The Ethics

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

by

Benedict de Spinoza

Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes

PART I. CONCERNING GOD. 

DEFINITIONS. 

I. By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which theessence involves existence, or that of which the nature is onlyconceivable as existent. 

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can belimited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, abody is called finite because we always conceive another greaterbody. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but abody is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. 

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and isconceived through itself: in other words, that of which aconception can be formed independently of any other conception. 

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives asconstituting the essence of substance. 

V. By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or thatwhich exists in, and is conceived through, something other thanitself. 

[1] "Affectiones"

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, asubstance consisting in infinite attributes, of which eachexpresses eternal and infinite essentiality. 

Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after itskind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infiniteattributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involvesno negation. 

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by thenecessity of its own nature, and of which the action isdetermined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing isnecessary, or rather constrained, which is determined bysomething external to itself to a fixed and definite method ofexistence or action. 

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it isconceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition ofthat which is eternal. 

Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternaltruth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot beexplained by means of continuance or time, though continuance maybe conceived without a beginning or end. 

AXIOMS. 

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or insomething else. 

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must beconceived through itself. 

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it isimpossible that an effect can follow. 

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves theknowledge of a cause. 

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, theone by means of the other; the conception of one does notinvolve the conception of the other. 

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. 

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essencedoes not involve existence. 

PROPOSITIONS. 

PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications. 

Proof. --This is clear from Deff. Iii. And v. 

PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, havenothing in common. 

Proof. --Also evident from Def. Iii. For each must exist initself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, theconception of one does not imply the conception of the other. 

PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one thecause of the other. 

Proof. --If they have nothing in common, it follows that onecannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. V. ), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. Iv. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one fromthe other, either by the difference of the attributes of thesubstances, or by the difference of their modifications. 

Proof. --Everything which exists, exists either in itself or insomething else (Ax. I. ), --that is (by Deff. Iii. And v. ), nothingis granted in addition to the understanding, except substance andits modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides theunderstanding, by which several things may be distinguished onefrom the other, except the substances, or, in other words (seeAx. Iv. ), their attributes and modifications. Q. E. D. 

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or moresubstances having the same nature or attribute. 

Proof. --If several distinct substances be granted, they mustbe distinguished one from the other, either by the difference oftheir attributes, or by the difference of their modifications(Prop. Iv. ). If only by the difference of their attributes, itwill be granted that there cannot be more than one with anidentical attribute. If by the difference of theirmodifications--as substance is naturally prior to itsmodifications (Prop. I. ), --it follows that setting themodifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that istruly, (Deff. Iii. And vi. ), there cannot be conceived onesubstance different from another, --that is (by Prop. Iv. ), therecannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance. 

Proof. --It is impossible that there should be in the universetwo substances with an identical attribute, i. E. Which haveanything common to them both (Prop. Ii. ), and, therefore (Prop. Iii. ), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one beproduced by the other. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that a substance cannot beproduced by anything external to itself. For in the universenothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (asappears from Ax. I. And Deff. Iii. And v. ). Now (by the lastProp. ) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q. E. D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of thecontradictory. For, if substance be produced by an externalcause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of itscause (Ax. Iv. ), and (by Def. Iii. ) it would itself not besubstance. 

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances. 

Proof. --Substance cannot be produced by anything external(Corollary, Prop vi. ), it must, therefore, be its own cause--thatis, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existencebelongs to its nature. 

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite. 

Proof. --There can only be one substance with an identicalattribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. Vii. );its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite orinfinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. Ii. ) itwould then be limited by something else of the same kind, whichwould also necessarily exist (Prop. Vii. ); and there would betwo substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd(Prop. V. ). It therefore exists as infinite. Q. E. D. 

Note I. --As finite existence involves a partial negation, andinfinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the givennature, it follows (solely from Prop. Vii. ) that every substanceis necessarily infinite. 

Note II. --No doubt it will be difficult for those who thinkabout things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know themby their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop. Vii. : for such persons make no distinction between themodifications of substances and the substances themselves, andare ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hencethey may attribute to substances the beginning which they observein natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, makecomplete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well asmen--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so longas they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, ifpeople would consider the nature of substance, they would have nodoubt about the truth of Prop. Vii. In fact, this propositionwould be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, bysubstance, would be understood that which is in itself, and isconceived through itself--that is, something of which theconception requires not the conception of anything else; whereasmodifications exist in something external to themselves, and aconception of them is formed by means of a conception of thething in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas ofnon--existent modifications; for, although they may have noactual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet theiressence is so involved in something external to themselves thatthey may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truthsubstances can have, external to the intellect, must consist intheir existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear anddistinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is notsure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if hesaid that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no itwas false (a little consideration will make this plain); or ifanyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the sameas saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height ofabsurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that theexistence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. Andwe can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that thereis but one such substance. I think that this may profitably bedone at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with thedemonstration, we must premise:----

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves norexpresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. Fromthis it follows that----

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number ofindividuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the natureof the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangleexpresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: itdoes not imply any fixed number of triangles. 

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing acause why it should exist. 

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in thenature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulatedapart from such definition. 

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individualthings exist in nature, there must be some cause for theexistence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. Forexample, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity'ssake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to havehad no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence ofthese twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause ofhuman existence in general; we must also show why there areexactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must beassigned for the existence of each individual. Now this causecannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the truedefinition of man does not involve any consideration of thenumber twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence ofthese twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, mustnecessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we maylay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist ofseveral individuals must have an external cause. And, as it hasbeen shown already that existence appertains to the nature ofsubstance, existence must necessarily be included in itsdefinition; and from its definition alone existence must bededucible. But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii. , iii. ), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the samenature. Q. E. D. 

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater thenumber of its attributes (Def. Iv. ). 

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must beconceived through itself. 

Proof. --An attribute is that which the intellect perceives ofsubstance, as constituting its essence (Def. Iv. ), and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. Iii. ). Q. E. D. 

Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, infact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of theother--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute twoentities, or two different substances. For it is the nature ofsubstance that each of its attributes is conceived throughitself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existedsimultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to onesubstance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that eachand every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and thatits reality or being is in proportion to the number of itsattributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinitebeing must necessarily be defined as consisting in infiniteattributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal andinfinite essence. 

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able todistinguish different substances, let him read the followingpropositions, which show that there is but one substance in theuniverse, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such asign would be sought in vain. 

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists. 

Proof. --If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that Goddoes not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (Prop. Vii. ) is absurd. Therefore God necessarilyexists. 

Another proof. --Of everything whatsoever a cause or reasonmust be assigned, either for its existence, or for itsnon--existence--e. G. If a triangle exist, a reason or cause must begranted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does notexist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it fromexisting, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause musteither be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or beexternal to it. For instance, the reason for the non--existenceof a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because itwould involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existenceof substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as itsnature involves existence. (See Prop. Vii. )

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circledoes not follow from the nature of those figures, but from theorder of universal nature in extension. From the latter it mustfollow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it isimpossible that it should exist. So much is self--evident. Itfollows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause orreason be granted which prevents its existence. 

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents theexistence of God, or which destroys his existence, we mustcertainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such areason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from thevery nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn fromanother substance of another nature. For if it were of the samenature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. Butsubstance of another nature could have nothing in common with God(by Prop. Ii. ), and therefore would be unable either to cause orto destroy his existence. 

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divineexistence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divinenature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawnfrom God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. Tomake such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite andsupremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature ofGod, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason beassigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, Godnecessarily exists. Q. E. D. 

Another proof. --The potentiality of non--existence is anegation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existenceis a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarilyexists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are morepowerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviouslyabsurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a beingabsolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist eitherin ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (seeAxiom. I. And Prop. Vii. ). Therefore a being absolutelyinfinite--in other words, God (Def. Vi. )--necessarily exists. Q. E. D. 

Note. --In this last proof, I have purposely shown God'sexistence ą posteriori, so that the proof might be more easilyfollowed, not because, from the same premises, God's existencedoes not follow ą priori. For, as the potentiality of existenceis a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increasesin the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strengthfor existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such asGod, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be manywho will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch asthey are accustomed only to consider those things which flow fromexternal causes. Of such things, they see that those whichquickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quicklyalso disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult ofaccomplishment--that is, not so easily brought intoexistence--those things which they conceive as more complicated. 

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not hereshow the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly, " nor discuss whether, from the point of view ofuniversal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: Ineed only remark that I am not here speaking of things, whichcome to pass through causes external to themselves, but only ofsubstances which (by Prop. Vi. ) cannot be produced by anyexternal cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoeverperfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy oftheir external cause; and therefore their existence arisessolely from the perfection of their external cause, not fromtheir own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed bysubstance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existenceof substance must arise solely from its own nature, which isnothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thingdoes not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore wecannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of theexistence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, ofGod. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, andinvolves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning hisexistence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the questionis given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderatelyattentive reader. 

PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from whichit would follow that substance can be divided. 

Proof. --The parts into which substance as thus conceived wouldbe divided either will retain the nature of substance, or theywill not. If the former, then (by Prop. Viii. ) each part willnecessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. Vi. ) self--caused, and (byProp. V. ) will perforce consist of a different attribute, sothat, in that case, several substances could be formed out of onesubstance, which (by Prop. Vi. ) is absurd. Moreover, the parts(by Prop. Ii. ) would have nothing in common with their whole, andthe whole (by Def. Iv. And Prop. X. ) could both exist and beconceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to beabsurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that theparts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the wholesubstance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the natureof substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. Vii. ) isabsurd. 

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible. 

Proof. --If it could be divided, the parts into which it wasdivided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinitesubstance, or they would not. If the former, we should haveseveral substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. V. ) isabsurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. Vii. ) substance absolutelyinfinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. Xi. ) is alsoabsurd. 

Corollary. --It follows, that no substance, and consequently noextended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible. 

Note. --The indivisibility of substance may be more easilyunderstood as follows. The nature of substance can only beconceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing elsecan be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. Viii)involves a manifest contradiction. 

PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. 

Proof. --As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom noattribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied(by Def. Vi. ), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. Xi. ); if anysubstance besides God were granted, it would have to be explainedby some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the sameattribute would exist, which (by Prop. V. ) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, beconceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily haveto be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of thisproof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can begranted or conceived. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (byDef. Vi. ) only one substance can be granted in the universe, andthat substance is absolutely infinite, as we have alreadyindicated (in the note to Prop. X. ). 

Corollary II. --It follows: 2. That extension and thoughtare either attributes of God or (by Ax. I. ) accidents(affectiones) of the attributes of God. 

PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing canbe, or be conceived. 

Proof. --Besides God, no substance is granted or can beconceived (by Prop. Xiv. ), that is (by Def. Iii. ) nothing whichis in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. V. ) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can onlythrough it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sumtotal of existence (by Ax. I. ), therefore, without God nothingcan be, or be conceived. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body andmind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons havestrayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has beensaid. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywisereflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of thisthey find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by bodya definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by acertain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicatesuch a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhileby other reasons with which they try to prove their point, theyshow that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apartfrom the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefromthe divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning oftheir own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, atany rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. Vi, and note 2, Prop. Viii. ), that no substance can be produced or created by anythingother than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. Xiv. ), thatbesides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence wedrew the conclusion that extended substance is one of theinfinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain morefully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which allstart from the following points:----

Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can beinfinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. Thisthey illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one ortwo. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it beconceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then beeither finite or infinite. If the former, then infinitesubstance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. Ifthe latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as anotherinfinite, which is also absurd. 

Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it wouldequally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each partmeasured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelvetimes as great as the other. 

Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawntwo diverging lines which at first are at a definite distanceapart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that thedistance between the two lines will be continually increased, until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. Asthese absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantityas infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substancemust necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertainto the nature of God. 

The second argument is also drawn from God's supremeperfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremelyperfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God. 

Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, whoby them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of thedivine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, Ithink an attentive reader will see that I have already answeredtheir propositions; for all their arguments are founded on thehypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and sucha hypothesis I have shown (Prop. Xii. , and Coroll. Prop. Xiii. )to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that allthese absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not nowdiscussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusionthat extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from thenotion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion thatan infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite partstherefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed offinite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (inProp. Xii. ). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has inreality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity oftheirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extendedsubstance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting likea man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares, and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds todeny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn tothe circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible(Props. Viii. , v. , xii. ) they assert, in order to prove that itis finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it canbe multiplied and divided. 

So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed ofpoints, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot beinfinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assertthat extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than itwould be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surfaceof lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all whoknow clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those whodeny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substancecould be so divided that its parts were really separate, whyshould not one part admit of being destroyed, the othersremaining joined together as before? And why should all be sofitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in thecase of things, which are really distinct one from the other, onecan exist without the other, and can remain in its originalcondition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together toprevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really bedistinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it issubstance cannot be divided. 

If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturallyso prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity isconceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely bythe intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is representedin our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shallfind that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; butif we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, andconceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, weshall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it isinfinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to allwho make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere thesame, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far aswe conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts aredistinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, inso far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its partsto be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it isextended substance; from this point of view it is neitherseparated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it iswater, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it issubstance, it is neither produced nor corrupted. 

I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, infact, founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, thatmatter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composedof parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should beconsidered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God(by Prop. Xiv. ) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it couldreceive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, andall things which come to pass, come to pass solely through thelaws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortlyshow) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can innowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything otherthan himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of theDivine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it isgranted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for thepresent. 

PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must followan infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all thingswhich can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect. 

Proof. --This proposition will be clear to everyone, whoremembers that from the given definition of any thing theintellect infers several properties, which really necessarilyfollow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thingdefined); and it infers more properties in proportion as thedefinition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, inproportion as the essence of the thing defined involves morereality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infiniteattributes (by Def. Vi. ), of which each expresses infiniteessence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of itsnature an infinite number of things (that is, everything whichcan fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) mustnecessarily follow. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --Hence it follows, that God is the efficientcause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infiniteintellect. 

Corollary II. --It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an accident of his nature. 

Corollary III. --It follows, thirdly, that God is theabsolutely first cause. 

PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, andis not constrained by anyone. 

Proof. --We have just shown (in Prop. Xvi. ), that solely fromthe necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of thingsabsolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved(in Prop. Xv. ), that without God nothing can be nor be conceivedbut that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist;outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained toact. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --It follows: 1. That there can be no causewhich, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides theperfection of his own nature, moves God to act. 

Corollary II. --It follows: 2. That God is the sole freecause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature(by Prop. Xi. And Prop. Xiv. , Coroll. I. ), and acts by the solenecessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. Vii. ) thesole free cause. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we havesaid follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. Butthis is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that itsthree interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which isabsurd. 

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of thisproposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God'snature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they canattribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection inourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actuallysupremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bringinto existence everything which he actually understands, for theythink that they would thus destroy God's power. If, theycontend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, hewould not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer toasset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he createsnothing except that which he has decided, by some absoluteexercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shownsufficiently clearly (by Prop. Xvi. ), that from God's supremepower, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number ofways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way asfrom the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and foreternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two rightangles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed fromall eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same stateof activity. This manner of treating the question attributes toGod an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands aninfinite number of creatable things, which he will never be ableto create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and renderhimself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God isperfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his powerextends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and mostrepugnant to God's omnipotence. 

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and thewill which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertainto the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in somesignificance quite different from those they usually bear. Forintellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the humanintellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common withthem but the name; there would be about as much correspondencebetween the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenlyconstellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I willprove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, itcannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality(Prop. Xvi. , Coroll. I. ). On the contrary, the truth and formalessence of things is as it is, because it exists byrepresentation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore theintellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constituteGod's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of theiressence and of their existence. This seems to have beenrecognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differfrom them in respect to its essence, and in respect to itsexistence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, preciselyin the quality which the latter gains from the former. 

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, butmust be different in existence; and hence if the existence ofone of them cease, the existence of the other will notnecessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could bedestroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would bedestroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both ofthe essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differfrom such effect both in respect to its essence, and also inrespect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the causeboth of the essence and the existence of our intellect;therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived toconstitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both inrespect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it inanywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. Thereasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyonecan easily see. 

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient causeof all things. 

Proof. --All things which are, are in God, and must beconceived through God (by Prop. Xv. ), therefore (by Prop. Xvi. , Coroll. I. ) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be nosubstance (by Prop. Xiv. ), that is nothing in itself external toGod. This is our second point. God, therefore, is theindwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal. 

Proof. --God (by Def. Vi. ) is substance, which (by Prop. Xi. )necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. Vii. ) existence appertainsto its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from itsdefinition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. Viii. ). Further, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def. Iv. ) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in otherwords, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, shouldbe involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternityappertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown inProp. Vii. ); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of theattributes, and thus all are eternal. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition is also evident from the manner inwhich (in Prop. Xi. ) I demonstrated the existence of God; it isevident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. Xix. Ofmy "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved theeternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat. 

PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and thesame. 

Proof. --God (by the last Prop. ) and all his attributes areeternal, that is (by Def. Viii. ) each of his attributes expressesexistence. Therefore the sameattributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain atthe same time his eternal existence--in other words, that whichconstitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time hisexistence. Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are oneand the same. Q. E. D. 

Coroll. I. --Hence it follows that God's existence, like hisessence, is an eternal truth. 

Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that God, and all theattributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could bechanged in respect to existence, they must also be able to bechanged in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed fromtrue to false, which is absurd. 

PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature ofany attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, inother words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute. 

Proof. --Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the propositionto be denied), that something in some attribute of God can followfrom the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at thesame time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence orduration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in theattribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed tobe an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. Xi. ) in itsnature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived asfinite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. Ii. ); but it isnot limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constitutedthe idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has notconstituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. Xi. )must necessarily exist. 

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting theidea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturallyfollow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (forit is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, ifthe idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take anyexample, as the proof is of universal application) follows fromthe necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, thesaid thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our firstpoint. 

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity ofthe nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. Forif it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity ofthe nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to beabout not to exist. 

Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily existunchanged (by Prop. Xi. , and Prop. Xx. , Coroll. Ii. ); and beyondthe limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing thelatter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going toexist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea ofGod, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowedtherefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, oranything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature ofsome attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, butthrough the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed ofanything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God'sabsolute nature. 

PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in sofar as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarilyand as infinite, through the said attribute, must also existnecessarily and as infinite. 

Proof. --The proof of this proposition is similar to that ofthe preceding one. 

PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and asinfinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute natureof some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by amodification which exists necessarily, and as infinite. 

Proof. --A mode exists in something else, through which it mustbe conceived (Def. V. ), that is (Prop. Xv. ), it exists solely inGod, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a modeis conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it mustnecessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute ofGod, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing theinfinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. Viii. )eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. Amode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, mustfollow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, eitherimmediately (Prop. Xxi. ) or through the means of somemodification, which follows from the absolute nature of the saidattribute; that is (by Prop. Xxii. ), which exists necessarilyand as infinite. 

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does notinvolve existence. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from Def. I. For that ofwhich the nature (considered in itself) involves existence isself--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that God is not only the cause ofthings coming into existence, but also of their continuing inexistence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause ofthe being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we seethat it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God mustbe the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existenceappertain. (Prop. Xiv. Coroll. I. ) Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existenceof things, but also of their essence. 

Proof. --If this be denied, then God is not the cause of theessence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (byAx. Iv. ) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. Xv. ) isabsurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. Xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, theessence of things must be inferred from it, no less than theirexistence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. Thiswill be made still clearer by the following corollary. 

Corollary. --Individual things are nothing but modifications ofthe attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of Godare expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appearsfrom Prop. Xv. And Def. V. 

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particularmanner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and thatwhich has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself toact. 

Proof. --That by which things are said to be conditioned to actin a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this isobvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence Godby the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. Xxv. And xvi. ); this is our first point. Our second point isplainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has notbeen conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first partof our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown isabsurd. 

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to actin a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from the third axiom. 

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which isfinite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or beconditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence andaction by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, andhas a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot inits turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it beconditioned for existence and action by another cause, which alsois finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on toinfinity. 

Proof. --Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has beenthus conditioned by God (by Prop. Xxvi. And Prop. Xxiv. , Coroll. ). 

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of anyattribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. Xxi. ). Itmust, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far asthe said attribute is considered as in some way modified; forsubstance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. I. And Def. Iii. , v. ), while modes are merely modifications of theattributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infiniteand eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore itmust follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action byGod or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter aremodified by some modification which is finite, and has aconditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, thiscause or this modification (for the reason by which weestablished the first part of this proof) must in its turn beconditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has aconditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for thesame reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity. Q. E. D. 

Note. --As certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolutenature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, itfollows:--1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of thosethings immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not afterhis kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannoteither exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. Xv. And Prop. Xxiv. Coroll. ). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remotecause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishingthese from what he immediately produces, or rather from whatfollows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, weunderstand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, thatwithout him they can neither be nor be conceived. 

PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but allthings are conditioned to exist and operate in a particularmanner by the necessity of the divine nature. 

Proof. --Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. Xv. ). But God cannotbe called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. Xi. ) he existsnecessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of thedivine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently(Prop. Xvi. ); and they thus follow, whether we consider thedivine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any wayconditioned to act (Prop. Xxvii. ). Further, God is not only thecause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop. Xxiv, Coroll. ), but also in so far as they are considered asconditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. Xxvi. ). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. Xxvi. ), it isimpossible, and not contingent, that they should conditionthemselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it isimpossible, and not contingent, that they should renderthemselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned bythe necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but alsoto exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothingthat is contingent. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Before going any further, I wish here to explain, whatwe should understand by nature viewed as active (naturanaturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I sayto explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by natureviewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes ofsubstance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in otherwords (Prop. Xiv. , Coroll. I. , and Prop. Xvii. , Coroll. Ii) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. 

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that whichfollows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of theattributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes ofGod, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived. 

PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in functioninfinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and themodifications of God, and nothing else. 

Proof. --A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. Vi. ); inother words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellectin representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But innature (by Prop. Xiv. , Coroll. I. ) there is no substance saveGod, nor any modifications save those (Prop. Xv. ) which are inGod, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Thereforethe intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, mustcomprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite orinfinite, as will, desire, love, &c. , should be referred topassive nature and not to active nature. 

Proof. --By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolutethought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing fromother modes, such as love, desire, &c. , and therefore (Def. V. )requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (byProp. Xv. And Def. Vi. ), through some attribute of God whichexpresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be soconceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor beconceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passiverather than to nature active, as must also the other modes ofthinking. Q. E. D. 

Note. --I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only ofwhat is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act ofunderstanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. Forwe cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge ofthe act of understanding. 

PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only anecessary cause. 

Proof. --Will is only a particular mode of thinking, likeintellect; therefore (by Prop. Xxviii. ) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some causeother than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it mustalso be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of hisbeing substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of hispossessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternalessence of thought (by Prop. Xxiii. ). Thus, however it beconceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause bywhich it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def. Vii. ) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary orconstrained cause. Q. E. D. 

Coroll. I. --Hence it follows, first, that God does not actaccording to freedom of the will. 

Coroll. II. --It follows, secondly, that will and intellectstand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, andrest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must beconditioned by God (Prop. Xxix. ) to exist and act in a particularmanner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, bywhich it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinitenumber of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account besaid to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinitenumber of results from motion and rest would justify us in sayingthat motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no moreappertains to God than does anything else in nature, but standsin the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, whichwe have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particularmanner. 

PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being byGod in any manner or in any order different from that which hasin fact obtained. 

Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God(Prop. Xvi. ), and by the nature of God are conditioned to existand act in a particular way (Prop. Xxix. ). If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature, or have been conditionedto act in a different way, so that the order of nature would havebeen different, God's nature would also have been able to bedifferent from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. Xi. ) thatdifferent nature also would have perforce existed, andconsequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. Xiv. , Coroll. I. ) is absurd. Therefore thingscould not have been brought into being by God in any othermanner, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note I. --As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun atnoonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling thingscontingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shallattach to the word contingent; but I will first explain thewords necessary and impossible. 

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essenceor in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thingnecessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, orfrom a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing issaid to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence ordefinition involves a contradiction, or because no external causeis granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; buta thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relationto the imperfection of our knowledge. 

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does ordoes not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that itdoes not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubtconcerning the existence, because the order of causes escapesus, --such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary orimpossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible. 

Note II. --It clearly follows from what we have said, thatthings have been brought into being by God in the highestperfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from amost perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection inGod, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From itscontrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have justshown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had beenbrought into being in any other way, we should have to assign toGod a nature different from that, which we are bound to attributeto him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being. 

I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, andwill refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simplybecause they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom verydifferent from that which we (Def. Vii. ) have deduced. Theyassign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am alsoconvinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and dulyweigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will rejectsuch freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There isno need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. Xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence ofGod, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that thingscould not have been by him created other than they are, or in adifferent order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on whatour opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solelyon the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. Ifit were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from alleternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would beconvicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is nosuch thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solelyfrom the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or nevercould have decreed anything but what is; that God did not existbefore his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it issaid, supposing that God had made a different universe, or hadordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature andher order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection inGod. But persons who say this must admit that God can change hisdecrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning natureand her order, different from those which he has ordained--inother words, if he had willed and conceived something differentconcerning nature--he would perforce have had a differentintellect from that which he has, and also a different will. Butif it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and adifferent will, without any change in his essence or hisperfection, what would there be to prevent him changing thedecrees which he has made concerning created things, andnevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and willconcerning things created and their order are the same, inrespect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived. 

Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit thatGod's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; asthey also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God'sessence are identical, it follows that, if God had had adifferent actual intellect and a different will, his essencewould also have been different; and thus, as I concluded atfirst, if things had been brought into being by God in adifferent way from that which has obtained, God's intellect andwill, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce havebeen different, which is absurd. 

As these things could not have been brought into being by Godin any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and asthe truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfectionof God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves tobelieve that God did not wish to create all the things which werein his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as hehad understood them. 

But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection norimperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to becalled perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on thewill of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought itabout that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versā. What is such an assertion, but an opendeclaration that God, who necessarily understands that which hewishes, might bring it about by his will, that he shouldunderstand things differently from the way in which he doesunderstand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height ofabsurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against itsemployers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God'swill cannot be different (as we have just most clearlydemonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither canthings be different. I confess, that the theory which subjectsall things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts thatthey are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truththan the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in allthings with a view of promoting what is good. For these latterpersons seem to set up something beyond God, which does notdepend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only anothername for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utterabsurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the firstand only free cause of the essence of all things and also oftheir existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refutingsuch wild theories. 

PROP. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence. 

Proof. --From the sole necessity of the essence of God itfollows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. Xi. ) and of allthings (Prop. Xvi. And Coroll. ). Wherefore the power of God, bywhich he and all things are and act, is identical with hisessence. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists. 

Proof. --Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop. )be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that itnecessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effectdoes not follow. 

Proof. --Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence ina given conditioned manner (by Prop. Xxv. , Coroll. ); that is, (by Prop. Xxxiv. ), whatsoever exists, expresses in a givenconditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things, therefore an effect must (by Prop. Xvi. ) necessarily follow. Q. E. D. 

APPENDIX:

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and propertiesof God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that withouthim they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that allthings are predetermined by God, not through his free will orabsolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove theprejudices, which might impede the comprehension of mydemonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to theunderstanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explainedit above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring thesemisconceptions before the bar of reason. 

All such opinions spring from the notion commonlyentertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that Godhimself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is saidthat God made all things for man, and man that he might worshiphim). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally soprone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices aboutgood and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order andconfusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this isnot the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature ofthe human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as astarting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that allhave the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that theyare conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, thatmen think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of theirvolitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for thatwhich is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes topass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes ofevents, and when these are learned, they are content, as havingno cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causesfrom external sources, they are compelled to turn to consideringthemselves, and reflecting what end would have induced thempersonally to bring about the given event, and thus theynecessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as theyfind in themselves and outside themselves many means which assistthem not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals foryielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breedingfish, &c. , they come to look on the whole of nature as a meansfor obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, thatthey found these conveniences and did not make them, they thinkthey have cause for believing, that some other being has madethem for their use. As they look upon things as means, theycannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from themeans which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, theyare bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universeendowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adaptedeverything for human use. They are bound to estimate the natureof such rulers (having no information on the subject) inaccordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert thatthe gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bindman to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hencealso it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, accordingto his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that Godmight love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole courseof nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity andinsatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed intosuperstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for thisreason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explainthe final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show thatnature does nothing in vain, i. E. Nothing which is useless toman, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result:among the many helps of nature they were bound to find somehindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c. : so theydeclared that such things happen, because the gods are angry atsome wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed intheir worship. Experience day by day protested and showed byinfinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot ofpious and impious alike; still they would not abandon theirinveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class suchcontradictions among other unknown things of whose use they wereignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition ofignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoningand start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, thatGod's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such adoctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from thehuman race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnishedanother standard of verity in considering solely the essence andproperties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besidesmathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directedto these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledgeof the truth. 

I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There isno need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal inview, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, Ithink, is already evident enough, both from the causes andfoundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, andalso from Prop. Xvi. , and the Corollary of Prop. Xxxii. , and, infact, all those propositions in which I have shown, thateverything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and withthe utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, inorder to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. Thatwhich is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versā:it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and thatwhich is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passingover the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it isplain from Props. Xxi. , xxii. , xxiii. That the effect is mostperfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect whichrequires for its production several intermediate causes is, inthat respect, more imperfect. But if those things which weremade immediately by God were made to enable him to attain hisend, then the things which come after, for the sake of which thefirst were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all. 

Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires somethingwhich he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw adistinction between the object of want and the object ofassimilation; still they confess that God made all things forthe sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They areunable to point to anything prior to creation, except Godhimself, as an object for which God should act, and are thereforedriven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked thosethings for whose attainment he created means, and further that hedesired them. 

We must not omit to notice that the followers of thisdoctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning finalcauses, have imported a new method of argument in proof of theirtheory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but toignorance; thus showing that they have no other method ofexhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from aroof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrateby their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, howcould so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrentcircumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps youwill answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind wasblowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why, " they willinsist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that verytime walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind hadthen sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the daybefore, the weather being previously calm, and that the man hadbeen invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why wasthe sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till atlast you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, thesanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame ofthe human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of thecauses of so great a work of art, conclude that it has beenfashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernaturalskill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurtanother. 

Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, andstrives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced asan impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as theinterpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their onlyavailable means for proving and preserving their authority wouldvanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to mythird point. 

After men persuaded themselves, that everything which iscreated is created for their sake, they were bound to consider asthe chief quality in everything that which is most useful tothemselves, and to account those things the best of all whichhave the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they werebound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the natureof things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief thatthey are free agents arose the further notions of praise andblame, sin and merit. 

I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of humannature; the former I will briefly explain here. 

Everything which conduces to health and the worship of Godthey have called good, everything which hinders these objectsthey have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do notunderstand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in anyway, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake theirimagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe thatthere is an order in things, being really ignorant both of thingsand their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, thatthe impression they make on our senses requires little effort ofimagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we saythat they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they areill--ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easilyimagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order toconfusion--as though there were any order in nature, except inrelation to our imagination--and say that God has created allthings in order; thus, without knowing it, attributingimagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that Godforesaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that itshould be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, theywould not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find aninfinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, andvery many others which confound its weakness. But enough hasbeen said on this subject. The other abstract notions arenothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination isdifferently affected: though they are considered by the ignorantas the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe thateverything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion whichobjects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrarymotion be excited, they are styled ugly. 

Things which are perceived through our sense of smell arestyled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c. 

Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunaticenough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure inharmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuadedthemselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise toharmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyonejudges of things according to the state of his brain, or rathermistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need nolonger wonder that there have arisen all the controversies wehave witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although humanbodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others theydiffer; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; whatis pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need notfurther enumerate, because this is not the place to treat thesubject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently wellknown. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely aspalates. " All of which proverbs show, that men judge of thingsaccording to their mental disposition, and rather imagine thanunderstand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, asmathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what Ihave urged. 

We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonlygiven of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicatethe true nature of anything, but only the constitution of theimagination; and, although they have names, as though they wereentities, existing externally to the imagination, I call thementities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, allarguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easilyrebutted. 

Many argue in this way. If all things follow from anecessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are thereso many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as thingscorrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I havesaid, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to bereckoned only from their own nature and power; things are notmore or less perfect, according as they delight or offend humansenses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant tomankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer butthis: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation ofevery degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, morestrictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as tosuffice for the production of everything conceivable by aninfinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. Xvi. 

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; ifthere are any more of the same sort, everyone may easilydissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection. 

Part II. 

ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE

I now pass on to explaining the results, which mustnecessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal andinfinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Parti. , Prop. Xvi. , that an infinite number must follow in aninfinite number of ways), but only those which are able to leadus, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mindand its highest blessedness. 

DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certaindeterminate manner the essence of God, in so far as he isconsidered as an extended thing. (See Pt. I. , Prop. Xxv. , Coroll. )

DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thingthat, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;in other words, that without which the thing, and which itselfwithout the thing, can neither be nor be conceived. 

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which isformed by the mind as a thinking thing. 

Explanation. --I say conception rather than perception, becausethe word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive inrespect to the object; whereas conception seems to express anactivity of the mind. 

DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in sofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to theobject, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea. 

Explanation. --I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that markwhich is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea andits object (ideatum). 

DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance ofexisting. 

Explanation. --I say indefinite, because it cannot bedetermined through the existence itself of the existing thing, orby its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence ofthe thing, but does not take it away. 

DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms. 

DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which arefinite and have a conditioned existence; but if severalindividual things concur in one action, so as to be allsimultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, sofar, as one particular thing. 

AXIOMS

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, thatis, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this orthat man does or does not exist. 

II. Man thinks. 

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other ofthe passions, do not take place, unless there be in the sameindividual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the ideacan exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking. 

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways. 

V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies andmodes of thought. 

N. B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. Xiii. 

PROPOSITIONS

PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinkingthing. 

Proof. --Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, aremodes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the natureof God (Pt. I. , Prop. Xxv. , Coroll. ). God therefore possessesthe attribute (Pt. I. , Def. V. ) of which the concept is involvedin all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. I. , Def. Vi. ). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition is also evident from the fact, that weare able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, inproportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking morethoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality orperfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinitenumber of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from theconsideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (Pt. I. , Deff. Iv. And vi. ) one of theinfinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing. 

PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is anextended thing. 

Proof. --The proof of this proposition is similar to that ofthe last. 

PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of hisessence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from hisessence. 

Proof. --God (by the first Prop. Of this Part) can think aninfinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the samething, by Prop. Xvi. , Part i. ) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now allthat is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. I. , Prop. Xxxv. ). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, andin God alone. Q. E. D. (Part i. , Prop. Xv. )

Note. --The multitude understand by the power of God the freewill of God, and the right over all things that exist, whichlatter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. Forit is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and toreduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very oftenlikened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted(Pt. I. , Prop. Xxxii. , Corolls. I. And ii. ), and we have shown(Part i. , Prop. Xvi. ) that God acts by the same necessity, asthat by which he understands himself; in other words, as itfollows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the samenecessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. Wefurther showed (Part i. , Prop. Xxxiv. ), that God's power isidentical with God's essence in action; therefore it is asimpossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceivehim as non--existent. If we might pursue the subject further, Icould point out, that the power which is commonly attributed toGod is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by themultitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves anegation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the sameground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, toturn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I fromProp. Xvi. To the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power ofGod with the human power and right of kings. 

PROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number ofthings follow in infinite ways, can only be one. 

Proof. --Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save theattributes of God and his modifications (Part i. , Prop. Xxx. ). Now God is one (Part i. , Prop. Xiv. , Coroll. ). Therefore theidea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow ininfinite ways, can only be one. Q. E. D. 

PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, onlyin so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so faras he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideasboth of the attributes of God and of particular things do not ownas their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the thingsperceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from Prop. Iii. Of thisPart. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the ideaof his essence, and of all things which follow necessarilytherefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not becausehe is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being ofideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being ofideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i. , Prop. Xxv. , Coroll. ) a mode which expresses in a certain manner thenature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore(Part i. , Prop. X. ) involves the conception of no other attributeof God, and consequently (by Part i. , Ax. Iv. ) is not the effectof any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being ofideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as athinking thing, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, inso far as he is considered through the attribute of which theyare modes, and not in so far as he is considered through anyother attribute. 

Proof. --Each attribute is conceived through itself, withoutany other (Part i. , Prop. X. ); wherefore the modes of eachattribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not ofany other. Thus (Part i. , Ax. Iv. ) they are caused by God, onlyin so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modesthey are, and not in so far as he is considered through anyother. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence the actual being of things, which are notmodes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, becausethat nature has prior knowledge of the things. Thingsrepresented in ideas follow, and are derived from theirparticular attribute, in the same manner, and with the samenecessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) fromthe attribute of thought. 

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as theorder and connection of things. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from Part i. , Ax. Iv. Forthe idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge ofthe cause, whereof it is an effect. 

Corollary. --Hence God's power of thinking is equal to hisrealized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from theinfinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection fromthe idea of God in the world of thought (objective). 

Note. --Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind whathas been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can beperceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essenceof substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are oneand the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and theidea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed intwo ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized bythose Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and thethings understood by God are identical. For instance, a circleexisting in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which isalso in God, are one and the same thing displayed throughdifferent attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under theattribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, orunder any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or oneand the same chain of causes--that is, the same things followingin either case. 

I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of theidea of a circle, --in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of acircle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because theactual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as aproximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that againthrough another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as weconsider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the orderof the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through theattribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider thingsas modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole ofnature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, inthe case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as theyare in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as heconsists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the presentexplain my meaning more clearly. 

PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that donot exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, inthe same way as the formal essences of particular things or modesare contained in the attributes of God. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from the last; it isunderstood more clearly from the preceding note. 

Corollary. --Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes ofGod, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and whenparticular things are said to exist, not only in so far as theyare involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as theyare said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue. 

Note. --If anyone desires an example to throw more light onthis question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour toillustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is suchthat if any number of straight lines intersect within it, therectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yetnone of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so faras the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of theserectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they arecomprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, fromthis infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas ofthese two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in theidea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence ofthose rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from theremaining ideas of the remaining rectangles. 

PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing iscaused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far ashe is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actuallyexisting, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affectedby a third idea, and so on to infinity. 

Proof. --The idea of an individual thing actually existing isan individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes(by the Corollary and note to Prop. Viii. Of this part); thus(by Prop. Vi. Of this part) it is caused by God, in so far onlyas he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. Xxviii. Of Part i. )in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far ashe is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and heis the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and soon to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (byProp. Vii. Of this book) the same as the order and connection ofcauses. Therefore of a given individual idea another individualidea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by thatidea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, inso far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Whatsoever takes place in the individual object ofany idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as hehas the idea of the object. 

Proof. --Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, itsidea is in God (by Prop. Iii. Of this part), not in so far as heis infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected byanother idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop. ); but (byProp. Vii. Of this part) the order and connection of ideas is thesame as the order and connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual objectwill be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object. Q. E. D. 

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to theessence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute theactual being[2] of man. 

[2] "Forma"

Proof. --The being of substance involves necessary existence(Part i. , Prop. Vii. ). If, therefore, the being of substanceappertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, manwould necessarily be granted also (II. Def. Ii. ), and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd(II. Ax. I. ). Therefore, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition may also be proved from I. V. , in whichit is shown that there cannot be two substances of the samenature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance isnot that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, theproposition is evident from the other properties ofsubstance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c. , as anyone may see for himself. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows, that the essence of man isconstituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God. For (by the last Prop. ) the being of substance does not belong tothe essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) issomething which is in God, and which without God can neither benor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll. ), or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditionedmanner. 

Note. --Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or beconceived without God. All men agree that God is the one andonly cause of all things, both of their essence and of theirexistence; that is, God is not only the cause of things inrespect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respectto their being (secundum esse). 

At the same time many assert, that that, without which athing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of thatthing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of Godappertains to the essence of created things, or else that createdthings can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is moreprobably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think thecause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to theproper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, whichshould be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in theorder of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to belast in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first placewhat they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they areconsidering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all tothe divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind tothe study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear inmind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid theknowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses areno help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it ishardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradictthemselves freely. 

However, I pass over this point. My intention her was onlyto give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thingcannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet Goddoes not appertain to their essence. I said that "I consideredas belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, thething is necessarily removed also; or that without which thething, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor beconceived. " (II. Def. Ii. )

PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual beingof the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actuallyexisting. 

Proof. --The essence of man (by the Coroll. Of the last Prop. )is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely(by II. Ax. Ii. ), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. Iii. ) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea isgiven, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is priorin nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the humanmind. But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II. Viii. Coroll. ) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it musttherefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not ofan infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. Xxi. , xxii. ), mustalways necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. I. ) involve anabsurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes theactual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actuallyexisting. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows, that the human mind is part ofthe infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the humanmind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God hasthis or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so faras he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in sofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when wesay that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as heconstitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far ashe, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea ofanother thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing inpart or inadequately. 

Note. --Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, andwill call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, andnot to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to theend. 

PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the humanmind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind ofthe said occurrence. That is, if the object of the ideaconstituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place inthat body without being perceived by the mind. 

Proof. --Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. Ix. Coroll. ), inso far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the saidobject, that is (II. Xi. ), in so far as he constitutes the mindof anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the objectconstituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof isnecessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence ofthe human mind; that is (by II. Xi. Coroll. ) the knowledge ofthe said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other wordsthe mind perceives it. 

Note. --This proposition is also evident, and is more clearlyto be understood from II. Vii. , which see. 

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mindis the body, in other words a certain mode of extension whichactually exists, and nothing else. 

Proof. --If indeed the body were not the object of the humanmind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be inGod (II. Ix. Coroll. ) in virtue of his constituting our mind, butin virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; thatis (II. Xi. Coroll. ) the ideas of the modifications of the bodywould not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. Iv. ) we do possess theidea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object ofthe idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body asit actually exists (II. Xi. ). Further, if there were any otherobject of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, asnothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I. Xxxvi. ) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. Xi. ); but(I. Ax. V. ) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of ourmind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind isunited to the body, but also the nature of the union between mindand body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequatelyor distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of thenature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hithertohave been entirely general, applying not more to men than toother individual things, all of which, though in differentdegrees, are animated. [3] For of everything there is necessarilyan idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way asthere is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we haveasserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also beasserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the otherhand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one fromthe other, one being more excellent than another and containingmore reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellentthan the object of another idea, and contains more reality. 

[3] "Animata"

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human minddiffers from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it isnecessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, ofthe human body. What this nature is, I am not able here toexplain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that inproportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doingmany actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also isthe mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others forforming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actionsof the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodiesconcur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which itis the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognizethe superiority of one mind over others, and may further see thecause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the followingpropositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore Ihave thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly mypresent statements. In order to do so, I must premise a fewpropositions concerning the nature of bodies. 

AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest. 

AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly. 

LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another inrespect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not inrespect of substance. 

Proof. --The first part of this proposition is, I take it, self--evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect ofsubstance, is plain both from I. V. And I. Viii. It is broughtout still more clearly from I. Xv, note. 

LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects. 

Proof. --All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve theconception of one and the same attribute (II. , Def. I. ). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest. 

LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined tomotion or rest by another body, which other body has beendetermined to motion or rest by a third body, and that thirdagain by a fourth, and so on to infinity. 

Proof. --Bodies are individual things (II. , Def. I. ), which(Lemma I. ) are distinguished one from the other in respect tomotion and rest; thus (I. Xxviii. ) each must necessarily bedetermined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely(II. Vi. ), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. I. ) inmotion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set inmotion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body tomotion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on toinfinity. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps inmotion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some otherbody; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to astate of motion by some other body. This is indeed self--evident. For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is atrest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it isat rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for noother consequence could have been involved than its remaining atrest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, solong as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anythingconcerning it, except that it is in motion. If A issubsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the resultof A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led tocontinued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resultedfrom something, which was not in A, namely, from an externalcause determining A to a state of rest. 

Axiom I. --All modes, wherein one body is affected by anotherbody, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affectedand the body affecting; so that one and the same body may bemoved in different modes, according to the difference in thenature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, differentbodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body. 

Axiom II. --When a body in motion impinges on another body atrest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order tocontinue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion inthe recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the movingbody has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the lineof motion of incidence and the same plane. 

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only distinguished one from the other by motion andrest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies. 

Definition. --When any given bodies of the same or differentmagnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, orif they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so thattheir mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certainfixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and thattogether they compose one body or individual, which isdistinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union. 

Axiom III. --In proportion as the parts of an individual, or acompound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being movedfrom their position; consequently the individual will, withgreater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form. Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies, are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over smallsuperficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motionamong one another, are called fluid. 

LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded ofseveral bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the sametime, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature taketheir place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change in its actuality (forma). 

Proof. --Bodies (Lemma i. ) are not distinguished in respect ofsubstance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of anindividual consists (by the last Def. ) in a union of bodies; butthis union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substanceand in respect of mode. Q. E. D. 

LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greateror less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the samemutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will stillpreserve its original nature, and its actuality will not bechanged. 

Proof. --The same as for the last Lemma. 

LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual becompelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that theybe able to continue their motions and their mutual communicationin the same relations as before, the individual will retain itsown nature without any change of its actuality. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident, for the individualis supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, wespoke of as its actual being. 

LEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composedpreserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or atrest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long aseach part retains its motion, and preserves its communicationwith other parts as before. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from the definition of anindividual prefixed to Lemma iv. 

Note. --We thus see, how a composite individual may be affectedin many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodiesonly distinguished one from the other in respect of motion andrest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simplecharacter. If, however, we now conceive another individualcomposed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall findthat the number of ways in which it can be affected, withoutlosing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its partswould consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi. )each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quickeror slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit itsmotions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. Ifwe further conceive a third kind of individuals composed ofindividuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may beaffected in a still greater number of ways without changing theiractuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceivethe whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, allbodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in theindividual as a whole. I should feel bound to explain anddemonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing aspecial treatise on body. But I have already said that such isnot my object; I have only touched on the question, because itenables me to prove easily that which I have in view. 

POSTULATES

I. The human body is composed of a number of individualparts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itselfextremely complex. 

II. Of the individual parts composing the human body someare fluid, some soft, some hard. 

III. The individual parts composing the human body, andconsequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety ofways by external bodies. 

IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of anumber of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated. 

V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by anexternal body to impinge often on another soft part, it changesthe surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impressionthereupon of the external body which impels it. 

VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrangethem in a variety of ways. 

PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a greatnumber of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capableof receiving a great number of impressions. 

Proof. --The human body (by Post. Iii. And vi. ) is affected invery many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very manyways of affecting external bodies. But (II. Xii. ) the humanmind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; thehuman mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number ofthings, and is so in proportion, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of thehuman mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number ofideas. 

Proof. --The idea constituting the actual being of the humanmind is the idea of the body (II. Xiii. ), which (Post. I. ) iscomposed of a great number of complex individual parts. Butthere is necessarily in God the idea of each individual partwhereof the body is composed (II. Viii. Coroll. ); therefore(II. Vii. ), the idea of the human body is composed of thesenumerous ideas of its component parts. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body isaffected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the humanbody, and also the nature of the external body. 

Proof. --All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from thenature of the affecting body (by Ax. I. , after the Coroll. OfLemma iii. ), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax. Iv. ) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea ofevery mode, in which the human body is affected by externalbodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the externalbody. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --Hence it follows, first, that the human mindperceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with thenature of its own. 

Corollary II. --It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which wehave of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of ourown body than the nature of external bodies. I have amplyillustrated this in the Appendix to Part I. 

PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner whichinvolves the nature of any external body, the human mind willregard the said external body as actually existing, or as presentto itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as toexclude the existence or the presence of the said external body. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident, for so long as thehuman body continues to be thus affected, so long will the humanmind (II. Xii. ) regard this modification of the body--that is (bythe last Prop. ), it will have the idea of the mode as actuallyexisting, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, butpostulates the existence or presence of the nature of theexternal body; therefore the mind (by II. Xvi. , Coroll. I. ) willregard the external body as actually existing, until it isaffected, &c. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --The mind is able to regard as present externalbodies, by which the human body has once been affected, eventhough they be no longer in existence or present. 

Proof. --When external bodies determine the fluid parts of thehuman body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, theychange the surface of the last named (Post. V. ); hence (Ax. Ii. , after the Coroll. Of Lemma iii. ) they are refracted therefrom ina different manner from that which they followed before suchchange; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the newsurfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will berefracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelledtowards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, theywill, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the humanbody in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. Xii. ) will againtake cognizance--that is (II. Xvii. ), the mind will again regardthe external body as present, and will do so, as often as thefluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfacesby their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although theexternal bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard themas present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present many things which are not. It ispossible that the same result may be brought about by othercauses; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicatedone possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed outthe true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from thetruth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, whichrest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot becontroverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the humanbody, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. After II. Xiii. ). Furthermore (II. Vii. Coroll. , II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. ), we clearlyunderstand what is the difference between the idea, say, ofPeter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and theidea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. Theformer directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, andonly implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latterindicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the natureof Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's bodylasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, eventhough he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usualphraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which theideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will callthe images of things, though they do not recall the figure ofthings. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we saythat it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, inorder to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of themind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The minddoes not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far asit is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes theexistence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. Ifthe mind, while imagining non--existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, thispower of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of itsnature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty ofimagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. Vii. ), if this faculty of imagination be free. 

PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two ormore bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imaginesany of them, it will straightway remember the others also. 

Proof. --The mind (II. Xvii. Coroll. ) imagines any given body, because the human body is affected and disposed by theimpressions from an external body, in the same manner as it isaffected when certain of its parts are acted on by the saidexternal body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then sodisposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, andthe mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember theother. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply acertain association of ideas involving the nature of thingsoutside the human body, which association arises in the mindaccording to the order and association of the modifications(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is anassociation of those ideas only, which involve the nature ofthings outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to thenature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of thehuman body are, strictly speaking (II. Xvi. ), those which involvethe nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order andassociation of the modifications of the human body, in order todistinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises fromthe order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives thingsthrough their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind fromthe thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at thethought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), aRoman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the manhas often been affected by these two things; that is, that theman has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at thefruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought toanother, according as his habit has ordered the images of thingsin his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees thetracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought ofa horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thoughtof war, &c. ; while a countryman will proceed from the thought ofa horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every manwill follow this or that train of thought, according as he hasbeen in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental imagesof things in this or that manner. 

PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and doesnot know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modificationswhereby the body is affected. 

Proof. --The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of thehuman body (II. Xiii. ), which (II. Ix. ) is in God, in so far ashe is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thingactually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. Iv. ) the human bodystands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideasis the same as the order and connection of causes (II. Vii. );this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regardedas affected by the ideas of very many particular things. ThusGod has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, inso far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in sofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (byII. Xi. Coroll. ), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so faras he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the humanmind perceives those modifications (II. Xii. ), and consequently(II. Xvi. ) the human body itself, and as actually existing;therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also inGod, following in God in the same manner, and being referred toGod in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the humanbody. 

Proof. --Thought is an attribute of God (II. I. ); therefore(II. Iii. ) there must necessarily be in God the idea both ofthought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also ofthe human mind (II. Xi. ). Further, this idea or knowledge of themind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, butin so far as he is affected by another idea of an individualthing (II. Ix. ). But (II. Vii. ) the order and connection ofideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and isreferred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge ofthe body. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in thesame way as the mind is united to the body. 

Proof. --That the mind is united to the body we have shown fromthe fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. Xii. Andxiii. ); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must beunited with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manneras the mind is united to the body. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition is comprehended much more clearly fromwhat we have said in the note to II. Vii. We there showed thatthe idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. Xiii. ), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attributeof thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore theidea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself arein God by the same necessity and follow from him from the samepower of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, thatis, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode ofthought without reference to the object; if a man knowsanything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and atthe same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on toinfinity. But I will treat of this hereafter. 

PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modificationsof the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. 

Proof. --The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in Godin the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in thesame way as II. Xx. But the ideas of the modifications of thebody are in the human mind (II. Xii. ), that is, in God, in so faras he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore theideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has theknowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. Xxi. ), theywill be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives notonly the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of suchmodifications. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far asit perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. 

Proof. --The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. Xx. ) follows inGod in the same manner, and is referred to God in the samemanner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II. Xix. ) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is(II. Xi. Coroll. ), since the knowledge of the human body is notreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of thehuman mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mindreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of thehuman mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. Xi. ), the humanmind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas ofthe modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve thenature of the human body itself (II. Xvi. ), that is (II. Xiii. ), they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledgeof these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but(by the last Prop. ) the knowledge of these ideas is in the humanmind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only hasknowledge of itself. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequateknowledge of the parts composing the human body. 

Proof. --The parts composing the human body do not belong tothe essence of that body, except in so far as they communicatetheir motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def. After Lemma iii. ), not in so far as they can be regarded asindividuals without relation to the human body. The parts of thehuman body are highly complex individuals (Post. I. ), whoseparts (Lemma iv. ) can be separated from the human body without inany way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of thelatter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. I. , afterLemma iii. ) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II. Iii. ) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch (II. Ix. ) as he is regarded as affected by another ideaof a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in theorder of nature to the aforesaid part (II. Vii. ). We may affirmthe same thing of each part of each individual composing thehuman body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing thehuman body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very manyideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of thehuman body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes thenature of the human mind (II. Xiii); therefore (II. Xi. Coroll. ), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledgeof the human body. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body doesnot involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. 

Proof. --We have shown that the idea of a modification of thehuman body involves the nature of an external body, in so far asthat external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which hasno reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof isin God (II. Ix. ), in so far as God is regarded as affected by theidea of a further thing, which (II. Vii. ) is naturally prior tothe said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of theexternal body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of themodification of the human body; in other words, the idea of themodification of the human body does not involve an adequateknowledge of the external body. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external bodyas actually existing, except through the ideas of themodifications of its own body. 

Proof. --If the human body is in no way affected by a givenexternal body, then (II. Vii. ) neither is the idea of the humanbody, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by theidea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it inany manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the humanbody is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far(II. Xvi. And Coroll. ) it perceives that external body. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --In so far as the human mind imagines an externalbody, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof. 

Proof. --When the human mind regards external bodies throughthe ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that itimagines (see II. Xvii. Note); now the mind can only imagineexternal bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. Xxv. ), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not anadequate knowledge of them. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human bodydoes not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself. 

Proof. --Every idea of a modification of the human bodyinvolves the nature of the human body, in so far as the humanbody is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. Xvi. ). But, inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affectedin many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are notclear and distinct, but confused. 

Proof. --The ideas of the modifications of the human bodyinvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies(II. Xvi. ); they must involve the nature not only of the humanbody but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes(Post. Iii. ), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (byII. Xxiv. , xxv. ) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, asalso of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in sofar as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in sofar as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas ofmodifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mindalone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mindis, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered initself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with theidea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of themodifications of the human body, in so far as they are referredto the mind only, as everyone may easily see. 

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of thehuman body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the humanmind. 

Proof. --The idea of a modification of the human body (II. Xxvii. ) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is(II. Xiii. ) it does not agree with the nature of the mindadequately; therefore (I. Ax. Vi) the idea of this idea does notadequately express the nature of the human mind, or does notinvolve an adequate knowledge thereof. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that the human mind, when itperceives things after the common order of nature, has not anadequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does notknow itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of themodifications of body (II. Xxiii. ). It only perceives its ownbody (II. Xix. ) through the ideas of the modifications, and onlyperceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in sofar as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequateknowledge of itself (II. Xxix. ), nor of its own body (II. Xxvii. ), nor of external bodies (II. Xxv. ), but only afragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. Xxviii. Andnote). Q. E. D. 

Note. --I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate butonly a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and ofexternal bodies, whenever it perceives things after the commonorder of nature; that is, whenever it is determined fromwithout, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, toregard this or that; not at such times as it is determined fromwithin, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, andcontrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, itregards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below. 

PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of theduration of our body. 

Proof. --The duration of our body does not depend on itsessence (II. Ax. I. ), nor on the absolute nature of God (I. Xxi. ). But (I. Xxviii. ) it is conditioned to exist and operateby causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist andoperate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, theselast again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order ofnature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing maybe constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far ashe has the idea of the human body only. (II. Ix. Coroll. )Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in Godvery inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constitutingthe nature of the human mind; that is (II. Xi. Coroll. ), thisknowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of theduration of particular things external to ourselves. 

Proof. --Every particular thing, like the human body, must beconditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in afixed and definite relation; this other particular thing mustlikewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I. Xxviii. ) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, fromthis common property of particular things, we have only a veryinadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw asimilar conclusion with regard to the duration of particularthings, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledgeof the duration thereof. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that all particular things arecontingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea oftheir duration (by the last Prop. ), and this is what we mustunderstand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I. Xxxiii. , Note i. ) For (I. Xxix. ), except in this sense, nothingis contingent. 

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true. 

Proof. --All ideas which are in God agree in every respect withtheir objects (II. Vii. Coroll. ), therefore (I. Ax. Vi. ) they areall true. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causesthem to be called false. 

Proof. --If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positivemode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive qualityof falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II. Xxxii. ); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. Xv. ). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them tobe called false. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate andperfect, is true. 

Proof. --When we say that an idea in us is adequate andperfect, we say, in other words (II. Xi. Coroll. ), that the ideais adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes theessence of our mind; consequently (II. Xxxii. ), we say that suchan idea is true. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. 

Proof. --There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes themto be called false (II. Xxxiii. ); but falsity cannot consist insimple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and tobe mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, forignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists inthe privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, orconfused ideas involve. Q. E. D. 

Note. --In the note to II. Xvii. I explained how error consistsin the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more lighton the subject I will give an example. For instance, men aremistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made upof consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of thecauses by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for theiractions. As for their saying that human actions depend on thewill, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspondthereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they noneof them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feigndwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provokeeither laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the factthat, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's truedistance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwardslearn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred ofthe earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we areignorant of its true distance, but because the modification ofour body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our saidbody is affected thereby. 

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the samenecessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas. 

Proof. --All ideas are in God (I. Xv. ), and in so far as theyare referred to God are true (II. Xxxii. ) and (II. Vii. Coroll. )adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. Xxiv. Andxxviii. ); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity (II. Vi. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II. , above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does notconstitute the essence of any particular thing. 

Proof. --If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that itconstitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the essence of B. Then (II. Def. Ii. ) it cannot without B eitherexist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does itconstitute the essence of any particular thing. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and whichare equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceivedexcept adequately. 

Proof. --Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, andwhich is equally present in the part of any given body and in thewhole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For theidea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. Vii. Coroll. ), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of thehuman body, which (II. Xvi. , xxv. , xxvii. ) involve in part thenature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; thatis (II. Xii. , xiii. ), the idea in God will necessarily beadequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and inso far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind (II. Xi. Coroll. ) necessarily perceives Aadequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far asit perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or anyexternal body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q. E. D. 

Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas ornotions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii. ) all bodies agreein certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop. ) must beadequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all. 

PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of thehuman body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the humanbody, and which is present equally in each part of either, or inthe whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind. 

Proof. --If A be that, which is common to and a property of thehuman body and external bodies, and equally present in the humanbody and in the said external bodies, in each part of eachexternal body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea ofA in God (II. Vii. Coroll. ), both in so far as he has the idea ofthe human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the givenexternal bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body isaffected by an external body through that, which it has in commontherewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involvethe property A (II. Xvi. ), and therefore (II. Vii. Coroll. ) theidea of this modification, in so far as it involves the propertyA, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by theidea of the human body; that is (II. Xiii. ), in so far as heconstitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. Xi. Coroll. ) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that the mind is fitted toperceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body hasmore in common with other bodies. 

PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas whichare therein adequate, are also themselves adequate. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident. For when we saythat an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which aretherein adequate, we say, in other words (II. Xi. Coroll. ), thatan idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, notin so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected bythe ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far ashe constitutes the essence of the human mind. 

Note I. --I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of ourratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms ornotions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by thismethod of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are moreuseful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use atall. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to allmen, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those whoare unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which areill--founded. Again we should discern whence the notions calledsecondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms onwhich they are founded, and other points of interest connectedwith these questions. But I have decided to pass over thesubject here, partly because I have set it aside for anothertreatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader bytoo great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anythingnecessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whenceare derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that thehuman body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forminga certain number of images (what an image is I explained in theII. Xvii. Note) within itself at the same time; if this numberbe exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if thisnumber of images, of which the body is capable of formingdistinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will becomeentirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident(from II. Prop. Xvii. Coroll. , and xviii. ) that the human mindcan distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its bodycan form images simultaneously. When the images become quiteconfused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodiesconfusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, asit were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute ofBeing, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the factthat images are not always equally vivid, and from otheranalogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; forthe purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us toconsider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these termsrepresent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similarcauses arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so manyimages, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in thehuman mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeedutterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of smalldifferences between individuals (e. G. Colour, size, &c. ) andtheir definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, inwhich all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected bythem, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the saidindividuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expressesby the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number ofparticular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable toimagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by allmen in the same way, but vary in each individual according as thepoint varies, whereby the body has been most often affected andwhich the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature ofman, will by the name of man understand an animal of erectstature; those who have been accustomed to regard some otherattribute, will form a different general image of man, forinstance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animalwithout feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to thehabit of his body. 

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formedof them, so many controversies should have arisen. 

Note II. --From all that has been said above it is clear, thatwe, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1. )From particular things represented to our intellectfragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses(II. Xxix. Coroll. ); I have settled to call such perceptions bythe name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. [4]

[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n. ]

(2. ) From symbols, e. G. , from the fact of having read or heardcertain words we remember things and form certain ideasconcerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things(II. Xviii. Note). I shall call both these ways of regardingthings knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3. ) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, andadequate ideas of the properties of things (II. Xxxviii. Coroll. , xxxix. And Coroll. And xl. ); this I call reason and knowledge ofthe second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which wewill call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from anadequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes ofGod to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I willillustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be tothe third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen withouthesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide theproduct by the first; either because they have not forgotten therule which they received from a master without any proof, orbecause they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, orby virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of theseventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general propertyof proportionals. 

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. Forinstance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that thefourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because weinfer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second. 

PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source offalsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarilytrue. 

Proof. --To knowledge of the first kind we have (in theforegoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequateand confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the onlysource of falsity (II. Xxxv. ). Furthermore, we assigned to thesecond and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which areadequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II. Xxxiv. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, notknowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the truefrom the false. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident. He, who knows howto distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate ideaof true and false. That is (II. Xl. , note ii. ), he must know thetrue and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge. 

PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows thathe has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thingperceived. 

Proof. --A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind(II. Xi. Coroll. ). Let us suppose that there is in God, in sofar as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and bereferred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. Xx. , whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea Ais supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayedthrough the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A mustbe referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. Xi. Coroll. ), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequateidea or knows a thing truly (II. Xxxiv. ), must at the same timehave an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; thatis, obviously, he must be assured. Q. E. D. 

Note. --I explained in the note to II. Xxi. What is meant bythe idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoingproposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has atrue idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highestcertainty. For to have a true idea is only another expressionfor knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea issomething lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode ofthinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do firstunderstand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of athing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what canthere be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as astandard of truth? Even as light displays both itself anddarkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. 

I think I have thus sufficiently answered thesequestions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a falseidea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, atrue idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have anyadvantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comesit that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects? Thesequestions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficientlyanswered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea isplain: from what was said in II. Xxxv. , the former is related tothe latter as being is to not--being. The causes of falsity Ihave set forth very clearly in II. Xix. And II. Xxxv. With thenote. From what is there stated, the difference between a manwho has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is madeapparent. As for the last question--as to how a man can be surethat he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have justpointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arisesfrom the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds withits object--in other words, that truth is its own standard. Wemay add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, ispart of the infinite intellect of God (II. Xi. Coroll. );therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are asnecessarily true as the ideas of God. 

PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard thingsas contingent, but as necessary. 

Proof. --It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly(II. Xli. ), namely (I. Ax. Vi. ), as they are in themselves--thatis (I. Xxix. ), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --Hence it follows, that it is only through ourimagination that we consider things, whether in respect to thefuture or the past, as contingent. 

Note. --How this way of looking at things arises, I willbriefly explain. We have shown above (II. Xvii. And Coroll. )that the mind always regards things as present to itself, eventhough they be not in existence, until some causes arise whichexclude their existence and presence. Further (II. Xviii. ), weshowed that, if the human body has once been affected by twoexternal bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwardsimagines one of the said external bodies, will straightwayremember the other--that is, it will regard both as present toitself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existenceand presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, fromthe fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly thanothers, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let ussuppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time inthe morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, thattoday he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, fromII. Prop. Xviii. , that, as soon as he sees the morning light, hewill imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of thesky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in otherwords, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with hisimagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, hewill imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--thatis, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relationto a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in theevening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, byimagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a pasttime. If it should at any time happen, that on some otherevening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, onthe following morning, associate with his imagination of eveningsometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for thechild is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate firstone, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. Thiswavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imaginationbe concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing inrelation to time past or time present: consequently, we mayimagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to timepresent, past, or future. 

Corollary II. --It is in the nature of reason to perceivethings under a certain form of eternity (sub quādam ęternitatisspecie). 

Proof. --It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not ascontingent, but as necessary (II. Xliv. ). Reason perceives thisnecessity of things (II. Xli. ) truly--that is (I. Ax. Vi. ), as itis in itself. But (I. Xvi. ) this necessity of things is the verynecessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in thenature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II. Xxxviii. ), which answer to things common to all, and which (II. Xxxvii. ) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity. 

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particularthing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal andinfinite essence of God. 

Proof. --The idea of a particular thing actually existingnecessarily involves both the existence and the essence of thesaid thing (II. Viii. ). Now particular things cannot beconceived without God (I. Xv. ); but, inasmuch as (II. Vi. ) theyhave God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under theattribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideasmust necessarily involve (I. Ax. Iv. ) the conception of theattributes of those ideas--that is (I. Vi. ), the eternal andinfinite essence of God. Q. E. D. 

Note. --By existence I do not here mean duration--that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as acertain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature ofexistence, which is assigned to particular things, because theyfollow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternalnecessity of God's nature (I. Xvi. ). I am speaking, I repeat, ofthe very existence of particular things, in so far as they are inGod. For although each particular thing be conditioned byanother particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the forcewhereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows fromthe eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. Xxiv. Coroll. ). 

PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence ofGod which every idea involves is adequate and perfect. 

Proof. --The proof of the last proposition is universal; andwhether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the ideathereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop. ), will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essenceof God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in thewhole; therefore (II. Xxxviii. ) this knowledge will be adequate. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of theeternal and infinite essence of God. 

Proof. --The human mind has ideas (II. Xxii. ), from which (II. Xxiii. ) it perceives itself and its own body (II. Xix. ) andexternal bodies (II. Xvi. Coroll. I. And II. Xvii. ) as actuallyexisting; therefore (II. Xlv. And xlvi. ) it has an adequateknowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Hence we see, that the infinite essence and theeternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infermany things, which we may adequately know, and we may form thatthird kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. Xl. , and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion tospeak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God asthey have of general notions, because they are unable to imagineGod as they do bodies, and also because they have associated thename God with images of things that they are in the habit ofseeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as theyare, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Manyerrors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we donot apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man saysthat the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to itscircumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredlyattaches a meaning to the word circle different from thatassigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes incalculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, andanother on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they donot make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, thatthey have the same numbers in their mind as they have on thepaper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be inerror, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom Ilately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into aneighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men donot rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpretthe meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatlycontradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, ofthe argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they considermistaken and absurd in their opponents. 

PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will;but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, whichhas also been determined by another cause, and this last byanother cause, and so on to infinity. 

Proof. --The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. Xi. ), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. Xvii. Coroll. Ii. ); in other words, it cannot have an absolutefaculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. Xxviii. ) itmust be determined by a cause, which has also been determined byanother cause, and this last by another, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mindno absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are eitherentirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation tothis or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" tothis or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The causewhich leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth inthe Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I wouldhere remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean thefaculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, wherebythe mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are generalnotions, which cannot be distinguished from the particularinstances on which they are based, we must inquire whethervolitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind anyaffirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far asit is an idea, involves. On which subject see the followingproposition, and II. Def. Iii. , lest the idea of pictures shouldsuggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as areformed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, butthe conceptions of thought. 

PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation andnegation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves. 

Proof. --There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positiveor negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, thisor that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let usconceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinkingwhereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of atriangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmationinvolves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, withoutthe idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the samething to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, asit is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. Iii. ) without the ideaof a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor beconceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of atriangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that itsthree interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versā, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor beconceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmationbelongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothingbesides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we haveselected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Will and understanding are one and the same. 

Proof. --Will and understanding are nothing beyond theindividual volitions and ideas (II. Xlviii. And note). But aparticular volition and a particular idea are one and the same(by the foregoing Prop. ); therefore, will and understanding areone and the same. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We have thus removed the cause which is commonlyassigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsityconsists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideaswhich are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When wesay, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that hehas no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what isfalse, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause hisimagination to waver (see II. Xliv. Note). Thus, although theman be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never saythat he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive(II. Xliii. And note), not merely the absence of doubt. 

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fullyexplained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, andI will furthermore answer the objections which may be advancedagainst our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of theadvantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some, " for they willbe better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifthpart. 

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers tomake an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception ofthe mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It isfurther necessary that they should distinguish between idea andwords, whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images, words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confusedtogether, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutelynecessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both forphilosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Thosewho think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us bycontact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideasof those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are notideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree ofour will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimatepictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do notsee that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves anaffirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words withideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think thatthey can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, ordeny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, whoreflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in nowise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearlyunderstand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does notconsist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence ofwords and images is put together by bodily motions, which in nowise involve the conception of thought. 

These few words on this subject will suffice: I willtherefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raisedagainst our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason fortheir holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than theunderstanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of anincrease in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation ornegation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we donot perceive, but that they have need of an increase in theirfaculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished fromthe intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach usespecially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgmentbefore assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmedby the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as heperceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents. 

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does nottherefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is notdeceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse doesexist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly byexperience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free anddifferent from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may beobjected that one affirmation does not apparently contain morereality than another; in other words, that we do not seem toneed for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater powerthan for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection thananother, for as objects are some more excellent than others, soalso are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; thisalso seems to point to a difference between the understanding andthe will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act fromfree will, what will happen if the incentives to action areequally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will heperish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shallseem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man ratherthan an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would thendetermine his own action, and would consequently possess thefaculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objectionsmight also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidenceeverything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to thetask of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly aspossible. 

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the willhas a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understandingbe meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the willhas a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty offorming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volitionshould be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm aninfinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannotaffirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by thesame faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) aninfinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is aninfinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still beurged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceivethem, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty ofperception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we havealready. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bringit about that we should understand an infinite number of otherentities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greaterunderstanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than thatwhich we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby weexplain all particular volitions--in other words, that which iscommon to all such volitions. 

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common oruniversal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to bewondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itselfinto the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: forwhat is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of aninfinite number of individuals. 

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have afree power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say thatanyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, thathe does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, aperception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothingelse. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of thehorse (II. Xvii. Coroll. ), and the boy does not perceive anythingwhich would exclude the existence of the horse, he willnecessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able todoubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. Wehave daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and Ido not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending hisjudgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing itabout that he should not dream those things, which he dreams thathe sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams wesuspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. 

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far asactual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind'simaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II. Xvii. Note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act ofperception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception ofa winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If themind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it wouldregard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasonsfor doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unlessthe imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea whichprecludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mindperceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse isinadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny theexistence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on thesubject. 

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the thirdobjection, namely, that the will is something universal which ispredicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which iscommon to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequateessence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in theabstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, thesame in all, not in so far as it is considered as constitutingthe idea's essence: for, in this respect, particularaffirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. Forinstance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as muchas the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. 

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equalpower of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, andto affirm that that which is false is true. These twoaffirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation toone another as being and not--being; for there is nothingpositive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality offalsehood (II. Xxxv. Note, and xlvii. Note). 

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, whenwe confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reasonand abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, Iam quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibriumdescribed (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant fromhim) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether suchan one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; Ianswer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should beconsidered, who hangs himself, or how we should considerchildren, fools, madmen, &c. 

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of thisdoctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gatheredfrom what has been said. The doctrine is good, 1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to thedecree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and somuch the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more andmore understand God. Such a doctrine not only completelytranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highesthappiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge ofGod, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bidus. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a trueestimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by Godwith high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, asfor having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and theservice of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom. 

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conductourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters whichare not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For itshows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles orfrowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from theeternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows fromthe essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to tworight angles. 

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teachesus to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or tobe angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should becontent with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from anywomanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by theguidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, asI will show in Part III. 

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on thecommonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed andled, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely dowhatsoever things are best. 

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning ofthis note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to aclose. I think I have therein explained the nature andproperties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficientclearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised manyexcellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessaryto be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain. 

PART III. 

ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to betreating rather of matters outside nature than of naturalphenomena following nature's general laws. They appear toconceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within akingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than followsnature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attributehuman infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature ingeneral, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, whichaccordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the humanmind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is lookedupon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellentmen (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right wayof life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of theemotions, and the power of the mind against them for theirrestraint. 

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though hebelieved, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, atthe same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attainto absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, heaccomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his owngreat intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For thepresent I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse orderide human emotions than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat ofhuman vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forthwith rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against asrepugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can beset down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, andeverywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come topass and change from one form to another, are everywhere andalways the same; so that there should be one and the same methodof understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions ofhatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, followfrom this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer tocertain definite causes, through which they are understood, andpossess certain properties as worthy of being known as theproperties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itselfaffords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature andstrength of the emotions according to the same method, as Iemployed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and themind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly thesame manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, andsolids. 

DEFINITIONS

I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effectcan be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate orpartial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, itseffect cannot be understood. 

II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either withinus or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; thatis (by the foregoing definition) when through our naturesomething takes place within us or externally to us, which canthrough our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards somethingwhen that something takes place within us, or follows from ournature externally, we being only the partial cause. 

III. By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, wherebythe active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications. 

N. B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of thesemodifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise Icall it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive. 

POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby itspower of activity is increased or diminished, and also in otherways which do not render its power of activity either greater orless. 

N. B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. AndLemmas v. And vii. , which see after II. Xiii. 

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. V. ), and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II. Xvii. ). 

PROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certaincases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it isnecessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, itis necessarily passive. 

Proof. --In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, andsome ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. Xl. Note). Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also inGod, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. Xl. Coroll. ), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise(by the same Coroll. ) adequate in God, not inasmuch as hecontains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but ashe, at the same time, contains the minds of other things. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. I. ), notinasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived asaffected by the given idea (II. Ix. ). But of that effect whereofGod is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which isadequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind inquestion is the adequate cause (II. Xi. Coroll. ). Therefore ourmind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. Ii. ), is incertain cases necessarily active; this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which isadequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself themind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, togetherwith the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, ofsuch an effect (II. Xi. Coroll. ) the mind of the given man is notan adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. Ii. ) themind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain casesnecessarily passive; this was our second point. Therefore ourmind, &c. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that the mind is more or lessliable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequateideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion asit possesses adequate ideas. 

PROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can minddetermine body to motion or rest or any state different fromthese, if such there be. 

Proof. --All modes of thinking have for their cause God, byvirtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of hisbeing displayed under any other attribute (II. Vi. ). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode ofthought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. I. ), itis not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion andrest of a body must arise from another body, which has also beendetermined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, andabsolutely everything which takes place in a body must springfrom God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode ofextension, and not by some mode of thought (II. Vi. ); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. Thiswas our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This is made more clear by what was said in the note toII. Vii. , namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, underthe attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order orconcatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceivedunder the one attribute or the other; consequently the order ofstates of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous innature with the order of states of activity and passivity in themind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which weproved II. Xii. 

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be nofurther room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact isproved by experience, that men can be induced to consider thequestion calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that itis merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set inmotion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions dependingsolely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of thebody, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience whatthe body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so faras she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained suchan accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he canexplain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the factthat many actions are observed in the lower animals, which fartranscend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many thingsin their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the solelaws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at. 

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves thebody, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to thebody, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say thatthis or that physical action has its origin in the mind, whichlatter has dominion over the body, they are using words withoutmeaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they areignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder atit. 

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the meanswhereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fitstate to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we haveexperience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak orare silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfittedfor thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mindsimultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power ofthinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, Ithink everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that themind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a givensubject, but according as the body is more or less fitted forbeing stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also isthe mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. 

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from thelaws of nature considered as extended substance, we should beable to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things ofthat kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would thehuman body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, becapable of building a single temple. However, I have justpointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of thebody's power, or say what can be concluded from a considerationof its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many thingsbeing accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they wouldnever have believed possible except under the direction of mind:such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, andwondered at by their performers when awake. I would further callattention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpassesin complexity all that has been put together by human art, not torepeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, underwhatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would bemuch happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as theyare to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can governanything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anythingmore easily than their appetites; when it comes about that manybelieve, that we are only free in respect to objects which wemoderately desire, because our desire for such can easily becontrolled by the thought of something else frequentlyremembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to whatwe seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then beallayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unlesssuch persons had proved by experience that we do many thingswhich we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, whenassailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow theworse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that weare free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its ownfree will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freelydesires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desiresto run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters fromthe free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, hewould willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, agarrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believethat they speak from the free decision of their mind, when theyare in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that menbelieve themselves to be free, simply because they are consciousof their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby thoseactions are determined; and, further, it is plain that thedictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, andtherefore vary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those whoare assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed thisway or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mentaldecision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, aresimultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we calldecision, when it is regarded under and explained through theattribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it isregarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from thelaws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly inthe sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to anotherpoint, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, wecannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember orforget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind mustin any case be limited to the power of uttering or not utteringsomething which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet wedo not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of thebody. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and weseem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, wherebywe keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should not dare to do when awake. 

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind twosorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we mustnecessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which isbelieved to be free, is not distinguishable from the imaginationor memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which anidea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. Xlix. ). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mindby the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence oract in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dreamwith their eyes open. 

PROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequateideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely oninadequate ideas. 

Proof. --The first element, which constitutes the essence ofthe mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existentbody (II. Xi. And xiii. ), which (II. Xv. ) is compounded of manyother ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II. Xxix. Coroll. , II. Xxxviii. Coroll. ). Whatsoever thereforefollows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximatecause, through which it must be understood, must necessarilyfollow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. Butin so far as the mind (III. I. ) has inadequate ideas, it isnecessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind followsolely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is onlypassive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed tothe mind, except in so far as it contains something involvingnegation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itselfwithout other parts: I could thus show, that passive states areattributed to individual things in the same way that they areattributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise beperceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind. 

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause externalto itself. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident, for the definitionof anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does notnegative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of thething, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regardonly the thing itself, without taking into account externalcauses, we shall not be able to find in it anything which coulddestroy it. Q. E. D. 

PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist inthe same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying theother. 

Proof. --If they could agree together or co--exist in the sameobject, there would then be in the said object something whichcould destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, isabsurd, therefore things, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavoursto persist in its own being. 

Proof. --Individual things are modes whereby the attributes ofGod are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. Xxv. Coroll. );that is, (I. Xxxiv. ), they are things which express in a givendeterminate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can bedestroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. Iv. ); butcontrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away itsexistence (III. V. ). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in sofar as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its ownbeing. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours topersist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essenceof the thing in question. 

Proof. --From the given essence of any thing certainconsequences necessarily follow (I. Xxxvi. ), nor have things anypower save such as necessarily follows from their nature asdetermined (I. Xxix. ); wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, itacts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. Vi. ), the power orendeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing inquestion. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persistin its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinitetime. 

Proof. --If it involved a limited time, which should determinethe duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from thatpower whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not existbeyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;but this (III. Iv. ) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewitha thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since (III. Iv. ) it will by the same power whereby it alreadyexists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by someexternal cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time. 

PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinctideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours topersist in its being for an indefinite period, and of thisendeavour it is conscious. 

Proof. --The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate andinadequate ideas (III. Iii. ), therefore (III. Vii. ), both in sofar as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses thelatter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that foran indefinite time (III. Viii. ). Now as the mind (II. Xxiii. ) isnecessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of themodifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. Vii. )conscious of its own endeavour. 

Note. --This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, iscalled will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction itis called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man'sessence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all thoseresults which tend to its preservation; and which man has thusbeen determined to perform. 

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in sofar as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordinglybe thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do westrive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because wedeem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to begood, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, ordesire it. 

PROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto. 

Proof. --Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulatedtherein (III. V. ). Therefore neither can the idea of such athing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. Ix. Coroll. ); that is (II. Xi. , xiii. ), the idea of that thingcannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. Xi. , xiii. ) the first element, that constitutes the essence ofthe mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, itfollows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is theendeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to ourmind, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hindersthe power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases ordiminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from II. Vii. Or from II. Xiv. 

Note. --Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive statesof transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shallsignify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greaterperfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein themind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion ofpleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall callstimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion ofpain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering areattributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affectedthan the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alikeaffected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note toProp. Ix. Of this part; beyond these three I recognize no otherprimary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all otheremotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, Ishould like here to explain at greater length Prop. X of thispart, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea iscontrary to another. In the note to II. Xvii. We showed that theidea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves theexistence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, itfollows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. Viii. , that the present existence of our mind depends solely on thefact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. Xvii. , xviii. And note) that the power ofthe mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also dependson the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and itspower of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases toaffirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why themind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be themind itself (III. Iv. ), nor again the fact that the body ceasesto exist. For (by II. Vi. ) the cause, why the mind affirms theexistence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm theexistence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but(II. Xvii. ) this result follows from another idea, which excludesthe present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting theessence of our mind. 

PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceivethose things, which increase or help the power of activity in thebody. 

Proof. --So long as the human body is affected in a mode, whichinvolves the nature of any external body, the human mind willregard that external body as present (II. Xvii. ), andconsequently (II. Vii. ), so long as the human mind regards anexternal body as present, that is (II. Xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the natureof the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceivesthings, which increase or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power ofactivity (III. Post. I. ); consequently (III. Xi. ) the mind'spower of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus(III. Vi. , ix. ) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imaginesuch things. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish orhinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far aspossible, to remember things which exclude the existence of thefirst--named things. 

Proof. --So long as the mind conceives anything of the kindalluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished orconstrained (cf. III. Xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continueto conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, whichexcludes the present existence thereof (II. Xvii. ); that is (asI have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body isdiminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives somethingelse, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:therefore the mind (III. Ix. ), as far as it can, will endeavourto conceive or remember the latter. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that the mind shrinks fromconceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power ofitself and of the body. 

Note. --From what has been said we may clearly understand thenature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasureaccompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothingelse but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Wefurther see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he whohates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter. 

PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions atthe same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by oneof these two, be also affected by the other. 

Proof. --If the human body has once been affected by two bodiesat once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, itwill straightway remember the other also (II. Xviii. ). But themind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body thanthe nature of external bodies (II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. ); therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. Iii. ) has beenonce affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, wheneverit is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected bythe other. 

PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire. 

Proof. --Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneouslyaffected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nordiminishes its power of activity, and the other does eitherincrease or diminish the said power (III. Post. I. ). From theforegoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind isafterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power ofaction, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, whichdoes increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III. Xi. Note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus theformer of the two emotions will, not through itself, butaccidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same wayalso it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally thecause of desire. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thingwith the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be notthe efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hateit. 

Proof. --For from this fact alone it arises (III. Xiv. ), thatthe mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected withthe emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. Xi. Note), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased ordiminished, &c. ; and consequently (III. Xii. ), according as themind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. Xiii. Coroll. ), in other words (III. Xiii. Note), according as it maylove or hate the same. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love orhate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We shouldrefer to the same category those objects, which affect uspleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble otherobjects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in thenext Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the firstto introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy, " wished tosignify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless Ithink we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate knownor manifest qualities. 

PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a givenobject has some point of resemblance with another object which iswont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although thepoint of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the saidemotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with loveor hate. 

Proof. --The point of resemblance was in the object (byhypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus(III. Xiv. ), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, itwill straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, andconsequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same pointof resemblance, will be accidentally (III. Xv. ) a cause ofpleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), althoughthe point in which the two objects resemble one another be notthe efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard thefirst--named object with love or hate. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affectus painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thingwhich is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion ofpleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the sametime we shall love it. 

Proof. --The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a causeof pain, and (III. Xiii. Note), in so far as we imagine it withthis emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceivethat it has some point of resemblance to something else, which iswont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, weshall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it(III. Xvi. ); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This disposition of the mind, which arises from twocontrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to theemotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination(II. Xliv. Note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one fromthe other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bearin mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, whichgive rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to theother accidentally. I have done this, in order that they mightbe more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not denythat vacillation of the disposition generally arises from anobject, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The humanbody is composed (II. Post. I. ) of a variety of individual partsof different nature, and may therefore (Ax. I. After Lemma iii. After II. Xiii. ) be affected in a variety of different ways byone and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the samething can be affected in many ways, it can also in many differentways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we caneasily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause ofmany and conflicting emotions. 

PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfullyby the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thingpresent. 

Proof. --So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it benon--existent (II. Xvii. And Coroll. ), he will not conceive it aspast or future, except in so far as its image is joined to theimage of time past or future (II. Xliv. Note). Wherefore theimage of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whetherit be referred to time past, time future, or time present; thatis (II. Xvi. Coroll. ), the disposition or emotion of the body isidentical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, orpresent. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q. E. D. 

Note I. --I call a thing past or future, according as we eitherhave been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, accordingas we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it hasrecreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm itsexistence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion whichexcludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. Xvii. )the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same wayas if the thing were actually present. However, as it generallyhappens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, solong as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually indoubt about its issue (II. Xliv. Note); it follows that theemotions which arise from similar images of things are not soconstant, but are generally disturbed by the images of otherthings, until men become assured of the issue. 

Note II. --From what has just been said, we understand what ismeant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, andDisappointment. [5] Hope is nothing else but an inconstantpleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of somethingconcerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt beremoved from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fearbecomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising fromthe image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something pastwhereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Painopposed to Joy. 

[5] Conscientię morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock. 

PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love isdestroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preservedhe will feel pleasure. 

Proof. --The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceivethose things which increase or help the body's power of activity(III. Xii. ); in other words (III. Xii. Note), those things whichit loves. But conception is helped by those things whichpostulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hinderedby those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. Xvii. );therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence ofan object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive theobject of love, in other words (III. Xi. Note), affect the mindpleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude theexistence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mentalendeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyedwill feel pain, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate isdestroyed will also feel pleasure. 

Proof. --The mind (III. Xiii. ) endeavours to conceive thosethings, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body'spower of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. Xiii. Note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude theexistence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps theaforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. Xi. Note), affectsthe mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object ofhis hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love isaffected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affectedpleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion willbe greater or less in the lover according as it is greater orless in the thing loved. 

Proof. --The images of things (as we showed in III. Xix. ) whichpostulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind'sendeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulatesthe existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more inproportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is(III. Xi. Note) a transition to a greater perfection; thereforethe image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mentalendeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the loverpleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotionmay have been greater in the object of love. This was our firstpoint. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, itis to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion tothe amount of pain (III. Xi. Note); therefore (III. Xix. ) he whoconceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the saidemotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affectssome object of our love, we shall be affected with love towardsthat thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects anobject of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatredtowards it. 

Proof. --He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object ofour love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if weconceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure orpain (III. Xxi. ). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to cometo us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore(III. Xiii. Note), if we conceive that anyone affects an objectof our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected withlove or hatred towards him. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Prop. Xxi. Explains to us the nature of Pity, which wemay define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we canuse for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not. 

We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit onanother, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injuresanother, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, thatwe not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shownin III. Xxi. ), but also for a thing which we have hithertoregarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resemblesourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approvalon one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury. 

PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred ispainfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if hethinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feelpain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, accordingas its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred. 

Proof. --In so far as an object of hatred is painfullyaffected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to thestrength of the pain (III. Xi. Note). Therefore, he (III. Xx. )who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfullyaffected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to theamount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. Thiswas our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence ofthe pleasurably affected thing (III. Xi. Note), in proportion asthe pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that anobject of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception(III. Xiii. ) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in otherwords (III. Xi. Note), he who hates will be painfully affected. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, andwithout any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop. Xxvii. ), in so far as a man conceives that something similar tohimself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in likemanner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrarycircumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only. 

PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects anobject of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If weconceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shallfeel love towards him. 

Proof. --This proposition is proved in the same way as III. Xxii. , which see. 

Note. --These and similar emotions of hatred are attributableto envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in sofar as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another'shurt, and to grieve at another's advantage. 

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, andconcerning what we love, everything that we can conceive toaffect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affectpainfully ourselves or the loved object. 

Proof. --That, which we conceive to affect an object of ourlove pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably orpainfully (III. Xxi. ). But the mind (III. Xii. ) endeavours, asfar as possible, to conceive those things which affect uspleasurably; in other words (II. Xvii. And Coroll. ), itendeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. Xiii. ), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things asaffect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirmconcerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whateverwe conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which wehate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everythingwhich we conceive to affect it pleasurably. 

Proof. --This proposition follows from III. Xxiii. , as theforegoing proposition followed from III. Xxi. 

Note. --Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man mayeasily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling iscalled pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly ofhimself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams withhis eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things thatfall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accountingthem real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable toconceive anything which excludes their existence, and determineshis own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springingfrom a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasurewhich arises from a man thinking too highly of another is calledover--esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking toolittle of a man is called disdain. 

PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which islike ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with alike emotion (affectus). 

Proof. --The images of things are modifications of the humanbody, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present tous (II. Xvii. ); in other words (II. X. ), whereof the ideasinvolve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the natureof the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature ofthe external body be similar to the nature of our body, then theidea which we form of the external body will involve amodification of our own body similar to the modification of theexternal body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar toourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception willexpress a modification of our body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to beaffected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a likeemotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, weshall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and notsimilar, emotion. Q. E. D. 

Note I. --This imitation of emotions, when it is referred topain, is called compassion (cf. III. Xxii. Note); when it isreferred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing elsebut the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that weconceive that others have the like desire. 

Corollary I. --If we conceive that anyone, whom we havehitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects somethingsimilar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects thesame, we shall be affected with hatred towards him. 

Proof. --This is proved from the last proposition in the samemanner as III. Xxii. Is proved from III. Xxi. 

Corollary II. --We cannot hate a thing which we pity, becauseits misery affects us painfully. 

Proof. --If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoicein its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis. 

Corollary III. --We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity. 

Proof. --That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything whichremoves its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. Xiii. ); inother words (III. Ix. Note), we shall desire to destroy it, or weshall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shallendeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q. E. D. 

Note II. --This will or appetite for doing good, which arisesfrom pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, iscalled benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising fromcompassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has donegood or harm to something, which we conceive to be likeourselves, see III. Xxii. Note. 

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceiveto conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroywhatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or toconduce to pain. 

Proof. --We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive thatwhich we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. Xii. ); in otherwords (II. Xvii. ) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far aspossible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour ofthe mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, andsimultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's powerof action. (This is clear from II. Vii. Coroll. And II. Xi. Coroll. ). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for itsexistence, in other words (which by III. Ix. Note, come to thesame thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our firstpoint. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believedto be the cause of pain, that is (III. Xiii. Note), which wehate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. Xx. ). We shall, therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroythe same, or (III. Xiii. ) to remove it from us, so that we maynot regard it as present; this was our second point. Whereforewhatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceivemen[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrinkfrom doing that which we conceive men to shrink from. 

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean menwhom we regard without any particular emotion. 

Proof. --From the fact of imagining, that men love or hateanything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. Xxvii. ). That is (III. Xiii. Note), from this mere fact we shall feelpleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shallendeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard withpleasure, etc. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solelyin order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we soeagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omitcertain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases itis generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name ofpraise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action ofanother, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blameto the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action. 

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives asaffecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, hewill regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he hasdone anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain. 

Proof. --He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasureor pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected withpleasure or pain (III. Xxvii. ), but, as a man (II. Xix. Andxxiii. ) is conscious of himself through the modifications wherebyhe is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected withpleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in otherwords, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatismutandis in the case of pain. Q. E. D. 

Note. --As love (III. Xiii. ) is pleasure accompanied by theidea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by theidea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in questionwill be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love andhatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employother names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasureaccompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will styleHonour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: Imean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man'sbelief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasureaccompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is calledself--complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance. Again, as it may happen (II. Xvii. Coroll. ) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may existsolely in his own imagination, and as (III. Xxv. ) everyoneendeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceiveswill affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that avain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all. 

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause. " "Honor" = Gloria. 

[8] See previous endnote. 

PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hatesanything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shallthereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks fromsomething that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul. 

Proof. --From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone lovesanything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. Xxvii. ): butwe are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a newcause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence weshall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the merefact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shallourselves shrink from that thing (III. Xxvii. ). If we assumethat we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneouslylove it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subjectto vacillation (III. Xvii. Note). Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --From the foregoing, and also from III. Xxviii. Itfollows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to causeothers to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himselfhates: as the poet says: "As lovers let us share every hopeand every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what theother leaves. "[9]

[9] Ovid, "Amores, " II. Xix. 4, 5. Spinoza transposes the verses. 

"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

 Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat. "

Note. --This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likesand dislikes should meet with universal approval, is reallyambition (see III. Xxix. Note); wherefore we see that everyoneby nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind shouldlive according to his own individual disposition: when such adesire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyoneelse's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, allbecome mutually hateful. 

PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight insomething, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavourto bring it about that the man in question shall not gainpossession thereof. 

Proof. --From the mere fact of our conceiving that anotherperson takes delight in a thing (III. Xxvii. And Coroll. ) weshall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delighttherein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would beprevented by another's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III. Xxviii. ). Q. E. D. 

Note. --We thus see that man's nature is generally soconstituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and enviesthose who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to hisown love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see thatfrom the same property of human nature, whence it follows thatmen are merciful, it follows also that they are envious andambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shallfind that she entirely confirms what we have said; moreespecially if we turn our attention to the first years of ourlife. We find that children, whose body is continually, as itwere, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see otherslaughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitatewhatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves ofwhatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as theimages of things are, as we have said, modifications of the humanbody, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed byexternal causes to act in this or that manner. 

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves weendeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should loveus in return. 

Proof. --That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, toconceive in preference to anything else (III. Xii. ). If thething be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect itpleasurably in preference to anything else (III. Xxix. ). Inother words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring itabout, that the thing should be affected with pleasureaccompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. Xiii. Note), that it should love us in return. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive aloved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be ourcomplacency. 

Proof. --We endeavour (III. Xxxiii. ), as far as we can, tobring about, that what we love should love us in return: inother words, that what we love should be affected with pleasureaccompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, inproportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affectedbecause of us, our endeavour will be assisted. --that is (III. Xi. And note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we takepleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect somethingsimilar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive aloved object to be affected, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his lovejoins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than hehimself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towardsthe loved object and with envy towards his rival. 

Proof. --In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object iswell affected towards him, will be the strength of hisself--approval (by the last Prop. ), that is (III. Xxx. Note), ofhis pleasure; he will, therefore (III. Xxviii. ), endeavour, asfar as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely boundto him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinksthat someone else has a similar desire (III. Xxxi. ). But thisendeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of theloved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the lovedobject has joined to itself; therefore (III. Xi. Note) he willfor that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea ofthe loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of hisrival; that is, he will be (III. Xiii. ) affected with hatredtowards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. Xv. Coroll. ), which latter he will envy as enjoying the belovedobject. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This hatred towards an object of love joined with envyis called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but awavering of the disposition arising from combined love andhatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wontto derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; andalso in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertainedtowards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hatethe object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurablyaffected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he iscompelled to associate the image of his loved one with the imageof him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into playin the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a womanwhom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, notonly because his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with theparts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinksfrom her. 

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his belovedwith the same joyful countenance as before, and this also giveshim pain as a lover, as I will now show. 

PROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has oncetaken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstancesas when he first took delight therein. 

Proof. --Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction withthe object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause ofpleasure (III. Xv. ); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in otherwords, he will desire to possess the object of his love under thesame circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of theaforesaid attendant circumstances be missing. 

Proof. --For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to bemissing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. Ashe is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing orcircumstance (by the last Prop. ), he will, in so far as heconceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. Xix. ). Q. E. D. 

Note. --This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absenceof the object of love, is called Regret. 

PROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred orlove, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater. 

Proof. --Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power ofactivity (III. Xi. Note), in other words (III. Vii. ), diminishesor constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist inhis own being; therefore (III. V. ) it is contrary to the saidendeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain aredirected to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarilyopposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; thereforethe greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employedto remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire orappetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure(III. Xi. Note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, itmay easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected bypleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and hisdesire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure. 

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of painand pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will begreater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes beingequal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of hisformer love. 

Proof. --If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, moreof his appetites are put under restraint than if he had neverloved it. For love is a pleasure (III. Xiii. Note) which a manendeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. Xxviii. );he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and byaffecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour isgreater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is theendeavour to bring about that the beloved should return hisaffection (III. Xxxiii. ). Now these endeavours are constrainedby hatred towards the object of love (III. Xiii. Coroll. And III. Xxiii. ); wherefore the lover (III. Xi. Note) will for this causealso be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his lovehas been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused byhatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved theobject; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greaterpain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had neverloved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his formerlove was greater. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him aninjury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrueto himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by thesame law, seek to benefit him. 

Proof. --To hate a man is (III. Xiii. Note) to conceive him asa cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour toremove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, inother words, a greater evil, should accrue to the haterthereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by notcarrying out the injury, which he planned against the object ofhis hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury(III. Xxviii. ), and the strength of his endeavour (III. Xxxvii. )will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and willtherefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part ofthis proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hatesanother, etc. Q. E. D. 

Note. --By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and allthat conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies ourlongings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind ofpain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I haveshown (III. Ix. Note) that we in no case desire a thing becausewe deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good becausewe desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrinkfrom; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus amiser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want ofmoney the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much asglory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious mannothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothingmore painful than another's success. So every man, according tohis emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful oruseless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from thatwhich he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, iscalled timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fearwhereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards asfuture by encountering a lesser evil (III. Xxviii. ). But if theevil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by thefear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils fearedbe very great. 

PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, andbelieves that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hatethat other in return. 

Proof. --He who conceives another as affected with hatred, willthereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. Xxvii. ), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, bythe hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except himwho is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated bysome one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the ideaof his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q. E. D. 

Note. --He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatredwill (III. Xxx. And note) be affected with shame; but this case(III. Xxv. ) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred mayalso arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injurethe object of our hate (III. Xxxix. ). He therefore who conceivesthat he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the causeof some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain orfear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in otherwords, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as Isaid above. 

Corollary I. --He who conceives, that one whom he loves hateshim, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in sofar as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he isdetermined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey toconflicting hatred and love. 

Corollary II. --If a man conceives that one, whom he hashitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury frommotives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury inkind. 

Proof. --He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by thelast proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. Xxvi. ) willendeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. Xxxix. ). Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injurydone to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour torepay it in kind. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is calledAnger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselvesis called Revenge. 

PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, andbelieves that he has given no cause for such love, he will lovethat other in return. (Cf. III. Xv. Coroll. , and III. Xvi. )

Proof. --This proposition is proved in the same way as thepreceding one. See also the note appended thereto. 

Note. --If he believes that he has given just cause for thelove, he will take pride therein (III. Xxx. And note); this iswhat most often happens (III. Xxv. ), and we said that itscontrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hatedby another. (See note to preceding proposition. ) Thisreciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting himwho loves us (III. Xxxix. ), and who endeavours to benefit us, iscalled gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men aremuch more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits. 

Corollary. --He who imagines that he is loved by one whom hehates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This isproved in the same way as the first corollary of the precedingproposition. 

Note. --If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavourto injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinarycause for hatred. 

PROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone frommotives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that thebenefit is received without gratitude. 

Proof. --When a man loves something similar to himself, heendeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should beloved thereby in return (III. Xxxiii. ). Therefore he who hasconferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, whichhe feels of being loved in return; that is (III. Xxxiv. ) fromthe hope of honour or (III. Xxx. Note) pleasure; hence he willendeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, orto regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, heconceives something else, which excludes the existence of thesaid cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. Xix. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and canon the other hand be destroyed by love. 

Proof. --He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hateshim in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the formerhatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. Xl. ). But if, on theother hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, hewill to this extent (III. Xxxviii. ) regard himself with pleasure, and (III. Xxix. ) will endeavour to please the cause of hisemotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. Xli. ), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. Xxxvii. ) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotionfrom which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than thatwhich arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours toaffect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the betterof it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passesinto love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had notpreceded it. 

Proof. --The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. Xxxviii. Of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he waswont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of lovingfeels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added thepleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove thepain involved in hatred (III. Xxxvii. ), accompanied by the ideaof the former object of hatred as cause. 

Note. --Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hateanything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoyingthis greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that heshould be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, norlong to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone willalways endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain asfar as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that aman should desire to hate someone, in order that he might lovehim the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. Forthe strength of love is in proportion to the strength of thehatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred becontinually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that hemight take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: insuch a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. Vi. )is absurd. 

PROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himselfhates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he willhate that person. 

Proof. --The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards himwho hates it (III. Xl. ); therefore the lover, in conceiving thatanyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing asaffected by hatred, in other words (III. Xiii. ), by pain;consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by theidea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, hewill hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III. Xiii. Note). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfullyby anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and ifthe pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the saidstranger as cause, under the general category of the class ornation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to theindividual stranger, but also to the whole class or nationwhereto he belongs. 

Proof. --This is evident from III. Xvi. 

PROP. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate isdestroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by acertain pain in us. 

Proof. --This is evident from III. Xxvii. For in so far as weconceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves feel pain. 

Note. --This proposition can also be proved from the Corollaryto II. Xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does notactually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body isaffected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as theremembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regardit with pain; this determination, while the image of the thingin question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of otherthings excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is notdestroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as thesaid determination is checked: for this reason the joy arisingfrom the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time weremember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when theimage of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as itinvolves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regardthe thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when itactually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image ofthe thing other images, which exclude its existence, thisdetermination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoicesafresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the causeof men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight innarrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when menconceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and aredetermined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh bythe idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of thedanger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secureafresh: therefore they rejoice afresh. 

PROP. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter isdestroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the paininvolved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea ofanother cause: and will be diminished in proportion as weconceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion. 

Proof. --This Prop. Is evident from the mere definition of loveand hatred (III. Xiii. Note). For pleasure is called lovetowards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply inso far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or theother. When this condition of causality is either wholly orpartly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in partvanishes. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive tobe free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than ifit were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. 

Proof. --A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. Vii. )be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, weshall therefore (III. Xiii. Note) love it or hate it, and shalldo so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from thegiven emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion beconceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. Vii. Part I. ) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one ofthe causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatredtowards it will be less. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to befree, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towardsanything else: to this consideration we must add the imitationof emotions treated of in III. Xxvii. , xxxiv. , xl. And xliii. 

PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hopeor fear. 

Proof. --This proposition is proved in the same way as III. Xv. , which see, together with the note to III. Xviii. 

Note. --Things which are accidentally the causes of hope orfear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omensare the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions ofhope and fear given in III. Xviii. Note) the causes also ofpleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard themwith love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as meanstowards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III. Xxv. , that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readilyin that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which wefear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above orbelow their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think itworth while to point out here the vacillations springing fromhope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so faras we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what wehave said concerning love and hatred. 

PROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the sameobject, and the same man may be differently affected at differenttimes by the same object. 

Proof. --The human body is affected by external bodies in avariety of ways (II. Post. Iii. ). Two men may therefore bedifferently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. I. After Lemma iii. After II. Xiii. ) may be differently affected byone and the same object. Further (by the same Post. ) the humanbody can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affectedat different times by one and the same object. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We thus see that it is possible, that what one manloves another may hate, and that what one man fears another maynot fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what heonce hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (III. Xxxix. Note), itfollows that men's judgments may vary no less than theiremotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, wedistinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, andstyle some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evilwhich I am accustomed to fear; if I further take intoconsideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and tobenefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear ofan evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call himdaring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears anevil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further takeinto consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear ofan evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say thathe is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment. 

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divineintellect, as I have shown in II. Xiii. Note. 

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of humanjudgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by hisemotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes causepleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty ofthings alluded to in III. Xxviii. ; we may readily conceive thata man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at anotherwith pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus wecan easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self ascause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea ofone's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense becausemen believe themselves to be free (III. Xlix. ). 

PROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunctionwith others, and which we do not conceive to have any propertythat is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for solong, as an object which we conceive to have some propertypeculiar to itself. 

Proof. --As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen inconjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II. Xviii. And note), and thus we pass forthwith from thecontemplation of one object to the contemplation of anotherobject. And this is the case with the object, which we conceiveto have no property that is not common to many. For we thereuponassume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have notbefore seen in conjunction with other objects. But when wesuppose that we conceive an object something special, which wehave never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, whileregarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall toregarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to thecontemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This mental modification, or imagination of aparticular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is calledWonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is calledConsternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossedin the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power tothink of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, oranything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is therebyregarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c. , be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, ourlove will on this account be the greater (III. Xii. ), and whenjoined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may inlike manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the otheremotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be ableto deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names inordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of theemotions have been applied in accordance rather with theirordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of theirnature. 

To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises fromthe fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, orfearing something, or because something, at first sight, appearsto be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c. , we are, in consequence (III. Xv. Coroll. And III. Xxvii. ), determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if fromthe presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the causeof wonder, love, fear, &c. , the mind then, by the presence of thething, remains determined to think rather of those qualitieswhich are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, onthe other hand, the presence of the object would cause it moreparticularly to regard that which is therein. As devotionsprings from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derisionspring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scornfrom contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c. , in association with contempt, and can thence deduce otheremotions, which are not distinguished one from another by anyrecognized name. 

PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power ofactivity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater inproportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself andits own power of activity. 

Proof. --A man does not know himself except through themodifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. Xix. Andxxiii. ). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplateitself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or(III. Xi. Note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will begreater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is ableto conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --This pleasure is fostered more and more, inproportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the morehe will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied bythe idea of himself (III. Xxix. Note); thus he is (III. Xxvii. )himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the ideaof himself. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things asassert its power of activity. 

Proof. --The endeavour or power of the mind is the actualessence thereof (III. Vii. ); but the essence of the mindobviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; notthat which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mindendeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm itspower of activity. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feelspain thereat. 

Proof. --The essence of the mind only affirms that which themind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature toconceive only such things as assert its power of activity (lastProp. ). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its ownweakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attemptingto conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it ischecked in its endeavour----in other words (III. Xi. Note), itfeels pain. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --This pain is more and more fostered, if a manconceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in thesame way as the corollary to III. Liii. 

Note. --This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from thecontemplation of ourselves, is called self--love orself--complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed asoften as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power ofactivity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his ownexploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, andalso that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. Xxiv. Note, and III. Xxxii. Note), rejoicing in the shortcomings oftheir equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever aman conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III. Liii. ), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, andhe conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. Xl. Note), inproportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regardthem as something special. Therefore, a man will take mostpleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates somequality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirmsof himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals ingeneral, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on thecontrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fallshort when compared with those of others. This pain (III. Xxviii. ) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrongconstruction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as hecan, embellishing his own. 

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatredand envy, which latter is fostered by their education. Forparents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solelyby the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scrupleto assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men'svirtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove suchdoubts, I append the following corollary. 

Corollary. --No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not hisequal. 

Proof. --Envy is a species of hatred (III. Xxiv. Note) or (III. Xiii. Note) pain, that is (III. Xi. Note), a modification wherebya man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, ischecked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything, which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore aman will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is thesame thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate toanother's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannotbe checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtuein some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such anone. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the samenature as himself. Q. E. D. 

Note. --When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. Lii. , we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c. , we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiarto him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no moreenvy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lionsfor being courageous. 

PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, ofdesire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such asvacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c. , as there are kinds of objects whereby weare affected. 

Proof. --Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotionscompounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, orpassive states (III. Xi. Note); now we are necessarily passive(III. I. ), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in sofar as we have such ideas are we passive (III. Iii. ); that is, we are only necessarily passive (II. Xl. Note), in so far as weconceive, or (II. Xvii. And note) in so far as we are affected byan emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and thenature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of everypassive state must necessarily be so explained, that the natureof the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, thepleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves thenature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from theobject B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore thesetwo pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as thecauses whence they arise are by nature different. So again theemotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by naturedifferent from the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c. 

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c. , as there are kinds of objects whereby we areaffected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so faras it is conceived as determined to a particular action by anygiven modification of itself (III. Ix. Note); therefore, according as a man is affected through external causes by this orthat kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c. , in other words, according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, sowill his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of onedesire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds ofpleasure, pain, love, &c. , consequently (by what has been shown)there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objectswhereby we are affected. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the lastproposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species oflove or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in amanner varying according to the object, with which they areconcerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c. , we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so faras we distinguish them from others merely by the objectswherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. Fortemperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to opposeto luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passivestates, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates thelast--named emotions. However, I cannot here explain theremaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous asthe kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine thestrength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to havea general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, Irepeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions andthe mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of themind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between various emotions oflove, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towardschildren, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for usto take cognizance of such differences, or to track out furtherthe nature and origin of the emotions. 

PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from theemotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence ofthe one individual differs from the essence of the other. 

Proof. --This proposition is evident from Ax. I. (which seeafter Lemma iii. Prop. Xiii. , Part II. ). Nevertheless, we willprove it from the nature of the three primary emotions. 

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man'snature or essence (III. Ix. Note); therefore desire in oneindividual differs from desire in another individual, only in sofar as the nature or essence of the one differs from the natureor essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passivestates or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour topersist in his being is increased or diminished, helped orhindered (III. Xi. And note). But by the endeavour to persist inits being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body inconjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. Ix. Note);therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire orappetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased ordiminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are everyman's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one mandiffer from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in sofar as the nature or essence of the one man differs from theessence of the other; consequently, any emotion of oneindividual only differs, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animalswhich are called irrational (for after learning the origin ofmind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man'semotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from humannature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire ofprocreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desireof the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites ofinsects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to theseveral natures. Thus, although each individual lives contentand rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has hisbeing, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, isnothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, andhence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy ofanother, to the extent that the essence of one differs from theessence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoingproposition, that there is no small difference between the joywhich actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by aphilosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I havetreated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he ispassive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable tohim in so far as he is active. 

PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivitiesor passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure anddesire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. 

Proof. --When the mind conceives itself and its power ofactivity, it feels pleasure (III. Liii. ): now the mindnecessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true oradequate idea (II. Xliii. ). But the mind does conceive certainadequate ideas (II. Xl. Note 2. ). Therefore it feels pleasure inso far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as itis active (III. I. ). Again, the mind, both in so far as it hasclear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. Ix. ); but by suchan endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop. );therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as weunderstand, or (III. I. ) in so far as we are active. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind asactive, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure ordesire. 

Proof. --All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, orpain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain wemean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked(III. Xi. And note); therefore, in so far as the mind feelspain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, isdiminished or checked (III. I. ); therefore, no painful emotionscan be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, butonly emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop. )are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q. E. D. 

Note. --All actions following from emotion, which areattributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I setdown to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide intocourage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). Bycourage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preservehis own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and tounite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down tocourage, those which aim at the good of others I set down tohighmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mindin danger, &c. , are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c. , are varieties of highmindedness. 

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through theirprimary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what Ihave said, that we are in many ways driven about by externalcauses, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary windswe toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But Ihave said, that I have only set forth the chief conflictingemotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in thesame way as above, we can easily show that love is united torepentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree fromwhat has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one withanother in so many ways, and so many variations may arisetherefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the mostimportant; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would bemore curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerninglove, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying athing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in anotherway, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mindbegins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, whenwe conceive something which generally delights us with itsflavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst weare thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body isotherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thusotherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present bestimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it bestimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feelrepugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently thepresence of the food which we formerly longed for will becomeodious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety orweariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outwardmodifications of the body observable in emotions, such, forinstance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c. , for theseare attributable to the body only, without any reference to themind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to besupplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should here and therebe added. 

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it isconceived, as determined to a particular activity by some givenmodification of itself. 

Explanation. --We have said above, in the note to Prop. Ix. Ofthis part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it isdetermined to act in a way tending to promote its ownpersistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetiteand desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite ornot, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order toavoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained fromexplaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define itin such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all thoseendeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the termsappetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceivedas determined to a particular activity; but from such adefinition (cf. II. Xxiii. ) it would not follow that the mind canbe conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order toimply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c. For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand everydisposition of the said essence, whether such disposition beinnate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute ofthought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to eachman's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one toanother, according as a man is drawn in different directions, andknows not where to turn. 

II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greaterperfection. 

III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a lessperfection. 

Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfectionitself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which hepasses, he would possess the same, without the emotion ofpleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration ofthe contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consistsin the transition to a less perfection, and not in the lessperfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as hepartakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, thatpain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. Forabsence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transitionfrom a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is anactivity whereby a man's power of action is lessened orconstrained (cf. III. Xi. Note). I pass over the definitions ofmerriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because theseterms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merelykinds of pleasure or pain. 

IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, whereinthe mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept inquestion has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. Lii. Andnote). 

Explanation--In the note to II. Xviii. We showed the reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightwayfalls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because theimages of the two things are so associated and arranged, that onefollows the other. This state of association is impossible, ifthe image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a standin the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by othercauses to think of something else. 

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, isof the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not includewonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so includeit, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from nopositive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, butmerely from the absence of a cause, which should determine themind to pass from the contemplation of one object to thecontemplation of another. 

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primaryemotions (as I said in the note to III. Xi. ), namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it iscustomary to speak of certain emotions springing from the threeprimitive ones by different names, when they are referred to theobjects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add adefinition of contempt. 

V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mindso little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine thosequalities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf. III. Lii. Note). 

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, forI am not aware that any emotions are named after them. 

VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an externalcause. 

Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly theessence of love; the definition given by those authors who saythat love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the lovedobject expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of itsproperties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admittedto be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I saythat it is a property of love, that the lover should wish tounite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wishconsent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for Ihave shown such, in II. Xlviii. , to be fictitious); neither do Imean a desire of being united to the loved object when it isabsent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; forlove can be conceived without either of these desires; but bywish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account ofthe presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of thelover is strengthened, or at least maintained. 

VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an externalcause. 

Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after whathas been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. Also III. Xiii. Note). 

VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea ofsomething which is accidentally a cause of pleasure. 

IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something whichis accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. Xv. Note). 

X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire. 

Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III. Lii. ) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happensthat the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shallcease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotionreadily degenerates into simple love. 

XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving thepresence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which wehate. 

Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, wedeny existence thereof (III. Lii. Note), and to that extentrejoice (III. Xx. ). But since we assume that man hates thatwhich he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is notwithout alloy (cf. III. Xlvii. Note). 

XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea ofsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubtthe issue. 

XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea ofsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubtthe issue (cf. III. Xviii. Note). 

Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there isno hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue ofanything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes theexistence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to thisextent, feels pain (cf. III. Xix. ); consequently, whiledependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, whofears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of somethingwhich he hates, also conceives something which excludes theexistence of the thing in question; to this extent he feelspleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it willturn out as he desires (III. Xx. ). 

XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of somethingpast or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed. 

XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past orfuture, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed. 

Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despairfrom fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an eventhas been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceivessomething past or future as present and regards it as such, orelse because he conceives other things, which exclude theexistence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can neverbe absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II. Xxxi. Coroll. ), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubtconcerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubtconcerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it(II. Xlix. Note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by thesame emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past orfuture, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this Ihave already shown in III. Xviii. , to which, with its note, Irefer the reader. 

XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope. 

XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea ofsomething past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope. 

XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which hasbefallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf. III. Xxii. Note, and III. Xxvii. Note). 

Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) thereseems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term isused in reference to a particular action, and the latter inreference to a disposition. 

XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another. 

XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil toanother. 

Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed insenses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But mypurpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the natureof things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey mymeaning without any violent departure from their ordinarysignification. One statement of my method will suffice. As forthe cause of the above--named emotions see III. Xxvii. Coroll. I. , and III. Xxii. Note. 

XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of thelove we bear him. 

XXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because wehate him. 

Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, anddisparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may alsobe defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think toohighly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may bedefined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think toomeanly of a hated object. Cf. III. Xxvi. Note. 

XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to bepained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another'sevil fortune. 

Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, bydoing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore bethus defined:

XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces aman to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain atanother's evil fortune. 

Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. Xxiv. Andxxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or painaccompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either initself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, whichare accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause. 

XXV. Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man'scontemplation of himself and his own power of action. 

XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of hisown weakness of body or mind. 

Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in sofar as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation ofour own power of action; but, in so far as we mean therebypleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believewe have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposedto repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of someaction, which we believe we have performed by the free decisionof our mind. 

Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth inIII. Li. Note, and in III. Liii. , liv. , lv. And note. Concerningthe free decision of the mind see II. Xxxv. Note. This isperhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it isnothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonlycalled wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which arecalled right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gatherfrom what has been said, that this depends in great measure oneducation. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of them, andalso by persuading to and praising the latter class, have broughtit about, that the former should be associated with pain and thelatter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. Forcustom and religion are not the same among all men, but thatwhich some consider sacred others consider profane, and what someconsider honourable others consider disgraceful. According aseach man has been educated, he feels repentance for a givenaction or glories therein. 

XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self fromself--love. 

Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for thelatter term is used in reference to an external object, but prideis used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, aspartiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect orproperty of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, loveof self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to thinktoo highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as heconceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. Forwhatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, heimagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannotdo. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so longis he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is itimpossible for him to do it. However, if we consider suchmatters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivablethat a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, shouldimagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of theworld are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself inthe present something in relation to a future time of which he isuncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unableto form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and donothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that aman thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessivefear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride anemotion which I will call self--abasement, for as fromself--complacency springs pride, so from humility springsself--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX. Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self byreason of pain. 

Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed tooppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attentionto the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wontto call proud the man who boasts too much (III. Xxx. Note), whotalks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with astyle and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. Onthe other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, whoconfesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, andwho, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire. However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, areextremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strivesagainst them as much as it can (see III. Xiii. , liv. ); hencethose, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, aregenerally in reality the most ambitious and envious. 

XXX. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some actionof our own, which we believe to be praised by others. 

[11] Gloria. 

XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action ofour own, which we believe to be blamed by others. 

Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. Xxx. But weshould here remark the difference which exists between shame andmodesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we areashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrainsa man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposedto shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I willduly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I haveremarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than totheir nature. 

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotionsarising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat ofthose which I refer to desire. 

XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the sametime constrained by the remembrance of other things which excludethe existence of it. 

Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that veryfact, as I have already said more than once, disposed tocontemplate it with the same emotion as if it were somethingpresent; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude theexistence of that which we remember. Thus when we remembersomething which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by thatvery fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion ofpleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at oncechecked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existenceof the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictlyspeaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises fromthe absence of something we hate (cf. III. Xlvii. Note). But, asthe name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotiondown, among the emotions springing from desire. 

XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in usby our conception that others have the same desire. 

Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others runningaway, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, drawstowards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his ownwere burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another'semotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes ofemulation and imitation are different, but because it has becomecustomary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates thatwhich we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to thecause of emulation, cf. III. Xxvii. And note. The reason whythis emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III. Xxxii. And note. 

XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springingfrom love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similarfeelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. Xxxix. Note and xl. 

XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. Xxvii. Note. 

XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we areinduced to injure one whom we hate, III. Xxxix. 

XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, throughmutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, hasinjured us. (See III. Xl. Coroll. Ii and note. )

XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man isimpelled to injure one whom we love or pity. 

Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not apassive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains hisanger and revenge. 

XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which wedread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. Xxxix. Note. 

XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to dosomething dangerous which his equals fear to attempt. 

XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked bythe fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter. 

Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but thefear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence Ido not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in sofar as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotionof daring. 

XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire ofavoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears. 

Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species ofcowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a doublefear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps aman so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove theevil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire ofremoving the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I saywavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to beconstrained by the fear of another evil, which equally tormentshim: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he mayavert of the two. On this subject, see III. Xxxix. Note, andIII. Lii. Note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. Li. Note. 

XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is thedesire of acting in a way that should please men, and refrainingfrom that which should displease them. 

XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power. 

Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions(cf. III. Xxvii. And xxxi. ) are fostered and strengthened;therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, solong as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same timenecessarily bound by this. "The best men, " says Cicero, "areespecially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write abook contemning honour, sign their names thereto, " and so on. 

XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of livingsumptuously. 

XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking. 

XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches. 

XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexualintercourse. 

Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it isstill called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown inIII. Lvi. ) have on contraries. For deference is a species ofambition. Cf. III. Xxix. Note. 

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of themind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, anambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fearare not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. Foran avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food anddrink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrainhimself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences aresecret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to thosevices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. Forthough an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remainavaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because hecannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so muchconcerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c. , as with theappetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed tothese emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I willspeak presently. 

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind Ipass over in silence, first, because they arise from thecompounding of the emotions already described; secondly, becausemany of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it issufficient for practical purposes to have merely a generalknowledge of them. However, it is established from thedefinitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that theyall spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that thereis nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to becalled by a variety of names in accordance with its variousrelations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attentionto these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerningthe nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define theemotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only. 

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is aconfused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, orany part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greateror less than before, and by the presence of which the mind isdetermined to think of one thing rather than another. 

Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soulis a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is onlypassive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III. Iii. ) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning itsbody or any part thereof a force for existence greater thanbefore. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denoterather the actual disposition of our own body (II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. ) than the nature of an external body. But the idea whichconstitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express thedisposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because itspower of action or force for existence is increased ordiminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, whenI say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do notmean that the mind compares the present with the past dispositionof the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality ofan emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before. 

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II. Xi. , xiii. ), that it affirms the actual existence of its ownbody, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the veryessence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater orless perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its ownbody, or any part thereof, something involving more or lessreality than before. 

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind isincreased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formedof its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving moreor less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning itsown body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power ofthinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, Ihave added by the presence of which the mind is determined tothink of one thing rather than another, so that, besides thenature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of thedefinition explains, I might also express the nature of desire. 

PART IV:

Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

PREFACE

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions Iname bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he isnot his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so muchso, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is betterfor him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and whatis good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this partof my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make afew prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, goodand evil. 

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and hasbrought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinksthat he knows, the intention and aim of its author. Forinstance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be notyet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that workis to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it iscarried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seenbefore, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, heplainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms. 

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think outtypes of houses, buildings, towers, &c. , and to prefer certaintypes to others, it came about, that each man called perfect thatwhich he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of thething in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agreeless with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidentlybeen completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect orimperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of thingsnatural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas theyhold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothingwithout an object) has them in view, and has set them as typesbefore herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which theyhave formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature hasfallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfector imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from trueknowledge of what they pronounce upon. 

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I. , that Nature doesnot work with an end in view. For the eternal and infiniteBeing, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity asthat whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the samenecessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I. Xvi. ). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and thereason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he doesnot exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for thesake of an end; of his existence and of his action there isneither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called finalis nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is consideredas the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we saythat to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, wemean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences ofhousehold life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, thebeing inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, isnothing else but this particular desire, which is really theefficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, becausemen are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. Theyare, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actionsand appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they aredetermined to any particular desire. Therefore, the commonsaying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, andproduces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glossestreated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection andimperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, ornotions which we form from a comparison among one another ofindividuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def. Vi. ), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. Forwe are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to onegenus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the categoryof Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to thiscategory, and comparing them one with another, find that somepossess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far aswe attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end, infirmity, etc. , we, to this extent, call them imperfect, becausethey do not affect our mind so much as the things which we callperfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, orbecause Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scopeof a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessityof the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows fromthe necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarilycomes to pass. 

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positivequality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes ofthinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of thingsone with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the sametime good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good forhim that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that isdeaf, it is neither good nor bad. 

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still beretained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as atype of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be usefulfor us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I haveindicated. 

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which wecertainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to thetype of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by"bad, " that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us inapproaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are moreperfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach moreor less nearly to the said type. For it must be speciallyremarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to agreater perfection, or vice versā, I do not mean that he ischanged from one essence or reality to another; for instance, ahorse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into aman, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that weconceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this isunderstood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--inother words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, andoperates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard toits duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The durationof things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essenceof things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, willalways be able to persist in existence with the same forcewherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, allthings are equal. 

DEFINITIONS. 

I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful tous. 

II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be ahindranceto us in the attainment of any good. 

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards theend. )

III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, whileregarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, whichnecessarily asserts their existence or excludes it. 

IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, whileregarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be determined for producing them. 

(In I. Xxxiii. Note. I. , I drew no distinction betweenpossible and contingent, because there was in that place no needto distinguish them accurately. )

V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man indifferent directions, though they are of the same kind, such asluxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and arecontraries, not by nature, but by accident. 

VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III. Xviii. , notes. I. And ii. , which see. 

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctlyconceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundredfeet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds thatwhich we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distancefrom us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose timeof existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longerinterval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equallydistant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to thesame moment of time. )

VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean adesire. 

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; thatis (III. Vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is aman's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power ofeffecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature. 

AXIOM. 

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there isnot another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed. 

PROPOSITIONS. 

PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea isremoved by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its beingtrue. 

Proof. --Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledgewhich inadequate ideas involve (II. Xxxv. ), nor have they anypositive quality on account of which they are called false (II. Xxxiii. ); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II. Xxxii. ). Wherefore, if the positive qualitypossessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what istrue, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then beremoved by itself, which (IV. Iii. ) is absurd. Therefore, nopositive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This proposition is more clearly understood from II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicatesrather the present disposition of the human body than the natureof the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. Forinstance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distantfrom us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so longas we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its truedistance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explainstho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affectedthereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shallstill nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as wesaid in II. Xxxv. Note, we do not imagine the sun to be so nearus, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because themind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that thebody is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun fallingon the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imaginethe sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of itsreal position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein themind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural dispositionof the body, or that its power of activity is increased ordiminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish atits presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear anevil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but thecontrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which willcertainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the presentexistence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. Xvii. 

PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart ofNature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. 

Proof. --We are said to be passive, when something arises inus, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. Ii. ), that is(III. Def. I. ), something which cannot be deduced solely from thelaws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as weare a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself withoutother parts. Q. E. D. 

PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing islimited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of externalcauses. 

Proof. --This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful thanA, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited bythe power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by thepower of external causes. Q. E. D. 

PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part ofNature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as theiradequate cause. 

Proof. --The power, whereby each particular thing, andconsequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or ofNature (I. Xxiv. Coroll. ); not in so far as it is infinite, butin so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence(III. Vii. ). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explainedthrough his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite powerof God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I. Xxxiv. ). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understoodsolely through the nature of man, it would follow that he wouldnot be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; thiswould be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power waseither finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself allchanges which could spring from external causes; or of theinfinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would beso ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing anychanges save such as tended towards his own preservation. Butthe first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop. , the proof ofwhich is universal, and can be applied to all individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable ofundergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solelythrough his own nature, and consequently that he must always (aswe have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow fromthe infinite power of God, and consequently (I. Xvi. ) from thenecessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded asaffected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of natureas conceived under the attributes of extension and thought mustbe deducible. It would therefore follow (I. Xxi. ) that man isinfinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Itis, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo anychanges save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always aprey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general orderof nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much asthe nature of things demands. 

PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and itspersistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby weourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power ofan external cause compared with our own. 

Proof. --The essence of a passion cannot be explained throughour essence alone (III. Deff. I. And ii. ), that is (III. Vii. ), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby weourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown inII. Xvi. ) must necessarily be defined by the power of an externalcause compared with our own. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome therest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomesobstinately fixed to him. 

Proof. --The force and increase of any passion and itspersistence in existing are defined by the power of an externalcause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop. ); therefore(IV. Iii. ) it can overcome a man's power, &e. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed byanother emotion contrary thereto, and with more power forcontrolling emotion. 

Proof. --Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, isan idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or lessforce of existence than before (cf. The general Definition of theEmotions at the end of Part III. ). When, therefore, the mind isassailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affectedwith a modification whereby its power of activity is increased ordiminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. V. ) receivesfrom its cause the force for persistence in its being; whichforce can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II. Vi. ), in virtue of the body being affected with a modificationcontrary to (III. V. ) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax. );wherefore (II. Xii. ) the mind is affected by the idea of amodification contrary to, and stronger than the formermodification, in other words, (by the general definition of theemotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to andstronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroythe existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot bedestroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and strongeremotion. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --An emotion, in so far as it is referred to themind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of amodification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, thatwhich we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo canonly be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, andstronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definitionof the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the bodycontrary to, and stronger than, the modification which weundergo. 

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else butthe emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are consciousthereof. 

Proof. --We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service orthe reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. I. And ii. ), thatis (III. Vii. ), when it increases or diminishes, helps orhinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceivethat a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good orevil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing elsebut the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily followsfrom that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. Xxii. ). But thisidea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is unitedto body (II. Xxi. ); that is, there is no real distinctionbetween this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification ofthe body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge ofgood and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as weare conscious thereof. Q. E. D. 

PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be withus at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceivethe cause to be with us. 

Proof. --Imagination or conception is the idea, by which themind regards a thing as present (II. Xvii. Note), but whichindicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature ofthe external thing (II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. ). An emotion istherefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the dispositionof the body. But a conception (by II. Xvii. ) is stronger, solong as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existenceof the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger ormore intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at thepresent time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be withus. Q. E. D. 

Note. --When I said above in III. Xviii. That we are affectedby the image of what is past or future with the same emotion asif the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, thatthis is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of thething in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that theimage becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us otherthings which exclude the present existence of the future object:I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because Ipurposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part ofmy work. 

Corollary. --The image of something past or future, that is, ofa thing which we regard as in relation to time past or timefuture, to the exclusion of time present, is, when otherconditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future isless intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felttowards something present. 

PROP. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close athand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive thatits time for existence is separated from the present by a longerinterval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to havenot long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if weconceive that it has long passed away. 

Proof. --In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, ornot long passed away, we conceive that which excludes thepresence of the object less, than if its period of futureexistence were more distant from the present, or if it had longpassed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop. )we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --From the remarks made in Def. Vi. Of this part itfollows that, if objects are separated from the present by alonger period than we can define in conception, though theirdates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, theyall affect us equally faintly. 

PROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessaryis, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotiontowards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary. 

Proof. --In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we denya thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to benecessary (I. Xxxiii. Note. I. ); wherefore (IV. Ix. ) an emotiontowards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not toexist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, ismore intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotiontowards a thing contingent. 

Proof. --In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we areaffected by the conception of some further thing, which wouldassert the existence of the former (IV. Def. Iii. ); but, on theother hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, whichexclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive athing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive thingswhich assert its existence (IV. Iv. ), that is (III. Xviii. ), things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towardssomething possible is more vehement. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --An emotion towards a thing, which we know not toexist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is farfainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us. 

Proof. --Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing asfuture (IV. Ix. Coroll. ), and is much more vehement, than if thefuture time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. X. ). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period ofexistence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is farfainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing ascontingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regardas contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived thething to be present with us. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we knownot to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past. 

Proof. --In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we arenot affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts theexistence of the said thing (IV. Def. Iii. ), but, on the otherhand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding itspresent existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relationto time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recallsthe thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. Xviii. Andnote), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II. Xvii. Coroll. ). Therefore (IV. Ix. ) an emotion towards a thingcontingent, which we know does not exist in the present, isfainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards athing past. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check anyemotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it isconsidered as an emotion. 

Proof. --An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of itsbody a greater or less force of existing than before (by thegeneral Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has nopositive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of whatis true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, byvirtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far assuch knowledge is an emotion (IV. Viii. ) if it have more strengthfor restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able torestrain the given emotion. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad canbe quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising fromthe emotions whereby we are assailed. 

Proof. --From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far asit is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. Of theEmotions, i. ), the strength of which is proportioned to thestrength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. Xxxvii. ). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact ofour truly understanding anything, it follows that it is alsopresent with us, in so far as we are active (III. I. ), and musttherefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. Ii. );consequently (III. Vii. ) its force and increase can be definedsolely by human power. Again, the desires arising from theemotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion asthe said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force andincrease must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it(IV. Iii. ); hence the desires arising from like emotions may bemore vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledgeof good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be moreeasily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what isagreeable at the present moment. 

Proof. --Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. Ix. Coroll. ). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge ofgood and evil, though it be concerned with things which are goodat the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrongdesire (by the last Prop. , the proof whereof is of universalapplication). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, whenconcerned with the future, can be more easily controlled orquenched, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good andevil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what iscontingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desirefor things that are present. 

Proof. --This Prop. Is proved in the same way as the last Prop. From IV. Xii. Coroll. 

Note. --I think I have now shown the reason, why men are movedby opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that thetrue knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of thingsgave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]----"The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse--I follow. "

[12] Ov. Met. Vii. 20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor. "

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. " Ihave not written the above with the object of drawing theconclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, orthat a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling hisemotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and theinfirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason cando in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. Ihave said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of humaninfirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settledto treat separately. 

PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditionsbeing equal, stronger than desire arising from pain. 

Proof. --Desire is the essence of a man (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persistin his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, bythe fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on thecontrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain beingfelt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arisingfrom pleasure must be defined by human power together with thepower of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain mustbe defined by human power only. Thus the former is the strongerof the two. Q. E. D. 

Note. --In these few remarks I have explained the causes ofhuman infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abideby the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show whatcourse is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions arein harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them arecontrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositionsin detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch thembriefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp mymeaning. 

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which isuseful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, shoulddesire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can topreserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that awhole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. Iv. )

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordancewith the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. Viii. ), and as no oneendeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance withthe laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that thefoundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's ownbeing, and that happiness consists in man's power of preservinghis own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for itsown sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more usefulto us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly andlastly, that suicides are weak--minded, and are overcome byexternal causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it followsfrom Postulate iv. , Part II. , that we can never arrive at doingwithout all external things for the preservation of our being orliving, so as to have no relations with things which are outsideourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that ourintellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and couldunderstand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many thingsoutside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, tobe desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, thanthose which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, forexample, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of themsingly. 

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful thanman--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their beingcan be wished for by men, than that all should so in all pointsagree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, withone consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve theirbeing, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what isuseful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselvesnothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in theirconduct. 

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thusbriefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greaterdetail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gainthe attention of those who believe, that the principle that everyman is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundationof impiety, rather than of piety and virtue. 

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is thecase, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby Ihave hitherto proceeded. 

PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarilydesires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad. 

Proof. --The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. Viii. ) theemotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are consciousthereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinksgood, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite isnothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. The Definition ofAppetite, III. Ix. Note, and Def. Of the Emotions, i. ). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desiresthe one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seekwhat is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his ownbeing--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, inproportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, thatis, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. 

Proof. --Virtue is human power, which is defined solely byman's essence (IV. Def. Viii. ), that is, which is defined solelyby the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve hisown being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently(III. Iv. And vi. ), in so far as a man neglects to preserve hisown being, he is wanting in power. Q. E. D. 

Note. --No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, orpreserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causesexternal and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from thenecessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsionfrom external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: whichlatter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twistsround his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up asword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant'scommand, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evilby incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes mayso disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it mayassume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the ideacannot exist in the mind (III. X. ) But that a man, from thenecessity of his own nature, should endeavour to becomenon--existent, is as impossible as that something should be madeout of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a littlereflection. 

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, andto live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, andto live--in other words, to actually exist. 

Proof. --The proof of this proposition, or rather theproposition itself, is self--evident, and is also plain from thedefinition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c. , blessedly or rightly, is (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ) the essenceof man--that is (III. Vii. ), the endeavour made by everyone topreserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to thisendeavour to preserve one's own being. 

Proof. --The effort for self--preservation is the essence of athing (III. Vii. ); therefore, if any virtue could be conceivedas prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to beconceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --The effort for self--preservation is the first andonly foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothingcan be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived. 

PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particularaction because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely saidto act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, inso far as he is determined for the action because he understands. 

Proof. --In so far as a man is determined to an action throughhaving inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. I. ), that is (III. Deff. I. , and iii. ), he does something, which cannot be perceivedsolely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. Viii. ), whichdoes not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he isdetermined for an action because he understands, he is active;that is, he does something, which is perceived through hisessence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in usthe same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance withthe dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful toone's self. 

Proof. --To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothingelse but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. Butwe only act, in so far as we understand (III. Iii. ): thereforeto act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, andthat on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. Xxii. Coroll. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake ofanything else. 

Proof. --The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours topersist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of thething itself (III. Vii. ); from this alone, and not from theessence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. Vi. ) thateveryone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, thisproposition is plain from IV. Xxii. Coroll. , for if a man shouldendeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason isnothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in sofar as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding. 

Proof. --The effort for self--preservation is nothing else butthe essence of the thing in question (III. Vii. ), which, in sofar as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force forcontinuing in existence (III. Vi. ) and doing such things asnecessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. OfAppetite, III. Ix. Note). But the essence of reason is noughtelse but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctlyunderstands (see the definition in II. Xl. Note. Ii. ); therefore(II. Xl. ) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason isnothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of themind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, topreserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; thiseffort at understanding is (IV. Xxii. Coroll. ) the first andsingle basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understandthings for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. Xxv. ); on theother hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be ableto conceive any good for itself, save such things as areconducive to understanding. 

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, savesuch things as really conduce to understanding, or such as areable to hinder us from understanding. 

Proof. --The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothingbeyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoingProp. ). But the mind (II. Xli. , xliii. And note) cannot possesscertainty concerning anything, except in so far as it hasadequate ideas, or (what by II. Xl. Note, is the same thing) inso far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good orevil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God. 

Proof. --The mind is not capable of understanding anythinghigher than God, that is (I. Def. Vi. ), than a Being absolutelyinfinite, and without which (I. Xv. ) nothing can either be or beconceived; therefore (IV. Xxvi. And xxvii. ), the mind's highestutility or (IV. Def. I. ) good is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only tothe same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. Themind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as wehave already shown, the highest that the mind can understand isGod; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understandor to know God. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely differentfrom our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, andabsolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it hassomething in common with our nature. 

Proof. --The power of every individual thing, and consequentlythe power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only bedetermined by an individual thing (I. Xxviii. ), whose nature (II. Vi. ) must be understood through the same nature as that, throughwhich human nature is conceived. Therefore our power ofactivity, however it be conceived, can be determined andconsequently helped or hindered by the power of any otherindividual thing, which has something in common with us, but notby the power of anything, of which the nature is entirelydifferent from our own; and since we call good or evil thatwhich is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. Viii. ), that is (III. Xi. Note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, ourpower of activity; therefore, that which is entirely differentfrom our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the qualitywhich it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us inso far as it is contrary to our nature. 

Proof. --We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. Viii. ), that is (by the Def. , which see in III. Xi. Note), whenit diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, ifanything were bad for us through that quality which it has incommon with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish orcheck that which it has in common with our nature, which (III. Iv. ) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through thatquality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it iscontrary to our nature. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. 

Proof. --In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, itcannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be eithergood or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither goodnor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. I. ), whichtends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by thehypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;but this (III. Vi. ) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thingis in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thingis in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better forus, and vice versā, in proportion as a thing is more useful forus, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far asit is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily bedifferent therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it canneither be good nor bad (IV. Xxix. ); if contrary, it will becontrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is good--in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, canbe good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmonywith our nature, and vice versā. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, theycannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony. 

Proof. --Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, areunderstood to agree in power (III. Vii. ), not in want of power ornegation, and consequently not in passion (III. Iii. Note);wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This is also self--evident; for, if we say that whiteand black only agree in the fact that neither is red, weabsolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect. So, ifwe say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that bothare finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity oftheir own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the powerof external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and astone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agreeonly in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, reallyagree in no respect. 

PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they areassailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;and to this extent one and the same man is variable andinconstant. 

Proof. --The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. I. , ii. ), butit must be defined by the power, that is (III. Vii. ), by thenature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence itfollows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as thereare external objects whereby we are affected (III. Lvi. ), andthat men may be differently affected by one and the sameobject (III. Li. ), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towardsthe same object, and may therefore be variable andinconstant. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which arepassions, they can be contrary one to another. 

Proof. --A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul'sfeeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar tothat which Paul hates (III. Xvi. ), or because Peter has solepossession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. Xxxii. Andnote), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated inIII. Lv. Note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hatePeter (Def. Of Emotions, vii. ), consequently it may easily happenalso, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each shouldendeavour to do the other an injury, (III. Xxxix. ), that is (IV. Xxx. ), that they should be contrary one to another. But theemotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. Lix. );hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which arepassions, can be contrary one to another. Q. E. D. 

Note. --I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceivesthat Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; fromthis it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, throughagreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;if this were so, Props. Xxx. And xxxi. Of this part would beuntrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, weshall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are notin one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of onediffering from the other. For, in so far as each loves the samething, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. Xxxi. ), that is(Def. Of the Emotions, vi. ) the pleasure of each is fosteredthereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they areat variance through both loving the same thing, and through theagreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed todiffer. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the lovedobject as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea ofthe loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affectedwith pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thusthey will be at variance one with another. We can easily show inlike manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely ondifferences, and not on the agreement between men's natures. 

PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature. 

Proof. --In so far as men are assailed by emotions that arepassions, they can be different in nature (IV. Xxxiii. ), and atvariance one with another. But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. Iii. );therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as itis defined by reason must (III. Def. Ii. ) be understood solelythrough human nature as its proximate cause. But, since everyman by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. Xix. ); andfurther, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deemgood or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. Xli. ); it followsthat men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for humannature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. Xxxi. Coroll. ); in other words, such things as are in harmony witheach man's nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live inobedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one withanother. Q. E. D. 

Corollary I. --There is no individual thing in nature, which ismore useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmonywith his nature (IV. Xxxi. Coroll. ); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, whenhe lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. Ii. ), and to thisextent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature ofanother man (by the last Prop. ); wherefore among individualthings nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives inobedience to reason. Q. E. D. 

Corollary II. --As every man seeks most that which is useful tohim, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a manseeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. Xx. ), or, what is thesame thing (IV. Def. Viii. ), the more is he endowed with power toact according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live inobedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, whenthey live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop. ); therefore(by the foregoing Coroll. ) men will be most useful one toanother, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. Q. E. D. 

Note. --What we have just shown is attested by experience soconspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Manis to man a God. " Yet it rarely happens that men live inobedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, thatthey are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, sothat the definition of man as a social animal has met withgeneral assent; in fact, men do derive from social life muchmore convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh theirfill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropespraise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let themheap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much moreeasily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces canthey escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: notto say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But Iwill treat of this more at length elsewhere. 

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue iscommon to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein. 

Proof. --To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason(IV. Xxiv. ), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience toreason is to understand (IV. Xxvi. ); therefore (IV. Xxviii. ) thehighest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;that is (II. Xlvii. And note) a good which is common to all andcan be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are ofthe same nature. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good ofthose who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would itnot then follow, as above (IV. Xxxiv. ), that men living inobedience to reason, that is (IV. Xxxv. ), men in so far as theyagree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To suchan inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally butfrom the very nature of reason, that main's highest good iscommon to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence ofman, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man couldneither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasurein this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the humanmind (II. Xlvii. ), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternaland infinite essence of God. 

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows aftervirtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledgeof God. 

Proof. --Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men (IV. Xxxv; Coroll. I. );therefore (IV. Xix. ), we shall in obedience to reason necessarilyendeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience toreason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guidedby reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires forhimself, is to understand (IV. Xxvi. ); wherefore the good, whicheach follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire alsofor others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to themind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. Of the Emotions, i. );now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. Xi. ), which involves the knowledge of God (II. Xlvii. ), and without it(I. Xv. ), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, inproportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge ofGod, so also will be greater the desire of the follower ofvirtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as goodfor himself. Q. E. D. 

Another Proof. --The good, which a man desires for himself andloves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others loveit also (III. Xxxi. ); he will therefore endeavour that othersshould love it also; and as the good in question is common toall, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoicetherein, and this he will do the more (III. Xxxvii. ), inproportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater. 

Note I. --He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to causeothers to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of theworld live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delightin something different, and accordingly study and, by similarimpulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with whatpleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by menunder the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only bepossessed by a single individual, it follows that those who loveit are not consistent in their intentions, but, while theydelight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, whoendeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse butcourteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause inso far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down toReligion. The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by alife according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associateothers with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; byhonourable I mean that which is praised by men living accordingto reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to thegaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what arethe foundations of a state; and the difference between truevirtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I havesaid; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living inaccordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else butman's allowing himself to be led by things which are external tohimself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demandedby the general disposition of things rather than by his ownnature considered solely in itself. 

[13] Honestas

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. Xviii. Of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against theslaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstitionand womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest ofwhat is useful to us further teaches us the necessity ofassociating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have thesame rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, menhave far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that wemay not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their natureis not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different fromhuman emotions (III. Lvii. Note). It remains for me to explainwhat I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these pointssee the following note. 

Note II. --In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explainpraise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice. 

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. Xxix. Note:the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But Imust first say a few words concerning man in the state of natureand in society. 

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actionswhich follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore bysovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what isbad, takes care of his own advantage according to his owndisposition (IV. Xix. And IV. Xx. ), avenges the wrongs done tohim (III. Xl. Coroll. Ii. ), and endeavours to preserve that whichhe loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. Xxviii. ). Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remainin possession of this his right, without any injury being done tohis neighbour (IV. Xxxv. Coroll. I. ). But seeing that they are aprey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue(IV. Vi. ), they are often drawn in different directions, andbeing at variance one with another (IV. Xxxiii. Xxxiv. ), stand inneed of mutual help (IV. Xxxv. Note). Wherefore, in order thatmen may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it isnecessary that they should forego their natural right, and, forthe sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injuretheir fellow--men. The way in which this end can be obtained, sothat men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. Iv. Coroll. ), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render eachother mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. Vii. And III. Xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can onlybe restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary toitself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear ofincurring a greater injury themselves. 

On this law society can be established, so long as it keepsin its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenginginjury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it alsopossesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and topass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless inrestraining emotion, but by threats (IV. Xvii. Note). Such asociety established with laws and the power of preserving itselfis called a State, while those who live under its protection arecalled citizens. We may readily understand that there is in thestate of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronouncedgood or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solelyof his own advantage, and according to his disposition, withreference only to his individual advantage, decides what is goodor bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. 

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; itcan only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced onby common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the Stateauthority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which istherefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, onthe other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man isthought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantageswhich a State provides. 

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consentmaster of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can besaid to belong to one man rather than another: all things arecommon to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive nowish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of thatwhich belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in thestate of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideasare only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by commonconsent what belongs to one man and what to another. 

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice andinjustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributeswhich display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough. 

PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as torender it capable of being affected in an increased number ofways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number ofways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body isthereby rendered more capable of being affected or affectingother bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect ishurtful to man. 

Proof. --Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the bodyincreases also the mind's capability of perception (II. Xiv. );therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders itcapable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. Xxvi. Xxvii. ); andis so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the bodycapable; contrariwise (II. Xiv. , IV. Xxvi. Xxvii. ), it ishurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of theproportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human bodymutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes achange in such proportion is bad. 

Proof. --The human body needs many other bodies for itspreservation (II. Post. Iv. ). But that which constitutes thespecific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its partscommunicate their several motions one to another in a certainfixed proportion (Def. Before Lemma iv. After II. Xiii. ). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of theproportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the humanbody mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of thehuman body, and consequently renders the human body capable ofbeing affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies inmany ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop. ). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportioncauses the human body to assume another specific character, inother words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though thepoint is indeed self--evident), to be destroyed, and consequentlytotally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers ofways; therefore it is bad. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The extent to which such causes can injure or be ofservice to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But Iwould here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutuallyamong its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to denythat a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood andother properties, wherein the life of a body is thought toconsist, may none the less be changed into another nature totallydifferent from its own. There is no reason, which compels me tomaintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that Ishould hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of acertain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, andthough he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of hispast life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies hehad written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken fora grown--up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. Ifthis instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? Aman of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he canonly be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogyof other men. However, I prefer to leave such questionsundiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious forraising new issues. 

PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causesmen to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoeverbrings discord into a State is bad. 

Proof. --For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmonyalso causes them to live according to reason (IV. Xxxv. ), and istherefore (IV. Xxvi. Xxvii. ) good, and (for the same reason)whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:contrariwise, pain in itself is bad. 

Proof. --Pleasure (III. Xi. And note) is emotion, whereby thebody's power of activity is increased or helped; pain isemotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished orchecked; therefore (IV. Xxxviii. ) pleasure in itself is good, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad. 

Proof. --Mirth (see its Def. In III. Xi. Note) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in allparts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. Xi. ), the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such amanner, that the several parts maintain their former proportionof motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. Xxxix. ), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. In thesame note to III. Xi. ) is pain, which, in so far as it isreferred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease orhindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV. Xxxviii. ) it is always bad. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the otherhand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure isbad. 

Proof. --Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) ispleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than therest (see its Definition, III. Xi. Note); the power of thisemotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body(IV. Vi. ), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thusrendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of otherways: therefore (IV. Xxxviii. ) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. Xli. ). But, as itsforce and increase is defined by the power of an external causecompared with our own (IV. V. ), we can conceive infinite degreesand modes of strength in this emotion (IV. Iii. ); we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, andpreventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body'scapabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive. 

Proof. --Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of anexternal cause (Def. Of Emotions, vi. ); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. Xi. Note); hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength ofdesire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises(III. Xxxvii. ). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men'sactions (IV. Vi. ); so, therefore, can desire, which arises fromthe same emotion, overcome all other desires, and becomeexcessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerningstimulation. 

Note. --Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceivedmore easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, wherebywe are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of thebody which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotionsare generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplationof one object, that it is unable to think of others; andalthough men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very feware found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet thereare cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinatelyfixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they think they have it before them;when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he isdelirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed withlove, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but theirmistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they aremade objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing butgain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing butglory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they aregenerally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c. , are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases. 

PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good. 

Proof. --When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III. Xxxix. ), that is (IV. Xxxvii. ), we endeavour to do something thatis bad. Therefore, &c. Q. E. D. 

N. B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatredtowards men. 

Corollary I. --Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, andother emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, arebad; this is evident from III. Xxxix. And IV. Xxxvii. 

Corollary II. --Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred isbase, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III. Xxxix. , and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. Xxxvii. Note. 

Note. --Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. Stated tobe bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. Forlaughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, solong as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. Xli. ). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim andgloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one'shunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, thegreater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater theperfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must wenecessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make useof what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) isthe part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man torefresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food anddrink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growingplants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury tohis neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerousparts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need offresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may beequally capable of performing all the actions, which follow fromthe necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that themind may also be equally capable of understanding many thingssimultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with ourprinciples, and also with general practice; therefore, if therebe any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned isthe best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need forme to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail. 

PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c. , towards him. 

Proof. --All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. Xlv. Coroll. I. );therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason willendeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by suchemotions (IV. Xix. ); consequently, he will also endeavour toprevent others being so assailed (IV. Xxxvii. ). But hatred isincreased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love(III. Xliii. ), so that hatred may pass into love (III. Xliv. );therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason willendeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. Q. E. D. 

Note. --He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred isassuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred withlove, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstandsmany as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, butthrough increase in their powers; all these consequences followso plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail. 

PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselvesgood. 

Proof. --Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is pain (Def. Of the Emotions, xiii. ), and hope (Def. Ofthe Emotions, Explanation xii. And xiii. ) cannot exist withoutfear; therefore (IV. Xli. ) these emotions cannot be good inthemselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessivepleasure (IV. Xliii. ). Q. E. D. 

Note. --We may add, that these emotions show defectiveknowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the samereason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs ofa want of mental power. For although confidence and joy arepleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to beguided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour tofree ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominatefortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom. 

PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over--esteem and disparagement arealways bad. 

Proof. --These emotions (see Def. Of the Emotions, xxi. Xxii. )are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. Xxvi. Xxvii. )bad. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XLIX. Over--esteem is apt to render its object proud. 

Proof. --If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love'ssake, we are apt to become elated (III. Xli. ), or to bepleasurably affected (Def. Of the Emotions, xxx. ); the goodwhich we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. Xxv. ); andtherefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in otherwords, we are apt to become proud. Q. E. D. 

PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless. 

Proof. --Pity (Def. Of the Emotions, xviii. ) is a pain, andtherefore (IV. Xli. ) is in itself bad. The good effect whichfollows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pityfrom misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at thedictation of reason (IV. Xxxvii. ); only at the dictation ofreason are we able to perform any action, which we know forcertain to be good (IV. Xxvii. ); thus, in a man who lives underthe guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q. E. D. 

Note. --He who rightly realizes, that all things follow fromthe necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass inaccordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will notfind anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor willhe bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of humanvirtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and torejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched withcompassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often doessomething which he afterwards regrets; partly because we cannever be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partlybecause we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in thisplace expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance ofreason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor bycompassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. Xxvii. ) he seemsunlike a man. 

PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agreetherewith and arise therefrom. 

Proof. --Approval is love towards one who has done good toanother (Def. Of the Emotions, xix. ); therefore it may bereferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. Lix. ), that is (III. Iii. ), in so far as it understands;therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q. E. D. 

Another Proof. --He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. Xxxvii. ); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellowhis own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he willfeel pleasure (III. Xi. Note) accompanied by the idea of thebenefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Indignation as we defined it (Def. Of the Emotions, xx. ) is necessarily evil (IV. Xlv. ); we may, however, remarkthat, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peacepunishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be saidto be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited byhatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him. 

PROP. LII. Self--approval may arise from reason, and that whicharises from reason is the highest possible. 

Proof. --Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man'scontemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. Of theEmotions, xxv. ). But a man's true power of action or virtue isreason herself (III. Iii. ), as the said man clearly anddistinctly contemplates her (II. Xl. Xliii. ); thereforeself--approval arises from reason. Again, when a man iscontemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctlyor adequately, such things as follow from his power of action(III. Def. Ii. ), that is (III. Iii. ), from his power ofunderstanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does thehighest possible self--approval arise. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Self--approval is in reality the highest object forwhich we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. Xxv. ) no oneendeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulteriorobject, and, as this approval is more and more fostered andstrengthened by praise (III. Liii. Coroll. ), and on the contrary(III. Lv. Coroll. ) is more and more disturbed by blame, famebecomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and lifeunder disgrace is almost unendurable. 

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise fromreason. 

Proof. --Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation ofhis own infirmities (Def. Of the Emotions, xxvi. ). But, in sofar as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed tounderstand his essence, that is, his power (III. Vii. ). Wherefore, if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmityin himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but(III. Lv. ) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity byvirtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by theknowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, thisis the same as saying that we conceive that a man understandshimself distinctly (IV. Xxvi. ), because[14] his power of activityis aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from aman's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from thecontemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q. E. D. 

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which Ihave translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that). 

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise fromreason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched orinfirm. 

Proof. --The first part of this proposition is proved like theforegoing one. The second part is proved from the meredefinition of the emotion in question (Def. Of the Emotions, xxvii. ). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, byevil desires; secondly, by pain. 

Note. --As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, thesetwo emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope andFear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we hadbetter sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey toemotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linkedtogether in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when itis not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, whoconsulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuouslycommended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those whoare a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily thanothers to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to becomefree and to enjoy the life of the blessed. 

PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignoranceof self. 

Proof. --This is evident from Def. Of the Emotions, xxviii. Andxxix. 

PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extremeinfirmity of spirit. 

Proof. --The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation(IV. Xxii. Coroll. ) under the guidance of reason (IV. Xxiv. ). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of thefoundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance ofreason (IV. Xxiv. ): now he, that acts under the guidance ofreason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. Xliii. ). Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, andconsequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;in other words (IV. Def. Viii. ), is most infirm of spirit. Thusextreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud andthe dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions. 

Note. --Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former apainful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful(IV. Xviii. ). 

PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterersand parasites, but hates the company of the high--minded. 

Proof. --Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimationof himself (Def. Of the Emotions, xxviii. And vi. ); thisestimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all themeans in his power (III. Xiii. Note); he will therefore delightin the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character istoo well known to need definition here), and will avoid thecompany of high--minded men, who value him according to hisdeserts. Q. E. D. 

Note. --It would be too long a task to enumerate here all theevil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to allthe emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man maybe called proud from his underestimation of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arisingfrom the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himselfsuperior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the oppositequality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arisingfrom the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferiorto his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that aproud man is necessarily envious (III. Xli. Note), and only takespleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of hisbent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish. 

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is thedejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch ashis pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity andother men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in otherwords, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied incontemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers. "Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as hethinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone toenvy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men'sactions, with a view to fault--finding rather than correction, inorder to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glorytherein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effectsfollow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows fromthe nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to tworight angles. I have already said that I call these and similaremotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. Thelaws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof manis but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should thinkthat I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deedsof men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, asI said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotionsand their properties as on the same footing with other naturalphenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power andingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully asother things which we admire, and which we delight tocontemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in theemotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury uponhim. 

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but mayarise therefrom. 

Proof. --This is evident from Def. Of the Emotions, xxx. , andalso from the definition of an honourable man (IV. Xxxvii. Note. I. ). 

Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when thisgood opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in otherwords, the highest object of each man's love (IV. Lii. Note);consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retainhis reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, sothat, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, andreadily represses the fame of others. The object of the strifebeing estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant isseized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in everypossible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is moreproud of having done harm to others than of having done good tohimself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, beingnothing. 

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferredfrom what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. Iwill only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame isreally imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the sameway as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is notmortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has nodesire to live honourably. 

Such are the points which I undertook to remark uponconcerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for thedesires, they are good or bad according as they spring from goodor evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered inus by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as isevident from what was said in IV. Xliv. Note), and would beuseless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidanceof reason only, as I will now briefly, show. 

PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined byemotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determinedwithout emotion by reason. 

Proof. --To act rationally, is nothing else (III. Iii. And Def. Ii. ) but to perform those actions, which follow from thenecessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain isbad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action(IV. Xli. ); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to anyaction, which we should be unable to perform under the guidanceof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders aman's capability for action (IV. Xli. Xliii. ); therefore to thisextent we could not be determined by it to any action, which wecould not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (forit consists in the fact that a man's capability for action isincreased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except inso far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extentof affording him an adequate conception of himself and hisactions (III. Iii. , and note). 

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought tosuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conceptionof himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotionwherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributableto pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. Of the Emotions, iv. Explanation); and desire (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ) is nothingelse but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q. E. D. 

Another Proof. --A given action is called bad, in so far as itarises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV. ), one and the sameaction being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to theaction which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. Xix. ). Q. E. D. 

Note. --An example will put this point in a clearer light. Theaction of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, andin so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises hisarm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violentlydownwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as properto the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved byanger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II. ), because oneand the same action can be associated with various mental imagesof things; therefore we may be determined to the performance ofone and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear anddistinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire whichsprings from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would becomeuseless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see whydesire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, iscalled by us blind. 

PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is notattributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain partsthereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole. 

Proof. --Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of abody, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevailsover the remaining parts (IV. Vi. ). This part will not endeavourto do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts ofthe body may perform its office; for this it would be necessaryfor it to have a force or power of doing away with its ownpowers, which (III. Vi. ) is absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve itscondition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kindaforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If itbe assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked sothat the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the samemanner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect toa man as a whole. Q. E. D. 

Note. --As pleasure is generally (IV. Xliv. Note) attributed toone part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our beingwith out taking into consideration our health as a whole: towhich it may be added, that the desires which have most hold overus (IV. Ix. ) take account of the present and not of the future. 

PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive. 

Proof. --Desire (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ) consideredabsolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it isconceived as in any way determined to a particular activity bysome given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arisesfrom reason, that is (III. Iii. ), which is engendered in us in sofar as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so faras it is conceived as determined to such activities as areadequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. Ii. ). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature consideredin itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be ableto do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under thedictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea beof a thing future, past, or present. 

Proof. --Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance ofreason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II. Xliv. Coroll. Ii. ), and is therefore affected with the samecertitude (II. Xliii. And note). Wherefore, whether the thing bepresent, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the samenecessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whetherthe idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in allcases be equally true (II. Xli. ); that is, it will alwayspossess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. Iv. );therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under thedictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whetherthe idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q. E. D. 

Note. --If we could possess an adequate knowledge of theduration of things, and could determine by reason their periodsof existence, we should contemplate things future with the sameemotion as things present; and the mind would desire as thoughit were present the good which it conceived as future;consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in thepresent for the sake of a greater good in the future, and wouldin no wise desire that which is good in the present but a sourceof evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, wecan have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration ofthings (II. Xxxi. ); and the periods of their existence (II. Xliv. Note. ) we can only determine by imagination, which is notso powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hencesuch true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merelyabstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the orderof things and the connection of causes, with a view todetermining what is good or bad for us in the present, is ratherimaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if thedesire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far asit looks on into the future, be more readily checked than thedesire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. Xvi. )

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order toescape evil, is not led by reason. 

Proof. --All the emotions which are attributable to the mind asactive, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure anddesire (III. Lix. ); therefore, he who is led by fear, and doesgood in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. 

Note. --Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail atvice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men byreason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escapeevil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others aswretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, ifthey be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men. 

Corollary. --Under desire which springs from reason, we seekgood directly, and shun evil indirectly. 

Proof. --Desire which springs from reason can only spring froma pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III. Lix. ), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive(IV. Lxi. ), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springsfrom the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. Viii. ); hence underthe guidance of reason we seek good directly and only byimplication shun evil. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of asick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eatswhat he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takespleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out oflife, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly toavoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not fromhatred or anger but from love of the public well--being, is guidedsolely by reason. 

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge. 

Proof. --The knowledge of evil (IV. Viii. ) is pain, in so faras we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to alesser perfection (Def. Of the Emotions, iii. ) and thereforecannot be understood through man's nature (III. Vi. , and vii. );therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. Ii. ) which (III. Iii. )depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof(II. Xxix. ), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessedonly adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil. 

PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue thegreater of two goods and the lesser of two evils. 

Proof. --A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater goodis in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad tothings, in so far as we compare them one with another (seepreface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lessergood; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue onlythe greater good and the lesser evil. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue thelesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shunthe lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek theformer and shun the latter. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greatergood in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to agreater evil in the future. [15]

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro. " (Van Vloten). Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturialicujus mali. " The last word of the latter is an obviousmisprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majorisboni. " (Pollock, p. 268, note. )

Proof. --If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of thingsfuture, it would be affected towards what is future in the sameway as towards what is present (IV. Lxii. ); wherefore, lookingmerely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil beassumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. Lxv. ) wemay seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lessergood in the present, &c. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --We may, under the guidance of reason, seek alesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greatergood in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. ThisCorollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as theCorollary to IV. Lxv. Is related to the said IV. Lxv. 

Note. --If these statements be compared with what we havepointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Partup to Prop. Xviii. , we shall readily see the difference between aman, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who isled by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actionswhereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master andonly performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importancein life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call theformer a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whosedisposition and manner of life it will be well to make a fewobservations. 

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things;and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life. 

Proof. --A free man is one who lives under the guidance ofreason, who is not led by fear (IV. Lxiii. ), but who directlydesires that which is good (IV. Lxiii. Coroll. ), in other words(IV. Xxiv. ), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve hisbeing on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; whereforesuch an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdomis a meditation of life. Q. E. D. 

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as theyremained free, form no conception of good and evil. 

Proof. --I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has onlyadequate ideas; therefore (IV. Lxiv. Coroll. ) he has noconception of evil, or consequently (good and evil beingcorrelative) of good. Q. E. D. 

Note. --It is evident, from IV. Iv. , that the hypothesis ofthis Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far aswe look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in sofar as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is thecause of man's existence. 

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem tohave been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, savethat whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith heprovided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that Godforbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge ofgood and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was inentire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could benothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but thatafter he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightwaybegan to imitate their emotions (III. Xxvii. ), and to lose hisfreedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by thepatriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea ofGod, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desirefor others the good which he desires for himself, as we haveshown above (IV. Xxxvii. ). 

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them. 

Proof. --Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotioncontrary to itself, and possessing more power in restrainingemotion (IV. Vii. ). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (IV. V. And iii. ):hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daringthan in checking fear (III. Lix. Note); in other words (Def. Ofthe Emotions, xl. And xli. ), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --The free man is as courageous in timely retreat asin combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence ofmind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat. 

Note. --What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. Lix. Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c. 

PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them. 

Proof. --Everyone judges what is good according to hisdisposition (III. Xxxix. Note); wherefore an ignorant man, whohas conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate uponit, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by thereceiver, will feel pain (III. Xlii. ). But the free man onlydesires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. Xxxvii. ), notrepaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primaryimportance. Therefore the free man, lest he should becomehateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather thanreason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receivingtheir favours. 

Note. --I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us humanaid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is oftennecessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repaysuch favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution indeclining favours, lest we should have the appearance ofdespising those who bestow them, or of being, from avariciousmotives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground foroffence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, indeclining favours, we must look to the requirements of utilityand courtesy. 

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one toanother. 

Proof. --Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity offriendship (IV. Xxxv. , and Coroll. I. ), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. Xxxvii. ), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful oneto another. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desirehave for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not anemotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that aman is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by thegifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to concealhis thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an oneshows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts becorrupted, to his own or the general hurt. 

PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always ingood faith. 

Proof. --If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in acase where he could by breaking faith free himself from thedanger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservationcompletely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered bypointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it wouldpersuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reasonwould persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite theirforces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have anygeneral laws, which is absurd. 

PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free ina State, where he lives under a general system of law, than insolitude, where he is independent. 

Proof. --The man, who is guided by reason, does not obeythrough fear (IV. Lxiii. ): but, in so far as he endeavours topreserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is(IV. Lxvi. Note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. Xxxvii. ), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. Xxxvii. Note. Ii. ), to live according to the laws of his country. Thereforethe free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires topossess the general rights of citizenship. Q. E. D. 

Note. --These and similar observations, which we have made onman's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, tocourage and nobility of character (III. Lix. Note). I do notthink it worth while to prove separately all the properties ofstrength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates noman, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with noman, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. Thesepropositions, and all that relate to the true way of life andreligion, are easily proved from IV. Xxxvii. And IV. Xlvi. ;namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that everyman should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. L. , and in other places; namely, that the strong man has everfirst in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessityof the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtfuland evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to hisown disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as theyreally are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, suchas are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similaremotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, aswe said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go onhis way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attainingto such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove inthe following Part. 

APPENDIX. 

What have said in this Part concerning the right way of lifehas not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought eachProposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring themunder leading heads. 

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from thenecessity of our nature, that they can be understood eitherthrough it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of ourbeing a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceivedthrough itself without other individuals. 

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which arereferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived toconsist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are onlyreferred to the mind, in so far as it conceives thingsinadequately, and their force and increase are generally definednot by the power of man, but by the power of things external tous: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latterpassions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge. 

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are definedby man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may beeither good or bad. 

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfectthe understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this aloneman's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeedblessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, whicharises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect theunderstanding is nothing else but to understand God, God'sattributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity ofhis nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, theultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern allhis fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequateconception of himself and of all things within the scope of hisintelligence. 

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rationallife: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in hisenjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined byintelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man'sperfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rationallife, are alone called evil. 

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause arenecessarily good, no evil can befall man except through externalcauses; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universalnature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and toconform to in almost infinite ways. 

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part ofnature, or that he should not follow her general order; but ifhe be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony withhis own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little inharmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodatehimself to them without undergoing a great change himself. 

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to becapable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying therational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seemssafest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be goodor useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy therational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as wethink best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign rightof nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest. 

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of anygiven thing than other individuals of the same species;therefore (cf. Vii. ) for man in the preservation of his being andthe enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more usefulthan his fellow--man who is led by reason. Further, as we knownot anything among individual things which is more excellent thana man led by reason, no man can better display the power of hisskill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come atlast to live under the dominion of their own reason. 

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind ofhatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and aretherefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerfulthan their fellows. 

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love andhigh--mindedness. 

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associatetheir ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bondsas they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, andgenerally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship. 

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under theguidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious andmore prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force ofcharacter is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and torestrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. Butthose who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing atvice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather thanstrengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves andothers. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or frommisguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutesrather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceablyendure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers andchoose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline inpreference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of theirfather: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long asthey may spite their parents. 

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed ineverything by their own lusts, yet their association in commonbrings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it isbetter to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to striveto promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony andfriendship. 

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as areattributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For menbrook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what isreckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the receivedcustoms of their society. For winning love those qualities areespecially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. Xxxvii. Notes. I. Ii. ; xlvi. Note; and lxxiii. Note). 

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but suchharmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity ofspirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: thesame is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear acertain resemblance to piety. 

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especiallysuch as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustainlife. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond thepower and the advantage of any private person. For the riches ofany private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limitedfor him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providingfor the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, andhas regard only to the general advantage. 

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude ourduty must be wholly different (cf. IV. Lxx. Note; lxxi. Note). 

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust ofgeneration arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sortof love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is aspecies of madness; and then it promotes discord rather thanharmony (cf. III. Xxxi. Coroll. ). 

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is inharmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be notengendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire tobeget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if thelove of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not causedby bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul. 

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only bymeans of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None aremore readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to befirst, but are not. 

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of pietyand religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yetis he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. Lvii. Note). 

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in suchmatters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species ofpain, it does not concern the exercise of reason. 

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men aredirectly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblanceto equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may passjudgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men'srights. 

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desireof pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable topiety (as we said in IV. Xxxvii. Note. I. ). But, if it springfrom emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, underthe false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords andseditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in wordor in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be calledafter his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in hisconversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, andwill be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: buthe will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the waywhereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not byfear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, toendeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience toreason. 

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in naturein whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate withourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for ouradvantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve ordestroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt toour use as best we may. 

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external tous, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire fromobserving them, and from recombining their elements in differentforms, is principally the preservation of the body; from thispoint of view, those things are most useful which can so feed andnourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil theirfunctions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of beingaffected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting externalbodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mindcapable of thinking (IV. Xxxviii. , xxxix. ). But there seem to bevery few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the duenourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of very many parts of differentnature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, sothat the whole body may be equally capable of doing everythingthat can follow from its own nature, and consequently that themind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions. 

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength ofeach individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend oneanother mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token foreverything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mindof the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardlyconceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with theidea of money as cause. 

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seekmoney, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, butbecause they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bringthemselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish theirbodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that theylose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation oftheir body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fixthe measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little. 

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist thevarious parts of the body, and enable them to perform theirfunctions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aidto, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving uspleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suitour advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referredto one part of the body more than to the other parts; thereforemost emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be athand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may becomeexcessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay mostregard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimatewhat is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. Xliv. Note, andlx. Note. )

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account asgood all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above (IV. Xlv. Note), none but the envioustake delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater thepleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfectionwhereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of thedivine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulatedby a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who isled by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided byreason. 

XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and isinfinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we havenot, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use thosethings which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with anequal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claimsof our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we havedone our duty, and that the power which we possess is notsufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that wefollow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understandingof this, that part of our nature which is defined byintelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, willassuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescencewill endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligentbeings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that whichis true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understandingof these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves isin harmony with the order of nature as a whole. 

PART V:

Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, whichis concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall thereforetreat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far thereason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of MentalFreedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how muchmore powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no partof my design to point out the method and means whereby theunderstanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby thebody may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance ofits functions. The latter question lies in the province ofMedicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or ofreason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of itsdominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I havealready shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotionsdepended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutelygovern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by theprotest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control andmoderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by theexample (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dogand the other a hunting--dog. For by long training it could bebrought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed tohunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares. Tothis opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part ofthe brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by theaid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements whichare set going in the body, and also external objects, and whichthe mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in variousways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midstof the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion ofthe animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in themidst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animalspirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many differentmarks are impressed on the said gland, as there are differentexternal objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends thegland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended oncebefore by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, thegland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving anddetermining them to the condition wherein they were, whenrepulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He furtherasserted, that every act of mental volition is united in natureto a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, wheneveranyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volitioncauses the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person inquestion had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, themere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel theanimal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which woulddilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature withthe wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish tolook at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have beenunited by nature to one particular thought out of the wholenumber of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yetit can nevertheless become through habituation associated withother thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions del'āme, I. 50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute powerover its passions. For passions as defined by him are"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which arereferred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movementof the spirits. " (Passions de l'āme, I. 27). But, seeing that wecan join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirelyon our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will withsure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish ouractions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions whichwe wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire anabsolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine ofthis illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from hisown words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I couldhardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, Iam lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow fromself--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did notclearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken totask the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities throughoccult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside whichoccult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, Iask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear anddistinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate unionwith a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should likehim to explain this union through its proximate cause. But hehad so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the unionbetween the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to haverecourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion themind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can ithold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland canbe agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by theanimal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which wehave closely united with firm decisions, cannot be againdisjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it wouldfollow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a givendanger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspendedin a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anythingexcept running away. In truth, as there is no common standard ofvolition and motion, so is there no comparison possible betweenthe powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determinedby the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is nogland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that itcan thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also thatall the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of thebrain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makesconcerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I haveabundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, sincethe power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by theunderstanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge ofthe mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe allhave had experience of, but do not accurately observe ordistinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all thoseconclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness. 

AXIOMS. 

I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, achange must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one ofthe two, and continue until they cease to be contrary. 

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essenceof its cause. 

(This axiom is evident from III. Vii. )

PROPOSITIONS. 

PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arrangedand associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body orthe images of things precisely in the same way arranged andassociated in the body. 

Proof. --The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. Vii. ) as the order and connection of things, and vice versā theorder and connection of things is the same (II. Vi. Coroll. Andvii. ) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even asthe order and connection of ideas in the mind takes placeaccording to the order and association of modifications of thebody (II. Xviii. ), so vice versā (III. Ii. ) the order andconnection of modifications of the body takes place in accordancewith the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things arearranged and associated in the mind. Q. E. D. 

PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to otherthoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that externalcause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from theseemotions, be destroyed. 

Proof. --That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause(Def. Of the Emotions, vi. Vii. ); wherefore, when this cause isremoved, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom aredestroyed. Q. E. D. 

PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be apassion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. 

Proof. --An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (bythe general Def. Of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form aclear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will onlybe distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred tothe mind only, by reason (II. Xxi. , and note); therefore (III. Iii. ), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q. E. D. 

Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under ourcontrol, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, inproportion as it is more known to us. 

PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof wecannot form some clear and distinct conception. 

Proof. --Properties which are common to all things can only beconceived adequately (II. Xxxviii. ); therefore (II. Xii. AndLemma ii. After II. Xiii. ) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereofwe cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For anemotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the generalDef. Of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the precedingProp. ) involve some clear and distinct conception. 

Note. --Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed byan effect (I. Xxxvi. ), and that we clearly and distinctlyunderstand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate(II. Xl. ), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly anddistinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if notabsolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing itabout, that he should become less subject to them. To attainthis result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts toacquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge ofevery emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly anddistinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thusthat the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of anexternal cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whenceit will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. Will bedestroyed (V. Ii. ), but also that the appetites or desires, whichare wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable ofbeing excessive (IV. Lxi. ). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, andthat through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his ownfashion (III. Xxxi. Note); in a man, who is not guided byreason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, anddoes not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who livesby the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which iscalled piety (IV. Xxxvii. Note. I. And second proof). In likemanner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far asthey spring from inadequate ideas; the same results areaccredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated byadequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined toany given action, may arise as much from adequate as frominadequate ideas (IV. Lix. ). Than this remedy for the emotions(to return to the point from which I started), which consists ina true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being withinour power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power savethat of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shownabove (III. Iii. ). 

PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, otherconditions being equal, greater than any other emotion. 

Proof. --An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to befree, is greater than one towards what we conceive to benecessary (III. Xlix. ), and, consequently, still greater than onetowards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. Xi. ). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than toconceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causeswhereby it has been determined to action (II. Xxxv. Note);therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simplyis, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feeltowards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and isless subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things asnecessary. 

Proof. --The mind understands all things to be necessary (I. Xxix. ) and to be determined to existence and operation by aninfinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoingProposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is lesssubject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. Xlviii. )feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, isapplied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctlyand vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over theemotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that thepain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon asthe man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any meanshave been preserved. So also we see that no one pities aninfant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one hereand there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; becauseinfancy would not then be looked on as a state natural andnecessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we maynote several other instances of the same sort. 

PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, ifwe take account of time, are stronger than those, which areattributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. 

Proof. --We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of theemotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of thesaid thing (II. Xvii. ). Wherefore, the emotion, which isreferred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of anature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV. Vi. ), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sortcontrolled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of itsexternal cause (IV. Ix. ). But an emotion which springs fromreason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things(see the def. Of reason in II. Xl. Note. Ii. ), which we alwaysregard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude theirpresent existence), and which we always conceive in the samemanner (II. Xxxviii. ). Wherefore an emotion of this kind alwaysremains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. I. ) emotions, whichare contrary thereto and are not kept going by their externalcauses, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent theemotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q. E. D. 

PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the numberof simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. 

Proof. --Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few(III. Vii. ): therefore (IV. V. ), in proportion to the increasednumber of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotionbecomes stronger. Q. E. D. 

Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. Ii. 

PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diversecauses which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotionitself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and lessaffected towards each of its causes, than if it were a differentand equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to asingle cause. 

Proof. --An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as ithinders the mind from being able to think (IV. Xxvi. Xxvii. );therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to thecontemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful thananother equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind inthe single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it isunable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III. Vii. ), consists solely in thought (II. Xi. ), the mind is lesspassive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think ofseveral things at once, than in regard to an equally strongemotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a fewor of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, thisemotion (III. Xlviii. ), in so far as it is attributable toseveral causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q. E. D. 

PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary toour nature, we have the power of arranging and associating themodifications of our body according to the intellectual order. 

Proof. --The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, thatis (IV. Xxx. ), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impedethe mind from understanding (IV. Xxvii. ). So long, therefore, aswe are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, themind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV. Xxvi. ), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clearand distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. Xl. Note. Ii. And II. Xlvii. Note); consequently we have in suchcases the power of arranging and associating the modifications ofthe body according to the intellectual order. Q. E. D. 

Note. --By this power of rightly arranging and associating thebodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easilyaffected by evil emotions. For (V. Vii. ) a greater force isneeded for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged andassociated according to the intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, solong as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, isto frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to theparticular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, sothat our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and thatit may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laiddown among the rules of life (IV. Xlvi. And note), that hatredshould be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not requiredwith hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may bealways ready to our hand in time of need, we should often thinkover and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, andin what manner and way they may be best warded off byhigh--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong withthe idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be readyfor use when a wrong is done to us (II. Xviii. ). If we keep alsoin readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the goodwhich follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the resultof the right way of life ( IV. Lii. ), and that men, no less thaneverything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in suchcase I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arisestherefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination andwill be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from agrievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless beovercome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far soonerthan if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. Asis indeed evident from V. Vi. Vii. Viii. We should, in the sameway, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; theordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind andimagined, together with the means whereby through readiness ofresource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptionswe should always bear in mind that which is good in everyindividual thing (IV. Lxiii. Coroll. And III. Lix. ), in orderthat we may always be determined to action by an emotion ofpleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in thepursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end forwhich it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attainit. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and thefickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks exceptthrough a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these dothe most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair ofgaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus givingvent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it iscertain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse ofhonour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedilycovet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is commonto all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of themisuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merelytorments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, notonly of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they lovethink of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stockfaults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by thelove of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge ofthe virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joywhich arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wisedesire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or torevel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligentlyobserve and practise these precepts (which indeed are notdifficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, forthe most part, to direct his actions according to thecommandments of reason. 

[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the groundthat the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context. 

PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to moreobjects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, andoccupies the mind more. 

Proof. --In proportion as a mental image or an emotion isreferred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it canbe aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mindcontemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often infull vigour, and (V. Viii. ) occupies the mind more. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easilyassociated with the images referred to things which we clearlyand distinctly understand, than with others. 

Proof. --Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the common properties of things or deductionstherefrom (see definition of Reason, II. Xl. Note ii. ), and areconsequently (by the last Prop. ) more often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplateother things in conjunction with these than in conjunction withsomething else, and consequently (II. Xviii. ) that the images ofthe said things should be more often associated with the imagesof these than with the images of something else. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion asit is associated with a greater number of other images. 

Proof. --In proportion as an image is associated with a greaternumber of other images, so (II. Xviii. ) are there more causeswhereby it can be aroused. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodilymodifications or images of things may be referred to the idea ofGod. 

Proof. --There is no modification of the body, whereof the mindmay not form some clear and distinct conception (V. Iv. );wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referredto the idea of God (I. Xv. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself andhis emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as hemore understands himself and his emotions. 

Proof. --He who clearly and distinctly understands himself andhis emotions feels pleasure (III. Liii. ), and this pleasure is(by the last Prop. ) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore(Def. Of the Emotions, vi. ) such an one loves God, and (for thesame reason) so much the more in proportion as he moreunderstands himself and his emotions. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place inthe mind. 

Proof. --For this love is associated with all the modificationsof the body (V. Xiv. ) and is fostered by them all (V. Xv. );therefore (V. Xi. ), it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected byany emotion of pleasure or pain. 

Proof. --All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, aretrue (II. Xxxii. ), that is (II. Def. Iv. ) adequate; andtherefore (by the general Def. Of the Emotions) God is withoutpassions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to alesser perfection (I. Xx. Coroll. Ii. ); therefore (by Def. Ofthe Emotions, ii. Iii. ) he is not affected by any emotion ofpleasure or pain. 

Corollary. --Strictly speaking, God does not love or hateanyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop. ) is not affected by anyemotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. Of the Emotions, vi. Vii. ) he does not love or hate anyone. 

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God. 

Proof. --The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect(II. Xlvi. Xlvii. ); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III. Iii. ); consequently (III. Lix. ) there can beno pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. Ofthe Emotions, vii. ), no one can hate God. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Love towards God cannot be turned into hate. 

Note. --It may be objected that, as we understand God as thecause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the causeof pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand thecauses of pain, it to that extent (V. Iii. ) ceases to be apassion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. Lix. ); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we tothat extent feel pleasure. 

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God shouldlove him in return. 

Proof. --For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. Xvii. Coroll. ) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, andconsequently he would desire to feel pain (III. Xix. ); which isabsurd (III. Xxviii. ). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotionof envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, inproportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined toGod by the same bond of love. 

Proof. --This love towards God is the highest good which we canseek for under the guidance of reason (IV. Xxviii. ), it is commonto all men (IV. Xxxvi. ), and we desire that all should rejoicetherein (IV. Xxxvii. ); therefore (Def. Of the Emotions, xxiii. ), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion ofjealousy (V. Xviii. See definition of Jealousy, III. Xxxv. Note);but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, inproportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoicetherein. Q. E. D. 

Note. --We can in the same way show, that there is no emotiondirectly contrary to this love, whereby this love can bedestroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards Godis the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far asit is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless thebody be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it isreferred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. 

I have now gone through all the remedies against theemotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, cando against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power overthe emotions consists:----

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. Iv. Note). 

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from thethought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V. Ii. And V. Iv. Note). 

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotionsreferred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass thosereferred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner(V. Vii. ). 

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]are fostered, which have regard to the common properties ofthings or to God (V. Ix. Xi. ). 

[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions. 

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange andassociate, one with another, its own emotions (V. X. Note andxii. Xiii. Xiv. ). 

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotionsmay be better understood, it should be specially observed thatthe emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotionof one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man ismore troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we arecomparing the various emotions of the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion thanby another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by acomparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and itsinfirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledgeonly: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that itmay be characterized more readily by its passive states than byits activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the formermind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideasattributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of humaninfirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritualunhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced toexcessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For no one issolicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. Arise, except inregard to things whereof no one can be really master. 

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear anddistinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge(II. Xlvii. Note), founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroythem, in so far as they are passions (V. Iii. And iv. Note); atany rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind(V. Xiv. ). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutableand eternal (V. Xv. ), whereof we may really enter into possession(II. Xlv. ); neither can it be defiled with those faults whichare inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength tostrength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, anddeeply penetrate it. 

And now I have finished with all that concerns this presentlife: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I havebriefly described all the remedies against the emotions. Andthis everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he hasattended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to thedefinitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, toPropositions i. And iii. Of Part III. It is now, therefore, timeto pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration ofthe mind, without relation to the body. 

PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember whatis past, while the body endures. 

Proof. --The mind does not express the actual existence of itsbody, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body asactual, except while the body endures (II. Viii. Coroll. ); and, consequently (II. Xxvi. ), it does not imagineany body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus itcannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II. Xvii. Note), or remember things past, except while the body endures (seedefinition of Memory, II. Xviii. Note). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under theform of eternity. 

Proof. --God is the cause, not only of the existence of this orthat human body, but also of its essence (I. Xxv. ). Thisessence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through thevery essence of God (I. Ax. Iv. ), and be thus conceived by acertain eternal necessity (I. Xvi. ); and this conception mustnecessarily exist in God (II. Iii. ). Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed withthe body, but there remains of it something which is eternal. 

Proof. --There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, whichexpresses the essence of the human body (last Prop. ), which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essenceof the human mind (II. Xiii. ). But we have not assigned to thehuman mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far asit expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explainedthrough duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. Viii. Coroll. ), we do not assign to it duration, except while the bodyendures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which isconceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essenceof God (last Prop. ); this something, which appertains to theessence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q. E. D. 

Note. --This idea, which expresses the essence of the bodyunder the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain modeof thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and isnecessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we shouldremember that we existed before our body, for our body can bearno trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined interms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For themind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, noless than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of themind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other thanproofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed beforethe body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves theessence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, andthat thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, orexplained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said toendure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, inso far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus faronly has it the power of determining the existence of things bytime, and conceiving them under the category of duration. 

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the moredo we understand God. 

Proof. --This is evident from I. Xxv. Coroll. 

PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highestvirtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. 

Proof. --The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequateidea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of theessence of things (see its definition II. Xl. Note. Ii. ); and, in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we betterunderstand God (by the last Prop. ); therefore (IV. Xxviii. ) thehighest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. Viii. ) the power, ornature, or (III. Vii. ) highest endeavour of the mind, is tounderstand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable ofunderstanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desiresmore to understand things by that kind. 

Proof--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive themind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind ofknowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus toconceive things; and consequently (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capablethereof. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises thehighest possible mental acquiescence. 

Proof. --The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV. Xxviii. ), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge(V. Xxv. ), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mindknows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. Xxiv. ):consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledgepasses to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def. Of the Emotions, ii. ) affected by the highest pleasure, suchpleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his ownvirtue; thus (Def. Of the Emotions, xxv. ), from this kind ofknowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by thethird kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from thesecond kind of knowledge. 

Proof. --This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever weunderstand clearly and distinctly, we understand either throughitself, or through that which is conceived through itself; thatis, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which arereferred to the third kind of knowledge (II. Xl. Note. Ii. )cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, andare referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow fromadequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind ofknowledge; therefore (Def. Of the Emotions, i. ), the desire ofknowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise fromthe first, but from the second kind. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form ofeternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving thepresent actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceivingthe essence of the body under the form of eternity. 

Proof. --In so far as the mind conceives the present existenceof its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can bedetermined by time, and to that extent only has it the power ofconceiving things in relation to time (V. Xxi. II. Xxvi. ). Buteternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. Viii. And explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not thepower of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but itpossesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason toconceive things under the form of eternity (II. Xliv. Coroll. Ii. ), and also because it is of the nature of the mind toconceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. Xxiii. ), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs tothe essence of mind (II. Xiii. ). Therefore this power ofconceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to themind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the bodyunder the form of eternity. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either asexisting in relation to a given time and place, or as contained inGod and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, weconceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve theeternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. Xlv. Andnote, which see. 

PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the bodyunder the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily aknowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceivedthrough God. 

Proof. --Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as thisinvolves necessary existence (I. Def. Viii. ). Therefore toconceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive thingsin so far as they are conceived through the essence of God asreal entities, or in so far as they involve existence through theessence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceivesitself and the body under the form of eternity, has to thatextent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q. E. D. 

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, asits formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. 

Proof. --The mind does not conceive anything under the form ofeternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under theform of eternity (V. Xxix. ); that is, except in so far as it iseternal (V. Xxi. Xxiii. ); therefore (by the last Prop. ), in sofar as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, whichknowledge is necessarily adequate (II. Xlvi. ); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everythingwhich can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. Xl. ), inother words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge(see Def. In II. Xl. Note. Ii. ), whereof accordingly the mind(III. Def. I. ), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate orformal cause of such knowledge. Q. E. D. 

Note. --In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent inthis kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious ofhimself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect andblessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we musthere observe that, although we are already certain that the mindis eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form ofeternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be morereadily explained and better understood, we will consider themind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and tounderstand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we havedone hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, solong as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless ourpremisses are plain. 

PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind ofknowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied bythe idea of God as cause. 

Proof. --From this kind of knowledge arises the highestpossible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions, xxv. ), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the ideaof the mind itself (V. Xxvii. ), and consequently (V. Xxx. ) theidea also of God as cause. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --From the third kind of knowledge necessarilyarises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledgearises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is(Def. Of the Emotions, vi. ), the love of God; not in so far aswe imagine him as present (V. Xxix. ), but in so far as weunderstand him to be eternal; this is what I call theintellectual love of God. 

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises fromthe third kind of knowledge, is eternal. 

Proof. --The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. Xxxi. I. Ax. Iii. ); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arisestherefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Although this love towards God has (by the foregoingProp. ) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections oflove, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. Of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except thatthe mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which wefeigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea ofGod as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition toa greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in themind being endowed with perfection itself. 

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subjectto those emotions which are attributable to passions. 

Proof. --Imagination is the idea wherewith the mindcontemplates a thing as present (II. Xvii. Note); yet this ideaindicates rather the present disposition of the human body thanthe nature of the external thing (II. Xvi. Coroll. Ii. ). Therefore emotion (see general Def. Of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;therefore (V. Xxi. ) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that no love save intellectuallove is eternal. 

Note. --If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see thatthey are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but thatthey confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to theimagination or the memory which they believe to remain afterdeath. 

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectuallove. 

Proof. --God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. Vi. ), that is (II. Def. Vi. ), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;and such rejoicing is (II. Iii. ) accompanied by the idea ofhimself, that is (I. Xi. And Def. I. ), the idea of his own cause:now this is what we have (in V. Xxxii. Coroll. ) described asintellectual love. 

PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God isthat very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far ashe is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through theessence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God ispart of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. 

Proof. --This love of the mind must be referred to theactivities of the mind (V. Xxxii. Coroll. And III. Iii. ); it isitself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itselfaccompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. Xxxii. And Coroll. );that is (I. Xxv. Coroll. And II. Xi. Coroll. ), an activitywhereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the humanmind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;therefore (by the last Prop. ), this love of the mind is part ofthe infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loveshimself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of Godtowards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards Godare identical. 

Note. --From what has been said we clearly understand, whereinour salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, inthe constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's lovetowards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, calledGlory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referredto God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence ofspirit, which (Def. Of the Emotions, xxv. Xxx. ) is not reallydistinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, itis (V. Xxxv. ) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it isreferred to the mind, it is the same (V. Xxvii. ). 

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely inknowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I. Xv. , and II. Xlvii. Note), it becomes clear to us, in what mannerand way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows fromthe divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thoughtit worth while here to call attention to this, in order to showby this example how the knowledge of particular things, which Ihave called intuitive or of the third kind (II. Xl. Note. Ii. ), is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, whichI have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although inPart I. I showed in general terms, that all things (andconsequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essenceand existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimateand placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mindso much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actualessence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God. 

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary tothis intellectual love, or which can take it away. 

Proof. --This intellectual love follows necessarily from thenature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded throughthe nature of God as an eternal truth (V. Xxxiii. And xxix. ). If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contraryto this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;consequently, that, which should be able to take away thislove, would cause that which is true to be false; an obviousabsurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The Axiom of Part IV. Has reference to particularthings, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a giventime and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt. 

PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more thingsby the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject tothose emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death. 

Proof. --The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. Xi. );therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things bythe second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be thepart of it that endures (V. Xxix. And xxiii. ), and, consequently(by the last Prop. ), the greater will be the part that is nottouched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or inother words, evil (IV. Xxx. ). Thus, in proportion as the mindunderstands more things by the second and third kinds ofknowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remainsunimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Hence we understand that point which I touched on inIV. Xxxix. Note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as themind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highestpossible acquiescence (V. Xxvii. ), it follows that the human mindcan attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof whichwe have shown to perish with the body (V. Xxi. ) should be oflittle importance when compared with the part which endures. ButI will soon treat of the subject at greater length. 

PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatestnumber of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest partis eternal. 

Proof. --He, who possesses a body capable of the greatestnumber of activities, is least agitated by those emotions whichare evil (IV. Xxxviii. )--that is (IV. Xxx. ), by those emotionswhich are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. X. ), hepossesses the power of arranging and associating themodifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all themodifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;whence it will come to pass that (V. Xv. ) he will be affectedwith love towards God, which (V. Xvi. ) must occupy or constitutethe chief part of the mind; therefore (V. Xxxiii. ), such a manwill possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Since human bodies are capable of the greatest numberof activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such anature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a greatknowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest orchief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcelyfear death. But, in order that this may be understood moreclearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state ofperpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for thebetter or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy. 

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes acorpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of lifewith a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, asin the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of veryfew activities, and depending, for the most part, on externalcauses, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcelyconscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, whohas a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, ofGod, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarilyendeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so faras its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed intosomething else capable of very many activities, and referable toa mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to itsimagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparisonwith its intellect, as I have already said in the note to thelast Proposition. 

PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more ofperfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, viceversā, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. 

Proof. --In proportion as each thing is more perfect, itpossesses more of reality (II. Def. Vi. ), and, consequently (III. Iii. And note), it is to that extent more active and lesspassive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus provethat, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it moreperfect. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. --Hence it follows that the part of the mind whichendures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (V. Xxiii. Xxix. ) is theunderstanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. Iii. );the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. Xxi. ), through which only we are said to be passive (III. Iii. And general Def. Of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be itgreat or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q. E. D. 

Note. --Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to setforth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded withoutrelation to the body; whence, as also from I. Xxi. And otherplaces, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by anothereternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on toinfinity; so that all taken together at once constitute theeternal and infinite intellect of God. 

PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, weshould still consider as of primary importance piety andreligion, and generally all things which, in Part IV. , we showedto be attributable to courage and high--mindedness. 

Proof. --The first and only foundation of virtue, or the ruleof right living is (IV. Xxii. Coroll. And xxiv. ) seeking one'sown true interest. Now, while we determined what reasonprescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Althoughwe were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, wenevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courageand high--mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, evenif we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put theaforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q. E. D. 

Note. --The general belief of the multitude seems to bedifferent. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in sofar as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede theirrights, in so far as they are bound to live according to thecommandments of the divine law. They therefore believe thatpiety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable tofirmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope tolay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, butalso, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished afterdeath, that they are induced to live according to the divinecommandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carrythem. 

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that themind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged liferemains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden ofpiety, they would return to their own inclinations, controllingeverything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obeyfortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me notless absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that hecan by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish tocram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because hesees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should preferto be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use ofreason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worthrefuting. 

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtueitself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control ourlusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are ableto control our lusts. 

Proof. --Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. Xxxvi andnote), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V. Xxxii. Coroll. ); therefore this love (III. Iii. Lix. ) must bereferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;therefore (IV. Def. Viii. ) it is virtue itself. This was ourfirst point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more inthis divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand(V. Xxxii. ); that is (V. Iii. Coroll. ), so much the more powerhas it over the emotions, and (V. Xxxviii. ) so much the less isit subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, inproportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love orblessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely inthe understanding, it follows that no one rejoices inblessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from thisblessedness itself. Q. E. D. 

Note. --I have thus completed all I wished to set forthtouching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind'sfreedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and howmuch he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by hislusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in variousways by external causes without ever gaining the trueacquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it wereunwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon ashe ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. 

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, isscarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious ofhimself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternalnecessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses trueacquiescence of his spirit. 

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this resultseems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needsmust it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it bepossible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could withoutgreat labour be found, that it should be by almost all menneglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they arerare. 

End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza

[1] "Affectiones"

[2] "Forma"

[3] "Animata"

[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n. ]

[5] Conscientię morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock. 

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean menwhom we regard without any particular emotion. 

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause. " "Honor" = Gloria. 

[8] See previous endnote. 

[9] Ovid, "Amores, " II. Xix. 4, 5. Spinoza transposes the verses. 

 "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

 Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat. "

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divineintellect, as I have shown in II. Xiii. Note. 

[11] Gloria. 

[12] Ov. Met. Vii. 20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor. "

[13] Honestas

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which Ihave translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that). 

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro. " (Van Vloten). Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturialicujus mali. " The last word of the latter is an obviousmisprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majorisboni. " (Pollock, p. 268, note. )

[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the groundthat the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context. I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may beobtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship. 

[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.