises do not support the conclusion. The premises are unsound. The Gladstonians are far too much of parliamentary formalists. Theirimagination and their reason are impressed by the strength in the Houseof Commons of the Irish party. The eighty votes from Ireland daunt them. But wise men must look behind votes at facts. The eighty Irish HomeRulers are, it is true, no light matter, even when allowance is madefor the way in which corruption and intimidation vitiate the vote ofIreland. But their voice is not the voice of the Irish people; it is atmost the mutter or the clamour of a predominant Irish faction. It is thevoice of Ireland in the same sense in which a century ago the shouts oryells of the Jacobin Club were the voice of France. To any one who looksbehind the forms of the constitution to the realities of life, the voiceof Irish wealth, of Irish intelligence, and of Irish loyalty is at leastas important as the voice of Irish sedition or discontent. The eightyvotes must in any case be reckoned morally at not more than sixty, forto this number they would be reduced by any fair and democratic schemeof representation. No one can be less tempted than myself to make lightof Irish turbulence and Irish misery. But it must not be exaggerated. The discontent of 1893 is nothing to the rebellion, sedition, ordisloyalty of 1782, of 1798, of 1829, or of 1848. If Irishmen of oneclass are discontented, Irishmen of another class are contented, prosperous, and loyal. The protest of Irish Protestants--the grandsonsof the men who detested the Union--against the dissolution of the Union, is the reward and triumph of Pitt's policy of Union. The eighty Irishmembers ask for Home Rule, but the tenant farmers of Ireland ask not forHome Rule but for the ownership of the land; and the Irish tenantfarmers will and may under a Unionist Government become owners of theirland, and, what is no slight matter, may become owners by honest means. Vain for Mr. M'Carthy[110] to assert that Irish farmers would not haveaccepted even from Mr. Parnell the most favourable of land laws inexchange for Home Rule. Mr. M'Carthy believes what he says, but it isimpossible for any student of Irish history or of Irish politics tobelieve Mr. M'Carthy. Facts are too strong for him. Mr. Lalor showed aprevision denied to our amiable novelist. Gustave de Beaumont understoodpolitical philosophy better than the lively recorder of the superficialaspects of recent English history. Mr. Parnell and Mr. Davitt, and thewhole line of witnesses before the Special Commission, tell a differenttale. The very name of the _Land_ League is significant. Home Rule was amere theme for academic discussion in the mouth of Mr. Butt. Repealitself never touched the strongest passions of Irish nature, thoughadvocated by the most eloquent and popular of Irish orators. Not anindependent Parliament, but independent ownership of land, has alwaysbeen the desire of Irish cultivators. It was a cry for the land whichgave force to the demand for Home Rule; and an Irish agitator, if hisstrength fails, renews it by touching the earth. But why confine ourobservation to Ireland? We here come upon the passions, not of Irishnature, but of human nature. There is not a landowner in France who doesnot care tenfold more for the security of his land than for the form ofthe government. If peasants trembled for their property the Republicwould fall to-morrow. This is no mere conjecture; the peasantry wereJacobins as long as the Jacobins gave them the land, they wereImperialists whilst Napoleon was their security against a restorationwhich to them meant confiscation of land purchased or seized during theRevolution. The country population of France heard with indifference ofthe fall of Louis Philippe, and possibly approved the proclamation ofthe second Republic. But the communism of 1848 roused every landowneragainst Paris. The peasant proprietors filled the benches of theNational Assembly with Conservatives or Reactionists who would save themfrom plunder; fear became for once the cause of courage, and dread ofloss of property sent thousands of peasant proprietors to Paris, thatthey might crush by force of arms the socialist insurrection of June. Perjury, fraud, and cruelty disgraced the _coup d'état_ of 1851. But, asLiberals now see, the second Empire, hateful though it was to every manwho loved freedom or cared for integrity, did not owe the permanence ofits power to cunning or to violence. It was the dread of the Red Spectrewhich drove the landowners of France into Imperialism; they may haveliked parliamentary liberty, it was a pleasant luxury, but they lovedtheir land and property, it was their life-blood, and by Socialism theirland and property was they believed menaced. As to the Coercion Act, no sensible man, be he Radical or Tory, needtrouble himself. The Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887, isneither a disgrace to England nor an injury to Ireland. Its permanence, which is the cause of its mildness, is its merit. Well would it havebeen had the Act been extended to the whole United Kingdom. Local lawsare open to some of the same objections as temporary laws. Theenactment contains some improvements in our criminal procedure. There isno more idle superstition than the belief that criminal procedure doesnot, like other human arrangements, require change. If incendiarismshould become an element in the conduct of trade disputes, if dynamiteis to be recognised as a legitimate arm in political conflicts, thecriminal law of the United Kingdom will, we may be sure, need andreceive several alterations and improvements. By far the strongest portion of the Gladstonian argument is the stressthat can be laid on the demoralisation of Parliament, produced partly, though not wholly, by the Irish vote. This is a consideration which, asfar as it goes, tells in favour of Home Rule. It is, however, aconsideration of which the Gladstonian apologist for the newconstitution of 1893 [can] make no use. His reasoning of necessitystands thus: The presence of 80 Irish members at Westminster has demoralisedParliament, therefore we must above all things retain 80 or possibly 103Irish members at Westminster. He is placed in a hopeless dilemma; hedare not draw the only conclusion to which his argument points, namely, that the Irish members must be excluded from the Parliament atWestminster. By a strange fatality, the policy of 1823 retrospectivelycondemns the policy of 1886, whilst the very strongest argument infavour of the policy of 1886 condemns the policy of 1893. The premises, were they sound, do not support the conclusion. There exists undoubtedly such a thing in politics as necessity. When England acknowledged the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, orwhen France surrendered Metz and Strasburg, no one could talk ofimprudence of impolicy. The will of Englishmen and of Frenchmen wascoerced by the force of events. When all Protestant Ireland was in arms, when the whole Irish nation demanded parliamentary independence, whenEngland had been defeated in America, when France and Spain were alliedagainst her, then the acceptance of Grattan's declaration of right wasin truth a necessity. When Wellington became the supporter of CatholicEmancipation because he would not face civil war, when famine was at ourgates and Peel repealed the corn laws--then again politicians couldplead the excuse of necessity. In these and like crises the wisest menand the bravest men are forced to recognise the logic of facts; andnecessity rather than prudence dictates the course of statesmanship. Butno such crisis has now arisen. England and Ireland were as safe underthe government of Lord Salisbury as under the government of Mr. Gladstone--perhaps safer. No one except an extremely excited and veryrhetorical politician will venture to assert that, if Lord Salisburyinstead of Mr. Gladstone had last summer gained a majority of forty, anyman or woman throughout the United Kingdom would have trembled for thesafety of the country. The sky is far less dark than on that fearful dayeleven years back[111] when England stood aghast at the assassinationsof the Phoenix Park. Irish discontent is an immense evil, of which everyjust man must deplore the existence; its removal would be the greatestbenefit which statesmanship could by any possibility confer uponEngland. But the immediate dealing with it in a particular way is not anecessity. Were the Home Rule Bill, and every Home Rule Bill, rejectedby Parliament, the United Kingdom would be as safe as it has been at anytime for the last ninety years and more. In plain truth we have all of us forgotten the meaning of necessity. Gladstonians have come honestly to confuse the needs of a party with thenecessities of the country. This is a delusion that at all times and inall lands affects great political connections which, having oncerendered high services to the nation, have outlived the valid reasonsfor their existence. The Republicans saved the United States fromdisruption. Hence in 1888, when Secession was an historical memory, manyof the most to be respected among Americans believed that the rule of anhonest Democrat was a worse evil than the rule of a corrupt Republican. Thousands of Frenchmen, amidst the moral bankruptcy of Republicanpoliticians, still hold that, because Republicans years ago saved Francefrom ruin, even reconciled Conservatives cannot in the year 1893 beplaced in office without danger to the commonwealth. So it is abroad; soit has been in England. In 1760 the best and wisest of English statesmendeemed it impossible that England should be rightly governed by anypoliticians but the representatives of the Revolution Families. In 1829honest citizens trembled at the thought of power passing into the handsof the Whigs; for the Tories had ruled for nearly sixty years, and theTories had preserved England from revolution and invasion. So at thismoment to many well-meaning Liberals the long predominance of theLiberal party makes the possibility of a Cabinet containing politicianswho may in any sense be called Tories seem a monstrous calamity, whichit is a necessity to avert. Vain to point out that Lord Salisbury andMr. Balfour are such Tories as Eldon would have called Jacobins and LordMelbourne Radicals, and that, they are allied with the best and mosttrustworthy of living Liberal leaders. Their is no arguing withsentiment; it is necessary to keep the Gladstonian Liberals in office, and the constitution must be sacrificed in order that Lord Salisbury maynot resume the Premiership. But there is a deeper cause than all thisfor our strange ideas of necessity. Habitual ease and unvaryingprosperity have for a moment lowered the national spirit. Englishmenconfuse inconveniences with dangers; they have forgotten what real perilis; they cannot understand the calmness with which, not a century ago, their fathers resisted at once insurrection in Ireland and the mostpowerful foreign enemy who has ever challenged the power of England, andthis too at a time when the population of Great Britain was not abovenine millions and the people of Ireland numbered more than fourmillions, when France was the leading military power of the world, andIreland might at any moment receive the aid of a French army led by oneof the best French generals. The men of 1798 or 1800 would mock at ourideas of necessity. Ireland has not an eighth of the population of theUnited Kingdom; our Home Rulers are not Ireland; they are a verydifferent thing--the Irish populace. Let us yield everything which oughtto be yielded to justice; let us obey the dictates of expediency, whichis only justice looked at from another side; let us concede much togenerosity; but in the name of common sense, of honesty, and ofmanliness, let us hear no more of necessity. Once in an age necessitymay be the defence of statesmanship forced to confess its own blindness, but it is far more often the plea of tyranny, of ambition, of cowardice, or despair. B. _No danger in Home Rule_. The arguments which are employed to showthat the policy of Home Rule and the new constitution which embodies itinvolve no danger for England are in the main drawn from the'Safeguards' or Restrictions contained in the Bill--from the allegedprecedent of Grattan's Constitution--from the success of Home Rule inother parts of the world--and, generally, from the expediency oftrustfulness. i. _The Safeguards_. The Restrictions on the power of the IrishParliament are, it is asserted, sufficient and more than sufficient toreassure Unionists, and an intimation is sometimes added that, iffurther security is wanted, further safeguards may be provided. This ground of confidence may be briefly dismissed; its answer is ineffect supplied by the foregoing pages. On the action of the Irish Executive the Restrictions place, and fromthe nature of things can place, no restraint whatever, and yet bothEngland and the Irish Loyalists have far more reason to dread the abuseof executive than of legislative authority. On the legal action of theIrish Parliament the Restrictions do place a certain restraint, but theRestrictions are, as already shown, not in reality enforceable. They arefor good purposes a nullity; they are effective, if at all, almostwholly for evil; they exhibit the radical and fatal inconsistency ofGladstonian policy. The policy of Home Rule is a policy of absolute andunrestricted trust; the safeguards are based on distrust. There issomething to be said for generous confidence, and something also fordistrustful prudence; there is nothing to be said for ineffectivesuspicion. ii. _Grattan's Constitution_. From the asserted harmony between Englandand Ireland from 1782 to 1800 under Grattan's Constitution, theinference is drawn that there is no reason to fear discord betweenEngland and Ireland under the Gladstonian constitution of 1893. The fallacy underlying the appeal to this precedent has been, to usewords of Mr. Lecky, 'so frequently exposed that I can only wonder at itsrepetition. '[112] Under Grattan's Constitution the Irish Executive wasappointed, not by the Irish Parliament, but by the English Ministry; theIrish Parliament consisted solely of Protestants; it represented themiscalled 'English garrison, ' and was in sympathy with the governingclasses of England. With all this to promote harmony, the concordbetween the governing powers in England and in Ireland was dubious. Therejection of England's proposals as to trade, and the exaction of theRenunciation Act, betray a condition of opinion which at any momentmight have produced open discord. When at last the parliamentaryindependence of Ireland had led up to a savage rebellion, suppressed Ifear with savage severity, English statesmen knew that an independentIrish Parliament threatened the existence of England. I may be allowed, even by Gladstonians, to place the genius and patriotism of Pitt on atleast a level with the genius and patriotism of the present Premier. Imay be allowed to doubt whether Mr. Gladstone's studies, howeverprofound, in the history of Ireland, can, in 1893, render hisacquaintance with the circumstances and the dangers of 1800 equal to theknowledge of the Minister who, in 1800, carried the Act of Union. AndPitt then held that the Union with Ireland was necessary for thepreservation of England. If moreover Grattan's Constitution be aprecedent for our guidance, let us see to what the precedent points. Theleading principles or features of Grattan's Constitution are well known. They are the absolute sovereignty of the Irish Parliament, and itsindependence of and equality with the Parliament of Great Britain; therenunciation by the British Parliament of any claim whatever tolegislate for Ireland, and of any jurisdiction on the part of anyBritish court to entertain appeals from Ireland; and, lastly, theabsence of all representation of Ireland in the Parliament atWestminster. Each of these principles or features is denied or reversedby our new Gladstonian constitution. The Irish Parliament is to be, nota sovereign legislature, but a subordinate legislature created bystatute, and a legislature of such restricted and inferior authority asto be unworthy of the name of a parliament. The Imperial Parliament, with its vast majority of British members, asserts its absolutesupremacy in Ireland, and the right at its discretion to legislate forIreland on any matter whatever; in Ireland there is to be founded anImperial or British Court appointed by the Imperial Ministry, havingjurisdiction on all matters affecting Imperial rights, and the finalCourt of Appeal from every tribunal in Ireland is to be the BritishPrivy Council. Add to this that Irish members are to sit in theParliament of Westminster as the 'outward and visible sign' of theImperial Parliament's supremacy. But if every principle of Grattan'sConstitution be contradicted by the Gladstonian constitution, if everyprinciple which Grattan detested is a principle which Mr. Gladstoneasserts, with what show of reason can the success, uncertain though itbe, of the Constitution of 1782 be pleaded as evidence of the probablesuccess of the Gladstonian constitution of 1893? That two arrangementsare unlike is to ordinary minds no proof that they will have similarresults; a parliamentary majority of forty-two may repeal the Act ofUnion, but it cannot repeal the laws of logic. [113] iii. _Success of Home Rule_. All over the world, we are told, Home Rulehas succeeded; there are, under the government of the British Crown, atleast twenty countries enjoying Home Rule, and their local independencecauses no inconvenience to the United Kingdom or to the British Empire. It follows therefore that Home Rule in Ireland will be a success andwill in no way disturb the peace or prosperity of the United Kingdom. The sole difficulty in meeting this argument is the extreme vagueness ofits principal term. The words 'Home Rule' are in their signification sovague, at any rate as employed by Ministerialists, that they covergovernments of totally different descriptions. Hungary, Norway, a Stateof the American Union, a Province of the Canadian Dominion, the Dominionitself, Man, Jersey, and Guernsey, every English colony withrepresentative institutions, are each described, by one Gladstonianreasoner or another, as happy and prosperous under Home Rule. But thereis no one who will deny that the dissimilarities between the governmentsexisting in each of the countries referred to are at least as strikingas are their similarities; that the contrast, for example, between therelation of Hungary to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the relation ofNew York to the United States is at least as obvious as its likeness. The analogy, moreover, between Home Rule in any of these countries andHome Rule in Ireland is at best distant and shadowy. [114] The crisis is too serious to permit us to waste words in examining thecuriosities of the Home Rule controversy. Of Hungary, and its relationto the Empire of which it forms part, nothing at all will here be said. There is nothing in that relation analogous to Irish Home Rule. Nor needwe trouble ourselves with the 'Home Rule' of Rhodes, of Samos, or of theLebanon. Of these and any other States, if such there be, which enjoy'Home Rule' under the supremacy of the Sultan, all that need be said isthat it is satisfactory to learn on the authority of Mr. Gladstone thatany part whatever of the Turkish Empire is well governed and happy. Ifany one can seriously suppose that the prosperity of Man and the ChannelIslands, which reap all the benefits and bear none of the burdens ofconnection with Great Britain, and moreover have at no time beendiscontented, affords any reason for supposing that the secularmiseries and discontent of Ireland will be cured by a system ofgovernment totally different from that which prevails either in Man, orGuernsey, or in Jersey, let him refer to these interesting islands. [115]For myself I shall leave them out of account. Of the cordial relationsbetween Sweden and Norway we hear nothing; the goodwill generated by asystem of Home Rule is bringing these countries to the brink of civilwar. [116] There are two analogous cases or precedents on which serious reasonersrely in support of a policy of Home Rule for Ireland. The success offederal government in other countries, and especially in the UnitedStates, and the success of colonial independence throughout the BritishEmpire, are adduced as presumptions that Home Rule would knit togetherGreat Britain and Ireland, or, as the cant of the day goes, transform apaper union into a union of hearts. If New York be loyal to the UnitedStates, if New Zealand be loyal to the British Crown, why should notIreland, when endowed with local independence resembling theindependence of an American State or of a self-governing British colony, be a loyal member of the United Kingdom?[117] This is the suggested argument--let us consider its validity. As to federalism. --All the conditions which make a federal constitutionwork successfully in the United States, in Switzerland, and possibly inGermany, are wanting in England and Ireland. No man till the last fiveor six years has even suggested that Englishmen or Scotsmen desire afederal government for its own sake. Whether Mr. Gladstone himself hasany wish to federalise the whole United Kingdom is at least open todoubt. Where federalism has succeeded, it has succeeded as a means ofuniting separate communities into a nation; it has not been used as ameans of disuniting one State into separate nationalities. The UnitedStates, it has been well said, is a nation under the form of a federalgovernment. Gladstonians apparently wish to bind together two, or shallwe say three or four, nations, or nationalities, under the reality of afederation and the name of a United Kingdom. While all the powerfulcountries of the world are increasing their strength by union, theadvocates of the new constitution pretend to increase the moral strengthof the United Kingdom by loosening the ties of its political unity. Ifany one ask why federalism which has succeeded in America should notsucceed in the United Kingdom, the true answer is best suggested byanother question: Why would not the constitutional monarchy of Englandsuit the United States? The answer in each case is the same. Thecircumstances and wants of the two countries are essentially different;and if this be not a sufficient reply, the reflection is worth makingthat in the three great Confederacies of the world unity has beenachieved, or enforced by armed conflict. As to colonial independence. --The plain and decisive reason why theloyalty of New Zealand to the Empire affords no presumption of theloyalty under our new constitution of Ireland to the United Kingdom isthis: The whole condition of New Zealand is different from the conditionof Ireland, and our new constitution is not intended to give Ireland theposition of New Zealand. Thousands of miles separate New Zealand fromGreat Britain. Ireland is separated from us by not much more than twelvemiles. New Zealand has never been hostile to England; her people areloyal to the British Crown. Ireland, or part of the Irish people, hasbeen divided from England by a feud of centuries; it would be difficultamong Irish Nationalists to obtain even the show of loyalty to theCrown. New Zealand is wealthy, and New Zealand pays not a single taxinto the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. Ireland is poor, and, if hertaxation is lightened by Home Rule, the tribute which will be paid toEngland will be heavy, and far more galling than the taxes she now paysin common with the rest of the United Kingdom. The new constitution, again, is utterly unlike a colonial constitution. Its burdens would notbe tolerated by any one of our independent colonies. The rights itgives, no less than the obligations it imposes, are foreign to ourcolonial system. The presence of the Irish representation at Westminsterforbids all comparison between Ireland under Home Rule and New Zealandunder a system of colonial independence. But the matter must be pressed further. Even were it possible to placeIreland in the position either of an American State or Swiss Canton, orof an independent colony, the arrangement would not meet the needs ofthe United Kingdom. This is a point which has not as yet arrestedattention. For the safety of the United Kingdom it is absolutelynecessary that the authority of the Imperial Government, or, in otherwords, the law of the land, should be enforced in Ireland in a sense inwhich the law of the land is rarely enforced in federations, and inwhich it is certainly not enforced by the Imperial Government inself-governing colonies. In federations the law of the land is nearly powerless when opposed tothe will of a particular State. President Jackson's reported dictum, 'John Marshall[118] has delivered his judgment, let him now enforce itif he can, ' and the fact that the judgment was never enforced, [119] arethings not to be forgotten. They are worth a thousand disquisitions onthe admirable working of federalism. But there is no need to rely on atraditional story, which, however, is an embodiment of an undoubtedtransaction. The plainest facts of American history all tell the sametale. No Abolitionist could in 1850 without peril to his life havepreached abolition in South Carolina; difficult indeed was theenforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law and small the practical respectpaid in Massachusetts to the doctrine of the Dred Scott Case. Unless allreports are false, the Negro vote throughout the Southern States is atthis moment practically falsified, and little do the ConstitutionalAmendments benefit a Negro in any case where his conduct offendsSouthern principle or prejudice. For my present argument it mattersnothing whether the oppression of individuals or the defiance of law wasor was not, in all these cases, as it certainly was in some instances, aviolation to the supreme law of the land. If the law was violated then, why should we expect Imperial law to be of more force in Ireland thanfederal law in South Carolina, or in Massachusetts? If the rights ofindividuals were not adequately protected by federal law against theinjustice of a particular State, then why expect that the provisions ofour new constitution, far less stringent as they are than the protectiveprovisions of the United States Constitution, should avail to protectunpopular persons in Ireland against the legal tyranny of the IrishExecutive or the Irish Parliament? Experience of federalism is not confined to the United States. The SwissConfederation is in Europe the most successful both of democratic and offederal polities. The Swiss Executive exercises powers common to allcontinental governments but of a description which no English Cabinetcould claim, and the Swiss Executive is made up of statesmen skilfulbeyond measure in what may be called the diplomacy of federalism. Yet inSwitzerland, as in the United States, federal government means weakgovernment. Ticino is a small Canton, but from the days of Atheniangreatness small States have been the instructors of the world, andEnglishmen, hesitating over a political leap in the dark, would do wellto study the Ticinese revolution of September 11, 1890. The Radicals ofthe Canton rose in insurrection, and deposed the lawful government byviolence; as Englishmen may remember, the contest though short involvedat least one murder. The Swiss Executive (called the Federal Council)forthwith took steps to restore order and to reinstate the lawfulCantonal government. Their own commissioner, a military officer, ineffect declined to put the overthrown government back in power. Orderwas restored, but the law was never vindicated. A strange set ofnegotiations, transactions, or intrigues took place. In the FederalAssembly at Berne, the Conservatives, a minority, urged the rights ofthe lawful government of Ticino. The Liberals defended or palliated therevolutionists. On the whole the advantage seems to have rested withthe latter. A trial before a Federal Court took place, but the accusedwere acquitted. No one, if I am rightly informed, was punished for anact of manifest treason. It is even more noticeable that ProfessorHilty, a distinguished and respected Swiss publicist, vindicates orpalliates the admitted breach of law, in deference to the principle orsentiment, which if true has wide application, that 'human nature is notrevolutionary, and that no revolution ever arises without a heavy shareof guilt (Mitschuld) on the part of the government against which therevolution is directed. '[120] The instructiveness of this passage inSwiss history as regards the working of our new constitution is obvious;Englishmen should specially note the interconnection between lawlessnessin Ticino and the balance of parties at Berne; it is easy to foresee ananalogous connection between revolution, say in Dublin or Belfast, andthe balance of parties at Westminster. But this is not my immediatepoint; my point is that the Federal Government at Berne cannot enforceobedience to law in Ticino in the way in which Englishmen expect thatthe Imperial Government shall, under any circumstances, enforce or causethe law to be enforced in Ireland. But Ireland, it will be said, is to occupy a position like that of aself-governing colony. In British colonies the Imperial power and therule of law are respected; both therefore will be respected in Ireland. The plain answer to this suggestion is that in a British self-governingcolony, no law is enforceable which is opposed to colonial sentiment andwhich the colonial Ministry refuse to put into execution. Onewell-ascertained fact is enough to dispose of a hundred platitudes aboutImperial supremacy and the loyal obedience of our colonies. Victoria isas loyal to the Crown as any colony which England possesses, yet thesubmission to law of the Victorian Government and people is not by anymeans unlimited. Ten years ago three British subjects arrived atMelbourne and were about to land. Popular sentiment, or in other wordsthe will of the mob, had decreed that they should not enter the colony. The Victorian Premier (Mr. Service) announced in Parliament that theirlanding should be hindered. The police, acting under the orders of theMinistry, boarded the ship which brought the strangers, went near toassaulting the captain, and forcibly prevented the hated travellers fromsetting foot on shore. By arrangement between the Melbourne Government, the captain, and the three men, who were by this time in terror of theirlives, the victims of lawlessness were carried back to England. That thelaw had been grossly violated no one can really dispute. The violationwas the more serious because it excited no notice. No appeal wasapparently made to the Courts. The Governor--the representative ofImperial power and Imperial justice--knew presumably what was going on, yet he uttered not one word of remonstrance. The Agent-General forVictoria, when at last a private person in England called attention tothe outrage at Melbourne, pleaded in effect the plea of necessity, anddescribed the act of tyranny, whereby British citizens were in a Britishcolony turned into outlaws, as 'an act of executive authority. ' TheImperial Government did I believe--what was perhaps the wisest thing itcould do--nothing. Imperial supremacy in the colonies was, as regardsthe protection of unpopular individuals, admitted to be a farce. What, however, rendered the three travellers unpopular? They were Irishinformers who had aided, unless I am mistaken, in the conviction of thePhoenix Park murderers. Let us now in imagination conceive our newconstitution to have come into being, and transfer the transactions atMelbourne in 1883 to Dublin in 1894. Will the Imperial supremacy whichis supposed to be so effective in the colonies be of any more worth inIreland than in Victoria?[121] Were it true, then, which it certainly is not, that the conditions existin Ireland which conduce to the maintenance of federal power in theState of a well-arranged federation, and to the maintenance of Imperialpower in a self-governing British colony, this would not be enough tosupport the argument in favour of the new constitution. For the ImperialGovernment needs that the law should be maintained, and the rights ofindividuals be protected, in Ireland with greater stringency than thelaw is enforced or the rights of individuals are protected either undera federal government or in a British colony. Miserable indeed would bethe position of England were she forced in Ireland to wink atlawlessness such as but the other day disgraced New Orleans, or at moblaw countenanced by the 'Executive, ' such as in 1883 ruled supreme atMelbourne. Foreign powers at any rate would rightly decline to let thedefects of our constitution excuse the neglect of international duties. If England cannot shuffle off her responsibilities, England is bound inprudence to maintain her power. iv. _The Policy of Trust_. 'I believe myself that suspicion is thebesetting vice of politicians and that trust is often the truestwisdom. '[122] This sentiment is followed by curious and ambiguous qualifications. Itis not cited for the sake of fixing Mr. Gladstone with any doctrinewhatever; it is quoted because it neatly expresses the sentiment which, in one form or another, underlies most of the arguments in favour ofHome Rule or of our new constitution. The right attitude for apolitician, it is urged, is trust; he should trust the Irish leaders andtheir assurances or professions; he should trust in the trainingconferred upon men by the exercise of power; he should trust in thehealing effects of a policy of conciliation, or, to put the mattershortly, he should trust in the goodness and reasonableness of humannature. Exercise only a little trustfulness and the policy of Home Rule, it is suggested, may be seen to be a wise and prudent policy. [123] How far, then, is trust in any of the three forms, which it may on thisoccasion take, a reasonable sentiment? We are told to trust the Irish leaders. My answer to this advice is plain and decided. Confidence is not amatter of choice. You cannot give your trust simply because you wish togive it. Men are trusted because they are trustworthy. The Irish HomeRule leaders as a body cannot inspire trust, for the simple reason thattheir whole policy and conduct prove them untrustworthy. Politicians, strange as the fact may appear to them, cannot get quit of their past. Look for a moment at the history--the patent, acknowledged history--ofthe agitators or the patriots (and I doubt not that many of them are, from their own point of view, patriotic) in whom we are asked toconfide, and whose assurances are to form the basis on which to rest adubious policy. They have been till recently the foes of England. Thisin itself is not much; many a rebel has been the enemy of England, andyet has been entitled to the respect of Englishmen. But there are deedswhich neither hatred to England nor love of Ireland can justify. Evensedition has its moral code, and like war itself is subject toobligations which no man can neglect without infamy. The conspiratorscondemned by the Special Commission--and among them are to be found themost prominent of the Irish leaders[124]--have been guilty of conductwhich no wise man ought to forget and no good man ought to palliate. They have for years excited Irish ignorance against England and againstEnglish officials by a system of gross incessant slander; witness thepages of _United Ireland_ when Lord Spencer and Sir George Trevelyanwere in power at Dublin. The men whom we are told to trust are men whodid enter into a criminal conspiracy by a system of coercion andintimidation to promote an agrarian agitation against the payment ofagricultural rents, for the purpose of impoverishing and expelling fromthe country the English landlords[125]; they are men found guilty of notdenouncing intimidation which led to crime and outrage, but ofpersisting in it with a knowledge of its effect. [126] They are proved tohave made payments to compensate persons injured in the commission ofcrime[127]; they are men who have solicited and taken the money ofPatrick Ford, the advocate of dynamite; and have invited and obtainedthe co-operation of the Clan-na-Gael. [128] Their whole system ofagitation has been utterly unlike that of honourable agitators, conspirators, or rebels; it would have excited the horror of O'Connell;it would have been repudiated with disgust by Davis, by Gavan Duffy, bySmith O'Brien, and the other Irish leaders of 1848. The men who now askfor our confidence have in their attack upon England forgotten what wasdue to Ireland; they have deliberately taught Irish peasants lessons ofdishonesty, oppression, and cruelty, which the farmers of Ireland maytake years to unlearn. Of the degradation which they have graduallyinflicted upon the English Parliament one is glad to say little. It is, however, well that the House of Commons should recollect thatparliamentary debates are open to all the world and that Englishmen andEnglishwomen see no reason why brutalities of expression should betolerated in the oldest representative Assembly of Europe which would bereproved in any respectable English meeting. But you can sometimes trustmen's capacity where you cannot trust their moral feeling. Unfortunatelythe Irish Parliamentary party have given us examples of their ability inmatters of government which are not reassuring. The scenes of CommitteeRoom No. 15[129] are a rehearsal of parliamentary life under Home Ruleat Dublin. But the Gladstonians, we shall be told, guarantee the good faith oftheir associates. Unfortunately, as judges of character the Gladstoniansare out of court. The leader who first obtained their confidence was Mr. Parnell. If the Home Rule Bill of 1886 had become law Mr. Parnell wouldhave become Premier of Ireland, and we should have been bidden to puttrust in his loyalty and his integrity. There are no Gladstonians nowwho think Mr. Parnell trustworthy. Why should they be better judges ofthe trustworthiness of Mr. Dillon, Mr. M'Carthy, or Mr. Davitt, thanthey were of the character of the statesman who was the leader, friendor patron of the whole Irish Parliamentary party? Note, however--for inthis matter it is essential to make one's meaning perfectly clear--I donot allege, or suppose, that the assurances of the Irish leaders aremendacious. They believe, I doubt not, what they say at the moment; buttheir words mean very little. In a sense they believed, or did notdisbelieve, the slanderous accusations which filled the pages of _UnitedIreland_. In a sense they now believe that the Home Rule Bill is asatisfactory compromise. But the belief in each case must be consideredessentially superficial. Men are the victims of their own career: it isabsolutely impossible that leaders many of whom have indulged invirulence, in slanders, in cruelty, in oppression, should be suddenlycredited with strict truthfulness, with sobriety, with respect for therights of others. Even as it is, landlords are, in Mr. Sexton's eyes, criminals, [130] and he therefore cannot be trusted to act with fairnesstowards Irish landowners. Mr. Redmond holds that imprisoned dynamitersand other criminals should be released, whether guilty or not, and it istherefore reasonable not to put Mr. Redmond in a position where he caninsist upon an amnesty for dynamiters and conspirators. Nor is it at allclear that as regards amnesty any Anti-Parnellite dare dissent from thedoctrine of Mr. Redmond. It is odious, it will be said, to dwell onfaults or crimes which, were it possible, every man would wishforgotten. But when we are asked to trust politicians who areuntrustworthy, it is a duty to say why we must refuse to them every kindof confidence. Of the penalty for such plain speaking I am well aware. It will be said that to attack the Irish leaders is to slander the Irishpeople. This is untrue. In times of revolution men perpetually come tothe front unworthy of the nation whom they lead. To treat distrust ofthe leaders of the Land League as dislike or distrust of the Irishpeople is as unfair as to say that the censor of Robespierre, of Marat, or of Barère denies that during the Revolution Frenchmen displayed highgenius and rare virtues. There are thousands of Irishmen who willendorse every word I have written about the Irish leaders. Add to thisthat I am not called upon to pronounce any further condemnation upon theparty than was pronounced upon the chief among them by the SpecialCommission. All I assert is that from the nature of things the men foundguilty by the Commission cannot inspire trust. Power, it is often intimated, teaches its own lessons. Trust Irishmenwith the government of their own country, and you may feel confidentthat experience will teach them how to govern justly. To this argument I need not myself provide a reply: it has beenadmirably given by my friend Mr. Bryce. Every word which in thefollowing passage refers to the State legislatures of the United Statesapplies in principle to the future Parliament at Dublin:-- 'The chief lesson which a study of the more vicious among the State legislatures teaches, is that power does not necessarily bring responsibility in its train. I should be ashamed to write down so bald a platitude were it not that it is one of those platitudes which are constantly forgotten or ignored. People who know well enough that, in private life, wealth or rank or any other kind of power is as likely to mar a man as to make him, to lower as to raise his sense of duty, have nevertheless contracted the habit of talking as if human nature changed when it entered public life, as if the mere possession of public functions, whether of voting or of legislating, tended of itself to secure their proper exercise. We know that power does not purify men in despotic governments, but we talk as if it did so in free governments. Every one would of course admit, if the point were put flatly to him, that power alone is not enough, but that there must be added to power, in the case of the voter, a direct interest in the choice of good men, in the case of the legislator, responsibility to the voters, in the case of both, a measure of enlightenment and honour. What the legislatures of the worst States show is not merely the need for the existence of a sound public opinion, for such a public opinion exists, but the need for methods by which it can be brought into efficient action upon representatives who, if they are left to themselves, and are not individually persons with a sense of honour and a character to lose, will be at least as bad in public life as they could be in private. The greatness of the scale on which they act, and of the material interests they control, will do little to inspire them. New York and Pennsylvania are by far the largest and wealthiest States in the Union. Their legislatures are confessedly the worst. '[131] The passage is the more impressive just because it is not written with aview to Ireland. No one doubts that the people of the United States, both in morality and in talent, equal if they do not excel the people ofany other country in the world. But the warmest eulogist of Americaseeks throughout his work for the explanation of the fact which isreally past dispute, that the political morality of the United Statessinks below the general morality of the nation. [132] There is not theleast reason why under a vicious constitution the government at Dublinshould not reflect or exaggerate the vices, rather than represent thenoble qualities and the gifts, of the Irish people. But the doctrine of trust takes another and more general form. You mayplace confidence, it is alleged, in the goodness of human nature, andshould believe that the concession of Home Rule, just because it meetsthe wishes of the Irish people, will take away every source ofdiscontent, and thereby remove any difficulty in making even animperfect constitution work well. To this the answer may fairly be made, which I have made in thepreceding pages, that Home Rule does not meet the wish of the mostimportant part of the Irish people, but in truth arouses theirabhorrence, and that even Home Rulers care much less than Gladstonianssuppose about constitutional changes. To give a man a vote for aParliament at Dublin when he is demanding an acre or two of land, comesvery near giving him a stone when he asks for bread. But I assume for amoment that the Irishmen, who express no great enthusiasm for the HomeRule Bill, desire the new constitution as ardently as sixty years or soago our fathers desired parliamentary reform. Yet even on thisassumption the belief in Home Rule as a panacea for Irish ills ischildish, and belongs to a bygone stage of opinion. We now know thatchanges in political machinery, however important, do not of themselvesproduce content. A poverty-stricken peasant in Connaught will not bemade happy because a Parliament meets at Dublin. We now further knowthat the difficulty of satisfying popular aspirations often arises fromthe fundamental faults of human nature. Trust in the people may often bewiser than distrust, but to suppose that masses of men are wiser, morereasonable, or more virtuous than the individuals of which they consist, is as idle a political delusion as the corresponding ecclesiasticaldelusion that a church has virtues denied to the believers who make upthe church. On this point an anecdote makes my meaning clearer than anargument. On May 15, 1848, the French National Assembly was invaded byan armed mob, who shouted and yelled for three hours and more, andthreatened at any moment to slaughter the representatives of France. From June 22-26, 1848, there raged the most terrible of theinsurrections which Paris has seen. For the first time in modern historythe workmen of the capital rose against the body of the more or lesswell-to-do citizens. There was not a man in Paris who did not tremblefor his property and his life. Householders feared the very servants intheir homes. Between these days of ferocity intervened a day ofsentiment. On May 21, 1848, the Assembly attended a Feast of Concord. There were carts filled with allegorical figures, there wereprocessions, there were embraces; the whole town, soldiers, nationalguards, gardes mobiles, armed workmen, a million of men or more, passedin array before the deputies. The feast was a feast of concord, butevery deputy had provided himself with pistols or some weapon ofdefence. This was the occasion when we are told by the reporter of thescene, 'Carnot said to me with a touch of that silliness (_niaiserie_)which is always to be found mixed up with the virtues of honestdemocrats, "Believe me, my dear colleague, you must always trust thepeople. " I remember I answered him rather rudely, "Ah! why didn't youremind me of that on the day before May 15?"' The anecdote is told bythe greatest political thinker whom France has produced since the daysof Montesquieu. 'Trust in the people' did not appear the last word ofpolitical wisdom to Alexis de Tocqueville. [133] The Gladstonian pleas to which answer has been made are, it will besaid, arguments not in favour of our new constitution, but in support ofHome Rule. The remark is just; it points to a curious weakness in thereasoning of Gladstonians. They adduce many reasons of more or lessweight for conceding some kind of Home Rule to Ireland. But few indeedare the reasons put forward, either in the House of Commons orelsewhere, in favour of the actual Home Rule Bill of 1893. As to themerits of this definite measure Ministerialists show a singularreticence. It may be that they wish to save time and hold that themeasure commends itself without any recommendation by force of its owninherent merits. But to a critic of the new constitution anotherexplanation suggests itself. Can it be possible that Ministerialiststhemselves are not certain what are the fixed principles of the newpolicy? Everything about it is indefinite, vague, uncertain. Who can saywith assurance what Gladstonians understand by Imperial supremacy? Isthere or is there not any idea of excluding Ulster from the operation ofthe Bill? Is it or is it not a principle that members from Ireland shallbe summoned to Westminster? Are the Irish members, if summoned, to voteon all matters, or on some only? To each of these questions the onlyanswer that can be given is--nobody knows. But in this state ofignorance it is natural and excusable that apologists should confinethemselves to general lines of defence. No politician who respectshimself would willingly risk a vigorous apology for the specialprovisions of a particular measure, when, for aught he knows, theprovision which he thinks essential turns out to be an unimportantdetail, and is liable to sudden variation. FOOTNOTES: [108] 'I have told you candidly my sentiments. I think they are notlikely to alter yours.... But hereafter they may be of some use to you, in some future form which your commonwealth may take. In the present itcan hardly remain; but before its final settlement it may be obliged topass, as one of our poets says, "through great varieties of untriedbeing, " and in all its transmigrations to be purified by fire andblood. '--_Burke's Works_, ii. (ed. 1872), p. 517, 'Reflections on theRevolution in France. ' [109] As to the general causes of the strength of the Home Rule movementin England, and the general considerations in its favour, see _England'sCase against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), ch. Iii. And iv. Pp. 34-127. From theopinions expressed in these chapters I see no reason for receding. [110] Mr. M'Carthy, April 10, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debate_, 353. [111] [May 6, 1882. Now twenty-nine years back. ] [112] Every one should read Mr. Lecky's letter of April 4, 1893, addressed to the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, and printed in the_Chamber's Reply_ to Mr. Gladstone's speech. It deals immediately notwith the relations between England and Ireland, but with the allegedprosperity of Ireland under Grattan's Constitution. But in principle itapplies to the point here discussed, and I venture to say that everypage of Mr. Lecky's _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_ whichrefers to Grattan's Parliament bears out the contention, that noinference can be drawn from it as to the successful working, as regardseither England or Ireland, of the legislature to be constituted underthe Home Rule Bill. [113] Add also that steamboats and railways have practically, since thetime of Grattan, brought Ireland nearer to England, and Dublin nearer toLondon. At the end of the last or the beginning of this century a LordLieutenant was for weeks prevented by adverse winds from crossing fromHolyhead to Dublin. Mr. Morley can attend a Cabinet Council atWestminster one afternoon and breakfast next morning in Dublin. [114] With the conclusions as to Home Rule of my lamented friend Mr. Freeman it is impossible for me to agree. But for that very reason I canthe more freely insist upon the merit of his paper on _Irish Home Ruleand its Analogies_ as an attempt to clear up our ideas as to the meaningof Home Rule. He, for instance, points out that the relations betweenHungary and Austria do not constitute the relation of Home Rule andafford no analogy to the relation which Home Rulers propose to establishbetween Great Britain and Ireland. See _The New Princeton Review_ for1888, vol. Vi. Pp. 172, 190. [115] A Gladstonian who thinks the case of the Channel Islands in point, would do well to get up the facts of their history. They were no more'given' a constitution by England than, as most Frenchmen believe, theywere conquered from France. See Mr. Haldane, April 7, 1893, _TimesParliamentary Debates_, p. 333. [116] They have now (1911) led to political separation, happily withoutthe need for civil war. [117] See further on this point, Home Rule as Federalism, _England'sCase against Home Rule_ (3rd ed. ), pp. 160-197, and for Home Rule asColonial Independence, _ib_. Pp. 197-218. [118] Then the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. [119] See 'Andrew Jackson, ' _American Statesmen Series_, p. 182. [120] Hilty, _Separatabdruck aus dem Politischen Jahrbuch derSchweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft_ (_Jahrgang_ 1891), p. 377. [121] For the story of Kavanagh, Hanlon, and Smith, and their attemptedlanding at Melbourne, see _England's Case_ (3rd ed. ), p. 207. [122] Mr. Gladstone, February 13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 307. [123] An eminent and very able Gladstonian M. P. Once said in mypresence, in effect, for I cannot cite his actual words, that thedifference between Gladstonians and Unionists was a difference in theirjudgment of character or of human nature. He touched I believe far morenearly than do most politicians the root of the differences which dividethe authors and the critics of our new constitution. [124] Report of Special Commission, pp. 54, 55. [125] _Ibid_. Pp. 53, 119. [126] _Ibid_. Pp. 119, 120. [127] Report of Special Commission, p. 120. [128] _Ibid_. [129] This Committee Room was the scene of the desertion of Parnell bythe majority of his former followers. [130] 'The crime of the Land League was a trifle compared to the crimeof the landlords. '--Mr. Sexton, April 20, 1893, _Times ParliamentaryDebates_, p. 525. [131] Bryce, _American Commonwealth_ (1st ed. ), ii. Pp. 190, 191. [132] Compare _ibid_. Ii. P. 618. [133] 'Carnot me dit avec cette niaiserie que les démocrates honnêtes nemanquent guère de mêler à leur vertu: "Croyez-moi, mon cher collègue, ilfaut toujours se fier au peuple. " Je me rappelle que je lui répondisassez brusquement: "Eh! que ne me disiez-vous cela la veille du 15mai?"'--_Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville_, p. 196. CHAPTER V THE PATH OF SAFETY We stand on the brink of a precipice. [134] To say that Englishmen areasked to take a leap in the dark is far to understate the peril of themoment. We are asked to leave an arduous but well-known road, and tospring down an unfathomed ravine filled with rocks, on any one of whichwe may be dashed to pieces. The very excess of the peril hides its existence from ordinary citizens. Mr. Gladstone, they argue, is a wise man and a good man, his colleaguesare partisans, they are not conspirators; it is incredible that theyshould recommend a measure fraught with ruin to England. But the matteris intelligible enough. Mr. Gladstone's weakness, no less than hisstrength, has always lain in his temporary but exclusive preoccupationwith some one dominant idea. The one notion which possesses his mind--tojudge from his public conduct and speeches--is that at any cost HomeRule, that is, an Irish Executive and an Irish Parliament, must beconceded to Ireland. Enthusiasm, pride, ambition, all the motives, goodand bad, which can influence a statesman, urge him to achieve this oneobject. If he succeeds his political career is crowned with victory, ifnot with final triumph; if he fails his whole course during the lastseven years turns out an error. But it has long been manifest that onlywith the greatest difficulty can English electors be persuaded to acceptHome Rule. Hence it has been found essential that the principles of themeasure should not be known before the time for passing it into law. Hence the ill-starred avoidance of discussion. Hence the ultimateframing of a scheme which is made to pass, but is not made to work, andwhich probably enough does not represent the real wishes or convictionsof any one statesman. Where is the Minister who will tell us that thisparticular Government of Ireland Bill is according to his judgment--Iwill not say in its details, but in each and all of its leadingprinciples--the best constitution which can be framed for determiningthe relations between England and Ireland? This Minister has notappeared--I doubt whether he exists. The Bill may be a model of artfulprovision for conciliating the prejudices or soothing the fears ofEnglish electors, but it is not a well-digested constitution. It isinferior to the Home Rule Bill of 1886. Another consequence of thecircumstances under which the Bill has been framed is that its authorsthemselves have never had the benefit to be derived from the maturediscussion of its principles. Mr. Gladstone himself cannot say what areand what are not the fundamental ideas of his scheme. He obviously held, at any rate when the Bill was introduced, that the presence of the Irishmembers at Westminster was a detail, whereas it is in reality the factwhich governs the character of the new constitution. To imply that sucha matter can be treated as subsidiary is, in the eyes of any student ofconstitutions, as ridiculous as it would seem to Mr. Gladstone for aChancellor of the Exchequer, on introducing his budget, to assert that, whether he maintained or did not maintain the income tax, was an organicdetail which did not fundamentally affect his financial proposals. TheMinistry are as much at sea as their chief; nor is this wonderful. Thereare two things of which English statesmen have had little experience. The one is a revolutionary movement, the other is the construction of aconstitution. But the Home Rule Bill is at once the effect and the signof a revolutionary movement, and the task in which the Gladstonians areengaged is the formation of a new constitution. Blind leaders areleading a blind people, and our blind leaders, some of whom care morefor Radical supremacy in England than for Imperial supremacy in Ireland, are like many other men of our time, the slaves of phrases, such as'trust in the people, ' which pass muster for principles. If the blindlead the blind, what wonder if they stumble over a precipice? The peril in which the country stands is concealed from us by a curiousreaction of opinion. Good political institutions, it was at one timeheld, were the cause of a nation's happiness, and England, it was firmlybelieved, owed her prosperity wholly to her constitution. A century ofrevolutions has taught us all that a good form of government cannot ofitself save a state from ruin, and many of us have come to think thatforms of government are nothing, and that no constitutional changes canimpair the strength of England. No delusion however is more patent ormore noxious. Never was a country richer in the elements of strengththan were the Thirteen Colonies when their independence was acknowledgedby England. Yet the Confederation by the vices of its constitutionfilled the colonies with discord, and made them both weak at home andcontemptible abroad, whilst the creation of the United States restoredthem to peace and opened for them the road to greatness. Thepredominance for more than fifty years of the Slave Power in thepolitics of the American Union, the struggle measured by centuriesthrough which at last the Protestant and progressive Cantons ofSwitzerland asserted their rightful supremacy over the Catholic andunprogressive Cantons of Switzerland, the weakness of Prussia when, notmuch more than forty[135] years back, she could hardly maintain herrights and her dignity against Austria, the classical instance ofGermany, which though possessed of every source of power lay forgenerations at the mercy of France, mainly on account of viciouspolitical institutions, are proofs, if evidence were wanting, of thecapacity of ill-designed constitutions to hamper the action and threatenthe prosperity of great nations. A constitution in truth is a nationalgarb. A good constitution will not make a weak country strong, but anunsuitable constitution may reduce a strong country to feebleness. Aweakling does not become a strong man by putting on armour, but a giantcan derive no advantage from his strength if once he be got by fraud orforce into a strait waistcoat. Strength, it is true, will in the long run assert itself. The artificialsupremacy of Ireland, or of a faction supported by Irish votes, will notlast for ever; probably it will not last long. If the new constitutionprove unbearable by England it will not be borne; it will be overthrownor evaded. Far am I from asserting that the breach or evasion will, whenit shall occur, be justifiable. Englishmen's ideas of good faith arestrict, but they are narrow. One main reason for dreading the newconstitution is that it may try beyond measure the patience and thehonesty of England. If, for instance, Ulster should resist the legalauthority of the Parliament at Dublin, there may arise one of thoseterrible periods in which the observation of pledged faith seemsinconsistent with the natural dictates of honour and humanity, and weakconcession at the present moment will, at such a crisis, be found tohave contained among its other perils the danger lest England, when atlast she re-asserts her power in Ireland, should not re-establish herjustice. Where then lies the path of safety? The road is difficult, but it isclearly marked; it is at any rate to be found, not by any exercise ofsubtlety or of extraordinary acuteness, but by obeying the plaindictates of common sense and sound public morality. The characteristicsof Unionist policy must be seriousness, simplicity, and reliance uponan appeal to the nation. Seriousness is essential. The need of the time is to impress on the mass of the people the intensegravity of the crisis. Far too much was said before the general electionabout the weaknesses and the inconsistencies of the Gladstonians, andfar too little about the causes of their strength and the absolutenecessity for arduous efforts to defeat the Separatists at thepolling-booths. The error must not be repeated. The people must be told, as they may be told with absolute truth, thatthe fate of England is in question, and that nothing but the efforts ofevery Unionist throughout the land can save the country fromdestruction. The contest has, without either party being aware of thechange, shifted its character since 1886. Then the names of Unionistsand Separatists expressed the whole difference between the opponents andsupporters of the Home Rule Bill. The Gladstonians for the most partmeant the Bill to affect, as far as possible, the condition of Irelandalone. They did not mean to change the constitution of the UnitedKingdom. It is now plain, as has been shown throughout these pages, thatthe measure of so-called Home Rule is a new constitution for the wholeUnited Kingdom. In 1886 the Gladstonians _bona fide_ intended to closethe period of agitation. In 1893 many Gladstonians see in Home Rule forIreland only the first step towards an extended scheme of federalism. In 1886 no Gladstonian had palliated crime or oppression, noGladstonian statesman had discovered that boycotting was nothing butexclusive dealing, no Gladstonian Chancellor had made light ofconspiracy. All this is changed. Alliance with revolutionists orconspirators has imbued respectable English statesmen with revolutionarydoctrines and revolutionary sentiment. The difference between Unionistand Separatist remains, but it is merged in the wider difference betweenConstitutionalists and Revolutionists. The question at issue is notmerely, though this is serious enough, whether the Act of Union shall berepealed or relaxed, but whether the United Kingdom is morally a nation, and whether as a nation it has a right to insist upon the supremeauthority belonging to the majority of its citizens. A similar questionwas some thirty-two years ago put to the people of the United States; itwas decided by the arbitrament of battle. The terrible calamity of an appeal to the test of force Englishmen mayavoid, but if it is to be avoided the national rights of the wholepeople of the United Kingdom must be asserted as strenuously by theirvotes as the rights of the citizens of the United States were vindicatedby their arms. The people of England again must be solemnly warned thaterrors in policy or acts of injustice may snatch from us the power ofdetermining a political controversy at the ballot-box instead of on thebattle-field. It is folly to raise cases on the constitution; it isalways of the most doubtful prudence to handle the casuistry ofpolitics. Nothing will tempt me to discuss in these pages what are theethical limits to the exercise of constitutionally unlimitedsovereignty, or at what point legal oppression justifies armedresistance. Two considerations must at this crisis be kept in mind. Theone is that, until oppression is actually committed, the maintenance oforder is the duty of every citizen, and, like most political duties, isalso a matter of the most obvious expediency; the other is that thecompulsion of loyal citizens to forgo the direct protection of thegovernment whose sovereignty they admit, and to accept the rule of agovernment whose moral claim to their allegiance they deny, is aproceeding of the grossest injustice. Let the people of England also besolemnly warned that the Gladstonian policy of 1893 repeats theessential error of the condemned policy of Protestant ascendency. Gladstonians hold that the democracy of England may ally itself with thedemocracy of Ireland, and may treat lightly the rights and the wishes ofa Protestant and Conservative minority. In bygone times the aristocraticand Protestant government of England allied itself with the Protestantand aristocratic government of Ireland, and held light the rights andthe wishes of the Catholic majority. Each policy labours under the samedefect. The enforced supremacy of a class, be it a minority or amajority, is opposed to the equitable principle of the supremacy of thewhole nation. There is no reason to suppose that Catholic ascendencywill be found more tolerable than was Protestant ascendency. The policy of Unionism should be marked by simplicity. The Unionist leaders have a clear though a difficult duty to perform. Their one immediate function is resistance to a dangerous revolution. Logically and politically, there was a good deal to be said for thedeliberate refusal to discuss, or to vote upon, any of the details ofthe Home Rule Bill. There is always a danger lest the attempt to amend aradically and essentially vicious measure should promote the delusionthat it is amendable. And any success in debate would be dearlypurchased if it led the electors to suppose that the Government ofIreland Bill, which in fact embodies a policy, so fundamentally perversethat no alteration of details can render it tolerable, is a measurewhich, though faulty in its execution, is sound in principle. TheUnionists leaders, however, whom we can absolutely trust, have decidedthat abstention from debate would be an error. As far as the matter isto be looked at from a parliamentary point of view their judgment isdecisive, and since the policy of combating the Bill point by point hasbeen adopted it should be carried out, as it is being carried out, withthe utmost stringency. Minute discussion of the clauses of the Bill iselaborate instruction for the mass of the nation. To the cry of obstruction no heed whatever need be paid. As long asthere is real discussion obstruction becomes, when the matter in debateis the formation of a new constitution for the United Kingdom, animpossibility. The business needs the most careful consideration. Ministers themselves are uncertain as to what are the essentialprinciples of their own scheme. Every detail involves a principle, andin a Bill where clearness is of vital importance, every clause involvesan ambiguity. Each part moreover of the new constitution must beconsidered with regard to the rest, and the expression of differentviews as to the meaning of the Bill is of itself of utility, when it isof the greatest importance that Englishmen and Irishmen, Conservativesand Radicals, should be agreed as to the meaning of the new FundamentalLaw. When, in short, a constitution for the country is being drawn up, no discussion which is rational can be obstructive. If a week or afortnight of parliamentary time is expended in defining the meaning ofthe supreme authority of Parliament, or in deciding whether the Irishdelegacy is or is not to be retained at Westminster, not a moment toomuch is devoted to points of such transcendent importance. 'But thedebate, ' it is urged, 'will at this rate last for months. ' Why not? 'Noother Bills, ' it is added, 'can be passed. ' What Bills, I answer, oughtto be passed whilst the constitution of England is undergoingfundamental alteration? 'But the principles of the measure, ' it isobjected, 'might have been discussed and settled during the last sevenyears. ' So, I reply, they might, if it had pleased the Gladstonianseither to produce their Bill or to announce its general principles. Their silence was politic; it won them a majority at the generalelection, but you cannot from the nature of things combine theadvantages both of reticence and of outspokenness. Silence may have beenjustified as a piece of clever party tactics; it is a very differentquestion whether the concealment of seven years has turned out highstatesmanship. Gladstonians, like other men, cannot, as the saying goes, have their cake and eat it. They have had the advantages, they are nowpaying the inevitable price of reserve. Unionists in any case are boundto turn this invaluable time to account. Discussion of the constitutionis the education of the people. In order, however, that this political training may be effective, ourparliamentary teachers must take care that the public are not confusedby the prominence necessarily given to details. Minute criticism of theBill is important, but at the present moment it is important only asenforcing the radical vice of its main principles. No effort must bespared to keep the mind of the nation well fixed upon these principles. The surrender by the British Parliament and the British Government ofall effective part in the government of Ireland, the ambiguities of sucha term as 'Imperial supremacy' and all that these ambiguities involve, the inadequacy and the futility of the Restrictions, the errors andimpolicy of the financial arrangements, above all the injustice toEngland and the injury to Ireland of retaining, under a system of HomeRule, even a single Irish representative at Westminster, these broadconsiderations are the things which should be pressed, and pressed home, upon the electors. Minor matters are good topics for parliamentarydiscussion, but should not receive a confusing and illusory prominence. The electors again must be made to feel that it is the essentialprinciple of Home Rule, the setting up of an Irish Government and anIrish Parliament, to which Unionists are opposed. The least appearanceof concession to Home Rulers, or any action which gives increasedcurrency to the delusion, certainly cherished by some moderateGladstonians, that Home Rule can be identified with or cut down toextended local self-government, [136] will be fatal to the cause ofUnionism. The concession to Ireland of a petty, paltry, peddlinglegislature, which dare hardly call itself a Parliament, and isofficially designated say as a national council, combined with somefaint imitation of a Cabinet, called say a committee, would disappointand irritate Home Rulers; it would cheat their hopes, but it wouldafford them the means of gaining their end. It would not give assuranceto Unionists, it would not be a triumph of Unionist policy, it wouldrather be the destruction of Unionism. The one course of safety is totake care that at the next general election the country has laid beforeit for determination a clear and unmistakable issue. The question forevery elector to answer must be reducible to the form Aye or No; willyou, or will you not, repeal the Union and establish an Irish Executiveand an Irish Parliament in Dublin? If the question be so raisedUnionists have no reason to fear an answer. The policy of Unionism has always relied on an appeal to the nation. The one desire of Unionists has always been to fight their opponents onthe clear unmistakable issue of Home Rule. The policy of Separatists hasbeen to keep Home Rule in the background whilst making its meaningindefinite, and to mix up all the multifarious issues raised by theNewcastle programme, as well as many others, with the one essentialquestion whether we should or should not repeal or modify the Act ofUnion. To their policy of appeal to the people the Unionists will, of course, adhere. The House of Lords will, it may be presumed, as a matter not somuch of right as of obvious duty, reject the present Home Rule Bill, soas to refer to the electors of the United Kingdom the question whetherwe shall, or shall not, have a new constitution. Even if such areference to the electors should result in a Gladstonian majority, it isstill possible that a further dissolution might be necessary. Themajority for Home Rule might be much reduced. I doubt whether Mr. Gladstone himself would maintain that with a majority say of ten ortwenty, a Minister would be morally justified in attempting afundamental change in the constitution. As to such speculative mattersthere is no need to say anything. It is worth while, however, to repeata statement which cannot be too often insisted upon, that the mostimportant function of the House of Lords at the present day is to takecare that no fundamental change in the constitution takes place whichhas not received the undoubted assent of the nation. The peers are moreand more clearly awakening to the knowledge that under the circumstancesof modern public life this protection of the rights of the nation, whichis in complete conformity with democratic principle, is the supreme dutyof the Upper House. The question, however, to be considered at the moment is whether for theperformance of this duty something more may not be required than thecompelling of a dissolution. This something more is a direct appeal tothe electors in the nature of a Referendum. The question is still atheoretical one; it cannot (unfortunately as it will appear to manypersons) be raised during the debates on the Bill in the House ofCommons. When the Bill reaches the House of Lords, it will, we maysuppose, be rejected, and all that a Unionist can wish for is, first, that before actual rejection its general principles should be subjectedto complete discussion, and what is in this case the same thing, exposure, and next that the House of Lords should, if necessary, takesteps which can easily be imagined, for providing that the rejection ofthe Bill shall entail a dissolution. If, however, the dissolution shouldresult in a Gladstonian majority, and should lead to another Home RuleBill being sent up to their lordships, the question then arises as tothe Referendum. My own conviction, which has been before laid before thepublic, is that the Lords would do well if they appended to any HomeRule Bill which they were prepared to accept a clause which might makeits coming into force depend upon its, within a limited time, receivingthe approval of the majority of the electors of the United Kingdom. Andin the particular case of the Home Rule Bill it is fair, for reasonsalready stated, [137] that the Bill before becoming law should receivethe assent of a majority of the electors both of Great Britain and ofIreland. This course, it may be said, is unconstitutional. This word hasno terrors for me; it means no more than unusual, and the institution ofa Referendum would simply mean the formal acknowledgment of the doctrinewhich lies at the basis of English democracy--that a law depends atbottom for its enactment on the assent of the nation as represented bythe electors. At a time when the true danger is that sections or classesshould arrogate to themselves authority which belongs to the State, itis an advantage to bring into prominence the sovereignty of the nation. The present is exactly a crisis at which we may override the practicesto save the principles of the constitution. The most forcible objectionwhich can be made is that you ought not for the sake of avoiding aparticular evil to introduce an innovation of dubious expediency. Theobjection itself is valid, but it is in the present instanceinapplicable. My conviction is that the introduction of the Referendum, in one shape or another in respect of large constitutional changes, would be a distinct benefit to the country. It affords the one availablecheck on the recklessness of party leaders; for the check is at onceeffective and in perfect conformity with democratic principle andsentiment. A second objection is that a Referendum renders any law whichobtains the approval of the electors more difficult of alteration thanan ordinary Act of Parliament. The allegation is true, but it reallytells greatly in favour of an ultimate reference to the people of anyHome Rule Bill passed in a Parliament. If such a Bill becomes law, itought to be a law not admitting of easy repeal. No doubt reaction may bejustifiable, but reaction is a great evil, and the Referendum puts acheck as well on reaction as on hasty innovation. In any case the timehas arrived when Unionist statesmen should consider the expediency ofannouncing that no Home Rule Bill will finally be accepted until it hasundergone a reference to and received the approval of the electors. Onno better issue could battle be joined with revolutionists than on thequestion whether the people of the United Kingdom should or should notbe allowed to express their will. Unionists have every reason to feelconfidence in their cause; their only policy, their one path of safetyis to make it, as they can do, absolutely plain that they rely uponjustice, and that they appeal from parties to the nation. We have now before us the essential features of the new constitutionframed by Gladstonians for the whole United Kingdom. We know itsinherent defects and inconsistencies; we have considered what may besaid on its behalf, or rather of the policy of which it is the outcome. The proposed change in our form of government touches the veryfoundations of the State, and deeply, though indirectly, threatens theunity of the whole Empire. Never surely since the day when the NationalAssembly of France drew up that Constitution of 1791, which built to beeternal endured for not quite a year, has an ancient nation been sostrangely invited to accept an untried and unknown polity. The position indeed of the French constitution-makers was in somerespects stronger and more defensible than the position of our Englishinnovators. The members of the National Assembly knew precisely whatthey were doing. They meant to alter the fundamental institutions ofFrance. A change moreover in the whole scheme of French government wasan admitted necessity. France might be uncertain as to the working ofthe new constitution, but France was absolutely certain that the _ancienrégime_ was detestable. Individuals or nations may wisely risk much whenthey are escaping from a social condition which they detest, they mayknow that an innovation is in itself of doubtful expediency, yet mayconsider any alleged reform worth a trial when no change can be a changefor the worse. In the France of 1791 confidence in the future meantabhorrence of the past. The authors of our new constitution can hardly be called the designersof their own handiwork; they have been the sport of accident. Theirintention, or rather the intention of their leader, was in 1886 merelyto grant some sort of Parliamentary independence to Ireland. Theresolution to concede Home Rule was sudden; it may have been taken upwithout due weighing of its consequences. It has assuredly led tounexpected results. The statesmen who meant merely to give Home Rule toIreland have stumbled into the making of a new constitution for theUnited Kingdom. What wonder that their workmanship betrays itsaccidental origin. It has no coherence, no consistency; nothing iscalled by its right name, and words are throughout substituted forfacts; the new Parliament of Ireland is denied its proper title; thesupremacy of the Imperial Parliament is nominally saved, and is reallydestroyed; and the very statesmen who proclaim the supremacy of theImperial Parliament refuse to assert the subordination of the IrishParliament. The authors of the constitution are at sea as to itsleading principles, and its most essential provision they deem anorganic detail, which may at any moment be modified or removed. Thewhole thing is an incongruous patchwork affair, made up of shreds andtatters torn from the institutions of other lands. It is as inconsistentwith the proposed and rejected Constitution of 1886 as with the existingConstitution of England. While however our constitution-makers tenderfor the acceptance of the nation a scheme of fundamental change, whereofthe effect is uncertain, conjectural, and perilous, and the permanenceis not guaranteed by its authors, Englishmen are well satisfied withtheir old constitution; they may desire its partial modification orexpansion, they have never even contemplated its overthrow. Politicians, in short, who meant to initiate a moderate reform, are pressing arevolutionary change on a country which neither needs nor desires arevolution; they propose to get rid of grave, though temporary, inconveniences by a permanent alteration of which no man can calculatethe results in our whole system of government. Never before was a nationso strangely advised by such bewildered counsellors to take for solittle apparent reason so desperate a leap in the dark. FOOTNOTES: [134] The whole gist of this chapter applies to the state of England in1911 with greater force than even to its condition in 1893. Home Rulewill be carried, if at all, only by a House of Commons freed from theauthority of the House of Lords, and from the need of an appeal to thepeople. [135] Now sixty-one years. [136] If any one wishes to see the difference between localself-government and Home Rule, let him compare the Bill for theextension of self-government in Ireland, brought in by the lateMinistry, with the Home Rule Bill. The Local Government Bill went veryfar, some persons may even maintain dangerously far, in creating and inextending the authority of local bodies in Ireland. But it was not HomeRule, or anything like Home Rule. The most extended Local GovernmentBill and the most restricted Home Rule Bill differ fundamentally inprinciple. The one in effect denies, the other in effect concedes, aseparate national government to Ireland. [137] See pp. 119-121, _ante_. APPENDIX GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES _Legislative Authority_Clause. 1. Establishment of Irish Legislature. 2. Powers of Irish Legislature. 3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. 4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. _Executive Authority_5. Executive power in Ireland. _Constitution of Legislature_6. Composition of Irish Legislative Council. 7. Composition of Irish Legislative Assembly. 8. Disagreement between two Houses, how settled. _Irish Representation in House of Commons_9. Representation in Parliament of Irish counties and boroughs. _Finance_10. As to separate Consolidated Fund and taxes. 11. Hereditary revenues and income tax. 12. Financial arrangements as between United Kingdom andIreland. 13. Treasury Account (Ireland). 14. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund. 15. Irish Church Fund. 16. Local loans. 17. Adaptation of Acts as to Local Taxation Accounts and probate, etc. , duties. 18. Money bills and votes. 19. Exchequer judges for revenue actions, election petitions, etc. _Post Office Postal Telegraphs and Savings Banks_20. Transfer of post office and postal telegraphs. 21. Transfer of savings banks. _Irish Appeals and Decision of Constitutional Questions_22. Irish appeals. 23. Special provision for decision of constitutional questions. _Lord Lieutenant and Crown Lands_24. Office of Lord Lieutenant. 25. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. _Judges and Civil Servants_26. Tenure of future judges. 27. As to existing judges and other persons having salaries charged onthe Consolidated Fund. 28. As to persons holding civil service appointments. 29. As to existing pensions and superannuation allowances. _Police_30. As to Police. _Miscellaneous_31. Irish Exchequer Consolidated Fund and Audit. 32. Law applicable to both Houses of Irish Legislature. 33. Supplemental provisions as to powers of Irish Legislature. 34. Limitation on borrowing by local authorities. _Transitory Provisions_35. Temporary restriction on powers of Irish Legislature and Executive. 36. Transitory provisions. 37. Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, etc. 38. Appointed day. 39. Definitions. 40. Short title. SCHEDULES A BILL TO AMEND THE PROVISION FORTHE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND[138] Whereas it is expedient that without impairing or restricting thesupreme authority of Parliament, an Irish Legislature should be createdfor such purposes in Ireland as in this Act mentioned: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by andwith the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, andCommons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority ofthe same, as follows: _Legislative Authority_ 1. _On and after the appointed day_ there shall be in Ireland aLegislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and of two Houses, theLegislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. 2. With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Actmentioned, there shall be granted to the Irish Legislature power tomake laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland inrespect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof. 3. The Irish Legislature shall not have power to make laws in respect ofthe following matters or any of them:-- (1) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency; or the Lord Lieutenant as representative of the Crown; or (2) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state of war; or (3) Naval or military forces, or the defence of the realm; or (4) Treaties and other relations with foreign States or the relations between different parts of Her Majesty's dominions or offences connected with such treaties or relations; or (5) Dignities or titles of honour; or (6) Treason, treason-felony, alienage, or naturalisation; or (7) Trade with any place out of Ireland; or quarantine, or navigation (except as respects inland waters and local health or harbour regulations); or (8) Beacons, lighthouses, or sea marks (except so far as they can consistently with any general Act of Parliament be constructed or maintained by a local harbour authority); or (9) Coinage; legal tender; or the standard of weights and measures; or (10) Trade marks, merchandise marks, copyright, or patent rights. Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. 4. The powers of the Irish Legislature shall not extend to the making ofany law-- (1) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or (2) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on account of religious belief; or (3) Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity; or (4) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money, without attending the religious instruction at that school; or (5) Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation; or (6) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by Royal Charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a corporation raising for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, or administering funds so raised) may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law; or (7) Whereby any inhabitant of the United Kingdom may be deprived of equal rights as respects public sea fisheries. Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. _Executive Authority_ 5. --(1) The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in HerMajesty the Queen, and the Lord Lieutenant, on behalf of Her Majesty, shall exercise any prerogatives or other executive power of the Queenthe exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty, and shall, in Her Majesty's name, summon, prorogue, and dissolve the IrishLegislature. (2) There shall be an Executive Committee of the PrivyCouncil of Ireland to aid and advise in the government of Ireland, beingof such numbers, and comprising persons holding such offices, as HerMajesty may think fit, or as may be directed by Irish Act. (3) The LordLieutenant shall, on the advice of the said Executive Committee, give orwithhold the assent of Her Majesty to Bills passed by the two Houses ofthe Irish Legislature, subject nevertheless to any instructions given byHer Majesty in respect of any such Bill. _Constitution of Legislature_ 6. --(1) The Irish Legislative Council shall consist of _forty-eight_councillors. (2) Each of the constituencies mentioned in the FirstSchedule to this Act shall return the number of councillors namedopposite thereto in the schedule. (3) Every man shall be entitled to beregistered as an elector, and when registered to vote at an election, ofa councillor for a constituency, who owns or occupies any land ortenement in the constituency of a rateable value of more than _twenty_pounds, subject to the like conditions as a man is entitled at thepassing of this Act to be registered and vote as a parliamentary electorin respect of an ownership qualification or of the qualificationspecified in section five of the Representation of the People Act, 1884, as the case may be: Provided that a man shall not be entitled to beregistered, nor if registered to vote, at an election of a councillor inmore than one constituency in the same year. (4) The term of office ofevery councillor shall be _eight_ years, and shall not be affected by adissolution; and one _half_ of the councillors shall retire in every_fourth_ year, and their seats shall be filled by a new election. 7. --(1) The Irish Legislative Assembly shall consist of _one hundred andthree_ members, returned by the existing parliamentary constituencies inIreland, or the existing divisions thereof, and elected by theparliamentary electors for the time being in those constituencies ordivisions. (2) The Irish Legislative Assembly when summoned may, unlesssooner dissolved, have continuance _for five_ years from the day onwhich the summons directs it to meet and no longer. (3) After _six_years from the passing of this Act, the Irish Legislature may alter thequalification of the electors, and the constituencies, and thedistribution of the members among the constituencies, provided that insuch distribution due regard is had to the population of theconstituencies. 8. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill adopted by the LegislativeAssembly is lost by the disagreement of the Legislative Council, andafter a dissolution, or the period of _two years_ from suchdisagreement, such Bill, or a Bill for enacting the said provision, isagain adopted by the Legislative Assembly and fails within three monthsafterwards to be adopted by the Legislative Council, the same shallforthwith be submitted to the members of the two Houses deliberating andvoting together thereon, and shall be adopted or rejected according tothe decision of the majority of those members present and voting on thequestion. _Irish Representation in House of Commons_ 9. Unless and until Parliament otherwise determines, the followingprovisions shall have effect-- (1) After _the appointed day_ each of the constituencies named in the Second Schedule to this Act shall return to serve in Parliament the number of members named opposite thereto in that schedule, and no more, and Dublin University shall cease to return any member. (2) The existing divisions of the constituencies shall, save as provided in that schedule, be abolished. (3) An Irish representative peer in the House of Lords and a member of the House of Commons for an Irish constituency shall not be entitled to deliberate or vote on-- (_a_) any Bill or motion in relation thereto, the operation of which Bill or motion is confined to Great Britain or some part thereof; or (_b_) any motion or resolution relating solely to some tax not raised or to be raised in Ireland; or (_c_) any vote or appropriation of money made exclusively for some service not mentioned in the Third Schedule to this Act; or (_d_) any motion or resolution exclusively affecting Great Britain or some part thereof or some local authority or some person or thing therein; or (_e_) any motion or resolution, incidental to any such motion or resolution as either is last mentioned, or relates solely to some tax not raised or to be raised in Ireland, or incidental to any such vote or appropriation of money as aforesaid. (4) Compliance with the provisions of this section shall not be questioned otherwise than in each House in manner provided by the House. (5) The election laws and the laws relating to the qualification of parliamentary electors shall not, so far as they relate to parliamentary elections, be altered by the Irish Legislature, but this enactment shall not prevent the Irish Legislature from dealing with any officers concerned with the issue of writs of election, and if any officers are so dealt with, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty by Order in Council to arrange for the issue of such writs, and the writs issued in pursuance of such Order shall be of the same effect as if issued in manner heretofore accustomed. _Finance_ 10. --(1) _On and after the appointed day_ there shall be an IrishExchequer and Consolidated Fund separate from those of the UnitedKingdom. (2) The duties of customs and excise and the duties on postageshall be imposed by Act of Parliament, but subject to the provisions ofthis Act the Irish Legislature may, in order to provide for the publicservice of Ireland, impose any other taxes. (3) Save as in this Actmentioned, all matters relating to the taxes in Ireland and thecollection and management thereof shall be regulated by Irish Act, andthe same shall be collected and managed by the Irish Government and formpart of the public revenues of Ireland: Provided that-- (_a_) the duties of customs shall be regulated, collected, managed, and paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as heretofore; and (_b_) all prohibitions in connection with the duties of excise, and so far as regards articles sent out of Ireland, all matters relating to those duties, shall be regulated by Act of Parliament; and (_c_) the excise duties on articles consumed in Great Britain shall be paid in Great Britain or to an officer of the Government of the United Kingdom. (4) Save as in this Act mentioned, all the public revenues of Irelandshall be paid into the Irish Exchequer and form a Consolidated Fund, andbe appropriated to the public service of Ireland by Irish Act. (5) Ifthe duties of excise are increased above the rates in force on _thefirst day of March one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three_, the netproceeds in Ireland of the duties in excess of the said rates shall bepaid from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. (6) _If the duties of excise are reduced below the rates in force on thesaid day, and the net proceeds of such duties in Ireland are inconsequence less than the net proceeds of the duties before thereduction, a sum equal to the deficiency shall, unless it is otherwiseagreed between the Treasury and the Irish Government, be paid from theExchequer of the United Kingdom to the Irish Exchequer_. 11. --(1) The hereditary revenues of the Crown in Ireland which aremanaged by the Commissioners of Woods shall continue during the life ofHer present Majesty to be managed and collected by those Commissioners, and the net amount payable by them to the Exchequer on account of thoserevenues, after deducting all expenses (but including an allowance forinterest on such proceeds of the sale of those revenues as have not beenre-invested in Ireland), shall be paid into the Treasury Account(Ireland) hereinafter mentioned, for the benefit of the Irish Exchequer. (2) A person shall not be required to pay income tax in Great Britain inrespect of property situate or business carried on in Ireland, and aperson shall not be required to pay income tax in Ireland in respect ofproperty situate or business carried on in Great Britain. (3) _For thepurpose of giving to Ireland the benefit of the difference between theincome tax collected in Great Britain from British, Colonial, andforeign securities held by residents in Ireland, and the income taxcollected in Ireland from Irish securities held by residents in GreatBritain, there shall be made to Ireland out of the income tax collectedin Great Britain, an allowance of such amount as may be from time totime determined by the Treasury, in accordance with a minute of theTreasury laid before Parliament before the appointed day, and suchallowance shall be paid into the Treasury Account (Ireland) for thebenefit of the Irish Exchequer_. (4) Provided that the provisions ofthis section with respect to income tax shall not apply to any excess ofthe rate of income tax in Great Britain above the rate in Ireland or ofthe rate of income tax in Ireland above the rate in Great Britain. 12. --(1) The duties of customs contributed by Ireland and, save asprovided by this Act, that portion of any public revenue of the UnitedKingdom to which Ireland may claim to be entitled, whether specified inthe Third Schedule to this Act or not, shall be carried to theConsolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, as the contribution of Irelandto Imperial liabilities and expenditure as defined in that Schedule. (2)The civil charges of the Government in Ireland shall, subject as in thisAct mentioned, be borne after the appointed day by Ireland. (3) After_fifteen_ years from the passing of this Act the arrangements made bythis Act for the contribution of Ireland to Imperial liabilities andexpenditure, and otherwise for the financial relations between theUnited Kingdom and Ireland, may be revised in pursuance of an address toHer Majesty from the House of Commons, or from the Irish LegislativeAssembly. 13. --(1) There shall be established under the direction of the Treasuryan account (in this Act referred to as the Treasury Account (Ireland)). (2) There shall be paid into such account all sums payable from theIrish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, or from thelatter to the former Exchequer, and all sums directed to be paid intothe account for the benefit of either of the said Exchequers. (3) Allsums which are payable from either of the said Exchequers to the otherof them, or being payable out of one of the said Exchequers arerepayable by the other Exchequer, shall in the first instance be payableout of the said account so far as the money standing on the account issufficient; and for the purpose of meeting such sums, the Treasury outof the customs revenue collected in Ireland, and the Irish Governmentout of any of the public revenues in Ireland, may direct money to bepaid to the Treasury Account (Ireland) instead of into the Exchequer. (4) Any surplus standing on the account to the credit of eitherExchequer, and not required for meeting payments, shall at convenienttimes be paid into that Exchequer, and where any sum so payable into theExchequer of the United Kingdom is required by law to be forthwith paidto the National Debt Commissioners, that sum may be paid to thoseCommissioners without being paid into the Exchequer. (5) All sumspayable by virtue of this Act out of the Consolidated Fund of the UnitedKingdom or of Ireland shall be payable from the Exchequer of the UnitedKingdom or Ireland, as the case may be, within the meaning of this Act, and all sums by this Act made payable from the Exchequer of the UnitedKingdom shall, if not otherwise paid, be charged on and paid out of theConsolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 14. --(1) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund in favourof the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as a first charge on that fundall sums which-- (_a_) are payable to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer; or (_b_) are required to repay to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom sums issued to meet the dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed land stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, or (_c_) otherwise have been or are required to be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom in consequence of the non-payment thereof out of the Exchequer of Ireland or otherwise by the Irish Government. (2) If at any time the Controller and Auditor-General of the UnitedKingdom is satisfied that any such charge is due, he shall certify theamount of it, and the Treasury shall send such certificate to the LordLieutenant, who shall thereupon by order, without any counter-signature, direct the payment of the amount from the Irish Exchequer to theExchequer of the United Kingdom, and such order shall be duly obeyed byall persons, and until the amount is wholly paid no other payment shallbe made out of the Irish Exchequer for any purpose whatever. (3) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund next after theforegoing charge: (_a_) all sums, for dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed land stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, which the Land Purchase Account and the Guarantee Fund under that Act are insufficient to pay; (_b_) all sums due in respect of any debt incurred by the Government of Ireland, whether for interest, management, or sinking fund; (_c_) an annual sum of _five thousand_ pounds for the expenses of the household and establishment of the Lord Lieutenant; (_d_) all existing charges on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of Irish services other than the salary of the Lord Lieutenant; and (_e_) the salaries and pensions of all judges of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland or of any county or other like court, who are appointed after the passing of this Act, and are not the Exchequer judges hereafter mentioned. (4) Until all charges created by this Act upon the Irish ConsolidatedFund and for the time being due are paid, no money shall be issued fromthe Irish Exchequer for any other purpose whatever. 15. --(1) All existing charges on the Church property in Ireland--that isto say, all property accruing under the Irish Church Act, 1869, andtransferred to the Irish Land Commission by the Irish Church AmendmentAct, 1881--shall so far as not paid out of the said property be chargedon the Irish Consolidated Fund, and any of those charges guaranteed bythe Treasury, if and so far as not paid, shall be paid out of theExchequer of the United Kingdom. (2) Subject to the existing charges thereon, the said Church propertyshall belong to the Irish Government, and be managed, administered, anddisposed of as directed by Irish Act. 16. --(1) All sums paid or applicable in or towards the discharge of theinterest or principal of any local loan advanced before the appointedday on security in Ireland, or otherwise in respect of such loan, whichbut for this Act would be paid to the National Debt Commissioners, andcarried to the Local Loans Fund, shall, after the appointed day, bepaid, until otherwise provided by Irish Act, to the Irish Exchequer. (2) For the payment to the Local Loans Fund of the principal andinterest of such loans, the Irish Government shall after the appointedday pay by half-yearly payments an annuity for _forty-nine_ years, atthe rate of _four_ per cent, on the principal of the said loans, exclusive of any sums written off before the appointed day from theaccount of assets of the Local Loans Fund, and such annuity shall bepaid from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and when so paid shall be forthwith paid to the National DebtCommissioners for the credit of the Local Loans Fund. (3) After the appointed day, money for loans in Ireland shall cease tobe advanced either by the Public Works Loan Commissioners or out of theLocal Loans Fund. 17. --(1) So much of any Act as directs payment to the Local Taxation(Ireland) Account of any share of probate, excise, or customs dutiespayable to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom shall, together with anyenactment amending the same, be repealed as from the appointed daywithout prejudice to the adjustment of balances after that day; but thelike amounts shall continue to be paid to the Local Taxation Accounts inEngland and Scotland as would have been paid if this Act had not passed, and any residue of the said share shall be paid into the Exchequer ofthe United Kingdom. (2) The stamp duty chargeable in respect of the personalty of a deceasedperson shall not in the case of administration granted in Great Britainbe chargeable in respect of any personalty situate in Ireland, nor inthe case of administration granted in Ireland be chargeable in respectof any personalty situate in Great Britain; and any administrationgranted in Great Britain shall not, if re-sealed in Ireland, be exemptfrom stamp duty on administration granted in Ireland, and anyadministration granted in Ireland shall not, when re-sealed in GreatBritain, be exempt from stamp duty on administration granted in GreatBritain. (3) In this section the expression "administration" means probate orletters of administration, and as respects Scotland, confirmationinclusive of the inventory required under the Acts relating to the saidstamp duty, and the expression "personalty" means personal or movableestate and effects. 18. --(1) Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue or forimposing any tax shall originate in the Legislative Assembly. (2) It shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to adopt or passany vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the appropriation for anypurpose of any part of the public revenue of Ireland, or of any tax, except in pursuance of a recommendation from the Lord Lieutenant in thesession in which such vote, resolution, address, or Bill is proposed. 19. --(1) Two of the judges of the Supreme Court in Ireland shall beExchequer judges, and shall be appointed under the great seal of theUnited Kingdom; and their salaries and pensions shall be charged on andpaid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. (2) The Exchequer judges shall be removeable only by Her Majesty onaddress from the two Houses of Parliament, and each such judge shall, save as otherwise provided by Parliament, receive the same salary and beentitled to the same pension as is at the time of his appointment fixedfor the puisne judges of the Supreme Court, and during his continuancein office his salary shall not be diminished, nor his right to pensionaltered, without his consent. (3) An alteration of any rules relating to such legal proceedings as arementioned in this section shall not be made except with the approval ofHer Majesty the Queen in Council; and the sittings of the Exchequerjudges shall be regulated with the like approval. (4) All legal proceedings in Ireland, which are instituted at theinstance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs, or anyof their officers, or relate to the election of members to serve inParliament, or touch any matter within the powers of the IrishLegislature, or touch any matter affected by a law which the IrishLegislature have not power to repeal or alter, shall, if so required byany party to such proceedings, be heard and determined before theExchequer judges or (except where the case requires to be determined bytwo judges) before one of them, and in any such legal proceeding anappeal shall, if any party so requires, lie from any court of firstinstance in Ireland to the Exchequer judges, and the decision of theExchequer judges shall be subject to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen inCouncil and not to any other tribunal. (5) If it is made to appear to an Exchequer judge that any decree orjudgment in any such proceeding as aforesaid has not been duly enforcedby the sheriff or other officer whose duty it is to enforce the same, such judge shall appoint some officer whose duty it shall be to enforcethe judgment or decree; and for that purpose such officer and allpersons employed by him shall be entitled to the same privileges, immunities, and powers as are by law conferred on a sheriff and hisofficers. (6) The Exchequer judges, when not engaged in hearing and determiningsuch legal proceedings as above in this section mentioned, shall performsuch of the duties ordinarily performed by other judges of the SupremeCourt in Ireland as may be assigned by Her Majesty the Queen in Council. (7) All sums recovered by the Treasury or the Commissioners of Customsor any of their officers, or recovered under any Act relating to dutiesof customs, shall, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, be paid tosuch public account as the Treasury or the Commissioners direct. _Post Office Postal Telegraphs and Savings Banks_ 20. --(1) As from _the appointed day_ the postal and telegraph service inIreland shall be transferred to the Irish Government, and may beregulated by Irish Act, except as in this Act mentioned and except asregards matters relating-- (_a_) to such conditions of the transmission or delivery of postal packets and telegrams as are incidental to the duties on postage; or (_b_) foreign mails or submarine telegraphs or through lines in connection therewith; or (_c_) to any other postal or telegraph business in connection with places out of the United Kingdom. (2) The administration of or incidental to the said excepted mattersshall, save as may be otherwise arranged with the Irish Post Office, remain with the Postmaster-General. (3) As regards the revenue and expenses of the postal and telegraphservice, the Postmaster-General shall retain the revenue collected anddefray the expenses incurred in Great Britain, and the Irish Post Officeshall retain the revenue collected and defray the expenses incurred inIreland, subject to the provisions of the Fourth Schedule to this Act;which schedule shall have full effect, but may be varied or added to byagreement between the Postmaster-General and the Irish Post Office. (4) _The sums payable by the Postmaster-General or Irish Post Office tothe other of them in pursuance of this Act shall, if not paid out of thePost Office moneys, be paid from the Exchequer of the United Kingdom orof Ireland, as the case requires, to the other Exchequer_. (5) Sections forty-eight to fifty-two of the Telegraph Act 1863, and anyenactment amending the same, shall apply to all telegraphic lines of theIrish Government in like manner as to the telegraphs of a company withinthe meaning of that Act. 21. --(1) As from _the appointed day_ there shall be transferred to theIrish Government the post office savings banks in Ireland and all suchpowers and duties of any department or officer in Great Britain as areconnected with post office savings banks, trustee savings banks orfriendly societies in Ireland, and the same may be regulated by IrishAct. (2) The Treasury shall publish not less than six months' previous noticeof the transfer of savings banks. (3) If before the date of the transfer any depositor in a post officesavings bank so requests, his deposit shall, according to his request, either be paid to him or transferred to a post office savings bank inGreat Britain, and after the said date the depositors in a post officesavings bank in Ireland shall cease to have any claim against thePostmaster-General or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, butshall have the like claim against the Government and Consolidated Fundof Ireland. (4) If before the date of the transfer the trustees of any trusteesavings bank so request, then, according to the request, either all sumsdue to them shall be repaid and the savings bank closed, or those sumsshall be paid to the Irish Government, and after the said date thetrustees shall cease to have any claim against the National DebtCommissioners or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, but shallhave the like claim against the Government and Consolidated Fund ofIreland. (5) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, if a sumdue on account of any annuity or policy of insurance which has beforethe above-mentioned notice been granted through a post office or trusteesavings bank is not paid by the Irish Government, that sum shall be paidout of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. _Irish Appeals and Decision of Constitutional Questions_ 22. --(1) The appeal from courts in Ireland to the House of Lords shallcease; and where any person would, but for this Act, have a right toappeal from any court in Ireland to the House of Lords, such personshall have the like right to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen in Council;and the right so to appeal shall not be affected by any Irish Act; andall enactments relating to appeals to Her Majesty the Queen in Council, and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, shall applyaccordingly. (2) When the Judicial Committee sit for hearing appeals from a court inIreland, there shall be present not less than four Lords of Appeal, within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at leastone member who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court in Ireland. (3) A rota of privy councillors to sit for hearing appeals from courtsin Ireland shall be made annually by Her Majesty in Council, and theprivy councillors, or some of them, on that rota shall sit to hear thesaid appeals. A casual vacancy in such rota during the year may befilled by Order in Council. (4) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of the House ofLords to determine the claims to Irish peerages. 23. --(1) If it appears to the Lord Lieutenant or a Secretary of Stateexpedient in the public interest that steps shall be taken for thespeedy determination of the question whether any Irish Act or anyprovision thereof is beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, he mayrepresent the same to Her Majesty in Council, and thereupon the saidquestion shall be forthwith referred to and heard and determined by theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council, constituted as if hearing anappeal from a court in Ireland. (2) Upon the hearing of the question such persons as seem to theJudicial Committee to be interested may be allowed to appear and beheard as parties to the case, and the decision of the Judicial Committeeshall be given in like manner as if it were the decision of an appeal, the nature of the report or recommendation to Her Majesty being statedin open court. (3) Nothing in this Act shall prejudice any other power of Her Majestyin Council to refer any question to the Judicial Committee or the rightof any person to petition Her Majesty for such reference. _Lord Lieutenant and Crown Lands_ 24. --(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act, everysubject of the Queen shall be qualified to hold the office of LordLieutenant of Ireland, without reference to his religious belief. (2) The term of office of the Lord Lieutenant shall be _six years_, without prejudice to the power of Her Majesty the Queen at any time torevoke the appointment. 25. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may placeunder the control of the Irish Government, for the purposes of thatgovernment, such of the lands and buildings in Ireland vested in or heldin trust for Her Majesty, and subject to such conditions or restrictions(if any) as may seem expedient. _Judges and Civil Servants_ 26. A judge of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland, orof any county court or other court with a like jurisdiction in Ireland, appointed after the passing of this Act, shall not be removed from hisoffice except in pursuance of an address from the two Houses of theLegislature of Ireland, nor during his continuance in office shall hissalary be diminished or right to pension altered without his consent. 27. --(1) All existing judges of the Supreme Court, county court judges, and Land Commissioners in Ireland and all existing officers serving inIreland in the permanent civil service of the Crown and receivingsalaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, shall, if they are removeable at present on address from both Houses ofParliament, continue to be removeable only upon such address, and ifremoveable in any other manner shall continue to be removeable only inthe same manner as heretofore; and shall continue to receive the samesalaries, gratuities, and pensions, and to be liable to perform the sameduties as heretofore, or such duties as Her Majesty may declare to beanalogous, and their salaries and pensions, if and so far as not paidout of the Irish Consolidated Fund, shall be paid out of the Exchequerof the United Kingdom: Provided that this section shall be subject tothe provisions of this Act with respect to the Exchequer judges. (2) _If any of the said judges, commissioners, or officers retires fromoffice with the Queen's approbation before completion of the period ofservice entitling him to a pension, Her Majesty may, if she thinks fit, grant to him such pension, not exceeding the pension to which he wouldon that completion have been entitled, as to Her Majesty seems meet_. 28. --(1) All existing officers in the permanent civil service of theCrown, who are not above provided for, and are at the appointed dayserving in Ireland, shall after that day continue to hold their officesby the same tenure and to receive the same salaries, gratuities, andpensions, and to be liable to perform the same duties as heretofore orsuch duties as the Treasury may declare to be analogous; _and the saidgratuities and pensions, and until three years after the passing of thisAct, the salaries due to any of the said officers if remaining in hisexisting office, shall be paid to the payees by the Treasury out of theExchequer of the United Kingdom_. (2) Any such officer may after _three years_ from the passing of thisAct retire from office, and shall, at any time during those three years, if required by the Irish Government, retire from office, and on any suchretirement may be awarded by the Treasury a gratuity or pension inaccordance with the Fifth Schedule to this Act; Provided that-- (_a_) six months' written notice shall, unless it is otherwise agreed, be given either by the said officer or by the Irish Government as the case requires; and (_b_) such number of officers only shall retire at one time and at such intervals of time as the Treasury, in communication with the Irish Government, sanction. (3) If any such officer does not so retire, the Treasury may award himafter the said three years a pension in accordance with the FifthSchedule to this Act which shall become payable to him on his ultimateretirement from the service of the Crown. (4) _The gratuities and pensions awarded in accordance with the FifthSchedule to this Act shall be paid by the Treasury to the payees out ofthe Exchequer of the United Kingdom. _ (5) All sums paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom inpursuance of this section shall be repaid to that Exchequer from theIrish Exchequer. (6) This section shall not apply to officers retained in the service ofthe Government of the United Kingdom. 29. Any existing pension granted on account of service in Ireland as ajudge of the Supreme Court or of any court consolidated into that court, or as a county court judge, or in any other judicial position, or as anofficer in the permanent civil service of the Crown other than in anoffice the holder of which is after the appointed day retained in theservice of the Government of the United Kingdom, shall be charged on theIrish Consolidated Fund, and if and so far as not paid out of that fund, shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. _Police_ 30. --(1) The forces of the Royal Irish Constabulary and DublinMetropolitan Police shall, when and as local police forces are from timeto time established in Ireland in accordance with the Sixth Schedule tothis Act, be gradually reduced and ultimately cease to exist asmentioned in that Schedule; and after the passing of this Act, noofficer or man shall be appointed to either of those forces; Provided that until the expiration of _six_ years from the appointedday, nothing in this Act shall require the Lord Lieutenant to causeeither of the said forces to cease to exist, if as representing HerMajesty the Queen he considers it inexpedient. (2) The said two forces shall, while they continue, be subject to thecontrol of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty, and themembers thereof shall continue to receive the same salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and hold their appointments on the same tenure asheretofore, _and those salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and all theexpenditure incidental to either force, shall be paid out of theExchequer of the United Kingdom_. (3) When any existing member of either force retires under theprovisions of the Sixth Schedule to this Act, the Treasury may award tohim a gratuity or pension in accordance with that Schedule. (4) _Those gratuities and pensions and all existing pensions payable inrespect of service in either force, shall be paid by the Treasury to thepayees out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom_. (5) _Two-thirds of the net amount payable in pursuance of this sectionout of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom shall be repaid to thatExchequer from the Irish Exchequer_. _Miscellaneous_ 31. Save as may be otherwise provided by Irish Act-- (_a_) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply with the necessary modifications to the Exchequer and Consolidated Fund of Ireland, and an officer shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant to be the Irish Comptroller and Auditor General; and (_b_) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated Fund shall be audited as appropriation accounts in manner provided by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or under the direction of such officer. 32. --(1) Subject as in this Act mentioned and particularly to theSeventh Schedule to this Act (which Schedule shall have full effect) allexisting election laws relating to the House of Commons and the membersthereof shall, so far as applicable, extend to each of the two Houses ofthe Irish Legislature and the members thereof, but such election laws sofar as hereby extended may be altered by Irish Act. (2) The privileges, rights, and immunities to be held and enjoyed byeach House and the members thereof shall be such as may be defined byIrish Act, but so that the same shall never exceed those for the timebeing held and enjoyed by the House of Commons, and the members thereof. 33. --(i) The Irish Legislature may repeal or alter any provision of thisAct which is by this Act expressly made alterable by that Legislature, and also any enactments in force in Ireland, except such as eitherrelate to matters beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, or beingenacted by Parliament after the passing of this Act may be expresslyextended to Ireland. An Irish Act, notwithstanding it is in any respectrepugnant to any enactment excepted as aforesaid, shall, though readsubject to that enactment, be, except to the extent of that repugnancy, valid. (2) An order, rule, or regulation, made in pursuance of, or having theforce of, an Act of Parliament, shall be deemed to be an enactmentwithin the meaning of this section. (3) Nothing in this Act shall affect Bills relating to the divorce ormarriage of individuals, and any such Bill shall be introduced andproceed in Parliament in like manner as if this Act had not passed. 34. The local authority for any county or borough or other area shallnot borrow money without either-- (_a_) special authority from the Irish Legislature, or (_b_) the sanction of the proper department of the Irish Government: and shall not, without such special authority, borrow; (i) in the case of a municipal borough or town or area less than a county, any loan which together with the then outstanding debt of the local authority, will exceed twice the annual rateable value of the property in the municipal borough, town, or area; or (ii) in the case of a country or larger area, any loan which together with the then outstanding debt of the local authority, will exceed one-tenth of the annual rateable value of the property in the county or area; or (iii) in any case a loan exceeding one-half of the above limits without a local inquiry held in the county, borough, or area by a person appointed for the purpose by the said department. _Transitory Provisions_ 35. --(1) During _three_ years from the passing of this Act, and ifParliament is then sitting until the end of that session of Parliament, the Irish Legislature shall not pass an Act respecting the relations oflandlord and tenant, or the sale, purchase, or letting of landgenerally: Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent thepassing of any Irish Act with a view to the purchase of land forrailways, harbours, waterworks, town improvements, or other localundertakings. (2) During _six_ years from the passing of this Act, the appointment ofa judge of the Supreme Court or other superior courts in Ireland (otherthan one of the Exchequer judges) shall be made in pursuance of awarrant from Her Majesty countersigned as heretofore. 36. --(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act Her Majesty the Queen inCouncil may make or direct such arrangements as seem necessary or properfor setting in motion the Irish Legislature and Government and forotherwise bringing this Act into operation. (2) The Irish Legislatureshall be summoned to meet on the _first Tuesday in September, onethousand eight hundred and ninety-four_, and the first election ofmembers of the two Houses of the Irish Legislature shall be held at suchtime before that day, as may be fixed by Her Majesty in Council. (3)Upon the first meeting of the Irish Legislature the members of the Houseof Commons then sitting for Irish constituencies, including the membersfor Dublin University, shall vacate their seats, and writs shall, assoon as conveniently may be, be issued by the Lord Chancellor of Irelandfor the purpose of holding an election of members to serve inParliament for the constituencies named in the Second Schedule of thisAct. (4) The existing Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and the senior ofthe existing puisne judges of the Exchequer Division of the SupremeCourt, or if they or either of them are or is dead or unable orunwilling to act, such other of the judges of the Supreme Court as HerMajesty may appoint, shall be the first Exchequer judges. (5) Where itappears to Her Majesty the Queen in Council, before the expiration of_one year_ after the appointed day, that any existing enactmentrespecting matters within the powers of the Irish Legislature requiresadaptation to Ireland, whether-- (_a_) by the substitution of the Lord Lieutenant in Council, or of any department or officer of the executive Government in Ireland, for Her Majesty in Council, a Secretary of State, the Treasury, the Postmaster-General, the Board of Inland Revenue, or other public department or officer in Great Britain; or (_b_) by the substitution of the Irish Consolidated Fund or moneys provided by the Irish Legislature for the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, or moneys provided by Parliament; or (_c_) by the substitution or confirmation by, or other act to be done by or to, the Irish Legislature for confirmation by or other act to be done by or to Parliament; or (_d_) by any other adaptation; Her Majesty, by Order in Council, may make that adaptation. (6) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may provide for the transfer ofsuch property, rights, and liabilities, and the doing of such otherthings as may appear to Her Majesty necessary or proper for carryinginto effect this Act or any Order in Council under this Act. (7) An Order in Council under this section may make an adaptation orprovide for a transfer either unconditionally or subject to suchexceptions, conditions, and restrictions as may seem expedient. (8) The draft of every Order in Council under this section shall be laidbefore both Houses of Parliament for not less than two months before itis made, and such Order when made shall, subject as respects Ireland tothe provisions of an Irish Act, have full effect, but shall notinterfere with the continued application to any place, authority, person, or thing, not in Ireland, of the enactment to which the Orderrelates. 37. Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing laws, institutions, authorities, and officers in Ireland, whether judicial, administrative, or ministerial, and all existing taxes in Ireland shallcontinue as if this Act had not passed, but with the modificationsnecessary for adapting the same to this Act, and subject to berepealed, abolished, altered, and adapted in the manner and to theextent authorised by this Act. 38. Subject as in this Act mentioned the appointed day for the purposesof this Act shall be the day of the first meeting of the IrishLegislature, or such other day not more than _seven_ months earlier orlater as may be fixed by order of Her Majesty in Council eithergenerally or with reference to any particular provision of this Act, anddifferent days may be appointed for different purposes and differentprovisions of this Act, whether contained in the same section or indifferent sections. 39. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires--The expression'existing' means existing at the passing of this Act. The expression 'constituency' means a parliamentary constituency or acounty or borough returning a member or members to serve in either Houseof the Irish Legislature, as the case requires, and the expression'parliamentary constituency' means any county, borough, or universityreturning a member or members to serve in Parliament. The expression 'parliamentary elector' means a person entitled to beregistered as a voter at a parliamentary election. The expression 'parliamentary election' means the election of a memberto serve in Parliament. The expression 'tax' includes duties and fees, and the expression'duties of excise' does not include licence duties. The expression 'foreign mails' means all postal packets, whetherletters, parcels, or other packets, posted in the United Kingdom andsent to a place out of the United Kingdom, or posted in a place out ofthe United Kingdom and sent to a place in the United Kingdom, or intransit through the United Kingdom to a place out of the United Kingdom. The expression 'telegraphic line' has the same meaning as in theTelegraph Acts, 1863 to 1892. The expression 'duties on postage' includes all rates and sumschargeable for or in respect of postal packets, money orders, ortelegrams, or otherwise under the Post Office Acts or the Telegraph Act, 1892. The expression 'Irish Act' means a law made by the Irish Legislature. The expression 'election laws' means the laws relating to the electionof members to serve in Parliament, other than those relating to thequalification of electors, and includes all the laws respecting theregistration of electors, the issue and execution of writs, the creationof polling districts, the taking of the poll, the questioning ofelections, corrupt and illegal practices, the disqualification ofmembers and the vacating of seats. The expression 'rateable value' means the annual rateable value underthe Irish Valuation Acts. The expression 'salary' includes remuneration, allowances, andemoluments. The expression 'pension' includes superannuation allowance. 40. This Act may be cited as the Irish Government Act, 1893. SCHEDULES FIRST SCHEDULE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL CONSTITUENCIES AND NUMBER OF COUNCILLORS Constituencies Councillors. -------------- ----------- Antrim county Three Armagh county One Belfast borough Two Carlow county One Cavan county One Clare county One Cork county-- East Riding Three West Riding One Cork borough One Donegal county One Down county Three Dublin county Three Dublin borough Two Fermanagh county One Galway county Two Kerry county One Kildare county One Kilkenny county One King's county One Leitrim and Sligo counties One Limerick county Two Londonderry county One Longford county One Louth county One Mayo county One Meath county One Monaghan county One Queen's county One Roscommon county One Tipperary county Two Tyrone county One Waterford county One Westmeath county One Wexford county One Wicklow county One ----------- Forty-eight The expression 'borough' in this Schedule means an existingparliamentary borough. Counties of cities and towns not named in this Scheduleshall be combined with the county at large in which they areincluded for parliamentary elections, and, if not so included, then with the county at large bearing the same name. A borough named in this Schedule shall not for the purposesof this Schedule form part of any other constituency. SECOND SCHEDULE IRISH MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS Constituencies. Number of Members for House of Commons Antrim county ThreeArmagh county TwoBelfast borough (in divisions as mentioned below) FourCarlow county OneCavan county TwoClare county TwoCork county (in divisions as mentioned below) FiveCork borough TwoDonegal county ThreeDown county ThreeDublin county TwoDublin borough (in divisions as mentioned below) FourFermanagh county OneGalway county ThreeGalway borough OneKerry county ThreeKildare county OneKilkenny county OneKilkenny borough OneKing's county OneLeitrim county TwoLimerick county TwoLimerick borough OneLondonderry county TwoLondonderry borough OneLongford county OneLouth county OneMayo county ThreeMeath county TwoMonaghan county TwoNewry borough OneQueen's county OneRoscommon county TwoSligo county TwoTipperary county ThreeTyrone county ThreeWaterford county OneWaterford borough OneWestmeath county OneWexford county TwoWicklow county One -------- Eighty (1) In this Schedule the expression 'borough' means anexisting parliamentary borough. (2) In the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Dublin, onemember shall be returned by each of the existing parliamentarydivisions of those boroughs, and the law relating to the divisionsof boroughs shall apply accordingly. (3) The county of Cork shall be divided into two divisions, consisting of the East Riding and the West Riding, and threemembers shall be elected by the East Riding, and two membersshall be elected by the West Riding; and the law relating todivisions of counties shall apply to those divisions. THIRD SCHEDULE FINANCE IMPERIAL LIABILITIES, EXPENDITURE, AND MISCELLANEOUSREVENUE _Liabilities_ For the purposes of this Act 'Imperial liabilities' consist of:-- (1) The funded and unfunded debt of the United Kingdom, inclusive of terminable annuities paid out of the permanent annual charge for the National Debt, and inclusive of the cost of the management of the said funded and unfunded debt, but exclusive of the Local Loans stock and Guaranteed Land stock and the cost of the management thereof; and (2) All other charges on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom for the repayment of borrowed money, or to fulfil a guarantee. _Expenditure_ For the purpose of this Act Imperial expenditure consists ofexpenditure for the following services:-- I. Naval and military expenditure (including Greenwich Hospital). II. Civil expenditure, that is to say-- (_a_) Civil list and Royal family. (_b_) Salaries, pensions, allowances, and incidental expenses of-- (i) Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; (ii) Exchequer judges in Ireland. (_c_) Building, works, salaries, pensions, printing, stationery, allowances, and incidental expenses of-- (i) Parliament; (ii) National Debt Commissioners; (iii) Foreign Office and diplomatic and consular service, including secret service, special services, and telegraph subsidies; (iv) Colonial Office, including special services and telegraph subsidies; (v) Privy Council; (vi) Board of Trade, including the Mercantile Marine Fund, Patent Office, Railway Commission, and Wreck Commission, but excluding Bankruptcy; (vii) Mint; (viii) Meteorological Society; (ix) Slave trade service. (_d_) Foreign mails and telegraphic communication with places outside the United Kingdom. _Revenue_ For the purposes of this Act the public revenue to a portionof which Ireland may claim to be entitled consists of revenuefrom the following sources:-- 1. Suez Canal shares or payments on account thereof. 2. Loans and advances to foreign countries. 3. Annual payments by British possessions. 4. Fees, stamps, and extra receipts received by departments, the expenses of which are part of the Imperial expenditure. 5. Small branches of the hereditary revenues of the Crown. 6. Foreshores. [The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Schedules are for thesaving of space omitted. ] FOOTNOTES: [138] The Bill is printed as it was originally presented to the House ofCommons. INDEX _American Commonwealth_, by Rt. Hon. James Bryce, 37 _n__American History, Critical Period of_, by Fiske, 103Andrews, Mr. Justice, a Unitarian, 71 _n_Appeals under Irish Government Act, 209Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H. , on the policy of Home Rule, 26, 74 _n_ Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur, on Ireland, 71Beaumont, Gustave de, 142Bright, John, on Free Trade, 134Bryce, Rt. Hon. James, 26, _American Commonwealth_, 37, 169Burke, Edmund, _Reflections on the Revolution in France_, 134 Cambray, Mr. , _Irish Affairs and the Home Rule Question_, 1, 23Canada as a self-governing colony, 20, 25Civil servants under Irish Government Act, 210Clancy, Mr. , M. P. , and the financial clauses of the Home Rule Bill, 103Cobden and Free Trade, 134Coercion Act, the, 144Colonies, self-governing, _see_ New Zealand, Canada, Victoria_Constitution, Law of_, by Professor Dicey, 6 _n_, 29 _n_, 67 _n_Constitution of Legislature under Irish Government Act, 199Constitution, old and new, 1-20, 56; the new, 21 _et seq_. , 191; no settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_. ; rests on an unsound foundation and contradictory, 125; pleas for, 132 _et seq. _Constitutional questions, decision of, under Irish Government Act, 209Contracts, laws as to, 85, 86Crown Lands under Irish Government Act, 210 Davitt, Michael, and the New Constitution, 115, 142, 167Dicey, Professor A. V. , _Law of the Constitution, _ 6 _n_, 29 _n_, 67 _n_Duffy, Sir Gavan, Irish Nationalist, 39, 166; his prediction, 128 England, present constitution of, 2 _et seq_. ; retention of Irish Members at Westminster, 32 _et seq_. , 66, 123, 200, 218, 221; inducements to, 48; meaning of Home Rule to, 53 _et seq_. ; result of helping Portugal and Spain, 116; opposition to Home Rule, 119 _et seq_. ; Grattan's constitution, 149; the path of safety, 175 _et seq. __England's Case against Home Rule_, 59 _n_, 91 _n_, 94 _n_, 97 _n_, 138 _n_, 155 _n_, 162 _n_Executive authority under Irish Government Act, 198 Feast of Concord in France, 172Federalism, 6; and Home Rule, 13 _et seq_. , 96, 118; application to England, 155; how it works in other countries, 153 _et seq. _Finance, under Irish Government Act, 27, 100, 102, 201-207, 222, 223Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_, 103Ford, Patrick, 166France, and Italy, 116; Feast of Concord, 172; the constitution of 1791, 191Freeman, E. A. , _Irish Home Rule and Its Analogies_, 67 _n_, 153 _n_ Germany, federalism in, 6Girardin, M. , on the French Revolution, 135Gladstone, W. E. , and Home Rule, 26, 113, 128 _n_, 140, 163, 175; on the retention of Irish Members at Westminster, 32 _n_, 39, 66, 123Government, _see_ ParliamentGovernment of Ireland Bill, _see_ Home Rule BillGrattan's constitution, 139, 149-152 Hilty, Professor, Swiss publicist, 160Home Rule, a new constitution for the United Kingdom, 1, 19; compared with the old constitution, 8 _et seq_. ; four leading features of, 22; the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, 22-31; the retention of the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament, 32 _et seq_. , 66 _n_, 123, 200, 218-221; powers of the Irish Government, 66 _et seq_. , 197 _et seq _. ; the Veto, 88; Finance, 100-103, 201-207, 222, 223; as a settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_. ; is federalism, 118; reasons for, 132 _et seq_. ; necessity for, 138; the safeguards, 149; Grattan's constitution, 149; success of, 152 _et seq_. ; the policy of trust, 163 _et seq_. ; a revolutionary movement, 177, 191 Imperial Parliament, _see_ Parliament Ireland, the old constitution, 1-8; the new constitution, 8 _et seq_. ; the retention of Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament, 32 _et seq_. , 66 _n_, 123, 200, 218-221; meaning of Home Rule to, 53; powers of the Irish Government under Home Rule Bill, 66 _et seq_. , 197 _et seq_. ; the Irish Parliament, 75; restrictions and obligations, 80 _et seq_. ; the Veto, 88; the Privy Council and the Courts, 90 _et seq_. ; Home Rule no settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_. ; arguments for the new constitution, 132 _et seq_. ; her desire for parliamentary independence, 140_Irish Affairs and the Home Rule Question_, by Cambray, 1, 23 _n_Irish Constabulary under Home Rule Bill, 75 _n_, 212Irish Executive, 66Irish Government Act, _see_ Home Rule Bill_Irish Home Rule and its Analysis_, by E. A. Freeman, 67 _n_, 153 _n_Irish Parliament, 75Irish representation in the House of Commons, 32 _et seq_. , 66, 123, 200, 218-221Italy and France, 116 Jackson, Andrew, President of the United States, 158Judges under Home Rule Bill, 210 Lalor, Mr. , 142Lecky, Mr. , _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, 150Legislative authority under Home Rule Bill, 197 _et seq_. Local Government Bill compared with Home Rule Bill, 186Lord Lieutenant, office of, 66, 210 McCarthy, J. , on the effect of the Home Rule Bill, 112, 142, 167Mahoney, Pierce, _Irish Independent_ on the release of prisoners, 117Marshall, John, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 158Melbourne, Irish informers' reception at, 161, 162Mill, John Stuart, _Representative Government_, 6 _n_, 118 _n_. Morley, John, Chief Secretary for Ireland, on retention of Irish Members at Westminster, 39-43, 49, 62; changes in administration, 71; safeguards against legislation setting aside contracts, 86 New Zealand as a self-governing colony, 4, 5, 9, 20, 25, 31; compared with Ireland, 156Nulty, Dr. , Roman Catholic Bishop of Meath, 71 _n_. O'Connell, Daniel, compared with Parnell, 139; 166 Parliament, British and Imperial, authority of, in the United Kingdom, 2 _et seq_. ; in the Colonies, 4 _et seq_. ; supremacy of, 22 _et seq_. ; retention of Irish Members in, 32 _et seq_. ; power up to 1782, 55; since the Union, 56 _et seq. _Parnell, 34; and Home Rule, 139, 142, 167Phoenix Park murders, 146Police under Home Rule Bill, 75 _n_, 212Post Office and postal telegraphs under Home Rule Bill, 207, 208Privy Council and the Courts, 90Protection, 99, 198 Redmond, John, M. P. , Home Rule, 26, 50, 103; and the imprisoned dynamiters, 117 _n_, 168Referendum, Dicey on, 189, 190Religion, restrictions on, 99_Representative Government_, by John Stuart Mill, 118 _n. _Restrictions and obligations in Home Rule Bill, 80 _et seq_. , 197, 198, 214Retention of Irish Members in House of Commons, 32 _et seq_. , 66, 123, 200, 218-221Russell, Lord John, 32 _n_ Savings banks under Home Rule Bill, 207, 208Sexton, Thomas, on Home Rule Bill, 16 _n_, 26, 112, 126Siéyès, Abbé, 19Switzerland an example of successful federalism, 6, 159 Taxes, right to impose, 2, 3Ticino, insurrection in, 107, 160, 161_Times Parliamentary Debates, 26 _n_, 32 _n_; Mr. Asquith on executive authority, 74 _n_; John Morley on legislation to set aside contracts, 86 _n_; J. McCarthy and W. E. Gladstone on Home Rule as a final settlement, 112 _n_, 113 _n_, 142 _n_; Gladstone on the policy of trust, 163 _n_. Tocqueville, Alexis de, and the French Revolution, 134, 173Trust, the policy of, 163 Unionism, the policy for, 183 _et seq. __Unionist Delusions, _62 _n_. United States of America, division of parties in, 37 _n_; no law allowed to impair the obligation of a contract, 85; Bryce on State Legislatures in, 169, 170 Veto, the, 15, 199; its uselessness, 88Victoria as a self-governing colony, 4 _n_. _Victoria, Government of_, by Jenks, 9 _n_.