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[Illustration: PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND HIS SON "TAD. "]

A SHORT LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CONDENSED FROM NICOLAY & HAY'SABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY

BY

JOHN G. NICOLAY

NEW YORKThe Century Co. 1904

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_Published October, 1902_

THE DEVINNE PRESS. 

CONTENTS

I

Ancestry--Thomas Lincoln and Nancy Hanks--Rock Spring Farm--Lincoln'sBirth--Kentucky Schools--The Journey to Indiana--Pigeon CreekSettlement--Indiana Schools--Sally Bush Lincoln--Gentryville--Work andBooks--Satires and Sermons--Flatboat Voyage to New Orleans--The Journeyto Illinois

II

Flatboat--New Salem--Election Clerk--Store and Mill--Kirkham's"Grammar"--"Sangamo Journal"--The Talisman--Lincoln's Address, March 9, 1832--Black Hawk War--Lincoln Elected Captain--Mustered out May 27, 1832--Re-enlisted in Independent Spy Battalion--Finally Mustered out, June 16, 1832--Defeated for the Legislature--Blacksmith or Lawyer?--TheLincoln-Berry Store--Appointed Postmaster, May 7, 1833--NationalPolitics

III

Appointed Deputy Surveyor--Elected to Legislature in 1834--CampaignIssues--Begins Study of Law--Internal Improvement System--TheLincoln-Stone Protest--Candidate for Speaker in 1838 and 1840

IV

Law Practice--Rules for a Lawyer--Law and Politics: TwinOccupations--The Springfield Coterie--Friendly Help--Anne Rutledge--MaryOwens

V

Springfield Society--Miss Mary Todd--Lincoln's Engagement--His DeepDespondency--Visit to Kentucky--Letters to Speed--The ShieldsDuel--Marriage--Law Partnership with Logan--Hardin Nominated forCongress, 1843--Baker Nominated for Congress, 1844--Lincoln Nominatedand Elected, 1846

VI

First Session of the Thirtieth Congress--Mexican War--"WilmotProviso"--Campaign of 1848--Letters to Herndon about Young Men inPolitics--Speech in Congress on the Mexican War--Second Session of theThirtieth Congress--Bill to Prohibit Slavery in the District ofColumbia--Lincoln's Recommendations of Office-Seekers--Letters toSpeed--Commissioner of the General Land Office--Declines Governorship ofOregon

VII

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise--State Fair Debate--PeoriaDebate--Trumbull Elected--Letter to Robinson--The Know-Nothings--DecaturMeeting--Bloomington Convention--Philadelphia Convention--Lincoln's Votefor Vice-President--Frémont and Dayton--Lincoln's CampaignSpeeches--Chicago Banquet Speech

VIII

Buchanan Elected President--The Dred Scott Decision--Douglas'sSpringfield Speech, 1857--Lincoln's Answering Speech--Criticism of DredScott Decision--Kansas Civil War--Buchanan Appoints Walker--Walker'sLetter on Kansas--The Lecompton Constitution--Revolt of Douglas

IX

The Senatorial Contest in Illinois--"House Divided against Itself"Speech--The Lincoln-Douglas Debates--The Freeport Doctrine--DouglasDeposed from Chairmanship of Committee on Territories--Benjamin onDouglas--Lincoln's Popular Majority--Douglas Gains Legislature--Greeley, Crittenden _et al. _--"The Fight Must Go On"--Douglas's SouthernSpeeches--Senator Brown's Questions--Lincoln's Warning against PopularSovereignty--The War of Pamphlets--Lincoln's Ohio Speeches--The JohnBrown Raid--Lincoln's Comment

X

Lincoln's Kansas Speeches--The Cooper Institute Speech--New EnglandSpeeches--The Democratic Schism--Senator Brown's Resolutions--JeffersonDavis's Resolutions--The Charleston Convention--Majority and MinorityReports--Cotton State Delegations Secede--Charleston ConventionAdjourns--Democratic Baltimore Convention Splits--BreckinridgeNominated--Douglas Nominated--Bell Nominated by Union ConstitutionalConvention--Chicago Convention--Lincoln's Letters to Pickett andJudd--The Pivotal States--Lincoln Nominated

XI

Candidates and Platforms--The Political Chances--Decatur LincolnResolution--John Hanks and the Lincoln Rails--The Rail-SplitterCandidate--The Wide-Awakes--Douglas's Southern Tour--Jefferson Davis'sAddress--Fusion--Lincoln at the State House--The Election Result

XII

Lincoln's Cabinet Program--Members from the South--Questions andAnswers--Correspondence with Stephens--Action of Congress--PeaceConvention--Preparation of the Inaugural--Lincoln's FarewellAddress--The Journey to Washington--Lincoln's Midnight Journey

XIII

The Secession Movement--South Carolina Secession--Buchanan'sNeglect--Disloyal Cabinet Members--Washington Central Cabal--Anderson'sTransfer to Sumter--Star of the West--Montgomery Rebellion--Davis andStephens--Corner-stone Theory--Lincoln Inaugurated--His InauguralAddress--Lincoln's Cabinet--The Question of Sumter--Seward'sMemorandum--Lincoln's Answer--Bombardment of Sumter--Anderson'sCapitulation

XIV

President's Proclamation Calling for Seventy-five Regiments--Responses ofthe Governors--Maryland and Virginia--The Baltimore Riot--WashingtonIsolated--Lincoln Takes the Responsibility--Robert E. Lee--Arrival of theNew York Seventh--Suspension of Habeas Corpus--The Annapolis Route--Butlerin Baltimore--Taney on the Merryman Case--Kentucky--Missouri--LyonCaptures Camp Jackson--Boonville Skirmish--The Missouri Convention--Gamblemade Governor--The Border States

XV

Davis's Proclamation for Privateers--Lincoln's Proclamation ofBlockade--The Call for Three Years' Volunteers--Southern MilitaryPreparations--Rebel Capital Moved to Richmond--Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas Admitted to Confederate States--Desertion ofArmy and Navy Officers--Union Troops Fortify Virginia Shore of thePotomac--Concentration at Harper's Ferry--Concentration at FortressMonroe and Cairo--English Neutrality--Seward's 21st-of-MayDespatch--Lincoln's Corrections--Preliminary Skirmishes--Forward toRichmond--Plan of McDowell's Campaign

XVI

Congress--The President's Message--Men and Money Voted--TheContraband--Dennison Appoints McClellan--Rich Mountain--McDowell--BullRun--Patterson's Failure--McClellan at Washington

XVII

General Scott's Plans--Criticized as the "Anaconda"--The Three Fields ofConflict--Frémont Appointed Major-General--His Military Failures--Battleof Wilson's Creek--Hunter Ordered to Frémont--Frémont'sProclamation--President Revokes Frémont's Proclamation--Lincoln's Letterto Browning--Surrender of Lexington--Frémont Takes the Field--Cameron'sVisit to Frémont--Frémont's Removal

XVIII

Blockade--Hatteras Inlet--Port Royal Captured--The Trent Affair--LincolnSuggests Arbitration--Seward's Despatch--McClellan at Washington--Armyof the Potomac--McClellan's Quarrel with Scott--Retirement ofScott--Lincoln's Memorandum--"All Quiet on the Potomac"--Conditions inKentucky--Cameron's Visit to Sherman--East Tennessee--Instructions toBuell--Buell's Neglect--Halleck in Missouri

XIX

Lincoln Directs Coöperation--Halleck and Buell--Ulysses S. Grant--Grant's Demonstration--Victory at Mill River--Fort Henry--FortDonelson--Buell's Tardiness--Halleck's Activity--Victory of PeaRidge--Halleck Receives General Command--Pittsburg Landing--Island No. 10--Halleck's Corinth Campaign--Halleck's Mistakes

XX

The Blockade--Hatteras Inlet--Roanoke Island--Fort Pulaski--_Merrimac_and _Monitor_--The _Cumberland_ Sunk--The _Congress_ Burned--Battle ofthe Ironclads--Flag-Officer Farragut--Forts Jackson and St. Philip--NewOrleans Captured--Farragut at Vicksburg--Farragut's Second Expedition toVicksburg--Return to New Orleans

XXI

McClellan's Illness--Lincoln Consults McDowell and Franklin--President'sPlan against Manassas--McClellan's Plan against Richmond--Cameron andStanton--President's War Order No. 1--Lincoln's Questions toMcClellan--News from the West--Death of Willie Lincoln--The Harper'sFerry Fiasco--President's War Order No. 3--The News from HamptonRoads--Manassas Evacuated--Movement to the Peninsula--Yorktown--ThePeninsula Campaign--Seven Days' Battles--Retreat to Harrison's Landing

XXII

Jackson's Valley Campaign--Lincoln's Visit to Scott--Pope Assigned toCommand--Lee's Attack on McClellan--Retreat to Harrison'sLanding--Seward Sent to New York--Lincoln's Letter to Seward--Lincoln'sLetter to McClellan--Lincoln's Visit to McClellan--Halleck MadeGeneral-in-Chief--Halleck's Visit to McClellan--Withdrawal fromHarrison's Landing--Pope Assumes Command--Second Battle of Bull Run--TheCabinet Protest--McClellan Ordered to Defend Washington--The MarylandCampaign--Battle of Antietam--Lincoln visits Antietam--Lincoln's Letterto McClellan--McClellan Removed from Command

XXIII

Cameron's Report--Lincoln's Letter to Bancroft--Annual Message onSlavery--The Delaware Experiment--Joint Resolution on CompensatedAbolishment--First Border State Interview--Stevens's Comment--Districtof Columbia Abolishment--Committee on Abolishment--Hunter's OrderRevoked--Antislavery Measures of Congress--Second Border StateInterview--Emancipation Proposed and Postponed

XXIV

Criticism of the President for his Action on Slavery--Lincoln's Lettersto Louisiana Friends--Greeley's Open Letter--Mr. Lincoln'sReply--Chicago Clergymen Urge Emancipation--Lincoln's Answer--LincolnIssues Preliminary Proclamation--President Proposes ConstitutionalAmendment--Cabinet Considers Final Proclamation--Cabinet DiscussesAdmission of West Virginia--Lincoln Signs Edict of Freedom--Lincoln'sLetter to Hodges

XXV

Negro Soldiers--Fort Pillow--Retaliation--Draft--NorthernDemocrats--Governor Seymour's Attitude--Draft Riots in NewYork--Vallandigham--Lincoln on his Authority to Suspend Writ of HabeasCorpus--Knights of the Golden Circle--Jacob Thompson in Canada

XXVI

Burnside--Fredericksburg--A Tangle of Cross-Purposes--Hooker SucceedsBurnside--Lincoln to Hooker--Chancellorsville--Lee's SecondInvasion--Lincoln's Criticisms of Hooker's Plans--HookerRelieved--Meade--Gettysburg--Lee's Retreat--Lincoln's Letter toMeade--Lincoln's Gettysburg Address--Autumn Strategy--The Armies go intoWinter Quarters

XXVII

Buell and Bragg--Perryville--Rosecrans and Murfreesboro--Grant'sVicksburg Experiments--Grant's May Battles--Siege and Surrender ofVicksburg--Lincoln to Grant--Rosecrans's March to Chattanooga--Battle ofChickamauga--Grant at Chattanooga--Battle of Chattanooga--Burnside atKnoxville--Burnside Repulses Longstreet

XXVIII

Grant Lieutenant-General--Interview with Lincoln--Grant VisitsSherman--Plan of Campaigns--Lincoln to Grant--From the Wilderness toCold Harbor--The Move to City Point--Siege of Petersburg--Early MenacesWashington--Lincoln under Fire--Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley

XXIX

Sherman's Meridian Expedition--Capture of Atlanta--Hood SupersedesJohnston--Hood's Invasion of Tennessee--Franklin and Nashville--Sherman'sMarch to the Sea--Capture of Savannah--Sherman to Lincoln--Lincoln toSherman--Sherman's March through the Carolinas--The Burning of Charlestonand Columbia--Arrival at Goldsboro--Junction with Schofield--Visit toGrant

XXX

Military Governors--Lincoln's Theory of Reconstruction--CongressionalElection in Louisiana--Letter to Military Governors--Letter toShepley--Amnesty Proclamation, December 8, 1863--Instructions toBanks--Banks's Action in Louisiana--Louisiana AbolishesSlavery--Arkansas Abolishes Slavery--Reconstruction inTennessee--Missouri Emancipation--Lincoln's Letter to Drake--MissouriAbolishes Slavery--Emancipation in Maryland--Maryland Abolishes Slavery

XXXI

Shaping of the Presidential Campaign--Criticisms of Mr. Lincoln--Chase'sPresidential Ambitions--The Pomeroy Circular--ClevelandConvention--Attempt to Nominate Grant--Meeting of BaltimoreConvention--Lincoln's Letter to Schurz--Platform of RepublicanConvention--Lincoln Renominated--Refuses to Indicate Preference forVice-President--Johnson Nominated for Vice-President--Lincoln's Speechto Committee of Notification--Reference to Mexico in his Letter ofAcceptance--The French in Mexico

XXXII

The Bogus Proclamation--The Wade-Davis Manifesto--Resignation of Mr. Chase--Fessenden Succeeds Him--The Greeley PeaceConference--Jaquess-Gilmore Mission--Letter of Raymond--Bad Outlook forthe Election--Mr. Lincoln on the Issues of the Campaign--President'sSecret Memorandum--Meeting of Democratic National Convention--McClellanNominated--His Letter of Acceptance--Lincoln Reëlected--His Speech onNight of Election--The Electoral Vote--Annual Message of December 6, 1864--Resignation of McClellan from the Army

XXXIII

The Thirteenth Amendment--The President's Speech on its Adoption--TheTwo Constitutional Amendments of Lincoln's Term--Lincoln on Peace andSlavery in his Annual Message of December 6, 1864--Blair's MexicanProject--The Hampton Roads Conference

XXXIV

Blair--Chase Chief Justice--Speed Succeeds Bates--McCulloch SucceedsFessenden--Resignation of Mr. Usher--Lincoln's Offer of$400, 000, 000--The Second Inaugural--Lincoln's Literary Rank--His LastSpeech

XXXV

Depreciation of Confederate Currency--Rigor ofConscription--Dissatisfaction with the Confederate Government--LeeGeneral-in-Chief--J. E. Johnston Reappointed to Oppose Sherman'sMarch--Value of Slave Property Gone in Richmond--Davis's Recommendationof Emancipation--Benjamin's Last Despatch to Slidell--Condition of theArmy when Lee took Command--Lee Attempts Negotiations withGrant--Lincoln's Directions--Lee and Davis Agree upon Line ofRetreat--Assault on Fort Stedman--Five Forks--Evacuation ofPetersburg--Surrender of Richmond--Pursuit of Lee--Surrender ofLee--Burning of Richmond--Lincoln in Richmond

XXXVI

Lincoln's Interviews with Campbell--Withdraws Authority for Meeting ofVirginia Legislature--Conference of Davis and Johnston atGreensboro--Johnston Asks for an Armistice--Meeting of Sherman andJohnston--Their Agreement--Rejected at Washington--Surrender ofJohnston--Surrender of other Confederate Forces--End of the RebelNavy--Capture of Jefferson Davis--Surrender of E. Kirby Smith--Number ofConfederates Surrendered and Exchanged--Reduction of Federal Army to aPeace Footing--Grand Review of the Army

XXXVII

The 14th of April--Celebration at Fort Sumter--Last CabinetMeeting--Lincoln's Attitude toward Threats of Assassination--Booth'sPlot--Ford's Theater--Fate of the Assassins--The Mourning Pageant

XXXVIII

Lincoln's Early Environment--Its Effect on his Character--His Attitudetoward Slavery and the Slaveholder--His Schooling in Disappointment--HisSeeming Failures--His Real Successes--The Final Trial--HisAchievements--His Place in History

Index

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

I

Ancestry--Thomas Lincoln and Nancy Hanks--Rock Spring Farm--Lincoln'sBirth--Kentucky Schools--The Journey to Indiana--Pigeon CreekSettlement--Indiana Schools--Sally Bush Lincoln--Gentryville--Work andBooks--Satires and Sermons--Flatboat Voyage to New Orleans--The Journeyto Illinois

Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President of the United States, was bornin a log cabin in the backwoods of Kentucky on the 12th day of February1809. His father, Thomas Lincoln, was sixth in direct line of descentfrom Samuel Lincoln, who emigrated from England to Massachusetts in 1638. Following the prevailing drift of American settlement, these descendantshad, during a century and a half, successively moved from Massachusettsto New Jersey, from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, from Pennsylvania toVirginia, and from Virginia to Kentucky; while collateral branches of thefamily eventually made homes in other parts of the West. In Pennsylvaniaand Virginia some of them had acquired considerable property and localprominence. 

In the year 1780, Abraham Lincoln, the President's grandfather, was ableto pay into the public treasury of Virginia "one hundred and sixtypounds, current money, " for which he received a warrant, directed to the"Principal Surveyor of any County within the commonwealth of Virginia, "to lay off in one or more surveys for Abraham Linkhorn, his heirs orassigns, the quantity of four hundred acres of land. The error inspelling the name was a blunder of the clerk who made out the warrant. 

With this warrant and his family of five children--Mordecai, Josiah, Mary, Nancy, and Thomas--he moved to Kentucky, then still a county ofVirginia, in 1780, and began opening a farm. Four years later, while atwork with his three boys in the edge of his clearing, a party ofIndians, concealed in the brush, shot and killed him. Josiah, the secondson, ran to a neighboring fort for assistance; Mordecai, the eldest, hurried to the cabin for his gun, leaving Thomas, youngest of thefamily, a child of six years, by his father. Mordecai had just takendown his rifle from its convenient resting-place over the door of thecabin when, turning, he saw an Indian in his war-paint stooping to seizethe child. He took quick aim through a loop-hole, shot, and killed thesavage, at which the little boy also ran to the house, and from thiscitadel Mordecai continued firing at the Indians until Josiah broughthelp from the fort. 

It was doubtless this misfortune which rapidly changed the circumstancesof the family. [1] Kentucky was yet a wild, new country. As compared withlater periods of emigration, settlement was slow and pioneer life a hardstruggle. So it was probably under the stress of poverty, as well as bythe marriage of the older children, that the home was gradually brokenup, and Thomas Lincoln became "even in childhood . .. A wanderinglaboring boy, and grew up literally without education. .. . Before he wasgrown he passed one year as a hired hand with his uncle Isaac onWatauga, a branch of the Holston River. " Later, he seems to haveundertaken to learn the trade of carpenter in the shop of Joseph Hanksin Elizabethtown. 

 [Footnote 1: By the law of primogeniture, which at that date was still unrepealed in Virginia, the family estate went to Mordecai, the eldest son. ]

When Thomas Lincoln was about twenty-eight years old he married NancyHanks, a niece of his employer, near Beechland, in Washington County. She was a good-looking young woman of twenty-three, also from Virginia, and so far superior to her husband in education that she could read andwrite, and taught him how to sign his name. Neither one of the youngcouple had any money or property; but in those days living was notexpensive, and they doubtless considered his trade a sufficientprovision for the future. He brought her to a little house inElizabethtown, where a daughter was born to them the following year. 

During the next twelvemonth Thomas Lincoln either grew tired of hiscarpenter work, or found the wages he was able to earn insufficient tomeet his growing household expenses. He therefore bought a little farmon the Big South Fork of Nolin Creek, in what was then Hardin and is nowLa Rue County, three miles from Hodgensville, and thirteen miles fromElizabethtown. Having no means, he of course bought the place on credit, a transaction not so difficult when we remember that in that early daythere was plenty of land to be bought for mere promises to pay; underthe disadvantage, however, that farms to be had on these terms wereusually of a very poor quality, on which energetic or forehanded men didnot care to waste their labor. It was a kind of land generally known inthe West as "barrens"--rolling upland, with very thin, unproductivesoil. Its momentary usefulness was that it was partly cleared andcultivated, that an indifferent cabin stood on it ready to be occupied, and that it had one specially attractive as well as useful feature--afine spring of water, prettily situated amid a graceful clump offoliage, because of which the place was called Rock Spring Farm. Thechange of abode was perhaps in some respects an improvement uponElizabethtown. To pioneer families in deep poverty, a little farmoffered many more resources than a town lot--space, wood, water, greensin the spring, berries in the summer, nuts in the autumn, small gameeverywhere--and they were fully accustomed to the loss ofcompanionship. On this farm, and in this cabin, the future President ofthe United States was born, on the 12th of February, 1809, and here thefirst four years of his childhood were spent. 

When Abraham was about four years old the Lincoln home was changed to amuch better farm of two hundred and thirty-eight acres on Knob Creek, six miles from Hodgensville, bought by Thomas Lincoln, again on credit, for the promise to pay one hundred and eighteen pounds. A year later heconveyed two hundred acres of it by deed to a new purchaser. In this newhome the family spent four years more, and while here Abraham and hissister Sarah began going to A B C schools. Their first teacher wasZachariah Riney, who taught near the Lincoln cabin; the next, CalebHazel, at a distance of about four miles. 

Thomas Lincoln was evidently one of those easy-going, good-natured menwho carry the virtue of contentment to an extreme. He appears never tohave exerted himself much beyond the attainment of a necessarysubsistence. By a little farming and occasional jobs at his trade, heseems to have supplied his family with food and clothes. There is norecord that he made any payment on either of his farms. The fever ofwestward emigration was in the air, and, listening to glowing accountsof rich lands and newer settlements in Indiana, he had neither valuablepossessions nor cheerful associations to restrain the natural impulse ofevery frontiersman to "move. " In this determination his carpenter'sskill served him a good purpose, and made the enterprise not onlyfeasible but reasonably cheap. In the fall of 1816 he built himself asmall flatboat, which he launched at the mouth of Knob Creek, half amile from his cabin, on the waters of the Rolling Fork. This streamwould float him to Salt River, and Salt River to the Ohio. He alsothought to combine a little speculation with his undertaking. Part ofhis personal property he traded for four hundred gallons of whisky;then, loading the rest on his boat with his carpenter's tools and thewhisky, he made the voyage, with the help of the current, down theRolling Fork to Salt River, down Salt River to the Ohio, and down theOhio to Thompson's Ferry, in Perry County, on the Indiana shore. Theboat capsized once on the way, but he saved most of the cargo. 

Sixteen miles out from the river he found a location in the forest whichsuited him. Since his boat would not float up-stream, he sold it, lefthis property with a settler, and trudged back home to Kentucky, all theway on foot, to bring his wife and the two children--Sarah, nine yearsold, and Abraham, seven. Another son had been born to them some yearsbefore, but had died when only three days old. This time the trip toIndiana was made with the aid of two horses, used by the wife andchildren for riding and to carry their little equipage for camping atnight by the way. In a straight line, the distance is about fifty miles;but it was probably doubled by the very few roads it was possible tofollow. 

Having reached the Ohio and crossed to where he had left his goods onthe Indiana side, he hired a wagon, which carried them and his familythe remaining sixteen miles through the forest to the spot he hadchosen, which in due time became the Lincoln farm. It was a piece ofheavily timbered land, one and a half miles east of what has sincebecome the village of Gentryville, in Spencer County. The lateness ofthe autumn compelled him to provide a shelter as quickly as possible, and he built what is known on the frontier as a half-faced camp, aboutfourteen feet square. This structure differed from a cabin in that itwas closed on only three sides, and open to the weather on the fourth. It was usual to build the fire in front of the open side, and thenecessity of providing a chimney was thus avoided. He doubtless intendedit for a mere temporary shelter, and as such it would have sufficed forgood weather in the summer season. But it was a rude provision for thewinds and snows of an Indiana winter. It illustrates Thomas Lincoln'swant of energy, that the family remained housed in this primitive campfor nearly a whole year. He must, however, not be too hastily blamed forhis dilatory improvement. It is not likely that he remained altogetheridle. A more substantial cabin was probably begun, and, besides, therewas the heavy work of clearing away the timber--that is, cutting downthe large trees, chopping them into suitable lengths, and rolling themtogether into great log-heaps to be burned, or splitting them into railsto fence the small field upon which he managed to raise a patch of cornand other things during the ensuing summer. 

Thomas Lincoln's arrival was in the autumn of 1816. That same winterIndiana was admitted to the Union as a State. There were as yet no roadsworthy of the name to or from the settlement formed by himself and sevenor eight neighbors at various distances. The village of Gentryville wasnot even begun. There was no sawmill to saw lumber. Breadstuff could behad only by sending young Abraham, on horseback, seven miles, with a bagof corn to be ground on a hand grist-mill. In the course of two or threeyears a road from Corydon to Evansville was laid out, running past theLincoln farm; and perhaps two or three years afterward another fromRockport to Bloomington crossing the former. This gave rise toGentryville. James Gentry entered the land at the cross-roads. GideonRomine opened a small store, and their joint efforts succeeded ingetting a post-office established from which the village gradually grew. For a year after his arrival Thomas Lincoln remained a mere squatter. Then he entered the quarter-section (one hundred and sixty acres) onwhich he opened his farm, and made some payments on his entry, but onlyenough in eleven years to obtain a patent for one half of it. 

About the time that he moved into his new cabin, relatives and friendsfollowed from Kentucky, and some of them in turn occupied the half-facedcamp. In the ensuing autumn much sickness prevailed in the Pigeon Creeksettlement. It was thirty miles to the nearest doctor, and severalpersons died, among them Nancy Hanks Lincoln, the mother of youngAbraham. The mechanical skill of Thomas was called upon to make thecoffins, the necessary lumber for which had to be cut with a whip-saw. 

The death of Mrs. Lincoln was a serious loss to her husband andchildren. Abraham's sister Sarah was only eleven years old, and thetasks and cares of the little household were altogether too heavy forher years and experience. Nevertheless, they struggled on bravelythrough the winter and next summer, but in the autumn of 1819 ThomasLincoln went back to Kentucky and married Sally Bush Johnston, whom hehad known and, it is said, courted when she was merely Sally Bush. Johnston, to whom she was married about the time Lincoln married NancyHanks, had died, leaving her with three children. She came of a betterstation in life than Thomas, and is represented as a woman of uncommonenergy and thrift, possessing excellent qualities both of head andheart. The household goods which she brought to the Lincoln home inIndiana filled a four-horse wagon. Not only were her own three childrenwell clothed and cared for, but she was able at once to provide littleAbraham and Sarah with home comforts to which they had been strangersduring the whole of their young lives. Under her example and urging, Thomas at once supplied the yet unfinished cabin with floor, door, andwindows, and existence took on a new aspect for all the inmates. Underher management and control, all friction and jealousy was avoidedbetween the two sets of children, and contentment, if not happiness, reigned in the little cabin. 

The new stepmother quickly perceived the superior aptitudes andabilities of Abraham. She became very fond of him, and in every wayencouraged his marked inclination to study and improve himself. Theopportunities for this were meager enough. Mr. Lincoln himself has drawna vivid outline of the situation:

"It was a wild region, with many bears and other wild animals still inthe woods. There I grew up. There were some schools so called, but noqualification was ever required of a teacher beyond readin', writin', and cipherin' to the Rule of Three. If a straggler supposed tounderstand Latin happened to sojourn in the neighborhood, he was lookedupon as a wizard. There was absolutely nothing to excite ambition foreducation. "

As Abraham was only in his eighth year when he left Kentucky, the littlebeginnings he had learned in the schools kept by Riney and Hazel in thatState must have been very slight--probably only his alphabet, orpossibly three or four pages of Webster's "Elementary Spelling Book. " Itis likely that the multiplication table was as yet an unfathomedmystery, and that he could not write or read more than the words hespelled. There is no record at what date he was able again to go toschool in Indiana. Some of his schoolmates think it was in his tenthyear, or soon after he fell under the care of his stepmother. Theschool-house was a low cabin of round logs, a mile and a half from theLincoln home, with split logs or "puncheons" for a floor, split logsroughly leveled with an ax and set up on legs for benches, and a log cutout of one end and the space filled in with squares of greased paper forwindow panes. The main light in such primitive halls of learning wasadmitted by the open door. It was a type of school building common inthe early West, in which many a statesman gained the first rudiments ofknowledge. Very often Webster's "Elementary Spelling Book" was the onlytext-book. Abraham's first Indiana school was probably held five yearsbefore Gentryville was located and a store established there. Until thenit was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain books, slates, pencils, pen, ink, and paper, and their use was limited to settlers who hadbrought them when they came. It is reasonable to infer that the Lincolnfamily had no such luxuries, and, as the Pigeon Creek settlementnumbered only eight or ten families there must have been very few pupilsto attend this first school. Nevertheless, it is worthy of special notethat even under such difficulties and limitations, the American thirstfor education planted a school-house on the very forefront of everysettlement. 

Abraham's second school in Indiana was held about the time he wasfourteen years old, and the third in his seventeenth year. By this timehe probably had better teachers and increased facilities, though withthe disadvantage of having to walk four or five miles to theschool-house. He learned to write, and was provided with pen, ink, and acopy-book, and probably a very limited supply of writing-paper, forfacsimiles have been printed of several scraps and fragments upon whichhe had carefully copied tables, rules, and sums from his arithmetic, such as those of long measure, land measure, and dry measure, andexamples in multiplication and compound division. All this indicatesthat he pursued his studies with a very unusual purpose anddetermination, not only to understand them at the moment, but to imprintthem indelibly upon his memory, and even to regain them in visible formfor reference when the school-book might no longer be in his hands orpossession. 

Mr. Lincoln has himself written that these three different schools were"kept successively by Andrew Crawford, ---- Swaney, and Azel W. Dorsey. "Other witnesses state the succession somewhat differently. The importantfact to be gleaned from what we learn about Mr. Lincoln's schooling isthat the instruction given him by these five different teachers--two inKentucky and three in Indiana, in short sessions of attendance scatteredover a period of nine years--made up in all less than a twelvemonth. He said of it in 1860, "Abraham now thinks that the aggregate of all hisschooling did not amount to one year. " This distribution of the tuitionhe received was doubtless an advantage. Had it all been given him at hisfirst school in Indiana, it would probably not have carried him halfthrough Webster's "Elementary Spelling Book. " The lazy or indifferentpupils who were his schoolmates doubtless forgot what was taught them atone time before they had opportunity at another; but to the exceptionalcharacter of Abraham, these widely separated fragments of instructionwere precious steps to self-help, of which he made unremitting use. 

It is the concurrent testimony of his early companions that he employedall his spare moments in keeping on with some one of his studies. Hisstepmother says: "Abe read diligently. .. . He read every book he couldlay his hands on; and when he came across a passage that struck him, hewould write it down on boards, if he had no paper, and keep it thereuntil he did get paper. Then he would rewrite it, look at it, repeat it. He had a copy-book, a kind of scrap-book, in which he put down allthings, and thus preserved them. " There is no mention that either he orother pupils had slates and slate-pencils to use at school or at home, but he found a ready substitute in pieces of board. It is stated that heoccupied his long evenings at home doing sums on the fire-shovel. Ironfire-shovels were a rarity among pioneers; they used, instead a broad, thin clapboard with one end narrowed to a handle. In cooking by the openfire, this domestic implement was of the first necessity to arrangepiles of live coals on the hearth, over which they set their "skillet"and "oven, " upon the lids of which live coals were also heaped. 

Upon such a wooden shovel Abraham was able to work his sums by theflickering firelight. If he had no pencil, he could use charcoal, andprobably did so. When it was covered with figures he would take adrawing-knife, shave it off clean, and begin again. Under these variousdisadvantages, and by the help of such troublesome expedients, AbrahamLincoln worked his way to so much of an education as placed him farahead of his schoolmates, and quickly abreast of the acquirements of hisvarious teachers. The field from which he could glean knowledge was verylimited, though he diligently borrowed every book in the neighborhood. The list is a short one--"Robinson Crusoe, " Aesop's "Fables, " Bunyan's"Pilgrim's Progress, " Weems's "Life of Washington, " and a "History ofthe United States. " When he had exhausted other books, he evenresolutely attacked the Revised Statutes of Indiana, which Dave Turnham, the constable, had in daily use and permitted him to come to his houseand read. 

It needs to be borne in mind that all this effort at self-educationextended from first to last over a period of twelve or thirteen years, during which he was also performing hard manual labor, and proves adegree of steady, unflinching perseverance in a line of conduct thatbrings into strong relief a high aim and the consciousness of abundantintellectual power. He was not permitted to forget that he was on anuphill path, a stern struggle with adversity. The leisure hours which hewas able to devote to his reading, his penmanship, and his arithmeticwere by no means overabundant. Writing of his father's removal fromKentucky to Indiana, he says:

"He settled in an unbroken forest, and the clearing away of surplus woodwas the great task ahead. Abraham, though very young, was large of hisage, and had an ax put into his hands at once; and from that till withinhis twenty-third year he was almost constantly handling that most usefulinstrument--less, of course, in plowing and harvesting seasons. "

John Hanks mentions the character of his work a little more in detail. "He and I worked barefoot, grubbed it, plowed, mowed, and cradledtogether; plowed corn, gathered it, and shucked corn. " The sum of it allis that from his boyhood until after he was of age, most of his time wasspent in the hard and varied muscular labor of the farm and the forest, sometimes on his father's place, sometimes as a hired hand for otherpioneers. In this very useful but commonplace occupation he had, however, one advantage. He was not only very early in his life a tall, strong country boy, but as he grew up he soon became a tall, strong, sinewy man. He early attained the unusual height of six feet fourinches, with arms of proportionate length. This gave him a degree ofpower and facility as an ax-man which few had or were able to acquire. He was therefore usually able to lead his fellows in efforts of bothmuscle and mind. He performed the tasks of his daily labor and masteredthe lessons of his scanty schooling with an ease and rapidity they wereunable to attain. 

Twice during his life in Indiana this ordinary routine was somewhatvaried. When he was sixteen, while working for a man who lived at themouth of Anderson's Creek, it was part of his duty to manage aferry-boat which transported passengers across the Ohio River. It wasdoubtless this which three years later brought him a new experience, that he himself related in these words:

"When he was nineteen, still residing in Indiana, he made his firsttrip upon a flatboat to New Orleans. He was a hired hand merely, and heand a son of the owner, without other assistance, made the trip. Thenature of part of the 'cargo load, ' as it was called, made it necessaryfor them to linger and trade along the sugar-coast, and one night theywere attacked by seven negroes with intent to kill and rob them. Theywere hurt some in the mêlée, but succeeded in driving the negroes fromthe boat, and then 'cut cable, ' 'weighed anchor, ' and left. "

This commercial enterprise was set on foot by Mr. Gentry, the founder ofGentryville. The affair shows us that Abraham had gained an enviablestanding in the village as a man of honesty, skill, and judgment--onewho could be depended on to meet such emergencies as might arise inselling their bacon and other produce to the cotton-planters along theshores of the lower Mississippi. 

By this time Abraham's education was well advanced. His handwriting, hisarithmetic, and his general intelligence were so good that he hadoccasionally been employed to help in the Gentryville store, and Gentrythus knew by personal test that he was entirely capable of assisting hisson Allen in the trading expedition to New Orleans. For Abraham, on theother hand, it was an event which must have opened up wide vistas offuture hope and ambition. Allen Gentry probably was nominal supercargoand steersman, but we may easily surmise that Lincoln, as the "bow oar, "carried his full half of general responsibility. For this service theelder Gentry paid him eight dollars a month and his passage home on asteamboat. It was the future President's first eager look into the wide, wide world. 

Abraham's devotion to his books and his sums stands forth in morestriking light from the fact that his habits differed from those of mostfrontier boys in one important particular. Almost every youth of thebackwoods early became a habitual hunter and superior marksman. TheIndiana woods were yet swarming with game, and the larder of every cabindepended largely upon this great storehouse of wild meat. [2] The PigeonCreek settlement was especially fortunate on this point. There was inthe neighborhood of the Lincoln home what was known in the West as adeer-lick--that is, there existed a feeble salt-spring, whichimpregnated the soil in its vicinity or created little pools of brackishwater--and various kinds of animals, particularly deer, resorted thereto satisfy their natural craving for salt by drinking from these orlicking the moist earth. Hunters took advantage of this habit, and oneof their common customs was to watch in the dusk or at night, and securetheir approaching prey by an easy shot. Skill with the rifle and successin the chase were points of friendly emulation. In many localities theboy or youth who shot a squirrel in any part of the animal except itshead became the butt of the jests of his companions and elders. Yet, under such conditions and opportunities Abraham was neither a hunter nora marksman. He tells us:

"A few days before the completion of his eighth year, in the absence ofhis father, a flock of wild turkeys approached the new log cabin, andAbraham, with a rifle gun, standing inside, shot through a crack andkilled one of them. He has never since pulled a trigger on any largergame. "

 [Footnote 2: Franklin points out how much this resource of the early Americans contributed to their spirit of independence by saying:

 "I can retire cheerfully with my little family into the boundless woods of America, which are sure to afford freedom and subsistence to any man who can bait a hook or pull a trigger. "

 (See "The Century Magazine, " "Franklin as a Diplomatist, " October, 1899, p. 888. )]

The hours which other boys spent in roaming the woods or lying in ambushat the deer-lick, he preferred to devote to his effort at mentalimprovement. It can hardly be claimed that he did this from calculatingambition. It was a native intellectual thirst, the significance of whichhe did not himself yet understand. Such exceptional characteristicsmanifested themselves only in a few matters. In most particulars he grewup as the ordinary backwoods boy develops into the youth and man. As hewas subjected to their usual labors, so also he was limited to theirusual pastimes and enjoyments. 

The varied amusements common to our day were not within their reach. Theperiod of the circus, the political speech, and the itinerant show hadnot yet come. Schools, as we have seen, and probably meetings or churchservices, were irregular, to be had only at long intervals. Primitiveathletic games and commonplace talk, enlivened by frontier jests andstories, formed the sum of social intercourse when half a dozen or ascore of settlers of various ages came together at a house-raising orcorn-husking, or when mere chance brought them at the same time to thepost-office or the country store. On these occasions, however, Abrahamwas, according to his age, always able to contribute his full share ormore. Most of his natural aptitudes equipped him especially to play hispart well. He had quick intelligence, ready sympathy, a cheerfultemperament, a kindling humor, a generous and helpful spirit. He wasboth a ready talker and appreciative listener. By virtue of his tallstature and unusual strength of sinew and muscle, he was from thebeginning a leader in all athletic games; by reason of his studioushabits and his extraordinarily retentive memory he quickly became thebest story-teller among his companions. Even the slight training hegained from his studies greatly quickened his perceptions and broadenedand steadied the strong reasoning faculty with which nature had endowedhim. 

As the years of his youth passed by, his less gifted comrades learned toaccept his judgments and to welcome his power to entertain and instructthem. On his own part, he gradually learned to write not merely with thehand, but also with the mind--to think. It was an easy transition forhim from remembering the jingle of a commonplace rhyme to theconstructing of a doggerel verse, and he did not neglect the opportunityof practising his penmanship in such impromptus. Tradition also relatesthat he added to his list of stories and jokes humorous imitations fromthe sermons of eccentric preachers. But tradition has very likely bothmagnified and distorted these alleged exploits of his satire andmimicry. All that can be said of them is that his youth was marked byintellectual activity far beyond that of his companions. 

It is an interesting coincidence that nine days before the birth ofAbraham Lincoln Congress passed the act to organize the Territory ofIllinois, which his future life and career were destined to render soillustrious. Another interesting coincidence may be found in the factthat in the same year (1818) in which Congress definitely fixed thenumber of stars and stripes in the national flag, Illinois was admittedas a State to the Union. The Star of Empire was moving westward at anaccelerating speed. Alabama was admitted in 1819, Maine in 1820, Missouri in 1821. Little by little the line of frontier settlement waspushing itself toward the Mississippi. No sooner had the pioneer builthim a cabin and opened his little farm, than during every summercanvas-covered wagons wound their toilsome way over the new-made roadsinto the newer wilderness, while his eyes followed them with wistfuleagerness. Thomas Lincoln and his Pigeon Creek relatives and neighborscould not forever withstand the contagion of this example, and at lengththey yielded to the irrepressible longing by a common impulse. Mr. Lincoln writes:

"March 1, 1830, Abraham having just completed his twenty-first year, hisfather and family, with the families of the two daughters andsons-in-law of his stepmother, left the old homestead in Indiana andcame to Illinois. Their mode of conveyance was wagons drawn by ox-teams, and Abraham drove one of the teams. They reached the county of Macon, and stopped there some time within the same month of March. His fatherand family settled a new place on the north side of the Sangamon River, at the junction of the timber land and prairie, about ten miles westerlyfrom Decatur. Here they built a log cabin, into which they removed, andmade sufficient of rails to fence ten acres of ground, fenced and brokethe ground, and raised a crop of sown corn upon it the same year. .. . Thesons-in-law were temporarily settled in other places in the county. Inthe autumn all hands were greatly afflicted with ague and fever, towhich they had not been used, and by which they were greatlydiscouraged, so much so that they determined on leaving the county. Theyremained, however, through the succeeding winter, which was the winterof the very celebrated 'deep snow' of Illinois. "

II

Flatboat--New Salem--Election Clerk--Store and Mill--Kirkham's"Grammar"--"Sangamo Journal"--The Talisman--Lincoln's Address, March 9, 1832--Black Hawk War--Lincoln Elected Captain--Mustered out May 27, 1832--Reënlisted in Independent Spy Battalion--Finally Mustered out, June16, 1832--Defeated for the Legislature--Blacksmith or Lawyer?--TheLincoln-Berry Store--Appointed Postmaster, May 7, 1833--National Politics

The life of Abraham Lincoln, or that part of it which will interestreaders for all future time, properly begins in March, 1831, after thewinter of the "deep snow. " According to frontier custom, being thentwenty-one years old, he left his father's cabin to make his own fortunein the world. A man named Denton Offutt, one of a class of local tradersand speculators usually found about early Western settlements, hadprobably heard something of young Lincoln's Indiana history, particularly that he had made a voyage on a flatboat from Indiana to NewOrleans, and that he was strong, active, honest, and generally, as wouldbe expressed in Western phrase, "a smart young fellow. " He was thereforejust the sort of man Offutt needed for one of his trading enterprises, and Mr. Lincoln himself relates somewhat in detail how Offutt engagedhim and the beginning of the venture:

"Abraham, together with his stepmother's son, John D. Johnston, andJohn Hanks, yet residing in Macon County, hired themselves to DentonOffutt to take a flatboat from Beardstown, Illinois [on the IllinoisRiver], to New Orleans; and for that purpose were to joinhim--Offutt--at Springfield, Illinois, so soon as the snow should gooff. When it did go off, which was about the first of March, 1831, thecounty was so flooded as to make traveling by land impracticable, toobviate which difficulty they purchased a large canoe, and came down theSangamon River in it. This is the time and the manner of Abraham's firstentrance into Sangamon County. They found Offutt at Springfield, butlearned from him that he had failed in getting a boat at Beardstown. This led to their hiring themselves to him for twelve dollars per montheach, and getting the timber out of the trees and building a boat at OldSangamon town on the Sangamon River, seven miles northwest ofSpringfield, which boat they took to New Orleans, substantially upon theold contract. "

It needs here to be recalled that Lincoln's father was a carpenter, andthat Abraham had no doubt acquired considerable skill in the use oftools during his boyhood and a practical knowledge of the constructionof flatboats during his previous New Orleans trip, sufficient to enablehim with confidence to undertake this task in shipbuilding. From theafter history of both Johnston and Hanks, we know that neither of themwas gifted with skill or industry, and it becomes clear that Lincoln wasfrom the first leader of the party, master of construction, and captainof the craft. 

It took some time to build the boat, and before it was finished theSangamon River had fallen so that the new craft stuck midway across thedam at Rutledge's Mill, at New Salem, a village of fifteen or twentyhouses. The inhabitants came down to the bank, and exhibited greatinterest in the fate of the boat, which, with its bow in the air and itsstern under water, was half bird and half fish, and they probablyjestingly inquired of the young captain whether he expected to dive orto fly to New Orleans. He was, however, equal to the occasion. He boreda hole in the bottom of the boat at the bow, and rigged some sort oflever or derrick to lift the stern, so that the water she had taken inbehind ran out in front, enabling her to float over the partly submergeddam; and this feat, in turn, caused great wonderment in the crowd at thenovel expedient of bailing a boat by boring a hole in her bottom. 

This exploit of naval engineering fully established Lincoln's fame atNew Salem, and grounded him so firmly in the esteem of his employerOffutt that the latter, already looking forward to his futureusefulness, at once engaged him to come back to New Salem, after his NewOrleans voyage, to act as his clerk in a store. 

Once over the dam and her cargo reloaded, partly there and partly atBeardstown, the boat safely made the remainder of her voyage to NewOrleans; and, returning by steamer to St. Louis, Lincoln and Johnston(Hanks had turned back from St. Louis) continued on foot to Illinois, Johnston remaining at the family home, which had meanwhile been removedfrom Macon to Coles County, and Lincoln going to his employer andfriends at New Salem. This was in July or August, 1831. Neither Offuttnor his goods had yet arrived, and during his waiting he had a chance toshow the New Salemites another accomplishment. An election was to beheld, and one of the clerks was sick and failed to come. Scribes werenot plenty on the frontier, and Mentor Graham, the clerk who waspresent, looking around for a properly qualified colleague, noticedLincoln, and asked him if he could write, to which he answered, in localidiom, that he "could make a few rabbit tracks, " and was thereuponimmediately inducted into his first office. He performed his duties notonly to the general satisfaction, but so as to interest Graham, who wasa schoolmaster, and afterward made himself very useful to Lincoln. 

Offutt finally arrived with a miscellaneous lot of goods, which Lincolnopened and put in order in a room that a former New Salem storekeeperwas just ready to vacate, and whose remnant stock Offutt also purchased. Trade was evidently not brisk at New Salem, for the commercial zeal ofOffutt led him to increase his venture by renting the Rutledge andCameron mill, on whose historic dam the flatboat had stuck. For a whilethe charge of the mill was added to Lincoln's duties, until anotherclerk was engaged to help him. There is likewise good evidence that inaddition to his duties at the store and the mill, Lincoln made himselfgenerally useful--that he cut down trees and split rails enough to makea large hog-pen adjoining the mill, a proceeding quite natural when weremember that his hitherto active life and still growing musclesimperatively demanded the exercise which measuring calico or weighingout sugar and coffee failed to supply. 

We know from other incidents that he was possessed of ample bodilystrength. In frontier life it is not only needed for useful labor ofmany kinds, but is also called upon to aid in popular amusement. Therewas a settlement in the neighborhood of New Salem called Clary's Grove, where lived a group of restless, rollicking backwoodsmen with a strongliking for various forms of frontier athletics and rough practicaljokes. In the progress of American settlement there has always been atime, whether the frontier was in New England or Pennsylvania orKentucky, or on the banks of the Mississippi, when the champion wrestlerheld some fraction of the public consideration accorded to the victor inthe Olympic games of Greece. Until Lincoln came, Jack Armstrong was thechampion wrestler of Clary's Grove and New Salem, and picturesquestories are told how the neighborhood talk, inflamed by Offutt's fulsomelaudation of his clerk, made Jack Armstrong feel that his fame was indanger. Lincoln put off the encounter as long as he could, and when thewrestling match finally came off neither could throw the other. Thebystanders became satisfied that they were equally matched in strengthand skill, and the cool courage which Lincoln manifested throughout theordeal prevented the usual close of such incidents with a fight. Insteadof becoming chronic enemies and leaders of a neighborhood feud, Lincoln's self-possession and good temper turned the contest into thebeginning of a warm and lasting friendship. 

If Lincoln's muscles were at times hungry for work, not less so was hismind. He was already instinctively feeling his way to his destiny when, in conversation with Mentor Graham, the schoolmaster, he indicated hisdesire to use some of his spare moments to increase his education, andconfided to him his "notion to study English grammar. " It was entirelyin the nature of things that Graham should encourage this mentalcraving, and tell him: "If you expect to go before the public in anycapacity, I think it the best thing you can do. " Lincoln said that if hehad a grammar he would begin at once. Graham was obliged to confess thatthere was no such book at New Salem, but remembered that there was oneat Vaner's, six miles away. Promptly after breakfast the next morningLincoln walked to Vaner's and procured the precious volume, and, probably with Graham's occasional help, found no great difficulty inmastering its contents. While tradition does not mention any other studybegun at that time, we may fairly infer that, slight as may have beenGraham's education, he must have had other books from which, togetherwith his friendly advice, Lincoln's intellectual hunger derived furtherstimulus and nourishment. 

In his duties at the store and his work at the mill, in his study ofKirkham's "Grammar, " and educational conversations with Mentor Graham, in the somewhat rude but frank and hearty companionship of the citizensof New Salem and the exuberant boys of Clary's Grove, Lincoln's life forthe second half of the year 1831 appears not to have been eventful, butwas doubtless more comfortable and as interesting as had been hisflatboat building and New Orleans voyage during the first half. He wasbusy in useful labor, and, though he had few chances to pick up scrapsof schooling, was beginning to read deeply in that book of human nature, the profound knowledge of which rendered him such immense service inafter years. 

The restlessness and ambition of the village of New Salem was many timesmultiplied in the restlessness and ambition of Springfield, fifteen ortwenty miles away, which, located approximately near the geographicalcenter of Illinois, was already beginning to crave, if not yet to feel, its future destiny as the capital of the State. In November of the sameyear that aspiring town produced the first number of its weeklynewspaper, the "Sangamo Journal, " and in its columns we begin to findrecorded historical data. Situated in a region of alternating spaces ofprairie and forest, of attractive natural scenery and rich soil, it wasnevertheless at a great disadvantage in the means of commercialtransportation. Lying sixty miles from Beardstown, the nearest landingon the Illinois River, the peculiarities of soil, climate, and primitiveroads rendered travel and land carriage extremely difficult--oftenentirely impossible--for nearly half of every year. The very firstnumber of the "Sangamo Journal" sounded its strongest note on the thenleading tenet of the Whig party--internal improvements by the generalgovernment, and active politics to secure them. In later numbers welearn that a regular Eastern mail had not been received for three weeks. The tide of immigration which was pouring into Illinois is illustratedin a tabular statement on the commerce of the Illinois River, showingthat the steamboat arrivals at Beardstown had risen from one each in theyears 1828 and 1829, and only four in 1830, to thirty-two during theyear 1831. This naturally directed the thoughts of travelers and tradersto some better means of reaching the river landing than the frozen ormuddy roads and impassable creeks and sloughs of winter and spring. Theuse of the Sangamon River, flowing within five miles of Springfield andemptying itself into the Illinois ten or fifteen miles from Beardstown, seemed for the present the only solution of the problem, and a publicmeeting was called to discuss the project. The deep snows of the winterof 1830-31 abundantly filled the channels of that stream, and the winterof 1831-32 substantially repeated its swelling floods. Newcomers in thatregion were therefore warranted in drawing the inference that it mightremain navigable for small craft. Public interest on the topic wasgreatly heightened when one Captain Bogue, commanding a small steamerthen at Cincinnati, printed a letter in the "Journal" of January 26, 1832, saying: "I intend to try to ascend the river [Sangamo] immediatelyon the breaking up of the ice. " It was well understood that the chiefdifficulty would be that the short turns in the channels were liable tobe obstructed by a gorge of driftwood and the limbs and trunks ofoverhanging trees. To provide for this, Captain Bogue's letter added: "Ishould be met at the mouth of the river by ten or twelve men, havingaxes with long handles under the direction of some experienced man. Ishall deliver freight from St. Louis at the landing on the Sangamo Riveropposite the town of Springfield for thirty-seven and a half cents perhundred pounds. " The "Journal" of February 16 contained an advertisementthat the "splendid upper-cabin steamer _Talisman_" would leave forSpringfield, and the paper of March 1 announced her arrival at St. Louison the 22d of February with a full cargo. In due time the citizencommittee appointed by the public meeting met the _Talisman_ at themouth of the Sangamon, and the "Journal" of March 29 announced withgreat flourish that the "steamboat _Talisman_, of one hundred and fiftytons burden, arrived at the Portland landing opposite this town onSaturday last. " There was great local rejoicing over this demonstrationthat the Sangamon was really navigable, and the "Journal" proclaimedwith exultation that Springfield "could no longer be considered aninland town. "

President Jackson's first term was nearing its close, and the Democraticparty was preparing to reëlect him. The Whigs, on their part, had heldtheir first national convention in December, 1831, and nominated HenryClay to dispute the succession. This nomination, made almost a year inadvance of the election, indicates an unusual degree of politicalactivity in the East, and voters in the new State of Illinois werefired with an equal party zeal. During the months of January andFebruary, 1832, no less than six citizens of Sangamon County announcedthemselves in the "Sangamo Journal" as candidates for the Statelegislature, the election for which was not to occur until August; andthe "Journal" of March 15 printed a long letter, addressed "To thePeople of Sangamon County, " under date of the ninth, signed A. Lincoln, and beginning:

"FELLOW-CITIZENS: Having become a candidate for the honorable office ofone of your representatives in the next general assembly of this State, in accordance with an established custom and the principles of truerepublicanism, it becomes my duty to make known to you, the people whomI propose to represent, my sentiments with regard to local affairs. " Hethen takes up and discusses in an eminently methodical and practical waythe absorbing topic of the moment--the Whig doctrine of internalimprovements and its local application, the improvement of the SangamonRiver. He mentions that meetings have been held to propose theconstruction of a railroad, and frankly acknowledges that "no otherimprovement that reason will justify us in hoping for can equal inutility the railroad, " but contends that its enormous cost precludes anysuch hope, and that, therefore, "the improvement of the Sangamon Riveris an object much better suited to our infant resources. " Relating hisexperience in building and navigating his flatboat, and his observationof the stage of the water since then, he draws the very plausibleconclusion that by straightening its channel and clearing away itsdriftwood the stream can be made navigable "to vessels of fromtwenty-five to thirty tons burden for at least one half of all commonyears, and to vessels of much greater burden a part of the time, " Hisletter very modestly touches a few other points of needed legislation--alaw against usury, laws to promote education, and amendments to estrayand road laws. The main interest for us, however, is in the frank avowalof his personal ambition. 

"Every man is said to have his peculiar ambition. Whether it be true ornot, I can say, for one, that I have no other so great as that of beingtruly esteemed of my fellow-men by rendering myself worthy of theiresteem. How far I shall succeed in gratifying this ambition is yet to bedeveloped. I am young, and unknown to many of you. I was born, and haveever remained, in the most humble walks of life. I have no wealthy orpopular relations or friends to recommend me. My case is thrownexclusively upon the independent voters of the country, and if electedthey will have conferred a favor upon me for which I shall beunremitting in my labors to compensate. But if the good people in theirwisdom shall see fit to keep me in the background, I have been toofamiliar with disappointments to be very much chagrined. "

This written and printed address gives us an accurate measure of the manand the time. When he wrote this document he was twenty-three years old. He had been in the town and county only about nine months of actualtime. As Sangamon County covered an estimated area of twenty-one hundredand sixty square miles, he could know but little of either it or itspeople. How dared a "friendless, uneducated boy, working on a flatboatat twelve dollars a month, " with "no wealthy or popular friends torecommend" him, aspire to the honors and responsibilities of alegislator? The only answer is that he was prompted by that intuition ofgenius, that consciousness of powers which justify their claims by theirachievements. When we scan the circumstances more closely, we finddistinct evidence of some reason for his confidence. Relativelyspeaking, he was neither uneducated nor friendless. His acquirementswere already far beyond the simple elements of reading, writing, andciphering. He wrote a good, clear, serviceable hand; he could talk welland reason cogently. The simple, manly style of his printed addressfully equals in literary ability that of the average collegian in thetwenties. His migration from Indiana to Illinois and his two voyages toNew Orleans had given him a glimpse of the outside world. His naturallogic readily grasped the significance of the railroad as a new factorin transportation, although the first American locomotive had been builtonly one year, and ten to fifteen years were yet to elapse before thefirst railroad train was to run in Illinois. 

One other motive probably had its influence. He tells us that Offutt'sbusiness was failing, and his quick judgment warned him that he wouldsoon be out of a job as clerk. This, however, could be only a secondaryreason for announcing himself as a candidate, for the election was notto occur till August, and even if he were elected there would be neitherservice nor salary till the coming winter. His venture into politicsmust therefore be ascribed to the feeling which he so frankly announcedin his letter, his ambition to become useful to his fellow-men--theimpulse that throughout history has singled out the great leaders ofmankind. 

In this particular instance a crisis was also at hand, calculated todevelop and utilize the impulse. Just about a month after thepublication of Lincoln's announcement the "Sangamo Journal" of April 19printed an official call from Governor Reynolds, directed to GeneralNeale of the Illinois militia, to organize six hundred volunteers of hisbrigade for military service in a campaign against the Indians underBlack Hawk, the war chief of the Sacs, who, in defiance of treaties andpromises, had formed a combination with other tribes during the winter, and had now crossed back from the west to the east side of theMississippi River with the determination to reoccupy their old homes inthe Rock River country toward the northern end of the State. 

In the memoranda which Mr. Lincoln furnished for a campaign biography, he thus relates what followed the call for troops:

"Abraham joined a volunteer company, and, to his own surprise, waselected captain of it. He says he has not since had any success in lifewhich gave him so much satisfaction. He went to the campaign, servednear three months, met the ordinary hardships of such an expedition, butwas in no battle. " Official documents furnish some further interestingdetails. As already said, the call was printed in the "Sangamo Journal"of April 19. On April 21 the company was organized at Richland, SangamonCounty, and on April 28 was inspected and mustered into service atBeardstown and attached to Colonel Samuel Thompson's regiment, theFourth Illinois Mounted Volunteers. They marched at once to the hostilefrontier. As the campaign shaped itself, it probably became evident tothe company that they were not likely to meet any serious fighting, and, not having been enlisted for any stated period, they became clamorous toreturn home. The governor therefore had them and other companiesmustered out of service, at the mouth of Fox River, on May 27. Not, however, wishing to weaken his forces before the arrival of new leviesalready on the way, he called for volunteers to remain twenty dayslonger. Lincoln had gone to the frontier to perform real service, notmerely to enjoy military rank or reap military glory. On the same day, therefore, on which he was mustered out as captain, he reënlisted, andbecame Private Lincoln in Captain Iles's company of mounted volunteers, organized apparently principally for scouting service, and sometimescalled the Independent Spy Battalion. Among the other officers whoimitated this patriotic example were General Whiteside and Major John T. Stuart, Lincoln's later law partner. The Independent Spy Battalion, having faithfully performed its new term of service, was finallymustered out on June 16, 1832. Lincoln and his messmate, George M. Harrison, had the misfortune to have their horses stolen the day before, but Harrison relates:

"I laughed at our fate and he joked at it, and we all started offmerrily. The generous men of our company walked and rode by turns withus, and we fared about equal with the rest. But for this generosity ourlegs would have had to do the better work; for in that day this drearyroute furnished no horses to buy or to steal, and, whether on horse orafoot, we always had company, for many of the horses' backs were toosore for riding. "

Lincoln must have reached home about August 1, for the election was tooccur in the second week of that month, and this left him but ten daysin which to push his claims for popular indorsement. His friends, however had been doing manful duty for him during his three months'absence, and he lost nothing in public estimation by his promptenlistment to defend the frontier. Successive announcements in the"Journal" had by this time swelled the list of candidates to thirteen. But Sangamon County was entitled to only four representatives and whenthe returns came in Lincoln was among those defeated. Nevertheless, hemade a very respectable showing in the race. The list of successful andunsuccessful aspirants and their votes was as follows:

 E. D. Taylor. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 1127 John T. Stuart. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 991 Achilles Morris. .. .. .. .. .. .. 945 Peter Cartwright. .. .. .. .. .. . 815

Under the plurality rule, these four had been elected. The unsuccessfulcandidates were:

 A. G. Herndon. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 806 W. Carpenter. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 774 J. Dawson. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 717 A. Lincoln. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 657 T. M. Neale. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 571 R. Quinton. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 485 Z. Peter. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 214 E. Robinson. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 169 ---- Kirkpatrick. .. .. .. .. .. 44

The returns show that the total vote of the county was about twenty-onehundred and sixty-eight. Comparing this with the vote cast for Lincoln, we see that he received nearly one third of the total county vote, notwithstanding his absence from the canvass, notwithstanding the factthat his acquaintanceship was limited to the neighborhood of New Salem, notwithstanding the sharp competition. Indeed, his talent and fitnessfor active practical politics were demonstrated beyond question by theresult in his home precinct of New Salem, which, though he ran as aWhig, gave two hundred and seventy-seven votes for him and only threeagainst him. Three months later it gave one hundred and eighty-five forthe Jackson and only seventy for the Clay electors, proving Lincoln'spersonal popularity. He remembered for the remainder of his life withgreat pride that this was the only time he was ever beaten on a directvote of the people. 

The result of the election brought him to one of the serious crises ofhis life, which he forcibly stated in after years in the followingwritten words:

"He was now without means and out of business, but was anxious to remainwith his friends, who had treated him with so much generosity, especially as he had nothing elsewhere to go to. He studied what heshould do; thought of learning the blacksmith trade, thought of tryingto study law, rather thought he could not succeed at that without abetter education. "

The perplexing problem between inclination and means to follow it, thestruggle between conscious talent and the restraining fetters ofpoverty, has come to millions of young Americans before and since, butperhaps to none with a sharper trial of spirit or more resolutepatience. Before he had definitely resolved upon either career, chanceserved not to solve, but to postpone his difficulty, and in the end togreatly increase it. 

New Salem, which apparently never had any good reason for becoming atown, seems already at that time to have entered on the road to rapiddecay. Offutt's speculations had failed, and he had disappeared. Thebrothers Herndon, who had opened a new store, found business dull andunpromising. Becoming tired of their undertaking, they offered to sellout to Lincoln and Berry on credit, and took their promissory notes inpayment. The new partners, in that excess of hope which usually attendsall new ventures, also bought two other similar establishments that werein extremity, and for these likewise gave their notes. It is evidentthat the confidence which Lincoln had inspired while he was a clerk inOffutt's store, and the enthusiastic support he had received as acandidate, were the basis of credit that sustained these severalcommercial transactions. 

It turned out in the long run that Lincoln's credit and the popularconfidence that supported it were as valuable both to his creditors andhimself as if the sums which stood over his signature had been gold coinin a solvent bank. But this transmutation was not attained until he hadpassed through a very furnace of financial embarrassment. Berry proved aworthless partner, and the business a sorry failure. Seeing this, Lincoln and Berry sold out again on credit--to the Trent brothers, whosoon broke up and ran away. Berry also departed and died, and finallyall the notes came back upon Lincoln for payment. He was unable to meetthese obligations, but he did the next best thing. He remained, promisedto pay when he could, and most of his creditors, maintaining theirconfidence in his integrity, patiently bided their time, till, in thecourse of long years, he fully justified it by paying, with interestevery cent of what he learned to call, in humorous satire upon his ownfolly, the "national debt. "

With one of them he was not so fortunate. Van Bergen, who bought one ofthe Lincoln-Berry notes, obtained judgment, and, by peremptory sale, swept away the horse, saddle, and surveying instruments with the dailyuse of which Lincoln "procured bread and kept body and soul together, "to use his own words. But here again Lincoln's recognized honesty washis safety. Out of personal friendship, James Short bought the propertyand restored it to the young surveyor, giving him time to repay. It wasnot until his return from Congress, seventeen years after the purchaseof the store, that he finally relieved himself of the last instalmentsof his "national debt. " But by these seventeen years of sober industry, rigid economy, and unflinching faith to his obligations he earned thetitle of "Honest old Abe, " which proved of greater service to himselfand his country than if he had gained the wealth of Croesus. 

Out of this ill-starred commercial speculation, however, Lincoln derivedone incidental benefit, and it may be said it became the determiningfactor in his career. It is evident from his own language that heunderwent a severe mental struggle in deciding whether he would become ablacksmith or a lawyer. In taking a middle course, and trying to becomea merchant, he probably kept the latter choice strongly in view. Itseems well established by local tradition that during the period whilethe Lincoln-Berry store was running its fore-doomed course from bad toworse, Lincoln employed all the time he could spare from his customers(and he probably had many leisure hours) in reading and study of variouskinds. This habit was greatly stimulated and assisted by his beingappointed, May 7, 1833, postmaster at New Salem, which office hecontinued to hold until May 30, 1836, when New Salem partiallydisappeared and the office was removed to Petersburg. The influenceswhich brought about the selection of Lincoln are not recorded, but it issuggested that he had acted for some time as deputy postmaster under theformer incumbent, and thus became the natural successor. Evidently hispolitics formed no objection, as New Salem precinct had at the Augustelection, when he ran as a Whig, given him its almost solid vote forrepresentative notwithstanding the fact that it was more than two thirdsDemocratic. The postmastership increased his public consideration andauthority, broadened his business experience, and the newspapers hehandled provided him an abundance of reading matter on topics of bothlocal and national importance up to the latest dates. 

Those were stirring times, even on the frontier. The "Sangamo Journal"of December 30, 1832, printed Jackson's nullification proclamation. Thesame paper, of March 9, 1833, contained an editorial on Clay'scompromise and that of the 16th had a notice of the great nullificationdebate in Congress. The speeches of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster werepublished in full during the following month, and Mr. Lincoln could notwell help reading them and joining in the feelings and comments theyprovoked. 

While the town of New Salem was locally dying, the county of Sangamonand the State of Illinois were having what is now called a boom. Otherwide-awake newspapers, such as the "Missouri Republican" and "LouisvilleJournal, " abounded in notices of the establishment of new stage linesand the general rush of immigration. But the joyous dream of the NewSalemites, that the Sangamon River would become a commercial highway, quickly faded. The _Talisman_ was obliged to hurry back down the rapidlyfalling stream, tearing away a portion of the famous dam to permit herdeparture. There were rumors that another steamer, the _Sylph_, wouldestablish regular trips between Springfield and Beardstown, but shenever came. The freshets and floods of 1831 and 1832 were succeeded by aseries of dry seasons, and the navigation of the Sangamon River wasnever afterward a telling plank in the county platform of eitherpolitical party. 

III

Appointed Deputy Surveyor--Elected to Legislature in 1834--CampaignIssues--Begins Study of Law--Internal Improvement System--TheLincoln-Stone Protest--Candidate for Speaker in 1838 and 1840

When Lincoln was appointed postmaster, in May, 1833, the Lincoln-Berrystore had not yet completely "winked out, " to use his own picturesquephrase. When at length he ceased to be a merchant, he yet remained agovernment official, a man of consideration and authority, who still hada responsible occupation and definite home, where he could read, write, and study. The proceeds of his office were doubtless very meager, but inthat day, when the rate of postage on letters was still twenty-fivecents, a little change now and then came into his hands, which, in thescarcity of money prevailing on the frontier, had an importancedifficult for us to appreciate. His positions as candidate for thelegislature and as postmaster probably had much to do in bringing himanother piece of good fortune. In the rapid settlement of Illinois andSangamon County, and the obtaining titles to farms by purchase orpreëmption, as well as in the locating and opening of new roads, thecounty surveyor had more work on his hands than he could performthroughout a county extending forty miles east and west and fifty northand south, and was compelled to appoint deputies to assist him. The nameof the county surveyor was John Calhoun, recognized by all hiscontemporaries in Sangamon as a man of education and talent and anaspiring Democratic politician. It was not an easy matter for Calhoun tofind properly qualified deputies, and when he became acquainted withLincoln, and learned his attainments and aptitudes, and the estimationin which he was held by the people of New Salem, he wisely concluded toutilize his talents and standing, notwithstanding their difference inpolitics. The incident is thus recorded by Lincoln:

"The surveyor of Sangamon offered to depute to Abraham that portion ofhis work which was within his part of the county. He accepted, procureda compass and chain, studied Flint and Gibson a little, and went at it. This procured bread, and kept soul and body together. "

Tradition has it that Calhoun not only gave him the appointment, butlent him the book in which to study the art, which he accomplished in aperiod of six weeks, aided by the schoolmaster, Mentor Graham. The exactperiod of this increase in knowledge and business capacity is notrecorded, but it must have taken place in the summer of 1833, as thereexists a certificate of survey in Lincoln's handwriting signed, "J. Calhoun, S. S. C. , by A. Lincoln, " dated January 14, 1834. Before June ofthat year he had surveyed and located a public road from "Musick's Ferryon Salt Creek, _via_ New Salem, to the county line in the direction toJacksonville, " twenty-six miles and seventy chains in length, the exactcourse of which survey, with detailed bearings and distances, was drawnon common white letter-paper pasted in a long slip, to a scale of twoinches to the mile, in ordinary yet clear and distinct penmanship. Thecompensation he received for this service was three dollars per day forfive days, and two dollars and fifty cents for making the plat andreport. 

An advertisement in the "Journal" shows that the regular fees of anotherdeputy were "two dollars per day, or one dollar per lot of eight acresor less, and fifty cents for a single line, with ten cents per mile fortraveling. "

While this class of work and his post-office, with its emoluments, probably amply supplied his board, lodging and clothing, it left him nosurplus with which to pay his debts, for it was in the latter part ofthat same year (1834) that Van Bergen caused his horse and surveyinginstruments to be sold under the hammer, as already related. Meanwhile, amid these fluctuations of good and bad luck, Lincoln maintained hisequanimity, his steady, persevering industry, and his hopeful ambitionand confidence in the future. Through all his misfortunes and hisfailures, he preserved his self-respect and his determination tosucceed. 

Two years had nearly elapsed since he was defeated for the legislature, and, having received so flattering a vote on that occasion, it wasentirely natural that he should determine to try a second chance. Fournew representatives were to be chosen at the August election of 1834, and near the end of April Lincoln published his announcement that hewould again be a candidate. He could certainly view his expectations inevery way in a more hopeful light. His knowledge had increased, hisexperience broadened, his acquaintanceship greatly increased. Histalents were acknowledged, his ability recognized. He was postmaster anddeputy surveyor. He had become a public character whose services were indemand. As compared with the majority of his neighbors, he was a man oflearning who had seen the world. Greater, however, than all theseadvantages, his sympathetic kindness of heart, his sincere, openfrankness, his sturdy, unshrinking honesty, and that inborn sense ofjustice that yielded to no influence, made up a nobility of characterand bearing that impressed the rude frontiersmen as much as, if not morequickly and deeply than, it would have done the most polished anderudite society. 

Beginning his campaign in April, he had three full months before him forelectioneering, and he evidently used the time to good advantage. Thepursuit of popularity probably consisted mainly of the same methods thatin backwoods districts prevail even to our day: personal visits andsolicitations, attendance at various kinds of neighborhood gatherings, such as raisings of new cabins, horse-races, shooting-matches, sales oftown lots or of personal property under execution, or whatever occasionserved to call a dozen or two of the settlers together. One recordedincident illustrates the practical nature of the politician's art atthat day:

"He [Lincoln] came to my house, near Island Grove, during harvest. Therewere some thirty men in the field. He got his dinner and went out in thefield where the men were at work. I gave him an introduction, and theboys said that they could not vote for a man unless he could make ahand. 'Well, boys, ' said he, 'if that is all, I am sure of your votes. 'He took hold of the cradle, and led the way all the round with perfectease. The boys were satisfied, and I don't think he lost a vote in thecrowd. "

Sometimes two or more candidates would meet at such places, and shortspeeches be called for and given. Altogether, the campaign was livelierthan that of two years before. Thirteen candidates were again contestingfor the four seats in the legislature, to say nothing of candidates forgovernor, for Congress, and for the State Senate. The scope ofdiscussion was enlarged and localized. From the published address of anindustrious aspirant who received only ninety-two votes, we learn thatthe issues now were the construction by the general government of acanal from Lake Michigan to the Illinois River, the improvement of theSangamon River, the location of the State capital at Springfield, aUnited States bank, a better road law, and amendments to the estraylaws. 

When the election returns came in Lincoln had reason to be satisfiedwith the efforts he had made. He received the second highest number ofvotes in the long list of candidates. Those cast for the representativeschosen stood: Dawson, 1390; Lincoln, 1376; Carpenter 1170; Stuart, 1164. The location of the State capital had also been submitted to popularvote at this election. Springfield, being much nearer the geographicalcenter of the State, was anxious to deprive Vandalia of that honor, andthe activity of the Sangamon politicians proved it to be a dangerousrival. In the course of a month the returns from all parts of the Statehad come in, and showed that Springfield was third in the race. 

It must be frankly admitted that Lincoln's success at this juncture wasone of the most important events of his life. A second defeat might havediscouraged his efforts to lift himself to a professional career, andsent him to the anvil to make horseshoes and to iron wagons for thebalance of his days. But this handsome popular indorsement assured hisstanding and confirmed his credit. With this lift in the clouds of hishorizon, he could resolutely carry his burden of debt and hopefully lookto wider fields of public usefulness. Already, during the progress ofthe canvass, he had received cheering encouragement and promise of mostvaluable help. One of the four successful candidates was John T. Stuart, who had been major of volunteers in the Black Hawk War while Lincolnwas captain, and who, together with Lincoln, had reënlisted as a privatein the Independent Spy Battalion. There is every likelihood that the twohad begun a personal friendship during their military service, which wasof course strongly cemented by their being fellow-candidates and bothbelonging to the Whig party. Mr. Lincoln relates:

"Major John T. Stuart, then in full practice of the law [atSpringfield], was also elected. During the canvass, in a privateconversation he encouraged Abraham to study law. After the election, heborrowed books of Stuart, took them home with him, and went at it ingood earnest. He studied with nobody. .. . In the autumn of 1836 heobtained a law license, and on April 15, 1837, removed to Springfieldand commenced the practice, his old friend Stuart taking him intopartnership. "

From and after this election in 1834 as a representative, Lincoln was apermanent factor in the politics and the progress of Sangamon County. Ata Springfield meeting in the following November to promote commonschools, he was appointed one of eleven delegates to attend a conventionat Vandalia called to deliberate on that subject. He was reëlected tothe legislature in 1836, in 1838, and in 1840, and thus for a period ofeight years took a full share in shaping and enacting the public andprivate laws of Illinois, which in our day has become one of the leadingStates in the Mississippi valley. Of Lincoln's share in thatlegislation, it need only be said that it was as intelligent andbeneficial to the public interest as that of the best of his colleagues. The most serious error committed by the legislature of Illinois duringthat period was that it enacted laws setting on foot an extensive systemof internal improvements, in the form of railroads and canals, altogether beyond the actual needs of transportation for the thenexisting population of the State, and the consequent reckless creationof a State debt for money borrowed at extravagant interest and liberalcommissions. The State underwent a season of speculative intoxication, in which, by the promised and expected rush of immigration and theswelling currents of its business, its farms were suddenly to becomevillages, its villages spreading towns, and its towns transformed intogreat cities, while all its people were to be made rich by the increasedvalue of their land and property. Both parties entered with equalrecklessness into this ill-advised internal improvement system, which inthe course of about four years brought the State to bankruptcy, with nosubstantial works to show for the foolishly expended millions. 

In voting for these measures, Mr. Lincoln represented the public opinionand wish of his county and the whole State; and while he was asblamable, he was at the same time no more so than the wisest of hiscolleagues. It must be remembered in extenuation that he was justbeginning his parliamentary education. From the very first, however, heseems to have become a force in the legislature, and to have renderedspecial service to his constituents. It is conceded that the one objectwhich Springfield and the most of Sangamon County had at heart was theremoval of the capital from Vandalia to that place. This wasaccomplished in 1836, and the management of the measure appears to havebeen intrusted mainly to Mr. Lincoln. 

One incident of his legislative career stands out in such prominentrelation to the great events of his after life that it deserves specialexplanation and emphasis. Even at that early date, a quarter of acentury before the outbreak of the Civil War, the slavery question wasnow and then obtruding itself as an irritating and perplexing elementinto the local legislation of almost every new State. Illinois, thoughguaranteed its freedom by the Ordinance of 1787, nevertheless underwenta severe political struggle in which, about four years after heradmission into the Union, politicians and settlers from the South made adetermined effort to change her to a slave State. The legislature of1822-23, with a two-thirds pro-slavery majority of the State Senate, anda technical, but legally questionable, two-thirds majority in the House, submitted to popular vote an act calling a State convention to changethe constitution. It happened, fortunately, that Governor Coles, thougha Virginian, was strongly antislavery, and gave the weight of hisofficial influence and his whole four years' salary to counteract thedangerous scheme. From the fact that southern Illinois up to that timewas mostly peopled from the slave States, the result was seriously indoubt through an active and exciting campaign, and the convention wasfinally defeated by a majority of eighteen hundred in a total vote ofeleven thousand six hundred and twelve. While this result effectuallydecided that Illinois would remain a free State, the propagandism andreorganization left a deep and tenacious undercurrent of pro-slaveryopinion that for many years manifested itself in vehement and intolerantoutcries against "abolitionism, " which on one occasion caused the murderof Elijah P. Lovejoy for persisting in his right to print an antislaverynewspaper at Alton. 

Nearly a year before this tragedy the Illinois legislature had underconsideration certain resolutions from the Eastern States on the subjectof slavery, and the committee to which they had been referred reported aset of resolves "highly disapproving abolition societies, " holding that"the right of property in slaves is secured to the slaveholding Statesby the Federal Constitution, " together with other phraseology calculatedon the whole to soothe and comfort pro-slavery sentiment. After muchirritating discussion, the committee's resolutions were finally passed, with but Lincoln and five others voting in the negative. No recordremains whether or not Lincoln joined in the debate; but, to leave nodoubt upon his exact position and feeling, he and his colleague, DanStone, caused the following protest to be formally entered on thejournals of the House:

"Resolutions upon the subject of domestic slavery having passed bothbranches of the General Assembly at its present session, the undersignedhereby protest against the passage of the same. "

"They believe that the institution of slavery is founded on bothinjustice and bad policy, but that the promulgation of abolitiondoctrines tends rather to increase than abate its evils. "

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has no power underthe Constitution to interfere with the institution of slavery in thedifferent States. "

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has the power, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but that the power ought not to be exercised, unless at the request ofthe people of the District. "

"The difference between these opinions and those contained in the saidresolutions is their reasons for entering this protest. "

In view of the great scope and quality of Lincoln's public service inafter life, it would be a waste of time to trace out in detail his wordsor his votes upon the multitude of questions on which he acted duringthis legislative career of eight years. It needs only to be rememberedthat it formed a varied and thorough school of parliamentary practiceand experience that laid the broad foundation of that extraordinaryskill and sagacity in statesmanship which he afterward displayed inparty controversy and executive direction. The quick proficiency andready aptitude for leadership evidenced by him in this, as it may becalled, his preliminary parliamentary school are strikingly proved bythe fact that the Whig members of the Illinois House of Representativesgave him their full party vote for Speaker, both in 1838 and 1840. Butbeing in a minority, they could not, of course, elect him. 

IV

Law Practice--Rules for a Lawyer--Law and Politics: Twin Occupations--TheSpringfield Coterie--Friendly Help--Anne Rutledge--Mary Owens

Lincoln's removal from New Salem to Springfield and his entrance into alaw partnership with Major John T. Stuart begin a distinctively newperiod in his career, From this point we need not trace in detail hisprogress in his new and this time deliberately chosen vocation. Thelawyer who works his way up in professional merit from a five-dollar feein a suit before a justice of the peace to a five-thousand-dollar feebefore the Supreme Court of his State has a long and difficult path toclimb. Mr. Lincoln climbed this path for twenty-five years withindustry, perseverance, patience--above all, with that sense of moralresponsibility that always clearly traced the dividing line between hisduty to his client and his duty to society and truth. His unqualifiedfrankness of statement assured him the confidence of judge and jury inevery argument. His habit of fully admitting the weak points in his casegained their close attention to its strong ones, and when clientsbrought him bad cases, his uniform advice was not to begin the suit. Among his miscellaneous writings there exist some fragments of autographnotes, evidently intended for a little lecture or talk to law studentswhich set forth with brevity and force his opinion of what a lawyerought to be and do. He earnestly commends diligence in study, and, nextto diligence, promptness in keeping up his work. 

"As a general rule, never take your whole fee in advance, " he says, "norany more than a small retainer. When fully paid beforehand, you are morethan a common mortal if you can feel the same interest in the case as ifsomething was still in prospect for you as well as for your client. ""Extemporaneous speaking should be practised and cultivated. It is thelawyer's avenue to the public. However able and faithful he may be inother respects, people are slow to bring him business if he cannot makea speech. And yet, there is not a more fatal error to young lawyers thanrelying too much on speech-making. If any one, upon his rare powers ofspeaking, shall claim an exemption from the drudgery of the law, hiscase is a failure in advance. Discourage litigation. Persuade yourneighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how thenominal winner is often a real loser--in fees, expenses, and waste oftime. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being agood man. There will still be business enough. Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this. Who can bemore nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls the register ofdeeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up strife and putmoney in his pocket? A moral tone ought to be infused into theprofession which should drive such men out of it. " "There is a vaguepopular belief that lawyers are necessarily dishonest. I say vaguebecause when we consider to what extent confidence and honors arereposed in and conferred upon lawyers by the people, it appearsimprobable that their impression of dishonesty is very distinct andvivid. Yet the impression is common--almost universal. Let no young manchoosing the law for a calling for a moment yield to the popular belief. Resolve to be honest at all events; and if, in your own judgment, youcannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation, rather than one in the choosing of whichyou do, in advance, consent to be a knave. "

While Lincoln thus became a lawyer, he did not cease to remain apolitician. In the early West, law and politics were parallel roads tousefulness as well as distinction. Newspapers had not then reached anyconsiderable circulation. There existed neither fast presses to printthem, mail routes to carry them, nor subscribers to read them. Sinceeven the laws had to be newly framed for those new communities, thelawyer became the inevitable political instructor and guide as far asability and fame extended. His reputation as a lawyer was a twin of hisinfluence as an orator, whether through logic or eloquence. Localconditions fostered, almost necessitated, this double pursuit. Westwardemigration was in its full tide, and population was pouring into thegreat State of Illinois with ever accelerating rapidity. Settlementswere spreading, roads were being opened, towns laid out, the largercounties divided and new ones organized, and the enthusiastic visions ofcoming prosperity threw the State into that fever of speculation whichculminated in wholesale internal improvements on borrowed capital andbrought collapse, stagnation, and bankruptcy in its inevitable train. Asalready said, these swift changes required a plentiful supply of newlaws, to frame which lawyers were in a large proportion sent to thelegislature every two years. These same lawyers also filled the bar andrecruited the bench of the new State, and, as they followed theitinerant circuit courts from county to county in their varioussections, were called upon in these summer wanderings to explain inpublic speeches their legislative work of the winter. By a naturalconnection, this also involved a discussion of national and partyissues. It was also during this period that party activity wasstimulated by the general adoption of the new system of party caucusesand party conventions to which President Jackson had given the impulse. 

In the American system of representative government, elections not onlyoccur with the regularity of clockwork, but pervade the whole organismin every degree of its structure from top to bottom--Federal, State, county, township, and school district. In Illinois, even the Statejudiciary has at different times been chosen by popular ballot. Thefunction of the politician, therefore, is one of continuous watchfulnessand activity, and he must have intimate knowledge of details if he wouldwork out grand results. Activity in politics also produces eagercompetition and sharp rivalry. In 1839 the seat of government wasdefinitely transferred from Vandalia to Springfield, and there soongathered at the new State capital a group of young men whose variedability and future success in public service has rarely beenexcelled--Douglas, Shields, Calhoun, Stuart, Logan, Baker, Treat, Hardin, Trumbull, McClernand, Browning, McDougall, and others. 

His new surroundings greatly stimulated and reinforced Mr. Lincoln'sgrowing experience and spreading acquaintance, giving him a larger shareand wider influence in local and State politics. He became a valued andsagacious adviser in party caucuses, and a power in party conventions. Gradually, also, his gifts as an attractive and persuasive campaignspeaker were making themselves felt and appreciated. 

His removal, in April, 1837, from a village of twenty houses to a "city"of about two thousand inhabitants placed him in striking new relationsand necessities as to dress, manners, and society, as well as politics;yet here again, as in the case of his removal from his father's cabin toNew Salem six years before, peculiar conditions rendered the transitionless abrupt than would at first appear. Springfield, notwithstanding itsgreater population and prospective dignity as the capital, was in manyrespects no great improvement on New Salem. It had no public buildings, its streets and sidewalks were unpaved, its stores, in spite of alltheir flourish of advertisements, were staggering under the hard timesof 1837-39, and stagnation of business imposed a rigid economy on allclasses. If we may credit tradition, this was one of the most seriouscrises of Lincoln's life. His intimate friend, William Butler, relatedto the writer that, having attended a session of the legislature atVandalia, he and Lincoln returned together at its close to Springfieldby the usual mode of horseback travel. At one of their stopping-placesover night Lincoln, in one of his gloomy moods, told Butler the story ofthe almost hopeless prospects which lay immediately before him--that thesession was over, his salary all drawn, and his money all spent; that hehad no resources and no work; that he did not know where to turn to earneven a week's board. Butler bade him be of good cheer, and, without anyformal proposition or agreement, took him and his belongings to his ownhouse and domesticated him there as a permanent guest, with Lincoln'stacit compliance rather than any definite consent. Later Lincoln shareda room and genial companionship, which ripened into closest intimacy, inthe store of his friend Joshua F. Speed, all without charge or expense;and these brotherly offerings helped the young lawyer over presentnecessities which might otherwise have driven him to muscular handiworkat weekly or monthly wages. 

From this time onward, in daily conversation, in argument at the bar, inpolitical consultation and discussion, Lincoln's life graduallybroadened into contact with the leading professional minds of thegrowing State of Illinois. The man who could not pay a week's board billwas twice more elected to the legislature, was invited to publicbanquets and toasted by name, became a popular speaker, moved in thebest society of the new capital, and made what was considered abrilliant marriage. 

Lincoln's stature and strength, his intelligence and ambition--in short, all the elements which gave him popularity among men in New Salem, rendered him equally attractive to the fair sex of that village. On theother hand, his youth, his frank sincerity, his longing for sympathy andencouragement, made him peculiarly sensitive to the society andinfluence of women. Soon after coming to New Salem he chanced much inthe society of Miss Anne Rutledge, a slender, blue-eyed blonde, nineteenyears old, moderately educated, beautiful according to localstandards--an altogether lovely, tender-hearted, universally admired, and generally fascinating girl. From the personal descriptions of herwhich tradition has preserved, the inference is naturally drawn that hertemperament and disposition were very much akin to those of Mr. Lincolnhimself. It is little wonder, therefore, that he fell in love with her. But two years before she had become engaged to a Mr. McNamar, who hadgone to the East to settle certain family affairs, and whose absencebecame so unaccountably prolonged that Anne finally despaired of hisreturn, and in time betrothed herself to Lincoln. A year or so afterthis event Anne Rutledge was taken sick and died--the neighbors said ofa broken heart, but the doctor called it brain fever, and his sciencewas more likely to be correct than their psychology. Whatever may havebeen the truth upon this point, the incident threw Lincoln into profoundgrief, and a period of melancholy so absorbing as to cause his friendsapprehension for his own health. Gradually, however, their studied anddevoted companionship won him back to cheerfulness, and his secondaffair of the heart assumed altogether different characteristics, mostof which may be gathered from his own letters. 

Two years before the death of Anne Rutledge, Mr. Lincoln had seen andmade the acquaintance of Miss Mary Owens, who had come to visit hersister Mrs. Able, and had passed about four weeks in New Salem, afterwhich she returned to Kentucky. Three years later, and perhaps a yearafter Miss Rutledge's death, Mrs. Able, before starting for Kentucky, told Mr. Lincoln probably more in jest than earnest, that she wouldbring her sister back with her on condition that he would becomeher--Mrs. Able's--brother-in-law. Lincoln, also probably more in jestthan earnest, promptly agreed to the proposition; for he remembered MaryOwens as a tall, handsome, dark-haired girl, with fair skin and largeblue eyes, who in conversation could be intellectual and serious as wellas jovial and witty, who had a liberal education, and was consideredwealthy--one of those well-poised, steady characters who look uponmatrimony and life with practical views and social matronly instincts. 

The bantering offer was made and accepted in the autumn of 1836, and inthe following April Mr. Lincoln removed to Springfield. Before thisoccurred, however, he was surprised to learn that Mary Owens hadactually returned with her sister from Kentucky, and felt that theromantic jest had become a serious and practical question. Their firstinterview dissipated some of the illusions in which each had indulged. The three years elapsed since they first met had greatly changed herpersonal appearance. She had become stout; her twenty-eight years (oneyear more than his) had somewhat hardened the lines of her face. Both infigure and feature she presented a disappointing contrast to the slimand not yet totally forgotten Anne Rutledge. 

On her part, it was more than likely that she did not find in him allthe attractions her sister had pictured. The speech and manners of theIllinois frontier lacked much of the chivalric attentions and flatteringcompliments to which the Kentucky beaux were addicted. He was yet adiamond in the rough, and she would not immediately decide till shecould better understand his character and prospects, so no formalengagement resulted. 

In December, Lincoln went to his legislative duties at Vandalia, and inthe following April took up his permanent abode in Springfield. Such aseparation was not favorable to rapid courtship, yet they had occasionalinterviews and exchanged occasional letters. None of hers to him havebeen preserved, and only three of his to her. From these it appears thatthey sometimes discussed their affair in a cold, hypothetical way, evendown to problems of housekeeping, in the light of mere worldly prudence, much as if they were guardians arranging a _mariage de convenance_, rather than impulsive and ardent lovers wandering in Arcady. WithoutMiss Owens's letters it is impossible to know what she may have said tohim, but in May, 1837, Lincoln wrote to her:

"I am often thinking of what we said about your coming to live atSpringfield. I am afraid you would not be satisfied. There is a greatdeal of flourishing about in carriages here, which it would be yourdoom to see without sharing it. You would have to be poor, without themeans of hiding your poverty. Do you believe you could bear thatpatiently? Whatever woman may cast her lot with mine, should any ever doso, it is my intention to do all in my power to make her happy andcontented; and there is nothing I can imagine that would make me moreunhappy than to fail in the effort. I know I should be much happier withyou than the way I am, provided I saw no signs of discontent in you. What you have said to me may have been in the way of jest, or I may havemisunderstood it. If so, then let it be forgotten; if otherwise, I muchwish you would think seriously before you decide. What I have said Iwill most positively abide by, provided you wish it. My opinion is thatyou had better not do it. You have not been accustomed to hardship, andit may be more severe than you now imagine. I know you are capable ofthinking correctly on any subject, and if you deliberate maturely uponthis before you decide, then I am willing to abide your decision. "

Whether, after receiving this, she wrote him the "good long letter" heasked for in the same epistle is not known. Apparently they did not meetagain until August, and the interview must have been marked by reserveand coolness on both sides, which left each more uncertain than before;for on the same day Lincoln again wrote her, and, after saying that shemight perhaps be mistaken in regard to his real feelings toward her, continued thus:

"I want in all cases to do right, and most particularly so in all caseswith women. I want at this particular time, more than anything else, todo right with you; and if I knew it would be doing right, as I rathersuspect it would, to let you alone, I would do it. And for the purposeof making the matter as plain as possible, I now say that you can nowdrop the subject, dismiss your thoughts (if you ever had any) from meforever, and leave this letter unanswered, without calling forth oneaccusing murmur from me. And I will even go further, and say that if itwill add anything to your comfort or peace of mind to do so, it is mysincere wish that you should. Do not understand by this that I wish tocut your acquaintance. I mean no such thing. What I do wish is that ourfurther acquaintance shall depend upon yourself. If such furtheracquaintance would contribute nothing to your happiness, I am sure itwould not to mine. If you feel yourself in any degree bound to me, I amnow willing to release you, provided you wish it; while, on the otherhand, I am willing and even anxious to bind you faster, if I can beconvinced that it will in any considerable degree add to your happiness. This, indeed, is the whole question with me. "

All that we know of the sequel is contained in a letter which Lincolnwrote to his friend Mrs. Browning nearly a year later, after Miss Owenshad finally returned to Kentucky, in which, without mentioning thelady's name, he gave a seriocomic description of what might be called acourtship to escape matrimony. He dwells on his disappointment at herchanged appearance, and continues:

"But what could I do? I had told her sister that I would take her forbetter or for worse, and I made a point of honor and conscience in allthings to stick to my word, especially if others had been induced to acton it, which in this case I had no doubt they had; for I was now fairlyconvinced that no other man on earth would have her, and hence theconclusion that they were bent on holding me to my bargain. 'Well, 'thought I, 'I have said it, and, be the consequences what they may, itshall not be my fault if I fail to do it. .. . ' All this while, although Iwas fixed 'firm as the surge-repelling rock' in my resolution, I found Iwas continually repenting the rashness which had led me to make it. Through life I have been in no bondage, either real or imaginary, fromthe thraldom of which I so much desired to be free. .. . After I haddelayed the matter as long as I thought I could in honor do (which, bythe way, had brought me round into last fall), I concluded I might aswell bring it to a consummation without further delay, and so I musteredmy resolution and made the proposal to her direct; but, shocking torelate, she answered, No. At first I supposed she did it through anaffectation of modesty, which I thought but ill became her under thepeculiar circumstances of her case, but on my renewal of the charge Ifound she repelled it with greater firmness than before. I tried itagain and again, but with the same success, or rather with the same wantof success. I finally was forced to give it up, at which I veryunexpectedly found myself mortified almost beyond endurance. I wasmortified, it seemed to me, in a hundred different ways. My vanity wasdeeply wounded by the reflection that I had so long been too stupid todiscover her intentions, and at the same time never doubting that Iunderstood them perfectly; and also that she, whom I had taught myselfto believe nobody else would have, had actually rejected me with all myfancied greatness. And, to cap the whole, I then for the first timebegan to suspect that I was really a little in love with her. "

The serious side of this letter is undoubtedly genuine and candid, whilethe somewhat over-exaggeration of the comic side points as clearly thathe had not fully recovered from the mental suffering he had undergonein the long conflict between doubt and duty. From the beginning, thematch-making zeal of the sister had placed the parties in a falseposition, produced embarrassment, and created distrust. A differentbeginning might have resulted in a very different outcome, for Lincoln, while objecting to her corpulency, acknowledges that in both feature andintellect she was as attractive as any woman he had ever met; and MissOwens's letters, written after his death, state that her principalobjection lay in the fact that his training had been different fromhers, and that "Mr. Lincoln was deficient in those little links whichmake up the chain of a woman's happiness. " She adds: "The last message Iever received from him was about a year after we parted in Illinois. Mrs. Able visited Kentucky, and he said to her in Springfield, 'Tellyour sister that I think she was a great fool because she did not stayhere and marry me. '" She was even then not quite clear in her own mindbut that his words were true. 

V

Springfield Society--Miss Mary Todd--Lincoln's Engagement--His DeepDespondency--Visit to Kentucky--Letters to Speed--The ShieldsDuel--Marriage--Law Partnership with Logan--Hardin Nominated forCongress, 1843--Baker Nominated for Congress, 1844--Lincoln Nominated andElected, 1846

The deep impression which the Mary Owens affair made upon Lincoln isfurther shown by one of the concluding phrases of his letter to Mrs. Browning: "I have now come to the conclusion never again to think ofmarrying. " But it was not long before a reaction set in from thispessimistic mood. The actual transfer of the seat of government fromVandalia to Springfield in 1839 gave the new capital fresh animation. Business revived, public improvements were begun, politics ran high. Already there was a spirit in the air that in the following yearculminated in the extraordinary enthusiasm and fervor of the Harrisonpresidential campaign of 1840, that rollicking and uproarious partycarnival of humor and satire, of song and jollification, of hard ciderand log cabins. While the State of Illinois was strongly Democratic, Sangamon County was as distinctly Whig, and the local party disputes werehot and aggressive. The Whig delegation of Sangamon in the legislature, popularly called the "Long Nine, " because the sum of the stature of itsmembers was fifty-four feet, became noted for its influence inlegislation in a body where the majority was against them; and of theseMr. Lincoln was the "tallest" both in person and ability, as wasrecognized by his twice receiving the minority vote for Speaker of theHouse. 

Society also began organizing itself upon metropolitan rather thanprovincial assumptions. As yet, however society was liberal. Men ofeither wealth or position were still too few to fill its ranks. Energy, ambition talent, were necessarily the standard of admission; andLincoln, though poor as a church mouse, was as welcome as those whocould wear ruffled shirts and carry gold watches. The meetings of thelegislature at Springfield then first brought together that splendidgroup of young men of genius whose phenomenal careers and distinguishedservices have given Illinois fame in the history of the nation. It is amarked peculiarity of the American character that the bitterest foes inparty warfare generally meet each other on terms of perfect socialcourtesy in the drawing-rooms of society; and future presidentialcandidates, cabinet members, senators, congressmen, jurists, orators, and battle heroes lent the little social reunions of Springfield a zestand exaltation never found--perhaps impossible--amid the heavy, oppressive surroundings of conventional ceremony, gorgeous upholstery, and magnificent decorations. 

It was at this period also that Lincoln began to feel and exercise hisexpanding influence and powers as a writer and speaker. Already, twoyears earlier, he had written and delivered before the Young Men'sLyceum of Springfield an able address upon "The Perpetuation of OurPolitical Institutions, " strongly enforcing the doctrine of rigidobedience to law. In December, 1839, Douglas, in a heated conversation, challenged the young Whigs present to a political discussion. Thechallenge was immediately taken up, and the public of Springfieldlistened with eager interest to several nights of sharp debate betweenWhig and Democratic champions, in which Lincoln bore a prominent andsuccessful share. In the following summer, Lincoln's name was placedupon the Harrison electoral ticket for Illinois, and he lent all hiszeal and eloquence to swell the general popular enthusiasm for"Tippecanoe and Tyler too. "

In the midst of this political and social awakening of the new capitaland the quickened interest and high hopes of leading citizens gatheredthere from all parts of the State, there came into the Springfieldcircles Miss Mary Todd of Kentucky, twenty-one years old, handsome, accomplished, vivacious, witty, a dashing and fascinating figure indress and conversation, gracious and imperious by turns. She easilysingled out and secured the admiration of such of the Springfield beauxas most pleased her somewhat capricious fancy. She was a sister of Mrs. Ninian W. Edwards, whose husband was one of the "Long Nine. " Thiscircumstance made Lincoln a frequent visitor at the Edwards house; and, being thus much thrown in her company, he found himself, almost beforehe knew it, entangled in a new love affair, and in the course of atwelvemonth engaged to marry her. 

Much to the surprise of Springfield society, however, the courtship tooka sudden turn. Whether it was caprice or jealousy, a new attachment, ormature reflection will always remain a mystery. Every such case is a lawunto itself, and neither science nor poetry is ever able to analyze andexplain its causes and effects. The conflicting stories then current, and the varying traditions that yet exist, either fail to agree or tofit the sparse facts which came to light. There remains no dispute, however, that the occurrence, whatever shape it took, threw Mr. Lincolninto a deeper despondency than any he had yet experienced, for onJanuary 23, 1841, he wrote to his law partner, John T. Stuart:

"For not giving you a general summary of news you must pardon me; it isnot in my power to do so. I am now the most miserable man living. Ifwhat I feel were equally distributed to the whole human family, therewould not be one cheerful face on earth. Whether I shall ever be better, I cannot tell; I awfully forebode I shall not. To remain as I am isimpossible; I must die or be better. "

Apparently his engagement to Miss Todd was broken off, but whether thatwas the result or the cause of his period of gloom seems still a matterof conjecture. His mind was so perturbed that he felt unable to attendthe sessions of the legislature of which he was a member; and after itsclose his intimate friend Joshua F. Speed carried him off for a visit toKentucky. The change of scene and surroundings proved of great benefit. He returned home about midsummer very much improved, but not yetcompletely restored to a natural mental equipoise. While on their visitto Kentucky, Speed had likewise fallen in love, and in the followingwinter had become afflicted with doubts and perplexities akin to thosefrom which Lincoln had suffered. It now became his turn to give sympathyand counsel to his friend, and he did this with a warmth and delicacyborn of his own spiritual trials, not yet entirely overmastered. Hewrote letter after letter to Speed to convince him that his doubts aboutnot truly loving the woman of his choice were all nonsense. 

"Why, Speed, if you did not love her, although you might not wish herdeath, you would most certainly be resigned to it. Perhaps this pointis no longer a question with you, and my pertinacious dwelling upon itis a rude intrusion upon your feelings. If so, you must pardon me. Youknow the hell I have suffered on that point, and how tender I am uponit. .. . I am now fully convinced that you love her, as ardently as youare capable of loving. .. . It is the peculiar misfortune of both you andme to dream dreams of Elysium far exceeding all that anything earthlycan realize. "

When Lincoln heard that Speed was finally married, he wrote him:

"It cannot be told how it now thrills me with joy to hear you say youare 'far happier than you ever expected to be, ' That much, I know, isenough. I know you too well to suppose your expectations were not, atleast, sometimes extravagant; and if the reality exceeds them all, Isay, Enough, dear Lord. I am not going beyond the truth when I tell youthat the short space it took me to read your last letter gave me morepleasure than the total sum of all I have enjoyed since the fatal firstof January, 1841. Since then it seems to me I should have been entirelyhappy, but for the never-absent idea that there is one still unhappywhom I have contributed to make so. That still kills my soul. I cannotbut reproach myself for even wishing to be happy while she isotherwise. "

It is quite possible that a series of incidents that occurred during thesummer in which the above was written had something to do with bringingsuch a frame of mind to a happier conclusion. James Shields, afterward ageneral in two wars and a senator from two States, was at that timeauditor of Illinois, with his office at Springfield. Shields was anIrishman by birth, and, for an active politician of the Democraticparty, had the misfortune to be both sensitive and irascible in partywarfare. Shields, together with the Democratic governor and treasurer, issued a circular order forbidding the payment of taxes in thedepreciated paper of the Illinois State banks, and the Whigs wereendeavoring to make capital by charging that the order was issued forthe purpose of bringing enough silver into the treasury to pay thesalaries of these officials. Using this as a basis of argument, a coupleof clever Springfield society girls wrote and printed in the "SangamoJournal" a series of humorous letters in country dialect, purporting tocome from the "Lost Townships, " and signed by "Aunt Rebecca, " who calledherself a farmer's widow. It is hardly necessary to say that Mary Toddwas one of the culprits. The young ladies originated the scheme more topoke fun at the personal weaknesses of Shields than for the sake ofparty effect, and they embellished their simulated plaint about taxeswith an embroidery of fictitious social happenings and personalallusions to the auditor that put the town on a grin and Shields intofury. The fair and mischievous writers found it necessary to consultLincoln about how they should frame the political features of theirattack, and he set them a pattern by writing the first letter of theseries himself. 

Shields sent a friend to the editor of the "Journal, " and demanded thename of the real "Rebecca. " The editor, as in duty bound, asked Lincolnwhat he should do, and was instructed to give Lincoln's name, and not tomention the ladies. Then followed a letter from Shields to Lincolndemanding retraction and apology, Lincoln's reply that he declined toanswer under menace, and a challenge from Shields. Thereupon Lincolninstructed his "friend" as follows: If former offensive correspondencewere withdrawn and a polite and gentlemanly inquiry made, he waswilling to explain that:

"I did write the 'Lost Townships' letter which appeared in the 'Journal'of the 2d instant, but had no participation in any form in any otherarticle alluding to you. I wrote that wholly for political effect; I hadno intention of injuring your personal or private character or standingas a man or a gentleman; and I did not then think, and do not now think, that that article could produce or has produced that effect against you, and had I anticipated such an effect I would have forborne to write it. And I will add that your conduct toward me, so far as I know, had alwaysbeen gentlemanly, and that I had no personal pique against you and nocause for any. .. . If nothing like this is done, the preliminaries of thefight are to be:

"_First_. Weapons: Cavalry broadswords of the largest size, preciselyequal in all respects, and such as now used by the cavalry company atJacksonville. 

"_Second_. Position: A plank ten feet long, and from nine to twelveinches broad, to be firmly fixed on edge, on the ground, as the linebetween us, which neither is to pass his foot over upon forfeit of hislife. Next, a line drawn on the ground on either side of said plank andparallel with it, each at the distance of the whole length of the swordand three feet additional from the plank, and the passing of his ownsuch line by either party during the fight shall be deemed a surrenderof the contest. "

The two seconds met, and, with great unction, pledged "our honor to eachother that we would endeavor to settle the matter amicably, " butpersistently higgled over points till publicity and arrests seemedimminent. Procuring the necessary broadswords, all parties then hurriedaway to an island in the Mississippi River opposite Alton, where, longbefore the planks were set on edge or the swords drawn, mutual friendstook the case out of the hands of the seconds and declared anadjustment. The terms of the fight as written by Mr. Lincoln showplainly enough that in his judgment it was to be treated as a farce, andwould never proceed beyond "preliminaries. " There, of course, ensued theusual very bellicose after-discussion in the newspapers, with additionalchallenges between the seconds about the proper etiquette of suchfarces, all resulting only in the shedding of much ink and furnishingSpringfield with topics of lively conversation for a month. Theseoccurrences, naturally enough, again drew Mr. Lincoln and Miss Toddtogether in friendly interviews, and Lincoln's letter to Speed detailingthe news of the duels contains this significant paragraph:

"But I began this letter not for what I have been writing, but to saysomething on that subject which you know to be of such infinitesolicitude to me. The immense sufferings you endured from the first daysof September till the middle of February you never tried to conceal fromme, and I well understood. You have now been the husband of a lovelywoman nearly eight months. That you are happier now than the day youmarried her I well know, for without you could not be living. But I haveyour word for it too, and the returning elasticity of spirits which ismanifested in your letters. But I want to ask a close question. 'Are younow in feeling as well as judgment glad that you are married as youare?' From anybody but me this would be an impudent question not to betolerated, but I know you will pardon it in me. Please answer itquickly, as I am impatient to know. "

The answer was evidently satisfactory, for on November 4, 1842, the Rev. Charles Dresser united Abraham Lincoln and Mary Todd in the holy bondsof matrimony. [3]

 [Footnote 3: The following children were born of this marriage:

 Robert Todd, August 1, 1843; Edward Baker, March 10, 1846; William Wallace, December 21, 1850; Thomas, April 4, 1853. 

 Edward died in infancy; William in the White House, February 20, 1862; Thomas in Chicago, July 15, 1871; and the mother, Mary Lincoln, in Springfield, July 16, 1882. 

 Robert, who filled the office of Secretary of War with distinction under the administrations of Presidents Garfield and Arthur, as well William as that of minister to England under the administration of President Harrison, now resides in Chicago, Illinois. ]

His marriage to Miss Todd ended all those mental perplexities andperiods of despondency from which he had suffered more or less duringhis several love affairs, extending over nearly a decade. Out of thekeen anguish he had endured, he finally gained that perfect mastery overhis own spirit which Scripture declares to denote a greatness superiorto that of him who takes a city. Few men have ever attained thatcomplete domination of the will over the emotions, of reason overpassion, by which he was able in the years to come to meet and solve thetremendous questions destiny had in store for him. His wedding onceover, he took up with resolute patience the hard, practical routine ofdaily life, in which he had already been so severely schooled. Even hissentimental correspondence with his friend Speed lapsed into neglect. Hewas so poor that he and his bride could not make the contemplated visitto Kentucky they would both have so much enjoyed. His "national debt" ofthe old New Salem days was not yet fully paid off. "We are not keepinghouse, but boarding at the Globe tavern, " he writes. "Our room . .. Andboarding only cost us four dollars a week. "

His law partnership with Stuart had lasted four years, but was dissolvedby reason of Stuart's election to Congress, and a new one was formedwith Judge Stephen T. Logan, who had recently resigned from the circuitbench, where he had learned the quality and promise of Lincoln'stalents. It was an opportune and important change. Stuart had devotedhimself mainly to politics, while with Logan law was the primary object. Under Logan's guidance and encouragement, he took up both the study andpractical work of the profession in a more serious spirit. Lincoln'sinterest in politics, however, was in no way diminished, and, in truth, his limited practice at that date easily afforded him the time necessaryfor both. 

Since 1840 he had declined a reëlection to the legislature, and hisambition had doubtless contributed much to this decision. His late lawpartner, Stuart, had been three times a candidate for Congress. He wasdefeated in 1836, but successfully gained his election in 1838 and 1840, his service of two terms extending from December 2, 1839, to March 3, 1843. For some reason, the next election had been postponed from theyear 1842 to 1843. It was but natural that Stuart's success shouldexcite a similar desire in Lincoln, who had reached equal partyprominence, and rendered even more conspicuous party service. Lincolnhad profited greatly by the companionship and friendly emulation of themany talented young politicians of Springfield, but this same conditionalso increased competition and stimulated rivalry. Not only himself, butboth Hardin and Baker desired the nomination, which, as the districtthen stood, was equivalent to an election. 

When the leading Whigs of Sangamon County met, Lincoln was under theimpression that it was Baker and not Hardin who was his most dangerousrival, as appears in a letter to Speed of March 24, 1843:

"We had a meeting of the Whigs of the county here on last Monday toappoint delegates to a district convention, and Baker beat me and gotthe delegation instructed to go for him. The meeting, in spite of myattempt to decline it, appointed me one of the delegates, so that ingetting Baker the nomination I shall be fixed a good deal like a fellowwho is made groomsman to a man that has cut him out and is marrying hisown dear 'gal. '"

The causes that led to his disappointment are set forth more in detailin a letter, two days later, to a friend in the new county of Menard, which now included his old home, New Salem, whose powerful assistancewas therefore lost from the party councils of Sangamon. The letter alsodwells more particularly on the complicated influences which thepractical politician has to reckon with, and shows that even hismarriage had been used to turn popular opinion against him. 

"It is truly gratifying to me to learn that while the people of Sangamonhave cast me off, my old friends of Menard, who have known me longestand best, stick to me. It would astonish, if not amuse, the oldercitizens to learn that I (a stranger, friendless, uneducated, pennilessboy, working on a flatboat at ten dollars per month) have been put downhere as the candidate of pride, wealth, and aristocratic familydistinction. Yet so, chiefly, it was. There was, too, the strangestcombination of church influence against me. Baker is a Campbellite, andtherefore, as I suppose, with few exceptions got all that church. Mywife has some relations in the Presbyterian churches and some with theEpiscopal churches; and therefore, wherever it would tell, I was setdown as either the one or the other, while it was everywhere contendedthat no Christian ought to go for me, because I belonged to no church, was suspected of being a deist, and had talked about fighting a duel. With all these things, Baker of course had nothing to do. Nor do Icomplain of them. As to his own church going for him, I think that wasright enough, and as to the influences I have spoken of in the other, though they were very strong, it would be grossly untrue and unjust tocharge that they acted upon them in a body, or were very near so. I onlymean that those influences levied a tax of a considerable per cent. Uponmy strength throughout the religious community. "

In the same letter we have a striking illustration of Lincoln'sintelligence and skill in the intricate details of political management, together with the high sense of honor and manliness which directed hisaction in such matters. Speaking of the influences of Menard County, hewrote:

"If she and Mason act circumspectly, they will in the convention be ableso far to enforce their rights as to decide absolutely which one of thecandidates shall be successful. Let me show the reason of this. Hardin, or some other Morgan candidate, will get Putnam, Marshall, Woodford, Tazewell, and Logan [counties], making sixteen. Then you and Mason, having three, can give the victory to either side. You say you shallinstruct your delegates for me, unless I object. I certainly shall notobject. That would be too pleasant a compliment for me to tread in thedust. And, besides, if anything should happen (which, however, is notprobable) by which Baker should be thrown out of the fight, I would beat liberty to accept the nomination if I could get it. I do, however, feel myself bound not to hinder him in any way from getting thenomination. I should despise myself were I to attempt it. I think, then, it would be proper for your meeting to appoint three delegates, and toinstruct them to go for some one as a first choice, some one else as asecond, and perhaps some one as a third; and if in those instructions Iwere named as the first choice it would gratify me very much. If youwish to hold the balance of power, it is important for you to attend toand secure the vote of Mason also. "

A few weeks again changed the situation, of which he informed Speed in aletter dated May 18:

"In relation to our Congress matter here, you were right in supposing Iwould support the nominee. Neither Baker nor I, however, is the man--butHardin, so far as I can judge from present appearances. We shall have nosplit or trouble about the matter; all will be harmony. "

In the following year (1844) Lincoln was once more compelled to exercisehis patience. The Campbellite friends of Baker must have again been veryactive in behalf of their church favorite; for their influence, added tohis dashing politics and eloquent oratory, appears to have secured himthe nomination without serious contention, while Lincoln found a partialrecompense in being nominated a candidate for presidential elector, which furnished him opportunity for all his party energy and zeal duringthe spirited but unsuccessful presidential campaign for Henry Clay. Henot only made an extensive canvass in Illinois, but also made a numberof speeches in the adjoining State of Indiana. 

It was probably during that year that a tacit agreement was reachedamong the Whig leaders in Sangamon County, that each would be satisfiedwith one term in Congress and would not seek a second nomination. ButHardin was the aspirant from the neighboring county of Morgan, andapparently therefore not included in this arrangement. Already, in thefall of 1845, Lincoln industriously began his appeals and instructionsto his friends in the district to secure the succession. Thus he wroteon November 17:

"The paper at Pekin has nominated Hardin for governor, and, commentingon this, the Alton paper indirectly nominated him for Congress. It wouldgive Hardin a great start, and perhaps use me up, if the Whig papers ofthe district should nominate him for Congress. If your feelings towardme are the same as when I saw you (which I have no reason to doubt), Iwish you would let nothing appear in your paper which may operateagainst me. You understand. Matters stand just as they did when I sawyou. Baker is certainly off the track, and I fear Hardin intends to beon it. "

But again, as before, the spirit of absolute fairness governed all hismovements, and he took special pains to guard against it being"suspected that I was attempting to juggle Hardin out of a nominationfor Congress by juggling him into one for governor. " "I should bepleased, " he wrote again in January, "if I could concur with you in thehope that my name would be the only one presented to the convention; butI cannot. Hardin is a man of desperate energy and perseverance, and onethat never backs out; and, I fear, to think otherwise is to be deceivedin the character of our adversary. I would rejoice to be spared thelabor of a contest, but, 'being in, ' I shall go it thoroughly and to thebottom. " He then goes on to recount in much detail the chances for andagainst him in the several counties of the district, and in laterletters discusses the system of selecting candidates, where theconvention ought to be held, how the delegates should be chosen, theinstructions they should receive, and how the places of absentdelegates should be filled. He watched his field of operations, plannedhis strategy, and handled his forces almost with the vigilance of amilitary commander. As a result, he won both his nomination in May andhis election to the Thirtieth Congress in August, 1846. 

In that same year the Mexican War broke out. Hardin became colonel ofone of the three regiments of Illinois volunteers called for byPresident Polk, while Baker raised a fourth regiment, which was alsoaccepted. Colonel Hardin was killed in the battle of Buena Vista, andColonel Baker won great distinction in the fighting near the City ofMexico. 

Like Abraham Lincoln, Douglas was also elected to Congress in 1846, where he had already served the two preceding terms. But theseredoubtable Illinois champions were not to have a personal tilt in theHouse of Representatives. Before Congress met, the Illinois legislatureelected Douglas to the United States Senate for six years from March 4, 1847. 

VI

First Session of the Thirtieth Congress--Mexican War--"WilmotProviso"--Campaign of 1848--Letters to Herndon about Young Menin Politics--Speech in Congress on the Mexican War--Second Sessionof the Thirtieth Congress--Bill to Prohibit Slavery in the Districtof Columbia--Lincoln's Recommendations of Office-Seekers--Lettersto Speed--Commissioner of the General Land Office--Declines Governorshipof Oregon

Very few men are fortunate enough to gain distinction during their firstterm in Congress. The reason is obvious. Legally, a term extends overtwo years; practically, a session of five or six months during thefirst, and three months during the second year ordinarily reduce theiropportunities more than one half. In those two sessions, even if wepresuppose some knowledge of parliamentary law, they must learn thedaily routine of business, make the acquaintance of theirfellow-members, who already, in the Thirtieth Congress, numberedsomething over two hundred, study the past and prospective legislationon a multitude of minor national questions entirely new to the newmembers, and perform the drudgery of haunting the departments in thecharacter of unpaid agent and attorney to attend to the privateinterests of constituents--a physical task of no small proportions inLincoln's day, when there was neither street-car nor omnibus in the"city of magnificent distances, " as Washington was nicknamed. Add tothis that the principal work of preparing legislation is done by thevarious committees in their committee-rooms, of which the public hearsnothing, and that members cannot choose their own time for makingspeeches; still further, that the management of debate on preparedlegislation must necessarily be intrusted to members of long experienceas well as talent, and it will be seen that the novice need not expectimmediate fame. 

It is therefore not to be wondered at that Lincoln's single term in theHouse of Representatives at Washington added practically nothing to hisreputation. He did not attempt to shine forth in debate by either astinging retort or a witty epigram, or by a sudden burst of inspiredeloquence. On the contrary, he took up his task as a quiet but earnestand patient apprentice in the great workshop of national legislation, and performed his share of duty with industry and intelligence, as wellas with a modest and appreciative respect for the ability and experienceof his seniors. 

"As to speech-making, " he wrote, "by way of getting the hang of theHouse, I made a little speech two or three days ago on a post-officequestion of no general interest. I find speaking here and elsewhereabout the same thing. I was about as badly scared, and no worse, as I amwhen I speak in court. I expect to make one within a week or two inwhich I hope to succeed well enough to wish you to see it. " And again, some weeks later: "I just take my pen to say that Mr. Stephens ofGeorgia, a little, slim, pale-faced consumptive man with a voice likeLogan's, has just concluded the very best speech of an hour's length Iever heard. My old, withered, dry eyes are full of tears yet. "

He was appointed the junior Whig member of the Committee on Post-officesand Post-roads, and shared its prosaic but eminently useful labors bothin the committee-room and the House debates. His name appears on onlyone other committee, --that on Expenditures of the War Department, --andhe seems to have interested himself in certain amendments of the lawrelating to bounty lands for soldiers and such minor military topics. Helooked carefully after the interests of Illinois in certain grants ofland to that State for railroads, but expressed his desire that thegovernment price of the reserved sections should not be increased toactual settlers. 

During the first session of the Thirtieth Congress he delivered threeset speeches in the House, all of them carefully prepared and fullywritten out. The first of these, on January 12, 1848, was an elaboratedefense of the Whig doctrine summarized in a House resolution passed aweek or ten days before, that the Mexican War "had been unnecessarilyand unconstitutionally commenced by the President, " James K. Polk. Thespeech is not a mere party diatribe, but a terse historical and legalexamination of the origin of the Mexican War. In the after-light of ourown times which shines upon these transactions, we may readily admitthat Mr. Lincoln and the Whigs had the best of the argument, but it mustbe quite as readily conceded that they were far behind the President andhis defenders in political and party strategy. The former were clearlywasting their time in discussing an abstract question of internationallaw upon conditions existing twenty months before. During those twentymonths the American arms had won victory after victory, and planted theAmerican flag on the "halls of the Montezumas. " Could even successfulargument undo those victories or call back to life the brave Americansoldiers who had shed their blood to win them?

It may be assumed as an axiom that Providence has never gifted anypolitical party with all of political wisdom or blinded it with all ofpolitical folly. Upon the foregoing point of controversy the Whigs weresadly thrown on the defensive, and labored heavily under their alreadydiscounted declamation. But instinct rather than sagacity led them toturn their eyes to the future, and successfully upon other points toretrieve their mistake. Within six weeks after Lincoln's speechPresident Polk sent to the Senate a treaty of peace, under which Mexicoceded to the United States an extent of territory equal in area toGermany, France, and Spain combined, and thereafter the origin of thewar was an obsolete question. What should be done with the new territorywas now the issue. 

This issue embraced the already exciting slavery question, and Mr. Lincoln was doubtless gratified that the Whigs had taken a position uponit so consonant with his own convictions. Already, in the previousCongress, the body of the Whig members had joined a small group ofantislavery Democrats in fastening upon an appropriation bill the famous"Wilmot Proviso, " that slavery should never exist in territory acquiredfrom Mexico, and the Whigs of the Thirtieth Congress steadily followedthe policy of voting for the same restriction in regard to every pieceof legislation where it was applicable. Mr. Lincoln often said he hadvoted forty or fifty times for the Wilmot Proviso in various formsduring his single term. 

Upon another point he and the other Whigs were equally wise. Repellingthe Democratic charge that they were unpatriotic in denouncing the war, they voted in favor of every measure to sustain, supply, and encouragethe soldiers in the field. But their most adroit piece of strategy, nowthat the war was ended, was in their movement to make General TaylorPresident. 

In this movement Mr. Lincoln took a leading and active part. No livingAmerican statesman has ever been idolized by his party adherents as wasHenry Clay for a whole generation, and Mr. Lincoln fully shared thishero-worship. But his practical campaigning as a candidate forpresidential elector in the Harrison campaign of 1840, and the Claycampaign of 1844, in Illinois and the adjoining States, afforded him abasis for sound judgment, and convinced him that the day when Clay couldhave been elected President was forever passed. 

"Mr. Clay's chance for an election is just no chance at all, " he wroteon April 30. "He might get New York, and that would have elected in1844, but it will not now, because he must now, at the least, loseTennessee which he had then, and in addition the fifteen new votes ofFlorida, Texas, Iowa, and Wisconsin. .. . In my judgment, we can electnobody but General Taylor; and we cannot elect him without a nomination. Therefore don't fail to send a delegate. " And again on the same day:"Mr. Clay's letter has not advanced his interests any here. Several whowere against Taylor, but not for anybody particularly before, are sincetaking ground, some for Scott and some for McLean. Who will be nominatedneither I nor any one else can tell. Now, let me pray to you in turn. Myprayer is that you let nothing discourage or baffle you, but that, inspite of every difficulty, you send us a good Taylor delegate from yourcircuit. Make Baker, who is now with you, I suppose, help about it. Heis a good hand to raise a breeze. "

In due time Mr. Lincoln's sagacity and earnestness were both justified;for on June 12 he was able to write to an Illinois friend:

"On my return from Philadelphia, where I had been attending thenomination of 'Old Rough, ' I found your letter in a mass of others whichhad accumulated in my absence. By many, and often, it had been said theywould not abide the nomination of Taylor; but since the deed has beendone, they are fast falling in, and in my opinion we shall have a mostoverwhelming, glorious triumph. One unmistakable sign is that all theodds and ends are with us--Barnburners, Native Americans, Tyler men, disappointed office-seeking Locofocos, and the Lord knows what. This isimportant, if in nothing else, in showing which way the wind blows. Someof the sanguine men have set down all the States as certain for Taylorbut Illinois, and it as doubtful. Cannot something be done even inIllinois? Taylor's nomination takes the Locos on the blind side. Itturns the war-thunder against them. The war is now to them the gallowsof Haman, which they built for us, and on which they are doomed to behanged themselves. "

Nobody understood better than Mr. Lincoln the obvious truth that inpolitics it does not suffice merely to nominate candidates. Somethingmust also be done to elect them. Two of the letters which he at thistime wrote home to his young law partner, William H. Herndon, areespecially worth quoting in part, not alone to show his own zeal andindustry, but also as a perennial instruction and encouragement to youngmen who have an ambition to make a name and a place for themselves inAmerican politics:

"Last night I was attending a sort of caucus of the Whig members, heldin relation to the coming presidential election. The whole field of thenation was scanned, and all is high hope and confidence. .. . Now, as tothe young men. You must not wait to be brought forward by the older men. For instance, do you suppose that I should ever have got into notice ifI had waited to be hunted up and pushed forward by older men? You youngmen get together and form a 'Rough and Ready Club, ' and have regularmeetings and speeches. .. . Let every one play the part he can playbest, --some speak, some sing, and all 'holler. ' Your meetings will be ofevenings; the older men, and the women, will go to hear you; so that itwill not only contribute to the election of 'Old Zach, ' but will be aninteresting pastime, and improving to the intellectual faculties of allengaged. "

And in another letter, answering one from Herndon in which that youngaspirant complains of having been neglected, he says:

"The subject of that letter is exceedingly painful to me; and I cannotbut think there is some mistake in your impression of the motives of theold men. I suppose I am now one of the old men; and I declare, on myveracity, which I think is good with you, that nothing could afford memore satisfaction than to learn that you and others of my young friendsat home are doing battle in the contest, and endearing themselves to thepeople, and taking a stand far above any I have been able to reach intheir admiration. I cannot conceive that other old men feel differently. Of course I cannot demonstrate what I say; but I was young once, and Iam sure I was never ungenerously thrust back. I hardly know what to say. The way for a young man to rise is to improve himself every way he can, never suspecting that anybody wishes to hinder him. Allow me to assureyou that suspicion and jealousy never did help any man in any situation. There may sometimes be ungenerous attempts to keep a young man down; andthey will succeed, too, if he allows his mind to be diverted from itstrue channel to brood over the attempted injury. Cast about, and see ifthis feeling has not injured every person you have ever known to fallinto it. "

Mr. Lincoln's interest in this presidential campaign did not expenditself merely in advice to others. We have his own written record thathe also took an active part for the election of General Taylor after hisnomination, speaking a few times in Maryland near Washington, severaltimes in Massachusetts, and canvassing quite fully his own district inIllinois. Before the session of Congress ended he also delivered twospeeches in the House--one on the general subject of internalimprovements, and the other the usual political campaign speech whichmembers of Congress are in the habit of making to be printed for homecirculation; made up mainly of humorous and satirical criticism, favoring the election of General Taylor, and opposing the election ofGeneral Cass, the Democratic candidate. Even this production, however, is lighted up by a passage of impressive earnestness and eloquence, inwhich he explains and defends the attitude of the Whigs in denouncingthe origin of the Mexican War:

"If to say 'the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commencedby the President, ' be opposing the war, then the Whigs have verygenerally opposed it. Whenever they have spoken at all they have saidthis; and they have said it on what has appeared good reason to them. The marching an army into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening the inhabitants away, leaving their growing crops and otherproperty to destruction, to you may appear a perfectly amiable, peaceful, unprovoking procedure; but it does not appear so to us. So tocall such an act, to us appears no other than a naked, impudentabsurdity, and we speak of it accordingly. But if, when the war hadbegun, and had become the cause of the country, the giving of our moneyand our blood, in common with yours, was support of the war, then it isnot true that we have always opposed the war. With few individualexceptions, you have constantly had our votes here for all the necessarysupplies. And, more than this, you have had the services, the blood, andthe lives of our political brethren in every trial and on every field. The beardless boy and the mature man, the humble and thedistinguished--you have had them. Through suffering and death, bydisease and in battle, they have endured, and fought and fell with you. Clay and Webster each gave a son, never to be returned. From the Stateof my own residence, besides other worthy but less known Whig names, wesent Marshall, Morrison, Baker, and Hardin; they all fought and onefell, and in the fall of that one we lost our best Whig man. Nor werethe Whigs few in number or laggard in the day of danger. In thatfearful, bloody, breathless struggle at Buena Vista, where each man'shard task was to beat back five foes or die himself, of the five highofficers who perished, four were Whigs. In speaking of this, I mean noodious comparison between the lion-hearted Whigs and the Democrats whofought there. On other occasions, and among the lower officers andprivates on that occasion, I doubt not the proportion was different. Iwish to do justice to all. I think of all those brave men as Americans, in whose proud fame, as an American, I, too, have a share. Many of them, Whigs and Democrats, are my constituents and personal friends; and Ithank them--more than thank them--one and all, for the high, imperishable honor they have conferred on our common State. "

During the second session of the Thirtieth Congress Mr. Lincoln made nolong speeches, but in addition to the usual routine work devolved on himby the committee of which he was a member, he busied himself inpreparing a special measure which, because of its relation to the greatevents of his later life, needs to be particularly mentioned. Slaveryexisted in Maryland and Virginia when these States ceded the territoryout of which the District of Columbia was formed. Since, by thatcession, this land passed under the exclusive control of the Federalgovernment, the "institution" within this ten miles square could nolonger be defended by the plea of State sovereignty, and antislaverysentiment naturally demanded that it should cease. Pro-slaverystatesmen, on the other hand, as persistently opposed its removal, partly as a matter of pride and political consistency, partly because itwas a convenience to Southern senators and members of Congress, whenthey came to Washington, to bring their family servants where the locallaws afforded them the same security over their black chattels whichexisted at their homes. Mr. Lincoln, in his Peoria speech in 1854, emphasized the sectional dispute with this vivid touch of local color:

"The South clamored for a more efficient fugitive-slave law. The Northclamored for the abolition of a peculiar species of slave trade in theDistrict of Columbia, in connection with which, in view from the windowsof the Capitol, a sort of negro livery-stable, where droves of negroeswere collected, temporarily kept, and finally taken to Southern markets, precisely like droves of horses, had been openly maintained for fiftyyears. "

Thus the question remained a minor but never ending bone of contentionand point of irritation, and excited debate arose in the ThirtiethCongress over a House resolution that the Committee on the Judiciary beinstructed to report a bill as soon as practicable prohibiting the slavetrade in the District of Columbia. In this situation of affairs, Mr. Lincoln conceived the fond hope that he might be able to present a planof compromise. He already entertained the idea which in later yearsduring his presidency he urged upon both Congress and the border slaveStates, that the just and generous mode of getting rid of the barbarousinstitution of slavery was by a system of compensated emancipationgiving freedom to the slave and a money indemnity to the owner. Hetherefore carefully framed a bill providing for the abolishment ofslavery in the District upon the following principal conditions:

_First_. That the law should be adopted by a popular vote in theDistrict. 

_Second_. A temporary system of apprenticeship and gradual emancipationfor children born of slave mothers after January 1, 1850. 

_Third_. The government to pay full cash value for slaves voluntarilymanumitted by their owners. 

_Fourth_. Prohibiting bringing slaves into the District, or selling themout of it. 

_Fifth_. Providing that government officers, citizens of slave States, might bring with them and take away again, their slave house-servants. 

_Sixth_. Leaving the existing fugitive-slave law in force. 

When Mr. Lincoln presented this amendment to the House, he said that hewas authorized to state that of about fifteen of the leading citizens ofthe District of Columbia, to whom the proposition had been submitted, there was not one who did not approve the adoption of such aproposition. He did not wish to be misunderstood. He did not knowwhether or not they would vote for this bill on the first Monday inApril; but he repeated that out of fifteen persons to whom it had beensubmitted, he had authority to say that every one of them desired thatsome proposition like this should pass. 

While Mr. Lincoln did not so state to the House, it was well understoodin intimate circles that the bill had the approval on the one hand ofMr. Seaton, the conservative mayor of Washington, and on the other handof Mr. Giddings, the radical antislavery member of the House ofRepresentatives. Notwithstanding the singular merit of the bill inreconciling such extremes of opposing factions in its support, thetemper of Congress had already become too hot to accept such a rationaland practical solution, and Mr. Lincoln's wise proposition was notallowed to come to a vote. 

The triumphant election of General Taylor to the presidency in November, 1848, very soon devolved upon Mr. Lincoln the delicate and difficultduty of making recommendations to the incoming administration of personssuitable to be appointed to fill the various Federal offices inIllinois, as Colonel E. D. Baker and himself were the only Whigs electedto Congress from that State. In performing this duty, one of his leadingcharacteristics, impartial honesty and absolute fairness to politicalfriends and foes alike, stands out with noteworthy clearness. His termended with General Taylor's inauguration, and he appears to haveremained in Washington but a few days thereafter. Before leaving, hewrote to the new Secretary of the Treasury:

"Colonel E. D. Baker and myself are the only Whig members of Congressfrom Illinois--I of the Thirtieth, and he of the Thirty-first. We havereason to think the Whigs of that State hold us responsible, to someextent, for the appointments which may be made of our citizens. We donot know you personally, and our efforts to see you have, so far, beenunavailing. I therefore hope I am not obtrusive in saying in this way, for him and myself, that when a citizen of Illinois is to be appointed, in your department, to an office, either in or out of the State, we mostrespectfully ask to be heard. "

On the following day, March 10, 1849, he addressed to the Secretary ofState his first formal recommendation. It is remarkable from the factthat between the two Whig applicants whose papers are transmitted, hesays rather less in favor of his own choice than of the opposingclaimant. 

"SIR: There are several applicants for the office of United StatesMarshal for the District of Illinois, among the most prominent of whomare Benjamin Bond, Esq. , of Carlyle, and ---- Thomas, Esq. , of Galena. Mr. Bond I know to be personally every way worthy of the office; and heis very numerously and most respectably recommended. His papers I sendto you; and I solicit for his claims a full and fair consideration. Having said this much, I add that in my individual judgment theappointment of Mr. Thomas would be the better. 

 "Your obedient servant, "A. LINCOLN"

(Indorsed on Mr. Bond's papers. )

"In this and the accompanying envelop are the recommendations of abouttwo hundred good citizens, of all parts of Illinois, that Benjamin Bondbe appointed marshal for that district. They include the names of nearlyall our Whigs who now are, or have ever been, members of the Statelegislature, besides forty-six of the Democratic members of the presentlegislature, and many other good citizens. I add that from personalknowledge I consider Mr. Bond every way worthy of the office, andqualified to fill it. Holding the individual opinion that theappointment of a different gentleman would be better, I ask especialattention and consideration for his claims, and for the opinionsexpressed in his favor by those over whom I can claim no superiority. "

There were but three other prominent Federal appointments to be made inMr. Lincoln's congressional district, and he waited until after hisreturn home so that he might be better informed of the local opinionconcerning them before making his recommendations. It was nearly a monthafter he left Washington before he sent his decision to the severaldepartments at Washington. The letter quoted below, relating to one ofthese appointments, is in substance almost identical with the others, and particularly refrains from expressing any opinion of his own for oragainst the policy of political removals. He also expressly explainsthat Colonel Baker, the other Whig representative, claims no voice inthe appointment. 

"DEAR SIR: I recommend that Walter Davis be appointed Receiver of theLand Office at this place, whenever there shall be a vacancy. I cannotsay that Mr. Herndon, the present incumbent, has failed in the properdischarge of any of the duties of the office. He is a very warmpartizan, and openly and actively opposed to the election of GeneralTaylor. I also understand that since General Taylor's election he hasreceived a reappointment from Mr. Polk, his old commission not havingexpired. Whether this is true the records of the department will show. Imay add that the Whigs here almost universally desire his removal. "

If Mr. Lincoln's presence in Washington during two sessions in Congressdid not add materially to either his local or national fame, it was ofincalculable benefit in other respects. It afforded him a closeinspection of the complex machinery of the Federal government and itsrelation to that of the States, and enabled him to notice both the easyroutine and the occasional friction of their movements. It brought himinto contact and, to some degree, intimate companionship with politicalleaders from all parts of the Union, and gave him the opportunity ofjoining in the caucus and the national convention that nominated GeneralTaylor for President. It broadened immensely the horizon of hisobservation, and the sharp personal rivalries he noted at the center ofthe nation opened to him new lessons in the study of human nature. Hisquick intelligence acquired knowledge quite as, or even more, rapidly byprocess of logical intuition than by mere dry, laborious study; and itwas the inestimable experience of this single term in the Congress ofthe United States which prepared him for his coming, yet undreamed-of, responsibilities, as fully as it would have done the ordinary man in adozen. 

Mr. Lincoln had frankly acknowledged to his friend Speed, after hiselection in 1846, that "being elected to Congress, though I am verygrateful to our friends for having done it, has not pleased me as muchas I expected. " It has already been said that an agreement had beenreached among the several Springfield aspirants, that they would limittheir ambition to a single term, and take turns in securing and enjoyingthe coveted distinction; and Mr. Lincoln remained faithful to thisagreement. When the time to prepare for the election of 1848 approached, he wrote to his law partner:

"It is very pleasant to learn from you that there are some who desirethat I should be reëlected. I most heartily thank them for their kindpartiality; and I can say, as Mr. Clay said of the annexation of Texas, that 'personally I would not object' to a reëlection, although I thoughtat the time, and still think, it would be quite as well for me toreturn to the law at the end of a single term. I made the declarationthat I would not be a candidate again, more from a wish to deal fairlywith others, to keep peace among our friends, and to keep the districtfrom going to the enemy, than for any cause personal to myself; so that, if it should so happen that nobody else wishes to be elected, I couldnot refuse the people the right of sending me again. But to enter myselfas a competitor of others, or to authorize any one so to enter me, iswhat my word and honor forbid. "

Judge Stephen T. Logan, his late law partner, was nominated for theplace, and heartily supported not only by Mr. Lincoln, but also by theWhigs of the district. By this time, however, the politics of thedistrict had undergone a change by reason of the heavy emigration toIllinois at that period, and Judge Logan was defeated. 

Mr. Lincoln's strict and sensitive adherence to his promises now broughthim a disappointment which was one of those blessings in disguise socommonly deplored for the time being by the wisest and best. A number ofthe Western members of Congress had joined in a recommendation toPresident-elect Taylor to give Colonel E. D. Baker a place in hiscabinet, a reward he richly deserved for his talents, his party service, and the military honor he had won in the Mexican War. When thisapplication bore no fruit, the Whigs of Illinois, expecting at leastsome encouragement from the new administration, laid claim to a bureauappointment, that of Commissioner of the General Land Office, in the newDepartment of the Interior, recently established. 

"I believe that, so far as the Whigs in Congress are concerned, " wroteLincoln to Speed twelve days before Taylor's inauguration, "I couldhave the General Land Office almost by common consent; but then Sweetand Don Morrison and Browning and Cyrus Edwards all want it, and what isworse, while I think I could easily take it myself, I fear I shall havetrouble to get it for any other man in Illinois. "

Unselfishly yielding his own chances, he tried to induce the fourIllinois candidates to come to a mutual agreement in favor of one oftheir own number. They were so tardy in settling their differences as toexcite his impatience, and he wrote to a Washington friend:

"I learn from Washington that a man by the name of Butterfield willprobably be appointed Commissioner of the General Land Office, Thisought not to be. .. . Some kind friends think I ought to be an applicant, but I am for Mr. Edwards. Try to defeat Butterfield, and, in doing so, use Mr. Edwards, J. L. D. Morrison, or myself, whichever you can to bestadvantage. "

As the situation grew persistently worse, Mr. Lincoln at length, aboutthe first of June, himself became a formal applicant. But the delayresulting from his devotion to his friends had dissipated his chances. Butterfield received the appointment, and the defeat was aggravatedwhen, a few months later, his unrelenting spirit of justice and fairnessimpelled him to write a letter defending Butterfield and the Secretaryof the Interior from an attack by one of Lincoln's warm personal butindiscreet friends in the Illinois legislature. It was, however, afortunate escape. In the four succeeding years Mr. Lincoln qualifiedhimself for better things than the monotonous drudgery of anadministrative bureau at Washington. It is probable that this defeatalso enabled him more easily to pass by another temptation. The Tayloradministration, realizing its ingratitude, at length, in September, offered him the governorship of the recently organized territory ofOregon; but he replied:

"On as much reflection as I have had time to give the subject, I cannotconsent to accept it. "

VII

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise--State Fair Debate--PeoriaDebate--Trumbull Elected--Letter to Robinson--The Know-Nothings--DecaturMeeting--Bloomington Convention--Philadelphia Convention--Lincoln's Votefor Vice-President--Frémont and Dayton--Lincoln's CampaignSpeeches--Chicago Banquet Speech

After the expiration of his term in Congress Mr. Lincoln applied himselfwith unremitting assiduity to the practice of law, which the growth ofthe State in population, and the widening of his acquaintanceship noless than his own growth in experience and legal acumen, rendered evermore important and absorbing. 

"In 1854, " he writes, "his profession had almost superseded the thoughtof politics in his mind, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromisearoused him as he had never been before. "

Not alone Mr. Lincoln, but, indeed, the whole nation, was soaroused--the Democratic party, and nearly the entire South, to force thepassage of that repeal through Congress, and an alarmed majority, including even a considerable minority of the Democratic party in theNorth, to resist its passage. 

Mr. Lincoln, of course, shared the general indignation of Northernsentiment that the whole of the remaining Louisiana Territory, out ofwhich six States, and the greater part of two more, have since beenorganized and admitted to the Union, should be opened to the possibleextension of slavery. But two points served specially to enlist hisenergy in the controversy. One was personal, in that Senator Douglas ofIllinois, by whom the repeal was championed, and whose influence as afree-State senator and powerful Democratic leader alone made the repealpossible, had been his personal antagonist in Illinois politics foralmost twenty years. The other was moral, in that the new questioninvolved the elemental principles of the American government, thefundamental maxim of the Declaration of Independence, that all men arecreated equal. His intuitive logic needed no demonstration that bank, tariff, internal improvements, the Mexican War, and their relatedincidents, were questions of passing expediency; but that this suddenreaction, needlessly grafted upon a routine statute to organize a newterritory, was the unmistakable herald of a coming struggle which mighttransform republican institutions. 

It was in January, 1854, that the accidents of a Senate debate threwinto Congress and upon the country the firebrand of the repeal of theMissouri Compromise. The repeal was not consummated till the month ofMay; and from May until the autumn elections the flame of acrimoniousdiscussion ran over the whole country like a wild fire. There is norecord that Mr. Lincoln took any public part in the discussion until themonth of September, but it is very clear that he not only carefullywatched its progress, but that he studied its phases of development, itshistorical origins, and its legal bearings with close industry, andgathered from party literature and legislative documents a harvest ofsubstantial facts and data, rather than the wordy campaign phrases andexplosive epithets with which more impulsive students and speakers werecontent to produce their oratorical effects. Here we may again quoteMr. Lincoln's exact written statement of the manner in which he resumedhis political activity:

"In the autumn of that year [1854] he took the stump, with no broaderpractical aim or object than to secure, if possible, the reëlection ofHon. Richard Yates to Congress. His speeches at once attracted a moremarked attention than they had ever before done. As the canvassproceeded he was drawn to different parts of the State, outside of Mr. Yates's district. He did not abandon the law, but gave his attention byturns to that and politics. The State Agricultural Fair was atSpringfield that year, and Douglas was announced to speak there. "

The new question had created great excitement and uncertainty inIllinois politics, and there were abundant signs that it was beginningto break up the organization of both the Whig and the Democraticparties. This feeling brought together at the State fair an unusualnumber of local leaders from widely scattered counties, and almostspontaneously a sort of political tournament of speech-making broke out. In this Senator Douglas, doubly conspicuous by his championship of theNebraska Bill in Congress, was expected to play the leading part, whilethe opposition, by a common impulse, called upon Lincoln to answer him. Lincoln performed the task with such aptness and force, with suchfreshness of argument, illustrations from history, and citations fromauthorities, as secured him a decided oratorical triumph, and lifted himat a single bound to the leadership of the opposition to Douglas'spropagandism. Two weeks later, Douglas and Lincoln met at Peoria in asimilar debate, and on his return to Springfield Lincoln wrote out andprinted his speech in full. 

The reader who carefully examines this speech will at once be impressedwith the genius which immediately made Mr. Lincoln a power in Americanpolitics. His grasp of the subject is so comprehensive, his statement soclear, his reasoning so convincing, his language so strong and eloquentby turns, that the wonderful power he manifested in the discussions anddebates of the six succeeding years does not surpass, but only amplifiesthis, his first examination of the whole brood of questions relating toslavery precipitated upon the country by Douglas's repeal. After asearching history of the Missouri Compromise, he attacks thedemoralizing effects and portentous consequences of its repeal. 

"This declared indifference, " he says, "but, as I must think, covertreal zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate. I hate itbecause of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it becauseit deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world;enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt usas hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom to doubt oursincerity; and especially because it forces so many good men amongourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civilliberty, criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting thatthere is no right principle of action but self-interest. .. . Slavery isfounded in the selfishness of man's nature--opposition to it in his loveof justice. These principles are an eternal antagonism, and when broughtinto collision so fiercely as slavery extension brings them, shocks andthroes and convulsions must ceaselessly follow. Repeal the MissouriCompromise, repeal all compromises, repeal the Declaration ofIndependence, repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal humannature. It still will be the abundance of man's heart that slaveryextension is wrong, and out of the abundance of his heart his mouthwill continue to speak. "

With argument as impetuous, and logic as inexorable, he disposes ofDouglas's plea of popular sovereignty:

"Here, or at Washington, I would not trouble myself with the oyster lawsof Virginia, or the cranberry laws of Indiana. The doctrine ofself-government is right--absolutely and eternally right--but it has nojust application as here attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say, thatwhether it has such application depends upon whether a negro is not oris a man. If he is not a man, in that case, he who is a man may, as amatter of self-government, do just what he pleases with him. But if thenegro is a man, is it not to that extent a total destruction ofself-government to say that he too shall not govern himself? When thewhite man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governshimself and also governs another man, that is more thanself-government--that is despotism. .. . I particularly object to the newposition which the avowed principle of this Nebraska law gives toslavery in the body politic. I object to it because it assumes thatthere can be moral right in the enslaving of one man by another. Iobject to it as a dangerous dalliance for a free people--a sad evidencethat, feeling prosperity, we forget right; that liberty, as a principle, we have ceased to revere. .. . Little by little, but steadily as man'smarch to the grave, we have been giving up the old for the new faith. Near eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are createdequal; but now, from that beginning, we have run down to the otherdeclaration, that for some men to enslave others is a 'sacred right ofself-government. ' These principles cannot stand together. They are asopposite as God and Mammon. "

If one compares the serious tone of this speech with the hard cider andcoon-skin buncombe of the Harrison campaign of 1840, and its loftyphilosophical thought with the humorous declamation of the Taylorcampaign of 1848, the speaker's advance in mental development at oncebecomes apparent. In this single effort Mr. Lincoln had risen from theclass of the politician to the rank of the statesman. There is awell-founded tradition that Douglas, disconcerted and troubled byLincoln's unexpected manifestation of power in the Springfield andPeoria debates, sought a friendly interview with his opponent, andobtained from him an agreement that neither one of them would make anyfurther speeches before the election. 

The local interest in the campaign was greatly heightened by the factthat the term of Douglas's Democratic colleague in the United StatesSenate was about to expire, and that the State legislature to be electedwould have the choosing of his successor. It is not probable thatLincoln built much hope upon this coming political chance, as theDemocratic party had been throughout the whole history of the State indecided political control. It turned out, nevertheless, that in theelection held on November 7, an opposition majority of members of thelegislature was chosen, and Lincoln became, to outward appearances, themost available opposition candidate. But party disintegration had beenonly partial. Lincoln and his party friends still called themselvesWhigs, though they could muster only a minority of the total membershipof the legislature. The so-called Anti-Nebraska Democrats, opposingDouglas and his followers, were still too full of traditional partyprejudice to help elect a pronounced Whig to the United States Senate, though as strongly "Anti-Nebraska" as themselves. Five of them broughtforward, and stubbornly voted for, Lyman Trumbull, an Anti-NebraskaDemocrat of ability, who had been chosen representative in Congress fromthe eighth Illinois District in the recent election. On the ninth ballotit became evident to Lincoln that there was danger of a new Democraticcandidate, neutral on the Nebraska question, being chosen. In thiscontingency, he manifested a personal generosity and political sagacityfar above the comprehension of the ordinary smart politician. He advisedand prevailed upon his Whig supporters to vote for Trumbull, and thussecure a vote in the United States Senate against slavery extension. Hehad rightly interpreted both statesmanship and human nature. Hispersonal sacrifice on this occasion contributed essentially to thecoming political regeneration of his State; and the five Anti-NebraskaDemocrats, who then wrought his defeat, became his most devoted personalfollowers and efficient allies in his own later political triumph, whichadverse currents, however, were still to delay to a tantalizing degree. The circumstances of his defeat at that critical stage of his careermust have seemed especially irritating, yet he preserved a mostremarkable equanimity of temper. "I regret my defeat moderately, " hewrote to a sympathizing friend, "but I am not nervous about it. "

We may fairly infer that while Mr. Lincoln was not "nervous, " he wasnevertheless deeply impressed by the circumstance as an illustration ofthe grave nature of the pending political controversy. A letter writtenby him about half a year later to a friend in Kentucky, is full of suchserious reflection as to show that the existing political conditions inthe United States had engaged his most profound thought andinvestigation. 

"That spirit, " he wrote, "which desired the peaceful extinction ofslavery has itself become extinct with the occasion and the men of theRevolution. Under the impulse of that occasion, nearly half the Statesadopted systems of emancipation at once, and it is a significant factthat not a single State has done the like since. So far as peacefulvoluntary emancipation is concerned, the condition of the negro slave inAmerica, scarcely less terrible to the contemplation of a free mind, isnow as fixed and hopeless of change for the better as that of the lostsouls of the finally impenitent. The Autocrat of all the Russias willresign his crown and proclaim his subjects free republicans sooner thanwill our American masters voluntarily give up their slaves. Ourpolitical problem now is, 'Can we as a nation continue togetherpermanently--forever--half slave and half free?' The problem is toomighty for me--may God, in his mercy, superintend the solution. "

Not quite three years later Mr. Lincoln made the concluding problem ofthis letter the text of a famous speech. On the day before his firstinauguration as President of the United States, the "Autocrat of all theRussias, " Alexander II, by imperial decree emancipated his serfs; whilesix weeks after the inauguration the "American masters, " headed byJefferson Davis, began the greatest war of modern times to perpetuateand spread the institution of slavery. 

The excitement produced by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in1854, by the election forays of the Missouri Border Ruffians into Kansasin 1855, and by the succeeding civil strife in 1856 in that Territory, wrought an effective transformation of political parties in the Union, in preparation for the presidential election of that year. Thistransformation, though not seriously checked, was very considerablycomplicated by an entirely new faction, or rather by the sudden revivalof an old one, which in the past had called itself Native Americanism, and now assumed the name of the American Party, though it was morepopularly known by the nickname of "Know-Nothings, " because of itssecret organization. It professed a certain hostility to foreign-bornvoters and to the Catholic religion, and demanded a change in thenaturalization laws from a five years' to a twenty-one years'preliminary residence. This faction had gained some sporadic successesin Eastern cities, but when its national convention met in February, 1856, to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President, thepending slavery question, that it had hitherto studiously ignored, caused a disruption of its organization; and though the adheringdelegates nominated Millard Fillmore for President and A. J. Donelson forVice-President, who remained in the field and were voted for, to someextent, in the presidential election, the organization was present onlyas a crippled and disturbing factor, and disappeared totally frompolitics in the following years. 

Both North and South, party lines adjusted themselves defiantly upon thesingle issue, for or against men and measures representing the extensionor restriction of slavery. The Democratic party, though radicallychanging its constituent elements, retained the party name, and becamethe party of slavery extension, having forced the repeal and supportedthe resulting measures; while the Whig party entirely disappeared, itsmembers in the Northern States joining the Anti-Nebraska Democrats inthe formation of the new Republican party. Southern Whigs either wentboldly into the Democratic camp, or followed for a while the delusiveprospects of the Know-Nothings. 

This party change went on somewhat slowly in the State of Illinois, because that State extended in territorial length from the latitude ofMassachusetts to that of Virginia, and its population contained anequally diverse local sentiment. The northern counties had at oncebecome strongly Anti-Nebraska; the conservative Whig counties of thecenter inclined to the Know-Nothings; while the Kentuckians andCarolinians, who had settled the southern end, had strong antipathies towhat they called abolitionism, and applauded Douglas and repeal. 

The agitation, however, swept on, and further hesitation becameimpossible. Early in 1856 Mr. Lincoln began to take an active part inorganizing the Republican party. He attended a small gathering ofAnti-Nebraska editors in February, at Decatur, who issued a call for amass convention which met at Bloomington in May, at which the Republicanparty of Illinois was formally constituted by an enthusiastic gatheringof local leaders who had formerly been bitter antagonists, but who nowjoined their efforts to resist slavery extension. They formulated anemphatic but not radical platform, and through a committee selected acomposite ticket of candidates for State offices, which the conventionapproved by acclamation. The occasion remains memorable because of theclosing address made by Mr. Lincoln in one of his most impressiveoratorical moods. So completely were his auditors carried away by theforce of his denunciation of existing political evils, and by theeloquence of his appeal for harmony and union to redress them, thatneither a verbatim report nor even an authentic abstract was made duringits delivery: but the lifting inspiration of its periods will never fadefrom the memory of those who heard it. 

About three weeks later, the first national convention of the Republicanparty met at Philadelphia, and nominated John C. Frémont of Californiafor President. There was a certain fitness in this selection, from thefact that he had been elected to the United States Senate whenCalifornia applied for admission as a free State, and that theresistance of the South to her admission had been the entering wedge ofthe slavery agitation of 1850. This, however, was in reality a minorconsideration. It was rather his romantic fame as a daring RockyMountain explorer, appealing strongly to popular imagination andsympathy, which gave him prestige as a presidential candidate. 

It was at this point that the career of Abraham Lincoln had a narrow andfortunate escape from a premature and fatal prominence. The IllinoisBloomington convention had sent him as a delegate to the Philadelphiaconvention; and, no doubt very unexpectedly to himself, on the firstballot for a candidate for Vice-President he received one hundred andten votes against two hundred and fifty-nine votes for William L. Daytonof New Jersey, upon which the choice of Mr. Dayton was at once madeunanimous. But the incident proves that Mr. Lincoln was already gaininga national fame among the advanced leaders of political thought. Happily, a mysterious Providence reserved him for larger and nobleruses. 

The nominations thus made at Philadelphia completed the array for thepresidential battle of 1856. The Democratic national convention had metat Cincinnati on June 2, and nominated James Buchanan for President andJohn C. Breckinridge for Vice-President. Its work presented two pointsof noteworthy interest, namely: that the South, in an arrogantpro-slavery dictatorship, relentlessly cast aside the claims of Douglasand Pierce, who had effected the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, andnominated Buchanan, in apparently sure confidence of thatsuper-serviceable zeal in behalf of slavery which he so obedientlyrendered; also, that in a platform of intolerable length there was sucha cunning ambiguity of word and concealment of sense, such a doubledealing of phrase and meaning, as to render it possible that thepro-slavery Democrats of the South and some antislavery Democrats of theNorth might join for the last time to elect a "Northern man withSouthern principles. "

Again, in this campaign, as in several former presidential elections, Mr. Lincoln was placed upon the electoral ticket of Illinois, and hemade over fifty speeches in his own and adjoining States in behalf ofFrémont and Dayton. Not one of these speeches was reported in full, butthe few fragments which have been preserved show that he occupied nodoubtful ground on the pending issues. Already the Democrats wereraising the potent alarm cry that the Republican party was sectional, and that its success would dissolve the Union. Mr. Lincoln did not thendream that he would ever have to deal practically with such acontingency, but his mind was very clear as to the method of meeting it. Speaking for the Republican party, he said:

"But the Union in any event will not be dissolved. We don't want todissolve it, and if you attempt it, we won't let you. With the purse andsword, the army and navy and treasury, in our hands and at our command, you could not do it. This government would be very weak, indeed, if amajority, with a disciplined army and navy and a well-filled treasury, could not preserve itself when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined, unorganized minority. All this talk about the dissolution of the Unionis humbug, nothing but folly. We do not want to dissolve the Union; youshall not. "

While the Republican party was much cast down by the election ofBuchanan in November, the Democrats found significant cause forapprehension in the unexpected strength with which the Frémont tickethad been supported in the free States. Especially was this true inIllinois, where the adherents of Frémont and Fillmore had formed afusion, and thereby elected a Republican governor and State officers. One of the strong elements of Mr. Lincoln's leadership was the cheerfulhope he was always able to inspire in his followers, and his abidingfaith in the correct political instincts of popular majorities. Thistrait was happily exemplified in a speech he made at a Republicanbanquet in Chicago about a month after the presidential election. Recalling the pregnant fact that though Buchanan gained a majority ofthe electoral vote, he was in a minority of about four hundred thousandof the popular vote for President, Mr. Lincoln thus summed up thechances of Republican success in the future:

"Our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change publicopinion, can change the government, practically, just so much. Publicopinion on any subject always has a 'central idea, ' from which all itsminor thoughts radiate. That 'central idea' in our political publicopinion at the beginning was, and until recently has continued to be, 'the equality of men. ' And although it has always submitted patiently towhatever of inequality there seemed to be as matter of actual necessity, its constant working has been a steady progress towards the practicalequality of all men. The late presidential election was a struggle byone party to discard that central idea and to substitute for it theopposite idea that slavery is right in the abstract; the workings ofwhich as a central idea may be the perpetuity of human slavery and itsextension to all countries and colors. .. . All of us who did not vote forMr. Buchanan, taken together, are a majority of four hundred thousand. But in the late contest we were divided between Frémont and Fillmore. Can we not come together for the future? Let every one who reallybelieves, and is resolved, that free society is not and shall not be afailure, and who can conscientiously declare that in the past contest hehas done only what he thought best--let every such one have charity tobelieve that every other one can say as much. Thus let bygones bebygones; let past differences as nothing be; and with steady eye on thereal issue, let us reinaugurate the good old 'central ideas' of therepublic. We can do it. The human heart is with us; God is with us. Weshall again be able, not to declare that 'all States as States areequal, ' nor yet that 'all citizens as citizens are equal, ' but to renewthe broader, better declaration, including both these and much more, that 'all men are created equal. '"

VIII

Buchanan Elected President--The Dred Scott Decision--Douglas'sSpringfield Speech, 1857--Lincoln's Answering Speech--Criticism of DredScott Decision--Kansas Civil War--Buchanan Appoints Walker--Walker'sLetter on Kansas--The Lecompton Constitution--Revolt of Douglas

The election of 1856 once more restored the Democratic party to fullpolitical control in national affairs. James Buchanan was electedPresident to succeed Pierce; the Senate continued, as before, to have adecided Democratic majority; and a clear Democratic majority oftwenty-five was chosen to the House of Representatives to succeed theheavy opposition majority of the previous Congress. 

Though the new House did not organize till a year after it was elected, the certainty of its coming action was sufficient not only to restore, but greatly to accelerate the pro-slavery reaction begun by the repealof the Missouri Compromise. This impending drift of national policy nowreceived a powerful impetus by an act of the third coördinate branch, the judicial department of the government. 

Very unexpectedly to the public at large, the Supreme Court of theUnited States, a few days after Buchanan's inauguration, announced itsjudgment in what quickly became famous as the Dred Scott decision. DredScott, a negro slave in Missouri, sued for his freedom on the groundthat his master had taken him to reside in the State of Illinois andthe Territory of Wisconsin, where slavery was prohibited by law. Thequestion had been twice decided by Missouri courts, once for and thenagainst Dred Scott's claim; and now the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, after hearing the case twice elaborately argued by eminentcounsel, finally decided that Dred Scott, being a negro, could notbecome a citizen, and therefore was not entitled to bring suit. Thisbranch, under ordinary precedent, simply threw the case out of court;but in addition, the decision, proceeding with what lawyers call _obiterdictum_, went on to declare that under the Constitution of the UnitedStates neither Congress nor a territorial legislature possessed power toprohibit slavery in Federal Territories. 

The whole country immediately flared up with the agitation of theslavery question in this new form. The South defended the decision withheat, the North protested against it with indignation, and thecontroversy was greatly intensified by a phrase in the opinion of ChiefJustice Taney, that at the time of the Declaration of Independencenegroes were considered by general public opinion to be so far inferior"that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. "

This decision of the Supreme Court placed Senator Douglas in a curiousdilemma. While it served to indorse and fortify his course in repealingthe Missouri Compromise, it, on the other hand, totally negatived histheory by which he had sought to make the repeal palatable, that thepeople of a Territory, by the exercise of his great principle of popularsovereignty, could decide the slavery question for themselves. But, being a subtle sophist, he sought to maintain a show of consistency byan ingenious evasion. In the month of June following the decision, hemade a speech at Springfield, Illinois, in which he tentativelyannounced what in the next year became widely celebrated as his Freeportdoctrine, and was immediately denounced by his political confrères ofthe South as serious party heterodoxy. First lauding the Supreme Courtas "the highest judicial tribunal on earth, " and declaring that violentresistance to its decrees must be put down by the strong arm of thegovernment, he went on thus to define a master's right to his slave inKansas:

"While the right continues in full force under the guarantees of theConstitution, and cannot be divested or alienated by an act of Congress, it necessarily remains a barren and a worthless right unless sustained, protected, and enforced by appropriate police regulations and locallegislation prescribing adequate remedies for its violation. Theseregulations and remedies must necessarily depend entirely upon the willand wishes of the people of the Territory, as they can only beprescribed by the local legislatures. Hence, the great principle ofpopular sovereignty and self-government is sustained and firmlyestablished by the authority of this decision. "

Both the legal and political aspects of the new question immediatelyengaged the earnest attention of Mr. Lincoln; and his splendid power ofanalysis set its ominous portent in a strong light. He made a speech inreply to Douglas about two weeks after, subjecting the Dred Scottdecision to a searching and eloquent criticism. He said:

"That decision declares two propositions--first, that a negro cannot suein the United States courts; and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibitslavery in the Territories. It was made by a divided court--dividingdifferently on the different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss themerits of the decision, and in that respect I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis than he could onTaney. .. . We think the Dred Scott decision was erroneous. We know thecourt that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shalldo what we can to have it overrule this. We offer no resistance toit. .. . If this important decision had been made by the unanimousconcurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partizan bias, andin accordance with legal public expectation and with the steady practiceof the departments throughout our history and had been in no part basedon assumed historical facts which are not really true; or if, wanting insome of these, it had been before the court more than once, and hadthere been affirmed and reaffirmed through a course of years, it thenmight be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not toacquiesce in it as a precedent. But when, as is true, we find it wantingin all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, itis not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not havingyet quite established a settled doctrine for the country. .. . 

"The Chief Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes, as afact, that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable nowthan it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars the condition of that race has beenameliorated; but as a whole, in this country, the change between thenand now is decidedly the other way; and their ultimate destiny has neverappeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of thefive States--New Jersey and North Carolina--that then gave the freenegro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and inthe third--New York--it has been greatly abridged; while it has notbeen extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, thoughthe number of the States has more than doubled. In those days, as Iunderstand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate theirslaves; but since then such legal restraints have been made uponemancipation as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days, legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in theirrespective States, but now it is becoming quite fashionable for Stateconstitutions to withhold that power from the legislatures. In thosedays, by common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to thenew countries was prohibited, but now Congress decides that it will notcontinue the prohibition and the Supreme Court decides that it could notif it would. In those days, our Declaration of Independence was heldsacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making thebondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed and sneeredat and construed, and hawked at and torn, till, if its framers couldrise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it. All thepowers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him, ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day isfast joining the cry. They have him in his prison-house; they havesearched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One afteranother they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now theyhave him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which cannever be unlocked without the concurrence of every key--the keys in thehands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundreddifferent and distant places; and they stand musing as to whatinvention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced tomake the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is. "

There is not room to quote the many other equally forcible points in Mr. Lincoln's speech. Our narrative must proceed to other significant eventsin the great pro-slavery reaction. Thus far the Kansas experiment hadproduced nothing but agitation, strife, and bloodshed. First the stormin Congress over repeal; then a mad rush of emigration to occupy theTerritory. This was followed by the Border Ruffian invasions, in whichMissouri voters elected a bogus territorial legislature, and the boguslegislature enacted a code of bogus laws. In turn, the more rapidemigration from free States filled the Territory with a majority offree-State voters, who quickly organized a compact free-State party, which sent a free-State constitution, known as the Topeka Constitution, to Congress, and applied for admission. This movement proved barren, because the two houses of Congress were divided in sentiment. Meanwhile, President Pierce recognized the bogus laws, and issued proclamationsdeclaring the free-State movement illegal and insurrectionary; and thefree-State party had in its turn baffled the enforcement of the boguslaws, partly by concerted action of nonconformity and neglect, partly byopen defiance. The whole finally culminated in a chronic border warbetween Missouri raiders on one hand, and free-State guerrillas on theother; and it became necessary to send Federal troops to check thedisorder. These were instructed by Jefferson Davis, then Secretary ofWar, that "rebellion must be crushed. " The future Confederate Presidentlittle suspected the tremendous prophetic import of his order. The mostsignificant illustration of the underlying spirit of the struggle wasthat President Pierce had successively appointed three Democraticgovernors for the Territory, who, starting with pro-slavery bias, allbecame free-State partizans, and were successively insulted and drivenfrom the Territory by the pro-slavery faction when in manly protest theyrefused to carry out the behests of the Missouri conspiracy. After athree years' struggle neither faction had been successful, neither partywas satisfied; and the administration of Pierce bequeathed to itssuccessor the same old question embittered by rancor and defeat. 

President Buchanan began his administration with a boldly announcedpro-slavery policy. In his inaugural address he invoked the popularacceptance of the Dred Scott decision, which he already knew was coming;and a few months later declared in a public letter that slavery "existsin Kansas under the Constitution of the United States. .. . How it evercould have been seriously doubted is a mystery. " He chose for thegovernorship of Kansas, Robert J. Walker, a citizen of Mississippi ofnational fame and of pronounced pro-slavery views, who accepted hisdangerous mission only upon condition that a new constitution, to beformed for that State, must be honestly submitted to the real voters ofKansas for adoption or rejection. President Buchanan and his advisers, as well as Senator Douglas, accepted this condition repeatedly andemphatically. But when the new governor went to the Territory, he soonbecame convinced, and reported to his chief, that to make a slave Stateof Kansas was a delusive hope. "Indeed, " he wrote, "it is universallyadmitted here that the only real question is this: whether Kansas shallbe a conservative, constitutional, Democratic, and ultimately freeState, or whether it shall be a Republican and abolition State. "

As a compensation for the disappointment, however, he wrote later directto the President:

"But we must have a slave State out of the southwestern IndianTerritory, and then a calm will follow; Cuba be acquired with theacquiescence of the North; and your administration, having in realitysettled the slavery question, be regarded in all time to come as are-signing and re-sealing of the Constitution. .. . I shall be pleasedsoon to hear from you. Cuba! Cuba! (and Porto Rico, if possible) shouldbe the countersign of your administration, and it will close in a blazeof glory. "

And the governor was doubtless much gratified to receive the President'sunqualified indorsement in reply: "On the question of submitting theconstitution to the _bona fide_ resident settlers of Kansas, I amwilling to stand or fall. "

The sequel to this heroic posturing of the chief magistrate is one ofthe most humiliating chapters in American politics. Attendantcircumstances leave little doubt that a portion of Mr. Buchanan'scabinet, in secret league and correspondence with the pro-slaveryMissouri-Kansas cabal, aided and abetted the framing and adoption ofwhat is known to history as the Lecompton Constitution, an organicinstrument of a radical pro-slavery type; that its pretended submissionto popular vote was under phraseology, and in combination with suchgigantic electoral frauds and dictatorial procedure, as to render thewhole transaction a mockery of popular government; still worse, thatPresident Buchanan himself, proving too weak in insight and will todetect the intrigue or resist the influence of his malign counselors, abandoned his solemn pledges to Governor Walker, adopted the LecomptonConstitution as an administration measure, and recommended it toCongress in a special message, announcing dogmatically: "Kansas istherefore at this moment as much a slave State as Georgia or SouthCarolina. "

The radical pro-slavery attitude thus assumed by President Buchanan andSouthern leaders threw the Democratic party of the free States intoserious disarray, while upon Senator Douglas the blow fell with theforce of party treachery--almost of personal indignity. The Dred Scottdecision had rudely brushed aside his theory of popular sovereignty, andnow the Lecompton Constitution proceedings brutally trampled it down inpractice. The disaster overtook him, too, at a critical moment. Hissenatorial term was about to expire; the next Illinois legislature wouldelect his successor. The prospect was none too bright for him, for atthe late presidential election Illinois had chosen Republican Stateofficers. He was compelled either to break his pledges to the Democraticvoters of Illinois, or to lead a revolt against President Buchanan andthe Democratic leaders in Congress. Party disgrace at Washington, orpopular disgrace in Illinois, were the alternatives before him. To losehis reëlection to the Senate would almost certainly end his publiccareer. When, therefore, Congress met in December, 1857, Douglas boldlyattacked and denounced the Lecompton Constitution, even before thePresident had recommended it in his special message. 

"Stand by the doctrine, " he said, "that leaves the people perfectly freeto form and regulate their institutions for themselves, in their ownway, and your party will be united and irresistible in power. .. . IfKansas wants a slave-State constitution, she has a right to it; if shewants a free-State constitution, she has a right to it. It is none of mybusiness which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether itis voted down or voted up. Do you suppose, after the pledges of my honorthat I would go for that principle and leave the people to vote as theychoose, that I would now degrade myself by voting one way if theslavery clause be voted down, and another way if it be voted up? I carenot how that vote may stand. .. . Ignore Lecompton; ignore Topeka; treatboth those party movements as irregular and void; pass a fair bill--theone that we framed ourselves when we were acting as a unit; have a fairelection--and you will have peace in the Democratic party, and peacethroughout the country, in ninety days. The people want a fair vote. They will never be satisfied without it. .. . But if this constitution isto be forced down our throats in violation of the fundamental principleof free government, under a mode of submission that is a mockery andinsult, I will resist it to the last. "

Walker, the fourth Democratic governor who had now been sacrificed tothe interests of the Kansas pro-slavery cabal, also wrote a sharp letterof resignation denouncing the Lecompton fraud and policy; and such wasthe indignation aroused in the free States, that although the Senatepassed the Lecompton Bill, twenty-two Northern Democrats joining theirvote to that of the Republicans, the measure was defeated in the Houseof Representatives. The President and his Southern partizans bitterlyresented this defeat; and the schism between them, on the one hand, andDouglas and his adherents, on the other, became permanent andirreconcilable. 

IX

The Senatorial Contest in Illinois--"House Divided against Itself"Speech--The Lincoln-Douglas Debates--The Freeport Doctrine--DouglasDeposed from Chairmanship of Committee on Territories--Benjamin onDouglas--Lincoln's Popular Majority--Douglas Gains Legislature--Greeley, Crittenden, _et al. _--"The Fight Must Go On"--Douglas's SouthernSpeeches--Senator Brown's Questions--Lincoln's Warning against PopularSovereignty--The War of Pamphlets--Lincoln's Ohio Speeches--The JohnBrown Raid--Lincoln's Comment

The hostility of the Buchanan administration to Douglas for his part indefeating the Lecompton Constitution, and the multiplying chancesagainst him, served only to stimulate his followers in Illinois togreater efforts to secure his reëlection. Precisely the same elementsinspired the hope and increased the enthusiasm of the Republicans of theState to accomplish his defeat. For a candidate to oppose the "LittleGiant, " there could be no rival in the Republican ranks to AbrahamLincoln. He had in 1854 yielded his priority of claim to Trumbull; healone had successfully encountered Douglas in debate. The politicalevents themselves seemed to have selected and pitted these two championsagainst each other. Therefore, when the Illinois State convention onJune 16, 1858, passed by acclamation a separate resolution, "ThatAbraham Lincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans ofIllinois for the United States Senate as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas, " it only recorded the well-known judgment of the party. Afterits routine work was finished, the convention adjourned to meet again inthe hall of the State House at Springfield at eight o'clock in theevening. At that hour Mr. Lincoln appeared before the assembleddelegates and delivered a carefully studied speech, which has becomehistoric. After a few opening sentences, he uttered the followingsignificant prediction:

"'A house divided against itself cannot stand. ' I believe thisgovernment cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do notexpect the Union to be dissolved--I do not expect the house to fall--butI do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing orall the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the furtherspread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in thebelief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocateswill push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all theStates, old as well as new, North as well as South. "

Then followed his critical analysis of the legislative objects andconsequences of the Nebraska Bill, and the judicial effects anddoctrines of the Dred Scott decision, with their attendant and relatedincidents. The first of these had opened all the national territory toslavery. The second established the constitutional interpretation thatneither Congress nor a territorial legislature could exclude slaveryfrom any United States territory. The President had declared Kansas tobe already practically a slave State. Douglas had announced that he didnot care whether slavery was voted down or voted up. Adding to thesemany other indications of current politics, Mr. Lincoln proceeded:

"Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decisiondeclaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit aState to exclude slavery from its limits. .. . Such a decision is all thatslavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. .. . We shalllie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on theverge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. "

To avert this danger, Mr. Lincoln declared it was the duty ofRepublicans to overthrow both Douglas and the Buchanan politicaldynasty. 

"Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteenhundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse ofresistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance againstus. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements, we gathered fromthe four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under theconstant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did webrave all then to falter now?--now, when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall notfail--if we stand firm, we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerateor mistakes delay it, but, sooner or later, the victory is sure tocome. "

Lincoln's speech excited the greatest interest everywhere throughout thefree States. The grave peril he so clearly pointed out came home to thepeople of the North almost with the force of a revelation; andthereafter their eyes were fixed upon the Illinois senatorial campaignwith undivided attention. Another incident also drew to it the equalnotice and interest of the politicians of the slave States. 

Within a month from the date of Lincoln's speech, Douglas returned fromWashington and began his campaign of active speech-making in Illinois. The fame he had acquired as the champion of the Nebraska Bill, and, morerecently, the prominence into which his opposition to the Lecomptonfraud had lifted him in Congress, attracted immense crowds to hismeetings, and for a few days it seemed as if the mere contagion ofpopular enthusiasm would submerge all intelligent political discussion. To counteract this, Mr. Lincoln, at the advice of his leading friends, sent him a letter challenging him to joint public debate. Douglasaccepted the challenge, but with evident hesitation; and it was arrangedthat they should jointly address the same meetings at seven towns in theState, on dates extending through August, September, and October. Theterms were, that, alternately, one should speak an hour in opening, theother an hour and a half in reply, and the first again have half an hourin closing. This placed the contestants upon an equal footing beforetheir audiences. Douglas's senatorial prestige afforded him noadvantage. Face to face with the partizans of both, gathered in immensenumbers and alert with critical and jealous watchfulness, there was noevading the square, cold, rigid test of skill in argument and truth inprinciple. The processions and banners, the music and fireworks, of bothparties, were stilled and forgotten while the audience listened withhigh-strung nerves to the intellectual combat of three hours' duration. 

It would be impossible to give the scope and spirit of these famousdebates in the space allotted to these pages, but one of theturning-points in the oratorical contest needs particular mention. Northern Illinois, peopled mostly from free States, and southernIllinois, peopled mostly from slave States, were radically opposed insentiment on the slavery question; even the old Whigs of centralIllinois had to a large extent joined the Democratic party, because oftheir ineradicable prejudice against what they stigmatized as"abolitionism. " To take advantage of this prejudice, Douglas, in hisopening speech in the first debate at Ottawa in northern Illinois, propounded to Lincoln a series of questions designed to commit him tostrong antislavery doctrines. He wanted to know whether Mr. Lincolnstood pledged to the repeal of the fugitive-slave law; against theadmission of any more slave States; to the abolition of slavery in theDistrict of Columbia; to the prohibition of the slave trade betweendifferent States; to prohibit slavery in all the Territories; to opposethe acquisition of any new territory unless slavery were firstprohibited therein. 

In their second joint debate at Freeport, Lincoln answered that he waspledged to none of these propositions, except the prohibition of slaveryin all Territories of the United States. In turn he propounded fourquestions to Douglas, the second of which was:

"Can the people of a United States Territory in any lawful way, againstthe wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from itslimits prior to the formation of a State constitution?"

Mr. Lincoln had long and carefully studied the import and effect of thisinterrogatory, and nearly a month before, in a private letter, accurately foreshadowed Douglas's course upon it:

"You shall have hard work, " he wrote, "to get him directly to the pointwhether a territorial legislature has or has not the power to excludeslavery. But if you succeed in bringing him to it--though he will becompelled to say it possesses no such power--he will instantly takeground that slavery cannot actually exist in the Territories unless thepeople desire it and so give it protection by territorial legislation. If this offends the South, he will let it offend them, as at all eventshe means to hold on to his chances in Illinois. "

On the night before the Freeport debate the question had also beenconsidered in a hurried caucus of Lincoln's party friends. They alladvised against propounding it, saying, "If you do, you can never besenator. " "Gentlemen, " replied Lincoln, "I am killing larger game; ifDouglas answers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 isworth a hundred of this. "

As Lincoln had predicted, Douglas had no resource but to repeat thesophism he had hastily invented in his Springfield speech of theprevious year. 

"It matters not, " replied he, "what way the Supreme Court may hereafterdecide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not gointo a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawfulmeans to introduce it or exclude it, as they please, for the reason thatslavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere unless it is supported bylocal police regulations. Those police regulations can only beestablished by the local legislature, and if the people are opposed toslavery they will elect representatives to that body who will byunfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it intotheir midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislationwill favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of theSupreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of thepeople to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect andcomplete under the Nebraska Bill. "

In the course of the next joint debate at Jonesboro', Mr. Lincoln easilydisposed of this sophism by showing: 1. That, practically, slavery hadworked its way into Territories without "police regulations" in almostevery instance; 2. That United States courts were established to protectand enforce rights under the Constitution; 3. That members of aterritorial legislature could not violate their oath to support theConstitution of the United States; and, 4. That in default oflegislative support, Congress would be bound to supply it for any rightunder the Constitution. 

The serious aspect of the matter, however, to Douglas was not thecriticism of the Republicans, but the view taken by Southern Democraticleaders, of his "Freeport doctrine, " or doctrine of "unfriendlylegislation. " His opposition to the Lecompton Constitution in theSenate, grievous stumbling-block to their schemes as it had proved, might yet be passed over as a reckless breach of party discipline; butthis new announcement at Freeport was unpardonable doctrinal heresy, asrank as the abolitionism of Giddings and Lovejoy. 

The Freeport joint debate took place August 27, 1858. When Congressconvened on the first Monday in December of the same year, one of thefirst acts of the Democratic senators was to put him under party ban byremoving him from the chairmanship of the Committee on Territories, aposition he had held for eleven years. In due time, also, the Southernleaders broke up the Charleston convention rather than permit him to benominated for President; and, three weeks later, Senator Benjamin ofLouisiana frankly set forth, in a Senate speech, the light in which theyviewed his apostacy:

"We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon apoint upon which we were at issue, that it should be considered ajudicial point; that he would abide the decision; that he would actunder the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that havingsaid that to us here in the Senate, he went home, and, under the stressof a local election, his knees gave way; his whole person trembled. Hisadversary stood upon principle and was beaten; and, lo! he is thecandidate of a mighty party for the presidency of the United States. Thesenator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for which he faltered;but, lo! the grand prize of his ambition to-day slips from his grasp, because of his faltering in his former contest, and his success in thecanvass for the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him theloss of the presidency of the United States. "

In addition to the seven joint debates, both Lincoln and Douglas madespeeches at separate meetings of their own during almost every day ofthe three months' campaign, and sometimes two or three speeches a day. At the election which was held on November 2, 1858, a legislature waschosen containing fifty-four Democrats and forty-six Republicans, notwithstanding the fact that the Republicans had a plurality ofthirty-eight hundred and twenty-one on the popular vote. But theapportionment was based on the census of 1850, and did not reflectrecent changes in political sentiment, which, if fairly represented, would have given them an increased strength of from six to ten membersin the legislature. Another circumstance had great influence in causingLincoln's defeat. Douglas's opposition to the Lecompton Constitution inCongress had won him great sympathy among a few Republican leaders inthe Eastern States. It was even whispered that Seward wished Douglas tosucceed as a strong rebuke to the Buchanan administration. The mostpotent expression and influence of this feeling came, however, fromanother quarter. Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, who, since Clay's deathin 1852, was the acknowledged leader of what remained of the Whig party, wrote a letter during the campaign, openly advocating the reëlection ofDouglas, and this, doubtless, influenced the vote of all the IllinoisWhigs who had not yet formally joined the Republican party. Lincoln'sown analysis gives, perhaps, the clearest view of the unusual politicalconditions:

"Douglas had three or four very distinguished men of the most extremeantislavery views of any men in the Republican party expressing theirdesire for his reëlection to the Senate last year. That would of itselfhave seemed to be a little wonderful, but that wonder is heightened whenwe see that Wise of Virginia, a man exactly opposed to them, a man whobelieves in the divine right of slavery, was also expressing his desirethat Douglas should be reëlected; that another man that may be said tobe kindred to Wise, Mr. Breckinridge, the Vice-President, and of yourown State, was also agreeing with the antislavery men in the North thatDouglas ought to be reëlected. Still to heighten the wonder, a senatorfrom Kentucky, whom I have always loved with an affection as tender andendearing as I have ever loved any man, who was opposed to theantislavery men for reasons which seemed sufficient to him, and equallyopposed to Wise and Breckinridge, was writing letters to Illinois tosecure the reëlection of Douglas. Now that all these conflictingelements should be brought, while at daggers' points with one another, to support him, is a feat that is worthy for you to note and consider. It is quite probable that each of these classes of men thought by thereëlection of Douglas their peculiar views would gain something; it isprobable that the antislavery men thought their views would gainsomething that Wise and Breckinridge thought so too, as regards theiropinions; that Mr. Crittenden thought that his views would gainsomething, although he was opposed to both these other men. It isprobable that each and all of them thought they were using Douglas, andit is yet an unsolved problem whether he was not using them all. "

Lincoln, though beaten in his race for the Senate, was by no meansdismayed, nor did he lose his faith in the ultimate triumph of the causehe had so ably championed. Writing to a friend, he said:

"You doubtless have seen ere this the result of the election here. Ofcourse I wished, but I did not much expect a better result. .. . I am gladI made the late race. It gave me a hearing on the great and durablequestion of the age, which I could have had in no other way; and thoughI now sink out of view, and shall be forgotten, I believe I have madesome marks which will tell for the cause of civil liberty long after Iam gone. "

And to another:

"Yours of the 13th was received some days ago. The fight must go on. Thecause of civil liberty must not be surrendered at the end of one or evenone hundred defeats. Douglas had the ingenuity to be supported in thelate contest, both as the best means to break down and to uphold theslave interest. No ingenuity can keep these antagonistic elements inharmony long. Another explosion will soon come. "

In his "House divided against itself" speech, Lincoln had emphaticallycautioned Republicans not to be led on a false trail by the oppositionDouglas had made to the Lecompton Constitution; that his temporaryquarrel with the Buchanan administration could not be relied upon tohelp overthrow that pro-slavery dynasty. 

"How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything aboutit. His avowed mission is impressing the 'public heart' to care nothingabout it. .. . Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principleso that our great cause may have assistance from his great ability, Ihope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But, clearly, he isnot now with us--he does not pretend to be--he does not promise ever tobe. Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its ownundoubted friends--those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in thework, who do care for the result. "

Since the result of the Illinois senatorial campaign had assured thereëlection of Douglas to the Senate, Lincoln's sage advice acquired adouble significance and value. Almost immediately after the close of thecampaign Douglas took a trip through the Southern States, and inspeeches made by him at Memphis, at New Orleans, and at Baltimore soughtto regain the confidence of Southern politicians by taking decidedlyadvanced ground toward Southern views on the slavery question. On thesugar plantations of Louisiana he said, it was not a question betweenthe white man and the negro, but between the negro and the crocodile. Hewould say that between the negro and the crocodile, he took the side ofthe negro; but between the negro and the white man, he would go for thewhite man. The Almighty had drawn a line on this continent, on the oneside of which the soil must be cultivated by slave labor? on the other, by white labor. That line did not run on 36° and 30' [the MissouriCompromise line], for 36° and 30' runs over mountains and throughvalleys. But this slave line, he said, meanders in the sugar-fields andplantations of the South, and the people living in their differentlocalities and in the Territories must determine for themselves whethertheir "middle belt" were best adapted to slavery or free labor. Headvocated the eventual annexation of Cuba and Central America. Stillgoing a step further, he laid down a far-reaching principle. 

"It is a law of humanity, " he said, "a law of civilization that whenevera man or a race of men show themselves incapable of managing their ownaffairs, they must consent to be governed by those who are capable ofperforming the duty. .. . In accordance with this principle, I assert thatthe negro race, under all circumstances, at all times, and in allcountries, has shown itself incapable of self-government. "

This pro-slavery coquetting, however, availed him nothing, as he felthimself obliged in the same speeches to defend his Freeport doctrine. Having taken his seat in Congress, Senator Brown of Mississippi, towardthe close of the short session, catechized him sharply on this point. 

"If the territorial legislature refuses to act, " he inquired "will youact? If it pass unfriendly acts, will you pass friendly? If it pass lawshostile to slavery, will you annul them, and substitute laws favoringslavery in their stead?"

There was no evading these direct questions, and Douglas answeredfrankly:

"I tell you, gentlemen of the South, in all candor, I do not believe aDemocratic candidate can ever carry any one Democratic State of theNorth on the platform that it is the duty of the Federal government toforce the people of a Territory to have slavery when they do not wantit. "

An extended discussion between Northern and Southern Democraticsenators followed the colloquy, which showed that the Freeport doctrinehad opened up an irreparable schism between the Northern and Southernwings of the Democratic party. 

In all the speeches made by Douglas during his Southern tour, hecontinually referred to Mr. Lincoln as the champion of abolitionism, andto his doctrines as the platform of the abolition or Republican party. The practical effect of this course was to extend and prolong theIllinois senatorial campaign of 1858, to expand it to national breadth, and gradually to merge it in the coming presidential campaign. Theeffect of this was not only to keep before the public the position ofLincoln as the Republican champion of Illinois, but also gradually tolift him into general recognition as a national leader. Throughout theyear 1859 politicians and newspapers came to look upon Lincoln as theone antagonist who could at all times be relied on to answer and refutethe Douglas arguments. His propositions were so forcible and direct, hisphraseology so apt and fresh, that they held the attention and excitedcomment. A letter written by him in answer to an invitation to attend acelebration of Jefferson's birthday in Boston, contains some notablepassages:

"Soberly, it is now no child's play to save the principles of Jeffersonfrom total overthrow in this nation. One would state with greatconfidence that he could convince any sane child that the simplerpropositions of Euclid are true; but, nevertheless, he would fail, utterly, with one who should deny the definitions and axioms. Theprinciples of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society. And yet they are denied and evaded with no small show of success. Onedashingly calls them 'glittering generalities. ' Another bluntly callsthem 'self-evident lies. ' And others insidiously argue that they applyto 'superior races. ' These expressions, differing in form, are identicalin object and effect--the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. They woulddelight a convocation of crowned heads plotting against the people. Theyare the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We mustrepulse them, or they will subjugate us. This is a world ofcompensation; and he who would be no slave must consent to have noslave. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and, under a just God, cannot long retain it. "

Douglas's quarrel with the Buchanan administration had led manyRepublicans to hope that they might be able to utilize his name and histheory of popular sovereignty to aid them in their local campaigns. Lincoln knew from his recent experience the peril of this delusive partystrategy, and was constant and earnest in his warnings against adoptingit. In a little speech after the Chicago municipal election on March 1, 1859, he said:

"If we, the Republicans of this State, had made Judge Douglas ourcandidate for the Senate of the United States last year, and had electedhim, there would to-day be no Republican party in this Union. .. . Let theRepublican party of Illinois dally with Judge Douglas, let them fall inbehind him and make him their candidate, and they do not absorb him--heabsorbs them. They would come out at the end all Douglas men, allclaimed by him as having indorsed every one of his doctrines upon thegreat subject with which the whole nation is engaged at this hour--thatthe question of negro slavery is simply a question of dollars andcents? that the Almighty has drawn a line across the continent, on oneside of which labor--the cultivation of the soil--must always beperformed by slaves. It would be claimed that we, like him, do not carewhether slavery is voted up or voted down. Had we made him our candidateand given him a great majority, we should never have heard an end ofdeclarations by him that we had indorsed all these dogmas. "

To a Kansas friend he wrote on May 14, 1859:

"You will probably adopt resolutions in the nature of a platform. Ithink the only temptation will be to lower the Republican standard inorder to gather recruits In my judgment, such a step would be a seriousmistake, and open a gap through which more would pass out than pass in. And this would be the same whether the letting down should be indeference to Douglasism, or to the Southern opposition element; eitherwould surrender the object of the Republican organization--thepreventing of the spread and nationalization of slavery. .. . Let a unionbe attempted on the basis of ignoring the slavery question, andmagnifying other questions which the people are just now not caringabout, and it will result in gaining no single electoral vote in theSouth, and losing every one in the North. "

To Schuyler Colfax (afterward Vice-President) he said in a letter datedJuly 6, 1859:

"My main object in such conversation would be to hedge against divisionsin the Republican ranks generally and particularly for the contest of1860. The point of danger is the temptation in different localities to'platform' for something which will be popular just there, but which, nevertheless, will be a firebrand elsewhere and especially in a nationalconvention. As instances: the movement against foreigners inMassachusetts; in New Hampshire, to make obedience to thefugitive-slave law punishable as a crime; in Ohio, to repeal thefugitive-slave law; and squatter sovereignty, in Kansas. In these thingsthere is explosive matter enough to blow up half a dozen nationalconventions, if it gets into them; and what gets very rife outside ofconventions is very likely to find its way into them. "

And again, to another warm friend in Columbus, Ohio, he wrote in aletter dated July 28, 1859:

"There is another thing our friends are doing which gives me someuneasiness. It is their leaning toward 'popular sovereignty. ' There arethree substantial objections to this. First, no party can commandrespect which sustains this year what it opposed last. Secondly Douglas(who is the most dangerous enemy of liberty, because the most insidiousone) would have little support in the North, and, by consequence, nocapital to trade on in the South, if it were not for his friends thusmagnifying him and his humbug. But lastly, and chiefly, Douglas'spopular sovereignty, accepted by the public mind as a just principle, nationalizes slavery, and revives the African slave-trade inevitably. Taking slaves into new Territories, and buying slaves in Africa, areidentical things, identical rights or identical wrongs, and the argumentwhich establishes one will establish the other. Try a thousand years fora sound reason why Congress shall not hinder the people of Kansas fromhaving slaves, and when you have found it, it will be an equally goodone why Congress should not hinder the people of Georgia from importingslaves from Africa. "

An important election occurred in the State of Ohio in the autumn of1859, and during the canvass Douglas made two speeches in which, asusual, his pointed attacks were directed against Lincoln by name. Quitenaturally, the Ohio Republicans called Lincoln to answer him, and themarked impression created by Lincoln's replies showed itself not alonein their unprecedented circulation in print in newspapers and pamphlets, but also in the decided success which the Ohio Republicans gained at thepolls. About the same time, also, Douglas printed a long political essayin "Harper's Magazine, " using as a text quotations from Lincoln's "Housedivided against itself" speech, and Seward's Rochester speech definingthe "irrepressible conflict. " Attorney-General Black of PresidentBuchanan's cabinet here entered the lists with an anonymously printedpamphlet in pungent criticism of Douglas's "Harper" essay; which againwas followed by reply and rejoinder on both sides. 

Into this field of overheated political controversy the news of the JohnBrown raid at Harper's Ferry on Sunday, October 19, fell with startlingportent. The scattering and tragic fighting in the streets of the littletown on Monday; the dramatic capture of the fanatical leader on Tuesdayby a detachment of Federal marines under the command of Robert E. Lee, the famous Confederate general of subsequent years; the undignifiedhaste of his trial and condemnation by the Virginia authorities; theinterviews of Governor Wise, Senator Mason, and RepresentativeVallandigham with the prisoner; his sentence, and execution on thegallows on December 2; and the hysterical laudations of his acts by afew prominent and extreme abolitionists in the East, kept publicopinion, both North and South, in an inflamed and feverish state fornearly six weeks. 

Mr. Lincoln's habitual freedom from passion, and the steady andcommon-sense judgment he applied to this exciting event, which threwalmost everybody into an extreme of feeling or utterance, are wellillustrated by the temperate criticism he made of it a few months later:

"John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. Itwas an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in whichthe slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that theslaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could notsucceed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the manyattempts, related in history, at the assassination of kings andemperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till hefancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures theattempt, which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini'sattempt on Louis Napoleon and John Brown's attempt at Harper's Ferrywere, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to castblame on old England in the one case, and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things. "

X

Lincoln's Kansas Speeches--The Cooper Institute Speech--New EnglandSpeeches--The Democratic Schism--Senator Brown's Resolutions--JeffersonDavis's Resolutions--The Charleston Convention--Majority and MinorityReports--Cotton State Delegations Secede--Charleston ConventionAdjourns--Democratic Baltimore Convention Splits--BreckinridgeNominated--Douglas Nominated--Bell Nominated by Union ConstitutionalConvention--Chicago Convention--Lincoln's Letters to Pickett andJudd--The Pivotal States--Lincoln Nominated

During the month of December, 1859, Mr. Lincoln was invited to theTerritory of Kansas, where he made speeches at a number of its new andgrowing towns. In these speeches he laid special emphasis upon thenecessity of maintaining undiminished the vigor of the Republicanorganization and the high plane of the Republican doctrine. 

"We want, and must have, " said he, "a national policy as to slaverywhich deals with it as being a wrong. Whoever would prevent slaverybecoming national and perpetual yields all when he yields to a policywhich treats it either as being right, or as being a matter ofindifference. " "To effect our main object we have to employ auxiliarymeans. We must hold conventions, adopt platforms, select candidates, andcarry elections. At every step we must be true to the main purpose. Ifwe adopt a platform falling short of our principle, or elect a manrejecting our principle, we not only take nothing affirmative by oursuccess, but we draw upon us the positive embarrassment of seemingourselves to have abandoned our principle. "

A still more important service, however, in giving the Republicanpresidential campaign of 1860 precise form and issue was rendered by himduring the first three months of the new year. The public mind hadbecome so preoccupied with the dominant subject of national politics, that a committee of enthusiastic young Republicans of New York andBrooklyn arranged a course of public lectures by prominent statesmen andMr. Lincoln was invited to deliver the third one of the series. Themeeting took place in the hall of the Cooper Institute in New York, onthe evening of February 27, 1860; and the audience was made up of ladiesand gentlemen comprising the leading representatives of the wealth, culture, and influence of the great metropolis. 

Mr. Lincoln's name and arguments had filled so large a space in Easternnewspapers, both friendly and hostile, that the listeners before himwere intensely curious to see and hear this rising Western politician. The West was even at that late day but imperfectly understood by theEast. The poets and editors, the bankers and merchants of New Yorkvaguely remembered having read in their books that it was the home ofDaniel Boone and Davy Crockett, the country of bowie-knives and pistols, of steamboat explosions and mobs, of wild speculation and therepudiation of State debts; and these half-forgotten impressions hadlately been vividly recalled by a several years' succession of newspaperreports retailing the incidents of Border Ruffian violence andfree-State guerrilla reprisals during the civil war in Kansas. What wasto be the type, the character, the language of this speaker? How wouldhe impress the great editor Horace Greeley, who sat among the invitedguests? David Dudley Field, the great lawyer, who escorted him to theplatform; William Cullen Bryant, the great poet, who presided over themeeting?

Judging from after effects, the audience quickly forgot thesequestioning thoughts. They had but time to note Mr. Lincoln's impressivestature, his strongly marked features, the clear ring of his ratherhigh-pitched voice, and the almost commanding earnestness of his manner. His beginning foreshadowed a dry argument using as a text Douglas'sphrase that "our fathers, when they framed the government under which welive, understood this question just as well and even better than we donow, " But the concise statements, the strong links of reasoning, and theirresistible conclusions of the argument with which the speaker followedhis close historical analysis of how "our fathers" understood "thisquestion, " held every listener as though each were individually mergedin the speaker's thought and demonstration. 

"It is surely safe to assume, " said he, with emphasis, "that thethirty-nine framers of the original Constitution and the seventy-sixmembers of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, takentogether, do certainly include those who may be fairly called 'ourfathers who framed the government under which we live. ' And, soassuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his wholelife, declared that, in his understanding, any proper division of localfrom Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade theFederal government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. "

With equal skill he next dissected the complaints, the demands, and thethreats to dissolve the Union made by the Southern States, pointed outtheir emptiness, their fallacy, and their injustice, and defined theexact point and center of the agitation. 

"Holding, as they do, " said he, "that slavery is morally right andsocially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full nationalrecognition of it, as a legal right and a social blessing. Nor can wejustifiably withhold this on any ground, save our conviction thatslavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, andconstitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silencedand swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to itsnationality--its universality! If it is wrong, they cannot justly insistupon its extension--its enlargement. All they ask we could readilygrant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readilygrant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right, and ourthinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon which depends the wholecontroversy. .. . Wrong as we think slavery is we can yet afford to let italone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arisingfrom its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes willprevent it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and tooverrun us here in the free States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us bediverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are soindustriously plied and belabored, contrivances such as groping for somemiddle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for aman who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a policyof 'don't care, ' on a question about which all true men do care; such asUnion appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to disunionists;reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but therighteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploringmen to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did. Neitherlet us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, norfrightened from it by menaces of destruction to the government nor ofdungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and inthat faith let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it. "

The close attention bestowed on its delivery, the hearty applause thatgreeted its telling points, and the enthusiastic comments of theRepublican journals next morning showed that Lincoln's Cooper Institutespeech had taken New York by storm. It was printed in full in four ofthe leading New York dailies, and at once went into large circulation incarefully edited pamphlet editions. From New York, Lincoln made a tourof speech-making through several of the New England States, and waseverywhere received with enthusiastic welcome and listened to with aneagerness that bore a marked result in their spring elections. Theinterest of the factory men who listened to these addresses was equaled, perhaps excelled, by the gratified surprise of college professors whenthey heard the style and method of a popular Western orator that wouldbear the test of their professional criticism and compare with the bestexamples in their standard text-books. 

The attitude of the Democratic party in the coming presidential campaignwas now also rapidly taking shape. Great curiosity existed whether theradical differences between its Northern and Southern wings could by anypossibility be removed or adjusted, whether the adherents of Douglas andthose of Buchanan could be brought to join in a common platform and inthe support of a single candidate. The Democratic leaders in theSouthern States had become more and more out-spoken in their pro-slaverydemands. They had advanced step by step from the repeal of the MissouriCompromise in 1854, the attempt to capture Kansas by Missouri invasionsin 1855 and 1856, the support of the Dred Scott decision and theLecompton fraud in 1857, the repudiation of Douglas's Freeport heresy in1858, to the demand for a congressional slave code for the Territoriesand the recognition of the doctrine of property in slaves. These lasttwo points they had distinctly formulated in the first session of theThirty-sixth Congress. On January 18, 1860, Senator Brown of Mississippiintroduced into the Senate two resolutions, one asserting thenationality of slavery, the other that, when necessary, Congress shouldpass laws for its protection in the Territories. On February 2 JeffersonDavis introduced another series of resolutions intended to serve as abasis for the national Democratic platform, the central points of whichwere that the right to take and hold slaves in the Territories couldneither be impaired nor annulled, and that it was the duty of Congressto supply any deficiency of laws for its protection. Perhaps even moresignificant than these formulated doctrines was the pro-slavery spiritmanifested in the congressional debates. Two months were wasted in aparliamentary struggle to prevent the election of the Republican, JohnSherman, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, because theSouthern members charged that he had recommended an "abolition" book;during which time the most sensational and violent threats of disunionwere made in both the House and the Senate, containing repeateddeclarations that they would never submit to the inauguration of a"Black Republican" President. 

When the national Democratic convention met at Charleston, on April 23, 1860, there at once became evident the singular condition that thedelegates from the free States were united and enthusiastic in theirdetermination to secure the nomination of Douglas as the Democraticcandidate for President, while the delegates from the slave States wereequally united and determined upon forcing the acceptance of an extremepro-slavery platform. All expectations of a compromise, all hope ofcoming to an understanding by juggling omissions or evasions in theirdeclaration of party principles were quickly dissipated. The platformcommittee, after three days and nights of fruitless effort, presentedtwo antagonistic reports. The majority report declared that neitherCongress nor a territorial legislature could abolish or prohibit slaveryin the Territories, and that it was the duty of the Federal governmentto protect it when necessary. To this doctrine the Northern memberscould not consent; but they were willing to adopt the ambiguousdeclaration that property rights in slaves were judicial in theircharacter, and that they would abide the decisions of the Supreme Courton such questions. 

The usual expedient of recommitting both reports brought no relief fromthe deadlock. A second majority and a second minority report exhibitedthe same irreconcilable divergence in slightly different language, andthe words of mutual defiance exchanged in debating the first report roseto a parliamentary storm when the second came under discussion. On theseventh day the convention came to a vote, and, the Northern delegatesbeing in the majority, the minority report was substituted for that ofthe majority of the committee by one hundred and sixty-five to onehundred and thirty-eight delegates--in other words, the Douglasplatform was declared adopted. Upon this the delegates of the cottonStates--Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas--withdrew from the convention. It soon appeared, however, that the Douglas delegates had achieved only a barren victory. Theirmajority could indeed adopt a platform, but, under the acknowledgedtwo-thirds rule which governs Democratic national conventions, they hadnot sufficient votes to nominate their candidate. During the fifty-sevenballots taken, the Douglas men could muster only one hundred andfifty-two and one half votes of the two hundred and two necessary to achoice; and to prevent mere slow disintegration the convention adjournedon the tenth day, under a resolution to reassemble in Baltimore on June18. 

Nothing was gained, however, by the delay. In the interim, JeffersonDavis and nineteen other Southern leaders published an addresscommending the withdrawal of the cotton States delegates, and in aSenate debate Davis laid down the plain proposition, "We want nothingmore than a simple declaration that negro slaves are property, and wewant the recognition of the obligation of the Federal government toprotect that property like all other. "

Upon the reassembling of the Charleston convention at Baltimore, itunderwent a second disruption on the fifth day; the Northern wingnominated Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, and the Southern wing John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky as their respective candidates for President. In the meanwhile, also, regular and irregular delegates from sometwenty-two States, representing fragments of the old Whig party, hadconvened at Baltimore on May 9 and nominated John Bell of Tennessee astheir candidate for President, upon a platform ignoring the slaveryissue and declaring that they would "recognize no other politicalprinciple than the Constitution of the country, the union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws. "

In the long contest between slavery extension and slavery restrictionwhich was now approaching its culmination the growing demands andincreasing bitterness of the pro-slavery party had served in an equaldegree to intensify the feelings and stimulate the efforts of theRepublican party; and, remembering the encouraging opposition strengthwhich the united vote of Frémont and Fillmore had shown in 1856, theyfelt encouraged to hope for possible success in 1860, since the Fillmoreparty had practically disappeared throughout the free States. When, therefore, the Charleston convention was rent asunder and adjourned onMay 10 without making a nomination, the possibility of Republicanvictory seemed to have risen to probability. Such a feeling inspired theeager enthusiasm of the delegates to the Republican national conventionwhich met, according to appointment, at Chicago on May 16. 

A large, temporary wooden building, christened "The Wigwam, " had beenerected in which to hold its sessions, and it was estimated that tenthousand persons were assembled in it to witness the proceedings. William H. Seward of New York was recognized as the leading candidate, but Chase of Ohio, Cameron of Pennsylvania, Bates of Missouri, andseveral prominent Republicans from other States were known to haveactive and zealous followers. The name of Abraham Lincoln had also oftenbeen mentioned during his growing fame, and, fully a year before, anardent Republican editor of Illinois had requested permission toannounce him in his newspaper. Lincoln, however, discouraged suchaction at that time, answering him:

"As to the other matter you kindly mention, I must in candor say I donot think myself fit for the presidency. I certainly am flattered andgratified that some partial friends think of me in that connection; butI really think it best for our cause that no concerted effort, such asyou suggest, should be made. "

He had given an equally positive answer to an eager Ohio friend in thepreceding July; but about Christmas 1859, an influential caucus of hisstrongest Illinois adherents made a personal request that he wouldpermit them to use his name, and he gave his consent, not so much in anyhope of becoming the nominee for President, as in possibly reaching thesecond place on the ticket; or at least of making such a showing ofstrength before the convention as would aid him in his future senatorialambition at home, or perhaps carry him into the cabinet of theRepublican President, should one succeed. He had not been eager to enterthe lists, but once having agreed to do so, it was but natural that heshould manifest a becoming interest, subject, however, now as always, tohis inflexible rule of fair dealing and honorable faith to all his partyfriends. 

"I do not understand Trumbull and myself to be rivals, " he wroteDecember 9, 1859. "You know I am pledged not to enter a struggle withhim for the seat in the Senate now occupied by him; and yet I wouldrather have a full term in the Senate than in the presidency. "

And on February 9 he wrote to the same Illinois friend:

"I am not in a position where it would hurt much for me not to benominated on the national ticket; but I am where it would hurt some forme not to get the Illinois delegates. What I expected when I wrote thethe letter to Messrs. Dole and others is now happening. Your discomfitedassailants are most bitter against me; and they will, for revenge uponme, lay to the Bates egg in the South, and to the Seward egg in theNorth, and go far toward squeezing me out in the middle with nothing. Can you not help me a little in this matter in your end of thevineyard?"

It turned out that the delegates whom the Illinois State convention sentto the national convention at Chicago were men not only of exceptionalstanding and ability, but filled with the warmest zeal for Mr. Lincoln'ssuccess; and they were able at once to impress upon delegates from otherStates his sterling personal worth and fitness, and his superioravailability. It needed but little political arithmetic to work out thesum of existing political chances. It was almost self-evident that inthe coming November election victory or defeat would hang upon theresult in the four pivotal States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. It was quite certain that no Republican candidate couldcarry a single one of the fifteen slave States; and equally sure thatBreckinridge, on his extreme pro-slavery platform, could not carry asingle one of the eighteen free States. But there was a chance that oneor more of these four pivotal free States might cast its vote forDouglas and popular sovereignty. 

A candidate was needed, therefore, who could successfully cope withDouglas and the Douglas theory; and this ability had been convincinglydemonstrated by Lincoln. As a mere personal choice, a majority of theconvention would have preferred Seward; but in the four pivotal Statesthere were many voters who believed Seward's antislavery views to betoo radical. They shrank apprehensively from the phrase in one of hisspeeches that "there is a higher law than the Constitution. " Thesepivotal States all lay adjoining slave States, and their public opinionwas infected with something of the undefined dread of "abolitionism. "When the delegates of the pivotal States were interviewed, they franklyconfessed that they could not carry their States for Seward, and thatwould mean certain defeat if he were the nominee for President. Fortheir voters Lincoln stood on more acceptable ground. His speeches hadbeen more conservative; his local influence in his own State of Illinoiswas also a factor not to be idly thrown away. 

Plain, practical reasoning of this character found ready acceptanceamong the delegates to the convention. Their eagerness for the successof the cause largely overbalanced their personal preferences forfavorite aspirants. When the convention met, the fresh, heartyhopefulness of its members was a most inspiring reflection of the publicopinion in the States that sent them. They went at their work with anearnestness which was an encouraging premonition of success, and theyfelt a gratifying support in the presence of the ten thousand spectatorswho looked on at their work. Few conventions have ever been pervaded bysuch a depth of feeling, or exhibited such a reserve of latententhusiasm. The cheers that greeted the entrance of popular favorites, and the short speeches on preliminary business, ran and rolled throughthe great audience in successive moving waves of sound that were echoedand reëchoed from side to side of the vast building. Not alone thedelegates on the central platform, but the multitude of spectators aswell, felt that they were playing a part in a great historical event. 

The temporary, and afterward the permanent organization, was finished onthe first day, with somewhat less than usual of the wordy andtantalizing small talk which these routine proceedings always callforth. On the second day the platform committee submitted its work, embodying the carefully considered and skilfully framed body ofdoctrines upon which the Republican party, made up only four yearsbefore from such previously heterogeneous and antagonistic politicalelements was now able to find common and durable ground of agreement. Around its central tenet, which denied "the authority of Congress, of aterritorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existenceto slavery in any territory of the United States, " were grouped vigorousdenunciations of the various steps and incidents of the pro-slaveryreaction, and its prospective demands; while its positiverecommendations embraced the immediate admission of Kansas, freehomesteads to actual settlers, river and harbor improvements of anational character, a railroad to the Pacific Ocean, and the maintenanceof existing naturalization laws. 

The platform was about to be adopted without objection when a flurry ofdiscussion arose over an amendment, proposed by Mr. Giddings of Ohio, toincorporate in it that phrase of the Declaration of Independence whichdeclares the right of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness. Impatience was at once manifested lest any change shouldproduce endless delay and dispute. "I believe in the Ten Commandments, "commented a member, "but I do not want them in a political platform";and the proposition was voted down. Upon this the old antislaveryveteran felt himself agrieved, and, taking up his hat, marched out ofthe convention. In the course of an hour's desultory discussionhowever, a member, with stirring oratorical emphasis, asked whether theconvention was prepared to go upon record before the country as votingdown the words of the Declaration of Independence--whether the men of1860, on the free prairies of the West, quailed before repeating thewords enunciated by the men of '76 at Philadelphia. In an impulse ofpatriotic reaction, the amendment was incorporated into the platform, and Mr. Giddings was brought back by his friends, his face beaming withtriumph; and the stormy acclaim of the audience manifested the deepfeeling which the incident evoked. 

On the third day it was certain that balloting would begin, and crowdshurried to the Wigwam in a fever of curiosity. Having grown restless atthe indispensable routine preliminaries, when Mr. Evarts nominatedWilliam H. Seward of New York for President, they greeted his name witha perfect storm of applause. Then Mr. Judd nominated Abraham Lincoln ofIllinois and in the tremendous cheering that broke from the throats ofhis admirers and followers the former demonstration dwindled tocomparative feebleness. Again and again these contests of lungs andenthusiasm were repeated as the choice of New York was seconded byMichigan, and that of Illinois by Indiana. 

When other names had been duly presented, the cheering at lengthsubsided, and the chairman announced that balloting would begin. Manyspectators had provided themselves with tally-lists, and when the firstroll-call was completed were able at once to perceive the drift ofpopular preference. Cameron, Chase, Bates, McLean, Dayton, and Collamerwere indorsed by the substantial votes of their own States; but twonames stood out in marked superiority: Seward, who had received onehundred and seventy-three and one half votes, and Lincoln, one hundredand two. 

The New York delegation was so thoroughly persuaded of the final successof their candidate that they did not comprehend the significance of thisfirst ballot. Had they reflected that their delegation alone hadcontributed seventy votes to Seward's total, they would have understoodthat outside of the Empire State, upon this first showing, Lincoln heldtheir favorite almost an even race. As the second ballot progressed, their anxiety visibly increased. They watched with eagerness as thecomplimentary votes first cast for State favorites were transferred nowto one, now to the other of the recognized leaders in the contest, andtheir hopes sank when the result of the second ballot was announced:Seward, one hundred and eighty-four and one half, Lincoln, one hundredand eighty-one; and a volume of applause, which was with difficultychecked by the chairman, shook the Wigwam at this announcement. 

Then followed a short interval of active caucusing in the variousdelegations, while excited men went about rapidly interchangingquestions, solicitations, and messages between delegations fromdifferent States. Neither candidate had yet received a majority of allthe votes cast, and the third ballot was begun amid a deep, almostpainful suspense, delegates and spectators alike recording eachannouncement of votes on their tally-sheets with nervous fingers. Butthe doubt was of short duration. The second ballot had unmistakablypointed out the winning man. Hesitating delegations and fragments frommany States steadily swelled the Lincoln column. Long before thesecretaries made the official announcement, the totals had been figuredup: Lincoln, two hundred and thirty one and one half, Seward, onehundred and eighty. Counting the scattering votes, four hundred andsixty-five ballots had been cast, and two hundred and thirty-three werenecessary to a choice. Seward had lost four and one half, Lincoln hadgained fifty and one half, and only one and one half votes more wereneeded to make a nomination. 

The Wigwam suddenly became as still as a church, and everybody leanedforward to see whose voice would break the spell. Before the lapse of aminute, David K. Cartter sprang upon his chair and reported a change offour Ohio votes from Chase to Lincoln. Then a teller shouted a nametoward the skylight, and the boom of cannon from the roof of the Wigwamannounced the nomination and started the cheering of the overjoyedIllinoisans down the long Chicago streets; while in the Wigwam, delegation after delegation changed its vote to the victor amid a tumultof hurrahs. When quiet was somewhat restored, Mr. Evarts, speaking forNew York and for Seward, moved to make the nomination unanimous, and Mr. Browning gracefully returned the thanks of Illinois for the honor theconvention had conferred upon the State. In the afternoon the conventioncompleted its work by nominating Hannibal Hamlin of Maine forVice-President; and as the delegates sped homeward in the night trains, they witnessed, in the bonfires and cheering crowds at the stations, that a memorable presidential campaign was already begun. 

XI

Candidates and Platforms--The Political Chances--Decatur LincolnResolution--John Hanks and the Lincoln Rails--The Rail-SplitterCandidate--The Wide-Awakes--Douglas's Southern Tour--Jefferson Davis'sAddress--Fusion--Lincoln at the State House--The Election Result

The nomination of Lincoln at Chicago completed the preparations of thedifferent parties of the country for the presidential contest of 1860;and presented the unusual occurrence of an appeal to the voters of theseveral States by four distinct political organizations. In the order ofpopular strength which they afterward developed, they were:

1. The Republican party, whose platform declared in substance thatslavery was wrong, and that its further extension should be prohibitedby Congress. Its candidates were Abraham Lincoln of Illinois forPresident and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine for Vice-president. 

2. The Douglas wing of the Democratic party, which declared indifferencewhether slavery were right or wrong, extended or prohibited, andproposed to permit the people of a Territory to decide whether theywould prevent or establish it. Its candidates were Stephen A. Douglas ofIllinois for President, and Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia forVice-President. 

3. The Buchanan wing of the Democratic party, which declared thatslavery was right and beneficial, and whose policy was to extend theinstitution, and create new slave States. Its candidates were John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky for President, and Joseph Lane of Oregon forVice-President. 

4. The Constitutional Union party, which professed to ignore thequestion of slavery, and declared it would recognize no politicalprinciples other than "the Constitution of the country, the union of theStates, and the enforcement of the laws. " Its candidates were John Bellof Tennessee for President, and Edward Everett of Massachusetts forVice-President. 

In the array of these opposing candidates and their platforms, it couldbe easily calculated from the very beginning that neither Lincoln norDouglas had any chance to carry a slave State, nor Breckinridge nor Bellto carry a free State; and that neither Douglas in the free States, norBell in either section could obtain electoral votes enough to succeed. Therefore, but two alternatives seemed probable. Either Lincoln would bechosen by electoral votes, or, upon his failure to obtain a sufficientnumber, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives, in which case the course of combination, chance, or intrigue could notbe foretold. The political situation and its possible results thusinvolved a degree of uncertainty sufficient to hold out a contingenthope to all the candidates and to inspire the followers of each toactive exertion. This hope and inspiration, added to the hot temperwhich the long discussion of antagonistic principles had engendered, served to infuse into the campaign enthusiasm, earnestness, and evenbitterness, according to local conditions in the different sections. 

In campaign enthusiasm the Republican party easily took the lead. Abouta week before his nomination, Mr. Lincoln had been present at theIllinois State convention at Decatur in Coles County, not far from theold Lincoln home, when, at a given signal, there marched into theconvention old John Hanks, one of his boyhood companions, and anotherpioneer, who bore on their shoulders two long fence rails decorated witha banner inscribed: "Two rails from a lot made by Abraham Lincoln andJohn Hanks in the Sangamon Bottom in the year 1830. " They were greetedwith a tremendous shout of applause from the whole convention succeededby a united call for Lincoln, who sat on the platform. The tumult wouldnot subside until he rose to speak, when he said:

"GENTLEMEN: I suppose you want to know something about those things[pointing to old John and the rails]. Well, the truth is, John Hanks andI did make rails in the Sagamon Bottom. I don't know whether we madethose rails or not; fact is, I don't think they are a credit to themakers [laughing as he spoke]. But I do know this: I made rails then, and I think I could make better ones than these now. "

Still louder cheering followed this short, but effective reply. But theconvention was roused to its full warmth of enthusiasm when a resolutionwas immediately and unanimously adopted declaring that "Abraham Lincolnis the first choice of the Republican party of Illinois for thePresidency, " and directing the delegates to the Chicago convention "touse all honorable means to secure his nomination, and to cast the voteof the State as a unit for him. "

It was this resolution which the Illinois delegation had so successfullycarried out at Chicago. And, besides they had carried with them the twofence rails, and set them up in state at the Lincoln headquarters attheir hotel, where enthusiastic lady friends gaily trimmed them withflowers and ribbons and lighted them up with tapers. These slightpreliminaries, duly embellished in the newspapers, gave the key to theRepublican campaign, which designated Lincoln as the Rail-splitterCandidate, and, added to his common Illinois sobriquet of "Honest OldAbe, " furnished both country and city campaign orators a powerfullysympathetic appeal to the rural and laboring element of the UnitedStates. 

When these homely but picturesque appellations were fortified by thecopious pamphlet and newspaper biographies in which people read thestory of his humble beginnings, and how he had risen, by dint of simple, earnest work and native genius, through privation and difficulty, firstto fame and leadership in his State, and now to fame and leadership inthe nation, they grew quickly into symbols of a faith and trust destinedto play no small part in a political revolution of which the people atlarge were not as yet even dreaming. 

Another feature of the campaign also quickly developed itself. On thepreceding 5th of March, one of Mr. Lincoln's New England speeches hadbeen made at Hartford, Connecticut; and at its close he was escorted tohis hotel by a procession of the local Republican club, at the head ofwhich marched a few of its members bearing torches and wearing caps andcapes of glazed oilcloth, the primary purpose of which was to shieldtheir clothes from the dripping oil of their torches. Both thesimplicity and the efficiency of the uniform caught the popular eye, asdid also the name, "Wide-Awakes, " applied to them by the "HartfordCourant. " The example found quick imitation in Hartford and adjoiningtowns, and when Mr. Lincoln was made candidate for President, everycity, town, and nearly every village in the North, within a brief space, had its organized Wide-Awake club, with their half-military uniform anddrill; and these clubs were often, later in the campaign, gathered intoimposing torch-light processions, miles in length, on occasions ofimportant party meetings and speech-making. It was the revived spirit ofthe Harrison campaign of twenty years before; but now, shorn of its funand frolic, it was strengthened by the power of organization and thetremendous impetus of earnest devotion to a high principle. 

It was a noteworthy feature of the campaign that the letters ofacceptance of all the candidates, either in distinct words orunmistakable implication, declared devotion to the Union, while at thesame time the adherents of each were charging disunion sentiments andintentions upon the other three parties. Douglas himself made a tour ofspeech-making through the Southern States, in which, while denouncingthe political views of both Lincoln and Breckinridge, he neverthelessopenly declared, in response to direct questions, that no grievancecould justify disunion, and that he was ready "to put the hemp aroundthe neck and hang any man who would raise the arm of resistance to theconstituted authorities of the country. "

During the early part of the campaign the more extreme Southernfire-eaters abated somewhat of their violent menaces of disunion. Between the Charleston and the Baltimore Democratic conventions anaddress published by Jefferson Davis and other prominent leaders hadexplained that the seventeen Democratic States which had voted atCharleston for the seceders' platform could, if united with Pennsylvaniaalone, elect the Democratic nominees against all opposition. This hopedoubtless floated before their eyes like a will-o'-the-wisp until theOctober elections dispelled all possibility of securing Pennsylvania forBreckinridge. From that time forward there began a renewal of disunionthreats, which, by their constant increase throughout the South, prepared the public mind of that section for the coming secession. 

As the chances of Republican success gradually grew stronger, anundercurrent of combination developed itself among those politicians ofthe three opposing parties more devoted to patronage than principle, tobring about the fusion of Lincoln's opponents on some agreed ratio of adivision of the spoils. Such a combination made considerable progress inthe three Northern States of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Itappears to have been engineered mainly by the Douglas faction, though, it must be said to his credit, against the open and earnest protest ofDouglas himself. But the thrifty plotters cared little for hisdisapproval. 

By the secret manipulations of conventions and committees a fusionelectoral ticket was formed in New York, made up of adherents of thethree different factions in the following proportion: Douglas, eighteen;Bell, ten; Breckinridge, seven; and the whole opposition vote of theState of New York was cast for this fusion ticket. The same tactics werepursued in Pennsylvania, where, however, the agreement was not so openlyavowed. One third of the Pennsylvania fusion electoral candidates werepledged to Douglas; the division of the remaining two thirds betweenBell and Breckinridge was not made public. The bulk of the Pennsylvaniaopposition vote was cast for this fusion ticket, but a respectablepercentage refused to be bargained away, and voted directly for Douglasor Bell. In New Jersey a definite agreement was reached by the managers, and an electoral ticket formed, composed of two adherents of Bell, twoof Breckinridge, and three of Douglas; and in this State a practicalresult was effected by the movement. A fraction of the Douglas votersformed a straight electoral ticket, adopting the three Douglascandidates on the fusion ticket, and by this action these three Douglaselectors received a majority vote in New Jersey, On the whole, however, the fusion movement proved ineffectual to defeat Lincoln and, indeed, itwould not have done so even had the fusion electoral tickets deceived amajority in all three of the above-named States. 

The personal habits and surroundings of Mr. Lincoln were variedsomewhat, though but slightly, during the whole of this election summer. Naturally, he withdrew at once from active work, leaving his law officeand his whole law business to his partner, William H. Herndon; while hisfriends installed him in the governor's room in the State House atSpringfield, which was not otherwise needed during the absence of thelegislature. Here he spent the time during the usual business hours ofthe day, attended only by his private secretary, Mr. Nicolay. Friendsand strangers alike were thus able to visit him freely and withoutceremony and they availed themselves largely of the opportunity. Few, ifany, went away without being favorably impressed by his hearty Westerngreeting, and the frank sincerity of his manner and conversation, inwhich, naturally, all subjects of controversy were courteously andinstinctively avoided by both the candidate and his visitors. 

By none was this free, neighborly intercourse enjoyed more than by theold-time settlers of Sangamon and the adjoining counties, who came torevive the incidents and memories of pioneer days with one who couldgive them such thorough and appreciative interest and sympathy. Heemployed no literary bureau, wrote no public letters, made no set orimpromptu speeches, except that once or twice during great politicalmeetings at Springfield he uttered a few words of greeting and thanks topassing street processions. All these devices of propagandism he left tothe leaders and committees of his adherents in their several States. Even the strictly confidential letters in which he indicated his adviceon points in the progress of the campaign did not exceed a dozen innumber; and when politicians came to interview him at Springfield, hereceived them in the privacy of his own home, and generally theirpresence created little or no public notice. Cautious politician as hewas, he did not permit himself to indulge in any over-confidence, butthen, as always before, showed unusual skill in estimating politicalchances. Thus he wrote about a week after the Chicago convention:

"So far as I can learn, the nominations start well everywhere; and, ifthey get no backset, it would seem as if they are going through. "

Again, on July 4:

"Long before this you have learned who was nominated at Chicago. We knownot what a day may bring forth, but to-day it looks as if the Chicagoticket will be elected. "

And on September 22, to a friend in Oregon:

"No one on this side of the mountains pretends that any ticket can beelected by the people, unless it be ours. Hence, great efforts tocombine against us are being made, which, however, as yet have not hadmuch success Besides what we see in the newspapers, I have a good dealof private correspondence; and, without giving details, I will only sayit all looks very favorable to our success. "

His judgment was abundantly verified at the presidential election, which occurred upon November 6, 1860. Lincoln electors were chosen inevery one of the free States except New Jersey, where, as has alreadybeen stated, three Douglas electors received majorities because theirnames were on both the fusion ticket and the straight Douglas ticket;while the other four Republican electors in that State succeeded. Of theslave States, eleven chose Breckinridge electors, three of them Bellelectors, and one of them--Missouri--Douglas electors. As provided bylaw, the electors met in their several States on December 5, toofficially cast their votes, and on February 13, 1861, Congress in jointsession of the two Houses made the official count as follows: forLincoln, one hundred and eighty; for Breckinridge, seventy-two; forBell, thirty-nine; and for Douglas, twelve; giving Lincoln a clearmajority of fifty-seven in the whole electoral college. ThereuponBreckinridge, who presided over the joint session, officially declaredthat Abraham Lincoln was duly elected President of the United States forfour years, beginning March 4, 1861. 

XII

Lincoln's Cabinet Program--Members from the South--Questions andAnswers--Correspondence with Stephens--Action of Congress--PeaceConvention--Preparation of the Inaugural--Lincoln's FarewellAddress--The Journey to Washington--Lincoln's Midnight Journey

During the long presidential campaign of 1860, between the Chicagoconvention in the middle of May and the election at the beginning ofNovember, Mr. Lincoln, relieved from all other duties, had watchedpolitical developments with very close attention not merely to discernthe progress of his own chances, but, doubtless, also, much moreseriously to deliberate upon the future in case he should be elected. But it was only when, on the night of November 6, he sat in thetelegraph office at Springfield, from which all but himself and theoperators were excluded, and read the telegrams as they fell from thewires, that little by little the accumulating Republican majoritiesreported from all directions convinced him of the certainty of hissuccess; and with that conviction there fell upon him the overwhelming, almost crushing weight of his coming duties and responsibilities. Heafterward related that in that supreme hour, grappling resolutely withthe mighty problem before him, he practically completed the firstessential act of his administration, the selection of his futurecabinet--the choice of the men who were to aid him. 

From what afterward occurred, we may easily infer the general principlewhich guided his choice. One of his strongest characteristics, as hisspeeches abundantly show, was his belief in the power of public opinion, and his respect for the popular will. That was to be found and to bewielded by the leaders of public sentiment In the present instance therewere no truer representatives of that will than the men who had beenprominently supported by the delegates to the Chicago convention for thepresidential nominations. Of these he would take at least three, perhapsfour, to compose one half of his cabinet. In selecting Seward, Chase, Bates, and Cameron, he could also satisfy two other points of therepresentative principle, the claims of locality and the elements offormer party divisions now joined in the newly organized Republicanparty. With Seward from New York, Cameron from Pennsylvania, Chase fromOhio, and himself from Illinois, the four leading free States had each arepresentative. With Bates from Missouri, the South could not complainof being wholly excluded from the cabinet. New England was properlyrepresented by Vice-President Hamlin. When, after the inauguration, Smith from Indiana Welles from Connecticut, and Blair from Maryland wereadded to make up the seven cabinet members, the local distributionbetween East and West, North and South, was in no wise disturbed. Itwas, indeed, complained that in this arrangement there were four formerDemocrats, and only three former Whigs; to which Lincoln laughinglyreplied that he had been a Whig, and would be there to make the numbereven. 

It is not likely that this exact list was in Lincoln's mind on the nightof the November election, but only the principal names in it; and muchdelay and some friction occurred before its completion. The post ofSecretary of State was offered to Seward on December 8. 

"Rumors have got into the newspapers, " wrote Lincoln, "to the effectthat the department named above would be tendered you as a compliment, and with the expectation that you would decline it. I beg you to beassured that I have said nothing to justify these rumors. On thecontrary, it has been my purpose, from the day of the nomination atChicago, to assign you, by your leave, this place in theadministration. "

Seward asked a few days for reflection, and then cordially accepted. Bates was tendered the Attorney-Generalship on December 15, while makinga personal visit to Springfield. Word had been meanwhile sent to Smiththat he would probably be included. The assignment of places to Chaseand Cameron worked less smoothly. Lincoln wrote Cameron a note onJanuary 3, saying he would nominate him for either Secretary of theTreasury or Secretary of War, he had not yet decided which; and on thesame day, in an interview with Chase, whom he had invited toSpringfield, said to him:

"I have done with you what I would not perhaps have ventured to do withany other man in the country--sent for you to ask whether you willaccept the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury, without, however, being exactly prepared to offer it to you. "

They discussed the situation very fully, but without reaching a definiteconclusion, agreeing to await the advice of friends. Meanwhile, therumor that Cameron was to go into the cabinet excited such hotopposition that Lincoln felt obliged to recall his tender in aconfidential letter; and asked him to write a public letter decliningthe place. Instead of doing this, Cameron fortified himself withrecommendations from prominent Pennsylvanians, and demonstrated that inhis own State he had at least three advocates to one opponent. 

Pending the delay which this contest consumed, another cabinetcomplication found its solution. It had been warmly urged byconservatives that, in addition to Bates, another cabinet member shouldbe taken from one of the Southern States. The difficulty of doings thishad been clearly foreshadowed by Mr. Lincoln in a little editorial whichhe wrote for the Springfield "Journal" on December 12:

"_First_. Is it known that any such gentleman of character would accepta place in the cabinet?

"_Second_. If yea, on what terms does he surrender to Mr. Lincoln, orMr. Lincoln to him, on the political differences between them, or dothey enter upon the administration in open opposition to each other?"

It was very soon demonstrated that these differences wereinsurmountable. Through Mr. Seward, who was attending his senatorialduties at Washington, Mr. Lincoln tentatively offered a cabinetappointment successively to Gilmer of North Carolina, Hunt of Louisianaand Scott of Virginia, no one of whom had the courage to accept. 

Toward the end of the recent canvass, and still more since the election, Mr. Lincoln had received urgent letters to make some public declarationto reassure and pacify the South, especially the cotton States, whichwere manifesting a constantly growing spirit of rebellion. Most of suchletters remained unanswered, but in a number of strictly confidentialreplies he explained the reasons for his refusal. 

"I appreciate your motive, " he wrote October 23, "when you suggest thepropriety of my writing for the public something disclaiming allintention to interfere with slaves or slavery in the States: but, in myjudgment, it would do no good. I have already done this many, manytimes; and it is in print, and open to all who will read. Those who willnot read or heed what I have already publicly said, would not read orheed a repetition of it. 'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead. '"

To the editor of the "Louisville Journal" he wrote October 29:

"For the good men of the South--and I regard the majority of them assuch--I have no objection to repeat seventy and seven times. But I havebad men to deal with, both North and South; men who are eager forsomething new upon which to base new misrepresentations; men who wouldlike to frighten me, or at least to fix upon me the character oftimidity and cowardice. "

Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, who afterward became ConfederateVice-President, made a strong speech against secession in that State onNovember 14; and Mr. Lincoln wrote him a few lines asking for a revisedcopy of it. In the brief correspondence which ensued, Mr. Lincoln againwrote him under date of December 22:

"I fully appreciate the present peril the country is in, and the weightof responsibility on me. Do the people of the South really entertainfears that a Republican administration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with the slaves, or with them about the slaves? If they do, Iwish to assure you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The South would be in no moredanger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington. Isuppose, however, this does not meet the case. You think slavery isright and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong and ought tobe restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It certainly is the onlysubstantial difference between us. "

So, also, replying a few days earlier in a long letter to Hon. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, to whom, as already stated, he offered acabinet appointment, he said:

"On the territorial question I am inflexible, as you see my position inthe book. On that there is a difference between you and us; and it isthe only substantial difference. You think slavery is right and ought tobe extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. For thisneither has any just occasion to be angry with the other. As to theState laws, mentioned in your sixth question, I really know very littleof them. I never have read one. If any of them are in conflict with thefugitive-slave clause, or any other part of the Constitution, Icertainly shall be glad of their repeal; but I could hardly bejustified, as a citizen of Illinois, or as President of the UnitedStates, to recommend the repeal of a statute of Vermont or SouthCarolina. "

Through his intimate correspondence with Mr. Seward and personal friendsin Congress, Mr. Lincoln was kept somewhat informed of the hostiletemper of the Southern leaders, and that a tremendous pressure was beingbrought upon that body by timid conservatives and the commercialinterests in the North to bring about some kind of compromise whichwould stay the progress of disunion; and on this point he sent anemphatic monition to Representative Washburne on December 13:

"Your long letter received. Prevent as far as possible any of ourfriends from demoralizing themselves and their cause by entertainingpropositions for compromise of any sort on slavery extension. There isno possible compromise upon it but what puts us under again, and all ourwork to do over again. Whether it be a Missouri line or Eli Thayer'spopular sovereignty, it is all the same. Let either be done, andimmediately filibustering and extending slavery recommences. On thatpoint hold firm as a chain of steel. "

Between the day when a President is elected by popular vote and that onwhich he is officially inaugurated there exists an interim of four longmonths, during which he has no more direct power in the affairs ofgovernment than any private citizen. However anxiously Mr. Lincoln mightwatch the development of public events at Washington and in the cottonStates; whatever appeals might come to him through interviews orcorrespondence, no positive action of any kind was within his power, beyond an occasional word of advice or suggestion. The position of theRepublican leaders in Congress was not much better. Until the actualsecession of States, and the departure of their representatives, theywere in a minority in the Senate; while the so-called South Americansand Anti-Lecompton Democrats held the balance of power in the House. Thesession was mainly consumed in excited, profitless discussion. Both theSenate and House appointed compromise committees, which met and labored, but could find no common ground of agreement. A peace convention met anddeliberated at Washington, with no practical result, except to waste thepowder for a salute of one hundred guns over a sham report to whichnobody paid the least attention. 

Throughout this period Mr. Lincoln was by no means idle. Besides themany difficulties he had to overcome in completing his cabinet, hedevoted himself to writing his inaugural address. Withdrawing himselfsome hours each day from his ordinary receptions, he went to a quietroom on the second floor of the store occupied by his brother-in-law, onthe south side of the public square in Springfield, where he could thinkand write in undisturbed privacy. When, after abundant reflection andrevision, he had finished the document, he placed it in the hands of Mr. William H. Bailhache, one of the editors of the "Illinois StateJournal, " who locked himself and a single compositor into thecomposing-room of the "Journal. " Here, in Mr. Bailhache's presence, itwas set up, proof taken and read, and a dozen copies printed; afterwhich the types were again immediately distributed. The alert newspapercorrespondents in Springfield, who saw Mr. Lincoln every day as usual, did not obtain the slightest hint of what was going on. 

Having completed his arrangements, Mr. Lincoln started on his journey toWashington on February 11, 1861, on a special train, accompanied by Mrs. Lincoln and their three children, his two private secretaries, and asuite of about a dozen personal friends. Mr. Seward had suggested thatin view of the feverish condition of public affairs, he should come aweek earlier; but Mr. Lincoln allowed himself only time enoughcomfortably to fill the appointments he had made to visit the capitalsand principal cities of the States on his route, in accordance withnon-partizan invitations from their legislatures and mayors, which hehad accepted. Standing on the front platform of the car, as theconductor was about to pull the bell-rope, Mr. Lincoln made thefollowing brief and pathetic address of farewell to his friends andneighbors of Springfield--the last time his voice was ever to be heardin the city which had been his home for so many years:

 "My friends: No one, not in my situation, can appreciate my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and the kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him who can go with me, and remain with you, and be everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell. "

It was the beginning of a memorable journey. On the whole route fromSpringfield to Washington, at almost every station, even the smallest, was gathered a crowd of people in hope to catch a glimpse of the face ofthe President-elect, or, at least, to see the flying train. At thelarger stopping-places these gatherings were swelled to thousands, andin the great cities into almost unmanageable assemblages. Everywherethere were vociferous calls for Mr. Lincoln, and, if he showed himself, for a speech. Whenever there was sufficient time, he would step to therear platform of the car and bow his acknowledgments as the train wasmoving away, and sometimes utter a few words of thanks and greeting. Atthe capitals of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, as also in the cities of Cincinnati, Cleveland, Buffalo, New York, andPhiladelphia, a halt was made for one or two days, and a program wascarried out of a formal visit and brief address to each house of thelegislature, street processions, large receptions in the evening, andother similar ceremonies; and in each of them there was anunprecedented outpouring of the people to take advantage of everyopportunity to see and to hear the future Chief Magistrate of the Union. 

Party foes as well as party friends made up these expectant crowds. Thepublic suspense was at a degree of tension which rendered every eye andear eager to catch even the slightest indication of the thoughts orintentions of the man who was to be the official guide of the nation ina crisis the course and end of which even the wisest dared not predict. In the twenty or thirty brief addresses delivered by Mr. Lincoln on thisjourney, he observed the utmost caution of utterance and reticence ofdeclaration; yet the shades of meaning in his carefully chosen sentenceswere enough to show how alive he was to the trials and dangersconfronting his administration, and to inspire hope and confidence inhis judgment. He repeated that he regarded the public demonstrations notas belonging to himself, but to the high office with which the peoplehad clothed him; and that if he failed, they could four years latersubstitute a better man in his place; and in his very first address, atIndianapolis, he thus emphasized their reciprocal duties:

"If the union of these States and the liberties of this people shall belost, it is but little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but agreat deal to the thirty millions of people who inhabit these UnitedStates, and to their posterity in all coming time. It is your businessto rise up and preserve the Union and liberty for yourselves and not forme. .. . I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that not withpoliticians, not with Presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, is the question, Shall the Union and shall the liberties of this countrybe preserved to the latest generations?"

Many salient and interesting quotations could be made from his otheraddresses, but a comparatively few sentences will be sufficient toenable the reader to infer what was likely to be his ultimate conclusionand action. In his second speech at Indianapolis he asked the question:

"On what rightful principle may a State, being not more thanone-fiftieth part of the nation in soil and population, break up thenation, and then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision of itself inthe most arbitrary way?"

At Steubenville:

"If the majority should not rule, who would be the judge? Where is sucha judge to be found? We should all be bound by the majority of theAmerican people--if not, then the minority must control. Would that beright?"

At Trenton:

"I shall do all that may be in my power to promote a peaceful settlementof all our difficulties. The man does not live who is more devoted topeace than I am, none who would do more to preserve it, but it may benecessary to put the foot down firmly. "

At Harrisburg:

"While I am exceedingly gratified to see the manifestation upon yourstreets of your military force here, and exceedingly gratified at yourpromise to use that force upon a proper emergency--while I make theseacknowledgments, I desire to repeat, in order to preclude any possiblemisconstruction, that I do most sincerely hope that we shall have no usefor them; that it will never become their duty to shed blood, and mostespecially never to shed fraternal blood. I promise that so far as I mayhave wisdom to direct, if so painful a result shall in any wise bebrought about, it shall be through no fault of mine. "

While Mr. Lincoln was yet at Philadelphia, he was met by Mr. FrederickW. Seward, son of Senator Seward, who brought him an importantcommunication from his father and General Scott at Washington. About thebeginning of the year serious apprehension had been felt lest a suddenuprising of the secessionists in Virginia and Maryland might endeavor togain possession of the national capital. An investigation by a committeeof Congress found no active military preparation to exist for such apurpose, but considerable traces of disaffection and local conspiracy inBaltimore; and, to guard against such an outbreak, President Buchananhad permitted his Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, to call General Scott toWashington and charge him with the safety of the city, not only at thatmoment, but also during the counting of the presidential returns inFebruary, and the coming inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. For this purposeGeneral Scott had concentrated at Washington a few companies from theregular army, and also, in addition, had organized and armed about ninehundred men of the militia of the District of Columbia. 

In connection with these precautions, Colonel Stone, who commanded theseforces, had kept himself informed about the disaffection in Baltimore, through the agency of the New York police department. The communicationbrought by young Mr. Seward contained besides notes from his father andGeneral Scott, a short report from Colonel Stone, stating that there hadarisen within the past few days imminent danger of violence to and theassassination of Mr. Lincoln in his passage through Baltimore, shouldthe time of that passage be known. 

"All risk, " he suggested, "might be easily avoided by a change in thetraveling arrangements which would bring Mr. Lincoln and a portion ofhis party through Baltimore by a night train without previous notice. "

The seriousness of this information was doubled by the fact that Mr. Lincoln had, that same day, held an interview with a prominent Chicagodetective who had been for some weeks employed by the president of thePhiladelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore railway to investigate the dangerto their property and trains from the Baltimore secessionists. Theinvestigations of this detective, a Mr. Pinkerton, had been carried onwithout the knowledge of the New York detective, and he reported notidentical, but almost similar, conditions of insurrectionary feeling anddanger, and recommended the same precaution. 

Mr. Lincoln very earnestly debated the situation with his intimatepersonal friend, Hon. N. B. Judd of Chicago, perhaps the most active andinfluential member of his suite, who advised him to proceed toWashington that same evening on the eleven-o'clock train. "I cannot goto-night, " replied Mr. Lincoln; "I have promised to raise the flag overIndependence Hall to-morrow morning, and to visit the legislature atHarrisburg. Beyond that I have no engagements. "

The railroad schedule by which Mr. Lincoln had hitherto been travelingincluded a direct trip from Harrisburg, through Baltimore, to Washingtonon Saturday, February 23. When the Harrisburg ceremonies had beenconcluded on the afternoon of the 22d, the danger and the proposedchange of program were for the first time fully laid before aconfidential meeting of the prominent members of Mr. Lincoln's suite. Reasons were strongly urged both for and against the plan; but Mr. Lincoln finally decided and explained that while he himself was notafraid he would be assassinated, nevertheless, since the possibility ofdanger had been made known from two entirely independent sources, andofficially communicated to him by his future prime minister and thegeneral of the American armies, he was no longer at liberty to disregardit; that it was not the question of his private life, but the regularand orderly transmission of the authority of the government of theUnited States in the face of threatened revolution, which he had noright to put in the slightest jeopardy. He would, therefore, carry outthe plan, the full details of which had been arranged with the railroadofficials. 

Accordingly, that same evening, he, with a single companion, Colonel W. H. Lamon, took a car from Harrisburg back to Philadelphia, at whichplace, about midnight, they boarded the through train from New York toWashington, and without recognition or any untoward incident passedquietly through Baltimore, and reached the capital about daylight on themorning of February 23, where they were met by Mr. Seward andRepresentative Washburne of Illinois, and conducted to Willard's Hotel. 

When Mr. Lincoln's departure from Harrisburg became known, a recklessnewspaper correspondent telegraphed to New York the ridiculous inventionthat he traveled disguised in a Scotch cap and long military cloak. There was not one word of truth in the absurd statement. Mr. Lincoln'sfamily and suite proceeded to Washington by the originally arrangedtrain and schedule, and witnessed great crowds in the streets ofBaltimore, but encountered neither turbulence nor incivility of anykind. There was now, of course, no occasion for any, since the telegraphhad definitely announced that the President-elect was already inWashington. 

XIII

The Secession Movement--South Carolina Secession--Buchanan'sNeglect--Disloyal Cabinet Members---Washington Central Cabal--Anderson'sTransfer to Sumter--Star of the West--Montgomery Rebellion---Davis andStephens--Corner-stone Theory--Lincoln Inaugurated--His InauguralAddress--Lincoln's Cabinet--The Question of Sumter--Seward'sMemorandum--Lincoln's Answer--Bombardment of Sumter--Anderson'sCapitulation

It is not the province of these chapters to relate in detail the courseof the secession movement in the cotton States in the interim whichelapsed between the election and inauguration of President Lincoln. Still less can space be given to analyze and set forth the lamentablefailure of President Buchanan to employ the executive authority andpower of the government to prevent it, or even to hinder itsdevelopment, by any vigorous opposition or adequate protest. Thedetermination of South Carolina to secede was announced by the governorof that State a month before the presidential election, and on the daybefore the election he sent the legislature of the State a revolutionarymessage to formally inaugurate it. From that time forward the wholeofficial machinery of the State not only led, but forced the movementwhich culminated on December 20 in the ordinance of secession by theSouth Carolina convention. 

This official revolution in South Carolina was quickly imitated bysimilar official revolutions ending in secession ordinances in theStates of Mississippi, on January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10; Alabama, January 11; Georgia, January 19; Louisiana, January 26; and by a stillbolder usurpation in Texas, culminating on February 1. From the day ofthe presidential election all these proceedings were known probably morefully to President Buchanan than to the general public, because many ofthe actors were his personal and party friends; while almost at theirvery beginning he became aware that three members of his cabinet weresecretly or openly abetting and promoting them by their officialinfluence and power. 

Instead of promptly dismissing these unfaithful servants, he retainedone of them a month, and the others twice that period, and permittedthem so far to influence his official conduct, that in his annualmessage to Congress he announced the fallacious and paradoxical doctrinethat though a State had no right to secede, the Federal government hadno right to coerce her to remain in the Union. 

Nor could he justify his non-action by the excuse that contumaciousspeeches and illegal resolves of parliamentary bodies might be toleratedunder the American theory of free assemblage and free speech. Almostfrom the beginning of the secession movement, it was accompanied fromtime to time by overt acts both of treason and war; notably, by theoccupation and seizure by military order and force of the secedingStates, of twelve or fifteen harbor forts, one extensive navy-yard, halfa dozen arsenals, three mints, four important custom-houses, threerevenue cutters, and a variety of miscellaneous Federal property; forall of which insults to the flag, and infractions of the sovereignty ofthe United States, President Buchanan could recommend no moreefficacious remedy or redress than to ask the voters of the country toreverse their decision given at the presidential election, and toappoint a day of fasting and prayer on which to implore the Most High"to remove from our hearts that false pride of opinion which would impelus to persevere in wrong for the sake of consistency. "

Nor must mention be omitted of the astounding phenomenon that, encouraged by President Buchanan's doctrine of non-coercion and purposeof non-action, a central cabal of Southern senators and representativesissued from Washington, on December 14, their public proclamation of theduty of secession; their executive committee using one of the rooms ofthe Capitol building itself as the headquarters of the conspiracy andrebellion they were appointed to lead and direct. 

During the month of December, while the active treason of cotton-Stateofficials and the fatal neglect of the Federal executive were in theirmost damaging and demoralizing stages, an officer of the United Statesarmy had the high courage and distinguished honor to give theever-growing revolution its first effective check. Major RobertAnderson, though a Kentuckian by birth and allied by marriage to aGeorgia family, was, late in November, placed in command of the Federalforts in Charleston harbor; and having repeatedly reported that hislittle garrison of sixty men was insufficient for the defense of FortMoultrie, and vainly asked for reinforcements which were not sent him, he suddenly and secretly, on the night after Christmas, transferred hiscommand from the insecure position of Moultrie to the strong andunapproachable walls of Fort Sumter, midway in the mouth of Charlestonharbor, where he could not be assailed by the raw Charleston militiacompanies that had for weeks been threatening him with a stormingassault. In this stronghold, surrounded on all sides by water, heloyally held possession for the government and sovereignty of the UnitedStates. 

The surprised and baffled rage of the South Carolina rebels created acrisis at Washington that resulted in the expulsion of the President'streacherous counselors and the reconstruction of Mr. Buchanan's cabinetto unity and loyalty. The new cabinet, though unable to obtain PresidentBuchanan's consent to aggressive measures to reëstablish the Federalauthority, was, nevertheless, able to prevent further concessions to theinsurrection, and to effect a number of important defensive precautions, among which was the already mentioned concentration of a small militaryforce to protect the national capital. 

Meanwhile, the governor of South Carolina had begun the erection ofbatteries to isolate and besiege Fort Sumter; and the first of these, ona sand-spit of Morris Island commanding the main ship-channel, by a fewshots turned back, on January 9, the merchant steamer _Star of theWest_, in which General Scott had attempted to send a reinforcement oftwo hundred recruits to Major Anderson. Battery building was continuedwith uninterrupted energy until a triangle of siege works wasestablished on the projecting points of neighboring islands, mounting atotal of thirty guns and seventeen mortars, manned and supported by avolunteer force of from four to six thousand men. 

Military preparation, though not on so extensive or definite a scale, was also carried on in the other revolted States; and while Mr. Lincolnwas making his memorable journey from Springfield to Washington, telegrams were printed in the newspapers, from day to day, showing thattheir delegates had met at Montgomery, Alabama, formed a provisionalcongress, and adopted a constitution and government under the title ofThe Confederate States of America, of which they elected Jefferson Davisof Mississippi President, and Alexander H. Stephens of GeorgiaVice-President. 

It needs to be constantly borne in mind that the beginning of this vastmovement was not a spontaneous revolution, but a chronic conspiracy. "The secession of South Carolina, " truly said one of the chief actors, "is not an event of a day. It is not anything produced by Mr. Lincoln'selection, or by the non-execution of the fugitive-slave law. It is amatter which has been gathering head for thirty years. " The centralmotive and dominating object of the revolution was frankly avowed byVice-President Stephens in a speech he made at Savannah a few weeksafter his inauguration:

"The prevailing ideas entertained by him [Jefferson] and most of theleading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws ofnature; that it was wrong in _principle_, socially, morally, andpolitically. .. . Our new government is founded upon exactly the oppositeidea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the greattruth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; thatslavery--subordination to the superior race--is his natural and normalcondition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of theworld, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. "

In the week which elapsed between Mr. Lincoln's arrival in Washingtonand the day of inauguration, he exchanged the customary visits ofceremony with President Buchanan, his cabinet, the Supreme Court, thetwo Houses of Congress, and other dignitaries. In his rooms at Willard'sHotel he also held consultations with leading Republicans about thefinal composition of his cabinet and pressing questions of publicpolicy. Careful preparations had been made for the inauguration, andunder the personal eye of General Scott the military force in the citywas ready instantly to suppress any attempt to disturb the peace orquiet of the day. 

On March 4 the outgoing and incoming Presidents rode side by side in acarriage from the Executive Mansion to the Capitol and back, escorted byan imposing military and civic procession; and an immense throng ofspectators heard the new Executive read his inaugural address from theeast portico of the Capitol. He stated frankly that a disruption of theFederal Union was being formidably attempted, and discusseddispassionately the theory and illegality of secession. He held that theUnion was perpetual; that resolves and ordinances of disunion arelegally void; and announced that to the extent of his ability he wouldfaithfully execute the laws of the Union in all the States. The powerconfided to him would be used to hold, occupy, and possess the propertyand places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties andimposts. But beyond what might be necessary for these objects therewould be no invasion, no using of force against or among the peopleanywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior localityshould be so great and universal as to prevent competent residentcitizens from holding the Federal offices, there would be no attempt toforce obnoxious strangers among them for that object. The mails, unlessrepelled, would continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union; andthis course would be followed until current events and experience shouldshow a change to be necessary. To the South he made an earnest pleaagainst the folly of disunion, and in favor of maintaining peace andfraternal good will; declaring that their property, peace, and personalsecurity were in no danger from a Republican administration. 

"One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to beextended, " he said, "while the other believes it is wrong and ought notto be extended; that is the only substantial dispute. .. . Physicallyspeaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sectionsfrom each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husbandand wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond thereach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot dothis. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, eitheramicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory afterseparation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends canmake laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, thanlaws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always;and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you ceasefighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse areagain upon you. .. . In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, andnot in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government willnot assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves theaggressors. .. . I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. Wemust not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not breakour bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching fromevery battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart andhearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of theUnion, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angelsof our nature. "

But the peaceful policy here outlined was already more difficult tofollow than Mr. Lincoln was aware. On the morning after inauguration theSecretary of War brought to his notice freshly received letters fromMajor Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, announcingthat in the course of a few weeks the provisions of the garrison wouldbe exhausted, and therefore an evacuation or surrender would becomenecessary, unless the fort were relieved by supplies or reinforcements;and this information was accompanied by the written opinions of theofficers that to relieve the fort would require a well-appointed army oftwenty thousand men. 

The new President had appointed as his cabinet William H. Seward, Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; SimonCameron, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; CalebB. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General; and Edward Bates, Attorney-General. The Presidentand his official advisers at once called into counsel the highestmilitary and naval officers of the Union to consider the new andpressing emergency revealed by the unexpected news from Sumter. Theprofessional experts were divided in opinion. Relief by a force oftwenty thousand men was clearly out of the question. No such Union armyexisted, nor could one be created within the limit of time. The officersof the navy thought that men and supplies might be thrown into the fortby swift-going vessels, while on the other hand the army officersbelieved that such an expedition would surely be destroyed by theformidable batteries which the insurgents had erected to close theharbor. In view of all the conditions, Lieutenant-General Scott, general-in-chief of the army, recommended the evacuation of the fort asa military necessity. 

President Lincoln thereupon asked the several members of his cabinet thewritten question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision FortSumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only twomembers replied in the affirmative, while the other five argued againstthe attempt, holding that the country would recognize that theevacuation of the fort was not an indication of policy, but a necessitycreated by the neglect of the old administration. Under this advice, thePresident withheld his decision until he could gather furtherinformation. 

Meanwhile, three commissioners had arrived from the provisionalgovernment at Montgomery, Alabama, under instructions to endeavor tonegotiate a _de facto_ and _de jure_ recognition of the independence ofthe Confederate States. They were promptly informed by Mr. Seward thathe could not receive them; that he did not see in the Confederate Statesa rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation; andthat he was not at liberty to recognize the commissioners as diplomaticagents, or to hold correspondence with them. Failing in this directapplication, they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell ofthe Supreme Court, as a friendly intermediary, who came to Seward in theguise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with JeffersonDavis soon revealed a treasonable intent; and, replying to Campbell'searnest entreaties that peace should be maintained, Seward informed himconfidentially that the military status at Charleston would not bechanged without notice to the governor of South Carolina. On March 29 acabinet meeting for the second time discussed the question of Sumter. Four of the seven members now voted in favor of an attempt to supply thefort with provisions, and the President signed a memorandum order toprepare certain ships for such an expedition, under the command ofCaptain G. V. Fox. 

So far, Mr. Lincoln's new duties as President of the United States hadnot in any wise put him at a disadvantage with his constitutionaladvisers. Upon the old question of slavery he was as well informed andhad clearer convictions and purposes than either Seward or Chase. Andupon the newer question of secession, and the immediate decision aboutFort Sumter which it involved, the members of his cabinet were, likehimself, compelled to rely on the professional advice of experiencedarmy and navy officers. Since these differed radically in theiropinions, the President's own powers of perception and logic were ascapable of forming a correct decision as men who had been governors andsenators. He had reached at least a partial decision in the memorandumhe gave Fox to prepare ships for the Sumter expedition. 

It must therefore have been a great surprise to the President when, onApril 1, Secretary of State Seward handed him a memorandum setting fortha number of most extraordinary propositions. For a full enumeration ofthe items the reader must carefully study the entire document, which isprinted below in a foot-note;[4] but the principal points for which ithad evidently been written and presented can be given in a fewsentences. 

 [Footnote 4: SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION. APRIL 1, 1861. 

 First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign. 

 Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters. 

 Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country. 

 Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action. 

 Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular and perhaps not sufficiently explained My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must

 CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION. 

 In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of _Patriotism_ or _Union_. 

 The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the Union men in the South. 

 I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity. 

 For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law. 

 This will raise distinctly the question of _Union_ or _Disunion_. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South. 

 FOR FOREIGN NATIONS. 

 I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once. 

 I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. 

 And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, Would convene Congress and declare war against them. 

 But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. 

 For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly. 

 Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

 Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 

 It is not in my especial province. 

 But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility. ]

A month has elapsed, and the administration has neither a domestic nor aforeign policy. The administration must at once adopt and carry out anovel, radical, and aggressive policy. It must cease saying a word aboutslavery, and raise a great outcry about Union. It must declare waragainst France and Spain, and combine and organize all the governmentsof North and South America in a crusade to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. This policy once adopted, it must be the business of some oneincessantly to pursue it. "It is not in my especial province, " wrote Mr. Seward; "but I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility. " Thisphrase, which is a key to the whole memorandum, enables the readereasily to translate its meaning into something like the following:

After a month's trial, you, Mr. Lincoln, are a failure as President. Thecountry is in desperate straits, and must use a desperate remedy. Thatremedy is to submerge the South Carolina insurrection in a continentalwar. Some new man must take the executive helm, and wield the undividedpresidential authority. I should have been nominated at Chicago, andelected in November, but am willing to take your place and perform yourduties. 

Why William H. Seward, who is fairly entitled to rank as a greatstatesman, should have written this memorandum and presented it to Mr. Lincoln, has never been explained; nor is it capable of explanation. Itssuggestions were so visionary, its reasoning so fallacious, itsassumptions so unwarranted, its conclusions so malapropos, that it fallsbelow critical examination. Had Mr. Lincoln been an envious or aresentful man, he could not have wished for a better occasion to put arival under his feet. 

The President doubtless considered the incident one of phenomenalstrangeness, but it did not in the least disturb his unselfish judgmentor mental equipoise. There was in his answer no trace of excitement orpassion. He pointed out in a few sentences of simple, quiet explanationthat what the administration had done was exactly a foreign and domesticpolicy which the Secretary of State himself had concurred in and helpedto frame. Only, that Mr. Seward proposed to go further and give upSumter. Upon the central suggestion that some one mind must direct, Mr. Lincoln wrote with simple dignity:

"If this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy isadopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed withoutgood reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled tohave, the advice of all the cabinet. "

Mr. Lincoln's unselfish magnanimity is the central marvel of the wholeaffair. His reply ended the argument. Mr. Seward doubtless saw at oncehow completely he had put himself in the President's power. Apparently, neither of the men ever again alluded to the incident. No other personsexcept Mr. Seward's son and the President's private secretary ever sawthe correspondence, or knew of the occurrence. The President put thepapers away in an envelop, and no word of the affair came to the publicuntil a quarter of a century later, when the details were published inMr. Lincoln's biography. In one mind, at least, there was no furtherdoubt that the cabinet had a master, for only some weeks later Mr. Seward is known to have written: "There is but one vote in the cabinet, and that is cast by the President. " This mastery Mr. Lincoln retainedwith a firm dignity throughout his administration. When, near the closeof the war, he sent Mr. Seward to meet the rebel commissioners at theHampton Roads conference, he finished his short letter of instructionswith the imperative sentence: "You will not assume to definitelyconsummate anything. "

From this strange episode our narrative must return to the question ofFort Sumter. On April 4, official notice was sent to Major Anderson ofthe coming relief, with the instruction to hold out till the eleventh ortwelfth if possible; but authorizing him to capitulate whenever it mightbecome necessary to save himself and command. Two days later thePresident sent a special messenger with written notice to the governorof South Carolina that an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumterwith provisions only; and that if such attempt were not resisted, nofurther effort would be made to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or unless in case of an attack on the fort. 

The building of batteries around Fort Sumter had been begun, under theorders of Governor Pickens, about the first of January, and continuedwith industry and energy; and about the first of March GeneralBeauregard, an accomplished engineer officer, was sent by theConfederate government to take charge of and complete the works. OnApril 1 he telegraphed to Montgomery: "Batteries ready to open Wednesdayor Thursday. What instructions?"

At this point, the Confederate authorities at Montgomery foundthemselves face to face with the fatal alternative either to begin waror to allow their rebellion to collapse. Their claim to independence wasdenied, their commissioners were refused a hearing; yet not an angryword, provoking threat, nor harmful act had come from President Lincoln. He had promised them peace, protection, freedom from irritation; hadoffered them the benefit of the mails. Even now, all he proposed to dowas--not to send guns or ammunition or men to Sumter, but only bread andprovisions to Anderson and his soldiers. His prudent policy placed themin the exact attitude described a month earlier in his inaugural; theycould have no conflict without being themselves the aggressors. But therebellion was organized by ambitious men with desperate intentions. Amember of the Alabama legislature, present at Montgomery, said toJefferson Davis and three members of his cabinet: "Gentlemen, unless yousprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be backin the old Union in less than ten days. " And the sanguinary advice wasadopted. In answer to his question, "What instructions?" Beauregard onApril 10 was ordered to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and, incase of refusal, to reduce it. 

The demand was presented to Anderson, who replied that he would evacuatethe fort by noon of April 15, unless assailed, or unless he receivedsupplies or controlling instructions from his government. This answerbeing unsatisfactory to Beauregard, he sent Anderson notice that hewould open fire on Sumter at 4:20 on the morning of April 12. 

Promptly at the hour indicated the bombardment was begun. As has beenrelated, the rebel siege-works were built on the points of the islandsforming the harbor, at distances varying from thirteen hundred totwenty-five hundred yards, and numbered nineteen batteries, with anarmament of forty-seven guns, supported by a land force of from four tosix thousand volunteers. The disproportion between means of attack anddefense was enormous. Sumter, though a work three hundred by threehundred and fifty feet in size, with well-constructed walls andcasemates of brick, was in very meager preparation for such a conflict. Of its forty-eight available guns, only twenty-one were in thecasemates, twenty-seven being on the rampart _en barbette_. The garrisonconsisted of nine commissioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissionedofficers and privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatantworkmen compelled by the besiegers to remain to hasten the consumptionof provisions. 

Under the fire of the seventeen mortars in the rebel batteries, Andersoncould reply only with a vertical fire from the guns of small caliber inhis casemates, which was of no effect against the rebel bomb-proofs ofsand and roofs of sloping railroad iron; but, refraining from exposinghis men to serve his barbette guns, his garrison was also safe in itsprotecting casemates. It happened, therefore, that although the attackwas spirited and the defense resolute, the combat went on for a day anda half without a single casualty. It came to an end on the second dayonly when the cartridges of the garrison were exhausted, and the red-hotshot from the rebel batteries had set the buildings used as officers'quarters on fire, creating heat and smoke that rendered further defenseimpossible. 

There was also the further discouragement that the expedition of reliefwhich Anderson had been instructed to look for on the eleventh ortwelfth, had failed to appear. Several unforeseen contingencies hadprevented the assembling of the vessels at the appointed rendezvousoutside Charleston harbor, though some of them reached it in time tohear the opening guns of the bombardment. But as accident had derangedand thwarted the plan agreed upon, they could do nothing exceptimpatiently await the issue of the fight. 

A little after noon of April 13, when the flagstaff of the fort had beenshot away and its guns remained silent, an invitation to capitulate withthe honors of war came from General Beauregard, which Anderson accepted;and on the following day, Sunday, April 14, he hauled down his flag withimpressive ceremonies, and leaving the fort with his faithful garrison, proceeded in a steamer to New York. 

XIV

President's Proclamation Calling for Seventy-five Regiments--Responsesof the Governors--Maryland and Virginia--The Baltimore Riot--WashingtonIsolated--Lincoln Takes the Responsibility--Robert E. Lee--Arrival ofthe New York Seventh--Suspension of Habeas Corpus--The AnnapolisRoute--Butler in Baltimore--Taney on the MerrymanCase--Kentucky--Missouri--Lyon Captures Camp Jackson--BoonvilleSkirmish--The Missouri Convention--Gamble made Governor--The BorderStates

The bombardment of Fort Sumter changed the political situation as if bymagic. There was no longer room for doubt, hesitation, concession, orcompromise. Without awaiting the arrival of the ships that were bringingprovisions to Anderson's starving garrison, the hostile Charlestonbatteries had opened their fire on the fort by the formal order of theConfederate government, and peaceable secession was, withoutprovocation, changed to active war. The rebels gained possession ofCharleston harbor; but their mode of obtaining it awakened thepatriotism of the American people to a stern determination that theinsult to the national authority and flag should be redressed, and theunrighteous experiment of a rival government founded on slavery as itscorner-stone should never succeed. Under the conflict thus begun thelong-tolerated barbarous institution itself was destined ignobly toperish. 

On his journey from Springfield to Washington Mr. Lincoln had said that, devoted as he was to peace, he might find it necessary "to put the footdown firmly. " That time had now come. On the morning of April 15, 1861, the leading newspapers of the country printed the President'sproclamation reciting that, whereas the laws of the United States wereopposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of SouthCarolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings, the militia of the several States of the Union, tothe aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, was called forth tosuppress said combinations and cause the laws to be duly executed. Theorders of the War Department specified that the period of service underthis call should be for three months; and to further conform to theprovisions of the Act of 1795, under which the call was issued, thePresident's proclamation also convened the Congress in special sessionon the coming fourth of July. 

Public opinion in the free States, which had been sadly demoralized bythe long discussions over slavery, and by the existence of four factionsin the late presidential campaign, was instantly crystallized andconsolidated by the Sumter bombardment and the President's proclamationinto a sentiment of united support to the government for the suppressionof the rebellion. The several free-State governors sent loyal andenthusiastic responses to the call for militia, and tendered double thenumbers asked for. The people of the slave States which had not yetjoined the Montgomery Confederacy--namely, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, andDelaware--remained, however, more or less divided on the issue as itnow presented itself. The governors of the first six of these werealready so much engaged in the secret intrigues of the secessionmovement that they sent the Secretary of War contumacious and insultingreplies, and distinct refusals to the President's call for troops. Thegovernor of Delaware answered that there was no organized militia in hisState which he had legal authority to command, but that the officers oforganized volunteer regiments might at their own option offer theirservices to the United States; while the governor of Maryland, incomplying with the requisition, stipulated that the regiments from hisState should not be required to serve outside its limits, except todefend the District of Columbia. 

A swift, almost bewildering rush of events, however, quickly compelledmost of them to take sides. Secession feeling was rampant in Baltimore;and when the first armed and equipped Northern regiment, theMassachusetts Sixth, passed through that city on the morning of April19, on its way to Washington, the last four of its companies wereassailed by street mobs with missiles and firearms while marching fromone depot to the other; and in the running fight which ensued, four ofits soldiers were killed and about thirty wounded, while the mobprobably lost two or three times as many. This tragedy instantly threwthe whole city into a wild frenzy of insurrection. That same afternoonan immense secession meeting in Monument Square listened to a torrent oftreasonable protest and denunciation, in which Governor Hicks himselfwas made momentarily to join. The militia was called out, preparationswere made to arm the city, and that night the railroad bridges wereburned between Baltimore and the Pennsylvania line to prevent thefurther transit of Union regiments. The revolutionary furor spread tothe country towns, and for a whole week the Union flag practicallydisappeared from Maryland. 

While these events were taking place to the north, equally threateningincidents were occurring to the south of Washington. The State ofVirginia had been for many weeks balancing uneasily between loyalty andsecession. In the new revolutionary stress her weak remnant ofconditional Unionism gave way; and on April 17, two days after thePresident's call, her State convention secretly passed a secessionordinance, while Governor Letcher ordered a military seizure of theUnited States navy-yard at Norfolk and the United States armory atHarper's Ferry. Under orders from Washington, both establishments wereburned to prevent their falling into insurrectionary hands; but thedestruction in each case was only partial, and much valuable warmaterial thus passed to rebel uses. 

All these hostile occurrences put the national capital in the greatestdanger. For three days it was entirely cut off from communication withthe North by either telegraph or mail. Under the orders of GeneralScott, the city was hastily prepared for a possible siege. The flour atthe mills, and other stores of provisions were taken possession of. TheCapitol and other public buildings were barricaded, and detachments oftroops stationed in them. Business was suspended by a common impulse;streets were almost deserted except by squads of military patrol;shutters of stores, and even many residences, remained unopenedthroughout the day. The signs were none too reassuring. In addition tothe public rumors whispered about by serious faces on the streets, General Scott reported in writing to President Lincoln on the evening ofApril 22:

"Of rumors, the following are probable, viz. : _First_, that fromfifteen hundred to two thousand troops are at the White House (fourmiles below Mount Vernon, a narrow point in the Potomac), engaged inerecting a battery; _Second_, that an equal force is collected or inprogress of assemblage on the two sides of the river to attack FortWashington; and _Third_, that extra cars went up yesterday to bring downfrom Harper's Ferry about two thousand other troops to join in a generalattack on this capital--that is, on many of its fronts at once. I feelconfident that with our present forces we can defend the Capitol, theArsenal, and all the executive buildings (seven) against ten thousandtroops not better than our District volunteers. "

Throughout this crisis President Lincoln not only maintained hiscomposure, but promptly assumed the high responsibilities the occasiondemanded. On Sunday, April 21, he summoned his cabinet to meet at theNavy Department, and with their unanimous concurrence issued a number ofemergency orders relating to the purchase of ships, the transportationof troops and munitions of war, the advance of $2, 000, 000 of money to aUnion Safety Committee in New York, and other military and navalmeasures, which were despatched in duplicate by private messengers overunusual and circuitous routes. In a message to Congress, in which heafterward explained these extraordinary transactions, he said:

"It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existingmeans, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should letthe government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself ofthe broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases ofinsurrection, I would make an effort to save it with all its blessingsfor the present age and for posterity. "

Unwelcome as was the thought of a possible capture of Washington city, President Lincoln's mind was much more disturbed by many suspiciousindications of disloyalty in public officials, and especially inofficers of the army and navy. Hundreds of clerks of Southern birthemployed in the various departments suddenly left their desks and wentSouth. The commandant of the Washington navy-yard and thequartermaster-general of the army resigned their positions to takeservice under Jefferson Davis. One morning the captain of a lightbattery on which General Scott had placed special reliance for thedefense of Washington came to the President at the White House toasseverate and protest his loyalty and fidelity; and that same nightsecretly left his post and went to Richmond to become a Confederateofficer. 

The most prominent case, however, was that of Colonel Robert E. Lee, theofficer who captured John Brown at Harper's Ferry, and who afterwardbecame the leader of the Confederate armies. As a lieutenant he hadserved on the staff of General Scott in the war with Mexico. Personallyknowing his ability, Scott recommended him to Lincoln as the mostsuitable officer to command the Union army about to be assembled underthe President's call for seventy-five regiments; and this command wasinformally tendered him through a friend. Lee, however, declined theoffer, explaining that "though opposed to secession, and deprecatingwar, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States. " Heresigned his commission in a letter written on April 20, and, withoutwaiting for notice of its acceptance, which alone could discharge himfrom his military obligation, proceeded to Richmond, where he wasformally and publicly invested with the command of the Virginia militaryand naval forces on April 22; while, two days later, the rebelVice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, and a committee of the Richmondconvention signed a formal military league making Virginia an immediatemember of the Confederate States, and placing her armies under thecommand of Jefferson Davis. 

The sudden uprising in Maryland and the insurrectionary activity inVirginia had been largely stimulated by the dream of the leadingconspirators that their new confederacy would combine all the slaveStates, and that by the adhesion of both Maryland and Virginia theywould fall heir to a ready-made seat of government. While thebombardment of Sumter was in progress, the rebel Secretary of War, announcing the news in a jubilant speech at Montgomery, in the presenceof Jefferson Davis and his colleagues, confidently predicted that therebel flag would before the end of May "float over the dome of theCapitol at Washington. " The disloyal demonstrations in Maryland andVirginia rendered such a hope so plausible that Jefferson Davistelegraphed to Governor Letcher at Richmond that he was preparing tosend him thirteen regiments, and added: "Sustain Baltimore ifpracticable. We reinforce you"; while Senator Mason hurried to that citypersonally to furnish advice and military assistance. 

But the flattering expectation was not realized. The requisitepreparation and concert of action were both wanting. The Union troopsfrom New York and New England, pouring into Philadelphia, flanked theobstructions of the Baltimore route by devising a new one by way ofChesapeake Bay and Annapolis; and the opportune arrival of the SeventhRegiment of New York in Washington, on April 25, rendered that cityentirely safe against surprise or attack, relieved the apprehension ofofficials and citizens, and renewed its business and public activity. The mob frenzy of Baltimore and the Maryland towns subsided almost asquickly as it had risen. The Union leaders and newspapers assertedthemselves, and soon demonstrated their superiority in numbers andactivity. 

Serious embarrassment had been created by the timidity of GovernorHicks, who, while Baltimore remained under mob terrorism, officiallyprotested against the landing of Union troops at Annapolis; and, stillworse, summoned the Maryland legislature to meet on April 26--a stepwhich he had theretofore stubbornly refused to take. This event hadbecome doubly dangerous, because a Baltimore city election held duringthe same terror week had reinforced the legislature with ten secessionmembers, creating a majority eager to pass a secession ordinance at thefirst opportunity. The question of either arresting or dispersing thebody by military force was one of the problems which the crisis forcedupon President Lincoln. On full reflection he decided against eithermeasure. 

"I think it would not be justifiable, " he wrote to General Scott, "norefficient for the desired object. _First_, they have a clearly legalright to assemble; and we cannot know in advance that their action willnot be lawful and peaceful. And if we wait until they shall have acted, their arrest or dispersion will not lessen the effect of their action. _Secondly_, we cannot permanently prevent their action. If we arrestthem, we cannot long hold them as prisoners; and, when liberated, theywill immediately reassemble and take their action. And precisely thesame if we simply disperse them: they will immediately reassemble insome other place. I therefore conclude that it is only left to thecommanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shallbe to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt themost prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to thebombardment of their cities; and, in the extremest necessity, thesuspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_. "

Two days later the President formally authorized General Scott tosuspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ along his military lines, or intheir vicinity, if resistance should render it necessary. Arrivals ofadditional troops enabled the General to strengthen his military hold onAnnapolis and the railroads; and on May 13 General B. F. Butler, withabout one thousand men, moved into Baltimore and established a fortifiedcamp on Federal Hill, the bulk of his force being the SixthMassachusetts, which had been mobbed in that city on April 19. Already, on the previous day, the bridges and railroad had been repaired, and theregular transit of troops through the city reëstablished. 

Under these changing conditions the secession majority of the Marylandlegislature did not venture on any official treason. They sent acommittee to interview the President, vented their hostility in spitefulreports and remonstrances, and prolonged their session by a recess. Nevertheless, so inveterate was their disloyalty and plotting againstthe authority of the Union, that four months later it became necessaryto place the leaders under arrest, finally to head off their darlingproject of a Maryland secession ordinance. 

One additional incident of this insurrectionary period remains to benoticed. One John Merryman, claiming to be a Confederate lieutenant, wasarrested in Baltimore for enlisting men for the rebellion, and ChiefJustice Taney of the United States Supreme Court, the famous author ofthe Dred Scott decision, issued a writ of _habeas corpus_ to obtain hisrelease from Fort McHenry. Under the President's orders, GeneralCadwalader of course declined to obey the writ. Upon this, the chiefjustice ordered the general's arrest for contempt, but the officer sentto serve the writ was refused entrance to the fort. In turn, theindignant chief justice, taking counsel of his passion instead of hispatriotism, announced dogmatically that "the President, under theConstitution and laws of the United States, cannot suspend the privilegeof the writ of _habeas corpus_, nor authorize any military officer to doso"; and some weeks afterward filed a long written opinion in support ofthis dictum. It is unnecessary here to quote the opinions of severaleminent jurists who successfully refuted his labored argument, nor torepeat the vigorous analysis with which, in his special message toCongress of July 4, President Lincoln vindicated his own authority. 

While these events were occurring in Maryland and Virginia, theremaining slave States were gradually taking sides, some for, othersagainst rebellion. Under radical and revolutionary leadership similar tothat of the cotton States, the governors and State officials of NorthCarolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas placed their States in an attitude ofinsurrection, and before the middle of May practically joined them tothe Confederate government by the formalities of military leagues andsecession ordinances. 

But in the border slave States--that is, those contiguous to the freeStates--the eventual result was different. In these, though secessionintrigue and sympathy were strong, and though their governors and Stateofficials favored the rebellion, the underlying loyalty and Unionism ofthe people thwarted their revolutionary schemes. This happened even inthe northwestern part of Virginia itself. The forty-eight counties ofthat State lying north of the Alleghanies and adjoining Pennsylvania andOhio repudiated the action at Richmond, seceded from secession, andestablished a loyal provisional State government. President Lincolnrecognized them and sustained them with military aid; and in due timethey became organized and admitted to the Union as the State of WestVirginia. In Delaware, though some degree of secession feeling existed, it was too insignificant to produce any note-worthy publicdemonstration. 

In Kentucky the political struggle was deep and prolonged. The governortwice called the legislature together to initiate secession proceedings;but that body refused compliance, and warded off his scheme by voting tomaintain the State neutrality. Next, the governor sought to utilize themilitary organization known as the State Guard to effect his object. TheUnion leaders offset this movement by enlisting several volunteer Unionregiments. At the June election nine Union congressmen were chosen, andonly one secessionist; while in August a new legislature was electedwith a three-fourths Union majority in each branch. Other secessionintrigues proved equally abortive; and when, finally, in September, Confederate armies invaded Kentucky at three different points, theKentucky legislature invited the Union armies of the West into the Stateto expel them, and voted to place forty thousand Union volunteers at theservice of President Lincoln. 

In Missouri the struggle was more fierce, but also more brief. As farback as January, the conspirators had perfected a scheme to obtainpossession, through the treachery of the officer in charge, of theimportant Jefferson Barracks arsenal at St. Louis, with its store ofsixty thousand stand of arms and a million and a half cartridges. Theproject, however, failed. Rumors of the danger came to General Scott, who ordered thither a company of regulars under command of CaptainNathaniel Lyon, an officer not only loyal by nature and habit, but alsoimbued with strong antislavery convictions. Lyon found valuable supportin the watchfulness of a Union Safety Committee composed of leading St. Louis citizens, who secretly organized a number of Union regimentsrecruited largely from the heavy German population; and from thesesources Lyon was enabled to make such a show of available military forceas effectively to deter any mere popular uprising to seize the arsenal. 

A State convention, elected to pass a secession ordinance, resulted, unexpectedly to the conspirators, in the return of a majority of Uniondelegates, who voted down the secession program and adjourned to thefollowing December. Thereupon, the secession governor ordered his Statemilitia into temporary camps of instruction, with the idea of takingMissouri out of the Union by a concerted military movement. One of theseencampments, established at St. Louis and named Camp Jackson in honor ofthe governor, furnished such unquestionable evidences of intendedtreason that Captain Lyon, whom President Lincoln had meanwhileauthorized to enlist ten thousand Union volunteers, and, if necessary, to proclaim martial law, made a sudden march upon Camp Jackson with hisregulars and six of his newly enlisted regiments, stationed his force incommanding positions around the camp, and demanded its surrender. Thedemand was complied with after but slight hesitation, and the capturedmilitia regiments were, on the following day, disbanded under parole. Unfortunately, as the prisoners were being marched away a secession mobinsulted and attacked some of Lyon's regiments and provoked a returnfire, in which about twenty persons, mainly lookers-on, were killed orwounded; and for a day or two the city was thrown into the panic andlawlessness of a reign of terror. 

Upon this, the legislature, in session at Jefferson City, the capital ofthe State, with a three-fourths secession majority, rushed through theforms of legislation a military bill placing the military and financialresources of Missouri under the governor's control. For a month longervarious incidents delayed the culmination of the approaching struggle, each side continuing its preparations, and constantly accentuating therising antagonism. The crisis came when, on June 11, Governor Jacksonand Captain Lyon, now made brigadier-general by the President, met in aninterview at St. Louis. In this interview the governor demanded that hebe permitted to exercise sole military command to maintain theneutrality of Missouri, while Lyon insisted that the Federal militaryauthority must be left in unrestricted control. It being impossible toreach any agreement, Governor Jackson hurried back to his capital, burning railroad bridges behind him as he went, and on the followingday, June 12, issued his proclamation calling out fifty thousand Statemilitia, and denouncing the Lincoln administration as "anunconstitutional military despotism. "

Lyon was also prepared for this contingency. On the afternoon of June13, he embarked with a regular battery and several battalions of hisUnion volunteers on steamboats, moved rapidly up the Missouri River toJefferson City, drove the governor and the secession legislature intoprecipitate flight, took possession of the capital, and, continuing hisexpedition, scattered, after a slight skirmish, a small rebel militaryforce which had hastily collected at Boonville. Rapidly following theseevents, the loyal members of the Missouri State convention, which had inFebruary refused to pass a secession ordinance, were called together, and passed ordinances under which was constituted a loyal Stategovernment that maintained the local civil authority of the UnitedStates throughout the greater part of Missouri during the whole of theCivil War, only temporarily interrupted by invasions of transientConfederate armies from Arkansas. 

It will be seen from the foregoing outline that the original hope of theSouthern leaders to make the Ohio River the northern boundary of theirslave empire was not realized. They indeed secured the adhesion ofVirginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, by which theterritory of the Confederate States government was enlarged nearly onethird and its population and resources nearly doubled. But the northerntier of slave States--Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, andMissouri--not only decidedly refused to join the rebellion, but remainedtrue to the Union; and this reduced the contest to a trial of militarystrength between eleven States with 5, 115, 790 whites, and 3, 508, 131slaves, against twenty-four States with 21, 611, 422 whites and 342, 212slaves, and at least a proportionate difference in all other resourcesof war. At the very outset the conditions were prophetic of the result. 

XV

Davis's Proclamation for Privateers--Lincoln's Proclamation ofBlockade--The Call for Three Years' Volunteers--Southern MilitaryPreparations--Rebel Capital Moved to Richmond--Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas Admitted to Confederate States--Desertion of Armyand Navy Officers--Union Troops Fortify Virginia Shore of thePotomac--Concentration at Harper's Ferry--Concentration at FortressMonroe and Cairo--English Neutrality--Seward's 21st-of-MayDespatch--Lincoln's Corrections--Preliminary Skirmishes--Forward toRichmond--Plan of McDowell's Campaign

From the slower political developments in the border slave States wemust return and follow up the primary hostilities of the rebellion. Thebombardment of Sumter, President Lincoln's call for troops, theBaltimore riot, the burning of Harper's Ferry armory and Norfolknavy-yard, and the interruption of railroad communication which, fornearly a week, isolated the capital and threatened it with siege andpossible capture, fully demonstrated the beginning of serious civil war. 

Jefferson Davis's proclamation, on April 17, of intention to issueletters of marque, was met two days later by President Lincoln'scounter-proclamation instituting a blockade of the Southern ports, anddeclaring that privateers would be held amenable to the laws againstpiracy. His first call for seventy-five thousand three months' militiawas dictated as to numbers by the sudden emergency, and as to form andterm of service by the provisions of the Act of 1795. It needed only afew days to show that this form of enlistment was both cumbrous andinadequate; and the creation of a more powerful army was almostimmediately begun. On May 3 a new proclamation was issued, calling intoservice 42, 034 three years' volunteers, 22, 714 enlisted men to add tenregiments to the regular army, and 18, 000 seamen for blockade service: atotal immediate increase of 82, 748, swelling the entire militaryestablishment to an army of 156, 861 and a navy of 25, 000. 

No express authority of law yet existed for these measures; butPresident Lincoln took the responsibility of ordering them, trustingthat Congress would legalize his acts. His confidence was entirelyjustified. At the special session which met under his proclamation, onthe fourth of July, these acts were declared valid, and he wasauthorized, moreover, to raise an army of a million men and $250, 000, 000in money to carry on the war to suppress the rebellion; while otherlegislation conferred upon him supplementary authority to meet theemergency. 

Meanwhile, the first effort of the governors of the loyal States was tofurnish their quotas under the first call for militia. This was easyenough as to men. It required only a few days to fill the regiments andforward them to the State capitals and principal cities; but to arm andequip them for the field on the spur of the moment was a difficult taskwhich involved much confusion and delay, even though existing armoriesand foundries pushed their work to the utmost and new ones wereestablished. Under the militia call, the governors appointed all theofficers required by their respective quotas, from company lieutenant tomajor-general of division; while under the new call for three years'volunteers, their authority was limited to the simple organization ofregiments. 

In the South, war preparation also immediately became active. All theindications are that up to their attack on Sumter, the Southern leadershoped to effect separation through concession and compromise by theNorth. That hope, of course, disappeared with South Carolina's openingguns, and the Confederate government made what haste it could to meetthe ordeal it dreaded even while it had provoked it. The rebel Congresswas hastily called together, and passed acts recognizing war andregulating privateering; admitting Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to the Confederate States; authorizing a $50, 000, 000 loan;practically confiscating debts due from Southern to Northern citizens;and removing the seat of government from Montgomery, Alabama, toRichmond, Virginia. 

Four different calls for Southern volunteers had been made, aggregating82, 000 men; and Jefferson Davis's message now proposed to furtherorganize and hold in readiness an army of 100, 000. The work of erectingforts and batteries for defense was being rapidly pushed at all points:on the Atlantic coast, on the Potomac, and on the Mississippi and otherWestern streams. For the present the Confederates were well suppliedwith cannon and small arms from the captured navy-yards at Norfolk andPensacola and the six or eight arsenals located in the South. Themartial spirit of their people was roused to the highest enthusiasm, andthere was no lack of volunteers to fill the companies and regimentswhich the Confederate legislators authorized Davis to accept, either byregular calls on State executives in accordance with, or singly indefiance of, their central dogma of States Rights, as he might prefer. 

The secession of the Southern States not only strengthened the rebellionwith the arms and supplies stored in the various military and navaldepots within their limits, and the fortifications erected for theirdefense: what was of yet greater help to the revolt, a considerableportion of the officers of the army and navy--perhaps onethird--abandoned the allegiance which they had sworn to the UnitedStates, and, under the false doctrine of State supremacy taught bySouthern leaders, gave their professional skill and experience to thedestruction of the government which had educated and honored them. Thedefection of Robert E. Lee was a conspicuous example, and his loss tothe Union and service to the rebel army cannot easily be measured. So, also, were the similar cases of Adjutant-General Cooper andQuartermaster-General Johnston. In gratifying contrast stands thesteadfast loyalty and devotion of Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, who, though he was a Virginian and loved his native State, never waveredan instant in his allegiance to the flag he had heroically followed inthe War of 1812, and triumphantly planted over the capital of Mexico in1847. Though unable to take the field, he as general-in-chief directedthe assembling and first movements of the Union troops. 

The largest part of the three months' regiments were ordered toWashington city as the most important position in a political, and mostexposed in a military point of view. The great machine of war, oncestarted, moved, as it always does, by its own inherent energy fromarming to concentration, from concentration to skirmish and battle. Itwas not long before Washington was a military camp. Gradually thehesitation to "invade" the "sacred soil" of the South faded out underthe stern necessity to forestall an invasion of the equally sacred soilof the North; and on May 24 the Union regiments in Washington crossedthe Potomac and planted themselves in a great semicircle of formidableearthworks eighteen miles long on the Virginia shore, from Chain Bridgeto Hunting Creek, below Alexandria. 

Meanwhile, a secondary concentration of force developed itself atHarper's Ferry, forty-nine miles northwest of Washington. When, on April20, a Union detachment had burned and abandoned the armory at thatpoint, it was at once occupied by a handful of rebel militia; andimmediately thereafter Jefferson Davis had hurried his regiments thitherto "sustain" or overawe Baltimore; and when that prospect failed, itbecame a rebel camp of instruction. Afterward, as Major-GeneralPatterson collected his Pennsylvania quota, he turned it toward thatpoint as a probable field of operations. As a mere town, Harper's Ferrywas unimportant; but, lying on the Potomac, and being at the head of thegreat Shenandoah valley, down which not only a good turnpike, but alsoan effective railroad ran southeastward to the very heart of theConfederacy, it was, and remained through the entire war, a strategicalline of the first importance, protected, as the Shenandoah valley was, by the main chain of the Alleghanies on the west and the Blue Ridge onthe east. 

A part of the eastern quotas had also been hurried to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, lying at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, which became andcontinued an important base for naval as well as military operations. Inthe West, even more important than St. Louis was the little town ofCairo, lying at the extreme southern end of the State of Illinois, atthe confluence of the Ohio River with the Mississippi. Commanding, as itdid, thousands of miles of river navigation in three differentdirections, and being also the southernmost point of the earliestmilitary frontier, it had been the first care of General Scott to occupyit; and, indeed, it proved itself to be the military key of the wholeMississippi valley. 

It was not an easy thing promptly to develop a military policy for thesuppression of the rebellion. The so-called Confederate States ofAmerica covered a military field having more than six times the area ofGreat Britain, with a coast-line of over thirty-five hundred miles, andan interior frontier of over seven thousand miles. Much less was itpossible promptly to plan and set on foot concise military campaigns toreduce the insurgent States to allegiance. Even the great militarygenius of General Scott was unable to do more than suggest a vagueoutline for the work. The problem was not only too vast, but as yet tooindefinite, since the political future of West Virginia, Kentucky, andMissouri still hung in more or less uncertainty. 

The passive and negligent attitude which the Buchanan administration hadmaintained toward the insurrection during the whole three months betweenthe presidential election and Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, gave therebellion an immense advantage in the courts and cabinets of Europe. Until within three days of the end of Buchanan's term not a word ofprotest or even explanation was sent to counteract the impression thatdisunion was likely to become permanent. Indeed, the non-coerciondoctrine of Buchanan's message was, in the eyes of European statesmen, equivalent to an acknowledgment of such a result; and the formation ofthe Confederate government, followed so quickly by the fall of FortSumter, seemed to them a practical realization of their forecast. Thecourse of events appeared not merely to fulfil their expectations, butalso, in the case of England and France, gratified their eager hopes. ToEngland it promised cheap cotton and free trade with the South. ToFrance it appeared to open the way for colonial ambitions which NapoleonIII so soon set on foot on an imperial scale. 

Before Charles Francis Adams, whom President Lincoln appointed as thenew minister to England, arrived in London and obtained an interviewwith Lord John Russell, Mr. Seward had already received several items ofdisagreeable news. One was that, prior to his arrival, the Queen'sproclamation of neutrality had been published, practically raising theConfederate States to the rank of a belligerent power, and, before theyhad a single privateer afloat, giving these an equality in British portswith United States ships of war. Another was that an understanding hadbeen reached between England and France which would lead bothgovernments to take the same course as to recognition, whatever thatcourse might be. Third, that three diplomatic agents of the ConfederateStates were in London, whom the British minister had not yet seen, butwhom he had caused to be informed that he was not unwilling to seeunofficially. 

Under the irritation produced by this hasty and equivocal action of theBritish government, Mr. Seward wrote a despatch to Mr. Adams under dateof May 21, which, had it been sent in the form of the original draft, would scarcely have failed to lead to war between the two nations. Whileit justly set forth with emphasis and courage what the government of theUnited States would endure and what it would not endure from foreignpowers during the Southern insurrection, its phraseology, written in aheat of indignation, was so blunt and exasperating as to implyintentional disrespect. 

When Mr. Seward read the document to President Lincoln, the latter atonce perceived its objectionable tone, and retained it for furtherreflection. A second reading confirmed his first impression. Thereupon, taking his pen, the frontier lawyer, in a careful revision of the wholedespatch, so amended and changed the work of the trained and experiencedstatesman, as entirely to eliminate its offensive crudeness, and bringit within all the dignity and reserve of the most studied diplomaticcourtesy. If, after Mr. Seward's remarkable memorandum of April 1, theSecretary of State had needed any further experience to convince him ofthe President's mastery in both administrative and diplomatic judgment, this second incident afforded him the full evidence. 

No previous President ever had such a sudden increase of official workdevolve upon him as President Lincoln during the early months of hisadministration. The radical change of parties through which he waselected not only literally filled the White House with applicants foroffice, but practically compelled a wholesale substitution of newappointees for the old, to represent the new thought and will of thenation. The task of selecting these was greatly complicated by the sharpcompetition between the heterogeneous elements of which the Republicanparty was composed. This work was not half completed when the Sumterbombardment initiated active rebellion, and precipitated the newdifficulty of sifting the loyal from the disloyal, and the yet morepressing labor of scrutinizing the organization of the immense newvolunteer army called into service by the proclamation of May 3. Mr. Lincoln used often to say at this period, when besieged by claims toappointment, that he felt like a man letting rooms at one end of hishouse, while the other end was on fire. In addition to this merelyroutine work was the much more delicate and serious duty of deciding thehundreds of novel questions affecting the constitutional principles andtheories of administration. 

The great departments of government, especially those of war and navy, could not immediately expedite either the supervision or clericaldetails of this sudden expansion, and almost every case of resultingconfusion and delay was brought by impatient governors and Stateofficials to the President for complaint and correction. Volunteers werecoming rapidly enough to the various rendezvous in the different States, but where were the rations to feed them, money to pay them, tents toshelter them, uniforms to clothe them, rifles to arm them, officers todrill and instruct them, or transportation to carry them? In thiscarnival of patriotism, this hurly-burly of organization, the weaknessesas well as the virtues of human nature quickly developed themselves, andthere was manifest not only the inevitable friction of personal rivalry, but also the disturbing and baneful effects of occasional falsehood anddishonesty, which could not always be immediately traced to theresponsible culprit. It happened in many instances that there werealarming discrepancies between the full paper regiments and brigadesreported as ready to start from State capitals, and the actual number ofrecruits that railroad trains brought to the Washington camps; and Mr. Lincoln several times ironically compared the process to that of a mantrying to shovel a bushel of fleas across a barn floor. 

While the month of May insensibly slipped away amid these preparatoryvexations, camps of instruction rapidly grew to small armies at a fewprincipal points, even under such incidental delay and loss; and duringJune the confronting Union and Confederate forces began to produce theconflicts and casualties of earnest war. As yet they were both few andunimportant: the assassination of Ellsworth when Alexandria wasoccupied; a slight cavalry skirmish at Fairfax Court House; the rout ofa Confederate regiment at Philippi, West Virginia; the blunderingleadership through which two Union detachments fired upon each other inthe dark at Big Bethel, Virginia; the ambush of a Union railroad trainat Vienna Station; and Lyon's skirmish, which scattered the firstcollection of rebels at Boonville, Missouri. Comparatively speaking allthese were trivial in numbers of dead and wounded--the first few dropsof blood before the heavy sanguinary showers the future was destined tobring. But the effect upon the public was irritating and painful to adegree entirely out of proportion to their real extent and gravity. 

The relative loss and gain in these affairs was not greatly unequal. Thevictories of Philippi and Boonville easily offset the disasters of BigBethel and Vienna. But the public mind was not yet schooled to patienceand to the fluctuating chances of war. The newspapers demanded promptprogress and ample victory as imperatively as they were wont to demandparty triumph in politics or achievement in commercial enterprise. "Forward to Richmond, " repeated the "New York Tribune, " day after day, and many sheets of lesser note and influence echoed the cry. Thereseemed, indeed, a certain reason for this clamor, because the period ofenlistment of the three months' regiments was already two thirds gone, and they were not yet all armed and equipped for field service. 

President Lincoln was fully alive to the need of meeting this populardemand. The special session of Congress was soon to begin, and to it thenew administration must look, not only to ratify what had been done, butto authorize a large increase of the military force, and heavy loans forcoming expenses of the war. On June 29, therefore, he called his cabinetand principal military officers to a council of war at the ExecutiveMansion, to discuss a more formidable campaign than had yet beenplanned. General Scott was opposed to such an undertaking at that time. He preferred waiting until autumn, meanwhile organizing and drilling alarge army, with which to move down the Mississippi and end the war witha final battle at New Orleans. Aside from the obvious militaryobjections to this course, such a procrastination, in the presentirritation of the public temper, was not to be thought of; and the oldgeneral gracefully waived his preference and contributed his bestjudgment to the perfecting of an immediate campaign into Virginia. 

The Confederate forces in Virginia had been gathered by the orders ofGeneral Lee into a defensive position at Manassas Junction, where arailroad from Richmond and another from Harper's Ferry come together. Here General Beauregard, who had organized and conducted the Sumterbombardment, had command of a total of about twenty-five thousand menwhich he was drilling. The Junction was fortified with some slightfield-works and fifteen heavy guns, supported by a garrison of twothousand; while the main body was camped in a line of seven miles'length behind Bull Run, a winding, sluggish stream flowing southeasterlytoward the Potomac. The distance was about thirty-two miles southwest ofWashington. Another Confederate force of about ten thousand, underGeneral J. E. Johnston, was collected at Winchester and Harper's Ferryon the Potomac, to guard the entrance to the Shenandoah valley; and anunderstanding existed between Johnston and Beauregard, that in caseeither were attacked, the other would come to his aid by the quickrailroad transportation between the two places. 

The new Union plan contemplated that Brigadier-General McDowell shouldmarch from Washington against Manassas and Bull Run, with a forcesufficient to beat Beauregard, while General Patterson, who hadconcentrated the bulk of the Pennsylvania regiments in the neighborhoodof Harper's Ferry, in numbers nearly or quite double that of hisantagonist, should move against Johnston, and either fight or hold himso that he could not come to the aid of Beauregard. At the councilMcDowell emphasized the danger of such a junction; but General Scottassured him: "If Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have Patterson onhis heels. " With this understanding, McDowell's movement was ordered tobegin on July 9. 

XVI

Congress--The President's Message--Men and Money Voted--TheContraband--Dennison Appoints McClellan--Rich Mountain--McDowell--BullRun--Patterson's Failure--McClellan at Washington

While these preparations for a Virginia campaign were going on, anothercampaign was also slowly shaping itself in Western Virginia; but beforeeither of them reached any decisive results the Thirty-seventh Congress, chosen at the presidential election of 1860, met in special session onthe fourth of July, 1861, in pursuance of the President's proclamationof April 15. There being no members present in either branch from theseceded States, the number in each house was reduced nearly one third. Agreat change in party feeling was also manifest. No more rampantsecession speeches were to be heard. Of the rare instances of men whowere yet to join the rebellion, ex-Vice-President Breckinridge was themost conspicuous example; and their presence was offset by prominentSouthern Unionists like Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and John J. Crittenden of Kentucky. The heated antagonisms which had divided theprevious Congress into four clearly defined factions were so farrestrained or obliterated by the events of the past four months, as toleave but a feeble opposition to the Republican majority now dominant inboth branches, which was itself rendered moderate and prudent by the newconditions. 

The message of President Lincoln was temperate in spirit, but positiveand strong in argument. Reciting the secession and rebellion of theConfederate States, and their unprovoked assault on Fort Sumter, hecontinued:

"Having said to them in the inaugural address, 'You can have no conflictwithout being yourselves the aggressors, ' he took pains not only to keepthis declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the powerof ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able tomisunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surroundingcircumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailantsof the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight orin expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort sentto that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready togive that protection in whatever was lawful. .. . This issue embraces morethan the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family ofman the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy--agovernment of the people by the same people--can or cannot maintain itsterritorial integrity against its own domestic foes. "

With his singular felicity of statement, he analyzed and refuted thesophism that secession was lawful and constitutional. 

"This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from theassumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertainingto a State--to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have neithermore nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by theConstitution--no one of them ever having been a State out of theUnion. .. . The States have their status in the Union, and they have noother legal status. If they break from this, they can only do so againstlaw and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or purchasethe Union gave each of them whatever of independence or liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created themas States. Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and, inturn, the Union threw off their old dependence for them, and made themStates, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a State constitutionindependent of the Union. "

A noteworthy point in the message is President Lincoln's expression ofhis abiding confidence in the intelligence and virtue of the people ofthe United States. 

"It may be affirmed, " said he, "without extravagance that the freeinstitutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved thecondition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of thiswe now have a striking and an impressive illustration. So large an armyas the government has now on foot was never before known, without asoldier in it but who has taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this, there are many single regiments whose members, oneand another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known inthe world; and there is scarcely one from which there could not beselected a President, a cabinet a congress, and, perhaps, a court, abundantly competent to administer the government itself. .. . This isessentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is astruggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance ofgovernment whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; tolift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths oflaudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start, and a fairchance in the race of life. .. . I am most happy to believe that the plainpeople understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note that whilein this, the government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in thearmy and navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned andproved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldieror common sailor is known to have deserted his flag. "

Hearty applause greeted that portion of the message which asked formeans to make the contest short and decisive; and Congress actedpromptly by authorizing a loan of $250, 000, 000 and an army not to exceedone million men. All of President Lincoln's war measures for which noprevious sanction of law existed were duly legalized; additional directincome and tariff taxes were laid; and the Force Bill of 1795, andvarious other laws relating to conspiracy, piracy, unlawful recruiting, and kindred topics, were amended or passed. 

Throughout the whole history of the South, by no means the least of theevils entailed by the institution of slavery was the dread of slaveinsurrections which haunted every master's household; and this vagueterror was at once intensified by the outbreak of civil war. It standsto the lasting credit of the negro race in the United States that thewrongs of their long bondage provoked them to no such crime, and thatthe Civil War appears not to have even suggested, much less started, anysuch organization or attempt. But the John Brown raid had indicated somepossibility of the kind, and when the Union troops began their movementsGenerals Butler in Maryland and Patterson in Pennsylvania, movingtoward Harper's Ferry, and McClellan in West Virginia, in order toreassure non-combatants, severally issued orders that all attempts atslave insurrection should be suppressed. It was a most pointed andsignificant warning to the leaders of the rebellion how much morevulnerable the peculiar institution was in war than in peace, and thattheir ill-considered scheme to protect and perpetuate slavery wouldprove the most potent engine for its destruction. 

The first effect of opening hostilities was to give adventurous ordiscontented slaves the chance to escape into Union camps, where, evenagainst orders to the contrary, they found practical means of protectionor concealment for the sake of the help they could render as cooks, servants, or teamsters, or for the information they could give orobtain, or the invaluable service they could render as guides. Practically, therefore, at the very beginning, the war created a bond ofmutual sympathy based on mutual helpfulness, between the Southern negroand the Union volunteer; and as fast as the Union troops advanced, andsecession masters fled, more or less slaves found liberation and refugein the Union camps. 

At some points, indeed, this tendency created an embarrassment to Unioncommanders. A few days after General Butler assumed command of the Uniontroops at Fortress Monroe, the agent of a rebel master who had fled fromthe neighborhood came to demand, under the provisions of thefugitive-slave law, three field hands alleged to be in Butler's camp. Butler responded that as Virginia claimed to be a foreign country thefugitive-slave law was clearly inoperative, unless the owner would comeand take an oath of allegiance to the United States. In connection withthis incident, the newspaper report stated that as the breastworks andbatteries which had been so rapidly erected for Confederate defense inevery direction on the Virginia peninsula were built by enforced negrolabor under rigorous military impressment, negroes were manifestlycontraband of war under international law. The dictum was so pertinent, and the equity so plain, that, though it was not officially formulatedby the general until two months later, it sprang at once into popularacceptance and application; and from that time forward the words "slave"and "negro" were everywhere within the Union lines replaced by thefamiliar, significant term "contraband. "

While Butler's happy designation had a more convincing influence onpublic thought than a volume of discussion, it did not immediately solvethe whole question. Within a few days he reported that he had slaveproperty to the value of $60, 000 in his hands, and by the end of Julynine hundred "contrabands, " men, women, and children, of all ages. Whatwas their legal status, and how should they be disposed of? It was aknotty problem, for upon its solution might depend the sensitive publicopinion and balancing, undecided loyalty and political action of theborder slave States of Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. In solving the problem, President Lincoln kept in mind the philosophicmaxim of one of his favorite stories, that when the Western Methodistpresiding elder, riding about the circuit during the spring freshets, was importuned by his young companion how they should ever be able toget across the swollen waters of Fox River, which they were approaching, the elder quieted him by saying he had made it the rule of his lifenever to cross Fox River till he came to it. 

The President did not immediately decide, but left it to be treated as aquestion of camp and local police, in the discretion of each commander. Under this theory, later in the war, some commanders excluded, othersadmitted such fugitives to their camps; and the curt formula of GeneralOrders, "We have nothing to do with slaves. We are neither negrostealers nor negro catchers, " was easily construed by subordinateofficers to justify the practice of either course. _Inter arma silentleges_. For the present, Butler was instructed not to surrender suchfugitives, but to employ them in suitable labor, and leave the questionof their final disposition for future determination. Congress greatlyadvanced the problem, soon after the battle of Bull Run, by adopting anamendment which confiscated a rebel master's right to his slave when, byhis consent, such slave was employed in service or labor hostile to theUnited States. The debates exhibited but little spirit of partizanship, even on this feature of the slavery question. The border State membersdid not attack the justice of such a penalty. They could only urge thatit was unconstitutional and inexpedient. On the general policy of thewar, both houses, with but few dissenting votes, passed the resolution, offered by Mr. Crittenden, which declared that the war was not waged foroppression or subjugation, or to interfere with the rights orinstitutions of States, "but to defend and maintain the supremacy of theConstitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired. " The special sessionadjourned on August 6, having in a single month completed and enacted athorough and comprehensive system of war legislation. 

The military events that were transpiring in the meanwhile doubtless hadtheir effect in hastening the decision and shortening the labors ofCongress. To command the thirteen regiments of militia furnished by theState of Ohio, Governor Dennison had given a commission of major-generalto George B. McClellan, who had been educated at West Point and servedwith distinction in the Mexican War, and who, through unusualopportunities in travel and special duties in surveys and exploration, had gained acquirements and qualifications that appeared to fit him fora brilliant career. Being but thirty-five years old, and having reachedonly the grade of captain, he had resigned from the army, and was at themoment serving as president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. General Scott warmly welcomed his appointment to lead the Ohiocontingent, and so industriously facilitated his promotion that by thebeginning of June McClellan's militia commission as major-general hadbeen changed to a commission for the same grade in the regular army, andhe found himself assigned to the command of a military departmentextending from Western Virginia to Missouri. Though this was a leap inmilitary title, rank, and power which excels the inventions of romance, it was necessitated by the sudden exigencies of army expansion over thevast territory bordering the insurrection, and for a while seemedjustified by the hopeful promise indicated in the young officer's zealand activity. 

His instructions made it a part of his duty to encourage and support theUnionists of Western Virginia in their political movement to divide theState and erect a Union commonwealth out of that portion of it lyingnorthwest of the Alleghanies. General Lee, not fully informed of theadverse popular sentiment, sent a few Confederate regiments into thatregion to gather recruits and hold the important mountain passes. McClellan, in turn, advanced a detachment eastward from Wheeling, toprotect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; and at the beginning of June, an expedition of two regiments, led by Colonel Kelly, made a spiriteddash upon Philippi, where, by a complete surprise, he routed andscattered Porterfield's recruiting detachment of one thousandConfederates. Following up this initial success, McClellan threwadditional forces across the Ohio, and about a month later had the goodfortune, on July 11, by a flank movement under Rosecrans, to drive aregiment of the enemy out of strong intrenchments on Rich Mountain, force the surrender of the retreating garrison on the following day, July 12, and to win a third success on the thirteenth over anotherflying detachment at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of the CheatRiver, where the Confederate General Garnett was killed in askirmish-fire between sharp-shooters. 

These incidents, happening on three successive days, and in distanceforty miles apart, made a handsome showing for the young departmentcommander when gathered into the single, short telegram in which hereported to Washington that Garnett was killed, his force routed, atleast two hundred of the enemy killed, and seven guns and one thousandprisoners taken. "Our success is complete, and secession is killed inthis country, " concluded the despatch. The result, indeed, largelyovershadowed in importance the means which accomplished it. The Unionloss was only thirteen killed and forty wounded. In subsequent effect, these two comparatively insignificant skirmishes permanently recoveredthe State of West Virginia to the Union. The main credit was, of course, due to the steadfast loyalty of the people of that region. 

This victory afforded welcome relief to the strained and impatientpublic opinion of the Northern States, and sharpened the eagerexpectation of the authorities at Washington of similar results fromthe projected Virginia campaign. The organization and command of thatcolumn were intrusted to Brigadier-General McDowell, advanced to thisgrade from his previous rank of major. He was forty-two years old, anaccomplished West Point graduate, and had won distinction in the MexicanWar, though since that time he had been mainly engaged in staff duty. Onthe morning of July 16, he began his advance from the fortifications ofWashington, with a marching column of about twenty-eight thousand menand a total of forty-nine guns, an additional division of about sixthousand being left behind to guard his communications. Owing to therawness of his troops, the first few days' march was necessarilycautious and cumbersome. 

The enemy, under Beauregard, had collected about twenty-three thousandmen and thirty-five guns, and was posted behind Bull Run. A preliminaryengagement occurred on Thursday, July 18, at Blackburn's Ford on thatstream, which served to develop the enemy's strong position, but onlydelayed the advance until the whole of McDowell's force reachedCentreville Here McDowell halted, spent Friday and Saturday inreconnoitering, and on Sunday, July 21, began the battle by a circuitousmarch across Bull Run and attacking the enemy's left flank. 

It proved that the plan was correctly chosen, but, by a confusion in themarch, the attack, intended for day-break, was delayed until nineo'clock. Nevertheless, the first half of the battle, during theforenoon, was entirely successful, the Union lines steadily driving theenemy southward, and enabling additional Union brigades to join theattacking column by a direct march from Centreville. 

At noon, however, the attack came to a halt, partly through the fatigueof the troops, partly because the advancing line, having swept the fieldfor nearly a mile, found itself in a valley, from which further progresshad to be made with all the advantage of the ground in favor of theenemy. In the lull of the conflict which for a while ensued, theConfederate commander, with little hope except to mitigate a defeat, hurriedly concentrated his remaining artillery and supporting regimentsinto a semicircular line of defense at the top of the hill that theFederals would be obliged to mount, and kept them well concealed amongthe young pines at the edge of the timber, with an open field in theirfront. 

Against this second position of the enemy, comprising twelve regiments, twenty-two guns, and two companies of cavalry, McDowell advanced in theafternoon with an attacking force of fourteen regiments, twenty-fourguns, and a single battalion of cavalry, but with all the advantages ofposition against him. A fluctuating and intermitting attack resulted. The nature of the ground rendered a combined advance impossible. TheUnion brigades were sent forward and repulsed by piecemeal. A batterywas lost by mistaking a Confederate for a Union regiment. Even now thevictory seemed to vibrate, when a new flank attack by seven rebelregiments, from an entirely unexpected direction, suddenly impressed theUnion troops with the belief that Johnston's army from Harper's Ferryhad reached the battle-field; and, demoralized by this belief, the Unioncommands, by a common impulse, gave up the fight as lost, and halfmarched, half ran from the field. Before reaching Centreville, theretreat at one point degenerated into a downright panic among armyteamsters and a considerable crowd of miscellaneous camp-followers; andhere a charge or two by the Confederate cavalry companies capturedthirteen Union guns and quite a harvest of army wagons. 

When the truth came to be known, it was found that through the want ofskill and courage on the part of General Patterson in his operations atHarper's Ferry, General Johnston, with his whole Confederate army, hadbeen allowed to slip away; and so far from coming suddenly into thebattle of Bull Run, the bulk of them were already in Beauregard's campson Saturday, and performed the heaviest part of the fighting in Sunday'sconflict. 

The sudden cessation of the battle left the Confederates in doubtwhether their victory was final, or only a prelude to a fresh Unionattack. But as the Union forces not only retreated from the field, butalso from Centreville, it took on, in their eyes, the proportions of agreat triumph; confirming their expectation of achieving ultimateindependence, and, in fact, giving them a standing in the eyes offoreign nations which they had hardly dared hope for so soon. In numbersof killed and wounded, the two armies suffered about equally; andGeneral Johnston writes: "The Confederate army was more disorganized byvictory than that of the United States by defeat. " Manassas was turnedinto a fortified camp, but the rebel leaders felt themselves unable tomake an aggressive movement during the whole of the following autumn andwinter. 

The shock of the defeat was deep and painful to the administration andthe people of the North. Up to late Sunday afternoon favorable reportshad come to Washington from the battle-field, and every one believed inan assured victory. When a telegram came about five o'clock in theafternoon, that the day was lost, and McDowell's army in full retreatthrough Centreville, General Scott refused to credit the news, socontradictory of everything which had been heard up to that hour. Butthe intelligence was quickly confirmed. The impulse of retreat oncestarted, McDowell's effort to arrest it at Centreville proved useless. The regiments and brigades not completely disorganized made anunmolested and comparatively orderly march back to the fortifications ofWashington, while on the following day a horde of stragglers found theirway across the bridges of the Potomac into the city. 

President Lincoln received the news quietly and without any visible signof perturbation or excitement; but he remained awake and in theexecutive office all of Sunday night, listening to the personalnarratives of a number of congressmen and senators who had, with unduecuriosity, followed the army and witnessed some of the sounds and sightsof the battle. By the dawn of Monday morning the President hadsubstantially made up his judgment of the battle and its probableresults, and the action dictated by the untoward event. This was, inbrief, that the militia regiments enlisted under the three months' callshould be mustered out as soon as practicable; the organization of thenew three years' forces be pushed forward both east and west; Manassasand Harper's Ferry and the intermediate lines of communication be seizedand held; and a joint movement organized from Cincinnati on EastTennessee, and from Cairo on Memphis. 

Meanwhile, General McClellan was ordered from West Virginia toWashington, where he arrived on July 26, and assumed command of theDivision of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washingtonon both sides of the river. He quickly cleared the city of stragglers, and displayed a gratifying activity in beginning the organization of theArmy of the Potomac from the new three years' volunteers that werepouring into Washington by every train. He was received by theadministration and the army with the warmest friendliness andconfidence, and for awhile seemed to reciprocate these feelings withzeal and gratitude. 

XVII

General Scott's Plans--Criticized as the "Anaconda"--The Three Fields ofConflict--Frémont Appointed Major-General--His Military Failures--Battleof Wilson's Creek--Hunter Ordered to Frémont--Frémont'sProclamation--President Revokes Frémont's Proclamation--Lincoln's Letterto Browning--Surrender of Lexington--Frémont Takes the Field--Cameron'sVisit to Frémont--Frémont's Removal

The military genius and experience of General Scott, from the first, pretty correctly divined the grand outline of military operations whichwould become necessary in reducing the revolted Southern States torenewed allegiance. Long before the battle of Bull Run was planned, heurged that the first seventy-five regiments of three months' militiacould not be relied on for extensive campaigns, because their term ofservice would expire before they could be well organized. His outlinesuggestion, therefore, was that the new three years' volunteer army beplaced in ten or fifteen healthy camps and given at least four months ofdrill and tactical instruction; and when the navy had, by a rigidblockade, closed all the harbors along the seaboard of the SouthernStates, the fully prepared army should, by invincible columns, move downthe Mississippi River to New Orleans, leaving a strong cordon ofmilitary posts behind it to keep open the stream, join hands with theblockade, and thus envelop the principal area of rebellion in apowerful military grasp which would paralyze and effectually kill theinsurrection. Even while suggesting this plan, however, the generaladmitted that the great obstacle to its adoption would be the impatienceof the patriotic and loyal Union people and leaders, who would refuse towait the necessary length of time. 

The general was correct in his apprehension. The newspapers criticizedhis plan in caustic editorials and ridiculous cartoons as "Scott'sAnaconda, " and public opinion rejected it in an overwhelming demand fora prompt and energetic advance. Scott was correct in military theory, while the people and the administration were right in practice, underexisting political conditions. Although Bull Run seemed to justify thegeneral, West Virginia and Missouri vindicated the President and thepeople. 

It can now be seen that still a third element--geography--intervened togive shape and sequence to the main outlines of the Civil War. When, atthe beginning of May, General Scott gave his advice, the seat ofgovernment of the first seven Confederate States was still atMontgomery, Alabama. By the adhesion of the four interior border Statesto the insurrection, and the removal of the archives and administrationof Jefferson Davis to Richmond, Virginia, toward the end of June, as thecapital of the now eleven Confederate States, Washington necessarilybecame the center of Union attack, and Richmond the center ofConfederate defense. From the day when McDowell began his march to BullRun, to that when Lee evacuated Richmond in his final hopeless flight, the route between these two opposing capitals remained the principal anddominating line of military operations, and the region betweenChesapeake Bay and the Potomac River on the east, and the chain of theAlleghanies on the west, the primary field of strategy. 

According to geographical features, the second great field of strategylay between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, and thethird between the Mississippi River, the Rocky Mountains, and the RioGrande. Except in Western Virginia, the attitude of neutrality assumedby Kentucky for a considerable time delayed the definition of themilitary frontier and the beginning of active hostilities in the secondfield, thus giving greater momentary importance to conditions existingand events transpiring in Missouri, with the city of St. Louis as theprincipal center of the third great military field. 

The same necessity which dictated the promotion of General McClellan atone bound from captain to major-general compelled a similar phenomenalpromotion, not alone of officers of the regular army, but also ofeminent civilians to high command and military responsibility in theimmense volunteer force authorized by Congress. Events, rather thanoriginal purpose, had brought McClellan into prominence and rankingduty; but now, by design, the President gave John C. Frémont acommission of major-general, and placed him in command of the thirdgreat military field, with headquarters at St. Louis, with the leadingidea that he should organize the military strength of the Northwest, first, to hold Missouri to the Union, and, second, by a carefullyprepared military expedition open the Mississippi River. By so doing, hewould sever the Confederate States, reclaim or conquer the region lyingwest of the great stream, and thus reduce by more than one half theterritorial area of the insurrection. Though he had been an armylieutenant, he had no experience in active war; yet the talent andenergy he had displayed in Western military exploration, and thepolitical prominence he had reached as candidate of the Republican partyfor President in 1856, seemed to fit him preëminently for such a duty. 

While most of the volunteers from New England and the Middle States wereconcentrated at Washington and dependent points, the bulk of the Westernregiments was, for the time being, put under the command of Frémont forpresent and prospective duty. But the high hopes which theadministration placed in the general were not realized. The genius whichcould lead a few dozen or a few hundred Indian scouts and mountaintrappers over desert plains and through the fastnesses of the SierraNevada, that could defy savage hostilities and outlive starvation amidimprisoning snows, failed signally before the task of animating andcombining the patriotic enthusiasm of eight or ten great northwesternStates, and organizing and leading an army of one hundred thousand eagervolunteers in a comprehensive and decisive campaign to recover a greatnational highway. From the first, Frémont failed in promptness, inforesight, in intelligent supervision and, above all, in inspiringconfidence and attracting assistance and devotion. His militaryadministration created serious extravagance and confusion, and hispersonal intercourse excited the distrust and resentment of thegovernors and civilian officials, whose counsel and coöperation wereessential to his usefulness and success. 

While his resources were limited, and while he fortified St. Louis andreinforced Cairo, a yet more important point needed his attention andhelp. Lyon, who had followed Governor Jackson and General Price in theirflight from Boonville to Springfield in southern Missouri, found hisforces diminished beyond his expectation by the expiration of the termof service of his three months' regiments, and began to be threatened bya northward concentration of Confederate detachments from the Arkansasline and the Indian Territory. The neglect of his appeals for helpplaced him in the situation where he could neither safely remaininactive, nor safely retreat. He therefore took the chances ofscattering the enemy before him by a sudden, daring attack with his fivethousand effectives, against nearly treble numbers, in the battle ofWilson's Creek, at daylight on August 10. The casualties on the twosides were nearly equal, and the enemy was checked and crippled; but theUnion army sustained a fatal loss in the death of General Lyon, who wasinstantly killed while leading a desperate bayonet charge. His skill andactivity had, so far, been the strength of the Union cause in Missouri. The absence of his counsel and personal example rendered a retreat tothe railroad terminus at Rolla necessary. This discouraging event turnedpublic criticism sharply upon Frémont. Loath to yield to mere publicclamor, and averse to hasty changes in military command, Mr. Lincolnsought to improve the situation by sending General David Hunter to takea place on Frémont's staff. 

"General Frémont needs assistance, " said his note to Hunter, "which itis difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. Hiscardinal mistake is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to seehim; and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matterhe is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of largeexperience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is onegrade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve the countryand oblige me by taking it voluntarily?"

This note indicates, better than pages of description, the kind, helpful, and forbearing spirit with which the President, through thelong four years' war, treated his military commanders and subordinates;and which, in several instances, met such ungenerous return. But evenwhile Mr. Lincoln was attempting to smooth this difficulty, Frémont hadalready burdened him with two additional embarrassments. One was aperplexing personal quarrel the general had begun with the influentialBlair family, represented by Colonel Frank Blair, the indefatigableUnionist leader in Missouri, and Montgomery Blair, thepostmaster-general in Lincoln's cabinet, who had hitherto been Frémont'smost influential friends and supporters; and, in addition, the father ofthese, Francis P. Blair, Sr. , a veteran politician whose influence datedfrom Jackson's administration, and through whose assistance Frémont hadbeen nominated as presidential candidate in 1856. 

The other embarrassment was of a more serious and far-reaching nature. Conscious that he was losing the esteem and confidence of both civil andmilitary leaders in the West, Frémont's adventurous fancy caught at theidea of rehabilitating himself before the public by a bold politicalmanoeuver. Day by day the relation of slavery to the Civil War wasbecoming a more troublesome question, and exciting impatient and angrydiscussion. Without previous consultation with the President or any ofhis advisers or friends, Frémont, on August 30, wrote and printed, ascommander of the Department of the West, a proclamation establishingmartial law throughout the State of Missouri, and announcing that:

"All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within theselines shall be tried by court-martial, and if found guilty will be shot. The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State ofMissouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shallbe directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies inthe field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use; and theirslaves, if any they have, are hereby declared freemen. "

The reason given in the proclamation for this drastic and dictatorialmeasure was to suppress disorder, maintain the public peace, and protectpersons and property of loyal citizens--all simple police duties. Forissuing his proclamation without consultation with the President, hecould offer only the flimsy excuse that it involved two days of time tocommunicate with Washington, while he well knew that no battle waspending and no invasion in progress. This reckless misuse of powerPresident Lincoln also corrected with his dispassionate prudence andhabitual courtesy. He immediately wrote to the general:

"MY DEAR SIR: Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me someanxiety:

"_First_. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, theConfederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands, inretaliation; and so, man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, myorder that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation, withoutfirst having my approbation or consent. 

"_Second_. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, inrelation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves oftraitorous owners, will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn themagainst us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allowme, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify thatparagraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the actof Congress entitled, 'An act to confiscate property used forinsurrectionary purposes, ' approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of whichact I herewith send you. 

"This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. Isend it by a special messenger, in order that it may certainly andspeedily reach you. "

But the headstrong general was too blind and selfish to accept this mildredress of a fault that would have justified instant displacement fromcommand. He preferred that the President should openly direct him tomake the correction. Admitting that he decided in one night upon themeasure, he added: "If I were to retract it of my own accord, it wouldimply that I myself thought it wrong, and that I had acted without thereflection which the gravity of the point demanded. " The inference isplain that Frémont was unwilling to lose the influence of his hasty stepupon public opinion. But by this course he deliberately placed himselfin an attitude of political hostility to the administration. 

The incident produced something of the agitation which the general hadevidently counted upon. Radical antislavery men throughout the freeStates applauded his act and condemned the President, and militaryemancipation at once became a subject of excited discussion. Even strongconservatives were carried away by the feeling that rebels would be butproperly punished by the loss of their slaves. To Senator Browning, thePresident's intimate personal friend, who entertained this feeling, Mr. Lincoln wrote a searching analysis of Frémont's proclamation and itsdangers:

"Yours of the seventeenth is just received; and, coming from you, Iconfess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a lawwhich you had assisted in making and presenting to me, less than a monthbefore, is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Frémont'sproclamation as to confiscation of property and the liberation of slavesis purely political, and not within the range of military law ornecessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farmof a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, hehas the right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the necessitylasts; and this is within military law, because within militarynecessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner orhis heirs forever, and this as well when the farm is not needed formilitary purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savorof military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the generalneeds them he can seize them and use them, but when the need is past, itis not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must besettled according to laws made by law-makers, and not by militaryproclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply'dictatorship. ' It assumes that the general may do anything hepleases--confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal people, aswell as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular, with some thoughtless people, than that which hasbeen done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow othersto assume it on my responsibility. 

"You speak of it as being the only means of saving the government. Onthe contrary, it is itself the surrender of the government. Can it bepretended that it is any longer the government of the United States--anygovernment of constitution and laws--wherein a general or a presidentmay make permanent rules of property by proclamation? I do not sayCongress might not, with propriety, pass a law on the point, just suchas General Frémont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member ofCongress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shallexpressly or impliedly seize and exercize the permanent legislativefunctions of the government. 

"So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing waspopular in some quarters, and would have been more so if it had been ageneral declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would notbudge till that proclamation was modified; and General Andersontelegraphed me that on the news of General Frémont having actuallyissued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threwdown their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probablethat the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. Theseall against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We wouldas well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of thiscapital. "

If it be objected that the President himself decreed militaryemancipation a year later, then it must be remembered that Frémont'sproclamation differed in many essential particulars from the President'sedict of January 1, 1863. By that time, also, the entirely changedconditions justified a complete change of policy; but, above all, thesupreme reason of military necessity, upon which alone Mr. Lincoln basedthe constitutionality of his edict of freedom, was entirely wanting inthe case of Frémont. 

The harvest of popularity which Frémont evidently hoped to secure by hisproclamation was soon blighted by a new military disaster. TheConfederate forces which had been united in the battle of Wilson's Creekquickly became disorganized through the disagreement of their leadersand the want of provisions and other military supplies, and mainlyreturned to Arkansas and the Indian Territory, whence they had come. ButGeneral Price, with his Missouri contingent, gradually increased hisfollowers, and as the Union retreat from Springfield to Rolla left theway open, began a northward march through the western part of the Stateto attack Colonel Mulligan, who, with about twenty-eight hundred Federaltroops, intrenched himself at Lexington on the Missouri River. Secessionsympathy was strong along the line of his march, and Price gainedadherents so rapidly that on September 18 he was able to investMulligan's position with a somewhat irregular army numbering abouttwenty thousand. After a two days' siege, the garrison was compelled tosurrender, through the exhaustion of the supply of water in theircisterns. The victory won, Price again immediately retreated southward, losing his army almost as fast as he had collected it, made up, as itwas, more in the spirit and quality of a sudden border foray than anorganized campaign. 

For this new loss, Frémont was subjected to a shower of fiercecriticism, which this time he sought to disarm by ostentatiousannouncements of immediate activity. "I am taking the field myself, " hetelegraphed, "and hope to destroy the enemy either before or after thejunction of forces under McCulloch. " Four days after the surrender, theSt. Louis newspapers printed his order organizing an army of fivedivisions. The document made a respectable show of force on paper, claiming an aggregate of nearly thirty-nine thousand. In reality, however, being scattered and totally unprepared for the field, itpossessed no such effective strength. For a month longer extravagantnewspaper reports stimulated the public with the hope of substantialresults from Frémont's intended campaign. Before the end of that time, however, President Lincoln, under growing apprehension, sent Secretaryof War Cameron and the adjutant-general of the army to Missouri to makea personal investigation. Reaching Frémont's camp on October 13, theyfound the movement to be a mere forced, spasmodic display, withoutsubstantial strength, transportation, or coherent and feasible plan; andthat at least two of the division commanders were without means toexecute the orders they had received, and utterly without confidence intheir leader, or knowledge of his intentions. 

To give Frémont yet another chance, the Secretary of War withheld thePresident's order to relieve the general from command, which he hadbrought with him, on Frémont's insistence that a victory was reallywithin his reach. When this hope also proved delusive, and suspicion wasaroused that the general might be intending not only to deceive, but todefy the administration, President Lincoln sent the following letter bya special friend to General Curtis, commanding at St. Louis:

"DEAR SIR: On receipt of this, with the accompanying inclosures, youwill take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosureaddressed to Major-General Frémont delivered to him with all reasonabledispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when GeneralFrémont shall be reached by the messenger--yourself, or any one sent byyou--he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediatepresence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to bedelivered, but held for further orders. After, and not till after, thedelivery to General Frémont, let the inclosure addressed to GeneralHunter be delivered to him. "

The order of removal was delivered to Frémont on November 2. By thatdate he had reached Springfield, but had won no victory, fought nobattle, and was not in the presence of the enemy. Two of his divisionswere not yet even with him. Still laboring under the delusion, perhapsimposed on him by his scouts, his orders stated that the enemy was onlya day's march distant, and advancing to attack him. The inclosurementioned in the President's letter to Curtis was an order to GeneralDavid Hunter to relieve Frémont. When he arrived and assumed command thescouts he sent forward found no enemy within reach, and no suchcontingency of battle or hope of victory as had been rumored andassumed. 

Frémont's personal conduct in these disagreeable circumstances wasentirely commendable. He took leave of the army in a short farewellorder, couched in terms of perfect obedience to authority and courtesyto his successor, asking for him the same cordial support he had himselfreceived. Nor did he by word or act justify the suspicions ofinsubordination for which some of his indiscreet adherents had givencause. Under the instructions President Lincoln had outlined in hisorder to Hunter, that general gave up the idea of indefinitely pursuingPrice, and divided the army into two corps of observation, which weredrawn back and posted, for the time being, at the two railroad terminiof Rolla and Sedalia, to be recruited and prepared for further service. 

XVIII

Blockade--Hatteras Inlet--Port Royal Captured--The TrentAffair--Lincoln Suggests Arbitration--Seward's Despatch--McClellan atWashington--Army of the Potomac--McClellan's Quarrel withScott--Retirement of Scott--Lincoln's Memorandum--"All Quiet on thePotomac"--Conditions in Kentucky--Cameron's Visit to Sherman--EastTennessee--Instructions to Buell--Buell's Neglect--Halleck in Missouri

Following the fall of Fort Sumter, the navy of the United States was inno condition to enforce the blockade from Chesapeake Bay to the RioGrande declared by Lincoln's proclamation of April 19. Of the forty-twovessels then in commission nearly all were on foreign stations. Anotherserious cause of weakness was that within a few days after the Sumterattack one hundred and twenty-four officers of the navy resigned, orwere dismissed for disloyalty, and the number of such was doubled beforethe fourth of July. Yet by the strenuous efforts of the department infitting out ships that had been laid up, in completing those underconstruction, and in extensive purchases and arming of all classes ofvessels that could be put to use, from screw and side-wheel merchantsteamers to ferry-boats and tugs, a legally effective blockade wasestablished within a period of six months. A considerable number of newwar-ships was also immediately placed under construction. The specialsession of Congress created a commission to study the subject ofironclads, and on its recommendation three experimental vessels of thisclass were placed under contract. One of these, completed early in thefollowing year, rendered a momentous service, hereafter to be mentioned, and completely revolutionized naval warfare. 

Meanwhile, as rapidly as vessels could be gathered and prepared, theNavy Department organized effective expeditions to operate againstpoints on the Atlantic coast. On August 29 a small fleet, under commandof Flag Officer Stringham, took possession of Hatteras Inlet, aftersilencing the forts the insurgents had erected to guard the entrance, and captured twenty-five guns and seven hundred prisoners. This success, achieved without the loss of a man to the Union fleet, was of greatimportance, opening, as it did, the way for a succession of victories inthe interior waters of North Carolina early in the following year. 

A more formidable expedition, and still greater success soon followed. Early in November, Captain Du-Pont assembled a fleet of fifty sail, including transports, before Port Royal Sound. Forming a column of ninewar-ships with a total of one hundred and twelve guns, the line steamedby the mid-channel between Fort Beauregard to the right, and Fort Walkerto the left, the first of twenty and the second of twenty-three guns, each ship delivering its fire as it passed the forts. Turning at theproper point, they again gave broadside after broadside while steamingout, and so repeated their circular movement. The battle was decidedwhen, on the third round, the forts failed to respond to the fire of theships. When Commander Rodgers carried and planted the Stars and Stripeson the ramparts, he found them utterly deserted, everything having beenabandoned by the flying garrisons. Further reconnaissance proved thatthe panic extended itself over the whole network of sea islands betweenCharleston and Savannah, permitting the immediate occupation of theentire region, and affording a military base for both the navy and thearmy of incalculable advantage in the further reduction of the coast. 

Another naval exploit, however, almost at the same time, absorbedgreater public attention, and for a while created an intense degree ofexcitement and suspense. Ex-Senators J. M. Mason and John Slidell, havingbeen accredited by the Confederate government as envoys to Europeancourts, had managed to elude the blockade and reach Havana. CaptainCharles Wilkes, commanding the _San Jacinto_, learning that they were totake passage for England on the British mail steamer _Trent_, intercepted that vessel on November 8 near the coast of Cuba, took therebel emissaries prisoner by the usual show of force, and brought themto the United States, but allowed the _Trent_ to proceed on her voyage. The incident and alleged insult produced as great excitement in Englandas in the United States, and the British government began instant andsignificant preparations for war for what it hastily assumed to be aviolation of international law and an outrage on the British flag. Instructions were sent to Lord Lyons, the British minister atWashington, to demand the release of the prisoners and a suitableapology; and, if this demand were not complied with within a singleweek, to close his legation and return to England. 

In the Northern States the capture was greeted with great jubilation. Captain Wilkes was applauded by the press; his act was officiallyapproved by the Secretary of the Navy, and the House of Representativesunanimously passed a resolution thanking him for his "brave, adroit, andpatriotic conduct. " While the President and cabinet shared the firstimpulses of rejoicing, second thoughts impressed them with the gravenature of the international question involved, and the serious dilemmaof disavowal or war precipitated by the imperative British demand. Itwas fortunate that Secretary Seward and Lord Lyons were close personalfriends, and still more that though British public opinion had stronglyfavored the rebellion, the Queen of England entertained the kindliestfeelings for the American government. Under her direction, Prince Albertinstructed the British cabinet to formulate and present the demand inthe most courteous diplomatic language, while, on their part, theAmerican President and cabinet discussed the affair in a temper ofjudicious reserve. 

President Lincoln's first desire was to refer the difficulty to friendlyarbitration, and his mood is admirably expressed in the autographexperimental draft of a despatch suggesting this course. 

"The President is unwilling to believe, " he wrote, "that her Majesty'sgovernment will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to himto be only a partial record, in the making up of which he has beenallowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, withno assurance that her Majesty's government will consent to hear him; yetthis much he directs me to say, that this government has intended noaffront to the British flag, or to the British nation; nor has itintended to force into discussion an embarrassing question; all which isevident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained of was doneby the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the government. But, being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether wemight not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strictright; because we, too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justlyjealous of their rights, and in whose presence our government could undothe act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or atleast very questionable. The United States government and people arestill willing to make reparation upon such showing. 

"Accordingly, I am instructed by the President to inquire whether herMajesty's government will hear the United States upon the matter inquestion. The President desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United States; theposition Great Britain has assumed, including her Majesty's proclamationin relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is thesubject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of theirvoyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master ofthe _Trent_ had of their relation to the United States, and of theobject of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for thevoyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respectivepositions assumed in analogous cases between Great Britain and theUnited States. 

"Upon a submission containing the foregoing facts, with those set forthin the before-mentioned despatch to your lordship, together with allother facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to saythe government of the United States will, if agreed to by her Majesty'sgovernment, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award. "

The most practised diplomatic pen in Europe could not have written amore dignified, courteous, or succinct presentation of the case; andyet, under the necessities of the moment, it was impossible to adoptthis procedure. Upon full discussion, it was decided that war with GreatBritain must be avoided, and Mr. Seward wrote a despatch defending thecourse of Captain Wilkes up to the point where he permitted the _Trent_to proceed on her voyage. It was his further duty to have brought herbefore a prize court. Failing in this, he had left the captureincomplete under rules of international law, and the American governmenthad thereby lost the right and the legal evidence to establish thecontraband character of the vessel and the persons seized. Under thecircumstances, the prisoners were therefore willingly released. ExcitedAmerican feeling was grievously disappointed at the result; but Americangood sense readily accommodated itself both to the correctness of thelaw expounded by the Secretary of State, and to the public policy thataverted a great international danger; particularly as this decisionforced Great Britain to depart from her own and to adopt the Americantraditions respecting this class of neutral rights. 

It has already been told how Captain George B. McClellan was suddenlyraised in rank, at the very outset of the war, first to amajor-generalship in the three months' militia, then to the command ofthe military department of the Ohio; from that to a major-generalship inthe regular army; and after his successful campaign in West Virginia wascalled to Washington and placed in command of the Division of thePotomac, which comprised all the troops in and around Washington, onboth sides of the river. Called thus to the capital of the nation toguard it against the results of the disastrous battle of Bull Run, andto organize a new army for extended offensive operations, thesurrounding conditions naturally suggested to him that in alllikelihood he would play a conspicuous part in the great drama of theCivil War. His ambition rose eagerly to the prospect. On the day onwhich he assumed command, July 27, he wrote to his wife:

"I find myself in a new and strange position here; President, cabinet, General Scott, and all, deferring to me. By some strange operation ofmagic I seem to have become the power of the land. "

And three days later:

"They give me my way in everything, full swing and unboundedconfidence. .. . Who would have thought, when we were married, that Ishould so soon be called upon to save my country?"

And still a few days afterward:

"I shall carry this thing _en grande_, and crush the rebels in onecampaign. "

From the giddy elevation to which such an imaginary achievement raisedhis dreams, there was but one higher step, and his colossal egotismimmediately mounted to occupy it. On August 9, just two weeks after hisarrival in Washington, he wrote:

"I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my lifewhen the country is saved;" while in the same letter he adds, with themost naïve unconsciousness of his hallucination: "I am not spoiled by myunexpected new position. "

Coming to the national capital in the hour of deepest public depressionover the Bull Run defeat, McClellan was welcomed by the President, thecabinet, and General Scott with sincere friendship, by Congress with ahopeful eagerness, by the people with enthusiasm, and by Washingtonsociety with adulation. Externally he seemed to justify such a greeting. He was young, handsome, accomplished, genial and winning in conversationand manner. He at once manifested great industry and quick decision, and speedily exhibited a degree of ability in army organization whichwas not equaled by any officer during the Civil War. Under his eye thestream of the new three years' regiments pouring into the city went totheir camps, fell into brigades and divisions, were supplied withequipments, horses, and batteries, and underwent the routine of drill, tactics, and reviews, which, without the least apparent noise orfriction, in three months made the Army of the Potomac a perfectfighting machine of over one hundred and fifty thousand men and morethan two hundred guns. 

Recognizing his ability in this work, the government had indeed givenhim its full confidence, and permitted him to exercise almost unboundedauthority; which he fully utilized in favoring his personal friends, anddrawing to himself the best resources of the whole country in arms, supplies, and officers of education and experience. For a while hisoutward demeanor indicated respect and gratitude for the promotion andliberal favors bestowed upon him. But his phenomenal rise was fatal tohis usefulness. The dream that he was to be the sole savior of hiscountry, announced confidentially to his wife just two weeks after hisarrival in Washington, never again left him so long as he continued incommand. Coupled with this dazzling vision, however, was soon developedthe tormenting twofold hallucination: first, that everybody wasconspiring to thwart him; and, second, that the enemy had from double toquadruple numbers to defeat him. 

For the first month he could not sleep for the nightmare thatBeauregard's demoralized army had by a sudden bound from Manassas seizedthe city of Washington. He immediately began a quarrel with GeneralScott, which, by the first of November, drove the old hero intoretirement and out of his pathway. The cabinet members who, wittingly orunwittingly, had encouraged him in this he some weeks later stigmatizedas a set of geese. Seeing that President Lincoln was kind and unassumingin discussing military questions, McClellan quickly contracted the habitof expressing contempt for him in his confidential letters; and thefeeling rapidly grew until it reached a mark of open disrespect. Thesame trait manifested itself in his making exclusive confidants of onlytwo or three of his subordinate generals, and ignoring the counsel ofall the others; and when, later on, Congress appointed a standingcommittee of leading senators and representatives to examine into theconduct of the war, he placed himself in a similar attitude respectingtheir inquiry and advice. 

McClellan's activity and judgment as an army organizer naturally createdgreat hopes that he would be equally efficient as a commander in thefield. But these hopes were grievously disappointed. To his first greatdefect of estimating himself as the sole savior of the country, must atonce be added the second, of his utter inability to form any reasonablejudgment of the strength of the enemy in his front. On September 8, whenthe Confederate army at Manassas numbered forty-one thousand, he ratedit at one hundred and thirty thousand. By the end of October thatestimate had risen to one hundred and fifty thousand, to meet which heasked that his own force should be raised to an aggregate of two hundredand forty thousand, with a total of effectives of two hundred and eightthousand, and four hundred and eighty-eight guns. He suggested that togather this force all other points should be left on the defensive; thatthe Army of the Potomac held the fate of the country in its hands; thatthe advance should not be postponed beyond November 25; and that asingle will should direct the plan of accomplishing a crushing defeat ofthe rebel army at Manassas. 

On the first of November the President, yielding at last to GeneralScott's urgent solicitation, issued the orders placing him on theretired list, and in his stead appointing General McClellan to thecommand of all the armies. The administration indulged the expectationthat at last "The Young Napoleon, " as the newspapers often called him, would take advantage of the fine autumn weather, and, by a bold movewith his single will and his immense force, outnumbering the enemynearly four to one, would redeem his promise to crush the army atManassas and "save the country. " But the November days came and went, asthe October days had come and gone. McClellan and his brilliant staffgalloped unceasingly from camp to camp, and review followed review, while autumn imperceptibly gave place to the cold and storms of winter;and still there was no sign of forward movement. 

Under his own growing impatience, as well as that of the public, thePresident, about the first of December, inquired pointedly, in amemorandum suggesting a plan of campaign, how long it would require toactually get in motion. McClellan answered: "By December 15, --probably25"; and put aside the President's suggestion by explaining: "I have nowmy mind actively turned toward another plan of campaign that I do notthink at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people. "

December 25 came, as November 25 had come, and still there was no plan, no preparation, no movement. Then McClellan fell seriously ill. By aspontaneous and most natural impulse, the soldiers of the various campsbegan the erection of huts to shelter them from snow and storm. In a fewweeks the Army of the Potomac was practically, if not by order, inwinter quarters; and day after day the monotonous telegraphic phrase"All quiet on the Potomac" was read from Northern newspapers in Northernhomes, until by mere iteration it degenerated from an expression of deepdisappointment to a note of sarcastic criticism. 

While so unsatisfactory a condition of affairs existed in the firstgreat military field east of the Alleghanies, the outlook was quite asunpromising both in the second--between the Alleghanies and theMississippi--and in the third--west of the Mississippi. When theConfederates, about September 1, 1861, invaded Kentucky, they stationedGeneral Pillow at the strongly fortified town of Columbus on theMississippi River, with about six thousand men; General Buckner atBowling Green, on the railroad north of Nashville, with five thousand;and General Zollicoffer, with six regiments, in eastern Kentucky, fronting Cumberland Gap. Up to that time there were no Union troops inKentucky, except a few regiments of Home Guards. Now, however, the Statelegislature called for active help; and General Anderson, exercisingnominal command from Cincinnati, sent Brigadier-General Sherman toNashville to confront Buckner, and Brigadier-General Thomas to Camp DickRobinson, to confront Zollicoffer. 

Neither side was as yet in a condition of force and preparation to takethe aggressive. When, a month later, Anderson, on account of ill healthturned over the command to Sherman, the latter had gathered only abouteighteen thousand men, and was greatly discouraged by the task ofdefending three hundred miles of frontier with that small force. In aninterview with Secretary of War Cameron, who called upon him on hisreturn from Frémont's camp, about the middle of October, he stronglyurged that he needed for immediate defense sixty thousand, and forultimate offense "two hundred thousand before we were done. " "GreatGod!" exclaimed Cameron, "where are they to come from?" Both Sherman'sdemand and Cameron's answer were a pertinent comment on McClellan'spolicy of collecting the whole military strength of the country atWashington to fight the one great battle for which he could never getready. 

Sherman was so distressed by the seeming magnitude of his burden that hesoon asked to be relieved; and when Brigadier-General Buell was sent tosucceed him in command of that part of Kentucky lying east of theCumberland River, it was the expectation of the President that he woulddevote his main attention and energy to the accomplishment of a specificobject which Mr. Lincoln had very much at heart. 

Ever since the days in June, when President Lincoln had presided overthe council of war which discussed and decided upon the Bull Runcampaign, he had devoted every spare moment of his time to the study ofsuch military books and leading principles of the art of war as wouldaid him in solving questions that must necessarily come to himself forfinal decision. His acute perceptions, retentive memory, and unusualpower of logic enabled him to make rapid progress in the acquisition ofthe fixed and accepted rules on which military writers agree. In this, as in other sciences, the main difficulty, of course, lies in applyingfixed theories to variable conditions. When, however, we remember thatat the outbreak of hostilities all the great commanders of the Civil Warhad experience only as captains and lieutenants, it is not strange thatin speculative military problems the President's mature reasoning powersshould have gained almost as rapidly by observation and criticism astheirs by practice and experiment. The mastery he attained of thedifficult art, and how intuitively correct was his grasp of militarysituations, has been attested since in the enthusiastic admiration ofbrilliant technical students, amply fitted by training and intellect toexpress an opinion, whose comment does not fall short of declaring Mr. Lincoln "the ablest strategist of the war. "

The President had early discerned what must become the dominating anddecisive lines of advance in gaining and holding military control of theSouthern States. Only two days after the battle of Bull Run, he hadwritten a memorandum suggesting three principal objects for the armywhen reorganized: First, to gather a force to menace Richmond; second, amovement from Cincinnati upon Cumberland Gap and East Tennessee; third, an expedition from Cairo against Memphis. In his eyes, the second ofthese objectives never lost its importance; and it was in factsubstantially adopted by indirection and by necessity in the closingperiods of the war. The eastern third of the State of Tennessee remainedfrom the first stubbornly and devotedly loyal to the Union. At anelection on June 8, 1861, the people of twenty-nine counties, by morethan two to one, voted against joining the Confederacy; and the mostrigorous military repression by the orders of Jefferson Davis andGovernor Harris was necessary to prevent a general uprising against therebellion. 

The sympathy of the President, even more than that of the whole North, went out warmly to these unfortunate Tennesseeans, and he desired toconvert their mountain fastnesses into an impregnable patrioticstronghold. Had his advice been followed, it would have completelysevered railroad communication, by way of the Shenandoah valley, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, between Virginia and the Gulf States, accomplishing in the winter of 1861 what was not attained until twoyears later. Mr. Lincoln urged this in a second memorandum, made late inSeptember; and seeing that the principal objection to it lay in the longand difficult line of land transportation, his message to Congress ofDecember 3, 1861, recommended, as a military measure, the constructionof a railroad to connect Cincinnati, by way of Lexington, Kentucky, withthat mountain region. 

A few days after the message, he personally went to the President's roomin the Capitol building, and calling around him a number of leadingsenators and representatives, and pointing out on a map before them theEast Tennessee region, said to them in substance:

I am thoroughly convinced that the closing struggle of the war willoccur somewhere in this mountain country. By our superior numbers andstrength we will everywhere drive the rebel armies back from the leveldistricts lying along the coast, from those lying south of the OhioRiver, and from those lying east of the Mississippi River. Yielding toour superior force, they will gradually retreat to the more defensiblemountain districts, and make their final stand in that part of the Southwhere the seven States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia come together. Thepopulation there is overwhelmingly and devotedly loyal to the Union. Thedespatches from Brigadier-General Thomas of October 28 and November 5show that, with four additional good regiments, he is willing toundertake the campaign and is confident he can take immediatepossession. Once established, the people will rally to his support, andby building a railroad, over which to forward him regular supplies andneeded reinforcements from time to time, we can hold it against allattempts to dislodge us, and at the same time menace the enemy in anyone of the States I have named. 

While his hearers listened with interest, it was evident that theirminds were still full of the prospect of a great battle in Virginia, thecapture of Richmond, and an early suppression of the rebellion. Railroadbuilding appeared to them altogether too slow an operation of war. Toshow how sagacious was the President's advice, we may anticipate byrecalling that in the following summer General Buell spent as much time, money, and military strength in his attempted march from Corinth to EastTennessee as would have amply sufficed to build the line from Lexingtonto Knoxville recommended by Mr. Lincoln--the general's effort resultingonly in his being driven back to Louisville; that in 1863, Burnside, under greater difficulties, made the march and successfully heldKnoxville, even without a railroad, which Thomas with a few regimentscould have accomplished in 1861; and that in the final collapse of therebellion, in the spring of 1865, the beaten armies of both Johnston andLee attempted to retreat for a last stand to this same mountain regionwhich Mr. Lincoln pointed out in December, 1861. 

Though the President received no encouragement from senators andrepresentatives in his plan to take possession of East Tennessee, thatobject was specially enjoined in the instructions to General Buell whenhe was sent to command in Kentucky. 

"It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of easternTennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore seems proper that youshould remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces by rapid marches by CumberlandGap or Walker's Gap on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad atthat point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of eastern Tennessee torise, while you at the same time cut off the railway communicationbetween eastern Virginia and the Mississippi. "

Three times within the same month McClellan repeated this injunction toBuell with additional emphasis. Senator Andrew Johnson andRepresentative Horace Maynard telegraphed him from Washington:

"Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest; thegovernment must come to their relief. "

Buell replied, keeping the word of promise to the ear, but, with hisambition fixed on a different campaign, gradually but doggedly broke itto the hope. When, a month later, he acknowledged that his preparationsand intent were to move against Nashville, the President wrote him:

"Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south ofCumberland Gap than Nashville. _First_, because it cuts a great arteryof the enemy's communication which Nashville does not; and, _secondly_, because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. .. . But my distress is that our friends in EastTennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. "

McClellan's comment amounted to a severe censure, and this was quicklyfollowed by an almost positive command to "advance on eastern Tennesseeat once. " Again Buell promised compliance, only, however, again toreport in a few weeks his conviction "that an advance into EastTennessee is impracticable at this time on any scale which would besufficient. " It is difficult to speculate upon the advantages lost bythis unwillingness of a commander to obey instructions. To say nothingof the strategical value of East Tennessee to the Union, the fidelity ofits people is shown in the reports sent to the Confederate governmentthat "the whole country is now in a state of rebellion"; that "civil warhas broken out in East Tennessee"; and that "they look for thereëstablishment of the Federal authority in the South with as muchconfidence as the Jews look for the coming of the Messiah. "

Henry W. Halleck, born in 1815, graduated from West Point in 1839, who, after distinguished service in the Mexican war, had been brevettedcaptain of Engineers, but soon afterward resigned from the army topursue the practice of law in San Francisco, was, perhaps, the bestprofessionally equipped officer among the number of those called byGeneral Scott in the summer of 1861 to assume important command in theUnion army. It is probable that Scott intended he should succeed himselfas general-in-chief; but when he reached Washington the autumn wasalready late, and because of Frémont's conspicuous failure it seemednecessary to send Halleck to the Department of the Missouri, which, asreconstituted, was made to include, in addition to several northwesternStates, Missouri and Arkansas, and so much of Kentucky as lay west ofthe Cumberland River. This change of department lines indicates thebeginning of what soon became a dominant feature of military operations;namely, that instead of the vast regions lying west of the Mississippi, the great river itself, and the country lying immediately adjacent toit on either side, became the third principal field of strategy andaction, under the necessity of opening and holding it as a greatmilitary and commercial highway. 

While the intention of the government to open the Mississippi River by apowerful expedition received additional emphasis through Halleck'sappointment, that general found no immediate means adequate to the taskwhen he assumed command at St. Louis. Frémont's régime had left thewhole department in the most deplorable confusion. Halleck reported thathe had no army, but, rather, a military rabble to command and for someweeks devoted himself with energy and success to bringing order out ofthe chaos left him by his predecessor. A large element of his difficultylay in the fact that the population of the whole State was tainted withdisloyalty to a degree which rendered Missouri less a factor in thelarger questions of general army operations, than from the beginning tothe end of the war a local district of bitter and relentless factionalhatred and guerrilla or, as the term was constantly employed, "bushwhacking" warfare, intensified and kept alive by annual rovingConfederate incursions from Arkansas and the Indian Territory indesultory summer campaigns. 

XIX

Lincoln Directs Coöperation--Halleck and Buell--Ulysses S. Grant--Grant's Demonstration--Victory at Mill River--Fort Henry--FortDonelson--Buell's Tardiness--Halleck's Activity--Victory of PeaRidge--Halleck Receives General Command--Pittsburg Landing--Island No. 10--Halleck's Corinth Campaign--Halleck's Mistakes

Toward the end of December, 1861, the prospects of the administrationbecame very gloomy. McClellan had indeed organized a formidable army atWashington, but it had done nothing to efface the memory of the Bull Rundefeat. On the contrary, a practical blockade of the Potomac by rebelbatteries on the Virginia shore, and another small but irritating defeatat Ball's Bluff, greatly heightened public impatience. The necessarysurrender of Mason and Slidell to England was exceedingly unpalatable. Government expenditures had risen to $2, 000, 000 a day, and a financialcrisis was imminent. Buell would not move into East Tennessee, andHalleck seemed powerless in Missouri. Added to this, McClellan's illnesscompleted a stagnation of military affairs both east and west. Congresswas clamoring for results, and its joint Committee on the Conduct of theWar was pushing a searching inquiry into the causes of previous defeats. 

To remove this inertia, President Lincoln directed specific questions tothe Western commanders. "Are General Buell and yourself in concert?" hetelegraphed Halleck on December 31. And next day he wrote:

"I am very anxious that, in case of General Buell's moving towardNashville, the enemy shall not be greatly reinforced, and I think thereis danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real orfeigned attack on Columbus from up-river at the same time would eitherprevent this, or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. "

Similar questions also went to Buell, and their replies showed that noconcert, arrangement, or plans existed, and that Halleck was not readyto coöperate. The correspondence started by the President's inquiry forthe first time clearly brought out an estimate of the Confederatestrength opposed to a southward movement in the West. Since theConfederate invasion of Kentucky on September 4, the rebels had sostrongly fortified Columbus on the Mississippi River that it came to becalled the "Gibraltar of the West, " and now had a garrison of twentythousand to hold it; while General Buckner was supposed to have a forceof forty thousand at Bowling Green on the railroad between Louisvilleand Nashville. For more than a month Buell and Halleck had been awarethat a joint river and land expedition southward up the Tennessee or theCumberland River, which would outflank both positions and cause theirevacuation, was practicable with but little opposition. Yet neitherBuell nor Halleck had exchanged a word about it, or made the slightestpreparation to begin it; each being busy in his own field, and with hisown plans. Even now, when the President had started the subject, Halleckreplied that it would be bad strategy for himself to move againstColumbus, or Buell against Bowling Green; but he had nothing to sayabout a Tennessee River expedition, or coöperation with Buell to effectit, except by indirectly complaining that to withdraw troops fromMissouri would risk the loss of that State. 

The President, however, was no longer satisfied with indecision andexcuses, and telegraphed to Buell on January 7:

"Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you canbe ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delayis ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have somethingdefinite. I send a like despatch to Major-General Halleck. "

To this Buell made no direct reply, while Halleck answered that he hadasked Buell to designate a date for a demonstration, and explained twodays later: "I can make, with the gunboats and available troops, apretty formidable demonstration, but no real attack. " In point of fact, Halleck had on the previous day, January 6, written to Brigadier-GeneralU. S. Grant: "I wish you to make a demonstration in force": and he addedfull details, to which Grant responded on January 8: "Your instructionsof the sixth were received this morning, and immediate preparations madefor carrying them out"; also adding details on his part. 

Ulysses S. Grant was born on April 27, 1822, was graduated from WestPoint in 1843, and brevetted captain for gallant conduct in the MexicanWar; but resigned from the army and was engaged with his father in aleather store at Galena, Illinois, when the Civil War broke out. Employed by the governor of Illinois a few weeks at Springfield toassist in organizing militia regiments under the President's first call, Grant wrote a letter to the War Department at Washington tendering hisservices, and saying: "I feel myself competent to command a regiment, ifthe President in his judgment should see fit to intrust one to me. " Forsome reason, never explained, this letter remained unanswered, thoughthe department was then and afterward in constant need of educated andexperienced officers. A few weeks later, however, Governor Yatescommissioned him colonel of one of the Illinois three years' regiments. From that time until the end of 1861, Grant, by constant and speciallymeritorious service, rose in rank to brigadier-general and to thecommand of the important post of Cairo, Illinois, having meanwhile, onNovember 7, won the battle of Belmont on the Missouri shore oppositeColumbus. 

The "demonstration'" ordered by Halleck was probably intended only as apassing show of activity; but it was executed by Grant, though understrict orders to "avoid a battle, " with a degree of promptness andearnestness that drew after it momentous consequences. He pushed astrong reconnaissance by eight thousand men within a mile or two ofColumbus, and sent three gunboats up the Tennessee River, which drew thefire of Fort Henry. The results of the combined expedition convincedGrant that a real movement in that direction was practicable, and hehastened to St. Louis to lay his plan personally before Halleck. Atfirst that general would scarcely listen to it; but, returning to Cairo, Grant urged it again and again, and the rapidly changing militaryconditions soon caused Halleck to realize its importance. 

Within a few days, several items of interesting information reachedHalleck: that General Thomas, in eastern Kentucky, had won a victoryover the rebel General Zollicoffer, capturing his fortified camp onCumberland River, annihilating his army of over ten regiments, and fullyexposing Cumberland Gap; that the Confederates were about to throwstrong reinforcements into Columbus; that seven formidable Unionironclad river gunboats were ready for service; and that a rise offourteen feet had taken place in the Tennessee River, greatly weakeningthe rebel batteries on that stream and the Cumberland. The advantages onthe one hand, and the dangers on the other, which these reportsindicated, moved Halleck to a sudden decision. When Grant, on January28, telegraphed him: "With permission, I will take Fort Henry on theTennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there, " Halleck respondedon the thirtieth: "Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. "

It would appear that Grant's preparations were already quite completewhen he received written instructions by mail on February 1, for on thenext day he started fifteen thousand men on transports, and on February4 himself followed with seven gunboats under command of Commodore Foote. Two days later, Grant had the satisfaction of sending a double messagein return: "Fort Henry is ours. .. . I shall take and destroy FortDonelson on the eighth. "

Fort Henry had been an easy victory. The rebel commander, convinced thathe could not defend the place, had early that morning sent away hisgarrison of three thousand on a retreat to Fort Donelson, and simplyheld out during a two hours' bombardment until they could escapecapture. To take Fort Donelson was a more serious enterprise. Thatstronghold, lying twelve miles away on the Cumberland River, was a muchlarger work, with a garrison of six thousand, and armed with seventeenheavy and forty-eight field guns. If Grant could have marchedimmediately to an attack of the combined garrisons, there would havebeen a chance of quick success. But the high water presentedunlooked-for obstacles, and nearly a week elapsed before his army beganstretching itself cautiously around the three miles of Donelson'sintrenchments. During this delay, the conditions became greatly changed. When the Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston received news thatFort Henry had fallen, he held a council at Bowling Green with hissubordinate generals Hardee and Beauregard, and seeing that the Unionsuccess would, if not immediately counteracted, render both Nashvilleand Columbus untenable, resolved, to use his own language, "To defendNashville at Donelson. "

An immediate retreat was begun from Bowling Green to Nashville, andheavy reinforcements were ordered to the garrison of Fort Donelson. Ithappened, therefore, that when Grant was ready to begin his assault theConfederate garrison with its reinforcements outnumbered his entirearmy. To increase the discouragement, the attack by gunboats on theCumberland River on the afternoon of February 14 was repulsed, seriouslydamaging two of them, and a heavy sortie from the fort threw the rightof Grant's investing line into disorder. Fortunately, General Halleck atSt. Louis strained all his energies to send reinforcements, and thesearrived in time to restore Grant's advantage in numbers. 

Serious disagreement among the Confederate commanders also hastened thefall of the place. On February 16, General Buckner, to whom the seniorofficers had turned over the command, proposed an armistice, and theappointment of commissioners to agree on terms of capitulation. To thisGrant responded with a characteristic spirit of determination: "No termsexcept unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I proposeto move immediately upon your works. " Buckner complained that the termswere ungenerous and unchivalric, but that necessity compelled him toaccept them; and Grant telegraphed Halleck on February 16: "We havetaken Fort Donelson, and from twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners. " Thesenior Confederate generals, Pillow and Floyd, and a portion of thegarrison had escaped by the Cumberland River during the preceding night. 

Since the fall of Fort Henry on February 6, a lively correspondence hadbeen going on, in which General Halleck besought Buell to come with hisavailable forces, assist in capturing Donelson, and command the columnup the Cumberland to cut off both Columbus and Nashville. PresidentLincoln, scanning the news with intense solicitude, and losing noopportunity to urge effective coöperation, telegraphed Halleck:

"You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed fromoutside: to prevent which latter will, I think, require all thevigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in fullcoöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from BowlingGreen will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a fewmiles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. Itis unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly toward Nashville, breakingup the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime, Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all southand perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force fromGeneral Thomas on the upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of abombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroythe bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson isvastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send acopy of this to Buell. "

This telegram abundantly shows with what minute understanding andaccurate judgment the President comprehended military conditions andresults in the West. Buell, however, was too intent upon his ownseparate movement to seize the brilliant opportunity offered him. As heonly in a feeble advance followed up the retreating Confederate columnfrom Bowling Green to Nashville, Halleck naturally appropriated tohimself the merit of the campaign, and telegraphed to Washington on theday after the surrender:

"Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers, and give mecommand in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson. "

The eagerness of General Halleck for superior command in the West was, to say the least, very pardonable. A vast horizon of possibilities wasopening up to his view. Two other campaigns under his direction wereexciting his liveliest hopes. Late in December he had collected an armyof ten thousand at the railroad terminus at Rolla, Missouri, undercommand of Brigadier-General Curtis, for the purpose of scattering therebel forces under General Price at Springfield or driving them out ofthe State. Despite the hard winter weather, Halleck urged on themovement with almost peremptory orders, and Curtis executed theintentions of his chief with such alacrity that Price was forced into arapid and damaging retreat from Springfield toward Arkansas. Whileforcing this enterprise in the southwest, Halleck had also determined onan important campaign in southeast Missouri. 

Next to Columbus, which the enemy evacuated on March 2, the strongestConfederate fortifications on the Mississippi River were at Island No. 10, about forty miles farther to the south. To operate against these, heplanned an expedition under Brigadier-General Pope to capture the townof New Madrid as a preliminary step. Columbus and Nashville were almostsure to fall as the result of Donelson. If now he could bring his twoMissouri campaigns into a combination with two swift and strongTennessee expeditions, while the enemy was in scattered retreat, hecould look forward to the speedy capture of Memphis. But to therealization of such a project, the hesitation and slowness of Buell werea serious hindrance. That general had indeed started a division underNelson to Grant's assistance, but it was not yet in the Cumberland whenDonelson surrendered. Halleck's demand for enlarged power, therefore, became almost imperative. He pleaded earnestly with Buell:

"I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down tothe Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be foughtin that vicinity. .. . There will be no battle at Nashville. " Histelegrams to McClellan were more urgent. "Give it [the Western Division]to me, and I will split secession in twain in one month. " And again: "Imust have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay arelosing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President andSecretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly. "

But McClellan was in no mood to sacrifice the ambition of his intimatefriend and favorite, General Buell, and induced the President towithhold his consent; and while the generals were debating by telegraph, Nelson's division of the army of Buell moved up the Cumberland andoccupied Nashville under the orders of Grant. Halleck, however, heldtenaciously to his views and requests, explaining to McClellan that hehimself proposed going to Tennessee:

"That is now the great strategic line of the western campaign, and I amsurprised that General Buell should hesitate to reinforce me. He was toolate at Fort Donelson. .. . Believe me, General, you make a seriousmistake in having three independent commands in the West. There neverwill and never can be any coöperation at the critical moment; allmilitary history proves it. "

This insistence had greater point because of the news received thatCurtis, energetically following Price into Arkansas, had won a greatUnion victory at Pea Ridge, between March 5 and 8, over the unitedforces of Price and McCulloch, commanded by Van Dorn. At this juncture, events at Washington, hereafter to be mentioned, caused a reorganizationof military commands and President Lincoln's Special War Order No. 3consolidated the western departments of Hunter, Halleck, and Buell, asfar east as Knoxville, Tennessee, under the title of the Department ofthe Mississippi, and placed General Halleck in command of the whole. Meanwhile, Halleck had ordered the victorious Union army at FortDonelson to move forward to Savannah on the Tennessee River under thecommand of Grant; and, now that he had superior command, directed Buellto march all of his forces not required to defend Nashville "as rapidlyas possible" to the same point. Halleck was still at St. Louis; andthrough the indecision of his further orders, through the slowness ofBuell's march, and through the unexplained inattention of Grant, theUnion armies narrowly escaped a serious disaster, which, however, thedetermined courage of the troops and subordinate officers turned into amost important victory. 

The "golden opportunity" so earnestly pointed out by Halleck, while notentirely lost, was nevertheless seriously diminished by the hesitationand delay of the Union commanders to agree upon some plan of effectivecoöperation. When, at the fall of Fort Donelson the Confederatesretreated from Nashville toward Chattanooga, and from Columbus towardJackson, a swift advance by the Tennessee River could have kept themseparated; but as that open highway was not promptly followed in force, the flying Confederate detachments found abundant leisure to form ajunction. 

Grant reached Savannah, on the east bank of the Tennessee River, aboutthe middle of March, and in a few days began massing troops at PittsburgLanding, six miles farther south, on the west bank of the Tennessee;still keeping his headquarters at Savannah, to await the arrival ofBuell and his army. During the next two weeks he reported several timesthat the enemy was concentrating at Corinth, Mississippi, an importantrailroad crossing twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing, the estimate oftheir number varying from forty to eighty thousand. All this time hismind was so filled with an eager intention to begin a march uponCorinth, and a confidence that he could win a victory by a promptattack, that he neglected the essential precaution of providing againstan attack by the enemy, which at the same time was occupying thethoughts of the Confederate commander General Johnston. 

General Grant was therefore greatly surprised on the morning of April 6, when he proceeded from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing, to learn the causeof a fierce cannonade. He found that the Confederate army, fortythousand strong, was making an unexpected and determined attack in forceon the Union camp, whose five divisions numbered a total of aboutthirty-three thousand. The Union generals had made no provision againstsuch an attack. No intrenchments had been thrown up, no plan orunderstanding arranged. A few preliminary picket skirmishes had, indeed, put the Union front on the alert, but the commanders of brigades andregiments were not prepared for the impetuous rush with which the threesuccessive Confederate lines began the main battle. On their part, theenemy did not realize their hope of effecting a complete surprise, andthe nature of the ground was so characterized by a network of localroads, alternating patches of woods and open fields, miry hollows andabrupt ravines, that the lines of conflict were quickly broken intoshort, disjointed movements that admitted of little or no combined orsystematic direction. The effort of the Union officers was necessarilylimited to a continuous resistance to the advance of the enemy, fromwhatever direction it came; that of the Confederate leaders to thegeneral purpose of forcing the Union lines away from Pittsburg Landingso that they might destroy the Federal transports and thus cut off allmeans of retreat. In this effort, although during the whole of Sunday, April 6, the Union front had been forced back a mile and a half, theenemy had not entirely succeeded. About sunset, General Beauregard, who, by the death of General Johnston during the afternoon, succeeded to theConfederate command, gave orders to suspend the attack, in the firmexpectation however, that he would be able to complete his victory thenext morning. 

But in this hope he was disappointed. During the day the vanguard ofBuell's army had arrived on the opposite bank of the river. Beforenightfall one of his brigades was ferried across and deployed in frontof the exultant enemy. During the night and early Monday morning threesuperb divisions of Buell's army, about twenty thousand fresh, well-drilled troops, were advanced to the front under Buell's owndirection; and by three o'clock of that day the two wings of the Unionarmy were once more in possession of all the ground that had been loston the previous day, while the foiled and disorganized Confederates werein full retreat upon Corinth. The severity of the battle may be judgedby the losses. In the Union army: killed, 1754; wounded, 8408; missing, 2885. In the Confederate army: killed, 1728; wounded, 8012; missing. 954. 

Having comprehended the uncertainty of Buell's successful junction withGrant, Halleck must have received tidings of the final victory atPittsburg Landing with emotions of deep satisfaction. To this was nowjoined the further gratifying news that the enemy on that same momentousApril 7 had surrendered Island No. 10, together with six or seventhousand Confederate troops, including three general officers, to thecombined operations of General Pope and Flag-Officer Foote. Fullparticulars of these two important victories did not reach Halleck forseveral days. Following previous suggestions, Pope and Foote promptlymoved their gunboats and troops down the river to the next Confederatestronghold, Fort Pillow, where extensive fortifications, aided by anoverflow of the adjacent river banks, indicated strong resistance andconsiderable delay. When all the conditions became more fully known, Halleck at length adopted the resolution, to which he had been stronglyleaning for some time, to take the field himself. About April 10 heproceeded from St. Louis to Pittsburg Landing, and on the fifteenthordered Pope with his army to join him there, which the latter, havinghis troops already on transports succeeded in accomplishing by April 22. Halleck immediately effected a new organization, combining the armiesof the Tennessee, of the Ohio, and of the Mississippi into respectivelyhis right wing, center, and left wing. He assumed command of the wholehimself, and nominally made Grant second in command. Practically, however, he left Grant so little authority or work that the latter felthimself slighted, and asked leave to proceed to another field of duty. 

It required but a few weeks to demonstrate that however high wereHalleck's professional acquirements in other respects, he was totallyunfit for a commander in the field. Grant had undoubtedly been carelessin not providing against the enemy's attack at Pittsburg Landing. Halleck, on the other extreme, was now doubly over-cautious in his marchupon Corinth. From first to last, his campaign resembled a siege. Withover one hundred thousand men under his hand, he moved at a snail'space, building roads and breastworks, and consuming more than a month inadvancing a distance of twenty miles; during which period Beauregardmanaged to collect about fifty thousand effective Confederates andconstruct defensive fortifications with equal industry around Corinth. When, on May 29, Halleck was within assaulting distance of the rebelintrenchments Beauregard had leisurely removed his sick and wounded, destroyed or carried away his stores, and that night finally evacuatedthe place, leaving Halleck to reap, practically, a barren victory. 

Nor were the general's plans and actions any more fruitful during thefollowing six weeks. He wasted the time and energy of his soldiersmultiplying useless fortifications about Corinth. He despatched Buell'swing of the army on a march toward eastern Tennessee but under suchinstructions and limitations that long before reaching its objective itwas met by a Confederate army under General Bragg, and forced into aretrograde movement which carried it back to Louisville. Moredeplorable, however, than either of these errors of judgment wasHalleck's neglect to seize the opportune moment when, by a vigorousmovement in coöperation with the brilliant naval victories underFlag-Officer Farragut, commanding a formidable fleet of Union war-ships, he might have completed the over-shadowing military task of opening theMississippi River. 

XX

The Blockade--Hatteras Inlet--Roanoke Island--Fort Pulaski--Merrimacand Monitor--The Cumberland Sunk--The Congress Burned--Battle of theIronclads--Flag-officer Farragut--Forts Jackson and St. Philip--NewOrleans Captured--Farragut at Vicksburg--Farragut's Second Expedition toVicksburg--Return to New Orleans

In addition to its heavy work of maintaining the Atlantic blockade, thenavy of the United States contributed signally toward the suppression ofthe rebellion by three brilliant victories which it gained during thefirst half of the year 1862. After careful preparation during severalmonths, a joint expedition under the command of General Ambrose E. Burnside and Flag-Officer Goldsborough, consisting of more than twelvethousand men and twenty ships of war, accompanied by numeroustransports, sailed from Fort Monroe on January 11, with the object ofoccupying the interior waters of the North Carolina coast. Before thelarger vessels could effect their entrance through Hatteras Inlet, captured in the previous August, a furious storm set in, which delayedthe expedition nearly a month. By February 7, however, that and otherserious difficulties were overcome, and on the following day theexpedition captured Roanoke Island, and thus completely opened the wholeinterior water-system of Albemarle and Pamlico sounds to the easyapproach of the Union fleet and forces. 

From Roanoke Island as a base, minor expeditions within a short periodeffected the destruction of the not very formidable fleet which theenemy had been able to organize, and the reduction of Fort Macon and therebel defenses of Elizabeth City, New Berne, and other smaller places. An eventual advance upon Goldsboro' formed part of the original plan;but, before it could be executed, circumstances intervened effectuallyto thwart that object. 

While the gradual occupation of the North Carolina coast was going on, two other expeditions of a similar nature were making steady progress. One of them, under the direction of General Quincy A. Gillmore, carriedon a remarkable siege operation against Fort Pulaski, standing on anisolated sea marsh at the mouth of the Savannah River. Here not only thedifficulties of approach, but the apparently insurmountable obstacle ofmaking the soft, unctuous mud sustain heavy batteries, was overcome, andthe fort compelled to surrender on April 11, after an effectivebombardment. The second was an expedition of nineteen ships, which, within a few days during the month of March, without serious resistance, occupied the whole remaining Atlantic coast southward as far as St. Augustine. 

When, at the outbreak of the rebellion, the navy-yard at Norfolk, Virginia, had to be abandoned to the enemy, the destruction at that timeattempted by Commodore Paulding remained very incomplete. Among thevessels set on fire, the screw-frigate _Merrimac_, which had beenscuttled, was burned only to the water's edge, leaving her hull andmachinery entirely uninjured. In due time she was raised by theConfederates, covered with a sloping roof of railroad iron, providedwith a huge wedge-shaped prow of cast iron, and armed with a formidablebattery of ten guns. Secret information came to the Navy Department ofthe progress of this work, and such a possibility was kept in mind bythe board of officers that decided upon the construction of the threeexperimental ironclads in September, 1861. 

The particular one of these three especially intended for this peculiaremergency was a ship of entirely novel design, made by the celebratedinventor John Ericsson, a Swede by birth, but American by adoption--aman who combined great original genius with long scientific study andexperience. His invention may be most quickly described as having asmall, very low hull, covered by a much longer and wider flat deck onlya foot or two above the water-line, upon which was placed a revolvingiron turret twenty feet in diameter, nine feet high, and eight inchesthick, on the inside of which were two eleven-inch guns trained side byside and revolving with the turret. This unique naval structure waspromptly nicknamed "a cheese-box on a raft, " and the designation was notat all inapt. Naval experts at once recognized that her sea-goingqualities were bad; but compensation was thought to exist in the beliefthat her iron turret would resist shot and shell, and that the thin edgeof her flat deck would offer only a minimum mark to an enemy's guns: inother words, that she was no cruiser, but would prove a formidablefloating battery; and this belief she abundantly justified. 

The test of her fighting qualities was attended by what almost suggesteda miraculous coincidence. On Saturday, March 8, 1862, about noon, astrange-looking craft resembling a huge turtle was seen coming intoHampton Roads out of the mouth of Elizabeth River, and it quickly becamecertain that this was the much talked of rebel ironclad _Merrimac_, or, as the Confederates had renamed her, the _Virginia_. She steamedrapidly toward Newport News, three miles to the southwest, where theUnion ships _Congress_ and _Cumberland_ lay at anchor. These saw theuncouth monster coming and prepared for action. The _Minnesota_, the_St. Lawrence_, and the _Roanoke_, lying at Fortress Monroe also saw herand gave chase, but, the water being low, they all soon grounded. Thebroadsides of the _Congress_, as the _Merrimac_ passed her at threehundred yards' distance, seemed to produce absolutely no effect upon hersloping iron roof. Neither did the broadsides of her intended prey, northe fire of the shore batteries, for even an instant arrest her speedas, rushing on, she struck the _Cumberland_, and with her iron prowbroke a hole as large as a hogshead in her side. Then backing away andhovering over her victim at convenient distance, she raked her deckswith shot and shell until, after three quarters of an hour's combat, the_Cumberland_ and her heroic defenders, who had maintained the fight withunyielding stubbornness, went to the bottom in fifty feet of water withcolors flying. 

Having sunk the _Cumberland_, the _Merrimac_ next turned her attentionto the _Congress_, which had meanwhile run into shoal water and groundedwhere the rebel vessel could not follow. But the _Merrimac_, beingherself apparently proof against shot and shell by her iron plating, took up a raking position two cables' length away, and during an hour'sfiring deliberately reduced the _Congress_ to helplessness and tosurrender--her commander being killed and the vessel set on fire. Theapproach, the manoeuvering, and the two successive combats consumed theafternoon, and toward nightfall the _Merrimac_ and her three smallconsorts that had taken little part in the action withdrew to the rebelbatteries on the Virginia shore: not alone because of the approachingdarkness and the fatigue of the crew, but because the rebel ship hadreally suffered considerable damage in ramming the _Cumberland_, as wellas from one or two chance shots that entered her port-holes. 

That same night, while the burning _Congress_ yet lighted up the watersof Hampton Roads, a little ship, as strange-looking and as new to marinewarfare as the rebel turtleback herself, arrived by sea in tow from NewYork, and receiving orders to proceed at once to the scene of conflict, stationed herself near the grounded _Minnesota_. This was Ericsson's"cheese-box on a raft, " named by him the _Monitor_. The Union officerswho had witnessed the day's events with dismay, and were filled withgloomy forebodings for the morrow, while welcoming this providentialreinforcement, were by no means reassured. The _Monitor_ was only halfthe size of her antagonist, and had only two guns to the other's ten. But this very disparity proved an essential advantage. With only tenfeet draft to the _Merrimac's_ twenty-two, she not only possessedsuperior mobility, but might run where the _Merrimac_ could not follow. When, therefore, at eight o'clock on Sunday, March 9, the _Merrimac_again came into Hampton Roads to complete her victory, Lieutenant JohnL. Worden, commanding the _Monitor_, steamed boldly out to meet her. 

Then ensued a three hours' naval conflict which held the breathlessattention of the active participants and the spectators on ship andshore, and for many weeks excited the wonderment of the reading world. If the _Monitor's_ solid eleven-inch balls bounded without apparenteffect from the sloping roof of the _Merrimac_, so, in turn, the_Merrimac's_ broadsides passed harmlessly over the low deck of the_Monitor_, or rebounded from the round sides of her iron turret. Whenthe unwieldy rebel turtleback, with her slow, awkward movement, triedto ram the pointed raft that carried the cheese-box, the little vessel, obedient to her rudder, easily glided out of the line of direct impact. 

Each ship passed through occasional moments of danger, but the longthree hours' encounter ended without other serious damage than an injuryto Lieutenant Worden by the explosion of a rebel shell against a creviceof the _Monitor's_ pilot-house through which he was looking, which, temporarily blinding his eye-sight, disabled him from command. At thatpoint the battle ended by mutual consent. The _Monitor_, unharmed exceptby a few unimportant dents in her plating, ran into shoal water topermit surgical attendance to her wounded officer. On her part, the_Merrimac_, abandoning any further molestation of the other ships, steamed away at noon to her retreat in Elizabeth River. The forty-onerounds fired from the _Monitor's_ guns had so far weakened the_Merrimac's_ armor that, added to the injuries of the previous day, itwas of the highest prudence to avoid further conflict. A tragic fatesoon ended the careers of both vessels. Owing to other military events, the _Merrimac_ was abandoned, burned, and blown up by her officers abouttwo months later; and in the following December, the _Monitor_ founderedin a gale off Cape Hatteras. But the types of these pioneer ironclads, which had demonstrated such unprecedented fighting qualities, werecontinued. Before the end of the war the Union navy had more than twentymonitors in service; and the structure of the _Merrimac_ was in a numberof instances repeated by the Confederates. 

The most brilliant of all the exploits of the navy during the year 1862were those carried on under the command of Flag-Officer David G. Farragut, who, though a born Southerner and residing in Virginia whenthe rebellion broke out, remained loyal to the government and true tothe flag he had served for forty-eight years. Various preparations hadbeen made and various plans discussed for an effective attempt againstsome prominent point on the Gulf coast. Very naturally, all examinationsof the subject inevitably pointed to the opening of the Mississippi asthe dominant problem to be solved; and on January 9, Farragut wasappointed to the command of the western Gulf blockading squadron, andeleven days thereafter received his confidential instructions to attemptthe capture of the city of New Orleans. 

Thus far in the war, Farragut had been assigned to no prominent service, but the patience with which he had awaited his opportunity was now morethan compensated by the energy and thoroughness with which hesuperintended the organization of his fleet. By the middle of April hewas in the lower Mississippi with seventeen men-of-war and one hundredand seventy-seven guns. With him were Commander David D. Porter, incharge of a mortar flotilla of nineteen schooners and six armedsteamships, and General Benjamin F. Butler, at the head of an armycontingent of six thousand men, soon to be followed by considerablereinforcements. 

The first obstacle to be overcome was the fire from the twin fortsJackson and St. Philip, situated nearly opposite each other at a bend ofthe Mississippi twenty-five miles above the mouth of the river, whilethe city of New Orleans itself lies seventy-five miles farther up thestream. These were formidable forts of masonry, with an armamenttogether of over a hundred guns, and garrisons of about six hundred meneach. They also had auxiliary defenses: first, of a strong riverbarrier of log rafts and other obstructions connected by powerfulchains, half a mile below the forts; second, of an improvised fleet ofsixteen rebel gunboats and a formidable floating battery. None ofFarragut's ships were ironclad. He had, from the beginning of theundertaking, maintained the theory that a wooden fleet, properlyhandled, could successfully pass the batteries of the forts. "I would assoon have a paper ship as an ironclad; only give me _men_ to fight her!"he said. He might not come back; but New Orleans would be won. In hishazardous undertaking his faith was based largely on the skill andcourage of his subordinate commanders of ships, and this faith was fullysustained by their gallantry and devotion. 

Porter's flotilla of nineteen schooners carrying two mortars each, anchored below the forts, maintained a heavy bombardment for five days, and then Farragut decided to try his ships. On the night of thetwentieth the daring work of two gunboats cut an opening through theriver barrier through which the vessels might pass; and at two o'clockon the morning of April 24, Farragut gave the signal to advance. Thefirst division of his fleet, eight vessels, led by Captain Bailey, successfully passed the barrier. The second division of nine ships wasnot quite so fortunate. Three of them failed to pass the barrier, butthe others, led by Farragut himself in his flag-ship, the _Hartford_, followed the advance. 

The starlit night was quickly obscured by the smoke of the generalcannonade from both ships and forts; but the heavy batteries of thelatter had little effect on the passing fleet. Farragut's flag-ship wasfor a short while in great danger. At a moment when she slightlygrounded a huge fire-raft, fully ablaze, was pushed against her by arebel tug, and the flames caught in the paint on her side, and mountedinto her rigging. But this danger had also been provided against, and byheroic efforts the _Hartford_ freed herself from her peril. Immediatelyabove the forts, the fleet of rebel gunboats joined in the battle, whichnow resolved itself into a series of conflicts between single vessels orsmall groups. But the stronger and better-armed Union ships quicklydestroyed the Confederate flotilla, with the single exception that twoof the enemy's gunboats rammed the _Varuna_ from opposite sides and sankher. Aside from this, the Union fleet sustained much miscellaneousdamage, but no serious injury in the furious battle of an hour and ahalf. 

With but a short halt at Quarantine, six miles above the forts, Farragutand his thirteen ships of war pushed on rapidly over the seventy-fivemiles, and on the forenoon of April 25 New Orleans lay helpless underthe guns of the Union fleet. The city was promptly evacuated by theConfederate General Lovell. Meanwhile, General Butler was busy movinghis transports and troops around outside by sea to Quarantine; and, having occupied that point in force, Forts Jackson and St. Philipcapitulated on April 28. This last obstruction removed, Butler, afterhaving garrisoned the forts, brought the bulk of his army up to NewOrleans, and on May 1 Farragut turned over to him the formal possessionof the city, where Butler continued in command of the Department of theGulf until the following December. 

Farragut immediately despatched an advance section of his fleet up theMississippi. None of the important cities on its banks below Vicksburghad yet been fortified, and, without serious opposition, theysurrendered as the Union ships successively reached them. Farraguthimself, following with the remainder of his fleet, arrived atVicksburg on May 20. This city, by reason of the high bluffs on which itstands, was the most defensible point on the whole length of the greatriver within the Southern States; but so confidently had theConfederates trusted to the strength of their works at Columbus, IslandNo. 10, Fort Pillow, and other points, that the fortifications ofVicksburg had thus far received comparatively little attention. Therecent Union victories, however, both to the north and south, hadawakened them to their danger; and when Lovell evacuated New Orleans, heshipped heavy guns and sent five Confederate regiments to Vicksburg; andduring the eight days between their arrival on May 12 and the twentieth, on which day Farragut reached the city, six rebel batteries were put inreadiness to fire on his ships. 

General Halleck, while pushing his siege works toward Corinth, wasnotified as early as April 27 that Farragut was coming, and the logic ofthe situation ought to have induced him to send a coöperating force toFarragut's assistance, or, at the very least, to have matured plans forsuch coöperation. All the events would have favored an expedition ofthis kind. When Corinth, at the end of May, fell into Halleck's hands, Forts Pillow and Randolph on the Mississippi River were hastilyevacuated by the enemy, and on June 6 the Union flotilla of rivergunboats which had rendered such signal service at Henry, Donelson, andIsland No. 10, reinforced by a hastily constructed flotilla of heavyriver tugs converted into rams, gained another brilliant victory in amost dramatic naval battle at Memphis, during which an opposingConfederate flotilla of similar rams and gunboats was almost completelydestroyed, and the immediate evacuation of Memphis by the Confederatesthereby forced. 

This left Vicksburg as the single barrier to the complete opening of theMississippi, and that barrier was defended by only six batteries and agarrison of six Confederate regiments at the date of Farragut's arrivalbefore it. But Farragut had with his expedition only two regiments oftroops, and the rebel batteries were situated at such an elevation thatthe guns of the Union fleet could not be raised sufficiently to silencethem. Neither help nor promise of help came from Halleck's army, andFarragut could therefore do nothing but turn his vessels down stream andreturn to New Orleans. There, about June 1, he received news from theNavy Department that the administration was exceedingly anxious to havethe Mississippi opened; and this time, taking with him Porter's mortarflotilla and three thousand troops, he again proceeded up the river, anda second time reached Vicksburg on June 25. 

The delay, however, had enabled the Confederates greatly to strengthenthe fortifications and the garrison of the city. Neither a bombardmentfrom Porter's mortar sloops, nor the running of Farragut's ships pastthe batteries, where they were joined by the Union gunboat flotilla fromabove, sufficed to bring the Confederates to a surrender. Farragutestimated that a coöperating land force of twelve to fifteen thousandwould have enabled him to take the works; and Halleck, on June 28 andJuly 3, partially promised early assistance. But on July 14 he reporteddefinitely that it would be impossible for him to render the expectedaid. Under these circumstances, the Navy Department ordered Farragutback to New Orleans, lest his ships of deep draft should be detained inthe river by the rapidly falling water. The capture of Vicksburg waspostponed for a whole year, and the early transfer of Halleck toWashington changed the current of Western campaigns. 

XXI

McClellan's Illness--Lincoln Consults McDowell and Franklin--President'sPlan against Manassas--McClellan's Plan against Richmond--Cameron andStanton--President's War Order No. 1--Lincoln's Questions toMcClellan--News from the West--Death of Willie Lincoln--The Harper'sFerry Fiasco--President's War Order No. 3--The News from HamptonRoads--Manassas Evacuated--Movement to the Peninsular--Yorktown--ThePeninsula Campaign--Seven Days' Battles--Retreat to Harrison's Landing

We have seen how the express orders of President Lincoln in the earlydays of January, 1862, stirred the Western commanders to the beginningof active movements that brought about an important series of victoriesduring the first half of the year. The results of his determination tobreak a similar military stagnation in the East need now to be related. 

The gloomy outlook at the beginning of the year has already beenmentioned. Finding on January 10 that General McClellan was still illand unable to see him, he called Generals McDowell and Franklin intoconference with himself, Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary ofWar; and, explaining to them his dissatisfaction and distress atexisting conditions, said to them that "if something were not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellandid not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided hecould see how it could be made to do something. "

The two generals, differing on some other points, agreed, however, in amemorandum prepared next day at the President's request, that a directmovement against the Confederate army at Manassas was preferable to amovement by water against Richmond; that preparations for the formercould be made in a week, while the latter would require a month or sixweeks. Similar discussions were held on the eleventh and twelfth, andfinally, on January 13, by which date General McClellan had sufficientlyrecovered to be present. McClellan took no pains to hide his displeasureat the proceedings, and ventured no explanation when the President askedwhat and when anything could be done. Chase repeated the directinterrogatory to McClellan himself, inquiring what he intended doingwith his army, and when he intended doing it. McClellan stated hisunwillingness to develop his plans, but said he would tell them if hewas ordered to do so. The President then asked him if he had in his ownmind any particular time fixed when a movement could be commenced. McClellan replied that he had. "Then, " rejoined the President, "I willadjourn this meeting. "

While these conferences were going on, a change occurred in thePresident's cabinet; Secretary of War Cameron, who had repeatedlyexpressed a desire to be relieved from the onerous duties of the WarDepartment, was made minister to Russia and Edwin M. Stanton appointedto succeed him. Stanton had been Attorney-General during the last monthsof President Buchanan's administration, and, though a lifelong Democrat, had freely conferred and coöperated with Republican leaders in theSenate and House of Representatives in thwarting secession schemes. Hewas a lawyer of ability and experience, and, possessing organizingqualities of a high degree combined with a strong will and greatphysical endurance, gave his administration of the War Department arecord for efficiency which it will be difficult for any future ministerto equal; and for which service his few mistakes and subordinate faultsof character will be readily forgotten. In his new functions, Stantonenthusiastically seconded the President's efforts to rouse the Army ofthe Potomac to speedy and vigorous action. 

In his famous report, McClellan states that very soon after Stantonbecame Secretary of War he explained verbally to the latter his plan ofa campaign against Richmond by way of the lower Chesapeake Bay, and atStanton's direction also explained it to the President. It is notstrange that neither the President nor the new Secretary approved it. The reasons which then existed against it in theory, and were afterwarddemonstrated in practice, are altogether too evident. As this first planwas never reduced to writing, it may be fairly inferred that it was oneof those mere suggestions which, like all that had gone before, wouldserve only to postpone action. 

The patience of the President was at length so far exhausted that onJanuary 27 he wrote his General War Order No. I, which directed "thatthe 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of allthe land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgentforces, " and that the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, thegeneral-in-chief, and all other commanders and subordinates of land andnaval forces "will severally be held to their strict and fullresponsibilities for prompt execution of this order. " To leave no doubtof his intention that the Army of the Potomac should make a beginning, the President, four days later, issued his Special War Order No. I, directing that after providing safely for the defense of Washington, itshould move against the Confederate army at Manassas Junction, on orbefore the date announced. 

As McClellan had been allowed to have his way almost without questionfor six months past, it was, perhaps, as much through mere habit ofopposition as from any intelligent decision in his own mind that heagain requested permission to present his objections to the President'splan. Mr. Lincoln, thereupon, to bring the discussion to a practicalpoint, wrote him the following list of queries on February 3:

"MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movementof the Army of the Potomac--yours to be down the Chesapeake, up theRappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroadon the York River; mine, to move directly to a point on the railroadsouthwest of Manassas. 

"If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, Ishall gladly yield my plan to yours. 

"_First_. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure oftime and money than mine?"

"_Second_. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?"

"_Third_. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?"

"_Fourth_. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it wouldbreak no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?"

"_Fifth_. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult byyour plan than mine?"

Instead of specifically answering the President's conciseinterrogatories, McClellan, on the following day, presented to theSecretary of War a long letter, reciting in much detail his statement ofwhat he had done since coming to Washington, and giving a ramblingoutline of what he thought might be accomplished in the futureprosecution of the war. His reasoning in favor of an advance byChesapeake Bay upon Richmond, instead of against Manassas Junction, rests principally upon the assumption that at Manassas the enemy isprepared to resist, while at Richmond there are no preparations; that towin Manassas would give us only the field of battle and the moral effectof a victory, while to win Richmond would give us the rebel capital withits communications and supplies; that at Manassas we would fight on afield chosen by the enemy, while at Richmond we would fight on onechosen by ourselves. If as a preliminary hypothesis these comparisonslooked plausible, succeeding events quickly exposed their fallacy. 

The President, in his anxious studies and exhaustive discussion withmilitary experts in the recent conferences, fully comprehended thatunder McClellan's labored strategical theories lay a fundamental error. It was not the capture of a place, but the destruction of the rebelarmies that was needed to subdue the rebellion. But Mr. Lincoln also sawthe fearful responsibility he would be taking upon himself if he forcedMcClellan to fight against his own judgment and protest, even thoughthat judgment was incorrect. The whole subject, therefore, underwent anew and yet more elaborate investigation. The delay which this renderednecessary was soon greatly lengthened by two other causes. It was aboutthis time that the telegraph brought news from the West of the surrenderof Fort Henry, February 6, the investment of Fort Donelson on thethirteenth, and its surrender on the sixteenth, incidents which absorbedthe constant attention of the President and the Secretary of War. Almostsimultaneously, a heavy domestic sorrow fell upon Mr. Lincoln in theserious illness of his son Willie, an interesting and most promising ladof twelve, and his death in the White House on February 20. 

When February 22 came, while there was plainly no full compliance withthe President's War Order No. I, there was, nevertheless, such promiseof a beginning, even at Washington, as justified reasonable expectation. The authorities looked almost hourly for the announcement of twopreliminary movements which had been preparing for many days: one, toattack rebel batteries on the Virginia shore of the Potomac; the otherto throw bridges--one of pontoons, the second a permanent bridge ofcanal-boats--across the river at Harper's Ferry, and an advance byBanks's division on Winchester to protect the opening of the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad and reëstablish transportation to and from the Westover that important route. 

On the evening of February 27, Secretary Stanton came to the President, and, after locking the door to prevent interruption, opened and read twodespatches from McClellan, who had gone personally to superintend thecrossing. The first despatch from the general described the fine spiritsof the troops, and the splendid throwing of the pontoon bridge byCaptain Duane and his three lieutenants, for whom he at once recommendedbrevets, and the immediate crossing of eighty-five hundred infantry. This despatch was dated at ten o'clock the previous night. "The next isnot so good, " remarked the Secretary of War. It stated that the liftlock was too small to permit the canal-boats to enter the river, so thatit was impossible to construct the permanent bridge. He would thereforebe obliged to fall back upon the safe and slow plan of merely coveringthe reconstruction of the railroad, which would be tedious and make itimpossible to seize Winchester. 

"What does this mean?" asked the President, in amazement. 

"It means, " said the Secretary of War, "that it is a damned fizzle. Itmeans that he doesn't intend to do anything. "

The President's indignation was intense; and when, a little later, General Marcy, McClellan's father-in-law and chief of staff, came in, Lincoln's criticism of the affair was in sharper language than was hisusual habit. 

"Why, in the name of common sense, " said he, excitedly, "couldn't thegeneral have known whether canal-boats would go through that lock beforehe spent a million dollars getting them there? I am almost despairing atthese results. Everything seems to fail. The impression is daily gainingground that the general does not intend to do anything. By a failurelike this we lose all the prestige gained by the capture of FortDonelson. "

The prediction of the Secretary of War proved correct. That same night, McClellan revoked Hooker's authority to cross the lower Potomac anddemolish the rebel batteries about the Occoquan River. It was doubtlessthis Harper's Ferry incident which finally convinced the President thathe could no longer leave McClellan intrusted with the sole andunrestricted exercise of military affairs. Yet that general had shownsuch decided ability in certain lines of his profession, and had plainlyin so large a degree won the confidence of the Army of the Potomacitself, that he did not wish entirely to lose the benefit of hisservices. He still hoped that, once actively started in the field, hemight yet develop valuable qualities of leadership. He had substantiallydecided to let him have his own way in his proposed campaign againstRichmond by water, and orders to assemble the necessary vessels had beengiven before the Harper's Ferry failure was known. 

Early on the morning of March 8, the President made one more effort toconvert McClellan to a direct movement against Manassas, but withoutsuccess. On the contrary, the general convened twelve of his divisioncommanders in a council, who voted eight to four for the water route. This finally decided the question in the President's mind, but hecarefully qualified the decision by two additional war orders of hisown, written without consultation. President's General War Order No. 2directed that the Army of the Potomac should be immediately organizedinto four army corps, to be respectively commanded by McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and a fifth under Banks. It is noteworthy thatthe first three of these had always earnestly advocated the Manassasmovement. President's General War Order No. 3 directed, in substance:_First_. An immediate effort to capture the Potomac batteries. _Second_. That until that was accomplished not more than two army corps should bestarted on the Chesapeake campaign toward Richmond _Third_. That anyChesapeake movement should begin in ten days; and--_Fourth_. That nosuch movement should be ordered without leaving Washington entirelysecure. 

Even while the President was completing the drafting and copying ofthese important orders, events were transpiring which once more put anew face upon the proposed campaign against Richmond. During theforenoon of the next day, March 9, a despatch was received from FortressMonroe, reporting the appearance of the rebel ironclad _Merrimac_, andthe havoc she had wrought the previous afternoon--the _Cumberland_ sunk, the _Congress_ surrendered and burned, the _Minnesota_ aground and aboutto be attacked. There was a quick gathering of officials at theExecutive Mansion--Secretaries Stanton, Seward, Welles, GeneralsMcClellan, Meigs, Totten, Commodore Smith, and Captain Dahlgren--and ascene of excitement ensued, unequaled by any other in the President'soffice during the war. Stanton walked up and down like a caged lion, andeager discussion animated cabinet and military officers. Two otherdespatches soon came, one from the captain of a vessel at Baltimore, whohad left Fortress Monroe on the evening of the eighth, and a copy of atelegram to the "New York Tribune, " giving more details. 

President Lincoln was the coolest man in the whole gathering, carefullyanalyzing the language of the telegrams, to give their somewhat confusedstatements intelligible coherence. Wild suggestions flew from speaker tospeaker about possible danger to be apprehended from the new marineterror--whether she might not be able to go to New York or Philadelphiaand levy tribute, to Baltimore or Annapolis to destroy the transportsgathered for McClellan's movement, or even to come up the Potomac andburn Washington; and all sorts of prudential measures and safeguardswere proposed. 

In the afternoon, however, apprehension was greatly quieted. That veryday a cable was laid across the bay, giving direct telegraphiccommunication with Fortress Monroe, and Captain Fox, who happened to beon the spot, concisely reported at about 4 P. M. The dramatic sequel--thetimely arrival of the _Monitor_, the interesting naval battle betweenthe two ironclads, and that at noon the _Merrimac_ had withdrawn fromthe conflict, and with her three small consorts steamed back intoElizabeth River. 

Scarcely had the excitement over the _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_ news begunto subside, when, on the same afternoon, a new surprise burst upon themilitary authorities in a report that the whole Confederate army hadevacuated its stronghold at Manassas and the batteries on the Potomac, and had retired southward to a new line behind the Rappahannock. GeneralMcClellan hastened across the river, and, finding the news to becorrect, issued orders during the night for a general movement of thearmy next morning to the vacated rebel camps. The march was promptlyaccomplished, notwithstanding the bad roads, and the troops had themeager satisfaction of hoisting the Union flag over the deserted rebelearthworks. 

For two weeks the enemy had been preparing for this retreat; and, beginning their evacuation on the seventh, their whole retrogrademovement was completed by March 11, by which date they were secure intheir new line of defense, "prepared for such an emergency--the southbank of the Rappahannock strengthened by field-works, and provided witha depot of food, " writes General Johnston. No further comment is neededto show McClellan's utter incapacity or neglect, than that for full twomonths he had commanded an army of one hundred and ninety thousand, present for duty, within two days' march of the forty-seven thousandConfederates, present for duty, whom he thus permitted to march away totheir new strongholds without a gun fired or even a meditated attack. 

General McClellan had not only lost the chance of an easy and brilliantvictory near Washington, but also the possibility of his favorite planto move by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, and from there bya land march _via_ West Point toward Richmond. On that route the enemywas now in his way. He therefore, on March 13, hastily called a councilof his corps commanders, who decided that under the new conditions itwould be best to proceed by water to Fortress Monroe, and from theremove up the Peninsula toward Richmond. To this new plan, adopted in thestress of excitement and haste, the President answered through theSecretary of War on the same day:

"_First_. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make itentirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of thatposition and line of communication. "

"_Second_. Leave Washington entirely secure. "

"_Third_. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing anew base at Fort Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at allevents, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemyby some route. "

Two days before, the President had also announced a step which he haddoubtless had in contemplation for many days, if not many weeks, namely, that--

"Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the headof the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved fromthe command of the other military departments, he retaining command ofthe Department of the Potomac. "

This order of March 11 included also the already mentioned consolidationof the western departments under Halleck; and out of the region lyingbetween Halleck's command and McClellan's command it created theMountain Department, the command of which he gave to General Frémont, whose reinstatement had been loudly clamored for by many prominent andenthusiastic followers. 

As the preparations for a movement by water had been in progress sinceFebruary 27, there was little delay in starting the Army of the Potomacon its new campaign. The troops began their embarkation on March 17, andby April 5 over one hundred thousand men, with all their material ofwar, had been transported to Fortress Monroe, where General McClellanhimself arrived on the second of the month, and issued orders to beginhis march on the fourth. 

Unfortunately, right at the outset of this new campaign, GeneralMcClellan's incapacity and want of candor once more became sharplyevident. In the plan formulated by the four corps commanders, andapproved by himself, as well as emphatically repeated by the President'sinstructions, was the essential requirement that Washington should beleft entirely secure. Learning that the general had neglected thispositive injunction, the President ordered McDowell's corps to remainfor the protection of the capital; and when the general complained ofthis, Mr. Lincoln wrote him on April 9:

"After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganizedmen, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be leftfor the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up on the lineof Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without againexposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Thispresented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) agreat temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock andsack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by thejudgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, hadbeen neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. 

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leaveBanks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up andnothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied. I wasconstrained to substitute something for it myself. "

"And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the linefrom Richmond _via_ Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousandunorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allowme to evade. .. . "

"By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you--that is, he willgain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can byreinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensableto you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will dome the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay insearch of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was onlyshifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the sameenemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The countrywill not fail to note--is noting now--that the present hesitation tomove upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. "

General McClellan's expectations in coming to the Peninsula, first, thathe would find few or no rebel intrenchments, and, second, that he wouldbe able to make rapid movements, at once signally failed. On theafternoon of the second day's march he came to the first line of theenemy's defenses, heavy fortifications at Yorktown on the York River, and a strong line of intrenchments and dams flooding the Warwick River, extending to an impassable inlet from James River. But the situation wasnot yet desperate. Magruder, the Confederate commander, had only eleventhousand men to defend Yorktown and the thirteen-mile line of theWarwick. McClellan, on the contrary, had fifty thousand at hand, and asmany more within call, with which to break the Confederate line andcontinue his proposed "rapid movements. " But now, without any adequatereconnaissance or other vigorous effort, he at once gave up his thoughtsof rapid movement, one of the main advantages he had always claimed forthe water route, and adopted the slow expedient of a siege of Yorktown. Not alone was his original plan of campaign demonstrated to be faulty, but by this change in the method of its execution it became fatal. 

It would be weary and exasperating to recount in detail the remainingprincipal episodes of McClellan's operations to gain possession of theConfederate capital. The whole campaign is a record of hesitation, delay, and mistakes in the chief command, brilliantly relieved by theheroic fighting and endurance of the troops and subordinate officers, gathering honor out of defeat, and shedding the luster of renown over aresult of barren failure. McClellan wasted a month raising siege-worksto bombard Yorktown, when he might have turned the place by two or threedays' operations with his superior numbers of four to one. By hisfailure to give instructions after Yorktown was evacuated, he allowed asingle division of his advance-guard to be beaten back at Williamsburg, when thirty thousand of their comrades were within reach, but withoutorders. He wrote to the President that he would have to fight doublenumbers intrenched, when his own army was actually twice as strong asthat of his antagonist. Placing his army astride the Chickahominy, heafforded that antagonist, General Johnston, the opportunity, at a suddenrise of the river, to fall on one portion of his divided forces at FairOaks with overwhelming numbers. Finally, when he was within four milesof Richmond and was attacked by General Lee, he began a retreat to theJames River, and after his corps commanders held the attacking enemy atbay by a successful battle on each of six successive days, he day afterday gave up each field won or held by the valor and blood of his heroicsoldiers. On July 1, the collected Union army made a stand at the battleof Malvern Hill, inflicting a defeat on the enemy which practicallyshattered the Confederate army, and in the course of a week caused it toretire within the fortifications of Richmond. During all thismagnificent fighting, however, McClellan was oppressed by theapprehension of impending defeat; and even after the brilliant victoryof Malvern Hill, continued his retreat to Harrison's Landing, where theUnion gunboats on the James River assured him of safety and supplies. 

It must be borne in mind that this Peninsula campaign, from the landingat Fortress Monroe to the battle at Malvern Hill, occupied three fullmonths, and that during the first half of that period the government, yielding to McClellan's constant faultfinding and clamor forreinforcements, sent him forty thousand additional men; also that in theopinion of competent critics, both Union and Confederate, he had, afterthe battle of Fair Oaks, and twice during the seven days' battles, abrilliant opportunity to take advantage of Confederate mistakes, and bya vigorous offensive to capture Richmond. But constitutional indecisionunfitted him to seize the fleeting chances of war. His hope of victorywas always overawed by his fear of defeat. While he commanded during alarge part of the campaign double, and always superior, numbers to theenemy, his imagination led him continually to double their strength inhis reports. This delusion so wrought upon him that on the night of June27 he sent the Secretary of War an almost despairing and insubordinatedespatch, containing these inexcusable phrases:

"Had I twenty thousand or even ten thousand fresh troops to useto-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, andshall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel ofthe army. .. . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done yourbest to sacrifice this army. "

Under almost any other ruler such language would have been quicklyfollowed by trial and dismissal, if not by much severer punishment. Butwhile Mr. Lincoln was shocked by McClellan's disrespect, he was yet morestartled by the implied portent of the despatch. It indicated a loss ofconfidence and a perturbation of mind which rendered possible even asurrender of the whole army. The President, therefore, with his habitualfreedom from passion, merely sent an unmoved and kind reply:

"Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as wecan. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. Ihave not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them asfast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite askeenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or arepulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. "

XXII

Jackson's Valley Campaign--Lincoln's Visit to Scott--Pope Assigned toCommand--Lee's Attack on McClellan--Retreat to Harrison'sLanding--Seward Sent to New York--Lincoln's Letter to Seward--Lincoln'sLetter to McClellan--Lincoln's Visit to McClellan--Halleck madeGeneral-in-Chief--Halleck's Visit to McClellan--Withdrawal fromHarrison's Landing--Pope Assumes Command--Second Battle of Bull Run--TheCabinet Protest--McClellan Ordered to Defend Washington--The MarylandCampaign--Battle of Antietam--Lincoln Visits Antietam--Lincoln's Letterto McClellan--McClellan Removed from Command

During the month of May, while General McClellan was slowly working hisway across the Chickahominy by bridge-building and intrenching, thereoccurred the episode of Stonewall Jackson's valley campaign, in whichthat eccentric and daring Confederate commander made a rapid andvictorious march up the Shenandoah valley nearly to Harper's Ferry. Itsprincipal effect upon the Richmond campaign was to turn back McDowell, who had been started on a land march to unite with the right wing ofMcClellan's army, under instructions, however, always to be in readinessto interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march uponWashington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much lauded bymilitary writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luckrather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was animprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would haveresulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces underMcDowell, Shields, and Frémont, ordered by President Lincoln, not beenthwarted by the mistake and delay of Frémont. It was an episode thatsignally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retainedMcDowell's corps for the protection of the national capital. 

That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President haddevoted his serious attention. During the whole of McClellan's Richmondcampaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat, and the eventualities it might create. Little by little, that general'shesitation, constant complaints, and exaggerated reports of the enemy'sstrength changed the President's apprehensions from possibility toprobability; and he took prompt measures to be prepared as far aspossible, should a new disaster arise. On June 24 he made a hurriedvisit to the veteran General Scott at West Point, for consultation onthe existing military conditions, and on his return to Washington calledGeneral Pope from the West, and, by an order dated June 26, speciallyassigned him to the command of the combined forces under Frémont, Banks, and McDowell, to be called the Army of Virginia, whose duty it should beto guard the Shenandoah valley and Washington city, and, as far as mightbe, render aid to McClellan's campaign against Richmond. 

The very day on which the President made this order proved to be thecrisis of McClellan's campaign. That was the day he had fixed upon for ageneral advance; but so far from realizing this hope, it turned out, also, to be the day on which General Lee began his attack on the Army ofthe Potomac, which formed the beginning of the seven days' battles, andchanged McClellan's intended advance against Richmond to a retreat tothe James River. It was after midnight of the next day that McClellansent Stanton his despairing and insubordinate despatch indicating thepossibility of losing his entire army. 

Upon the receipt of this alarming piece of news, President Lincolninstantly took additional measures of safety. He sent a telegram toGeneral Burnside in North Carolina to come with all the reinforcementshe could spare to McClellan's help. Through the Secretary of War heinstructed General Halleck at Corinth to send twenty-five thousandinfantry to McClellan by way of Baltimore and Washington. His mostimportant action was to begin the formation of a new army. On the sameday he sent Secretary of State Seward to New York with a letter to beconfidentially shown to such of the governors of States as could behurriedly called together, setting forth his view of the presentcondition of the war, and his own determination in regard to itsprosecution. After outlining the reverse at Richmond and the newproblems it created, the letter continued:

"What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open theMississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. Areasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for itsprotection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troopsin the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly orindirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place whichwe now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintainthis contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or myterm expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I wouldpublicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that Ifear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have athing understood as it really is. "

Meanwhile, by the news of the victory of Malvern Hill and the secureposition to which McClellan had retired at Harrison's Landing, thePresident learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was notas desperate as at first had seemed. The result of Seward's visit to NewYork is shown in the President's letter of July 2, answering McClellan'surgent call for heavy reinforcements:

"The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerableforce, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention ofresponsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doingmore than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only begthat in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you thinkyou are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you totry just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I willstrengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors ofeighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which Iaccept. "

And in another letter, two days later:

"To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within amonth, or even six weeks, is impossible. .. . Under these circumstances, the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save thearmy--first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if youmust. "

To satisfy himself more fully about the actual situation, the Presidentmade a visit to Harrison's Landing on July 8 and 9, and held personalinterviews with McClellan and his leading generals. While the questionof removing the army underwent considerable discussion, the Presidentleft it undecided for the present; but on July 11, soon after his returnto Washington, he issued an order:

"That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the wholeland forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that herepair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positionsand operations within the department now under his charge. "

Though General Halleck was loath to leave his command in the West, hemade the necessary dispositions there, and in obedience to thePresident's order reached Washington on July 23, and assumed command ofall the armies as general-in-chief. On the day following he proceeded toGeneral McClellan's headquarters at Harrison's Landing, and after twodays' consultation reached the same conclusion at which the Presidenthad already arrived, that the Army of the Potomac must be withdrawn. McClellan strongly objected to this course. He wished to be reinforcedso that he might resume his operations against Richmond. To do this hewanted fifty thousand more men, which number it was impossible to givehim, as he had already been pointedly informed by the President. OnHalleck's return to Washington, it was, on further consultation, resolved to bring the Army of the Potomac back to Acquia Creek and uniteit with the army of Pope. 

On July 30, McClellan received a preliminary order to send away hissick, and the withdrawal of his entire force was ordered by telegraph onAugust 3. With the obstinacy and persistence that characterized hiscourse from first to last, McClellan still protested against the change, and when Halleck in a calm letter answered his objections with both theadvantages and the necessity of the order, McClellan's movement ofwithdrawal was so delayed that fully eleven days of inestimable timewere unnecessarily lost, and the army of Pope was thereby put in seriousperil. 

Meanwhile, under President Lincoln's order of June 26, General Pope hadleft the West, and about the first of July reached Washington, where fortwo weeks, in consultation with the President and the Secretary of War, he studied the military situation, and on July 14 assumed command of theArmy of Virginia, consisting of the corps of General Frémont, eleventhousand five hundred strong, and that of General Banks, eight thousandstrong, in the Shenandoah valley, and the corps of General McDowell, eighteen thousand five hundred strong, with one division at Manassas andthe other at Fredericksburg. It is unnecessary to relate in detail thecampaign which followed. Pope intelligently and faithfully performed thetask imposed on him to concentrate his forces and hold in check theadvance of the enemy, which began as soon as the Confederates learned ofthe evacuation of Harrison's Landing. 

When the Army of the Potomac was ordered to be withdrawn it was clearlyenough seen that the movement might put the Army of Virginia injeopardy; but it was hoped that if the transfer to Acquia Creek andAlexandria were made as promptly as the order contemplated, the twoarmies would be united before the enemy could reach them. McClellan, however, continued day after day to protest against the change, and madehis preparations and embarkation with such exasperating slowness asshowed that he still hoped to induce the government to change its plans. 

Pope, despite the fact that he had managed his retreat with skill andbravery, was attacked by Lee's army, and fought the second battle ofBull Run on August 30, under the disadvantage of having one ofMcClellan's divisions entirely absent and the other failing to respondto his order to advance to the attack on the first day. McClellan hadreached Alexandria on August 24; and notwithstanding telegram aftertelegram from Halleck, ordering him to push Franklin's division out toPope's support, excuse and delay seemed to be his only response, endingat last in his direct suggestion that Franklin's division be kept todefend Washington, and Pope be left to "get out of his scrape" as besthe might. 

McClellan's conduct and language had awakened the indignation of thewhole cabinet, roused Stanton to fury, and greatly outraged the feelingsof President Lincoln. But even under such irritation the President was, as ever, the very incarnation of cool, dispassionate judgment, allowingnothing but the daily and hourly logic of facts to influence hissuggestions or decision. In these moments of crisis and danger he feltmore keenly than ever the awful responsibilities of rulership, and thatthe fate of the nation hung upon his words and acts from hour to hour. 

His official counselors, equally patriotic and sincere, were not hisequals in calmness of temper. On Friday, August 29, Stanton went toChase, and after an excited conference drew up a memorandum of protest, to be signed by the members of the cabinet, which drew a gloomy pictureof present and apprehended dangers, and recommended the immediateremoval of McClellan from command. Chase and Stanton signed the paper, as also did Bates, whom they immediately consulted, and somewhat laterSmith added his signature. But when they presented it to Welles, hefirmly refused, stating that though he concurred with them in judgment, it would be discourteous and unfriendly to the President to adopt such acourse. They did not go to Seward and Blair, apparently believing themto be friendly to McClellan, and therefore probably unwilling to givetheir assent. The refusal of Mr. Welles to sign had evidently caused amore serious discussion among them about the form and language of theprotest; for on Monday, September 1, it was entirely rewritten by Bates, cut down to less than half its original length as drafted by Stanton, and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet. 

Presented for the second time to Mr. Welles, he reiterated hisobjection, and again refused his signature. Though in the new form itbore the signatures of a majority of the cabinet, the paper was neverpresented to Mr. Lincoln. The signers may have adopted the feeling ofMr. Welles that it was discourteous; or they may have thought that withonly four members of the cabinet for it and three against it, it wouldbe ineffectual; or, more likely than either, the mere progress of eventsmay have brought them to consider it inexpedient. 

The defeat of Pope became final and conclusive on the afternoon ofAugust 30, and his telegram announcing it conveyed an intimation that hehad lost control of his army. President Lincoln had, therefore, toconfront a most serious crisis and danger. Even without having seen thewritten and signed protest, he was well aware of the feelings of thecabinet against McClellan. With what began to look like a seriousconspiracy among McClellan's officers against Pope, with Pope's army ina disorganized retreat upon Washington, with the capital in possibledanger of capture by Lee, and with a distracted and half-mutinouscabinet, the President had need of all his caution and all his wisdom. Both his patience and his judgment proved equal to the demand. 

On Monday, September 1, repressing every feeling of indignation, andsolicitous only to make every expedient contribute to the public safety, he called McClellan from Alexandria to Washington and asked him to usehis personal influence with the officers who had been under his commandto give a hearty and loyal support to Pope as a personal favor to theirformer general, and McClellan at once sent a telegram in this spirit. 

That afternoon, also, Mr. Lincoln despatched a member of GeneralHalleck's staff to the Virginia side of the Potomac, who reported thedisorganization and discouragement among the retreating troops as evenmore than had been expected. Worse than all, Halleck, thegeneral-in-chief, who was much worn out by the labors of the past fewdays, seemed either unable or unwilling to act with prompt direction andcommand equal to the emergency, though still willing to give his adviceand suggestion. 

Under such conditions, Mr. Lincoln saw that it was necessary for himpersonally to exercise at the moment his military functions andauthority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. On the morning ofSeptember 2, therefore, he gave a verbal order, which during the day wasissued in regular form as coming from the general-in-chief, thatMajor-General McClellan be placed in command of the fortificationsaround Washington and the troops for the defense of the capital. Mr. Lincoln made no concealment of his belief that McClellan had acted badlytoward Pope and really wanted him to fail; "but there is no one in thearmy who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours intoshape half as well as he can, " he said. "We must use the tools we have;if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight. "

It turned out that the second battle of Bull Run had by no means soseriously disorganized the Union army as was reported, and thatWashington had been exposed to no real danger. The Confederate armyhovered on its front for a day or two, but made neither attack nordemonstration. Instead of this, Lee entered upon a campaign intoMaryland, hoping that his presence might stimulate a secession revolt inthat State, and possibly create the opportunity successfully to attackBaltimore or Philadelphia. 

Pope having been relieved and sent to another department, McClellan soonrestored order among the troops, and displayed unwonted energy andvigilance in watching the movements of the enemy, as Lee gradually movedhis forces northwestward toward Leesburg, thirty miles from Washington, where he crossed the Potomac and took position at Frederick, ten milesfarther away. McClellan gradually followed the movement of the enemy, keeping the Army of the Potomac constantly in a position to protect bothWashington and Baltimore against an attack. In this way it happened thatwithout any order or express intention on the part of either the generalor the President, McClellan's duty became imperceptibly changed fromthat of merely defending Washington city to that of an active campaigninto Maryland to follow the Confederate army. 

This movement into Maryland was begun by both armies about September 4. On the thirteenth of that month McClellan had reached Frederick, whileLee was by that time across the Catoctin range at Boonsboro', but hisarmy was divided. He had sent a large part of it back across thePotomac to capture Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. On that day therefell into McClellan's hands the copy of an order issued by General Leethree days before, which, as McClellan himself states in his report, fully disclosed Lee's plans. The situation was therefore, as follows: Itwas splendid September weather, with the roads in fine condition. McClellan commanded a total moving force of more than eighty thousand;Lee, a total moving force of forty thousand. The Confederate army wasdivided. Each of the separate portions was within twenty miles of theUnion columns; and before half-past six on the evening of September 13, McClellan had full knowledge of the enemy's plans. 

General Palfrey, an intelligent critic friendly to McClellan, distinctlyadmits that the Union army, properly commanded, could have absolutelyannihilated the Confederate forces. But the result proved quitedifferent. Even such advantages in McClellan's hands failed to rouse himto vigorous and decisive action. As usual, hesitation and tardinesscharacterized the orders and movements of the Union forces, and duringthe four days succeeding, Lee had captured Harper's Ferry with eleventhousand prisoners and seventy-three pieces of artillery, reunited hisarmy, and fought the defensive battle of Antietam on September 17, withalmost every Confederate soldier engaged, while one third of McClellan'sarmy was not engaged at all and the remainder went into action piecemealand successively, under such orders that coöperative movement and mutualsupport were practically impossible. Substantially, it was a drawnbattle, with appalling slaughter on both sides. 

Even after such a loss of opportunity, there still remained a preciousbalance of advantage in McClellan's hands. Because of its smaller totalnumbers, the Confederate army was disproportionately weakened by thelosses in battle. The Potomac River was almost immediately behind it, and had McClellan renewed his attack on the morning of the eighteenth, as several of his best officers advised, a decisive victory was yetwithin his grasp. But with his usual hesitation, notwithstanding thearrival of two divisions of reinforcements, he waited all day to make uphis mind. He indeed gave orders to renew the attack at daylight on thenineteenth, but before that time the enemy had retreated across thePotomac, and McClellan telegraphed, apparently with great satisfaction, that Maryland was free and Pennsylvania safe. 

The President watched the progress of this campaign with an eagernessborn of the lively hope that it might end the war. He sent severaltelegrams to the startled Pennsylvania authorities to assure them thatPhiladelphia and Harrisburg were in no danger. He ordered areinforcement of twenty-one thousand to join McClellan. He sent aprompting telegram to that general: "Please do not let him [the enemy]get off without being hurt. " He recognized the battle of Antietam as asubstantial, if not a complete victory, and seized the opportunity itafforded him to issue his preliminary proclamation of emancipation onSeptember 22. 

For two weeks after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan kept hisarmy camped on various parts of the field, and so far from exhibitingany disposition of advancing against the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, showed constant apprehension lest the enemy might come and attack him. On October 1, the President and several friends made a visit toAntietam, and during the three succeeding days reviewed the troops andwent over the various battle-grounds in company with the general. Thebetter insight which the President thus received of the nature andresults of the late battle served only to deepen in his mind theconviction he had long entertained--how greatly McClellan's defectsoverbalanced his merits as a military leader; and his impatience foundvent in a phrase of biting irony. In a morning walk with a friend, waving his arm toward the white tents of the great army, he asked: "Doyou know what that is?" The friend, not catching the drift of histhought, said, "It is the Army of the Potomac, I suppose. " "So it iscalled, " responded the President, in a tone of suppressed indignation, "But that is a mistake. It is only McClellan's body-guard. "

At that time General McClellan commanded a total force of one hundredthousand men present for duty under his immediate eye, and seventy-threethousand present for duty under General Banks about Washington. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that on October 6, the second day afterMr. Lincoln's return to Washington, the following telegram went to thegeneral from Halleck:

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs thatyou cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the riverbetween the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by youroperation, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men. If you moveup the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve thousand orfifteen thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the interiorline, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He isvery desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You willimmediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to crossthe river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It isnecessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined onbefore orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. Iam directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chieffully concur with the President in these instructions. "

This express order was reinforced by a long letter from the President, dated October 13, specifically pointing out the decided advantagesMcClellan possessed over the enemy, and suggesting a plan of campaigneven to details, the importance and value of which was self-evident. 

"You remember my speaking to you of what I called yourover-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that youcannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to beat least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?. .. Changepositions with the enemy, and think you not he would break yourcommunication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dreadhis going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he givesup his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do butto follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fallupon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of thewater-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the routethat you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His routeis the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as goodon yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to crossthe Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. Myidea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize, if he would permit. If he should move northward Iwould follow him closely, holding his communications. If he shouldprevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I wouldpress closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity shouldpresent, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. Isay 'try'; if we never try we shall never succeed. If he makes a standat Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage ofcoming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. "

But advice, expostulation, argument, orders, were all wasted, now asbefore, on the unwilling, hesitating general. When he had frittered awayanother full month in preparation, in slowly crossing the Potomac, andin moving east of the Blue Ridge and massing his army about Warrenton, ashort distance south of the battle-field of Bull Run, without a vigorousoffensive, or any discernible intention to make one, the President'spatience was finally exhausted, and on November 5 he sent him an orderremoving him from command. And so ended General McClellan's militarycareer. 

XXIII

Cameron's Report--Lincoln's Letter to Bancroft--Annual Message onSlavery--The Delaware Experiment--Joint Resolution on CompensatedAbolishment--First Border State Interview--Stevens's Comment--Districtof Columbia Abolishment--Committee on Abolishment--Hunter's OrderRevoked--Antislavery Measures of Congress--Second Border StateInterview--Emancipation Proposed and Postponed

The relation of the war to the institution of slavery has been touchedupon in describing several incidents which occurred during 1861, namely, the designation of fugitive slaves as "contraband, " the Crittendenresolution and the confiscation act of the special session of Congress, the issuing and revocation of Frémont's proclamation, and various ordersrelating to contrabands in Union camps. The already mentionedresignation of Secretary Cameron had also grown out of a similarquestion. In the form in which it was first printed, his report asSecretary of War to the annual session of Congress which met on December3, 1861, announced:

"If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the rebels asslaves are capable of bearing arms and performing efficient militaryservice, it is the right, and may become the duty, of the government toarm and equip them, and employ their services against the rebels, underproper military regulation, discipline, and command. "

The President was not prepared to permit a member of his cabinet, without his consent, to commit the administration to so radical a policyat that early date. He caused the advance copies of the document to berecalled and modified to the simple declaration that fugitive andabandoned slaves, being clearly an important military resource, shouldnot be returned to rebel masters, but withheld from the enemy to bedisposed of in future as Congress might deem best. Mr. Lincoln sawclearly enough what a serious political rôle the slavery question waslikely to play during the continuance of the war. Replying to a letterfrom the Hon. George Bancroft, in which that accomplished historianpredicted that posterity would not be satisfied with the results of thewar unless it should effect an increase of the free States, thePresident wrote:

"The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one whichdoes not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all duecaution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it. "

This caution was abundantly manifested in his annual message to Congressof December 3, 1861:

"In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing theinsurrection, " he wrote, "I have been anxious and careful that theinevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violentand remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in everycase, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent asthe primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questionswhich are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate actionof the legislature. .. . The Union must be preserved; and hence allindispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste todetermine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyalas well as the disloyal, are indispensable. "

The most conservative opinion could not take alarm at phraseology soguarded and at the same time so decided; and yet it proved broad enoughto include every great exigency which the conflict still had in store. 

Mr. Lincoln had indeed already maturely considered and in his own mindadopted a plan of dealing with the slavery question: the simple planwhich, while a member of Congress, he had proposed for adoption in theDistrict of Columbia--the plan of voluntary compensated abolishment. Atthat time local and national prejudice stood in the way of itspracticability; but to his logical and reasonable mind it seemed nowthat the new conditions opened for it a prospect at least of initialsuccess. 

In the late presidential election the little State of Delaware had, by afusion between the Bell and the Lincoln vote, chosen a Union member ofCongress, who identified himself in thought and action with the newadministration. While Delaware was a slave State, only the merestremnant of the institution existed there--seventeen hundred andninety-eight slaves all told. Without any public announcement of hispurpose, the President now proposed to the political leaders ofDelaware, through their representative, a scheme for the gradualemancipation of these seventeen hundred and ninety-eight slaves, on thepayment therefore by the United States at the rate of four hundreddollars per slave, in annual instalments during thirty-one years to thatState, the sum to be distributed by it to the individual owners. ThePresident believed that if Delaware could be induced to take this step, Maryland might follow, and that these examples would create a sentimentthat would lead other States into the same easy and beneficent path. Butthe ancient prejudice still had its relentless grip upon some of theDelaware law-makers. A majority of the Delaware House indeed voted toentertain the scheme. But five of the nine members of the DelawareSenate, with hot partizan anathemas, scornfully repelled the "abolitionbribe, " as they called it, and the project withered in the bud. 

Mr. Lincoln did not stop at the failure of his Delaware experiment, butat once took an appeal to a broader section of public opinion. On March6, 1862, he sent a special message to the two houses of Congressrecommending the adoption of the following joint resolution:

"_Resolved_, that the United States ought to coöperate with any Statewhich may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such Statepecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, tocompensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by suchchange of system. "

"The point is not, " said his explanatory message, "that all the Statestolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation;but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more northernshall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more southern that inno event will the former ever join the latter in their proposedConfederacy. I say 'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual, andnot sudden, emancipation is better for all. .. . Such a proposition on thepart of the general government sets up no claim of a right by Federalauthority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, asit does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the Stateand its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter ofperfectly free choice with them. In the annual message last December Ithought fit to say, 'The Union must be preserved; and hence, allindispensable means must be employed. ' I said this, not hastily, butdeliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensablemeans to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the nationalauthority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it isimpossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all theruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or mayobviously promise great efficiency toward ending the struggle, must andwill come. "

The Republican journals of the North devoted considerable discussion tothe President's message and plan, which, in the main, were veryfavorably received. Objection was made, however, in some quarters thatthe proposition would be likely to fail on the score of expense, andthis objection the President conclusively answered in a private letterto a senator. 

"As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation, withcompensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or twobrief suggestions. Less than one half-day's cost of this war would payfor all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head. .. . Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the sameprice, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentuckyand Missouri. .. . Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on thepart of those States and this District would shorten the war more thaneighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?"

Four days after transmitting the message the President called togetherthe delegations in Congress from the border slave States, and in a longand earnest personal interview, in which he repeated and enforced thearguments of his message, urged upon them the expediency of adopting hisplan, which he assured them he had proposed in the most friendly spirit, and with no intent to injure the interests or wound the sensibilities ofthe slave States. On the day following this interview the House ofRepresentatives adopted the joint resolution by more than a two-thirdsvote; ayes eighty-nine, nays thirty-one. Only a very few of the borderState members had the courage to vote in the affirmative. The Senatealso passed the joint resolution, by about a similar party division, notquite a month later; the delay occurring through press of businessrather than unwillingness. 

As yet, however, the scheme was tolerated rather than heartily indorsedby the more radical elements in Congress. Stevens, the cynicalRepublican leader of the House of Representatives, said:

"I confess I have not been able to see what makes one side so anxious topass it, or the other side so anxious to defeat it. I think it is aboutthe most diluted milk-and-water-gruel proposition that was ever given tothe American nation. "

But the bulk of the Republicans, though it proposed no immediatepractical legislation, nevertheless voted for it, as a declaration ofpurpose in harmony with a pending measure, and as being, on the onehand, a tribute to antislavery opinion in the North, and, on the other, an expression of liberality toward the border States. The concurrentmeasure of practical legislation was a bill for the immediateemancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia, on the paymentto their loyal owners of an average sum of three hundred dollars foreach slave, and for the appointment of a commission to assess and awardthe amount. The bill was introduced early in the session, and itsdiscussion was much stimulated by the President's special message andjoint resolution. Like other antislavery measures, it was opposed by theDemocrats and supported by the Republicans, with but triflingexceptions; and by the same majority of two thirds was passed by theSenate on April 3, and the House on April 11, and became a law by thePresident's signature on April 16. 

The Republican majority in Congress as well as the President was thuspledged to the policy of compensated abolishment, both by the promise ofthe joint resolution and the fulfilment carried out in the Districtbill. If the representatives and senators of the border slave States hadshown a willingness to accept the generosity of the government, theycould have avoided the pecuniary sacrifice which overtook the slaveowners in those States not quite three years later. On April 14, in theHouse of Representatives, the subject was taken up by Mr. White ofIndiana, at whose instance a select committee on emancipation, consisting of nine members, a majority of whom were from border slaveStates, was appointed; and this committee on July 16 reported acomprehensive bill authorizing the President to give compensation at therate of three hundred dollars for each slave to any one of the States ofDelaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, thatmight adopt immediate or gradual emancipation. Some subsequentproceedings on this subject occurred in Congress in the case ofMissouri; but as to the other States named in the bill, either theneglect or open opposition of their people and representatives andsenators prevented any further action from the committee. 

Meanwhile a new incident once more brought the question of militaryemancipation into sharp public discussion. On May 9, General DavidHunter, commanding the Department of the South, which consisted mainlyof some sixty or seventy miles of the South Carolina coast between NorthEdisto River and Warsaw Sound, embracing the famous Sea Island cottonregion which fell into Union hands by the capture of Port Royal in 1861, issued a military order which declared:

"Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible;the persons in these three States--Georgia, Florida, and SouthCarolina--heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared foreverfree. "

The news of this order, coming by the slow course of ocean mails, greatly surprised Mr. Lincoln, and his first comment upon it waspositive and emphatic. "No commanding general shall do such a thing, upon my responsibility, without consulting me, " he wrote to SecretaryChase. Three days later, May 19, 1862, he published a proclamationdeclaring Hunter's order entirely unauthorized and void, and adding:

"I further make known that whether it be competent for me, ascommander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of anyState or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shallhave become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of thegovernment to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, undermy responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feeljustified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. Theseare totally different questions from those of police regulations inarmies and camps. "

This distinct reservation of executive power, and equally plainannouncement of the contingency which would justify its exercise, wascoupled with a renewed recital of his plan and offer of compensatedabolishment and reinforced by a powerful appeal to the public opinion ofthe border slave States. 

"I do not argue, " continued the proclamation, "I beseech you to make thearguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to thesigns of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration ofthem, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partizan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting noreproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change itcontemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending orwrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not beendone, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it isnow your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lamentthat you have neglected it. "

This proclamation of President Lincoln's naturally created considerableand very diverse comment, but much less than would have occurred had notmilitary events intervened which served in a great degree to absorbpublic attention. At the date of the proclamation McClellan, with theArmy of the Potomac, was just reaching the Chickahominy in his campaigntoward Richmond; Stonewall Jackson was about beginning his startlingraid into the Shenandoah valley; and Halleck was pursuing his somewhatleisurely campaign against Corinth. On the day following theproclamation the victorious fleet of Farragut reached Vicksburg in itsfirst ascent of the Mississippi. Congress was busy with the multifariouswork that crowded the closing weeks of the long session; and among thiscongressional work the debates and proceedings upon several measures ofpositive and immediate antislavery legislation were significant "signsof the times. " During the session, and before it ended, acts oramendments were passed prohibiting the army from returning fugitiveslaves; recognizing the independence and sovereignty of Haiti andLiberia; providing for carrying into effect the treaty with England tosuppress the African slave trade; restoring the Missouri Compromise andextending its provisions to all United States Territories; greatlyincreasing the scope of the confiscation act in freeing slaves actuallyemployed in hostile military service; and giving the Presidentauthority, if not in express terms, at least by easy implication, toorganize and arm negro regiments for the war. 

But between the President's proclamation and the adjournment of Congressmilitary affairs underwent a most discouraging change. McClellan'sadvance upon Richmond became a retreat to Harrison's Landing Halleckcaptured nothing but empty forts at Corinth. Farragut found nocoöperation at Vicksburg, and returned to New Orleans, leaving itshostile guns still barring the commerce of the great river. Still worse, the country was plunged into gloomy forebodings by the President's callfor three hundred thousand new troops. 

About a week before the adjournment of Congress the President againcalled together the delegations from the border slave States, and readto them, in a carefully prepared paper, a second and most urgent appealto adopt his plan of compensated abolishment. 

"Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly thatin no event will the States you represent ever join their proposedconfederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But youcannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them solong as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution withinyour own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelminglydone, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and Iknow what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before theirfaces, and they can shake you no more forever. .. . If the war continueslong, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institutionin your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion--bythe mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will havenothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. Howmuch better for you and for your people to take the step which at onceshortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which issure to be wholly lost in any other event. How much better to thus savethe money which else we sink forever in the war. .. . Our common countryis in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action tobring it speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is savedto the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. Toyou, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure thathappiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewithforever. "

Even while the delegations listened, Mr. Lincoln could see that eventshad not yet ripened their minds to the acceptance of his proposition. Intheir written replies, submitted a few days afterward, two thirds ofthem united in a qualified refusal, which, while recognizing thePresident's patriotism and reiterating their own loyalty, urged a numberof rather unsubstantial excuses. The minority replies promised to submitthe proposal fairly to the people of their States, but could of coursegive no assurance that it would be welcomed by their constituents. Theinterview itself only served to confirm the President in an alternativecourse of action upon which his mind had doubtless dwelt for aconsiderable time with intense solicitude, and which is best presentedin the words of his own recital. 

"It had got to be, " said he, in a conversation with the artist F. B. Carpenter, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, untilI felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operationswe had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and mustchange our tactics, or lose the game. I now determined upon the adoptionof the emancipation policy; and, without consultation with, or theknowledge of, the cabinet, I prepared the original draft of theproclamation, and after much anxious thought called a cabinet meetingupon the subject. .. . All were present excepting Mr. Blair, thePostmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, butcame in subsequently. I said to the cabinet that I had resolved uponthis step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but tolay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them, suggestions as towhich would be in order after they had heard it read. "

It was on July 22 that the President read to his cabinet the draft ofthis first emancipation proclamation, which, after a formal warningagainst continuing the rebellion, was in the following words:

"And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting ofCongress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure fortendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any and allStates which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining theauthority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarilyadopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual abolishment ofslavery within such State or States; that the object is to practicallyrestore, thenceforward to be maintained, the constitutional relationbetween the general government and each and all the States wherein thatrelation is now suspended or disturbed; and that for this object thewar, as it has been, will be prosecuted. And as a fit and necessarymilitary measure for effecting this object, I, as commander-in-chief ofthe army and navy of the United States, do order and declare that on thefirst day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundredand sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or Stateswherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not thenbe practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever be free. "

Mr. Lincoln had given a confidential intimation of this step to Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles on the day following the border State interview, but to all the other members of the cabinet it came as a completesurprise. Blair thought it would cost the administration the fallelections. Chase preferred that emancipation should be proclaimed bycommanders in the several military districts. Seward, approving themeasure, suggested that it be postponed until it could be given to thecountry supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as wouldbe the case then, upon the greatest disasters of the war. Mr. Lincoln'srecital continues:

"The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with verygreat force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought uponthe subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put thedraft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. "

XXIV

Criticism of the President for his Action on Slavery--Lincoln's Lettersto Louisiana Friends--Greeley's Open Letter--Mr. Lincoln'sReply--Chicago Clergymen Urge Emancipation--Lincoln's Answer--LincolnIssues Preliminary Proclamation--President Proposes ConstitutionalAmendment--Cabinet Considers Final Proclamation--Cabinet DiscussesAdmission of West Virginia--Lincoln Signs Edict of Freedom--Lincoln'sLetter to Hodges

The secrets of the government were so well kept that no hint whatevercame to the public that the President had submitted to the cabinet thedraft of an emancipation proclamation. Between that date and the battleof the second Bull Run intervened the period of a full month, duringwhich, in the absence of military movements or congressional proceedingsto furnish exciting news, both private individuals and public journalsturned a new and somewhat vindictive fire of criticism upon theadministration. For this they seized upon the ever-ready text of theubiquitous slavery question. Upon this issue the conservatives protestedindignantly that the President had been too fast, while, contrarywise, the radicals clamored loudly that he had been altogether too slow. Wehave seen how his decision was unalterably taken and his coursedistinctly marked out, but that he was not yet ready publicly toannounce it. Therefore, during this period of waiting for victory, heunderwent the difficult task of restraining the impatience of bothsides, which he did in very positive language. Thus, under date of July26, 1862, he wrote to a friend in Louisiana:

"Yours of the sixteenth, by the hand of Governor Shepley, is received. It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by thecourse of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that is a falsepretense. The people of Louisiana--all intelligent peopleeverywhere--know full well that I never had a wish to touch thefoundations of their society, or any right of theirs. With perfectknowledge of this, they forced a necessity upon me to send armies amongthem, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by thepresence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy--know how to becured of General Phelps. Remove the necessity of his presence. .. . I am apatient man--always willing to forgive on the Christian terms ofrepentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I mustsave this government if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will notdo; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall notsurrender this game leaving any available card unplayed. "

Two days later he answered another Louisiana critic:

"Mr. Durant complains that, in various ways, the relation of master andslave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers itparticularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an actof Congress, while constitutional guarantees are suspended on the pleaof military necessity. The truth is that what is done and omitted aboutslaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is amilitary necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither insufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our linesslaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure inthis direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he andsuch as he shall have time to help themselves. .. . What would you do inmy position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecuteit in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose-water? Would youdeal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up thecontest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastfulmood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to savethe government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personalinclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vastfor malicious dealing. "

The President could afford to overlook the misrepresentations andinvective of the professedly opposition newspapers, but he had also tomeet the over-zeal of influential Republican editors of strongantislavery bias. Horace Greeley printed, in the New York "Tribune" ofAugust 20, a long "open letter" ostentatiously addressed to Mr. Lincoln, full of unjust censure all based on the general accusation that thePresident and many army officers as well, were neglecting their dutyunder pro-slavery influences and sentiments. The open letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote in reply is remarkable not alone for the skill with whichit separated the true from the false issue of the moment, but also forthe equipoise and dignity with which it maintained his authority asmoral arbiter between the contending factions. 

 "EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 22, 1862. 

 "HON. HORACE GREELEY. 

"DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the nineteenth, addressed to myselfthrough the New York 'Tribune. ' If there be in it any statements orassumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now andhere, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I maybelieve to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waiveit in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed tobe right. 

"As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing, ' as you say, I have not meantto leave any one in doubt. 

"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under theConstitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, thenearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was. ' If there be those whowould not save the Union unless they could at the same time saveslavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not savethe Union unless they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do notagree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save theUnion, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could savethe Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could saveit by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it byfreeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I doabout slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps tosave the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believeit would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shallbelieve what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever Ishall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correcterrors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast asthey shall appear to be true views. 

"I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty;and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that allmen everywhere could be free. 

 "Yours, "A. LINCOLN. "

It can hardly be doubted that President Lincoln, when he wrote thisletter, intended that it should have a twofold effect upon publicopinion: first, that it should curb extreme antislavery sentiment togreater patience; secondly, that it should rouse dogged pro-slaveryconservatism, and prepare it for the announcement which he had resolvedto make at the first fitting opportunity. At the date of the letter, hevery well knew that a serious conflict of arms was soon likely to occurin Virginia; and he had strong reason to hope that the junction of thearmies of McClellan and Pope which had been ordered, and was then inprogress, could be successfully effected, and would result in a decisiveUnion victory. This hope, however, was sadly disappointed. The secondbattle of Bull Run, which occurred one week after the Greeley letter, proved a serious defeat, and necessitated a further postponement of hiscontemplated action. 

As a secondary effect of the new disaster, there came upon him once morean increased pressure to make reprisal upon what was assumed to be thereally vulnerable side of the rebellion. On September 13, he was visitedby an influential deputation from the religious denominations ofChicago, urging him to issue at once a proclamation of universalemancipation. His reply to them, made in the language of the mostperfect courtesy nevertheless has in it a tone of rebuke that indicatesthe state of irritation and high sensitiveness under which he was livingfrom day to day. In the actual condition of things, he could neithersafely satisfy them nor deny them. As any answer he could make would beliable to misconstruction, he devoted the larger part of it to pointingout the unreasonableness of their dogmatic insistence:

"I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that byreligious men, who are equally certain that they represent the divinewill. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken inthat belief, and perhaps, in some respects, both. I hope it will not beirreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would revealhis will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might besupposed he would reveal it directly to me. .. . What good would aproclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are nowsituated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world willsee must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against thecomet. .. . Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal orconstitutional grounds, for, as commander-in-chief of the army and navyin time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which maybest subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, inview of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided onaccording to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to thesuppression of the rebellion. .. . Do not misunderstand me because I havementioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that havethus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have notdecided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold thematter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on mymind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to beGod's will, I will do. "

Four days after this interview the battle of Antietam was fought, andwhen, after a few days of uncertainty it was ascertained that it couldbe reasonably claimed as a Union victory, the President resolved tocarry out his long-matured purpose. The diary of Secretary Chase hasrecorded a very full report of the interesting transaction. On this evermemorable September 22, 1862, after some playful preliminary talk, Mr. Lincoln said to his cabinet:

"GENTLEMEN: I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about therelation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, severalweeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever sincethen my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I havethought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish thatwe were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebelshas not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have beendriven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger ofinvasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon asit should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation ofemancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothingto any one, but I made the promise to myself and [hesitating a little]to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfilthat promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I havedetermined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respectfor any one of you. But I already know the views of each on thisquestion. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have consideredthem as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is thatwhich my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything inthe expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any one of youthinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many othersmight, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I wassatisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any oneof them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he couldbe put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of thepeople as I had some time since, I do not know that, all thingsconsidered any other person has more; and, however this may be, there isno way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; Imust do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the coursewhich I feel I ought to take. "

The members of the cabinet all approved the policy of the measure; Mr. Blair only objecting that he thought the time inopportune, while otherssuggested some slight amendments. In the new form in which it wasprinted on the following morning, the document announced a renewal ofthe plan of compensated abolishment, a continuance of the effort atvoluntary colonization, a promise to recommend ultimate compensation toloyal owners, and--

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousandeight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within anyState, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then bein rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize andmaintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts torepress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make fortheir actual freedom. "

Pursuant to these announcements, the President's annual message ofDecember 1, 1862, recommended to Congress the passage of a jointresolution proposing to the legislatures of the several States aconstitutional amendment consisting of three articles, namely: Oneproviding compensation in bonds for every State which should abolishslavery before the year 1900; another securing freedom to all slaveswho, during the rebellion, had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances ofwar--also providing compensation to legal owners; the third authorizingCongress to provide for colonization. The long and practical argument inwhich he renewed this plan, "not in exclusion of, but additional to, allothers for restoring and preserving the national authority throughoutthe Union, " concluded with the following eloquent sentences:

"We can succeed only by concert. It is not, 'Can any of us imaginebetter?' but, 'Can we all do better?' Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs, 'Can we do better?' The dogmas of the quietpast are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled highwith difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, andthen we shall save our country. 

"Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We, of this Congress andthis administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. Nopersonal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another ofus. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honoror dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. Theworld will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We--even we here--hold thepower and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, weassure freedom to the free--honorable alike in what we give and what wepreserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope ofearth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful generous, just--a way which, if followed, the world willforever applaud, and God must forever bless. "

But Mr. Lincoln was not encouraged by any response to this earnestappeal, either from Congress or by manifestations of public opinion. Indeed, it may be fairly presumed that he expected none. Perhaps heconsidered it already a sufficient gain that it was silently accepted asanother admonition of the consequences which not he nor hisadministration, but the Civil War, with its relentless agencies, wasrapidly bringing about. He was becoming more and more conscious of thesilent influence of his official utterances on public sentiment, if notto convert obstinate opposition, at least to reconcile it to patientsubmission. 

In that faith he steadfastly went on carrying out his well-matured plan, the next important step of which was the fulfilment of the announcementsmade in the preliminary emancipation proclamation of September 22. OnDecember 30, he presented to each member of his cabinet a copy of thedraft he had carefully made of the new and final proclamation to beissued on New Year's day. It will be remembered that as early as July22, he informed the cabinet that the main question involved he haddecided for himself. Now, as twice before it was only upon minor pointsthat he asked their advice and suggestion, for which object he placedthese drafts in their hands for verbal and collateral criticism. 

In addition to the central point of military emancipation in all theStates yet in rebellion, the President's draft for the first timeannounced his intention to incorporate a portion of the newly liberatedslaves into the armies of the Union. This policy had also been underdiscussion at the first consideration of the subject in July. Mr. Lincoln had then already seriously considered it, but thought itinexpedient and productive of more evil than good at that date. In hisjudgment, the time had now arrived for energetically adopting it. 

On the following day, December 31, the members brought back to thecabinet meeting their several criticisms and suggestions on the draft hehad given them. Perhaps the most important one was that earnestlypressed by Secretary Chase, that the new proclamation should make noexceptions of fractional parts of States controlled by the Union armies, as in Louisiana and Virginia, save the forty-eight counties of thelatter designated as West Virginia, then in process of formation andadmission as a new State; the constitutionality of which, on this sameDecember 31, was elaborately discussed in writing by the members of thecabinet, and affirmatively decided by the President. 

On the afternoon of December 31, the cabinet meeting being over, Mr. Lincoln once more carefully rewrote the proclamation, embodying in itthe suggestions which had been made as to mere verbal improvements; buthe rigidly adhered to his own draft in retaining the exceptions as tofractional parts of States and the forty-eight counties of WestVirginia; and also his announcement of intention to enlist the freedmenin military service. Secretary Chase had submitted the form of a closingparagraph. This the President also adopted, but added to it, after thewords "warranted by the Constitution, " his own important qualifyingcorrection, "upon military necessity. "

The full text of the weighty document will be found in a foot-note. [5]

 [Footnote 5:

 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A PROCLAMATION. 

 Whereas on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:

 "That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. 

 "That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong counter-vailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the United States. "

 Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:

 Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. 

 And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. 

 And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. 

 And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. 

 And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. 

 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

 Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. 

 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

 BY THE PRESIDENT: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, _Secretary of State_. ]

It recited the announcement of the September proclamation; defined itscharacter and authority as a military decree; designated the States andparts of States that day in rebellion against the government; orderedand declared that all persons held as slaves therein "are andhenceforward shall be free"; and that such persons of suitable conditionwould be received into the military service. "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by theConstitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgmentof mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God. "

The conclusion of the momentous transaction was as deliberate andsimple as had been its various stages of preparation. The morning andmidday of January 1, 1863, were occupied by the half-social, half-official ceremonial of the usual New Year's day reception at theExecutive Mansion, established by long custom. At about three o'clock inthe afternoon, after full three hours of greetings and handshakings, Mr. Lincoln and perhaps a dozen persons assembled in the executive office, and, without any prearranged ceremony the President affixed hissignature to the great Edict of Freedom. No better commentary will everbe written upon this far-reaching act than that which he himselfembodied in a letter written to a friend a little more than a yearlater:

"I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have neverunderstood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted rightto act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath Itook that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, anddefend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take theoffice without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take anoath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me topractically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral questionof slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in meredeference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I didunderstand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to thebest of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by everyindispensable means, that government, that nation, of which thatConstitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation andyet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must beprotected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a lifeis never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwiseunconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to thepreservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of thenation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I couldnot feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preservethe Constitution if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I shouldpermit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together. When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensablenecessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected because I did not yetthink it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunterattempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did notyet think the indispensable necessity had come. When in March and Mayand July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the borderStates to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensablenecessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would comeunless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and Iwas, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of eithersurrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of layingstrong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. "

XXV

Negro Soldiers--Fort Pillow--Retaliation--Draft--NorthernDemocrats--Governor Seymour's Attitude--Draft Riots in NewYork--Vallandigham--Lincoln on his Authority to Suspend Writ of HabeasCorpus--Knights of the Golden Circle--Jacob Thompson in Canada

On the subject of negro soldiers, as on many other topics, the period ofactive rebellion and civil war had wrought a profound change in publicopinion. From the foundation of the government to the Rebellion, thehorrible nightmare of a possible slave insurrection had brooded over theentire South. This feeling naturally had a sympathetic reflection in theNorth, and at first produced an instinctive shrinking from any thoughtof placing arms in the hands of the blacks whom the chances of war hadgiven practical or legal freedom. During the year 1862, a few sporadicefforts were made by zealous individuals, under apparently favoringconditions, to begin the formation of colored regiments. The eccentricSenator Lane tried it in Kansas, or, rather, along the Missouri borderwithout success. General Hunter made an experiment in South Carolina, but found the freedmen too unwilling to enlist, and the white officerstoo prejudiced to instruct them. General Butler, at New Orleans, infusedhis wonted energy into a similar attempt, with somewhat better results. He found that before the capture of the city, Governor Moore ofLouisiana had begun the organization of a regiment of free colored menfor local defense. Butler resuscitated this organization for which hethus had the advantage of Confederate example and precedent, and againstwhich the accusation of arming slaves could not be urged. Early inSeptember, Butler reported, with his usual biting sarcasm:

"I shall also have within ten days a regiment, one thousand strong, ofnative guards (colored), the darkest of whom will be about thecomplexion of the late Mr. Webster. "

All these efforts were made under implied, rather than expressedprovisions of law, and encountered more or less embarrassment inobtaining pay and supplies, because they were not distinctly recognizedin the army regulations. This could not well be done so long as thePresident considered the policy premature. His spirit of caution in thisregard was set forth by the Secretary of War in a letter of instructiondated July 3, 1862:

"He is of opinion, " wrote Mr. Stanton, "that under the laws of Congress, they [the former slaves] cannot be sent back to their masters; that incommon humanity they must not be permitted to suffer for want of food, shelter, or other necessaries of life; that to this end they should beprovided for by the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, andthat those who are capable of labor should be set to work and paidreasonable wages. In directing this to be done, the President does notmean, at present, to settle any general rule in respect to slaves orslavery, but simply to provide for the particular case under thecircumstances in which it is now presented. "

All this was changed by the final proclamation of emancipation, whichauthoritatively announced that persons of suitable condition, whom itdeclared free, would be received into the armed service of the UnitedStates. During the next few months, the President wrote several personalletters to General Dix, commanding at Fortress Monroe; to AndrewJohnson, military governor of Tennessee; to General Banks, commanding atNew Orleans; and to General Hunter, in the Department of the South, urging their attention to promoting the new policy; and, what was yetmore to the purpose, a bureau was created in the War Department havingspecial charge of the duty, and the adjutant-general of the army waspersonally sent to the Union camps on the Mississippi River tosuperintend the recruitment and enlistment of the negroes, where, withthe hearty coöperation of General Grant and other Union commanders, hemet most encouraging and gratifying success. 

The Confederate authorities made a great outcry over the new departure. They could not fail to see the immense effect it was destined to have inthe severe military struggle, and their prejudice of generations greatlyintensified the gloomy apprehensions they no doubt honestly felt. Yeteven allowing for this, the exaggerated language in which they describedit became absolutely ludicrous. The Confederate War Department earlydeclared Generals Hunter and Phelps to be outlaws, because they weredrilling and organizing slaves; and the sensational proclamation issuedby Jefferson Davis on December 23, 1862, ordered that Butler and hiscommissioned officers, "robbers and criminals deserving death, . .. Be, whenever captured, reserved for execution. "

Mr. Lincoln's final emancipation proclamation excited them to a stillhigher frenzy. The Confederate Senate talked of raising the black flag;Jefferson Davis's message stigmatized it as "the most execrable measurerecorded in the history of guilty man"; and a joint resolution of theConfederate Congress prescribed that white officers of negro Unionsoldiers "shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punishedat the discretion of the court. " The general orders of some subordinateConfederate commanders repeated or rivaled such denunciations andthreats. 

Fortunately, the records of the war are not stained with either excessesby the colored troops or even a single instance of such proclaimedbarbarity upon white Union officers; and the visitation of vengeanceupon negro soldiers is confined, so far as known, to the single instanceof the massacre at Fort Pillow. In that deplorable affair, theConfederate commander reported, by telegraph, that in thirty minutes hestormed a fort manned by seven hundred, and captured the entire garrisonkilling five hundred and taking one hundred prisoners while he sustaineda loss of only twenty killed and sixty wounded. It is unnecessary toexplain that the bulk of the slain were colored soldiers. Making dueallowance for the heat of battle, history can considerately veil closerscrutiny into the realities wrapped in the exaggerated boast of such avictory. 

The Fort Pillow incident, which occurred in the spring of 1864, broughtupon President Lincoln the very serious question of enforcing an orderof retaliation which had been issued on July 30, 1863, as an answer tothe Confederate joint resolution of May 1. Mr. Lincoln's freedom fromevery trace of passion was as conspicuous in this as in all his officialacts. In a little address at Baltimore, while referring to the rumor ofthe massacre which had just been received, Mr. Lincoln said:

"We do not to-day know that a colored soldier, or white officercommanding colored soldiers, has been massacred by the rebels when madea prisoner. We fear it, believe it, I may say, but we do not know it. Totake the life of one of their prisoners on the assumption that theymurder ours, when it is short of certainty that they do murder ours, might be too serious, too cruel, a mistake. "

When more authentic information arrived, the matter was very earnestlydebated by the assembled cabinet; but the discussion only served tobring out in stronger light the inherent dangers of either course. Inthis nice balancing of weighty reasons, two influences decided thecourse of the government against retaliation. One was that General Grantwas about to begin his memorable campaign against Richmond, and that itwould be most impolitic to preface a great battle by the tragicspectacle of a military punishment, however justifiable. The second wasthe tender-hearted humanity of the ever merciful President. FrederickDouglass has related the answer Mr. Lincoln made to him in aconversation nearly a year earlier:

"I shall never forget the benignant expression of his face, the tearfullook of his eye, and the quiver in his voice when he deprecated a resortto retaliatory measures. 'Once begun, ' said he, 'I do not know wheresuch a measure would stop. ' He said he could not take men out and killthem in cold blood for what was done by others. If he could get hold ofthe persons who were guilty of killing the colored prisoners in coldblood, the case would be different, but he could not kill the innocentfor the guilty. "

Amid the sanguinary reports and crowding events that held publicattention for a year, from the Wilderness to Appomattox, the Fort Pillowaffair was forgotten, not only by the cabinet, but by the country. 

The related subjects of emancipation and negro soldiers would doubtlesshave been discussed with much more passion and friction, had not publicthought been largely occupied during the year 1863 by the enactment ofthe conscription law and the enforcement of the draft. In the hardstress of politics and war during the years 1861 and 1862, the popularenthusiasm with which the free States responded to the President's callto put down the rebellion by force of arms had become measurablyexhausted. The heavy military reverses which attended the failure ofMcClellan's campaign against Richmond, Pope's defeat at the second BullRun, McClellan's neglect to follow up the drawn battle of Antietam withenergetic operations, the gradual change of early Western victories to acessation of all effort to open the Mississippi, and the scattering ofthe Western forces to the spiritless routine of repairing and guardinglong railroad lines, all operated together practically to stopvolunteering and enlistment by the end of 1862. 

Thus far, the patriotic record was a glorious one. Almost one hundredthousand three months' militia had shouldered muskets to redress thefall of Fort Sumter; over half a million three years' volunteerspromptly enlisted to form the first national army under the laws ofCongress passed in August, 1861; nearly half a million more volunteerscame forward under the tender of the governors of free States and thePresident's call of July, 1862, to repair the failure of McClellan'sPeninsula campaign. Several minor calls for shorter terms of enlistment, aggregating more than forty thousand, are here omitted for brevity'ssake. Had the Western victories continued, had the Mississippi beenopened, had the Army of the Potomac been more fortunate, volunteeringwould doubtless have continued at quite or nearly the same rate. Butwith success delayed, with campaigns thwarted, with public sentimentdespondent, armies ceased to fill. An emergency call for three hundredthousand nine months' men, issued on August 4, 1862, produced a total ofonly eighty-six thousand eight hundred and sixty; and an attempt tosupply these in some of the States by a draft under State lawsdemonstrated that mere local statutes and machinery for that form ofmilitary recruitment were defective and totally inadequate. 

With the beginning of the third year of the war, more energetic measuresto fill the armies were seen to be necessary; and after very hot andacrimonious debate for about a month, Congress, on March 3, 1863, passeda national conscription law, under which all male citizens between theages of twenty and forty-five were enrolled to constitute the nationalforces, and the President was authorized to call them into service bydraft as occasion might require. The law authorized the appointment of aprovost-marshal-general, and under him a provost-marshal, acommissioner, and a surgeon, to constitute a board of enrollment in eachcongressional district; who, with necessary deputies, were required tocarry out the law by national authority, under the supervision of theprovost-marshal-general. 

For more than a year past, the Democratic leaders in the Northern Stateshad assumed an attitude of violent partizanship against theadministration, their hostility taking mainly the form of stubbornopposition to the antislavery enactments of Congress and theemancipation measures of the President. They charged with louddenunciation that he was converting the maintenance of the Union into awar for abolition, and with this and other clamors had gainedconsiderable successes in the autumn congressional elections of 1862, though not enough to break the Republican majority in the House ofRepresentatives. General McClellan was a Democrat, and, since hisremoval from command, they proclaimed him a martyr to this policy, andwere grooming him to be their coming presidential candidate. 

The passage of the conscription law afforded them a new pretext toassail the administration; and Democratic members of both Houses ofCongress denounced it with extravagant partizan bitterness as aviolation of the Constitution, and subversive of popular liberty. In themouths of vindictive cross-roads demagogues, and in the columns ofirresponsible newspapers that supply the political reading among themore reckless elements of city populations, the extravagant language ofDemocratic leaders degenerated in many instances into unrestrained abuseand accusation. Yet, considering that this was the first conscriptionlaw ever enacted in the United States, considering the multitude ofquestions and difficulties attending its application, considering thatthe necessity of its enforcement was, in the nature of things, unwelcometo the friends of the government, and, as naturally, excited all theenmity and cunning of its foes to impede, thwart, and evade it, the lawwas carried out with a remarkably small proportion of delay, obstruction, or resulting violence. 

Among a considerable number of individual violations of the act, inwhich prompt punishment prevented a repetition, only two prominentincidents arose which had what may be called a national significance. Inthe State of New York the partial political reaction of 1862 had causedthe election of Horatio Seymour, a Democrat, as governor. A man of highcharacter and great ability, he, nevertheless, permitted his partizanfeeling to warp and color his executive functions to a dangerousextent. The spirit of his antagonism is shown in a phrase of hisfourth-of-July oration:

"The Democratic organization look upon this administration as hostile totheir rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men whowould do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises. "

Believing--perhaps honestly--the conscription law to beunconstitutional, he endeavored, by protest, argument and administrativenon-compliance, to impede its execution on the plea of first demanding aSupreme Court decision as to its legality. To this President Lincolnreplied:

"I cannot consent to suspend the draft in New York, as you request, because, among other reasons, time is too important. .. . I do not objectto abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the judgesthereof, on the constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should bewilling to facilitate the obtaining of it; but I cannot consent to losethe time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemywho, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into hisranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. Notime is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which willsoon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if theyshall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. "

Notwithstanding Governor Seymour's neglect to give the enrollingofficers any coöperation, preparations for the draft went on in New Yorkcity without prospect of serious disturbance, except the incendiarylanguage of low newspapers and handbills. But scarcely had the wheelbegun to turn, and the drawing commenced on July 13, when a sudden riotbroke out. First demolishing the enrolling-office, the crowd nextattacked an adjoining block of stores, which they plundered and set onfire, refusing to let the firemen put out the flames. From this pointthe excitement and disorder spread over the city, which for three dayswas at many points subjected to the uncontrolled fury of the mob. Loudthreats to destroy the New York "Tribune" office, which the inmates asvigorously prepared to defend, were made. The most savage brutality waswreaked upon colored people. The fine building of the colored OrphanAsylum, where several hundred children barely found means of escape, wasplundered and set on fire. It was notable that foreigners of recentimportation were the principal leaders and actors in this lawlessness inwhich two million dollars worth of property was destroyed, and severalhundred persons lost their lives. 

The disturbance came to an end on the night of the fourth day, when asmall detachment of soldiers met a body of rioters, and firing intothem, killed thirteen, and wounded eighteen more. Governor Seymour gavebut little help in the disorder, and left a stain on the record of hiscourage by addressing a portion of the mob as "my friends. " Theopportune arrival of national troops restored, and thereaftermaintained, quiet and safety. 

Some temporary disturbance occurred in Boston, but was promptly putdown, and loud appeals came from Philadelphia and Chicago to stop thedraft. The final effect of the conscription law was not so much toobtain recruits for the service, as to stimulate local effort throughoutthe country to promote volunteering, whereby the number drafted waseither greatly lessened or, in many localities, entirely avoided byfilling the State quotas. 

The military arrest of Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democratic member ofCongress from Ohio, for incendiary language denouncing the draft, alsogrew to an important incident. Arrested and tried under the orders ofGeneral Burnside, a military commission found him guilty of havingviolated General Order No. 38, by "declaring disloyal sentiments andopinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power of thegovernment in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion"; andsentenced him to military confinement during the war. Judge Leavitt ofthe United States Circuit Court denied a writ of _habeas corpus_ in thecase. President Lincoln regretted the arrest, but felt it imprudent toannul the action of the general and the military tribunal. Conforming toa clause of Burnside's order, he modified the sentence by sendingVallandigham south beyond the Union military lines. The affair created agreat sensation, and, in a spirit of party protest, the Ohio Democratsunanimously nominated Vallandigham for governor. Vallandigham went toRichmond, held a conference with the Confederate authorities, and, byway of Bermuda, went to Canada, from whence he issued a politicaladdress. The Democrats of both Ohio and New York took up the politicaland legal discussion with great heat, and sent imposing committees topresent long addresses to the President on the affair. 

Mr. Lincoln made long written replies to both addresses of which only somuch needs quoting here as concisely states his interpretation of hisauthority to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_:

"You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override allthe guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of conserving thepublic safety--when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent meas struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply aquestion who shall decide or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur fordecision, but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. Bynecessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision isto be made from time to time; and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made the commander-in-chief oftheir army and navy, is the man who holds the power and bears theresponsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, the samepeople will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands, to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves inthe Constitution. "

Forcible and convincing as was this legal analysis, a single sympatheticphrase of the President's reply had a much greater popular effect:

"Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts while I must nottouch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?"

The term so accurately described the character of Vallandigham, and thepointed query so touched the hearts of the Union people throughout theland whose favorite "soldier boys" had volunteered to fill the Unionarmies, that it rendered powerless the crafty criticism of partydiatribes. The response of the people of Ohio was emphatic. At theOctober election Vallandigham was defeated by more than one hundredthousand majority. 

In sustaining the arrest of Vallandigham, President Lincoln had actednot only within his constitutional, but also strictly within his legal, authority. In the preceding March, Congress had passed an actlegalizing all orders of this character made by the President at anytime during the rebellion, and accorded him full indemnity for allsearches, seizures, and arrests or imprisonments made under his orders. The act also provided:

"That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorizedto suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in any case, throughout the United States or any part thereof. "

About the middle of September, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation formally putthe law in force, to obviate any hindering or delaying the promptexecution of the draft law. 

Though Vallandigham and the Democrats of his type were unable to preventor even delay the draft, they yet managed to enlist the sympathies andsecure the adhesion of many uneducated and unthinking men by means ofsecret societies, known as "Knights of the Golden Circle, " "The Order ofAmerican Knights, " "Order of the Star, " "Sons of Liberty, " and by otherequally high-sounding names, which they adopted and discarded in turn, as one after the other was discovered and brought into undesiredprominence. The titles and grips and passwords of these secret militaryorganizations, the turgid eloquence of their meetings, and theclandestine drill of their oath-bound members, doubtless exercised quiteas much fascination on such followers as their unlawful object of aidingand abetting the Southern cause. The number of men thus enlisted in thework of inducing desertion among Union soldiers, fomenting resistance tothe draft, furnishing the Confederates with arms, and conspiring toestablish a Northwestern Confederacy in full accord with the South, which formed the ultimate dream of their leaders, is hard to determine. Vallandigham, the real head of the movement, claimed five hundredthousand, and Judge Holt, in an official report, adopted that as beingsomewhere near the truth, though others counted them at a full million. 

The government, cognizant of their existence, and able to produceabundant evidence against the ring-leaders whenever it chose to do so, wisely paid little heed to these dark-lantern proceedings, though, aswas perhaps natural, military officers commanding the departments inwhich they were most numerous were inclined to look upon them moreseriously; and Governor Morton of Indiana was much disquieted by theirwork in his State. 

Mr. Lincoln's attitude toward them was one of good-humored contempt. "Nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democratsare disloyal, " he said; and maintained that there was more folly thancrime in their acts. Indeed, though prolific enough of oaths andtreasonable utterances, these organizations were singularly lacking inenergy and initiative. Most of the attempts made against the publicpeace in the free States and along the northern border came, not fromresident conspirators, but from Southern emissaries and their Canadiansympathizers; and even these rarely rose above the level of ordinaryarson and highway robbery. 

Jacob Thompson, who had been Secretary of the Interior under PresidentBuchanan, was the principal agent of the Confederate government inCanada, where he carried on operations as remarkable for theirimpracticability as for their malignity. One plan during the summer of1864 contemplated nothing less than seizing and holding the three greatStates of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, with the aid of disloyalDemocrats, whereupon it was supposed Missouri and Kentucky wouldquickly join them and make an end of the war. 

Becoming convinced, when this project fell through, that nothing couldbe expected from Northern Democrats he placed his reliance on Canadiansympathizers, and turned his attention to liberating the Confederateprisoners confined on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay and at CampDouglas near Chicago. But both these elaborate schemes, which embracedsuch magnificent details as capturing the war steamer _Michigan_ on LakeErie, came to naught. Nor did the plans to burn St. Louis and New York, and to destroy steamboats on the Mississippi River, to which he alsogave his sanction, succeed much better. A very few men were tried andpunished for these and similar crimes, despite the voluble protest ofthe Confederate government but the injuries he and his agents were ableto inflict, like the acts of the Knights of the Golden Circle on theAmerican side of the border, amounted merely to a petty annoyance, andnever reached the dignity of real menace to the government. 

XXVI

Burnside--Fredericksburg--A Tangle of Cross-Purposes--Hooker SucceedsBurnside--Lincoln to Hooker--Chancellorsville--Lee's SecondInvasion--Lincoln's Criticisms of Hooker's Plans--HookerRelieved--Meade--Gettysburg--Lee's Retreat--Lincoln's Letter toMeade--Lincoln's Gettysburg Address--Autumn Strategy--The Armies go intoWinter Quarters

It was not without well-meditated reasons that Mr. Lincoln had so longkept McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. He perfectlyunderstood that general's defects, his want of initiative, hishesitations, his delays, his never-ending complaints. But he had longforeseen the difficulty which would and did immediately arise when, onNovember 5, 1862, he removed him from command. Whom should he appoint asMcClellan's successor? What officer would be willing and competent toplay a better part? That important question had also long beenconsidered; several promising generals had been consulted, who, asgracefully as they could, shrank from the responsibility even before itwas formally offered them. 

The President finally appointed General Ambrose E. Burnside to thecommand. He was a West Point graduate, thirty-eight years old, ofhandsome presence, brave and generous to a fault, and McClellan'sintimate friend. He had won a favorable reputation in leading theexpedition against Roanoke Island and the North Carolina coast; and, called to reinforce McClellan after the Peninsula disaster, commandedthe left wing of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. He was notcovetous of the honor now given him. He had already twice declined it, and only now accepted the command as a duty under the urgent advice ofmembers of his staff. His instincts were better than the judgment of hisfriends. A few brief weeks sufficed to demonstrate what he had toldthem--that he "was not competent to command such a large army. "

The very beginning of his work proved the truth of his self-criticism. Rejecting all the plans of campaign which were suggested to him, hefound himself incapable of forming any very plausible or consistent oneof his own. As a first move he concentrated his army opposite the townof Fredericksburg on the lower Rappahannock, but with such delays thatGeneral Lee had time to seize and strongly fortify the town and theimportant adjacent heights on the south bank; and when Burnside's armycrossed on December 11, and made its main and direct attack on theformidable and practically impregnable Confederate intrenchments on thethirteenth, a crushing repulse and defeat of the Union forces, with aloss of over ten thousand killed and wounded, was the quick and direfulresult. 

It was in a spirit of stubborn determination rather than clear, calculating courage that he renewed his orders for an attack on thefourteenth; but, dissuaded by his division and corps commanders from therash experiment, succeeded without further damage in withdrawing hisforces on the night of the fifteenth to their old camps north of theriver. In manly words his report of the unfortunate battle gave generouspraise to his officers and men, and assumed for himself all theresponsibility for the attack and its failure. But its secondaryconsequences soon became irremediable. By that gloomy disaster Burnsidealmost completely lost the confidence of his officers and men, andrumors soon came to the President that a spirit akin to mutiny pervadedthe army. When information came that, on the day after Christmas, Burnside was preparing for a new campaign, the President telegraphedhim:

"I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement ofthe army without letting me know. "

This, naturally, brought Burnside to the President for explanation, and, after a frank and full discussion between them, Mr. Lincoln, on NewYear's day, wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

"General Burnside wishes to cross the Rappahannock with his army, buthis grand division commanders all oppose the movement. If in such adifficulty as this you do not help, you fail me precisely in the pointfor which I sought your assistance. You know what General Burnside'splan is, and it is my wish that you go with him to the ground, examineit as far as practicable, confer with the officers, getting theirjudgment and ascertaining their temper; in a word, gather all theelements for forming a judgment of your own, and then tell GeneralBurnside that you do approve, or that you do not approve, his plan. Yourmilitary skill is useless to me if you will not do this. "

Halleck's moral and official courage, however, failed the President inthis emergency. He declined to give his military opinion, and asked tobe relieved from further duties as general-in-chief. This left Mr. Lincoln no option, and still having need of the advice of hisgeneral-in-chief on other questions, he indorsed on his own letter, "withdrawn because considered harsh by General Halleck. " Thecomplication, however, continued to grow worse, and the correspondencemore strained. Burnside declared that the country had lost confidence inboth the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief; also, that his owngenerals were unanimously opposed to again crossing the Rappahannock. Halleck, on the contrary, urged another crossing, but that it must bemade on Burnside's own decision, plan, and responsibility. Upon this thePresident, on January 8, 1863, again wrote Burnside:

"I understand General Halleck has sent you a letter of which this is acopy. I approve this letter. I deplore the want of concurrence with youin opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Becautious, and do not understand that the government or country isdriving you. I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the commandof the Army of the Potomac; and if I did, I should not wish to do it byaccepting the resignation of your commission. "

Once more Burnside issued orders against which his generals protested, and which a storm turned into the fruitless and impossible "mud march"before he reached the intended crossings of the Rappahannock. Finally, on January 23, Burnside presented to the President the alternative ofeither approving an order dismissing about a dozen generals, oraccepting his own resignation, and Mr. Lincoln once more had before himthe difficult task of finding a new commander for the Army of thePotomac. On January 25, 1863, the President relieved Burnside andassigned Major-General Joseph Hooker to duty as his successor; and inexplanation of his action wrote him the following characteristic letter:

"I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course Ihave done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yetI think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard towhich I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave andskilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mixpolitics with your profession, in which you are right. You haveconfidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensablequality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does goodrather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command ofthe army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him asmuch as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and toa most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in sucha way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army andthe government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but inspite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals whogain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is militarysuccess, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will supportyou to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than ithas done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spiritwhich you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing theircommander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. Ishall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you norNapoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an armywhile such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Bewareof rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and giveus victories. "

Perhaps the most remarkable thing in this letter is the evidence itgives how completely the genius of President Lincoln had by this, themiddle of his presidential term, risen to the full height of his greatnational duties and responsibilities. From beginning to end it speaksthe language and breathes the spirit of the great ruler, secure inpopular confidence and official authority, equal to the greatemergencies that successively rose before him. Upon General Hooker itscourteous praise and frank rebuke, its generous trust and distinct noteof fatherly warning, made a profound impression. He strove worthily toredeem his past indiscretions by devoting himself with great zeal andenergy to improving the discipline and morale of his army, recalling itsabsentees, and restoring its spirit by increased drill and renewedactivity. He kept the President well informed of what he was doing, andearly in April submitted a plan of campaign on which Mr. Lincolnindorsed, on the eleventh of that month:

"My opinion is that just now, with the enemy directly ahead of us, thereis no eligible route for us into Richmond; and consequently a questionof preference between the Rappahannock route and the James River routeis a contest about nothing. Hence, our prime object is the enemy's armyin front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all, unless it beincidental to the main object. "

Having raised his effective force to about one hundred and thirtythousand men, and learning that Lee's army was weakened by detachmentsto perhaps half that number, Hooker, near the end of the month, preparedand executed a bold movement which for a while was attended withencouraging progress. Sending General Sedgwick with three army corps tomake a strong demonstration and crossing below Fredericksburg, Hookerwith his remaining four corps made a somewhat long and circuitous marchby which he crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above thetown without serious opposition, and on the evening of April 30 had hisfour corps at Chancellorsville, south of the Rappahannock, from whencehe could advance against the rear of the enemy. But his advantage ofposition was neutralized by the difficulties of the ground. He was inthe dense and tangled forest known as the Wilderness, and the decisionand energy of his brilliant and successful advance were suddenlysucceeded by a spirit of hesitation and delay in which the evident andacknowledged chances of victory were gradually lost. The enemy foundtime to rally from his surprise and astonishment, to gather a strongline of defense, and finally, to organize a counter flank movement underStonewall Jackson, which fell upon the rear of the Union right andcreated a panic in the Eleventh Corps. Sedgwick's force had crossedbelow and taken Fredericksburg; but the divided Union army could noteffect a junction; and the fighting from May 1 to May 4 finally ended bythe withdrawal of both sections of the Union army north of theRappahannock. The losses suffered by the Union and the Confederateforces were about equal, but the prestige of another brilliant victoryfell to General Lee, seriously balanced, however, by the death ofStonewall Jackson, who was accidentally killed by the fire of his ownmen. 

In addition to his evident very unusual diminution of vigor and will, Hooker had received a personal injury on the third, which for some hoursrendered him incapable of command; and he said in his testimony beforethe Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"When I returned from Chancellorsville I felt that I had fought nobattle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought nogeneral battle for the reason that I could not get my men in position todo so probably not more than three or three and a half corps on theright were engaged in the fight. "

Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville had not been so great a disaster asthat of Burnside at Fredericksburg; and while his influence was greatlyimpaired, his usefulness did not immediately cease. The President andthe Secretary of War still had faith in him. The average opinion of hisqualities has been tersely expressed by one of his critics, who wrote:"As an inferior he planned badly and fought well; as a chief he plannedwell and fought badly. " The course of war soon changed, so that he wasobliged to follow rather than permitted to lead the developments of anew campaign. 

The brilliant victories gained by Lee inspired the Confederateauthorities and leaders with a greatly exaggerated hope of the ultimatesuccess of the rebellion. It was during the summer of 1863 that theConfederate armies reached, perhaps, their highest numerical strengthand greatest degree of efficiency. Both the long dreamed of possibilityof achieving Southern independence and the newly flushed military ardorof officers and men, elated by what seemed to them an unbroken record ofsuccesses on the Virginia battle-fields moved General Lee to the boldhazard of a second invasion of the North. Early in June, Hooker gave itas his opinion that Lee intended to move against Washington, and askedwhether in that case he should attack the Confederate rear. To thisLincoln answered on the fifth of that month:

"In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I wouldby no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force atFredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight inintrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worstyou at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting anadvantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk ofbeing entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence andliable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to goreone way or kick the other. "

Five days later, Hooker, having become convinced that a large part ofLee's army was in motion toward the Shenandoah valley, proposed thedaring plan of a quick and direct march to capture Richmond. But thePresident immediately telegraphed him a convincing objection:

"If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee'smoving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would notbe able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile, your communications, andwith them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and notRichmond, is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upperPotomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening yourlines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him. "

The movement northward of Lee's army, effectually masked for some daysby frequent cavalry skirmishes, now became evident to the Washingtonauthorities. On June 14, Lincoln telegraphed Hooker:

"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded atWinchester, and Tyler at Martinsburg If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, andthe tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg andChancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you notbreak him?"

While Lee, without halting, crossed the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, and continued his northward march into Maryland and Pennsylvania, Hookerprudently followed on the "inside track" as Mr. Lincoln had suggested, interposing the Union army effectually to guard Washington andBaltimore. But at this point a long-standing irritation and jealousybetween Hooker and Halleck became so acute that on thegeneral-in-chief's refusing a comparatively minor request, Hooker askedto be relieved from command. The President, deeming divided counsel atso critical a juncture more hazardous than a change of command, tookHooker at his word, and appointed General George G. Meade as hissuccessor. 

Meade had, since Chancellorsville, been as caustic a critic of Hooker asHooker was of Burnside at and after Fredericksburg. But all spirit ofinsubordination vanished in the exciting stress of a pursuing campaignand the new and retiring leaders of the Army of the Potomac exchangedcompliments in General Orders with high chivalric courtesy, while thearmy continued its northward march with undiminished ardor and unbrokenstep. When Meade crossed the Pennsylvania line, Lee was already farahead, threatening Harrisburg. The Confederate invasion spread terrorand loss among farms and villages, and created almost a panic in thegreat cities. Under the President's call for one hundred thousand sixmonths' militia six of the adjoining States were sending hurried andimprovised forces to the banks of the Susquehanna, under the command ofGeneral Couch. Lee, finding that stream too well guarded, turned hiscourse directly east, which, with Meade marching to the north, broughtthe opposing armies into inevitable contact and collision at the town ofGettysburg. 

Meade had both expected and carefully prepared to receive the attackand fight a defensive battle on the line of Pipe Creek. But when, on theafternoon of July 1, 1863, the advance detachments of each army met andengaged in a fierce conflict for the possession of the town, Meade, onlearning the nature of the fight, and the situation of the ground, instantly decided to accept it, and ordering forward his whole force, made it the principal and most decisive battle-field of the whole war. 

The Union troops made a violent and stubborn effort to hold the town ofGettysburg; but the early Confederate arrivals, taking position in ahalf-circle on the west, north, and east, drove them through and out ofit. The seeming reverse proved an advantage. Half a mile to the south itenabled the Union detachments to seize and establish themselves onCemetery Ridge and Hill. This, with several rocky elevations, and acrest of boulders making a curve to the east at the northern end, was initself almost a natural fortress, and with the intrenchments thrown upby the expert veterans, soon became nearly impregnable. Beyond a widevalley to the west, and parallel with it, lay Seminary Ridge, on whichthe Confederate army established itself with equal rapidity. Lee hadalso hoped to fight a defensive battle; but thus suddenly arrested inhis eastward march in a hostile country, could not afford to stand stilland wait. 

On the morning of July 2, both commanding generals were in the field. After careful studies and consultations Lee ordered an attack on boththe extreme right and extreme left of the Union position, meeting somesuccess in the former, but a complete repulse in the latter. That night, Meade's council of war, coinciding with his own judgment, resolved tostand and fight it out; while Lee, against the advice of Longstreet, his ablest general, with equal decision determined to risk the chance ofa final and determined attack. 

It was Meade who began the conflict at dawn on the morning of July 3, but only long enough to retake and hold the intrenchments on his extremeright, which he had lost the evening before; then for some hours anominous lull and silence fell over the whole battle-field. But thesewere hours of stern preparation At midday a furious cannonade began fromone hundred and thirty Confederate guns on Seminary Ridge, which wasanswered with promptness and spirit by about seventy Union guns from thecrests and among the boulders of Cemetery Ridge; and the deafening roarof artillery lasted for about an hour, at the end of which time theUnion guns ceased firing and were allowed to cool, and to be made readyto meet the assault that was sure to come. There followed a period ofwaiting almost painful to officers and men, in its intense expectancy;and then across the broad, undulating, and highly cultivated valleyswept the long attacking line of seventeen thousand rebel infantry, thevery flower of the Confederate army. But it was a hopeless charge. Thinned, almost mowed down by the grape-shot of the Union batteries andthe deadly aim of the Union riflemen behind their rocks andintrenchments the Confederate assault wavered, hesitated, struggled on, and finally melted away before the destructive fire. A few rebelbattle-flags reached the crest, only, however, to fall, and theirbearers and supporters to be made prisoners. The Confederate dream oftaking Philadelphia and dictating peace and separation in IndependenceHall was over forever. 

It is doubtful whether Lee immediately realized the full measure of hisdefeat, or Meade the magnitude of his victory. The terrible losses ofthe battle of Gettysburg--over three thousand killed, fourteen thousandwounded, and five thousand captured or missing of the Union army; andtwenty-six hundred killed, twelve thousand wounded, and five thousandmissing of the Confederates--largely occupied the thoughts and labors ofboth sides during the national holiday which followed. It was a surpriseto Meade that on the morning of July 5 the Confederate army haddisappeared, retreating as rapidly as might be to the neighborhood ofHarper's Ferry. Unable immediately to cross because the Potomac wasswollen by heavy rains, and Meade having followed and arrived in Lee'sfront on July 10, President Lincoln had the liveliest hopes that Meadewould again attack and capture or destroy the Confederate army. Generouspraise for his victory, and repeated and urgent suggestions to renew hisattack and end the rebellion, had gone to Meade from the President andGeneral Halleck. But Meade hesitated, and his council of war objected;and on the night of July 13 Lee recrossed the Potomac in retreat. Whenhe heard the news, Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticismand disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at theescape of Lee:

"The case, summarily stated, is this: You fought and beat the enemy atGettysburg, and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great asyours. He retreated and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressinglypursue him; but a flood in the river detained him till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troopsdirectly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg, while it wasnot possible that he had received a single recruit, and yet you stoodand let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move awayat his leisure, without attacking him. .. . Again, my dear general, I donot believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved inLee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon himwould, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could notsafely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of theriver, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of theforce you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I donot expect [that] you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity isgone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it. "

Clearly as Mr. Lincoln had sketched and deeply as he felt Meade's faultof omission, so quick was the President's spirit of forgiveness, and sothankful was he for the measure of success which had been gained, thathe never signed or sent the letter. 

Two memorable events are forever linked with the Gettysburg victory: thesurrender of Vicksburg to Grant on the same fourth of July, described inthe next chapter, and the dedication of the Gettysburg battle-field as anational cemetery for Union soldiers, on November 19, 1863, on whichoccasion President Lincoln crowned that imposing ceremonial with anaddress of such literary force, brevity, and beauty, that critics haveassigned it a high rank among the world's historic orations. He said:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on thiscontinent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to theproposition that all men are created equal. 

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are meton a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portionof that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave theirlives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and properthat we should do this. 

"But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate--we cannot consecrate--wecannot hallow--this ground. The brave men, living and dead, whostruggled here have consecrated it far above our poor power to add ordetract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they whofought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to behere dedicated to the great task remaining before us--that from thesehonored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which theygave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve thatthese dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, bythe people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. "

Having safely crossed the Potomac, the Confederate army continued itsretreat without halting to the familiar camps in central Virginia it hadso long and valiantly defended. Meade followed with alert but prudentvigilance, but did not again find such chances as he lost on the fourthof July, or while the swollen waters of the Potomac held his enemy as ina trap. During the ensuing autumn months there went on between theopposing generals an unceasing game of strategy, a succession of movesand counter-moves in which the opposing commanders handled their greatarmies with the same consumate skill with which the expertfencing-master uses his foil, but in which neither could break throughthe other's guard. Repeated minor encounters took place which, in otherwars, would have rated as heavy battles; but the weeks lengthened intomonths without decisive results, and when the opposing armies finallywent into winter quarters in December, 1863, they again confronted eachother across the Rapidan in Virginia, not very far south of where theylay in the winter of 1861. 

XXVII

Buell and Bragg--Perryville--Rosecrans and Murfreesboro--Grant'sVicksburg Experiments--Grant's May Battles--Siege and Surrender ofVicksburg--Lincoln to Grant--Rosecrans's March to Chattanooga--Battle ofChickamauga--Grant at Chattanooga--Battle of Chattanooga--Burnside atKnoxville--Burnside Repulses Longstreet

From the Virginia campaigns of 1863 we must return to the Westerncampaigns of the same year, or, to be more precise, beginning with themiddle of 1862. When, in July of that year, Halleck was called toWashington to become general-in-chief, the principal plan he left behindwas that Buell, with the bulk of the forces which had captured Corinth, should move from that place eastward to occupy eastern Tennessee. Buell, however, progressed so leisurely that before he reached Chattanooga theConfederate General Bragg, by a swift northward movement, advanced intoeastern Kentucky, enacted the farce of appointing a Confederate governorfor that State, and so threatened Louisville that Buell was compelledabruptly to abandon his eastward march and, turning to the north, run aneck-and-neck race to save Louisville from rebel occupation. Successfulin this, Buell immediately turned and, pursuing the now retreatingforces of Bragg, brought them to bay at Perryville, where, on October 8, was fought a considerable battle from which Bragg immediately retreatedout of Kentucky. 

While on one hand Bragg had suffered defeat, he had on the other causedBuell to give up all idea of moving into East Tennessee, an object onwhich the President had specially and repeatedly insisted. When Halleckspecifically ordered Buell to resume and execute that plan, Buell urgedsuch objections, and intimated such unwillingness, that on October 24, 1862, he was relieved from command, and General Rosecrans was appointedto succeed him. Rosecrans neglected the East Tennessee orders asheedlessly as Buell had done; but, reorganizing the Army of theCumberland and strengthening his communications, marched against Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro. The severe engagementof that name, fought on December 31, 1862, and the three succeeding daysof the new year, between forces numbering about forty-three thousand oneach side, was tactically a drawn battle, but its results rendered it animportant Union victory, compelling Bragg to retreat; though, forreasons which he never satisfactorily explained, Rosecrans failed forsix months to follow up his evident advantages. 

The transfer of Halleck from the West to Washington in the summer of1862, left Grant in command of the district of West Tennessee. ButBuell's eastward expedition left him so few movable troops that duringthe summer and most of the autumn he was able to accomplish littleexcept to defend his department by the repulse of the enemy at Iuka inSeptember, and at Corinth early in October, Rosecrans being in localcommand at both places. It was for these successes that Rosecrans waschosen to succeed Buell. 

Grant had doubtless given much of his enforced leisure to studying thegreat problem of opening the Mississippi, a task which was thus left inhis own hands, but for which, as yet, he found neither a theoreticalsolution, nor possessed an army sufficiently strong to begin practicalwork. Under the most favorable aspects, it was a formidable undertaking. Union gunboats had full control of the great river from Cairo as farsouth as Vicksburg; and Farragut's fleet commanded it from New Orleansas far north as Port Hudson. But the intervening link of two hundredmiles between these places was in as complete possession of theConfederates, giving the rebellion uninterrupted access to the immenseresources in men and supplies of the trans-Mississippi country, andeffectually barring the free navigation of the river. Both the citiesnamed were strongly fortified, but Vicksburg, on the east bank, by itsnatural situation on a bluff two hundred feet high, rising almost out ofthe stream, was unassailable from the river front. Farragut had, indeed, in midsummer passed up and down before it with little damage from itsfire; but, in return, his own guns could no more do harm to itsbatteries than they could have bombarded a fortress in the clouds. 

When, by the middle of November, 1862, Grant was able to reunitesufficient reinforcements, he started on a campaign directly southwardtoward Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and sent Sherman, with anexpedition from Memphis, down the river to the mouth of the Yazoo, hoping to unite these forces against Vicksburg. But before Grant reachedGrenada his railroad communications were cut by a Confederate raid, andhis great depot of supplies at Holly Springs captured and burned, leaving him for two weeks without other provisions than such as he couldgather by foraging. The costly lesson proved a valuable experience tohim, which he soon put to use. Sherman's expedition also met disaster. Landing at Milliken's Bend, on the west bank of the Mississippi, heventured a daring storming assault from the east bank of the Yazoo atHaines's Bluff, ten miles north of Vicksburg, but met a bloody repulse. 

Having abandoned his railroad advance, Grant next joined Sherman atMilliken's Bend in January, 1863, where also Admiral Porter, with ariver squadron of seventy vessels, eleven of them ironclads, was addedto his force. For the next three months Grant kept his large army andflotilla busy with four different experiments to gain a practicableadvance toward Vicksburg, until his fifth highly novel and, to otherminds, seemingly reckless and impossible plan secured him a brilliantsuccess and results of immense military advantage. One experiment was tocut a canal across the tongue of land opposite Vicksburg, through whichthe flotilla might pass out of range of the Vicksburg guns. A second wasto force the gunboats and transports up the tortuous and swampy Yazoo tofind a landing far north of Haines's Bluff. A third was for the flotillato enter through Yazoo Pass and Cold Water River, two hundred milesabove, and descend the Yazoo to a hoped-for landing. Still a fourthproject was to cut a canal into Lake Providence west of the Mississippi, seventy miles above, find a practicable waterway through two hundredmiles of bayous and rivers, and establish communication with Banks andFarragut, who were engaged in an effort to capture Port Hudson. 

The time, the patience, the infinite labor, and enormous expense ofthese several projects were utterly wasted. Early in April, Grant beganan entirely new plan, which was opposed by all his ablest generals, and, tested by the accepted rules of military science, looked like a headlongventure of rash desperation. During the month of April he caused AdmiralPorter to prepare fifteen or twenty vessels--ironclads, steamtransports, and provision barges--and run them boldly by night past theVicksburg and, later, past the Grand Gulf batteries, which the admiralhappily accomplished with very little loss. Meanwhile, the general, by avery circuitous route of seventy miles, marched an army of thirty-fivethousand down the west bank of the Mississippi and, with Porter'svessels and transports, crossed them to the east side of the river atBruinsburg. From this point, with an improvised train of countryvehicles to carry his ammunition, and living meanwhile entirely upon thecountry, as he had learned to do in his baffled Grenada expedition, hemade one of the most rapid and brilliant campaigns in military history. In the first twenty days of May he marched one hundred and eighty miles, and fought five winning battles--respectively Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black River--in each of which hebrought his practically united force against the enemy's separateddetachments, capturing altogether eighty-eight guns and over sixthousand prisoners, and shutting up the Confederate General Pemberton inVicksburg. By a rigorous siege of six weeks he then compelled hisantagonist to surrender the strongly fortified city with one hundred andseventy-two cannon, and his army of nearly thirty thousand men. On thefourth of July, 1863, the day after Meade's crushing defeat of Lee atGettysburg, the surrender took place, citizens and Confederate soldiersdoubtless rejoicing that the old national holiday gave them escape fromtheir caves and bomb-proofs, and full Yankee rations to still theirlong-endured hunger. 

The splendid victory of Grant brought about a quick and important echo. About the time that the Union army closed around Vicksburg, GeneralBanks, on the lower Mississippi, began a close investment and siege ofPort Hudson, which he pushed with determined tenacity. When the rebelgarrison heard the artillery salutes which were fired by order of Banksto celebrate the surrender of Vicksburg, and the rebel commander wasinformed of Pemberton's disaster, he also gave up the defense, and onJuly 9 surrendered Port Hudson with six thousand prisoners and fifty-oneguns. 

Great national rejoicing followed this double success of the Union armson the Mississippi, which, added to Gettysburg, formed the turning tidein the war of the rebellion; and no one was more elated over theseWestern victories, which fully restored the free navigation of theMississippi, than President Lincoln. Like that of the whole country, hispatience had been severely tried by the long and ineffectual experimentsof Grant. But from first to last Mr. Lincoln had given him firm andundeviating confidence and support. He not only gave the general quickpromotion, but crowned the official reward with the following generousletter:

"My Dear General: I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimableservice you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. Whenyou first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should dowhat you finally did--march the troops across the neck, run thebatteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had anyfaith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the YazooPass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and tookPort Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down theriver and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of theBig Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personalacknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong. "

It has already been mentioned that General Rosecrans after winning thebattle of Murfreesboro at the beginning of 1863, remained inactive atthat place nearly six months, though, of course, constantly busyrecruiting his army, gathering supplies, and warding off severaltroublesome Confederate cavalry raids. The defeated General Braggretreated only to Shelbyville, ten miles south of the battle-field hehad been obliged to give up, and the military frontier thus dividedTennessee between the contestants. Against repeated prompting and urgingfrom Washington, Rosecrans continued to find real or imaginary excusesfor delay until midsummer, when, as if suddenly awaking from a longlethargy, he made a bold advance and, by a nine days' campaign ofskilful strategy, forced Bragg into a retreat that stopped only atChattanooga, south of the Tennessee River, which, with the surroundingmountains, made it the strategical center and military key to the heartof Georgia and the South. This march of Rosecrans, ending the day beforethe Vicksburg surrender, again gave the Union forces full possession ofmiddle Tennessee down to its southern boundary. 

The march completed, and the enemy thus successfully manoeuvered out ofthe State, Rosecrans once more came to a halt, and made no furthermovement for six weeks. The President and General Halleck were alreadyout of patience with Rosecrans for his long previous delay. Bragg'sretreat to Chattanooga was such a gratifying and encouraging supplementto the victories of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, that they felt theConfederate army should not be allowed to rest, recruit, and fortify theimportant gateway to the heart of the Southern Confederacy, and earlyin August sent Rosecrans peremptory orders to advance. This directionseemed the more opportune and necessary, since Burnside had organized aspecial Union force in eastern Kentucky, and was about starting on adirect campaign into East Tennessee. 

Finally, obeying this explicit injunction, Rosecrans took the initiativein the middle of August by a vigorous southward movement. ThreateningChattanooga from the north, he marched instead around the left flank ofBragg's army, boldly crossing the Cumberland Mountains, the TennesseeRiver, and two mountain ranges beyond. Bragg, seriously alarmed lestRosecrans should seize the railroad communications behind him, hastilyevacuated Chattanooga, but not with the intention of flight, asRosecrans erroneously believed and reported. When, on September 9, theleft of Rosecrans's army marched into Chattanooga without firing a shot, the Union detachments were so widely scattered in separating mountainvalleys, in pursuit of Bragg's imaginary retreat, that Bragg believed hesaw his chance to crush them in detail before they could unite. 

With this resolve, Bragg turned upon his antagonist but his effort atquick concentration was delayed by the natural difficulties of theground. By September 19, both armies were well gathered on oppositesides of Chickamauga Creek, eight miles southeast of Chattanooga; eachcommander being as yet, however, little informed of the other's positionand strength. Bragg had over seventy-one thousand men; Rosecrans, fifty-seven thousand. The conflict was finally begun, rather by accidentthan design, and on that day and the twentieth was fought the battle ofChickamauga, one of the severest encounters of the whole war. Developingitself without clear knowledge on either side, it became a movingconflict, Bragg constantly extending his attack toward his right, andRosecrans meeting the onset with prompt shifting toward his left. 

In this changing contest Rosecrans's army underwent an alarming crisison the second day of the battle. A mistake or miscarriage of ordersopened a gap of two brigades in his line, which the enemy quickly found, and through which the Confederate battalions rushed with an energy thatswept away the whole Union right in a disorderly retreat. Rosecranshimself was caught in the panic, and, believing the day irretrievablylost, hastened back to Chattanooga to report the disaster and collectwhat he might of his flying army. The hopeless prospect, however, soonchanged. General Thomas, second in command, and originally in charge ofthe center, had been sent by Rosecrans to the extreme left, and had, while the right was giving way, successfully repulsed the enemy in hisfront. He had been so fortunate as to secure a strong position on thehead of a ridge, around which he gathered such remnants of the beatendetachments as he could collect, amounting to about half the Union army, and here, from two o'clock in the afternoon until dark, he held hissemicircular line against repeated assaults of the enemy, with a heroicvalor that earned him the sobriquet of "The Rock of Chickamauga. " Atnight, Thomas retired, under orders, to Rossville, half way toChattanooga. 

The President was of course greatly disappointed when Rosecranstelegraphed that he had met a serious disaster, but this disappointmentwas mitigated by the quickly following news of the magnificent defenseand the successful stand made by General Thomas at the close of thebattle. Mr. Lincoln immediately wrote in a note to Halleck:

"I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position ator about Chattanooga, because, if held, from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and alsobreaks one of his most important railroad lines. .. . If he can onlymaintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out ashort and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn inits vitals. "

And to Rosecrans he telegraphed directly, bidding him be of good cheer, and adding: "We shall do our utmost to assist you. " To this end theadministration took instant and energetic measures. On the night ofSeptember 23, the President, General Halleck, several members of thecabinet, and leading army and railroad officials met in an improvisedcouncil at the War Department, and issued emergency orders under whichtwo army corps from the Army of the Potomac, numbering twenty thousandmen in all, with their arms and equipments ready for the field, thewhole under command of General Hooker, were transported from their campson the Rapidan by railway to Nashville and the Tennessee River in thenext eight days. Burnside, who had arrived at Knoxville early inSeptember, was urged by repeated messages to join Rosecrans, and otherreinforcements were already on the way from Memphis and Vicksburg. 

All this help, however, was not instantly available. Before it couldarrive Rosecrans felt obliged to draw together within the fortificationsof Chattanooga, while Bragg quickly closed about him, and, bypractically blockading Rosecrans's river communication, placed him in astate of siege. In a few weeks the limited supplies brought the Unionarmy face to face with famine. It having become evident that Rosecranswas incapable of extricating it from its peril, he was relieved and thecommand given to Thomas, while the three western departments wereconsolidated under General Grant, and he was ordered personally toproceed to Chattanooga, which place he reached on October 22. 

Before his arrival, General W. F. Smith had devised and prepared aningenious plan to regain control of river communication. Under theorders of Grant, Smith successfully executed it, and full rations soonrestored vigor and confidence to the Union troops. The considerablereinforcements under Hooker and Sherman coming up, put the besiegingenemy on the defensive, and active preparations were begun, whichresulted in the famous battle and overwhelming Union victory ofChattanooga on November 23, 24, and 25, 1863. 

The city of Chattanooga lies on the southeastern bank of the TennesseeRiver. Back of the city, Chattanooga valley forms a level plain abouttwo miles in width to Missionary Ridge, a narrow mountain range fivehundred feet high, generally parallel to the course of the Tennessee, extending far to the southwest. The Confederates had fortified the upperend of Missionary Ridge to a length of five to seven miles opposite thecity, lining its long crest with about thirty guns, amply supported byinfantry. This formidable barrier was still further strengthened by twolines of rifle-pits, one at the base of Missionary Ridge next to thecity, and another with advanced pickets still nearer ChattanoogaNorthward, the enemy strongly held the end of Missionary Ridge where therailroad tunnel passes through it; southward, they held the yet strongerpoint of Lookout Mountain, whose rocky base turns the course of theTennessee River in a short bend to the north. 

Grant's plan in rough outline was, that Sherman, with the Army of theTennessee, should storm the northern end of Missionary Ridge at therailroad tunnel; Hooker, stationed at Wauhatchie, thirteen miles to thesouthwest with his two corps from the Army of the Potomac, shouldadvance toward the city, storming the point of Lookout Mountain on hisway; and Thomas, in the city, attack the direct front of MissionaryRidge. The actual beginning slightly varied this program, with a changeof corps and divisions, but the detail is not worth noting. 

Beginning on the night of November 23, Sherman crossed his command overthe Tennessee, and on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth gained thenorthern end of Missionary Ridge, driving the enemy before him as far asthe railroad tunnel. Here, however, he found a deep gap in the ridge, previously unknown to him, which barred his further progress. That sameafternoon Hooker's troops worked their way through mist and fog up therugged sides of Lookout Mountain, winning the brilliant success whichhas become famous as the "battle above the clouds. " That same afternoon, also, two divisions of the center, under the eyes of Grant and Thomas, pushed forward the Union line about a mile, seizing and fortifying ahill called Orchard Knob, capturing Bragg's first line of rifle-pits andseveral hundred prisoners. 

So far, everything had occurred to inspirit the Union troops anddiscourage the enemy. But the main incident was yet to come, on theafternoon of November 25. All the forenoon of that day Grant waitedeagerly to see Sherman making progress along the north end of MissionaryRidge, not knowing that he had met an impassable valley. Grant'spatience was equally tried at hearing no news from Hooker, though thatgeneral had successfully reached Missionary Ridge, and was ascendingthe gap near Rossville. 

At three o'clock in the afternoon Grant at length gave Thomas the orderto advance. Eleven Union brigades rushed forward with orders to take theenemy's rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, and then halt toreform. But such was the ease of this first capture, such the eagernessof the men who had been waiting all day for the moment of action, that, after but a slight pause, without orders, and moved by a common impulse, they swept on and up the steep and rocky face of Missionary Ridge, heedless of the enemy's fire from rifle and cannon at the top, until infifty-five minutes after leaving their positions they almostsimultaneously broke over the crest of the ridge in six differentplaces, capturing the batteries and making prisoners of the supportinginfantry, who, surprised and bewildered by the daring escalade, madelittle or no further resistance. Bragg's official report soundly beratesthe conduct of his men, apparently forgetting the heavy loss they hadinflicted on their assailants but regardless of which the Union veteransmounted to victory in an almost miraculous exaltation of patrioticheroism. 

Bragg's Confederate army was not only beaten, but hopelessly demoralizedby the fiery Union assault, and fled in panic and retreat. Grant kept upa vigorous pursuit to a distance of twenty miles, which he ceased inorder to send an immediate strong reinforcement under Sherman to relieveBurnside, besieged by the Confederate General Longstreet at Knoxville. But before this help arrived, Burnside had repulsed Longstreet who, promptly informed of the Chattanooga disaster, retreated in thedirection of Virginia. Not being pursued, however, this general againwintered in East Tennessee; and for the same reason, the beaten army ofBragg halted in its retreat from Missionary Ridge at Dalton, where italso went into winter quarters. The battle of Chattanooga had opened thegreat central gateway to the south, but the rebel army, still determinedand formidable, yet lay in its path, only twenty-eight miles away. 

XXVIII

Grant Lieutenant-General--Interview with Lincoln--Grant VisitsSherman--Plan of Campaigns--Lincoln to Grant--From the Wilderness to ColdHarbor--The Move to City Point--Siege of Petersburg--Early MenacesWashington--Lincoln under Fire--Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley

The army rank of lieutenant-general had, before the Civil War, beenconferred only twice on American commanders; on Washington, for servicein the War of Independence, and on Scott, for his conquest of Mexico. Asa reward for the victories of Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Congress passed, and the President signed in February, 1864, an act torevive that grade. Calling Grant to Washington, the President met himfor the first time at a public reception at the Executive Mansion onMarch 8, when the famous general was received with all themanifestations of interest and enthusiasm possible in a social stateceremonial. On the following day, at one o'clock, the general's formalinvestiture with his new rank and authority took place in the presenceof Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet, and a few other officials. 

"General Grant, " said the President, "the nation's appreciation of whatyou have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do in theexisting great struggle, are now presented, with this commissionconstituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a correspondingresponsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it willsustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for thenation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence. "

General Grant's reply was modest and also very brief:

"Mr. President, I accept this commission with gratitude for the highhonor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on somany fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor notto disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of theresponsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all to the favor of thatProvidence which leads both nations and men. "

In the informal conversation which followed, General Grant inquired whatspecial service was expected of him; to which the President replied thatthe country wanted him to take Richmond; and being asked if he could doso, replied that he could if he had the troops, which he was assuredwould be furnished him. On the following day, Grant went to the Army ofthe Potomac, where Meade received him with frank courtesy, generouslysuggesting that he was ready to yield the command to any one Grant mightprefer. Grant, however, informed Meade that he desired to make nochange; and, returning to Washington, started west without a moment'sloss of time. On March 12, 1864, formal orders of the War Departmentplaced Grant in command of all the armies of the United States, whileHalleck, relieved from that duty, was retained at Washington as thePresident's chief of staff. 

Grant frankly confesses in his "Memoirs" that when he started east itwas with a firm determination to accept no appointment requiring him toleave the West; but "when I got to Washington and saw the situation, itwas plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. " Hisshort visit had removed several false impressions, and future experiencewas to cure him of many more. 

When Grant again met Sherman in the West, he outlined to that general, who had become his most intimate and trusted brother officer, the verysimple and definite military policy which was to be followed during theyear 1864. There were to be but two leading campaigns. Sherman, startingfrom Chattanooga, full master of his own movements, was to lead thecombined western forces against the Confederate army under Johnston, thesuccessor of Bragg. Grant would personally conduct the campaign in theEast against Richmond, or rather against the rebel army under Lee. Meadewould be left in immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, toexecute the personal daily directions of Grant. The two Confederatearmies were eight hundred miles apart, and should either give way, itwas to be followed without halt or delay to battle or surrender, toprevent its junction with the other. Scattered as a large portion of theUnion forces were in garrisons and detachments at widely separatedpoints, there were, of course, many details to be arranged, and a fewexpeditions already in progress; but these were of minor importance, andfor contributory, rather than main objects, and need not here bedescribed. 

Returning promptly to Washington, Grant established his headquarterswith the Army of the Potomac, at Culpepper, and for about a monthactively pushed his military preparations. He seems at first to havebeen impressed with a dread that the President might wish to influenceor control his plans. But the few interviews between them removed thesuspicion which reckless newspaper accusation had raised; and all doubton this point vanished, when, on the last day of April, Mr. Lincoln senthim the following explicit letter:

"Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wishto express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done upto this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan Ineither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraintsupon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture ofour men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are lesslikely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there isanything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let meknow it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustainyou. "

Grant's immediate reply confessed the groundlessness of hisapprehensions:

"From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to thepresent day, I have never had cause of complaint--have never expressedor implied a complaint against the administration, or the Secretary ofWar, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorouslyprosecuting what appeared to me my duty. Indeed, since the promotionwhich placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the greatresponsibility and importance of success, I have been astonished at thereadiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without evenan explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire andexpect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you. "

The Union army under Grant, one hundred and twenty-two thousand strong, on April 30, was encamped north of the Rapidan River. The Confederatearmy under Lee, numbering sixty-two thousand, lay south of that stream. Nearly three years before, these opposing armies had fought their firstbattle of Bull Run, only a comparatively short distance north of wherethey now confronted each other. Campaign and battle between them hadsurged far to the north and to the south, but neither could as yet claimover the other any considerable gain of ground or of final advantage inthe conflict. Broadly speaking, relative advance and retreat, as well asrelative loss and gain of battle-fields substantially balanced eachother. Severe as had been their struggles in the past, a more arduoustrial of strength was before them. Grant had two to one in numbers; Leethe advantage of a defensive campaign. He could retire toward cumulativereserves, and into prepared fortifications; knew almost by heart everyroad, hill, and forest of Virginia; had for his friendly scout everywhite inhabitant. Perhaps his greatest element of strength lay in theconscious pride of the Confederate army that through all fluctuations ofsuccess and failure, it had for three years effectually barred the wayof the Army of the Potomac to Richmond. But to offset this there nowmenaced it what was before absent in every encounter, the grim, unflinching will of the new Union commander. 

General Grant devised no plan of complicated strategy for the problembefore him, but proposed to solve it by plain, hard, persistentfighting. He would endeavor to crush the army of Lee before it couldreach Richmond or unite with the army of Johnston; or, failing in that, he would shut it up in that stronghold and reduce it by a siege. Withthis in view, he instructed Meade at the very outset: "Lee's army willbe your objective point. Where Lee goes, there you will go, also. "Everything being ready, on the night of May 4, Meade threw five bridgesacross the Rapidan, and before the following night the whole Union army, with its trains, was across the stream moving southward by the leftflank, past the right flank of the Confederates. 

Sudden as was the advance, it did not escape the vigilant observation ofLee, who instantly threw his force against the flanks of the Unioncolumns, and for two days there raged in that difficult, broken, andtangled region known as the Wilderness, a furious battle of detachmentsalong a line five miles in length. Thickets, swamps, and ravines, rendered intelligent direction and concerted manoeuvering impossible, and furious and bloody as was the conflict, its results were indecisive. No enemy appearing on the seventh, Grant boldly started to SpottsylvaniaCourt House, only, however, to find the Confederates ahead of him; andon the eighth and ninth these turned their position, already strong bynature, into an impregnable intrenched camp. Grant assaulted their workson the tenth, fiercely, but unsuccessfully. There followed one day ofinactivity, during which Grant wrote his report, only claiming thatafter six days of hard fighting and heavy losses "the result up to thistime is much in our favor"; but expressing, in the phrase whichimmediately became celebrated, his firm resolution to "fight it out onthis line if it takes all summer. "

On May 12, 1864, Grant ordered a yet more determined attack, in which, with fearful carnage on both sides, the Union forces finally stormed theearthworks which have become known as the "bloody angle. " But findingthat other and more formidable intrenchments still resisted his entranceto the Confederate camp, Grant once more moved by the left flank pasthis enemy toward Richmond. Lee followed with equal swiftness along theinterior lines. Days passed in an intermitting, and about equallymatched contest of strategy and fighting. The difference was that Grantwas always advancing and Lee always retiring. On May 26, Grant reportedto Washington:

"Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, andthe action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outsideof intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the_morale_ over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may bemistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is alreadyassured. "

That same night, Grant's advance crossed the Pamunkey River at HanoverTown, and during another week, with a succession of marching, flanking, and fighting. Grant pushed the Union army forward to Cold Harbor. HereLee's intrenched army was again between him and Richmond, and on June 3, Grant ordered another determined attack in front, to break through thatconstantly resisting barrier. But a disastrous repulse was theconsequence. Its effect upon the campaign is best given in Grant's ownletter, written to Washington on June 5:

"My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, northof Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on thenorth side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south sideand besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. Inow find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of thefirst importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They actpurely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensiveimmediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they caninstantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human lifethan I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I haddesigned outside of the city. "

During the week succeeding the severe repulse at Cold Harbor, whichclosed what may be summed up as Grant's campaign against Richmond, hemade his preparations to enter upon the second element of his generalplan, which may be most distinctively denominated the siege ofPetersburg, though, in fuller phraseology, it might be called the siegeof Petersburg and Richmond combined. But the amplification is notessential; for though the operation and the siege-works embraced bothcities, Petersburg was the vital and vulnerable point. When Petersburgfell, Richmond fell of necessity. The reason was, that Lee's army, inclosed within the combined fortifications, could only be fed by theuse of three railroads centering at Petersburg; one from the southeast, one from the south, and one with general access from the southwest. Between these, two plank roads added a partial means of supply. Thusfar, Grant's active campaign, though failing to destroy Lee's army, hadnevertheless driven it into Richmond, and obviously his next step waseither to dislodge it, or compel it to surrender. 

Cold Harbor was about ten miles from Richmond, and that city wasinclosed on the Washington side by two circles of fortifications devisedwith the best engineering skill. On June 13, Grant threw forward an armycorps across the Chickahominy, deceiving Lee into the belief that he wasmaking a real direct advance upon the city; and so skilfully concealedhis intention that by midnight of the sixteenth he had moved the wholeUnion army with its artillery and trains about twenty miles directlysouth and across the James River, on a pontoon bridge over two thousandfeet long, to City Point. General Butler, with an expedition fromFortress Monroe, moving early in May, had been ordered to capturePetersburg; and though he failed in this, he had nevertheless seized andheld City Point, and Grant thus effected an immediate junction withButler's force of thirty-two thousand. Butler's second attempt to seizePetersburg while Grant was marching to join him also failed, and Grant, unwilling to make any needless sacrifice, now limited his operations tothe processes of a regular siege. 

This involved a complete change of method. The campaign againstRichmond, from the crossing of the Rapidan and battle of the Wilderness, to Cold Harbor, and the change of base to City Point, occupied a periodof about six weeks of almost constant swift marching and hard fighting. The siege of Petersburg was destined to involve more than nine months ofmingled engineering and fighting. The Confederate army forming thecombined garrisons of Richmond and Petersburg numbered about seventythousand. The army under Grant, though in its six weeks' campaign it hadlost over sixty thousand in killed, wounded, and missing, was againraised by the reinforcements sent to it, and by its junction withButler, to a total of about one hundred and fifty thousand. With thissuperiority of numbers, Grant pursued the policy of alternatelythreatening the defenses of Lee, sometimes south, sometimes north of theJames River, and at every favorable opportunity pushing his siege-workswestward in order to gradually gain and command the three railroads andtwo plank roads that brought the bulk of absolutely necessary food andsupplies to the Confederate armies and the inhabitants of Petersburg andRichmond. It is estimated that this gradual westward extension ofGrant's lines, redoubts, and trenches, when added to those threateningRichmond and Petersburg on the east, finally reached a total developmentof about forty miles. The catastrophe came when Lee's army grewinsufficient to man his defensive line along this entire length, andGrant, finding the weakened places, eventually broke through it, compelling the Confederate general and army to evacuate and abandon bothcities and seek safety in flight. 

The central military drama, the first two distinctive acts of which areoutlined above, had during this long period a running accompaniment ofconstant under-plot and shifting and exciting episodes. The ShenandoahRiver, rising northwest of Richmond, but flowing in a general northeastcourse to join the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, gives its name to a valleytwenty to thirty miles wide, highly fertile and cultivated, and havingthroughout its length a fine turnpike, which in ante-railroad days wasan active commercial highway between North and South. Bordered on thewest by the rugged Alleghany Mountains, and on the east by the singleoutlying range called the Blue Ridge, it formed a protected militarylane or avenue, having vital relation to the strategy of campaigns onthe open Atlantic slopes of central Virginia. The Shenandoah valley hadthus played a not unimportant part in almost every military operation ofthe war, from the first battle of Bull Run to the final defense ofRichmond. 

The plans of General Grant did not neglect so essential a feature of histask. While he was fighting his way toward the Confederate capital, hisinstructions contemplated the possession and occupation of theShenandoah valley as part of the system which should isolate andeventually besiege Richmond. But this part of his plan underwent manyfluctuations. He had scarcely reached City Point when he became awarethat General Lee, equally alive to the advantages of the Shenandoahvalley, had dispatched General Early with seventeen thousand men on aflying expedition up that convenient natural sally-port, which was forthe moment undefended. 

Early made such speed that he crossed the Potomac during the first weekof July, made a devastating raid through Maryland and southernPennsylvania, threatened Baltimore, and turning sharply to the south, was, on the eleventh of the month, actually at the outskirts ofWashington city, meditating its assault and capture. Only the opportunearrival of the Sixth Army Corps under General Wright, on the afternoonof that day, sent hurriedly by Grant from City Point, saved the Federalcapital from occupation and perhaps destruction by the enemy. 

Certain writers have represented the government as panic-stricken duringthe two days that this menace lasted; but neither Mr. Lincoln, norSecretary Stanton, nor General Halleck, whom it has been even more thefashion to abuse, lacked coolness or energy in the emergency. Indeed, the President's personal unconcern was such as to give his associatesmuch uneasiness. On the tenth, he rode out as was his usual customduring the summer months, to spend the night at the Soldiers' Home, inthe suburbs; but Secretary Stanton, learning that Early was advancing inheavy force, sent after him to compel his return to the city; and twiceafterward, intent on watching the fighting which took place near FortStevens, he exposed his tall form to the gaze and bullets of the enemyin a manner to call forth earnest remonstrance from those near him. 

The succeeding military events in the Shenandoah valley must here besummed up in the brief statement that General Sheridan, being placed incommand of the Middle Military Division and given an army of thirty orforty thousand men, finally drove back the Confederate detachments uponRichmond, in a series of brilliant victories, and so devastated thesouthern end of the valley as to render it untenable for either army;and by the destruction of the James River Canal and the Virginia CentralRailroad, succeeded in practically carrying out Grant's intention ofeffectually closing the avenue of supplies to Richmond from thenorthwest. 

XXIX

Sherman's Meridian Expedition--Capture of Atlanta--Hood SupersedesJohnston--Hood's Invasion of Tennessee--Franklin andNashville--Sherman's March to the Sea--Capture of Savannah--Sherman toLincoln--Lincoln to Sherman--Sherman's March through the Carolinas--TheBurning of Charleston and Columbia--Arrival at Goldsboro--Junction withSchofield--Visit to Grant

While Grant was making his marches, fighting his battles, and carryingon his siege operations in Virginia, Sherman in the West was performingthe task assigned to him by his chief, to pursue, destroy, or capturethe principal western Confederate army, now commanded by GeneralJohnston. The forces which under Bragg had been defeated in the previousautumn at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, had halted as soon aspursuit ceased, and remained in winter quarters at and about Dalton, only twenty-eight or thirty miles on the railroad southeast ofChattanooga where their new commander, Johnston, had, in the spring of1864, about sixty-eight thousand men with which to oppose the Unionadvance. 

A few preliminary campaigns and expeditions in the West need not here bedetailed, as they were not decisive. One, however, led by Shermanhimself from Vicksburg to Meridian, must be mentioned, since, during themonth of February, it destroyed about one hundred miles of the severalrailroads centering at the latter place, and rendered the whole railroadsystem of Mississippi practically useless to the Confederates, thuscontributing essentially to the success of his future operations. 

Sherman prepared himself by uniting at Chattanooga the best material ofthe three Union armies, that of the Cumberland, that of the Tennessee, and that of the Ohio, forming a force of nearly one hundred thousand menwith two hundred and fifty-four guns. They were seasoned veterans, whomthree years of campaigning had taught how to endure every privation, andavail themselves of every resource. They were provided with everyessential supply, but carried with them not a pound of useless baggageor impedimenta that could retard the rapidity of their movements. 

Sherman had received no specific instructions from Grant, except tofight the enemy and damage the war resources of the South; but thesituation before him clearly indicated the city of Atlanta, Georgia, ashis first objective, and as his necessary route, the railroad leadingthither from Chattanooga. It was obviously a difficult line of approach, for it traversed a belt of the Alleghanies forty miles in width, and inaddition to the natural obstacles they presented, the Confederatecommander, anticipating his movement, had prepared elaborate defensiveworks at the several most available points. 

As agreed upon with Grant, Sherman began his march on May 5, 1864, theday following that on which Grant entered upon his Wilderness campaignin Virginia. These pages do not afford space to describe his progress. It is enough to say that with his double numbers he pursued the policyof making strong demonstrations in front, with effective flank movementsto threaten the railroad in the Confederate rear, by which means heforced back the enemy successively from point to point, until by themiddle of July he was in the vicinity of Atlanta, having during hisadvance made only one serious front attack, in which he met a costlyrepulse. His progress was by no means one of mere strategical manoeuver. Sherman says that during the month of May, across nearly one hundredmiles of as difficult country as was ever fought over by civilizedarmies, the fighting was continuous, almost daily, among trees andbushes, on ground where one could rarely see one hundred yards ahead. 

However skilful and meritorious may have been the retreat into whichJohnston had been forced, it was so unwelcome to the Richmondauthorities, and damaging to the Confederate cause, that about themiddle of July, Jefferson Davis relieved him, and appointed one of hiscorps commanders, General J. B. Hood, in his place; whose personalqualities and free criticism of his superior led them to expect a changefrom a defensive to an aggressive campaign. Responding to thisexpectation, Hood almost immediately took the offensive, and madevigorous attacks on the Union positions, but met disastrous repulse, andfound himself fully occupied in guarding the defenses of Atlanta. Forsome weeks each army tried ineffectual methods to seize the other'srailroad communications. But toward the end of August, Sherman's flankmovements gained such a hold of the Macon railroad at Jonesboro, twenty-five miles south of Atlanta, as to endanger Hood's security; andwhen, in addition, a detachment sent to dislodge Sherman was defeated, Hood had no alternative but to order an evacuation. On September 3, Sherman telegraphed to Washington:

"Atlanta is ours, and fairly won. .. . Since May 5 we have been in oneconstant battle or skirmish, and need rest. "

The fall of Atlanta was a heavy blow to the Confederates. They had, during the war, transformed it into a city of mills, foundries, andworkshops, from which they drew supplies, ammunition, and equipments, and upon which they depended largely for the manufacture and repair ofarms. But perhaps even more important than the military damage to theSouth resulting from its capture, was its effect upon Northern politics. Until then the presidential campaign in progress throughout the freeStates was thought by many to involve fluctuating chances under theheavy losses and apparently slow progress of both eastern and westernarmies. But the capture of Atlanta instantly infused new zeal andconfidence among the Union voters, and from that time onward, thereëlection of Mr. Lincoln was placed beyond reasonable doubt. 

Sherman personally entered the city on September 8, and took promptmeasures to turn it into a purely military post. He occupied only theinner line of its formidable defenses, but so strengthened them as tomake the place practically impregnable. He proceeded at once to removeall its non-combatant inhabitants with their effects, arranging a trucewith Hood under which he furnished transportation to the south for allthose whose sympathies were with the Confederate cause, and sent to thenorth those who preferred that destination. Hood raised a great outcryagainst what he called such barbarity and cruelty, but Sherman repliedthat war is war, and if the rebel families wanted peace they and theirrelatives must stop fighting. 

"God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be morehumane to fight with a town full of women, and the families of a bravepeople at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety amongtheir own friends and people. "

Up to his occupation of Atlanta, Sherman's further plans had neitherbeen arranged by Grant nor determined by himself, and for a whileremained somewhat undecided. For the time being, he was perfectly securein the new stronghold he had captured and completed. But his suppliesdepended upon a line of about one hundred and twenty miles of railroadfrom Atlanta to Chattanooga, and very near one hundred and fifty milesmore from Chattanooga to Nashville. Hood, held at bay at Lovejoy'sStation, was not strong enough to venture a direct attack or undertake asiege, but chose the more feasible policy of operating systematicallyagainst Sherman's long line of communications. In the course of someweeks both sides grew weary of the mere waste of time and militarystrength consumed in attacking and defending railroad stations, andinterrupting and reëstablishing the regularities of provision trains. Toward the end of September, Jefferson Davis visited Hood, and inrearranging some army assignments, united Hood's and an adjoiningConfederate department under the command of Beauregard; partly with aview to adding the counsels of the latter to the always energetic andbold, but sometimes rash, military judgment of Hood. 

Between these two Hood's eccentric and futile operations againstSherman's communications were gradually shaded off into a plan for aConfederate invasion of Tennessee. Sherman, on his part, finally maturedhis judgment that instead of losing a thousand men a month merelydefending the railroad, without other advantage, he would divide hisarmy, send back a portion of it under the command of General Thomas todefend the State of Tennessee against the impending invasion; and, abandoning the whole line of railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, andcutting entirely loose from his base of supplies, march with theremainder to the sea; living upon the country, and "making the interiorof Georgia feel the weight of war. " Grant did not immediately fall inwith Sherman's suggestion; and Sherman prudently waited until theConfederate plan of invading Tennessee became further developed. Itturned out as he hoped and expected. Having gradually ceased his raidsupon the railroad, Hood, by the end of October, moved westward toTuscumbia on the Tennessee River, where he gathered an army of aboutthirty-five thousand, to which a cavalry force under Forrest of tenthousand more was soon added. 

Under Beauregard's orders to assume the offensive, he began a rapidmarch northward, and for a time with a promise of cutting off someadvanced Union detachments. We need not follow the fortunes of thiscampaign further than to state that the Confederate invasion ofTennessee ended in disastrous failure. It was severely checked at thebattle of Franklin on November 30; and when, in spite of this reverse, Hood pushed forward and set his army down before Nashville as if forattack or siege, the Union army, concentrated and reinforced to aboutfifty-five thousand, was ready. A severe storm of rain and sleet heldthe confronting armies in forced immobility for a week; but on themorning of December 15, 1864, General Thomas moved forward to an attackin which on that and the following day he inflicted so terrible a defeatupon his adversary, that the Confederate army not only retreated in routand panic, but soon literally went to pieces in disorganization, anddisappeared as a military entity from the western conflict. 

Long before this, Sherman had started on his famous march to the sea. His explanations to Grant were so convincing, that the general-in-chief, on November 2, telegraphed him: "Go on as you propose. " In anticipationof this permission, he had been preparing himself ever since Hood lefthim a clear path by starting westward on his campaign of invasion. FromAtlanta, he sent back his sick and wounded and surplus stores toChattanooga, withdrew the garrisons, burned the bridges, broke up therailroad, and destroyed the mills, foundries, shops and public buildingsin Atlanta. With sixty thousand of his best soldiers, and sixty-fiveguns, he started on November 15 on his march of three hundred miles tothe Atlantic. They carried with them twenty days' supplies ofprovisions, five days' supply of forage, and two hundred rounds ofammunition, of which each man carried forty rounds. 

With perfect confidence in their leader, with perfect trust in eachothers' valor, endurance and good comradeship, in the fine weather ofthe Southern autumn, and singing the inspiring melody of "John Brown'sBody, " Sherman's army began its "marching through Georgia" as gaily asif it were starting on a holiday. And, indeed, it may almost be saidsuch was their experience in comparison with the hardships of war whichmany of these veterans had seen in their varied campaigning. Theymarched as nearly as might be in four parallel columns abreast, makingan average of about fifteen miles a day. Kilpatrick's admirable cavalrykept their front and flanks free from the improvised militia andirregular troopers of the enemy. Carefully organized foraging partiesbrought in their daily supply of miscellaneous provisions--corn, meat, poultry, and sweet potatoes, of which the season had yielded an abundantharvest along their route. 

The Confederate authorities issued excited proclamations and orders, calling on the people to "fly to arms, " and to "assail the invader infront, flank, and rear, by night and by day. " But no rising occurredthat in any way checked the constant progress of the march. The Southernwhites were, of course, silent and sullen, but the negroes received theYankees with demonstrations of welcome and good will, and in spite ofSherman's efforts, followed in such numbers as to embarrass hisprogress. As he proceeded, he destroyed the railroads by filling upcuts, burning ties, heating the rails red hot and twisting them aroundtrees and into irreparable spirals. Threatening the principal cities tothe right and left, he marched skilfully between and past them. 

He reached the outer defenses of Savannah on December 10, easily drivingbefore him about ten thousand of the enemy. On December 13, he stormedFort McAllister, and communicated with the Union fleet through OssabawSound, reporting to Washington that his march had been most agreeable, that he had not lost a wagon on the trip, that he had utterly destroyedover two hundred miles of rails, and consumed stores and provisions thatwere essential to Lee's and Hood's armies. With pardonable exultationGeneral Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln on December 22:

"I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, withone hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition. Also abouttwenty-five thousand bales of cotton. "

He had reason to be gratified with the warm acknowledgment whichPresident Lincoln wrote him in the following letter:

"MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN: Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift, thecapture of Savannah. When you were about leaving Atlanta for theAtlantic coast I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you werethe better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked, nothing gained, 'I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor isall yours, for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce. Andtaking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is, indeed, a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious andimmediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that yourarmy could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important newservice, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force ofthe whole--Hood's army--it brings those who sat in darkness to see agreat light. But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave GeneralGrant and yourself to decide. Please make my grateful acknowledgments toyour whole army, officers and men. "

It was again General Sherman who planned and decided the next step ofthe campaign. Grant sent him orders to fortify a strong post, leave hisartillery and cavalry, and bring his infantry by sea to unite with theArmy of the Potomac before Petersburg. Greatly to Sherman'ssatisfaction, this order was soon revoked, and he was informed thatGrant wished "the whole matter of your future actions should be leftentirely to your own discretion. " In Sherman's mind, the next steps tobe taken were "as clear as daylight. " The progress of the war in theWest could now be described step by step, and its condition and probablecourse be estimated with sound judgment. The opening of the MississippiRiver in the previous year had cut off from the rebellion the vastresources west of the great river. Sherman's Meridian campaign inFebruary had rendered useless the railroads of the State of Mississippi. The capture of Atlanta and the march to the sea had ruined the railroadsof Georgia, cutting off another huge slice of Confederate resources. The battles of Franklin and Nashville had practically annihilated theprincipal Confederate army in the West. Sherman now proposed to Grantthat he would subject the two Carolinas to the same process, by marchinghis army through the heart of them from Savannah to Raleigh. 

"The game is then up with Lee, " he confidently added, "unless he comesout of Richmond, avoids you, and fights me, in which case I shouldreckon on your being on his heels. .. . If you feel confident that you canwhip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that Ican handle him in the open country. "

Grant promptly adopted the plan, and by formal orders directed Shermanto execute it. Several minor western expeditions were organized tocontribute to its success. The Union fleet on the coast was held inreadiness to coöperate as far as possible with Sherman's advance, and toafford him a new base of supply, if, at some suitable point he shoulddesire to establish communications with it. When, in the middle ofJanuary, 1865, a naval expedition captured Fort Fisher at the mouth ofCape Fear River, an army corps under General Schofield was brought eastfrom Thomas's Army of the Tennessee, and sent by sea to the NorthCarolina coast to penetrate into the interior and form a junction withSherman when he should arrive. 

Having had five weeks for rest and preparation, Sherman began the thirdstage of his campaign on February 1, with a total of sixty thousand men, provisions for twenty days, forage for seven, and a full supply ofammunition for a great battle. This new undertaking proved a task ofmuch greater difficulty and severer hardship than his march to the sea. Instead of the genial autumn weather, the army had now to face thewintry storms that blew in from the neighboring coast. Instead of thedry Georgia uplands, his route lay across a low sandy country cut byrivers with branches at right angles to his line of march, and borderedby broad and miry swamps. But this was an extraordinary army, whichfaced exposure, labor and peril with a determination akin to contempt. Here were swamps and water-courses to be waded waist deep; endless milesof corduroy road to be laid and relaid as course after course sank intothe mud under the heavy army wagons; frequent head-water channels ofrivers to be bridged; the lines of railroad along their route to be tornup and rendered incapable of repair; food to be gathered by foraging;keeping up, meanwhile a daily average of ten or twelve miles ofmarching. Under such conditions, Sherman's army made a mid-winter marchof four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days, crossing fivenavigable rivers, occupying three important cities, and rendering thewhole railroad system of South Carolina useless to the enemy. 

The ten to fifteen thousand Confederates with which General Hardee hadevacuated Savannah and retreated to Charleston could, of course, opposeno serious opposition to Sherman's march. On the contrary, when Shermanreached Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, on February 16, Hardeeevacuated Charleston, which had been defended for four long yearsagainst every attack of a most powerful Union fleet, and where the mostingenious siege-works and desperate storming assault had failed to wrestFort Wagner from the enemy. But though Charleston fell without a battle, and was occupied by the Union troops on the eighteenth, the destructivehand of war was at last heavily laid upon her. The Confederategovernment pertinaciously adhered to the policy of burning accumulationsof cotton to prevent it falling into Union hands; and the supplygathered in Charleston to be sent abroad by blockade runners, havingbeen set on fire by the evacuating Confederate officials, the flames notonly spread to the adjoining buildings, but grew into a greatconflagration that left the heart of the city a waste of blackened wallsto illustrate the folly of the first secession ordinance. Columbia, thecapital, underwent the same fate, to even a broader extent. Here thecotton had been piled in a narrow street, and when the torch was appliedby similar Confederate orders, the rising wind easily floated theblazing flakes to the near roofs of buildings. On the night followingSherman's entrance the wind rose to a gale, and neither the efforts ofthe citizens, nor the ready help of Sherman's soldiers were able tocheck the destruction. Confederate writers long nursed the accusationthat it was the Union army which burned the city as a deliberate act ofvengeance. Contrary proof is furnished by the orders of Sherman, leavingfor the sufferers a generous supply of food, as well as by the carefulinvestigation by the mixed commission on American and British claims, under the treaty of Washington. 

Still pursuing his march, Sherman arrived at Cheraw March 3, and openedcommunication with General Terry, who had advanced from Fort Fisher toWilmington. Hitherto, his advance had been practically unopposed. Butnow he learned that General Johnston had once more been placed incommand of the Confederate forces, and was collecting an army nearRaleigh, North Carolina. Well knowing the ability of this general, Sherman became more prudent in his movements. But Johnston was able togather a force of only twenty-five or thirty thousand men, of which thetroops Hardee brought from Charleston formed the nucleus; and the twominor engagements on March 16 and 19 did little to impede Sherman'sadvance to Goldsboro, where he arrived on March 23, forming a junctionwith the Union army sent by sea under Schofield, that had reached thesame point the previous day. 

The third giant stride of Sherman's great campaign was thus happilyaccomplished. His capture of Atlanta, his march to the sea and captureof Savannah, his progress through the Carolinas, and the fall ofCharleston, formed an aggregate expedition covering nearly a thousandmiles, with military results that rendered rebellion powerless in thecentral States of the Southern Confederacy. Several Union cavalry raidshad accomplished similar destruction of Confederate resources in Alabamaand the country bordering on East Tennessee. Military affairs wereplainly in a condition which justified Sherman in temporarily devolvinghis command on General Schofield and hurrying by sea to make a briefvisit for urgent consultation with General Grant at his headquartersbefore Richmond and Petersburg. 

XXX

Military Governors--Lincoln's Theory of Reconstruction--CongressionalElection in Louisiana--Letter to Military Governors--Letter toShepley--Amnesty Proclamation, December 8, 1863--Instructions toBanks--Banks's Action in Louisiana--Louisiana AbolishesSlavery--Arkansas Abolishes Slavery--Reconstruction inTennessee--Missouri Emancipation--Lincoln's Letter to Drake--MissouriAbolishes Slavery--Emancipation in Maryland--Maryland Abolishes Slavery

To subdue the Confederate armies and establish order under martial lawwas not the only task before President Lincoln. As rapidly as rebelStates or portions of States were occupied by Federal troops, it becamenecessary to displace usurping Confederate officials and appoint intheir stead loyal State, county, and subordinate officers to restore theadministration of local civil law under the authority of the UnitedStates. In western Virginia the people had spontaneously effected thisreform, first by repudiating the Richmond secession ordinance andorganizing a provisional State government, and, second, by adopting anew constitution and obtaining admission to the Union as the new Stateof West Virginia. In Missouri the State convention which refused to passa secession ordinance effected the same object by establishing aprovisional State government. In both these States the whole process ofwhat in subsequent years was comprehensively designated "reconstruction"was carried on by popular local action, without any Federal initiativeor interference other than prompt Federal recognition and substantialmilitary support and protection. 

But in other seceded States there was no such groundwork of loyalpopular authority upon which to rebuild the structure of civilgovernment. Therefore, when portions of Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, and North Carolina came under Federal control, President Lincoln, duringthe first half of 1862, appointed military governors to begin the workof temporary civil administration. He had a clear and consistentconstitutional theory under which this could be done. In his firstinaugural he announced the doctrine that "the union of these States isperpetual" and "unbroken. " His special message to Congress on July 4, 1861, added the supplementary declaration that "the States have theirstatus in the Union, and they have no other legal status. " The samemessage contained the further definition:

"The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection tomake its nest within her borders; and this government has no choice leftbut to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret, asthe loyal citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Thoseloyal citizens this government is bound to recognize and protect, asbeing Virginia. "

The action of Congress entirely conformed to this theory. That bodyadmitted to seats senators and representatives from the provisionalState governments of West Virginia and Missouri; and also allowedSenator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee to retain his seat, and admittedHorace Maynard and Andrew J. Clements as representatives from the sameState, though since their election Tennessee had undergone the usualsecession usurpation, and had as yet organized no loyal provisionalgovernment. 

The progress of the Union armies was so far checked during the secondhalf of 1862, that Military Governor Phelps, appointed for Arkansas, didnot assume his functions; and Military Governor Stanley wielded butslight authority in North Carolina. Senator Andrew Johnson, appointedmilitary governor of Tennessee, established himself at Nashville, thecapital, and, though Union control of Tennessee fluctuated greatly, hewas able, by appointing loyal State and county officers, to control theadministration of civil government in considerable districts, undersubstantial Federal jurisdiction. 

In the State of Louisiana the process of restoring Federal authority wascarried on a step farther, owing largely to the fact that the territoryoccupied by the Union army, though quite limited, comprising only thecity of New Orleans and a few adjacent parishes, was more securely held, and its hostile frontier less disturbed. It soon became evident thatconsiderable Union sentiment yet existed in the captured city andsurrounding districts, and when some of the loyal citizens began tomanifest impatience at the restraints of martial law, President Lincolnin a frank letter pointed the way to a remedy:

"The people of Louisiana, " he wrote under date of July 28, 1862, "whowish protection to person and property, have but to reach forth theirhands and take it. Let them in good faith reinaugurate the nationalauthority and set up a State government conforming thereto under theConstitution. They know how to do it, and can have the protection of thearmy while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such Stategovernment can dispense with its presence, and the people of the Statecan then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern themselves to theirown liking. "

At about this date there occurred the serious military crisis inVirginia; and the battles of the Peninsula, of the second Bull Run, andof Antietam necessarily compelled the postponement of minor questions. But during this period the President's policy on the slavery questionreached its development and solution, and when, on September 22, heissued his preliminary proclamation of emancipation, it also paved theway for a further defining of his policy of reconstruction. 

That proclamation announced the penalty of military emancipation againstall States in rebellion on the succeeding first day of January; but alsoprovided that if the people thereof were represented in Congress byproperly elected members, they should be deemed not in rebellion, andthereby escape the penalty. Wishing now to prove the sincerity of whathe said in the Greeley letter, that his paramount object was to save theUnion, and not either to save or destroy slavery, he wrote a circularletter to the military governors and commanders in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, instructing them to permit and aid the people within thedistricts held by them to hold elections for members of Congress, andperhaps a legislature, State officers, and United States senators. 

"In all available ways, " he wrote, "give the people a chance to expresstheir wishes at these elections. Follow forms of law as far asconvenient, but at all events get the expression of the largest numberof the people possible. All see how such action will connect with andaffect the proclamation of September 22. Of course the men electedshould be gentlemen of character, willing to swear support to theConstitution as of old, and known to be above reasonable suspicion ofduplicity. "

But the President wished this to be a real and not a sham proceeding, ashe explained a month later in a letter to Governor Shepley:

"We do not particularly need members of Congress from there to enable usto get along with legislation here. What we do want is the conclusiveevidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing to bemembers of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and thatother respectable citizens there are willing to vote for them and sendthem. To send a parcel of Northern men here as representatives, elected, as would be understood (and perhaps really so), at the point of thebayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous; and were I a member ofCongress here, I would vote against admitting any such man to a seat. "

Thus instructed, Governor Shepley caused an election to be held in thefirst and second congressional districts of Louisiana on December 3, 1862, at which members of Congress were chosen. No Federal office-holderwas a candidate, and about one half the usual vote was polled. The Houseof Representatives admitted them to seats after full scrutiny, thechairman of the committee declaring this "had every essential of aregular election in a time of most profound peace, with the exception ofthe fact that the proclamation was issued by the military instead of thecivil governor of Louisiana. "

Military affairs were of such importance and absorbed so much attentionduring the year 1863, both at Washington and at the headquarters of thevarious armies, that the subject of reconstruction was of necessitysomewhat neglected. The military governor of Louisiana indeed ordered aregistration of loyal voters, about the middle of June, for the purposeof organizing a loyal State government; but its only result was todevelop an inevitable antagonism and contest between conservatives whodesired that the old constitution of Louisiana prior to the rebellionshould be revived, by which the institution of slavery as then existingwould be maintained, and the free-State party which demanded that anentirely new constitution be framed and adopted, in which slavery shouldbe summarily abolished. The conservatives asked President Lincoln toadopt their plan. While the President refused this, he in a letter toGeneral Banks dated August 5, 1863, suggested the middle course ofgradual emancipation. 

"For my own part, " he wrote, "I think I shall not, in any event, retractthe emancipation proclamation; nor, as Executive, ever return to slaveryany person who is freed by the terms of that proclamation, or by any ofthe acts of Congress. If Louisiana shall send members to Congress, theiradmission to seats will depend, as you know, upon the respective housesand not upon the President. "

"I would be glad for her to make a new constitution recognizing theemancipation proclamation and adopting emancipation in those parts ofthe State to which the proclamation does not apply. And while she is atit, I think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt somepractical system by which the two races could gradually live themselvesout of their old relation to each other, and both come out betterprepared for the new. Education for young blacks should be included inthe plan. After all, the power or element of 'contract' may besufficient for this probationary period, and by its simplicity andflexibility may be the better. "

During the autumn months the President's mind dwelt more and more onthe subject of reconstruction, and he matured a general plan which helaid before Congress in his annual message to that body on December 8, 1863. He issued on the same day a proclamation of amnesty, on certainconditions, to all persons in rebellion except certain specifiedclasses, who should take a prescribed oath of allegiance. Theproclamation further provided that whenever a number of persons soamnestied in any rebel State, equal to one tenth the vote cast at thepresidential election of 1860, should "reëstablish a State governmentwhich shall be republican, and in no wise contravening said oath, " suchwould be recognized as the true government of the State. The annualmessage discussed and advocated the plan at length, but also added:"Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specifiedway, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way. "

This plan of reconstructing what came to be called "ten percent States, "met much opposition in Congress, and that body, reversing its action informer instances, long refused admission to members and senators fromStates similarly organized; but the point needs no further mention here. 

A month before the amnesty proclamation the President had written toGeneral Banks, expressing his great disappointment that thereconstruction in Louisiana had been permitted to fall in abeyance bythe leading Union officials there, civil and military. 

"I do, however, " he wrote, "urge both you and them to lose no more time. Governor Shepley has special instructions from the War Department. Iwish him--these gentlemen and others coöperating--without waiting formore territory, to go to work and give me a tangible nucleus which theremainder of the State may rally around as fast as it can, and which Ican at once recognize and sustain as the true State government. "

He urged that such reconstruction should have in view a new free-Stateconstitution, for, said he:

"If a few professedly loyal men shall draw the disloyal about them, andcolorably set up a State government repudiating the emancipationproclamation and reëstablishing slavery, I cannot recognize or sustaintheir work. .. . I have said, and say again, that if a new Stategovernment, acting in harmony with this government and consistently withgeneral freedom, shall think best to adopt a reasonable temporaryarrangement in relation to the landless and houseless freed people, I donot object; but my word is out to be for and not against them on thequestion of their permanent freedom. "

General Banks in reply excused his inaction by explaining that themilitary governor and others had given him to understand that they wereexclusively charged with the work of reconstruction in Louisiana. Tothis the President rejoined under date of December 24, 1863:

"I have all the while intended you to be master, as well in regard toreorganizing a State government for Louisiana as in regard to themilitary matters of the department, and hence my letters onreconstruction have nearly, if not quite, all been addressed to you. Myerror has been that it did not occur to me that Governor Shepley or anyone else would set up a claim to act independently of you. .. . I nowdistinctly tell you that you are master of all, and that I wish you totake the case as you find it, and give us a free-State reorganization ofLouisiana in the shortest possible time. "

Under this explicit direction of the President, and basing his actionon martial law as the fundamental law of the State, the general caused agovernor and State officials to be elected on February 22, 1864. Tooverride the jealousy and quarrels of both the conservative andfree-State parties, he set out in his proclamation that the officials tobe chosen should--

"Until others are appointed by competent authority, constitute the civilgovernment of the State, under the constitution and laws of Louisiana, except so much of the said constitution and laws as recognize, regulate, or relate to slavery; which, being inconsistent with the presentcondition of public affairs, and plainly inapplicable to any class ofpersons now existing within its limits, must be suspended, and they aretherefore and hereby declared to be inoperative and void. "

The newly elected governor was inaugurated on March 4, with imposingpublic ceremonies, and the President also invested him "with the powersexercised hitherto by the military governor of Louisiana. " General Banksfurther caused delegates to a State convention to be chosen, who, in asession extending from April 6 to July 25, perfected and adopted a newconstitution, which was again adopted by popular vote on September 5following. General Banks reported the constitution to be "one of thebest ever penned. .. . It abolishes slavery in the State, and forbids thelegislature to enact any law recognizing property in man. Theemancipation is instantaneous and absolute, without condition orcompensation, and nearly unanimous. "

The State of Arkansas had been forced into rebellion by militaryterrorism, and remained under Confederate domination only because theUnion armies could afford the latent loyal sentiment of the State noeffective support until the fall of Vicksburg and the opening of theMississippi. After that decisive victory, General Steele marched aUnion column of about thirteen thousand from Helena to Little Rock, thecapital, which surrendered to him on the evening of September 10, 1863. By December, eight regiments of Arkansas citizens had been formed forservice in the Union army; and, following the amnesty proclamation ofDecember 8, the reorganization of a loyal State government was speedilybrought about, mainly by spontaneous popular action, of course under thedirection and with the assistance of General Steele. 

In response to a petition, President Lincoln sent General Steele onJanuary 20, 1864, a letter repeating substantially the instructions hehad given General Banks for Louisiana. Before these could be carriedout, popular action had assembled at Little Rock on January 8, 1864, aformal delegate convention, composed of forty-four delegates who claimedto represent twenty-two out of the fifty-four counties of the State. OnJanuary 22 this convention adopted an amended constitution whichdeclared the act of secession null and void, abolished slaveryimmediately and unconditionally, and wholly repudiated the Confederatedebt. The convention appointed a provisional State government, and underits schedule an election was held on March 14, 1864. During the threedays on which the polls were kept open, under the orders of GeneralSteele, who by the President's suggestion adopted the conventionprogram, a total vote of 12, 179 was cast for the constitution, and only226 against it; while the provisional governor was also elected for anew term, together with members of Congress and a legislature which indue time chose United States senators. By this time Congress hadmanifested its opposition to the President's plan, but Mr. Lincoln stoodfirm, and on June 29 wrote to General Steele:

"I understand that Congress declines to admit to seats the persons sentas senators and representatives from Arkansas. These persons apprehendthat in consequence you may not support the new State government thereas you otherwise would. My wish is that you give that government and thepeople there the same support and protection that you would if themembers had been admitted, because in no event, nor in any view of thecase, can this do any harm, while it will be the best you can do towardsuppressing the rebellion. "

While Military Governor Andrew Johnson had been the earliest to beginthe restoration of loyal Federal authority in the State of Tennessee, the course of campaign and battle in that State delayed its completionto a later period than in the others. The invasion of Tennessee by theConfederate General Bragg in the summer of 1862, and the long delay ofthe Union General Rosecrans to begin an active campaign against himduring the summer of 1863, kept civil reorganization in a very uncertainand chaotic condition. When at length Rosecrans advanced and occupiedChattanooga, President Lincoln deemed it a propitious time to vigorouslybegin reorganization, and under date of September 11, 1863, he wrote themilitary governor emphatic suggestions that:

"The reinauguration must not be such as to give control of the State andits representation in Congress to the enemies of the Union, driving itsfriends there into political exile. .. . You must have it otherwise. Letthe reconstruction be the work of such men only as can be trusted forthe Union. Exclude all others; and trust that your government soorganized will be recognized here as being the one of republican form tobe guaranteed to the State, and to be protected against invasion anddomestic violence. It is something on the question of time to rememberthat it cannot be known who is next to occupy the position I now hold, nor what he will do. I see that you have declared in favor ofemancipation in Tennessee, for which, may God bless you. Getemancipation into your new State government--constitution--and therewill be no such word as fail for your case. "

In another letter of September 19, the President sent the governorspecific authority to execute the scheme outlined in his letter ofadvice; but no substantial success had yet been reached in the processof reconstruction in Tennessee during the year 1864, when theConfederate army under Hood turned northward from Atlanta to begin itsthird and final invasion of the State. This once more delayed all workof reconstruction until the Confederate army was routed and dispersed bythe battle of Nashville on December 15, 1864. Previous popular actionhad called a State convention, which, taking immediate advantage of theexpulsion of the enemy, met in Nashville on January 9, 1865, in whichfifty-eight counties and some regiments were represented by about fourhundred and sixty-seven delegates. After six days of deliberation theconvention adopted a series of amendments to the constitution, the mainordinance of which provided:

"That slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment forcrime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are herebyforever abolished and prohibited throughout the State. "

These amendments were duly adopted at a popular election held onFebruary 22, and the complete organization of a loyal State governmentunder them followed in due course. 

The State of Missouri needed no reconstruction. It has already been saidthat her local affairs were administered by a provisional Stategovernment instituted by the State convention chosen by popular electionbefore rebellion broke out. In this State, therefore, the institution ofslavery was suppressed by the direct action of the people, but notwithout a long and bitter conflict of party factions and militarystrife. There existed here two hostile currents of public opinion, one, the intolerant pro-slavery prejudices of its rural population; theother, the progressive and liberal spirit dominant in the city of St. Louis, with its heavy German population, which, as far back as 1856, hadelected to Congress a candidate who boldly advocated gradualemancipation: St. Louis, with outlying cities and towns, supplyingduring the whole rebellion the dominating influence that held the Statein the Union, and at length transformed her from a slave to a freeState. 

Missouri suffered severely in the war, but not through importantcampaigns or great battles. Persistent secession conspiracy, the Kansasepisodes of border strife, and secret orders of Confederate agents fromArkansas instigating unlawful warfare, made Missouri a hotbed ofguerrilla uprisings and of relentless neighborhood feuds, in which armedpartizan conflict often degenerated into shocking barbarity, and thepretense of war into the malicious execution of private vengeance. President Lincoln drew a vivid picture of the chronic disorders inMissouri in reply to complaints demanding the removal of GeneralSchofield from local military command:

"We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; butin this case that question is a perplexing compound--Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least foursides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of thosewho are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union _with_, but not_without_, slavery--those for it _without_, but not _with_--those for it_with_ or _without_, but prefer it _with_--and those for it _with orwithout_, but prefer it _without_. Among these again is a subdivision ofthose who are for _gradual_ but not for _immediate_, and those who arefor _immediate_, but not for _gradual_ extinction of slavery. It is easyto conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may besincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for theUnion, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different wayof sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned, and motivesare assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds andthrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feelsan impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revengeand retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be amonghonest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad andevery dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strongmeasures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse bymaladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. Thesecauses amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, withoutascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaperfiles, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils nowcomplained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. .. . I do not feel justified to enterupon the broad field you present in regard to the political differencesbetween radicals and conservatives. From time to time I have done andsaid what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follownobody. The radicals and conservatives each agree with me in some thingsand disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in allthings; for then they would agree with each other, and would be toostrong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to dootherwise, and I do not question their right. I, too, shall do whatseems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri, or elsewhere, responsible to me, and not to either radicals or conservatives. It is myduty to hear all; but at last I must, within my sphere, judge what to doand what to forbear. "

It is some consolation to history, that out of this blood and travailgrew the political regeneration of the State. Slavery and emancipationnever gave each other a moment's truce. The issue was raised to an acutestage by Frémont's proclamation in August, 1861. Though that ill-advisedmeasure was revoked by President Lincoln, the friction and irritation ofwar kept it alive, and in the following year a member of the MissouriState convention offered a bill to accept and apply President Lincoln'splan of compensated abolishment. Further effort was made in thisdirection in Congress, where in January, 1863, the House passed a billappropriating ten million dollars, and in February, the Senate anotherbill appropriating fifteen million dollars to aid compensatedabolishment in Missouri. But the stubborn opposition of threepro-slavery Missouri members of the House prevented action on the latterbill or any compromise. 

The question, however, continually grew among the people of Missouri, and made such advance that parties, accepting the main point as alreadypractically decided at length only divided upon the mode of procedureThe conservatives wanted the work to be done by the old Stateconvention, the radicals desired to submit it to a new convention freshfrom the people. Legislative agreement having failed, the provisionalgovernor called the old State convention together. The conventionleaders who controlled that body inquired of the President whether hewould sustain their action. To this he made answer in a letter toSchofield dated June 22, 1863:

"Your despatch, asking in substance whether, in case Missouri shalladopt gradual emancipation, the general government will protectslave-owners in that species of property during the short time it shallbe permitted by the State to exist within it, has been received. Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, andbelieving as I do that gradual can be made better than immediate forboth black and white, except when military necessity changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would be given. I cannot knowexactly what shape an act of emancipation may take. If the period fromthe initiation to the final end should be comparatively short, and theact should prevent persons being sold during that period into morelasting slavery, the whole would be easier. I do not wish to pledge thegeneral government to the affirmative support of even temporary slaverybeyond what can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, this is not desired, but that it is desired for the militaryforce of the United States, while in Missouri, to not be used insubverting the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during theprogress of emancipation. This I would desire also. "

Proceeding with its work, the old State convention, which had hithertomade a most honorable record, neglected a great opportunity. It indeedadopted an ordinance of gradual emancipation on July 1, 1863, but ofsuch an uncertain and dilatory character, that public opinion in theState promptly rejected it. By the death of the provisional governor onJanuary 31, 1864, the conservative party of Missouri lost its mosttrusted leader, and thereafter the radicals succeeded to the politicalpower of the State. At the presidential election of 1864, that partychose a new State convention, which met in St. Louis on January 6, 1865, and on the sixth day of its session (January 11) formally adopted anordinance of immediate emancipation. 

Maryland, like Missouri, had no need of reconstruction. Except for theBaltimore riot and the arrest of her secession legislature during thefirst year of the war, her State government continued its regularfunctions. But a strong popular undercurrent of virulent secessionsympathy among a considerable minority of her inhabitants was only heldin check by the military power of the Union, and for two yearsemancipation found no favor in the public opinion of the State. Herrepresentatives, like those of most other border States, coldly refusedPresident Lincoln's earnest plea to accept compensated abolishment; anda bill in Congress to give Maryland ten million dollars for that objectwas at once blighted by the declaration of one of her leadingrepresentatives that Maryland did not ask for it. Nevertheless, thesubject could no more be ignored there than in other States; and afterthe President's emancipation proclamation an emancipation partydeveloped itself in Maryland. 

There was no longer any evading the practical issue, when, by thePresident's direction, the Secretary of War issued a military order, early in October, 1863, regulating the raising of colored troops incertain border States, which decreed that slaves might be enlistedwithout consent of their owners, but provided compensation in suchcases. At the November election of that year the emancipation party ofMaryland elected its ticket by an overwhelming majority, and alegislature that enacted laws under which a State convention was chosento amend the constitution. Of the delegates elected on April 6, 1864, sixty-one were emancipationists, and only thirty-five opposed. 

After two months' debate this convention by nearly two thirds adopted anarticle:

"That hereafter in this State there shall be neither slavery norinvoluntary servitude except in punishment of crime whereof the partyshall have been duly convicted; and all persons held to service or laboras slaves are hereby declared free. "

The decisive test of a popular vote accepting the amended constitutionas a whole, remained, however, yet to be undergone. President Lincolnwillingly complied with a request to throw his official voice andinfluence in favor of the measure, and wrote, on October 10, 1864:

"A convention of Maryland has framed a new constitution for the State; apublic meeting is called for this evening at Baltimore to aid insecuring its ratification by the people; and you ask a word from me forthe occasion. I presume the only feature of the instrument about whichthere is serious controversy is that which provides for the extinctionof slavery. It needs not to be a secret, and I presume it is no secret, that I wish success to this provision. I desire it on everyconsideration. I wish all men to be free. I wish the material prosperityof the already free, which I feel sure the extinction of slavery wouldbring. I wish to see in process of disappearing that only thing whichever could bring this nation to civil war. I attempt no argument. Argument upon the question is already exhausted by the abler, betterinformed, and more immediately interested sons of Maryland herself. Ionly add that I shall be gratified exceedingly if the good people of theState shall, by their votes, ratify the new constitution. "

At the election which was held on October 12 and 13, stubborn Marylandconservatism, whose roots reached far back to the colonial days, madeits last desperate stand, and the constitution was ratified by amajority of only three hundred and seventy-five votes out of a total ofnearly sixty thousand. But the result was accepted as decisive, and indue time the governor issued his proclamation, declaring the newconstitution legally adopted. 

XXXI

Shaping of the Presidential Campaign--Criticisms of Mr. Lincoln--Chase'sPresidential Ambitions--The Pomeroy Circular--ClevelandConvention--Attempt to Nominate Grant--Meeting of BaltimoreConvention--Lincoln's Letter to Schurz--Platform of RepublicanConvention--Lincoln Renominated--Refuses to Indicate Preference forVice-President--Johnson Nominated for Vice-President--Lincoln's Speechto Committee of Notification--Reference to Mexico in his Letter ofAcceptance--The French in Mexico

The final shaping of the campaign, the definition of the issues, thewording of the platforms, and selection of the candidates, had grownmuch more out of national politics than out of mere party combination orpersonal intrigues. The success of the war, and fate of the Union, ofcourse dominated every other consideration; and next to this thetreatment of the slavery question became in a hundred forms almost adirect personal interest. Mere party feeling, which had utterly vanishedfor a few months in the first grand uprising of the North, had been oncemore awakened by the first Bull Run defeat, and from that time onwardwas heard in loud and constant criticism of Mr. Lincoln and the acts ofhis supporters wherever they touched the institution of slavery. TheDemocratic party, which had been allied with the Southern politicians inthe interests of that institution through so many decades, quitenaturally took up its habitual rôle of protest that slavery shouldreceive no hurt or damage from the incidents of war, where, in theborder States, it still had constitutional existence among loyal Unionmen. 

On the other hand, among Republicans who had elected Mr. Lincoln, andwho, as a partizan duty, indorsed and sustained his measures, Frémont'sproclamation of military emancipation in the first year of the warexcited the over-hasty zeal of antislavery extremists, and developed asmall but very active faction which harshly denounced the President whenMr. Lincoln revoked that premature and ill-considered measure. No matterwhat the President subsequently did about slavery, the Democratic pressand partizans always assailed him for doing too much, while the Frémontpress and partizans accused him of doing too little. 

Meanwhile, personal considerations were playing their minor, but notunimportant parts. When McClellan was called to Washington, and duringall the hopeful promise of the great victories he was expected to win, afew shrewd New York Democratic politicians grouped themselves about him, and put him in training as the future Democratic candidate forPresident; and the general fell easily into their plans and ambitions. Even after he had demonstrated his military incapacity, when he hadreaped defeat instead of victory, and earned humiliation instead oftriumph, his partizan adherents clung to the desperate hope that thoughthey could not win applause for him as a conqueror, they might yetcreate public sympathy in his behalf as a neglected and persecutedgenius. 

The cabinets of Presidents frequently develop rival presidentialaspirants, and that of Mr. Lincoln was no exception. Considering thestrong men who composed it, the only wonder is that there was so littlefriction among them. They disagreed constantly and heartily on minorquestions, both with Mr. Lincoln and with each other, but their greatdevotion to the Union, coupled with his kindly forbearance, and theclear vision which assured him mastery over himself and others, keptpeace and even personal affection in his strangely assorted officialfamily. 

The man who developed the most serious presidential aspirations wasSalmon P. Chase, his Secretary of the Treasury, who listened to andactively encouraged the overtures of a small faction of the Republicanparty which rallied about him at the end of the year 1863. Pure anddisinterested, and devoted with all his energies and powers to the causeof the Union, he was yet singularly ignorant of current public thought, and absolutely incapable of judging men in their true relations Heregarded himself as the friend of Mr. Lincoln and made strongprotestations to him and to others of this friendship, but he held sopoor an opinion of the President's intellect and character, comparedwith his own, that he could not believe the people blind enough toprefer the President to himself. He imagined that he did not covetadvancement, and was anxious only for the public good; yet, in the midstof his enormous labors found time to write letters to every part of thecountry, protesting his indifference to the presidency, but indicatinghis willingness to accept it, and painting pictures so dark of thechaotic state of affairs in the government, that the irresistibleinference was that only he could save the country. From the beginningMr. Lincoln had been aware of this quasi-candidacy, which continued allthrough the winter Indeed, it was impossible to remain unconscious ofit, although he discouraged all conversation on the subject, andrefused to read letters relating to it. He had his own opinion of thetaste and judgment displayed by Mr. Chase in his criticisms of thePresident and his colleagues in the cabinet, but he took no note ofthem. 

"I have determined, " he said, "to shut my eyes, so far as possible, toeverything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good secretary, and I shallkeep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we maynever have a worse man. "

And he went on appointing Mr. Chase's partizans and adherents to placesin the government. Although his own renomination was a matter in regardto which he refused to talk much, even with intimate friends, he wasperfectly aware of the true drift of things. In capacity of appreciatingpopular currents Chase was as a child beside him; and he allowed theopposition to himself in his own cabinet to continue, without questionor remark, all the more patiently, because he knew how feeble it reallywas. 

The movement in favor of Mr. Chase culminated in the month of February, 1864, in a secret circular signed by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, andwidely circulated through the Union; which criticised Mr. Lincoln's"tendency toward compromises and temporary expedients"; explained thateven if his reëlection were desirable, it was practically impossible inthe face of the opposition that had developed; and lauded Chase as thestatesman best fitted to rescue the country from present perils andguard it against future ills. Of course copies of this circular soonreached the White House, but Mr. Lincoln refused to look at them, andthey accumulated unread in the desk of his secretary. Finally, it gotinto print, whereupon Mr. Chase wrote to the President to assure him hehad no knowledge of the letter before seeing it in the papers. To thisMr. Lincoln replied:

"I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, becauseI had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issueswhich I supposed came from it, . .. For several weeks. I have known justas little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. .. . Ifully concur with you that neither of us can be justly held responsiblefor what our respective friends may do without our instigation orcountenance. .. . Whether you shall remain at the head of the TreasuryDepartment is a question which I will not allow myself to consider fromany standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, inthat view, I do not perceive occasion for a change. "

Even before the President wrote this letter, Mr. Chase's candidacy hadpassed out of sight. In fact, it never really existed save in theimagination of the Secretary of the Treasury and a narrow circle of hisadherents. He was by no means the choice of the body of radicals whowere discontented with Mr. Lincoln because of his deliberation indealing with the slavery question, or of those others who thought he wasgoing entirely too fast and too far. 

Both these factions, alarmed at the multiplying signs which foretold histriumphant renomination, issued calls for a mass convention of thepeople, to meet at Cleveland, Ohio, on May 31, a week before theassembling of the Republican national convention at Baltimore, to unitein a last attempt to stem the tide in his favor. Democratic newspapersnaturally made much of this, heralding it as a hopeless split in theRepublican ranks, and printing fictitious despatches from Clevelandreporting that city thronged with influential and earnest delegates. Far from this being the case, there was no crowd and still lessenthusiasm. Up to the very day of its meeting no place was provided forthe sessions of the convention, which finally came together in a smallhall whose limited capacity proved more than ample for both delegatesand spectators. Though organization was delayed nearly two hours in thevain hope that more delegates would arrive, the men who had been countedupon to give character to the gathering remained notably absent. Thedelegates prudently refrained from counting their meager number, andafter preliminaries of a more or less farcical nature, voted for aplatform differing little from that afterward adopted at Baltimore, listened to the reading of a vehement letter from Wendell Phillipsdenouncing Mr. Lincoln's administration and counseling the choice ofFrémont for President, nominated that general by acclamation, withGeneral John Cochrane of New York for his running-mate, christenedthemselves the "Radical Democracy, " and adjourned. 

The press generally greeted the convention and its work with a chorus ofridicule, though certain Democratic newspapers, from motives harmlesslytransparent, gave it solemn and unmeasured praise. General Frémont, taking his candidacy seriously, accepted the nomination, but threemonths later, finding no response from the public, withdrew from thecontest. 

At this fore-doomed Cleveland meeting a feeble attempt had been made bythe men who considered Mr. Lincoln too radical, to nominate GeneralGrant for President, instead of Frémont; but he had been denounced as aLincoln hireling, and his name unceremoniously swept aside. During thesame week another effort in the same direction was made in New York, though the committee having the matter in charge made no public avowalof its intention beforehand, merely calling a meeting to express thegratitude of the country to the general for his signal services; andeven inviting Mr. Lincoln to take part in the proceedings. This hedeclined to do, but wrote:

"I approve, nevertheless, whatever may tend to strengthen and sustainGeneral Grant and the noble armies now under his direction. My previoushigh estimate of General Grant has been maintained and heightened bywhat has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting, whilethe magnitude and difficulty of the task before him do not prove lessthan I expected. He and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of theirgreat trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will so shape yourgood words that they may turn to men and guns, moving to his and theirsupport. "

With such gracious approval of the movement the meeting naturally fellinto the hands of the Lincoln men. General Grant neither at this timenor at any other, gave the least countenance to the efforts which weremade to array him in political opposition to the President. 

These various attempts to discredit the name of Mr. Lincoln and nominatesome one else in his place caused hardly a ripple on the great currentof public opinion. Death alone could have prevented his choice by theUnion convention. So absolute and universal was the tendency that mostof the politicians made no effort to direct or guide it; they simplyexerted themselves to keep in the van and not be overwhelmed. Theconvention met on June 7, but irregular nominations of Mr. Lincoln forPresident had begun as early as January 6, when the first Stateconvention of the year was held in New Hampshire. 

From one end of the country to the other such spontaneous nominationshad joyously echoed his name. Only in Missouri did it fail ofoverwhelming adhesion, and even in the Missouri Assembly the resolutionin favor of his renomination was laid upon the table by a majority ofonly eight. The current swept on irresistibly throughout the spring. Afew opponents of Mr. Lincoln endeavored to postpone the meeting of thenational convention until September, knowing that their only hope lay insome possible accident of the summer. But though supported by sopowerful an influence as the New York "Tribune, " the National Committeepaid no attention to this appeal. Indeed, they might as well haveconsidered the request of a committee of prominent citizens to check animpending thunderstorm. 

Mr. Lincoln took no measures whatever to promote his own candidacy. While not assuming airs of reluctance or bashfulness, he discouraged onthe part of strangers any suggestion as to his reëlection. Among hisfriends he made no secret of his readiness to continue the work he wasengaged in, if such should be the general wish. "A second term would bea great honor and a great labor, which together, perhaps, I would notdecline if tendered, " he wrote Elihu B. Washburne. He not only opposedno obstacle to the ambitions of Chase, but received warnings to bewareof Grant in the same serene manner, answering tranquilly, "If he takesRichmond, let him have it. " And he discouraged office-holders, civil ormilitary, who showed any special zeal in his behalf. To General Schurz, who wrote asking permission to take an active part in the presidentialcampaign, he replied:

"Allow me to suggest that if you wish to remain in the military service, it is very dangerous for you to get temporarily out of it; because, with a major-general once out, it is next to impossible for even thePresident to get him in again. .. . Of course I would be very glad to haveyour service for the country in the approaching political canvass; but Ifear we cannot properly have it without separating you from themilitary. " And in a later letter he added: "I perceive no objection toyour making a political speech when you are where one is to be made; butquite surely, speaking in the North and fighting in the South at thesame time are not possible; nor could I be justified to detail anyofficer to the political campaign during its continuance and then returnhim to the army. "

Not only did he firmly take this stand as to his own nomination, butenforced it even more rigidly in cases where he learned that Federaloffice-holders were working to defeat the return of certain Republicancongressmen. In several such instances he wrote instructions of whichthe following is a type:

"Complaint is made to me that you are using your official power todefeat Judge Kelley's renomination to Congress. .. . The correctprinciple, I think, is that all our friends should have absolute freedomof choice among our friends. My wish, therefore, is that you will dojust as you think fit with your own suffrage in the case, and notconstrain any of your subordinates to do other than as he thinks fitwith his. "

He made, of course, no long speeches during the campaign, and in hisshort addresses, at Sanitary Fairs, in response to visiting delegations, or on similar occasions where custom and courtesy decreed that he mustsay something, preserved his mental balance undisturbed, speakingheartily and to the point, but skilfully avoiding the perils that besetthe candidate who talks. 

When at last the Republican convention came together on June 7, 1864, ithad less to do than any other convention in our political history; forits delegates were bound by a peremptory mandate. It was opened by briefremarks from Senator Morgan of New York, whose significant statementthat the convention would fall far short of accomplishing its greatmission unless it declared for a Constitutional amendment prohibitingAfrican slavery, was loudly cheered. In their speeches on taking thechair, both the temporary chairman, Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge ofKentucky, and the permanent chairman, William Dennison of Ohio, treatedMr. Lincoln's nomination as a foregone conclusion, and the applausewhich greeted his name showed that the delegates did not resent thisdisregard of customary etiquette. There were, in fact, but three tasksbefore the convention--to settle the status of contesting delegations, to agree upon a platform, and to nominate a candidate forVice-President. 

The platform declared in favor of crushing rebellion and maintaining theintegrity of the Union, commending the government's determination toenter into no compromise with the rebels. It applauded PresidentLincoln's patriotism and fidelity in the discharge of his duties, andstated that only those in harmony with "these resolutions" ought to havea voice in the administration of the government. This, while intended towin support of radicals throughout the Union, was aimed particularly atPostmaster General Blair, who had made many enemies. It approved allacts directed against slavery; declared in favor of a constitutionalamendment forever abolishing it; claimed full protection of the laws ofwar for colored troops; expressed gratitude to the soldiers and sailorsof the Union; pronounced in favor of encouraging foreign immigration;of building a Pacific railway; of keeping inviolate the faith of thenation, pledged to redeem the national debt; and vigorously reaffirmedthe Monroe Doctrine. 

Then came the nominations. The only delay in registering the will of theconvention occurred as a consequence of the attempt of members to do itby irregular and summary methods. When Mr. Delano of Ohio made thecustomary motion to proceed to the nomination, Simon Cameron moved as asubstitute the renomination of Lincoln and Hamlin by acclamation. A longwrangle ensued on the motion to lay this substitute on the table, whichwas finally brought to an end by the cooler heads, who desired thatwhatever opposition to Mr. Lincoln there might be in the conventionshould have fullest opportunity of expression. The nominations, therefore, proceeded by call of States in the usual way. Theinterminable nominating speeches of recent years had not yet come intofashion. B. C. Cook, the chairman of the Illinois delegation, merelysaid:

"The State of Illinois again presents to the loyal people of this nationfor President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln--God bless him!"

Others, who seconded the nomination, were equally brief. Every Stategave its undivided vote for Lincoln, with the exception of Missouri, which cast its vote, under positive instructions, as the chairmanstated, for Grant. But before the result was announced, John F. Hume ofMissouri moved that Mr. Lincoln's nomination be declared unanimous. Thiscould not be done until the result of the balloting was made known--fourhundred and eighty-four for Lincoln, twenty-two for Grant. Missouri thenchanged its vote, and the secretary read the grand total of five hundredand six for Lincoln; the announcement being greeted with a storm ofcheering which lasted many minutes. 

The principal names mentioned for the vice-presidency were HannibalHamlin, the actual incumbent; Andrew Johnson of Tennessee; and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York. Besides these, General L. H. Rousseau had the voteof his own State--Kentucky. The radicals of Missouri favored GeneralB. F. Butler, who had a few scattered votes also from New England. Amongthe principal candidates, however, the voters were equally enoughdivided to make the contest exceedingly spirited and interesting. 

For several days before the convention met Mr. Lincoln had been besiegedby inquiries as to his personal wishes in regard to his associate on theticket. He had persistently refused to give the slightest intimation ofsuch wish. His private secretary, Mr. Nicolay, who was at Baltimore inattendance at the convention, was well acquainted with this attitude;but at last, over-borne by the solicitations of the chairman of theIllinois delegation, who had been perplexed at the advocacy of JosephHolt by Leonard Swett, one of the President's most intimate friends, Mr. Nicolay wrote to Mr. Hay, who had been left in charge of the executiveoffice in his absence:

"Cook wants to know, confidentially, whether Swett is all right; whetherin urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes;whether the President has any preference, either personal or on thescore of policy; or whether he wishes not even to interfere by aconfidential intimation. .. . Please get this information for me, ifpossible. "

The letter was shown to the President, who indorsed upon it:

"Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, but I hadnot heard or thought of him for V. P. Wish not to interfere about V. P. Cannot interfere about platform. Convention must judge for itself. "

This positive and final instruction was sent at once to Mr. Nicolay, andby him communicated to the President's most intimate friends in theconvention. It was therefore with minds absolutely untrammeled by evenany knowledge of the President's wishes that the convention went aboutits work of selecting his associate on the ticket. It is altogetherprobable that the ticket of 1860 would have been nominated without acontest had it not been for the general impression, in and out of theconvention, that it would be advisable to select as a candidate for thevice-presidency a war Democrat. Mr. Dickinson, while not putting himselfforward as a candidate, had sanctioned the use of his name on thespecial ground that his candidacy might attract to the support of theUnion party many Democrats who would have been unwilling to support aticket avowedly Republican; but these considerations weighed with stillgreater force in favor of Mr. Johnson, who was not only a Democrat, butalso a citizen of a slave State. The first ballot showed that Mr. Johnson had received two hundred votes, Mr. Hamlin one hundred andfifty, and Mr. Dickinson one hundred and eight; and before the resultwas announced almost the whole convention turned their votes to Johnson;whereupon his nomination was declared unanimous. The work was so quicklydone that Mr. Lincoln received notice of the action of the conventiononly a few minutes after the telegram announcing his own renominationhad reached him. 

Replying next day to a committee of notification, he said in part:

"I will neither conceal my gratification nor restrain the expression ofmy gratitude that the Union people, through their convention, in thecontinued effort to save and advance the nation, have deemed me notunworthy to remain in my present position. I know no reason to doubtthat I shall accept the nomination tendered and yet, perhaps I shouldnot declare definitely before reading and considering what is called theplatform. I will say now, however, I approve the declaration in favor ofso amending the Constitution as to prohibit slavery throughout thenation. When the people in revolt, with a hundred days of explicitnotice that they could within those days resume their allegiance withoutthe overthrow of their institutions, and that they could not resume itafterward, elected to stand out, such amendment to the Constitution asis now proposed became a fitting and necessary conclusion to the finalsuccess of the Union cause. .. . In the joint names of Liberty and Union, let us labor to give it legal form and practical effect. "

In his letter of June 29, formally accepting the nomination, thePresident observed the same wise rule of brevity which he had followedfour years before. He made but one specific reference to any subject ofdiscussion. While he accepted the convention's resolution reaffirmingthe Monroe Doctrine, he gave the convention and the country distinctlyto understand that he stood by the action already adopted by himself andthe Secretary of State. He said:

"There might be misunderstanding were I not to say that the position ofthe government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumedthrough the State Department and approved and indorsed by the conventionamong the measures and acts of the Executive will be faithfullymaintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that positionpertinent and applicable. "

This resolution, which was, in truth, a more vigorous assertion of theMonroe Doctrine than the author of that famous tenet ever dreamed ofmaking, had been introduced in the convention by the radicals as acovert censure of Mr. Lincoln's attitude toward the French invasion ofour sister republic; but through skilful wording of the platform hadbeen turned by his friends into an indorsement of the administration. 

And, indeed, this was most just, since from the beginning PresidentLincoln and Mr. Seward had done all in their power to discourage thepresence of foreign troops on Mexican territory. When a joint expeditionby England, France, and Spain had been agreed upon to seize certainMexican ports in default of a money indemnity demanded by thosecountries for outrages against their subjects, England had invited theUnited States to be a party to the convention. Instead, Mr. Lincoln andMr. Seward attempted to aid Mexico with a sufficient sum to meet thesedemands, and notified Great Britain of their intention to do so, and themotives which prompted them. The friendly assistance came to naught; butas the three powers vigorously disclaimed any designs against Mexico'sterritory or her form of government, the United States saw no necessityfor further action, beyond a clear definition of its own attitude forthe benefit of all the parties. 

This it continued to repeat after England withdrew from the expedition, and Spain, soon recalling her troops, left Napoleon III to set theArchduke Maximilian on his shadowy throne, and to develop in the heartof America his scheme of an empire friendly to the South. At the momentthe government was unable to do more, though recognizing the veiledhostility of Europe which thus manifested itself in a movement on whatmay be called the right flank of the republic. While giving utterance tono expressions of indignation at the aggressions, or of gratification atdisaster which met the aggressor, the President and Mr. Seward continuedto assert, at every proper opportunity the adherence of the Americangovernment to its traditional policy of discouraging Europeanintervention in the affairs of the New World. 

XXXII

The Bogus Proclamation--The Wade-Davis Manifesto--Resignationof Mr. Chase--Fessenden Succeeds Him--The Greeley PeaceConference--Jaquess-Gilmore Mission--Letter of Raymond--Bad Outlook forthe Election--Mr. Lincoln on the Issues of the Campaign--President'sSecret Memorandum--Meeting of Democratic National Convention--McClellanNominated--His Letter of Acceptance--Lincoln Reëlected--His Speech onNight of Election--The Electoral Vote--Annual Message of December 6, 1864--Resignation of McClellan from the Army

The seizure of the New York "Journal of Commerce" and New York "World, "in May, 1864, for publishing a forged proclamation calling for fourhundred thousand more troops, had caused great excitement among thecritics of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The terrible slaughter ofGrant's opening campaign against Richmond rendered the country painfullysensitive to such news at the moment; and the forgery, which proved tobe the work of two young Bohemians of the press, accomplished itspurpose of raising the price of gold, and throwing the Stock Exchangeinto a temporary fever. Telegraphic announcement of the imposture soonquieted the flurry, and the quick detection of the guilty partiesreduced the incident to its true rank; but the fact that the fierySecretary of War had meanwhile issued orders for the suppression of bothnewspapers and the arrest of their editors was neither forgiven norforgotten. The editors were never incarcerated, and the journals resumedpublication after an interval of only two days, but the incident wasvigorously employed during the entire summer as a means of attack uponthe administration. 

Violent opposition to Mr. Lincoln came also from those members of bothHouses of Congress who disapproved his attitude on reconstruction. Though that part of his message of December 8, 1863, relating to theformation of loyal State governments in districts which had been inrebellion at first received enthusiastic commendation from bothconservatives and radicals, it was soon evident that the millennium hadnot yet arrived, and that in a Congress composed of men of such positiveconvictions and vehement character, there were many who would not submitpermanently to the leadership of any man, least of all to that of one soreasonable, so devoid of malice, as the President. 

Henry Winter Davis at once moved that that part of the message bereferred to a special committee of which he was chairman, and onFebruary 15 reported a bill whose preamble declared the ConfederateStates completely out of the Union; prescribing a totally differentmethod of reëstablishing loyal State governments, one of the essentialsbeing the prohibition of slavery. Congress rejected the preamble, butafter extensive debate accepted the bill, which breathed the same spiritthroughout. The measure was also finally acceded to in the Senate, andcame to Mr. Lincoln for signature in the closing hours of the session. He laid it aside and went on with other business, despite the evidentanxiety of several friends, who feared his failure to indorse it wouldlose the Republicans many votes in the Northwest. In stating hisattitude to his cabinet he said:

"This bill and the position of these gentlemen seem to me, in assertingthat the insurrectionary States are no longer in the Union, to make thefatal admission that States, whenever they please, may of their ownmotion dissolve their connection with the Union. Now we cannot survivethat admission, I am convinced. If that be true, I am not President;these gentlemen are not Congress. I have laboriously endeavored to avoidthat question ever since it first began to be mooted, and thus to avoidconfusion and disturbance in our own councils. It was to obviate thisquestion that I earnestly favored the movement for an amendment to theConstitution abolishing slavery, which passed the Senate and failed inthe House. I thought it much better, if it were possible, to restore theUnion without the necessity of a violent quarrel among its friends as towhether certain States have been in or out of the Union during thewar--a merely metaphysical question and one unnecessary to be forcedinto discussion. "

But though every member of the cabinet agreed with him, he foresaw theimportance of the step he had resolved to take, and its possibledisastrous consequences to himself. When some one said that the threatsof the radicals were without foundation, and that the people would notbolt their ticket on a question of metaphysics, he answered:

"If they choose to make a point upon this, I do not doubt that they cando harm. They have never been friendly to me. At all events, I must keepsome consciousness of being somewhere near right. I must keep somestandard or principle fixed within myself. "

Convinced, after fullest deliberation, that the bill was too restrictivein its provisions, and yet unwilling to reject whatever of practicalgood might be accomplished by it, he disregarded precedents, and actingon his lifelong rule of taking the people into his confidence, issued aproclamation on July 8, giving a copy of the bill of Congress, recitingthe circumstances under which it was passed, and announcing that whilehe was unprepared by formal approval of the bill to be inflexiblycommitted to any single plan of restoration, or to set aside thefree-State governments already adopted in Arkansas and Louisiana, or todeclare that Congress was competent to decree the abolishment ofslavery; yet he was fully satisfied with the plan as one very propermethod of reconstruction, and promised executive aid to any State thatmight see fit to adopt it. 

The great mass of Republican voters, who cared little for the"metaphysics" of the case, accepted this proclamation, as they hadaccepted that issued six months before, as the wisest and mostpracticable method of handling the question; but among those alreadyhostile to the President, and those whose devotion to the cause offreedom was so ardent as to make them look upon him as lukewarm, theexasperation which was already excited increased. The indignation of Mr. Davis and of Mr. Wade, who had called the bill up in the Senate, atseeing their work thus brought to nothing, could not be restrained; andtogether they signed and published in the New York "Tribune" of August 5the most vigorous attack ever directed against the President from hisown party; insinuating that only the lowest motives dictated his action, since by refusing to sign the bill he held the electoral votes of therebel States at his personal dictation; calling his approval of the billof Congress as a very proper plan for any State choosing to adopt it, a"studied outrage"; and admonishing the people to "consider the remedy ofthese usurpations, and, having found it, " to "fearlessly execute it. "

Congress had already repealed the fugitive-slave law, and to the votersat large, who joyfully accepted the emancipation proclamation, itmattered very little whether the "institution" came to its inevitableend, in the fragments of territory where it yet remained, by virtue ofcongressional act or executive decree. This tempest over the method ofreconstruction had, therefore, little bearing on the presidentialcampaign, and appealed more to individual critics of the President thanto the mass of the people. 

Mr. Chase entered in his diary: "The President pocketed the greatbill. .. . He did not venture to veto, and so put it in his pocket. It wasa condemnation of his amnesty proclamation and of his general policy ofreconstruction, rejecting the idea of possible reconstruction withslavery, which neither the President nor his chief advisers have, in myopinion, abandoned. " Mr. Chase was no longer one of the chief advisers. After his withdrawal from his hopeless contest for the presidency, hissentiments toward Mr. Lincoln took on a tinge of bitterness whichincreased until their friendly association in the public service becameno longer possible; and on June 30 he sent the President hisresignation, which was accepted. There is reason to believe that he didnot expect such a prompt severing of their official relations, sincemore than once, in the months of friction which preceded thisculmination, he had used a threat to resign as means to carry some pointin controversy. 

Mr. Lincoln, on accepting his resignation, sent the name of David Tod ofOhio to the Senate as his successor; but, receiving a telegram from Mr. Tod declining on the plea of ill health, substituted that of WilliamPitt Fessenden, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, whosenomination was instantly confirmed and commanded general approval. 

Horace Greeley, editor of the powerful New York "Tribune, " had becomeone of those patriots whose discouragement and discontent led them, during the summer of 1864, to give ready hospitality to any suggestionsto end the war. In July he wrote to the President, forwarding the letterof one "Wm. Cornell Jewett of Colorado, " which announced the arrival inCanada of two ambassadors from Jefferson Davis with full powers tonegotiate a peace. Mr. Greeley urged, in his over-fervid letter oftransmittal, that the President make overtures on the following plan ofadjustment: First. The Union to be restored and declared perpetual. Second. Slavery to be utterly and forever abolished. Third. A completeamnesty for all political offenses. Fourth. Payment of four hundredmillion dollars to the slave States, pro rata, for their slaves. Fifth. Slave States to be represented in proportion to their total population. Sixth. A national convention to be called at once. 

Though Mr. Lincoln had no faith in Jewett's story, and doubted whetherthe embassy had any existence, he determined to take immediate action onthis proposition. He felt the unreasonableness and injustice of Mr. Greeley's letter, which in effect charged his administration with acruel disinclination to treat with the rebels, and resolved to convincehim at least, and perhaps others, that there was no foundation for thesereproaches. So he arranged that the witness of his willingness to listento any overtures that might come from the South should be Mr. Greeleyhimself, and answering his letter at once on July 9, said:

"If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have anyproposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing therestoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else itembraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that if he reallybrings such proposition he shall at the least have safe conduct with thepaper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where youshall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons. "

This ready acquiescence evidently surprised and somewhat embarrassed Mr. Greeley, who replied by several letters of different dates, but made nomotion to produce his commissioners. At last, on the fifteenth, to end acorrespondence which promised to be indefinitely prolonged, thePresident telegraphed him: "I was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man or men. " Mr. Greeley then went to Niagara, andwrote from there to the alleged commissioners, Clement C. Clay and JamesP. Holcombe, offering to conduct them to Washington, but neglecting tomention the two conditions--restoration of the Union and abandonment ofslavery--laid down in Mr. Lincoln's note of the ninth and repeated byhim on the fifteenth. Even with this great advantage, Clay and Holcombefelt themselves too devoid of credentials to accept Mr. Greeley's offer, but replied that they could easily get credentials, or that other agentscould be accredited, if they could be sent to Richmond armed with "thecircumstances disclosed in this correspondence. "

This, of course, meant that Mr. Lincoln should take the initiative insuing the Richmond authorities for peace on terms proposed by them. Theessential impossibility of these terms was not, however, apparent to Mr. Greeley, who sent them on to Washington, soliciting fresh instructions. With unwearied patience, Mr. Lincoln drew up a final paper, "To Whom itmay Concern, " formally restating his position, and despatched Major Haywith it to Niagara. This ended the conference; the Confederates chargingthe President through the newspapers with a "sudden and entire change ofviews"; while Mr. Greeley, being attacked by his colleagues of the pressfor his action, could defend himself only by implied censure of thePresident, utterly overlooking the fact that his own original letter hadcontained the identical propositions Mr. Lincoln insisted upon. 

The discussion grew so warm that both he and his assailants at lastjoined in a request to Mr. Lincoln to permit the publication of thecorrespondence. This was, of course, an excellent opportunity for thePresident to vindicate his own proceeding. But he rarely looked at suchmatters from the point of view of personal advantage, and he feared thatthe passionate, almost despairing appeals of the most prominentRepublican editor of the North for peace at any cost, disclosed in thecorrespondence, would deepen the gloom in the public mind and have aninjurious effect upon the Union cause. The spectacle of the veteranjournalist, who was justly regarded as the leading controversial writeron the antislavery side, ready to sacrifice everything for peace, andfrantically denouncing the government for refusing to surrender thecontest, would have been, in its effect upon public opinion, a disasterequal to the loss of a great battle. He therefore proposed to Mr. Greeley, in case the letters were published, to omit some of the mostvehement passages; and took Mr. Greeley's refusal to assent to this as aveto on their publication. 

It was characteristic of him that, seeing the temper in which Mr. Greeley regarded the transaction, he dropped the matter and submittedin silence to the misrepresentations to which he was subjected by reasonof it. Some thought he erred in giving any hearing to the rebels; somecriticized his choice of a commissioner; and the opposition naturallymade the most of his conditions of negotiation, and accused him ofembarking in a war of extermination in the interests of the negro. Though making no public effort to set himself right, he was keenly aliveto their attitude. To a friend he wrote:

"Saying reunion and abandonment of slavery would be considered, ifoffered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, ifoffered. .. . Allow me to remind you that no one, having control of therebel armies, or, in fact, having any influence whatever in therebellion, has offered, or intimated, a willingness to a restoration ofthe Union, in any event, or on any condition whatever. .. . If JeffersonDavis wishes for himself, or for the benefit of his friends at theNorth, to know what I would do if he were to offer peace and reunion, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me. "

If the result of Mr. Greeley's Niagara efforts left any doubt that peacewas at present unattainable, the fact was demonstrated beyond questionby the published report of another unofficial and volunteer negotiationwhich was proceeding at the same time. In May, 1863, James F. Jaquess, D. D. , a Methodist clergyman of piety and religious enthusiasm, who hadbeen appointed by Governor Yates colonel of an Illinois regiment, applied for permission to go South, urging that by virtue of his churchrelations he could, within ninety days, obtain acceptable terms of peacefrom the Confederates. The military superiors to whom he submitted therequest forwarded it to Mr. Lincoln with a favorable indorsement; andthe President replied, consenting that they grant him a furlough, ifthey saw fit, but saying:

"He cannot go with any government authority whatever. This is absoluteand imperative. "

Eleven days later he was back again within Union lines, claiming to havevaluable "unofficial" proposals for peace. President Lincoln paid noattention to his request for an interview, and in course of time hereturned to his regiment. Nothing daunted, however, a year later heapplied for and received permission to repeat his visit, this time incompany with J. R. Gilmore, a lecturer and writer, but, as before, expressly without instruction or authority from Mr. Lincoln. They wentto Richmond, and had an extended interview with Mr. Davis, during whichthey proposed to him a plan of adjustment as visionary as it wasunauthorized, its central feature being a general election to be heldover the whole country, North and South, within sixty days, on the twopropositions, --peace with disunion and Southern independence, or peacewith Union, emancipation, no confiscation, and universal amnesty, --themajority vote to decide, and the governments at Washington and Richmondto be finally bound by the decision. 

The interview resulted in nothing but a renewed declaration from Mr. Davis that he would fight for separation to the bitter end--adeclaration which, on the whole, was of service to the Union cause, since, to a great extent, it stopped the clamor of the peace factionistsduring the presidential campaign. Not entirely, however. There was stillcriticism enough to induce Henry J. Raymond, chairman of the executivecommittee of the Republican party, to write a letter on August 22, suggesting to Mr. Lincoln that he ought to appoint a commission in dueform to make proffers of peace to Davis on the sole condition ofacknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution; all other questions tobe settled in a convention of the people of all the States. 

Mr. Lincoln answered this patiently and courteously, framing, to givepoint to his argument, an experimental draft of instructions with whichhe proposed, in case such proffers were made, to send Mr. Raymondhimself to the rebel authorities. On seeing these in black and white, Raymond, who had come to Washington to urge his project, readily agreedwith the President and Secretaries Seward, Stanton, and Fessenden, thatto carry it out would be worse than losing the presidential contest: itwould be ignominiously surrendering it in advance. 

"Nevertheless, " wrote an inmate of the White House, "the visit ofhimself and committee here did great good. They found the President andcabinet much better informed than themselves, and went home encouragedand cheered. "

The Democratic managers had called the national convention of theirparty to meet on the fourth of July, 1864; but after the nomination ofFrémont at Cleveland, and of Lincoln at Baltimore, it was thoughtprudent to postpone it to a later date, in the hope that something inthe chapter of accidents might arise to the advantage of the opposition. It appeared for a while as if this manoeuver were to be successful. Themilitary situation was far from satisfactory. The terrible fighting ofGrant's army in Virginia had profoundly shocked and depressed thecountry; and its movement upon Petersburg, so far without decisiveresults, had contributed little hope or encouragement. The campaign ofSherman in Georgia gave as yet no positive assurance of the brilliantresults it afterward attained. The Confederate raid into Maryland andPennsylvania in July was the cause of great annoyance and exasperation. 

This untoward state of things in the field of military operations foundits exact counterpart in the political campaign. Several circumstancescontributed to divide and discourage the administration party. Theresignation of Mr. Chase had seemed to not a few leading Republicans apresage of disintegration in the government. Mr. Greeley's mission atNiagara Falls had unsettled and troubled the minds of many. TheDemocrats, not having as yet appointed a candidate or formulated aplatform, were free to devote all their leisure to attacks upon theadministration. The rebel emissaries in Canada, being in thoroughconcert with the leading peace men of the North, redoubled their effortsto disturb the public tranquility, and not without success. In themidst of these discouraging circumstances the manifesto of Wade andDavis had appeared to add its depressing influence to the general gloom. 

Mr. Lincoln realized to the full the tremendous issues of the campaign. Asked in August by a friend who noted his worn looks, if he could not goaway for a fortnight's rest, he replied:

"I cannot fly from my thoughts--my solicitude for this great countryfollows me wherever I go. I do not think it is personal vanity orambition, though I am not free from these infirmities, but I cannot butfeel that the weal or woe of this great nation will be decided inNovember. There is no program offered by any wing of the Democraticparty, but that must result in the permanent destruction of the Union. "

"But, Mr. President, " his friend objected, "General McClellan is infavor of crushing out this rebellion by force. He will be the Chicagocandidate. "

"Sir, the slightest knowledge of arithmetic will prove to any man thatthe rebel armies cannot be destroyed by Democratic strategy. It wouldsacrifice all the white men of the North to do it. There are now in theservice of the United States nearly one hundred and fifty thousandable-bodied colored men, most of them under arms, defending andacquiring Union territory. The Democratic strategy demands that theseforces be disbanded, and that the masters be conciliated by restoringthem to slavery. .. . You cannot conciliate the South if you guarantee tothem ultimate success; and the experience of the present war provestheir successes inevitable if you fling the compulsory labor of millionsof black men into their side of the scale. .. . Abandon all the posts nowgarrisoned by black men, take one hundred and fifty thousand men fromour side and put them in the battle-field or corn-field against us, andwe would be compelled to abandon the war in three weeks. .. . My enemiespretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am President it shall be carried on for the sole purpose ofrestoring the Union. But no human power can subdue this rebellionwithout the use of the emancipation policy and every other policycalculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion. .. . Let my enemies prove to the country that the destruction of slavery isnot necessary to a restoration of the Union. I will abide the issue. "

The political situation grew still darker. When at last, toward the endof August, the general gloom had enveloped even the President himself, his action was most original and characteristic. Feeling that thecampaign was going against him, he made up his mind deliberately as tothe course he should pursue, and laid down for himself the actiondemanded by his conviction of duty. He wrote on August 23 the followingmemorandum:

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable thatthis administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to socoöperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between theelection and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election onsuch ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards. "

He then folded and pasted the sheet in such manner that its contentscould not be read, and as the cabinet came together he handed this paperto each member successively, requesting them to write their names acrossthe back of it. In this peculiar fashion he pledged himself and theadministration to accept loyally the anticipated verdict of the peopleagainst him, and to do their utmost to save the Union in the briefremainder of his term of office. He gave no intimation to any member ofhis cabinet of the nature of the paper they had signed until after hisreëlection. 

The Democratic convention was finally called to meet in Chicago onAugust 29. Much had been expected by the peace party from the strengthand audacity of its adherents in the Northwest; and, indeed, the day ofthe meeting of the convention was actually the date appointed by rebelemissaries in Canada for an outbreak which should effect that revolutionin the northwestern States which had long been their chimerical dream. This scheme of the American Knights, however, was discovered and guardedagainst through the usual treachery of some of their members; and it isdoubtful if the Democrats reaped any real, permanent advantage from thedelay of their convention. 

On coming together, the only manner in which the peace men and warDemocrats could arrive at an agreement was by mutual deception. The warDemocrats, led by the delegation from New York, were working for amilitary candidate; while the peace Democrats, under the leadership ofVallandigham, who had returned from Canada and was allowed to remain atlarge through the half-contemptuous and half-calculated leniency of thegovernment he defied, bent all their energies to a clear statement oftheir principles in the platform. 

Both got what they desired. General McClellan was nominated on the firstballot, and Vallandigham wrote the only plank worth quoting in theplatform. It asserted: "That after four years of failure to restore theUnion by the experiment of war, during which . .. The Constitution itselfhas been disregarded in every part, " public welfare demands "thatimmediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities. " It isaltogether probable that this distinct proposition of surrender to theConfederates might have been modified or defeated in full convention ifthe war Democrats had had the courage of their convictions; but theywere so intent upon the nomination of McClellan, that they consideredthe platform of secondary importance, and the fatal resolutions wereadopted without debate. 

Mr. Vallandigham, having thus taken possession of the convention, nextadopted the candidate, and put the seal of his sinister approval onGeneral McClellan by moving that his nomination be made unanimous, whichwas done amid great cheering. George H. Pendleton was nominated forVice-President, and the convention adjourned--not _sine die_, as iscustomary, but "subject to be called at any time and place the executivenational committee shall designate. " The motives of this action were notavowed, but it was taken as a significant warning that the leaders ofthe Democratic party held themselves ready for any extraordinarymeasures which the exigencies of the time might provoke or invite. 

The New-Yorkers, however, had the last word, for Governor Seymour, inhis letter as chairman of the committee to inform McClellan of hisnomination, assured him that "those for whom we speak were animated withthe most earnest, devoted, and prayerful desire for the salvation of theAmerican Union"; and the general, knowing that the poison of death wasin the platform, took occasion in his letter of acceptance to renew hisassurances of devotion to the Union, the Constitution, the laws, and theflag of his country. After having thus absolutely repudiated theplatform upon which he was nominated, he coolly concluded:

"Believing that the views here expressed are those of the convention andthe people you represent, I accept the nomination. "

His only possible chance of success lay, of course, in his war record. His position as a candidate on a platform of dishonorable peace wouldhave been no less desperate than ridiculous. But the stars in theircourses fought against the Democratic candidates. Even before theconvention that nominated them, Farragut had won the splendid victory ofMobile Bay; during the very hours when the streets of Chicago wereblazing with Democratic torches, Hood was preparing to evacuate Atlanta;and the same newspaper that printed Vallandigham's peace platformannounced Sherman's entrance into the manufacturing metropolis ofGeorgia. The darkest hour had passed; dawn was at hand, and amid thethanksgivings of a grateful people, and the joyful salutes of greatguns, the presidential campaign began. 

When the country awoke to the true significance of the Chicago platform, the successes of Sherman excited the enthusiasm of the people, and theUnionists, arousing from their midsummer languor, began to show theirconfidence in the Republican candidate, the hopelessness of all effortsto undermine him became evident. 

The electoral contest began with the picket firing in Vermont and Mainein September, was continued in what might be called the grand guardfighting in October in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, andIndiana, and the final battle took place all along the line on November8. To Mr. Lincoln this was one of the most solemn days of his life. Assured of his personal success, and made devoutly confident by themilitary successes of the last few weeks that the day of peace and thereëstablishment of the Union was at hand, he felt no elation, and nosense of triumph over his opponents. The thoughts that filled his mindwere expressed in the closing sentences of the little speech he made inresponse to a group of serenaders that greeted him when, in the earlymorning hours, he left the War Department, where he had gone on theevening of election to receive the returns:

"I am thankful to God for this approval of the people; but, while deeplygrateful for this mark of their confidence in me, if I know my heart, mygratitude is free from any taint of personal triumph. I do not impugnthe motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me to triumphover any one, but I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of thepeople's resolution to stand by free government and the rights ofhumanity. "

Lincoln and Johnson received a popular majority of 411, 281, and twohundred and twelve out of two hundred and thirty-three electoral votes, only those of New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky, twenty-one in all, being cast for McClellan. In his annual message to Congress, which meton December 5, President Lincoln gave the best summing up of the resultsof the election that has ever been written:

"The purpose of the people within the loyal States to maintain theintegrity of the Union was never more firm nor more nearly unanimousthan now. .. . No candidate for any office whatever, high or low, hasventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up theUnion. There have been much impugning of motives and much heatedcontroversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Unioncause; but on the distinct issue of Union or no Union the politicianshave shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity amongthe people. In affording the people the fair opportunity of showing oneto another and to the world this firmness and unanimity of purpose, theelection has been of vast value to the national cause. "

On the day of election General McClellan resigned his commission in thearmy, and the place thus made vacant was filled by the appointment ofGeneral Philip H. Sheridan, a fit type and illustration of the turn inthe tide of affairs, which was to sweep from that time rapidly onward tothe great decisive national triumph. 

XXXIII

The Thirteenth Amendment--The President's Speech on its Adoption--TheTwo Constitutional Amendments of Lincoln's Term--Lincoln on Peace andSlavery in his Annual Message of December 6, 1864--Blair's MexicanProject--The Hampton Roads Conference

A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitutionprohibiting slavery throughout the United States had passed the Senateon April 8, 1864, but had failed of the necessary two-thirds vote in theHouse. The two most vital thoughts which animated the Baltimoreconvention when it met in June had been the renomination of Mr. Lincolnand the success of this constitutional amendment. The first wasrecognized as a popular decision needing only the formality of anannouncement by the convention; and the full emphasis of speech andresolution had therefore been centered on the latter as the dominant andaggressive reform upon which the party would stake its politicalfortunes in the presidential campaign. Mr. Lincoln had himself suggestedto Mr. Morgan the wisdom of sounding that key-note in his opening speechbefore the convention; and the great victory gained at the polls inNovember not only demonstrated his sagacity, but enabled him to take upthe question with confidence among his recommendations to Congress inthe annual message of December 6, 1864. Relating the fate of the measureat the preceding session, he said:

"Without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood inopposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage ofthe measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question isnot changed, but an intervening election shows, almost certainly, thatthe next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence there isonly a question of time as to when the proposed amendment will go to theStates for their action. And as it is to so go at all events, may we notagree that the sooner the better? It is not claimed that the electionhas imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes anyfurther than, as an additional element to be considered, their judgmentmay be affected by it. It is the voice of the people, now for the firsttime heard upon the question. In a great national crisis like ours, unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is verydesirable--almost indispensable. And yet no approach to such unanimityis attainable unless some deference shall be paid to the will of themajority, simply because it is the will of the majority. In this casethe common end is the maintenance of the Union; and among the means tosecure that end, such will, through the election, is most clearlydeclared in favor of such constitutional amendment. "

The joint resolution was called up in the House on January 6, 1865, andgeneral discussion followed from time to time, occupying perhaps halfthe days of that month. As at the previous session, the Republicans allfavored, while the Democrats mainly opposed it; but important exceptionsamong the latter showed what immense gains the proposition had made inpopular opinion and in congressional willingness to recognize and embodyit. The logic of events had become more powerful than party creed orstrategy. For fifteen years the Democratic party had stood as sentineland bulwark to slavery, and yet, despite its alliance and championship, the "peculiar institution" was being consumed in the fire of war. It hadwithered in popular elections, been paralyzed by confiscation laws, crushed by executive decrees, trampled upon by marching Union armies. More notable than all, the agony of dissolution had come upon it in itsfinal stronghold--the constitutions of the slave States. Local publicopinion had throttled it in West Virginia, in Missouri, in Arkansas, inLouisiana, in Maryland, and the same spirit of change was uponTennessee, and even showing itself in Kentucky. The Democratic party didnot, and could not, shut its eyes to the accomplished facts. 

The issue was decided on the afternoon of January 31, 1865. The scenewas one of unusual interest. The galleries were filled to overflowing, and members watched the proceedings with unconcealed solicitude. "Up tonoon, " said a contemporaneous report, "the pro-slavery party are said tohave been confident of defeating the amendment; and after that time hadpassed, one of the most earnest advocates of the measure said: "'Tis thetoss of a copper. " At four o'clock the House came to a final vote, andthe roll-call showed: yeas, one hundred and nineteen; nays, fifty-six;not voting, eight. Scattering murmurs of applause followed affirmativevotes from several Democratic members; but when the Speaker finallyannounced the result, members on the Republican side of the House sprangto their feet, and, regardless of parliamentary rules, applauded withcheers and hand-clappings--an exhibition of enthusiasm quickly echoed bythe spectators in the crowded galleries, where waving of hats andhandkerchiefs and similar demonstrations of joy lasted for severalminutes. 

A salute of one hundred guns soon made the occasion the subject ofcomment and congratulation throughout the city. On the following night aconsiderable procession marched with music to the Executive Mansion tocarry popular greetings to the President. In response to their calls heappeared at a window and made a brief speech, of which only an abstractreport was preserved, but which is nevertheless important as showing thesearching analysis of cause and effect this question had undergone inhis mind, the deep interest he felt in it, and the far-reachingconsequences he attached to the measure and its success:

"The occasion was one of congratulation to the country and to the wholeworld. But there is a task yet before us--to go forward and haveconsummated by the votes of the States that which Congress had so noblybegun yesterday. He had the honor to inform those present that Illinoishad already to-day done the work. Maryland was about half through, buthe felt proud that Illinois was a little ahead. He thought this measurewas a very fitting, if not an indispensable, adjunct to the winding upof the great difficulty. He wished the reunion of all the Statesperfected, and so effected as to remove all causes of disturbance in thefuture; and to attain this end it was necessary that the originaldisturbing cause should, if possible, be rooted out. He thought allwould bear him witness that he had never shrunk from doing all that hecould to eradicate slavery, by issuing an emancipation proclamation. Butthat proclamation falls far short of what the amendment will be whenfully consummated. A question might be raised whether the proclamationwas legally valid. It might be urged that it only aided those that cameinto our lines, and that it was inoperative as to those who did not givethemselves up; or that it would have no effect upon the children ofslaves born hereafter; in fact, it would be urged that it did not meetthe evil. But this amendment is a king's cure-all for all the evils. Itwinds the whole thing up. He would repeat that it was the fitting, ifnot the indispensable, adjunct to the consummation of the great game weare playing. "

Widely divergent views were expressed by able constitutional lawyers asto what would constitute a valid ratification of the ThirteenthAmendment; some contending that ratification by three fourths of theloyal States would be sufficient, others that three fourths of all theStates, whether loyal or insurrectionary, was necessary. Mr. Lincoln, ina speech on Louisiana reconstruction, while expressing no opinionagainst the first proposition, nevertheless declared with greatargumentative force that the latter "would be unquestioned andunquestionable"; and this view appears to have governed the action ofhis successor. 

As Mr. Lincoln mentioned with just pride, Illinois was the first Stateto ratify the amendment. On December 18, 1865, Mr. Seward, who remainedas Secretary of State in the cabinet of President Johnson, made officialproclamation that the legislatures of twenty-seven States, constitutingthree fourths of the thirty-six States of the Union, had ratified theamendment, and that it had become valid as a part of the Constitution. Four of the States constituting this number--Virginia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas--were those whose reconstruction had beeneffected under the direction of President Lincoln. Six more Statessubsequently ratified the amendment, Texas ending the list in February, 1870. 

The profound political transformation which the American Republic hadundergone can perhaps best be measured by contrasting the twoconstitutional amendments which Congress made it the duty of the Lincolnadministration to submit officially to the States. The first, signed byPresident Buchanan as one of his last official acts, and accepted andindorsed by Lincoln in his inaugural address, was in these words:

"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize orgive to Congress the power to abolish or interfere within any State withthe domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held tolabor or service by the laws of said State. "

Between Lincoln's inauguration and the outbreak of war, the Departmentof State transmitted this amendment to the several States for theiraction; and had the South shown a willingness to desist from secessionand accept it as a peace offering, there is little doubt that it wouldhave become a part of the Constitution. But the thunder of Beauregard'sguns drove away all possibility of such a ratification, and within fouryears the Lincoln administration sent forth the amendment of 1865, sweeping out of existence by one sentence the institution to which ithad in its first proposal offered a virtual claim to perpetualrecognition and tolerance. The "new birth of freedom" which Lincolninvoked for the nation in his Gettysburg address, was accomplished. 

The closing paragraphs of President Lincoln's message to Congress ofDecember 6, 1864, were devoted to a summing up of the existingsituation. The verdict of the ballot-box had not only decided thecontinuance of a war administration and war policy, but renewed theassurance of a public sentiment to sustain its prosecution. Inspired bythis majestic manifestation of the popular will, he was able to speak ofthe future with hope and confidence. But with characteristic prudenceand good taste, he uttered no word of boasting, and indulged in nosyllable of acrimony; on the contrary, in terms of fatherly kindness heagain offered the rebellious States the generous conditions he hadpreviously tendered them. 

"The national resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible. The public purpose to reëstablish and maintain thenational authority is unchanged and, as we believe, unchangeable. Themanner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On carefulconsideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that noattempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in anygood. He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union--preciselywhat we will not and cannot give. His declarations to this effect areexplicit and oft-repeated. .. . What is true, however, of him who headsthe insurgent cause is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot reaccept the Union, they can. Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The number of such may increase. Theycan, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their arms andsubmitting to the national authority under the Constitution. After somuch, the government could not, if it would, maintain war against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If questions shouldremain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in constitutional andlawful channels. .. . In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance tothe national authority, on the part of the insurgents, as the onlyindispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat thedeclaration made a year ago, that 'While I remain in my presentposition I shall not attempt to retract or modify the emancipationproclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free bythe terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. ' Ifthe people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive dutyto reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrumentto perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply tosay that the war will cease on the part of the government whenever itshall have ceased on the part of those who began it. " The country wasabout to enter upon the fifth year of actual war; but all indicationswere pointing to a speedy collapse of the rebellion. This foreshadoweddisaster to the Confederate armies gave rise to another volunteer peacenegotiation, which, from the boldness of its animating thought and theprominence of its actors, assumes a special importance. The veteranpolitician Francis P. Blair, Sr. , who, from his long political andpersonal experience in Washington, knew, perhaps better than almost anyone else, the individual characters and tempers of Southern leaders, conceived that the time had come when he might take up the rôle ofsuccessful mediator between the North and the South. He gave varioushints of his desire to President Lincoln, but received neitherencouragement nor opportunity to unfold his plans. "Come to me afterSavannah falls, " was Lincoln's evasive reply. On the surrender of thatcity, Mr. Blair hastened to put his design into execution, and with asimple card from Mr. Lincoln, dated December 28, saying, "Allow thebearer, F. P. Blair, Sr. , to pass our lines, go south and return, " as hisonly credential, set out for Richmond. From General Grant's camp heforwarded two letters to Jefferson Davis: one, a brief request to beallowed to go to Richmond in search of missing title papers presumablytaken from his Maryland home during Early's raid; the other, a longerletter, explaining the real object of his visit, but stating with theutmost candor that he came wholly unaccredited, save for permission topass the lines, and that he had not offered the suggestions he wished tosubmit in person to Mr. Davis to any one in authority at Washington. 

After some delay, he found himself in Richmond, and was accorded aconfidential interview by the rebel President on January 12, 1865, whenhe unfolded his project, which proved to be nothing less than aproposition that the Union and Confederate armies cease fighting eachother and unite to drive the French from Mexico. He supported thisdaring idea in a paper of some length, pointing out that as slavery, thereal cause of the war, was hopelessly doomed, nothing now remained tokeep the two sections of the country apart except the possibleintervention of foreign soldiery. Hence, all considerations pointed tothe wisdom of dislodging the French invaders from American soil, andthus baffling "the designs of Napoleon to subject our Southern people tothe 'Latin race. '"

"He who expels the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty from our southern flank, "the paper said further, "will ally his name with those of Washington andJackson as a defender of the liberty of the country. If in deliveringMexico he should model its States in form and principle to adapt them toour Union, and add a new southern constellation to its benignant skywhile rounding off our possessions on the continent at the Isthmus, . .. He would complete the work of Jefferson, who first set one foot of ourcolossal government on the Pacific by a stride from the Gulf ofMexico. .. . "

"I then said to him, 'There is my problem, Mr. Davis; do you think itpossible to be solved?' After consideration, he said: 'I think so. ' Ithen said, 'You see that I make the great point of this matter that thewar is no longer made for slavery, but monarchy. You know that if thewar is kept up and the Union kept divided, armies must be kept afoot onboth sides, and this state of things has never continued long withoutresulting in monarchy on one side or the other, and on both generally. 'He assented to this. "

The substantial accuracy of Mr. Blair's report is confirmed by thememorandum of the same interview which Jefferson Davis wrote at thetime. In this conversation, the rebel leader took little pains todisguise his entire willingness to enter upon the wild scheme ofmilitary conquest and annexation which could easily be read between thelines of a political crusade to rescue the Monroe Doctrine from itspresent peril. If Mr. Blair felt elated at having so quickly made aconvert of the Confederate President, he was further gratified atdiscovering yet more favorable symptoms in his official surroundings atRichmond. In the three or four days he spent at the rebel capital hefound nearly every prominent personage convinced of the hopelesscondition of the rebellion, and even eager to seize upon any contrivanceto help them out of their direful prospects. 

But the government councils at Washington were not ruled by the spiritof political adventure. Abraham Lincoln had a loftier conception ofpatriotic duty, and a higher ideal of national ethics. His wholeinterest in Mr. Blair's mission lay in the rebel despondency itdisclosed, and the possibility it showed of bringing the Confederates toan abandonment of their resistance. Mr. Davis had, indeed, given Mr. Blair a letter, to be shown to President Lincoln, stating hiswillingness, "notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, " toappoint a commissioner to enter into negotiations "with a view to securepeace to the two countries. " This was, of course, the old impossibleattitude. In reply the President wrote Mr. Blair on January 18 thefollowing note:

"SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the twelfthinstant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, andshall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any otherinfluential person now resisting the national authority, may informallysend to me, with the view of securing peace to the people of our onecommon country. "

With this, Mr. Blair returned to Richmond, giving Mr. Davis such excusesas he could hastily frame why the President had rejected his plan for ajoint invasion of Mexico. Jefferson Davis therefore had only twoalternatives before him--either to repeat his stubborn ultimatum ofseparation and independence, or frankly to accept Lincoln's ultimatum ofreunion. The principal Richmond authorities knew, and some of themadmitted, that their Confederacy was nearly in collapse. Lee sent adespatch saying he had not two days' rations for his army. Richmond wasalready in a panic at rumors of evacuation. Flour was selling at athousand dollars a barrel in Confederate currency. The recent fall ofFort Fisher had closed the last avenue through which blockade-runnerscould bring in foreign supplies. Governor Brown of Georgia was refusingto obey orders from Richmond, and characterizing them as "despotic. "Under such circumstances a defiant cry of independence would notreassure anybody; nor, on the other hand, was it longer possible toremain silent. Mr. Blair's first visit had created general interest;when he came a second time, wonder and rumor rose to fever heat. 

Impelled to take action, Mr. Davis had not the courage to be frank. After consultation with his cabinet, a peace commission of three wasappointed, consisting of Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President; R. M. T. Hunter, senator and ex-Secretary of State; and John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War--all of them convinced that the rebellion washopeless, but unwilling to admit the logical consequences andnecessities. The drafting of instructions for their guidance was adifficult problem, since the explicit condition prescribed by Mr. Lincoln's note was that he would receive only an agent sent him "withthe view of securing peace to the people of our one common country. " Therebel Secretary of State proposed, in order to make the instructions "asvague and general as possible, " the simple direction to confer "upon thesubject to which it relates"; but his chief refused the suggestion, andwrote the following instruction, which carried a palpable contradictionon its face:

"In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing isa copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for informalconference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, andfor the purpose of securing peace to the two countries. "

With this the commissioners presented themselves at the Union lines onthe evening of January 29, but instead of showing their double-meaningcredential, asked admission, "in accordance with an understandingclaimed to exist with Lieutenant-General Grant. " Mr. Lincoln, beingapprised of the application, promptly despatched Major Thomas T. Eckert, of the War Department, with written directions to admit them undersafe-conduct, if they would say in writing that they came for thepurpose of an informal conference on the basis of his note of January 18to Mr. Blair. The commissioners having meantime reconsidered the form oftheir application and addressed a new one to General Grant which met therequirements, were provisionally conveyed to Grant's headquarters; andon January 31 the President commissioned Secretary Seward to meet them, saying in his written instructions:

"You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, towit: First. The restoration of the national authority throughout all theStates. Second. No receding by the Executive of the United States on theslavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annualmessage to Congress, and in preceding documents. Third. No cessation ofhostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forceshostile to the government. You will inform them that all propositions oftheirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passedupon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they maychoose to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitelyconsummate anything. "

Mr. Seward started on the morning of February 1, and simultaneously withhis departure the President repeated to General Grant the monitionalready sent him two days before: "Let nothing which is transpiringchange, hinder, or delay your military movements or plans. " Major Eckerthad arrived while Mr. Seward was yet on the way, and on seeing JeffersonDavis's instructions, promptly notified the commissioners that theycould not proceed further without complying strictly with PresidentLincoln's terms. Thus, at half-past nine on the night of February 1, their mission was practically at an end, though next day they againrecanted and accepted the President's conditions in writing. Mr. Lincoln, on reading Major Eckert's report on the morning of February 2, was about to recall Secretary Seward by telegraph, when he was shown aconfidential despatch from General Grant to the Secretary of War, stating his belief that the intention of the commissioners was good, andtheir desire for peace sincere, and regretting that Mr. Lincoln couldnot have an interview with them. This communication served to change hispurpose. Resolving not to neglect the indications of sincerity heredescribed, he telegraphed at once, "Say to the gentlemen I will meetthem personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there, " andjoined Secretary Seward that same night. 

On the morning of February 3, 1865, the rebel commissioners wereconducted on board the _River Queen_, lying at anchor near Fort Monroe, where President Lincoln and Secretary Seward awaited them. It was agreedbeforehand that no writing or memorandum should be made at the time, sothe record of the interview remains only in the separate accounts whichthe rebel commissioners wrote out afterward from memory, neither Mr. Seward nor President Lincoln ever having made any report in detail. In acareful analysis of these reports, the first striking feature is thedifference of intention between the parties. It is apparent that Mr. Lincoln went honestly and frankly to offer them the best terms he couldto, secure peace and reunion, but to abate no jot of official duty orpersonal dignity; while the main thought of the commissioners was toevade the express condition on which they had been admitted toconference, to seek to postpone the vital issue, and to propose anarmistice by debating a mere juggling expedient against which they hadin a private agreement with one another already committed themselves. 

At the first hint of Blair's Mexican project, however, Mr. Lincolnfirmly disclaimed any responsibility for the suggestion, or anyintention of adopting it, and during the four hours' talk led theconversation continually back to the original object of the conference. But though he patiently answered the many questions addressed him by thecommissioners, as to what would probably be done on various importantsubjects that must arise at once if the Confederate States consented, carefully discriminating in his answers between what he was authorizedunder the Constitution to do as Executive, and what would devolve uponcoördinate branches of the government, the interview came to nothing. The commissioners returned to Richmond in great disappointment, andcommunicated the failure of their efforts to Jefferson Davis, whosechagrin was equal to their own. They had all caught eagerly at the hopethat this negotiation would somehow extricate them from the dilemmas anddangers of their situation. Davis took the only course open to him afterrefusing the honorable peace Mr. Lincoln had tendered. He transmittedthe commissioners' report to the rebel Congress, with a brief and drymessage stating that the enemy refused any terms except those theconqueror might grant; and then arranged as vigorous an effort ascircumstances permitted once more to "fire the Southern heart. " A publicmeeting was called, where the speeches, judging from the meager reportsprinted, were as denunciatory and bellicose as the bitterest Confederatecould desire. Davis particularly is represented to have excelled himselfin defiant heroics. "Sooner than we should ever be united again, " hesaid, "he would be willing to yield up everything he had on earth--if itwere possible, he would sacrifice a thousand lives"; and he furtherannounced his confidence that they would yet "compel the Yankees, inless than twelve months, to petition us for peace on our own terms. "

This extravagant rhetoric would seem merely grotesque, were it notembittered by the reflection that it was the signal which carried manyadditional thousands of brave soldiers to death, in continuing apalpably hopeless military struggle. 

XXXIV

Blair--Chase Chief Justice--Speed Succeeds Bates--McCulloch SucceedsFessenden--Resignation of Mr. Usher--Lincoln's Offer of$400, 000, 000--The Second Inaugural--Lincoln's Literary Rank--His LastSpeech

The principal concession in the Baltimore platform made by the friendsof the administration to their opponents, the radicals, was theresolution which called for harmony in the cabinet. The President atfirst took no notice, either publicly or privately, of this resolution, which was in effect a recommendation that he dismiss those members ofhis council who were stigmatized as conservatives; and the first cabinetchange which actually took place after the adjournment of the conventionfilled the radical body of his supporters with dismay, since they hadlooked upon Mr. Chase as their special representative in the government. The publication of the Wade-Davis manifesto still further increasedtheir restlessness, and brought upon Mr. Lincoln a powerful pressurefrom every quarter to satisfy radical demands by dismissing MontgomeryBlair, his Postmaster-General. Mr. Blair had been one of the founders ofthe Republican party, and in the very forefront of opposition to slaveryextension, but had gradually attracted to himself the hostility of allthe radical Republicans in the country. The immediate cause of thisestrangement was the bitter quarrel that developed between his familyand General Frémont in Missouri: a quarrel in which the Blairs wereundoubtedly right in the beginning, but which broadened and extendeduntil it landed them finally in the Democratic party. 

The President considered the dispute one of form rather than substance, and having a deep regard, not only for the Postmaster-General, but forhis brother, General Frank Blair, and for his distinguished father, wasmost reluctant to take action against him. Even in the bosom of thegovernment, however, a strong hostility to Mr. Blair manifested itself. As long as Chase remained in the cabinet there was smoldering hostilitybetween them, and his attitude toward Seward and Stanton was one ofincreasing enmity. General Halleck, incensed at some caustic remarksBlair was reported to have made about the defenders of the capital afterEarly's raid, during which the family estate near Washington hadsuffered, sent an angry note to the War Department, wishing to know ifsuch "wholesale denouncement" had the President's sanction; adding thateither the names of the officers accused should be stricken from therolls, or the "slanderer dismissed from the cabinet. " Mr. Stanton sentthe letter to the President without comment. This was too much; and theSecretary received an answer on the very same day, written in Mr. Lincoln's most masterful manner:

"Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I supposesuch knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, Ido not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would notdismiss a member of the cabinet therefore. I do not consider what mayhave been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss issufficient ground for so grave a step. .. . I propose continuing to bemyself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall bedismissed. "

Not content with this, the President, when the cabinet came together, read them this impressive little lecture:

"I must myself be the judge how long to retain in and when to remove anyof you from his position. It would greatly pain me to discover any ofyou endeavoring to procure another's removal, or in any way to prejudicehim before the public. Such endeavor would be a wrong to me, and, muchworse, a wrong to the country. My wish is that on this subject no remarkbe made nor question asked by any of you, here or elsewhere, now orhereafter. "

This is one of the most remarkable speeches ever made by a President. The tone of authority is unmistakable. Washington was never moredignified; Jackson was never more peremptory. 

The feeling against Mr. Blair and the pressure upon the President forhis removal increased throughout the summer. All through the period ofgloom and discouragement he refused to act, even when he believed theverdict of the country likely to go against him, and was assured onevery side that such a concession to the radical spirit might be greatlyto his advantage. But after the turn had come, and the prospectivetriumph of the Union cause became evident, he felt that he ought nolonger to retain in his cabinet a member who, whatever his personalmerits, had lost the confidence of the great body of Republicans; and onSeptember 9 wrote him a kindly note, requesting his resignation. 

Mr. Blair accepted his dismissal in a manner to be expected from hismanly and generous character, not pretending to be pleased, but assumingthat the President had good reason for his action; and, on turning overhis office to his successor, ex-Governor William Dennison of Ohio, wentat once to Maryland and entered into the campaign, working heartily forMr. Lincoln's reëlection. 

After the death of Judge Taney in October, Mr. Blair for a whileindulged the hope that he might be appointed chief justice, a positionfor which his natural abilities and legal acquirements eminently fittedhim. But Mr. Chase was chosen, to the bitter disappointment of Mr. Blair's family, though even this did not shake their steadfast loyaltyto the Union cause or their personal friendship for the President. Immediately after his second inauguration, Mr. Lincoln offeredMontgomery Blair his choice of the Spanish or the Austrian mission, anoffer which he peremptorily though respectfully declined. 

The appointment of Mr. Chase as chief justice had probably been decidedon in Mr. Lincoln's own mind from the first, though he gave no publicintimation of his decision before sending the nomination to the Senateon December 6. Mr. Chase's partizans claimed that the President hadalready virtually promised him the place; his opponents counted upon theex-secretary's attitude of criticism to work against his appointment. But Mr. Lincoln sternly checked all presentations of this personalargument; nor were the prayers of those who urged him to overlook theharsh and indecorous things Mr. Chase had said of him at all necessary. To one who spoke in this latter strain the President replied:

"Oh, as to that I care nothing. Of Mr. Chase's ability, and of hissoundness on the general issues of the war, there is, of course, noquestion. I have only one doubt about his appointment. He is a man ofunbounded ambition, and has been working all his life to becomePresident. That he can never be; and I fear that if I make him chiefjustice he will simply become more restless and uneasy and neglect theplace in his strife and intrigue to make himself President. If I weresure that he would go on the bench and give up his aspirations, and donothing but make himself a great judge, I would not hesitate a moment. "

He wrote out Mr. Chase's nomination with his own hand, and sent it tothe Senate the day after Congress came together. It was confirmed atonce, without reference to a committee, and Mr. Chase, on learning ofhis new dignity, sent the President a cordial note, thanking him for themanner of his appointment, and adding: "I prize your confidence and goodwill more than any nomination to office. " But Mr. Lincoln's fears werebetter founded than his hopes. Though Mr. Chase took his place on thebench with a conscientious desire to do his whole duty in his greatoffice, he could not dismiss the political affairs of the country fromhis mind, and still considered himself called upon to counteract themischievous tendencies of the President toward conciliation and hastyreconstruction. 

The reorganization of the cabinet went on by gradual disintegrationrather than by any brusque or even voluntary action on the part of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Bates, the attorney-general, growing weary of the labors ofhis official position, resigned toward the end of November. Mr. Lincoln, on whom the claim of localities always had great weight, unable todecide upon another Missourian fitted for the place, offered it toJoseph Holt of Kentucky, who declined, and then to James Speed, also aKentuckian of high professional and social standing, the brother of hisearly friend Joshua F. Speed. Soon after the opening of the new year, Mr. Fessenden, having been again elected to the Senate from Maine, resigned his office as Secretary of the Treasury. The place thusvacated instantly excited a wide and spirited competition ofrecommendations. The President wished to appoint Governor Morgan of NewYork, who declined, and the choice finally fell upon Hugh McCulloch ofIndiana, who had made a favorable record as comptroller of the currency. Thus only two of Mr. Lincoln's original cabinet, Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles, were in office at the date of his second inauguration; and stillanother change was in contemplation. Mr. Usher of Indiana, who had forsome time discharged the duties of Secretary of the Interior, desiring, as he said, to relieve the President from any possible embarrassmentwhich might arise from the fact that two of his cabinet were from thesame State, sent in his resignation, which Mr. Lincoln indorsed "To takeeffect May 15, 1865. "

The tragic events of the future were mercifully hidden. Mr. Lincoln, looking forward to four years more of personal leadership, was planningyet another generous offer to shorten the period of conflict. His talkwith the commissioners at Hampton Roads had probably revealed to him theundercurrent of their hopelessness and anxiety; and he had told themthat personally he would be in favor of the government paying a liberalindemnity for the loss of slave property, on absolute cessation of thewar and the voluntary abolition of slavery by the Southern States. 

This was indeed going to the extreme of magnanimity; but Mr. Lincolnremembered that the rebels, notwithstanding all their offenses anderrors, were yet American citizens, members of the same nation, brothersof the same blood. He remembered, too, that the object of the war, equally with peace and freedom, was the maintenance of one governmentand the perpetuation of one Union. Not only must hostilities cease, butdissension, suspicion, and estrangement be eradicated. Filled with suchthoughts and purposes, he spent the day after his return from HamptonRoads in considering and perfecting a new proposal, designed as a peaceoffering to the States in rebellion. On the evening of February 5, 1865, he called his cabinet together, and read to them the draft of a jointresolution and proclamation embodying this idea, offering the SouthernStates four hundred million dollars, or a sum equal to the cost of thewar for two hundred days, on condition that hostilities cease by thefirst of April, 1865; to be paid in six per cent. Government bonds, prorata on their slave populations as shown by the census of 1860--one halfon April 1, the other half only upon condition that the ThirteenthAmendment be ratified by a requisite number of States before July 1, 1865. 

It turned out that he was more humane and liberal than hisconstitutional advisers. The indorsement in his own handwriting on themanuscript draft records the result of his appeal and suggestion:

 "February 5, 1865. To-day, these papers, which explain themselves, were drawn up and submitted to the cabinet, and unanimously disapproved by them. 

 "A. LINCOLN. "

With the words, "You are all opposed to me, " sadly uttered, thePresident folded up the paper and ceased the discussion. 

The formal inauguration of Mr. Lincoln for his second presidential termtook place at the appointed time, March 4, 1865. There is littlevariation in the simple but impressive pageantry with which the officialceremony is celebrated. The principal novelty commented upon by thenewspapers was the share which the hitherto enslaved race had for thefirst time in this public and political drama. Civic associations ofnegro citizens joined in the procession, and a battalion of negrosoldiers formed part of the military escort. The weather wassufficiently favorable to allow the ceremonies to take place on theeastern portico of the Capitol, in view of a vast throng of spectators. The central act of the occasion was President Lincoln's second inauguraladdress, which enriched the political literature of the Union withanother masterpiece, and deserves to be quoted in full. He said:

 "FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then, a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. 

 "On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it--all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war--seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. 

 "One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered--that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh. ' If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope--fervently do we pray--that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. '

 "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan--to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations. "

The address being concluded, Chief Justice Chase administered the oathof office; and listeners who heard Abraham Lincoln for the second timerepeat, "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the officeof President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, "went from the impressive scene to their several homes with thankfulnessand with confidence that the destiny of the country and the liberty ofthe citizen were in safe keeping. "The fiery trial" through which he hadhitherto walked showed him possessed of the capacity, the courage, andthe will to keep the promise of his oath. 

Among the many criticisms passed by writers and thinkers upon the secondinaugural, none will so interest the reader as that of Mr. Lincolnhimself, written about ten days after its delivery, in the followingletter to a friend:

 "DEAR MR. WEED: Every one likes a compliment. Thank you for yours on my little notification speech, and on the recent inaugural address. I expect the latter to wear as well as, perhaps better than, anything I have produced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case, is to deny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told, and, as whatever of humiliation there is in it falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to tell it. "

Nothing would have more amazed Mr. Lincoln than to hear himself called aman of letters; but this age has produced few greater writers. Emersonranks him with Aesop; Montalembert commends his style as a model for theimitation of princes. It is true that in his writings the range ofsubjects is not great. He was chiefly concerned with the politicalproblems of the time, and the moral considerations involved in them. Butthe range of treatment is remarkably wide, running from the wit, the gayhumor, the florid eloquence of his stump speeches, to the marveloussententiousness and brevity of the address at Gettysburg, and thesustained and lofty grandeur of his second inaugural; while many of hisphrases have already passed into the daily speech of mankind. 

A careful student of Mr. Lincoln's character will find this inauguraladdress instinct with another meaning, which, very naturally, thePresident's own comment did not touch. The eternal law of compensation, which it declares and applies to the sin and fall of American slavery, in a diction rivaling the fire and dignity of the old Hebrew prophecies, may, without violent inference, be interpreted to foreshadow anintention to renew at a fitting moment the brotherly goodwill gift tothe South which has already been treated of. Such an inference findsstrong corroboration in the sentences which closed the last publicaddress he ever made. On Tuesday evening, April 11, a considerableassemblage of citizens of Washington gathered at the Executive Mansionto celebrate the victory of Grant over Lee. The rather long and carefulspeech which Mr. Lincoln made on that occasion was, however, less aboutthe past than the future. It discussed the subject of reconstruction asillustrated in the case of Louisiana, showing also how that issue wasrelated to the questions of emancipation, the condition of the freedmen, the welfare of the South, and the ratification of the constitutionalamendment. 

"So new and unprecedented is the whole case, " he concluded, "that noexclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details andcollaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become anew entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. Inthe present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to makesome new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, andshall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper. "

Can any one doubt that this "new announcement" which was taking shape inhis mind would again have embraced and combined justice to the blacksand generosity to the whites of the South, with Union and liberty forthe whole country?

XXXV

Depreciation of Confederate Currency--Rigor ofConscription--Dissatisfaction with the Confederate Government--LeeGeneral-in-Chief--J. E. Johnston Reappointed to Oppose Sherman'sMarch--Value of Slave Property Gone in Richmond--Davis's Recommendationof Emancipation--Benjamin's Last Despatch to Slidell--Condition of theArmy when Lee took Command--Lee Attempts Negotiations withGrant--Lincoln's Directions--Lee and Davis Agree upon Line ofRetreat--Assault on Fort Stedman--Five Forks--Evacuation ofPetersburg--Surrender of Richmond--Pursuit of Lee--Surrender ofLee--Burning of Richmond--Lincoln in Richmond

From the hour of Mr. Lincoln's reëlection the Confederate cause wasdoomed. The cheering of the troops which greeted the news from the Northwas heard within the lines at Richmond and at Petersburg; and althoughthe leaders maintained their attitude of defiance, the impressionrapidly gained ground among the people that the end was not far off. Thestimulus of hope being gone, they began to feel the pinch of increasingwant. Their currency had become almost worthless. In October, a dollarin gold was worth thirty-five dollars in Confederate money. With theopening of the new year the price rose to sixty dollars, and, despitethe efforts of the Confederate treasury, which would occasionally rushinto the market and beat down the price of gold ten or twenty per cent. A day, the currency gradually depreciated until a hundred for one wasoffered and not taken. It was natural for the citizens of Richmond tothink that monstrous prices were being extorted for food, clothing, andsupplies, when in fact they were paying no more than was reasonable. Topay a thousand dollars for a barrel of flour was enough to strike ahouseholder with terror but ten dollars is not a famine price. Highprices, however, even if paid in dry leaves, are a hardship when dryleaves are not plentiful; and there was scarcity even of Confederatemoney in the South. 

At every advance of Grant's lines a new alarm was manifested inRichmond, the first proof of which was always a fresh rigor in enforcingthe conscription laws and the arbitrary orders of the frightenedauthorities. After the capture of Fort Harrison, north of the James, squads of guards were sent into the streets with directions to arrestevery able-bodied man they met. It is said that the medical boards wereordered to exempt no one capable of bearing arms for ten days. Humannature will not endure such a strain as this, and desertion grew toocommon to punish. 

As disaster increased, the Confederate government steadily lost groundin the confidence and respect of the Southern people. Mr. Davis and hiscouncilors were doing their best, but they no longer got any credit forit. From every part of the Confederacy came complaints of what was done, demands for what was impossible to do. Some of the States were in acondition near to counter-revolution. A slow paralysis was benumbing thelimbs of the insurrection, and even at the heart its vitality wasplainly declining. The Confederate Congress, which had hitherto been themere register of the President's will, now turned upon him. On January19 it passed a resolution making Lee general-in-chief of the army. ThisMr. Davis might have borne with patience, although it was intended as anotification that his meddling with military affairs must come to anend. But far worse was the bitter necessity put upon him as a sequel tothis act, of reappointing General Joseph E. Johnston to the command ofthe army which was to resist Sherman's victorious march to the north. Mr. Seddon, rebel Secretary of War, thinking his honor impugned by avote of the Virginia delegation in Congress, resigned. Warnings ofserious demoralization came daily from the army, and disaffection was sorife in official circles in Richmond that it was not thought politic tocall public attention to it by measures of repression. 

It is curious and instructive to note how the act of emancipation had bythis time virtually enforced itself in Richmond. The value of slaveproperty was gone. It is true that a slave was still occasionally sold, at a price less than one tenth of what he would have brought before thewar, but servants could be hired of their nominal owners for almostnothing--merely enough to keep up a show of vassalage. In effect, anyone could hire a negro for his keeping--which was all that anybody inRichmond, black or white, got for his work. Even Mr. Davis had at lastbecome docile to the stern teaching of events. In his message ofNovember he had recommended the employment of forty thousand slaves inthe army--not as soldiers, it is true, save in the last extremity--withemancipation to come. 

On December 27, Mr. Benjamin wrote his last important instruction toJohn Slidell, the Confederate commissioner in Europe. It is nothing lessthan a cry of despair. Complaining bitterly of the attitude of foreignnations while the South is fighting the battles of England and Franceagainst the North, he asks: "Are they determined never to recognize theSouthern Confederacy until the United States assent to such action ontheir part?" And with a frantic offer to submit to any terms whichEurope might impose as the price of recognition, and a scarcely veiledthreat of making peace with the North unless Europe should act speedily, the Confederate Department of State closed its four years of fruitlessactivity. 

Lee assumed command of all the Confederate armies on February 9. Hissituation was one of unprecedented gloom. The day before he had reportedthat his troops, who had been in line of battle for two days atHatcher's Run, exposed to the bad winter weather, had been without meatfor three days. A prodigious effort was made, and the danger ofstarvation for the moment averted, but no permanent improvementresulted. The armies of the Union were closing in from every point ofthe compass. Grant was every day pushing his formidable left wing nearerthe only roads by which Lee could escape; Thomas was threatening theConfederate communications from Tennessee; Sheridan was riding for thelast time up the Shenandoah valley to abolish Early; while from thesouth the redoubtable columns of Sherman were moving northward with thesteady pace and irresistible progress of a tragic fate. 

A singular and significant attempt at negotiation was made at this timeby General Lee. He was so strong in the confidence of the people of theSouth, and the government at Richmond was so rapidly becomingdiscredited, that he could doubtless have obtained the popular supportand compelled the assent of the Executive to any measures he thoughtproper for the attainment of peace. From this it was easy for him andfor others to come to the wholly erroneous conclusion that General Grantheld a similar relation to the government and people of the UnitedStates. General Lee seized upon the pretext of a conversation reportedto him by General Longstreet as having been held with General E. O. C. Ordunder an ordinary flag of truce for the exchange of prisoners, toaddress a letter to Grant, sanctioned by Mr. Davis, saying he had beeninformed that General Ord had said General Grant would not decline aninterview with a view "to a satisfactory adjustment of the presentunhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, " provided Leehad authority to act. He therefore proposed to meet General Grant "withthe hope that . .. It may be found practicable to submit the subjects ofcontroversy . .. To a convention of the kind mentioned"; professinghimself "authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interviewmay render necessary. "

Grant at once telegraphed these overtures to Washington. Stantonreceived the despatch at the Capitol, where the President was, accordingto his custom, passing the last night of the session of Congress, forthe convenience of signing bills. The Secretary handed the telegram toMr. Lincoln, who read it in silence. He asked no advice or suggestionfrom any one about him, but, taking up a pen, wrote with his usualslowness and precision a despatch in Stanton's name, which he showed toSeward, and then handed to Stanton to be signed and sent. The languageis that of an experienced ruler, perfectly sure of himself and of hisduty:

"The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have noconference with General Lee, unless it be for capitulation of GeneralLee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs meto say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any politicalquestions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, andwill submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile, you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. "

Grant answered Lee that he had no authority to accede to hisproposition, and explained that General Ord's language must have beenmisunderstood. This closed to the Confederate authorities the lastavenue of hope of any compromise by which the alternative of utterdefeat or unconditional surrender might be avoided. 

Early in March, General Lee visited Richmond for conference with Mr. Davis on the measures to be adopted in the crisis which he saw wasimminent. He had never sympathized with the slight Congress had intendedto put upon Mr. Davis when it gave him supreme military authority, andcontinued to the end to treat his President as commander-in-chief of theforces. There is direct contradiction between Mr. Davis and General Leeas to how Davis received this statement of the necessities of thesituation. Mr. Davis says he suggested immediate withdrawal fromRichmond, but that Lee said his horses were too weak for the roads intheir present condition, and that he must wait. General Lee, on theother hand, is quoted as saying that he wished to retire behind theStaunton River, from which point he might have indefinitely protractedthe war, but that the President overruled him. Both agreed, however, that sooner or later Richmond must be abandoned, and that the next moveshould be to Danville. 

But before he turned his back forever upon the lines he had so stoutlydefended, Lee resolved to dash once more at the toils by which he wassurrounded. He placed half his army under the command of General John B. Gordon, with orders to break through the Union lines at Fort Stedmanand take possession of the high ground behind them. A month earlierGrant had foreseen some such move on Lee's part, and had ordered GeneralParke to be prepared to meet an assault on his center, and to have hiscommanders ready to bring all their resources to bear on the point indanger, adding: "With proper alacrity in this respect I would have noobjection to seeing the enemy get through. " This characteristic phrasethrows the strongest light both on Grant's temperament, and on themastery of his business at which he had arrived. Under such generalship, an army's lines are a trap into which entrance is suicide. 

The assault was made with great spirit at half-past four on the morningof March 25. Its initial success was due to a singular cause. The spotchosen was a favorite point for deserters to pass into the Union lines, which they had of late been doing in large numbers. When Gordon'sskirmishers, therefore, came stealing through the darkness, they weremistaken for an unusually large party of deserters, and theyover-powered several picket-posts without firing a shot. The stormingparty, following at once, took the trenches with a rush, and in a fewminutes had possession of the main line on the right of the fort, and, next, of the fort itself. It was hard in the semi-darkness todistinguish friends from foes, and for a time General Parke was unableto make headway; but with the growing light his troops advanced fromevery direction to mend the breach, and, making short work of theConfederate detachments, recaptured the fort, opening a cross-fire ofartillery so withering that few of the Confederates could get back totheir own lines. This was, moreover, not the only damage theConfederates suffered. Humphreys and Wright, on the Union left, rightlyassuming that Parke could take care of himself, instantly searched thelines in their front to see if they had been essentially weakened tosupport Gordon's attack. They found they had not, but in gaining thisknowledge captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines in front of them, which, being held, gave inestimable advantage to the Union army in thestruggle of the next week. 

Grant's chief anxiety for some time had been lest Lee should abandon hislines; but though burning to attack, he was delayed by the same badroads which kept Lee in Richmond, and by another cause. He did not wishto move until Sheridan had completed the work assigned him in theShenandoah valley and joined either Sherman or the army at Petersburg. On March 24, however, at the very moment Gordon was making his plans fornext day's sortie, Grant issued his order for the great movement to theleft which was to finish the war. He intended to begin on thetwenty-ninth, but Lee's desperate dash of the twenty-fifth convinced himthat not a moment was to be lost. Sheridan reached City Point on thetwenty-sixth. Sherman came up from North Carolina for a brief visit nextday. The President was also there, and an interesting meeting took placebetween these famous brothers in arms and Mr. Lincoln; after whichSherman went back to Goldsboro, and Grant began pushing his army to theleft with even more than his usual iron energy. 

It was a great army--the result of all the power and wisdom of thegovernment, all the devotion of the people, all the intelligence andteachableness of the soldiers themselves, and all the ability which amighty war had developed in the officers. In command of all was Grant, the most extraordinary military temperament this country has ever seen. The numbers of the respective armies in this last grapple have been theoccasion of endless controversy. As nearly as can be ascertained, thegrand total of all arms on the Union side was 124, 700; on theConfederate side, 57, 000. 

Grant's plan, as announced in his instructions of March 24, was at firstto despatch Sheridan to destroy the South Side and Danville railroads, at the same time moving a heavy force to the left to insure the successof this raid, and then to turn Lee's position. But his purpose developedfrom hour to hour, and before he had been away from his winterheadquarters one day, he gave up this comparatively narrow scheme, andadopted the far bolder plan which he carried out to his immortal honor. He ordered Sheridan not to go after the railroads, but to push for theenemy's right rear, writing him: "I now feel like ending the matter. .. . We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can bedone with the enemy. "

On the thirtieth, Sheridan advanced to Five Forks, where he found aheavy force of the enemy. Lee, justly alarmed by Grant's movements, haddespatched a sufficient detachment to hold that important cross-roads, and taken personal command of the remainder on White Oak Ridge. A heavyrain-storm, beginning on the night of the twenty-ninth and continuingmore than twenty-four hours, greatly impeded the march of the troops. Onthe thirty-first, Warren, working his way toward the White Oak road, wasattacked by Lee and driven back on the main line, but rallied, and inthe afternoon drove the enemy again into his works. Sheridan, opposed byPickett with a large force of infantry and cavalry, was also forcedback, fighting obstinately, as far as Dinwiddie Court House, from whichpoint he hopefully reported his situation to Grant at dark. Grant, moredisturbed than Sheridan himself, rained orders and suggestions allnight to effect a concentration at daylight on that portion of the enemyin front of Sheridan; but Pickett, finding himself out of position, silently withdrew during the night, and resumed his strongly intrenchedpost at Five Forks. Here Sheridan followed him on April 1, and repeatedthe successful tactics of his Shenandoah valley exploits so brilliantlythat Lee's right was entirely shattered. 

This battle of Five Forks should have ended the war. Lee's right wasrouted; his line had been stretched westward until it broke; there wasno longer any hope of saving Richmond, or even of materially delayingits fall. But Lee apparently thought that even the gain of a day was ofvalue to the Richmond government, and what was left of his Army ofNorthern Virginia was still so perfect in discipline that it answeredwith unabated spirit every demand made upon it. Grant, who feared Leemight get away from Petersburg and overwhelm Sheridan on the White Oakroad, directed that an assault be made all along the line at fouro'clock on the morning of the second. His officers responded withenthusiasm; and Lee, far from dreaming of attacking any one after thestunning blow he had received the day before, made what hastypreparations he could to resist them. 

It is painful to record the hard fighting which followed. Wright, in hisassault in front of Forts Fisher and Walsh, lost eleven hundred men infifteen minutes of murderous conflict that made them his own; and othercommands fared scarcely better, Union and Confederate troops alikedisplaying a gallantry distressing to contemplate when one reflectsthat, the war being already decided, all this heroic blood was shed invain. The Confederates, from the Appomattox to the Weldon road, fellslowly back to their inner line of works; and Lee, watching theformidable advance before which his weakened troops gave way, sent amessage to Richmond announcing his purpose of concentrating on theDanville road, and made preparations for the evacuation which was nowthe only resort left him. 

Some Confederate writers express surprise that General Grant did notattack and destroy Lee's army on April 2; but this is a view, after thefact, easy to express. The troops on the Union left had been on foot foreighteen hours, had fought an important battle, marched andcountermarched many miles, and were now confronted by Longstreet's freshcorps behind formidable works, while the attitude of the force underGordon on the south side of the town was such as to require the closeattention of Parke. Grant, anticipating an early retirement of Lee fromhis citadel, wisely resolved to avoid the waste and bloodshed of animmediate assault on the inner lines of Petersburg. He ordered Sheridanto get upon Lee's line of retreat; sent Humphreys to strengthen him;then, directing a general bombardment for five o'clock next morning, andan assault at six, gave himself and his soldiers a little of the restthey had so richly earned and so seriously needed. 

He had telegraphed during the day to President Lincoln, who was still atCity Point, the news as it developed from hour to hour. Prisoners heregarded as so much net gain: he was weary of slaughter, and wanted thewar ended with as little bloodshed as possible; and it was with delightthat he summed up on Sunday afternoon: "The whole captures since thearmy started out gunning will not amount to less than twelve thousandmen, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. "

Lee bent all his energies to saving his army and leading it out of itsuntenable position on the James to a point from which he could effect ajunction with Johnston in North Carolina. The place selected for thispurpose was Burkeville, at the crossing of the South Side and Danvilleroads, fifty miles southwest from Richmond, whence a short distancewould bring him to Danville, where the desired junction could be made. Even yet he was able to cradle himself in the illusion that it was onlya campaign that had failed, and that he might continue the warindefinitely in another field. At nightfall all his preparations werecompleted, and dismounting at the mouth of the road leading to AmeliaCourt House, the first point of rendezvous, where he had directedsupplies to be sent, he watched his troops file noiselessly by in thedarkness. By three o'clock the town was abandoned; at half-past four itwas formally surrendered. Meade, reporting the news to Grant, receivedorders to march his army immediately up the Appomattox; and diviningLee's intentions, Grant also sent word to Sheridan to push with allspeed to the Danville road. 

Thus flight and pursuit began almost at the same moment. Theswift-footed Army of Northern Virginia was racing for its life, andGrant, inspired with more than his habitual tenacity and energy, notonly pressed his enemy in the rear, but hung upon his flank, andstrained every nerve to get in his front. He did not even allow himselfthe pleasure of entering Richmond, which surrendered to Weitzel early onthe morning of the third. 

All that day Lee pushed forward toward Amelia Court House. There waslittle fighting except among the cavalry. A terrible disappointmentawaited Lee on his arrival at Amelia Court House on the fourth. He hadordered supplies to be forwarded there, but his half-starved troopsfound no food awaiting them, and nearly twenty-four hours were lost incollecting subsistence for men and horses. When he started again on thenight of the fifth, the whole pursuing force was south and stretchingout to the west of him. Burkeville was in Grant's possession; the way toDanville was barred; the supply of provisions to the south cut off. Hewas compelled to change his route to the west, and started forLynchburg, which he was destined never to reach. 

It had been the intention to attack Lee at Amelia Court House on themorning of April 6, but learning of his turn to the west, Meade, who wasimmediately in pursuit, quickly faced his army about and followed. Arunning fight ensued for fourteen miles, the enemy, with remarkablequickness and dexterity, halting and partly intrenching themselves fromtime to time, and the national forces driving them out of everyposition; the Union cavalry, meanwhile, harassing the moving left flankof the Confederates, and working havoc on the trains. They also caused agrievous loss to history by burning Lee's headquarters baggage, with allits wealth of returns and reports. At Sailor's Creek, a rivulet runningnorth into the Appomattox, Ewell's corps was brought to bay, andimportant fighting occurred; the day's loss to Lee, there and elsewhere, amounting to eight thousand in all, with several of his generals amongthe prisoners. This day's work was of incalculable value to the nationalarms. Sheridan's unerring eye appreciated the full importance of it, hishasty report ending with the words: "If the thing is pressed, I thinkthat Lee will surrender. " Grant sent the despatch to President Lincoln, who instantly replied:

"Let the thing be pressed. "

In fact, after nightfall of the sixth, Lee's army could only flutterlike a wounded bird with one wing shattered. There was no longer anypossibility of escape; but Lee found it hard to relinquish the illusionof years, and as soon as night came down he again began his weary marchwestward. A slight success on the next day once more raised his hopes;but his optimism was not shared by his subordinates, and a number of hisprincipal officers, selecting General Pendleton as their spokesman, madeknown to him on the seventh their belief that further resistance wasuseless, and advised surrender. Lee told them that they had yet too manymen to think of laying down their arms, but in answer to a courteoussummons from Grant sent that same day, inquired what terms he would bewilling to offer. Without waiting for a reply, he again put his men inmotion, and during all of the eighth the chase and pursuit continuedthrough a part of Virginia green with spring, and until then unvisitedby hostile armies. 

Sheridan, by unheard-of exertions, at last accomplished the importanttask of placing himself squarely on Lee's line of retreat. About sunsetof the eighth, his advance captured Appomattox Station and four trainsof provisions. Shortly after, a reconnaissance revealed the fact thatLee's entire army was coming up the road. Though he had nothing butcavalry, Sheridan resolved to hold the inestimable advantage he hadgained, and sent a request to Grant to hurry up the required infantrysupport; saying that if it reached him that night, they "might perhapsfinish the job in the morning. " He added, with singular prescience, referring to the negotiations which had been opened: "I do not think Leemeans to surrender until compelled to do so. "

This was strictly true. When Grant replied to Lee's question aboutterms, saying that the only condition he insisted upon was that theofficers and men surrendered should be disqualified from taking up armsagain until properly exchanged, Lee disclaimed any intention tosurrender his army, but proposed to meet Grant to discuss therestoration of peace. It appears from his own report that even on thenight of the eighth he had no intention of giving up the fight. Heexpected to find only cavalry before him next morning, and thought hisremnant of infantry could break through while he himself was amusingGrant with platonic discussions in the rear. But on arriving at therendezvous he had suggested, he received Grant's courteous but decidedrefusal to enter into a political negotiation, and also the news that aformidable force of infantry barred the way and covered the adjacenthills and valley. The marching of the Confederate army was over forever, and Lee, suddenly brought to a sense of his real situation, sent ordersto cease hostilities, and wrote another note to Grant, asking aninterview for the purpose of surrendering his army. 

The meeting took place at the house of Wilmer McLean, in the edge of thevillage of Appomattox, on April 9, 1865. Lee met Grant at the threshold, and ushered him into a small and barely furnished parlor, where weresoon assembled the leading officers of the national army. General Leewas accompanied only by his secretary, Colonel Charles Marshall. A shortconversation led up to a request from Lee for the terms on which thesurrender of his army would be received. Grant briefly stated them, andthen wrote them out. Men and officers were to be paroled, and the arms, artillery, and public property turned over to the officer appointed toreceive them. 

"This, " he added, "will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, northeir private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man willbe allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by UnitedStates authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws inforce where they may reside. "

General Grant says in his "Memoirs" that up to the moment when he putpen to paper he had not thought of a word that he should write. Theterms he had verbally proposed were soon put in writing, and there hemight have stopped. But as he wrote a feeling of sympathy for hisgallant antagonist came over him, and he added the extremely liberalterms with which his letter closed. The sight of Lee's fine swordsuggested the paragraph allowing officers to retain their side-arms; andhe ended with a phrase he evidently had not thought of, and for which hehad no authority, which practically pardoned and amnestied every man inLee's army--a thing he had refused to consider the day before, and whichhad been expressly forbidden him in the President's order of March 3. Yet so great was the joy over the crowning victory, and so deep thegratitude of the government and people to Grant and his heroic army, that his terms were accepted as he wrote them, and his exercise of theExecutive prerogative of pardon entirely overlooked. It must be noticedhere, however, that a few days later it led the greatest of Grant'sgenerals into a serious error. 

Lee must have read the memorandum with as much surprise asgratification. He suggested and gained another importantconcession--that those of the cavalry and artillery who owned their ownhorses should be allowed to take them home to put in their crops; andwrote a brief reply accepting the terms. He then remarked that his armywas in a starving condition, and asked Grant to provide them withsubsistence and forage; to which he at once assented, inquiring for howmany men the rations would be wanted. Lee answered, "About twenty-fivethousand"; and orders were given to issue them. The number turned out tobe even greater, the paroles signed amounting to twenty-eight thousandtwo hundred and thirty-one. If we add to this the captures made duringthe preceding week, and the thousands who deserted the failing cause atevery by-road leading to their homes, we see how considerable an armyLee commanded when Grant "started out gunning. "

With these brief and simple formalities, one of the most momentoustransactions of modern times was concluded. The Union gunners preparedto fire a national salute, but Grant forbade any rejoicing over a fallenenemy, who, he hoped, would be an enemy no longer. The next day he rodeto the Confederate lines to make a visit of farewell to General Lee. They parted with courteous good wishes, and Grant, without pausing tolook at the city he had taken, or the enormous system of works which hadso long held him at bay, hurried away to Washington, intent only uponputting an end to the waste and burden of war. 

A very carnival of fire and destruction had attended the flight of theConfederate authorities from Richmond. On Sunday night, April 2, Jefferson Davis, with his cabinet and their more important papers, hurriedly left the doomed city on one of the crowded and overloadedrailroad trains. The legislature of Virginia and the governor of theState departed in a canal-boat toward Lynchburg; and every availablevehicle was pressed into service by the frantic inhabitants, all anxiousto get away before their capital was desecrated by the presence of"Yankee invaders. " By the time the military left, early next morning, aconflagration was already under way. The rebel Congress had passed alaw ordering government tobacco and other public property to be burned. General Ewell, the military commander, asserts that he took theresponsibility of disobeying the law, and that they were not fired byhis orders. However that may be, flames broke out in various parts ofthe city, while a miscellaneous mob, inflamed by excitement and by thealcohol which had run freely in the gutters the night before, rushedfrom store to store, smashing in the doors and indulging all thewantonness of pillage and greed. Public spirit was paralyzed, and thewhole fabric of society seemed crumbling to pieces, when the convictsfrom the penitentiary, a shouting, leaping crowd of party-coloreddemons, overcoming their guard, and drunk with liberty, appeared uponthe streets, adding their final dramatic horror to the pandemonium. 

It is quite probable that the very magnitude and rapidity of thedisaster served in a measure to mitigate its evil results. The burningof seven hundred buildings, comprising the entire business portion ofRichmond warehouses, manufactories, mills, depots, and stores, allwithin the brief space of a day, was a visitation so sudden, sounexpected, so stupefying, as to overawe and terrorize even wrong-doers, and made the harvest of plunder so abundant as to serve to scatter themob and satisfy its rapacity to quick repletion. 

Before a new hunger could arise, assistance was at hand. GeneralWeitzel, to whom the city was surrendered, taking up his headquarters inthe house lately occupied by Jefferson Davis, promptly set about thework of relief; organizing efficient resistance to the fire, which, upto this time, seems scarcely to have been attempted; issuing rations tothe poor, who had been relentlessly exposed to starvation by the actionof the rebel Congress; and restoring order and personal authority. Thata regiment of black soldiers assisted in this noble work must haveseemed to the white inhabitants of Richmond the final drop in their cupof misery. 

Into the capital, thus stricken and laid waste, came President Lincolnon the morning of April 4. Never in the history of the world did thehead of a mighty nation and the conqueror of a great rebellion enter thecaptured chief city of the insurgents in such humbleness and simplicity. He had gone two weeks before to City Point for a visit to General Grant, and to his son, Captain Robert Lincoln, who was serving on Grant'sstaff. Making his home on the steamer which brought him, and enjoyingwhat was probably the most satisfactory relaxation in which he had beenable to indulge during his whole presidential service, he had visitedthe various camps of the great army in company with the general, cheeredeverywhere by the loving greetings of the soldiers. He had met Shermanwhen that commander hurried up fresh from his victorious march, andafter Grant started on his final pursuit of Lee the President stilllingered; and it was at City Point that he received the news of the fallof Richmond. 

Between the receipt of this news and the following forenoon, but beforeany information of the great fire had reached them, a visit was arrangedfor the President and Rear-Admiral Porter. Ample precautions were takenat the start. The President went in his own steamer, the _River Queen_, with her escort, the _Bat_, and a tug used at City Point in landing fromthe steamer. Admiral Porter went in his flag-ship, the _Malvern_, and atransport carried a small cavalry escort and ambulances for the party. But the obstructions in the river soon made it impossible to proceed inthis fashion. One unforeseen accident after another rendered itnecessary to leave behind even the smaller boats, until finally theparty went on in Admiral Porter's barge, rowed by twelve sailors, andwithout escort of any kind. In this manner the President made his adventinto Richmond, landing near Libby Prison. As the party stepped ashorethey found a guide among the contrabands who quickly crowded thestreets, for the possible coming of the President had been circulatedthrough the city. Ten of the sailors, armed with carbines, were formedas a guard, six in front and four in rear, and between them thePresident, Admiral Porter, and the three officers who accompanied themwalked the long distance, perhaps a mile and a half, to the center ofthe town. 

The imagination can easily fill up the picture of a gradually increasingcrowd, principally of negroes, following the little group of marines andofficers, with the tall form of the President in its center; and, havinglearned that it was indeed Mr. Lincoln, giving expression to joy andgratitude in the picturesque emotional ejaculations of the colored race. It is easy also to imagine the sharp anxiety of those who had thePresident's safety in charge during this tiresome and even foolhardymarch through a city still in flames, whose white inhabitants weresullenly resentful at best, and whose grief and anger might at anymoment culminate against the man they looked upon as the incarnation oftheir misfortunes. But no accident befell him. Reaching GeneralWeitzel's headquarters, Mr. Lincoln rested in the mansion JeffersonDavis had occupied as President of the Confederacy, and after a day ofsight-seeing returned to his steamer and to Washington, to be strickendown by an assassin's bullet, literally "in the house of his friends. "

XXXVI

Lincoln's Interviews with Campbell--Withdraws Authority for Meeting ofVirginia Legislature--Conference of Davis and Johnston atGreensboro--Johnston Asks for an Armistice--Meeting of Sherman andJohnston--Their Agreement--Rejected at Washington--Surrender ofJohnston--Surrender of other Confederate Forces--End of the RebelNavy--Capture of Jefferson Davis--Surrender of E. Kirby Smith--Number ofConfederates Surrendered and Exchanged--Reduction of Federal Army to aPeace Footing--Grand Review of the Army

While in Richmond, Mr. Lincoln had two interviews with John A. Campbell, rebel Secretary of War, who had not accompanied the other fleeingofficials, preferring instead to submit to Federal authority. Mr. Campbell had been one of the commissioners at the Hampton Roadsconference, and Mr. Lincoln now gave him a written memorandum repeatingin substance the terms he had then offered the Confederates. OnCampbell's suggestion that the Virginia legislature, if allowed to cometogether, would at once repeal its ordinance of secession and withdrawall Virginia troops from the field, he also gave permission for itsmembers to assemble for that purpose. But this, being distorted intoauthority to sit in judgment on the political consequences of the war, was soon withdrawn. 

Jefferson Davis and his cabinet proceeded to Danville, where, two daysafter his arrival, the rebel President made still another effort to firethe Southern heart, announcing, "We have now entered upon a new phaseof the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particularpoints, our army will be free to move from point to point to strike theenemy in detail far from his base. Let us but will it and we are free";and declaring in sonorous periods his purpose never to abandon one footof ground to the invader. 

The ink was hardly dry on the document when news came of the surrenderof Lee's army, and that the Federal cavalry was pushing southward westof Danville. So the Confederate government again hastily packed itsarchives and moved to Greensboro, North Carolina, where its headquarterswere prudently kept on the train at the depot. Here Mr. Davis sent forGenerals Johnston and Beauregard, and a conference took place betweenthem and the members of the fleeing government--a conference not unmixedwith embarrassment, since Mr. Davis still "willed" the success of theConfederacy too strongly to see the true hopelessness of the situation, while the generals and most of his cabinet were agreed that their causewas lost. The council of war over, General Johnston returned to his armyto begin negotiations with Sherman; and on the following day, April 14, Davis and his party left Greensboro to continue their journey southward. 

Sherman had returned to Goldsboro from his visit to City Point, and sethimself at once to the reorganization of his army and the replenishmentof his stores. He still thought there was a hard campaign with desperatefighting ahead of him. Even on April 6, when he received news of thefall of Richmond and the flight of Lee and the Confederate government, he was unable to understand the full extent of the national triumph. Headmired Grant so far as a man might, short of idolatry, yet the longhabit of respect for Lee led him to think he would somehow get away andjoin Johnston in his front with at least a portion of the Army ofNorthern Virginia. He had already begun his march upon Johnston when helearned of Lee's surrender at Appomattox. 

Definitely relieved from apprehension of a junction of the twoConfederate armies, he now had no fear except of a flight and dispersalof Johnston's forces into guerrilla bands. If they ran away, he felt hecould not catch them; the country was too open. They could scatter andmeet again, and so continue a partizan warfare indefinitely. He couldnot be expected to know that this resolute enemy was sick to the heartof war, and that the desire for more fighting survived only in a groupof fugitive politicians flying through the pine forests of the Carolinasfrom a danger which did not exist. 

Entering Raleigh on the morning of the thirteenth, he turned his headsof column southwest, hoping to cut off Johnston's southward march, butmade no great haste, thinking Johnston's cavalry superior to his own, and desiring Sheridan to join him before he pushed the Confederates toextremities. While here, however, he received a communication fromGeneral Johnston, dated the thirteenth, proposing an armistice to enablethe National and Confederate governments to negotiate on equal terms. Ithad been dictated by Jefferson Davis during the conference atGreensboro, written down by S. R. Mallory, and merely signed by Johnston, and was inadmissible and even offensive in its terms; but Sherman, anxious for peace, and himself incapable of discourtesy to a braveenemy, took no notice of its language, and answered so cordially thatthe Confederates were probably encouraged to ask for better conditionsof surrender than they had expected to receive. 

The two great antagonists met on April 17, when Sherman offeredJohnston the same terms that had been accorded Lee, and alsocommunicated the news he had that morning received of the murder of Mr. Lincoln. The Confederate general expressed his unfeigned sorrow at thiscalamity, which smote the South, he said, as deeply as the North; and inthis mood of sympathy the discussion began. Johnston asserted that hewould not be justified in such a capitulation as Sherman proposed, butsuggested that together they might arrange the terms of a permanentpeace. This idea pleased Sherman, to whom the prospect of ending the warwithout shedding another drop of blood was so tempting that he did notsufficiently consider the limits of his authority in the matter. It canbe said, moreover, in extenuation of his course, that PresidentLincoln's despatch to Grant of March 3, which expressly forbade Grant to"decide, discuss, or to confer upon any political question, " had neverbeen communicated to Sherman; while the very liberality of Grant's termsled him to believe that he was acting in accordance with the views ofthe administration. 

But the wisdom of Lincoln's peremptory order was completely vindicated. With the best intentions in the world, Sherman, beginning very properlyby offering his antagonist the same terms accorded Lee, ended, after twodays' negotiation, by making a treaty of peace with the ConfederateStates, including a preliminary armistice, the disbandment of theConfederate armies, recognition by the United States Executive of theseveral State governments, reëstablishment of the Federal courts, and ageneral amnesty. "Not being fully empowered by our respective principalsto fulfil these terms, " the agreement truthfully concluded, "weindividually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain thenecessary authority. "

The rebel President, with unnecessary formality, required a report fromGeneral Breckinridge, his Secretary of War, on the desirability ofratifying this most favorable convention. Scarcely had he given it hisindorsement when news came that it had been disapproved at Washington, and that Sherman had been directed to continue his military operations;and the peripatetic government once more took up its southward flight. 

The moment General Grant read the agreement he saw it was entirelyinadmissible. The new President called his cabinet together, and Mr. Lincoln's instructions of March 3 to Grant were repeated toSherman--somewhat tardily, it must be confessed--as his rule of action. All this was a matter of course, and General Sherman could not properly, and perhaps would not, have objected to it. But the calm spirit ofLincoln was now absent from the councils of the government; and it wasnot in Andrew Johnson and Mr. Stanton to pass over a mistake like this, even in the case of one of the most illustrious captains of the age. They ordered Grant to proceed at once to Sherman's headquarters, and todirect operations against the enemy; and, what was worse, Mr. Stantonprinted in the newspapers the reasons of the government for disapprovingthe agreement in terms of sharpest censure of General Sherman. This, when it came to his notice some weeks later, filled him with hotindignation, and, coupled with some orders Halleck, who had been madecommander of the armies of the Potomac and the James, issued to Meade, to disregard Sherman's truce and push forward against Johnston, rousedhim to open defiance of the authorities he thought were persecuting him, and made him declare in a report to Grant, that he would have maintainedhis truce at any cost of life. Halleck's order, however, had beennullified by Johnston's surrender, and Grant, suggesting that thisoutburst was uncalled for, offered Sherman the opportunity to correctthe statement. This he refused, insisting that his record stand aswritten, although avowing his readiness to obey all future orders ofGrant and the President. 

So far as Johnston was concerned, the war was indeed over. He was unablelonger to hold his men together. Eight thousand of them left their campsand went home in the week of the truce, many riding away on theartillery horses and train mules. On notice of Federal disapproval ofhis negotiations with Sherman, he disregarded Jefferson Davis'sinstructions to disband the infantry and try to escape with the cavalryand light guns, and answered Sherman's summons by inviting anotherconference, at which, on April 26, he surrendered all the forces in hiscommand on the same terms granted Lee at Appomattox; Sherman supplying, as did Grant, rations for the beaten army. Thirty-seven thousand men andofficers were paroled in North Carolina--exclusive, of course, of thethousands who had slipped away to their homes during the suspension ofhostilities. 

After Appomattox the rebellion fell to pieces all at once. Leesurrendered less than one sixth of the Confederates in arms on April 9. The armies that still remained, though inconsiderable when compared withthe mighty host under the national colors, were yet infinitely largerthan any Washington ever commanded, and capable of strenuous resistanceand of incalculable mischief. But the march of Sherman from Atlanta tothe sea, and his northward progress through the Carolinas, hadpredisposed the great interior region to make an end of strife: atendency which was greatly promoted by the masterly raid of General J. H. Wilson's cavalry through Alabama, and his defeat of Forrest at Selma. An officer of Taylor's staff came to Canby's headquarters on April 19 tomake arrangements for the surrender of all the Confederate forces eastof the Mississippi not already paroled by Sherman and Wilson, embracingsome forty-two thousand men. The terms were agreed upon and signed onMay 4, at the village of Citronelle in Alabama. At the same time andplace the Confederate Commodore Farrand surrendered to Rear-AdmiralThatcher all the naval forces Of the Confederacy in the neighborhood ofMobile--a dozen vessels and some hundreds of officers. 

The rebel navy had practically ceased to exist some months before. Thesplendid fight in Mobile Bay on August 5, 1864, between Farragut's fleetand the rebel ram _Tennessee_, with her three attendant gunboats, andCushing's daring destruction of the powerful _Albemarle_ in AlbemarleSound on October 27, marked its end in Confederate waters. The duelbetween the _Kearsarge_ and the _Alabama_ off Cherbourg had alreadytaken place; a few more encounters, at or near foreign ports, furnishedoccasion for personal bravery and subsequent lively diplomaticcorrespondence; and rebel vessels, fitted out under the unduly lenient"neutrality" of France and England, continued for a time to work havocwith American shipping in various parts of the world. But these twoUnion successes, and the final capture of Fort Fisher and of Wilmingtonearly in 1865, which closed the last haven for daring blockade-runners, practically silenced the Confederate navy. 

General E. Kirby Smith commanded all the insurgent forces west of theMississippi. On him the desperate hopes of Mr. Davis and his flyingcabinet were fixed, after the successive surrenders of Lee and Johnstonhad left them no prospect in the east. They imagined they could movewestward, gathering up stragglers as they fled, and, crossing the river, join Smith's forces, and there continue the war. But after a time eventhis hope failed them. Their escort melted away; members of the cabinetdropped off on various pretexts, and Mr. Davis, abandoning the attemptto reach the Mississippi River, turned again toward the east in aneffort to gain the Florida coast and escape by means of a sailing vesselto Texas. 

The two expeditions sent in pursuit of him by General Wilson did notallow this consummation, which the government at Washington mightpossibly have viewed with equanimity. His camp near Irwinville, Georgia, was surrounded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard's command at dawn on May10, and he was captured as he was about to mount horse with a fewcompanions and ride for the coast, leaving his family to follow moreslowly. The tradition that he was captured in disguise, having donnedfemale dress in a last desperate attempt to escape, has only thisfoundation, that Mrs. Davis threw a cloak over her husband's shoulders, and a shawl over his head, on the approach of the Federal soldiers. Hewas taken to Fortress Monroe, and there kept in confinement for abouttwo years; was arraigned before the United States Circuit Court for theDistrict of Virginia for the crime of treason, and released on bail; andwas finally restored to all the duties and privileges of citizenship, except the right to hold office, by President Johnson's proclamation ofamnesty of December 25, 1868. 

General E. Kirby Smith, on whom Davis's last hopes of success hadcentered, kept up so threatening an attitude that Sherman was sent fromWashington to bring him to reason. But he did not long hold his positionof solitary defiance. One more needless skirmish took place nearBrazos, Texas, and then Smith followed the example of Taylor andsurrendered his entire force, some eighteen thousand, to General Canby, on May 26. One hundred and seventy-five thousand men in all weresurrendered by the different Confederate commanders, and there were, inaddition to these, about ninety-nine thousand prisoners in nationalcustody during the year. One third of these were exchanged, and twothirds released. This was done as rapidly as possible by successiveorders of the War Department, beginning on May 9 and continuing throughthe summer. 

The first object of the government was to stop the waste of war. Recruiting ceased immediately after Lee's surrender, and measures weretaken to reduce as promptly as possible the vast military establishment. Every chief of bureau was ordered, on April 28, to proceed at once tothe reduction of expenses in his department to a peace footing; and thisbefore Taylor or Smith had surrendered, and while Jefferson Davis wasstill at large. The army of a million men was brought down, withincredible ease and celerity, to one of twenty-five thousand. 

Before the great army melted away into the greater body of citizens, thesoldiers enjoyed one final triumph, a march through the capital, undisturbed by death or danger, under the eyes of their highestcommanders, military and civilian, and the representatives of the peoplewhose nationality they had saved. Those who witnessed this solemn yetjoyous pageant will never forget it, and will pray that their childrenmay never witness anything like it. For two days this formidable hostmarched the long stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue, starting from theshadow of the dome of the Capitol, and filling that wide thoroughfare toGeorgetown with a serried mass, moving with the easy yet rapid pace ofveterans in cadence step. As a mere spectacle this march of themightiest host the continent has ever seen gathered together was grandand imposing; but it was not as a spectacle alone that it affected thebeholder most deeply. It was not a mere holiday parade; it was an armyof citizens on their way home after a long and terrible war. Theirclothes were worn and pierced with bullets; their banners had been tornwith shot and shell, and lashed in the winds of a thousand battles; thevery drums and fifes had called out the troops to numberless nightalarms, and sounded the onset on historic fields. The whole countryclaimed these heroes as a part of themselves. And now, done withfighting, they were going joyously and peaceably to their homes, to takeup again the tasks they had willingly laid down in the hour of theircountry's peril. 

The world had many lessons to learn from this great conflict, whichliberated a subject people and changed the tactics of modern warfare;but the greatest lesson it taught the nations of waiting Europe was theconservative power of democracy--that a million men, flushed withvictory, and with arms in their hands, could be trusted to disband themoment the need for their services was over, and take up again thesoberer labors of peace. 

Friends loaded these veterans with flowers as they swung down theAvenue, both men and officers, until some were fairly hidden under theirfragrant burden. There was laughter and applause; grotesque figures werenot absent as Sherman's legions passed, with their "bummers" and theirregimental pets; but with all the shouting and the laughter and the joyof this unprecedented ceremony, there was one sad and dominant thoughtwhich could not be driven from the minds of those who saw it--that ofthe men who were absent, and who had, nevertheless, richly earned theright to be there. The soldiers in their shrunken companies wereconscious of the ever-present memories of the brave comrades who hadfallen by the way; and in the whole army there was the passionate andunavailing regret for their wise, gentle, and powerful friend, AbrahamLincoln, gone forever from the house by the Avenue, who had called thegreat host into being, directed the course of the nation during the fouryears they had been fighting for its preservation, and for whom, morethan for any other, this crowning peaceful pageant would have beenfraught with deep and happy meaning. 

XXXVII

The 14th of April--Celebration at Fort Sumter--Last CabinetMeeting--Lincoln's Attitude toward Threats of Assassination--Booth'sPlot--Ford's Theater--Fate of the Assassins--The Mourning Pageant

Mr. Lincoln had returned to Washington, refreshed by his visit to CityPoint, and cheered by the unmistakable signs that the war was almostover. With that ever-present sense of responsibility which distinguishedhim, he gave his thoughts to the momentous question of the restorationof the Union and of harmony between the lately warring sections. Hiswhole heart was now enlisted in the work of "binding up the nation'swounds, " and of doing all which might "achieve and cherish a just andlasting peace. "

April 14 was a day of deep and tranquil happiness throughout the UnitedStates. It was Good Friday, observed by a portion of the people as anoccasion of fasting and religious meditation; though even among the mostdevout the great tidings of the preceding week exerted their joyousinfluence, and changed this period of traditional mourning into anoccasion of general thanksgiving. But though the Misereres turned ofthemselves to Te Deums, the date was not to lose its awful significancein the calendar: at night it was claimed once more by a world-widesorrow. 

The thanksgiving of the nation found its principal expression atCharleston Harbor, where the flag of the Union received that day aconspicuous reparation on the spot where it had first been outraged. Atnoon General Robert Anderson raised over Fort Sumter the identical flaglowered and saluted by him four years before; the surrender of Leegiving a more transcendent importance to this ceremony, made statelywith orations, music, and military display. 

In Washington it was a day of deep peace and thankfulness. Grant hadarrived that morning, and, going to the Executive Mansion, had met thecabinet, Friday being their regular day for assembling. He expressedsome anxiety as to the news from Sherman which he was expecting hourly. The President answered him in that singular vein of poetic mysticismwhich, though constantly held in check by his strong common sense, formed such a remarkable element in his character. He assured Grant thatthe news would come soon and come favorably, for he had last night hadhis usual dream which preceded great events. He seemed to be, he said, in a singular and indescribable vessel, but always the same, moving withgreat rapidity toward a dark and indefinite shore; he had had this dreambefore Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg. The cabinetwere greatly impressed by this story; but Grant, most matter-of-fact ofcreated beings, made the characteristic response that "Murfreesboro wasno victory, and had no important results. " The President did not arguethis point with him, but repeated that Sherman would beat or had beatenJohnston; that his dream must relate to that, since he knew of no otherimportant event likely at present to occur. 

Questions of trade between the States, and of various phases ofreconstruction, occupied the cabinet on this last day of Lincoln's firmand tolerant rule. The President spoke at some length, disclosing hishope that much could be done to reanimate the States and get theirgovernments in successful operation before Congress came together. Hewas anxious to close the period of strife without over-much discussion. Particularly did he desire to avoid the shedding of blood, or anyvindictiveness of punishment. "No one need expect that he would take anypart in hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them. " "Enoughlives have been sacrificed, " he exclaimed; "we must extinguish ourresentments if we expect harmony and union. " He did not wish theautonomy nor the individuality of the States disturbed; and he closedthe session by commending the whole subject to the most carefulconsideration of his advisers. It was, he said, the great questionpending--they must now begin to act in the interest of peace. Such werethe last words that Lincoln spoke to his cabinet. They dispersed withthese sentences of clemency and good will in their ears, never again tomeet under his wise and benignant chairmanship. He had told them thatmorning a strange story, which made some demand upon their faith, butthe circumstances under which they were next to come together werebeyond the scope of the wildest fancy. 

The day was one of unusual enjoyment to Mr. Lincoln. His son Robert hadreturned from the field with General Grant, and the President spent anhour with the young captain in delighted conversation over the campaign. He denied himself generally to the throng of visitors, admitting only afew friends. In the afternoon he went for a long drive with Mrs. Lincoln. His mood, as it had been all day, was singularly happy andtender. He talked much of the past and future; after four years oftrouble and tumult he looked forward to four years of comparative quietand normal work; after that he expected to go back to Illinois andpractise law again. He was never simpler or gentler than on this day ofunprecedented triumph; his heart overflowed with sentiments of gratitudeto Heaven, which took the shape, usual to generous natures, of love andkindness to all men. 

From the very beginning of his presidency, Mr. Lincoln had beenconstantly subject to the threats of his enemies. His mail was infestedwith brutal and vulgar menace, and warnings of all sorts came to himfrom zealous or nervous friends. Most of these communications receivedno notice. In cases where there seemed a ground for inquiry, it wasmade, as carefully as possible, by the President's private secretary, orby the War Department; but always without substantial result. Warningsthat appeared most definite, when examined, proved too vague andconfused for further attention. The President was too intelligent not toknow that he was in some danger. Madmen frequently made their way to thevery door of the executive office, and sometimes into Mr. Lincoln'spresence. But he had himself so sane a mind, and a heart so kindly, evento his enemies, that it was hard for him to believe in political hatredso deadly as to lead to murder. 

He knew, indeed, that incitements to murder him were not uncommon in theSouth, but as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, he consideredthe possibilities of danger remote, and positively refused to tormenthimself with precautions for his own safety; summing the matter up bysaying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him;that his life was therefore in reach of any one, sane or mad, who wasready to murder and be hanged for it; and that he could not possiblyguard against all danger unless he shut himself up in an iron box, inwhich condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President. Hetherefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generallyunattended. He received hundreds of visitors in a day, his breast bareto pistol or knife. He walked at midnight, with a single secretary, oralone, from the Executive Mansion to the War Department and back. Herode through the lonely roads of an uninhabited suburb from the WhiteHouse to the Soldiers' Home in the dusk of the evening, and returned tohis work in the morning before the town was astir. He was greatlyannoyed when it was decided that there must be a guard at the ExecutiveMansion, and that a squad of cavalry must accompany him on his dailydrive; but he was always reasonable, and yielded to the best judgment ofothers. 

Four years of threats and boastings that were unfounded, and of plotsthat came to nothing, thus passed away; but precisely at the time whenthe triumph of the nation seemed assured, and a feeling of peace andsecurity was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, apparently no more important than the others, ripened in the sudden heatof hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor of a family of famous players;Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida;George Atzerodt, formerly a coachmaker, but more recently a spy andblockade-runner of the Potomac; David E. Herold, a young druggist'sclerk; Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists andConfederate soldiers; and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvousat the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt, the widowed mother of the lastnamed, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced byreverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. 

Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man oftwenty-six, strikingly handsome, with that ease and grace of mannerwhich came to him of right from his theatrical ancestors. He had playedfor several seasons with only indifferent success, his value as an actorlying rather in his romantic beauty of person than in any talent orindustry he possessed. He was a fanatical secessionist, and had imbibedat Richmond and other Southern cities where he played a furious spiritof partizanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After thereëlection of Mr. Lincoln, he visited Canada, consorted with the rebelemissaries there, and--whether or not at their instigation cannotcertainly be said--conceived a scheme to capture the President and takehim to Richmond. He passed a great part of the autumn and winterpursuing this fantastic enterprise, seeming to be always well suppliedwith money; but the winter wore away, and nothing was accomplished. OnMarch 4 he was at the Capitol, and created a disturbance by trying toforce his way through the line of policemen who guarded the passagethrough which the President walked to the east front of the building. His intentions at this time are not known; he afterward said he lost anexcellent chance of killing the President that day. 

His ascendancy over his fellow-conspirators seems to have been complete. After the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage akin tomadness he called them together and assigned each his part in the newcrime which had risen in his mind out of the abandoned abduction scheme. This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, aliasPayne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was tomurder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned toremove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most conspicuousrôle of the tragedy. It was Herold's duty to attend him as page and aidhim in his escape. Minor parts were given to stage-carpenters and otherhangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern atSurrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man namedLloyd, a quantity of arms and materials to be used in the abductionscheme. Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern on the eleventh, warned Lloydto have the "shooting-irons" in readiness, and, visiting the place againon the fourteenth, told him they would probably be called for thatnight. 

The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste. Itwas only about noon of the fourteenth that Booth learned that thePresident was to go to Ford's Theater that night to see the play "OurAmerican Cousin. " It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe thathe should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the daywas not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certainchurches. The President was fond of the theater. It was one of his fewmeans of recreation. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers andofficers, all eager to see him; by appearing in public he would gratifymany people whom he could not otherwise meet. Mrs. Lincoln had askedGeneral and Mrs. Grant to accompany her; they had accepted, and theannouncement that they would be present had been made in the eveningpapers; but they changed their plans, and went north by an afternoontrain. Mrs. Lincoln then invited in their stead Miss Harris and MajorRathbone, the daughter and the stepson of Senator Ira Harris. Beingdetained by visitors, the play had made some progress when the Presidentappeared. The band struck up "Hail to the Chief, " the actors ceasedplaying, the audience rose, cheering tumultuously, the President bowedin acknowledgment, and the play went on. 

From the moment he learned of the President's intention, Booth's everyaction was alert and energetic. He and his confederates were seen onhorseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference withMrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. He intrusted to anactor named Matthews a carefully prepared statement of his reasons forcommitting the murder, which he charged him to give to the publisher ofthe "National Intelligencer, " but which Matthews, in the terror anddismay of the night, burned without showing to any one. Booth wasperfectly at home in Ford's Theater. Either by himself, or with the aidof friends, he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during theafternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to thesmall passage behind the President's box. Once there, he guarded againstinterference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by asimple mortise in the angle of the wall and the door by which he hadentered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He evenprovided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box byboring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe theoccupants, or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery-stable a small, fleet horse. 

A few minutes before ten o'clock, leaving his horse at the rear of thetheater in charge of a call-boy, he went into a neighboring saloon, tooka drink of brandy, and, entering the theater, passed rapidly to thelittle hallway leading to the President's box. Showing a card to theservant in attendance, he was allowed to enter, closed the doornoiselessly, and secured it with the wooden bar he had previously madeready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whomand himself yet remained the partition and the door through which he hadmade the hole. 

No one, not even the comedian who uttered them, could ever remember thelast words of the piece that were spoken that night--the last AbrahamLincoln heard upon earth. The tragedy in the box turned play and playersto the most unsubstantial of phantoms. Here were five human beings in anarrow space--the greatest man of his time, in the glory of the moststupendous success of our history; his wife, proud and happy; a pair ofbetrothed lovers, with all the promise of felicity that youth, socialposition, and wealth could give them; and this handsome young actor, thepet of his little world. The glitter of fame, happiness, and ease wasupon the entire group; yet in an instant everything was to be changed. Quick death was to come to the central figure--the central figure of thecentury's great and famous men. Over the rest hovered fates from which amother might pray kindly death to save her children in their infancy. One was to wander with the stain of murder upon his soul, in frightfulphysical pain, with a price upon his head and the curse of a world uponhis name, until he died a dog's death in a burning barn; the wife was topass the rest of her days in melancholy and madness; and one of thelovers was to slay the other, and end his life a raving maniac. 

The murderer seemed to himself to be taking part in a play. Hate andbrandy had for weeks kept his brain in a morbid state. Holding a pistolin one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put thepistol to the President's head, and fired. Major Rathbone sprang tograpple with him, and received a savage knife wound in the arm. Then, rushing forward, Booth placed his hand on the railing of the box andvaulted to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such anathlete. He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in theflag that draped the front of the box. He fell, the torn flag trailingon his spur; but, though the fall had broken his leg, he rose instantlyand brandishing his knife and shouting, "Sic Semper Tyrannis!" fledrapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone called, "Stophim!" The cry rang out, "He has shot the President!" and from theaudience, stupid at first with surprise, and wild afterward withexcitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuitof the assassin. But he ran through the familiar passages, leaped uponhis horse, rewarding with a kick and a curse the boy who held him, andescaped into the night. 

The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, hiseyes closed. Major Rathbone, not regarding his own grievous hurt, rushedto the door of the box to summon aid. He found it barred, and some oneon the outside beating and clamoring for admittance. It was at once seenthat the President's wound was mortal. A large derringer bullet hadentered the back of the head, on the left side, and, passing through thebrain, lodged just behind the left eye. He was carried to a house acrossthe street, and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hallon the ground floor. Mrs. Lincoln followed, tenderly cared for by MissHarris. Rathbone, exhausted by loss of blood, fainted, and was takenhome. Messengers were sent for the cabinet, for the surgeon-general, forDr. Stone, Mr. Lincoln's family physician, and for others whose officialor private relations to the President gave them the right to be there. Acrowd of people rushed instinctively to the White House, and, burstingthrough the doors, shouted the dreadful news to Robert Lincoln and MajorHay, who sat together in an upper room. They ran down-stairs, and asthey were entering a carriage to drive to Tenth Street, a friend came upand told them that Mr. Seward and most of the cabinet had been murdered. The news seemed so improbable that they hoped it was all untrue; but, onreaching Tenth Street, the excitement and the gathering crowds preparedthem for the worst. In a few moments those who had been sent for andmany others were assembled in the little chamber where the chief of thestate lay in his agony. His son was met at the door by Dr. Stone, whowith grave tenderness informed him that there was no hope. 

The President had been shot a few minutes after ten. The wound wouldhave brought instant death to most men, but his vital tenacity wasremarkable. He was, of course, unconscious from the first moment; but hebreathed with slow and regular respiration throughout the night. As thedawn came and the lamplight grew pale, his pulse began to fail; but hisface, even then, was scarcely more haggard than those of the sorrowingmen around him. His automatic moaning ceased, a look of unspeakablepeace came upon his worn features, and at twenty-two minutes after sevenhe died. Stanton broke the silence by saying:

"Now he belongs to the ages. "

Booth had done his work efficiently. His principal subordinate, Payne, had acted with equal audacity and cruelty, but not with equally fatalresult. Going to the home of the Secretary of State, who lay ill in bed, he had forced his way to Mr. Seward's room, on the pretext of being amessenger from the physician with a packet of medicine to deliver. Theservant at the door tried to prevent him from going up-stairs; theSecretary's son, Frederick W. Seward, hearing the noise, stepped outinto the hall to check the intruders. Payne rushed upon him with apistol which missed fire, then rained blows with it upon his head, and, grappling and struggling, the two came to the Secretary's room and felltogether through the door. Frederick Seward soon became unconscious, andremained so for several weeks, being, perhaps, the last man in thecivilized world to learn the strange story of the night. The Secretary'sdaughter and a soldier nurse were in the room. Payne struck them rightand left, wounding the nurse with his knife, and then, rushing to thebed, began striking at the throat of the crippled statesman, inflictingthree terrible wounds on his neck and cheek. The nurse recovered himselfand seized the assassin from behind, while another son, roused by hissister's screams, came into the room and managed at last to force himoutside the door--not, however, until he and the nurse had been stabbedrepeatedly. Payne broke away at last, and ran down-stairs, seriouslywounding an attendant on the way, reached the door unhurt, sprang uponhis horse, and rode leisurely away. When surgical aid arrived, theSecretary's house looked like a field hospital. Five of its inmates werebleeding from ghastly wounds, and two of them, among the highestofficials of the nation, it was thought might never see the light ofanother day; though all providentially recovered. 

The assassin left behind him his hat, which apparently trivial loss costhim and one of his fellow conspirators their lives. Fearing that thelack of it would arouse suspicion, he abandoned his horse, instead ofmaking good his escape, and hid himself in the woods east of Washingtonfor two days. Driven at last by hunger, he returned to the city andpresented himself at Mrs. Surratt's house at the very moment when allits inmates had been arrested and were about to be taken to the officeof the provost-marshal. Payne thus fell into the hands of justice, andthe utterance of half a dozen words by him and the unhappy woman whoseshelter he sought proved the death-warrant of them both. 

Booth had been recognized by dozens of people as he stood before thefootlights and brandished his dagger; but his swift horse quicklycarried him beyond any haphazard pursuit. He crossed the Navy-Yardbridge and rode into Maryland, being joined very soon by Herold. Theassassin and his wretched acolyte came at midnight to Mrs. Surratt'stavern, and afterward pushed on through the moonlight to the house of anacquaintance of Booth, a surgeon named Mudd, who set Booth's leg andgave him a room, where he rested until evening, when Mudd sent them ontheir desolate way south. After parting with him they went to theresidence of Samuel Cox near Port Tobacco, and were by him given intothe charge of Thomas Jones, a contraband trader between Maryland andRichmond, a man so devoted to the interests of the Confederacy thattreason and murder seemed every-day incidents to be accepted as naturaland necessary. He kept Booth and Herold in hiding at the peril of hislife for a week, feeding and caring for them in the woods near hishouse, watching for an opportunity to ferry them across the Potomac;doing this while every wood-path was haunted by government detectives, well knowing that death would promptly follow his detection, and that areward was offered for the capture of his helpless charge that wouldmake a rich man of any one who gave him up. 

With such devoted aid Booth might have wandered a long way; but thereis no final escape but suicide for an assassin with a broken leg. Ateach painful move the chances of discovery increased. Jones was able, after repeated failures, to row his fated guests across the Potomac. Arriving on the Virginia side, they lived the lives of hunted animalsfor two or three days longer, finding to their horror that they werereceived by the strongest Confederates with more of annoyance thanenthusiasm, though none, indeed, offered to betray them. Booth had bythis time seen the comments of the newspapers on his work, and bittererthan death or bodily suffering was the blow to his vanity. He confidedhis feelings of wrong to his diary, comparing himself favorably withBrutus and Tell, and complaining: "I am abandoned, with the curse ofCain upon me, when, if the world knew my heart, that one blow would havemade me great. "

On the night of April 25, he and Herold were surrounded by a party underLieutenant E. P. Doherty, as they lay sleeping in a barn belonging to oneGarrett, in Caroline County, Virginia, on the road to Bowling Green. When called upon to surrender, Booth refused. A parley took place, afterwhich Doherty told him he would fire the barn. At this Herold came outand surrendered. The barn was fired, and while it was burning, Booth, clearly visible through the cracks in the building, was shot by BostonCorbett, a sergeant of cavalry. He was hit in the back of the neck, notfar from the place where he had shot the President, lingered about threehours in great pain, and died at seven in the morning. 

The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, weretried by military commission sitting in Washington in the months of Mayand June. The charges against them specified that they were "incitedand encouraged" to treason and murder by Jefferson Davis and theConfederate emissaries in Canada. This was not proved on the trial;though the evidence bearing on the case showed frequent communicationsbetween Canada and Richmond and the Booth coterie in Washington, andsome transactions in drafts at the Montreal Bank, where Jacob Thompsonand Booth both kept accounts. Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodtwere hanged on July 7; Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlin were imprisoned forlife at the Tortugas, the term being afterward shortened; and Spangler, the scene-shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years in jail. John H. Surratt escaped to Canada, and from there to England. Hewandered over Europe, and finally was detected in Egypt and brought backto Washington in 1867, where his trial lasted two months, and ended in adisagreement of the jury. 

Upon the hearts of a people glowing with the joy of victory, the news ofthe President's assassination fell as a great shock. It was the firsttime the telegraph had been called upon to spread over the world tidingsof such deep and mournful significance. In the stunning effect of theunspeakable calamity the country lost sight of the national success ofthe past week, and it thus came to pass that there was never anyorganized expression of the general exultation or rejoicing in the Northover the downfall of the rebellion. It was unquestionably best that itshould be so; and Lincoln himself would not have had it otherwise. Hehated the arrogance of triumph; and even in his cruel death he wouldhave been glad to know that his passage to eternity would prevent tooloud an exultation over the vanquished. As it was, the South could takeno umbrage at a grief so genuine and so legitimate; the people of thatsection even shared, to a certain degree, in the lamentations over thebier of one whom in their inmost hearts they knew to have wished themwell. 

There was one exception to the general grief too remarkable to be passedover in silence. Among the extreme radicals in Congress, Mr. Lincoln'sdetermined clemency and liberality toward the Southern people had madean impression so unfavorable that, though they were naturally shocked athis murder, they did not, among themselves, conceal their gratificationthat he was no longer in the way. In a political caucus, held a fewhours after the President's death, "the feeling was nearly universal, "to quote the language of one of their most prominent representatives, "that the accession of Johnson to the presidency would prove a godsendto the country. "

In Washington, with this singular exception, the manifestation of publicgrief was immediate and demonstrative. Within an hour after the body wastaken to the White House, the town was shrouded in black. Not only thepublic buildings, the shops, and the better residences were draped infuneral decorations, but still more touching proof of affection was seenin the poorest class of houses, where laboring men of both colors foundmeans in their penury to afford some scanty show of mourning. Theinterest and veneration of the people still centered in the White House, where, under a tall catafalque in the East Room, the late chief lay inthe majesty of death, and not at the modest tavern on PennsylvaniaAvenue, where the new President had his lodging, and where Chief-JusticeChase administered the oath of office to him at eleven o'clock on themorning of April 15. 

It was determined that the funeral ceremonies in Washington should becelebrated on Wednesday, April 19, and all the churches throughout thecountry were invited to join at the same time in appropriateobservances. The ceremonies in the East Room were brief and simple--theburial service, a prayer, and a short address; while all the pomp andcircumstance which the government could command was employed to give afitting escort from the White House to the Capitol, where the body ofthe President was to lie in state. The vast procession moved amid thebooming of minute-guns, and the tolling of all the bells in WashingtonGeorgetown, and Alexandria; and to associate the pomp of the day withthe greatest work of Lincoln's life, a detachment of colored troopsmarched at the head of the line. 

As soon as it was announced that Mr. Lincoln was to be buried atSpringfield, Illinois, every town and city on the route begged that thetrain might halt within its limits and give its people the opportunityof testifying their grief and reverence. It was finally arranged thatthe funeral cortege should follow substantially the same route overwhich he had come in 1861 to take possession of the office to which hehad given a new dignity and value for all time. On April 21, accompaniedby a guard of honor, and in a train decked with somber trappings, thejourney was begun. At Baltimore through which, four years before, it wasa question whether the President-elect could pass with safety to hislife, the coffin was taken with reverent care to the great dome of theExchange, where, surrounded with evergreens and lilies, it lay forseveral hours, the people passing by in mournful throngs. The samedemonstration was repeated, gaining continually in intensity of feelingand solemn splendor of display, in every city through which theprocession passed. The reception in New York was worthy alike of thegreat city and of the memory of the man they honored. The body lay instate in the City Hall, and a half-million people passed in deep silencebefore it. Here General Scott came, pale and feeble, but resolute, topay his tribute of respect to his departed friend and commander. 

The train went up the Hudson River by night, and at every town andvillage on the way vast waiting crowds were revealed by the fitful glareof torches, and dirges and hymns were sung. As the train passed intoOhio, the crowds increased in density, and the public grief seemedintensified at every step westward. The people of the great centralbasin were claiming their own. The day spent at Cleveland was unexampledin the depth of emotion it brought to life. Some of the guard of honorhave said that it was at this point they began to appreciate the placewhich Lincoln was to hold in history. 

The last stage of this extraordinary progress was completed, andSpringfield reached at nine o'clock on the morning of May 3. Nothing hadbeen done or thought of for two weeks in Springfield but thepreparations for this day, and they had been made with a thoroughnesswhich surprised the visitors from the East. The body lay in state in theCapitol, which was richly draped from roof to basement in black velvetand silver fringe. Within it was a bower of bloom and fragrance. Fortwenty-four hours an unbroken stream of people passed through, biddingtheir friend and neighbor welcome home and farewell; and at ten o'clockon May 4, the coffin lid was closed, and a vast procession moved out toOak Ridge, where the town had set apart a lovely spot for his grave, andwhere the dead President was committed to the soil of the State whichhad so loved and honored him. The ceremonies at the grave were simpleand touching. Bishop Simpson delivered a pathetic oration; prayers wereoffered and hymns were sung; but the weightiest and most eloquent wordsuttered anywhere that day were those of the second inaugural, which thecommittee had wisely ordained to be read over his grave, as the friendsof Raphael chose the incomparable canvas of the Transfiguration to bethe chief ornament of his funeral. 

XXXVIII

Lincoln's Early Environment--Its Effect on his Character--His Attitudetoward Slavery and the Slaveholder--His Schooling in Disappointment--HisSeeming Failures--His Real Successes--The Final Trial--HisAchievements--His Place in History

A child born to an inheritance of want; a boy growing into a narrowworld of ignorance; a youth taking up the burden of coarse manual labor;a man entering on the doubtful struggle of a local backwoodscareer--these were the beginnings of Abraham Lincoln, if we analyze themunder the hard practical cynical philosophy which takes for its mottothat "nothing succeeds but success. " If, however, we adopt a broaderphilosophy, and apply the more generous and more universal principlethat "everything succeeds which attacks favorable opportunity withfitting endeavor, " then we see that it was the strong vitality, theactive intelligence, and the indefinable psychological law of moralgrowth that assimilates the good and rejects the bad, which Nature gavethis obscure child, that carried him to the service of mankind and tothe admiration of the centuries with the same certainty with which theacorn grows to be the oak. 

We see how even the limitations of his environment helped the end. Self-reliance, that most vital characteristic of the pioneer, was his byblood and birth and training; and developed through the privations ofhis lot and the genius that was in him to the mighty strength needed toguide our great country through the titanic struggle of the Civil War. 

The sense of equality was his, also by virtue of his pioneer training--aconsciousness fostered by life from childhood to manhood in a state ofsociety where there were neither rich to envy nor poor to despise, wherethe gifts and hardships of the forest were distributed impartially toeach, and where men stood indeed equal before the forces of unsubduednature. 

The same great forces taught liberality, modesty, charity, sympathy--ina word, neighborliness. In that hard life, far removed from theartificial aids and comforts of civilization, where all the wealth ofCroesus, had a man possessed it, would not have sufficed to purchaserelief from danger, or help in time of need, neighborliness became ofprime importance. A good neighbor doubled his safety and his resources, a group of good neighbors increased his comfort and his prospects in aratio that grew like the cube root. Here was opportunity to practisethat virtue that Christ declared to be next to the love of God--thefruitful injunction to "love thy neighbor as thyself. "

Here, too, in communities far from the customary restraints of organizedlaw, the common native intelligence of the pioneer was brought face toface with primary and practical questions of natural right. These mennot only understood but appreciated the American doctrine ofself-government. It was this understanding, this feeling, which taughtLincoln to write: "When the white man governs himself, that isself-government; but when he governs himself and also governs anotherman, that is more than self-government--that is despotism"; and itsphilosophic corollary: "He who would be no slave must consent to have noslave. "

Abraham Lincoln sprang from exceptional conditions--was in truth, inthe language of Lowell, a "new birth of our new soil. " But thisdistinction was not due alone to mere environment. The ordinary man, with ordinary natural gifts, found in Western pioneer communities adevelopment essentially the same as he would have found under colonialVirginia or Puritan New England: a commonplace life, varying only withthe changing ideas and customs of time and locality. But for the manwith extraordinary powers of body and mind; for the individual gifted bynature with the genius which Abraham Lincoln possessed; the pioneercondition, with its severe training in self-denial, patience, andindustry, was favorable to a development of character that helped in apreëminent degree to qualify him for the duties and responsibilities ofleadership and government. He escaped the formal conventionalities whichbeget insincerity and dissimulation. He grew up without being warped byerroneous ideas or false principles; without being dwarfed by vanity, ortempted by self-interest. 

Some pioneer communities carried with them the institution of slavery;and in the slave State of Kentucky Lincoln was born. He remained thereonly a short time, and we have every reason to suppose that wherever hemight have grown to maturity his very mental and moral fiber would havespurned the doctrine and practice of human slavery. And yet so subtle isthe influence of birth and custom, that we can trace one lasting effectof this early and brief environment. Though he ever hated slavery, henever hated the slaveholder. This ineradicable feeling of pardon andsympathy for Kentucky and the South played no insignificant part in hisdealings with grave problems of statesmanship. He struck slavery itsdeath-blow with the hand of war, but he tendered the slaveholder agolden equivalent with the hand of friendship and peace. 

His advancement in the astonishing career which carried him fromobscurity to world-wide fame; from postmaster of New Salem village toPresident of the United States; from captain of a backwoods volunteercompany to commander-in-chief of the army and navy, was neither sudden, nor accidental, nor easy. He was both ambitious and successful, but hisambition was moderate and his success was slow. And because his successwas slow, his ambition never outgrew either his judgment or his powers. From the day when he left the paternal roof and launched his canoe onthe head waters of the Sangamon River to begin life on his own account, to the day of his first inauguration, there intervened full thirty yearsof toil, of study, self-denial, patience; often of effort baffled, ofhope deferred; sometimes of bitter disappointment. Given the naturalgift of great genius, given the condition of favorable environment, ityet required an average lifetime and faithful unrelaxing effort totransform the raw country stripling into a competent ruler for thisgreat nation. 

Almost every success was balanced--sometimes overbalanced by a seemingfailure. Reversing the usual promotion, he went into the Black Hawk Wara captain and, through no fault of his own, came out a private. He rodeto the hostile frontier on horseback, and trudged home on foot. Hisstore "winked out. " His surveyor's compass and chain, with which he wasearning a scanty living, were sold for debt. He was defeated in hisfirst campaign for the legislature; defeated in his first attempt to benominated for Congress; defeated in his application to be appointedcommissioner of the General Land Office; defeated for the Senate in theIllinois legislature of 1854, when he had forty-five votes to beginwith, by Trumbull, who had only five votes to begin with; defeated inthe legislature of 1858, by an antiquated apportionment, when his jointdebates with Douglas had won him a popular plurality of nearly fourthousand in a Democratic State; defeated in the nomination forVice-President on the Frémont ticket in 1856, when a favorable nod fromhalf a dozen wire-workers would have brought him success. 

Failures? Not so. Every seeming defeat was a slow success. His was thegrowth of the oak, and not of Jonah's gourd. Every scaffolding oftemporary elevation he pulled down, every ladder of transientexpectation which broke under his feet accumulated his strength, andpiled up a solid mound which raised him to wider usefulness and clearervision. He could not become a master workman until he had served atedious apprenticeship. It was the quarter of a century of readingthinking, speech-making and legislating which qualified him forselection as the chosen champion of the Illinois Republicans in thegreat Lincoln-Douglas joint debates of 1858. It was the greatintellectual victory won in these debates, plus the title "Honest oldAbe, " won by truth and manhood among his neighbors during a wholegeneration, that led the people of the United States to confide to hishands the duties and powers of President. 

And when, after thirty years of endeavor, success had beaten downdefeat; when Lincoln had been nominated elected, and inaugurated, camethe crowning trial of his faith and constancy. When the people, by freeand lawful choice, had placed honor and power in his hands; when hissignature could convene Congress, approve laws, make ministers, causeships to sail and armies to move; when he could speak with potentialvoice to other rulers of other lands, there suddenly came upon thegovernment and the nation the symptoms of a fatal paralysis; honorseemed to dwindle and power to vanish. Was he then, after all, not to bePresident? Was patriotism dead? Was the Constitution waste paper? Wasthe Union gone?

The indications were, indeed, ominous. Seven States were in rebellion. There was treason in Congress, treason in the Supreme Court, treason inthe army and navy. Confusion and discord rent public opinion. To useLincoln's own forcible simile, sinners were calling the righteous torepentance. Finally, the flag, insulted on the _Star of the West_, trailed in capitulation at Sumter and then came the humiliation of theBaltimore riot, and the President practically for a few days a prisonerin the capital of the nation. 

But his apprenticeship had been served, and there was no more failure. With faith and justice and generosity he conducted for four long years acivil war whose frontiers stretched from the Potomac to the Rio Grande;whose soldiers numbered a million men on each side; in which, countingskirmishes and battles small and great, was fought an average of twoengagements every day; and during which every twenty-four hours saw anexpenditure of two millions of money. The labor, the thought, theresponsibility, the strain of intellect and anguish of soul that he gaveto this great task, who can measure?

The sincerity of the fathers of the Republic was impugned he justifiedthem. The Declaration of Independence was called a "string of glitteringgeneralities" and a "self-evident lie"; he refuted the aspersion. TheConstitution was perverted; he corrected the error. The flag wasinsulted; he redressed the offense. The government was assailed? herestored its authority. Slavery thrust the sword of civil war at theheart of the nation? he crushed slavery, and cemented the purified Unionin new and stronger bonds. 

And all the while conciliation was as active as vindication was stern. He reasoned and pleaded with the anger of the South; he gaveinsurrection time to repent; he forbore to execute retaliation; heoffered recompense to slaveholders; he pardoned treason. 

What but lifetime schooling in disappointment; what but the pioneer'sself-reliance and freedom from prejudice; what but the patient faith, the clear perceptions of natural right, the unwarped sympathy andunbounding charity of this man with spirit so humble and soul so great, could have carried him through the labors he wrought to the victory heattained?

As the territory may be said to be its body, and its material activitiesits blood, so patriotism may be said to be the vital breath of a nation. When patriotism dies, the nation dies, and its resources as well as itsterritory go to other peoples with stronger vitality. 

Patriotism can in no way be more effectively cultivated than by studyingand commemorating the achievements and virtues of our great men--the menwho have lived and died for the nation, who have advanced its prosperity, increased its power, added to its glory. In our brief history the UnitedStates can boast of many great men, and the achievement by its sons ofmany great deeds; and if we accord the first rank to Washington asfounder, so we must unhesitatingly give to Lincoln the second place aspreserver and regenerator of American liberty. So far, however from beingopposed or subordinated either to the other, the popular heart hasalready canonized these two as twin heroes in our national pantheon, astwin stars in the firmament of our national fame. 

INDEX

=Able, Mrs. =, sister of Mary Owens, 55, 60

=Adams, Charles Francis=, member of Congress, United States minister to England, sent to England, 211

=Alabama=, State of, admitted as State, 1819, 19

=Alabama=, the, Confederate cruiser, sunk by the _Kearsarge_, 525

=Albemarle=, the, Confederate ironclad, destruction of, October 27, 1864, 525

=Albert=, Prince Consort, drafts note to Lord Russell about _Trent_ affair, 247

=Alexander II=, Czar of Russia, emancipates Russian serfs, 101

=Alexandria=, Virginia, occupation of, 214

=American Party=, principles of, 101, 102; nominates Millard Fillmore for President, 1856, 102

=Anderson, Robert=, brevet major-general United States army, transfers his command to Fort Sumter, 177, 178; reports condition of Fort Sumter, 182; notified of coming relief, 188; defense and surrender of Fort Sumter, 189, 190; telegram about Frémont's proclamation, 240; sends Sherman to Nashville, 254; turns over command to Sherman, 254; raises flag over Fort Sumter, 531

=Antietam=, Maryland, battle of, September 17, 1862, 31

=Arkansas=, State of, joins Confederacy, 200, 204; military governor appointed for, 419; reconstruction in, 426, 427; slavery abolished in, 427; slavery in, throttled by public opinion, 473; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 475

=Armies of the United States=, enlistment in, since beginning of the war, 353, 354; numbers under Grant's command, March, 1865, 507; reduction of, to peace footing, 527; grand review of, 527-529

=Armstrong, Jack=, wrestles with Lincoln, 25

=Arnold, Samuel=, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; imprisoned, 544

=Atlanta=, Georgia, siege of, July 22 to September 1, 1864, 407

=Atzerodt, George=, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; assigned to murder Andrew Johnson, 535; deposits arms in tavern at Surrattsville, 536; execution of, 544

=Bailey, Theodorus=, rear-admiral United States navy, in expedition against New Orleans, 284

=Bailhache, William H. =, prints Lincoln's first inaugural, 168

=Baker, Edward D. =, member of Congress, United States senator, brevet major-general United States Volunteers, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; nominated for Congress, 73; in Mexican War, 75

=Ball's Bluff=, Virginia, battle of, October, 21, 1861, 262

=Baltimore=, Maryland, Massachusetts Sixth mobbed in, 193; occupied by General Butler, 199; threatened by Early, 403; funeral honors to Lincoln in, 546

=Bancroft, George=, Secretary of the Navy, historian, minister to Prussia, letter to Lincoln, 321

=Banks, Nathaniel P. =, Speaker of the House of Representatives, major-general United States Volunteers, in Army of Virginia, 310; forces under, for defense of Washington, 317; operations against Port Hudson, 382; captures Port Hudson, 383, 384; reply to Lincoln, 425; causes election of State officers in Louisiana, 425, 426; opinion of new Louisiana constitution, 426

=Barton, William=, governor of Delaware, reply to Lincoln's call for volunteers, 193

=Bates, Edward=, member of Congress, Attorney-General, candidate for presidential nomination, 1860, 144; vote for, in Chicago convention, 149; tendered cabinet appointment, 163; appointed Attorney-General, 182; signs cabinet protest, 311; rewrites cabinet protest, 312; resigns from cabinet, 491

=Beauregard, G. T. =, Confederate general, reduces Fort Sumter, 188-190; in command at Manassas Junction, 215; understanding with Johnston, 216; battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, 226-229; council with Johnston and Hardee, 267; succeeds to command at Pittsburg Landing, 273; losses at Pittsburg Landing, 274; evacuates Corinth, 275; united with Hood, 409; orders Hood to assume offensive, 410; interview with Davis and Johnston, 520

=Bell, John=, member of Congress, Secretary of War, United States senator, nominated for President, 1860, 143; vote for, 160

=Benjamin, Judah P. =, United States senator, Confederate Secretary of State, suggestions about instructions to peace commissioners, 482; last instructions to Slidell, 501, 502

=Berry, William F. =, partner of Lincoln in a store, 35; death of, 36

=Big Bethel=, Virginia, disaster at, 214

=Blackburn's Ford=, Virginia, engagement at, July 18, 1861, 226

=Black Hawk=, chief of the Sac Indians, crosses Mississippi into Illinois, 32

=Black, Jeremiah S. =, Attorney-General, Secretary of State, war of pamphlets with Douglas, 134

=Blair, Francis P. =, Sr. , quarrel with Frémont, 236, 487; asks permission to go South, 478; interviews with Jefferson Davis, 479-482; his Mexican project, 479

=Blair, Francis P. =, Jr. , member of Congress major-general United States Volunteers quarrel with Frémont, 236, 487, 488

=Blair, Montgomery=, Postmaster-General, appointed Postmaster-General, 182; quarrel with Frémont, 236, 487, 488; at cabinet meeting, July 22, 1862, 331, 332; objects to time for issuing emancipation proclamation, 340; resolution in Republican platform aimed at, 446, 487; relations with members of the cabinet, 488; remarks after Early's raid, 488; retires from cabinet, 489; works for Lincoln's reëlection, 489, 490; wishes to be chief justice, 490; declines foreign mission, 490

=Bogue, Captain Vincent=, navigates Sangamon River in steamer _Talisman_, 27, 28

=Boonville=, Missouri, battle of, June 17, 1861, 214

=Booth, John Wilkes=, personal description of, 534, 535; scheme to abduct Lincoln, 535; creates disturbance at Lincoln's second inauguration, 535; assigns parts in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 535, 536; final preparations, 536, 537; shoots the President, 538; wounds Major Rathbone 538; escape of, 539; flight and capture of, 542, 543; death of, 543; account at Montreal Bank, 544

=Bragg, Braxton=, Confederate general, forces Buell back to Louisville, 275, 276; threatens Louisville, 379; battle of Perryville, 379; battle of Murfreesboro, 380; retreat to Chattanooga, 385; Chattanooga and Chickamauga, 386-392; retreats to Dalton, 392; superseded by Johnston, 395; his invasion delays reconstruction in Tennessee, 428

=Breckinridge, John C. =, Vice-President, Confederate major-general, and Secretary of War, nominated for Vice-President, 1856, 104; desires Douglas's reëlection to United States Senate, 126; nominated for President, 1860, 143; vote for, 160; joins the rebellion, 217; required by Davis to report on Johnston-Sherman agreement, 523

=Breckinridge, Robert J. =, D. D. , LL. D. , temporary chairman Republican national convention, 1864, 446

=Brown, Albert G. =, member of Congress, United States senator, questions Douglas, 129; demands congressional slave code, 141

=Brown, John=, raid at Harper's Ferry, trial and execution of, 134

=Brown, Joseph E. =, governor of Georgia, United States senator, refuses to obey orders from Richmond, 481

=Browning, Orville H. =, United States senator, Secretary of the Interior under President Johnson, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; speech in Chicago convention, 151

=Browning, Mrs. O. H. =, Lincoln's letter to, 58, 59

=Bryant, William Cullen=, presides over Cooper Institute meeting, 138

=Buchanan, Franklin=, captain United States navy, admiral Confederate navy, resigns from Washington navy-yard and joins the Confederacy, 196

=Buchanan, James=, fifteenth President of the United States, nominated for President, 1856, 104; elected President, 105, 108; announces pro-slavery policy, 114; appoints Walker governor of Kansas, 114; reply to Walker's letter, 115; special message recommending Lecompton Constitution, 115; permits Scott to be called to Washington, 172; non-action regarding secession, 176, 177; reconstruction of his cabinet, 178; rides with Lincoln in inauguration procession, 180; non-coercion doctrine of, 210; signs resolution for constitutional amendment, 476

=Buckner, Simon B. =, Confederate lieutenant-general, stationed at Bowling Green, 254; force of, 263; surrenders Fort Donelson, 267, 268

=Buell, Don Carlos=, major-general United States Volunteers, succeeds Sherman in Kentucky, 255; driven back to Louisville, 1862, 258; instructions about East Tennessee, 258, 259; reluctance to move into East Tennessee, 260; reluctance to coöperate with Halleck, 263, 264, 269; ordered forward to Savannah, 271; arrives at Pittsburg Landing, 273; retreats to Louisville, 275, 276; battle of Perryville, 379; relieved from command, 380

=Bull Run=, Virginia, battle of, July 21, 1861, 226-229; second battle of, August 30, 1862, 310, 311

=Burnside, Ambrose E. =, major-general United States Volunteers, holds Knoxville 1863, 258; commands force in Roanoke Island expedition, 277, 278; ordered to reinforce McClellan, 307; orders arrest of Vallandigham, 358; appointed to command Army of the Potomac, 363; previous services, 363, 364; battle of Fredericksburg, 364, 365; relieved from command, 366; ordered to reinforce Rosecrans, 388; besieged at Knoxville, 391; repulses Longstreet, 391

=Butler, Benjamin F. =, major-general United States Volunteers, member of Congress, occupies Baltimore, 199; orders concerning slaves, 220-222; instructions to, about slaves, 223; commands land force in Farragut's expedition against New Orleans, 283; in command at New Orleans, 285; report about negro soldiers, 348, 349; proclaimed an outlaw by Jefferson Davis, 350; seizes City Point, 401; receives votes for Vice-President at Baltimore convention, 448

=Butler, William=, relates incident about Lincoln, 53

=Butterfield, Justin=, appointed Commissioner of General Land Office, 92; defended by Lincoln from political attack, 92

=Cadwalader, George=, major-general United States Volunteers, action in Merryman case, 199, 200

=Cairo=, Illinois, military importance of, 209, 210

=Calhoun, John=, appoints Lincoln deputy surveyor, 39, 40; at Springfield, Illinois, 52

=Cameron, Simon=, United States senator, Secretary of War, candidate for presidential nomination, 1860, 144; vote for, in Chicago convention, 149; tendered cabinet appointment, 163, 164; appointed Secretary of War, 182; brings letters of Anderson to Lincoln, 182; visits Frémont, 242; interview with Sherman, 255; appointed minister to Russia, 289; reference to slavery in report to Congress, 320; moves renomination of Lincoln and Hamlin by acclamation, 447

=Campbell, John A. =, justice United States Supreme Court; Confederate commissioner; intermediary of Confederate commissioners, 183; at Hampton Roads conference, 482-485; interviews with Lincoln, 519

=Canby, E. R. S. =, brevet major-general United States army, receives surrender of Taylor, 525; receives surrender of E. Kirby Smith, 526, 527

=Carpenter, Frank B. =, conversation with Lincoln about emancipation proclamation, 331, 332

=Carpenter, W. =, defeated for Illinois legislature 1832, 34; elected in 1834, 43

=Carrick's Ford=, Virginia, battle of, July 13, 1861, 225

=Cartter, David K. =, announces change of vote to Lincoln in Chicago convention, 151

=Cartwright, Peter=, elected to Illinois legislature in 1832, 34

=Chancellorsville=, Virginia, battle of, May 1-4, 1863, 369

=Charleston=, South Carolina, capture of, February 18, 1865, 415; burning of, 416

=Chase, Salmon P. =, United States senator, Secretary of the Treasury, chief justice United States Supreme Court, candidate for presidential nomination, 1860, 144; vote for, in Chicago convention, 149; summoned to Springfield, 163; appointed Secretary of the Treasury, 182; questions McClellan at council of war, 289; signs cabinet protest, 311; favors emancipation by military commanders, 332; urges that parts of States be not exempted in final emancipation proclamation, 343; submits form of closing paragraph, 344; presidential aspirations of, 439-441; letter to Lincoln, 440, 441; resigns from cabinet, 457; effect of his resignation on the political situation, 464; looked upon by radicals as their representative in the cabinet, 487; hostility to Montgomery Blair, 488; made chief justice, 490, 491; note of thanks to Lincoln, 491; opinion of Lincoln, 491; administers oath of office to Lincoln at second inauguration, 496; administers oath of office to President Johnson, 545

=Chattanooga=, Tennessee, battle of, November 23-25, 1863, 389-392

=Chickamauga=, Tennessee, battle of, September 18-20, 1863, 386, 387

=Clary's Grove=, Illinois, settlement of, 24

=Clay, Clement C. , Jr. =, United States senator, Confederate agent in Canada, correspondence with Horace Greeley, 459

=Clay, Henry=, nominated for President, 28

=Clements, Andrew J. =, member of Congress, elected to Congress, 419

=Cleveland=, Ohio, funeral honors to Lincoln in, 547

=Cochrane, John=, member of Congress, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, nominated for Vice-President, 1864, 442

=Cold Harbor=, Virginia, battle of, June 1-12, 1864, 399

=Colfax, Schuyler=, member of Congress, Vice-President, letter to, from Lincoln, 132, 133

=Collamer, Jacob=, member of Congress, Postmaster-General, United States senator, vote for, in Chicago convention, 149

=Columbia=, South Carolina, capture and burning of, 415, 416

=Columbus=, Kentucky, evacuation of, 269

=Confederate States of America=, formed by seceding States, 178, 179; "corner-stone" theory, 179; government of, fires on Fort Sumter, 189; joined by North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, 200; strength of, 204; war measures of, 207; capital removed to Richmond, 207; strength of, in the West, 263; outcry of, against emancipation proclamation and arming of negroes, 350, 351; efficiency of armies of, in 1863, 370; proclamation calling on people to resist Sherman's march, 411, 412; nearly in state of collapse, 481; doomed from the hour of Lincoln's reëlection, 499; depreciation of its currency, 499, 500; conscription laws of, 500; Confederate Congress makes Lee general-in-chief, 500; number of soldiers in final struggle, 507; flight of, from Richmond, 515; collapse of the rebellion, 524-527; number of troops surrendered, 527

=Congress of the United States=, passes act organizing territory of Illinois, 19; fixes number of stars and stripes in the flag, 19; admits as States Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri, 19; nullification debate in, 38; Lincoln's service in, 75-90; Missouri Compromise, 94-96; Democratic majorities chosen in, in 1856, 108; agitation over Kansas in, 113; Senator Brown's resolutions, 141; official count of electoral votes, 160; appoints compromise committees, 167; Buchanan's annual message to, December, 1860, 176, 177; convened in special session by President Lincoln, 192; Lincoln's message to, May 26, 1862, 195; legalizes Lincoln's war measures, 206; meeting and measures of special session of Thirty-seventh Congress, 217-220; Southern unionists in, 217; Lincoln's message to, July 4, 1861, 218-220; action on slavery, 223; special session adjourns, 223; House passes resolution of thanks to Captain Wilkes, 246; friendly to McClellan, 250; Lincoln's message of December 3, 1861, 257, 321, 322; interview of border State delegations with Lincoln, 257, 258, 324, 325; Lincoln's special message, March 6, 1862, 323, 324; passes joint resolution favoring compensated emancipation, 325; passes bill for compensated emancipation in District of Columbia, 325, 336; House bill to aid emancipation in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, 326; slavery measures of 1862, 329; President's second interview with border slave State delegations, 329-331; President's annual message, December 1, 1862, 341, 342; passes national conscription law, 354, 355; act authorizing the President to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 359, 360; confers rank of lieutenant-general on Grant, 393; admits representatives and senators from States with provisional governments, 419; President's annual message, December 8, 1863, 424; reverses former action about seating members from "ten-per-cent States, " 424; bills to aid compensated abolishment in Missouri, 432; opposition to Lincoln in, 454; action on bill of Henry Winter Davis, 454; repeals fugitive-slave law, 457; confirms Fessenden's nomination, 458; Lincoln's message of December 5, 1864, 470-472; joint resolution proposing constitutional amendment to prohibit slavery throughout United States, 471-476; the two constitutional amendments submitted to the States during Lincoln's term, 475, 476; Senate confirms Chase's nomination as chief justice, 491

=Congress=, the, Union sailing frigate, burned by _Merrimac_, 280

=Constitutional Union Party=, candidates in 1860, 153

=Conventions=: first national convention of Whig party, 28; President Jackson gives impetus to system of, 52; Illinois State convention nominates Lincoln for Congress 74, 75; convention of "Know-Nothing" party, 1856, 102; Bloomington convention, May, 1856, 103; first national convention of Republican party, June 17, 1856, 103; Democratic national convention, June 2, 1856, 104; Democratic national convention, Charleston, April 23, 1860, 142; it adjourns to reassemble at Baltimore, June 18, 1860, 143; Constitutional Union Convention, Baltimore, May 9, 1860, 143; Republican national convention, Chicago, May 16, 1860, 144, 147-151; Decatur, Illinois, State convention, 154; Cleveland convention, May 31, 1864, 441, 442; meeting in New York to nominate Grant, 442, 443; New Hampshire State convention, January 6, 1864, 443; Republican national convention, June 7, 1864, 446-449; Democratic national convention, 1864, postponed, 463; Democratic national convention meets, 466-468; resolution of Baltimore convention hostile to Montgomery Blair, 487

=Cook, B. C. =, member of Congress, nominates Lincoln in Baltimore convention, 447; seeks to learn Lincoln's wishes about Vice-Presidency, 448

=Cooper, Samuel=, Confederate adjutant-general, joins the Confederacy, 208

=Corbett, Boston=, sergeant United States army, shoots Booth, 543

=Corinth=, Mississippi, captured by Halleck, 275

=Couch, Darius N. =, major-general United States Volunteers, militia force under, in Pennsylvania, 372

=Cox, Samuel=, assists Booth and Herold, 542

=Crawford, Andrew=, teacher of President Lincoln, 12

=Crittenden, John J. =, Attorney-General, United States senator, advocates reëlection of Douglas to United States Senate, 126; in Thirty-seventh Congress, 217; presents resolution, 223

=Cumberland=, the, Union frigate, sunk by _Merrimac_, 280

=Curtis, Samuel R. =, member of Congress, major-general United States Volunteers, sends order of removal to Frémont, 242, 243; campaign in Missouri, 269; victory at Pea Ridge, 271

=Cushing, William B. =, commander United States navy, destruction of the _Albemarle_, 525

=Dahlgren, John A. =, rear-admiral United States navy, at gathering of officials to discuss fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296

=Davis, Henry Winter=, member of Congress, bill prescribing method of reconstruction, 454; signs Wade-Davis manifesto, 456

=Davis, Jefferson=, Secretary of War, United States senator, Confederate President, orders that "rebellion must be crushed" in Kansas, 113; Senate resolutions of, 141; signs address commending Charleston disruption, 143; statement in Senate, 143; elected President of Confederate States of America, 179; telegram to Governor Letcher, 197; proclamation offering letters of marque to privateers, 205; camp of instruction at Harper's Ferry, 209; proclamation of outlawry, 350; message on emancipation proclamation, 350, 351; appoints Hood to succeed Johnston, 407; visits Hood, and unites commands of Beauregard and Hood, 409; interview with Jaquess and Gilmore, 462; interviews with F. P. Blair, Sr. , 479-481; gives Blair a letter to show Lincoln, 481; appoints peace commission, 482; instructions to peace commissioners, 482; reports Hampton Roads conference to rebel Congress, 485; speech at public meeting, 485, 486; Confederate Congress shows hostility to, 500, 501; reappoints J. E. Johnston to resist Sherman, 501; recommendations concerning slaves in rebel army, 501; sanctions Lee's letter to Grant, 503; conference with Lee, 504; flight from Richmond, 515; proclamation from Danville, 519, 520; retreat to Greensboro, North Carolina, 520; interview with Johnston and Beauregard, 520; continues southward, 520; dictates proposition of armistice presented by Johnston to Sherman, 521; requires report from Breckinridge about Johnston-Sherman agreement, 523; instructions to Johnston, 524; attempt to reach E. Kirby Smith, 525, 526; effort to gain Florida coast, 526; capture, imprisonment, and release of, 526

=Davis, Mrs. Jefferson=, captured with her husband, 526

=Dawson, John=, defeated for Illinois legislature, 1832, 34; elected in 1834, 43

=Dayton, William L. =, United States senator minister to France, nominated for Vice-President, 104; vote for, in Chicago convention, 149

=Delano, Columbus=, member of Congress, Secretary of the Interior, in Baltimore convention, 447

=Delaware=, State of, secession feeling in, 201; rejects compensated abolishment, 322, 323

=Democratic Party=, party of slavery extension, 102; nominates Buchanan and Breckinridge in 1856, 104; disturbed by Buchanan's attitude on slavery, 116; pro-slavery demands of, 140, 141; national conventions of, 1860, 142-144; candidates in 1860, 152, 153; opposition to emancipation measures and conscription law, 354, 355; adopts McClellan for presidential candidate, 355; interest in Vallandigham, 358; attitude on slavery, 437, 438, 472, 473; convention postponed, 463; national convention, 1864, 466-468

=Dennison, William=, governor of Ohio, Postmaster-General, permanent chairman of Republican national convention, 1864, 446; succeeds Blair as Postmaster-General, 489, 490

=Dickinson, Daniel S. =, United States senator, candidate for vice-presidential nomination, 1864, 448, 449

=Doherty, E. P. =, lieutenant United States army, captures Booth and Herold, 543

=Donelson, Andrew J. =, nominated for Vice-President, 102

=Dorsey, Azel W. =, teacher of President Lincoln, 12

=Douglas, Stephen A. =, member of Congress, United States senator, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; challenges young Whigs of Springfield to debate, 62; elected to United States Senate, 75; champions repeal of Missouri Compromise, 95; speech at Illinois State fair, 96; at Peoria, 96; agreement with Lincoln, 99; on Dred Scott case, 109, 110; denounces Lecompton Constitution, 116, 117; hostility of Buchanan administration toward, 117; Lincoln-Douglas joint debate, 121-125; speeches in the South, 128, 129; answer to Senator Brown, 129; references to Lincoln, 130; Ohio speeches, 133; "Harper's Magazine" essay, 134; fight over nomination of, for President, 1860, 142-144; nominated for President, 143; speeches during campaign of 1860, 156; vote for, 160

=Douglass, Frederick=, conversation with Lincoln, 352

=Draft=, Congress passes national conscription law, 354; opposition of Governor Seymour to, 355-357; riots in New York, 356, 357; dissatisfaction in other places, 357; opposition of Vallandigham to, 358

=Dred Scott= case, decision of Supreme Court in, 108, 109; protest of North against, 109; Senator Douglas on, 109, 110

=Dresser, Rev. Charles=, marries Abraham Lincoln and Mary Todd, 68, 69

=Du-Pont, Samuel F. =, rear-admiral United States navy, commands fleet in Port Royal expedition, 245

=Durant, Thomas J. =, mentioned in letter of Lincoln's, 334, 335

=Early, Jubal A. =, Confederate lieutenant-general, threatens Washington, 403; inflicts damage on Blair's estate, 488

=Eckert, Thomas T. =, brevet brigadier-general United States Volunteers, sent to meet peace commissioners at Hampton Roads, 482; refuses to allow peace commissioners to proceed, 483

=Edwards, Cyrus=, desires commissionership of General Land Office, 92

=Edwards, Ninian W. =, one of "Long Nine, " 63

=Edwards, Mrs. Ninian W. =, sister of Mrs. Lincoln, 63

=Ellsworth, E. E. =, colonel United States Volunteers, assassination of, 214

=Emancipation=, Lincoln-Stone protest, 47; Lincoln's bill for, in District of Columbia, 86, 87; Missouri Compromise, 94, 95; Frémont's proclamation of, 236-238; discussed in President's message of December 3, 1861, 321, 322; Lincoln offers Delaware compensated abolishment, 322, 323; special message of March 6, 1862, 323, 324; Congress passes bill for, in District of Columbia, 325, 326; bill to aid it in border slave States, 326; Hunter's order of, 327; measures in Congress relating to, 328, 329; Lincoln's second interview with delegations from border slave States, 329-331; Lincoln's conversation with Carpenter about, 331, 332; first draft of emancipation proclamation read to cabinet, 331, 332; President's interview with Chicago clergymen, 337-339; Lincoln issues preliminary emancipation proclamation, 339-341; annual message of December 1, 1862, 341, 342; President issues final emancipation proclamation, 342-346; President's views on, 346, 347; arming of negro soldiers, 348, 350; Lincoln's letters to Banks about emancipation in Louisiana, 423-425; slavery abolished in Louisiana, 426; slavery abolished in Arkansas, 427; slavery abolished in Tennessee, 429; slavery abolished in Missouri, 432-434; Maryland refuses offer of compensated abolishment, 434; slavery abolished in Maryland, 435, 436; Republican national platform favors Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, 446; Constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery in United States, 471-476; two Constitutional amendments affecting slavery offered during Lincoln's term, 475, 476; Lincoln's draft of joint resolution offering the South $400, 000, 000, 493; Jefferson Davis recommends employment of negroes in army, with emancipation to follow, 501. See _Slavery_

=England=, public opinion in, favorable to the South, 211; excitement in, over _Trent_ affair, 246; joint expedition to Mexico, 451; "neutrality" of, 525

=Ericsson=, John, inventor of the _Monitor_, 279

=Evarts=, William M. , Secretary of State, United States senator, nominates Seward for President, 149; moves to make Lincoln's nomination unanimous, 151

=Everett=, Edward, member of Congress, minister to England, Secretary of State, United States senator, candidate for Vice-President, 1860, 153

=Ewell=, Richard S. , Confederate lieutenant-general, in retreat to Appomattox, 511; statement about burning of Richmond, 516

=Ewing=, Thomas, Secretary of the Interior defended by Lincoln against political attack, 92

=Fair Oaks=, Virginia, battle of, 302

=Farragut=, David G. , admiral United States navy, captures New Orleans and ascends the Mississippi, 282-287; ascends Mississippi a second time, 287; mentioned 328, 329, 381; operations against Port Hudson, 382; Mobile Bay, 468, 525

=Farrand=, Ebenezer, captain Confederate navy, surrender of, 525

=Fessenden=, William P. , United States senator, Secretary of the Treasury, becomes Secretary of the Treasury, 458; agrees with President against making proffers of peace to Davis, 463; resigns from cabinet, 491, 492

=Field=, David Dudley, escorts Lincoln to platform at Cooper Institute, 138

=Fillmore=, Millard, thirteenth President of the United States, nominated by Know-Nothing party for President, 1856, 102

=Five Forks=, Virginia, battle of, April 1, 1865, 507-509

=Floyd=, John B. , Secretary of War, Confederate brigadier-general, escapes from Fort Donelson, 268

=Foote=, Andrew H. , rear-admiral United States navy, capture of Island No. 10, 274; proceeds to Fort Pillow, 274

=Forrest=, Nathan B. , Confederate lieutenant-general, with Hood's army, 410; defeat of, 525

=Fort Donelson=, Tennessee, capture of, 266-268

=Fort Fisher=, North Carolina, capture of, 414, 481, 525

=Fort Harrison=, Virginia, capture of, 560

=Fort Henry=, Tennessee, capture of, 266

=Fort Jackson=, Louisiana, capture of, 282-285

=Fort McAllister=, Georgia, stormed by Sherman, 412

=Fort Pillow=, Tennessee, evacuation of, 286; massacre of negro troops at, 351

=Fort Pulaski=, Georgia, capture of, 278

=Fort Randolph=, Tennessee, evacuation of, 286

=Fort Stedman=, Virginia, assault of, 505, 506

=Fort St. Philip=, Louisiana, capture of, 282-285

=Fort Sumter=, South Carolina, occupied by Anderson, 177, 178; attempt to reinforce 178; cabinet consultations about, 182-184; defense and capture of, 189, 190

=Fortress Monroe=, Virginia, importance of, 209

=Fox=, Gustavus V. , Assistant Secretary of the Navy, ordered to aid Sumter, 184; sends the President additional news about fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296, 297

=France=, public opinion in, favorable to the South, 211; joint expedition to Mexico, 451; "neutrality" of, 525

=Franklin=, Benjamin, on American forests and the spirit of independence they fostered, 17

=Franklin=, Tennessee, battle of, November 30, 1864, 410

=Franklin=, W. B. , brevet major-general United States army, advises movement on Manassas, 289

=Fredericksburg=, Virginia, battle of, December 13, 1862, 364

=Frémont=, John C. , United States senator, major-general United States army, nominated for President, 1856, 103; made major-general, 233; opportunities and limitations of, 233-235; criticism of, 235; quarrel with Blair family, 236, 487; proclamation freeing slaves, 236, 237, 432; refuses to revoke proclamation, 238; removed from command of Western Department, 241-243; commands Mountain Department, 299; ordered to form junction with McDowell and Shields, 306; in Army of Virginia, 310; nominated for President, 1864, 442; withdraws from the contest, 442

=Fusion=, attempts at, in campaign of 1860, 157, 158

=Gamble, Hamilton R. =, provisional governor of Missouri, calls State convention together, 433; death of, 434

=Garnett, Robert S. =, Confederate brigadier-general, killed at Carrick's Ford, 225

=Gentry, Allen=, makes flatboat trip with Lincoln, 16

=Gentry, James=, enters land at Gentryville, 9; sends Lincoln to New Orleans, 16

=Gettysburg=, Pennsylvania, battle of, July 1-3, 1863, 372-375; address of Mr. Lincoln at, 376, 377

=Giddings, Joshua R. =, member of Congress approves Lincoln's bill abolishing slavery in District of Columbia, 87; amendment to Chicago platform, 148, 149

=Gillmore, Quincy A. =, brevet major-general United States army, siege of Fort Pulaski, 278

=Gilmer, John A. =, member of Congress, tendered cabinet appointment, 164

=Gilmore, J. R. =, visits Jefferson Davis with Jaquess, 462

=Gist, William H. =, governor of South Carolina, inaugurates secession, 175

=Goldsborough, L. M. =, rear-admiral United States navy, commands fleet in Roanoke Island expedition, 277, 278

=Gordon, John B. =, Confederate lieutenant-general, United States senator, in assault of Fort Stedman, 504, 505; in defense of Petersburg, 509

=Graham, Mentor=, makes Lincoln election clerk, 23, 24; advises Lincoln to study grammar, 25; aids Lincoln to study surveying, 40

=Grant, Ulysses S. =, eighteenth President of the United States, general, and general-in-chief United States army, early life, 264; letter offering services to War Department, 264, 265; commissioned by Governor Yates, 265; reconnaissance toward Columbus, 265; urges movement on Fort Henry, 265, 266; capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, 266-268; ordered forward to Savannah, 271; Pittsburg Landing, 272-274; asks to be relieved, 275; co-operates with adjutant-general of the army in arming negroes, 350; repulses rebels at Iuka and Corinth, 380; Vicksburg campaign, 380-383; ordered to Chattanooga, 389; battle of Chattanooga, 390, 391; pursuit of Bragg, 391, 392; speech on accepting commission of lieutenant-general, 394; visits Army of the Potomac and starts west, 394; placed in command of all the armies, 394; conference with Sherman, 395; plan of campaign, 395, 397; returns to Culpepper, 395; fear of presidential interference, 395, 396; letter to Lincoln, 396; strength and position of his army, 396, 397; instructions to Meade, 397; battle of the Wilderness, 398; Spottsylvania Court House, 398, 399; report to Washington, 399; Cold Harbor, 399; letter to Washington, 399, 400; siege of Petersburg, 400-402; sends Wright to Washington, 403; withholds consent to Sherman's plan, 410; gives his consent, 411; orders to Sherman, 413; adopts Sherman's plan, 414; attempt to nominate him for President, 1864, 442, 443; depressing influence on political situation of his heavy fighting, 463; admits peace commissioners to his headquarters, 483; despatch to Stanton, 484; pushing forward, 502; telegraphs Lee's letter to Washington, 503; reply to Lee, 504; orders to General Parke, 505; issues orders for the final movement of the war, 506; number of men under his command in final struggle, 507; his plan, 507; battle of Five Forks, 507-509; orders Sheridan to get on Lee's line of retreat, 509, 510; sends Humphreys to Sheridan's assistance, 509; telegram to Lincoln, 509; pursuit of Lee, 510-513; sends Sheridan's despatch to Lincoln, 511; correspondence with Lee, 512, 513; receives Lee's surrender, 513-515; forbids salute in honor of Lee's surrender, 515; visit to Lee, 515; goes to Washington, 515; learns terms of agreement between Sherman and Johnson, 523; ordered to Sherman's headquarters, 523; gives Sherman opportunity to modify his report, 523, 524; at Lincoln's last cabinet meeting, 531; invited by Mrs. Lincoln to Ford's Theater, 536

=Grant, Mrs. U. S. =, invited by Mrs. Lincoln to Ford's Theater, 536

=Greeley, Horace=, hears Lincoln's Cooper Institute speech, 138; "open letter" to Lincoln, 335; Niagara Falls conference, 458-461; effect of his mission on political situation, 464

=Halleck, Henry Wager=, major-general and general-in-chief United States army, succeeds Frémont, 260; reluctance to coöperate with Buell, 263, 264; answers to Lincoln, 263, 264; instructions to Grant, 264; orders Grant to take Fort Henry, 266; sends reinforcements to Grant, 267; asks for command in the West, 269; plans expedition under Pope, 270; message to Buell, 270; telegrams to McClellan, 270; appeal to McClellan, 271; commands Department of the Mississippi, 271; orders Pope to join him, 274; march on Corinth, 275; capture of Corinth, 275; sends Buell to East Tennessee, 275; ordered to reinforce McClellan, 307; general-in-chief, 309; visit to McClellan, 309; orders Army of Potomac back to Acquia Creek, 309; letter to McClellan, 309, 310; orders McClellan to support Pope, 311; telegram to McClellan, 317; mentioned, 328, 329; asks to be relieved, 365; quarrel with Hooker, 372; urges Meade to active pursuit of Lee, 375; plans for Western campaign, 379; urges Buell to move into East Tennessee, 380; orders Rosecrans to advance, 385, 386; at council to consider news of Chattanooga, 388; President's chief of staff, 394; conduct during Early's raid, 403; note to War Department about Blair, 488; orders to Meade, 523

=Hamlin, Hannibal=, United States senator, Vice-President, nominated for Vice-President, 151; Cameron moves his renomination, 447; candidate for vice-presidential nomination in 1864, 448, 449

=Hanks, John=, tells of Lincoln's frontier labors, 15; flatboat voyage with Lincoln, 22, 23; at Decatur convention, 154

=Hanks, Joseph=, teaches Thomas Lincoln carpenter's trade, 5

=Hanks, Nancy=. See _Lincoln, Nancy Hanks_

=Hardee, William J. =, lieutenant-colonel United States army, Confederate lieutenant-general, council with Johnston and Beauregard, 267; evacuates Savannah and Charleston, 415; joins Johnston, 416

=Hardin, John J. =, member of Congress, colonel United States Volunteers, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; elected to Congress, 73; killed in Mexican War, 75

=Harper's Ferry=, Virginia, John Brown raid at, 134; burning of armory, 209; captured by Lee, September 15, 1862, 315

=Harris, Miss Clara W. =, attends Ford's Theater with Mrs. Lincoln, 536; assists Mrs. Lincoln, 539

=Harrison, George M. =, Lincoln's messmate in Black Hawk War, 33

=Hartford=, the, Union cruiser, Farragut's flag-ship, 284, 285

=Hatteras Inlet=, North Carolina, capture of forts at, August 29, 1861, 245

=Hay, John=, assistant private secretary to Lincoln, brevet colonel and assistant adjutant-general United States Volunteers, ambassador to England, Secretary of State, accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168; shows Lincoln letter of inquiry about Vice-Presidency, 448; mission to Canada, 460; at Lincoln's death-bed, 540

=Hazel, Caleb=, teacher of President Lincoln, 6

=Herndon, A. G. =, defeated for Illinois legislature, 1832, 34

=Herndon, "Jim" and "Row, "= sell Lincoln and Berry their store, 35

=Herndon, William H. =, Lincoln's law partner, 158; assumes Lincoln's law business during campaign, 158

=Herold, David E. =, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; chosen to assist Booth, 536; deposits arms in tavern at Surrattsville, 536; accompanies Booth in his flight, 542, 543; capture of, 543; execution of, 544

=Hicks, Thomas H. =, governor of Maryland, United States senator, reply to Lincoln's call for volunteers, 193; speech at mass-meeting, 193; protest against landing of troops at Annapolis, 198; calls meeting of Maryland legislature, 198

=Holcomb, James P. =, Confederate agent in Canada, correspondence with Horace Greeley, 459

=Holt, Joseph=, Postmaster-General, Secretary of War, judge-advocate general United States army, calls Scott to Washington, 172; report on Knights of the Golden Circle, 361; favored by Swett for Vice-President, 448; declines attorney-generalship, 491

=Hood, John B. =, Confederate general, succeeds Johnston, 407; evacuates Atlanta, 407, 468; truce with Sherman, 408; placed under command of Beauregard, 409; moves to Tuscumbia, 410; Franklin and Nashville, 410; his movements delay reconstruction in Tennessee, 429

=Hooker, Joseph=, brevet major-general United States army, succeeds Burnside in command of Army of the Potomac, 366; submits plan of campaign to Lincoln, 368; battle of Chancellorsville, 369, 370; criticism of, 370; foresees Lee's northward campaign, 370; proposes quick march to capture Richmond, 371; follows Lee, 372; asks to be relieved, 372; ordered to reinforce Rosecrans, 388; reaches Chattanooga, 389; in battle of Chattanooga, 390-391

=Hume, John F. =, moves that Lincoln's nomination be made unanimous, 447

=Humphreys, Andrew A. =, brevet major-general United States army, in recapture of Fort Stedman, 505, 506; ordered to assist Sheridan, 509

=Hunt, Randall=, tendered cabinet appointment, 164

=Hunter, David=, brevet major-general, United States army, asked to assist Frémont, 235, 236; ordered to relieve Frémont, 243; order of emancipation, 327; experiment with negro soldiers, 348; declared an outlaw by Confederate War Department, 350

=Hunter, R. M. T. =, United States senator, Confederate Secretary of State, appointed peace commissioner, 482; at Hampton Roads conference, 482-485

=Iles, Elijah=, captain Illinois Volunteers, commands company in Black Hawk War, 33

=Illinois=, State of, organized as Territory, 1809, 19; admitted as State, 1818, 19;legislative schemes of internal improvement, 44, 45; capital removed to Springfield, 45; political struggles over slavery, 45, 46; Lincoln-Douglas senatorial campaign in, 118-125; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 474, 475

=Island No. 10=, Tennessee, fortifications at, 269, 270; surrender of, 274

=Jackson, Andrew=, seventh President of the United States, gives impetus to system of party caucuses and conventions, 52

=Jackson, Claiborne F. =, governor of Missouri, attempts to force Missouri secession, 202-204; flight to Springfield, Missouri, 234

=Jackson, Thomas Jonathan ("Stonewall")=, Confederate lieutenant-general, Shenandoah valley campaign, 305, 306; mentioned, 328; killed at Chancellorsville, 369

=Jaquess, James F. =, D. D. , colonel United States Volunteers, visits to the South, 461, 462; interview with Jefferson Davis, 462

=Jewett, William Cornell=, letter to Greeley, 458

=Johnson, Andrew=, seventeenth President of the United States, in thirty-seventh Congress, 217; telegram about East Tennessee, 259; retains seat in Senate, 419; appointed military governor of Tennessee, 420; begins work of reconstruction, 428; nominated for Vice-President, 448, 449; popular and electoral votes for, 470; disapproves Sherman's agreement with Johnston, 523; proclamation of amnesty, 526; plot to murder, 535; rejoicing of radicals on his accession to the Presidency, 545; takes oath of office, 545

=Johnson, Herschel V. =, candidate for Vice-President, 1860, 152

=Johnston, Albert Sidney=, Confederate general, council with Hardee and Beauregard, 267; killed at Pittsburg Landing, 273

=Johnston, Joseph E. =, quartermaster-general United States army, Confederate general, member of Congress, joins Confederacy, 196, 208; understanding with Beauregard, 215, 216; joins Beauregard at Bull Run, 228; opinion of battle of Bull Run, 228; retrograde movement, 297; defeats McClellan at Fair Oaks, 302; succeeds Bragg, 395; strength of, in spring of 1864, 405; superseded by Hood, 407; again placed in command, 416, 501; interview with Davis, 520; begins negotiations with Sherman, 520; meetings with Sherman, 521, 522; agreement between them, 522; agreement disapproved at Washington, 523; surrender of, 524

=Johnston, Sarah Bush=, marries Thomas Lincoln, 10; improves the condition of his household, 10; tells of Lincoln's studious habits, 13

=Jones, Thomas=, assists Booth and Herold, 542, 543

=Judd, Norman B. =, minister to Prussia, member of Congress, nominates Lincoln for President, 1860, 149; member of Lincoln's suite, 173

=Kansas=, State of, slavery struggle in, 113-115; Lecompton Bill defeated in Congress, 117

=Kearsarge=, the, Union cruiser, battle with the _Alabama_, 525

=Kelly, Benjamin F. =, brevet major-general United States Volunteers, dash upon Philippi, 225

=Kentucky=, State of, action concerning secession, 201, 204; legislature asks Anderson for help, 254; public opinion in, regarding slavery, 473

=Kilpatrick, Judson=, brevet major-general United States army, minister to Chili, with Sherman on march to the sea, 411

=Kirkpatrick=, defeated for Illinois legislature 1832, 34

=Knights of Golden Circle=, extensive organization of, 360, 361; plans and failures of, 360-362; projected revolution in Northwestern States, 466

=Know-Nothing Party=, principles of, 101, 102; nominates Millard Fillmore for President, 1856, 102

=Lamon, Ward H. =, accompanies Lincoln on night journey to Washington, 174

=Lane, Joseph=, brevet major-general United States army, governor, United States senator candidate for Vice-President in 1860, 153; attempt to arm negroes, 348

=Leavitt, Humphrey H. =, member of Congress, judge United States Circuit Court, denies motion for habeas corpus for Vallandigham, 358

=Lecompton Constitution=, adopted in Kansas, 115; defeated in Congress, 117

=Lee, Robert E. =, colonel United States army, Confederate general, captures John Brown, 134; enters service of Confederacy, 196, 197, 208; concentrates troops at Manassas Junction, 215; sends troops into West Virginia, 224; attacks McClellan near Richmond, 302; campaign into Maryland, 314; captures Harper's Ferry, 315; battle of Antietam, 315; retreats across the Potomac, 316; battle of Chancellorsville, 369; resolves on invasion of the North, 370; crosses the Potomac, 371, 372; battle of Gettysburg, 372-374; retreats across the Potomac, 375, 377; strength and position of his army, 397; battle of the Wilderness, 398; Spottsylvania Court House, 398, 399; Cold Harbor, 399; defense of Petersburg, 400-402; sends Early up the Shenandoah valley, 403; despatch about rations for his army, 481; made general-in-chief, 500; assumes command of all the Confederate armies, 502; attempt to negotiate with Grant, 502, 503; conference with Davis, 504; attempt to break through Grant's lines, 504-506; number of men under his command in final struggle, 507; takes command in person, 507; attacks Warren, 507; battle of Five Forks, 507-509; makes preparations to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond, 509; begins retreat, 510; surrender of Richmond, 510; reaches Amelia Court House, 510; starts toward Lynchburg, 511; reply to generals advising him to surrender, 512; correspondence with Grant, 512, 513; surrender of, 513-515; size of army surrendered by, 524

=Letcher, John=, member of Congress, governor of Virginia, orders seizure of government property, 194

=Lincoln, Abraham=, sixteenth President of the United States, born February 12, 1800, 3, 6; goes to A B C schools, 6; early schooling in Indiana, 10-13; home studies and youthful habits, 13-19; manages ferry-boat, 15; flatboat trip to New Orleans, 15, 16; employed in Gentryville store, 16; no hunter, 17; kills wild turkey, 17, 18; emigrates to Illinois, March 1, 1830, 20; leaves his father's cabin, 21; engaged by Denton Offutt, 21; builds flatboat and takes it to New Orleans, 22, 23; incident at Rutledge's Mill, 22; returns to New Salem, 23; election clerk, 23, 24; clerk in Offutt's store, 24; wrestles with Jack Armstrong, 25; candidate for legislature, 1832, 29; address "To the Voters of Sangamon County, " 29, 30; volunteers for Black Hawk War, 32; elected captain of volunteer company, 32; mustered out and reënlists as private, 32, 33; finally mustered out, 33; returns to New Salem, 33; defeated for legislature, 33; enters into partnership with Berry, 35; sells out to the Trent brothers, 36; fails, but promises to pay his debts, 36; surveying instruments sold for debt, 36; "Honest old Abe, " 37; appointed postmaster of New Salem, 37; made deputy surveyor, 39, 40; candidate for legislature, 1834, 41, 42; elected to legislature, 43; begins study of law, 44; admitted to practice, 44; removes to Springfield and forms law partnership with J. T. Stuart, 44; reëlected to legislature, 44; services in legislature, 44-48; manages removal of State capital to Springfield, 45; Lincoln-Stone protest, 47; vote for, for Speaker of Illinois House, 48; his methods in law practice, 49; notes for law lecture, 49-51; his growing influence, 52; guest of William Butler, 53; intimacy with Joshua F. Speed, 53; engaged to Anne Rutledge, 54; her death, 54; his grief, 55; courtship of Mary Owens, 55-60; member of "Long Nine, " 61, 62; debate with Douglas and others, 1839, 62, 63; meets and becomes engaged to Mary Todd, 63; engagement broken, 64; his deep melancholy, 64; letter to Stuart, 64; visit to Kentucky, 64; letters to Speed, 64, 65; "Lost Townships" letters, 66; challenged by Shields, 66; prescribes terms of the duel, 67; duel prevented, 68; letter to Speed, 68; marriage to Mary Todd, November 4, 1842, 68, 69; children of, 69; partnership with Stuart dissolved, 69, 70; law partnership with S. T. Logan, 70; declines reëlection to legislature, 70; letter to Speed, 71; letter to Martin Morris, 71-73; letter to Speed, 73; presidential elector, 1844, 73; letters to B. F. James, 74; elected to Congress, 1846, 75; service and speeches in Congress, 76-90; votes for Wilmot Proviso, 79; presidential elector in 1840 and 1844, 80; favors General Taylor for President, 80-83; letters about Taylor's nomination, 80-82; letters to Herndon, 81-83; speeches for Taylor, 83; bill to prohibit slavery in District of Columbia, 86; letters recommending office-seekers, 87-89; letter to W. H. Herndon, 90, 91; letter to Speed, 91, 92; letter to Duff Green, 92; applies for commissionership of General Land Office, 92; defends Butterfield against political attack, 92; refuses governorship of Oregon, 93; indignation at repeal of Missouri Compromise, 94, 95; advocates reëlection of Richard Yates to Congress, 96; speech at Illinois State Fair, 96; debate with Douglas at Peoria, 96-99; agreement with Douglas, 99; candidate for United States Senate before Illinois legislature, 1855, 99; withdraws in favor of Trumbull, 100; letter to Robertson, 100, 101; speech at Bloomington convention, 1856, 103; vote for, for Vice-President, 1856, 104; presidential elector, 1856, 105; speeches in campaign of 1856, 105; speech at Republican banquet in Chicago, 106, 107; speech on Dred Scott case, 110-112; nominated for senator, 118, 119; "House divided against itself" speech, 119, 120, 127, 128; Lincoln-Douglas joint debate, 121-125; defeated for United States Senate, 125; analysis of causes which led to his defeat, 126, 127; letters to H. Asbury and A. G. Henry, 127; letter to A. L. Pierce and others, 130, 131; speech in Chicago, 131, 132; letter to M. W. Delahay, 132; letter to Colfax, 132, 133; letter to S. Galloway, 133; Ohio speeches, 133, 134; criticism of John Brown raid, 134, 135; speeches in Kansas, 136, 137; Cooper Institute speech, 137-140; speeches in New England, 140; letter to T. J. Pickett, 145; candidate for presidential nomination, 1860, 145; letters to N. B. Judd, 145, 146; nominated for President, 1860, 149-151; speech at Decatur convention, 153, 154; daily routine during campaign, 158, 159; letters during campaign, 159; elected President, 160; his cabinet program, 161-163; letter to Seward offering cabinet appointment, 163; offers Bates and Cameron cabinet appointments, 163; summons Chase to Springfield, 163; withdraws offer to Cameron, 163; editorial in Springfield "Journal, " 164; offers cabinet appointments to Gilmer, Hunt, and Scott, 164; letters to W. S. Speer and G. D. Prentiss, 164, 165; correspondence with Alexander H. Stephens, 165, 166; letter to Gilmer, 166; letter to Washburne, 166, 167; writes his inaugural, 167, 168; journey to Washington, 168-174; farewell address at Springfield, 169; speeches on journey to Washington, 169-171; consultation with Judd, 173; night journey to Washington, 173, 174; visits of ceremony, 179, 180; first inauguration of, 180-182; inaugural address, 180-182; calls council to consider question of Sumter, 182, 183; signs order for relief of Sumter, 184; answer to Seward's memorandum of April 1, 1861, 187; instructions to Seward, 1865, 187; notice to Governor Pickens, 188; issues call for 75, 000 volunteers, 192; assumes responsibility for war measures, 195; opinion against dispersing Maryland legislature, 198, 199; authorizes Scott to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 199; action in Merryman case, 200; institutes blockade, 205; calls for three years' volunteers, 206; appoints Charles Francis Adams minister to England, 211; modifies Seward's despatch of May 21, 212; his immense duties, 212, 213; calls council of war, 215; message to Congress, July 4, 1861, 218-220; postpones decision about slaves, 222, 223; receives news of defeat at Bull Run, 229; letter to Hunter, 235; letter to Frémont, 237, 238; letter to Browning, 238-240; sends Cameron to visit Frémont, 242; letter to General Curtis about Frémont, 242, 243; draft of despatch about Trent affair, 247, 248; welcomes McClellan to Washington, 250; orders retirement of General Scott, 253; memorandum to McClellan, 253; his grasp of military problems, 255, 256; memorandum after battle of Bull Run, 256; interest in East Tennessee, 256, 257; personally urges on Congress the construction of railroad in East Tennessee, 257, 258; letter to Buell, 258, 259; telegrams and letters to Buell and Halleck, 262-264, 268, 269; places Halleck in command of Department of the Mississippi, 271; calls councils of war, 288, 289; General War Order No. 1, 290; Special War Order No. 1, 291; letter to McClellan about plan of campaign, 291; interview with Stanton, 293, 294; interview with McClellan, 295; President's General War Orders No. 2 and No. 3, 295; receives news of fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296; relieves McClellan from command of all troops except Army of the Potomac, 298; orders McDowell to protect Washington, 299; letter to McClellan, 299, 300; letter to McClellan, 303, 304; visit to General Scott, 306; assigns General Pope to command of Army of Virginia, 306; orders Burnside and Halleck to reinforce McClellan, 307; letter to governors of free States, 307, 308; accepts 300, 000 new troops, 308; letters to McClellan, 308; visit to Harrison's Landing, 308; appoints Halleck general-in-chief, 309; his dispassionate calmness in considering McClellan's conduct, 311; asks McClellan to use his influence with Pope's officers, 313; places McClellan in command of defenses of Washington, 313; orders reinforcements to McClellan, 316; telegram to McClellan, 316; visit to Antietam, 316, 317; directions and letter to McClellan, 317-319; removes him from command, 319; letter to Bancroft, 321; reference to slavery in message to Congress, December 3, 1861, 321, 322; offers Delaware compensated abolishment, 322, 323; special message of March 6, 1862, proposing joint resolution favoring gradual abolishment, 323, 324; letter to McDougall, 324; interview with delegations from border slave States, 324, 325; signs bill for compensated emancipation in District of Columbia, 326; letter to Chase about Hunter's order of emancipation, 327; proclamation revoking Hunter's order, 327, 328; second interview with border State delegations in Congress, 329-331; conversation with Carpenter about emancipation, 331, 332; reads draft of first emancipation proclamation to cabinet, 331, 332; tells Seward and Welles of his purpose to issue emancipation proclamation, 332; letter to Reverdy Johnson, 334; letter to Cuthbert Bullitt, 334, 335; letter to Horace Greeley, 335-337; interview with Chicago clergymen, 337-339; issues preliminary emancipation proclamation, 339-341; annual message of December 1, 1862, 341, 342; issues final emancipation proclamation, January 1, 1863, 342-346; letter to A. G. Hodges, 346, 347; letters about arming negroes, 350; speech about Fort Pillow massacre, 351, 352; interview with Frederick Douglass, 352; letter to Governor Seymour, 356; action in case of Vallandigham, 358, 359; suspends privilege of writ of habeas corpus, 360; attitude toward Knights of the Golden Circle, 361; appoints Burnside to command Army of the Potomac, 363; telegram to Burnside, and letter to Halleck about Burnside, 365; letter to Burnside, 366; relieves Burnside and appoints Hooker to succeed him, 366; letter to Hooker, 366-368; criticism on Hooker's plan of campaign, 368; continued belief in Hooker, 370; instructions to Hooker, 370, 371; telegrams to Hooker, 371; appoints Meade to command Army of the Potomac, 372; urges Meade to active pursuit of Lee, 375; letter to Meade, 375, 376; Gettysburg address, 376, 377; letter to Grant, 384, 385; orders Rosecrans to advance, 385, 386; note to Halleck, 388; telegram to Rosecrans, 388; orders reinforcements to Rosecrans, 388; signs bill making Grant lieutenant-general, 393; address on presenting his commission, 393, 394; letter to Grant, 396; under fire, 403; letter to Sherman, 412, 413; appoints military governors for Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, and North Carolina, 419; his theory of "reconstruction, " 419; message to Congress, July 4, 1861, 419; letter to Cuthbert Bullitt, 420, 421; circular letter to military governors, 421, 422; letter to Governor Shepley, 422; letter to General Banks, 423; references to reconstruction in message to Congress, December 8, 1863, 424; amnesty proclamation, December 8, 1863, 424; letter to General Banks, 424, 425; letters to General Steele, 427, 428; letters to Johnson, 428, 429; letter to Drake and others, 430-432; revokes Frémont's proclamation freeing slaves, 432; letter to General Schofield, 433; directs Stanton to issue order regulating raising of colored troops, 434, 435; letter to H. W. Hoffman, 435, 436; Democrats and Frémont Republicans criticize his action on slavery, 437, 438; relations with his cabinet, 438, 439; attitude toward Chase, 439-441, 444; letter to Chase, 441; letter to F. A. Conkling and others, 443; sentiment in favor of his reëlection, 443, 444; letter to Washburne about second term, 444; letters to General Schurz, 444, 445; instructions to office-holders, 445; speeches during campaign, 445; renominated for President, 447, 448; refuses to intimate his preference for Vice-President, 448, 449; indorsement on Nicolay's letter, 448, 449; reply to committee of notification, 450; letter accepting nomination, 450, 451; his attitude toward the French in Mexico, 451, 452; opposition to, in Congress, 454; on Davis's reconstruction bill, 454-456; proclamation of July 8, 1864, 456; accepts Chase's resignation, 457; nominates David Tod to succeed him, 457; substitutes name of W. P. Fessenden, 457, 458; correspondence with Greeley, 458-460; criticized because of Niagara conference, 460, 461; draft of letter to C. D. Robinson, 461; indorsement on Jaquess's application to go South, 462; answer to Raymond's proposition, 463; interview with John T. Mills, 464, 465; memorandum, August 23, 1864, 466; speech on morning after election, 469, 470; popular and electoral votes for, 470; summing up of results of the election, 470; suggests key-note of Morgan's opening speech before Baltimore convention, 471; message to Congress, December 6, 1864, 471, 472, 476-478; answer to serenade, 474, 475; opinion on ratification of Thirteenth Amendment, 475; two constitutional amendments offered to the people during his administration, 476; gives Blair permission to go South, 478; letter to Blair in reply to Jefferson Davis, 481; sends Major Eckert to meet peace commissioners, 482; instructions to Seward, 483; instructions to Grant, 483; goes to Fortress Monroe, 484; conference with peace commissioners, 484, 485; pressure upon him to dismiss Montgomery Blair, 487, 489; personal regard for the Blairs, 488; letter to Stanton, 488; lecture to cabinet, 489; requests resignation of Blair, 489; nominates Chase for chief justice, 490, 491; opinion of Chase, 490, 491; offers attorney-generalship to Holt and Speed, 491; offers cabinet appointment to Governor Morgan, 492; appoints Hugh McCulloch Secretary of the Treasury, 492; indorsements on Usher's resignation, 492; his plans for the future, 492, 493; submits to cabinet draft of joint resolution offering the South $400, 000, 000, 493; his second inauguration, 493-496; the second inaugural, 494-496; letter to Weed, 497; his literary rank, 497; last public address, 498; despatch to Grant, March 3, 1865, 503, 504; at City Point, 506; telegraphs Grant, "Let the thing be pressed, " 511; visit to Richmond, 517, 518; interviews with John A. Campbell, 519; gives permission for meeting of Virginia legislature, 519; regret of army for, 529; return to Washington, 530; last cabinet meeting, 531, 532; 14th of April, 532, 533, 536-540; danger from assassination, 533, 534; interest in the theater, 536; attends Ford's Theater, 536, 537; death of, 538-540; his death prevents organized rejoicing at downfall of rebellion, 544; mourning for, 544-548; feeling of radicals at death of, 545; funeral ceremonies of, in Washington, 545, 546; funeral journey to Springfield, Illinois, 546, 547; burial at Springfield, 547, 548; his character and career, 549-555; his place in history, 555

=Lincoln, Abraham=, grandfather of the President, emigrates from Virginia to Kentucky, 3, 4; killed by Indians, 4

=Lincoln, Edward Baker=, son of President Lincoln, birth of, 69; death of, 69

=Lincoln, Isaac=, settles on Holston River, 5

=Lincoln, Josiah=, uncle of the President, goes to fort for assistance against Indians, 4

=Lincoln, Mary=, aunt of the President, 4

=Lincoln, Mary Todd=, wife of the President, engagement to Lincoln, 63, 64; writes "Lost Townships" letters, 66; marriage to Lincoln, November 4, 1842, 68, 69; children of, 69; death of, 69; accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168; drive with her husband, April 14, 1865, 532; invites friends to attend Ford's Theater, 536; attends theater with her husband, 538; at Lincoln's death-bed, 539

=Lincoln, Mordecai=, uncle of the President defends homestead against Indians, 4; inherits his father's lands, 4

=Lincoln, Nancy=, aunt of the President, 4

=Lincoln, Nancy Hanks=, mother of the President, marries Thomas Lincoln, June 12, 1806, 5;teaches her husband to sign his name, 5; birth of daughter, 5; birth of Abraham, son of, 6; death of, 9

=Lincoln, Robert Todd=, son of the President, Secretary of War, minister to England, birth of, 69; public services, 69; accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168; on Grant's staff, 517; with his father April 14, 1865, 532; at Lincoln's death-bed, 540

=Lincoln, Samuel=, ancestor of the President, emigrates to America, 3

=Lincoln, Sarah=, sister of the President, born, 5; goes to school, 6

=Lincoln, Sarah Bush Johnston=. See _Johnston, Sarah Bush_

=Lincoln, Thomas=, father of the President, 3; narrowly escapes capture by Indians, 4; learns carpenter's trade, 5; marries Nancy Hanks, June 12, 1806, 5; daughter of, born, 5; removes to Rock Spring Farm, 5, 6; Abraham, son of, born, 6; buys farm on Knob Creek, 6; emigrates to Indiana, 7, 8; death of his wife, 9; marries Sally Bush Johnston, 10; emigrates to Illinois, 20

=Lincoln, Thomas=, son of President Lincoln, birth of, 69; death of, 69; accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168

=Lincoln, William Wallace=, son of President Lincoln, birth of, 69; death of, 69, 293; accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168

=Lloyd, John M. =, keeps tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, 536

=Logan, Stephen T. =, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; law partnership with Lincoln, 70; defeated for Congress, 91

="Long Nine, "= a power in Illinois legislature, 61

=Longstreet, James=, Confederate lieutenant-general, besieges Burnside at Knoxville, 391; retreats toward Virginia, 391; reports conversation with Ord, 503; in final defense of Richmond, 509

=Louisiana=, State of, military governor appointed for, 419; election for members of Congress, 422; contest over slavery clause in new constitution, 422, 423; election of State officers in, 425, 426; adopts new constitution abolishing slavery, 426; slavery in, throttled by public opinion, 473; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 475

=Lovejoy, Elijah P. =, murder of, 46

=Lovell, Mansfield=, Confederate major-general, evacuates New Orleans, 285; sends men and guns to Vicksburg, 286

=Lyon, Nathaniel=, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, service in Missouri, 202-204; killed at Wilson's Creek, 234, 235

=Lyons, Richard Bickerton Pemell=, baron, afterward earl, British minister at Washington, instructed to demand apology for _Trent_ affair, 246

=McClellan, George B. =, major-general, general-in-chief, United States army, orders concerning slaves, 221; commissioned by Governor Dennison, 224; his previous career, 224; quick promotion of, 224; successes in western Virginia, 224, 225; ordered to Washington, 229; his ambition, 249-251; organizes Army of the Potomac, 250, 251; his hallucinations, 251, 252; quarrel with General Scott, 251, 252; expresses contempt for the President, 252; answer to President's inquiry, 253; illness of, 253; instructions to Buell, 258-260; unwilling to promote Halleck, 270; attends council of war, 289; explains plan of campaign to Stanton, 290; letter to Stanton, 292; revokes Hooker's authority to cross lower Potomac, 294; council of his officers votes in favor of water route, 295; at gathering of officials to discuss news of fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296; occupies abandoned rebel position, 297; calls council of corps commanders, 298; relieved from command of all troops save Army of the Potomac, 298; arrives at Fortress Monroe, 299; siege of Yorktown, 301; his incapacity and hallucination, 302-304; retreat to James River, 302; letter to Stanton, 303; protests against withdrawal of Army of the Potomac, 309; reaches Alexandria, 311; suggests leaving Pope to his fate, 311; telegram to Pope's officers, 313; in command of defenses of Washington, 313; follows Lee into Maryland, 314; learns Lee's plans, 315; battle of Antietam, 315; forces under his command, 317, 318; removed from command, 319; mentioned, 328, 329; adopted by Democrats for presidential candidate, 355, 438; nominated for President, 467; letter of acceptance, 468; electoral votes for, 470; resigns from the army, 470

=McClernand, John A. =, member of Congress, major-general United States Volunteers at Springfield, Illinois, 52

=McCulloch, Ben=, Confederate brigadier-general, defeat at Pea Ridge, 271

=McCulloch, Hugh=, Secretary of the Treasury, enters Lincoln's cabinet, 492

=McDougall, James A. =, member of Congress, United States senator, at Springfield, Illinois, 52

=McDowell, Irvin=, brevet major-general United States army, fears junction of Johnston and Beauregard, 216; advances against Beauregard, 226; battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, 226-229; advises movement on Manassas, 289; ordered by Lincoln to protect Washington, 299, 305; ordered to form junction with Shields and Frémont, 306; in Army of Virginia, 310

=McLean, John=, justice United States Supreme Court, vote for, in Chicago convention, 149

=McNamar, John=, engaged to Anne Rutledge, 54

=Magoffin, Beriah=, governor of Kentucky, efforts in behalf of secession, 201

=Magruder, John B. =, brevet lieutenant-colonel United States army, Confederate major-general, joins the Confederacy, 196; opposes McClellan with inferior numbers, 301

=Maine=, State of, admitted as State, 1820, 19

=Mallory, S. R. =, United States senator, Confederate Secretary of the Navy, writes proposition of armistice dictated by Davis and signed by Johnston, 521

=Malvern Hill=, Virginia, battle of, July 1, 1862, 302

=Marcy, R. B. =, brevet major-general United States army, McClellan's chief of staff, 294

=Marshall, Charles=, Confederate colonel, present at Lee's surrender, 513

=Maryland=, State of, secession feeling in, 193; arrest and dispersion of its legislature, 199; refuses offer of compensated abolishment, 434; emancipation party in, 434; abolishes slavery, 435, 436; slavery in, throttled by public opinion, 473; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 474

=Mason, James M. =, United States senator, Confederate commissioner to Europe, interview with John Brown, 134; goes to Baltimore, 197; capture of, 246-249

=Matthews, J. =, burns Booth's letter, 537

=Maximilian (Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph)=, Archduke of Austria and Emperor of Mexico, established by Napoleon III in Mexico, 451

=Maynard, Horace=, member of Congress, minister to Turkey, telegram about East Tennessee, 259; elected to Congress, 419

=Meade, George G. =, major-general United States army, succeeds Hooker in command of Army of the Potomac, 372; battle of Gettysburg, 372-374; pursuit of Lee, 375, 377; offers to give up command of Army of the Potomac, 394; continued in command, 395; reports surrender of Richmond, 510; ordered to pursue Lee, 510; pursuit of Lee, 511; ordered to disregard Sherman's truce, 523

=Meigs, Montgomery C. =, brevet major-general and quartermaster-general United States army, at gathering of officials to discuss news of battle between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296

=Memphis=, Tennessee, river battle at, 286

=Merrimac=, the, Confederate ironclad, battle with _Monitor_, 278-282

=Merryman, John=, arrest of, 199

=Minnesota=, the, Union steam frigate, in fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 280

=Missouri=, State of, admitted as State, 1821, 19; action concerning secession, 201-204; provisional State government established, 418; struggle over slavery, 430-434; adopts ordinance of emancipation, 434; resolution in Assembly favoring Lincoln's renomination, 444; votes for Grant in Baltimore convention, 447; slavery in, throttled by public opinion, 473

=Missouri Compromise=, repeal of, 94, 95

=Mobile Bay=, Alabama, battle of, August 5, 1864, 468, 525

=Monitor=, the, Union ironclad, battle with _Merrimac_, 279-282

=Montgomery=, Alabama, capital of Confederacy removed from, to Richmond, 207

=Moore, Thomas O. =, governor of Louisiana, arms free colored men, 348, 349

=Morgan, Edwin D. =, governor of New York, United States senator, opens Republican national convention, 1864, 446; declines cabinet appointment, 492

=Morris, Achilles=, elected to Illinois legislature in 1832, 34

=Morrison, James L. D. =, desires commissionership of General Land Office, 92

=Mudd, Samuel=, assists Booth and Herold, 542; imprisoned, 544

=Mulligan, James A. =, brevet brigadier-general United States Volunteers, captured by Price, 241

=Murfreesboro=, Tennessee, battle of, December 31, 1862, to January 3, 1863, 380

=Napoleon III=, colonial ambitions of, 211; establishes Maximilian in Mexico, 451

=Nashville=, Tennessee, battle of, December 15, 16, 1864, 410

=Neale, T. M. =, commands troops in Black Hawk War, 31, 32; defeated for Illinois legislature, 1832, 34

=Negro soldiers=, experiments with, early in the war, 348; governor of Louisiana arms free blacks, 348, 349; reference to, in emancipation proclamation, 349, 350; Lincoln's interest in, 350; attitude of Confederates toward, 350, 351; massacre of, at Fort Pillow, 351; President's conversation with Frederick Douglass about retaliation, 352; Stanton's order regulating raising of, 435; Republican national platform claims protection of laws of war for, 446; take part in second inauguration of Lincoln, 493, 494; Jefferson Davis's recommendation concerning slaves in rebel army, 501; assist in restoring order in Richmond, 517; in Lincoln's funeral procession, 546. See _Slavery_ and _Emancipation_

=Nelson, William=, lieutenant-commander United States navy, major-general United States Volunteers, occupies Nashville, 270

=New Orleans=, Louisiana, capture of, 283-285; Confederate negro regiment in, 348, 349; Union sentiment in, 420

=New Salem=, Illinois, town of, 22-26

=New York City=, draft riots in, 356, 357; funeral honors to Lincoln in, 546, 547

=Nicolay, John G. =, Lincoln's private secretary, 158; accompanies Mr. Lincoln to Washington, 168; in attendance at Baltimore convention, 448, 449; letter to Hay, 448

=North Carolina=, State of, joins Confederacy, 200, 204; military governor appointed for, 419

=Offutt, Denton=, engages Lincoln to take flatboat to New Orleans, 21; disappears from New Salem, 35

=O'Laughlin, Michael=, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; imprisoned, 544

=Ord, Edward O. C. =, brevet major-general United States army, conversation with Longstreet, 503

=Owens, Mary S. =, Lincoln's attentions to, correspondence with and proposal of marriage to, 55-60

=Palfrey, F. W. =, Confederate brigadier-general, statement about strength of Army of the Potomac, 315

=Parke, John G. =, brevet major-general United States army, in recapture of Fort Stedman, 505, 506; in assault at Petersburg 509

=Patterson, Robert=, major-general Pennsylvania militia, turns troops toward Harper's Ferry, 209; part in campaign against Manassas, 216; orders concerning slaves, 220, 221; failure at Harper's Ferry, 228

=Paulding, Hiram=, rear-admiral United States navy, burns Norfolk navy-yard, 278

=Pea Ridge=, Arkansas, battle of, 271

=Pemberton, John C. =, Confederate lieutenant-general, surrenders Vicksburg, 383

=Pendleton, George H. =, member of Congress minister to Prussia, nominated for Vice-President, 467

=Pendleton, William N. =, Confederate brigadier-general, advises Lee to surrender 512

=Perryville=, Kentucky, battle of, October 8, 1862, 379

=Peter, Z. =, defeated for Illinois legislature, 1832, 34

=Petersburg=, Virginia, operations against, 400-402, 507-510; evacuation of, April 2, 1865, 510

=Phelps, John S. =, member of Congress, appointed military governor of Arkansas, 420

=Phelps, J. W. =, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, mentioned in letter of Lincoln, 334; declared an outlaw by Confederate War Department, 350

=Philippi=, West Virginia, battle of, June 3, 1861, 214, 225

=Phillips, Wendell=, letter to Cleveland convention, 442

=Pickens, Francis W. =, member of Congress, minister to Russia, governor of South Carolina, fires on _Star of the West_, 178

=Pickett, George E. =, Confederate major-general, in battle of Five Forks, 507, 508

=Pierce, Franklin=, fourteenth President of the United States, recognizes bogus laws in Kansas, 113; appoints governors for Kansas, 113, 114

=Pillow, Gideon J. =, Confederate major-general, stationed at Columbus, 254; escapes from Fort Donelson, 268

=Pinkerton, Allen=, detective work of, 173

=Pittsburg Landing=, Tennessee, battle of, April 6, 7, 1862, 272-274

=Polk, James K. =, eleventh President of the United States, sends treaty of peace with Mexico to Senate, 79

=Pomeroy, Samuel C. =, United States senator, secret circular of, 440

=Pope, John=, brevet major-general United States army, sent to New Madrid, 270; capture of Island No. 10, 274; proceeds to Fort Pillow, 274; joins Halleck, 274; assigned to command Army of Virginia, 306; assumes command of Army of Virginia 310; second battle of Bull Run, 310, 311; despatch announcing his defeat, 312; relieved from command of Army of the Potomac, 314

=Porter, David D. =, admiral United States navy, commands mortar flotilla in expedition with Farragut, 282-287; in second expedition to Vicksburg, 287; in operations about Vicksburg, 382, 383; visits Richmond with Lincoln, 517, 518

=Porterfield, G. A. =, Confederate colonel, routed at Philippi, 225

=Port Hudson=, Louisiana, siege and surrender of, 383, 384

=Port Royal=, South Carolina, expedition against, 245, 246

=Powell, Lewis=, _alias_ Lewis Payne, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; assigned to murder Seward, 535; attack upon Seward, 540, 541; escape and capture of, 541, 542; execution of, 544

=Price, Sterling=, Confederate major-general retreat to Springfield, Missouri, 234; captures Mulligan, 241; retreats toward Arkansas, 269; defeat at Pea Ridge, 271

=Pritchard, Benjamin D. =, brevet brigadier-general United States Volunteers, captures Jefferson Davis, 526

=Quinton, R. =, defeated for Illinois legislature 1832, 34

=Rathbone, Henry R. =, brevet colonel United States army, attends Ford's Theater with Mrs. Lincoln and Miss Harris, 536; wounded by Booth, 538, 539

=Raymond, Henry J. =, member of Congress letter to Lincoln, 462, 463; visits Washington, 463

=Reconstruction=, in West Virginia and Missouri, 418, 419; Lincoln's theory of, 419; in Louisiana, 420-426; in Arkansas, 426, 427; in Tennessee, 428, 429; opposition in Congress to Lincoln's action concerning, 454; Henry Winter Davis's bill prescribing method of, 454; Lincoln's proclamation of, July 8, 1864, 456; Wade-Davis manifesto, 456, 457

=Republican Party=, formation of, 102, 103; nominates Frémont and Dayton, 1856, 103, 104; national convention of, 1860, 144-151; candidates in 1860, 152; campaign of, 1860, 153-160; Frémont faction denounces Lincoln's attitude on slavery, 438; the Chase faction, 439-441; national convention of, 1864, 446-449; gloomy prospects of, 462-466: success in elections of, 1864, 469, 470

=Retaliation, = rebel threats of, 350, 351; cabinet action on Fort Pillow massacre, 352; conversation between Lincoln and Frederick Douglass about, 352

=Reynolds, = John, governor of Illinois, issues call for volunteers for Black Hawk War, 31, 32

=Richmond, = Virginia, becomes capital of Confederate States, 207; panic in, at rumors of evacuation, 481; high prices in, 481; excitement created by Blair's visits, 481, 482; alarm at Grant's advance, 500; surrender of, April 3, 1865, 510; burning of, 515, 516

=Rich Mountain, = Virginia, battle of, July 11, 1861, 225

=Riney, Zachariah, = teacher of President Lincoln, 6

=Roanoke, = the, Union steam frigate, in fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 280

=Robinson, E. , = defeated for Illinois legislature, 1832, 34

=Rodgers, John, = rear-admiral United States navy, takes part in Port Royal expedition, 245, 246

=Romine, Gideon, = merchant at Gentryville, 9

=Rosecrans, William S. , = brevet major-general United States army, success at Rich Mountain, 225; succeeds Buell in Kentucky, 380; battle of Murfreesboro, 380; Iuka and Corinth, 380; drives Bragg to Chattanooga, 385; Chattanooga and Chickamauga, 386-388; relieved from command, 388, 389; dilatory movements delay reconstruction in Tennessee, 428

=Russell, Lord John, = British minister for foreign affairs, interview with Charles Francis Adams, 211

=Rutledge, Anne, = engagement to Lincoln, 54; death of, 54

=Savannah, = Georgia, occupied by Sherman, December 21, 1864, 412

=Schofield, J. M. , = brevet major-general, general-in-chief, United States army, ordered to join Sherman, 414; joins Sherman 417

=Schurz, Carl, = major-general United States Volunteers, United States senator, Secretary of the Interior, asks permission to take part in presidential campaign, 444

=Scott Dred, = case of, 108, 109

=Scott, Robert E. , = tendered cabinet appointment 164

=Scott, Winfield, = lieutenant-general United States army, warning to Lincoln about plot in Baltimore, 172; charged with safety of Washington, 172; attempt to reinforce Anderson, 178; advises evacuation of Sumter, 183; orders Washington prepared for a siege, 194; report to President Lincoln, 194, 195; offers Lee command of seventy-five regiments, 196; orders Lyon to St. Louis, 202; loyalty of, 208; occupies Cairo, Illinois, 210; military problem before, 210; plan of campaign 215, 216, 231, 232; refuses to credit news of defeat at Bull Run, 228, 229; welcomes McClellan to Washington, 250; quarrel with McClellan, 251, 252; retirement of, 251-253; rank as lieutenant-general, 393; attends Lincoln's funeral in New York, 547

=Seaton, William W. , = mayor of Washington approves Lincoln's bill abolishing slavery in District of Columbia, 87

=Secession, = South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas join the movement, 175, 176; action of central cabal, 177; sentiment in Maryland, 193, 194; Virginia passes ordinance of, 194; Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas join the movement, 200; sentiment in Delaware, 201; in Kentucky, 201; in Missouri, 201-204; numerical strength of, 204. See _Confederate States of America_

=Seddon, James A. , = member of Congress, Confederate Secretary of War, resignation of, 501

=Sedgwick, John, = major-general United States Volunteers, crosses Rappahannock and takes Fredericksburg, 368, 369

=Seven Days' Battles, = 302, 306, 307

=Seward, Augustus H. , = brevet colonel United States army, stabbed by Powell, _alias_ Payne, 541

=Seward, Frederick W. , = Assistant Secretary of State, visits Lincoln in Philadelphia, 172; wounded by Powell, _alias_, Payne, 540, 541

=Seward, William H. , = United States senator, Secretary of State, desires reëlection of Douglas to United States Senate, 125; candidate for presidential nomination, 1860, 144; votes for, in Chicago convention, 149-151; accepts cabinet appointment, 163; transmits offers of cabinet appointments, 164; suggestions to Lincoln about journey to Washington, 168; warning to Lincoln about plot in Baltimore, 172, 173; meets Lincoln at railway station in Washington, 174; appointed Secretary of State, 182; reply to Confederate commissioners, 183; reply to Judge Campbell, 183; memorandum of April 1, 1861, 184-187; opinion of Lincoln, 187; despatch of May 21, 211; friendship for Lord Lyons, 247; despatch in _Trent_ affair, 249; at gathering of officials to discuss news of _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296; goes to New York with President's letter, 307; Lincoln tells him of coming emancipation proclamation, 332; suggests postponement of emancipation proclamation, 332; attitude toward the French in Mexico, 451, 452; agrees with President against making proffers of peace to Davis, 463; proclaims ratification of Thirteenth Amendment, 475; goes to Hampton Roads, 483; relations with Montgomery Blair, 488; plot to murder, 535; attacked by Powell, _alias_ Payne, 540, 541

=Seymour, Horatio=, governor of New York, opposition to the draft, 355-357; correspondence with Lincoln, 356; notifies McClellan of his nomination, 468

=Shepley, G. F. =, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, military governor of Louisiana, orders election for members of Congress, 422; orders registration of loyal voters, 422, 423

=Sheridan, Philip H. =, lieutenant-general, general-in-chief, United States army, operations in Shenandoah valley, 403, 404; succeeds McClellan, 470; in Shenandoah valley, 502; reaches City Point, 506; advance to Five Forks, 507; reports situation to Grant, 507; battle of Five Forks, 508; ordered to get on Lee's line of retreat, 509, 510; despatch to Grant, 511; captures Appomattox Station, 512; despatch to Grant, 512

=Sherman, John=, member of Congress, Secretary of the Treasury, United States senator, candidate for Speaker of the House of Representatives, 141

=Sherman, William Tecumseh=, lieutenant-general, general-in-chief United States army, sent to Nashville, 254; succeeds Anderson, 254; interview with Cameron, 255; asks to be relieved, 255; in operations about Vicksburg, 381, 382; reaches Chattanooga, 389; in battle of Chattanooga, 390, 391; conference with Grant, 395; master in the West, 395; Meridian campaign, 405, 406; concentrates troops at Chattanooga, 406; march on Atlanta, 408, 468; truce with Hood, 408; divides his army, 409; march to the sea, 410-412; telegram to President Lincoln, 412; proposes to march through the Carolinas, 414; from Savannah to Goldsboro, 414-417; visit to Grant, 417; march northward, 502; visit to Lincoln and Grant, 506; admiration for Grant and respect for Lee, 520; enters Raleigh, 521; receives communication from Johnston, 521; meetings with Johnston, 521, 522; agreement between them, 522; agreement disapproved at Washington, 523; report to Grant, 523, 524; receives Johnston's surrender, 524; effect of his march through the South, 524; sent against E. Kirby Smith, 526; soldiers of, in grand review, 528

=Shields, James=, United States senator, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; auditor of Illinois, 65; challenges Lincoln to a duel, 66-68; ordered to form junction with McDowell and Frémont, 306

=Short, James=, buys Lincoln's surveying instruments and restores them to him, 36

=Simpson, M. =, Bishop of the Methodist Church, oration at Lincoln's funeral, 548

=Slavery=, agitation in Illinois, 45, 46; Lincoln-Stone protest, 47; Lincoln's bill to abolish, in District of Columbia, 85-87; repeal of Missouri Compromise, 94, 95; Peoria debate of Lincoln and Douglas, 96-98; Lincoln's Chicago banquet speech, 106, 107; Dred Scott case, 108-112; pro-slavery reaction, 113; slavery agitation in Kansas, 113-117; Lincoln's "House divided against itself" speech, 119, 120, 127, 128; Lincoln-Douglas joint debate, 121-125; John Brown raid, 134, 135; Lincoln's speeches in Kansas and the East, 136-140; pro-slavery demands of Democratic leaders, 141, 142; attitude of political parties upon, in 1860, 152, 153; "corner-stone" theory of the Confederate States, 179; dream of the conspirators, 197, 204; dread of slave insurrections in the South, 220, 221; action of Union commanders about, 220-223; Frémont's proclamation, 236-238; Lincoln to Browning about Frémont's proclamation, 238-240; President's interview with border State delegations, 257, 258, 324, 325; references to, in Cameron's report, 320; in Lincoln's message of December 3, 1861, 321, 322; Delaware offered compensated abolishment, 322, 323; Lincoln's special message to Congress, March 6, 1862, 323, 324; President's letter to McDougall, 324; Congress passes bill for compensated emancipation in District of Columbia, 325, 326; bill in Congress to aid emancipation in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, 326; Lincoln revokes Hunter's order, 327, 328; measures relating to, in Congress, 1862, 329; President's second interview with border State delegations, 329-331; Lincoln reads first draft of emancipation proclamation to cabinet, 331, 332; President's interview with Chicago clergymen, 337-339; President issues preliminary emancipation proclamation, 339-341; annual message of December 1, 1862, on, 341, 342; President issues final emancipation proclamation, 342-346; President's views on, 346, 347; arming of negro soldiers, 348-350; instructions from War Department about slaves, 349; contest over slavery clause in new Louisiana constitution, 423; slavery abolished in Louisiana, 426; abolished in Arkansas, 427; abolished in Tennessee, 429; abolished in Missouri, 434; abolished in Maryland, 435, 436; attitude of Democratic party on, 437, 438; Republican national platform favors constitutional amendment abolishing, 446; fugitive-slave law repealed, 457; constitutional amendment prohibiting, in United States, 471-476; public opinion on, in certain States, 473; two constitutional amendments offered during Lincoln's term, 475, 476; Lincoln's draft of joint resolution offering South $400, 000, 000, 493; decline in value of slave property in the South, 501; effect on Lincoln's character, 551. See _Emancipation_ and _Negro soldiers_

=Slidell, John=, minister to Mexico, United States senator, Confederate commissioner to Europe, capture of, 246-249; last instructions from Confederate Secretary of State to, 501, 502

=Smith, Caleb B. =, member of Congress, Secretary of the Interior, judge United States District Court, appointed Secretary of the Interior, 182; signs cabinet protest, 311, 312

=Smith, E. Kirby=, Confederate general, commands forces west of the Mississippi, 525; surrender of, 526, 527

=Smith, Melancton=, rear-admiral United States navy, at gathering of officials to discuss fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296

=Smith, William F. =, brevet major-general United States army, service at Chattanooga 389

=Spain=, joint expedition to Mexico, 451

=Spangler, Edward=, imprisoned for complicity in Booth's plot, 544

=Speed, James=, Attorney-General, appointed Attorney-General, 491

=Speed, Joshua F. =, intimacy with Lincoln, 53; Lincoln's letters to, 64, 65, 68; marriage, 65

=Spottsylvania=, Virginia, battle of, May 8-19, 1864, 398, 399

=Springfield=, Illinois, its ambition, 26; first newspaper, 26; becomes capital of Illinois, 45, 52; in 1837-39, 53; revival of business in, 61; society in, 62; Lincoln's speech of farewell at, 169; funeral honors to Lincoln in, 547, 548

=Stanley, Edward=, member of Congress, appointed military governor of North Carolina, 420

=Stanton, Edwin M. =, Attorney-General, Secretary of War, succeeds Cameron as Secretary of War, 289; his efficiency, 289, 290; interview with the President, 293, 294; at gathering of officials to discuss news of _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296; conveys President's reply to McClellan's plan of campaign, 298; indignation at McClellan, 311; draws up and signs memorandum of protest against continuing McClellan in command, 311; instruction about slaves, 349; faith in Hooker, 370; anxiety for Lincoln during Early's raid, 403; order regulating raising of colored troops, 435; orders suppression of two New York newspapers and arrest of their editors, 453, 454; agrees with President against making proffers of peace to Davis, 463; sends Halleck's letter to President, 488; shows Lincoln Grant's despatch transmitting Lee's overtures, 503; disapproves Sherman's agreement with Johnston, 523; at Lincoln's death-bed, 540

=Star of the West=, merchant vessel, unsuccessful attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, 178

=Steele, Frederick=, brevet major-general United States army, marches from Helena to Little Rock, Arkansas, 427; assists reconstruction in Arkansas, 427

=Stephens, Alexander H. =; member of Congress, Confederate Vice-President, correspondence with Lincoln, 165, 166; elected Vice-President Confederate States of America, 179; "corner-stone" theory, 179; signs military league, 197; appointed peace commissioner, 482; at Hampton Roads conference, 482-485

=Stevens, Thaddeus=, member of Congress, criticism of joint resolution offering compensated emancipation, 325

=St. Lawrence=, the, in fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 280

=Stone, Charles P. =, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, report about danger to Lincoln in Baltimore, 172, 173

=Stone, Dan=, member of Illinois legislature, protest with Lincoln against resolutions on slavery, 47

=Stone, Dr. Robert K. =, at Lincoln's death-bed, 539, 540

=Stringham, Silas H. =, rear-admiral United States navy, commands Hatteras expedition, 245

=Stuart, John T. =, major Illinois Volunteers, member of Congress, reënlists as private in Black Hawk War, 33; elected to Illinois legislature in 1832, 34; reëlected in 1834, 43; encourages Lincoln to study law, 44; at Springfield, Illinois, 52; elected to Congress, 69, 70

=Surratt, John H. =, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; deposits arms in tavern at Surrattsville, 536; escape to Canada, subsequent capture and trial, 544

=Surratt, Mrs. Mary E. =, in conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln, 534; visits tavern at Surrattsville, 536; fate of, 541, 542, 544

=Swaney=, teacher of President Lincoln, 12

=Swett, Leonard=, favors Holt for Vice-President, 448

=Taney, Roger B. =, chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, opinion in Dred Scott case, 109; action in Merryman case, 199, 200; death of, 490

=Taylor, E. D. =, elected to Illinois legislature in 1832, 34

=Taylor, Richard=, Confederate lieutenant-general, surrenders to Canby, 525, 527

=Taylor, Zachary=, twelfth President of the United States, nominated for President, 80, 81; elected President, 87

=Tennessee=, the, Confederate ram, in battle of Mobile Bay, 525

=Tennessee=, State of, joins Confederacy, 200, 204; military governor appointed for, 419; secession usurpation in, 420; delay of reconstruction in, 428; organization of State government and abolishment of slavery, 429; public opinion in, regarding slavery, 473; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 475

=Terry, Alfred H. =, brevet major-general United States army, communicates with Sherman, 416

=Texas=, State of, ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 475

=Thatcher, Henry K. =, rear-admiral United States navy, receives surrender of Farrand, 525

=Thirteenth Amendment=, joint resolution proposing, 471-475; ratification of, 475

=Thomas, George H. =, major-general United States army, ordered to oppose Zollicoffer, 254; victory over Zollicoffer, 265; at battle of Chickamauga, 387; succeeds Rosecrans at Chattanooga, 389; in battle of Chattanooga, 390, 391; sent by Sherman to defend Tennessee, 409; Franklin and Nashville, 410; threatens Confederate communications from Tennessee, 502

=Thompson, Jacob=, member of Congress, Secretary of the Interior, agent of Confederate government in Canada, 361; his visionary plans, 361, 362; account at Montreal Bank, 544

=Thompson, Samuel=, colonel Illinois Volunteers, commands regiment in Black Hawk War, 32

=Tod, David=, minister to Brazil, governor of Ohio, declines nomination for Secretary of the Treasury, 457

=Todd, Mary=, see _Lincoln, Mary Todd_

=Totten, Joseph G. =, brevet major-general United States army, at gathering of officials to discuss news of fight of _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296

=Treat, Samuel H. =, United States district judge, at Springfield, Illinois, 52

=Trent Brothers=, buy store of Lincoln and Berry, 36

=Trent=, the, British mail-steamer, overhauled by the _San Jacinto_, 246

=Trumbull, Lyman=, member of Congress, United States senator, at Springfield, Illinois, 52; elected to United States Senate, 1855, 100

=Turnham, David=, lends Lincoln "Revised Statutes of Indiana, " 14

=Usher, John P. =, Secretary of the Treasury, resigns from cabinet, 492

=Vallandigham, Clement L. =, member of Congress, interview with John Brown, 134; arrest and banishment of, 358; head of Knights of Golden Circle, etc. , 360, 361; at Democratic national convention, 467, 468

=Van Bergen=, sues Lincoln for debt, 36, 41

=Vandalia=, Illinois, removal of State capital from, to Springfield, 45, 52

=Van Dorn, Earl=, Confederate major-general, defeat at Pea Ridge, 271

=Varuna=, the, sunk in expedition against New Orleans, 285

=Vicksburg=, Mississippi, fortifications of, 287; surrender of, July 4, 1863, 376, 383; situation of 381; operations against, 381-383

=Victoria=, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, proclamation of neutrality, 211; kindly feelings toward United States, 247

=Vienna Station=, ambush at, 214

=Virginia=, State of, passes ordinance of secession, 194; in the Confederacy, 204; ratifies Thirteenth Amendment, 475

=Wade, Benjamin F. =, United States senator, signs Wade-Davis manifesto, 456

=Walker, Leroy Pope=, Confederate Secretary of War and brigadier-general, speech at Montgomery, 197

=Walker, Robert J. =, United States senator Secretary of the Treasury, appointed governor of Kansas, 114; letter to Buchanan 114, 115; resigns, 117

=Warren, Gouverneur K. =, brevet major-general United States army, attacked by Lee, 507

=Washburne, Elihu B. =, member of Congress, minister to France, meets Lincoln at railway station in Washington, 174

=Washington City=, cutoff from the North, 194-197; communication restored, 197; fortifications of, 208, 209; threatened by Early, 403; grand review of Union army in, 527-529

=Washington, George=, first President of the United States, rank of lieutenant-general, 393; size of his armies compared with Lee's, 524; his place in United States history, 555

=Weitzel, Godfrey=, brevet major-general United States army, receives surrender of Richmond, 510; sets about work of relief, 516

=Welles, Gideon=, Secretary of the Navy, appointed Secretary of the Navy, 182; approves course of Captain Wilkes, 246; at gathering of officials to discuss news of fight between _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, 296; refuses to sign cabinet protest, 311, 312; Lincoln tells him of coming emancipation proclamation, 332

=West Virginia=, State of, formation of, 200, 201; true to the Union, 204; effect on, of McClellan's campaign, 225; admission to the Union, 418; slavery in throttled by public opinion, 473

=Whig Party=, first national convention of, 28; nominates Henry Clay, 28; convention of 1860, 143, 144

=White, Albert S. =, member of Congress, United States senator, judge of District Court of Indiana, reports bill to aid emancipation in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, 326

=Whitesides, Samuel=, general Illinois Volunteers, reënlists as private in Black Hawk War, 33

=Wide Awakes=, origin and campaign work of, 155, 156

=Wilderness=, Virginia, battle of, May 5, 6, 1864, 398

=Wilkes, Charles=, rear-admiral United States navy, capture of the _Trent_, 246-249

=Wilmington=, North Carolina, occupation of, February 22, 1865, 525

=Wilson, James H. =, brevet major-general United States army, cavalry raid, and defeat of Forrest, 524, 525

=Wilson's Creek=, Missouri, battle of, August 10, 1861, 235

=Wise, Henry A. =, minister to Brazil; governor of Virginia, Confederate brigadier-general desires Douglas's reëlection to United States Senate, 126; interview with John Brown, 134

=Worden, John L. =, rear-admiral United States navy, commands the _Monitor_, 282

=Wright, Horatio G. =, brevet major-general United States army, sent to Washington 403; in recapture of Fort Stedman, 505, 506; in assault at Petersburg, 508, 509

=Yates, Richard=, member of Congress, governor of Illinois, United States senator Lincoln advocates his reëlection, 96; commissions Grant, 265; appoints J. F. Jaquess colonel of volunteer regiment, 461

=Yorktown=, Virginia, siege of, April 5 to May 3, 1862, 301

=Zollicoffer, Felix K. =, member of Congress, Confederate brigadier-general, in eastern Kentucky, 254; defeated by Thomas, 265

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