Transcriber's Notes:

 Italics have been marked with underscores, like '_this_'. Oe ligature has been changed to 'oe'. In "triêres" and "Triêres", the 'ê' stands for an 'e' with a macron. 

 Changes: p. 23: "Platea" changed to "Platæa" p. 23: "Leothychides" changed to "Leotychides" p. 27: Footnote 2: "see Chapter XIII" changed to "see Chapter XI" p. 67: "1494" changed to "1396", for the battle of Nicopolis took place on 25 September, 1396, not in 1494 p. 71: "Nicosis" changed to "Nicosia" p. 126: "Reganzona" changed to "Regazona" p. 145: Caption: "Vanderelde" changed to "Vandervelde" p. 152: "ninety two" changed to "ninety-two" p. 162: comma after "off San Domingo" changed to period p. 227 Footnote 18: comma removed after "Worden" pp. 300, 301: "Sevastopol" changed to "Sebastopol" p. 308: "Admiral Seniavine" changed to "Admiral Senyavin" p. 341: "Swir" changed to "Svir" (two times) p. 345: Index: "Bragadino, Ambrosio" changed to "Bragadino, Ambrogio" p. 348: Index: "Monceda" changed to "Moncada" (admiral of the galeasses in the armada) p. 349: Index: "Valdes, Diego Flores de, admira" changed to "Valdes, Diego Flores de, admiral"

 [Illustration: THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR From an engraving by W. Miller from the painting by C. Stanfield, R. A. ]

 FAMOUS SEA FIGHTS

 FROM SALAMIS TO TSU-SHIMA

 BY

 JOHN RICHARD HALE

 WITH THIRTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS AND SEVENTEEN PLANS

 BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY 1911

 INTRODUCTION

Three hundred years ago Francis Bacon wrote, amongst other wise words: "Tobe Master of the Sea is an Abridgement of Monarchy. .. . The Bataille ofActium decided the Empire of the World. The Bataille of Lepanto arrestedthe Greatnesse of the Turke. There be many Examples where Sea-Fights havebeen Finall to the Warre. But this much is certaine; that hee that commandsthe Sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of theWarre as he will. Whereas those, that be strongest by land, are many timesneverthelesse in great Straights. Surely, at this Day, with us of Europe, the Vantage of Strength at Sea (which is one of the Principall Dowries ofthis Kingdome of Greate Brittaine) is Great; Both because Most of theKingdomes of Europe are not merely Inland, but girt with the Sea most partof their Compasse; and because the Wealth of both Indies seemes in greatPart but an Accessary to the Command of the Seas. "[1]

 [1] Bacon's Essay on "The Greatness of Kingdoms, " first published in 1597. The extract is from the edition of 1625. 

The three centuries that have gone by since this was written have affordedample confirmation of the view here set forth, as to the importance of"Battailes by Sea" and the supreme value of the "Command of the Sea. " Notonly "we of Europe, " but our kindred in America and our allies in FarEastern Asia have now their proudly cherished memories of decisive navalvictory. 

I propose to tell in non-technical and popular language the story of someof the most remarkable episodes in the history of sea power. I shall beginwith the first sea-fight of which we have a detailed history--the Battle ofSalamis (B. C. 480), the victory by which Themistocles the Athenian provedthe soundness of his maxim that "he who commands the sea commands all. " Ishall end with the last and greatest of naval engagements, the Battle ofTsu-shima, an event that reversed the long experience of victory won byWest over East, which began with Salamis more than two thousand years ago. I shall have to tell of British triumphs on the sea from Sluys toTrafalgar; but I shall take instances from the history of other countriesalso, for it is well that we should remember that the skill, enterprise, and courage of admirals and seamen is no exclusive possession of our ownpeople. 

I shall incidentally describe the gradual evolution of the warship from thewooden, oar-driven galleys that fought in the Straits of Salamis to thesteel-built, steam-propelled giants that met in battle in the Straits ofTsu-shima. I shall have something to say of old seafaring ways, and much totell of the brave deeds done by men of many nations. These true stories ofthe sea will, I trust, have not only the interest that belongs to allrecords of courage, danger, and adventure, but also some practical lessonsof their own, for they may help to keep alive that intelligent popularinterest in sea power which is the best guarantee that the interests of ourown navy--the best safeguard of the Empire--will not be neglected, nomatter what Government is in power, or what political views may happen forthe moment to be in the ascendant. 

 J. R. H. 

 CONTENTS

 PAGE

 INTRODUCTION v

 PERIOD OF OAR AND CLOSE FIGHTING

 CHAPTER

 I. SALAMIS, B. C. 480 1

 II. ACTIUM, B. C. 31 25

 III. SVOLD ISLAND, A. D. 1000 40

 IV. SLUYS, 1340 55

 V. LEPANTO, 1571 67

 PERIOD OF SAIL AND GUN

 VI. THE ARMADA, 1588 105

 VII. OFF THE GUNFLEET, 1666 142

 VIII. THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, 1782 158

 IX. TRAFALGAR, 1805 173

 PERIOD OF STEAM, ARMOUR, AND RIFLED ARTILLERY

 X. HAMPTON ROADS, 1862 206

 XI. LISSA, 1866 231

 XII. THE YALU, 1894 252

 XIII. SANTIAGO, 1898 277

 XIV. TSU-SHIMA, 1905 297

 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

 THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR _Frontispiece_ From an engraving by W. Miller from the painting by C. Stanfield, R. A. 

 FACING PAGE ROMAN WARSHIPS 32 After the paintings found at Pompeii. 

 A VIKING FLEET 48 From a drawing by Paul Hardy. By permission of Cassell and Co. 

 A MEDITERRANEAN GALLEY OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 67 From an engraving by J. P. Le Bas, _Mediterranean Craft of the Sixteenth Century_. 

 A MEDITERRANEAN CARRACK OR FRIGATE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 67 From an engraving by Tomkins, _Mediterranean Craft of the Sixteenth Century_. 

 GALLEYS OF THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA IN ACTION WITH TURKISH GALLEYS 80 From an engraving at the British Museum. 

 THE "GREAT ARMADA" ENTERING THE CHANNEL 112 From the drawing of W. H. Overend. By permission of the _Illustrated London News_. 

 THE "SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS, " LAUNCHED 1637 144 A typical warship of the middle of the seventeenth century. After the painting by Vandervelde. 

 GUNS AND CARRONADES IN USE IN THE BRITISH NAVY IN THE LATTER PART OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 158 From drawings at the British Museum. 

 A THREE-DECKER OF NELSON'S TIME 173 From an engraving at the British Museum. 

 H. M. S. "WARRIOR"--THE FIRST BRITISH IRONCLAD 212 From a photograph by Symonds and Co. 

 THE BATTLE OF HAMPTON ROADS. THE "MERRIMAC" AND "MONITOR" ENGAGED AT CLOSE QUARTERS 224 From _Cassier's Magazine_, by permission of the Editor. 

 THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP "OREL" 330 From a photograph taken after the battle of Tsu-Shima, showing effects of Japanese shell fire. 

 LIST OF PLANS

 FACING PAGE

 LEPANTO. Course of Allied Fleet from Ithaca Channel to scene of battle 90

 LEPANTO (1). Allies forming line of battle. Turks advancing to attack 92

 LEPANTO (2). Beginning of the battle. (Noon, October 7th, 1571) 94

 LEPANTO (3). The mêlée. (About 12. 30 p. M. ) 96

 LEPANTO (4). Ulugh Ali's counter-attack. (About 2. 30 p. M. ) 102

 LEPANTO (5). Flight of Ulugh Ali--Allied Fleet forming up with captured prizes at close of battle. (About 4 p. M. ) 104

 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA, 1588 120

 TRAFALGAR 192

 HAMPTON ROADS (1st day). "Merrimac" comes out, sinks "Cumberland" and burns "Congress" 216

 HAMPTON ROADS (2nd day). Duel between "Monitor" and "Merrimac" 216

 THE "MERRIMAC" AND "MONITOR" DRAWN TO THE SAME SCALE 222

 LISSA. Battle formation of the Austrian Fleet 241

 BATTLE OF LISSA. The Austrian attack at the beginning of the battle 244

 BATTLE OF THE YALU (1). The Japanese attack 264

 BATTLE OF THE YALU (2). End of the fight 264

 BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. Showing places where the Spanish ships were destroyed 290

 BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. Sketch-map to show the extent of the waters in which the first part of the fight took place 321

 BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. General map 322

 BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. Diagrams of movements during the fighting of May 27th 326

 FROM SALAMIS TO TSU-SHIMA

 CHAPTER I

 SALAMIS

 B. C. 480

The world has lost all record of the greatest of its inventors--thepioneers who in far-off ages devised the simple appliances with which mentilled the ground, did their domestic work, and fought their battles forthousands of years. He who hung up the first weaver's beam and shaped thefirst rude shuttle was a more wonderful inventor than Arkwright. The makerof the first bow and arrow was a more enterprising pioneer than ourinventors of machine-guns. And greater than the builders of "Dreadnoughts"were those who "with hearts girt round with oak and triple brass" were thefirst to trust their frail barques to "the cruel sea. " No doubt thehollowed tree trunk, and the coracle of osiers and skins, had long beforethis made their trial trips on river and lake. Then came the first venturesin the shallow sea-margins, and at last a primitive naval architect builtup planked bulwarks round his hollowed tree trunk, and stiffened them withribs of bent branches, and the first ship was launched. 

This evolution of the ship must have been in progress independently in moreplaces than one. We are most concerned with its development in that easternend of the land-locked Mediterranean, which is the meeting-place of somany races, and around which so much of what is most momentous in theworld's history has happened. There seems good reason for believing thatamong the pioneers in early naval construction were the men of thatmarvellous people of old Egypt to whom the world's civilization owes somuch. They had doubtless learned their work on their own Nile before theypushed out by the channels of the Delta to the waters of the "Great Sea. "They had invented the sail, though it was centuries before any one learnedto do more than scud before the wind. It took long experience of the sea todiscover that one could fix one's sail at an oblique angle with themid-line of the ship, and play off rudder against sail to lay a course withthe wind on the quarter or even abeam and not dead astern. 

But there was as important an invention as the sail--that of the oar. Weare so familiar with it, that we do not realize all it means. Yet it is anotable fact that whole races of men who navigate river, lake, and sea, successfully and boldly, never hit upon the principle of the oar till theywere taught it by Europeans, and could of themselves get no further thanthe paddle. The oar, with its leverage, its capacity for making the veryweight of the crew become a motive power, became in more senses than onethe great instrument of progress on the sea. It gave the ship a power ofmanoeuvring independently of the wind, the same power that is the essenceof advantage in steam propulsion. The centuries during which the sailingship was the chief reliance of navigation and commerce were, after all, anepisode between the long ages when the oar-driven galley was the typicalship, and the present age of steam beginning less than a hundred years ago. 

Sails were an occasional help to the early navigator. Our songs of the seacall them the "white wings" of the ship. For the Greek poet Æschylus, thewings of the ship were the long oars. The trader creeping along the coastor working from island to island helping himself when the wind served withhis sail, and having only a small crew, could not afford much oar-power, though he had often to trust to it. But for the fighting ship, oar-powerand speed were as important as mechanical horse-power is for the warshipsof the twentieth century. So the war galley was built longer than thetrader, to make room for as many oars as possible on either side. In theMediterranean in those early days, as with the Vikings of later centuries, the "Long Ship" meant the ship of war. 

It is strange to reflect that all through human history war has been agreater incentive to shipbuilding progress than peaceful commerce. Forthose early navigators the prizes to be won by fighting and raiding weregreater than any that the more prosaic paths of trade could offer. Thefleets that issued from the Delta of the Nile were piratical squadrons, that were the terrors of the Mediterranean coasts. The Greek, too, like theNorseman, began his career on the sea with piracy. The Athenian historiantells of days when it was no offence to ask a seafaring man, "Are you apirate, sir?" The first Admirals of the Eastern Mediterranean hadundoubtedly more likeness to Captain Kidd and "Blackbeard" than to Nelsonand Collingwood. Later came the time when organized Governments in theGreek cities and on the Phoenician coast kept fleets on the land-locked seato deal with piracy and protect peaceful commerce. But the prizes thatallured the corsair were so tempting, that piracy revived again and again, and even in the late days of the Roman Republic the Consul Pompey had toconduct a maritime war on a large scale to clear the sea of the pirates. 

Of the early naval wars of the Mediterranean--battles of more or lesspiratical fleets, or of the war galleys of coast and island states--we haveno clear record, or no vestige of a record. Egyptians, Phoenicians, Cretans, men of the rich island state of which we have only recently foundthe remains in buried palaces, Greeks of the Asiatic mainland, and theirEastern neighbours, Greeks of the islands and the Peninsula, Illyrians ofthe labyrinth of creek and island that fringes the Adriatic, Sicilians andCarthaginians, all had their adventures and battles on the sea, in the dimbeginnings of history. Homer has his catalogue of ships set forth instately verse, telling how the Greek chieftains led 120, 000 warriorsembarked on 1100 galleys to the siege of Troy. But no hostile fleet metthem, if indeed the great armament ever sailed, as to which historians andcritics dispute. One must pass on for centuries after Homer's day to findreliable and detailed records of early naval war. The first great battle onthe sea, of which we can tell the story, was the fight in the Straits ofSalamis, when Greek and Persian strove for the mastery of the near East. 

King Darius had found that his hold on the Greek cities of Asia Minor wasinsecure so long as they could look for armed help to their kindred beyondthe Archipelago, and he had sent his satraps to raid the Greek mainland. That first invasion ended disastrously at Marathon. His son, Xerxes, tookup the quarrel and devoted years to the preparation not of a raid uponEurope, but of an invasion in which the whole power of his vast empire wasto be put forth by sea and land. 

It was fortunate for Greece that the man who then counted for most in thepolitics of Athens was one who recognized the all-importance of sea-power, though it is likely that at the outset all he had in mind was that thepossession of an efficient fleet would enable his city to exert itsinfluence on the islands and among the coast cities to the exclusion of themilitary power of its rival Sparta. When it was proposed that the productof the silver mines of Laurium should be distributed among the Atheniancitizens, it was Themistocles who persuaded his fellow-countrymen that abetter investment for the public wealth would be found in the building andequipment of a fleet. He used as one of his arguments the probability thatthe Persian King would, sooner or later, try to avenge the defeat ofMarathon. A no less effective argument was the necessity of protectingtheir growing commerce. Athens looked upon the sea, and that sea at oncedivided and united the scattered Greek communities who lived on the coastsand islands of the Archipelago. It was the possession of the fleet thusacquired that enabled Themistocles and Athens to play a decisive part inthe crisis of the struggle with Asia. 

It was in the spring of B. C. 480 that the march from Asia Minor began. Thevast multitude gathered from every land in Western Asia, from the shores ofthe Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and the wild mountain plateaux of theIndian border, was too numerous to be transported in any fleet that eventhe Great King could assemble. For seven days and nights it poured acrossthe floating bridge that swayed with the current of the Dardanelles, abridge that was a wonder of early military engineering, and the making ofwhich would tax the resources of the best army of to-day. Then it marchedby the coast-line through what is now Roumelia and Thessaly. It ate up thesupplies of the lands through which it passed. If it was to escape famineit must keep in touch with the ships that crossed and recrossed the narrowseas, bringing heavy cargoes of food and forage from the ports of Asia, andescorted by squadrons of long war galleys. 

Every Greek city had been warned of the impending danger. Even those whoremembered Marathon, the day when a few thousand spearmen had routed anAsiatic horde outnumbering them tenfold, realized that any force that nowcould be put in the field would be overwhelmed by this human tide of amillion fighting men. But there was one soldier-statesman who saw the wayto safety, and grasped the central fact of the situation. This wasThemistocles the Athenian, the chief man of that city, against which thefirst fury of the attack would be directed. No doubt it was he who inspiredthe prophetess of Delphi with her mysterious message that "the Atheniansmust make for themselves wooden walls, " and he supplied the explanation ofthe enigma. 

The Persian must be met not on the land, but in "wooden walls" upon thesea. Victory upon that element would mean the destruction of the huge armyon land. The greater its numbers the more helpless would be its position. It could not live upon "the country"; there must be a continual stream ofsea-borne supplies arriving from Asia, and this would be interrupted andcease altogether once the Greeks were masters of the sea. 

The Athens of the time was not the wonderful city that arose in lateryears, embellished by the masterpieces of some of the greatest architectsand artists the world has ever known. The houses huddled round the foot ofthe citadel hill--the Acropolis--which was crowned with rudely builtprimitive temples. But the people whose home it was were startled by theproposal of Themistocles that their city should be abandoned to the enemywithout one blow struck in its defence. Not Athens only, but every villageand farm in the surrounding country was to be deserted. Men, women, andchildren, horses and cattle, were all to be conveyed across the narrowstrait to the island of Salamis, which was to be the temporary refuge ofthe citizens of Athens and of the country-folk of Attica. 

Would they ever return to their ruined homes and devastated lands, wherethey would find houses burned, and vines and olives cut down? Could theyeven hope to maintain themselves in Salamis? Would it not be better tofight in defence of their homes even against desperate odds and meet theirfate at once, instead of only deferring the evil day? It was no easy taskfor the man of the moment to persuade his fellow-countrymen to adopt hisown far-sighted plans. Even when most of them had accepted his leadershipand were obeying his orders, a handful of desperate men refused to go. Theytook refuge on the hill of the Acropolis, and acting upon the literalmeaning of the oracle toiled with axe and hammer, building up woodenbarriers before the gates of the old citadel. 

Everywhere else the city and the country round were soon deserted. Thepeople streamed down to the shore and were ferried over to Salamis, wherehuts of straw and branches rose up in wide extended camps to shelter thecrowds that could find no place in the island villages. In every wood oneither shore trees were being felled. In every creek shipwrights were busynight and day building new ships or refitting old. To every Greek seaportmessages had been sent, begging them to send to the Straits of Salamis asmany ships, oarsmen, and fighting men as they could muster. 

Slowly the Persian army moved southward through Thessaly. A handful ofSpartans, under Leonidas, had been sent forward to delay the Persianadvance. They held the Pass of Thermopylæ, between the eastern shoulder ofMount Æta and the sea. It was a hopeless position. To fight there at allwith such an insignificant force was a mistake. But the Government ofSparta, slaves to tradition, could not grasp the idea of the plans proposedby the great Athenian. They were half persuaded to recall Leonidas, buthesitated to act until it was too late. The Spartan chief and his fewhundred warriors died at their post in self-sacrificing obedience to theletter of their orders. The Persians poured over the Pass and inundated theplains of Attica. The few Athenians who had persisted in defending theAcropolis of Athens made only a brief resistance against overwhelmingnumbers. They were all put to the sword and their fellow-countrymen in theisland of Salamis saw far off the pall of smoke that hung over their city, where temples and houses alike were sacked and set on fire by the victors. 

The winds and waves had already been fighting for the Greeks. The Persianwar fleet of 1200 great ships had coasted southwards by the shores ofThessaly till they neared the group of islands off the northern point ofEuboea. Their scouts reported a Greek fleet to be lying in the channelbetween the large island and the mainland. Night was coming on, and thePersians anchored in eight long lines off Cape Sepias. As the sun rosethere came one of those sudden gales from the eastward that are still theterror of small craft in the Archipelago. A modern sailor would try to beatout to seaward and get as far as possible from the dangerous shore, butthese old-world seamen dreaded the open sea. They tried to ride out thegale, but anchors dragged and hundreds of ships were piled in shatteredmasses on the shore. Some were stranded in positions where they could berepaired and refloated as the weather cleared up; but by the evening of thethird day, when at last the wind fell, only eight hundred galleys of thePersian armada were still in seaworthy fighting condition. 

Here, as on other occasions, the very numbers of the Persian fleet proved asource of danger to it. The harbours that could give shelter to thismultitude of ships were very few and far between, nor was it an easy matterto find that other refuge of the ancient navigator--a beach of easy slopeand sufficiently wide extent to enable the ships to be dragged out of thewater and placed high and dry beyond the reach of the angriest waves. Thefact that ships were beached and hauled up the shore during bad weather, and in winter, limited their size, and in both the Persian and the Greekfleets there probably was not a ship much bigger than the barges we see onour canals, or as big as some of the largest sea-going barges. 

The typical warship of the period of the Persian War was probably not morethan eighty or a hundred feet long, narrow, and nearly flat-bottomed. Atthe bow and stern there was a strongly built deck. Between this poop andforecastle a lighter deck ran fore and aft, and under this were thestations of the rowers. The bow was strengthened with plates of iron orbrass, and beams of oak, to enable it to be used as a ram, and the stemrose above the deck level and was carved into the head of some bird orbeast. There was a light mast which could be rigged up when the windserved, and carried a cross-yard and a square sail. Mast and yard weretaken down before going into action. 

The Greeks called their war galleys _triêres_, the Romans _triremes_, andthese names are generally explained as meaning that the ships werepropelled by three banks or rows of oars placed one above the other oneither side. The widely accepted theory of how they were worked is that theseats of the rowers were placed, not directly above each other, but thatthose who worked the lowest and shortest oars were close to the side of theship, the men for the middle range of oars a little above them and furtherinboard, and the upper tier of rowers still higher and near the centre-lineof the ship. An endless amount of erudition and research has been expendedon this question; but most of those who have dealt with it have beenclassical scholars possessing little or no practical acquaintance withseafaring conditions, and none of their proposed arrangements of threebanks of oars looks at all likely to be workable and effective. A practicaltest of the theory was made by Napoleon III when his "History of JuliusCæsar" was being prepared. He had a trireme constructed and tried upon theSeine. There were three banks of oars, but though the fitting andarrangement was changed again and again under the joint advice of classicalexperts and practical seamen, no satisfactory method of working thesuperposed banks of oars could be devised. 

The probability is that no such method of working was ever generallyemployed, and that the belief in the existence of old-world navies made upof ships with tier on tier of oars on either side is the outcome of amisunderstanding as to the meaning of a word. _Triêres_ and _trireme_ seemsat first glance to mean triple-oared, in the sense of the oars beingtriplicated; but there are strong arguments for the view that it was notthe oars but the oarsmen, who were arranged in "threes. " If this view iscorrect, the ancient warship was a galley with a single row of long oars oneither side, and three men pulling together each heavy oar. We know that inthe old navies of the Papal States and the Republics of Venice and Genoa inthe Middle Ages and the days of the Renaissance, and in the royal galleysof the old French monarchy, there were no ships with superposed banks ofoars, but there were galleys known as "triremes, " "quadriremes, " and"pentaremes, " driven by long oars each worked by three, four, or fiverowers. It is at least very likely that this was the method adopted in thewarships of still earlier times. 

A trireme of the days of the Persian War with fifty or sixty oars wouldthus have a crew of 150 or 180 rowers. Add to this some fifty or sixtyfighting men and we have a total crew of over two hundred. In the Persiannavies the rowers were mostly slaves, like the galley slaves of latertimes. They were chained to their oars, and kept in order or roused toexertion by the whip of their taskmasters. To train them to work togethereffectively required a long apprenticeship, and in rough water their workwas especially difficult. To miss the regular time of the stroke wasdangerous, for the long oars projecting far inboard would knock down andinjure the nearest rowers, unless all swung accurately together. Theflat-bottomed galleys rolled badly in a heavy sea, and in rough weatherrowing was fatiguing and even perilous work. 

Some two hundred men in a small ship meant crowded quarters, and lack ofroom everywhere except on the fighting deck. But as the fleets hugged theshore, and generally lay up for the night, the crews could mostly land tocook, eat, and sleep. In the Persian ships belonging to many nations, andsome of them to the Greek cities of Asia, Xerxes took the precaution ofhaving at least thirty picked Persian warriors in each crew. Their presencewas intended to secure the fidelity of the rest. 

In the Greek fleet the rowers were partly slaves, partly freemen impressedor hired for the work. Then there were a few seamen, fishermen, or men whoin the days of peace manned the local coasting craft. The chiefs of thisnavigating party were the _keleustes_, who presided over the rowers andgave the signal for each stroke, and the pilot, who was supposed to have aknowledge of the local waters and of wind and weather, and who acted assteersman, handling alone, or with the help of his assistants, the longstern oar that served as a rudder. The fighting men were not sailors, butsoldiers embarked to fight afloat, and their military chief commanded theship, with the help of the pilot. For more than two thousand years thisdivision between the sailor and the fighting element in navies continuedthroughout the world. The fighting commander and the sailing-master weretwo different men, and the captain of a man-of-war was often a landsman. 

In the Greek fleet which lay sheltered in the narrows, behind the longisland of Euboea while the Persians were battling with the tempest off CapeSepias, the Admiral was the Spartan Eurybiades, a veteran General, who knewmore about forming a phalanx of spearmen than directing the movements of afleet. The military reputation of his race had secured for him the chiefcommand, though of the whole fleet of between three and four hundredtriremes, less than a third had been provided by Sparta and her allies, andhalf of the armada was formed of the well-equipped Athenian fleet, commanded by Themistocles in person. As the storm abated the fleets facedeach other in the strait north of Euboea. In the Persian armada the bestships were five long galleys commanded by an Amazon queen, Artemisia ofHalicarnassus, a Greek fighting against Greeks. She scored the firstsuccess, swooping down with her squadron on a Greek galley that hadventured to scout along the Persian front in the grey of the morning. Attacked by the five the ship was taken, and the victors celebrated theirsuccess by hanging the commander over the prow of his ship, cutting histhroat and letting his blood flow into the sea, an offering to the gods ofthe deep. The cruel deed was something that inspired no particular sense ofhorror in those days of heathen war. It was probably not on account of thispiece of barbarity, but out of their anger at being opposed by a woman, anda Greek woman, that the allied leaders of Greece set a price on the head ofthe Amazon queen; but no one ever succeeded in qualifying to claim it. 

The Persians, hoping to gain an advantage from their superior numbers, nowdetached a squadron which was to coast along the eastern shores of Euboea, enter the strait at its southern end, and fall on the rear of the Greeks, while the main body attacked them in front. Eurybiades and Themistocles hadearly intelligence of this movement, but were not alarmed by it. Shortlybefore sunset the Greeks bore down on the Persians, attacked them in thenarrow waters where their numbers could not tell, sank some thirty ships byramming them, and then drew off as the night came on. 

It was a wild night. The Greeks had hardly regained their shelteredanchorage when the wind rose, lightning played round the mountain crests oneither hand, the thunder rolled and the rain came down in torrents. Themain Persian fleet, in a less sheltered position, found it difficult toavoid disaster, and the crews were horrified at seeing as the lightning litup the sea masses of debris and swollen corpses of drowned men driftingamongst them as the currents brought the wreckage of the earlier stormfloating down from beyond Cape Sepias. The hundred ships detached to roundthe south point of Euboea were still slowly making their way along itsrocky eastern coast. Caught in the midnight storm most of them drove ashoreand were dashed to pieces. 

In the morning the sea was still rough, but the Greeks came out of thestrait, and, without committing themselves to a general action, fell uponthe nearest ships, the squadron of Cilicia, and sank and captured severalof them, retiring when the main fleet began to close upon them. On thethird day the sea was calm and the Persians tried to force the narrows by afrontal attack. There was some hard fighting and loss on both sides, butthe Greeks held their own. As the sun set the Persians rowed back towardstheir anchorage inside Cape Sepias. 

When the sun rose again the Greek fleet had disappeared. Eurybiades andThemistocles had agreed in the night after the battle that the time wascome to abandon the defence of the Euboean Strait and retire to the watersof Salamis. The Persian army was now flooding the mainland with its myriadsof fighting men, and was master of Attica. A fleet, depending so much onthe land for supplies and for rest for its crews, could not maintain itselfin the straits when the Persians held the mainland and were in a positionto seize also the island of Euboea. Before sunrise the Greek ships wereworking their way in long procession through the Strait of Negropont. Earlyin the day they began to pass one by one the narrows at Chalcis, nowspanned by a bridge. Then the strait widened, and there were none to bartheir way to the open sea, and round Cape Sunium to their sheltered stationin the straits behind the island of Salamis. 

They had been reinforced on the way, and they now numbered 366 fightingships. Those of Sparta and the Peloponnesus were 89, the Athenian fleet180, while 97 more were supplied by the Greek islands, some of the shipsfrom Melos and the Cyclades being penteconters, large vessels whose longoars were each manned by five rowers. Losses by storm and battle hadreduced the Persian armada to some six hundred effective ships. The oddswere serious, but not desperate. 

But while the Persian fleet was directed by a single will, there weredivided counsels among the Greeks. Eurybiades had most of the leaders onhis side when he argued that Athens was hopelessly lost, and the best hopefor Greece was to defend the Peloponnesus by holding the isthmus ofCorinth with what land forces could be assembled and removing the fleet tothe waters of the neighbouring waters to co-operate in the defence. Themistocles, on the other hand, shrank from the idea of abandoning therefugees in the island of Salamis, and he regarded the adjacent straits asthe best position in which the Greeks could give battle. There, as in thechannel of Euboea, the narrow waters would do something to nullify thePersian advantage of numbers. For the Greeks, formed in several linesextending from shore to shore, could only be attacked by equal numbers. Only the leading ships of the attack would be in action at any givenmoment, and it would not matter how many hundred more were crowded behindthem. With a column of spearmen on land the weight of the rearward ranks, formed in a serried phalanx, would force onward those in front. But with acolumn of ships formed in several successive lines in narrow waters anyattempt of the rearward ships to press forward would mean confusion anddisaster to themselves and those that formed the leading lines. This wouldhave been true even of ships under sail, but in battle the war galleys wereoar-driven, and as the ships jammed together there would be entangled oars, and rowers flung from their benches with broken heads and arms. Betterdiscipline, more thorough fighting-power on the Greek side, would mean thatthe leading ships of their fleet would deal effectually with their nearestadversaries, while the rearward ships would rest upon their oars and plungeinto the mêlée only where disaster to a leading ship left an opening. 

A doubtful story says that Themistocles, foreseeing that if the battle waslong delayed the Spartan party would carry their point and withdraw to theisthmus, ran the risk of sending a message to King Xerxes, urging him toattack at once, hinting at a defection of the Athenian fleet, and tellinghim that if he acted without delay the Greeks were at his mercy, and thatthey were so terrified that they were thinking chiefly of how they mightescape. Herodotus tells of a council of war of the Persian leaders atwhich the fighting Queen Artemisia stood alone in advising delay. She toldthe King that in overrunning northern Greece he had done enough for onecampaign. Let him settle down for winter quarters in Attica and he wouldsee the Greek armament, already divided by jealousies and quarrels, breakup and disperse. He could then prepare quietly for the conquest of thePeloponnesus in the spring. But Xerxes was more flattered by the opinion ofthe satraps who told him that he had only to stretch out his hands todestroy the Greek fleet and make himself undisputed master of the sea. And, just as Themistocles was despairing of being able to keep the fleet atSalamis, news came that the Persians had decided to attack. The news wasbrought by Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who had been unjustly exiledfrom Athens some years before, but now in the moment of his country'sdanger ran the blockade of the Persians in a ship of Ægina, and came tothrow in his lot with his fellow-citizens. For the Greeks to set out forthe isthmus under these circumstances would be to risk having to meetsuperior numbers in the open sea. All now agreed that the fate of Greecewas to be decided in the waters of Salamis. 

Xerxes looked forward to the coming struggle with assured hope of victory, and prepared to enjoy the spectacle of the disaster that was about to fallupon his enemies. 

On the green slope of Mount Ægaleos, which commanded a full view of Salamisand the straits, the silken tents of the King and his Court were erected, acamp that was like a palace. Purple-dyed hangings, gilded tent poles withpomegranates of pure gold at the top of each, carpets bright with colour, carved furniture inlaid with ivory, all made up a display of luxuriouspomp. Before the royal tents a golden throne had been erected. Fan-bearerstook their post on either side, nobles who held the office of sword-bearersand cup-bearers waited at the steps of the throne. On either side and onthe slope below the ranks of the "Immortal Guard" were formed, tenthousand veterans, with armour and equipments gleaming with silver andgold. Along the shore from the white marble cliffs of Sunium by the port ofPhalerum and far up the winding coast-line of the straits, hundreds ofthousands more of this army of many nations stood in battle array. Theywere to witness the destruction of the Great King's enemies, and to take anactive part in it when, as all expected, disabled Greek galleys would bedriven ashore, and their crews would ask in vain for quarter. They were toshare, too, in the irruption into Salamis once the fleet was master of thestraits, and when the people of Athens, no longer protected by the sea, would be at the mercy of the Asiatic warriors. 

Amid the blare of trumpets the King took his seat upon his throne, andwatched his great armada sweeping towards the straits like a floating city. In those hundreds of long, low-sided ships thousands of slaves strained atthe banks of heavy oars, encouraged by the shouts of the picked warriorswho crowded the decks, and if their energies flagged, stimulated to newexertions by the whip of their taskmasters. 

From every point of vantage in Salamis, women, old men, children, all whocould not fight, looked out upon the sea, watching with heart-rendinganxiety the signs of the approaching struggle. Death or slavery and untoldmisery would be their fate if numbers should prevail in the battle. In ourdays, in the hours before such a decisive struggle a people watches thenewspapers, and waits for tidings of the fight in a turmoil of mingledhopes and fears. But whatever may be the result the individual, who is thusa spectator at a distance, runs no personal risks. It was otherwise inthose days of merciless heathen warfare, and here all would see forthemselves the changing fortunes of the fight on which their own fatedepended. 

The Greek fleet had been formed in two divisions of unequal strength. Thesmaller anchored in the western opening of the straits, furthest from theadvance of the enemy's armada, and was detailed to prevent any attackthrough the narrows on the Greek rear. The main body, three hundred strong, was moored in successive lines, just inside the opening of the straits tothe eastward. The best ships, the most trusted leaders, the picked warriorswere in the foremost line. On them the result of the day would chieflydepend, and here the man who had planned it all, commanded an Athenian wargalley in the centre of the array. In this fact we see another strikingdifference between past and present. The modern specialization of officesand capacities which divides between different individuals the functions ofpolitical leader, general, and admiral was yet centuries distant in thefuture. Themistocles, who had advised the policy of naval war, was to bethe foremost leader in the battle, and though purely naval tactics were tohave some part in it, it was to be to a great extent a land battle foughtout on floating platforms, so that one who had learned the art of war onland could act as an admiral on the sea. 

Sixty thousand men-rowers and warriors were crowded on board the Greekfleet. At least twice as many must have been borne on the decks and rowers'benches of the Persian armada. Midway in the opening of the straits thePersians had occupied the rocky island of Psytalia. Its ledges and itssummit glittered with arms, and beside it some light craft had taken postto assist friendly vessels in distress. Past the islet the great fleetswept in four successive divisions driven by the measured stroke of tens ofthousands of oars. On the left of the leading line was the Phoenician fleetled by the tributary kings of Tyre and Sidon, a formidable squadron, forthese war galleys were manned by real seamen, bold sailors who knew notonly the ways of the land-locked Mediterranean, but had ventured into theouter ocean. On the right were the ships of the Greek cities of Ionia, thelong galleys of Ephesus, Miletus, Samos, and Samothrace. Here Greek wouldmeet Greek in deadly strife. The rowers shouted as they bent to the longoars. The warriors grouped in the prow with spear and javelin in hand sangthe war songs of many nations. Along the bulwarks of the ships of Asiacrouched the Persian and Babylonian archers, the best bowmen of the ancientworld, with the arrow resting ready on the string. As the left of theleading line reached the opening of the strait the rowers reduced theirspeed, while on the other flank the stroke became more rapid. The long linewas wheeling round the point of Salamis, and came in full sight of theGreek fleet ranged in battle array across the narrows. 

The Athenian ships formed the right and centre of its leading line, thefleet of the Peloponnesus under the veteran Eurybiades was on the left. Therowers were resting on their oars, or just using them enough to keep theships in position. As the Persians came sweeping into the straits theGreeks began to chant the Pæan, their battle hymn. The crash of theencounter between the two navies was now imminent. 

For a few moments it seemed that already the Persians were assured ofvictory, for, seeing the enormous mass of the ships of Asia crowding thestrait from shore to shore, and stretching far away on the open sea outsideit, not a few of the European leaders lost heart for a while. The rowersbegan to backwater, and many of the ships of the first line retired sternforemost into the narrows. The rest followed their example, each onefearing to lose his place in the line, and be exposed in isolation to theattack of a crowd of enemies. It was perilously like the beginning of apanic that would soon end in disaster if it were not checked. 

But it was soon over. The last of the retiring Greek ships was a galley ofPallene in Macedonia, commanded by a good soldier, Arminias. He was one ofthose who was doing his best to check the panic. Resolved that whoever elsegave way he would sink rather than take to flight, he turned the prow ofhis trireme against the approaching enemy, and evading the ram of a Persianship ran alongside of her. The intermingled oars broke like matchwood, andthe two ships grappled. The battle had begun. Attacked on the other side byanother of the ships of Asia, Arminias was in deadly peril. The sight oftheir comrade's courage and of his danger stopped the retirement of theGreeks. Their rowers were now straining every nerve to come to the rescueof the isolated trireme, and from shore to shore the two fleets met withloud outcry and the jarring crash of scores of voluntary or involuntarycollisions. 

All order was soon lost. The strait of Salamis was now the scene of a vastmêlée, hundreds of ships crowding together in the narrow pass between theisland and the mainland. Themistocles in the centre with the picked shipsof Athens was forcing his way, wedge-like, between the Phoenician andIonian squadrons into the dense mass of the Persian centre. The bronzebeaks ground their way into hostile timbers, oars were swept away, rowersthrown in confusion from their benches stunned and with broken limbs. Shipssank and drowning men struggled for life; the Asiatic archers shot theirarrows at close quarters, the spearmen hurled their javelins; but it wasnot by missile weapons the fight was to be decided. Where the stroke of theram failed, the ships were jammed together in the press, and men foughthand to hand on forecastles and upper decks. Here it was that the Greeks, trained athletes, chosen men in the prime of life, protected by theirarmour and relying on the thrust of the long and heavy spear, had theadvantage over the Asiatics. Only their own countrymen of the Ioniansquadron could make any stand against them, and the Ionians had to face thespears of Sparta, in the hands of warriors all eager to avenge theslaughter of Thermopylæ. 

Some of these Ionian Greeks, fighting under the Persian standard, won localsuccesses here and there in the mêlée. They captured or sank several of theSpartan triremes. One of the ships of Samothrace performed an exploit likethat of Paul Jones, when with his own ship sinking under the feet of hiscrew he boarded and captured the "Serapis. " A Greek trireme had rammed theSamothracian ship, tearing open her side; but as she went down her Persianand Ionian crew scrambled on board their assailant and drove the Greeksinto the sea at the spear-point. It was noted that few of the Persian crewswere swimmers. When their ships sank they were drowned. The Greeks wereable to save themselves in such a disaster. They threw away shield, helmet, and spear, and swam to another ship or to the island shore. 

This fact would seem to indicate that with the exception of those whomanned the Ionian and Phoenician squadrons the crews of the Persian fleetwere much less at home on the sea than the Greeks. And we know from theresult of many battles, from Marathon to the victories of Alexander, thaton land the Greek was a better fighting man than the Asiatic. The soldiersof the "Great King, " inferior in fighting-power even on the land, wouldtherefore find themselves doubly handicapped by having to fight on thenarrow platforms floating on an unfamiliar element, and the sight of shipsbeing sunk and their crews drowned would tend to produce panic among them. So the Greek wedge forced itself further and further into the mass ofhostile ships, and in the narrow waters numbers could not tell. The Greekswere never at any given moment engaged with a superior force in actualhand-to-hand conflict, and they had sufficient ships behind them to makegood any local losses. Such a battle could have only one result. 

All order had been lost in the Persian fleet at an early stage of thefight. The rearward squadrons had pressed into the strait, and finding thatin the crowded waters they were endangering each other without being ableto take any effective part in the battle they began to draw off, and theforemost ships, pressed back by the Greek attack, began to follow themtowards the open water. The whole mingled mass of the battle was driftingeastward. The movement left the island of Psytalia unprotected by theAsiatic fleet, and Aristides, the Athenian, who had been watching the fightfrom the shore of Salamis, embarked a force of spearmen on some lightvessels, ferried them across to Psytalia and attacked its Persian garrison. They made a poor show of resistance, and to a man they were speared orflung over the rocks into the sea. The poet Æschylus, who was fighting as asoldier on one of the Athenian triremes, told afterwards, not in pity, butrejoicing at the destruction of his country's enemies, how the cries of themassacred garrison of Psytalia were heard above the din of the battle andincreased the growing panic of the Persians. 

Even those who had fought best in the Asiatic armada were now losing heartand taking to flight. Queen Artemisia, with her five galleys ofHalicarnassus, had fought in the front line among the ships of the Ioniansquadron. She was now working her way out of the mêlée, and in theconfusion rammed and sank a Persian warship. Xerxes, watching the fightfrom his throne on the hillside, thought it was a Greek ship that theAmazon had destroyed and exclaimed: "This woman is playing the man while mymen are acting like women!"

Two Persian ships in flight from the pursuing Greeks drove ashore at thebase of Mount Ægaleos. Xerxes, in his anger at the disaster to his fleet, ordered the troops stationed on the beach to behead every officer and manof their crews, and the sentence was at once executed. The closing scene ofthe battle was, indeed, a time of unmitigated horrors, for while thismassacre of the defeated crews was being carried out by the Persianguardsmen, the victorious Greeks were slaying all the fugitives who fellinto their hands. The Admiral of the Persian fleet, Ariabignes, brother ofXerxes, was among the dead. 

The pursuit was not continued far beyond the straits. The Greeks hesitatedto venture into open waters where numbers might tell against them if thePersians rallied, and they drew back to their morning anchorage. Theremnant of the Persian fleet anchored off the coast near Phalerum, the portof Athens, or took refuge in the small harbour. They were rejoined by adetachment which had been sent to round the south side of Salamis to attackthe western entrance of the straits, but which for some reason had neverbeen engaged during the day. 

The victorious Greeks did not realize the full extent of their triumph. They expected to be attacked again next morning, and hoped to repeat themanoeuvre which had been so far successful, of engaging the enemy in thenarrows with each flank protected by the shore, and no room for a superiorforce to form in the actual line of fighting contact. But though they didnot yet realize the fact, they had won a decisive victory. Xerxes had beenso impressed by the failure of his great armada to force the narrows ofSalamis that he had changed all his plans. 

In the night after the battle he held a council of war. It was decided thatthe attack should not be renewed, for there was no prospect of a secondattempt giving better results. Artemisia was directed to convey PrinceArtaxerxes, the heir of the Empire, back to Asia. Xerxes himself would leadback to the bridge of the Hellespont the main body of his immense army, forto attempt to maintain it in Greece during the winter would have meantfamine in its camps. The fleet was to sail at once for the northernArchipelago, and limit its operations to guarding the bridge of theHellespont and protecting the convoys for the army. When the winter came itwould have to be laid up; but by that time it was hoped Xerxes and the mainbody would be safe in Asia. Mardonius, the most trusted of his satraps, wasto occupy northern Greece with a picked force of 300, 000 men, with which hewas to attempt the conquest of the Peloponnesus next year. 

The Persian fleet sailed from the roadstead of Phalerum during that samenight. How far the crews were demoralized by the defeat of the previous dayis shown by the fact that there was something of a panic as the whitecliffs of Sunium glimmered through the darkness in the moonlight and weremistaken for the sails of hostile Greek warships menacing the line ofretreat. The Persians stood far out to sea to avoid these imaginaryenemies. When the day broke Themistocles and Eurybiades could hardly creditthe report that all the ships of Asia had disappeared from their anchorageof the evening before. The Athenian admiral urged immediate pursuit, theSpartan general hesitated and at last gave a reluctant consent. The fleetsailed as far as the island of Andros, but found no trace of the enemy. Invain Themistocles urged that it should go further, and if it failed to findthe enemy's fleet, at least show itself in the harbours of Asia and try torouse Ionia to revolt. Eurybiades declared that enough had beenaccomplished, and refused to risk a voyage across the Archipelago in thelate autumn. So the victorious fleet returned to Salamis, and thence thevarious contingents dispersed to be laid up for the winter in shelteredharbours and on level beaches, where a stockade could be erected and aguard left to protect the ships till the fine weather of next springallowed them to be launched again. 

When Xerxes reached the Hellespont with his army, after having lost heavilyby disease and famine in his weary march through Thessaly, Macedonia, andThrace, he found that the long bridge with which he had linked togetherEurope and Asia had been swept away by a storm. But the remnant of hisfleet was there waiting to ferry across the strait what was left of hisarmy, now diminished by many hundreds of thousands. 

The next year witnessed the destruction both of the army left underMardonius in northern Greece and of the remainder of the Persian fleet thathad fought at Salamis. Pausanias, with a hundred thousand Greeks, routedthe Persian army at Platæa. A fleet of 110 triremes, under the admiralsLeotychides and Xantippus, sailed across the Archipelago in search of thePersian fleet. They found it in the waters of Samos, but the enemy retiredtowards the mainland without giving battle. The Asiatics were disheartenedand divided. The Ionians were suspected of disaffection. The Phoenicianswere anxious only to return in safety to their own country and resume theirpeaceful trading, and as soon as they were out of sight of the Greeks, theydeserted the Persian fleet, and sailed southwards, bound for Tyre andSidon. 

What was left of the fleet anchored under the headland of Mycale. There wasno sign of a Greek pursuit. Rumour reported that the Athenian and Spartanadmirals were intent only on securing possession of the islands, and wouldnot venture on any enterprise against the coast of Asia. Perhaps it wasbecause he still feared to risk another engagement on the sea, that thePersian admiral found a pretext for laying up his ships. He declared thatthey were so foul with weeds and barnacles that, as a prelude to anyfurther operations, they must be beached and cleaned. They were thereforehauled ashore under the headland, and a stockade was erected round them, the fleet thus becoming a fortified camp guarded by its crews. 

And then the dreaded Greek fleet appeared. Its hundred triremes coulddisembark some twenty thousand men, for arms were provided even for therowers. A landing from low-sided ships of light draught was an easy matter. They were driven in a long line towards the shore. As they grounded, thewarriors sprang into the water and waded to land. The rowers left theiroars, grasped spear or sword, and followed them. The stockade was stormed;the ships inside it, dry with the heat of the Asiatic sun, and with seamsoozing with tar, were set on fire and were soon burning fiercely. As theflames died down and the pall of smoke drifted far over the promontory ofMycale, a mass of charred timbers was all that was left of the great armadaof Asia, and the victorious Greeks sailed homewards with the news that thefull fruits of Salamis had been garnered. 

 CHAPTER II

 ACTIUM

 B. C. 31

Actium was one of the decisive battles of the world--the event that fixedthe destinies of the Roman Empire for centuries to come, made Octavian itsdictator, and enabled him, while keeping the mere forms of Republican life, to inaugurate the imperial system of absolute rule, and reign as the firstof the Roman Emperors, under the name and title of Augustus. 

It brought to a close the series of civil wars which followed the murder ofhis grand-uncle, Julius Cæsar. The triumvirs, Mark Antony, Octavian, andLepidus, had avenged the assassination by a wholesale proscription of theirpolitical opponents, all of whom indiscriminately they charged with theguilt of the deed; and had defeated Brutus and Cassius on the plains ofPhilippi. They had parcelled out the Empire among them, and then quarrelledover the spoil. Octavian, the dictator of the West, had expelled Lepidusfrom the African provinces that had been assigned to him as his territory. Antony was now his only remaining rival. Cæsar's veteran lieutenant heldthe Eastern provinces of the Empire. During the years he had spent in theEast he had become half Orientalized, under the influence of the famousQueen of Egypt, Cleopatra, for whose sake he had dismissed his wifeOctavia, the sister of Octavian, in order that the Egyptian might take herplace. He had appeared beside her in Alexandria wearing the insignia of theEgyptian god Osiris, while Cleopatra wore those of Isis. Coins and medalswere struck bearing their effigies as joint rulers of the East, and theloyalty of Rome and the West to Octavian was confirmed by the sense ofindignation which every patriotic Roman felt at the news that Antony spokeopenly of making Alexandria and not Rome the centre of the Empire, and offounding with the Egyptian Queen a new dynasty that would rule East andWest from the Nile. 

The question to be decided in the civil war was therefore not merelywhether Octavian or Antony was to be the ruler of the Roman world, butwhether Eastern or Western influences were to predominate in shaping itsdestinies. Antony was preparing to carry the war into Italy, and assembledon the western shores of Greece an army made up of the Roman legions of theeastern provinces and large contingents of Oriental allies. During thewinter of B. C. 32-31, he had his head-quarters at Patræ (now Patras), onthe Gulf of Corinth, and his army, scattered in detachments among the coasttowns, was kept supplied with grain by ships from Alexandria. Antony's warfleet, strengthened by squadrons of Phoenician and Egyptian galleys, laysafely in the land-locked Ambracian Gulf (now the Gulf of Arta), approachedby a winding strait that could easily be defended. 

But Octavian had determined to preserve Italy from the horrors of war, bytransporting an army across the Adriatic in the coming summer and decidingthe conflict on the shores of Greece. An army of many legions was alreadyin cantonments on the eastern coast of Italy, or prepared to concentratethere in the spring. His fleet crowded the ports of Tarentum (Taranto) andBrundusium (Brindisi), and minor detachments were wintering in the smallerharbours of southern Italy. Most of his ships were smaller than those towhich they were to be opposed. It was reported that Antony had aconsiderable number of huge quinqueremes, and even larger ships of war, anchored in the Ambracian Gulf. The ships of the Western Empire weremostly triremes; but there was the advantage that while Antony's fleet waslargely manned by hastily recruited landsmen, Octavian had crews made up ofexperienced sailors. Many of them were of the race of the Liburni, men ofthe island-fringed coast of Dalmatia, to this day among the best sailors ofthe Adriatic, [2] and his admiral was the celebrated Marcus VipsaniusAgrippa, who had to his credit more than one naval success in the civilwars, amongst them a victory won off the headland of Mylæ, in the samewaters that had been the scene of the triumph of Duilius. 

 [2] Men of the same race of sailors and fishermen largely manned the victorious fleet of Tegethoff at Lissa, nineteen centuries later. See Chapter XI. 

Early in the spring, while the main body of Octavian's fleet concentratedat Brundusium, and the army that was to cross the Adriatic gathered aroundthe harbour, Agrippa with a strong squadron put to sea, seized the port ofMethone in the Peloponnesus, and using this place as his base of operationscaptured numbers of the Egyptian transports that were conveying supplies tothe enemy's camps. Antony ought to have replied to this challenge byputting to sea with his combined fleet, forcing Agrippa to concentrate theWestern armament to meet him, and deciding by a pitched battle who was tohave the command of the sea in the Adriatic. But Cæsar's old lieutenant, once as energetic and enterprising a soldier as his master, had now becomeindolent and irresolute. He was used to idling away weeks and months withCleopatra and his semi-Oriental Court. Instead of venturing on a vigorousoffensive campaign he left the initiative to his opponent, and with anominally more powerful fleet at his disposal he passively abandoned thecommand of the sea to Agrippa and Octavian. 

The Egypto-Roman army was ordered to concentrate on the southern shores ofthe Ambracian Gulf. A division of the fleet was moored in the windingstrait at its entrance, but directed to act only on the defensive. Insidethe Gulf the rest of the fleet lay, the largest ships at anchor, thesmaller hauled up on the shore. 

The crews had been brought up to full strength by enlisting mule-drivers, field-labourers, and other inexperienced landsmen, and would have beenbetter for training at sea; but except for some drills on the landlockedwaters they were left in idleness, and sickness soon broke out among themand thinned their numbers. The ships thus inefficiently manned presented aformidable array. There were some five hundred in all, including, however, a number of large merchantmen hastily fitted for war service. Just asmodern men-of-war are provided with steel nets hanging on booms as adefence against torpedoes, so it would seem that some at least of Antony'sships had been fitted with a clumsy device for defending them againstattack by ramming. Below the level of the oars, balks of timber werepropped out from their sides at the water-line, and it was hoped that thesebarricades would break the full force of an enemy's "beak. " But theinvention had the drawback of diminishing the speed of the ship, and makingquick turning more difficult, and thus it increased the very danger it wasintended to avert. 

Another feature of the larger ships, some of them the biggest that had yetbeen built for the line of battle, the "Dreadnoughts" of their day, wasthat wooden castles or towers had been erected on their upper decks, and onthese structures were mounted various specimens of a rude primitivesubstitute for artillery, ballistæ, catapults, and the like, engines fordischarging by mechanical means huge darts or heavy stones. These sametowers were also to be the places from which the Eastern bowmen, the bestarchers of the ancient world, would shower their arrows on a hostile fleet. 

But locked up in the bottle-necked Ambracian Gulf the great fleet, with itstower-crowned array of floating giants, had as little effect on the openingphase of the campaign as if its units had been so many castles on theshore. Agrippa soon felt that there was no serious risk of any attemptbeing made by Antony to interrupt the long and delicate operation offerrying over an army of a hundred thousand men and some twelve thousandcavalry from Italy to the opposite shore of the Adriatic. He took theprecaution of watching the outlet of the Ambracian Gulf with his swiftestships. The narrow entrance, while making it difficult to force a way intothe Gulf, had the disadvantage of all such positions, that a large fleetwould take a considerable time to issue from it into the open sea, and itwas therefore comparatively easy to blockade and observe it. If Antonyshowed any sign of coming out, there would be time to bring up the wholefleet of Octavian to meet him in the open. 

It was thus that Octavian was able securely to embark his army insuccessive divisions, and land it without interruption at the port ofToryne on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Having assembled there, itmarched southwards along the coast till it reached the hills on thenorthern shore of the Ambracian Gulf, and the two armies and fleets were inpresence of each other. 

The legions of Octavian encamped on a rising ground a few miles north ofthe entrance of the Gulf, and above a narrow neck of land which divided oneof its inlets from the open sea. The coast is here hollowed into a widebay, in which the main body of Agrippa's fleet was anchored, while adetached squadron observed the opening of the straits. The camp wassurrounded by entrenchments, and connected with the station of the fleet bya road protected by lines of earthworks and palisades, for it was thecustom of the Romans to make as much use of pick and spade as of sword andspear in their campaigns. On the site of the camp Octavian afterwardsfounded Nicopolis, "the City of Victory, " as the memorial of his triumph. 

From the camp on the hill there was a wide view over the Ambracian Gulf, asheet of water some thirty miles long and ten wide, surrounded by anamphitheatre of hills sloping to flat, and in many places marshy, shores. On the wide waters the fleet of Antony lay moored, line behind line, aforest of masts and yards. In the narrows of the entrance some of hislargest ships were anchored. Many of the ships of Phoenicia and Egyptdisplayed an Eastern profusion of colour in their painted upper works, their gilded bows, and their bright flags and streamers. Near the southernshore lay the state galley of Cleopatra, a floating palace, with its silkensails, gilded bulwarks, and oars bound and plated with silver. 

A line of earthworks and forts across the neck of the northern point, garrisoned by the best of Antony's Roman veterans, defended one side of thenarrows. The other side was a low-lying, triangular stretch of land, dry, sandy ground. The Greeks knew it as the _Akte_, just as the Italian sailorsstill call it the _Punta_, both words having the same meaning, "the Point. "At its northern extremity on a rocky platform there rose a temple ofApollo, known as the "Aktion, " the "sanctuary of the point, " a place ofpilgrimage for the fisher and sailor folk of the neighbourhood. Its name, Latinized into _Actium_, became famous as that of the naval battle. 

On the level ground by the temple was the camp of the army of Antony andCleopatra, a city of tents and reed-built huts, within its midst the gaypavilions of the Court. It was a mixed gathering of many nations--Romanlegions commanded by veterans of the wars of Cæsar; Egyptian battalions inthe quaint war dress we see on the painted walls of tombs by the Nile, andthe semi-barbarous levies of the tributary kings of Eastern Asia. Therewere widespread dissension and mutual suspicion among the allies. Not a fewof the Romans were chafing at their leader's subservience to a "Barbarian"queen. Many of the Eastern kinglets were considering whether they could notmake a better bargain with Octavian. The cavalry of both armies skirmishedamong the hills on the land side of the Gulf, and prisoners made byOctavian's troops readily took service with them. Then one of the Asiatickings, instead of fighting, joined the hostile cavalry with his barbarichorsemen, and night after night Roman deserters stole into the camp ofOctavian on the northern height. 

An attempt led by Antony in person against the Roman entrenchments wasbeaten off. A detachment of the fleet tried to elude the vigilance ofAgrippa and slip out to sea, but had to retire before superior numbers. Then both parties watched each other, while at the head-quarters of Antonycouncils of war were held to debate upon a plan of campaign. The situationwas becoming difficult. For Octavian contented himself with holding hisfortified camp with his infantry, drawing his supplies freely fromover-sea, while his cavalry prevented anything reaching Antony's lines fromthe land side, and Agrippa's fleet blockading the Gulf and sweeping thesea, made it impossible to bring corn from Egypt. Provisions were runningshort, and sickness was rife. A move of some kind must be made. 

The veteran Canidius, who commanded the army under Antony, had like most ofthe Romans little faith in the efficiency of the fleet. He proposed toAntony that it should be abandoned, and that the army should march eastwardinto Macedonia, and, with an unexhausted country to supply it, await thepursuit of ten legions of Octavian in a favourable position. But Antony, influenced by Cleopatra, refused to desert the fleet, which was the onepossible hope of reaching Egypt again, and rejecting an attack on the Romanentrenchments as a hopeless enterprise, he decided at last that all thetreasure of Court and army should be embarked on the ships, and an effortmade to break through the blockading squadrons. 

While the preparations were being made, the Romans renewed their entreatiesthat their leader would rather stake his fortunes on a battle on land. Oneday a veteran centurion of his guard, who bore the honourable scars ofmany campaigns, addressing him with tears in his eyes, said to Antony:"Imperator, why distrust these wounds, this sword? Why put your hopes onwretched logs of wood? Let Phoenicians and Egyptians fight on the sea, butlet us have land on which we know how to conquer or die. " It is the appealthat Shakespeare puts into the mouth of one of Antony's soldiers:--

 "O noble emperor, do not fight by sea; Trust not to rotten planks. Do you misdoubt This sword and these my wounds? Let the Egyptians And the Phoenicians go a-ducking; we Have used to conquer standing on the earth, And fighting foot to foot. "[3]

 [3] "Antony and Cleopatra, " Act iii, scene 7. 

The sight of the Egypto-Roman fleet crowding down to the narrows with theirsails bent on their yards showed that they meant to risk putting to sea, and Octavian embarked on Agrippa's fleet, with picked reinforcements fromthe legions. For four days the wind blew strongly from the south-west andthe blockaded fleet waited for better weather. On the fifth day the windhad fallen, the sea was smooth and the sun shone brightly. The floatingcastles of Antony's van division worked out of the straits, and after themin long procession came the rest of the Roman, Phoenician, and Egyptiangalleys. 

From the hills to the northward of the straits, from the low-lying headlandof Actium to the south, two armies, each of a hundred thousand men, watchedthe spectacle, and waited anxiously for the sight of the coming battle. 

The Western fleet had steered to a position off the entrance formed in twodivisions, the one led by Agrippa, the other by Octavian. Agrippa, whoseexperience and record of naval victory gave him the executive command, hadno intention of risking his small ships in the narrows, where they wouldhave been opposed by an equal number of heavier ships, more numerouslymanned, and would lose whatever advantage their superior handiness andseaworthiness gave them, through having no room to manoeuvre. He kepthis fleet of four hundred triremes sufficiently far from the shore to avoidthe shelving shallows that fringe it near the entrance to the straits, andto have ample sea-room. 

 [Illustration: ROMAN WARSHIPS _After the paintings found at Pompeii_]

For some time the fleets remained in presence of each other, bothhesitating to begin the attack. Antony knew that his slower and heavierships would have the best chance acting inshore and on the defensive, andAgrippa was, on the other hand, anxious not to engage until he could lurethem out seaward, where his light craft would have all the gain of rapidmanoeuvring. 

It was not till near noon that at last the Western fleet closed with theAllies. The ships that first encountered were nearly all Roman vessels, forthe Egyptian and Asiatic squadrons were not in the front line of Antony'sfleet, and the brunt of the attack fell upon the sluggish giants that hadbeen so elaborately fortified with booms in the water and towers andbreastworks on their decks. As the attacking ships came into range, arrows, javelins, and stones flew hurtling through the air from the line offloating castles, missiles that did not, however, inflict much loss, forthe men on the decks of the attacking fleet crouched behind bulwarks orcovered themselves with their oblong shields, and their bowmen made someshow of reply to the heavier discharge of engines of war on Antony's shipsand to the more rapid shooting of the Asiatic archers. The days were stillfar off when sea fights would be decided by "fire, " in the sense of thedischarge of projectiles. 

Could the tall ships have rammed the smaller and lower galleys of Octavianand Agrippa they would certainly have sent them to the bottom--a sunkenship for each blow of the brazen beak. But attempts at ramming were soonfound by Antony's captains to be both useless and dangerous. It was notmerely that their lighter and nimbler opponents easily avoided the onset. The well-trained crews evaded every attempt to run them down or grapplethem, chose their own distance as they hovered round their hugeadversaries, and presently as they gained confidence from impunity, begansuccessfully to practise the manoeuvre of eluding the ram, and using theirown bows, not for a blow against the hull of the heavier ship, but to sweepaway and shatter her long oars, that were too heavy to be saved by drawingthem in or unshipping them. Successful attack on the oars was equivalent todisabling an adversary's engines in a modern sea-fight. And when a ship wasthus crippled, her opponents could choose their own time to concentrateseveral of their ships for a joint attempt to take her by boarding. 

The unwieldy ships of Antony's first line, with their half-trained anduntrained crews, must have formed a straggling irregular line with largeintervals as they stood out to sea, and it was this that gave Octavian'sfleet the opportunity for the worrying tactics they adopted. Had theEgyptian and Phoenician ships come to the support of the leading line, their more sailor-like crews might have helped to turn the scale againstOctavian. But while the fight was yet undecided and before the Egyptiansquadron had taken any part in it, a breeze sprang up from the land, blowing from the north-east. Then, to the dismay of Antony's veterans whowatched the battle from the headland of Actium, it was seen that theEgyptians were unfurling their sails from the long yards. The signal hadbeen given from Cleopatra's stately vessel, which as the battle began hadrowed out to a position in the midst of the Egyptian squadron, and nowshook out her purple sails to the breeze, silken fabrics of fiery red, thatseemed at first glance like a battle-signal. But in battle sails were neverused and ships trusted entirely to the oar, so to set the sails meantplainly that the fight was to be abandoned. 

Driven by her silver-tipped oars, helped now with the land breeze thatswelled her sails, Cleopatra's galley passed astern of the fighting-line onits extreme left, and sixty of the warships of Alexandria followed theirqueen. Those who watched from the land must have hoped against hope thatthis was a novel manoeuvre, to use the breeze to aid the squadron of theirallies to shoot out from behind the main body, gain the flank of the enemy, and then suddenly let the sails flap idly, furl or drop them, and sweepdown with full speed of oars on the rear of the attack, with Cleopatraleading like Artemisia at Salamis. But the "serpent of old Nile" had nosuch ideas. She was in full flight for Alexandria, with her warshipsescorting her and conveying the wealth that had been embarked when it wasdecided to put to sea. Was her flight an act of treachery, or the result ofpanic-stricken alarm at the sight of the battle? But even her enemies neveraccused her of any lack of personal courage, and there are many indicationsthat it had been arranged before the fleet came out, that, as soon as anopportunity offered, Cleopatra with a sufficient escort should make forEgypt, where several legions were in garrison, and where even if the armynow camped beside the Ambracian Gulf could not be extricated from itsdifficulties, another army might be formed to prolong the war. 

But the withdrawal of the sixty ships threw the odds of battle heavilyagainst the rest of Antony's fleet. And matters were made worse by itsleader suddenly allowing his infatuation for the Queen of Egypt to sweepaway all sense of his duty to his comrades and followers and his honour asa commander. As he saw Cleopatra's sails curving round his line and makingfor the open sea, he hastily left his flagship, boarded a small and swiftgalley, and sped after the Egyptians. 

Agrippa was too good a leader to weaken his attack on the main body of theenemy by any attempt to interrupt the flight of the Egyptian squadron. Whenhe saw the galley of Antony following it, he guessed who was on board, anddetached a few of his triremes in pursuit. Antony was saved from captureonly by the rearward ships of the fugitive squadron turning back to engageand delay the pursuers. In this rearguard fight two of the Egyptianwarships were captured by Agrippa's cruisers. But meanwhile Antony's galleyhad run alongside of the royal flagship of the Egyptian fleet, and he hadbeen welcomed on board by Cleopatra. 

By this time, however, he had begun to realize the consequences of hisflight. Half an hour ago he had stood on the deck of a fighting ship, wherecomrades who had made his cause their own were doing brave battle againsthis enemies. Now, while the fight still raged far away astern, he foundhimself on the deck of a pleasure yacht, glittering with gold and silver, silk and ivory, and with women and slaves forming a circle round the Queen, who greeted him as he trod the carpeted deck. He made only a briefacknowledgment of her welcome, and then turned away and strode forward tothe bow, where he sat alone, huddled together, brooding on thoughts offailure and disgrace, while the royal galley and its escort of warshipssped southward with oar and sail, and the din of battle died away in thedistance, and all sight of it was lost beyond the horizon. 

The withdrawal of the Egyptians was a palpable discouragement to all thefleet, but not all were aware that their leader, Antony, had sharedCleopatra's flight. Some of those who realized what had happened gave upall further effort for victory, and leaving the line drove ashore on thesandy beach of Actium, and abandoning their ships joined the spectatorsfrom the camp. Others made their way by the strait into the greatland-locked haven of the Gulf. But most of the fleet still kept up thefight. The great ships that drifted helplessly, with broken oars, among theagile galleys of Agrippa's Liburnian sailors, or that grounded in theshallows nearer the shore, were, even in their helplessness as ships, formidable floating forts that it was difficult to sink and dangerous tostorm. More than one attempt to board was repulsed with loss, the highbulwarks and towers giving an advantage to the large fighting contingentsthat Antony had embarked. Some of them had drifted together, and werelashed side to side, so that their crews could mutually aid each other, andtheir archers bring a cross fire on the assailants of their wooden towers. Some ships had been sunk on both sides, and a few of the towered warshipsof the Eastern fleet had been captured by Agrippa, but at the cost of muchloss of life. 

To complete the destruction of the Antonian fleet, and secure his victory, Agrippa now adopted means that could not have been suddenly improvised, andmust therefore have been prepared in advance, perhaps at the earlierperiod, when he was considering the chances of forcing a way into the Gulf. Fire was the new weapon, arrows wreathed with oiled and blazing tow wereshot at the towers and bulwarks of the enemy. Rafts laden with combustibleswere set on fire, and towed or pushed down upon the drifting sea-castles. Ship after ship burst into flame. As the fire spread some tried vainly tomaster it; others, at an early stage, abandoned their ships, orsurrendered. As the resistance of the defeated armada gradually slackened, and about four o'clock came to an end, it was found that a number of shipshad taken refuge in the narrows and the Gulf; others were aground on thepoint; a few had been sunk, some more had surrendered, but numbers weredrifting on the sea, wrapped in smoke and flame. Some of these sank as thefire reached the water's edge, and the waves lapped into the hollow hull, or the weight of half-consumed upper works capsized them. Others driftedashore in the shallows, and reddened sea and land with the glare of theirdestruction far into the night. 

For the men who had fought, the victory, complete as it was, had an elementof disappointment. They had hoped to secure as a prize the treasures ofCleopatra, but these had been spirited away on the Egyptian fleet. But forthe commanders, Octavian and his able lieutenant, there was nothing toregret. The battle had once more decided the issue between East and West, and had given Octavian such advantages that it would be his own fault if hewere not soon master of the Roman World. 

Within a few days the remnant of the defeated fleet had been surrendered orburned at its anchors. The army of Canidius, after a half-hearted attemptat an inland march, and after being further weakened by desertions, declared for Octavian, and joined his standards. 

Cleopatra had entered the port of Alexandria with a pretence of returningin triumph from a naval victory. Laurel wreaths hung on spars and bulwarks, flags flew, trumpets sounded, and she received the enthusiastic greetingsof Greeks and Egyptians as she landed. But the truth could not be longconcealed, and under the blight of defeat, linked with stories of leadersdeserting comrades and allies, Antony and Cleopatra failed to rally anydetermined support to their side when the conqueror of Actium came tothreaten Egypt itself. Both ended their lives with their own hands, Cleopatra only resorting to this act of desperation when, after breakingwith Antony, she failed to enslave Octavian with her charms, and foresawthat she would appear among the prisoners at his coming triumph in Rome. 

2 September, B. C. 31--the day of Actium--is the date which most historiansselect to mark the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of theEmpire. The victor Octavian had already taken the name of his grand-uncle, Cæsar. He now adopted the title of Augustus, and accepted from army andsenate the permanent rank of Imperator, inaugurating a system of absolutismthat kept some of the forms of the old Republic as a thin disguise for thechange to Imperialism. 

On the height where he had camped before the battle, Nicopolis, the City ofVictory, was erected. The ground where his tent had stood was themarble-paved forum, adorned with the brazen beaks of conquered warships. The temple of Apollo, on the point of Actium, was rebuilt on more ambitiouslines, and on the level expanse of sandy ground behind it, every September, for some two hundred years, the "Actian games" were held to celebrate thedecisive victory. 

Augustus did not forget that to the fleet he had owed his success in thecivil war, and naval stations were organized and squadrons of warships keptin commission even in the long days of peace that followed his victory. They served to keep the Mediterranean free from the plague of piracy, andto secure the growing oversea commerce of the Empire which had made theMediterranean a vast Roman lake. 

 CHAPTER III

 THE BATTLE OF SVOLD ISLAND

 A. D. 1000

In the story of the battles of Salamis and Actium we have seen what navalwarfare was like in Greek and Roman times. It would be easy to add otherexamples, but they would be only repetitions of much the same story, forduring the centuries of the Roman power there was no marked change in navalarchitecture or the tactics of warfare on the sea. 

We pass, then, over a thousand years to a record of naval war waged in thebeginning of the Middle Ages by northern races--people who had, independently of Greek or Roman, evolved somewhat similar types of ships, but who were better sailors, though for all that they still used the shipnot so much as an engine of war as the floating platform on which warriorsmight meet in hand-to-hand conflict. Norseman, Dane, and Swede were all ofkindred blood. The land-locked Baltic, the deep fiords of the ScandinavianPeninsula, the straits and inlets of the archipelago that fringes its NorthSea coast, were the waters on which they learned such skill in seamanshipthat they soon launched out upon the open sea, and made daring voyages, notonly to the Orkneys and the Hebrides, and the Atlantic seaboard of Ireland, but the Faroes, and to still more distant Iceland and Greenland, and thensouthward to "Vineland, " the mainland of America, long after rediscoveredby the navigators of the fifteenth century. 

There is a considerable intermixture of Norse blood in the peoples of GreatBritain and Ireland, and perhaps from this sea-loving race comes some ofthe spirit of adventure that has helped so much to build up our own navalpower. When Nelson destroyed and captured the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, the Danes consoled themselves by saying that only a leader of their ownblood could have conquered them, and that Nelson's name showed he came ofthe Viking line. 

A chronicler tells how Charlemagne in his old age once came to a village onthe North Sea shore, and camped beside it. Looking to seaward he saw farout some long low ships, with gaily painted oars, dragon-shaped bows, andsails made of brightly coloured lengths of stuff sewn together and adornedwith embroidery along the yard. Tears came to his eyes as he said: "Thesesea-dragons will tear asunder the empire I have made. "

They were Viking cruisers, on their way to plunder some coast town; and theold Emperor's prophecy was verified when the Norman, who was a civilizedNorseman, became for a while the conquering race of Europe. Even before thedeath of Charlemagne the Norse and Danish sea-kings were raiding, plundering, and burning along the coasts of his Empire. Two hundred yearsof our own history is made up of the story of their incursions. England andIreland bore the first brunt of their onset, when they found the ways ofthe sea. But they ravaged all the western coasts of Europe, and even showedthemselves in the Mediterranean. From the end of the eighth till thebeginning of the eleventh century they were the terror of the westernworld, and early in that dark and stormy period their raids had grown intogreat expeditions; they landed armies that marched far inland, and theycarved out principalities for themselves. 

Western Europe had a brief respite at times when the Vikings fought amongstthemselves. In early days there were frequent struggles for supremacy inNorway, between local kinglets and ambitious chiefs. Fighting was in theblood of the Northmen. Two sea-roving squadrons would sometimes challengeeach other to battle for the mere sake of a fight. As Norway coalesced intoa single kingdom, and as the first teachers of Christianity induced thekings to suppress piracy, there was more of peace and order on the NorthernSeas. But in this transition period there was more than one strugglebetween the Scandinavian kingdoms, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. One of themost famous battles of these northern wars of the sea-kings was fought inthis period, when the old wild days of sea-roving were drawing to an end, and its picturesque story may well be told as that of a typical Norsebattle, for its hero, King Olaf Tryggveson, was the ideal of a northernsea-king. 

Olaf was a descendant of the race of Harold Haarfager, "Fair-hairedHarold, " the warrior who had united the kingdom of Norway, and made himselfits chief king at the close of the ninth century. But Olaf came of a branchof the royal house that civil war had reduced to desperate straits. He wasborn when his mother, Astrid, was a fugitive in a lonely island of theBaltic. As a boy he was sold into slavery in Russia. There, one day, in themarketplace of an Esthonian town, he was recognized by a relative, Sigurd, the brother of Astrid, and was freed from bondage and trained to arms as apage at the Court of the Norse adventurers who ruled the land. The "Saga"tells how Olaf, the son of Tryggva, grew to be tall of stature, and strongof limb, and skilled in every art of land and sea, of peace and war. Noneswifter than he on the snow-shoes in winter, no bolder swimmer when thesummer had cleared the ice from the waters. He could throw darts with bothhands, he could toss up two swords, catching them like a juggler, andkeeping one always in the air. He could climb rocks and peaks like amountain goat. He could row and sail, and had been known to display hisdaring skill as an athlete by running along the moving oars outside theship. He could ride a horse, and fight, mounted or on foot, with axe orsword, with spear or bow. 

In early manhood he came back to Norway to avenge the death of his fatherTryggva, and then took to sea-roving, for piracy was still the Norseman'strade. He raided the shores of the Continent from Friesland to NorthernFrance, but most of his piratical voyages were to the shores of our ownislands, and many a seaboard town in England, Wales, Scotland, and Irelandsaw Olaf's plundering squadron of swift ships. Five was the number of themwith which he visited the Orkneys. 

The Viking warships were small vessels. The ship dug out of the great gravemound at Sandefjord, in Norway, and now shown at Christiania, isseventy-seven feet long, with a beam of seventeen amidships, and a depth ofjust under six feet. Her draught of water would be only four feet, and shewould lie very low in the water, but her lines are those of a good seaboat. She had one mast, forty feet high, to carry a crossyard and a squaresail, and she had thirty-two oars, sixteen on each side. It says somethingfor the seamanship of the Northmen that it was with ships like this theysailed the Atlantic waves off the west coast of Ireland, and made their wayby the North Sea and the verge of the Arctic to the Faroes, Iceland, Greenland, and the mysterious "Vineland. "[4]

 [4] Some interesting light was thrown upon the voyages of the Norsemen by a practical experiment made in 1893. A Viking ship was built on the precise lines and dimensions of the ancient ship dug out of the mound of Gokstadt in 1880, 77 feet long with a beam of 17 feet, and was rigged with one mast and a square mainsail and jib foresail. As a prelude to her being shown at the Chicago Exhibition she was successfully taken across the Atlantic under sail and without an escorting ship. She left Bergen on May 1st, 1893, and arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, U. S. A. , on June 13th. She was commanded by Captain Magnus Andersen, who in 1886 had performed the feat of crossing the Atlantic in an open boat. Andersen had a crew of eleven men in the Viking ship. He reported that she had met with some bad weather and proved an excellent sea boat. Her average speed was nine knots, but with a fair wind she did eleven. In the following year the ship was accidentally sunk in the Chicago river, and raised and broken up. 

Raiding in the Irish Sea, Olaf Tryggveson made a stay in a harbour of theScilly Islands, and there he became a convert to Christianity. On the samevoyage he married the Countess Gyde, sister of his namesake, Olaf Kvaran, the Danish King of Dublin. It was while he was staying in Ireland with theDublin Danes that he heard news from Norway that opened larger ambitions tohim. The land was divided among many chiefs, and the most powerful of themwas hated as an oppressor by the people, who, he was told, would gladlywelcome as their king a leader as famed as Olaf Tryggveson, andrepresenting the line of Harold the Fair-haired. Helped by the Danes ofIreland, he sailed back to Norway, to win its crown for himself, and tocast down the worship of Thor and Odin, and make the land part ofChristendom. 

In the first enterprise he was quickly successful, and in 995 he wasrecognized as King of Norway at Trondhjem. During the five years that hereigned he devoted much of his energy to the second part of his mission, and made among his countrymen many real converts, and found still moreready to accept external conformity. Sometimes he would argue, exhort, appeal to the reason and the goodwill of chiefs and people. But often theold Viking spirit of his pagan days would master him, and he would hackdown with his battle-axe the emblems and the altars of Thor and Odin, andchallenge the old gods to avenge the insult if they had the power, and thentell the startled onlookers that if they were to be loyal to him and livein peace they must accept the new and better creed. 

The open sea and the deep fiords running far into the hills were the besthighways of his kingdom, and Olaf spared no effort to maintain a goodfighting fleet, the best ships of which lay anchored before his great hallat Trondhjem when he was at home. When he went out to war his path was bythe sea. He hunted down the pirates and destroyed their strongholds in thenorthern fiords, with none the less zeal because these places were also thelast refuge of the old paganism and its Berserker magicians. 

He had built for his own use a ship called the "Crane" (_Tranen_), longerthan ships were usually made at the time, and also of narrower beam. Heradditional length enabled more oars to be used, and her sharp bow, carvedinto a bird's head, and her graceful lines made her the fastest ship in thefiords when a good crew of rowers was swinging to the oars. A goodrowing-boat is generally a bad sailer, but Olaf had made the "Crane" swiftenough under canvas, or to speak more accurately, when her sails ofbrightly dyed wool were spread. She was given high bulwarks, and must havehad more than the usual four-foot draught of water, for she carried plentyof heavy stone ballast to stiffen her under sail. With the "Crane" as hisflagship, Olaf sailed northward to attack the Viking Raud, pirate andmagician, who held out for the old gods and the old wild ways. Raud hadanother exceptionally large ship, the longest in Norway, and till the"Crane" was built the swiftest also. The bow, carved into a dragon's headand covered with brazen scales, gave Raud's ship the name of the "Serpent"(_Ormen_). As Olaf sailed northward Raud and his allies met him in askirmish at sea, but soon gave way to superior numbers, and Raud, when hesteered the "Serpent" into the recesses of Salten Fiord, thought he hadshaken off pursuit, especially as the weather had broken, and wild winds, stormy seas, and driving mists and rain squalls might well make the fiordinaccessible to Olaf's fleet. Raud sat late feasting and drinking, and inthe early morning he still lay in a drunken sleep when the "Crane" slippedinto the fiord despite mist and storm, and Olaf seized the dragon ship andmade Raud a prisoner almost without striking a blow. 

When the King returned to Trondhjem he had the two finest ships of thenorth, the "Crane" and the "Serpent, " the latter the largest, the formerthe swiftest vessel that had yet been launched on the northern seas. Proudof such weapons, he wondered if he could not build a warship longer thanthe "Serpent" and swifter than the "Crane, " and he consulted his bestshipbuilder, Thorberg Haarklover, i. E. The "Hair-splitter, " so named fromhis deftness with the sharp adze, the shipwright's characteristic tool inthe days of wooden walls. Thorberg was given a free hand, and promised tobuild a ship that would be famous for centuries. This was the "Lang Ormen, "or "Long Serpent, " a "Dreadnought" of those old Viking days. She was 150feet long, and her sides rose high out of the water, but she had also adeep draught. The bow, strengthened with a cut-water of steel, wasfashioned like the head of a huge dragon, the stern carved into a dragon'stail, and bow and stern were covered with scales of gold. She had sixtyoars, and her crew was made up of no less than six hundred picked men, among them warriors whose names live in history. 

For a while Olaf, with his great ships, reigned victoriously over Norway, defeating more than one effort of the old pagan Vikings to shake his power. One of these defeated rivals, Erik Jarl (Earl Erik), took refuge in Sweden, gathered there a number of adherents who had like himself fled from Norwayto avoid Olaf's strong-handed methods of reform and conversion, and withthem sailed the Baltic, plundering its coasts in the old Viking fashion. King Svend of Denmark was jealous of the power of Norway, welcomed Erik athis Court, and gave him his daughter's hand. Svend's queen, Sigrid, was aSwedish princess, and Erik set to work to form a triple league againstNorway of which the three branches would be his own following of Norwegianmalcontents and the Swedes and Danes. 

Olaf had spent the summer of the year 1000, with a fleet of sixty ships, inthe South-Eastern Baltic. Autumn was coming, and the King was preparing toreturn home before the wintry weather began, when news arrived thathastened his departure. It was brought by one of his jarls, Earl Sigvald, who came with eleven ships, manned by his clansmen, and reported that therebel Erik had been joined by the kings of Sweden and Denmark, and thethree fleets of the allies were preparing to fall upon Olaf on his homewardvoyage. But Sigvald assured the King that if he would allow him to pilotthe Norwegian fleet he would take it safely through channels deep enoughfor even the "Long Serpent, " and elude the hostile armada, whichoutnumbered Olaf's fleet three to one. 

Sigvald, however, was a traitor. He had promised to lead Olaf into waterswhere the allied fleets would be waiting to attack him. And he knew theywould be anchored inside the island of Rügen, near the islet of Svold. 

So Olaf, trusting to his false friend, sailed westward from Wendland to hislast battle. The "Saga" tells how on a bright morning, Erik Jarl and thetwo kings watched from Svold the approach of the Norwegian ships, and atfirst doubted if Olaf was with them, but when they saw the "Long Serpent"towering above the rest they doubted no longer, and gave orders for their180 ships to clear for action, agreeing that Norway should be divided amongthem and the "Long Serpent" should be the prize of whoever first set footon her deck, so sure were they that numbers would give them victory evenagainst a champion of the seas like Olaf Tryggveson. The swift "Crane" andthe "Short Serpent, " taken from Raud of Salten Fiord, had sailed ahead ofthe fleet. They saw the ships of the allies crowding out of the channelbetween Svold and the mainland, and turned back to give the alarm. Thorkild, the half-brother of Olaf, who commanded the "Short Serpent, "urged the King to bear out to sea and avoid a fight with such desperateodds. But Olaf's blood was up. Like the triremes of the Mediterranean, the"Serpents, " "Dragons, " and "Cranes" of the northern seas used only the oarsin battle, and the King gave the order which meant fighting. "Down with thesails!" he said. "Who talks of running away? I never fled yet and neverwill. My life is in God's hands, but flight would be shame for ever. "

The battle that followed is the most famous in Viking story. We know itchiefly through poetic records. But there is no doubt the "Saga" preservesfor us much of the living tradition of the time, and if its writers yieldedto the temptation of decorating their narrative with picturesque detail, itmust be remembered that they told the tale of Olaf's last sea-fight to menwho knew from experience what Northern war was like, so they give us whatwe chiefly want, a lifelike picture of a Viking battle. 

Just as Shakespeare tells how at Shrewsbury "the King had many marching inhis coats, " and to this day in an Abyssinian army several nobles aredressed and armed like the King to divert personal attack from him, so, ashe stood on the after-deck of the "Long Serpent, " Olaf had beside him oneof his best warriors, Kolbiorn Slatter, a man like himself in height andbuild, and wearing the same splendid armour, with gilded shield and helmetand crimson cloak. Round them were grouped the picked fighting men of thebodyguard, the "Shield-burg, " so called because it was their duty to form abreastwork of their shields and ward off arrows and javelins from the King. On the poop also were the King's trumpeters bearing the "war horns"--longhorns of the wild ox, which now sounded the signal for battle. The droningcall was taken up by ship after ship, as the shouting sailors sent downsails and yards on deck. The ships closed on each other side by side, anddrew in their oars, forming in close line abreast, and then under baremasts the long array of war galleys, with their high bows carved into headsof beasts and birds and dragons, drifted with the current towards thehostile fleet. 

The sailors were lashing the ships together as they moved. Manoeuvringappears to have had small part in most Viking fights. The fleet became onegreat floating fortress, and as the ships met bow to bow the best warriorsfought hand to hand on the forecastle decks. 

 [Illustration: A VIKING FLEET]

The writer of the "Saga" tells how in the centre of the fleet the "LongSerpent" lay, with the "Crane" and the "Short Serpent" to port andstarboard. The sterns of the three ships were in line, and so the bow ofthe "Long Serpent" projected far in front of the rest. As the sailorssecured the ships in position, Ulf the Red-haired, who commanded on theforecastle of the "Long Serpent, " went aft and called out to the King thatif the "Serpent" lay so far ahead he and his men would have tough work inthe bow. "Are you afraid?" asked the King. "We are no more afraid forwardthan you are aft, " replied Ulf, with a flash of anger. The King lost histemper and threatened Ulf with an arrow on his bowstring. "Put down yourbow, " said Ulf. "If you shoot me you wound your own hand, " and then he wentback to his post on the forecastle deck. 

The allied fleet was now formed in line and bearing down on the Norwegians. Sigvald Jarl, who had lured the King into this ambush, hung back with hiseleven ships, and Olaf with his sixty had to meet a threefold force. KingSvend, with the Danish fleet, formed the enemy's centre. To his rightOlaf's namesake, King Olaf Svensker, led the Swedish ships. On the left wasErik, with the rebel heathen Jarls of Norway. Olaf watched the enemy'sapproach and talked to Kolbiorn and the men of the Shield-burg. He did notreckon that the Danes or the Swedes would give much trouble, he said; theDanes were soft fellows, and the Swedes would be better "at home picklingfish" than risking themselves in fight with Norsemen, but Erik's attackwould be dangerous. "These are Norwegians like ourselves. It will be hardagainst hard. "

Perhaps we have here a touch of flattery for his countrymen from the poetof the "Saga, " a Norseman telling the tale to men of his own race. Howeverthis may be, the words put into Olaf's mouth were true so far as the rebelJarls were concerned, even if they did injustice to Dane and Swede. 

Erik Jarl seems to have had some inventive talent and some idea of navaltactics. His ship was called the "Iron Beard, " because her bows bristledwith sharpened spikes of iron. She was to be herself a weapon, not merely ameans of bringing fighting men to close quarters for a hand-to-handstruggle. It is remarkable that, though it proved useful at the battle ofSvold, the armed bow found no regular place in Viking warfare. The "IronBeard" also anticipated modern methods in another way. Her bulwarks werecovered with iron-plating. It cannot have been of any serious thickness, for a Viking ship had not enough displacement to spare for carrying heavyarmour; but the thin plates were strong enough to be a defence againstarrows and spears, and as these would not penetrate a thick wooden bulwarkit seems likely that the plating was fixed on a rail running along eachside, thus giving a higher protection than the bulwark itself. Erik's shipwas thus a primitive ironclad ram. 

Though Olaf had spoken lightly of the Danes, it was King Svend's squadronthat began the fight, rowing forward in advance of the rest and falling onthe right and right centre of Olaf's fleet. The Swedes at first hung back. Svend himself on the left of the Danish attack steered straight for theprojecting bows of the "Long Serpent. " Red-haired Ulf grappled the DanishKing's ship, boarded her, and after a fierce fight in which the Norwegianbattle-axes did deadly work, cleared her from end to end. King Svend savedhis life by clambering on board of another ship. Olaf and his men from thehigh stern of the "Long Serpent" shot their arrows with telling effect intothe Danish ships. All along the centre the Norwegians held their own, andgradually the Danes began to give way. It was then only the Swedes workedtheir ships into the mêlée that raged in front of the line of Norwegianbows. To have swept round the line and attacked in flank and rear, whilethe Danes still grappled it in front, would have been a more effectivemethod of attack, but the opponents thought only of meeting front to frontlike fighting bulls. It may be too that Olaf's fleet had so drifted thatthere was not much room to pass between its right wing on the land. 

But however this may be, there was plenty of sea room on the left, and hereErik Jarl, in the "Iron Beard, " led the attack and used his advantage tothe full. Part of his squadron fell upon the Norwegian front; but the "IronBeard" and several of her consorts swung round the end of the line, andconcentrated their attack on the outside ship. Erik had grasped a cardinalprinciple of naval tactics, the importance of trying to crush a part of thehostile line by bringing a local superiority of force to bear upon it. Itwas "hard against hard"--Viking against Viking--but the Norwegians in theend ship were hopelessly outnumbered. They fought furiously and sold theirlives dearly; but soon the armed bow of the "Iron Beard" drove betweentheir ship and the next, the lashings were cut, and the Norwegian driftedout of the line, with her deck heaped with dead. Erik let her drift andattacked the next ship in the same way. He was eating up Olaf's left wingship by ship, while the Danes and Swedes kept the centre and right busy. 

It was the bloodiest fight that the North had ever seen, a fight to thedeath, for though there was now small hope of victory, the Norse battlemadness was strong in Olaf and his men. As the day wore on the right heldits own; but one by one every ship on the left had been cleared by Erik andthe Jarls, and now the battle raged round the three great ships in thecentre, the "Crane" and the two "Serpents. " Erik came up and drove the bowof the "Iron Beard" into the "Long Serpent's" bulwarks. The rebel Jarlstood on the forecastle behind the bristling spikes, his blood-stainedbattle-axe in hand and his Shield-burg standing close around him. 

They had now hard work to ward off the arrows that came whistling from the"Long Serpent, " for at such close quarters Erik had been recognized, andmore than one archer shot at him. The "Saga" tells how young EinarTamberskelver, the best of the bowmen of Norway, so strong that he couldsend a blunt arrow through a bull's hide, had posted himself in the riggingof the "Long Serpent" and made the rebel Jarl his mark. His arrows rattledon the shields of Erik's guard. One of them grazed his helmet, whistledover the "Iron Beard's" deck and buried itself in her rudder-head. Crouching in the bow of the "Iron Beard" behind her armour plates was aFinnish archer, and the Finlanders were such good bowmen that men saidsorcery aided their skill. Erik told him to shoot the man in the"Serpent's" rigging. The Finn, to show his marksmanship, aimed at Einar'sbowstring and cut it with his arrow. The bow released from the stringsprang open and broke with a loud report. "What is that sound?" asked Olaf. Einar sprang down from the rigging and answered, "It is the sound of thesceptre of Norway falling from your grasp. " It was noticed that Olaf's handwas bleeding, "his gauntlet was full of blood, " but he had given no signwhen he was wounded. Arrows, javelins, and stones were falling in showerson the decks of the "Crane" and the "Serpents, " for the Danes and Swedesworsted in the close fight had drawn off a little, and were helping Erik'sattack by thus fighting at a safer distance. 

Erik now boarded the "Long Serpent" amidships, but was beaten back. Hebrought up more of his ships and gathered a larger boarding-party. TheDanish and Swedish arrows had thinned the ranks of Ulf's men in the "LongSerpent's" bows. When Erik led a second storming-party on board, Danes andSwedes too came clambering over the bow, and the "Long Serpent" attacked onall sides was cleared to the poop. Here Olaf fought with Kolbiorn, Einarand the men of the Shield-burg around him. He was somewhat disabled by hiswounded hand, but he still used his battle-axe with deadly effect. Theattacking party were not quite sure which of the tall men in gilded armourwas the King, but at such close quarters some of them soon recognized him, and Erik called to his men not to kill Olaf, but to make him prisoner. Olafknew well that if his life was spared for a while it would be only to puthim to death finally with the cruelty the heathen Vikings delighted ininflicting on their enemies. As his men fell round him and his party wasdriven further and further astern, he must have seen that, outnumbered ashis men were, and with himself wounded, he would soon be overmastered andmade prisoner. There was just one chance of escape for the best swimmer inNorway. Holding up his shield he stepped on the bulwark, threw the shieldat his enemies, and dived overboard. Kolbiorn tried to dive with him, butwas seized and dragged back to the ship. When Erik found he was not theKing he spared his life. 

The few who remained of the Shield-burg sprang overboard. Some were killedby men who were waiting in boats to dispose of the fugitives, othersescaped by diving and swimming, and reached Danish and Swedish ships wherethey asked for, and were given, quarter. Einar, the archer, was one ofthose thus saved, and he is heard of later in the Danish wars of England. 

Olaf was never seen again. Sigvald's ships, after having watched the fightfrom afar, were rowing up to the victorious fleets, and for a long timethere was a rumour that King Olaf had slipped out of his coat of mail as heswam under water, and then rose and eluded Erik's boats, and reached one ofSigvald's ships, where he was hidden. The tale ran that he had been takenback to Wendland, where he was waiting to reappear some day in Norway andclaim his own. But years went on and there were no tidings of King OlafTryggveson. He had been drowned in his armour under the stern of the "LongSerpent. "

King Olaf is still, after nine centuries, one of the popular heroes of theNorwegian people. He had a twofold fame, as the ideal of a sea-king, as theruler who tried in his own wild untaught way to win the land of the Fiordsto Christendom. Another Olaf, who completed this last work a few yearslater, and who, like Olaf Tryggveson, reigned over Norway in right of hisprowess and his descent from Harold the Fair-haired, is remembered as St. Olaf, saint and martyr; but no exploit of either king lives in populartradition so brightly as the story of Olaf Tryggveson's death-battle atSvold. "My life is in God's hands, " he had said, "but flight would be shamefor ever. " His fight against desperate odds and ending in defeat and deathwon him fame for ever. 

 CHAPTER IV

 SLUYS

 1340

The gold "nobles" of the coinage of King Edward III show in conventionalfashion the King standing in the waist of a ship with a high bow and poop, the red-cross banner of St. George at the stern and the lions of Englandand the lilies of France emblazoned on his shield. The device typifies hisclaim to the sovereignty of the narrow seas between England and theContinent, the prize won for him by the fleet that conquered at Sluys. 

Sluys is often spoken of as the sea-fight that inaugurated the longvictorious career of the British Navy. It would be more correct to say thatit was the battle which, by giving King Edward the command of the Channel, made his successful invasion of France possible, and secured for Englandthe possession of Calais. Holding both Dover and Calais the English for twocenturies were masters of the narrow sea-gate through which all the tradebetween northern Europe and the rest of the world had to pass. They had thepower of bringing severe pressure to bear upon the German cities of theHansa League, the traders of the Low Countries, the merchants of Spain, Genoa, and Venice, by their control of this all-important waterway. Hencethe claim upheld till the seventeenth century that the King of England was"Sovereign of the Seas, " and that in the Channel and the North Sea everyforeign ship had to lower her sails and salute any English "King's ship"that she met. 

Sluys, which had such far-reaching consequences, was not the first ofEnglish naval victories. Alfred the Great maintained in the latter part ofhis reign a fleet of small ships to guard the coasts against the Norse andDanish pirates, and this won him the name of founder of the British Navy. But for centuries after there was no attempt at forming or keeping up aregular naval establishment. Alfred's navy must have been dispersed underhis weaker successors, for the Northmen never found any serious obstaclesto their raids. Harold had no navy, and the result was that in a singletwelvemonth England was twice invaded, first by Harold Hadrada and Tostig, who were beaten at Stamford Bridge, and then by William the Norman, whoconquered at Hastings. But even the Conqueror had no fighting fleet. Hisships were used merely to ferry his army across the Channel, and he made noattempt to use them against the Northmen who harried the east coast. Therecord of victory begins with the reign of King John, when in 1213 WilliamLongsword, his half-brother, with a fleet gathered from the shipping ofDover and the south-eastern ports, destroyed a French fleet that hadassembled on the coast of the Netherlands to transport an invading army toEngland. Damme (i. E. "the dams or embankments to keep out the sea") wasthen a fortified port. It is now a Dutch village, some miles from thecoast, in the midst of green meadows won from the sea, with roads shaded byavenues of trees, and only the traffic of its canal to remind it that itonce had a harbour. 

Four years later Hubert de Burgh, Governor of Dover Castle, defeatedanother attempted raid on England by improvising a fleet and attacking theFrench squadron in the Straits. De Burgh got to windward of the French, then sailed down on them, grappled and boarded them. There was an incidentwhich happily we do not hear of again in naval warfare. As the Englishscrambled on board of the French ships they threw quicklime in the eyes oftheir opponents. It was, no doubt, an ugly trick of piratical fighting, forin those days when there was no police of the seas there was a certainamount of piracy and smuggling carried on by the men of Dover and theCinque Ports. Just as for lack of police protection highway robbery was adanger of travel by road, so till organized naval power developed there wasa good deal of piracy in the European seas, and peaceful traders sailed inlarge fleets for mutual protection, just as travellers on land took care tohave companions for a journey. The Channel was also enlivened by occasionalfights for fishing-grounds between fleets of fishing-craft, and thequicklime trick of Hubert de Burgh's battle was probably one of the methodsof this irregular warfare. 

Edward I had a navy which did useful service by coasting northward, as hisarmies marched into Scotland, and securing for them regular supplies andreinforcements by sea. Under his weak successor the sea was neglected, andit was the third Edward who used the navy effectually to secure that hisquarrel with France should be fought out, not on English ground, but on theContinent, and thus became the founder of the sea power of England. 

There was no Royal Navy in the modern sense of the term. When the King wentto war his fleet was recruited from three different sources. The warshipwas a merchantman, on board of which a number of fighting-men, knights, men-at-arms, archers and billmen were embarked. These were more numerousthan the crew of sailors which navigated the ship, for the largest vesselsof the time were not of more than two to three hundred tons, and as oarswere not used in the rough seas of the Channel and there was only one mastwith a single square sail, and perhaps a jib-foresail, the necessary handsfor sailing her were few. There was a dual command, the knight or noble wholed the fighting-men being no sailor, and having a pilot under him whocommanded the sailors and navigated the ship. This dual arrangement (whichwe have seen at work in the fleets of more ancient days) left its traces inour Navy up to the middle of the nineteenth century, when ships of theRoyal Navy still had, besides the captain, a "sailing master" among theirofficers. 

The King owned a small number of ships, which he maintained just as he kepta number of knights in his pay to form his personal retinue on land. Duringpeace he hired these ships out to merchants, and when he called them backfor war service he took the crews that navigated them into his pay, andsent his fighting-men on board. But the King's ships were the leastnumerous element in the war fleet. Merchantmen were impressed for servicefrom London and the other maritime towns and cities, the feudal levyproviding the fighting complement. A third element in the fleet wasobtained from the Cinque Ports. There were really seven, not five, ofthem--Dover, Hythe, Hastings, Winchelsea, Rye, Romney, and Sandwich. Undertheir charter they enjoyed valuable privileges, in return for which theywere bound to provide, when the King called upon them, fifty-seven shipsand twelve hundred men and boys for fifteen days at their own expense, andas long after as the King paid the necessary charges. The naming of soshort a term of service shows that maritime operations were expected not tolast long. It was, indeed, a difficult matter to keep a medieval fleet atsea, and the conditions that produced this state of things lasted far intothe modern period. Small ships crowded with fighting-men had no room forany large store of provisions and water. When the first scanty supply wasexhausted, unless they were in close touch with a friendly port, they hadto be accompanied by a crowd of storeships, and as the best merchantmenwould naturally have been impressed for the actual fighting, these would besmall, inferior, and less seaworthy ships, and the fleet would have to payas much attention to guarding its convoy as to operating against an enemy. No wonder that as a rule the most that could be attempted was a shortvoyage and a single stroke. 

It was in 1340 that King Edward III challenged the title of Philip ofValois to the crown of France, and by claiming it for himself began "theHundred Years' War. " Both sides to the quarrel began to collect fleets andarmies, and both realized that the first struggle would be on the sea. Itwould be thus decided whether the war was to be fought out on French or onEnglish ground. 

The French King collected ships from his ports and strengthened his fleetby hiring a number of large warships from Genoa, then one of the greatmaritime republics of the Mediterranean. The Genoese sailors knew thenorthern seas, for there were always some of their ships in the greattrading fleet that passed up the Channel each spring, bringing the produceof the Mediterranean countries and the East to the northern ports ofEurope, and returned in the late summer laden with the merchandise of theHansa traders. 

Early in the year King Philip had assembled a hundred and ninety ships, large and small, French and Genoese, off the little town of Sluys on thecoast of Flanders. The fleet lay in the estuary of the river Eede. LikeDamme, Sluys has now become an inland village. Its name means "the sluice, "and, like Damme, reminds us how the people of the Netherlands have forcenturies been winning their land from the sea by their great system ofdams to keep the sea-water back, and sluices to carry the river-water tothe sea. The estuary of the Eede where the French fleet anchored is nowpasture land traversed by a canal, and the embankments that keep the seafrom the meadow lands lie some miles to the westward of the place whereKing Edward won his great naval victory. 

Had the French acted at once, there was nothing to prevent them fromopening the war by invading England. Perhaps they did not know how slowlythe English fleet was assembling. 

In the late spring when the French armament was nearly complete, KingEdward had only forty ships ready. They lay in the estuaries of the Orwelland the Stour, inside Harwich, long a place of importance for Englishnaval wars in the North Sea. Gradually, week after week, other ships camein from the Thames, and the northern seaports, from Southampton and theCinque Ports, and even from Bristol, creeping slowly along the coasts fromharbour to harbour. All this time the French might have swept the seas anddestroyed the English in detail; but they waited for more ships and moremen, and the time of opportunity went by. 

At last in the beginning of June the English King had two hundred shipsassembled, from decked vessels down to open sailing-boats. An army crowdedon board of them, knights and nobles in shining armour, burghers andpeasants in steel caps and leather jerkins, armed with the long-bow or thecombined pike and long battle-axe known as the "bill. " The King's ship flewthe newly adopted royal standard in which the golden lions on a red field, the arms of England, were quartered with the golden lilies of France on afield of blue, and another banner displaying the device that is still theflag of the Royal Navy, the Red Cross of St. George on a field of white, the banner adopted by Richard Coeur de Lion in his Crusade. The other shipsflew the banners of the barons and knights who commanded them, and on theroyal ship and those of the chief commanders there were trumpeters whosemartial notes were to give the signal for battle. As a knight of the MiddleAges despised the idea of fighting on foot, and there might be a landing inFlanders, some of the barons had provided for all eventualities by takingwith them their heavy war horses, uncomfortably stabled in the holds of thelarger ships. 

The fleet sailed southward along the coast, keeping the land in sight. Thetwo hundred ships of varying rates of speed and handiness could not move inthe ordered lines of a modern naval armament, but streamed along in anirregular procession, closing up when they anchored for the night. From theNorth Foreland, with a favourable wind behind them, they put out into theopen sea, and steering eastward were out of sight of land for a few hours, a more venturous voyage for these coasting craft than the crossing of theAtlantic is for us to-day. It must have been a trying experience for knightand yeoman, and they must have felt that a great peril was past when thetops of church towers and windmills showed above the horizon, and then thelow shore fringed with sandhills and the green dykes came in sight. 

Coasting along the shore north-eastwards, the fleet reached a point to thenorth-west of Bruges, not far from where the watering-place of Blankenbergnow stands. It had been ascertained from fishermen and coast-folk that theFrench fleet was still at Sluys, and it was decided to proceed no furtherwithout reconnoitring the enemy. The larger ships anchored, the smallerwere beached. The fighting-men landed and camped on the shore to recoverfrom the distresses of their voyage, during which they would have beencramped up in narrow quarters. 

Instead of, like a modern admiral, sending some of his lighter and swifterships to take a look at the enemy, King Edward arranged a cavalryreconnaissance, a simpler matter for his knightly following. Some of thehorses were got ashore, and a party of knights mounted and rode over thesandhills towards Sluys. They reached a point where, without being observedby the enemy, they could get a good view of the hostile fleet, and theybrought back news that made the King decide to attack next day. 

The French fleet was commanded by two knights, the Sieur de Kiriet and theSieur de Bahuchet. Kiriet's name suggests that he came of the Breton racethat has given so many good sailors and naval officers to France, soperhaps he knew something of the sea. Associated with the two Frenchcommanders there was an experienced fighting admiral, a veteran of the warsof the Mediterranean, Barbavera, who commanded the Genoese ships. Thoughthey had a slight superiority of numbers and more large ships than theEnglish, Kiriet and Bahuchet were, as one might expect from their prolongedinactivity, very wanting in enterprise now that the crisis had come. Theywere preparing to fight on the defensive. It was in vain that theexperienced commander Barbavera urged that they should weigh anchor andfight the English in the open sea, where numbers and weight would give theman advantage that would be lost in the narrow waters of the Eede estuary. They persisted in awaiting the attack. 

The French fleet was anchored along the south shore of the river-mouth, sterns to the land, its left towards the river-mouth, its right towards thetown of Sluys. The vessel on the extreme left was an English ship of largesize, the "Great Cristopher, " captured in the Channel in the first days ofthe war. The ships were grouped in three divisions--left, centre, andright. Kiriet and Bahuchet adopted the same plan of battle that King Olafhad used at Svold. The ships in each of the three divisions were lashedtogether side by side, so that they could only be boarded by the highnarrow bows, and there was an addition to the Norse plan, for inboardacross the bows barricades had been erected formed of oars, spars, andplanking, fastened across the forecastle decks. Behind these barriersarchers and Genoese cross-bowmen were posted. There was a second line ofarchers in the fighting-tops, for since the times of Norse warfare themasts had become heavier, and now supported above the crossyard a kind ofcrow's nest where two or three bowmen could be stationed, with shields hunground them as a parapet. 

The fleet thus was converted into a series of three long, narrow floatingforts. It was an intelligible plan of defence for a weak fleet against astrong one, but a hopeless plan for an armament strong enough to have metits opponents on the open sea, ship to ship. At Svold, Erik Jarl had shownthat such an array could be destroyed piecemeal if assailed on an exposedflank, and at Sluys the left, where the "Great Cristopher" lay to seaward, positively invited such an attack. 

King Edward saw his advantage as soon as his knights came back from theiradventurous ride and told him what they had seen, and he arranged his plansaccordingly. His great ships were to lead the attack, and concentrate theirefforts on the left of the French line. The rest were to pass inside themand engage the enemy in front, on the left, and centre. The enemy had bytying up his ships made it impossible to come to the rescue of the left, even if the narrow waters of the estuary would have allowed him to deployhis force into line. The English would have, and could not fail to keep, alocal superiority from the very outset on the left of the enemy, and onceit came to close quarters they would clear the French and Genoese decksfrom end to end of the line, taking ship after ship. While the attackdeveloped the English archers would prepare the way for it by thinning theranks of their enemies on the ships in the centre and then on the right. 

At dawn on 24 June--the day of battle--the wind was blowing fair into themouth of the Eede, but the tide was ebbing, and the attack could not bedriven home till it turned, and gave deep water everywhere between thebanks of the inlet. King Edward used the interval to array his fleet andget it into position for the dash into the river. His ships stood out tosea on the starboard tack, a brave sight with the midsummer sun shining onthe white sails, the hundreds of banners glowing with red, blue, white, andgold, the painted shields hanging on poop and bulwark. On the raised bowsand sterns of the larger ships barons and knights and men-at-arms stoodarrayed in complete armour. The archers were ranged along the bulwarks, orlooked out from the crow's-nest-tops over the swelling sails. 

Old Barbavera must have longed to cut lashings, slip cables, drift out onthe tide, and meet the English in the open, but he was in a minority of oneagainst two. And now the tide was dead slack and began to turn, and KingEdward's trumpets gave the expected signal for action. As their notes rangover the sea the shouting sailors squared the yards and the fleet began toscud before the wind for the river-mouth, where beyond the green dykes thatkept the entrance free a forest of masts bristled along the bank towardsSluys. 

The English came in with wind and tide helping them, several ships abreast, the rest following each as quickly as she might, like a great flock ofsea-birds streaming towards the shore. There could be no long ranging fireto prelude the close attack. At some sixty yards, when men could see eachother's faces across the gap, the English archers drew their bows, and thecloth-yard arrows began to fly, their first target the "Great Cristopher"on the flank of the line. Bolts from cross-bows came whizzing back inreply. But, as at Crecy soon after, the long-bow with its rapid dischargeof arrows proved its superiority over the slower mechanical weapon of theGenoese cross-bowmen. 

But no time was lost in mere shooting. Two English ships crashed into thebows and the port side of the "Cristopher, " and with the cry of "St. Georgefor England!" a score of knights vied with each other for the honour ofbeing first on board of the enemy. The other ships of the English van swunground bow to bow with the next of the French line, grappled and fought toboard them. King Edward himself climbed over the bows of a French ship, risking his life as freely as the youngest of his esquires. Then for awhile on the French left it was a question of which could best handle thelong, heavy swords, made not for deft fencing work, but for sheer hardhacking at helmet and breastplate. 

Behind this fight on the flank, ship after ship slipped into the river, butat first attacked only the left division closely, those that had pushedfurthest in opening with arrow fire on the centre and leaving the right tolook helplessly on. The English archers soon cleared the enemy's tops oftheir bowmen, and then from the English masts shot coolly into the throngon the hostile decks, their comrades at the bulwarks shooting over theheads of those engaged in the bows. The English arrows inflicted severeloss on the enemy, but the real business was done by the close attack ofthe boarding-parties, that cleared ship after ship from the left inwards, each ship attacked in turn having to meet the knights and men-at-arms fromseveral of the English vessels. 

But the French fought with determined courage, and hour after hour went byas the attack slowly worked its way along the line. The slaughter wasterrible, for in a sea-fight, as in the storming of a city wall, no quarterwas asked or given. The crews of the captured ships were cut down as theyfought, or driven over the stern into the water, where, for the most part, their heavy armour drowned them. 

It was past noon, and the tide was turning when the left and centre, thesquadrons of Kiriet and Bahuchet, were all captured. Then the attack ragedround the nearest vessels on the right, tall ships of the Genoese. Most ofthese, too, were taken, but as the tide ran out King Edward feared hislarge ships would ground in the upper waters of the estuary, and the signalwas given to break off the attack, an order welcome even to the wearyvictors. 

Barbavera, with a few ships, got clear of the beaten right wing and lay upnear Sluys, while the English plundered and burned some of their prizes andtook the best of them out to sea on the ebbing tide. In the night theGenoese admiral slipped out to sea, and got safely away. The French fleethad been utterly destroyed, and the Genoese sailors had no intention offurther risking themselves in King Philip's quarrel. They thought only ofreturning as soon as might be to the Mediterranean. 

King Edward went on to Ghent, after landing his fighting-men, and sendinghis fleet to bring further forces from England. Henceforth for many a longyear he might regard the Channel as a safe highway for men and supplies forthe war in France. 

The victory of the English had cost them a relatively trifling loss. TheFrench losses are said to have been nearly 30, 000 men. Strange to say, among the English dead were four ladies who had embarked on the King's shipto join the Queen's Court at Ghent. How they were killed is not stated. Probably they were courageous dames whose curiosity led them to watch thefight from the tall poop of the flagship as they would have watched atournament from the galleries of the lists, and there the cross-bow boltsof the Genoese found them. 

There is an old story that men feared to tell King Philip the news of thedisaster, and the Court jester broke the tidings with a casual remark thatthe French must be braver than the English, for they jumped into the sea byscores, while the islanders stuck to their ships. The defeat at seaprepared the way for other defeats by land, and in these campaigns thereappeared a new weapon of war--rudely fashioned cannon of short range andslow, inaccurate fire--the precursors of heavier artillery that was tochange the whole character of naval warfare. 

It was the coming of the cannon that inaugurated the modern period. Butbefore telling of battles in which artillery played the chief part, we musttell of a decisive battle that was a link between old and new. Lepanto--thebattle that broke the Turkish power in the Mediterranean--saw, like thesea-fights of later days, artillery in action, and at the same timeoar-driven galleys fighting with the tactics that had been employed atSalamis and Actium, and knights in armour storming the enemy's ships likeErik Jarl at Svold and King Edward at Sluys. 

 [Illustration: A GALLEY _From an engraving by J. P. Le Bas_]

 [Illustration: A CARRACK OR FRIGATE _From an engraving by Tomkins_ MEDITERRANEAN CRAFT OF THE 16TH CENTURY]

 CHAPTER V

 LEPANTO

 1571

The Turk has long been known as the "sick man of Europe, " and the story ofthe Ottoman Empire for a hundred years has been a tale of gradualdismemberment. Thus it is no easy matter for us to realize that forcenturies the Ottoman power was the terror of the civilized world. 

It was in 1358 that the Ottomans seized Gallipoli, on the Dardanelles, andthus obtained their first footing in Europe. They soon made themselvesmasters of Philippopolis and Adrianople. A crusading army, gathered todrive the Asiatic horde from Europe, was cut to pieces by the SultanBajazet at Nicopolis in 1396. On the day after the battle ten thousandChristian prisoners were massacred before the Sultan, the slaughter goingon from daybreak till late in the afternoon. The Turk had become the terrorof Europe. 

Constantinople was taken by Mahomet II in 1453, and the Greek Empire cameto an inglorious end. Then for more than a century Austrians, Hungarians, and Poles formed a barrier to the advance of the Asiatic power into CentralEurope. 

But the Turks during this century became a maritime power. They hadconquered the Crimea and were masters of the Black Sea. They had overrunGreece and most of the islands of the Archipelago. They had threatenedVenice with their fleets, and had for a while a foothold in Southern Italy. They took Rhodes from the Knights of St. John, annexed Syria and Egypt, andthe Sultan of Constantinople was acknowledged as the Khalifa of Islam, therepresentative of the Prophet by the Mohammedan states of NorthAfrica--Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco. In 1526 the victory of Mohacs made theTurks masters of Hungary. They had driven a wedge deep into Europe, andthere was danger that their fleets would soon hold the command of theMediterranean. 

These fleets were composed chiefly of large galleys--lineal descendants (soto say) of the ancient triremes. There was a row of long oars on eitherside, but sail power had so far developed that there were also one, two, even three tall masts, each crossed by a long yard that carried atriangular lateen sail. The base of the triangle lay along the yard, andthe apex was the lower corner of the triangular sail, which could be hauledover to either side of the ship, one end of the yard being hauled down onthe other side. The sail thus lay at an angle with the line of the keel, with one point of the yard high above the masthead, and by carrying thesheet tackle of the point of the sail across the ship, and reversing theposition of the yard, the galley was put on one tack or the other. Forward, pointing ahead, was a battery of two or more guns, and there was sometimesa second but lighter battery astern, to be used when the galley wasescaping from a ship of superior force. Turks, in the EasternMediterranean, Moors in the West, recruited their crews of rowers bycapturing Christian ships and raiding Christian villages, to carry offcaptives who could be trained to the oar. This piracy, plundering, andslave-hunting went on in the Mediterranean up to the first years of thenineteenth century, when, after the Turks themselves had long abandoned it, the sea rovers of the Barbary States in the western waters of the inlandsea still kept it up, and European nations paid blackmail to the Beys ofTripoli, Tunis, and Algiers to secure immunity for their ships and sailors. 

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries no part of the Mediterranean wasfree from the raids of the Moslem pirates. Such was the peril of the seathat ships used to carry two sets of sails, one white for use by day, theother black, in order to conceal their movements in the darkness. Thousandsof Christian slaves were always wearing out their miserable lives in thegalleys and prisons of the Mohammedan ports. Isolated expeditions weresometimes made by this or that Christian power for their deliverance. Tworeligious orders were founded to collect alms for their ransom, to ministerto them in their captivity, and to negotiate for their deliverance. But allthis was only a mitigation of the evil, and year after year there went onthe enslavement of Europeans, men for the galleys, women for the harems. 

One would have thought that all Europe would have banded itself together todrive back the Turk from the Danube and sweep the corsairs from theMediterranean. To their honour be it said that successive Popes endeavouredto arouse the old crusading spirit, and band civilized and Christian Europetogether for an enterprise that was to the advantage of all, and theneglect of which was a lasting disgrace. But their efforts were longdefeated by the mutual quarrels and jealousies and the selfish policy ofthe European powers. Venice and Genoa long preferred to maintain peace withthe Sultans, in order to have the undisturbed monopoly of the Easterntrade. France was too often the ally of the Turk, thanks to her traditionalrivalry with the House of Austria, the rulers of the German Empire. Thepressure of Turkish armies on the Eastern frontiers of the Empire made itimpossible for the Emperors to use their full strength on the Rhine or inNorth Italy. 

Again and again Rome uttered the cry of alarm, and the warning passedunheeded. But at last it was listened to, when a new outburst of aggressiveactivity on the part of the Turks for a while roused the maritime nationsof the Mediterranean from their lethargy, and then a glorious page wasadded to the story of naval warfare. 

In the year 1566 Suleiman the Magnificent died. He had conquered at Mohacsand besieged Vienna, enlarged the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire on land, and made its fleets the terror of the Mediterranean; but the year before hedied his pashas had failed disastrously in their attempt on Malta, and hissuccessor, Selim II (whom Ottoman historians surname "the Drunkard"), wasreported to be a half-imbecile wretch, devoid of either intelligence orenterprise. So Europe breathed more freely. But while the "Drunkard" idledin his seraglio by the Golden Horn, the old statesmen, generals, andadmirals, whom Suleiman had formed, were still living, and Europe hadlulled itself with false hopes of peace. 

For the sake of their Eastern trade interests the Venetians had as far aspossible stood neutral in the wars between Turk and Christian, and had longbeen in undisturbed possession of Cyprus. For eighty years they had held itunder a treaty that recognized certain rights of the Sultan to the islandas a dependency of Egypt. They had stood neutral while Suleiman took Rhodesand besieged Malta, though on either occasion the intervention of theVenetian fleet would have been a serious blow to the Ottoman power. TheVenetian Senate was therefore disagreeably surprised when an envoy fromConstantinople demanded the evacuation of Cyprus, and announced that theSultan intended to exercise his full rights as sovereign of the island. Thearmaments of the Republic were at a low ebb, but Doge and Senate rejectedthe Ottoman demand, and defied the menace of war that accompanied it. 

The neutrality of Venice had been the chief obstacle to the efforts ofPius V to form a league of the maritime powers of Southern Europe againstthe common enemy of Christendom. When, therefore, the Venetian ambassadorsapplied to the Vatican for help, the Pope put the limited resources of hisown states at their disposal, and exerted his influence to procure for themhelp from other countries. Pius saw the possibility of at last forming aleague against the Turk, and was statesman enough to perceive that a moreeffective blow would be struck against them by attacking them on the seathan by gathering a crusading army on the Theiss and the Danube. 

His own galleys were prepared for service under the orders of PrinceColonna, and a subsidy was sent to Venice from the papal treasury to aid inthe equipment of the Venetian fleet. The papal envoys appealed to theGenoese Republic, the Knights of Malta, and the Kings of France and Spainto reinforce the fleets of Rome and Venice. But France and Spain were moreinterested in their own local ambitions and jealousies, and even Philip IIgave at first very limited help. With endless difficulty a fleet of galleyswas at last assembled, Maltese, Genoese, Roman, Venetian, united under thecommand of Colonna. By the time the Christian armament was ready a largerTurkish fleet had appeared in the waters of Cyprus and landed an army, which, under its protection, began the siege of Nicosia. After long delaysColonna's fleet reached Suda Bay in Crete, and joined a squadron ofVenetian galleys kept for guardship duties in Cretan waters. 

Though Colonna was in nominal command, the fleet was really controlled by acommittee of the chiefs of its various squadrons. There were endlesscouncils of war, and it is a trite saying that "councils of war do notfight. " Prudent caution is oftener the outcome of such debates than daringenterprises. There was a time, in the first days of September, when, if theSuda fleet had gone boldly to the relief of Nicosia, it might have raisedthe siege, for the Venetian garrison was making such a vigorous defencethat in order to press the siege the Turkish pashas had stripped theirfleet of thousands of fighting-men to employ them in the trenches. But thegolden opportunity passed by, and when at last Colonna took his galleysacross to the coast of Asia Minor, Nicosia had fallen, and the Turks hadbegun the siege of the other Cypriote fortress, Famagusta. 

Again there were divided counsels and pitiful irresolution. The commandersof the various contingents were brave men, veterans of the Mediterraneanwars. But the coalition lacked one determined leader who could dominate therest, decide upon a definite plan of action, and put it into energeticexecution. Time was wasted till the bad weather began. Then the varioussquadrons made their way to the ports where they were to pass the winter. Asquadron of the Venetians remained in the Cretan ports. The rest dispersedto the harbours of Italy and the Ionian islands. 

The aged pontiff heard with bitter disappointment that nothing had beenaccomplished. The news might well have made even a younger man lose heart. But with undaunted courage he devoted himself to forming a more powerfulcombination for the great effort of the coming summer. 

It was all-important to secure the alliance of the King of Spain, who wasalso ruler of Naples and Sicily. But it was only after long negotiationsand smoothing away of endless jealousies between Spain and Venice, that atlast the treaty of the "Holy League" was signed by the Republic of Venice, the King of Spain, and the Pope, Pius V undertaking to bring in help fromthe minor Princes and Republics of Italy and the Knights of Malta. 

It was proposed that there should be a fleet of three hundred ships, ofwhich two hundred were to be galleys and a hundred _navi_, that isfull-rigged sailing-ships. It was the first time that the sailing-ship hadbeen given so important a place in naval projects in the Mediterranean, andthis shows the change that was rapidly coming into naval methods. Theallies were jointly to raise a force of 50, 000 fighting-men, including 500gunners. 

Once the treaty was arranged preparations were pushed forward, but againthere were wearisome delays. It was easy enough to build galleys. Thearsenal of Venice had once laid a keel at sunrise and launched the galleybefore sunset. But to recruit the thousands of oarsmen was a longerbusiness. It was not till well into the summer of 1571 that the armada ofthe Holy League began to assemble at the appointed rendezvous, Messina. Meanwhile, the Turks were pressing the siege of Famagusta, blockading it byland and sea, and sapping slowly up to its walls. The heroic commandant ofthe place, Antonio Bragadino, a worthy son of Venice, made an activedefence, retarding by frequent sorties the progress of the enemy's siegeworks. 

By the month of June the Turks had lost nearly 30, 000 men, including thosewho fell victims to the fever that raged in their camps. Bragadino'sgarrison had been thinned by the enemy's fire, by sickness, and bysemi-starvation, and at the same time the magazines of ammunition werenearly empty. Behind the yawning breaches of the rampart an inner line ofimprovised defences had been erected, and the citadel was still intact. Ifhe had had a little more flour and gunpowder, Bragadino would have held outas stubbornly as ever. But with starving men, empty magazines, and no signof relief, he had to accept the inevitable. He sent a flag of truce toMustapha Pasha, the Ottoman general, and relying on the impression made byhis stubborn defence, asked for generous terms. 

Mustapha professed a chivalrous admiration for the heroism of theVenetians. It was agreed that the garrison should march out with thehonours of war, and be transported under a flag of truce to Crete and thereset at liberty. The Ottoman general pledged himself to protect the peopleof Famagusta, and secure for them the free exercise of their religion. 

The war-worn soldiers marched out. Bragadino, with the Venetian nobles, were received at Mustapha's tent with every mark of honour. But no soonerhad the officers been separated from their men, and these divided intosmall parties, than all were made prisoners, bound, and robbed of all theirpersonal property. The Turks had often shown remorseless cruelty aftervictory, but they generally observed the terms of a capitulationhonourably. Mustapha's conduct was an unexampled case of treachery andbarbarity. 

The Venetian soldiers were sent on board the Turkish galleys and chained totheir oars as slaves. Bragadino saw his officers beheaded before thePasha's tent. He might have saved his life by becoming a renegade, but hewas incapable of such apostasy and treason. The barbarian, in whose powerhe was, invented new torments for his victim. Bragadino had his ears andnose cut off, and thus mutilated he was paraded round the Turkish army, andthen rowed in a boat through the fleet, and everywhere greeted with insultand mockery. Then Mustapha sentenced his prisoner to be flayed alive. Thetorture had hardly begun when he expired, dying the death of a hero and amartyr. Mustapha sent to Selim the Drunkard as trophies of the conquest ofCyprus the heads of the Venetian nobles and the skin of Bragadino stuffedwith straw. The news of the fall of Famagusta and the horrors that followedit did not reach the allied fleet till long after it had sailed fromMessina. 

But even during the period of preparation there were tidings that mightwell have inspired the leaders of the League with a new energy. The dangerfrom the East was pressing. In the spring the Ottoman fleet in the watersof Cyprus had been reinforced with new galleys from the arsenal ofConstantinople, and a squadron of Algerine corsairs under the renegadePasha Ulugh Ali, one of the best of the Turkish admirals. Thusstrengthened, the fleet numbered some two hundred and fifty sail. Evenbefore Famagusta fell Mustapha detached powerful squadrons which harriedthe Greek archipelago, and then rounding the capes of the Morea, madeprizes of peaceful traders and raided villages along the western shores ofGreece and in the Ionian islands. 

During the period of the Turkish power Europe was saved again and againfrom grave danger, because the Ottoman Sultans and the Pashas of Barbarynever seem to have grasped the main principles of maritime warfare. Theyhad no wide views. Most of the men who commanded for them on the sea hadthe spirit of pirates and buccaneers rather than of admirals. They put tosea to harry the trade of the Christian states and to raid their coastvillages, and so secure prizes, plunder, and slaves. They frittered awaytheir strength on these minor enterprises. Again and again occasionsoffered, when to concentrate their naval forces for a series of campaignsthat would sweep the Christian fleets one by one from the sea would havemade them masters of the Mediterranean, placed its commerce and its coastsat their mercy, and opened the way for a career of conquest, but theyallowed these opportunities to escape. 

The peril that menaced European civilization in 1571 was that at last theMoslem powers of the Mediterranean were actually combining their sea forcesfor a great effort of maritime conquest. Their operations were stilldelayed by their traditional disposition to indulge in plundering raids, orto wait for the fall of a blockaded fortress, instead of making thedestruction of the opposing sea power their first object. If the pashas ofSelim's fleets had really understood their business, they might havedestroyed the Christian squadrons in detail before they could effect theirconcentration in the waters of Messina. But the Turkish admirals let theopportunity escape them during the long months when the "Holy League" wasbeing formed and its fleets made ready for action. 

That the danger was met by the organization of a united effort to break theMoslem power on the sea was entirely due to the clear-sighted initiativeand the persistent energy of the aged Pius V. He had fully realized thatthe naval campaign of 1570 had been paralysed by the Christian fleet beingdirected, not by one vigorous will, but by the cautious decisions of apermanent council of war. He insisted on the armament of 1571 being underthe direction of one chief, and exercising his right as chief of theLeague, Pius V had to select the commander of its forces; he named ascaptain-general of the Christian armada Don Juan of Austria. 

Don Juan was then a young soldier, twenty-four years of age. He was the sonof the Emperor Charles V and his mistress, Barbara Blomberg of Ratisbon. His boyhood had been passed, unknown and unacknowledged by his father, in apeasant household in Castille. As a youth he had been adopted by a noblefamily of Valladolid. Then Philip II had acknowledged him as hishalf-brother, and given him the rank of a Spanish Prince. He studied atAlcala, having for his friends and companions Alexander Farnese, the "GreatCaptain" of future years, and the unfortunate Don Carlos. Don Juan's rankgave him early the opportunity of displaying in high command his markedgenius for war. He was employed in expeditions in the Mediterranean, anddirected the suppression of the Moorish revolt in Granada in 1570. He wasthen named "Capitan-General del Mar"--High Admiral of the Spanish fleets. Young as he was when Pius V appointed him commander-in-chief of the forcesof the Holy League, his services by land and sea, as well as his princelyrank, gave him the necessary prestige to enable him to command even oldergenerals like Marco Antonio Colonna, the leader of the papal and Italianforces, and the veteran Sebastian Veniero, who directed those of Venice. 

During the period of concentration it was Veniero who had the mostdifficult problem to solve. The Venetian fleet had separated into twodivisions at the close of the campaign of 1570. The weaker wintered in theharbours of Crete. The stronger detachment passed the winter at Corfu, inthe Ionian islands. In the early summer of 1571 Veniero took command atCorfu, and occupied himself with preparing the fleet for sea, andreinforcing it with new galleys from the arsenal of Venice, and newlyraised drafts of sailors, rowers, and fighting-men. Before hispreparations were complete, the vanguard of the Turkish armada, continuallyreinforced from the East, appeared on the western coasts of Greece. Toattack them with the force he had at hand would be to court destruction. Ulugh Ali, who commanded the vanguard of the enemy, was perhaps thebest-hated of the Moslem admirals. A Calabrese fisherman, he had beencaptured as a young man by one of the Barbary corsairs, and spent somemiserable years chained as a galley-slave at an oar. At last his endurancebroke down, and he escaped from his misery by becoming a Mohammedan. Underhis new name he rose rapidly to command, enriched himself by successfulpiracy, and before long won himself the rank of a Pasha and a vice-royaltyin North Africa. But, happily for Europe at large, though unfortunately formany a village along the shores of Greece and Illyria, Ulugh Ali as admiralof the Turkish fleets remained still a pirate, with the fixed idea that aplundering cruise was better than a naval campaign. Had the renegade beenmore admiral than pirate, he had an opportunity of changing the course ofhistory in that early summer of 1571. 

His fleet cruising off the coasts of Epirus held a central strategicposition in relation to the still dispersed Christian fleets. The papalcontingents on the western shores of Italy and the Spanish fleets in theports of the Two Sicilies, or coasting from Spain by the Gulf of Lyons andthe Italian shores, were, it is true, beyond his immediate reach, but hecould easily lop off one important branch of the triple League by cuttingoff the Venetians. The squadron from Crete must pass him to the southward;the more important contingent from Corfu must pass between him and SouthernItaly in narrow seas where he could hardly fail to bring it to action, andif it fought, the chances were he would overwhelm it. Or he might attack itat Corfu, or drive it from the island back upon Venice. If he had good luckhe might hope to be in time even after this to strike a blow also at theCretan squadron. 

But he thought only of plundering and burning along the coasts, carryingoff crowds of prisoners, some of whom were at once added to his crews ofchained rowers. Veniero at Corfu had to steel his heart against entreatiesto come to the rescue of the mainland coast population. He could not savethem, and he dared not destroy his fleet in a hopeless effort. He mustseize the opportunity while the Turks were occupied with their raids tosail unopposed to Messina. He decided even to risk the loss of Corfu. Hewas acting on the sound principle that in war all minor objects must besacrificed to the chief end of the campaign. But he could not be sure thatin obeying his original orders, and taking his fleet to Messina, he was notin another way risking his position, perhaps his life. He was leaving tothe Turks the temporary command of the Adriatic. After he left Corfu theycarried fire and sword along the Illyrian coast. There was a panic inVenice, and the city of the lagoons made hasty preparations for defence. But Veniero's action was soon justified. The news that the Christian armadawas assembled at Messina alarmed Ulugh Ali into abandoning any furtherenterprises in the Adriatic, and his squadrons withdrew to join theconcentration of the Turkish fleets at the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth. 

It was not till 23 August that the Spanish Prince arrived at Messina, tookcommand of the assembled fleets, and proceeded at once to organize hisforces, and issued his sailing and battle orders. 

Nearly three hundred ships crowded the harbour of Messina. There were threefleets, the Italian squadrons under the papal admiral Colonna, the Venetianfleet, and the fleet of Philip II formed of the ships of Spain and Naples. The main force of the three fleets was made up of galleys. But there werealso six galleasses and some seventy frigates, the former dependingchiefly, the latter entirely, on sail power for propulsion. The frigatewas, in the following century and almost up to our time, what the cruiseris in the armoured navies of to-day. But in the Mediterranean fleets of thefifteenth century the _frigata_ represented only an early type, out ofwhich the frigate of later days was developed. She was a smallsailing-ship, sometimes a mere yacht, armed only with a few light guns. Thefrigates were used to convey stores, the swifter among them being oftenemployed as dispatch boats. Depending entirely on the wind, it was notalways easy for them to accompany a fleet of galleys. Don Juan gave up theidea of making them part of his fighting fleet. It was still the period ofthe oar-driven man-of-war, though the day of sails was close at hand. 

The six galleasses represented a new type, a link between the oared shipsof the past and the sailing fleets of the immediate future. They were heavythree-masted ships, with rounded bows, and their upper works built with aninward curve, so that the width across the bulwarks amidships was less thanthat of the gundeck below. The frames of warships were built on these linestill after Nelson's days. This "tumble home" of the sides, as it wascalled, was adopted to bring the weight of the broadside guns nearer thecentre line of the ship, and so lessen the leverage and strain on herframework. The guns had first been fired over the bulwarks, but at a veryearly date port-holes were adopted for them. The galleass had a highforecastle and poop, each with its battery of guns, pointing ahead, astern, and on each side. Other guns were mounted on the broadsides in the waist ofthe ship; and to command the main-deck, in case an enemy's boarders gotpossession of it, lighter guns were mounted on swivels at the back of theforecastle and on the forepart of the poop. Compared to the low, crowdedgalley, the galleass was a roomy and much more seaworthy ship. She wasgenerally a slow sailer, but in order to enable her to make some progress, even in calms or against a head wind, and so work with a fleet of galleys, she had a rowers' deck, under her main or gundeck, and on each side twelveor fifteen oars of enormous length, each worked by several men. She had thedrawbacks of most compromises. She could not sail as well as the frigate, and her speed with the oar was much less than that of the galley. But thegain was that she could be used as a floating battery, carrying many moreguns than the few pieces mounted in the galley's bows. The galleass's gunswere high above the water, and the galleys dreaded their plunging fire. Each of Don Juan's six galleasses carried some thirty guns of variouscalibres, and to defend their high sides against an attack by boarders, their fighting-men were chiefly arquebusiers. 

In order to fuse the triple fleet of the Allies into one armada, and toavoid the risk of international jealousies, Don Juan proceeded to form hisgalleys into five squadrons, each made up of ships selected from the threefleets, so that none of these divisions could claim to act only for Rome, or Spain, or Venice. 

The organization of the Christian armada may be thus summed up in tabularform:--

 ----------------+----------------------+--------+------------------------ Division. | Commander. |Galleys. | Sailing-ships. ----------------+----------------------+--------+------------------------ Vanguard |Juan de Cardona | 7 | | | |Galleasses 6 M o { | | |Frigates 70 a f {Left Wing |Agostino Barbarigo | 53 | -- i { | | | 76 n b { | | | a {Centre |Don Juan de Austria | 62 |These frigates sailed l t { | | |during the voyage as a i t { | | |separate squadron under n l {Right Wing |Giovanni Andrea Doria | 50 |Don Cesar d'Avalos. E e { | | |They were employed as | | |storeships and tenders. Reserve |Alvaro de Bazan, | | |Marquis de Santa Cruz | 30 | ----------------+----------------------+--------+------------------------ Total 202 +76 sailing-ships = 278 ships in all. ----------------+----------------------+--------+------------------------

 [Illustration: GALLEYS OF THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA IN ACTION WITH TURKISH GALLEYS]

It is interesting to note that instead of choosing one of the largesailing-vessels as his flagship, Don Juan displayed his flag, the standardof the League, from the masthead of the largest of the Spanish galleys, the"Reale, " a splendid ship built for the Viceroy of Catalonia three yearsbefore. She had sixty oars, a battery of guns pointing forward through abreastwork in the bow, and another gun on her high poop, pointing over herstern, which was adorned with elaborate wood carvings, the work of Vasquezof Seville, one of the most famous sculptors of the day. She had a crew of300 rowers and 400 fighting-men. In the battle-line two other great galleyswere to lie to right and left of the "Reale, " on her starboard, theflagship of Colonna, the papal admiral, and to port that of Veniero theVenetian, flying the lion banner of St. Mark. Next to these were thegalleys of the Princes of Parma and Urbino. On the extreme right of thecentre was the post of the flagship of the Knights of Malta, commanded bythe Grand Master Giustiniani. All the galleys of the central squadron flewblue pennons as their distinguishing flag. 

The vanguard and the right flew green triangular flags. When the line wasformed Cardona and his seven galleys were to take post on the left or innerflank of the right division. Doria, the Genoese admiral, was on the extremeright. 

The left flew yellow pennons. Its admiral was the Venetian Barbarigo, aveteran of many a hard-fought campaign. 

Santa Cruz, the admiral of the reserve squadron, was posted in the middleof his line, flying his flag on board the "Capitana" or flagship of theNeapolitan squadron. All the flagships had as a distinctive mark a long redpennon at the foremast-head. 

Twenty-eight thousand fighting-men were embarked on the fleet. The Italiansoldiers were the most numerous, then came the Spaniards. There were about2000 of other nationalities, chiefly Germans. The Venetian galleys wererather short of fighting-men, and to remedy this weakness Veniero, thoughwith some reluctance, consented to receive on board of them detachments ofDon Juan's Spanish infantry. 

On almost every ship there were serving a number of young gentlemenvolunteers. To give a list of their names and of the commanders ofgalleasses and galleys and detachments of troops embarked would be to drawup a roll of the historic names of Italy and Spain. Lepanto might well bedescribed as not only the closing battle of crusading days, but the lastbattle of the age of chivalry. And, strange to say, on board of one ofColonna's galleys, acting as second in command of its fighting-men, therewas a young Spaniard who was to "laugh Europe out of its chivalry"--DonMiguel Cervantes de Saavedra, author of "Don Quixote" some thirty yearslater. 

At the end of the first week of September the fleet was ready for sea, butthe start was delayed by bad weather. For several days a storm raged in theStraits of Messina, accompanied by thunder and lightning and torrents ofrain. At length, on the 14th, the sky cleared and the sea went down. Nextday Don Juan sent off the squadron of frigates under the command of DonCesar d'Avalos, with orders to proceed to Taranto and await the main bodyof the fleet there. 

At sunrise on the 16th the great fleet left Messina. The "Reale" led theway; the tall galleasses were towed out by the galleys. It took some hoursfor the whole armada to clear the harbour, then, on the admiral's signal, they set their sails, and with wind and oar steered south-westward acrossthe straits. The first day's voyage was only a few miles. Don Juan wastaking the opportunity of reviewing his fleet, and testing his arrangementsfor its formation. Each captain had his written orders giving his positionwhen under way and in the line of battle. It was in this formation thefleet anchored along the Italian coast beyond Reggio, on a front of fivemiles. 

Next day the fleet rounded Cape Spartivento, the toe of Italy, and after anattempt to continue the voyage on the 19th was forced by bad weather to putback and anchor under shelter of the land for some twenty-four hours. 

As the weather improved, Don Juan decided not to coast round the Gulf byTaranto, but to lay his course from Cape Colonna for Cape Santa Maria (theheel of Italy), and then across the opening of the Adriatic to Corfu. Afrigate was sent to inform D'Avalos of the change of plans, and the armada, helped by a favouring wind, stood out to sea and for a while lost sight ofland. 

It was known that the Turkish fleet had concentrated in or near the openingof the Gulf of Corinth. It might also have put to sea, and Don Juan tookprecautions in view of a possible encounter during his voyage. Cardona, with his seven swift galleys of the vanguard, was directed to keep twentymiles ahead during the daytime, closing in to a distance of only eightmiles at sunset, and increasing the interval again at dawn. The threesquadrons of the main body appear to have been formed each in line ahead, the leading ships, those of the admirals, at the head of each squadron, with such lateral intervals between the columns that line of battle couldbe formed, by the ships coming up to right and left of their flagships. Santa Cruz with the reserve acted as a rearguard, and was to assist anyvessel that might be in difficulties. The rear ship of each squadron was todisplay a large lantern at the mast-head after dark. The admiral's ship wasdistinguished by three large lanterns. 

Forty galleys were detached to bring reinforcements of infantry fromTaranto and Gallipoli. Four swift galleys under the command of Gild'Andrada were sent on in advance to obtain information of the Ottomanfleet. 

From Cape Santa Maria the course was set for the Ionian Islands. On themorning of 24 September, through the driving rain that accompanied a heavythunderstorm, the look-outs of the vanguard could distinguish the chain ofislands north of Corfu, the islets of Merlera, Fano, and Samothraki, whichwith the reefs that almost connect them form a natural breakwater. The windand sea were rising, and the fleet anchored inside the shelter of theislands and reefs. It was not until 26 September that it reached at lengththe harbour of Corfu. It had taken ten days to complete a passage that thetourist from Messina to Corfu now covers in a single day. 

At Corfu the commandant of the fortress had terrible tales to tell of UlughAli's raid on the island, and the horrors that the Turks had perpetrated inthe villages, which now presented a scene of ruin and desolation. Gild'Andrada rejoined the fleet there. He had not seen the Turkish armament, but he had obtained news of it from coasters and fishermen. He estimatedfrom these reports that it was inferior in numbers to the Christian fleet, and he had learned that, as if conscious of its weakness, it had takenshelter well up the Gulf of Corinth, in the Bay of Lepanto. The bay lieseastward of the point where the gulf contracts into a narrow strait betweenthe "Castles of Roumelia" and "the Morea, " then held by the Turks. Thedefences were of such strength that at the time the strait was popularlyknown as "the Little Dardanelles. "[5] It was thought that it would behopeless for the allied fleet to attempt to force the passage. 

 [5] Admiral Jurien de la Gravière in his study of the campaign of Lepanto remarks that many a fortified strait has owed its inviolability only to its exaggerated reputation for the strength of its defences, and adds that in the Greek war of independence a French sailing corvette, the "Echo, " easily fought its way into the gulf past the batteries, and repassed them again when coming out a few days later. 

Four days were spent in the waters of Corfu, and 4000 troops of thegarrison were embarked. Gil d'Andrada's four galleys had again been sentaway to reconnoitre the enemy. On 30 September the weather was fine and thewind favourable, so Don Juan led his fleet from Corfu to the Bay ofGomenizza, thirty miles to the south-east, on the coast of Albania. Thegaleasses guarded the entrance of the bay; the galleys were moored insideit, bow on to the shore, with their guns thus directed towards it. Workingparties were landed under their protection to obtain supplies of wood andwater. On 2 October some Spaniards engaged in the work were surprised andmade prisoners by Turkish irregulars, Albanian horsemen, who carried themoff to the headquarters of Ali Pasha, the Turkish generalissimo, atLepanto. 

Gil d'Andrada rejoined at Gomenizza with news that the Turkish fleet wasnot more than 200 strong; that pestilence had broken out among itsfighting-men, and that many of the galleys were undermanned. Thisencouraged Don Juan to attempt an attack upon it as it lay in the gulf. 

But Ali Pasha had also received reports that led him to underrate thestrength of the Christian armada, and so induced him to put out to sea insearch of it. Twice he had reconnoitred the allied fleet. Before Don Juanarrived at Messina, Ulugh Ali had sent one of his corsairs, Kara Khodja, tocruise in Sicilian waters. The corsair painted every part of his ship adead black, and one dark night, under black sails, he slipped into Messinaharbour. The utter daring of his enterprise assisted him. Gliding like aghost about the roadstead, unmarked and unchallenged, he counted galleys, galleasses, and frigates, and brought back an under-estimate of the alliedstrength, only because the fleet was not yet all assembled. He repeated hisexploit while the fleet lay in the waters of Corfu. He could not approachso closely as at Messina, but what he saw led him to believe it was nostronger than when he first reconnoitred it. When Ali Pasha questioned theprisoners taken at Gomenizza, using torture to make them answer him, hethought their admissions confirmed Kara Khodja's reports. So he decided tocome out of Lepanto and attack the allied armada. 

Thus each fleet believed the other to be inferior in strength, andconsequently desired an early engagement. The Turkish fleet was made up of210 galleys and 64 galliots and smaller craft, 274 sail in all, and itscommander, Ali Pasha, was one of the veteran admirals of Suleiman'svictorious days; 25, 000 soldiers had been embarked under the Seraskier, orGeneral, Pertev Pasha. Ali had organized his fleet in four divisions, centre, right wing, left wing, and reserve. All the ships had oars as wellas sails, and though Ali had no huge floating batteries, like the sixgalleasses of Don Juan's fleet, the Turkish admiral could match theChristians with galley for galley, and have a surplus of 8 galleys and 66smaller craft. Of these the 44 galliots were almost as useful as thegalleys. Unlike the latter, which had two and often three masts, thegalliot had only one, and was smaller in size. But the Turkish galliots, mostly belonging to the piratical states of North Africa, were as large asmany of the Christian galleys of the second class; they could sail well, and they were manned by crews of fighting-men that had a long record ofpiratical warfare. 

The organization of Ali's fleet was:--

 ------------+----------+-----------+----------------+--------- Division. | Galleys. | Galliots. | Smaller Craft. | Totals. ------------+----------+-----------+----------------+--------- | | | | {Right Wing | 54 | 2 | -- | 56 { | | | | {Centre | 87 | 8 | -- | 95 { | | | | {Left Wing | 61 | 32 | -- | 93 | | | | Reserve | 8 | 2 | 20 | 30 ------------+----------+-----------+----------------+--------- Totals | 210 | 44 | 20 | 274 ------------+----------+-----------+----------------+---------

The fifty galleys of the right wing were ships from Egypt, the ports ofAsia Minor, and the arsenal of Constantinople, united under the command ofMohammed Chuluk Bey, Governor of Alexandria, known among the Christiansailors of the Mediterranean as Mohammed Scirocco. The centre, commanded byAli in person, was made up of galleys from Rhodes and the Greek islands, and from Constantinople and Gallipoli, and the Tripolitan squadron underDjaffir Agha, Governor of Tripoli. The left under Ulugh Ali, the Viceroy ofAlgiers, included ships from Constantinople, Asia Minor, Syria, and theports of North-west Africa. The reserve, chiefly composed of small craft, was under the command of Murad Dragut of Constantinople. 

There were a good many Greek and Calabrese renegades among the captains ofthe galleys, but the Syrians and the mixed Arab race of Alexandria hadlearned the ways of the sea; some even of the Turks were good sailors, andthe men of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers had made the sea their element. Thethousands of rowers, who provided the propelling power of the galleys, werefor the most part Christian slaves, chained to their heavy oars, by whichthey slept when the fleet anchored, living a life of weary labour, oftenhalf starved, always badly clothed, so that they suffered from cold andwet. Death was the immediate penalty of any show of insubordination, andthe whip of their taskmasters kept them to their work. There were men ofall classes among them, sailors taken from prizes, passengers who had thebad luck to be on board captured ships, fishermen and tillers of the soilcarried off in coast raids. They were short-lived, for their masters didnot spare them, and considered it a more economic policy to work the rowersto the utmost and replace them by other captures when they broke down. 

The oarsmen of the allied fleet had also a hard lot, but not as bad as thatof Ali Pasha's galley-slaves, because in the Christian fleet there was aconsiderable proportion of men hired for the campaign. But there was also aservile element, Turks taken prisoner in previous campaigns and chained tothe oar in reprisal for the treatment of Christian captives by Ottomancommanders, and a considerable number of what we should now call convictssentenced to hard labour, a rough lot of murderers, brigands, thieves, andthe like. It must be remembered that in most European countries thesentence for such offences would have been death. The convict galley-slavesof Don Juan's fleet were encouraged by the prospect of winning eithercomplete pardon or a remission of part of their sentences if there was avictory, and to enable them to co-operate in winning it, they were toldthat they would be freed from their chains and armed when the day of battlecame. 

The 25, 000 fighting-men of Ali Pasha's fleet were chiefly militia. Therewere only a few thousand of the formidable Janissaries. And among the smallarms of the Turkish fleet there were more bows and arrows than muskets. DonJuan had, on the other hand, a considerable number of arquebusiers on hisships. He had the further advantage that while even the largest of theTurkish galleys had only low bulwarks, the galleys of the allied fleet wereprovided with _pavesades_, large bucklers and shields, to be fitted alongthe bulwarks when clearing for action, and also permanent cross barriers toprevent a raking fire fore and aft. 

When Ali left the roadstead of Lepanto, and brought his fleet out frombehind the batteries of the "Little Dardanelles, " he believed he had such amarked superiority over the allied fleet that victory was a certainty, andhe expected to find Don Juan either at Gomenizza or in the waters of theIonian Islands. Pertev Pasha and several of the admirals had opposed Ali'sdecision, and had urged him either to remain at Lepanto, or run out of thegulf, round the Morea, and wait in the eastern seas for the campaign ofnext year. Their reason for this advice was that many of the fighting-menwere new levies unused to the sea. But Ali's self-confidence made himreject this prudent counsel. 

On 2 October, Don Juan had made up his mind to leave Gomenizza, enter theGulf of Corinth, and risk an attack on the passage of the LittleDardanelles. Accordingly in the afternoon he gave orders that the fleetshould prepare to sail at sunrise next day. During the long delay in theisland waters belated news came that Famagusta had fallen on 18 August, andwith the news there was a terrible story of the horrors that had followedthe broken capitulation. The news was now six weeks old, and this meantthat the whole of the enemy's fleet might be concentrated in the Gulf ofCorinth, but after the disasters of Cyprus an attempt must be made to win avictory against all or any odds. 

At sunrise the armada streamed out of the Bay of Gomenizza, and spedsouthwards with oar and sail. The Gulf of Arta was passed, and the admiralswere reminded not of the far-off battle that saw the flight of the EgyptianQueen and the epoch-making victory of Augustus Cæsar, but of a sea-fight inthe same waters only a few years ago that had ended in dire disaster to theChristian arms. Then through the hours of darkness the fleet worked its waypast the rock-bound shores of Santa Maura, whose cliffs glimmered in themoonlight. The roar of the breakers at their base warned the pilots to givethem good sea room. In the grey of the morning the peaks and ridges ofIthaca and Cephalonia rose out of the haze upon the sea, and soon aftersunrise the fleet was moving through the narrow strait between the islands. 

In the strait there were shelter and smooth water, but the wind was rising, backing from north-west to west, and raising a sea outside Cephalonia thatsent a heavy swell sweeping round its southern point and into the openingof the narrows. As the leading ships reached the mouth of the strait DonJuan did not like the look of the weather, and decided to anchor in the Bayof Phiscardo, a large opening in the Cephalonian shore just inside thestrait. 

For two days the fleet lay weather-bound in the bay. During one of thesedays of storm Kara Khodja, the Algerine, tried again to reconnoitre thefleet, but was driven off by the guardships at the entrance of the strait. 

On 6 October the wind shifted to the east and the sea began to go down. DonJuan refused to wait any longer. The fleet put to sea, under bare masts, and, rowing hard against the wind and through rough water, it worked itsway slowly across to the sheltered waters on the mainland coast between itand the islands of Curzolari. Here the fleet anchored for the night, justoutside the opening of the Gulf of Corinth. Not twenty miles away up thegulf lay the Turkish fleet, for Ali had brought it out of the Bay ofLepanto, and anchored in the Bay of Calydon. 

When the sun rose on the 7th, the wind was still contrary, blowing from thesouth-east. But at dawn the ships were under way, and moving slowly in longprocession between the mainland and the islands that fringe the coast. There was a certain amount of straggling. It was difficult to keep thedivisions closed up, and the tall galleasses especially felt the effect ofthe head wind, and some of the galleys had to assist them by towing. 

As the ships of the vanguard began to clear the channel between Oxia Islandand Cape Scropha, and the wide expanse of water at the entrance of the Gulfof Corinth opened before them, the look-outs reported several ships hulldown on the horizon to the eastward, the sun shining on their white sails, that showed like flecks of cloud on the sea-line. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO. COURSE OF ALLIED FLEET FROM ITHACA CHANNEL TO SCENE OF BATTLE]

The signal was sent back, "Enemy in sight, " for the number of sails told itmust be a fleet, and could be none other than that of Ali Pasha. The alliedsquadrons began to clear for action, and Don Juan displayed for thefirst time the consecrated banner sent him by Pius V, a large square flagembroidered with the crucifix and the figures of Saints Peter and Paul. 

It was an anxious time for the Christian admiral. His fleet, now stragglingfor miles along the coast, had to close up, issue from the channel, roundCape Scropha, and form in battle array in the open water to the eastward. If the Turks, who had the wind to help them, came up before this complexoperation was completed, he risked being beaten in detail. 

While the fleet was still working its way through the channel, Don Juan hadsent one of the Roman pilots, Cecco Pisani forward in a swift galley toreconnoitre. Pisani landed on Oxia, climbed one of its crags, and from thislofty outlook counted 250 sail in the enemy's fleet, which was coming outalong the north shore of the gulf, the three main squadrons abreast, thereserve astern of them. Returning to the "Reale, "[6] the pilot gave aguarded report to Don Juan, fearing to discourage the young commander nowthat battle was inevitable, but to his own admiral, the veteran Colonna, hespoke freely. "Signor, " he said, "you must put out all your claws, for itwill be a hard fight. "

 [6] The flagship. 

Then the wind suddenly fell and the sea became calm as a lake. The Turkswere seen to be furling their now useless sails. The rapidity with whichthe manoeuvre was simultaneously executed by hundreds of ships excited theadmiration of the Christians. It showed the enemy had well-disciplined andpractised crews. But at the same time the fact that at a crisis, when everymoment gained was priceless, the Turks had lost the fair wind, convincedthe allies that Heaven was aiding them, and gave them confidence in thepromises of their chaplains, grey-cowled Franciscans and black-robedDominicans, who were telling them that the prayers of Christendom wouldassure them a victory. Their young chief, Don Juan, left the "Reale" andembarked in a swift brigantine, in which he rowed along the forming line ofthe fleet. Clad in complete armour he stood in the bow holding up acrucifix, and as he passed each galley he called on officers and men tospare no effort in the holy cause for which they were about to fight. Thenhe returned to his post on the poop of the "Reale, " which was in the centreof the line, with several other large galleys grouped around her. As eachship was pulled into her fighting position, the Christian galley-slaveswere freed from the oar and given weapons with which to fight for thecommon cause and their own freedom. 

It was intended that the galleys of the left, centre, and right should formone long line, with the six galleasses well out in front of them, twobefore each division. These were to break the force of the Turkish onsetwith their cannon. But when the long line of the enemy's galleys camerushing to the onset, Don Juan's battle array was still incomplete. Barbarigo's flagship was on the extreme left under the land. His divisionhad formed upon this mark, "dressing by the left, " as a soldier would say. The tall galleasses of two gallant brothers, the Venetians Ambrogio andAntonio Bragadino, kinsmen of the hero of Famagusta, lay well out in frontof the left division. All the ships had their sails furled and the longyards hauled fore and aft. Don Juan had formed up the centre division, twomore galleasses out in front, the "Reale" in the middle of the line, thegalleys of Veniero and Colonna to right and left, and two selected galleyslying astern, covering the intervals between them and the flagship. Only afew oars were being used to keep the ships in their stations. So far sogood, but the rest of the allied fleet was still coming up. The reserve wasonly issuing from the channel behind Cape Scropha, and Doria was leadingthe right division into line, with his two galleasses working up astern, where their artillery would be useless. Thus when the battle began not muchmore than half of the Christian armada was actually in line. But for thesudden calm the position would have been even worse. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO 1. ALLIES FORMING LINE OF BATTLE. TURKS ADVANCING TO ATTACK]

It was almost noon when the battle began. The first shots were fired by thefour galleasses, as the long line of Ottoman galleys came sweeping on intorange of their guns. Heavy cannon, such as they carried, were stillsomething of a novelty in naval war, and the Turks had a dread of thesetall floating castles that bristled with guns, from which fire, smoke, andiron were now hurled against them. One of the first shots crashed into thedeck of Ali Pasha's flagship, scattering destruction as it came. TheTurkish line swayed and lost its even array. Some ships hesitated, otherscrowded together in order to pass clear of the galleasses. Daring captains, who ventured to approach with an idea of boarding them, shrank back underthe storm of musketry that burst from their lofty bulwarks. The Turkishfleet surged past the galleasses, broken into confused masses of ships, with wide intervals between each squadron, as a stream is divided by thepiles of a bridge. 

This disarray of the Turkish attack diminished the fire their bow-gunscould bring to bear on the Christian line, for the leading galleys maskedthe batteries of those that followed. Along the allied left and centre, lying in even array bows to the attack, the guns roared out in a heavycannonade. But then as the Ottoman bows came rushing through the smoke, andthe fleets closed on each other, the guns of the galleys were silent. For afew moments the fight had been like a modern battle, with hundreds of gunsthundering over the sea. Now it was a fight like Salamis or Actium, exceptfor the sharp reports of musketry in the mêlée and the cannon of thegalleasses making the Turkish galleys their mark when they could fire intothe mass without danger to their friends. 

The first to meet in close conflict were Barbarigo's division on theallied left and Mohammed Scirocco's squadron, which was opposed to it onthe Turkish right. The Egyptian Pasha brought his own galley into action onthe extreme flank bow to bow with the Venetian flagship, and some of thelighter Turkish galleys, by working through the shallows between Barbarigoand the land, were able to fall on the rear of the extreme left of theline, while the larger galleys pressed the attack in front. The Venetianflagship was rushed by a boarding-party of Janissaries, and her deckscleared as far as the mainmast. Barbarigo, fighting with his visor open, was mortally wounded with an arrow in his face, and was carried below. Buthis nephew Contarini restored the fight, and with the help ofreinforcements from the next galley drove the boarders from the decks ofthe flagship. Contarini was mortally wounded in the midst of his success. But two of his comrades, Nani and Porcia, led a rush of Venetians andSpaniards on to Mohammed Scirocco's flagship, whose decks were swept by thefire of the arquebusiers before the charge of swords and pikes burst overher bows. The onset was irresistible. The Turks were cut down, stabbed, hurled overboard, Mohammed himself being killed in the mêlée. 

By the time the great galley of Alexandria was thus captured the landwardwings of the two fleets were mingled together in a confused fight, in whichthere was little left of the original order. There was more trace of a lineon the allied or Christian side. The Turks had not broken through them, butthey had swung round, somewhat forcing Mohammed's galleys towards theshore. When the standard of the Egyptian admiral was hauled down by thevictorious Venetians, and the rowers suddenly ceased to be slaves andfraternized with the conquerors, some of the captains on the Turkish rightlost heart, drove their galleys aground in the shallows and deserted themfor the shore, where they hoped to find refuge among friends. On Don Juan'sleft, though the fighting continued in a fierce mêlée of ships lockedtogether, and with crews doing wild work with loud arquebuse and clashingsword, the battle was practically won. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO 2. BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE (NOON, OCT 7 1571)]

Meanwhile there had been close and deadly fighting in the centre. The mainsquadron of the Turks had, like their right division, suffered from thefire of the advanced galleasses. Several shots had struck the huge galleythat flew the flag of the Capitan-Pasha, Ali, a white pennon sent fromMecca, embroidered in gold with verses of the Koran. Ali steered straightfor the centre of the Christian line, where the group of large galleys, the"Reale" with the embroidered standard of the Holy League, Colonna's shipwith its ensign of the Papal Keys, and Veniero's with the Lion-flag of St. Mark, told him he was striking at the heart of the confederacy. He choseDon Juan's "Reale" for his adversary, relying on the Seraskier PertevPasha, and the Pasha of Mitylene on his left and right, to support him byattacking the other two flagships. 

Ali held the fire of his bow-guns till he was within a short musket-shot ofhis enemy, and then fired at point-blank. One of his cannon-balls crashedthrough the bow barrier of the "Reale, " and raked the rowers' benches, killing several oarsmen. As the guns of the "Reale" thundered out theirreply, the bow of the Turkish flagship, towering over the forecastle of DonJuan's vessel, came through the smoke-cloud and struck the Spanish shipstem to stem with a grinding crash and a splintering of timber, throwingdown many of the crew. The Turkish bow dug deep into the Spanish ship, andin the confusion of the collision it was thought for a moment she wassinking, but a forward bulkhead kept her afloat. Ali's ship rebounded fromthe shock, then glided alongside the "Reale" with much mutual smashing ofoars. The two ships grappled, and the hand-to-hand fight began. At the sametime Pertev Pasha grappled Veniero's flagship, and another Turkish galley, commanded by Ali's two sons, forced its way through the line and engagedthe two galleys that lay astern of the flagship. Then the Pasha of Mityleneclosed upon Colonna's ship, and all along the centre the galleys camedashing together. The crash of broken oars, the rattling explosions ofarquebuses and grenades, the war-notes of the Christian trumpets and theTurkish drums, the clash of swords, the shouts and yells of the combatants, rose in a deafening din. Froissart wrote in an earlier day that sea-fightswere always murderous. This last great battle of the medieval navies hadthe character of its predecessors. In this fight at close quarters on thenarrow space afforded by the galleys' decks there was no question ofsurrender on either side, no thought but of which could strike the hardestand kill the most. Nor could men, striving hand to hand in the confusion ofthe floating mêlée, know anything of what was being done beyond theirlimited range of view, so that even the admirals became for the moment onlyleaders of small groups of fighting-men. On the poop and forecastle of the"Reale" were gathered men whose names recalled all that was greatest in theannals of Spanish chivalry, veterans who had fought the Moor and voyagedthe western ocean, and young cavaliers eager to show themselves worthy sonsof the lines of Guzman and Mendoza, Benavides and Salazar. Don Juan, arrayed in complete steel, stood by the flagstaff of the consecratedstandard. Along the bulwarks four hundred Castilian arquebusiers incorselet and head-piece represented the pick of the yet unconquered Spanishinfantry. The three hundred rowers had left the oars, and, armed with pikeand sword, were ready to second them, when the musketry ceased and thestorming of the Turkish galleys began. From Ali's ship a hundred archersand three hundred musketeers of the Janissary corps replied to the fire ofthe Spaniards. The range was a few feet. Men were firing in each other'sfaces, and at such close quarters the arquebuse with its heavy ball was amore death-dealing weapon than the modern rifle. Such slaughter couldnot last, and the _caballeros_ were eager to end it by closing on the Turkswith cold steel. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO 3. THE MÊLÉE (ABOUT 12. 30 P. M. )]

Twice they dashed through the smoke over Ali's bulwarks, and for a whilegained a footing on the deck of the enemy's flagship. Twice they weredriven back by the reinforcements that Ali drew from the crews of galleysthat had crowded to his aid. Then the Turks came clambering over the bowsof the "Reale, " and nearly cleared the forecastle. Don Bernardino deCardenas brought up a reserve from the waist of the ship and attacked theTurkish boarders in the bows. He was struck by a musket-ball. It dinted hissteel helmet, but failed to penetrate. Cardenas fell, stunned by the shockof the blow, and died next day, "though he showed no sign of a wound. "

Don Juan himself was going forward sword in hand to assist in the fight inthe bows of the "Reale, " and Ali was hurrying up reinforcements to theattack. It was a critical moment. But Colonna just then struck a decisiveblow. He had boarded and stormed the ship that attacked him, a long galleycommanded by the Bey of Negropont. Having thus disposed of his immediateadversary, he saw the peril of the "Reale. " Manning all his oars, he drovethe bow of his flagship deep into the stern of Ali's ship, swept her deckswith a volley of musketry, and sent a storming-party on to her poop. Thediversion saved the "Reale. " The Spaniards hustled the Turks over her bowsat point of pike, and Ali, attacked on two sides, had now to fight on thedefensive. 

On the other side of the "Reale" Veniero's flagship was making a splendidfight. It is the details of those old battles that bring home to us thechanges of three centuries. A modern admiral stands sheltered in hisconning tower, amid voice tubes and electrical transmitters. Veniero, aveteran of seventy years, stood by the poop-rail of his galley, thinkingless of commanding than of doing his own share of the killing. Balls andarrows whistled around him, along the bulwarks amidships his men werefighting hand to hand with the Seraskier's galley that lay lashedalongside. There were no orders to give for the moment, so he occupiedhimself with firing a blunderbuss into the crowd on the Turkish deck, andhanding it to a servant to reload with half a dozen balls, and then firingagain and again. 

Here, too, in the main squadron were fighting the galleys of Spinola ofGenoa, of the young Duke of Urbino, of the Prince of Parma, of Bonelli, thenephew of Pius V, of Sforza of Milan, and Gonzaga of Solferino, and theyoung heirs of the Roman houses of Colonna and Orsini. Venice had not allthe glory of Lepanto. All Italy still remembers that every noble family, every famous city, from the Alps to Sicily, had its part in the battle. 

Colonna's timely aid to the "Reale" was the turning-point of the fight inthe centre. Led by Vasquez Coronada and Gil d'Andrada, the Spanish infantrypoured into Ali's ship, and winning their way foot by foot cleared herdecks. Not one of her four hundred fighting-men survived. Ali himself wasone of the last to fall. One account says that when all was lost he cut histhroat with his dagger, another that he was shot down at close quarters. His head was cut off, placed on a pike, and carried to Don Juan with thecaptured standard of Mecca. The chivalrous young admiral turned withdisgust from the sight of the blood-dripping head, and ordered it to bethrown into the sea. 

The battle had lasted an hour and a half. Don Juan saw in the capture ofthe enemy's flagship the assurance of victory. Like all great commanders, he knew the value of moral effect. He hoisted the consecrated banner of theLeague at the tall mast-head of the conquered galley, and bade histrumpeters blow a flourish and his men shout victory. In the confusion anduproar of the mêlée not many of the ships would see what was happeninground the "Reale, " but this demonstration would attract the attention offriends and foes in the centre of the fight. It was just one of the momentswhen, both parties becoming exhausted by the prolonged struggle, successwould belong to the side that could put forth even for a while the morevigorous effort, and the sight of the papal standard fluttering from theTurkish mast, instead of the banner of Mecca, inspired this effort on thepart of the Christians, and depressed and discouraged their adversaries. 

Pertev Pasha had lost heavily under the fire of the Venetian flagship, andhad failed in an effort to board her. He cut his galley adrift. Veniero lether go, and turned to attack other enemies. Pertev's ship drifted down ontwo Christian galleys, and was promptly boarded and taken. The Seraskierslipped on board of a small craft he was towing astern, reached anothership, and, giving up all hope of victory, fled with her from the fight. Veniero had meanwhile rammed and sunk two other galleys. He was woundedwith a bullet in the leg, but he had the wound bandaged and remained ondeck. The old man gave Venice good reason to be proud of her admiral. 

Along the left and centre of the Christian armada there was now victory. Admirals and captains were busy storming or sinking such of the enemy'sships as still maintained the fight. On the left Barbarigo had beenmortally wounded, and the losses had been heavy, but the success was sopronounced that large numbers of men had been landed to hunt down theTurkish fugitives on the shore. In the centre there was still some hardfighting. Here it was that Miguel Cervantes, leading the stormers to thecapture of a Turkish galley, received three wounds, one of which cost himhis left hand. 

When the battle began at noon, first on the allied left, then in thecentre, Doria, the Genoese admiral who commanded the right, was not yet inposition. His orders were to mark with his flagship the extreme right ofthe line of battle so that the rest of his division could form on thispoint. But it was soon seen that he was keeping away, steering southwardinto the open sea, with his division trailing after him in a long line, thegalleasses that should have been out in front coming slowly up behind thesquadron. Ulugh Ali with the left wing of the Turkish fleet had alsoaltered his course, and was steering on a parallel line to that taken bythe Genoese. Some of the Christian captains who watched these movementsfrom the right centre thought that Doria was deserting the armada, and eventhat he was in flight, pursued by Ulugh Ali. 

Doria afterwards explained that, as he steered out from behind the centreto take up his position in the battle line, he saw that Ulugh Ali, insteadof forming on Ali Pasha's flank, was working out to seaward, and hetherefore believed that the Algerine was trying to get upon the flank ofthe allied line, in order to envelop it and attack from both front andrear, so as to crush the extreme right with a local superiority of force. His plan was, therefore, to confine himself to observing Ulugh Ali'smovements, steering on a parallel course in the hope of eventually closingand meeting him fairly ship to ship. Doria was an old sailor, perhaps themost experienced leader in the fleet, except the veteran Veniero. If he hadbeen less of a tactician, perhaps he would have come into action sooner. And it is strange that, while playing for position against Ulugh Ali, hedid not realize that if, instead of continually increasing his own distancefrom the centre, he had at any moment turned back towards it, he could thusforce the Algerine admiral either to close with him or leave him free tooverwhelm the Turkish main squadron by enveloping its left. 

It was Ulugh Ali, not Doria, who turned back and ventured on a stroke likethis. The Algerine had, after all, outmanoeuvred the over-clever Genoese. The course taken by the two squadrons had, with the drift of the current, placed Ulugh Ali's rearmost ships actually somewhat nearer the seawardflank of the main fighting lines than Doria's galleys, which his squadronalso outnumbered. A signal ran down the long line of the Turkish left, andwhile some of the galleys turned and bore down on Doria's division, therest swung round and, before Doria had quite realized what was happening, Ulugh Ali, with the heaviest ships of his division, was rushing towards thefight in the centre. 

The brunt of the Algerine's onset fell upon a dozen galleys on Don Juan'sright flank. The furthest out, the flagship of the Knights of Malta, wasattacked by seven of the enemy's vessels. Next to her lay the papal galley"Fiorenza, " the Piedmontese "Margarita di Savoia, " and seven or eightVenetian ships. All these were enveloped in the Turkish attack whichengaged the line in front, flank and rear. There were no enemies theAlgerines hated so fiercely as the Knights of Malta, but, even though theyhad the flagship of the Order at such a fearful disadvantage, they did notventure to close with it until they had overwhelmed the knights and theircrew with a murderous fire of bullets and arrows at close quarters. Thenthey boarded the ship and disposed of the few surviving defenders. Thecommander, Giustiniani, wounded by five arrows, and a Sicilian and aSpanish knight alone survived, and these only because they were left fordead among the heaps of slain that encumbered the deck. Ulugh Ali securedas a trophy of his success the standard of the Knights. In the same way the"Fiorenza" and the "San Giovanni" of the papal squadron, and thePiedmontese ship, were rushed in rapid succession. On the "Fiorenza" theonly survivors were her captain, Tomasso de Medici, and sixteen men, allwounded; the captain of the "San Giovanni" was killed with most of his men, and the captain of the Savoyard ship survived an equally terribleslaughter, after receiving no less than eleven wounds. 

But Ulugh Ali was not to be allowed to "eat up" the line ship by ship. Reinforcements were now arriving in rapid succession. First Santa Cruz, with the reserve, dashed into the fight, and though twice wounded with shotfrom a Turkish arquebuse, drove his flagship into the midst of theAlgerines. Don Juan cut adrift a captured ship he had just taken in tow, and with twelve galleys hastened to assist the reserve in restoring thefight. Doria, leaving part of his division to encounter the galleys UlughAli had detached against it, led the rest into the mêlée. Colonna andVeniero were supporting Don Juan. The local advantage of numbers, whichUlugh Ali at first possessed, soon disappeared, but for more than an hourthe fight continued with heavy loss on both sides. Then the Algerineadmiral struggled out of the mêlée, and with fourteen ships flednorth-westward, steering for Cape Oxia and the wide channel between Ithacaand the mainland. Santa Cruz and Doria pursued for a while, but a windsprang up from the south-east, and the fugitives set their long lateensails. Under sail and oar a corsair could generally defy pursuit. 

The pursuers gave up the chase and returned to where Don Juan and the otheradmirals were securing their prizes, clearing the decks of dead, collectingthe wounded, and hurriedly repairing damages. It was now after fouro'clock, and less than three hours of daylight remained for theseoperations. Besides the handful that had escaped with Ulugh Ali, a fewgalleys had got away into the Gulf of Corinth, making for Lepanto, but thegreat Turkish armada had been destroyed, and the victorious armament wasmistress of the Mediterranean. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO 4. ULUGH ALI'S COUNTER-ATTACK (ABOUT 2. 30 P. M. )]

The success had been dearly bought. On both sides the losses in thehard-fought battle had been terrible. The allies had about 7500 men killedor drowned, two-thirds of these fighting-men, the rest rowers. The noblesand knights had exposed themselves freely in the mêlée, and Spain, Malta, Venice, and the Italian cities had each and all their roll of heroicdead. The list of the Venetians begins with the names of seventeen captainsof ships, including the admiral Barbarigo, besides twelve other chiefs ofgreat houses who fought under the standard of St. Mark in command ofcompanies of fighting-men. No less than sixty of the Knights of St. John"gave their lives that day for the cause of Christ, " to quote the annalistof the Order. Several others were wounded, and of these the PriorGiustiniani and his captain, Naro, of Syracuse, died soon after. One of theknights killed in the battle was a Frenchman, Raymond de Loubière, aProvençal. Another Frenchman, the veteran De Romegas, fought beside DonJuan on the "Reale, " and to his counsel and aid the commander-in-chiefattributed much of his success in the campaign. The long lists of theSpanish, Neapolitan, Roman, and Genoese nobles who fell at Lepanto includemany historic names. 

The losses of the defeated Moslems were still heavier. The lowest estimatemakes the number of the dead 20, 000, the highest 30, 000. Ali Pasha and mostof his captains were killed. Ali's two sons and several of his bestofficers were among the prisoners. Fifteen Turkish galleys were sunk orburned, no less than 190 ships were the prizes of the victors. A fewgalleys had escaped by the Little Dardanelles to Lepanto. A dozen more hadfound refuge with Ulugh Ali in the fortified harbour of Santa Maura. TheAlgerine eventually reached Constantinople, and laid at the feet of SultanSelim the standard of the Knights of Malta, which he had secured when hewas in temporary possession of Giustiniani's flagship. 

Don Juan's best trophies of victory were the 12, 000 Christian slaves foundon board the captured galleys. They were men of all nations, and some ofthem had for years toiled at the oar. Freed from their bondage, theycarried throughout all Christendom the news of the victory and the fame oftheir deliverer. 

Hardly three hours of daylight remained when the battle ended, and theChristian admirals reluctantly abandoned the pursuit of Ulugh Ali. Thebreeze that had aided the Algerine in his flight was rapidly increasing toa gale, and the sea was rising fast. The Christian fleet, encumbered withnearly two hundred prizes, and crippled by the loss of thousands of oarsshattered in the fight, was in serious danger in the exposed waters thathad been the scene of the battle. By strenuous and well-directed effortsthe crews of oarsmen were hurriedly reorganized. Happily the wind wasfavourable for a run through the Oxia Channel to the Bay of Petala. Theprizes were taken in tow. Sails were set. Weary men tugged at the oar, knights and nobles taking their places among them. As the October nightdeepened into darkness, amid driving rain and roaring wind-squalls, thefleet anchored in the sheltered bay. 

The gale that swept the Adriatic was a warning that the season for activeoperations was drawing to a close, and the admirals reluctantly decidedthat no more could be done till next spring. The swiftest ships were sentoff to carry the good news of Lepanto to Rome and Messina, Venice andGenoa, Naples and Barcelona. The fleet returned in triumph to Messina, andentered the port trailing the captured Turkish standards in the waterastern of the ships that had taken them, while pealing bells and salutingcannon greeted the victors. 

Lepanto worthily closed the long history of the oar-driven navies. Thegalleasses, with their tall masts and great sails, and their bristlingbatteries of cannon, which lay in front of Don Juan's battle line, represented the new type of ship that was soon to alter the whole aspect ofnaval war. So quickly came the change that men who had fought at Lepantowere present, only seventeen years later, at another world-famed battlethat was fought under sail, the defeat of King Philip's "Grand Armada" inthe Narrow Seas of the North. 

 [Illustration: LEPANTO 5. FLIGHT OF ULUGH ALI--ALLIED FLEET FORMING UP WITH CAPTURED PRIZES AT CLOSE OF BATTLE (ABOUT 4 P. M. )]

 CHAPTER VI

 THE GREAT ARMADA

 1588

 "Attend, all ye who list to hear Our glorious England's praise. I sing of the thrice famous deeds She wrought in ancient days, When that great fleet 'Invincible' Against her bore in vain The richest spoils of Mexico, The bravest hearts of Spain. "

Thus Macaulay begins his stirring ballad of the Armada. The lines havehelped to perpetuate a popular error--one of the many connected with thestory as it is generally told in our English histories. It somehow becamethe fashion at a very early date to speak of the defeat of the so-called"Invincible Armada" of Spain. But the Spaniards never gave their fleet sucha name. In the contemporary histories and in Spanish official documents itis more modestly and truthfully spoken of as the "Gran Armada"--"the greatarmed force. " And, by the way, our very use of the word "armada" is basedon popular ignorance of the Spanish language, and on the impressionproduced in England by the attempt of Philip II to make himself master ofthe narrow seas, and invade our islands. An "armada" is not necessarily afleet. It is an armed force, an "army" either marching on land or embarkedfor service on the sea, in which case fleet and fighting-men are includedin the word. 

Philip II was King not of Spain only, but also of Portugal and of the TwoSicilies, ruler of other European lands and "Lord of the Indies, " theSovereign of a widespread maritime Empire in Asia, Africa, and America, that had been won by a hundred years of enterprise on the part of sailorsand soldiers like Columbus and Vasco da Gama, Cortes, Pizarro, andAlbuquerque. The tradition of Spanish victory on the sea was a proud one, and as we have seen Spain had borne a leading part in the latest ofdecisive naval victories, when the Turkish power in the Mediterranean wasshattered at Lepanto; King Philip might therefore reasonably look forwardto success for his great fleet, and if it could once secure the mastery ofthe Channel, the invasion of England might be regarded as no very perilousenterprise. For the Spanish infantry were the best soldiers of the day, andthe Duke of Parma, who was to command the land operations, was one of thebest and most experienced leaders in Europe. 

Looking back on the events of the wonderful year of the Armada, we must tryto divest ourselves of the ideas of to-day, and see things as the men ofthe time saw them. Philip counted on divisions among the people of England. The event proved that he was mistaken, but he had reasonable grounds forthe view he took. A hundred years later another fleet conveyed a foreignarmy across the narrow seas from the Netherlands to change effectively thecourse of English affairs. It found a divided people, and the invading armywas welcomed by a party strong enough to effect a Revolution that was a newstarting-point in English history. Nor must we suppose that the policy ofPhilip II was directed entirely by religious views. If kings were easilyswayed by such motives, there would have not been such difficulty aboutorganizing a League against the Turk. 

Professor Laughton, in his introduction to the "State Papers relating tothe Defeat of the Armada, " puts the matter so clearly that it is worthwhile quoting his words at some length:--

 "It is not strange that the action of the fleet was for long misunderstood, and that the failure of the Spaniards should have been represented--as it often is even now--as due to a Heaven-sent storm. '_Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt_' was accepted as at once a true and pious explanation of the whole thing. It was, too, a flattering and economical belief. We were, it has been argued, a nation peculiarly dear to the Almighty, and He showed His favour by raising a storm to overwhelm our enemy, when the odds against us were most terrible. From the religious point of view such a representation is childish; from the historical it is false. False, because the Spanish fleet, after being hounded up Channel, had sustained a crushing defeat from the English, a defeat in which they lost many ships and thousands of men before they fled to the north. .. . Childish, because in affairs of State Providence works by recognized means, and gives the victory, not by disturbing the course of nature and nature's laws, but by giving the favoured nation wise and prudent commanders, skilful and able warriors; by teaching their hands to war and their fingers to fight. 

 "But, in fact, much of the nonsense that has been talked grew out of the attempt, not unsuccessfully made, to represent the war as religious; to describe it as a species of crusade instigated by the Pope, in order to bring heretical England once more into the fold of the true Church. In reality nothing can be more inaccurate. It is, indeed, quite certain that religious bitterness was imported into the quarrel; but the war had its origin in two perfectly clear and wholly mundane causes. "

Professor Laughton then goes on to explain what these causes were: (1) theattempts of Drake and Hawkins to break the Spanish monopoly of trade in theWest Indies by armed expeditions, which included the capture of Spanishships and the sacking of Spanish trading posts. The Spaniards regardedDrake and Hawkins as smugglers and pirates, and in vain asked Elizabeth todisavow and make amends for their acts. 

(2) "The countenance and assistance which had been given by the English tothe King's rebellious subjects in the Low Countries. "

The King was glad enough to put forward religious reasons as the motivesfor his enterprise in the hope of thus enlisting new allies on his side, but, like so many other wars, the conflict between Spain and England, whichbegan in 1585, arose largely from rivalry in trade. 

The Marquis of Santa Cruz, the same who had commanded the allied reserve atLepanto, was then the most famous and the most trusted of King Philip'sadmirals. Santa Cruz urged upon him the advisability of attempting aninvasion of England itself, as the only effective means of cutting off thesupport given by Elizabeth to the revolt of the Netherlands, and checkingat their source the raids on the West Indies. In March, 1586, he submittedto his master an elaborate plan for the operation. Santa Cruz's scheme wasan ambitious project for concentrating the whole force of the SpanishEmpire in an attack on England. Some 500 ships, great and small, were to beassembled in the ports of the Spanish peninsula, and 85, 000 men embarked onthem. 

Philip II thought the scheme too vast, and, above all, too costly. Hesubstituted for it another plan, which was more economical. Santa Cruz wasto assemble in the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula a fleet of more modestproportions, just strong enough to secure command of the Channel. Thisdone, he was to cover the transportation across the narrow seas of theSpanish army that was already operating in the Netherlands, under the Dukeof Parma. The army of the Netherlands would be reinforced with all thefighting-men that could be spared from the fleet. This was in its essentialpoints the plan of campaign of the "Gran' Armada" of 1588. 

It was intended that the attempt should be made in the summer of 1587. Itwas delayed for a twelvemonth by a daring enterprise of Francis Drake, amemorable enterprise, because in proposing it he laid down the trueprinciple for the defence of England against invasion. His policy was thatof Edward III at Sluys, his principle that it was better to keep the enemyoccupied on his own coasts rather than await him on those of England. On 2April, 1587, Drake sailed for Spain with only thirty ships, and surprisedand burned the half-armed transports and storeships collected at Cadiz forfitting out the Armada. His dashing enterprise had made its departure forthat year impossible. 

Before the preparations for the next summer's campaign were completed theMarquis of Santa Cruz died, and Spain lost her best and most experiencedadmiral. King Philip put in his place a great noble, Guzman, Duke ofMedina-Sidonia, who pleaded in vain to be excused, frankly declaring to hissovereign that he felt unfit for such high command, as he had scantknowledge of war and no experience of the sea. It is supposed that the Kingpersisted in the nomination because Medina-Sidonia's hereditary rank wouldplace him above the jealousies of the subordinate commanders, and he hopedto supply for the Marquis's inexperience by sending veteran sailors andsoldiers with him as his staff-officers and divisional commanders. 

By the middle of May, 1588, the Armada was at last ready to sail from theTagus. In England there had been the wildest reports as to its numbers andstrength. These exaggerations were repeated by the popular historians ofthe fighting in the Channel, and have become almost a national tradition. The Spanish galleons were said to be floating monsters, more like castlesthan ships; the fleet was so numerous that it hid the sea, and looked likea moving town; it "seemed as if room would scarce be found on the ocean forso vast an armament. "

The glory of the English victory was great enough to need no exaggerationto enhance it. But in sober fact there was no such enormous disparity, asis generally imagined, between the opposing forces. 

Large and small, there were 130 ships in the Armada. The detailedcatalogue of them, from the list sent by Medina-Sidonia to Philip II, hasbeen reprinted by Captain Duro in his "Armada Invencibile, " and byProfessor Laughton in his "State Papers relating to the Armada. " From thesesources I take a summarized table giving the statistics of the Armada, andthen add some particulars as to various squadrons, ships, andcommanders:--

 ------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+--------+---------- Divisions. | Ships. | Tons. | Guns. | Soldiers. |Sailors. |Total Men. ------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+--------+---------- Armada of Portugal | 12 | 7, 737 | 347 | 3, 330 | 1, 293 | 4, 623 " " Biscay | 14 | 6, 567 | 238 | 1, 937 | 863 | 2, 800 " " Castille | 16 | 8, 714 | 384 | 2, 458 | 1, 719 | 4, 171 " " Andalusia | 11 | 8, 762 | 240 | 2, 327 | 780 | 3, 105 " " Guipuzcoa | 14 | 6, 991 | 247 | 1, 992 | 616 | 2, 608 " " the Levant | 10 | 7, 705 | 280 | 2, 780 | 767 | 3, 523 Squadron of "urcas" | 23 |10, 271 | 384 | 3, 121 | 608 | 3, 729 (hulks or storeships) | | | | | | "Patasses" and "zabras" | 22 | 1, 121 | 91 | 479 | 574 | 1, 093 (small craft) | | | | | | Neapolitan galleasses | 4 | -- | 200 | 773 | 468 | 1, 341 Galleys | 4 | -- | 20 | -- | 362 | 362 ------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+--------+---------- | 130 |57, 868 |2, 431 | 19, 295 | 8, 050 | 27, 365 Rowers (in galleasses and galleys) | | | | 2, 088 | | | | ------ Grand total, soldiers, sailors and rowers| | | | 29, 453 -----------------------------------------+------+----------+--------+----------

The first point to note about the Armada is that it was almost entirely afleet of sailing-ships. The new period of naval war had begun. There hadbeen hundreds of galleys at Lepanto, seventeen years earlier, but therewere only four in the Armada, and none of these reached the Channel. Thelong, low, oar-driven warship, that for two thousand years had done so muchfighting in the Mediterranean, proved useless in the long waves of theAtlantic. [7] The only oared ships that really took part in the campaignwere the four galleasses, and in these the oar was only auxiliary to thespread of sail on their three full-rigged masts. The galleasse has beendescribed in the story of Lepanto. It was an intermediate or transitiontype of ship. It seems to have so impressed the English onlookers that thefour galleasses are given quite an unmerited importance in some of thepopular narratives of the war. 

 [7] Galleys were used in the land-locked Mediterranean and Baltic up to the first years of the nineteenth century, but the only sailors who ever ventured to take galleys into the wild weather of the Atlantic were the Norse Vikings. 

But the day of sails had come, and the really effective strength of theArmada lay in the tall galleons of the six "armadas" or squadrons ofPortugal, the Spanish provinces, and the Levantine traders. The galleon wasa large sailing-ship, but even as to the size of the galleons the populartradition of history is full of exaggeration. Built primarily for commerce, not for war, they carried fewer guns than the galleasses, though many ofthem were of heavier tonnage. In those days every large trader carried acertain number of guns for her protection, but such guns were mostly ofsmall calibre and short range. 

 [Illustration: THE "GREAT ARMADA" ENTERING THE CHANNEL _From the drawing by W. H. Overend_]

The largest galleons were in the armada of the Levant. The flagship, "LaRegazona, " commanded by Martin de Bertendona, was the biggest ship in thewhole fleet, a great vessel of 1249 tons. But she only mounted 30 guns, mostly light pieces. Compare this with the armament of the galleasses, and one sees the difference between ships built for war and galleons thatwere primarily traders. The largest of the four galleasses was only of 264tons, the smallest 169, but each of the four mounted 50 guns. In all thesix armadas of galleons there were only seven ships of over a thousandtons. There were fourteen more of over 800, and a considerable number ofunder 500 tons. But the galleon looked larger than she really was. Suchships had high bulwarks and towering fore and stern castles, and theyappear to have been over-rigged with huge masts and heavy yards. A galleonunder full sail must have been a splendid sight, the bows and stern and thetall "castles" tricked out with carving, gold and colour. Great lanternswere fixed on the poop. The sails were not dull stretches of canvas, butbright with colour, for woven into or embroidered on them there were hugecoats-of-arms, or brilliantly coloured crosses, and even pictures of thesaints with gilded haloes. From the mastheads fluttered pennons thirty orforty feet long, and flagstaffs displayed not only the broad standard ofthe Lions and Castles of Spain, but also the banners of nobles and knightswho were serving on board. 

But the tall ship, with her proud display of gold and colour, was moresplendid than formidable, and the Elizabethan seamen had soon realized thefact. Built originally for the more equable weather of the trade-windregion in the South Atlantic, she was not so well fitted for the wilderseas and changing winds of the North. She was essentially an unhandy ship. In bad weather she rolled heavily, and her heavy masts and spars and highupper works strained the whole structure, so that she was soon leakingbadly. With the wind abeam and blowing hard, her tall sides and toweringcastles were like sails that could not be reefed, a resisting surface thatcomplicated all manoeuvres. The guns that looked out from her port-holeswere mostly small cannon, many of them mere three and four-pounders, ofshort range and little effect. So small was the dependence the Spaniardsplaced upon them that they carried only the scantiest supply of ammunition. 

The fighting method of the galleon was to bear close down upon heropponent, run her aboard, if possible, pour down a heavy fire of musketryfrom the high bulwarks and castles, so as to bring a plunging shower ofbullets on the enemy's decks, and then board, and let pike and sword dotheir work as they had done at Lepanto. These were, after all, the methodsof the soldier, the tactics of the war-galley. It was the merit of Howard, Hawkins, Drake, and the other great captains, who commanded against theArmada, that they fought as seamen, using their more handy and betterhandled ships to choose their own position and range, refusing to let theSpaniards close, and bringing a more powerful, longer-ranging, and betterserved artillery to bear with destructive effect on the easy targetssupplied by the tall galleons. It is worth noting that while there weremore soldiers than seamen in the Armada, there were more seamen thansoldiers in the fleet that met it in the narrow seas. 

If the Armada had a commander whose only merit was personal courage, theadmirals of the various squadrons were all men of long experience in war, both by land and sea. Martinez de Recalde, the second in command andadmiral of the armada of Biscay, was a veteran seaman. Diego Flores deValdes, the admiral of Castille, was an enterprising and skilful leader, and if his advice had been taken at the outset there might have been adisaster for England. Pedro de Valdes, the admiral of Andalusia, had sailedthe northern seas, and Medina-Sidonia was told he might rely on his localknowledge. Moncada, the admiral of the galleasses, was a "first-ratefighting-man, " and De Leyva, the general of the troops embarked, who hadtaken command of the "Rata Coronada, " a great galleon of 800 tons in theLevant armada, showed that he was sailor as well as soldier. 

The Duke of Parma, who commanded the army that was to be embarked from theNetherlands, was counted the best general of the day, and his 30, 000Spanish regular infantry were the most formidable body of troops then inEurope. His orders from the King were to build or collect a flotilla offlat-bottomed barges to ferry his army across the straits under theprotection of the Armada, and for months thousands of shipwrights had beenat work in fishing ports and creeks, canals and rivers along the coastbetween Calais and Ostend. The Dutch rebels held Flushing and the mouth ofthe Scheldt, and they had a small but efficient fleet ready to do goodservice as the ally of England--a fact often overlooked in our popularstories of the Armada. Parma had proposed that he should attempt to reduceFlushing and obtain command of the Scheldt, as a preliminary to theenterprise against England. The Armada could then run for the Scheldt, andmake Antwerp its base of operations. But Philip was impatient of furtherdelays. Though the best of the Spanish admirals were against him, the Kinginsisted that the Armada need only run up Channel and obtain temporarycommand of the straits to enable Parma to embark his army in the flotillaeven from an open beach. In the King's mind the necessity of destroying thehostile sea power as a prelude to any scheme of invasion was disregarded orwas not understood. 

On 30 May, in fine weather, the Armada at last sailed from Lisbon. Thereports sent back to Philip II by Medina-Sidonia, as the fleet passed CapeFinisterre and stood out into the Bay of Biscay, told that all was well. But a few days later a storm from the Atlantic swept the sea, and partlydispersed the Armada. The storeships held on till they sighted the ScillyIslands, and then, finding they had parted from the fleet, turned back. Into the northern ports of Spain came scattered ships that had lost sparsand sails, some of them leaking so badly that only hard labour at the pumpskept them afloat. Medina-Sidonia, with the main body, made for Corunna, where he ordered the stragglers to reassemble. On 19 June he wrote to theKing reporting his arrival. 

Then he sent letters betraying so much discouragement and irresolution thatone wonders he was not promptly relieved of his command. He proposed thatthe whole enterprise should be abandoned and some means found for arrangingterms of peace. He reported that the fleet had suffered badly in the storm;that there was much sickness on board; that large quantities of provisionshad gone bad, and must be replaced; and that the ships were short of water. Instead of dismissing him from the command, the King wrote to his admiralordering and encouraging him to renew the attempt. The ships were refittedand provisioned, and drafts of men collected to replace the invalidedsoldiers and sailors. Early in July the Armada was again ready for sea. 

The news that King Philip's Great Armada had been beaten back by the wildBiscay gales reached England when the whole country was in a fever ofpreparation for resistance. A commission of noblemen and gentlemen had beenappointed "to sett doune such meanes as are fittest to putt the forces ofthe Realme in order to withstand any invasion. " The Lord-Lieutenants of thecounties were directed to be ready to call out the local levies, whichformed a roughly armed, and mostly untrained, militia. Garrisons wereorganized in the seaports, formed of more reliable and better equipped men, and a small force was collected at Tilbury to oppose a landing in theThames estuary. Faggots and brushwood were piled on hill-tops from Land'sEnd to Berwick to send the news of the Spaniards' arrival through Englandby a chain of beacon fires. 

The best of the Queen's advisers, men like the Lord Admiral Howard ofEffingham, and such experienced seamen as Hawkins, Drake, and Fenner, realized, and succeeded in persuading the Council, that it was on the sea, and not on the land, that England must be protected from invasion. Theirletters in the Armada State Papers are full of practical lessons even forthe present time. While insisting that the main effort must beconcentrated on the fleet, they did not disregard the advisability ofsubsidiary preparations on land, in case of accidents. But Howard insistedthat a few well-trained men were worth fourfold their number of irregularlevies, and wrote to the Council:--

 "I pray your Lordships to pardon me that I may put you in remembrance to move her Majesty that she may have an especial care to draw ten or twelve thousand men about her own person, that may not be men unpractised. For this she may well assure herself that 10, 000 men, that be practised and trained together under a good governor and expert leaders, shall do her Majesty more service than any 40, 000 which shall come from any other parts of the realm. For, my Lords, we have here 6000 men in the fleet, which we shall be able, out of our company, to land upon any great occasion, which being as they have been trained here under captains and men of experience, and each man knowing his charge and they their captains, I had rather have them to do any exploit than any 16, 000 men out of any part of the realm. "

The fleet, from which Howard of Effingham was ready to land these trainedmen if necessary, was even more numerous than the Armada itself, though theaverage size of the ships was smaller. On the list there appear the namesof no fewer than 197 ships, ranging in size from the "Triumph" of 1100 tons(Frobisher's ship) down to small coasting craft. The flagship, the "Ark, "or "Ark Royal, " was a vessel of 800 tons. Contemporary prints show that shehad a high poop and forecastle, but not on the exaggerated scale of theSpanish galleons; and that she had four masts, and was pierced with threetiers of port-holes for guns, besides gun-ports in the stern. She had acrew of 270 mariners, 34 gunners, and 126 soldiers. Contrary to the systemon which the Armada was manned, the seamen in every ship of the Englishfleet exceeded the soldiers in number. "The Ark" carried no less than 44guns, namely, 4 "cannon" (60-pounders), 4 "demi-cannon" (30-pounders) 12"culverins" (long 18-pounders), 12 "demi-culverins" (long 9-pounders), 6"sakers" (6-pounders), and six smaller pieces, some of them mounted inboardfor resisting boarders at close quarters. [8] This was an armament equalledby few of the Spanish ships, and the fact is that the English ships as arule were better armed than the Spaniards. 

 [8] These old wooden ships had a much longer life than the steel battleship of to-day, which becomes obsolete and is broken up after twenty years. The "Ark, " launched in 1587 (and built at the cost of £5000 = £50, 000 in the money of to-day), was refitted and renamed the "Anne Royal" (after James I's queen) in 1608; was the flagship of the Cadiz expedition of 1625, and was broken up in 1636. Hawkins's ship, the "Victory, " was launched in 1561; she sailed as the "Resolution" in Blake's fleet under the Commonwealth; was renamed the "Royal Prince" at the Restoration, and was burned in 1666 during Charles II's Dutch war. She was then over a hundred years old and still fit "to lie in the line of battle. "

But few of Howard's fleet were of heavy tonnage. There were only two shipsof over 1000 tons; one of 900; two of 800; three of 600; five or six of500, and all the rest less than 400 tons, many of them less than 100. Butthough the English ships were smaller than the Spaniards, they were betterat sailing and manoeuvring, thoroughly handy craft, manned by sailors whoknew how to make them do their best, and who were quite at home in therough northern seas. 

The main body of the fleet under Howard of Effingham assembled at Plymouth. Detached squadrons under Lord Henry Seymour and Sir W. Winter watched theStraits of Dover. Some of the captains thought Plymouth had been unwiselychosen as the station of the main fleet, pointing out that a south orsouth-west wind, which would be a fair wind for the Spaniards, would be avery foul one for ships working out of the long inlet of Plymouth Harbour. 

In June, Howard had news that the Armada was not only at sea, but far onits voyage. Merchantmen ran for shelter to Plymouth, and told how they hadmet at least two squadrons of large ships with great red crosses on theirforesails off Land's End, and in the entrance of the Channel. One ship hadbeen chased and fired on by a Spaniard. Then all trace of the enemy waslost. There was no news of him in the Channel or on the Irish coasts. Theweather had been bad, and it was rightly conjectured that the squadronssighted off Land's End were only detachments of the Armada scattered by thestorm, and that the great fleet had put back to Spain, probably to Corunna. This was soon confirmed by reports from France. 

For a while there was an impression that the danger was over. Drake, Hawkins, and other captains urged that now was the time to take the Englishfleet to the Spanish coast and destroy the crippled and discouraged Armadain its harbours. But the Queen and her Council hesitated to adopt so bold apolicy, and only a few ships were sent out to watch for the enemy in theBay of Biscay. These returned driven before a strong south wind, and thenfugitives from the Channel brought news that there was a crowd of ships offthe Lizard, and Howard in a short note reported that he had gone out toengage them. The Armada had come in earnest at last. 

After refitting at Corunna, Medina-Sidonia had sailed on 22 July with fineweather and a fair south wind. Progress was not rapid, for the greatfleet's speed was that of its slowest ships. On the 26th, when the Armadawas well out to sea off the headlands of Brittany, the morning was dull andcloudy, and towards noon the wind went round to the northward and increasedto half a gale, raising a heavy sea. The course was changed to theeastward, and the ships were kept under shortened sail. The four galleys, unable to face the rising storm, ran for shelter towards the French coast, and never rejoined. They went southwards before the wind. One was wreckednear Bayonne. The three others reached Spain. 

All next day the gale blew heavily. The Armada, scattered over a wideextent of sea, beat slowly to windward, working away from the dangerousFrench coast. Many ships temporarily parted company. It looked as if therewould be another failure. But on Thursday the 28th (to quote the Spanishadmiral's diary) "the day dawned clear and bright, the wind and sea morequiet than the day before. Forty ships were counted to be missing. " Theadmiral sent out three pinnaces to look for them, and next day, Friday, 29July (19 July, O. S. ), had news that all but one of them were with Pedro deValdes off the Lizard. This was the crowd of ships reported that same dayto Howard at Plymouth. 

The missing ship, the "Santa Ana, " the flagship of Biscay, rejoined later. In the evening Medina-Sidonia saw the coast of England, and notes that itwas "said to be the Lizard. " On the Saturday the admiral writes that "atdawn the Armada was near with the land, so as we were seen therefrom, whereupon they made fire and smokes. "[9] The crew of a capturedfishing-boat later in the day told him they had seen the English fleetcoming out of Plymouth, and in the evening Medina-Sidonia's diary tellsthat "many ships were seen, but because of the mist and rain we were unableto count them. "

 [9] Macaulay, writing his ballad of the Armada before the full English and Spanish records of the time were available, represents the news as being brought to Plymouth by a merchantman that had seen "Castille's black fleet lie heaving many a mile" out by the Channel Islands, where the Armada was never sighted. The "tall 'Pinta'" chased her for hours. There was no such ship in the Armada. Macaulay took the name of one of Columbus's caravels to adorn his ballad. Instead of the enemy seeing "fire and smokes" at dawn, he describes with more picturesque effect, how, in the night--

 "From the deep the Spaniards saw Along each southern shire, Cape after cape in endless range, Those twinkling points of fire. "

A council of war had been held on board his flagship, the "San Martin. " Thewind was south-west, the very wind to carry the Armada into Plymouth, anddead against the English fleet coming out. De Leyva proposed that theopportunity should be taken to attack the English in Plymouth Sound. Oncein the narrow waters the Spaniards could run them aboard and have theadvantage of their superior numbers of fighting-men in a hand-to-handconflict on the decks. The soldier's advice was good, but the sailors wereagainst him. They argued that the fleet must enter Plymouth Sound in lineahead at the risk of being destroyed in detail, as the shoals at theentrance (those on which the breakwater of to-day stands) left only twonarrow channels. De Leyva's bold plan was rejected, and it was decided thatthe Armada should proceed up Channel. 

 [Illustration: VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA 1588]

Next day the fighting began. The wind had shifted to the north-west, a goodenough wind for working up Channel on the port tack. English contemporaryaccounts say the Armada was formed in a half-moon, a centre and two wingsslightly thrown forward. Howard had as yet only brought part of his fleetout of Plymouth, but though greatly outnumbered by the Spaniards, he hadhis best ships and his most enterprising captains with him, and nothingdaunted by the grand array of the Armada, he began a series of harassingattacks upon it. 

It was Sunday morning, 31 July, according to the Spanish reckoning, the21st according to the Old Style still used in England. It was a sunny day, with just enough wind to help the nimble, seaworthy English ships in theirguerilla tactics. Howard's policy was to take full advantage of the threefactors that were on his side in the solution of the problem, betterseamanship in his crews, better gunnery, and handier ships. To close withand grapple in the fashion of earlier naval battles would have been to riskbeing crushed by superior numbers. His policy was to hang upon the flank orrear of the Armada, close in and try to cripple one or more ships byartillery fire, slip away if the enemy turned upon him, come on again asthey gave up the attempt to close, and he was ready all the time to swoopdown upon and capture any ship that might be detached from her consorts. Atthe time arm-chair critics on shore found fault with what they consideredthe half-hearted conduct of the admiral, and the Queen's Council inquiredwhy it was that none of the Spanish ships had been boarded. Sir WalterRaleigh, who, as Professor Laughton notes, "must have often talked withHoward, and Drake, and Hawkins, while the business was fresh in theirmemories, " thus explains and defends the admiral's conduct:--[10]

 "Certainly, he that will happily perform a fight at sea must believe that there is more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters than great daring, and must know that there is a great deal of difference between fighting loose or at large and grappling. To clap ships together without consideration belongs rather to a madman than to a man of war; for by such an ignorant bravery was Peter Strozzi lost at the Azores, when he fought against the Marquis of Santa Cruz. In like sort had the Lord Charles Howard, Admiral of England, been lost in the year 1588, if he had not been better advised than a great many malignant fools were, that found fault with his demeanour. The Spaniards had an army aboard them, and he had none; they had more ships than he had, and of higher building and charging; so that, had he entangled himself with those great and powerful vessels, he had greatly endangered this kingdom of England. For twenty men upon the defences are equal to a hundred that board and enter; whereas then, contrariwise, the Spaniards had a hundred for twenty of ours, to defend themselves withal. But our admiral knew his advantage and held it; which had he not done, he had not been worthy to have held his head. "

 [10] "Historie of the World, " edit. 1736, ii, 565, quoted by Professor Laughton, "State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, " vol. I, Introduction, p. Lxvi. 

The shift of the wind to the north-west had given the English the weathergage. They could run down before it on the enemy, and beat back against itin a way that was impossible for the clumsy galleons. Thus Howard and hiscaptains could choose their own position and range during the fighting. Itbegan by a pinnace, appropriately named the "Defiance, " firing a shot atthe nearest Spaniards, a challenge to battle. Medina-Sidonia held hiscourse and took no notice of it. Howard's squadron now swept past hisleft, and then engaged his rear ships. The admiral himself in "The Ark"steered for De Leyva's tall galleon, the "Rata Coronada, " perhaps takingher to be the flagship of the whole Armada. The two ships were soon inaction, the English gunners firing at the Spaniard's great hull, and DeLeyva's men aiming at the masts and yards of the "Ark" in the hope ofbringing down her spars and sails, crippling and then boarding her. Thebetter gunnery was on the English side. They fired three shots to theSpaniards' one, and every shot told on the huge target. And shots in thehull meant much loss of life and limb in the crowded decks. 

As Recalde with the rear division shortened sail, and turned to the help ofDe Leyva, the "Ark" and her consorts bore away, only to return again to theattack, bringing their guns into action against Recalde's huge galleon, the"Santa Ana, " and Pedro Valdes's ship, the "Rosario, " "Capitana, " orflagship of the Biscayan armada. These two had become separated from themain body with a few of her ships that now formed a kind of rearguard. Frobisher in the "Triumph" and Hawkins in the "Victory" were prominent inthe attack. On the Spanish side several of the flagships joined in thisrearguard fight. The admirals showed a chivalrous disposition to come toclose quarters, and thus Howard was engaged with some of the largest andbest commanded ships of the enemy. Oquendo, the admiral of Guipuzcoa, inhis 1200-ton galleon, called, like that of Recalde, the "Santa Ana, " hadsoon to draw out of the fight, with his ship on fire and badly damaged, notby the English cannon, but by a powder explosion on his main gundeck. [11]One only wonders that such accidents were not frequent on both sides, forthe powder was ladled into the guns from open gunpowder kegs, and matcheswere kept burning beside each gun. 

 [11] "Her two decks and her poop were blown up: in which was the paymaster of this Armada with part of the King's Treasure. "--Medina-Sidonia's narrative. 

The "fighting loose and at large" went on for about three hours. Recalde'sship was badly hulled, and also had her rigging cut up and one of her mastsdamaged. Pedro Valdes's flagship, the "Rosario, " was twice in collisionwith a consort, with disastrous results. Her bowsprit was carried away, andher foremast went over the side, the strain on the rigging bringing downthe main topmast with it. When the English drew off just before sundown, Valdes was busy cutting away the wreckage. Medina-Sidonia shortened sail toenable the rearward ships to rejoin, and then held his course up Channel. Valdes sent a request to him that a ship should be detailed to tow thedisabled "Rosario, " which otherwise could not keep up with the fleet. It isgenerally stated that Medina-Sidonia took no notice of the message, andabandoned Valdes to his fate, but in his narrative the Duke reports to KingPhilip that he personally endeavoured to assist the disabled "Rosario, " andsucceeded in removing the wounded from her, only failing to save her "owingto the heavy sea and the darkness of the weather. "

The English do not seem to have been troubled by the weather, and it cannothave been very bad, or the wounded could not have been taken by boats fromOquendo's ship. Evidently no great effort was made to succour the"Rosario, " and the ships detailed for the work did not like to lie inisolation so near the English during the night. The impression in theArmada certainly was that the gallant Valdes had been shamefully abandonedby the admiral. 

Before sunset a council of war had been held by Howard on board the "Ark. "It was decided to follow up the Armada through the short summer night. ToDrake in the "Revenge" was assigned the task of keeping touch with them andguiding the pursuit by displaying a large stern lantern on his ship. 

After dark Howard lost sight of the lantern, and then thought he had pickedit up again, but at daylight he found that he must have steered by a lightin the Armada, for as the day broke he lay with only a few ships perilouslynear the main body of the enemy. Drake explained that in the darkness hehad thought that some ships of the enemy were turning back, and hadfollowed them. He had certainly failed in his important duty, and there wasa suspicion that the veteran buccaneer was really manoeuvring to make sureof a prize, for at sunrise his ship, the "Revenge, " lay near the crippled"Rosario, " which had been deserted by her consorts. He summoned Valdes tosurrender, and the Spaniard, with his ship helpless and menaced by the mainEnglish fleet, hauled down his flag. The huge galleon was towed intoWeymouth, the first prize of the campaign. 

Howard had drawn off from the enemy, helped to secure the "Rosario, " andrallied his own fleet, which had straggled during the night. This day, Monday, 1 August (or 22 July, Old Style), there was no fighting, the Armadaworking slowly up Channel, followed by the English out of cannon-range. Medina-Sidonia formed a rearguard of forty galleons and three galleasses, "in all 43 of the best ships of the Armada to confront the enemy, so thatthere should be no hindrance to our joining with the Duke of Parma; and theDuke with the rest of the Armada should go in the van, so that the wholefleet was divided into only two squadrons, Don Alonso de Leyva taking therear under his charge. " At 11 a. M. Oquendo's ship was reported to besinking. Her crew and "the King's money" were taken out of her, and the"Santa Ana, " largest but one of King Philip's galleons, disappeared underthe grey-green waves of the Channel. In two days the Armada had lost two ofits divisional flagships. 

Howard had been reinforced during the day from the Western Channel ports. After the free expenditure of powder and shot the previous day, hismagazines were half empty, and he husbanded his ammunition and followed upthe Spaniards out of fighting range, writing to Portsmouth to have allships there ready to join him. "We mean so to course the enemy, " he added, "that they shall have no leisure to land. "

Seymour reported to the Council from Dover that the Armada was well upChannel, and he feared they might seize the Isle of Wight. He asked for"powder and shot" for his squadron--"whereof we have want in our fleet, andwhich I have divers times given knowledge thereof. " All the Englishcommanders felt this want of ammunition and supplies. The Queen's parsimonywas endangering the country. 

On the Tuesday morning, 2 August (23 July, Old Style), the Armada was offPortland. In the night the wind had gone round to the north-east, and asthe sun rose Howard's fleet was seen to be between the Spaniards and theland and to leeward of them. Medina-Sidonia was no sailor, but his veterancommanders saw the chance the shift of the wind had given them. The Armadaturned from its course up Channel, and on the starboard tack stood towardsthe English fleet, hoping in Spanish phrase to catch the enemy "between thesword and the wall. "

It was an anxious moment for Howard and his captains when the Armada camesweeping down on them, the galleasses in front pushing ahead with sail andoar, behind the long lines of galleons with the wind in the painted sailsof their towering masts. It looked as if the Spaniards would soon be lockedin close fight with the English squadron, with every advantage on the sideof King Philip's floating castles. Led by the "Ark, " the English shipsbegan to beat out to seaward with scant room for the manoeuvre. But just asthe close fight seemed inevitable and the tall "Regazona" had almost runthe "Ark" aboard, and while both ships were wrapped in a fog of powdersmoke, the wind suddenly shifted again, backing to the northward. Howardwas now working out well from the land, and every moment improved theposition. 

There was a heavy cannonade on both sides, but as the range lengthened, theadvantage was with the better gunners of the English ships. The galleasses, led by the great "Florencia, " tried, with the help of their long oars, tofall on the English rear, the galleons tacked and made one more attempt "tocome to hand-stroke, " but, writes Sidonia, "all to little effect, the enemyavoiding our attack by the lightness of their vessels. " Good seamanshiptold. Howard's ships were soon in a position to resume the "fighting loose"tactics of the first battle, and the Spaniards knew that at this game theywere the losers. So the Armada bore away, resuming its course up Channel, and the cannonade died down into dropping long shots, and then ceased, forHoward had no ammunition to spare. 

On the Wednesday the two fleets crept slowly up Channel, the English somesix miles astern of the Armada. Once they closed up, and a few shots wereexchanged with the galleasses in Recalde's rearguard. But Howard did notwant to fight. He was only "putting on a brag countenance, " for he waswoefully short of ammunition, and writing urgently for much-neededsupplies. The wind had fallen, and in the afternoon some of the galleonswere drifting along, heeled over by shifting guns and stores to enable thecarpenters slung over the sides to plug shot-holes near the waterline. 

On Thursday the fleets were off the Isle of Wight, and it was almost acalm, with occasional flaws of wind to help them on their way. Welcomereinforcements from Portsmouth joined Howard, and he received someammunition. Soon after sunrise there was a sharp fight. The "Santa Ana" anda Portuguese galleon had fallen astern of the Armada, and Hawkins, in the"Victory, " supported by several other ships, attacked them. He had doneconsiderable damage to the "Santa Ana, " and already reckoned her a prize, when the ever-ready De Leyva, with the great "Rata" and the galleasses, came to the rescue, and Hawkins reluctantly drew off. Howard, with the"Ark, " and his nephew, Lord Thomas Howard, in the "Golden Lion, " had comeup to cover the retirement of Hawkins. They became involved in a fight withthe Spanish rearguard, and the "Ark" was damaged, according to oneaccount, by a collision, but it seems more likely that her steering gearwas temporarily put out of order by a chance shot. She fell behind herconsorts, and lowered boats to tow her out of action. For the moment thewind was helping the Spaniards, and, led by Medina-Sidonia himself, severalgalleons turned to attack the "Ark. " But the wind freshened and changedsuddenly, and the English ships escaped from their dangerous position, andso the fight ended. 

On the Friday it was almost a dead calm. It was a bright summer day, andfrom the hills of the Isle of Wight there was a wondrous spectacle of thetwo fleets drifting idly over miles of sea, with the sails flapping againstthe masts. On board the "Ark, " now repaired and again fit for action, therewas a stately ceremony, the admiral, in the Queen's name, conferringknighthood on Hawkins, Frobisher and several other of the captains who hadtaken a leading part in the fighting. It was decided not to engage theenemy again till the fleets had reached the Straits of Dover. Shortness ofammunition was the reason for this decision. 

Medina-Sidonia was anxious on the same score. He sent off a pilot-boat tothe Duke of Parma, asking him to send him a supply of "four, six, andten-pound shot, " "because much of his ammunition had been wasted in theseveral fights. " The mention of such small weights shows with what lightartillery most of the galleons were armed. He also asked Parma to sendforty light craft to join the Armada, "to the end he might be able withthem to close with the enemy, because our ships being very heavy incomparison with the lightness of those of the enemy, it was impossible tocome to hand-stroke with them. "

At sunset the wind freshened, and at daybreak on Saturday the English wereseen following up closely, but there was no fighting, "the Armada sailingwith a fair wind and the rear close up, and in very good order. " At 10 a. M. The French coast near Boulogne was in sight. At four in the afternoon theArmada was off Calais, and at five orders were given to anchor in Calaisroads, "seven leagues from Dunkirk, " or between Calais and Gravelines. TheSpaniards noticed that some thirty-six ships had joined Howard's fleet, which anchored about a league away. The new arrivals were Seymour's andWinter's squadrons from Dover and the Downs. 

Medina-Sidonia now believed that he had all but accomplished his task. English writers say that the enemy were disappointed and discouraged whenthey anchored off Calais, but there is no proof of this in contemporarySpanish accounts. Medina-Sidonia thought it a success that he had got intotouch with the Viceroy of the Netherlands. He had sent off a messenger tohis head-quarters at Dunkirk, asking him to embark his army at once, anddeclaring his readiness to convoy it across Channel. 

But Medina-Sidonia was in a fool's paradise. His ignorance of war was theultimate source of his satisfaction with the outlook. Better men, likeLeyva and Recalde, realized that until the enemy's fleet was not merelyeluded, but effectively beaten, there could be no invasion of England. TheFrench Governor of Calais told the admiral that a change in the weathermight make his position very unpleasant, and Medina-Sidonia urged Parma toact at once by telling him "that he could not tarry without endangering thewhole fleet. "

But Parma was neither ready nor anxious for any prompt action. The fleet ofthe Netherlanders, some fifty sail, was blockading most of the places alongthe coast where he had prepared his flat-bottomed boats. He knew betterthan to embark the force he had in hand at Dunkirk till Howard's fleet wasdisposed of. 

But Howard was determined not to leave the Armada undisturbed in itsexposed anchorage. He had no sooner been joined by Seymour and Winter thanhe hurriedly prepared eight small craft in his own fleet to be used asfireships, by turning over to them all the inflammable lumber he couldcollect from the other vessels, and removing their guns, ammunition, andstores. 

Medina-Sidonia had spent the Sunday writing pressing letters to the Princeof Parma, and obtaining fresh water and other supplies from Calais. Whenthe long summer twilight ended the Armada was still riding at anchor, theirregular lines of dark hulls stretching for miles, with lanternsflickering at yard-arm or poop, and guard-boats rowing about the outskirtsof the floating city. At midnight there was a cry of alarm passed from shipto ship. The tide was running strong from the westward through the Straits, and sweeping along on its current came eight dark masses, each defined inthe night by a red flicker of fire that rose higher and spread wider as theEnglish fireships came nearer and nearer. 

Three years before, when Parma was besieging Antwerp, the revoltedNetherlanders had attacked the bridge he had thrown across the river belowthe city by sending drifting down upon it a ship laden with powder barrels, with a burning fuse and powder-train to fire them, and blocks of stoneheaped over them to increase the force of the explosion. The awfuldestruction caused by this floating volcano made the Spaniards long afterfearful of the attempt being repeated elsewhere, and Medina-Sidonia tellsin his diary that when Howard's fireships came drifting through the summernight off Gravelines, he and his captains thought that they were likely tobe _maquinas de minas_, "contrivances of mines, " like the terrible floatingmine of Antwerp. With this suspicion, all idea of grappling them wasabandoned. As they drew nearer there was something like a panic in theArmada. The admiral signalled to weigh anchor and make sail, but few of theships waited for the tedious operation of getting the heavy anchors up tothe cat-heads by slow hand labour on windlass or capstan. In most of thegalleons the carpenter's broad axe hacked through the cables and left theanchors deep in Channel mud. Sails were hurriedly shaken out, and like astartled flock of sheep the crowd of ships hurried away to the eastwardalong the coast in wild disorder. Moncada, the admiral of the galleasses, in the "San Lorenzo, " collided with the galleon "San Juan de Sicilia, " andthe great galleass dismasted and with shattered oars drifted on a back eddyof the tide towards Calais bar. The fireships went aground here and there, and burned harmlessly to the water's edge. Medina-Sidonia, seeing thedanger was over, fired a gun as a signal for the fleet to anchor, but mostof the ships had cut their cables, and had no spare anchors available ondeck, and they drifted along the coast, some of them as far as Dunkirk. Thesunrise on the Monday morning showed the great fleet widely scattered, onlya few of the best ships being with the admiral. Moncada's flagship had beenleft by the falling tide hard aground on Calais bar. 

The English attacked the stranded galleass in pinnaces and boats, Howardwith some of the larger ships standing by "to give the men comfort andcountenance. " Some of the Spaniards escaped to the shore. The rest, headedby Moncada, made a brave stand against the boarders, who swarmed up hersides, led by one Richard Tomson, of Ramsgate. Moncada was killed, and theship taken. The English pillaged her, but the hulk was abandoned and seizedlater by the French Governor of Calais. 

During this fight on the bar Medina-Sidonia had reassembled about half hisfleet, which he formed in a great crescent off Gravelines. The wind wasfrom the west, and numbers of galleons were away to leeward. Some of themwere in dire peril of driving ashore. Howard saw his advantage, and thewhole English fleet bore down on the Spanish crescent. It was the nearestthing to a pitched battle in the whole Armada campaign. The English came onwith wind and tide helping them and, with the confidence that was theoutcome of their growing sense of superiority, ventured to close quarterswith the tall Spaniards, while taking care never to give them the chance ofgrappling and boarding. As the fight went on the Spaniards worked slowlytowards the north-east edging off the land, for their deep draught and thefate of Moncada's galleass made them anxious about the Flanders shoals. 

Howard and Hawkins led the English centre, Drake and Frobisher the right, Seymour and Winter the left. Not a shot was fired till they were at musketrange, and then the English guns roared out in a well-sustained cannonadein which every shot told. It was the first of modern naval battles, thefights decided by gunfire, not by hand-to-hand conflict on the decks. TheSpaniards answered back with their lighter and more slowly servedartillery, and with a crackle of musketry fire. Before noon the Spanishcannon were mostly silent, for sheer lack of ammunition, and the galleonsdefended themselves only with musket and arquebuse, while striving in vainto close and grapple with their enemies. Spars and rigging were badly cutup, shots between wind and water were letting the sea into the huge hulls. Just as the English thought the "San Juan de Sicilia" had been put out ofaction and would be their prize, the galleon heeled over and went to thebottom. Soon the fight was only sustained by the rearward ships, the resttrying to extricate themselves from the mêlée, not for any lack of courage, but because all their ammunition was gone, their decks were encumbered withwreckage from aloft, and the men were toiling at the pumps to keep themafloat. 

The English at last drew off from their persistent attacks on the rearwardships, only because after a hot cannonade of seven hours they were runningshort of ammunition; so they used the advantage of position and betterseamanship and seaworthiness to break off from the battle, Howard hangingout the "council flag" from the "Ark, " as a signal to his leading captainsto come on board and discuss the situation with him. 

Medina-Sidonia, in his diary of the day, says nothing of the sinking of the"San Juan de Sicilia, " but he goes on to tell how the "San Felipe" and the"San Mateo" were seen drifting helplessly towards the shoals of the Zealandcoast; how efforts were made to take off their crews, but these failed, "for the sea was so high that nothing could be done, nor could the damagebe repaired which the flagship had suffered from great shot, whereby shewas in danger of being lost. " This talk of rough seas shows that, bravethough he undoubtedly was in battle, the Duke had the landsman'sexaggerated alarm at the choppy waves of the Channel, and regarded as agale and a storm what a sailor would call fine weather with a bit of abreeze. None of the English commanders thought that there was a high seathat summer afternoon. 

In the night it blew somewhat harder from the north-west, and as the earlydawn came it was seen that the Armada was in a perilous position. Thegalleons, many of them with badly damaged spars and rigging, many morewithout anchors at their cat-heads ready to bring them up, were beingforced nearer and nearer to the low sandy shores that were marked only bythe white foam of the breakers, and the leadsmen were giving warning thatthe keels were already dangerously near to the shelving bottom along theoutlying fringe of shoals. The English ships, with plenty of sea-room, looked on without closing in to attack. Little ammunition was left, andHoward and his captains were not going to waste good powder and shot onships that seemed doomed to hopeless destruction. Some of Medina-Sidonia'scaptains proposed that he should show the white flag and obtain the help ofthe English to tow the endangered vessels off the lee shore, but he refusedto hear of such base surrender, and told them he was prepared for death. Hetells in his journal of the day how a sudden change of the wind saved thefleet:--

 "The enemy held aloof, seeing that our Armada must be lost. The pilots on board the flagship--men of experience of that coast--told the Duke at this time that it was not possible to save a single ship of the Armada; for that with the wind as it was in the north-west, they must all needs go on the banks of Zeeland; that God alone could prevent it. Being in this peril and without any remedy, God was pleased to change the wind to west-south-west, whereby the fleet stood towards the north without hurt to any ship. "

The deliverance was not quite as complete as the Duke supposed. Far asternthe great "San Mateo" had grounded on the shoals "between Ostend andSluys. " Next day three English ships came to take her, but the Spaniards, notwithstanding their helpless plight, made a desperate fight for two hoursbefore they surrendered. Don Diego de Pimentel was in command, with severalnobles among his officers and volunteers. These were spared, for the sakeof the ransom they might fetch, but no quarter was given to the commoncrowd. William Borlas, one of the captors, wrote to Secretary Walsingham:"I was the means that the best sort were saved; and the rest were castoverboard and slain at the entry. "[12] These Elizabethan sea-fighters wereas cruel as they were brave. 

 [12] "Entry" = boarding the ship. 

Other ships drifted ashore or found their way into ports along the lowcoast to the north-eastward, but all these were taken by Prince Maurice ofNassau, admiral of the United Provinces, who with some thirty sail gleanedup the wreckage of the Armada, though he had taken no part in the fighting, only blockading Parma's flotillas as his share of the service. 

Meanwhile, saved by the shift of the wind, the main body of the Armada wasspeeding into the North Sea, led by Medina-Sidonia in the leaky "SanMartin. " Howard and the English fleet held a parallel course, shepherdingthe enemy without closing in to fire a single shot. Howard was again, touse the phrase of the time, "putting on a brag countenance, " for he was inno condition for serious fighting, even against such crippled opponents. The magazines of the English fleet were all but empty, its "cannon, demi-cannon, sakers, and falconets" doomed to useless silence, food andwater short in supply, and much sickness among the tired crews, who werecomplaining that they were badly fed and that the beer was undrinkable. 

In the evening Medina-Sidonia held a council of war on board the "SanMartin. " Soldiers and sailors, veterans of many wars, and the chief pilotsof the fleet sat round his cabin table, and there was anxious debate. Noone could say how long it would be before Parma's army was ready;ammunition and provisions were short, men falling sick, ships badlydamaged, though only a dozen had been actually lost. The wind wasincreasing from the south-south-west, and the pilots urged that the bestcourse was to run up the North Sea, round the north of Scotland, reach theopen Atlantic, and so return to Spain without further fighting. 

Some of the best of the officers, men who had been throughout in the thickof the fighting, protested against this course, to which their admiral wasevidently inclined. Recalde, Oquendo, and Leyva spoke for the braveminority. Most of the great fleet was still safe, and Recalde begged theDuke to lie off and on till the wind blew fair for the Channel again, andthen risk another fight. Leyva supported him, and said that though his ownship, the "Rata Coronada, " had been sorely battered, was leaking like asieve, and had only thirty cartridges in her magazine, he would rather takeher into action again and sink fighting than see the Armada run awaynorthward like a pack of cowards. But what seemed the easiest courseprevailed. Medina-Sidonia saved his conscience as a soldier by summing upthe resolution of the council as a decision to sail northward, but turnback and fight if the wind and weather became favourable. 

So in the following days the Armada sped northward before the south-westwind, which sometimes blew hard and raised a sea that increased thedistress of the Spaniards. Howard followed with the English fleet, justkeeping the Armada in sight. If the Spanish admiral shortened sail tocollect his rearward stragglers, Howard followed his example, making noattempt even to close and cut off the nearest ships. He was stillreluctantly compelled by empty magazines and half-empty lockers to becontent merely "to put on a brag countenance. " His shortness of suppliesforced him at last to lose touch of the enemy. Off the Firth of Forth heabandoned the pursuit. 

When the English ships returned to their ports the captains were not at allsure what had become of the Armada. Some thought it might have gone to theharbours of Norway and Denmark to winter and refit there, and renew theattempt next spring. One sees in the letters of Secretary Walsingham theuncertainty that prevailed among the Queen's counsellors, and somedisappointment that the victory was not more complete, though this was theresult of himself and his colleagues leaving Howard so ill supplied. On thesame day (8 August, Old Style) Walsingham writes to Lord Burghley: "It ishard now to resolve what advice to give Her Majesty for disarming, until itshall be known what is become of the Spanish fleet"; and to the LordChancellor: "I am sorry the Lord Admiral was forced to leave theprosecution of the enemy through the wants he sustained. Our half-doingsdoth breed dishonour and leaveth the disease uncured. "

Meanwhile, the Armada had held its course to the northward, sometimessighted far off from a Scottish headland. On 20 August (10th, Old Style), twelve days after the battle off Gravelines, it was passing between theOrkneys and Shetlands, heading for the Atlantic, helped by a change of windwhich now blew from the east, filling the great sails, but chilling thesouthern sailors and soldiers to the bone. Though it was summer, the coldwas like that of winter, and the bitter weather grew even worse as thegalleons sailed on into the North Atlantic. The great ships straggled formiles over grey foam-flecked seas, under dull cloud-packed skies that sentdown showers of sleety rain. Men huddled below in the crowded gundecks, andin fore and stern castles, and there were days when only the pilots keptthe deck, while gangs of men took their turn at the never-resting pumps. There were semi-starvation and fever in every ship. The chaplains were busygiving the last consolations of religion to dying men, and each day readthe burial service over a row of canvas-shrouded dead, and "committed themto the deep. "

The Armada no longer held together. Small groups formed haphazardsquadrons, keeping each other company, but many ships were isolated andploughed their way alone over the dreary sea. Many, despite hard work atthe pumps, settled lower and lower in the water each day, and at last sankin the ocean, their fate unknown and unrecorded till, as the months went byand there was no news of them, they were counted as hopelessly lost. Ofothers the fate is known. 

In his sailing instructions Medina-Sidonia had been warned that he shouldtake "great heed lest you fall upon the island of Ireland for fear of theharm that may happen to you on that coast, " where, as a sixteenth-centurysailor wrote, "the ocean sea raiseth such a billow as can hardly be enduredby the greatest ships. " There was heavy weather in the "ocean sea" thatAugust and September, but even so the galleons that steered well to thewestward before shaping their course for Spain, and kept plenty of sea-roomby never sighting the "island of Ireland, " succeeded in getting home, except where they were already so badly damaged and so leaky that theycould not keep afloat. But along the coasts of Scotland and Ireland therewas a succession of disasters for those who clung to, or were driven into, the landward waters. 

The first mishap occurred when the Armada was rounding the north ofScotland. The "Gran Grifon, " the flagship of Juan Lopez de Medina, admiralof the _urcas_ or storeships, drove on the rocks of Fair Isle, the solitarycliff-bound island in the channel between the Orkneys and Shetlands. Heresuch few as escaped the waves lived for some six weeks in "great hungerand cold. " Then a fishing-boat took them to Anstruther in Fifeshire, wherethey surrendered to the bailies. Lopez de Medina was among this handful ofsurvivors. Melville, the Presbyterian minister of Anstruther, describes himas "a very reverend man of big stature and grave and stout countenance, grey haired and very humble like, " as he asked quarter for himself and hiscomrades in misfortune. [13]

 [13] In some histories of the Armada and in more than one standard book of reference Lopez de Medina is confused with Medina-Sidonia, and it is stated that it was the flagship of the whole Armada that was lost on Fair Isle. 

Other distressed ships fled from the Atlantic storms for shelter inside theHebrides. Three entered the Sound of Mull, where one was wrecked nearLochaline, and a second off Salen. The third, the great galleass"Florencia, " went down in Tobermory Bay. The local fishermen still tell thetraditional story of her arrival and shipwreck. She lies in deep water, half-buried in the sand of the bottom, and enterprising divers are now busywith modern scientific appliances trying to recover the "pieces of eight"in her war-chest, and the silver plate which, according to a dispatch ofWalsingham's, was the dinner-service of the "Grandee of Spain" whocommanded her. 

But it was on the shores of the "island of Ireland" that the most tragicdisasters of the Armada took place. Its wrecks strewed the north and westcoasts. Fitzwilliam, the "Deputy" or the Viceroy, in Dublin, and Bingham, the Governor of Connaught, had taken precautions to prevent the Spaniardsfinding shelter, water, and food in the ports by reinforcing the westerngarrisons. Bingham feared the Irish might be friendly to the Spaniards, andindustriously spread among the coast population tales that if they landedthe foreigners would massacre the old and carry the young away intoslavery. The people of the ports, who had long traded with Spain, knewbetter, but some of the rude fisher-folk of the west coast perhaps believedthe slander. Where shipwrecked crews fell into the hands of Bingham's menno mercy was shown them. He marched four hundred prisoners into Galway, andhis troops massacred them in cold blood, and then he reported that, "havingmade a clean despatch of them both within the town, and in the countryabroad, he rested Sunday all day, giving praise and thanks to God for HerMajesty's most happy success in that action, and our deliverance from suchdangerous enemies. "

One of the _urcas_ came into Tralee Bay in an almost sinking condition, with her crew reduced to twenty-three men, ill and half starved and unableto work the ship. Sir Edward Denny, the Governor of Tralee Castle, wasabsent. The Spaniards surrendered to Lady Denny and her garrison. The menbegged for their lives, and some said they had friends in Waterford whowould pay ransom for them; but the lady had them all put to the sword, because "there was no safe keeping for them. "

In all, some twenty-five galleons were dashed to pieces under the giantcliff walls of the Irish coast, or on outlying skerries and rockyheadlands. In a few cases the Irish coast folk helped the survivors, buttoo often they were as cruel as the English, and killed and plundered them. Sir George Carew wrote to the Queen, rejoicing that there was now "bloodbetween the Irish and the King of Spain. " The Government troops marchedalong the coasts hunting for Spaniards. The Lord-Deputy Fitzwilliamaccompanied one of these parties, and told how in Sligo Bay he saw miles ofwreckage, "timber enough to build five of the greatest ships that ever Isaw, besides mighty great boats, cables, and other cordage, and some suchmasts for bigness and length, as I never saw any two could make the like. "Fitzwilliam fairly revelled in the destruction of the Spaniards. He wroteto Secretary Walsingham: "Since it hath pleased God by His hand upon therocks to drown the greater and better sort of them, I will, with Hisfavour, be His soldier for the despatching of those rags which yetremain. " At last he got tired of this miserable kind of "soldiering, " andproclaimed mercy for all Spaniards in Ireland who surrendered before 15January, 1589. Numbers of ragged and starving men surrendered. Others hadalready been smuggled over to Scotland, still an independent country, wherethey were well treated and given transport to Spain. 

The gallant Alonso de Leyva, after escaping from the wreck of his good shipthe "Rata Coronada" in Blacksod Bay, was steering for Scotland in one ofthe galleasses that had rescued him and his comrades, when the ship wasdriven by a storm against the wild cliffs of Dunluce Castle, near theGiant's Causeway. The galleass was shattered to matchwood, and Leyvaperished with all on board save five who swam ashore. 

In the last days of September the surviving ships of the Armada camestraggling into the northern ports of Spain with starving, fever-strickencrews. Medina-Sidonia had kept some fifty sail together till 18 September. He had resigned all active duties of command to his lieutenants, Flores andBobadilla, for he was ill and broken in spirit. His hair had whitened, andhe looked like an old man, as he sat all day in the "great cabin" of the"San Martin, " with his head in his hands. A Biscay gale scattered theremnant of the Armada, and on 21 September the "San Martin" appeared aloneoff Santander. The wind had fallen; her sails hung loose from the yards, and the long swell that followed the gale was driving the ship towards therocks outside the port. Some boats went out and towed her in. Most of thecrew were sick. Nearly two hundred had been buried at sea. 

Recalde and Oquendo brought their ships home, but landed broken with thehardships of the terrible voyage, and only survived it a few weeks. Everyship that arrived told of the many buried at sea, and landed scores ofdying and fever and scurvy-stricken men, so that all the northern portswere like great hospitals. When the last galleon had struggled intoharbour, fifty-five great ships were still missing. The best of the leaderswere dead. Not more than a third of the sailors and soldiers survived. Itwas a disaster from which Spain as a naval power never really recovered. For fifty years to come the Spanish infantry still upheld their claim to beinvincible on the battlefield, but the tall galleon had ceased to be themistress of the seas. 

The campaign of the Armada is remarkable not only for inaugurating themodern period of naval war, the era of the sail and the gun, but alsobecause, though it ended in disaster for one side and success for theother, there was from first to last in the long series of engagements inthe narrow seas no battle "fought to a finish. " In all the fighting theEnglish showed that they had grasped the essential ideas of the newwarfare, and proved themselves better sailors and better gunners, but thenumber of the ships they took or destroyed was insignificant. Howard was socrippled by parsimonious mismanagement on the part of his Government thathe had to be content with "half-doings, " instead of decisive results. Butthere was worse mismanagement on the Spanish side, and this led first tofailure, then to disaster. 

The story of the Armada is full of useful lessons, but for England itsmessage for all time is that her true defence against invasion lies not inarmies, but upon the sea. The Elizabethan captains knew well that if onceParma's veterans landed in Kent or Essex, the half-trained levies gatheredby the beacon fires could do little to stop their onward march. So theytook care to make the narrow seas an impassable barrier to the enemy byharrying the covering fleet and making it hopeless for Parma even to thinkof sending his transports to sea. The lesson is worth remembering evennow. 

 CHAPTER VII

 THE BATTLE OFF THE GUNFLEET

 1666

The decline of Spain as a great power was largely due to the unsuccessfulattempt to coerce the Dutch people. Out of the struggle arose the Republicof the United Provinces, and Holland, won from the sea, and almost anamphibious state, became in a few years a great naval power. A hardy raceof sailors was trained in the fisheries of the North Sea. Settlements wereestablished in the Far East, and fleets of Dutch East Indiamen broke theSpanish monopoly of Asiatic trade. It was to obtain a depot andwatering-place for their East Indiamen that the Dutch founded Cape Town, with far-reaching results on the future development of South Africa. 

A Dutch fleet had assisted in defeating the Armada, but the rise of thisnaval power on the eastern shores of the narrow seas made rivalry withEngland on the waters inevitable. In the seventeenth century there was aseries of hard-fought naval wars between England and the United Provinces. 

Under the two first Stuart Kings of England there were quarrels with theDutch that nearly led to war. The Dutch colonists and traders in the FarEastern seas had used high-handed measures to prevent English competition. Nearer home there were disputes as to the right claimed by the King's shipsto make any foreign ship lower her flag and salute the English ensign. Butit was not till the days of the Commonwealth that the first war broke out. It was a conflict between two republics. Its immediate cause was Cromwell'sNavigation Act, which deprived the Dutch of a considerable part of theircarrying trade. The first fight took place before the formal declaration ofwar, and was the result of a Dutch captain refusing the customary salute toa Commonwealth ship. 

In this, as in the later conflicts with Holland, while England was stillable to live on its own products, the Dutch were in the position in whichwe are now, for the command of the sea was vital to their daily life. Theirwhole wealth depended on their great fishing fleets in the North Sea; theirIndiamen which brought the produce of the East to Northern Europe throughthe Straits of Dover; and the carrying trade, in which they were thecarriers of the goods of all Central Europe, which the Rhine and theircanals brought into their ports. The mere prolongation of a naval war meantendless loss to the merchants and shipowners of Holland. 

The development of ocean-borne commerce had led to great improvements inshipbuilding in the three-quarters of a century since the days of theArmada, and the fleets that met in the Channel and the North Sea duringCromwell's Dutch war were far more powerful than those of Medina-Sidoniaand Howard. The nucleus of the English fleet had been formed by thepermanent establishment created by Charles I, but the ships for which hehad levied the "Ship Money" were used against him in the Civil War, for theseafaring population and the people of the ports mostly sided with theParliament. The operations against Rupert in the Mediterranean, the warwith the Algerines, and the expeditions to the West Indies had helped toform for the Commonwealth a body of experienced officers and seamen, and inBlake, Cromwell had at least one admiral of the first rank. The fleets onboth sides sometimes numbered as many as a hundred sail. The guns mountedin broadside tiers had come to be recognized as the weapons that mustdecide a sea-fight, and in this first Dutch war we see on both sidesattempts to use tactical formations that would give the best scope to gunpower. 

Though a battle was always likely to develop into an irregular mêlée, inwhich the boldest exchanged broadsides and the shirkers hung back, therewere attempts to fight in regular lines, the ships giving each other mutualsupport. Want of traditional experience, marked differences in the speedand manoeuvring power of ships, and the rudimentary character of thesignalling, made it difficult to keep the line, but it was early recognizedas an ideal to be aimed at. 

The old oar-driven galleys, with their heavy batteries in the bows and allthe guns pointing ahead, went into battle, as at Lepanto, in line abreast. The broadside battleship would thus have her guns pointed at her consorts. The line abreast was used only to bear down on the enemy. The fightingformation was the line ahead. This was adopted at first as a fleet runningdown from windward closed upon its enemy. Unless they were actually runningaway, the other side would be sailing in line ahead with the wind abeam. Itwas soon realized that in this formation an admiral had his fleet underbetter control, and gradually the normal formation for fleets became lineahead, and hostile fleets either fought running on parallel courses on thesame tack, or passed and repassed each other on opposite tacks. But thiswas the result of a long evolution, and the typically formal battles foughtout by rule in the "close-hauled line ahead" belong to the eighteenthcentury. 

The first Dutch war ended with Blake's victory off the Kentish Knock. Thesecond war, in the days of Charles II, is best remembered in England inconnection with a national disgrace, the Dutch raid on Chatham and theblockade of the Thames. This disaster was the result of a piece of almostincomprehensible folly on the part of the King and his advisers. But itcame shortly after a great naval victory, the story of which is by mostforgotten. It is worth telling again, if only to show that the disasterin the Thames was not the fault of the British navy, and that even underCharles II there were glorious days for our fleet. It is also interestingas a typical naval battle of the seventeenth century. 

 [Illustration: THE "SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS, " LAUNCHED 1637. A TYPICAL WARSHIP OF THE 17TH CENTURY _After the painting by Vandervelde_]

Hostilities began in 1664 without a formal declaration of war, the conflictopening with aggressions and reprisals in the colonial sphere of action. English fleets seized Dutch trading ships on the African coast and Dutchislands in the West Indies. In North America the Dutch settlement of NewAmsterdam, at the mouth of the Hudson, was occupied, annexed, and renamedNew York in honour of His Highness the Duke of York, the brother of theKing. England drifted into the war as the result of conflicts in thecolonies, and was in a state of dangerous unreadiness for the struggle onthe sea. "God knows how little fit we are for it, " wrote Pepys, who asSecretary of the Navy knew the whole position. There was the utmostdifficulty in obtaining men for the ships that were being got ready forsea. The pressgangs brought in poor creatures whom the captains describedas a useless rabble. There were hundreds of desertions. Happily the Dutchpreparations were also backward, and England had thus some breathing time. 

In June the two fleets, under the Duke of York and the Dutch Admiral Opdam, each numbering nearly a hundred sail, were in the North Sea, and on the 3rdthey met in battle, some thirty-five miles south-east of Lowestoft. Opdamwas driven back to the Texel with the loss of several ships. The Duke ofYork had behaved with courage and spirit during the fight, and was coveredwith splashes of the blood of officers killed beside him on thequarter-deck, where he himself was slightly wounded. But he showedslackness and irresolution in the pursuit, and failed to reap the fullresults of his victory. 

During the rest of the summer there were more or less successfulenterprises against Dutch trade; but the plague in London, in the portsand dockyards, and even in the fleet itself, seriously interfered with theprosecution of the war. As usual at that time, the winter months werepractically a time of truce. In the spring of 1666 both parties were readyfor another North Sea campaign. 

The Dutch had fitted out more than eighty ships under Admiral De Ruyter, and the English fleet was put under the command of Monk, Duke of Albemarle, with Prince Rupert, the fiery cavalry leader of the Civil War, as hisright-hand man. Both were soldiers who had had some sea experience. It wasstill the time when it was an ordinary event for a courtier to command abattleship, with a sailor to translate his orders into sea language andlook after the navigation for him. Pepys tells how he heard Monk's wife, the Duchess of Albemarle (perhaps echoing what her husband had said inprivate), "cry mightily out against the having of gentlemen captains, withfeathers and ribbons, and wish the King would send her husband to sea withthe old plain sea-captains that he served with formerly. "

Monk and Rupert went to join the fleet that was assembling at the Nore on23 April. It was not ready for sea till near the end of May. On 1 June, when part of the fleet was detached under Rupert to watch the Straits ofDover, Monk met De Ruyter (who was in superior force) off the Essex coastand began a battle that lasted for four days. The news of the first day'sfighting set London rejoicing, but soon there came disappointing reports offailure. 

The four days' battle had ended in defeat. Outnumbered as he was, Monk hadmade a splendid fight on the first two days, hoping from hour to hour forRupert's arrival. On the third day, the Sunday, he had to retire towardsthe Thames, covering his retreat with a rearguard of sixteen of his bestships. Several of these touched on the Galloper Sand, and Ascue's ship, the"Prince, " ran hard aground on the bank. Ascue struck his flag, and theDutch burned his ship, abandoning an effort to carry her off because atlast Rupert's squadron was in sight. On the fourth day a confused mêlée ofhard fighting off the Thames mouth ended in Monk retiring into the river. He had lost twenty ships and some three thousand men; but he had fought sowell that the Dutch bought their victory dearly, and, after attempting fora few days to blockade the Thames, had to return to Holland to refit andmake good their losses. 

Amid the general discouragement at the failure of the fleet there was anoutburst of mutual accusations of misconduct among the captains, and evensome bitter attacks on Monk, the "General at Sea. " Fault was found with thedividing of the fleet on a false report; with Monk's haste to attack theDutch when he was short of ships; and, finally, with his retreat before theenemy into the Thames. Monk, however, did not bear himself like a beatenman. He spoke of the long battle as, at the worst, an indecisiveengagement, and said he had given the Dutch as many hard knocks as he hadtaken, and now knew how to defeat them. He had sufficient influence atCourt to be able to retain his command, and so could look forward to tryinghis fortune again before long. 

The work of refitting the fleet was taken in hand. At any cost, the dangerof a blockade of the Thames must be averted, so the merchants of the Citycombined to help with money, and even some of the rich men of the Courtloosed their purse-strings. A fine three-decker launched at Chatham wasnamed the "Loyal London, " in compliment to the exertions of the City, andwork was pushed on so rapidly that she was soon ready for commission. Manyof the ships had been shorthanded in the four days' battle. The pressgangswere now set vigorously to work, and, though there was a constant drain ofdesertions to contend with, the numbers on board the ships at Chatham andin the lower Thames rose day by day. 

At the end of June a new impetus was given to the preparations by thereappearance of De Ruyter's fleet. He had repaired damages more quicklythan his opponents, and put to sea to blockade the Thames. It was on 29June that the fishermen of Margate and Broadstairs saw a great crowd ofstrange sail off the North Foreland. It was the Dutch fleet of over ahundred ships, great and small, and commanded by De Ruyter, Van Tromp, andJan Evertszoon. Some of the ships stood in close to Margate. The militia ofthe county was called out, and the alarm spread along the southern coast, for the rumour ran that the Dutch had come to cover a French invasion. Butno Frenchmen came, and the Hollanders themselves did not send even a boat'screw ashore. They were quite satisfied with stopping all the trade ofLondon by their mere presence off the Thames, and they had the chance tooof picking up homecoming ships that had not been duly warned. So, favouredby fine summer weather, the Dutch admirals cruised backwards and forwardsin leisurely fashion between the North Foreland and the outer end of theGunfleet Sand. They watched with their light craft all the channels thattraverse the tangle of sandbanks and shallows in the estuary of the river;but their main fleet was generally somewhere off the Essex coast, for onthat side of the estuary lay the channels then best known and most used, the Swin and the Black Deep. 

The fleet which thus for some three weeks held possession of the verygateway to the Thames numbered seventy-three line-of-battle ships, twenty-six frigates, and some twenty light craft fitted to be used asfireships. By great exertions Monk and Rupert had got together in the lowerThames eighty-seven fighting-ships and a squadron of fireships. Somefifteen more frigates might have been added to the fleet, but it wasthought better to leave them unmanned, and use their crews forstrengthening those of the larger ships. The fleet assembled at the Norehad full complements this time. The men were eager to meet the enemy, andnumbers of young gallants from the Court had volunteered for service assupernumeraries. The "Loyal London, " fresh from the builders' hands atChatham yard, with her crew of eight hundred men, was said to be "the bestship in the world, large or small. " Pepys noted that it was the talk ofcompetent men that this was "much the best fleet, for force of guns, greatness and number of ships, that ever England did see. " England hadcertainly need of a good fleet, for she never met on the sea a more capableand determined enemy than the Dutch. In fact, the republic of the UnitedProvinces was perhaps the only state that ever contended on anything likeequal terms against England for the command of the sea. 

When at last Monk and Rupert were ready to sail they had to wait for afavourable wind and tide, and, with the help of their pilots, solve asomewhat delicate problem. This problem was something like that which ageneral on land has to solve when it is a question of moving a large forcethrough defiles of which the other end is watched by the enemy's main army. But it had special complications that the soldier would not have to takeinto account. 

Monk's fleet sailing in line ahead, the only order in which it couldtraverse the narrow channels, would cover about nine miles from van torear. There were then no accurate charts of the Thames estuary such as wenow possess, and the pilots of the time believed the possible ways out forlarge ships to be fewer and more restricted than we know them to be atpresent. They advised Monk to take his fleet out from the Nore through theWarp and the West Swin, which form a continuous, fairly deep channel on theEssex side of the estuary along the outer edge of the Maplin Sands. At theouter end of the Maplins a long, narrow sandbank, known as the MiddleGround, with only a few feet of water over it at low tide, divides thechannel into two parallel branches, the East Swin and the Middle Deep. Atthe end of the Middle Ground these two channels and a third (known as theBarrow Deep) unite to form the broad King's Channel (also known as the EastSwin), where there is plenty of sea room, and presently this again expandsinto the open sea. 

In those old days of sailing-ships a fleet working its way out of thenarrower channels inside the Middle Deep in presence of an enemy wouldcourt destruction if the whole of its fighting strength could not bebrought out into the wide waters of the King's Channel on a single tide. Ifonly part of it got out before the tide turned, the van might be destroyedduring the long hours of waiting for the rearward ships to get out and joinin. 

On 19 July Monk brought his ships out to the Middle Ground, beside whichthey remained anchored in a long line till the 21st, waiting for afavourable wind and a full tide. The ebb flows fast through the narrowsfrom west to east, and weighing shortly before high water on the 22nd, thefleet spread all sail to a fair wind, and led by the "Royal Charles" withMonk and Rupert on her quarter-deck, the long procession of heavybattleships worked out into King's Channel, soon helped by a racing ebb. Those who saw the sight said that no finer spectacle had ever beenwitnessed on the seas, and certainly England had never till then challengedbattle with a more powerful fleet. Officers and men were in high spiritsand confident of victory, Rupert as eager as when in his younger days heled his wild charges of cavaliers, Monk impatient with prudent counselsurged by timid pilots, and using sharp, strong language to encourage themto take risks which he as a landsman did not appreciate. Not a ship touchedground. Some Dutch ships were sighted on the look-out off the edge of theGunfleet, but they drew off when Captain Elliot, in the "Revenge, " led asquadron of nine ships-of-the-line and some fireships to attack them. DeRuyter, who had been waiting with his main fleet off the Naze, stood out tosea, having no intention of beginning a battle till there were long hoursof daylight before him. As the sun went down the English fleet anchored inthe seaward opening of the King's Channel, with the "Royal Charles" nearthe buoy that marked the outer end of the Gunfleet Sands, and on bothsides men turned in with the expectation of hard fighting next morning. 

At daybreak the English fleet weighed anchor. The Dutch fleet was seen somemiles to seaward and more to the south, sailing in three divisions in lineahead. Evertszoon was in command of the van; De Ruyter of the centre; VanTromp of the rear. There were more than a hundred sail. Monk stood towardsthem before a light breeze, challenging battle in the fashion of the timewith much sounding of trumpets and beating of drums. But De Ruyter kept hisdistance, working to the southward outside the tangle of shallows in theThames estuary. All day the fleets drifted slowly, keeping out of gunshotrange. Towards evening the wind fell to a sullen calm with a cloudy sky, and Monk and De Ruyter both anchored outside the Long Sand. After sunsetthere came a summer storm, vivid flashes of lightning, heavy thunder-peals, and wild, tempestuous gusts of wind. The anchors held, but Monk lost one ofhis best ships, the "Jersey. " She was struck by lightning, which broughtdown a mass of spars and rigging on her decks, and so crippled her that shehad to leave the fleet at dawn. 

The Dutch fleet had disappeared. De Ruyter had weighed anchor during thestorm and run out to sea. Monk suspected that he had gone back to his oldcruising ground off the Naze, and when the wind fell and the weathercleared up in the afternoon of the 24th he weighed and sailed for the endof the Gunfleet to look for the enemy in that neighbourhood. He found notrace of him, and anchored again off the Gunfleet that evening, gettingunder way again at two in the morning of the 25th. 

De Ruyter's light craft had kept him informed of Monk's movements. TheDutch admiral had avoided battle, when it was first offered, because hehoped to manoeuvre for the weather gage, but the failing wind before thestorm had made it hopeless to attempt to work to windward of the English. At a council of war held on board De Ruyter's flagship on the evening ofthe 24th it was decided to accept battle next day, even if the Dutch had tofight to leeward. When the sun rose the two fleets were in sight, "eightleagues off the Naze, " De Ruyter in his old position to seaward andsouthward of Monk. 

The English "general at sea" had ninety-two battleships and seventeenfireships at his disposal. Following the custom of the time, the Englishwas, like the Dutch fleet, organized in three divisions. The van, distinguished by white ensigns, was commanded by Sir Thomas Allen; thecentre, or red division, flew the red ensign (now the flag of our merchantmarine), and was under the personal command of Monk and Rupert; the rear, under Sir Jeremy Smith, flew the blue ensign. Battles at sea were nowbeginning to be fought under formal rules which soon developed into asystem of pedantic rigidity. It was a point of honour that van shouldencounter van; centre, centre; and rear, rear. The Dutch were moving slowlyunder shortened sail in line ahead to the south-east of the English. Monkformed his fleet in line abreast on the port tack. The orders were that asthey closed with the enemy the ships were to bear up on to a courseparallel to that of the Dutch and engage in line ahead, division todivision and broadside to broadside. Training cruises and fleet manoeuvreswere still things of a far-off future, and the ships of Monk's threedivisions were all unequal in speed and handiness, so the manoeuvre was notexecuted with the machine-like regularity of a modern fleet. The van andcentre came into action fairly together, but the rearward ships straggledinto position, and Tromp was able to give some of the first comers a severehammering before their consorts came into action and relieved them of someof the brunt of his fire. 

The first shots had been fired between nine and ten a. M. Till after two inthe afternoon there was a close engagement, a steady, well-sustainedcannonade, with no attempt at manoeuvring on either side, the fleetsdrifting slowly before the light wind, wrapped in powder smoke, in themidst of which both sides made attempts to use their fireships against eachother. The only success was secured by the Dutch, who set the "Resolution"ablaze. She drifted out of the line and burned to the water's edge afterher crew had abandoned her. There was heavy loss of life in both fleets. 

For want of anything but the most rudimentary system of signalling, admirals had little control of a fight once it was begun. Monk, in the"Royal Charles, " had to content himself with marking out De Ruyter'sflagship, the "Seven Provinces, " as his immediate opponent, and fighting aprolonged duel with her. He walked his quarter-deck chewing tobacco, ahabit he had acquired as a precaution against infection during the Londonplague. He spoke at the outset with undeserved contempt of his opponent. "Now, " he said, "you shall see this fellow come and give me two broadsidesand then run. " But De Ruyter's broadsides thundered for hour after hour. However, the dogged persistency of the Dutch was met with persistentcourage as steady as their own. 

London listened anxiously to the far-off rumbling of the cannonade on theNorth Sea waters. Mr. Pepys went to Whitehall and found the Court "gone tochapel, it being St. James's Day. " Then he tells how--

 "by and by, while they are at chapel and we waiting chapel being done, come people out of the park, telling us that the guns are heard plainly. And so everybody to the park, and by and by the chapel done, the King and Duke into the bowling-green and upon the leads, whither I went, and there the guns were plain to be heard; though it was pretty to hear how confident some would be in the loudness of the guns, which it was as much as ever I could do to hear them. "

All the Eastern counties must have heard the cannon-thunder droning andrumbling like a far-off summer storm through the anxious hours of thatJuly day. As the afternoon went on even Dutch endurance found it hard tostand up against the steadily sustained cannonade of Monk's centre and vandivisions, and De Ruyter and Evertszoon began to make sail and work furtherout to sea, as if anxious to break off the fight. Monk, Rupert, and Allen, with the White and Red Divisions, followed them up closely, making, however, no attempt to board, but keeping up the fire of their batteries, and waiting for a chance to capture any crippled ship that might fallastern. Four of the enemy were thus taken. So the main bodies of bothfleets worked out into the North Sea on parallel courses, making no greatway, for the wind was falling. 

The rear divisions, Tromp's and Jeremy Smith's ships, did not follow thegeneral movement, for Tromp had never quite lost the advantage he hadgained in the opening stage of the battle. He kept his ships undershortened sail, and hammered away doggedly at the Blue Division. This wasthe moment when Monk might well have either reinforced Smith, or turnedwith all his force on Tromp, and overwhelmed and destroyed his squadron. Itwas made up of twenty-five line-of-battle ships and six frigates, and itsloss would have been a heavy blow to Holland. But on sea as on land therewas still little of the spirit of ordered combination. Just as Rupert atMarston Moor had destroyed the opposing wing of the Roundheads with afierce charge of his cavaliers, and then pursued, without a thought ofusing his advantage to fall upon the outnumbered and exposed centre of theenemy, so now Monk and Rupert pressed upon De Ruyter and Evertszoon, thoughTromp was at their mercy, and Smith was in serious peril. Thus theengagement broke into two separate battles as the summer evening drew on. 

Darkness ended the fight, and in the night the wind fell almost to a calm. Sunrise on the 26th showed the fleets drifting in disorder on a smooth sea, with their heavy sails hanging loose from the yards, only filled now andthen by disappointing flaws of wind. The crews were busy repairing damagesand transferring the wounded to the lighter craft. All day the only shotsfired were discharged by a couple of brass toy cannon mounted on a pleasureyacht which Rupert had brought with him. Taking advantage of a mere ruffleof wind, so light that it could not move the big ships, the Cavalier Princeran his yacht under the stern of the huge flagship of De Ruyter, and firedinto him. The Dutchman had no guns bearing dead aft, and the Prince wasable to worry him for a while, till there came one of those stronger gustsof wind that filled the sails of the "Seven Provinces, " and she swunground, showing a broadside that could blow the yacht out of the water. Butbefore a gun could be fired the yacht, with all sails spread, was racingback to the English fleet, and Rupert returned to the "Royal Charles" aspleased as a schoolboy with his frolic. 

During the night of the 26th the wind rose, and De Ruyter steered for theScheldt, followed up by Monk's two divisions. The Dutch admiral covered hisretreat with his best ships, and a running fight began at dawn. Even beforethe sun rose the sounds of a heavy cannonade had come through the darkness, telling that Tromp and Smith were hard at it again in their detachedbattle. Early in the day Monk abandoned the chase of the Dutch, and steeredtowards the sound of the cannonade. Soon the fleet came in distant sight ofthe battle. Tromp with the "Zealand squadron" was making a dogged retreat, working to the south-east, close-hauled on the wind from the north-east. Monk tacked and made more than one attempt to place himself across thecourse of the Dutchmen, hoping to catch them between his fleet and Smith'sBlue Division as between hammer and anvil. But Tromp slipped between hisenemies and was before long in full sail for Holland, with the threeEnglish divisions combined in a stern chase. Monk said that if Smith hadpressed Tromp closer early in the day, his retreat would have certainlybeen cut off. Smith and his friends protested that if the "general at sea"had laid his fleet on a better course, Tromp would have been taken. Thehonours of this last move in the game were with the Dutchman. 

A substantial victory had been gained, though there were few trophies toshow for it. The enemy had been met and forced by sheer hard knocks toabandon his station off the mouth of the Thames, and take refuge in his ownports. Monk was on the Dutch coast, picking up returning merchantmen asprizes, blockading the outgoing trade, and keeping the great fishing fleetin ruinous idleness. With the help of information supplied by a Dutchtraitor, Monk reaped further advantage from his victory and inflicted heavyadditional loss on the enemy. On 8 August the fleet sailed into theroadstead behind the long island of Terschelling, one of the chain ofislands at the mouth of the Zuyder Zee, and burned at their anchors ahundred and sixty Dutch merchantmen that had taken shelter there, includingseveral great East Indiamen. Next day landing-parties burned and plunderedthe ranges of warehouses on the island, and destroyed the town ofTerschelling. The loss to the Dutch traders was estimated at over a millionsterling. 

The victorious battle off the Thames in July, 1666, is practicallyforgotten, so far as the popular tradition of our naval successes goes. Ithas not even a name by which it might live in the memory of our people. Butit practically broke the power of Holland and brought the war to an end. What men do remember, and what has banished from their minds the livingtradition of the great North Sea battle, is the ugly fact that in thefollowing year De Ruyter sailed unopposed into the Thames, and captured andburned in the Medway dismantled ships that had fought victoriously againsthim in the North Sea battle--the "Royal Charles" being among his prizes. 

The fleets had, as usual at the time, been laid up for the winter. Themoney available for fitting them out in the following spring was divertedto other purposes and squandered by the King and the Court. Charles countedon having no need to commission a great fleet in the summer. He knew theDutch were feeling the strain of the war and the destruction of theirtrade, and would soon have to patch up a peace, and he opened preliminarynegotiations. Such negotiations must be prudently backed by an effectiveforce on the war footing. The King had practically disarmed as soon asthere was a prospect of peace. But the Dutch had fitted out the fleet inview of possible contingencies, and De Witt and De Ruyter could not resistthe temptation of revenging the defeat of 1666 and the sack of Terschellingby a raid on the Thames and Medway. It was the dishonesty and incapacity ofthe King and his parasite Court that laid England open to the shamefuldisaster that dimmed for all time the glory of Monk and Rupert's victory. But even after De Ruyter's exploits at Chatham the Dutch had no hope ofcontinuing the war, and within a few weeks of the disaster peace was signedat Breda. The story of the Dutch raid is a lasting lesson on the necessityof an island power never for a moment relaxing the armed guard of the sea. 

 CHAPTER VIII

 THE BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE

 1782

In the days when fleets in action relied upon the oar, all fighting was atclose quarters, and, as we have seen in our study of typical battles ofthis period, naval engagements fought out at close quarters gave verydefinite results, the fleet that was defeated being practically destroyed. 

When battles began to be fought under sail, with the gun as the chiefweapon, a new method had to be evolved. The more the fire of broadsidebatteries was relied upon, the greater was the tendency to fight at shortartillery range, without closing to hand-to-hand distance, and when thesailors and sea-fighters of the seventeenth century adopted line ahead asthe normal formation for making the most of broadside fire, battles had amarked tendency to degenerate into inconclusive artillery duels. 

In both the English and the French navies--the two powers that after thenaval decline of Spain and Holland disputed the command of the sea--thetactics of the battle in line ahead soon crystallized into a pedanticsystem. For a hundred years the methods of English admirals were kept inrigid uniformity by a code of "Fighting Instructions for the Navy, " drawnup under the direction of the Duke of York (afterwards James II), when hewas still Lord High Admiral of England in his brother's reign. Theseinstructions were a well-meant attempt to provide a "sealed pattern" fornaval engagements. They contemplated set, formal battles with both fleetsin line ahead, sailing on parallel courses, or passing and repassingeach other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides as the guns bore. TheFrench adopted similar methods. If the English had any advantage in theirtactics, it was in their ideas of gunnery. The French aimed at masts andrigging, in the hope of crippling an adversary in her sail power andforcing her to fall out of the moving line. The English believed in makingthe hull their target, aiming "between wind and water" to start dangerousleaks, or sending their shot into the crowded gun-decks to put the enemy'sbatteries out of action. 

 [Illustration: GUNS AND CARRONADES IN USE IN THE BRITISH NAVY IN THE LATTER PART OF THE 18TH CENTURY]

Under such methods battles became formal duels, in which, as often as not, there was no great result, and both sides claimed the victory. The story ofmany of the naval campaigns of the first three-quarters of the eighteenthcentury is weary reading. It was in the last quarter of the century thatEnglish admirals learned to fight again at close quarters, and to strikecrushing blows at an enemy. The new period of energetic, decisive fightingbegan with a famous battle in West Indian waters in 1782, and culminated inthe world-renowned victories of Nelson, who was a young captain on theNorth American station "when Rodney beat the Comte de Grasse" in the battleof the Saints' Passage. 

Born when George I was King, Rodney was a veteran of many wars when he wonhis West Indian triumph. He had fought the French under Hawke, and was withBoscawen at the taking of Louisburg. In 1759 he bombarded Havre, and burnedthe transport flotilla collected at the mouth of the Seine for a raid onEngland. Three years later, as commander-in-chief on the Leeward Islandsstation, he captured Martinique, St. Lucia, and Grenada, and learned theways of the West Indian seas. Then came years of political disfavour, half-pay and financial embarrassment, until in an hour of darkness forEngland, with the American colonies in successful revolt and Frenchman andSpaniard besieging Gibraltar by land and sea, the veteran admiral wasrecalled to active service, and found and seized the great opportunities ofhis life. Sailing south with a relieving fleet, he fell in with andcaptured a Spanish convoy off Finisterre, and then surprised and destroyedLungara's Spanish squadron, taking seven ships out of eleven, and chasingthe rest into Cadiz. The appearance of his fleet before Gibraltar saved thefortress, and then in February, 1780, he sailed across the Atlantic to tryconclusions with De Guichen, whose powerful fleet based on Martinique wasthreatening all the English possessions in the West Indies. So far numbersand opportunity had been on his side. He had now to depend more on skillthan fortune, and meet a more equal opponent. 

At his head-quarters at St. Lucia in April, 1780, Rodney heard that theFrench fleet under De Guichen had sailed from Martinique. On the 17th hefought an indecisive action with the enemy, an action notable for whatRodney attempted, not for what he accomplished. Twice again on later daysRodney met De Guichen, but none of the three battles did more than inflictmutual loss on the combatants, without producing any decisive result. Thecampaign was, like so many others in the West Indies, a struggle for thetemporary possession of this or that port or island, De Guichen's wholestrategy being based on the idea of avoiding the risks of a closeengagement that might imperil his fleet, and trying to snatch localadvantages when he could elude his enemy. 

In 1781 Rodney was compelled by ill-health temporarily to give up the WestIndian command and return to England. In the spring of 1782 he was againsent to the West Indies, at a moment when the situation of affairs was mostmenacing for British power beyond the Atlantic. Cornwallis had been forcedto surrender at Yorktown, and the success of the revolted American colonieswas now assured. The French fleet in the West Indies had been joined byreinforcements under the Comte de Grasse, who had gone out ascommander-in-chief, taking with him a considerable military force that wasto combine with an expedition from the Spanish American colonies, not forthe capture of some small islands in the Antilles, but for the conquest ofJamaica, the centre of British power and British trade in the West Indianseas. 

Kempenfeldt, a good sailor (now remembered chiefly as the admiral who "wentdown with twice three hundred men, " when the "Royal George" sank atSpithead), dispersed and destroyed at the mouth of the Channel a largeFrench convoy of supplies for De Grasse, and drove the squadron thatprotected it into Brest. With his task thus lightened, Rodney put to seawith four ships of the line, and after a stormy passage reached Barbadoeson 19 February, 1782. Sailing thence to Antigua, he formed a junction withand took command of the West Indian fleet, which Hood had commanded duringhis absence in England. From Antigua he took the fleet to St. Lucia, wherehe established his head-quarters in Gros Islet Bay. St. Lucia was thefavourite base of operations of our West Indian fleets in the old wars, andthe scene of much desperate fighting by land and sea. The year before DeGrasse had failed in an attempt to seize it. 

The fleet of the Comte de Grasse was only some forty miles away to thenorthward. It lay at Martinique, in the bay of Fort Royal (now Fort deFrance). Though it has nothing to do with the fortunes of Rodney and DeGrasse, it is interesting to note that in a convent school looking out onthe bay there was just then a little schoolgirl named Josephine de laPagerie, daughter of an artillery lieutenant in the garrison, who was tolive to be Empress of the French, when France was the mistress of Europe. 

During the month of March both fleets were busy preparing for sea. Rodneywas reinforced from England, and a small squadron from Brest joined DeGrasse. The reinforcements received during March had given Rodney theadvantage of numbers. He had thirty-six sail of the line to oppose thethirty that were with De Grasse at Martinique. In the English fleet therewere five great three-deckers, three of them carrying 98 and two of them 90guns. There were twenty-one 74's, a 70-gun ship, and nine 64's. In theFrench fleet there was one of the largest war vessels then afloat, DeGrasse's flagship, the "Ville de Paris, " of 104 guns. There were five shipsof 80 guns, twenty of 74, one of 70, and three of 64. This enumerationgives Rodney an advantage of six ships and more than two hundred guns. Itis quite true that the ships of the same rating in the French service weregenerally larger than the English, but even apart from numbers, the latterhad advantages in armament that were more important than any triflingdifference in size. The English guns were mostly mounted on an improvedsystem that gave a larger arc of training fore and aft, the practicalresult being that as ships passed each other the Frenchman was kept longerunder fire than the Englishman. Further, the English ships mounted, besidesthe guns counted in their armament, a number of carronades, mounted on theupper decks, short guns of large calibre, throwing a heavy shot when thefighting was carried on at close quarters, a weapon not yet introduced inthe French navy. Thanks to these improvements in the armament of his ships, Rodney had an advantage in gun-power beyond the mere superiority in numbersof ships and guns. He had a further advantage in the fact that a largernumber of his ships were copper-sheathed. This meant less fouling while theships were waiting at their anchorage, and therefore better speed for theEnglish when they put to sea. 

De Grasse was encumbered with a large convoy of merchantmen and storeships, and many of his ships were overcrowded with the troops destined for thedescent on Jamaica. It was expected that when he sailed it would be toform, in the first instance, a junction with the Spanish part of theexpedition off San Domingo. Rodney kept his fleet at St. Lucia, ready toweigh anchor on the shortest notice, and a smart frigate, the "Andromache"(commanded by Captain Byron, grandfather of the poet), cruised offMartinique, watching the Frenchman. 

At dawn on 8 April Byron saw that the French were coming out, and hehastened to St. Lucia under press of sail with the news. Off the port heflew the signal that told Rodney that De Grasse was at sea. Anchors came upand sails were shaken out, and Rodney set off in pursuit, knowing that DeGrasse had a very few hours' start of him. 

The few hours did not count for much, provided the English admiral couldonce get on the Frenchman's track. The danger of missing him could onlyarise from making at the outset a wrong judgment as to the course on whichthe enemy would sail. It was De Grasse's business to avoid a battle untilhe had safely taken his huge convoy to San Domingo and joined hands withhis Spanish allies. Rodney judged that he would most likely follow the longcurve of the chain of islands that fringe the Caribbean Sea, steering byPuerto Rico for San Domingo. In the night of the 8th the English fleetpassed Martinique. Next morning it was off the west coast of Dominica, making good speed, and away to the northward a far-spreading crowd of sailsshowed that Rodney had guessed rightly. The French fleet and convoy were insight. 

Dominica is a mass of volcanic ridges, falling to the seaward inprecipitous cliffs, rising landward tier above tier and shooting up intorocky spires that culminate in the towering peak of the Morne Diablotin, five thousand feet high. Under the shelter of this rugged island, while theprevailing trade wind blows steadily from the eastward, there are suddencalms, or irregular flaws of wind blowing now from one point, now fromanother, diverted by the irregular ridges of the high land. This Aprilmorning the sun had hardly risen when the wind fell, and the two fleetsdrifted slowly, with loose-hanging sails. Near the north end of the islandlay the convoy. A little to the southward De Grasse's thirty battleshipsstraggled in a long line over some six miles of sunlit sea. Off the centreand south of the island Rodney's larger fleet was stretched out in lineahead. It was formed in three divisions. Hood, in the 90-gun "Barfleur, "commanded the van. Rodney, with his flag flying in a tall three-decker, the"Formidable, " of 98 guns, was in the centre. The rear was commanded byRear-Admiral Samuel Drake, a namesake and descendant of that other Drakewhose name had been the terror of the West Indian seas in Elizabethan days. 

Suddenly there came a flaw of wind sweeping from the south round the end ofthe island, so narrow that most of the English fleet hardly felt it. Itfilled the sails of Hood's ships in the van, and they steered for twoFrench battleships that dropped astern of their consorts. One of theFrenchmen passed close under the tiers of guns in the leading English ship, but not a shot was fired at her as she swept by and rejoined her consorts. Rodney had not yet flown the signal for battle, and these were still thedays when personal enterprise and decision were not encouraged among thecaptains of a fleet. 

As the breeze filled the sails of the Frenchmen, Grasse signalled to theconvoy to bear away before it to the north-westward, while he with hisfighting-ships set his course for the channel between Dominica andGuadeloupe. He rightly judged that Rodney would follow the warships, andthus the convoy would have a good start. The channel towards which theFrench fleet was heading is known as the Saints' Passage, "not on thesurmise that it leads to Heaven, "[14] but because along its northern watersstretches a line of rocky islets known to the French as "_les Iles desSaintes_. " The nine ships of Hood forming the English van had gone farahead of the rest of the fleet. If De Grasse had not had his mind socentred on the idea of avoiding a battle, there is little doubt that hemight have brought an overwhelming force to bear on them. Luckily forRodney, he contented himself with sending his second in command, Vaudreuil, to skirmish with them, passing and repassing Hood's division atlong range and firing at masts and rigging in the hope of disabling themfor further pursuit. Hood returned the fire, doing as much damage as hesuffered, and towards midday the rest of the English had worked up to himby taking advantage of every breath of wind that blew over the ridges ofDominica. Then the wind fell again, and all through the night and thefollowing day (10 April) the fleets lay in sight of each other beyond evendistant cannon shot, Vaudreuil's and Hood's crews busying themselves withrepairing rigging and replacing damaged spars. 

 [14] Treves, "Cradle of the Deep, " p. 175. 

During the 11th De Grasse tried to get his fleet through the Saints'Passage, working by short tacks to windward, and baffled and delayed bysudden calms. In the afternoon several of his ships were still to thewestward of the strait, and Rodney, who had been getting gradually to thenorthward, despite the frequent failure of the wind under the lee ofDominica, was at last near enough seriously to threaten these laggards. Inorder to save them from being overwhelmed by the whole English fleet, DeGrasse gave up the advantage of weary hours of hard work and came backbefore the wind out of the strait. At sunset the two fleets lay to thewestward of the Saints' Passage, and there was no probability that DeGrasse would attempt to tack through it during the hours of darkness. Inthe night Rodney manoeuvred to get to windward of the enemy, and atdaylight on the 12th the two fleets were within striking distance, DeGrasse to the leeward, his fleet in a straggling line over some nine milesof sea. Rodney had his opportunity of forcing on a decisive battle at last. 

At some distance from the French line a partly dismasted line-of-battleship, the "Zelé, " was seen in tow of a frigate. She had been in collisionwith the flagship during the night, and had been so badly damaged that DeGrasse was sending her away to Guadeloupe. Rodney's ships had lost theirorder of battle somewhat in the darkness, and while he was reforming hisline he detached a couple of ships to threaten the disabled "Zelé. " Thishad the effect he intended. It removed De Grasse's last hesitation aboutfighting. The French line was soon seen bearing down on the port tack, therearward ships crowding sail to close up. Rodney's battle line, in reversedorder, led by Drake and the rear division, was already on a course thatwould bring the two fleets sweeping past each other, and the leading ship, the "Marlborough, " was steered so as to make the passage a close one. Rodney had hoisted the signal to engage the enemy to leeward. While thefleets were closing he sat in an arm-chair on his quarterdeck, for he wasolder than his sixty-four years, broken by long illness and only sustainedby his dogged spirit. One of his captains, Savage of the "Hercules, " alsowent into battle seated in an arm-chair beside the bulwarks of his ship. Hewas lame with gout and unable to stand or walk without help. When thefiring began, and the ships were passing each other amid a thunder ofbroadsides and a hail of shot and bullets, Captain Savage gravely raisedhis cocked hat to salute each enemy as she ranged up abreast of the"Hercules. " What would those old sailors have thought of the navalcommander of to-day peeping through the slits in the steel walls of aconning tower? But it is only fair to ask also what they would have thoughtof shells weighing half a ton bursting in fiery destruction. 

The "Marlborough, " approaching on a converging course, came to closequarters with the "Brave, " the sixth ship in De Grasse's line, and then, shifting her helm to bring her course parallel to that of the enemy, exchanged broadsides with the Frenchman. Ship after ship came into actionin the same way. The speed was nearer three than four knots, and the linessome six miles long, so it was more than an hour before the leading Englishbattleship was abreast of and engaged with the rearmost Frenchman. As shippassed ship there was a thunder of artillery, a rattle of small arms. Thena brief lull till the guns of two more opponents bore on each other. Butin this cannonade the English had the advantage of the heavy blows struckby their large-bore carronades at close range, and the fact that theirgun-mountings enabled them to keep a passing ship longer under fire thanwas possible for the French gunners. In De Grasse's ships, crowded withtroops, the slaughter was terrible. As the fight went on and the Frenchships came under the crushing fire of adversary after adversary, it wasseen that it was only with difficulty the officers kept the men at theguns. In this first hour of the fight the French began to throw the deadoverboard to clear their encumbered decks, and a strange horror was addedto the scene, for shoals of sharks that had followed the fleets to pick upanything thrown overboard now swarmed around them, lashing the water intofoam as they struggled for their human prey. 

At length the leading English ship was abeam of the rearmost of De Grasse'sfleet. Over some six miles of sea the two battle lines extended, every shipablaze with fire-flashes from her guns and with the dense smoke-cloudsdrifting around the English vessels and wrapping them in the fog of war. Ifthe battle was now to be fought out on the old traditional method, thefleets would clear each other, wear and tack and repass each other inopposite directions with a second exchange of fire. But now came the eventthat made the battle of the Saints' Passage epoch-making in naval history. 

What precisely happened is wrapped in a fog of controversy as dense as thesmoke-fog that enveloped Rodney's fleet at the decisive moment. One thingis certain. The old admiral suddenly changed all his plans, and executed anew manoeuvre with the signal he himself was disobeying--the order toengage to leeward--still flying from his flagship. The act was the suddenseizing of an unexpected opportunity. But some of the merit of the newdeparture was due to Rodney's right-hand man, his "Captain of the Fleet, "Sir Charles Douglas. Douglas was one of those whose minds had beeninfluenced by new theories on naval war, which were just then in the air. In Britain a Scotch country gentleman, John Clerk, of Eldin, had beenarguing for some time in pamphlets and manuscripts circulated among navalofficers against the formal methods that led to indecisive results. Hispaper plans for destroying an enemy were no doubt open to the criticismthat they would work out beautifully if the enemy stuck to theold-fashioned ways and attempted no counter-stroke. But the essence ofClerk's theories was that parallel orders of battle meant only indecisivecannonading; that to crush an enemy one must break into his line, bringparts of it under a close fire, not on one side, but on both, and decidethe fate of the ships thus cut off by superior numbers and superior gunpower before the rest could come to their help. His plans might not workout with the mechanical exactitude described in his writings, but theywould tend to produce the close mêlée, where the best men and the steadiestfire would win, and after such an encounter there would not be merely a fewmasts and spars shot away, and a few holes to be plugged, but the beatenside would be minus a number of ships sunk, burned, or taken, and condemnedto hopeless inferiority for the rest of the campaign. Clerk was not theonly man who put forward these ideas. A French Jesuit professor ofmathematics had worked out plans for securing local advantage of numbers ina sea-fight at close quarters; but while French naval officers laughed atnaval battles worked out with a piece of chalk and a blackboard, Britishsailors were either themselves thinking out similar schemes or werebeginning to think there might be something in the Scotch laird's diagrams. 

It was at the critical moment when the two fleets lay side by side inparallel lines on opposite courses, wrapped in the battle-smoke, thatDouglas, looking out through a gap in the war-cloud, saw that a sudden flawof wind blowing steadily from the south-east was flattening the Frenchsails against the masts and checking their speed. The same sudden change ofwind was filling the English sails, and the masters were squaring the yardsto it, while the Frenchmen to keep any way on their ships had to bringtheir bows partly round towards the English line. Between the "Glorieux, "the ship immediately opposed to Rodney's flagship, the "Formidable, " andthe next Frenchman in the line, the "Diadème, " a wide gap was opening up. Douglas saw the chance offered to his admiral. Half the English fleet wasahead of the "Formidable, " engaged with the rearward French ships. If the"Formidable" pushed through the gap, leading the rest of the line afterher, the French rear would be cut off from the van and brought under adouble fire at close quarters, and there would be a fair prospect ofdestroying it before De Grasse could come back to its support. He rushed toRodney's side. Moments were precious. He urged his plan in the briefestwords. At first the old admiral rejected it. "No, " he said, "I will notbreak my line. "[15] Douglas insisted, and the two officers stepped to theopening in the bulwarks at the gangway and looked out. The "Formidable" wasopposite the tempting gap in the French line. Rodney in a moment changedhis mind, and told Douglas that he accepted his plan. 

 [15] Rodney in at first refusing was upholding the strict letter of the "Fighting Instructions, " which forbade breaking the line or changing the order of battle during an action. Instruction XVI laid it down that:--

 "In all cases of fight with the enemy the commanders of His Majesty's ships are to _keep the fleet in one line_, and (as much as may be) to preserve that order of battle, which they have been directed to keep before the time of fight. "

In the haste to carry it out the signal to fight to leeward of the Frenchwas forgotten and left flying. The "Formidable" turned her high bows intothe gap, and swept through it with all her hundred guns and her carronadesin action, pouring broadside after broadside right and left into the"Glorieux" and the "Diadème. " Six ships in succession swung round andfollowed in the wake of the flagship, which was now engaged with theFrench on the windward side. Shattered by successive blasts ofwell-directed fire, the "Diadème" was drifting a helpless wreck, and therearward ships, with their way checked, were huddling in confusion behindher, English ships firing into them on both sides. Through another gap inthe French line, ahead of De Grasse's giant "Ville de Paris, " other Englishships made their way in the dense cloud of smoke, some of the captainshardly aware of what they were doing. The French van had meanwhile forgedahead, and then, as the wind suddenly fell to a dead calm, it was seen thatDe Grasse's fleet was broken into three isolated fragments. 

To the southward lay the van ships under De Bougainville becalmed, with noenemy in range of them. The "Ville de Paris, " with several of her consortsof the French centre, formed another group, with the whole of the rearwardEnglish division exchanging fire with them at long range. The rear of theFrench, under Vaudreuil, and the ships of the centre cut off by Rodney'smanoeuvre were huddled together, with Hood's division and the ships thathad followed the "Formidable" through the line shepherding them. The lossof the wind had made it difficult or impossible to keep the broadsidesbearing, and for an hour the action died down into a desultory cannonade. When the breeze came again over the ridges of Dominica, De Bougainville'sdivision, now far to leeward, made no attempt to succour De Grasse. Onlyone of his ships slowly beat up to the main battle. The French admiraltried to get away to the westward, but Hood clung doggedly to him, whileRodney and Drake completed the defeat of Vaudreuil and the French rear. The"Diadème" soon struck her colours. A frigate tried to tow the dismasted"Glorieux" out of the mêlée, but the captain of the "Glorieux, " DeKerlessi, saw that the effort would only end in the friendly frigate beingalso captured, and with his own hand he cut the tow-rope and hauled downhis flag. Then the "César" struck her colours, and while the rearwardships were being thus disposed of, in the broken Centre the "Hector" andthe "Ardent" surrendered to Hood's division. 

The English attack was now concentrated on the centre, and the battle ragedfiercely round the French flagship, distinguished by her huge bulk and hertowering masts. One by one these came down, trailing in a tangle of spars, sails, and rigging over her sides. Her crowded decks were a shambles ofdead and dying, but still De Grasse fought on--for honour, not for victory. His van held aloof, his broken rear was in flight. Five of his ships hadstruck. Still he kept his guns in action till Hood in his flagship, the"Princesse, " ranged close up alongside of him and poured in a series ofdestructive broadsides. Then the French flag came down at last, and DeGrasse went on board the "Princesse" and gave up his sword to thevice-admiral. 

The sun was going down when the French flagship surrendered. The captured"César, " set on fire by her crew, was blazing from stem to stern. The otherprizes had been secured. Rodney attempted no pursuit of the scatteredFrench ships that were sailing away to the southward and thenorth-westward. Enough had been done, he said. It was now his business torefit his fleet and take it to Jamaica. He had shattered the French powerin the West Indian seas and made himself the master of the field ofoperations. A younger and more vigorous man would have perhaps marked downVaudreuil's or Bougainville's fugitive divisions for utter destruction. ButRodney was content with the solid success he had obtained. 

The losses of the French fleet had been very heavy. In their crowded decksthe English fire had effected something like a massacre. On board the"Ville de Paris" more men had been killed and wounded than in the wholeEnglish fleet. Very few officers and men had escaped some kind of wound. Many of the ships that had got away were now very shorthanded, withleaking hulls, and spars and rigging badly cut up. 

The effect of the victory was to enable England to obtain much better termsin the treaty that was signed next year. A disastrous war was closed by abrilliant success. But England owed to it more than this temporaryadvantage. It was a new beginning, the opening event of the period ofsplendid triumphs on the sea on the reputation of which we are stillliving. To quote the words of Rodney's latest biographer, [16] "it markedthe beginning of that fierce and headlong yet well-calculated style ofsea-fighting which led to Trafalgar, and made England undisputed mistressof the sea. "

 [16] David Hannay, "Rodney" (English Men of Action), p. 213. 

 [Illustration: A THREE-DECKER OF NELSON'S TIME]

 CHAPTER IX

 TRAFALGAR

 1805

The closing years of the eighteenth century and the opening years of thenineteenth represent the most splendid period in the annals of the BritishNavy. Howe destroyed the French fleet in the Atlantic on "the gloriousFirst of June, 1794, " Nelson died in the midst of his greatest victory offCape Trafalgar on 21 October, 1805. Little more than eleven years separatedthe two dates, and this brief period was crowded with triumphs for Britainon the sea. The "First of June, " St. Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar are the great names in the roll of victory; but"the meteor flag of England" flew victorious in a hundred fights on all theseas of the world. 

Men who were officers young in the service on the day when Rodney broke atonce the formal traditions of a century and the battle-line of the Comte deGrasse lived through and shared in the glories of this decade of victory. Anew spirit had come into the navy. An English admiral would no longer thinkhe had done his duty in merely bringing his well-ordered line intocannon-shot of an enemy's array and exchanging broadsides with him athalf-cannon range. Nor was the occupation of a port or an island recognizedas an adequate result for a naval campaign. The enemy's fighting-fleet wasnow the object aimed at. It was not merely to be brought to action, andmore or less damaged by distant cannonading. The ideal battle was the closefight amid the enemy's broken line, and victory meant his destruction. 

The spirit of the time was personified in its greatest sailor. Nelson'sbattles were fought in grim earnest, taking risks boldly in order to securegreat results. Trafalgar--the last of his battles, and the last greatbattle of the days of the sail--was also the final episode in the longstruggle of Republican and Imperial France to snatch from England even fora while the command of the sea. 

When Napoleon assembled the Grand Army at Boulogne, gave it the officialtitle of the "_Armée d'Angleterre_, " and crowded every creek from Dunkirkto Havre with flat-bottomed boats for its transport across the Channel, hequite realized that the first condition of success for the scheme was thata French fleet should be in possession of the Channel at the moment hisveterans embarked for their short voyage. He had twenty sail of the line, under Admiral Ganteaume, at Brest; twelve under Villeneuve at Toulon; asquadron of five at Rochefort under Admiral Missiessy; five more at Ferrol;and in this last port and at Cadiz and Cartagena there were other shipsbelonging to his Spanish allies. But every port was watched by Englishbattleships and cruisers. The vigilant blockade had been kept up for twoyears, during which Nelson, who was watching Toulon, had hardly been anhour absent from his flagship, the "Victory"; and Collingwood, in the"Royal Sovereign, " did not anchor once in twenty-two months of alternatecruising and lying to. 

Napoleon's mind was ceaselessly busy with plans for moving his fleets onthe sea as he moved army corps on land, so as to elude, mislead, andout-manoeuvre the English squadrons, and suddenly bring a concentratedFrench force of overwhelming strength into the narrow seas. The first movein these plans was usually assigned to the Toulon fleet. According to oneproject it was to give Nelson the slip, make for the Straits of Gibraltar, combine with the Cadiz fleet in driving off or crushing the blockadingsquadron before that port, sail north with the liberated vessels, fall onthe blockading ships before Rochefort and Brest, and then sweep theChannel with the united squadrons. In other projects French fleets were torun the blockades simultaneously or in succession, raid the West Indies, draw off a part of the naval forces of England to the other side of theAtlantic, and then come swooping back upon the Channel. 

In the plan finally adopted the first move was to be the escape of theToulon fleet; the second, the threat against the West Indies. Its executionwas entrusted to Villeneuve, because Napoleon, ever since the escape of hissquadron from the disaster in Aboukir Bay, had regarded him as "a luckyman, " and luck and chance must play a great part in such a project. 

Nelson did not keep up a close and continuous blockade of Toulon with hisfighting-fleet of battleships. He used Sardinia as his base of supplies, and there were times when all the heavier ships were in Sardinian waters, while his frigates watched Toulon. His previous experiences had led him tobelieve that if the French Mediterranean fleet came out it would be foranother raid on Egypt, and this idea was confirmed by reports thatVilleneuve was embarking not only troops, but large quantities of saddleryand muskets. The story of the saddles seemed to indicate an expedition to acountry where plenty of horses could be obtained to mount a body ofcavalry--horses, too, that when they were bought or requisitioned would nothave saddles that a European trooper was used to. Nelson did not want tokeep the French shut up in Toulon. He was anxious to catch them in the opensea, and with his fleet on the coast of Sardinia and his frigates spreadout in a fan to the northwards he counted on bringing Villeneuve to actionif he attempted to reach the Levant. 

In January, 1805, the frigates brought news that the French were out, andNelson at once disposed his fleet to intercept their expected voyage toEgypt. He found no trace of them in the direction he expected, and he wasgreatly relieved on returning from a hurried rush eastward to learn thatbad weather had driven Villeneuve back to his port. "These gentlemen, " hesaid, "are not accustomed to the Gulf of Lyons gales, but we have buffetedthem for twenty-one months without carrying away a spar. "

On 30 March Villeneuve came out of Toulon again with eleven ships of theline. This time, thanks to Nelson's fixed idea about Egypt, he got a goodstart for the Atlantic. As soon as his frigates brought the news that theFrench were out, Nelson strung out his ships from the south point ofSardinia to Sicily and the African coast. He thus watched every possibleavenue to the Eastern Mediterranean, ready to concentrate and attack theenemy as soon as he got touch of them anywhere. But not a French sail wassighted. 

Villeneuve had run down past the Balearic Islands to Cartagena, whereAdmiral Salcedo was in command of a Spanish squadron. But the Spaniardswere not ready for sea, and Villeneuve was anxious to be west of theStraits of Gibraltar as soon as possible, and could not wait for hisdilatory allies. On 8 April he passed through the Straits. Then he steeredfor Cadiz, drove off Sir John Orde's blockading squadron of six sail, andentered the harbour on the 9th. 

At Cadiz there were Admiral Gravina's Spanish fleet and a Frenchbattleship, the "Aigle. " Again the Spaniards were mostly unready for sea, but six of them and the "Aigle" joined Villeneuve when he sailed out intothe Atlantic steering for the West Indies, now at the head of eighteenbattleships and seven frigates. 

Information was difficult to obtain and travelled slowly a hundred yearsago. It was not till 11 April that Nelson learned that Villeneuve hadpassed through the Straits of Gibraltar eight days before. Then, while theFrench were running down into the trade wind that was to carry themwestward, Nelson, still ignorant whether they were raiding the West Indiesor Ireland, but anxious in either case to be in the Atlantic as soon asmight be, had to work his way slowly towards the Straits against stormyhead winds, and then wait wearily at anchor on the Moorish coast for achange of wind that would carry him into the ocean. He was suffering fromdisappointment, depression, and ill-health. It was not till 7 May that hepassed the Straits. He had made up his mind that the French were probablybound for the West Indies, and he followed them. They had a long start, buthe trusted to find them among the islands and make the West Indian seasonce more famous for a great British victory. 

On 4 June he reached Barbadoes, and began his search, only to miss theFrench, thanks to false information, and learn too late that they werereturning to Europe. Villeneuve had paid only a flying visit to the WestIndies, leaving Martinique on 5 June, the day after Nelson arrived atBarbadoes, and steering first north, then eastwards across the Atlantic. Nelson followed on 13 June, and reached Gibraltar without once sighting hisenemy. 

He had, however, taken the precaution of dispatching a fast sailing brig toEngland with the news that the French fleet was returning to Europe. Thisship, the "Curieux, " actually got a glimpse of the enemy far off in midocean, and outsailed him to such good purpose that the Admiralty was ableto order the squadrons blockading Brest and Rochefort to unite under thecommand of Sir Robert Calder and try to intercept Villeneuve on his wayback. Though inferior in numbers to the allied fleet, Calder brought it toaction in thick, foggy weather on 22 July, some ninety miles off theSpanish Cape Finisterre. The battle, fought in semi-darkness, was adesultory, indecisive encounter, and though Calder cut off and took twoSpanish ships of the line, the feeling in England, when the news arrived, was not one of satisfaction at his partial success, but of undeservedindignation at his having failed to force the fighting and destroy theenemy's fleet. 

Villeneuve took his fleet into Vigo Bay. According to the plan ofcampaign, now that he had shaken off Nelson's pursuit, he should havesailed for the Channel, picking up the Brest and Rochefort squadrons on hisway. Napoleon, at Boulogne, was ceaselessly drilling the Grand Army inrapid embarkation and disembarkation, and hoping each day for news of hisadmiral's dash into the Channel. But Villeneuve, who knew Keith had asquadron in the Channel, and had a vague dread of Nelson suddenly makinghis appearance, had a better appreciation of the small chance of the schemegiving any result than the imperious soldier-Emperor, who had come tobelieve that what he ordered must succeed. From Vigo, Villeneuve wrote tothe Minister of Marine, Decrès, that his fleet was hardly in condition forany active enterprise. It had met with trying weather in the Atlantic. Hisflagship, the "Bucentaure, " had been struck and damaged by lightning. Allthe ships needed a dockyard overhaul. There was sickness among the crews. He had to land hundreds of men and send them to hospital. He wantedrecruits badly, and Vigo afforded only the scantiest resources for therefitting of the ships. He was already thinking of going back to Cadiz. Hemoved his fleet to Corunna, but there he found things in such a conditionthat he reported that he could not even find hospital room for the sick. 

From Napoleon came pressing orders to push on to the Channel at all risks. On 11 August Villeneuve put to sea, picking up a combined French andSpanish squadron from the neighbouring port of Ferrol. He meant to sail toBrest, bring out the squadron there, and call up the ships at Rochefort bysending on a frigate in advance with orders for that port. (The frigate wascaptured on the way by a British cruiser. ) He sent a dispatch overland toNapoleon to say that at last he was coming. 

In the Bay of Biscay, two days out from Corunna, he was told by a Danishmerchant-ship that there was a great fleet of British battleships close athand to the northward. The news was false. A few hours before the captainof a British cruiser had stopped the Dane and purposely given him thisfalse information, in the hope that it would reach the French and misleadthem. Except a few scattered cruisers, there was nothing between Villeneuveand the ports of Brest and Rochefort--nothing that could stop his projectedconcentration. Nelson had waited a few days at Gibraltar, where the news ofCalder's fight had not arrived. He communicated with Collingwood, who waswatching Cadiz with six ships, and then, conjecturing that the object ofthe French expedition might be Ireland, he sailed north and was off theIrish coast on 12 August, the day after Villeneuve left Corunna. Finding notrace of the enemy, he joined the squadron of Cornwallis off Ushant on 15August, and then, broken in health and depressed at what seemed a hugefailure, he went back to England to spend some time with Lady Hamilton atMerton. 

Villeneuve had hardly heard of the imaginary fleet when the wind, which hadso far been fair, went round to the north. This decided the irresoluteadmiral. To the dismay of his captains he suddenly altered his course andran before the wind southward to Cadiz, where he arrived on 22 August, contenting himself with watching the retirement of Collingwood's six shipsand making no effort to envelop and cut them off with his enormouslysuperior force. Collingwood promptly resumed the blockade when the Frenchand Spanish anchored, and deluded Villeneuve into the belief that theblockade was in touch with a supporting fleet by keeping one of his shipswell out in the offing, and frequently signalling through her to imaginaryconsorts below the horizon. 

On the very day that Villeneuve anchored at Cadiz, Napoleon sent off fromBoulogne this pressing dispatch to him at Brest:--

 "Admiral, I trust you have arrived at Brest. Start at once. Do not lose a moment. Come into the Channel with our united squadrons, and England is ours. We are all ready. Everything is embarked. Come here for twenty-four hours and all is ended, and six centuries of shame and insult will be avenged. "

When he heard that the admiral had lost heart and turned back he wasfurious. But he had already formed plans for an alternative enterprise. TheEnglish ministry had succeeded in forming a new coalition with Austria andRussia as a means of keeping the Emperor occupied on the Continent. On 27August Napoleon issued his orders for the march of the Grand Army to theDanube, and on 1 September he started on the career of victory, the stagesof which were to be Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. 

To Villeneuve he sent, through Decrès, bitter reproaches and new orders fora naval campaign in the Mediterranean. Decrès, writing to his old comrade, transmitted the new plan of campaign and softened down the Emperor's angrywords. Villeneuve reported that he could not leave Cadiz for some time. Hewas doing all that was possible to refit his fleet and find full crews forthe French and Spanish ships. For the latter men were provided by pressinglandsmen into the service. "It is pitiful, " wrote a French officer, "to seesuch fine ships manned with a handful of seamen and a crowd of beggars andherdsmen. " In the councils of war held at Cadiz there were fierce disputesbetween the French and Spanish officers, the latter accusing their alliesof having abandoned to their fate the two ships lost in Calder's action. The jealousy between the two nations rose so high that several Frenchsailors were stabbed at night in the streets. 

The English Government knew nothing of the inefficient state and theendless difficulties of the great fleet concentrated at Cadiz, and regardedits presence there as a standing danger. Collingwood was reinforced, and itwas decided to send Nelson out to join him, take over the command, blockadethe enemy closely, and bring him to action if he ventured out. 

Nelson sailed from Spithead on 15 September in his old flagship the"Victory, " accompanied by the "Euryalus, " Captain Blackwood, one of theswiftest and smartest frigates in the navy. Picking up the battleships"Thunderer" and "Ajax" on the way, he joined the fleet off Cadiz on 28September. 

Villeneuve had written to Decrès that none of the ships were in really goodorder, and that the Spanish vessels were "quite incapable of meeting theenemy. " Only a portion of his fleet had had the slight training afforded bythe Atlantic voyage. The rest had lain for years in harbour, and many ofthem had crews chiefly made up of recently enrolled landsmen. Many of thecaptains held that if there was to be a fight it would be useless tomanoeuvre or to attempt an artillery duel, and that the only chance ofsuccess lay in a hand-to-hand fight by boarding. But, then, to produce theposition for boarding meant being able to manoeuvre. Villeneuve wassupported by most of the superior officers of the fleet in the opinion thathe had better stay at Cadiz; but from Napoleon there came reiterated ordersfor the fleet to enter the Mediterranean. 

The last hesitation of the unfortunate admiral was ended by the news thatAdmiral Rosilly was coming from Paris to supersede him. If he did notattempt something, his career would end in disgrace. He held a finalcouncil of war, gave his last instructions to his officers, and then wroteto Decrès that he would obey the Emperor's orders, though he foresaw thatthey would probably lead to disaster. 

Contrary winds from the westward delayed his sailing for some days afterthis decision. Reefs and local currents made it difficult to work a largefleet out of Cadiz without a fair wind. A smaller but better-trained fleetthan that of Villeneuve had once taken three days to get out, and a portionof the fleet at sea and unsupported would be in deadly peril. On 17 Octoberthe wind began to work round to the eastward. Next day it fell almost to acalm, but it increased towards evening, and Villeneuve, after a conferencewith his Spanish colleague, Admiral Gravina, signalled that the ships wereto weigh anchor at sunrise on the 19th. 

Nelson had been watching Cadiz for three weeks, keeping his fleet well outat sea, with his frigates close in to the port, and a chain of ships actingas connecting links with them to pass on information by signalling withflags by day and lanterns by night. The system of signalling had beenlately so improved that it was fairly rapid and reliable, and Nelson kepthis fleet out of sight, and requested that the names of ships sent toreinforce him should not appear in the papers, as he hoped to deludeVilleneuve into a false idea that he had a very inferior force beforeCadiz. He feared that if the whole array of his fleet were visible from thelook-out stations of the port the allies would remain safe at anchor. During this period of waiting he had had more than one conference with hiscaptains, and had read and explained to them a manuscript memorandum, dated9 October, setting forth his plans for the expected battle. His plan ofbattle excited an enthusiasm among them, to which more than one of themafterwards bore testimony. They said that "the Nelson touch" was in it, andit is generally taken for granted that they saw in it something like astroke of genius and a new departure in tactics. I hope it is notpresumption on my part to suggest that their enthusiasm was partly theresult of their seeing that their trusted leader was thoroughly himselfagain and, to use a familiar phrase, meant business, and they had a furthermotive for satisfaction in seeing how thoroughly he relied on them and howready he was to give them a free hand in carrying out his general ideas. 

The "Nelson touch" memorandum of 9 October and the whole plan of the battlehave been, and still are, the subject of acute controversy, the variousphases of which it would be far too long to discuss. It is strange thatafter the lapse of a hundred years and the publication of a vast mass ofdetailed evidence--British, French, and Spanish--there are still widedifferences of opinion as to how the most famous naval battle in historywas actually fought out. There is even much uncertainty as to the order inwhich the British ships came into action. 

The memorandum shows that Nelson originally contemplated a formation inthree lines, an advanced division to windward, a main division under hispersonal command, and a lee division under his second-in-command, Collingwood. The final grouping of the ships in the battle was in twodivisions. In the following list of the British fleet the names of shipsare arranged in the same order in which they appear in Collingwood'sdispatch, written after the action:--

 WINDWARD LINE. 

 Ships. Guns. Commanders. 

 _Victory_ 100 {Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson. {Captain Hardy. _Téméraire_ 98 " Harvey. _Neptune_ 98 " Fremantle. _Leviathan_ 74 " Bayntun. _Conqueror_ 74 " Pellew. _Britannia_ 100 {Rear-Admiral Lord Northesk. {Captain Bullen. _Agamemnon_ 64 " Sir E. Berry. _Ajax_ 64 Lieutenant Pilfold. _Orion_ 74 Captain Codrington. _Minotaur_ 74 " Mansfield. _Spartiate_ 74 " Sir F. Laforey. _Africa_ 64 " Digby. 

 LEEWARD LINE. 

 Ships. Guns. Commanders. 

 _Royal Sovereign_ 100 {Vice-Admiral Collingwood. {Captain Rotherham. _Belleisle_ 74 " Hargood. _Mars_ 74 " Duff. _Tonnant_ 80 " Tyler. _Bellerophon_ 74 " Cooke. _Colossus_ 74 " Morris. _Achille_ 74 " King. _Dreadnought_ 98 " Conn. _Polyphemus_ 64 " Redmill. _Revenge_ 74 " Moorsom. _Swiftsure_ 74 " Rutherford. _Defiance_ 74 " Durham. _Thunderer_ 74 Lieutenant Stockham. _Defence_ 74 Captain Hope. _Prince_ 98 " Grindall. 

 Besides one frigate of 38 guns, three of 36, and two brigs of 12 and 8 guns. 

This was the fleet that lay off Cape Sta. Maria, some fifty miles fromCadiz, on Saturday, 19 October, 1805, and received from the frigateswatching the port the message, passed on by connecting ships, that theenemy was at last coming out. 

Villeneuve, like Nelson, had originally divided his fleet into threedivisions. On the day of battle it fought in an order which was (as weshall see) partly the result of chance, arrayed in a long double line. Hehad deliberately mixed together in his array the French and Spanish unitsof his fleet, to avoid the dangers that might arise from mutual jealousiesif they were drawn up in divisions apart. Instead of giving the list of hisfleet according to the _ordre de bataille_ drawn up in Cadiz harbour longbefore the event, it will be more convenient to arrange the list as theyactually lay in line from van to rear on the day of battle. 

The following, then, is the list of the allied Franco-Spanish fleet:

 Ships. Guns. Commanders. 

 [*] _Neptuno_ 80 _Scipion_ 74 Captain Bellanger. _Intrépide_ 74 Commodore Infernet. _Formidable_ 80 {Rear-Admiral Dumanoir le Pelley. {Captain Letellier. [*] _Rayo_ 100 Commodore Macdonel. _Duguay-Trouin_ 74 Captain Touffet. _Mont Blanc_ 74 Commodore La Villegris. [*] _San Francisco de Asis_ 74 Captain de Flores. [*] _San Agustino_ 74 " Cagigal. _Héros_ 74 " Poulain. [*] _Santisima Trinidad_ 130 {Rear-Admiral Cisneros. {Commodore de Uriarte. _Bucentaure_ 80 {Vice-Admiral Villeneuve. {Captain Magendie. _Neptune_ 80 Commodore Maistral. _Redoutable_ 74 Captain Lucas. [*] _San Leandro_ 64 " Quevedo. [*] _San Justo_ 74 " Gaston. _Indomptable_ 80 Commodore Hubert. [*] _Santa Ana_ 112 Vice-Admiral de Alava. _Fougueux_ 74 Captain Baudouin. [*] _Monarca_ 74 " Argumosa. _Pluton_ 74 Commodore Cosmao Kerjulien. [+]_Algéciras_ 74 {Rear-Admiral Magon. {Captain Letourneur. [*][+]_Bahama_ 74 Commodore Galiano. [+]_Aigle_ 74 Captain Gourrège. [+]_Swiftsure_[#] 74 " Villemadrin. [+]_Argonaute_ 74 " Epron. [*][+]_Montanez_ 74 " Alcedo. [*][+]_Argonauta_ 80 " Pareja. [+]_Berwick_ 74 Commodore Filhol-Camas. [+]_San Juan Nepomuceno_ 74 " de Churucca. [+]_Ildefonso_ 74 " de Vargas. [+]_Achille_ 74 Captain Deniéport. [+]_Principe de Asturias_ 112 {Admiral Gravina. {Rear-Admiral Escaño. 

 Besides five 40-gun frigates and two corvettes, one of 18, the other of 16 guns. 

 [*] Names of Spanish ships are distinguished by being marked with an asterisk. 

 [+] Ships of the "Squadron of Observation" originally intended to act independently under Gravina. 

 [#] Formerly British. 

So far as mere figures can show it, the relative strength of the opposingfleets may be thus compared:--

 Line of Battle. Lighter Ships. |_______________| |___________________________________|

 Brigs and Ships. Guns. Frigates. Guns. Corvettes. Guns. 

 British fleet 27 2148 4 146 2 20 Allied fleet 33 2626 5 200 2 30

But here once more--as so often happens in naval war--the mere reckoning upof ships and guns does not give the true measure of fighting power. TheBritish fleet was immeasurably superior in real efficiency, and the Frenchand Spanish leaders knew this perfectly well. 

The morning of 19 October was fine and clear with the wind from the shore. So clear was the day that the lookout in the foretop of the "Euryalus"could see the ripples on the beach. As the sun rose the enemy's ships wereseen to be setting their topsails, and one by one they unmoored and toweddown towards the harbour mouth. It was a long process working the shipssingly out of harbour. Blackwood, of the "Euryalus, " stood close in, andfrom early morning till near 2 p. M. Was sending his messages to the distantfleet. 

 Hoisted 7. 20 a. M. Transmitted to the "Victory" soon after 9 a. M. : "The enemy's ships are coming out. "

 11 a. M. : "Nineteen under sail. All the rest have top-yards hoisted except Spanish rear-admiral and one line-of-battle ship. "

 About 11. 3: "Little wind in harbour. Two of the enemy are at anchor. "

 Noon: "Notwithstanding little wind, enemy persevere to get outward. The rest, except one line, ready, yards hoisted. "

 Just before 2 p. M. : "Enemy persevering to work outward. Seven of line already without and two frigates. "

When the fleet began to show in force outside, Blackwood drew off to adistance of four miles from the shore and still watched them. He knew the"Euryalus" could outsail the fastest of the enemy if they tried to attackhim. His business was to keep them under observation. He could see that forwant of wind they were forced to work out ship after ship by towing themwith rowing-boats. He knew they could not be all out till the Sundaymorning, and he knew also that Nelson had acknowledged his messages and wasbeating up nearer and nearer to the port, though with the light winds hecould only make slow progress. Unless the enemy scuttled back into theharbour a battle was inevitable. 

On the Sunday morning (20 October) the wind freshened and enabledVilleneuve to bring out the last of his ships. They were hardly out whenthe wind changed and blew strong from the south-west, with squalls of rain. The French admiral signalled the order to tack to the southward undershortened sail. The fleet had been directed to sail in five paralleldivisions, each in line ahead, but for want of training in the crews theships lost station, and the formation was very irregular. At four in theafternoon the wind changed again to the north-west, but it was very lightand the fleet moved slowly. To the westward all day the "Euryalus" and"Sirius" frigates were seen watching Villeneuve's progress, and just asdarkness was closing in one of the French frigates signalled that therewere twenty sail coming in from the Atlantic. 

If there had been more wind, Villeneuve might have crowded all sail for theStraits, but he could only creep slowly along. Flashes and flares of lightto seaward showed him the British were exchanging night signals in thedarkness. He felt he was closely watched, and he was haunted by the memoryof the disastrous night battle in Aboukir Bay. Though the wind had gonedown the sea was rough, with a heavy swell rolling in from the westward, the well-known sign of an Atlantic storm that might break on the Spanishcoast before many hours. The flickering signals of the British fleet seemedto come nearer as the darkness of the moonless autumn night deepened, andabout nine a shadowy mass of sails was seen not far off. It was the"Euryalus" that had closed in with every light shaded to have a near lookat the enemy. 

There was an alarm that the British were about to attack, and Villeneuvesignalled to clear for action and form the prescribed double line ofbattle. The sharp drumbeats from the French ships, the lighting up of openports, the burning of blue lights, showed Blackwood what was in progress. It was nearly two hours before the lines were formed, and there was muchconfusion, ships slipping into stations not assigned to them; and Gravina, who had been directed to keep twelve of the best ships as an independentreserve, or "squadron of observation, " placing them in the line instead offorming independently. Then the fleet went about, reversing its order. Villeneuve had given up the idea of reaching the Straits without a battle, and was anxious to have the port of Cadiz under his lee when the crisiscame. 

Nelson's fleet, in two columns in line ahead, was drawing nearer and nearerto his enemy. Between the two fleets the "Euryalus" flitted like a ghost, observing and reporting every move of the allies, and sometimes comingquite near them. When the enemy reversed their order of sailing, Blackwood's ship was for a short time ahead of their double line, and sawthe allied fleet looking like "a lighted street some six miles long. "

After midnight the alarm in the Franco-Spanish fleet had passed off, andall the men who could be spared had turned in. At dawn on the Monday theFrench frigate "Hermione" reported the enemy in sight to windward, and atseven Villeneuve again gave the order to clear for action. 

The sight of the allied fleet had called forth a great outburst ofexultation on board of Nelson's ships. "As the day dawned, " wrote one ofhis officers, "the horizon appeared covered with ships. The whole force ofthe enemy was discovered standing to the southward, distant about ninemiles, between us and the coast near Trafalgar. I was awakened by thecheers of the crew and by their rushing up the hatchways to get a glimpseof the hostile fleet. The delight they manifested exceeded anything I everwitnessed. "

Opposing fleets separated by only nine miles of sea would in our day beexchanging long-range fire after a very few minutes of rapid approach. Itwas to be nearly six hours before Nelson and Villeneuve came withinfighting distance. The wind had become so slight that the British fleet wasoften moving at a speed of barely more than a knot over the grey-greenocean swells. 

Still anxious to fight, with Cadiz as a refuge for disabled ships, Villeneuve presently signalled to his fleet to go about. After they alteredtheir order of sailing and began to sail to the northward, moving veryslowly with the wind abeam (close-hauled on the port tack), the course ofthe "Victory" was a little north of east, directed at first to a pointabout two and a half miles ahead of the leading ship of the enemy. The"Royal Sovereign, " leading the leeward line on a parallel course, was abouta mile to the southward. As the allied fleet was moving so as presently tocross the course of the British, the result would be that at the moment ofcontact the line led by the "Victory" would come in a little ahead of theenemy's centre, and the "Royal Sovereign" to the rearward of it. But thecourses of the two fleets did not intersect at right angles. Many of thecurrent plans of the battle, and, strange to say, the great model at theRoyal United Service Institution (though constructed while many Trafalgarcaptains were still living), are misleading in representing the Britishadvance as a perpendicular attack in closely formed line ahead. 

In the heavy swell and the light wind the allied fleet had succeeded informing only an irregular line when it went about. There were wide gaps, some of them covered by ships lying in a second line; and the fleet was notin a straight line from van to rear, but the van formed an obtuse anglewith the rearward ships, the flat apex towards Cadiz, so that some ofNelson's officers thought the enemy had adopted a crescent-formed array. Atthe moment of contact Collingwood's division was advancing on a course thatformed an acute angle of between forty and fifty degrees with the line andcourse of the French rear. The result would be that the ships that followedthe "Royal Sovereign" were brought opposite ship after ship of the Frenchline and could fall upon them almost simultaneously by a slight alterationof the course. But the French van line lay at a greater angle to thewindward attack, and here the British advance was much nearer theperpendicular. 

Nelson had in his memorandum forbidden any time being wasted in forming aregular battle-line. The ships were to attack in the order and formation inwhich they sailed. If the enemy was to leeward (as was the case now), theleeward line, led by Collingwood, was to fall upon his rearward ships. Meanwhile, the windward line, led by the "Victory, " would cut through theenemy just in advance of the centre, and take care that the attack on therear was not interfered with. Collingwood was given a free hand as to howhe did his work. Nelson reminded the captains that in the smoke andconfusion of battle set plans were likely to go to pieces, and signals tobe unseen, and he left a wide discretion to every one, noting that nocaptain could do wrong if he laid his ship alongside of the nearest of theenemy. The actual battle was very unlike the diagram in the memorandum, which showed the British fleet steering a course parallel to the enemy upto the actual attack, and some of the captains thought that in theconfusion of the fight Nelson and Collingwood had abandoned the plan. Butif its letter was not realized, its spirit was acted upon. Nelson had saidhe intended to produce a mêlée, a close fight in which the better trainingand the more rapid and steady fire of the British would tell. It was anovelty that the two admirals each led a line into the fight. Thetraditional position for a flagship was in the middle of the admiral'sdivision, with a frigate near her to assist in showing and passing signalsalong the line. To the French officers it seemed a piece of daring rashnessfor the flagships to lead the lines, exposing themselves as they closed tothe concentrated fire of several ships. "This method of engaging battle, "wrote Gicquel des Touches, an officer of the "Intrépide, " "was contrary toordinary prudence, for the British ships, reaching us one by one, and at avery slow speed, seemed bound to be overpowered in detail by our superiorforces; but Nelson knew his own fleet--and ours. " This was, indeed, thesecret of it all. He knew the distant fire of the enemy would be all butharmless, and once broadside to broadside, he could depend on crushing hisopponents. 

This was why he did not trouble about forming a closely arrayedbattle-line, but let his ships each make her best speed, disregarding themere keeping of station and distance, so that though we speak of twolines, Collingwood's ships trailed out over miles of sea, and Nelson'sseemed to the French to come on in an irregular crowd, the "Victory" in theleading place, having her two nearest consorts not far astern, but one oneach quarter, and at times nearly abreast. Every stitch of canvas wasspread, the narrow yards being lengthened out with the booms for thestudding-sails. Blackwood had been called on board the "Victory" for awhile during the advance. Nelson asked him to witness his will, and thentalked to him of the coming victory, saying he would not be satisfied withless than twenty prizes. He was cheerful and talked freely, but all thewhile he carefully watched the enemy's course and formation, and personallydirected the course of his own ship. He meant, as he had said before, tokeep the enemy uncertain to the last as to his attack, and as the distanceshortened he headed for a while for the enemy's van before turning for thedash into his centre. Cheerful as he was, he did not expect to survive thefight. He disregarded the request of his friends to give the dangerous postat the head of the line to another ship, and though it was known that theenemy had soldiers on board, and there would be a heavy musketry fire atclose quarters, he wore on his admiral's uniform a glittering array ofstars and orders. 

To the advancing fleet the five miles of the enemy's line presented aformidable spectacle. We have the impressions of one of the midshipmen ofthe "Neptune" in a letter written after the battle, and he tells how--

 "It was a beautiful sight when their line was completed, their broadsides turned towards us, showing their iron teeth, and now and then trying the range of a shot to ascertain the distance, that they might, the moment we came within point-blank (about 600 yards), open their fire upon our van ships--no doubt with the hope of dismasting some of our leading vessels before they could close and break their line. Some of the enemy's ships were painted like ourselves with double yellow streaks, some with a broad single red or yellow streak, others all black, and the noble Santissima Trinidad with four distinct lines of red, with a white ribbon between them, made her seem to be a superb man-of-war, which, indeed, she was. "

The Spanish flagship was the largest ship afloat at the time, and shetowered high above her consorts. It was not the first time Nelson had seenher in battle, for she was in the fleet that he and Jervis defeated twelveyears before off Cape St. Vincent. 

As the fleets closed the famous signal, "_England expects that every manwill do his duty!_" flew from the "Victory. " At half-past eleven the "RoyalSovereign, " leading the lee line, was within a thousand yards of the enemy, making for a point a little to rearward of his centre, when the "Fougueux, "the ship for which she was heading, fired a first trial shot. Other shipsopened fire in succession, and the centre began firing at the "Victory" andher consorts. Not a shot in reply was fired by the British till they werealmost upon the allies. In the windward line the "Victory, " already underfire from eight ships of the allied van, began the battle by firing herforward guns on the port side as she turned to attack the French admiral'sflagship, the 100-gun "Bucentaure. "

Just as the "Victory" opened fire, at ten minutes to twelve, Collingwood, in the "Royal Sovereign, " had dashed into the allied line. He passedbetween the French "Fougueux" and the "Santa Ana, " the flagship of theSpanish Rear-Admiral Alava, sending one broadside crashing into the sternof the flagship, and with the other raking the bows of the Frenchman. "Whatwould not Nelson give to be here!" said Collingwood to his flag-captain. The hearty comradeship of the two admirals is shown by the fact that atthat moment Nelson, pointing to the "Royal Sovereign's" masts towering outof the dense smoke-cloud, exclaimed, "See how that noble fellow, Collingwood, takes his ship into action!"

 [Illustration: TRAFALGAR]

Swinging round on the inside of the "Santa Ana, " Collingwood engaged hermuzzle to muzzle. For a few minutes of fierce fighting he was alone in themidst of a ring of close fire, the "Fougueux" raking him astern, and twoSpanish and one French ship firing into his starboard side. The pressure onhim decreased as the other ships of his division, coming rapidly intoaction, closed with ship after ship of the allied rear. Further relief wasafforded by Nelson's impetuous attack on the centre. 

He was steering the "Victory" to pass astern of the "Bucentaure. " CaptainLucas, of the "Redoutable, " the next in the line, saw this, and resolved toprotect his admiral. He closed up so that his bowsprit was almost over theflagship's stern, and the "Bucentaure's" people called out to him not torun into them. The "Victory" then passed astern of the "Redoutable, " rakingher with a terribly destructive broadside, and then ranged up alongside ofher. Lucas had hoped to board the first ship he encountered. He grappledthe English flagship, and while the soldiers in the French tops kept up ahot fire on the upper decks, the broadside guns were blazing muzzle tomuzzle below, and a crowd of boarders made gallant but unsuccessfulattempts to cross the gap between the two ships, the plucky Frenchmen beingeverywhere beaten back. The "Redoutable's" way had been checked, andthrough the gap between her and the "Bucentaure" came the "Neptune" toengage the French flagship, while the famous "fighting 'Téméraire, '" whichhad raced the "Victory" into action, passed astern of the "Redoutable" andclosed with the Spanish "San Justo. " Ship after ship of both the Britishdivisions came up, though there were long gaps in the lines. The"Belleisle, " second of Collingwood's line, was three-quarters of a mileastern of the "Royal Sovereign" when the first shots were fired. It wasnearly two hours before the rearmost English ships were engaged. 

Meanwhile, the leading eight ships of the French van, commanded by AdmiralDumanoir, in the "Formidable, " after firing at the "Victory" and herimmediate consorts, as they came into action, had held on their course, andwere steadily drifting away from the battle. In vain Villeneuve signalledto them to engage the enemy. Dumanoir, in a lame explanation that heafterwards wrote, protested that he had no enemy within his reach, and thatwith the light wind he found it impossible to work back, though he usedboats to tow his ships round. The effort appears to have been made onlywhen he had gone so far that he was a mere helpless spectator of the fight, and his most severe condemnation lies in the fact that without his orderstwo of his captains eventually made their way back into the mêlée and, though it was too late to fight for victory, fought a desperate fight forthe honour of the flag they flew. 

Dumanoir's incompetent selfishness left the centre and rear to be crushedby equal numbers and far superior fighting power. But it was no easyvictory. Outmatched as they were, Frenchmen and Spaniards fought withdesperate courage and heroic determination. Trafalgar is remembered withpride by all the three nations whose flags flew over its cloud ofbattle-smoke. 

There is no naval battle regarding which we possess so many detailednarratives of those who took part in it on both sides, and it would be easyto compile a long list of stirring incidents and heroic deeds. Though thebattle lasted till about five o'clock, it had been practically decided inthe first hour. In that space of time many of the enemy's ships had beendisabled, two had been actually taken; and, on the other hand, England hadsuffered a loss that dimmed the brightness of the victory. 

In the first stage of the fight Nelson's flagship was engaged with the"Redoutable" alone, the two ships locked together. Presently the"Téméraire" closed on the other side of the Frenchman, and the "Victory"found herself in action with a couple of the enemy that came driftingthrough the smoke on the other side of her, one of them being the giant"Santisima Trinidad. " Before the "Téméraire" engaged her, the "Redoutable"had been fearfully damaged by the steady fire of the "Victory, " and hadalso lost heavily in repeated attempts to board the English flagship. Onlya midshipman and four men succeeded in scrambling on board, and they wereat once killed or made prisoners. Captain Lucas, of the "Redoutable, " inthe report on the loss of his ship, told how out of a crew of 643 officersand men, sailors and soldiers, three hundred were killed, and more than twohundred badly wounded, including most of the officers; the ship wasdismasted, stern-post damaged, and steering gear destroyed, and the sternon fire; she was leaking badly, and most of the pumps had been shotthrough; most of the lower-deck guns were dismounted, some by collisionwith the enemy's sides, some by his fire, and two guns had burst. Bothsides of the ship were riddled, in several places two or more ports hadbeen knocked into one, and the after-deck beams had come down, making ahuge gap in the upper-deck. The "Redoutable, " already in a desperatecondition, became a sinking wreck when the "Téméraire" added her fire tothat of the flagship. 

But the "Victory" had not inflicted this loss herself unscathed. One of hermasts had gone over the side, and there had been heavy loss on her upperdecks and in her batteries. The wheel was shot away. Several men had beenkilled and wounded on the quarter-deck, where Nelson was walking up anddown talking to Captain Hardy. One shot strewed the deck with the bodies ofeight marines. Another smashed through a boat, and passed between Nelsonand Hardy, bruising the latter's foot, and taking away a shoe-buckle. Allthe while there came a crackle of musketry from a party of sharpshooters inthe mizen-top of the "Redoutable, " only some sixty feet away, and Nelson'sdecorations must have made him a tempting target, even if the marksmen didnot know who he was. 

At twenty minutes past one he was hit in the left shoulder, the bulletplunging downwards and backwards into his body. He fell on his face, andHardy, turning, saw some of the men picking him up. "They have done for meat last, Hardy, " he said. "I hope not, " said the captain. And Nelsonreplied: "Yes, my backbone is shot through. " But he showed no agitation, and as the men carried him below he covered his decorations with ahandkerchief, lest the crew should notice them and realize that they hadlost their chief, and he gave Hardy an order to see that tiller-lines wererigged on the rudder-head, to replace the shattered wheel. 

His flag was kept flying, and till the action ended the fleet was not awareof his loss, and looked to the "Victory" for signals as far as the smokeallowed. He had not been ten minutes among the wounded on the lowest deckwhen the cheers of the crew, following on a sudden lull in the firing, toldhim that the "Redoutable" had struck her colours. 

Twenty minutes later the "Fougueux, " the second prize of the day, wassecured. She had come into action with the "Téméraire" while the latter wasstill engaged with the "Redoutable. " On the surrender of the latter the"Téméraire" was able to concentrate her fire on the "Fougueux. " Mast aftermast came down, and the sea was pouring into two huge holes on thewater-line when the shattered ship drifted foul of the "Téméraire, " and wasgrappled by her. Lieutenant Kennedy dashed on board of the Frenchman, atthe head of a rush of boarders, cleared her upper decks, hauled down herflag, and took possession of the dismasted ship. 

Between two and three o'clock no less than nine ships were taken, fiveSpanish and four French. Villeneuve's flagship, the "Bucentaure, " was oneof these. She struck a few minutes after two o'clock. At the opening of thebattle she had fired four broadsides at the approaching "Victory. " Nelsongave her one shattering broadside in reply at close quarters, as he passedon to attack the "Redoutable. " As this ship's way was stopped, and a spaceopened between her and the French flagship, Captain Fremantle brought histhree-decker, the "Neptune, " under the "Bucentaure's" stern, raking her ashe passed through the line and ranged up beside her. Then Pellew broughtthe "Conqueror" into action beside her on the other side, and as chanceallowed her guns to bear the "Victory" was at times able to join in theattack. French accounts of the battle tell of the terrible destructioncaused on board the "Bucentaure" by this concentrated fire. More than twohundred were _hors de combat_, most of them killed. Almost every officerand man on the quarter-deck was hit, Villeneuve himself being slightlywounded. The men could hardly stand to the guns, and at last their fire wasmasked by mast after mast coming down with yards, rigging and sails hangingover the gun muzzles. Villeneuve declared his intention of transferring hisflag to another ship, but was told that every boat had been knocked tosplinters, and his attendant frigate, which might have helped him in thisemergency, had been driven out of the mêlée. As the last of the masts wentover the side at two o'clock, the "Conqueror" ceased firing, and hailed the"Bucentaure" with a summons to surrender. Five minutes later her flag, hoisted on an improvised staff, was taken down, and Captain Atcherley, ofthe "Conqueror's" marines, went on board the French flagship, and receivedthe surrender of Admiral Villeneuve, his staff-officer Captain Prigny, Captain Magendie, commanding the ship, and General de Contamine, theofficer in command of the 4000 French troops embarked on the fleet. 

Next in the line ahead of the "Bucentaure" lay the giant "SantisimaTrinidad, " carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Cisneros. As the fleetsclosed, she had exchanged fire with her four tiers of guns with several ofthe British ships. When the mêlée began she came drifting down into thethick of the fight. For a while she was engaged with the "Victory" in thedense fog of smoke, where so many ships were tearing each other to piecesin the centre. The high-placed guns of the "Trinidad's" upper tier cut upthe "Victory's" rigging and sent down one of her masts. The Englishflagship was delivered from the attack of her powerful antagonist by the"Trinidad" drifting clear of her. By this time Fremantle was attacking herwith the "Neptune, " supported by the "Colossus. " At half-past one a thirdship joined in the close attack on the towering "Trinidad, " which everycaptain who got anywhere near her was anxious to make his prize. This newally was the battleship "Africa. " During the night she had run out to thenorthward of the British fleet. Nelson had signalled to her early in theday to rejoin as soon as possible, but her captain, Digby, needed nopressing. He was crowding sail to join in the battle. He ran down pastDumanoir's ships of the van squadron, putting a good many shots into them, but receiving no damage from their ill-aimed fire. Then he steered into thethick of the fight, taking for his guide the tall masts of the "Trinidad. "At 1. 30 he opened fire on her. At 1. 58 all the masts of the "Trinidad" camedown together, the enormous mass of spars, rigging, and sails going overher side into the water as she rolled to the swell. She had already lostsome four hundred men killed and wounded (Admiral Cisneros was among thelatter). Many of her guns had been silenced, and the fall of the mastsmasked a whole broadside. She now ceased firing and surrendered. In the logof the "Africa" it is noted that Lieutenant Smith was sent with a party totake possession of her. He does not seem to have succeeded in getting onboard, for the "Trinidad" drifted with silent guns for at least two hoursafter, with no prize crew on board. It was at the end of the battle thatthe "Prince" sent a party to board her and took her in tow. 

Another flagship, the three-decker "Santa Ana, " carrying the flag ofRear-Admiral Alava, became the prize of the "Royal Sovereign. " Collingwoodhad opened the fight by breaking the line astern of her. His rakingbroadside as he swept past her had put scores of her crew out of action. When he laid his ship alongside of her to leeward, it was evident from thevery first that she could not meet the English ship on anything like equalterms. In a quarter of an hour his flag-captain, Rotherham, graspedCollingwood's hand, saying: "I congratulate you, sir. Her fire isslackening, and she must soon strike. " But the "Santa Ana" fought to thelast, till only a single gun, now here, now there, answered the steady, pounding fire of the "Royal Sovereign's" broadside. At 2. 30 her colourscame down. Collingwood told his lieutenant to send the Spanish admiral onboard his own ship, but word was sent back that Alava was too badly woundedto be moved. More than four hundred of the "Santa Ana's" crew had beenkilled and wounded. 

The "Tonnant, " third ship in Collingwood's line, and one of the prizestaken in the Battle of the Nile, captured another flagship, that of thegallant Rear-Admiral Magon, the "Algéciras. " As the "Tonnant" went throughthe allied line, after exchanging fire with the "Fougueux" and the"Monarca, " the "Algéciras" raked her astern, killing some forty men. The"Tonnant" then swung round and engaged the "Algéciras, " and was crossingher bows when Magon, trying to run his ship alongside her, to board, entangled his bowsprit in the main rigging of the English ship. She wasthus held fast with only a few forward guns bearing, while most of thebroadside of the "Tonnant" was raking her. From the foretop of the"Algéciras" a party of marksmen fired down on the English decks and woundedCaptain Tyler badly. Admiral Magon, in person, tried to lead a strong bodyof boarders over his bows into the English ship. Mortally wounded, he wascarried aft, and of his men only one set foot on the "Tonnant. " This manwas at once stabbed with a pike, and would have been killed if an officerhad not rescued him. 

The ships lay so close that the flashes of the "Tonnant's" guns set fire tothe bows of the "Algéciras, " and the flames spread to both ships. A coupleof British sailors dragged the fire-hose over the hammock-nettings, andwhile the guns were still in action they worked to keep down and extinguishthe flames. One by one the masts of the "Algéciras" went into the sea, carrying the unfortunate soldiers in the tops with them. In a little morethan half an hour she lost 436 men, including most of her officers. Herposition was hopeless, and at last she struck her colours. The prize crewthat boarded her found Magon lying dead on the deck, with his captain, badly wounded, beside him. 

The "Bellerophon" (famous for her fight at the Nile, adding to her recordof hard fighting to-day, and destined to be the ship that was to receivethe conqueror of Europe as a prisoner) followed the "Tonnant" into action, and found herself engaged with the Spanish "Monarca" on one side, and theFrench "Aigle" on the other. She came in collision with the "Aigle, " andtheir yards locked together. The "Bellerophon's" rigging was cut to pieces;two of her masts were carried away, and numbers of her crew were struckdown, her captain being wounded early in the day. A little after half-pastone the "Aigle" drifted clear, and was engaged by, and in half an hourforced to strike to, the "Defiance. " Meanwhile the "Bellerophon" was hardat work with two Spanish ships, the "Monarca" and the "Bahama, " and soeffectually battered them that at three o'clock the former was a prize, andthe other surrendered half an hour later. 

The "Tonnant, " after her capture of Magon's ship, shared in the victoryover another brave opponent, Commodore Churucca, and his ship, the "SanJuan Nepomuceno. " Churucca was the youngest flag-officer in the Spanishnavy. He had won a European reputation by explorations in the Pacific andon the South American coasts. Keen in his profession, recklesslycourageous, deeply religious, he was an ideal hero of the Spanish navy, inwhich he is still remembered as "El Gran Churucca, " the "great Churucca, "who "died like the Cid. " He had no illusions, but told his friends he wasgoing to defeat and death, and he knew that when he left Cadiz he wasbidding a last farewell to the young wife he had lately married. 

"The French admiral does not know his business, " he said to his firstlieutenant, as he watched the van division holding its course, while thetwo English lines rushed to the attack. As the English closed with theSpanish rear, Churucca's ship came into close action with the "Defiance, "and was then attacked in succession by the "Dreadnought" and the "Tonnant. "The "San Juan" fought till half her men were _hors de combat_, several gunsdismounted, and two of the masts down. As long as Churucca lived theunequal fight was maintained. For a while he seemed to have a charmed life, as he passed from point to point, encouraging his men. He was returning tohis quarter-deck, when a ball shattered one of his legs. "It isnothing--keep on firing, " he said, and at first he refused to leave thedeck, lying on the planking, with the shattered limb roughly bandaged. Hesent for his second in command, and was told he had just been killed. Another officer, though wounded, took over the active command when at lastChurucca, nearly dead from loss of blood, was carried below. He gave a lastmessage for his wife, sent a final order that the ship should be foughttill she sank, and then said he must think only of God and the other world. As he expired the "San Juan" gave up the hopeless fight. The three shipsall claimed her as their prize, but it was the "Dreadnought" that tookpossession. 

The French "Swiftsure, " once English, was won back by the "Colossus, " aftera fight in which the "Orion" helped for a while. With her capture one-thirdof the enemy's whole force, including several flagships, was in Englishhands. The victory was won; it was now only a question of making it moreand more complete. 

Shortly after three o'clock the Spanish 80-gun ship "Argonauta" struck tothe "Belleisle, " which had been aided in her attack by the English"Swiftsure. " A few minutes later the "Leviathan" took another big Spaniard, the "San Agustino, " carrying her with a rush of boarders. It was about fouro'clock that, after an hour of hard fighting, the "San Ildefonso" hauleddown her colours to the "Defence. " About this time the French "Achille" wasseen to be ablaze and ceased firing. In the earlier stages of the fight shehad been engaged successively with the "Polyphemus, " "Defiance, " and"Swiftsure. " Her captain and several of her officers and nearly 400 men hadbeen killed and wounded when she was brought to close action by the"Prince. " Her fore-rigging caught fire, and the mast coming down across thedecks started a blaze in several places, and the men, driven from the upperdeck by the English fire, had to abandon their attempts to save their ship. She was well alight when at last she struck her colours, and the "Prince, "aided by the little brig "Pickle, " set to work to save the survivors of hercrew. She blew up after the battle. The "Berwick" was another ship takenbefore four o'clock, but I cannot trace the details of her capture. 

While the battle still raged fiercely, Admiral Dumanoir, in the"Formidable, " was steering away to the north-westward, followed by the"Mont Blanc, " "Duguay-Trouin, " and "Scipion. " But two ships of hisdivision, the "Neptuno" and the "Intrépide, " had disregarded his orders, and turned back to join in the fight, working the ships' heads round bytowing them with boats. The "Intrépide" led. Her captain, Infernet, was arough Provençal sailor, who had fought his way from the forecastle to thequarter-deck. Indignant at Dumanoir's conduct, he had early in the battlegiven orders to steer for the thickest of it. "_Lou capo sur lou'Bucentaure'!_" ("Head her for the 'Bucentaure'!") he shouted in his nativepatois. He arrived too late to fight for victory, but he fought for thehonour of his flag. After engaging several British ships, Infernet struckto the "Orion. " An officer of the "Conqueror" (which had taken part in thefight with the "Intrépide") wrote: "Her captain surrendered after one ofthe most gallant defences I ever witnessed. His name was Infernet, and itdeserves to be recorded by all who admire true heroism. The 'Intrépide' wasthe last ship that struck her colours. " The Spanish ship that had followedthe "Intrépide" into action, the 80-gun "Neptuno, " had shortly before beenforced to strike to the "Minotaur" and the "Spartiate, " another of theprizes of Aboukir Bay. 

Before these last two surrenders completed the long list of captured ships, Nelson had passed away. The story of his death in the cockpit of the"Victory" is too well known to need repetition. Before he died the cheersof his crew and the messages brought to him had told him of capture aftercapture, and assured him that his triumph was complete. As the firingceased, Collingwood took over the command of the fleet, and transferred hisflag from his own shattered and dismasted ship, the "Royal Sovereign, " toBlackwood's smart frigate, the "Euryalus. "

When the "Intrépide" struck, seventeen ships of the allied fleet had beentaken, one, the "Achille, " was in a blaze, and soon to blow up; four werein flight far away to the north-west, eleven were making for Cadiz, allbearing the marks of hard hitting during the fight. Some desultory firingat the nearest fugitives ended the battle. Crowds on the breakwater ofCadiz and the nearest beaches had watched all the afternoon the great bankof smoke on the horizon, and listened to the rumbling thunder of thecannonade. After sunset ship after ship came in, bringing news of disaster, and all the night wounded men were being conveyed to the hospitals. 

More than half the allied fleet had been taken or destroyed. The four shipsthat escaped with Dumanoir were captured a few days later by a squadronunder Sir Richard Strachan. The French ships that escaped into Cadiz weretaken possession of by the Spanish insurgents, when Spain rose against theFrench, and Cadiz joined the revolt. 

As the battle ended, the British fleet was, to use the expression of the"Neptune's" log, "in all directions. " The sun was going down; the sky wasovercast, and the rising swell and increasing wind told of the comingstorm. Most of the prizes had been dismasted; many of them were leakingbadly; some of the ships that had taken them were in almost as damaged acondition, and many of them were short-handed, with heavy losses in battleand detachments sent on board the captured vessels. The crews were busyclearing the decks, getting up improvised jury masts, and repairing thebadly cut-up rigging, where the masts still stood. Nelson's final order hadbeen to anchor to ride out the expected gale. Collingwood doubted if thiswould be safer than trying to make Gibraltar, and he busied himself gettingthe scattered fleet and prizes together, and tacking to the south-westward. 

The gale that swept all the coasts of Western Europe caught the disabledfleet with the hostile shore under its lee. Only four of the prizes, andthose the poorest ships of the lot, ever saw Gibraltar. Ship after shipwent down, others were abandoned and burnt, others drove ashore. In theselast instances the British prize crews were rescued and kindly treated bythe Spanish coast population. One ship, the "Algéciras, " was retaken by theFrench prisoners, and carried into Cadiz. Another, the big "Santa Ana, " wasrecaptured as she drifted helplessly off the port. 

But though there were few trophies left after the great storm, Trafalgarhad finally broken the naval power of Napoleon, freed England from all fearof invasion, and given her the undisputed empire of the sea. Yet there wereonly half-hearted rejoicings at home. The loss of Nelson seemed a dearprice to pay even for such a victory. 

Some 2500 men were killed and wounded in the victorious fleet. Of thelosses of the Allies it is difficult to give an estimate. Every ship thatwas closely engaged suffered severely, and hundreds of wounded went downin several of those that sank in the storm. For weeks after search-parties, riding along the shores from Cadiz to Cape Trafalgar gathered every day agrim harvest of corpses drifted to land by the Atlantic tides. The alliedloss was at least 7000 men, and may have been considerably greater. 

The news came to England, just after something like a panic had been causedby the tidings of the surrender of a whole Austrian army at Ulm. It reachedNapoleon in the midst of his triumphs, to warn him that his power wasbounded by the seas that washed the shores of the Continent. Well didMeredith say that in his last great fight Nelson "drove the smoke ofTrafalgar to darken the blaze of Austerlitz. "

 CHAPTER X

 THE COMING OF STEAM AND ARMOURED NAVIES

 THE FIGHT IN HAMPTON ROADS

 MARCH, 1862

Trafalgar was the greatest fight of the sailing-ships. There were laterengagements which were fought under sail, but no battle of such decisiveimport. It was a fitting close to a heroic era in the history of naval war, a period of not much more than four centuries, in thousands of years. Before it, came the long ages in which the fighting-ship depended more uponthe oar than the sail, or on the oar exclusively. After it, came ourpresent epoch of machine-propelled warships, bringing with it wide-sweepingchanges in construction, armament, and naval tactics. 

Inventive pioneers were busy with projects for the coming revolution innaval war while Nelson was still living. The Irish-American engineer, Fulton, had tried to persuade Napoleon to adopt steam propulsion, and hadastonished the Parisians by showing them his little steamer making its wayup the Seine with clumsy paddles churning up the waters and much sootysmoke pouring from its tall, thin funnel. The Emperor thought it was ascientific toy. Old admirals--most conservative of men--declared that agunboat with a few long "sweeps" or oars would be a handier fighting-shipin a calm, and if there was any wind a spread of sail was better than allthe American's tea-kettle devices. Fulton went back to America to runpassenger steamers on the Hudson, and tell unbelieving commodores andcaptains that the future of the sea power lay with the "tea-kettle ships. "

In the days of the long peace that followed Waterloo, and the greatindustrial development that came with it, the steam-engine and thepaddle-steamer made their way into the commercial fleets of the world, slowly and timidly at first, for it was a long time before a steamshipcould be provided with enough efficient engine power to enable her to showthe way to a smart clipper-built sailing-ship, and the early marine engineswere fearfully uneconomical. Steam had obtained a recognized position insmall ships for short voyages, ferry-boats, river steamers, and coastingcraft, but on the open ocean the sailing-ship still held its own. Aneminent scientist proved to demonstration that no steamship would ever beable to cross the Atlantic under steam alone. He showed that to do so itwould be necessary for her to carry a quantity of coal exceeding her entiretonnage capacity, and he expressed his readiness to eat the first steamerthat made the voyage from Liverpool to New York. But he lived to regret hisoffer. 

In 1838 the "Great Western" and the "Sirius" inaugurated the steampassenger service across the Atlantic, and the days of the liner began. Bythis time paddle-wheel gunboats were finding their way into the Britishnavy, and other powers were beginning to follow the example of England. Steamships were first in action in 1840, when Sir Charles Napier employedthem side by side with sailing-ships that had shared the triumphs ofNelson. This was in the attack on Acre, when England intervened to checkthe revolt of the Pasha of Egypt, Ibrahim, against his suzerain, theSultan. 

But still the steamship was regarded as an auxiliary. The greatthree-decker battleships, the smart sailing frigates, were the mainstrength of navies. The paddle-steamer was a defective type of warship, because her paddle-boxes and paddle-wheels, and her high-placed engines, presented a huge target singularly vulnerable. A couple of shots mightdisable in a minute her means of propulsion. True she had masts and sails, but if she could not use her engines, the paddles would prove a drag uponall her movements. 

It was the invention of the screw-propeller that made steam propulsion forwarships really practical. Brunel was one of the great advocates of thechange. He was a man who was in many ways before his time, and he had toencounter a more than usual amount of official conservatist obstruction. For years the veteran officers who advised the Admiralty opposed andridiculed the invention. When at last it was fitted to a gunboat, the"Rattler, " it was obvious that it provided the best means of applying steampropulsion to the purposes of naval war. The propeller was safe underwater, and the engines could be placed low down in the ship. 

By 1854, when the Crimean War began, both the British and French naviespossessed a number of steam-propelled line-of-battle ships, frigates, andgunboats, fitted with the screw. They had also some old paddle-ships. Butin the fleets dispatched to the Baltic and the Black Sea there were still aconsiderable number of sailing-ships, and a fleet still did most of itswork under sail. Even the steamships had only what we should now describeas auxiliary engines. The most powerful line-of-battle ships in the Britishnavy had engines of only 400 to 600 horsepower. [17] With such relativelysmall power they still had to depend chiefly on their sails. Tug-boats wereattached to the fleets to tow the sailing-ships, when the steamships wereusing their engines. 

 [17] Compare this with 23, 000 horse-power of the "Dreadnought's" turbine engines. 

Another change was taking place in the armament of warships and coastdefences. The rifled cannon was still in the experimental stage, butexplosive shells, which in Nelson's days were only fired from mortars atvery short range, had now been adapted to guns mounted on the broadsideand the coast battery. Solid shot were still largely used, but the comingof the shell meant that there would be terrible loss in action in thecrowded gun-decks, and inventors were already proposing that ships shouldbe armoured to keep these destructive missiles from penetrating theirsides. 

The attack on the sea front of Sebastopol by the allied fleets on 17October, 1854, was the event that brought home to the minds of even themost conservative the necessity of a great change in warship construction. It rang the knell of the old wooden walls, and led to the introduction ofarmour-clad navies. 

The idea of protecting ships from the fire of artillery and musketry byiron plating was an old one, and the wonder is that it did not much earlierreceive practical application. The Dutch claim to have been the pioneers ofironclad building more than three hundred years ago. During the famoussiege of Antwerp by the Spaniards in 1585 the people of the city built ahuge flat-bottomed warship, armoured with heavy iron plates, which theynamed the "Finis Belli, " a boastful expression of the hope that she wouldend the war. An old print of the "Finis Belli" shows a four-masted shipwith a high poop and forecastle, but with a low freeboard amidships. Onthis lower deck, taking up half the length of the ship, is an armouredcitadel, with port-holes for four heavy guns on each side. The roof of thecitadel has a high bulwark, loopholed for musketry. On three of the maststhere are also crow's-nests or round tops for musketeers. 

Heavily weighted with her armour, the ship had a deep draught of water, andprobably steered badly. In descending the Scheldt to attack the Spaniardsshe ran aground in a hopeless position under their batteries, and fell intothe hands of the Spanish commander, the Duke of Parma. He kept the "FinisBelli" "as a curiosity" till the end of the siege, and then had herdismantled. If she had scored a success, armoured navies would no doubthave made their appearance in the seventeenth century. 

Between the days of the "Finis Belli" and the coming of the first ironcladsthere were numerous projects of inventors. In 1805 a Scotchman, namedGillespie, proposed the mounting of guns and "ponderous mortars" inrevolving armoured turrets, both in fortifications on shore and on floatingbatteries. Two years later Abraham Bloodgood, of New York, designed afloating battery with an armoured turret. During the war between Englandand the United States in 1812 an American engineer, John Steevens, who wasa man in advance of his time, proposed the construction of asteam-propelled warship, with a ram-bow, and with her guns protected byshields. He prepared a design, but failed to persuade the Navy Departmentthat it was practicable. His son, Robert L. Steevens, improved the design, made experiments with guns, projectiles, and armour plates, and at last in1842 obtained a vote of Congress for the building of the "Steevensbattery, " a low-freeboard ram, steam-propelled, and armed with eight heavyguns mounted on her centre-line, on turntables protected by armouredbreastworks. The methods of the American navy were very dilatory, professional opinion was opposed to Steevens, whose project was regarded asthat of a "crank, " and the ship was left unfinished for years. She wasstill on the stocks when the Civil War began. Then other types came intofashion, and she was broken up on the ways. 

The man who introduced the armour-clad ship into the world's navies was theEmperor Napoleon III, the same who introduced rifled field artillery intothe armies of the world. Like other great revolutions, this epoch-makingchange in naval war began in a small way. What forced the question upon theEmperor's attention was the failure of the combined French and Englishfleets in the attack on the sea-forts of Sebastopol on 17 October, 1854. The most powerful ships in both navies had engaged the sea-forts, andsuffered such loss and injury that it was obvious that if the attack hadbeen continued the results would have been disastrous. Some means must befound of keeping explosive shells out of a ship's gun-decks, if they wereever to engage land batteries on anything like equal terms. Under theEmperor's directions the French naval architects designed four ships of anew type, which were rapidly constructed in the Imperial dockyards. Theywere "floating batteries, " not intended to take part in fleet actions, butonly to be used against fortifications. Their broad beam, heavy lines, rounded bows, and engines of only 225 horsepower, condemned them to slowspeed, just sufficient to place them in firing position. They were armouredwith 4-inch iron and armed with eighteen 50-pounder guns. The port-holeshad heavy iron ports, which were closed while the guns were reloading. 

Three of these floating batteries, the "Dévastation, " "Lave, " and"Tonnant, " came into action against the shore batteries at Kinburn on 17October, 1855 (the anniversary of the attack on the Sebastopol sea-forts). There was some difficulty in getting into position, as they could justcrawl along, and steered abominably. But when they opened fire at 800 yardsat 9 a. M. They silenced and wrecked the Russian batteries in eighty-fiveminutes, themselves suffering only trifling damage, and not losing a dozenmen. 

It was the first and last fight of the floating batteries. But while inEngland men were still discussing the problem of the sea-going ironclad, the French constructors were solving it. They had to look not toparliamentary and departmental committees, but to the initiative andsupport of an intelligent autocrat. So events went quicker in France. In1858 the keels of the first three French sea-going armour-clads were laiddown at Toulon, and next year the armoured frigate "Gloire, " the first ofEuropean ironclads, was launched, and every dockyard in France was busyconstructing armour-clads or rebuilding and armouring existing ships. 

France had gained a start in the building of the new type of warship. Whenthe "Dreadnought" was launched, it was said somewhat boastfully thatsingle-handed she could destroy the whole North Sea fleet of Germany. Itmight be more truly said of the "Gloire" that she could have metsingle-handed and destroyed the British Channel or Mediterranean Fleet ofthe day. It was the moment when tension with France over the Orsiniconspiracy had caused a widespread anticipation of war between that countryand England, and had called the Volunteer force into existence to repelinvasion. But the true defence must be in the command of the sea, and thefirst English ironclad, the old "Warrior, " was laid down at the ThamesIronworks. Work was begun in June, 1859, and the ship was launched inDecember, 1860. She was modelled on the old steam frigates, for the specialtypes of modern battleships and armoured cruisers were still in the future. She was built of iron, with unarmoured ends and 4 1/4-inch iron plating ona backing of 18 inches of teak over 200 feet amidships of her total lengthof 380 feet. There was a race of ironclad building between France andEngland, in which the latter won easily, and it was only for a very shorttime that our sea supremacy was endangered by the French Emperor's navalenterprise. But when the English and French fleets entered the Gulf ofMexico in 1861, our ships were all wooden walls, while the French admiral'sflag flew on the ironclad "Normandie, " the first armoured ship that evercrossed the Atlantic. 

Notwithstanding this fact, American writers are fond of saying, and manyEnglishmen believe, that the introduction of armoured navies was theoutcome of the American Civil War of the early 'sixties. All that is trueis that the War of Secession gave the world the spectacle of the firstfight between armour-clad ships, and the experiences of that war greatlyinfluenced the direction taken in the general policy of designers ofironclad warships. 

 [Illustration: H. M. S. WARRIOR, THE FIRST BRITISH IRONCLAD]

Towards the close of the Crimean War a Swedish engineer settled in theUnited States, John Ericsson, had sent to the Emperor Napoleon a design fora small armoured turret-ship of what was afterwards known as the Monitortype. He wrote to the Emperor that he asked for no reward or profit, for hewas only anxious to help France in her warfare with Russia, the hereditaryfoe of Sweden. The war was drawing to a close, and for his future projectsthe Emperor wanted large sea-going ships, not light-draught vessels forwork in the shallows of the Baltic. So Ericsson received a complimentaryletter of thanks and a medal, and kept his design for later use. Hisopportunity came in the first months of the Civil War. 

In the fifty years between the war of 1812 and the outbreak of thestruggle between North and South, the American navy had been greatlyneglected. It was a favourite theory in the United States that a navycould be improvised, and that the great thing would be, in case of war, to send out swarms of privateers to prey upon the enemy's commerce. Verylittle money was spent on the navy or the dockyards. On the navy listthere were a number of old ships, some of which had fought againstEngland in 1812. There were a number of small craft for revenue purposes, a lot of sailing-ships, and a few fairly modern steam frigates andsmaller steam vessels depending largely on sail-power, and known as"sloops-of-war"--really small frigates. 

While the dockyards of Europe had long been busy with the construction ofthe new armoured navies, the United States had not a single ironclad. Bothparties to the quarrel had to improvise up-to-date ships. 

Sea power was destined to play a great part in the conflict. As soon as theWashington Government realized that it was going to be a serious andprolonged war, not an affair of a few weeks, a general plan of operationswas devised, of which the essential feature was the isolation of theSouthern Confederacy. When the crisis came in 1861 the United States haddone little to open up and occupy the vast territories between the RockyMountains and the Mississippi Valley. The population of the States waschiefly to be found between the Mississippi and the Atlantic, and in thatregion lay the states of the Confederacy. They were mainly agriculturalcommunities, with hardly any factories. For arms, munitions of war, andsupplies of many kinds they would have to depend on importation from beyondtheir frontiers. It was therefore decided that while the United Statesarmies operated on the northern or land frontier of the Confederacy, itssea frontiers on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico should be closelyblockaded, and its river frontier, the line of the Mississippi, should beseized and held by a mixed naval and military force. For these lastoperations troops on the banks and gunboats on the river had to combine. Itwas said at the time, that on the Mississippi army and navy were like thetwo blades of a pair of shears, useless apart, but very effective whenworking together. 

Strange to say, it was not the industrial North, but the agriculturalSouth, that put the first ironclad into commission as a weapon against thecoast blockade. When the Secessionist forces seized the Navy Yard atNorfolk, in Virginia, a fine steam frigate, the "Merrimac" (built in 1855), was under repair there. The guard of the dockyard set her on fire beforesurrendering, but the flames were extinguished, and the "Merrimac, " withher upper works badly damaged, was in possession of the Southerners. ANorthern squadron of frigates and gunboats, steam and sailing ships, anchored in Hampton Roads, the landlocked sheet of water into which runsnot only the Elizabeth River, which gives access to Norfolk, but also theJames River, the waterway to Richmond, then the Confederate capital. Thenorthern shores of Hampton Roads were held by Federal troops, the southernby the Confederates. Presently spies brought to Washington the news thatthe "Rebels" were preparing a terrible new kind of warship at Norfolk todestroy the squadron in Hampton Roads and raise the blockade. 

The news was true. The Confederates had cut down the "Merrimac" nearly tothe water's edge and built a solid deck over her at this level. Then on thedeck they erected a huge deck-house, with sloping sides pierced withport-holes for ten heavy smooth-bore guns. The funnel passed up through theroof of the deck-house. There were no masts, only a flagstaff. The flatdeck space, fore and aft, and the sloping sides of the deck-house were tobe armoured with four inches of iron, but there were no armour platesavailable. Railway iron was collected and rolled into long narrow strips, and these were bolted on the structure in two layers, laid crosswise indifferent directions. An armoured conning-tower, low and three-sided, wasbuilt on the front of the deck-house roof. The bow was armed with a mass ofiron, in order to revive the ancient method of attack by ramming. Thusequipped the "Merrimac" was commissioned, under the command of CommodoreBuchanan, and renamed the "Confederate States' ironclad steam-ram'Virginia, '" but the ship was always generally known by her former name. 

At noon on Saturday, 8 March, 1862, the "Merrimac" started on her voyagedown the Elizabeth River. It was to be at once her trial trip and her firstfighting expedition. She was to attack and destroy the Federal blockadingfleet in Hampton Roads. Up to the last moment the ship was crowded withworking men. They were cleared out of her as she cast off from the quay. Asthe "Merrimac" went down the river the officers were telling off the men totheir stations. Not one of her guns had ever been fired. There had been afew hurried drills. Everything was improvised. 

The first disappointment was to find that with the engines doing their bestshe could only make five knots. She steered badly, answering her helmslowly and turning on a wide circle. As one of her officers put it, "shewas as unmanageable as a water-logged vessel. " She drew 22 feet of water, so that she had to keep to the narrow channel in the middle of the river, and the risk of getting hopelessly aground was serious. 

The Confederate troops crowded the batteries on either bank, and cheeredthe "Merrimac" as she went slowly down. It was a fine day, with brightsunshine and absolutely no wind, and the broad stretch of water in HamptonRoads was like a pond. At the same time a small squadron of Confederategunboats came down the James River to co-operate in the attack. These shipswere the "Yorktown" (12 guns), the "Jamestown" (2 guns), and the "Teaser"(1 gun). Two other gunboats, the "Beaufort" and the "Raleigh, " followed the"Merrimac. " But the chief hope of the attack was placed upon the ironclad. 

The nine vessels of the blockading fleet lay along the north side ofHampton Roads, from the point at Newport News to Old Point Comfort, wherethe Roads open on Chesapeake Bay. They were strung out over a distance ofabout eight miles. The shore on that side was held by the Federals, and thepoint at Newport News bristled with batteries. Near the point were anchoredthe sailing frigate "Congress, " of 50 guns, and the sloop "Cumberland, " afull-rigged three-master, armed with 30 guns. On board the Federal shipsthere was not the remotest expectation of attack. Clothes were drying inthe rigging. A crowd of boats lay alongside. It was known that theConfederates had been busy converting the old "Merrimac" into an armouredram at Norfolk Navy Yard, but it was not believed that she was yet readyfor action. The men had just eaten their dinners, and were having a pipe, when the first alarm was raised. By the wharf at Newport News lay atug-boat, the "Zouave, " which had been armed with a 30-pounder gun, and wasrated as a gunboat and tender to the fleet. Her captain noticed the smokeof steamers coming down the Elizabeth River, and cast off from the wharfand went alongside the "Cumberland. " The officer of the watch told him torun across to the river mouth and find out what was coming down fromNorfolk. 

 [Illustration: HAMPTON ROADS (1ST. DAY) "MERRIMAC" COMES OUT. SINKS "CUMBERLAND" & BURNS "CONGRESS"]

 [Illustration: HAMPTON ROADS (2ND. DAY) DUEL BETWEEN "MONITOR" & "MERRIMAC"]

"It did not take us long to find out, " he says, "for we had not gone overtwo miles when we saw what to all appearances looked like the roof of avery big barn belching forth smoke as from a chimney. We were all dividedin opinion as to what was coming. The boatswain's mate was the first tomake out the Confederate flag, and then we all guessed it was the'Merrimac' come at last. "

The little "Zouave" fired half a dozen shots, which fell short. The"Merrimac" took no notice of this demonstration, but steadily held her way. Then the "Cumberland" signalled to the "Zouave" to come back, and she ranpast the anchored warships and under shelter of the batteries. These werenow opening fire on the Confederate gunboats issuing from the James River. The "Congress" and "Cumberland" had cleared for action and weighed anchor. Other ships of the fleet had taken the alarm, and were coming up into theRoads to help their consorts. The Confederate batteries at Sewell's Pointopened fire at long range against these ships as they stood into the Roads. 

The "Merrimac" was steering straight for the "Cumberland, " in grim silence, her unarmoured consorts keeping well astern. When the range was aboutthree-quarters of a mile the two Federal ships opened fire with the heavyguns mounted on pivots on their upper decks, and the shore batteries alsobrought some guns to bear. A heavy cannonade from sea and shore was nowechoing over the landlocked waters, but the "Merrimac" fired not a gun inreply. A few cannon-shot struck her sloping armoured sides, and reboundedwith a ringing clang. The rest ricochetted harmlessly over the water, throwing up sparkling geysers of foam in the bright sunlight. 

At last, when the range was only some 500 yards, the bow-gun of the"Merrimac" was fired at the "Cumberland, " with an aim so true that itkilled or wounded most of the men at one of her big pivot-guns. A momentafter the ram was abeam of the "Congress, " and fired her starboard batteryof four guns into her at deadly close range. With the projectiles from 25guns of the "Congress" and 15 of the "Cumberland" rattling on her armour, riddling her funnel, and destroying davits, rails, and deck-fittings, the"Merrimac" steamed straight for the "Cumberland, " which made an ineffectualattempt to avoid the coming collision. At the last moment some men werekilled and wounded in the gun-deck of the ram by shots entering aport-hole. Then came a grinding crash as the iron ram of the "Merrimac"struck the "Cumberland" almost at right angles on the starboard side underher fore-rigging. On board the Confederate ship the shock was hardly felt. But the "Cumberland" heeled over with the blow, and righted herself againas the "Merrimac" reversed her engines and cleared her, leaving a hugebreach in the side of her enemy. The ram had crushed in several of herframes and made a hole in her side "big enough to drive a coach and horsesthrough. " The water was pouring into her like a mill-race. 

From the "Merrimac, " lying close alongside with silent guns, came a hailand a summons to surrender. From the deck of the "Cumberland" hercommander, Morris, replied with a curt refusal. The firing began again; the"Cumberland's" men, driven from the gun-deck by the inrush of rising water, took refuge on the upper deck. Some jumped overboard and began swimmingashore. Others kept her two pivot-guns in action for a few minutes. Thenwith a lurch she went down. Boats from the shore saved a few of her people. Those who watched from the batteries could hardly believe their eyes asthey saw the masts of the warship sticking out of the water where a fewminutes ago the "Cumberland" had waited in confidence for the attack of theimprovised "rebel" ironclad. 

As her adversary went down, the "Merrimac" turned slowly to menace the"Congress" with the same swift destruction. She took no notice of theharmless cannonade from the shore. Lieutenant Smith, who commanded the"Congress, " had realized that collision with the enemy meant destruction, rapid and inevitable, and decided that his best chance was to get intoshoal water under the batteries. He had slipped his cable, shaken out someof his sails, and signalled to the tug-boat "Zouave" to come to his help. The "Zouave" made fast to the "Congress" on the land side, but she had notmoved far when the ship grounded within easy range of the "Merrimac's"guns. These were already in action against her. 

The leading ship of the seaward Federal squadron, the frigate "Minnesota, "had come in within long range, and opened on the "Merrimac" and thegunboats. But she had only fired a few shots when she also ran aground onthe edge of the main channel, but in such a position that some of her gunscould still be brought to bear. Taking no notice of this more distant foe, the "Merrimac" devoted all her attention to the "Congress. " She sent abroadside into the stranded frigate, and then passing under her stern, raked her fore and aft and set her on fire. Lieutenant Smith, of the"Congress, " was badly wounded. Lieutenant Prendergast, who succeeded to thecommand, decided that with his ship aground and the enemy able quietly tocannonade her without coming under fire of most of her guns, to prolong thefight would be to waste life uselessly. After consulting his wounded chiefhe dipped his colours and displayed a white flag. The little "Zouave" castoff from the frigate, and as she cleared her, fired a single shot from herone gun at the "Merrimac, " and then ran down to the "Minnesota. " This shotled afterwards to a false report that the "Congress" had reopened firetreacherously after surrendering. 

Civil war has often been described as fratricidal. In this action betweenthe "Congress" and the "Merrimac" two brothers were opposed to each other. Commodore Buchanan, who commanded the "Merrimac, " knew, when he attackedthe "Congress, " that a younger brother of his was a junior officer of thefrigate. The younger man escaped unscathed, but the commodore was slightlywounded during the fight. When the "Congress" struck her colours, Buchananordered two of the gunboats to take off her crew. Her flag was secured tobe sent to Richmond as a trophy. While the gunboats "Raleigh" and"Beaufort" were taking off the Federal wounded, there came from thebatteries on shore a heavy fire of guns and rifles. Several of the woundedand two officers of the "Raleigh" were killed, and the gunboats drew off, leaving most of the crew of the "Congress" still on board. They escaped tothe shore in boats and by swimming. Meanwhile the "Merrimac" fired a numberof red-hot shot into her, and she was soon ablaze fore and aft. Then theironclad turned and fired at the "Minnesota. "

The sun was going down and the tide was running out rapidly. The deepdraught of the "Merrimac" made the risk of grounding, if she closelyengaged the "Minnesota, " a serious matter. So Buchanan signalled to thegunboats to cease fire, and, accompanied by them, steamed over to the southside of the Roads, where he anchored for the night under the Confederatebatteries, intending to complete the destruction of the Federal fleet nextmorning. 

The first day's fight was over. It had been a battle between the old andthe new--between a steam-propelled armoured ram and wooden sailing-ships. The "Cumberland" had been sunk, the "Congress" forced to surrender and seton fire, and the "Minnesota" was hopelessly aground and marked down as thefirst victim for next day. The Federals had lost some two hundred men. TheConfederates only twenty-one. Buchanan was wounded, not severely, butseriously enough for the command of the "Merrimac" to be transferred toLieutenant Jones. As night came on the moon rose, but the wide expanse ofwater was lighted up, not by her beams only, but also by the red glare fromthe burning "Congress. " The flames ran up her tarred rigging like rockettrails, masts and spars were defined in flickers of flame. At last, with adeafening roar that was heard for many a mile, she blew up, strewing theRoads with scattered wreckage. 

At ten o'clock that evening, while the "Congress" was still burning, astrange craft had steamed into the Roads from the sea, all unnoticed by theConfederates. She anchored in the shallow water between the "Minnesota" andthe shore. Her light draught enabled her to go into waters where lesspowerful fighting-ships would have grounded. To use the words of one whofirst saw her as the sun rose next day, she looked like a plank afloat witha can on top of it. She was Ericsson's ironclad turret-ship, the "Monitor. "

In the first weeks of the war inventors had besieged the United States NavyDepartment with proposals for the construction of ironclad warships. TheDepartment was still leisurely debating as to what policy should beadopted, when news came that the "Merrimac, " half-burnt at Norfolk Yard, was being reconstructed as an armoured ram, and it became urgent to providean adversary to meet her on something like equal terms. It was at thismoment that John Ericsson came forward with his offer to construct anarmoured light-draught turret-ship, which could be very rapidly built andput in commission. This last point was of cardinal importance, for reportsaid that work on the "Merrimac" was far advanced, and no ship could bebuilt on ordinary lines, of sufficient power to meet her, in the time nowavailable. The vessel must be of light draught to work in the shallow coastwaters, creeks, and river mouths of the Southern States. She might have tofight in narrow channels, where there would not be room for manoeuvring tobring broadside guns to bear. Ericsson, therefore, proposed that herarmament should be a pair of heavy guns mounted in a turret, which could berevolved so as to point them in any direction, independently of theposition of the ship herself. 

The hull was to be formed of two portions, a kind of barge-like structureor lower hull, built of iron, and mostly under water when the ship wasafloat, and fixed over this the upper hull, a raft-like structure, widerand longer, and with overhanging armoured sides and lighter deck-armour. The dimensions were--

Upper part of hull, length 172 feet, beam 41 feet. Lower hull, length 122 feet, beam 34 feet. Depth, underside of deck to keel-plate, 11 feet 2 inches. Draught of water, 10 feet. 

Engines and boilers were aft, and the long overhang of the armoured deckastern protected the under-water rudder and screw propeller. In theoverhang at the bow there was a well, in which the anchor hung under water. Forward, near the bow, there was a small armoured pilot-house, or, as wenow call it, "conning-tower. " Amidships, in an armoured turret, weremounted two heavy smooth-bore guns, of large calibre, and throwing a round, solid shot. 

The conning-tower was built of solid iron blocks, nine inches thick. Thesight-holes were narrow, elongated slits. This was the helmsman's station. 

The committee to which Ericsson's plans were referred was at first hostile;some of the members declared that the ship would not float, that her deckwould be under water, and she would be swamped at once. Further objectionswere that no crew could live in the under-water part of the hull. But atlength all objections were met, and the Swedish engineer was told that hisplans were accepted, and that a regular contract would be drawn up for hissignature. Ericsson knew the value of time, and before the contract wasready the keel plates of his turret-ship had been rolled and a dozen firmshad started work on her various parts. While the ship was being built, heproposed she should be named the "Monitor, " and the name became a generalterm for low-freeboard turret-ships. 

 [Illustration: THE "MERRIMAC" & "MONITOR" DRAWN TO THE SAME SCALE]

The keel of the ship was laid at Greenpoint Yard, Brooklyn, in October, 1861. She was launched on 30 January, 1862. The work of completing andfitting was carried on day and night, and she was commissioned for serviceon 25 February, 1862. But even when her crew were on board there were anumber of details to be completed. Workmen were busy on her almost up tothe moment of her departure from New York harbour nine days later, so therewas no chance of drilling the men and testing the guns and turret. 

Lieutenant Worden, United States Navy, was promoted to the rank of captainand given command. He formed a crew of volunteers for what was considered anovel and exceptionally dangerous service. Officers and men numberedfifty-eight in all. 

On the morning of Thursday, 6 March (two days before the "Merrimac's"attack on the "Cumberland"), the "Monitor" left New York in tow of the tug"Seth Low, " bound for Hampton Roads. The two days' voyage southwards alongthe coast was an anxious and trying time, and though the weather was notreally bad, the "Monitor" narrowly escaped foundering at sea. 

At 4 p. M. On the Saturday she was off Cape Henry, and the sound of afar-off cannonade was heard in the direction of Hampton Roads. The officersrightly guessed that the "Merrimac" was in action. It was after dark thatthe turret-ship steamed up the still water of the landlocked bay, amid thered glare from the burning "Congress. " She anchored beside the UnitedStates warship "Roanoke. " On board the fleet which eagerly watched herarrival there were general disappointment and depression at seeing howsmall she was. 

Worden shifted his anchorage in the night, and taking advantage of the"Monitor's" light draught steamed up the Roads, and anchored his ship inthe shallow water to landward of the stranded "Minnesota. "

There was not much sleep on board the "Monitor" that night, tired as themen were. At 2 a. M. The "Congress" blew up in a series of explosions. After that the men tried to settle down to rest, but before dawn all handswere roused to prepare for the coming fight. A little after 7 a. M. The"Merrimac" was seen steaming slowly across the bay, escorted by herflotilla of gunboats. She was coming to complete the destruction of theUnited States squadron, and had marked down the "Minnesota" as her firstvictim, in blissful ignorance of the arrival of the "Monitor. " Wordenrealized that if he allowed the fight to take place near the stranded ship, the "Merrimac" might engage him with one of her broadsides, and use theother to destroy the "Minnesota. " He therefore steamed boldly out into theopen water, challenging the Confederate ram to a duel. As he approached thewooden gunboats prudently turned back and ran under the shelter of theConfederate batteries on the south shore, leaving the "Merrimac" to meetthe "Monitor" in single combat. 

So that Sunday morning, 9 March, 1862, saw the first battle betweenironclad ships, with North and South, soldiers, sailors, and civiliansanxiously watching the combat from the ships in the Roads and the batterieson either shore. 

Worden was in the pilot-house with a quartermaster at the wheel, and alocal pilot to assist him. His first lieutenant, Dana Greene, commanded thetwo 11-inch guns in the turret. The "Merrimac" was the first to open fire. Worden waited to reply till she was at close quarters, then stopped hisengines, let his ship drift, and sent the order by speaking-tube to theturret, "Commence firing!" The "Monitor's" turret swung round, and her twoguns roared out, enveloping both ships in a fog of powder smoke as the hugecannon-balls crashed on the sloping armour of the "Merrimac. " They did notpenetrate it, but the theory of the Northern artillerists was that thehammering of heavy round shot on an enemy's armour would start the plates, shear bolt and rivet heads, and crush in the wooden backing, and sogradually succeed in making a breach in the armour somewhere. Butthroughout this fight at close quarters the "Merrimac's" cuirass remainedintact. 

 [Illustration: _Cassier's Magazine_ THE BATTLE OF HAMPTON ROADS. THE MERRIMAC AND MONITOR ENGAGED AT CLOSE QUARTERS]

The Southern ship was replying with a much more rapid fire from herbroadside guns. Hit after hit thundered on the "Monitor's" turret, but itsplating held good, though the sensation of being thus pummelled wasanything but pleasant to the men inside. At an early stage of the fight aquartermaster was disabled in a startling way. He was leaning against theinside of the turret, when a shot struck it just outside. The momentaryyielding of the plating to the blow passed on the shock to the man's body, and he fell stunned and collapsed, and had to be carried below. 

Although the speaking-tube from conning-tower to turret was inside thearmoured deck, a similar action of a shot, that did not penetrate, smashedit up, and after this orders had to be passed with difficulty by a chain ofmen. And this was not the only trouble the crew of the "Monitor" had tocontend with. But the "Monitor, " with all her defects, had the greatadvantage over the "Merrimac" of a slightly greater speed and of a muchgreater handiness. Her turning circle was much smaller than that of thelarger ship, and she could choose her position, and evade with comparativeease any attempt of her clumsy adversary to ram and run her down. The"Merrimac, " with her damaged funnel and diminished draught on her furnaces, found it even more difficult than on the previous day to get up speed. Attimes she was barely moving. Her depth was also a drawback in the narrowchannel. While the light-draught "Monitor" could go anywhere, the"Merrimac, " drawing 22 feet of water, was more than once aground, and wasgot afloat again after many anxious efforts. 

The "Monitor" had a good supply of solid shot; the "Merrimac" very few, forshe had been sent out, not to fight an armour-clad, but to destroy a woodenfleet. Finding that his shell-fire was making no impression on the"Monitor's" turret, and recognizing the difficulty of ramming his enemy, Commander Jones made up his mind to disregard the "Monitor" for a while, and attempt to complete the destruction of the "Minnesota. " He thereforeordered his pilot to steer across the Roads, and take up a position nearthe stranded frigate. The pilot afterwards confessed that he was moreanxious about facing the rapid fire of the "Minnesota's" numerous guns thanstanding the more deliberate attack of the "Monitor's" slow fire. He couldhave brought the "Merrimac" within half a mile of the "Minnesota, " but hemade a wide detour, and ran aground two miles from the Federal ship. Whenafter great efforts the ironclad was floated again, the pilot declared hecould not take her any nearer the "Minnesota" without grounding again, andCommander Jones reluctantly turned to renew the duel with the "Monitor, "which had been steaming slowly after him. The "Monitor's" officers thoughtthe "Merrimac" was running away from them, and were surprised when sheclosed with their ship again. 

Once more there was a fight at close quarters. Those who watched the battlecould make out very little of what was happening, for the two ships werewrapped in clouds of powder smoke and blacker smoke from their furnaces. The "Merrimac's" funnel was down, and the smoke from her furnace-room waspouring low over her casemate. In the midst of the semi-darkness Jonestried to ram the turret-ship, and nearly succeeded. Worden, using thesuperior handiness of his little vessel, converted the direct attack into aglancing blow, but the Confederates thought that if they had not lost theiron wedge of their ram the day before in sinking the "Cumberland" theywould have sunk the "Monitor. "

The turret-ship now kept a more respectful distance. For more than aquarter of an hour she did not fire a shot. The Confederates hoped they hadpermanently disabled her, but what had happened was that the "Monitor" hadceased fire in order to pass a supply of ammunition up into the turret, which could not be revolved while this was being done. Presently the"Monitor" began firing again. Jones of the "Merrimac" now changed histarget. Despairing of seriously damaging the "Monitor's" turret, heconcentrated his fire on her conning-tower, and before long this plan hadan important result. Dana Greene gives a vivid description of theincident:--

 "A shell struck the forward side of the pilot-house directly in the sight-hole or slit, and exploded, cracking the second iron log and partly lifting the top, leaving an opening. Worden was standing immediately behind this spot, and received in his face the force of the blow, which partly stunned him, and filling his eyes with powder, utterly blinded him. The injury was known only to those in the pilot-house and its immediate vicinity. The flood of light rushing through the top of the pilot-house, now partly open, caused Worden, blind as he was, to believe that the pilot-house was seriously injured if not destroyed; he, therefore, gave orders to put the helm to starboard, and 'sheer off. ' Thus the 'Monitor' retired temporarily from the action, in order to ascertain the extent of the injuries she had received. At the same time Worden sent for me, and I went forward at once, and found him standing at the foot of the ladder leading to the pilot-house. 

 "He was a ghastly sight, with his eyes closed and the blood apparently rushing from every pore in the upper part of his face. He told me that he was seriously wounded, and directed me to take command. I assisted in leading him to a sofa in his cabin, where he was tenderly cared for by Dr. Logue, and then I assumed command. Blind and suffering as he was, Worden's fortitude never forsook him; he frequently asked from his bed of pain of the progress of affairs, and when told that the 'Minnesota' was saved, he said, 'Then I can die happy!'"[18]

 [18] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, " vol. I, pp. 726, 727. Worden recovered, and there was no permanent injury to his sight. He lived to be a distinguished admiral of the United States Navy. 

In the confusion that followed the disablement of her commander, the"Monitor" had drifted away from the "Merrimac, " but still in a positionbetween her and the "Minnesota. " The Confederate ship fired at thetemporarily disabled turret-ship a few shots, to which there was no reply. Commander Jones and his officers believed they had put their opponent outof action. But the "Merrimac" was not in a position to profit by heradvantage. It was near 2 p. M. The tide was running out rapidly, and therisk of grounding was serious. Ammunition was beginning to be scarce. Thecrew was exhausted, and the ship's pumps had to be kept going, for underthe strain of the heavy firing, and the repeated groundings during the twodays, the hull was leaking badly. Jones judged the time had come to breakoff the action, and the "Merrimac" turned slowly, and began to steam intothe Elizabeth River, on her way back to Norfolk. 

The "Monitor, " seeing her retiring, fired a few long-range shots after her. They splashed harmlessly into the water. So the famous fight ended. 

On board both ships no life had been lost, and only a few men were wounded, Captain Worden's case being the most serious. In fact, there were fewercasualties than on the first day, when the loss of life in the wooden shipshad been serious, and the "Merrimac, " despite her armour, had hadtwenty-one men killed and wounded by the lighter projectiles of the"Cumberland" and "Congress" finding their way into her casemate through theport-holes. Neither ship had suffered severe injury, though if the battlehad continued, the damage done to the conning-tower of the "Monitor" mighthave had serious results. When the "Merrimac" was docked at Gosport Yard, Norfolk, to be overhauled and repaired, it was found that she hadninety-seven indentations on her armour. Twenty of these were judged to bethe marks of the "Monitor's" 11-inch balls. In these places the outer layerof armour-plating was cracked and badly damaged. The under layer and thewood backing were uninjured. The other seventy-seven marks were meresurface dents made by the lighter artillery of the wooden ships. The"Monitor" had used reduced charges of 15 pounds of gunpowder, and it wasbelieved that if the full charge of 30 pounds had been used, the resultsmight have been more serious, but the Navy Department had ordered thereduced charge, as it was feared that with full charges the strain on thegun-mountings and turret-gear would be too severe. The "Merrimac's" funnelwas riddled, and all outside fittings shot away. Two of her guns had beenmade unserviceable on the first day by shots striking their muzzles. 

Both sides claimed the victory in the Sunday's battle. The Confederatesclaimed to have driven off the "Monitor, " and stated that Jones had waitedfor some time for her to renew the fight, before he turned back to Norfolk. The Federals argued that the object of the "Merrimac" was to destroy the"Minnesota, " and the "Monitor" had prevented this, and was therefore thevictor. The frigate was successfully floated next tide. Sometimes the fightis described as a drawn battle, but most writers on the subject accept theFederal contention, and give the honours of the day to the littleturret-ship. 

The battle of Hampton Roads was notable, however, not so much for itsimmediate results, as for its effect on naval opinion and policy. Itfinally closed the era of unarmoured ships; it led to a perhaps exaggeratedimportance being attached to the ram as a weapon of attack; and it led to avery general adoption of the armoured turret, and for a while to thebuilding of low-freeboard turret-ships in various navies. It was not tilllong after that the story of the "Monitor's" perilous voyage from New Yorkwas told, and thus even in America it was not realized that the "Monitor"type was fit only for smooth waters, and was ill adapted for sea-goingships. On the Federal side there was a kind of enthusiasm for the"Monitor. " Numbers of low-freeboard turret-ships of somewhat larger size, and with improved details, were built for the United States, and even thefailure of Admiral Dupont's "Monitor" fleet in the attack on theCharleston batteries did not convince the Navy Department that the type wasdefective. Ericsson's building of the "Monitor" to meet the emergency of1862 was a stroke of genius, but its success had for a long time amisleading effect on the development of naval construction in the UnitedStates. 

The "Merrimac" was abandoned and burned by the Confederates a few weekslater when they evacuated Norfolk and the neighbourhood. At the end of theyear the "Monitor" was ordered to Charleston. She started in tow of apowerful tug, but the fate she had so narrowly escaped on her first voyageovertook her. She was caught in a gale off Cape Hatteras on the evening of31 December, 1862. The tow-ropes had to be cut, and shortly after midnightthe "Monitor" sank ten miles off the Cape. Several of her officers and menwent down with her. The rest were rescued by the tug, with greatdifficulty. 

Had the wind blown a little harder during the "Monitor's" first voyage fromNew York, or had the tow-rope to which she hung parted, there is no doubtshe would have gone down in the same way. In that case the course ofhistory would have been different, for the "Merrimac" would have beenundisputed master of the Atlantic coast, and have driven off or destroyedevery ship of the blockading squadrons. The fates of nations sometimesdepend on trifles. That of the American Union depended for some hours onthe soundness of the hawser by which the "Monitor" hung on to the tug-boat"Seth Low" of New York. 

 CHAPTER XI

 LISSA

 1866

In the American Civil War there had been no battle between ironclad fleets. "Monitors" had engaged batteries. The "Merrimac" had had her duel with thefirst of the little turret-ships. But experts were still wondering whatwould happen when fleets of armoured ships, built in first-class dockyards, met in battle on the sea. 

The war between Austria and Italy in 1866 gave the first answer. Theexperiment was not a completely satisfactory one, and some of its lessonswere misread. Others were soon made obsolete by new developments in navalarmaments. 

Still, Lissa will always count among the famous sea-fights of the world, for it was the first conflict in which the armoured sea-going ship took aleading part. But there is another reason: it proved in the most startlingway--though neither for the first time nor the last--that men count formore than machines, that courage and enterprise can reverse in the actualfight the conditions that beforehand would seem to make defeat inevitable. "Give me plenty of iron in the men, and I don't mind so much about iron inthe ships, " was a pithy saying of the American Admiral Farragut. There wasiron enough in the Austrian sailors, Tegethoff and Petz, to outweigh allthe iron in the guns and armour of the Italian admirals, Persano andAlbini, and the "iron in the men" gave victory to the fleet that on paperwas doomed to destruction. 

At the present time, when in our morning papers and in the monthly reviewswe find such frequent comparisons between the fleets of the Powers, comparisons almost invariably based only on questions of ships, armour, guns, and horse-power, and leaving the all-important human factor out ofaccount, it will be interesting to compare the relative strength--onpaper--of the Austrian and Italian fleets in 1866, before telling the storyof Lissa. 

Austria had only seven ironclads. All were of the earlier type ofarmour-clad ships, modelled on the lines of the old steam frigates, builtof wood, and plated with thin armour. The two largest--ships of 5000 tonsand 800 horse-power--mounted a battery of eighteen 48-pounder smooth bores. They had not a single rifled gun in their weak broadsides. These were the"Ferdinand Max" and the "Hapsburg. " The "Kaiser Max, " the "Prinz Eugen, "and "Don Juan de Austria" were smaller ships of 3500 tons and 650horse-power, but they had a slightly better armament, sixteen smooth-boremuzzle-loading 48-pounders, and fourteen rifled guns, light breech-loading24-pounders. The "Salamander" and the "Drache" were ships of 3000 tons and500 horse-power. They mounted sixteen rifled 24-pounders and tensmooth-bore 48-pounders. These five smaller ironclads were the only shipsunder the Austrian flag at all up to date. There were an old wooden screwline-of-battle ship and four wooden frigates, but these had neither rifledguns nor armour, and the naval critics of the day would doubtless refuse totake them into account. Then there were some wooden unarmoured gunboats anddispatch vessels. 

Now turning to the Italian Navy List, we find that these six ironclads, twoof them without a single rifled gun, would have to face no less than twelvearmoured ships, every one of them carrying rifled guns. One of them was athoroughly up-to-date vessel, just commissioned from Armstrong's yard atElswick, the armoured turret-ram "Affondatore" (i. E. "The Sinker"). Acorrespondent of "The Times" saw her when she put into Cherbourg on the waydown Channel. He reported that she looked formidable enough to sink thewhole Austrian ironclad fleet single-handed. She was a ship of 4000 tonsand 750 horse-power, iron-built, heavily armoured, and with a spur-bow forramming. She carried in her turret two 10-inch rifled Armstrong guns, throwing an armour-piercing shell of 295 pounds--say 300-pounders, and letus remember the heaviest rifled gun in the Austrian fleet was the little24-pounder. Then there were two wooden ironclads of 5700 tons and 800horse-power, the "Re d'Italia" and the "Re di Portogallo. " The "Re diPortogallo" carried 28 rifled guns, two 300-pounders, twelve 100-pounders, and fourteen 74-pounders. The "Re d'Italia" mounted thirty-two rifled guns, two 150-pounders, sixteen 100-pounders, fourteen 74-pounders, and besidesthese four smooth-bore 50-pounders. On paper these three ships, the two"Kings"[19] and the "Affondatore, " ought to have blown the Austrianironclads out of the sea or sent them to the bottom. Let us compare thenumber of rifled guns and the weight of metal. There is no need to countthe smooth-bores, for the "Merrimac-Monitor" fight had proved how littlethey could do even against weak armour. Here is the balance-sheet:--

 AUSTRIANS. | ITALIANS. Rifled Projectile. | Rifled Projectile. Ships. Guns. Lbs. | Ships. Guns. Lbs. | _Ferdinand Max_ none -- | _Affondatore_ 2 300 _Hapsburg_ none -- | { 2 150 _Kaiser Max_ 14 24 | _Re d'Italia_ {16 100 _Prinz Eugen_ 14 24 | {14 74 _Don Juan_ 14 24 | { 2 300 _Drache_ 16 24 | _Re di Portogallo_ {12 100 _Salamander_ 16 24 | {14 74 ----------- | ------------ Total 74 guns | Total 62 guns throwing 1776 lbs. Of metal. | throwing 6372 lbs. Of metal. 

 [19] "Re d'Italia" (King of Italy); "Re di Portogallo" (King of Portugal). 

Even the "Affondatore" was supposed to be what the "Dreadnought" is toolder ships in these paper estimates. What would she be with the two"Kings" helping her? But this was not all; the Italians could place in line_nine more_ ironclads. Here is this further list:--

 Weight of Ship. Tonnage. Horse- Rifled Guns. Broadside. Power. Lbs. 

 _Ancona_ 4250 700 {22 100-pounders} 2274 { 1 74-pounder }

 _Maria Pia_ 4250 700 {18 100-pounders} 2096 { 4 74-pounders}

 _Castelfidardo_ 4250 700 {22 100-pounders} 2274 { 1 74-pounder }

 _San Martino_ 4250 700 {16 100-pounders} 2044 { 6 74-pounders}

 _Principe di Carignano_[20] 4000 700 {12 100-pounders} 1644 { 6 74-pounders}

 _Terribile_ 2700 400 {10 100-pounders} 1444 { 6 74-pounders}

 _Formidabile_ 2700 400 {10 100-pounders} 1444 { 6 74-pounders}

 _Palestro_ 2000 300 2 150-pounders 300

 _Varese_ 2000 300 { 2 150-pounders} 500 { 2 100-pounders}

 Total: nine ships carrying 146 rifled guns throwing 14, 020 lbs. Of metal. 

 [20] The "Principe di Carignano" was wooden built; all the rest iron. 

What could the seven Austrian ironclads with their 74 little guns throwing1776 pounds of metal do against these nine ships with double the number ofguns and nearly ten times the weight of metal in their broadsides? But addin the three capital ships before noted on the Italian side, and we have:--

 12 ironclads against 7. 208 rifled guns against 74. 20, 392 pounds of metal in the broadsides against only 1776. 

Clearly it would be mad folly for the Austrian fleet to challenge aconflict! It would be swept from the Adriatic at the first encounter!

Here, then, are our calculations as to the command of the Adriatic at theoutset of the war of 1866. They leave out of account only one element--themen, and the spirit of the men. Let us see how the grim realities of warcan give the lie to paper estimates. 

Wilhelm von Tegethoff, who commanded the Austrian fleet with the rank ofrear-admiral, was one of the world's great sailors, and the man for theemergency. He had as a young officer taken part in the blockade of Veniceduring the revolution of 1848 and 1849; he had seen something of the navaloperations in the Black Sea during the Crimean War, as the commander of asmall Austrian steamer, and during the war of 1864 he had commanded thewooden steam frigate "Schwarzenberg" in the fight with the Danes offHeligoland. Besides these war services he had taken part in an exploringexpedition in the Red Sea and Somaliland, and he had made more than onevoyage as staff-captain to the Archduke Maximilian, whose favourite officerand close friend he had been for years. When the Archduke, an enthusiasticsailor, resigned his command of the Austrian fleet to embark for Mexico, where a short-lived reign as Emperor and a tragic death awaited him, hetold his brother, the Emperor Francis Joseph, that Tegethoff was the hopeof the Austrian navy. 

The young admiral (he was not yet forty years of age) had concentrated hisfleet at Pola, the Austrian naval port near Trieste. He had got togetherevery available ship, not only the seven ironclads, but the oldline-of-battle ship and the wooden frigates and gunboats. The Admiralty atVienna had suggested that he should take only the ironclads to sea, but hehad replied: "Give me every ship you have. You may depend on my findingsome good use for them. " He believed in his officers and men, and relied onthem to make a good fight on board anything that would float, whether thenaval experts considered it was out of date or not. Among his officers hehad plenty of men who were worthy of their chief and inspired with his owndauntless spirit, and the crews were largely composed of excellentmaterial, men from the wilderness of creek and island that extends alongthe Illyrian and Dalmatian shores, fishermen and coasting sailors, many ofthem so lately joined that instead of uniform they still wore theirpicturesque native costume. The crew looked a motley lot, but, to useFarragut's phrase, "there was iron in the men. "

Twenty-seven ships in all, small and large, were moored in four lines inthe roadstead of Fasana, near Pola. But they did not remain idly at theiranchors. Every day some of them ran out to sea, to fire at moving targetsor to practise rapid turning and ramming floating rafts. The bows werestrengthened by cross timbers in all the larger ships, and in the targetwork the crews were taught to concentrate the fire of several guns on onespot. But Tegethoff knew he had not a single gun in his fleet that couldpierce the armour of the Italian vessels. He told his officers that fordecisive results they must trust to the ram. He had painted his ships adead black. The Italian colour was grey. "When we get into the fight, " saidTegethoff, "you must ram away at anything you see painted grey. "

War was declared on 20 June. Tegethoff had been training his fleet since 9May, and was ready for action. He at once sent out the "Stadion" (apassenger steamer of the Austrian Lloyd line, employed as a scout and armedwith two 12-pounders) to reconnoitre the Italian coast of the Adriatic. The"Stadion" returned on the 23rd with news that though war had been expectedfor weeks the Italian fleet was not yet concentrated. A few of the shipswere at Ancona, but the greater part of it was reported to be at Taranto, with Admiral Count Persano, the commander-in-chief, who from the firstdisplayed the strangest irresolution. 

Tegethoff was anxious to attempt to engage the division at Ancona before itwas joined by the main body from Taranto, but he was held back by ordersfrom his Government directing him to remain in the Northern Adriaticcovering Venice. It was not till 26 June that he obtained a free handwithin limits defined by an order not to go further south than thefortified island of Lissa. 

He left Pola that evening with six ironclads, the wooden frigate"Schwarzenberg, " five gunboats, and the scouting steamer "Stadion. " He hadhoisted his rear-admiral's flag on the "Erzherzog Ferdinand Max. "[21] Hemade for Ancona, and was off the port at dawn next day. The first shots ofthe naval war were fired in the grey of the morning, when three of theAustrian gunboats chased the Italian dispatch vessel "Esploratore" into theport, outside of which she had been on the look-out. The Austrians wereable clearly to see and count the warships under the batteries in theharbour. Besides other craft, there were eleven of Persano's twelveironclads, the squadron from Taranto having reached Ancona the day before. Only the much-vaunted "Affondatore" had not yet joined. 

 [21] This was one of his least powerfully-armed ironclads, but Tegethoff seems to have selected her as his flagship because she was named after his old friend and chief, the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, who was at that time Emperor of Mexico, and involved in the final stage of the struggle that ended in his capture and execution by the Republican Juarez. 

Tegethoff cleared for action, and steamed up and down for some hours, justbeyond the range of the coast batteries. It was a challenge to the Italiansto come out and fight. But Persano did not accept it. He afterwards madeexcuses to his Government, saying he had not yet completed the finalfitting out of his ships. The moral effect on both fleets was important. The Austrians felt an increased confidence in their daring leader and agrowing contempt for their adversaries. On the 24th the Austrian army, under the Archduke Albert, had beaten the Italians at Custozza, and theAustrian navy looked forward to the same good fortune. The Italians weredepressed both by the news of Custozza and the hesitation of their admiralto risk anything. 

Early in the day Tegethoff started on his return voyage to Fasana, where hearrived in the evening, and found the ironclad "Hapsburg" waiting to joinhis flag, after having been refitted in the dockyard of Pola. As therewere now persistent rumours that the Italians were going to attempt anattack on Venice, Tegethoff remained in the Fasana roadstead, continuingthe training of his fleet. On 6 July he again took it to sea, practisedfleet manoeuvres under steam, and showed himself in sight of Ancona. Butthe Italian fleet was still lying idly in the harbour, and Tegethoff oncemore returned to Fasana in the hope that Persano would attempt someenterprise, during which he would be able to fall upon him in the open. 

The Italian admiral was meanwhile wasting time in lengthy correspondencewith his Government, and sending it letters which revealed his irresolutionand incompetence so plainly that they ought to have led to his immediatesupersession. He complained he had not definite orders, though he had beendirected to destroy the Austrian fleet, if it put to sea, or blockade it, if it remained in harbour. He explained now that he was mounting betterguns in some of his ships, now that he was waiting for the "Affondatore" tojoin. Once he actually wrote saying that some new ironclads ought to bepurchased from other powers to reinforce him. At last he was plainly toldthat if he did not at once do something for the honour of the Italian navyhe would be relieved of his command. With the Austrians victorious inNorthern Italy, a raid on Venice would have been too serious an operation, but he proposed as an alternative that a small land force should beembarked for a descent on the fortified island of Lissa, on the Dalmatiancoast. His fleet would escort it, and co-operate by bombarding the islandbatteries. The plan was accepted, and he proceeded to execute it. 

It was about as bad a scheme as could be imagined. It is a recognizedprinciple of war that over-sea expeditions should only be undertaken whenthe enemy's fleet has been either rendered helpless by a crushing defeat orblockaded in its ports. Before sending the transports to Lissa Persanoshould have steamed across to Pola and blockaded Tegethoff, fighting himif he came out. But Persano had a delusive hope that he could perhaps scorea victory without encountering the Austrian fleet by swooping down onLissa, crushing the batteries with a heavy bombardment, landing the troops, hoisting the Italian flag, and getting back to his safe anchorage at Anconabefore Tegethoff could receive news of what was happening, and come out andforce on a battle. 

Lissa was defended by a garrison of 1800 men, under Colonel Urs de Margina. This small body of troops held a number of forts and batteries mountingeighty-eight guns, none of them of large calibre. The works were old, andhad been hurriedly repaired. Most of them dated from the time of theEnglish occupation of the island during the Napoleonic wars. [22] Persanoexpected that Lissa would be a very easy nut to crack. 

 [22] Some of the forts were still known by English names, such as Wellington Tower, Bentinck Tower, and Robertson Tower. 

On 16 July the Italian fleet sailed from Ancona. Even now Persano carriedout his operations with leisurely deliberation. On the 17th he reconnoitredLissa, approaching in his flagship under French colours. Early on the 18ththe fleet closed in upon the island, flying French colours, till it was inposition before the batteries. 

The commandant had cable communication with Pola by a line running byLesina to the mainland. He reported to Tegethoff the appearance of thedisguised fleet, and then the opening of the attack on his batteries. Atfirst the Austrian admiral could hardly believe that the Italians hadcommitted themselves to such an ill-judged enterprise, and thought that theattack on Lissa might be only a feint meant to draw his fleet away from theNorthern Adriatic, and leave an opening for a dash at Pola, Trieste, orVenice itself. But cablegrams describing the progress of the attackconvinced him it was meant to be pressed home, and he telegraphed toColonel de Margina, telling him to hold out to the last extremity, andpromising to come to his relief with all the fleet. This message did notreach the colonel, for just before it was dispatched an Italian ship hadcut the cable between Lissa and Lesina, and seized the telegraph office ofthe latter island. Tegethoff's message thus fell into Persano's hands. Hepersuaded himself that it was mere bluff, intended to encourage thecommandant of Lissa to hold out as long as possible. He thought Tegethoffwould remain in the Northern Adriatic to protect or to overawe Venice. 

The attempt to reduce the batteries of Lissa by bombardment during the 18thproved a failure. In the evening Persano was in a very anxious state ofmind. He had made no arrangements for colliers to supply his fleet, and hiscoal was getting low. It was just possible that Tegethoff might come outand force him to fight, and he thought of returning to Ancona. But if hedid he would be dismissed from his command. At last he made up his mind toland the troops next morning, and try to carry the forts by an assaultcombined with an attack from the sea. His second in command, AdmiralAlbini, with the squadron of wooden ships and gunboats that accompanied theironclads, was directed to superintend and assist in the landing of thetroops. They were to be embarked in all available boats, and to land at 9a. M. During the night the ram "Affondatore" joined the fleet, and Persanohad all his twelve ironclads before Lissa. 

On the morning of the 18th the sea was smooth, and covered with a hot hazethat limited the view. The soldiers were being got into the boats, and theships were steaming to their stations for the attack, when about eighto'clock the "Esploratore, " which had been sent off to scout to thenorth-westward, appeared steaming fast out of a bank of haze with a signalflying, which was presently read, "Suspicious-looking ships in sight. "Tegethoff was coming. 

He had left Fasana late on the afternoon of the 18th, with every availableship, large and small, new and old, wooden wall and ironclad. He wouldfind work for all of them. All night he had steamed for Lissa, anxious atthe sudden cessation of the cable messages, but still hoping that he wouldsee the Austrian flag flying on its forts, or if not, that he would atleast find the enemy's fleet still in its waters. 

 [Illustration: LISSA. BATTLE FORMATION OF THE AUSTRIAN FLEET]

He had organized his fleet in three divisions. The first under his ownpersonal command was formed of the seven ironclads. The second division, under Commodore von Petz, was composed of wooden unarmoured ships. Thecommodore's flag flew on the old steam line-of-battle ship "Kaiser, " athree-decker with ninety-two guns on her broadsides, all smooth-boresexcept a couple of rifled 24-pounders. With the "Kaiser" were five oldwooden ships ("Novara, " "Schwarzenberg, " "Donau, " "Adria, " and "Radetzky")and a screw corvette, the "Erzherzog Friedrich. " The third division, underCommandant Eberle, was composed of ten gunboats. A dispatch-boat wasattached to each of the leading divisions, and the scout "Stadion, " theswiftest vessel in the fleet, was at the immediate disposal of the admiral, and was sent on in advance. 

The fleet steamed during the night in the order of battle that Tegethoffhad chosen. The divisions followed each other in succession, each in awedge formation, the flagship of the division in the centre with the restof the ships to port and starboard, not in line abreast, but each a littlebehind the other. The formation will be understood from the annexeddiagram. 

It was an anxious night for the Austrian admiral. For some hours there wasbad weather. Driving showers of fine rain from a cloudy sky made itdifficult at times to see the lights of the ships, and it was no easymatter for them to keep their stations. The sea was for a while so roughthat the ironclads had to close their ports, and there was a danger that ifthe weather did not improve and the sea become smoother they would not beable to fight most of their guns. But Tegethoff held steadily on hiscourse for Lissa. On sea, as on land, there are times in the crisis of awar when the highest prudence is to throw all ordinary rules of prudenceaside, and take all risks. 

The admiral had resolved from the outset that, whatever might be theresult, the Austrian fleet should not lie in safety under the protection ofshore batteries, leaving the Italian command of the Adriatic unchallenged. He felt that it would be better to sink in the open sea, in a hopelessfight against desperate odds, rather than ingloriously to survive the war, without making an effort to carry his flag to victory. So he steamedthrough the night, followed by his strange array of ships that anotherleader might well have considered as little better than uselessencumbrances, and in front the handful of inferior ironclads that mightwell be regarded as equally doomed to destruction when they met the morenumerous and more heavily armed ships of the enemy. But he had put away allthoughts of safety. He was staking every ship and every man and his ownlife against the faint chance of success. The coming day might see hisfleet destroyed, but such a failure would be no disgrace. On the contrary, it would only be less honourable than a well-won victory, and would be aninspiration to the men of a future fleet that would carry the banner of theHapsburgs in later days. So he rejoiced greatly when, as the day came, theweather began to clear, and the "Stadion" signalled back that Lissa wasstill holding out and the enemy's fleet lay under its shores. 

As soon as he read the "Esploratore's" signal, Persano had no doubt thatTegethoff was upon him. He countermanded the attack on Lissa, orderedAlbini to re-embark the troops, and proceeded to form his ironclads in lineof battle, intending to engage the enemy with these only. The ironcladswere standing in to attack the batteries of San Giorgio at the north-eastend of the island. Persano formed nine of them in three divisions, whichwere to follow each other in line ahead, the ram "Affondatore" being outof the line and to starboard of the second division. The formation was asfollows:--

 FIRST DIVISION. 

 { _Principe di Carignano_. Rear-Admiral Vacca { _Castelfidardo_. { _Ancona_. 

 SECOND DIVISION. 

 { _Re d'Italia_. _Affondatore_. Rear-Admiral Faa di Bruno { _Palestro_. (to starboard of the { _San Martino_. Line). 

 THIRD DIVISION. 

 { _Re di Portogallo_. Rear-Admiral Ribotti { _Maria Pia_. { _Varese_. 

The two other Italian ironclads, the "Formidabile" and the "Varese, " werenot in the line, and took no part in the coming battle. The "Formidabile"had suffered heavily in the attack on the shore batteries, numerous shellsentering her port-holes and making a slaughterhouse of her gun-deck. Shehad been ordered to Ancona, and had left Lissa in the early morning. The"Varese" had been detached to assist in operations on the other side of theisland, and joined Albini's squadron of wooden ships while the fight was inprogress. Persano's battle line first steered west along the north side ofLissa. About ten o'clock the driving mist on the sea cleared, and theAustrian fleet was then seen approaching on a S. S. E. Course. Persanoaltered his own course, and, led by Vacca in the "Principe di Carignano, "the Italian ironclads turned in succession on a N. N. E. Course. Thus as theAustrians closed on them the fleet in a sinuous line was steering acrossthe bows of the attacking ships. 

It was at this moment that Persano changed his flag from the "Re d'Italia" to the "Affondatore, " the former ship slowing down to enable theadmiral to leave her, and thus producing a wide gap between Vacca's and Faadi Bruno's divisions. The result of this sudden change of flagship wasconfusing, as most of the Italian ships were unaware of it, and stilllooked to the "Re d' Italia" for guidance, and did not notice signals madeby the "Affondatore. "

Tegethoff had given the successive signals as the mist dispersed, "Clearfor action--Close order--Look-out ships return to their stations--Fullspeed ahead. " As the last of the fog disappeared and the sun shone out, hesaw to his delight the Austrian flag still flying on the hill-sidebatteries of Lissa, and close in front between him and the island shoresthe enemy's fleet crossing his bows. Out fluttered his battle signal, "_Ironclads will ram and sink the enemy!_" A final signal was beingprepared, "_Muss Sieg von Lissa werden!_" ("There must be a victory ofLissa!"), but the close encounter had begun, and the ships were wrapped inclouds of powder-smoke before it could be hoisted. 

While Persano was passing from the "Re d' Italia" to the ram "Affondatore, "Vacca had begun the fight by firing his broadside at the advancingAustrians. The "Castelfidardo" and the "Ancona" followed his example. ButTegethoff held his fire, waiting for close quarters. One of these firstshots killed Captain Moll of the "Drache" on the bridge of his ship. Ayoung lieutenant took command of her. He was Weiprecht, who in later yearsbecame famous as the commander of the Austrian exploring ship "Tegethoff"in the Arctic regions. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF LISSA THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE]

As the fleets closed the Austrians opened fire, aiming, not at the armouredsides of the enemy, which no gun of theirs could penetrate, but at theirport-holes and bridges. Tegethoff in his flagship the "Ferdinand Max" waslooking for something to ram, but in the dense mass of smoke he passedthrough the wide gap between Vacca's division and the "Re d'Italia, "then finding no enemy in his front, he turned and went back into the battlefog of the Italian centre. The three ironclads on his left ("Hapsburg, ""Salamander, " and "Kaiser Max") were engaged with Vacca's division, the vanof the Italian fleet. The three others, "Don Juan, " "Drache, " and "PrinzEugen, " had flung themselves on Faa di Bruno's ships in the centre. VonPetz coming up with the wooden ships gallantly attacked Ribotti's rearwarddivision, any one of which should in theory have been able to dispose ofhis entire force. The gunboats hung on the margin of the fight, which hadnow become a confused mêlée. And while the Austrian wooden ships were thusrisking themselves in close action, Albini's Italian division of woodenships looked on from a safe distance. 

One can only tell some of the striking incidents of the battle, withoutbeing able even to fix the precise order of time in which they occurred. When the "Merrimac" sank the "Cumberland" with one blow of her ram inHampton Roads, the Federal ship was at anchor. But even in the confusionand semi-darkness of the mêlée at Lissa it was found that it was not suchan easy matter to ram a ship under way. The blow was generally eluded by aturn of the helm. Von Petz's flagship, the old three-decker "Kaiser, "towering amid the battle-smoke, attracted the attention of Persano in the"Affondatore, " and seemed an easy victim for his ram. But the big ironcladwas unhandy, and took eight minutes to turn a full circle, and twice Petzeluded her attack. The two 300-pounders of the "Affondatore" did muchdamage on board the "Kaiser, " but the wooden ship's broadside swept theupper works of the ram as the two vessels passed each other, and strewedher deck with wreckage. The fire of the heavy rifled guns on the Italianironclads did severe execution on the Austrian wooden ships. The captain ofthe "Novara" was killed; the "Erzherzog Friedrich" and the "Schwarzenberg"were badly hulled, and leaked so that they were only kept afloat by theirsteam pumps. The "Adria" was three times on fire. But Petz and the woodendivision did good service by keeping the rearward Italian ships fullyoccupied. 

Meanwhile Tegethoff, standing on the bridge of the "Ferdinand Max, " allreckless of the storm of fire that roared around him had dashed into theItalian centre. He rammed first the "Re d'Italia, " then the "Palestro, " butboth ships evaded the full force of the blow, and the Austrian flagshipscraped along their sides, bringing down a lot of gear. The mizzen-topmastand gaff of the "Palestro" came down with the shock, and the gaff fellacross the Austrian's deck, with the Italian tricolour flying from it. Before the ships could clear an Austrian sailor secured the flag. It wouldseem that the glancing blow given to the "Re d'Italia" had disorganized hersteering gear, and for a while she was not under control. Two other shipsjoined the flagship in attacking her, all believing she was still Persano'sflagship. The "Palestro, " fighting beside her, was set on fire by shellspassing through her unarmoured stern. The fire made such rapid progressthat she drew out of the fight, her crew trying to save their ship. 

Von Sterneck, the captain of the "Ferdinand Max, " had gone half-way up themizzen-rigging, to look out over the smoke; he reported that the "Red'Italia" was not under full control, and Tegethoff once more dashed at hisenemy. The bow of the "Ferdinand Max" this time struck the "Re d'Italia"full amidships, and simply forced in her side, making an enormous gap, crushing and smashing plates and frames. As the "Ferdinand Max" reversedher engines and drew her bows out of her adversary's side, the "Red'Italia" heeled over and sank instantly, carrying hundreds to the bottomand strewing the surface with wreckage and struggling men. 

The Austrians, after a moment of astonished horror at their own success, cheered wildly. The "Ferdinand Max" tried to save some of the drowningmen, and was lowering her only boat that remained unshattered by the fire, when the Italian ironclad "Ancona" tried to ram her. The Austrian flagshipevaded the blow, and the "Ancona, " as she slid past her, almost touchingher gun-muzzles, fired a broadside into her. The powder-smoke from theItalian guns poured into the port-holes of the "Ferdinand Max, " and for afew moments smothered her gun-deck in fog, but it was a harmless broadside. In their undisciplined haste to fire the Italians had loaded only with thecartridge, there was not a shot in the guns. This tells something of theconfusion on board. 

Another Austrian ironclad and two of the gunboats made plucky efforts tosave some of the survivors of the "Re d'Italia, " but they, too, were drivenoff by the fierce attacks of Italian ships. 

Meanwhile Petz with his wooden ships had fought his way through the Italianrear. With his old three-decker he boldly rammed the "Re di Portogallo. "The Italian ship evaded the full force of the blow, but the tall woodenvessel scraped along her side, starting several of her armour plates, carrying away port-hole covers and davits, dragging two anchors from herbows, smashing gun-muzzles and jerking four light guns into the sea. Butthe "Kaiser" herself suffered from the close fire of the "Re diPortogallo's" heavy guns and the shock of collision. Her stem and bowspritwere carried away, the gilded crown of her figure-head falling on herenemy's deck. Her foremast came crashing down on her funnel, and wreckedit, and the mass of fallen spars, sails, and rigging was set on fire bysparks and flame from the damaged funnel, the collapse of which nearlystopped the draught of the furnaces and dangerously reduced the pressure onthe boilers and the speed of the engines. 

The "Re di Portogallo" sheered off, but her consort, the "Maria Pia, " camerushing down on the disabled "Kaiser. " Petz avoided her ram, and engagedher at close quarters, but the shells of the "Maria Pia" burst one of the"Kaiser's" steam-pipes, temporarily disabled her steering gear, and didterrible execution in her stern battery. Petz himself was slightly wounded. With great difficulty he extricated his ship from the mêlée, and cuttingaway the wreckage, and fighting the fire that was raging forward, hesteered for San Giorgio, the port of Lissa, to seek shelter under itsbatteries. His wooden frigates gallantly protected his retreat and escortedhim to safety, then turned back to join once more in the fight. This wasthe moment when Albini with the Italian wooden squadron might easily havedestroyed Petz's division, but during the day all he did was to fire a fewshots at a range so distant that they were harmless. 

Persano, in the "Affondatore, " had for a moment threatened to attack the"Kaiser, " as she struggled out of the mêlée. He steamed towards her, andthen suddenly turned away. He afterwards explained that, seeing the plightof Petz's flagship, he thought she was already doomed to destruction, andlooked upon it as useless cruelty to sink her with her crew. 

The fleets were now separating, and the fire was slackening. In this laststage of the mêlée the "Maria Pia" and the "San Martino" collided amid thesmoke, and the latter received serious injuries. As the fleets worked awayfrom each other there was still a desultory fire kept up, but after havinglasted for about an hour and a half the battle was nearly over. 

Tegethoff, having got between the Italians and Lissa, reformed his fleet inthree lines of divisions, each in line ahead, the ironclads to seawardnearest the enemy; the wooden frigates next; and the gunboats nearest theland. Every ship except the "Kaiser" (which lay in the entrance of theport) was still ready for action. Some of them were leaking badly, including his flagship, which had started several plates in the bow whenshe rammed and sank the "Re d'Italia. " The fleet steamed slowly out fromthe land on a north-easterly course, the ironclads firing a fewlong-ranging shots at the Italians. 

Persano was also reforming his fleet in line, and was flying a signal tocontinue the action, but he showed no determined wish to close withTegethoff again. On the contrary, while reforming the line he kept it on anorthwesterly course, and thus the distance between the fleets wasincreasing every minute, as they were moving on divergent lines. Graduallythe firing died away and the battle was over. Albini, with the woodensquadron, and the ironclad "Terribile, " which had remained with him, andtaken no part in the fight, ran out and joined the main fleet. 

Persano afterwards explained that he was waiting for Tegethoff to come outand attack him. But the Austrian admiral had attained his object, byforcing his way through the Italian line, and placing himself in a positionto co-operate with the batteries of Lissa, in repelling any further attemptupon the island. There was no reason why, with his numerically inferiorfleet, he should come out again to fight a second battle. 

But though the action was ended, there was yet another disaster for theItalians. The "Palestro" had been for two hours fighting the fire lightedon board of her by the Austrian shells. Smoke was rising from hatchways andport-holes, but as she rejoined the fleet she signalled that the fire wasbeing got under and the magazines had been drowned. Two of the smallerships, the "Governolo" and the "Independenza, " came to her help and tookoff her wounded. To a suggestion that he should abandon his ship, hercommander, Capellini, replied: "Those who wish may go, but I shall stay, "and his officers and men remained with him, and continued working to putout the fire. But the attempt to drown the magazines had been a failure, for suddenly a deafening explosion thundered over the sea, the spars of the"Palestro" were seen flying skyward in a volcano of flame. As the smoke ofthe explosion cleared, the heaving water strewn with debris showed wherethe ship had been. 

The Austrian fleet was steaming into San Giorgio, amid the cheers of thegarrison and the people, when the explosion of the "Palestro" took place. Persano drew off with his fleet into the channel between Lissa and theisland of Busi, and when the sun went down the Italian ships were still insight from the look-out stations on the hills of Lissa. 

The Austrians worked all night repairing damages, and preparing for apossible renewal of the fight in the morning. But at sunrise the look-outsreported that there was not an Italian ship in sight. Persano had steeredfor Ancona after dark, and arrived there on the 21st. 

He was so unwise as to report that he had won a great naval victory in ageneral engagement with the Austrians in the waters of Lissa. Italy, already smarting under the defeat of Custozza, went wild with rejoicing. Cities were illuminated, salutes were fired, there was a call for highhonours for the victorious admiral. But within forty-eight hours the truthwas known. It was impossible to conceal the fact that Lissa had beenunsuccessfully attacked for two days, and that on the third it had beenrelieved by Tegethoff dashing through the Italian fleet, and destroying the"Re d'Italia" and the "Palestro, " without himself losing a single ship. There were riots in Florence, and the cry was now that Admiral Persano wasa coward and a traitor. To add to the gloom of the moment the ram"Affondatore, " which had been injured in the battle, sank at her anchorswhen a sudden gale swept the roadstead of Ancona. 

Three of the twelve Italian ironclads had thus been lost. Three more wereunavailable while their damages were being slowly repaired. Peace wasconcluded shortly after, and the Italian navy had no opportunity of showingwhat it could do under a better commander. 

In the sinking of the "Re d'Italia" some 450 men had been drowned. Morethan 200 lost their lives in the explosion of the "Palestra, " but theother losses of the Italians in the Battle of Lissa were slight, only 5killed and 39 wounded. The Austrians lost 38 killed (including twocaptains) and 138 wounded. These losses were not severe, considering thatseveral wooden ships had been exposed to heavy shell-fire at closequarters, and one must conclude that the gunnery of the Italian crews waswretched. The heaviest loss fell on Petz's flagship, the "Kaiser, " whichhad 99 killed and wounded. Some of the gunboats, among which were some oldpaddle-ships, though they took part in the fighting, had not a singlecasualty. 

Persano was tried by court-martial and deprived of his rank and dismissedfrom the navy. Tegethoff became the hero of Austria. His successful attackon a fleet that in theory should have been able to destroy every one of hisships in an hour, will remain for all time an honour to the Austrian navy, and a proof that skill and courage can hope to reverse the most desperatedisadvantages. 

 CHAPTER XII

 THE BATTLE OF THE YALU

 1894

One result of the victory won by Tegethoff at Lissa was that an exaggeratedimportance was for many years to come attached to the ram as a weapon ofattack. In every navy in the world ships were built with bows speciallydesigned for ramming. The sinking of the "Re d'Italia" had made such animpression on the public mind, that it was in vain for a minority amongnaval critics to urge that the ram was being overrated, and to point outthat even at Lissa for one successful attempt to sink an enemy by runningher down there had been an untold number of failures. It was very graduallythat the majority was brought to realize that a ship under full controlcould generally avoid a ramming attack, and that it could only be employedunder exceptional circumstances, and against an already disabled enemy. 

Then the progress of invention and armaments introduced features into navalwarfare that made it extremely difficult and dangerous for a large ship tocome to such close quarters as an attempt to ram implies. First theintroduction of the Whitehead torpedo as part of the auxiliary armament ofbattleships and cruisers gave the ship attacked a means of sinking theaggressor as she approached, and the increase in the power of guns lednaval tacticians to accept as a principle that fleet actions must be foughtat ranges which were regarded as too distant for any effective action inearlier days. 

But for nearly thirty years after Lissa there were no fleet actions. Ships, armour, guns, were all improved, and the great naval Powers built ona larger and larger scale. Steel took the place of iron as the material forshipbuilding and armour. Naval gunnery became a precise science. Torpedoeswere introduced, and with them such new types of ships as the swift torpedoboat and the "destroyer. " But there was very little fighting on the sea, though in the same period there were colossal conflicts on land. 

Hundreds of armour-clads were built that became obsolete, and were turnedover to the shipbreaker, without ever having fired a shot in action. Theories of tactics for fleet actions were worked out on paper, and testedto some extent at naval manoeuvres, but the supreme test of battle waswanting. In the Franco-German War of 1870 the French navy had such adecided superiority that the few German warships of the day were kept intheir harbours protected by batteries and sunken mines. The only navalaction of the war was an indecisive duel between two gunboats. In thesecond stage of the war the officers and men of the French navy fought assoldiers in the defence of France. Guns were taken from the ships to bemounted on land fortifications. Admirals commanded divisions, formedlargely of naval officers and bluejackets. 

Again in the war of 1878 between Russia and Turkey the Russians had only afew light craft in the Black Sea, and the Turkish fleet under Hobart Pasha, weak as it was, held the undisputed command of these waters, and had onlyto fear some isolated torpedo attacks. In South American civil wars andinternational conflicts there were duels between individual ships, and somedashing enterprises by torpedo boats, but nothing that could be describedas a fleet action between ironclads. The only time a British armoured fleetwas in action was against the batteries of Alexandria on the occasion ofthe bombardment in July, 1882. The forts, badly armed and constructed, andinefficiently defended, were silenced, but a careful examination of themconvinced experts that if they had been held by a better-trained garrison, the victory would not have been such an easy matter. This and subsequentexperiences have led to the general acceptance of the view that it will beseldom advisable to risk such valuable fighting machines as first-classbattleships and armoured cruisers in close action against well-constructedand powerfully armed shore defences. 

It was not till the summer of 1894 that at last there was another pitchedbattle between fleets that included a large proportion of armoured vessels. That action off the mouth of the Yalu River will be always remembered asthe event that heralded the coming of a new naval power. 

A long rivalry between China and Japan for the control of Korea hadresulted in an outbreak of war between the two empires of the Far East. Foran island state like Japan the command of the sea was a necessary conditionfor successful operations on the mainland of Asia, and for some years shehad been building up a powerful fleet, the ships being constructed inforeign yards, as the Japanese yards were not yet in a position to turn outlarge warships. 

In the memory of living men the Japanese fleets had been made up ofprimitive-looking war-junks. After failures to build ships in Japan on theEuropean model, the Government had in the middle of the nineteenth centurypurchased some small steamships abroad, but it was not till 1876 that thefirst Japanese armour-clad, the "Fuso, " was constructed in England fromdesigns by the late Sir Edward Reed. Naval progress was at first very slow, but solid foundations were laid. Young naval officers were attached to theBritish and other navies for professional training, and on their return toJapan became the educators of their fellow-countrymen in naval matters. Aserious obstacle to the acquisition of a numerous and powerful fleet wasthe financial question. Japan is not a rich country. At first, therefore, the Japanese did not venture to order battleships, but contentedthemselves with protected cruisers. They thought that these would besufficient for the impending conflict with China, which possessed only afleet of weak, protected cruisers of various types and a couple of smallcoast defence ironclads, that might be counted as inferior battleships. 

When war broke out between China and Japan in 1894, the fleet of the latterconsisted of older ships of miscellaneous types, and a number of newprotected cruisers, some of them armed with quick-firing guns, a type ofweapon only lately introduced into the world's navies. Of these moderncruisers most had been built and armed in French yards, but the best andswiftest ship was a fine cruiser delivered not long before from Armstrong'syard at Elswick. 

The following lists give some details of the Japanese and Chinese fleets, only the ships engaged at the Yalu battle being included. But these shipsrepresented almost the entire strength of the two rival navies, and noreally effective ship was absent on either side, while to make up the twosquadrons ships were sent to sea that in a European navy would have beenconsidered obsolete and left in harbour (see pages 256-7). 

A comparison of these two lists brings out some interesting points. Theadvantage in gun power was clearly on the side of the Japanese. Of theheavier class of guns they had seventy to fifty-five, and there were noweapons in the Chinese squadron equal to the long 12 1/2-inch rifledbreech-loaders of French make, carried by four of the Japanese cruisers. But there was a further gain in gun power for the Japanese in thepossession of 128 quick-firers, some of them of fairly heavy calibre. Thequick-firing gun was then a new weapon. It is really a quick loader, a gunfitted with a breech action that can be opened and closed by a rapidmovement, and so mounted that the recoil is taken up by mechanism in thecarriage which at once automatically runs the gun back into firingposition, while the process of loading is further accelerated (for thesmaller calibre guns) by making up the ammunition like that of a rifle, with projectile and charge in a big brass-cased cartridge, so that the guncan be loaded up by one movement, and the cartridge contains its own meansof ignition, and is fired by pulling off a trigger. The lighterquick-firers are further mounted on pivots, so that they can be easilymoved through an arc of a circle by one man, who keeps his eyes on a movingtarget and his finger on the trigger ready to fire. The storm of shellsthat poured from the Japanese quick-firers was even more terrible for theChinese than the slower fire of the heavy guns, and of these newquick-firing guns the Chinese only had three on the little "Kwang-ping. "

 JAPANESE FLEET -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+---------------------------------- |Tonnage. | |Heavy Guns. | | |Quick-firers. | | | |Machine Guns. Ships. | | | | | Notes. -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+---------------------------------- N {_Yoshino_ | 4150 | -- | 44 | -- |Swiftest ship in either fleet: e { | | | | | speed 23 knots; 2-inch w c{ | | | | | steel protective deck. Built r{ | | | | | by Armstrong. P u{ | | | | {|2-inch steel protective deck. R i{_Matsushima_ |} {| 12 | 16 | 6 {| Barbette forward covered o s{_Ikitsushima_|}4277{| 12 | 16 | 6 {| with 12-inch armour, and t e{_Hashidate_ |} {| 12 | 16 | 15 {| armed with a long Canet e r{ | | | | {| 12 1/2-inch gun. C s{ t {_Takachico_ |}3650{| 8 | -- | 12 {|3-inch steel protective deck. E {_Naniwa Kan_ |} {| 8 | -- | 12 {| Speed 18 knots. D {_Akitsushima_| 3150 | 1 | 12 | 10 |2 1/2-inch steel protective deck. | | | | | One long 12 1/2-inch Canet gun. _Chiyoda_ | 2450 | -- | 24 | 13 |Small partly armoured cruiser; | | | | | 4 1/2-inch armoured belt over | | | | | two-thirds of length; 1-inch | | | | | steel protective deck. _Fuso_ | 3718 | 6 | -- | 8 |4 1/2-in. Armour belt } | | | | | amidships. } Old _Hiyei_ | 2200 | 9 | -- | -- {|7-in. Armour belt. } ironclads | | | | {|9-in. Armour on } launched | | | | {| battery. } 1877-8. _Akagi_ | 615 | 2 | -- | 2 |Gunboat. _Saikio Maru_| 600 | -- | (?) | -- |Armed merchant steamer carrying | | | | | only a few small quick-firers. | |----|-----|-----| | | 70 | 128 | 84 | -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------

 CHINESE FLEET -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+---------------------------------- |Tonnage. | |Heavy Guns. | | |Quick-firers. | | | |Machine Guns. Ships. | | | | | Notes. -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+---------------------------------- A {_Chen-yuen_ |}7430{| 6 | -- | 12 {|Coast-defence battleships, 14-inch r {_Ting-yuen_ |} {| 6 | -- | 12 {| armour belt. Four 12-inch guns m { | | | | {| on each ship, mounted in pairs o { | | | | {| in turrets with 12-inch armour. U { | | | | | r {_Lai-yuen_ |}2850{| 4 | -- | 8 {|Armoured cruisers, 9 1/2-inch e {_King-yuen_ |} {| 4 | -- | 8 {| armour belt. 8-inch armour on d { | | | | {| barbettes forward. {_Ping-yuen_ | 2850 | 3 | -- | 8 |Armoured cruiser, 8-inch armour | | | | | belt; 5 inches on barbette. U | | | | | n {_Tsi-yuen_ | 2355 | 3 | -- | 10 | a {_Ching-yuen_ |}2300{| 5 | -- | 16 {|Quickest ships in the fleet: r {_Chi-yuen_ |} {| 5 | -- | 16 {| speed 18 knots. M { | | | | | o {_Yang-wei_ |}1350{| 6 | -- | 7 | u {_Chao-yung_ |} {| 6 | -- | 7 | r {_Kwang-chia_ | 1300 | 7 | -- | 8 | e {_Kwang-ping_ | 1030 | -- | 3 | 8 | d { | | | | | | | | | | 4 torpedo-boats | | | | | and 3 small | | | | | gunboats. | | | | | | |----|-----|-----| | | 55 | 3 | 120 | -----------------+------+----+-----+-----+----------------------------------

The Chinese fleet had more armour protection. The two coast-defencebattleships were heavily armoured, and there were three other lesscompletely protected ironclads, although seven other ships had no armourwhatever. In the Japanese fleet the only armoured vessels were the two oldironclads, belonging to an obsolete type, and the armour-belted "Chiyoda. "The real fighting force of the fleet was made up of the seven new protectedcruisers. Some of these had armour on the barbettes in which their longbow-guns were mounted, but their "protection" consisted in a deck platedwith steel covering the "vitals" of the ship, boilers, engines, andmagazines, all placed as low as possible in the hull. There was somefurther protection afforded by the coal-bunkers placed along the water-lineamidships. The theory of the protected cruiser was that everything belowthe water-line was safeguarded by this armoured deck, and as the over-waterportion of the ship was further divided by bulk-heads into numerouswater-tight compartments, the danger of the ship being sunk was remote. Theprotected cruiser is no longer regarded as having a place in the mainfighting-line. But the Japanese cruisers gave such good results in the Yalubattle that for a while an exaggerated value was attached to it. 

But in one point, and the most important of all, the Japanese had anoverwhelming advantage. The Chinese officers and men were mostly braveenough, but almost entirely unskilled. The only really efficient officersand engineers they had were a few Englishmen and Americans and two Germans. The Japanese, from Admiral Count Ito, who commanded, down to the youngestof the bluejackets, were not only brave with the inherited recklessness ofdeath and suffering, which is characteristic of their race, but were alsohighly trained in every branch of their profession, first-rate sailors, excellent gunners. And the fleet had for years been exercised inmanoeuvres, so that the ships could work together as an organized whole. The spirit which animated it was that of "No surrender--Victory at anycost. " It is a standing order of the Japanese navy that if a ship shouldstrike her colours, the first duty of her consorts is not to try torecapture her, but to endeavour to sink her and her crew. 

The Mandarin Ting, who commanded the Chinese fleet, was more of a soldierthan a sailor, but he had some sea experience, and was a thoroughly braveman. As soon as war was declared he was anxious to go in search of hisenemy. He urged upon the Pekin Government that the first step to be takenwas to use the Chinese fleet to attack the Japanese transports, which wereconveying troops to Korea. This would, of course, lead to a battle with theenemy's fleet, but Ting was quite confident that he would defeat theJapanese if he met them. In giving this advice the Chinese admiral wasreasoning on correct principles, even if his confidence in his own fightingpower was not justified by facts. To keep the fleet idle at Port Arthur orWei-hai-wei would be to concede the command of the sea to Japan, without aneffort to dispute it. 

But the mandarins at Pekin would not accept their admiral's view. In thefirst place they were alarmed at the fact that in a minor naval engagementoff the Korean coast, at the very outset of the conflict, the weak Chineseforce in action had fared very badly. The quarrel in Korea had begunwithout a regular declaration of war. On the coast there were the Chinesecruiser, "Tsi-yuen, " and a small gunboat, the "Kwang-yi. " On 24 July thetwo ships had gone to sea to look for, and give their escort to, sometransports that were expected with reinforcements from China. In the greyof the morning on the 25th they fell in with, and were attacked by, threeof the swift protected cruisers of the Japanese fleet, the "Yoshino, ""Akitsushima, " and "Naniwa Kan. " The fight was soon over. The gunboat wassunk, and the little cruiser was attacked at close quarters by the "NaniwaKan, " whose shells riddled her weak conning-tower, killing all within it. The "Tsing Yuen" fled, pursued by the "Naniwa, " whose commander, by theway, was Captain Togo, famous afterwards as the victorious admiral of theRusso-Japanese War. The "Tsing Yuen" made good her escape, only because thechase brought the "Naniwa Kan" on the track of the transport "Kowshing, "and Togo stopped to dispose of her by sending her to the bottom. 

This incident made the Pekin Government nervous about the fightingqualities of their ships. And then they were afraid that if Ting went tosea with all his ships, the Japanese fleet would elude him, and appear withan expeditionary force at the mouth of the Pei-ho, capture the Taku forts, and land an army to march on Pekin. They therefore ordered Admiral Ting tocollect his fleet at Port Arthur, and watch the sea-approach to thecapital. 

The Japanese were therefore able to land their troops in Korea withoutinterruption, and soon overran the peninsula. When they were advancing tocapture Ping-yang, the Chinese began to concentrate a second army to defendthe crossing of the Yalu River, the entrance into Southern Manchuria. Itwas now evident even to the Pekin mandarins that the Japanese plans did notat this stage of the war include a raid on the Pei-ho and the Chinesecapital, so Admiral Ting was at last allowed to go to sea, in order toprotect the movement of transports along the western shores of the KoreanBay to the mouth of the Yalu. 

On 14 September five large steamers crowded with troops left Taku under theconvoy of six Chinese cruisers and four torpedo boats, bound for the mouthof the Yalu River. Next day, as they passed Talienwan Bay, near PortArthur, they were joined by Ting with the rest of the fleet. On the secondday they safely reached their destination, and the troops were disembarked. And early on the 17th Ting again put to sea with his fleet to return toPort Arthur. 

He had expected to have to fight the Japanese on his outward voyage, and heknew that there was a still greater chance of meeting them on his way backdown the bay. He had a few white officers with him. On board his flagship, the armour-clad "Ting-yuen" was a German artillery officer, Major vonHanneken. On the other battleship was Commander McGiffen, formerly of theUnited States navy, nominally second in command to the Chinese captain ofthe "Chen-yuen, " but practically acting as her commander. On some of theother ships there were a few British-born engineer or gunnery officers, andsome of the latter had been petty officers in the English navy. By theadvice of these non-Chinese officers Ting had done something to remedy thedefects of his fleet. 

A good deal of woodwork had been cut away and thrown overboard, though fartoo much of it still remained, and on several ships there was a dangerousquantity of carved ornamental wood on the upper works, much of it all themore inflammable because it was gilded and lacquered in bright colourswhich it was the practice to clean with oiled rags. The thin steel roofs ofbarbettes, and the shields of many of the guns, had been removed, as the"Tsi-yuen's" experiences in the fight with the "Naniwa Kan" had shown thatsuch light steel did not keep out the shells of the Japanese quick-firers, but served only to ensure their bursting with deadly effect. Sometimes agun-shield had burst a shell, which if there had been no such attempt atprotection would perhaps have passed harmlessly over the heads of thegunners. Round the barbettes of the ships sacks of coal were stacked as anemergency method of strengthening these defences. Of coal the fleet had anabundance, but it was woefully short of ammunition, and much of what was onboard was old and defective. If Ting had had more professional knowledgeand training, he would have been more anxious as to the probable result ofa battle. 

Where were Admiral Ito and the Japanese fleet? Early in August he hadcrossed the Yellow Sea with his cruiser squadron, and shown himself beforePort Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. He drew the fire of the seaward forts at longrange, and replied with a few shots, but he made no attack. He was engagedonly in a reconnaissance, and was quite satisfied when he ascertained thatthe Chinese ships were remaining in harbour. He then returned to the Koreanside of the Yellow Sea, and till nearly the middle of September wasemployed in escorting the convoys of transports from Japan, and protectingthe disembarkation of the reinforcements they were bringing to Korea. 

On Friday, 14 September--the same day on which the Chinese convoy with thereinforcements for Manchuria left Taku--Ito had completed his work inconnection with the transport of Japanese troops, having landed the lastdetachments at Chinampo in the estuary of the Ta-tung River. Higher up theriver General Nodzu's army was attacking the Chinese walled town ofPing-yang. Ito sent his gunboats up the Ta-tung to co-operate with Nodzu, and leaving his torpedo boats at the river mouth, went to sea with hisfleet. He steered for the mouth of the Yalu River, intending to reconnoitrethe Chinese positions there, and obtain information as to the reportedconcentration of troops near the river mouth, but under the belief that theenemy's fleet was still at Port Arthur, Admiral Ting was just as ignorantof his enemy's position and movements. Early on the morning of Monday, 17September, he had expended some ammunition in practice at floating targetsoff the mouth of the Yalu. The fleet had then anchored, and the men weregiven a rest while the cooks got dinner ready. This was about 11 a. M. Alittle later there was unexpected news, that interrupted the cooking. Thelook-outs at the mastheads of the anchored fleet reported that the smoke ofmany steamers was rising above the horizon far away to the south-westward. It was a bright sunny day, with a perfectly smooth sea, clear air, and ablue sky, and the look-out men could easily make out that the smoke risingabove the skyline came from a long line of funnels. Admiral Ting had nodoubt it was the Japanese fleet, and he gave orders to weigh anchor andclear for action. 

Early that morning Admiral Ito had heard from coasting craft that theChinese fleet was at sea, and one trader retailed to him a rumour that thefleet was anchored behind Hai-Yang island, where there was a shelteredroadstead. But on reaching Hai-Yang he found only a few fishing-boats lyingbehind the island. He continued his voyage towards the Yalu, nowanticipating a meeting with Ting, unless the Chinese admiral had alreadyrun down the other coast of the bay, and so passed him at a distance duringthe previous night. 

Ito's fleet was steaming in line ahead, and was organized in two squadrons. The van squadron was led by his second in command, Admiral Tsuboi, who hadhoisted his flag on the fast cruiser "Yoshino. " After her in successioncame the cruisers "Takachico, " "Akitsushima, " and "Naniwa Kan. " Then therewas a considerable interval between the van squadron and the leading shipof the main squadron, the cruiser "Matsushima, " flying Count Ito's flag. Next to her came the armoured cruiser "Chiyoda"; then the "Matsushima's"two sister ships, the cruisers "Ikitsushima" and "Hashidate. " The fourships of the van squadron and the four leading ships of the main squadronrepresented the chief strength of Ito's fleet, his eight modern cruisers. After them came the two old ironclads "Hiyei" and "Fuso, " the gunboat"Akagi, " and the small armed merchant steamer "Saikio Maru. " The long lineof warships steaming swiftly through the sunlight must have looked morelike a fleet arrayed for some festive occasion than squadrons prepared forimminent battle, for every ship was painted a brilliant white, with thegilded device of the chrysanthemum forming a broad golden shield on herbows, and the red-and-white sun flag of Japan flew from every masthead. 

At half-past eleven, half an hour after the Chinese had perceived theapproach of the Japanese fleet, the "Yoshino, " which was leading theadvancing line of the van squadron, signalled that there was a dense massof black smoke on the horizon inshore. This was the smoke produced byTing's furnaces, as his ships hurriedly stoked their fires to get fullpressure on the boilers. Then the Chinese fleet was seen coming out andforming in line of battle. 

Admiral Ting formed his ships in line abreast, that is side by side withevery bow towards the enemy. In the centre were the two little battleships, with the armoured cruisers, "Lai-yuen" and "King-yuen, " to right and leftof them. On each flank of these four heavy ships there was a group of threeunarmoured cruisers--the "Ching-yuen, " "Chao-yung, " and "Yang-wei"--on theright; and the "Chi-yuen, " "Kwang-chia, " and "Tsi-yuen, " on the left. Thesewere the ten ships on which he relied to bear the brunt of the fighting. Away to the left flank and rear of the line, and nearer the shore, was thesmall, armour-clad "Ping-yuen, " the corvette "Kwang-ping, " and four torpedoboats. The Chinese fleet was under easy steam. The ships were painted adull black, but had a large amount of gilding and colour on their bows, upper works, and deck-houses, and they were all dressed with flags. Thedecks had been strewn with sand, to prevent accidents by men slipping, and flooded with water from the fire hose to minimize the danger of fire. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU 1. THE JAPANESE ATTACK]

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU 2. END OF THE FIGHT]

The fleets were now rapidly closing. McGiffen, the American officer of the"Chen-yuen, " was impressed with the "holiday aspect" of the scene. "Thetwenty-two ships, " he wrote in an account of the battle, "trim and fresh intheir paint and their bright new bunting, and gay with fluttering signalflags, presented such a holiday aspect, that one found a difficulty inrealizing that they were not there simply for a friendly meeting. "

When the range of the leading Japanese ship--the "Yoshino"--was just 5400metres, or something less than 3 1/2 miles, the Chinese admiral fired oneof his heavy barbette guns at her from the "Ting-yuen. " The shot fellshort, throwing up a great fountain of foaming water. The guns of the otherChinese ships roared out, and the line was wrapped in smoke, but thegunners had not the range in most cases, and their shooting was everywherebad. Untouched by the hostile fire, the Japanese fleet came silently on. 

At first the Japanese line had been heading directly for the Chinesecentre. It now altered its course, ship after ship, the "Yoshino" leadingthe line so that it would pass obliquely across the right front of theenemy, and beyond the extreme right of his line, the wing of Ting's fleetthat was furthest from the shore. At a range of about two miles, the"Yoshino" began replying to the Chinese fire with her bow guns and herstarboard battery, and the other ships opened as they reached the samerange. Thanks to McGiffen's narrative, we know what was the impression madeon the few skilled observers in the Chinese fleet. The advancing line ofhostile cruisers was wrapped in a dense cloud of smoke, out of which rosetheir tall masts. Through the smoke came a continual flicker of the longred flashes of the Japanese quick-firers. To men used to the old guns therapidity of the fire was something startling. But the Japanese had justmissed getting the range. The showers of shells were falling ahead of theChinese ships. The sea in front of their bows was a mass of spurtingcolumns and fountains of foam, and some of these geysers of sea-water shotup so close ahead that they splashed over the Chinese ships, and numbers ofmen on their forward-decks were drenched to the skin. 

But as the range shortened the rain of shells began to find its target, andfell crashing and exploding on the hulls and upper-works of the Chineseline. It had now lost something of its first formation. The centre hadsurged forward, the wings had hung back, and it had become slightly convex. Ito in his report stated that Admiral Ting had adopted a crescentformation, but this was only the result of his ships not keeping stationcorrectly. His order had been to fight in "line abreast. " Presently theline became so irregular that some of the Chinese ships were masking eachother's fire. The slow fire of the Chinese guns, ill directed as it was, did little damage to the Japanese cruisers. But the Chinese ships werealready suffering from the shower of shells. The Japanese found themselvesfaced with an unexpected difficulty of detail. In the older type of gunsthe silk cartridge-case was burned when the shot was fired. But with thequick-firers the solid drawn brass case of the cartridge, a thing like abig metal can, is jerked out by an extractor as the breech-block is swungback after firing, and these brass cases began to accumulate in heaps atthe gun positions. Extra men were sent to the batteries to throw themoverboard. 

The "Yoshino" was now on the extreme flank of Ting's right, about a mileaway from the "Yang-wei. " Count Ito signalled from the "Matsushima" for thevan squadron to circle round the enemy's fleet by changing its course tostarboard. This would bring the weaker ships of the hostile squadron undera cross-fire from the van squadron, sweeping round astern of them, and themain squadron crossing their bows obliquely. At the same time the ships onthe Chinese left had most of their guns masked by their consorts, and couldonly fire at relatively long range with their bow guns at the rearwardships of the Japanese main squadron. Ting was out-generalled, and waspaying the penalty of a bad formation. His weak right wing was in imminentdanger of being crushed by superior numbers and weight of fire. 

The two ironclads in the Chinese centre had been made the target of theheaviest guns in Ito's fleet. Theoretically these guns should have beenable to pierce even the heavily armoured plating of the barbettes, but noprojectile penetrated the armour of the two ships, though shot after shotcame thundering against them. Their unarmoured parts were pierced again andagain, the shells bursting as they entered, and lighting several fires thatwere extinguished with difficulty. 

But the unarmoured ships on the Chinese right were suffering terribly underthe cross-fire of the enemy's van and main squadrons. The two outer shipson this flank were the "Chao Yung" and the "Yang-wei. " Each of these shipshad a barbette armed with a 10-inch gun fore and aft. Amidships was araised structure carrying machine guns on its roof, and having on each sideof it a passage, off which opened a range of wooden cabins, oil-painted andvarnished. Under the rain of bursting shells these masses of dry, inflammable woodwork were soon ablaze; the fire spreading rapidly made itimpossible to bring up ammunition for the guns, and the two cruisersdrifted helplessly out of the line, each wrapped in clouds of black smoke, through which long tongues of red flame shot up into the air. 

On the other flank practically no damage had been done by the few shotsfired by the Japanese in this direction. But here there was a miserabledisplay of cowardice on the part of the Chinese. The ship on the extremeleft was the "Tsi-yuen, " which still bore the marks of her encounter withthe "Naniwa Kan, " in the first days of the war. The experiences of thatadventure had evidently got on the nerves of Captain Fong, who commandedher. As the Japanese line swung round the other flank, he suddenly left hisstation and steamed at full speed away from his admiral, crossing astern ofthe Japanese, at what he thought a safe distance, and heading for PortArthur. The rearmost Japanese cruiser, the "Chiyoda, " sent a shell afterhim, that dismounted one of his guns, and added wings to his flight. The"Kwang-chia, " the next ship in the Chinese line, followed his bad example, and leaving the battle raging behind them, the two cruisers soondisappeared over the south-western horizon. Fong, with the "Tsi-yuen, "reached Port Arthur. He said he had been in the thick of the fight, andonly left it when the day was lost. But the evidence of his own crew wasagainst him. He was promptly tried by court-martial and beheaded. The othership, the "Kwang-chia, " never reached Port Arthur. She was wrecked duringthe night after the battle, with much loss of life, on a reef outsideTalienwan Bay. 

There were some other instances of half-heartedness or worse among theChinese as the fight developed, but on the whole they fought bravely, andmany showed the most self-sacrificing courage. 

While the large Japanese cruisers of the two squadrons kept perfect stationand distance, and enveloped the Chinese right wing with as much precisionas if they had been carrying out a fleet exercise in peace manoeuvres, theolder ships in their line, less speedy and handy, had dropped astern, andwere under fire from Ting's two ironclads in the centre. The "Fuso" was atone time so close to them that one of the ironclads made an attempt to ramher, but the Japanese ship evaded it, and running along the broken front ofthe enemy, rejoined the main cruiser squadron. The other of the oldJapanese ironclads, the "Hiyei, " boldly steamed between the Chinesebattleships, amid a storm of fire. Two torpedoes were discharged at her, but both missed, and she joined the van squadron in the Chinese rear. Thelittle "Akagi" was for a while the target of many of the Chinese guns, andone of her masts went over the side. Ito had signalled to her, and to thearmed merchantman, "Saikio Maru, " that they might keep out of the fight, but Japanese courage would not allow of this. The "Saikio Maru" had anarrow escape. As the two burning cruisers drifted away from the Chineseright, making for the Yalu, the "Saikio" pursued them, firing her lightguns. Two Chinese gunboats opened upon her and four torpedo boats steamedout to attack her. But she turned her fire on them, and some of theJapanese cruisers helped her by accurate shooting at long range. TheChinese flotilla, which had expected an easy prey, turned back, andgunboats and torpedo boats disappeared in the Yalu estuary. 

But in the brief encounter the "Saikio Maru" had received a good deal ofdamage from the light guns of the hostile flotilla. Her funnel was riddled, and several steam-pipes cut through. She retired from the engagement. Withher went the "Hiyei, " which had been seriously damaged in her dash throughthe Chinese centre. The "Akagi" also withdrew to clear her decks, whichwere encumbered with wreckage. The fall of her mast had killed her captain, Sakamoto, and her two lieutenants were badly wounded. 

So far Ting had lost four of his unarmoured cruisers, and Ito had sent outof the fight three of his ships, the old ironclad "Hiyei, " the gunboat"Akagi, " and the armed steamer "Saikio Maru. " But none of these werefighting units of serious value. His two squadrons of protected cruiserswere intact, and it was on these he counted for victory. 

The second phase of the battle was a prolonged cannonade at a range of fromone to two miles. Thanks to the superior speed of the Japanese fleet, Itocould choose position and distance, and the training of his officers andmen enabled him to concentrate his fire now on one part, now on another, of the straggling Chinese line. His ships poured out a steady shower ofshells, whose heavy bursting charges not only scattered hurtling fragmentsof steel among the Chinese crews, but also had a tendency to light a hotfire wherever they exploded. The Chinese had a very poor supply of inferiorammunition, most of it armour-piercing projectiles, that were practicallysolid shot. Their fire was slow and ill-directed, and even when it foundits target the damage done was seldom serious. 

Two more Chinese ships were soon disposed of. The cruiser "Chi-yuen" hadbeen pluckily fought by her Chinese captain, Tang, and her Englishengineer, Purvis. She had received several shots between wind and water, and was leaking badly. Tang knew she could not be long kept afloat, and hemade a desperate resolution to attempt to ram a Japanese ship before hewent down. As the enemy's van squadron, headed by the "Yoshino, " camesweeping to closer range with the Chinese left the "Chi-yuen" made a dashfor the leading cruiser. Even if she had not been half-sinking already, theChinese ship had neither the speed nor handiness to ram the swiftest shipin the enemy's line. As the "Chi-yuen" came on, the guns of the vansquadron were concentrated on her. She was enveloped in a fierce storm ofbursting shells, and suddenly her bows plunged in the sea, her twin screwswhizzed for a moment in the air, and then all that was left to show whereshe had sunk was floating wreckage and drowning men. Purvis went down withhis ship. Tang was seen swimming on an oar for a few minutes, with a bigdog--a pet of his--paddling near him. Then the dog put its paws on hisshoulders, and he was forced under and drowned. 

Another Chinese cruiser, the "Lai-yuen, " which lay in the line to the rightof the two armour-clads, was now seen to be burning fiercely. On board thisship the Chinese engine-room staff showed devoted courage. While the firespread through the upper works, so that after the fight many of the irondeck beams were bare and twisted out of shape, not one of the brave menbelow quitted his post. Stokers, engineers, mechanics worked almost naked, in heat like that of a furnace. Some died, all were in the doctor's handsafter the fight, but they kept the engines going, obeyed orders, andbrought the half-burnt ship out of action. 

More than half of the Chinese fleet had now been destroyed or beaten off, without any loss to the main fighting force of the Japanese. Disregardingthe Chinese cruisers, which were now badly cut up and firing harmlessly atlong range, Ito concentrated his attack on the two armour-clads. Thougheach ship was hit more than four hundred times, their armour was neverpierced. Yet the Japanese had some guns that theoretically should havepenetrated it. Battle results are, however, often very different fromexperimental work on the testing range. 

Early in the fight a Japanese shell had cut down the foremast of theChinese flagship, sending overboard and drowning seven men who manned thetop--carrying away also the signal yards, so that no orders could for sometime be conveyed to the fleet. But for more than an hour Admiral Ting wasin no condition to give orders. Almost at the outset he had carelesslytaken a position that brought him within the danger arc of the blast fromhis own big barbette guns. He was stunned, and for a while it was thoughtthat he was dead. The ship was fought by two European officers, HerrAlbrecht, a German, and Mr. Nicholls, who had formerly been a petty officerin the British navy. Albrecht distinguished himself by more than once goingto terribly exposed positions, and personally handling the hose with whichhe extinguished the fires lighted by the Japanese shells. Nicholls directedthe barbette guns with a cool courage worthy of the service in which he hadbeen trained, until he was killed by a bursting shell. 

Two other white men, the German soldier, Captain von Hanneken, and theAmerican commander, McGiffen, took a prominent part in the fighting onboard the other armour-clad, the "Chen-yuen. " Both had more than one narrowescape. Von Hanneken was stunned for a while by an explosion, and slightlywounded while at the barbette guns. When the lacquered woodwork of the bowburst into flame and smoke, and none of the Chinese would go forward toextinguish it, McGiffen, who was in command of the ship, dragged thefire-hose to the danger point. Just as he had drowned the fire he waswounded in two places and stunned by a bursting shell. He had told the menin the barbette not to reopen fire till he rejoined them, but, to hishorror, as he recovered from the shock he saw the guns swing round andpoint directly over the bow. He escaped being blown to pieces by droppingthrough an open hatchway. Altogether during the fight the "Chen-yuen" wason fire eight times. 

Most of the Chinese crew fought pluckily, but there were some skulkers. McGiffen tells how once, when there was something wrong with the revolvinggear of the barbette guns, and he went down into a recess under thebarbette to clear it, he saw a group of frightened men huddled in thesemi-darkness, and heard the voice of a Chinese officer saying: "You can'thide down here. There are too many of us already. " But he tells also of thecourage of others. The captain of one of the guns was killed as he preparedto fire, the man's head being shattered by a shell, and his brainsscattered over the gun. Another man dragged the corpse away, took thelanyard, looked along the sights, and fired without a moment's hesitation. Tsao-kai, the gunnery lieutenant, was badly wounded and taken below. He hadbrought his brother, a mere boy, on board for a holiday, and had him besidehim in the barbette. The boy remained there to the end, helping to pass upammunition, and apparently regarding the fight as an interesting game, though he was the only unwounded individual in the barbette when thebattle ended. 

McGiffen asserts that when the fight began the "Chen-yuen" had in hermagazine, besides a quantity of armour-piercing (almost solid) shot, onlythree really effective shells for the 12-inch guns. Two of these were firedearly in the day. In the afternoon, in handling the ammunition, a third wasdiscovered. It was fired at the "Matsushima, " Ito's flagship, and didterrible execution. Ito, in his report, says that the incident occurred at3. 26 p. M. , and that the shell came from the "Ting-yuen, " but this appearsto have been a mistake. The shell dismounted a 5-inch gun, seriouslydamaged two more, and exploded a quantity of quick-firing ammunition thatwas lying ready near the guns. According to the Japanese official report, forty-six men were killed or badly wounded. Unofficial narratives make theloss even greater. One officer was simply blown to pieces. The flame of theexplosion set the ship on fire, and she was for a while in imminent dangerof destruction. 

"The crew, " writes Mr. H. W. Wilson, "with unabated gallantry and courage, divided their attention between the fire and the enemy. The bandsmen wentto the guns, and, though the position of the ship was critical, and herloss appalling, there was no panic. The fire was on the lower deck, justabove the magazine. In charge of the magazine were a gunner's mate and aseaman. The shell had apparently dented the plating over the powder, andthe red glow through the crevices showed the danger. But these brave mendid not abandon their post. Stripping off their clothes, they crammed theminto the cracks, and saved the 'Matsushima'; though nearly a third of themen above the waterline had been put out of action, the remnant got thefire under. "

While the fire was still burning the "Matsushima" steamed out of the fight, and Ito transferred his flag to the cruiser "Hashidate. " This was reallythe second narrow escape the "Matsushima" had experienced during thebattle. Early in the fight a 10-inch shell had passed through her side, killed four men in her torpedo-room, narrowly missed a loaded torpedo, smashed up an oil-tank, and then broke into pieces. Examination of thefragments showed there was no trace of a fuse, and a plug of cement filledthe place where the bursting charge should have been. It was really a badspecimen of a solid shot. If it had been a live shell, it might well havedestroyed the "Matsushima. " It was thanks to the wretched ammunitionsupplied by swindling contractors to the mandarins that the Japanese wereable to fight the battle with such trifling loss. 

After the transfer of Ito's flag to the "Hashidate" the battle became acannonade at an increasing range. The Chinese ammunition was running low, and Ito, after having had his quick-firers in action for hours, had alsohis magazines nearly empty. The heavy fire of the afternoon had failed todestroy the two little "battleships" that represented the only remainingeffective units of the Chinese fleet. Ito had accomplished enough in thedestruction of the Chinese cruisers, and he had no intention of givingtheir torpedo boats a chance, by spending the night near the mouth of theYalu River. At half-past five he broke off the engagement. 

Shortness of ammunition supply and exhaustion of officers and men wereprobably his real reasons, for the explanation he gave in his officialreport is not very convincing. "About 5. 30 p. M. , " he writes, "seeing thatthe 'Chen-yuen' and the 'Ting-yuen' had been joined by other ships, andthat my van squadron was separated by a great distance from my main force, and considering that sunset was approaching, I discontinued the action, andrecalled my main squadron by signal. As the enemy's vessels proceeded on asoutherly course, I assumed that they were making for Wei-hai-wei; andhaving reassembled the fleet, I proceeded upon what I supposed to be aparallel course to that of the enemy, with the intention of renewing theengagement in the morning, for I judged that a night action might bedisadvantageous, owing to the possibility of the ships becoming separatedin the darkness, and to the fact that the enemy had torpedo boats incompany. However, I lost sight of the Chinese, and at daylight there wereno signs of the enemy. "

There really were no ships of any importance available to join the Chineseironclads, so one is puzzled to imagine what Ito saw. It was only when thefiring died away that Admiral Ting sent orders to the "Kwang-ping, " thetransports, gunboats, and torpedo craft to come out. Only the "Kwang-ping"and the torpedo boats obeyed. As the sun went down he formed line ahead, and steered for Port Arthur. First came the two ironclads; then the"Lai-yuen, " with her upper works still on fire in places; then the"Ching-yuen, " "Ping-yuen, " "Kwang-ping, " and the torpedo boats. Far asternthe abandoned "Chao-yung" blazed like a bonfire in the twilight. Tinghonestly believed he had beaten off the Japanese fleet, and on his arrivalat Port Arthur reported a victory. But though Japanese opinion was notquite satisfied, Ito had so damaged the Chinese fleet that henceforth heheld command of the sea. He had won his success with comparatively smallloss. Of all the units of his fleet his flagship, the "Matsushima, " hadsuffered most. She had two officers killed and three wounded, and 33 menkilled and 71 wounded, a total of 109, and about a third of the losses inthe entire fleet. The "Hiyei" came next in the casualty list, with 56killed and wounded. The losses of the other ships were trifling. The"Ikitsushima" had 31 killed and wounded; the "Akagi, " 28; the"Akitsushima, " 15; the "Fuso, " 14; and the "Yoshino" and "Saikio, " each 11. The "Takachico" had an officer and two men wounded; the "Naniwa Kan"(Captain Togo's ship) one man wounded. The "Chiyoda, " which lay next to the"Matsushima, " in the main squadron, had not one single casualty. Theofficial return of losses gave these totals:--

 Killed. Wounded. Totals. Officers 10 16 26 Men 80 188 268 -- --- --- 90 204 294

There are no available returns of the Chinese loss. It was certainly muchheavier, perhaps a thousand men. But, thanks to their armour, the two"battleships" suffered comparatively little loss, notwithstanding theterrible fire to which they were exposed for hours. The "Ting-yuen" had 14killed and 20 wounded, the "Chen-yuen" 7 killed and 15 wounded. The twoships afterwards took part in the defence of Wei-hai-wei, where one wastorpedoed and the other captured by the Japanese. 

When the first reports of the Yalu battle reached Europe there was muchexaggerated talk about the value of the protected cruiser. It was even saidby amateur "naval experts" that this type and not the battleship would bethe warship of the future. It is almost needless to say that the battleconveyed no such lesson. If anything, it rather proved the enormousresisting power of the armoured ship. If Ting, instead of his twoantiquated coast-defence armour-clads, had had a couple of up-to-datebattleships manned with trained crews, he would certainly have disposed ofa good many of the Japanese cruisers. The Japanese quite realized this, andproceeded to build a heavily armoured fleet. 

The most valuable lesson of the battle was the warning of the danger offires lighted by exploding shells. This had an immediate influence on shipconstruction, and on the methods adopted by all navies in clearing foraction. 

But the most important point of all was that the conduct of the Japaneseofficers and men in the battle, and in the subsequent naval operations inthe siege of Wei-hai-wei, made the world realize that a new naval power hadarisen in the Far East. 

 CHAPTER XIII

 SANTIAGO DE CUBA

 1898

The United States Navy had taken a decisive part in securing victory forthe Union in the War of Secession. It had effectively blockaded theAtlantic and Gulf coasts of the Confederacy, captured New Orleans, givenvaluable help to the army, in seizing the line of the Mississippi, and bythe combined effect of these operations isolated the Confederate Statesfrom the rest of the world, destroyed their trade, and cut off theirsupplies. 

One would have expected that the importance of sea-power would have beenfully appreciated in the United States after such experiences, and thatsteps would have been taken to form and maintain an effective fleet. Butfor some twenty years after the war the American Navy was hopelesslyneglected. During this period the fleet consisted mainly of some of themiscellaneous collection of ships of various types built or purchasedduring the years of conflict. Old monitors that had engaged the batteriesof Charleston figured in the Navy List, beside sloops and steam frigatesthat were little better than armed merchantmen. The only good work that wasdone by the Navy Department was the training and maintenance of a corps ofexcellent officers, and to their influence it was due that at last abeginning was made of the building of a new navy. 

The first ships built were of two classes. Public opinion was stillclinging to the idea that the "Monitor" was a supremely effective type ofwarship, and accordingly considerable sums were expended on the building ofcoast-defence vessels of this type, low-freeboard turret-ships, carrying acouple of heavy guns in an armoured turret. But ships were also requiredthat could make ocean voyages, and show the flag in foreign waters, and forthis purpose a number of protected cruisers were built, full-rigged, mastedsteamers, with their guns in broadside batteries. 

Still, the United States possessed only a fourth or fifth-rate fleet, andcould not have sent to sea a squadron that could rank with the fleets keptin commission regularly by several of the European powers. Advocates of theold American plan of "having no foreign policy" even maintained that thecountry had no need of an ocean-going fleet, and required onlycoast-defence ships and a few light cruisers. 

It was not till the end of the 'eighties that American opinion was arousedto the danger of neglecting the sea-power of the States. The splendidAmerican Navy of to-day is the creation of less than twenty years ofsystematic development. When the war broke out between the United Statesand Spain over the Cuban question several of the new cruisers andbattleships were available, but many older ships were still in the service, and a number of armed liners and other makeshift auxiliaries were takeninto the navy. 

During the period of tension that immediately preceded the war two fleetswere concentrated on the Atlantic coast. The North Atlantic Fleet, underAdmiral Sampson, at Key West, Florida, and the reserve fleet, officiallyknown as the "Flying Squadron, " under Commodore Schley, at Hampton Roads. The Pacific Squadron, under Commodore Dewey, was at Hong Kong, waiting tosail for the Philippines as soon as war was declared. 

In the following list of Sampson's and Schley's squadrons, besides thedisplacement of each ship, the date of her launch is noted, so as todistinguish between the older and the newer types of warships:--

 NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON. 

 Displacement. Date of Speed. Tons. Launch. Knots. 

 Armoured cruiser (flagship)-- _New York_ 8, 480 1891 21

 Battleships-- _Iowa_ 11, 296 1896 16 _Indiana_ 10, 231 1893 15 1/2

 Cruisers-- _Cincinnati_ 3, 183 1892 19 _Detroit_ } _Montgomery_ } 2, 000 1892 17 _Marblehead_ }

 Monitors-- _Puritan_ 6, 060 1883 } 12 _Terror_ 3, 990 1883 }

 Torpedo-boats-- _Cushing_ 105 1890 22 1/2 _Ericsson_ 120 1892 23 _Rodgers_ } 142 1896 { 25 _Foote_ } { 24 1/2 _Porter_ } 185 1896 { 28 1/2 _Dupont_ } { 27 1/2 _Winslow_ 142 1897 24 1/2 (Besides gunboats and tenders. )

 FLYING SQUADRON. 

 Armoured cruiser (flagship)-- _Brooklyn_ 9, 153 1895 17

 Battleships-- _Texas_ 6, 315 1892 21 _Massachusetts_ 10, 231 1893 16

 Cruisers-- _Columbia_ } 7, 475 { 1892 } 23 _Minneapolis_ } { 1893 }

These were the two fleets available for the blockade of Cuba, and theoperations of attacking coast fortifications, covering the transportationof the army of invasion, and dealing with any naval force Spain might sendto these waters. 

Other units were subsequently added to the fleet after both squadrons hadconcentrated under Sampson's command. 

In West Indian waters the Spaniards had only a few light craft and the oldcruiser "Reina Mercedes" at Santiago, with her boilers and engines in sucha state that she could not go to sea. For many years the Spanish Navy hadbeen sadly neglected, but since 1890 some armoured cruisers had been built, and a flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers added to the navy. A number ofantiquated units figured on the Navy List, including useless "battleships"dating from the 'sixties, and small unarmoured cruisers little better thangunboats. There was one fairly modern battleship, the "Pelayo, " dating from1887, but expert opinion was very divided about her value. 

When the war broke out the Spanish Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Montojo, was at Manila. To use the words of an American naval officer, it was madeup of "a number of old tubs not fit to be called warships. " It was promptlydestroyed by Commodore Dewey's squadron from Hong Kong (Battle of ManilaBay, Sunday, 1 May, 1898). It was the first American victory in the war, and in the national rejoicing there was much exaggeration as to Dewey'sexploit, which was compared to Nelson's victories!

On the eve of the war a Spanish fleet, officially known as the AtlanticSquadron, had been concentrated, under the command of Admiral Cervera, inthe Portuguese harbour of St. Vincent, in the Cape de Verde Islands, andthe local authorities somewhat strained the laws of neutrality by allowingCervera to use the port to complete his preparations for some time afterthe outbreak of the war. 

The composition of the squadrons was as follows:--

 Displacement. Date of Speed. Tons. Launch. Knots. 

 Armoured cruisers-- _Infanta Maria Teresa_ (flagship) } { 1891 } _Vizcaya_ } 6890 { 1891 } 20 _Almirante Oquendo_ } { 1890 } _Cristobal Colon_ 6480 1896 20

 Torpedo-boat destroyers-- _Terror_ } _Furor_ } 400 1896-7 28 _Pluton_ }

 Torpedo-boats-- _Azor_, _Ariete_, _Rayo_. 

 Auxiliary cruiser-- _Ciudad de Cadiz_ (an armed liner acting as mother-ship to the torpedo-boats). 

The armoured cruisers were all of the same type, ships with an armoureddeck under water protecting the engines and magazines, a 6-inch armourbelt, and an armoured barbette fore and aft, mounting a 9 1/2-inch Hontoriagun. They had a secondary armament of ten 6-inch quick-firers, besides anumber of lighter guns for defence against torpedo craft, and had maximsmounted in their fighting tops. The "Cristobal Colon, " originally built forthe Italian Navy as the "Giuseppe Garibaldi, " and purchased by Spain andrenamed, had only the quick-firers, and had no guns in her barbettes. Thesehad originally been armed with Armstrong guns. The heavy Armstrongs weretaken out of her at Cadiz to be replaced by Hontorias, but these were notready when the war came, and the "Cristobal Colon" sailed for St. Vincentwithout them. The torpedo-boat destroyers were of the best and latest typeof their class, and recently built on the Clyde. 

The war in the Atlantic began by Sampson's squadron leaving Key West, establishing the blockade of Western Cuba, reconnoitring the sea defencesof Havana, and exchanging some shells with them at long range. Then, inorder to satisfy popular feeling in America, Sampson bombarded thebatteries of San Juan, in Puerto Rico, an operation that had no real effecton the fortunes of the war, and inflicted only trifling local loss on theSpaniards. 

An army had been assembled at Tampa, in Florida, and a huge fleet oftransports was collected to ferry it over to Cuba. Its destination wassupposed to be the western end of the island, where, in co-operation withthe insurgents by land and the fleet by sea, it would besiege and captureHavana. But again and again the sailing of the fleet was delayed, and therewas alarm in the cities of the Atlantic states, because the newspaperspublished wild reports of phantom armadas hovering off the coast. When newscame that Cervera had sailed from St. Vincent, and for many days there wasno trace of his movements, there was a quite unnecessary alarm as to whatthe Spanish squadron might do. A wise Press censorship would have been veryuseful to the United States, but there was little or no attempt to controlthe wild rumours published by the newspapers. 

For some days after the declaration of war (23 April) Cervera's squadronlay at St. Vincent. All the ships were repainted a dead black, some coalwas taken on board, and quantities of ammunition transferred from the holdsof the "Ciudad de Cadiz" to the magazines of the cruisers. At last, on 29April, Cervera sailed, leaving the torpedo-boats and the armed liner inport, and taking with him only his high-speed ships, the four armouredcruisers, and the three destroyers. 

His course was westward, and it was conjectured that San Juan de PuertoRico was his destination. The distance is about 2400 miles, and supposingthat he would proceed at a cruising speed of ten knots, in order toeconomize his coal, it was calculated that he would be across the Atlanticin ten days, reaching the West Indies about 9 May. Two swift armed linersthat had been attached to Schley's squadron were sent out to sweep theWestern Atlantic, and it was expected that by the end of the first week inMay they would bring back news of the enemy, but 7 May came and brought nonews. Ships arriving in ports on both sides of the ocean told of havingseen the smoke of a squadron on the horizon in so many places that itseemed as if the Atlantic must be full of fleets. Look-out stations as farnorth as the New England States told of glimpses of warships seen far offin the morning twilight, or vaguely distinguished through mist and rain. But definite news of Cervera there was none. It seemed as if his squadronhad vanished into space. 

Then there were theories started to account for his disappearance. It wassuggested that he had altered his course and gone to the coast of SouthAmerica, to intercept the battleship "Oregon, " which had come round fromthe Pacific to reinforce Sampson's fleet; or perhaps he was making for theCape or the Horn, bound on a long voyage for Manila, to destroy Dewey'sunarmoured cruisers and restore Spanish supremacy in the Philippines; or hewas ranging the oceans to prey upon American commerce. 

Then came a strange report, worth remembering as a caution against tooeasily accepting the rumours of wartime. From Cadiz came American Pressdispatches, duly passed by the Spanish censor, stating that Cervera'ssquadron had steamed back into that port. The start westward from St. Vincent was said to be a mere feint. The Spaniards had hoped to draw someof the swifter American ships out into the Atlantic, and score a victory byfighting them in European waters. Naval experts gravely discussed Cervera'stactics. Correspondents described the position of his fleet in Cadizharbour. Perhaps the Spanish censor helped the misleading rumours intocirculation by letting Americans at Cadiz imagine that ships fitting out inthe harbour were the missing fleet. 

At last, on 12 May, came definite news of one unit of the squadron. Thenight before the destroyer "Furor" had paid a flying visit in the dark tothe French port of St. Pierre, in Martinique, probably calling for cabledinformation and orders. On the 12th the "Terror" visited the same port inbroad daylight. That evening, from the hills of Martinique, four largecruisers were seen far out at sea, steering northwards, under easy steam. The cable from Martinique by St. Lucia to the States was out of order, andit was not till the 15th that Admiral Sampson received the news. Several ofhis heavy ships were coaling at Key West. He hurried on the work, and senthis lighter ships to watch the Windward and Mona Passages. He sent offSchley with the Flying Squadron to the south of Cuba, with orders to sweepthe island-fringed Caribbean sea and watch the Yucatan Channel with hiscruisers. As soon as he had completed coaling he himself sailed for thewaters north of Cuba. 

Once more there was for a while no news of Cervera. After dark on 12 May hehad altered his northern course and steered a little south of west, makingfor the Dutch island of Curaçao, where he expected to find some trampsteamers laden with coal and other supplies awaiting him. On Saturday, 14May, the "Maria Teresa" and the "Vizcaya" entered the port, the two othercruisers, accompanied by two destroyers, remaining outside. The expectedcolliers had not arrived; the Dutch authorities insisted on Cervera leavingCuraçao within twenty-four hours, and he sailed on the Sunday without beingable to fill up his bunkers. Once more the United States cruisers failed tosight him, as he steamed slowly across the Caribbean Sea, husbanding hiscoal and steering for Cuba. 

On Wednesday, 18 May, three American warships were off Santiago de Cuba. They came so close in that the Morro battery at the entrance fired uponthem. Before sundown they steamed away. They had missed Cervera by a fewhours, for at sunrise next morning he brought his four cruisers and twodestroyers into Santiago harbour. 

Santiago is the oldest Spanish city in Cuba, and was its capital in theearly days before Havana was founded. 

The old city stands at the head of a landlocked arm of the sea, surroundedby forest-clad hills, and approached through narrow ravine-like straits. Cervera had come there to obtain coal and supplies. If he had made it onlya temporary base, and had been able to coal immediately, and put to sea toattack the American cruisers scattered over the Caribbean waters, he mighthave scored successes for a while. But he waited at Santiago till he washopelessly blockaded. 

For some days the Washington Government, mindful of the Cadiz hoax, refusedto believe reports that the Spanish fleet was hidden behind the headlandsof Santiago harbour. It was not till 27 May that Admiral Schley obtaineddefinite proof of the fact, and formed the blockade of Santiago with hissquadron. Admiral Sampson then brought his fleet round, and took over thecommand. 

Until he reached Santiago Cervera had shown no lack of energy, but now hewas strangely devoid of enterprise. He allowed an American armed liner tocapture, off the port, a steamer that was bringing him 3000 tons ofmuch-needed coal, though he might have saved her by sending one of hiscruisers outside the headlands. He allowed an inferior force to blockadethe entrance for some days, without bringing out his cruisers by day toengage them, or sending out his destroyers by night to torpedo them. Hewaited until there was an overwhelming force assembled off the harbour. 

Then came a month of deadlock. He was blockaded by a vastly superior forcethat watched the narrow pass through which, if he left the harbour, hisfleet must come out one by one. But so long as he was within the headlandshe was unassailable. 

Admiral Sampson declined to risk his ships in an attempt to force thenarrow entrance and destroy the Spanish squadron inside. An attempt to"bottle up" Cervera, by sinking a tramp steamer, the "Merrimac, " in theentrance, proved a failure. Long-ranging bombardments produced no effecton the Spaniards. All the plans formed at Washington for the Cuban campaignwere disorganized. The blockade of the island had become the blockade ofthe one port of Santiago. If the United States Government had known howshort of supplies were the city and garrison of Santiago and Cervera'sfleet, it might have trusted to the blockade by sea and the operations ofthe insurgents by land, with the help of a few regulars, to force theSpanish admiral either to surrender or come out and fight. But it wasdecided to abandon for the present the projected attack on Havana, and sendthe army, collected for this purpose at Tampa, to attack Santiago by land, and so deprive Cervera of his refuge in the harbour. 

Santiago was defended by lines of entrenchments with some improvisedoutworks, and garrisoned by a division under General Linares. The Americantransports from Tampa began to arrive on 20 June, and the expeditionaryforce, under General Shafter, was disembarked during the following dayssome miles east of the city. There was then an advance over mere foresttracks through hilly country covered with dense bush. Cervera landed seamengunners with machine-guns and light quick-firers to strengthen the defence, and anchored one of his cruisers so that her heavy artillery could enfiladean attack on the entrenchments nearest the harbour. 

On 1 July Shafter made his attack. The Spaniards defended themselves withsuch obstinate energy that after fighting through a long summer day onlytwo outposts had been taken by the Americans, and at the cost of heavyloss. Next day there was desultory fighting along the front, but noprogress. It was difficult to bring up supplies along the forest tracks, now sodden with tropical rains. Sickness had broken out in the Americanlines. The resistance of the Spaniards showed a dogged determination thatwas a surprise to the invaders. 

Shafter himself was ill. Late on Saturday, 2 July, he appealed to AdmiralSampson to help him by forcing the narrows at all costs, and in the earlyhours of Sunday, the 3rd, he sent off to his Government a dispatch whichwas a confession of failure. 

This discouraging report was cabled to Washington early on the Sundaymorning, and caused deep dismay at the White House, but before evening newsarrived of events that had changed the whole situation. 

The evening before (2 July) Mr. Ramsden, the British Consul at Santiago, had written in his diary:--

 "It seems incredible that the Americans with their large force have not yet taken the place. The defence of the Spaniards has been really heroic, the more so when you consider that they are half-starved and sick. It was affirmed to-day that the squadron would leave this evening, but they have not done so, though the pilots are on board. I will believe it when I see them get out, and I wish they would. If they do, they will fare badly outside. "

During the Saturday Cervera had re-embarked the seamen landed for thedefence of the city, and had got up steam. He was going out because thepresence of his crews now only added to the difficulty of feeding thehalf-starved garrison and population of the place. He had a short supply ofinferior coal, and the most he hoped for was that some of his ships wouldelude, or fight their way past, the blockading squadron, and reach Havana. It is impossible to understand why, having decided to go out, he did notmake the attempt in the darkness of Saturday night, instead of waiting forbroad daylight next day. 

In one respect he was fortunate. His coming out was a complete surprise forthe Americans, and found them quite unprepared, with some of their bestships far from the scene of action. Admiral Sampson had steamed off to theeastward in his flagship, the "New York, " intending to land at Siboney forhis interview with General Shafter. The battleship "Massachusetts" hadgone with two of the lighter cruisers to coal at Guantanamo. But there werequite enough ships left off the seaward opening of the narrows, where fourbattleships, an armoured cruiser, and two light craft were keeping up theblockade. 

It was a bright summer day, with a light wind and a smooth sea. Due southof the harbour entrance, and about 5 1/2 miles from it, lay the battleship"Iowa. " To the east of her lay the "Oregon, " with the "Indiana" between herand the land, and about two miles nearer in, west of the "Iowa, " was thebattleship "Texas, " with the armoured cruiser "Brooklyn, " CommodoreSchley's flagship, lying between her and the land, and still nearer in thesmall armed revenue cruiser "Vixen, " lying about three miles south-west ofMorro Castle. On the other side of the entrance, close in to the land, wasa small armed steamer, the "Gloucester. " She had been purchased by the NavyDepartment on the outbreak of the war from Mr. Pierpont Morgan, the banker, and renamed. Before this she had been known as the steam yacht"Gloucester. " She was commanded by one of the best officers of the UnitedStates Navy, Captain Wainwright, who had been second in command of the"Maine" when she was blown up in Havana harbour. Wainwright was to showthis day that even an armed steam yacht may do good service in a modernnaval action. All the ships except the "Oregon" and the little "Gloucester"had let their fires burn low, and had hardly any steam pressure on theirboilers. At half-past nine the order was given for the crews to fall in forgeneral inspection. A few minutes later an apprentice on board the "Iowa"called attention to a mass of black smoke rising over the headlands of theharbour mouth. And then between the cliffs of Morro and Socapa Pointsappeared the bows of Cervera's flagship. An alarm gun rang out from the"Iowa, " the signal, "Enemy escaping--clear for action, " fluttered out fromthe halyards of the "Brooklyn, " and on every ship the bugles sounded, themen rushed to their battle stations, and the stokers worked madly to getsteam on the boilers. 

Admiral Cervera, guided by a local pilot, Miguel Lopez, had led his fleetdown the harbour, the "Maria Teresa" being followed in succession by thecruisers "Vizcaya, " "Cristobal Colon, " and "Oquendo, " and the destroyers"Pluton" and "Furor. " As the flagship entered the ravine of the narrowsCervera signalled to his captains, "I wish you a speedy victory!" MiguelLopez, who was with him in the conning-tower, remarked that the admiralgave his orders very deliberately, and showed no sign of anxiety orexcitement. He had asked Lopez to tell him how soon he could turn to thewestward. On a sign from the pilot, he gave the order, "Starboard!" to thehelmsman, put the engine-room indicator to "Full speed, " and told hiscaptain to open fire. As the guns roared out Cervera turned with a smile toLopez and said, "You have done your part well, pilot; I hope you will comeout of this safe and be well rewarded. You have deserved it. "

The cruisers had run out with an interval of about 600 yards between theships. There was a longer gap between the last of them and the destroyers, but the "Furor" was out within a quarter of an hour of the "Maria Teresa's"appearance between the headlands. That quarter of an hour had been a busytime for the Americans. The "Brooklyn" and the four battleships had at onceheaded for the opening of the harbour, the "Oregon" making the best speedtill the steam pressure rose on the boilers of her consorts. They were nosooner moving than they opened fire with their forward guns, the Spanishcruisers and the batteries of Socapa and Morro replying with shots, everyone of which fell short. 

As Cervera turned westward the American ships also altered their course inthe same direction. And now as the huge ships of the blockading squadron, each wrapped in a fog of smoke from her guns, converged upon the samecourse, there was a momentary danger of disastrous collision between them, a danger accentuated by an unexpected manoeuvre of Commodore Schley's ship, the "Brooklyn. " The "Texas" and the "Iowa" just cleared each other in thesmoke-cloud. As they sheered off from each other, the "Oregon, " which hadbeen following the "Iowa, " came rushing between the two ships, and the"Brooklyn" circled past their bows, suddenly crossing their course. Schley, in the first dash towards the Spaniards, had brought his great cruiserwithin 3000 yards of the "Maria Teresa, " then seeing the Spanish flagshipturning, as if to ram, he swung round to starboard, bringing his broadsideto bear on the enemy, but at the same time heading for his own battleships. He cleared them by completing a circle, coming back thus to the westwardcourse, which had at the same time been resumed by the Spanish flagship. Asthe "Brooklyn" turned the battleships swept up between her and the enemy, masking her fire, the "Oregon" leading, but the speed of Schley's ship soonenabled him to secure a forward place in the chase near the "Oregon. "

While the giants were thus manoeuvring the little "Gloucester" had comepluckily into action. Running in close under the Morro batteries, CommanderWainwright had fired some shots at the enemy's cruisers. Then realizingthat his light guns could do them no vital harm, he almost stopped the wayon his ship, and waited to engage the destroyers. Out came the "Furor" and"Pluton, " turning eastward as they cleared the entrance, and dashing forthe "Gloucester" with a mass of foam piling up over their bows. The"Indiana, " the rearmost of the battleships, fired some long-range shots atthem, but it was a stream of small shells from the "Gloucester's"quick-firers that stopped their rush. The "Furor" was soon drifting towardsthe cliffs, enveloped in clouds of escaping steam. The "Gloucester's" firehad killed her helmsman, wrecked her steering gear, and cut up several ofher steam-pipes, making her engine-room uninhabitable. The "Pluton, " not sobadly crippled, but with her hull penetrated in several places, was nextturned back. The "New York, " hurrying up from the eastward at the sound ofthe firing, escorted by the torpedo-boat "Ericsson, " fired on her at longrange. The "Pluton" kept her engines going just long enough to drive herashore under the Socapa cliffs. The "Furor" sank before she could reach theland. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF SANTIAGO SHOWING PLACES WHERE THE SPANISH SHIPS WERE DESTROYED & DOTTED LINE SHOWING GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE RUNNING FIGHT, THUS-----]

There was now a running fight, the four Spanish cruisers steaming westwardclose to the wooded shore, the American ships following them up and pouringin a deadly fire from every gun that could be brought to bear. It was soonevident that the Spaniards could not get up anything like their trialspeed, and their gunnery was so defective that there was small chance oftheir stopping any of their pursuers by well-aimed fire, or even ofinflicting any appreciable loss or damage on them. The "Maria Teresa" wasthe first to succumb. As she led the line out of the harbour she hadreceived the converging fire of the American ships, but she had notsuffered any serious injury. Until the American ships got up full steam theSpaniards had gained a little on them. An Englishman, Mr. Mason, whowatched the cruisers from a hill near Morro, till at ten o'clock the curveof the coast westward hid them from view, thought they were successfullyescaping. So far as he could see they had not been badly hit, and none ofthe Americans were yet abreast of them. But soon after the shipsdisappeared from the point of view near Morro, and when the "Maria Teresa"was only some six miles from the entrance, she suffered a series ofinjuries in rapid succession that put her out of action. 

It was the secondary armament of the American ships, the guns of mediumcalibre, that proved most effective in the running fight. It appears thatthe big 13 and 12-inch barbette and turret guns only made two hits in thewhole day. Two 12-inch shells fired simultaneously from a pair of gunsstruck the "Maria Teresa" just above the waterline on the port side, aftand below her stern turret. They burst in the torpedo-room, killing andwounding every one there, blowing a jagged hole in the starboard side, andsetting the ship on fire. An 8-inch shell came into the after battery andexploded between decks, causing many casualties. A 5-inch shell burst inthe coal-bunkers amidships, blew up the deck, and started a second fire. Another destructive hit was made by an 8-inch shell a few feet forward ofthe point where the pair of 12-inch shells had come in. The official reportthus describes its course:--

 "An 8-inch shell struck the gun-deck just under the after-barbette, passed through the side of the ship, and exploded, ranging aft. The damage done by this shell was very great. All the men in the locality must have been killed or badly wounded. The beams were torn and ripped. The fragments of the shell passed across the deck and cut through the starboard side. This shell also cut the fire main. "

Shells from the lighter artillery of the American ships riddled thefunnels, and cut up the deck-houses. One of these shells, bursting near theforward bridge, wounded Admiral Cervera slightly in the arm. He had comeoutside the conning-tower the better to watch the progress of his squadron. The armour belt had kept the water-line of the ship intact, and herbarbettes and heavy guns were also protected efficiently by the localarmour, but the enemy's shell fire had told on the unarmoured structure, inflicted heavy loss, and started two serious fires. All efforts to getthese under failed. The blazing tropic heat had scorched the woodwork ofthe ship into tinder, the movement of the vessel produced a draught thatmade the burning bunkers and decks roaring masses of flame. The men weredriven by the heat from battery and engine-room. The "Maria Teresa, " withsilent guns and masses of black smoke ascending to the sky, was headed forthe land. At a quarter-past ten she drove ashore at Nimanima, 6 1/2 mileswest of Morro Castle. Some of the men swam ashore, others were taken off bythe boats of the "Gloucester, " which came up just in time to help in savinglife. Commander Wainwright had to land a party to drive off a mob of Cubanguerillas, who came down to the shore, and were murdering the haplessSpaniards as they swam to the land. One of the "Gloucester's" boats tookout of the water Admiral Cervera and his son, Lieutenant Cervera. They werebrought on board the yacht, where Wainwright chivalrously greeted theunfortunate admiral with the words: "I congratulate you, sir, on havingmade as gallant a fight as was ever witnessed on the sea. "

At half-past ten another of the Spanish cruisers was a helpless wreck onlyhalf a mile westward of the stranded and burning flagship. This was the"Almirante Oquendo, " whose station had been last in the line. This drewupon her a converging fire from the guns of the pursuing battleships andcruisers. The destruction was terrible. Two guns of the secondary batterywere disabled. A shell came through the roof of the forward turret, killedand wounded all the gun crew, and put the gun permanently out of action. Ventilators and deck-fittings were swept away, the funnels cut up, and theunarmoured part of the sides repeatedly pierced by shells that startedseveral fires amidships. It was these that made further effort to keep upthe fight hopeless. After her captain, Juan Lazaga, had been killed by abursting shell, the "Oquendo, " now on fire in a dozen places, was drivenashore to save life. She blew up on the beach, the explosion of hermagazines nearly cutting the wreck in two. 

Of the Spanish squadron only the "Cristobal Colon" and the "Vizcaya" stillsurvived. The "Colon, " best and newest of the cruisers, was making goodspeed, and was furthest ahead. The "Vizcaya" lagged behind her, hardpressed by several American ships, led by the "Iowa. " The "Vizcaya" hadsuffered severely from the fire of the pursuit. Her coal-bunkers wereablaze on one side, and there was another fire making steady progress inthe gun-deck. Schley, in the "Brooklyn, " urging his engines to the utmost, rushed past the "Iowa, " and attempted to head off the "Vizcaya. " Hergallant captain, Antonio Eulate, realized that the "Brooklyn" was theswiftest ship in the pursuit, and that her destruction would materiallyincrease the chance of the "Colon" escaping. So he made a last effort toram or torpedo the "Brooklyn" before his own ship succumbed. He headed forSchley with a torpedo ready in his bow over-water tube. A shell from the"Brooklyn's" battery struck it fair, exploded the torpedo in the tube, andblew up and set fire to the forepart of the "Vizcaya. " Eulate then headedhis ship for the land, and she struck the shore under the cliffs atAsseradores, fifteen miles west of Morro, at a quarter-past eleven. The"Brooklyn, " the "Iowa, " and the "Oregon" were pouring their fire into heras she ran aground. Another explosion blew up part of her burning decks, and Eulate hauled down his flag. The Americans cheered as they saw the flagcome down amid the clouds of smoke, but Captain Robley Evans, of the"Iowa, " called out from the bridge to stop the cheers of his men. "Don'tcheer, boys. Those poor fellows are dying, " he said. Evans, with the"Iowa, " stood by the burning ship to rescue the survivors. 

The "Colon" alone remained. She had a lead of a good six miles, and manythought she would escape. The "Brooklyn" led the pursuit, followed closelyby the battleships "Oregon" and "Texas, " and the small cruiser "Vixen, "with Sampson's flagship, the "New York, " far astern, too far off to haveany real share in the action. On her trials the "Colon" had done 23 knots. If she could have done anything like this in the rush out of Santiago, shewould have simply walked away from the Americans, but she never did morethan fourteen. For some time, even at this reduced speed, she was so farahead that there was no firing. It was not until ten minutes past one thatthe "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" at last got within range and opened fire withtheir forward heavy guns. The "Colon, " with her empty barbettes, hadnothing with which to reply at the long range. In the earlier stage of thefight she had been hit only by an 8-inch shell, which did no materialdamage. As the pursuers gained on her she opened with her secondarybattery. Even now she received no serious injury, and she was never set onfire. But her captain, Moreu, realized that lack of speed had put him atthe mercy of the enemy. As they closed in upon him and opened fire withtheir heaviest guns, he turned his ship into the creek surrounded bytowering heights amid which the little Tarquino River runs into the sea, forty-eight miles west of Morro Castle. He hauled down his flag as heentered the creek. Without his orders the engineers opened the Kingstonvalves in the engine-room, and when the Americans boarded the "Colon" shewas rapidly sinking. She went down by the stern under the cliffs on theeast side of the inlet, and lay with her bow above water and her afterdecks awash. It was twenty minutes past one when she surrendered. 

The men of the "Iowa" and "Gloucester" had meanwhile rescued many of thesurvivors of the "Vizcaya, " not without serious risk to themselves, forthere were numerous explosions, and the decks were red-hot in places. Someof the Spaniards swam ashore, made their way through the bush to Santiago, and joined the garrison. Captain Eulate was brought on board the "Iowa, "and received by a guard of marines, who presented arms as he stepped fromthe gangway. He offered his sword to Robley Evans, but the American captainrefused to take it. "You have surrendered, " he said, "to four ships, eachheavier than your own. You did not surrender to the 'Iowa' only, so hercaptain cannot take your sword. "

Never in any naval action was there such complete destruction of a fleet. Of the six ships that steamed out of Santiago that summer morning, the"Furor" was sunk in deep water off the entrance; the "Pluton" was ashoreunder the Socapa cliff. At various points along the coast columns of blacksmoke rising a thousand feet into the sunlit sky showed where the burningwrecks of the "Maria Teresa, " the "Oquendo, " and the "Vizcaya" lay, andnearly fifty miles away the "Colon" was sunk at the mouth of the TarquinoRiver. 

And never was success obtained with such a trifling loss to the victors. The Spanish gunnery had been wretchedly bad. The only ships hit were the"Brooklyn" and the "Iowa, " and neither received any serious damage. Theonly losses by the enemy's fire were on board the "Brooklyn, " where asignalman was killed and two seamen wounded. Nine men were more or lessseriously injured by the concussion of their own guns. 

It must be confessed that the gunnery of the Americans was not of a highorder. Some 6500 shells were expended during the action. The Spanish wreckswere carefully examined, and all hits counted. Fires and explosions perhapsobliterated the traces of some of them, but so far as could be ascertained, the hits on the hulls and the upper works were comparatively few. And ofhits by the heavy 13-inch and 12-inch guns, only two could be tracedanywhere. 

The Spanish squadron had 2300 officers and men on board when it leftSantiago. Of these 1600 were prisoners after the action. It was estimatedthat in the fight 350 were killed and 150 wounded. This leaves some 200 tobe accounted for. Nearly 150 rejoined the garrison of Santiago afterswimming ashore. This leaves only fifty missing. They were probably drownedor killed by the Cuban guerillas. The fact that three of the Spanishcruisers had been rendered helpless by fires lighted on board by theenemy's shells accentuated the lesson already learned from the battle ofthe Yalu as to the necessity of eliminating inflammable material in theconstruction and fittings of warships. The damage done to the "Vizcaya" bythe explosion of one of her own torpedoes in her bow-tube proved thereality of a danger to which naval critics had already called attention. Henceforth the torpedo tubes of cruisers and battleships were all made toopen below the water-line. 

The result of the victory was a complete change in the situation atSantiago. The destruction of Cervera's fleet was the "beginning of the end"for the Spanish power in Cuba. 

 CHAPTER XIV

 TSU-SHIMA

 1905

When the war of 1894-5 between China and Japan was brought to a close bythe Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April, 1895), the Japanese were in possessionof Korea and Southern Manchuria, Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, Wei-hai-wei and the Pescadores Islands, and a joint naval and militaryexpedition was ready to seize Formosa. 

By the second article China ceded to Japan the fortress and dockyard ofPort Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. As soon as the terms of the treatywere published, Russia, which was the northern neighbour of China along theborders of Manchuria and Mongolia, and the neighbour of Japan by thepossession of Vladivostock and Saghalien, protested against the cession ofPort Arthur and its territory to the victors, arguing that the permanentoccupation of Port Arthur by a foreign Power would be a standing menace tothe Government at Pekin, and would put an end to the independence of China. Germany and France joined in the Russian protest, and the three Powersbegan to move their ships eastward. Their combined squadrons would havebeen more than a match for Admiral Ito's cruisers. England had a powerfulsquadron in the Eastern seas, but observed a strict neutrality in thediplomatic strife. 

If England had joined her, Japan would undoubtedly have fought rather thanyield up the fruit of her hard-won victories. But the Mikado's Ministersrealized that single-handed they could not face a Triple Alliance ofaggressive European Powers. The treaty was revised, the cession of PortArthur and its territory being struck out of it. They were to be restoredto China. 

But the statesmen of Japan, while they yielded the point, recognized inRussia their future rival for the empire of the East, and resolved to beginat once preparing for a struggle in years to come which would give themback more than they were now forced to abandon. They set to work to createa powerful navy, and at the same time added steadily to the fightingstrength of their army, which for a while found useful war training in thesubjugation of the hill tribes of Formosa. The millions of the warindemnity and loans negotiated abroad were expended on a great scheme ofarmaments. A fleet of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft was built inforeign shipyards, and the personnel of the navy was increased to provideofficers and crews. The Japanese Government went on for years patientlypreparing, regardless of conduct on the part of Russia that might havetempted a less self-possessed Power to premature action. 

The Russian Government had hardly forced Japan to abandon so large a partof her conquests when it took advantage of the weakness of China to obtainfrom the Pekin Government the right to make a railway through Manchuria tothe treaty port of Niu-chwang, and to place garrisons along the new linefor its protection, and further the right to garrison Port Arthur, use itas a naval station, and occupy the adjacent territory. When the firstrumours of the Russo-Chinese Treaty reached Europe they were treated withincredulity. It was said that it was impossible that Russia could cynicallyclaim a position which she had just declared was incompatible with theindependence of China, and which she had argued the nations of Europe couldnot permit to Japan or any other Power. But presently the treaty waspublished, and acted upon, Russia making Port Arthur her chief navalstation in the East, announcing a project for a great commercial port atTalienwan Bay, and, further, occupying the treaty port of Niu-chwang. Therewas a brief period of tension, during which there was a talk of variousPowers resisting this barefaced aggression, but European statesmen thoughtthat an easier course was open to them. Instead of resisting the aggressor, they embarked in a policy of aggression themselves, on the plea of securingcompensations and guarantees. The weakness of China made her the readyvictim of this policy. 

Foreign aggression from so many quarters called forth a patriotic movementin China, which in 1900 culminated in the "Boxer" revolt. For a while Japanand the European Powers, including Russia, became allies, to save theirembassies and repress the rising about Pekin. In the campaign the Japaneseforces proved themselves the most efficient of all, and their chiefsreturned home with an absolute confidence that they could successfully meetEuropean soldiers in the field. 

Japan had made the most unsparing use of its rights in Korea, acquired bythe Treaty of Shimonoseki, all but absolutely annexing the country. Afterthe Boxer revolt Admiral Alexieff, who was governor of the Russianpossessions in the Far East, embarked on a dangerous policy of provocationtowards Japan. He had an ill-informed contempt for the hardy islanders. Heunderrated their power of resistance, and felt sure that the mere fact thatthe Russian fleet outnumbered theirs would secure the command of the seafor Russia, and have a decisive effect in the event of a conflict. Hebelieved that the sooner it came the better. 

The Russian fleet in the East was steadily reinforced, unit by unit. TheJapanese people began to see in these proceedings, and in the work done atPort Arthur, a threat of early hostilities, and there was a general call onthe Government to anticipate the blow, when relations became strainedbetween the two countries in 1903. The Tokio Government was anxious not toprecipitate the war, for the organization of the army required some monthsfor completion, but the feeling in the navy, army, and civil populationforced its hand. After a brief delay of negotiations, during which bothparties worked with feverish energy to secure additional armaments, diplomatic relations were broken off at the beginning of February, 1904, and then, without waiting for any formal declaration of war, the Japanesetorpedo flotilla swooped down on the Russian fleet lying in the roadsoutside the narrow entrance of Port Arthur, found them utterly unpreparedto meet this sudden attack, and crippled several of the ships. A secondblow was the destruction of the first-class armoured cruiser "Variag, " theRussian guardship at Chemulpo, by a Japanese squadron. 

Most of the best ships in the Russian navy were in the East at the outbreakof the war. Alexieff had, however, made the initial mistake of dividing theforce at his disposal. Away north at Vladivostock was a squadron of threelarge armoured cruisers, the "Gromoboi, " "Rossia, " and "Rurik, " and theprotected cruiser "Bogatyr. " The "Variag" was isolated at Chemulpo, theport of Seoul, doing duty that might have been left to a gunboat. At PortArthur, under Admiral Stark, there was a strong fleet, including sevenbattleships, the "Petropavlosk, " "Poltava, " "Peresviet, " "Pobieda, ""Retsivan, " "Sebastopol, " and "Tsarevitch, " the cruisers "Askold, ""Boyarin, " "Bayan, " "Pallada, " "Diana, " and "Novik, " and a flotilla oftorpedo craft and the mine-laying steamer "Yenessei. " In the torpedo attackon the evening of 8 February the "Retsivan, " "Tsarevitch, " and "Pallada"were badly damaged. The "Variag" was destroyed next day, and a few dayslater the "Yenessei" accidentally blew herself up while laying mines. Thisseries of disasters seemed for a while to have almost destroyed the_morale_ of the fleet. Stark set to work to repair his damaged ships, madeno attempt to meet the Japanese at sea, or interfere with the transport oftheir armies to the mainland of Asia, and, subordinating his fleet to thedefence of Port Arthur, even landed guns and men to strengthen the landwardworks. The Japanese blockaded the port, insulted it with long-rangebombardments, and tried to block the narrow entrance by sinking oldsteamers across it. 

In March the arrival of the best officer in the Russian Navy, AdmiralMakharoff, for a while inspired new energy into the Port Arthur fleet. Therepairs of the injured ships were completed, and on 13 April the admiralsteamed out to challenge Togo and the main Japanese fleet to battle. Notwithstanding precautions taken against the known danger of floatingmines, the fleet entered a tract of water where several were afloat, andthe flagship "Petropavlosk" was destroyed with fearful suddenness by theexplosion of one of them. There was great loss of life, but the mostserious blow to Russia was the death of the admiral. 

After the fleet returned to the harbour there came another period ofirresolute inactivity. It was not till August, when several ships had beeninjured at their anchors by the bombardment from the land batteries of theJapanese attack, and it was evident that the port would soon be a dangerousplace for the ships, that Admiral Witjeft proceeded to sea, announcing thathe was going to Vladivostock, the cruiser squadron from that port havingbeen warned to come out and reinforce him on his way. 

The sea-fight, known as the battle of the Tenth of August, took place a fewmiles to seaward of the port. Witjeft led the fleet in his flagship the"Tsarevitch, " followed by the battleships "Retsivan, " "Sebastopol, ""Pobieda, " "Poltava, " and "Peresviet" (carrying the flag of the second incommand, Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky), and the cruiser division made upof the "Askold" (carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein), "Pallada, " "Diana, " and "Novik, " besides eight destroyers. The cruiser"Bayan" had been so damaged that she was left in port. Witjeft had a markedsuperiority in battleships. Togo had had six new first-rate ships of theclass under his command at the outset of the war, but on 15 May he had losttwo of them, one-third of his battleship fleet, by a disaster like that ofthe "Petropavlosk. " On that May morning, while cruising off Port Arthur, heran into a field of drift mines, and in a few minutes the battleships"Hatsuse" and "Yashima, " and the cruiser "Yoshino, " were destroyed. TheJapanese managed till the end of the war to conceal the fact that the"Yashima" had been lost, and the Russians up to the battle of Tsu-shimabelieved Togo had five of his big battleships intact. In the battle of 10August he put in his main fighting-line the two powerful armoured cruisers"Nisshin" and "Kasuga, " purchased from the Argentine Government on the eveof the war. 

The battle began with long-range firing at 1 p. M. , and continued till afterseven in the evening. It was decided by the superior gunnery of theJapanese, and the damage done by their high explosive shells. The"Tsarevitch, " badly cut up and set on fire, was driven out of the line. Witjeft was killed by a shell. His last word was to reiterate his order topush for Vladivostock. As darkness came on Ukhtomsky lost heart, and ledthe fleet back to Port Arthur. If he had held on he might have got throughthe Japanese fleet, for their ammunition was almost exhausted when thefiring ceased. Reitzenstein, with the cruisers, tried to execute Witjeft'slast order. The "Pallada, " however, left him and followed the battleships. The rest of the cruiser squadron and the destroyers that accompanied itwere forced to part company, and only the "Novik" got through to thenorthwards. The "Diana" fled southwards to the French port of Saigon; the"Askold, " with a destroyer, reached Shanghai. The battered "Tsarevitch, "with three destroyers, took refuge at Kiao-chau. All these ships weredisarmed by the French, German, and Chinese authorities, and detained tillthe end of the war, when they were restored to the Russian Government. 

The "Novik" failed to get into Vladivostock, but reached a Russian port inSaghalien, where a few days later she was tracked down and destroyed byJapanese cruisers. The Vladivostock squadron had come out to meet theunfortunate Witjeft. The "Boyarin" was left behind, damaged by accidentallygrounding, so the squadron was made up of the three big armoured cruisers"Gromoboi, " "Rossia, " and "Rurik. " They were approaching the straits ofTsu-shima, and were as far south as Fusan, when they were discovered andattacked by Admiral Kamimura's cruiser squadron, on 14 August. Once moregood gunnery against poor shooting decided the fight. The "Rurik" was sunk, and the "Gromoboi" and "Rossia" returned to Vladivostock, bearing marks ofvery hard hitting--riddled funnels, and sides hastily patched with platesof iron, told of the straight shooting of the Japanese cruisers. In boththe action with the Port Arthur battleship fleet and the Vladivostockcruiser squadron the losses of the Japanese had been very slight. 

On paper the Russians had had a distinct superiority over the Japanese insea-power at the outset, so far as it can be measured by balancing offbattleships, cruisers, and minor craft in parallel columns. In the monthsbefore the war there was ample material for the enterprising journalist towork up a navy scare at Tokio. But once more it was shown that not thenumber of ships but the temper and training of the men are the true measureof power on the sea. From the first Togo had asserted his superiority, andby asserting secured it. After the naval engagements of 10 and 14 Augustthe Russian Navy in the Far East accepted a position of helpless inaction. Ukhtomsky kept what was left of the fine fleet, that had been originallyassembled at Port Arthur, anchored in the land-locked harbour till theships were sunk by fire of the besieging batteries. 

While the Far Eastern fleet was still in being, and Port Arthur was holdingout, the Russian Government had announced its intention of sending asecond fleet from Europe to the seat of war. It had two fleets in Europeanwaters, those of the Black Sea and the Baltic. The Black Sea fleet was notavailable. International treaties barred its exit from the Dardanelles. Only the Baltic dockyards could supply the new armada. 

As soon as the news of the first torpedo attack on Port Arthur arrived, inFebruary, 1904, there was talk of the new fleet for the East, andunofficially the end of June was spoken of as the time when it would beready to sail. From the first it was obvious that this was an over-sanguineestimate, unless the fleet was to be made up entirely of old and weakships. The best units that could be made available, and without some atleast of which the fleet could hardly be sent out, were five powerfulbattleships that were being completed in the Neva yards and at Cronstadt. Two had been launched in 1901, two in 1902, and the fifth in 1903, but evenon the 1901 ships there was a large amount of work to be done. Navalexperts declared that the fleet would not be ready for a year, and thateven then the difficulty of coaling would make its voyage to the other sideof the world in war time a hopeless task for the admiral in command. 

By hard work the fleet was made ready for sea by the middle of September. The coaling difficulty was overcome by taking colliers with the fleet, contracting with a German firm to send large coal-laden steamers to variouspoints on the route selected, and straining to the utmost the benevolentneutrality of France, and using her colonial ports as halting places on theway. There was some difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number ofengineer officers, and of stokers who could manage the novel tubularboilers of the new battleships, and the fleet was undoubtedly handicappedby the inexperience of its engine-room and stokehold staff. 

Admiral Rojdestvensky, the officer chosen for the supreme command, had anexcellent record. He was fifty-six years of age, and had served in thenavy since 1865. In the Russo-Turkish War he had distinguished himself bybrilliant attacks on Turkish ships of war with a small torpedo gunboat, the"Vesta. " He had been naval attaché in London, and had filled importanttechnical and official positions at St. Petersburg, being for a while chiefof the general Naval Staff. Finally he had personal knowledge of theEastern seas and of the Japanese navy, for he had commanded the Russiansquadron in the Far East during the war between China and Japan. 

On 14 August--just after the news of the disastrous sortie of the PortArthur fleet had reached Europe, and on the very day that Kamimura defeatedthe Vladivostock squadron and sank the "Rurik"--Admiral Rojdestvenskyhoisted his flag on board his flagship, the "Knias Suvaroff, " at Cronstadt. But there was still much work to be done, and recent mishaps to some of theships' machinery to be made good, so the fleet did not sail till 25 August. Even then it was only for a few days' training cruise in the Baltic. 

On the 30th the fleet was back again at Cronstadt. Engineers and mechanicsworked night and day, setting right defects in the ships, and on 11September there was another start, this time for the port of Libau. 

The fleet consisted of seven battleships, two armoured cruisers, and someprotected cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. It was to be joined atLibau by a miscellaneous collection of craft--some small cruisers and anumber of merchantmen to be used as auxiliary cruisers, store, hospital, and repair ships. 

Of the five new battleships in the Neva yards four had been got ready forsea. These were the "Borodino, " "Orel, " "Imperator Alexander III, " and"Knias Suvaroff. " They were powerful ships of 13, 000 to 13, 500 tonsdisplacement, with engines of nominal 16, 000 horse-power, and theirofficial speed, which they never realized, was eighteen knots. Theirheaviest armour was nine inches, and they carried two pair of 12-inch gunsfore and aft in armoured turrets, with an auxiliary armament of twelve6-inch quick-firers besides lighter guns. The three other battleships, the"Ossliabya, " "Navarin, " and "Sissoi Veliki" were older ships. The newest ofthem, the "Ossliabya, " launched in 1898, was on her way to the East whenthe war broke out, and had turned back. She was of 12, 600 tonsdisplacement, and claimed a speed of eighteen knots. She carried four10-inch and eleven 6-inch guns. The other two ships were rated as havingsixteen knots speed, but probably could not much exceed twelve. Theirdisplacement and principal armament were:--

 _Navarin_, 10, 000 tons, four 12-inch guns, eight 6-inch Q. F. _Sissoi Veliki_, 8880 tons, four 12-inch guns, six 6-inch Q. F. 

The two armoured cruisers were old ships:--

 _Admiral Nakhimoff_, 8500 tons, eight 8-inch, ten 6-inch guns. _Dimitri Donskoi_, 7796 tons, six 6-inch, ten 4. 7 inch guns. 

Two of the protected cruisers, the "Aurora" and "Oleg, " were ships of about7000 tons, carrying for their main armament the former eight and the lattertwelve 6-inch guns. The other cruisers were four smaller ships, but some ofthem were comparatively new vessels with good speed--useful as scouts. 

Well manned with competent engineers and trained gunners the fleet wouldhave been formidable enough, notwithstanding its weaker units. But hereagain it was the men that counted. 

In the first week of October the fleet was taken to Revel. The Tsar arrivedthere on the 9th and inspected it next day. On the 11th it sailed. But itstopped again at Libau, until October 15, when at last it started for theEast. 

There had been wild rumours that the Japanese had sent emissaries toEurope, obtained some light craft, and fitted them as improvisedtorpedo-boats for the purpose of attacking the fleet on its voyage throughthe narrow waters that form the exit from the Baltic or during the crossingof the North Sea. The Russian police attached such importance to thesecanards that Rojdestvensky was warned to take precaution against attackuntil he was out on the open ocean. He passed the Danish straits with hisships partly cleared for action, fired on a Swedish merchantman and aGerman fishing-boat, and, avoiding the usual course from the Skaw to theChannel, ran by the Dogger Bank, and in a panic of false alarm opened fireon the steam trawling fleet, sinking a boat and killing and woundingseveral men. The result was an outburst of indignation in England, apartial mobilization of the British fleet, and some days of extremetension, when it seemed likely that England would be drawn into the war, with the probability that France would then, under the terms of heralliance with Russia, have also to enter into the conflict. An agreementwas arranged under which there was to be an international inquiry into theDogger Bank incident, and Russia promised to make full reparation. 

Meanwhile the Baltic fleet had run down Channel and across the Bay ofBiscay, and southwards to Tangier, where it was concentrated on 3 November, watched by Lord Charles Beresford and the Channel Fleet, for the period ofsharp tension was not over. At Tangier Rojdestvensky divided his force. Hewent southward along the African coast with the first division, and sentthe second division under Admiral Fölkersham into the Mediterranean to goeastwards by the Suez Canal route. A third division had been formed atLibau to reinforce the fleet. It was composed of the armoured cruisers"Izumrud" and "Oleg, " three auxiliary cruisers (armed liners of thevolunteer fleet), the "Terek, " "Rion, " and "Dnieper, " a flotilla ofdestroyers, and a number of storeships. It sailed from Libau on 7 November. 

Rojdestvensky put into various African ports, mostly in the Frenchcolonies, and coaled his ships from his colliers. He was at Dakar, in WestAfrica, on 13 November; at Gaboon on the 26th; in Great Fish Bay on 6December; and at Angra Pequeña on the 11th. He passed Cape Town on 19December. Rounding the Cape, he steered for Madagascar, and on 1 January, 1905, he anchored in the Bay of Ste. Marie, near Tamatave. 

On that same New Year's Day General Stoessel sent a flag of truce out toGeneral Nogi, to inform him that he was anxious to arrange the immediatesurrender of Port Arthur. The capitulation was signed next day. Thus at thevery moment that Rojdestvensky and the main fighting force of the Balticfleet established itself in the Indian Ocean, its nearest possible base inthe Eastern seas passed into Japanese hands, and the problem the Russianadmiral had to solve became more difficult. 

Fölkersham, with the second division, rejoined Rojdestvensky's division inthe waters of Madagascar. 

From Ste. Marie the fleet moved to the roadstead of Nossi-Bé, at the northend of Madagascar, where it was joined in February by the reinforcementsfor Libau. Rojdestvensky had now under his command an armada of some fortyships of all kinds, including storeships and colliers. Now that Port Arthurhad fallen he seemed in no hurry to proceed eastwards. 

There had been an agitation in Russia for a further reinforcement of thefleet, and though the addition of a few more old and weak ships could addno real strength to Rojdestvensky's armada, the Government yielded to theclamour, and on February 15 dispatched from Libau a fourth division, underthe command of Admiral Nebogatoff. The flagship was an armouredturret-ship, the "Imperator Nikolai I, " of 9700 tons, dating from 1889, andclassed in the Navy List as a battleship; with her went three smallarmoured "coast-defence battleships, " the "General Admiral Apraxin, " the"Admiral Ushakoff, " and the "Admiral Senyavin, " all of about 4000 tons, andthe cruiser "Vladimir Monomach, " of a little over 5500 tons. Rojdestvenskyseemed inclined to wait at Nossi-Bé for Nebogatoff's arrival, but theJapanese addressed strong protests to Paris against Madagascar being madea base of operations for a huge expedition against them; the FrenchGovernment sent pressing remonstrances to their friends at St. Petersburg, and the admiral was ordered by cable to move on. 

Sailing from Nossi-Bé on 25 March, Rojdestvensky steered first for theChagos Archipelago, and then for the Straits of Malacca. In the afternoonof 8 April the fleet passed Singapore, keeping well out to sea. The shipswere burning soft coal, and an enormous cloud of black smoke trailed fromthe forest of funnels. Steamers ran out from the port to see the splendidsight of the great crowd of ships moving four abreast into the China Sea. Before the fleet sailed many critics of naval matters had prophesied thatas Russia had no coaling stations the coaling difficulty would make itimpossible for Rojdestvensky ever to carry his fleet so far. The successfulentry into the Eastern seas was therefore regarded as something of anexploit. It was a revelation of the far-reaching power that would belong tobetter-equipped fleets in future wars. 

While the Baltic fleet was on its way the Japanese Government, patriotically supported by the Press and the people, kept a strict silenceon all naval matters. There were wild conjectures that under this veil ofsecrecy Togo had moved southwards, that he would fall on his enemy duringthe voyage across the Indian Ocean, or wait for him in the China Sea. Butthe Japanese admiral had no reason for embarking in such adventures. Heknew that if he kept his fleet near the shores of Japan his enemy must comesooner or later within effective striking distance. 

Rojdestvensky might attempt a raid on the coasts of Japan, or make a dashfor Niu-chwang to seize that port, now the nearest base of supply of theJapanese field army. Far-seeing precautions were taken against thiseventuality by accumulating enormous stores of supplies in the immediaterear of the army. But it was far more likely that the Russian admiral wouldtry to reach Vladivostock, either with or without a battle. To do so hewould have ultimately to pass through one of three channels into the Sea ofJapan. He must choose between the Korean or Tsu-shima straits between Japanand Korea, or the Tsugaru channel between Nippon and Yozo, or the LaPérouse Straits (known to the Japanese as the Soya channel) still furthernorth. Whatever course he chose, the best position for the Japanese fleetwas near the Tsu-shima straits, with the arsenal and dockyard ofShimonoseki close by on the Japanese shore. This the Russians themselvesforesaw would be the most likely position for Togo to select. 

He made Masampho Bay on the Korean side of the straits, and inside them(the "Douglas Bay" of our Admiralty Charts), the station for his fleet. Freed from all harassing blockading and cruising work, he devoted theperiod between the retirement and destruction of the Port Arthur fleet inthe late summer of 1904, and the approach of the Russians in May, 1905, torepairing his ships very thoroughly, substituting new guns for those theyhad mounted at the beginning of the war, which had had their rifling worndown. Continual target practice and manoeuvre exercises kept every ship andevery man up to the mark. Charts of the sea around Japan were ruled offinto small numbered squares, so as to facilitate the reporting of theenemy's position and movements from the moment he would be first sighted. An elaborate system of scouting by light cruisers was organized; signalstations were established on islands and headlands, and wirelessinstallations erected at central and outlying points. If Rojdestvensky madefor the Tsu-shima channels, Togo was there to meet him. If he went foreither of the more northern straits, the Japanese admiral counted on havingnews of his movements in sufficient time to enable him to steam at fullspeed by a shorter route, and still interpose between the Baltic armada andVladivostock. 

After passing Singapore, on 25 March, there was another delay before thefinal advance of the Russian fleet. Rojdestvensky was anxious to give timeto Nebogatoff to join him. This last reinforcement was coming by theMediterranean route. The Russian commander-in-chief again strained Frenchneutrality to the utmost. In April and May he passed week after week in theports of French Cochin China, first at Kamranh and then at Van Fong orHonkohe. Here, early in May, he was at last joined by Nebogatoff'ssquadron. 

Again Japan protested against the use of French harbours by her enemy. Thediplomatic tension became acute, and at one moment it seemed as if theRussian admiral were anxious to produce complications that would forceFrance into the war. But at last, to the general relief, on 14 May hesailed from Honkohe Bay. He passed through the Bashi Strait between Formosaand the Philippines, and then steered for Shanghai. Here, on 25 May, thefighting portion of the fleet lay out at sea, while a crowd of auxiliarysteamers, colliers, store-ships, and armed merchantmen were sent into theWusung River, the mouth of the Yang-tse, and anchored there. 

Their appearance without the fleet to which they belonged led to manyconjectures. The Japanese at once grasped its real meaning. To quote themessage cabled by the Tokio correspondent of "The Times":--

 "They read it as a plain intimation that Rojdestvensky intended to put his fate to the test at Tsu-shima, since, had it been his purpose to make for Tsugaru or Soya, he must have retained the services of these auxiliary ships during several days longer. It is apparent, indeed, that the Russian admiral here made his first cardinal mistake; he should have kept his non-combatant vessels out of sight as long as possible. Their absence from the arena would have been a mysterious element, whereas their apparition, especially as a segregated squadron in the Yang-tse River, furnished an unerring clue to expert observers. "

With the fleet the admiral retained only the hospital and repairing shipsand those laden with naval stores for the Vladivostock dockyard. On theevening of the 25th the fleet stood out to sea heading for Tsu-shima. Theweather was bad, with a probability that it would be worse. There was arising wind and sea with cold rain that made a blinding haze, but theRussian staff officers were rather pleased than depressed at suchunpleasant conditions. Thick weather would baffle the Japanese scouts andlookout stations, and rough seas would keep their torpedo flotillas atanchor. 

Out ahead were the fast cruisers of the scouting division, the "Svietlana, ""Almaz, " and "Ural. " After these came the main body of the fleet in lineahead in two columns, the heavy armour-clads on the starboard (right side), the rest of the armoured ships and four cruisers in the port line. Abreastof the leading ships each flank was guarded by a cruiser and two torpedodestroyers. After the fighting lines and between their foaming wakessteamed four store-ships and two repairing ships. Last of all were the twosteamers fitted as hospital ships. The arrangement is best shown by a roughdiagram:--

 _Svietlana_. 

 (Cruisers. ) _Almaz_. _Ural_. 

 PORT LINE. STARBOARD LINE. (Cruiser. ) (Cruiser. ) _Jemschug_. _Imperator Nikolai_. _Knias Suvaroff_. _Izumrud_. 2 torpedo _Admiral Senyavin_. _Imperator Alexander_. 2 torpedo destroyers. _Admiral Apraxin_. _Borodino_. Destroyers. _Admiral Ushakoff_. _Orel_. {_Oleg_. _Ossliabya_. Cruisers. {_Aurora_. _Sissoi Veliki_. {_Dimitri Donskoi_. _Navarin_. {_Alexander Monomach_. _Admiral Nakhimoff_. 5 torpedo destroyers. _Anadir_. } _Irtish_. } Store-ships. _Korea_. } _Kamschatka_. } _Svir_. } Repairing ships and tugs. _Russ_. }

 _Orel_. _Kostroma_. |_______________________| Hospital ships. 

In this order the great fleet steamed slowly through the rain and darkness. On board the great battleships there was much grumbling at "Nebogatoff'sold tubs, " though they themselves could not do much better, for poor coal, inefficient stoking, and weed-grown bottom-plates handicapped even thenewest of them. The next day, 26 May, was the eve of the greatest navalbattle in all history. "The clouds began to break and the sun shonefitfully, " says Captain Semenoff, [23] "but although a fairly freshsouth-westerly wind had sprung up, a thick mist still lay upon the water. "Rojdestvensky meant to pass the perilous straits in daylight, and hecalculated that by noon next day the fleet would be in the narrows ofTsu-shima. 

 [23] Semenoff had served with the Port Arthur fleet on board one of the cruisers which were disarmed in a neutral port after the battle of August 10th, 1904. He then returned to Europe, was attached to the staff of the Baltic fleet, and went out to the East on board the flagship. His remarkable narrative, "The Battle of Tsu-shima, " is a vivid detailed account of the "Suvaroff's" fortunes during the fight. He died in 1910. 

Behind that portal of the Sea of Japan Togo was waiting confidently for hisenemy, who, he knew, must now be near at hand. Never before had two suchpowerful fleets met in battle, and the fate of the East hung upon theresult of their encounter. 

That result must depend mainly upon the heavy armoured ships. In these andin the number of guns of the largest calibre, the Russians had an advantageso far as mere figures went, as the following tables show:--

 ARMOURED SHIPS Class. Japan. Russia. Battleships 4 8 Coast-defence armour-clad -- 3 Armoured cruisers 8 3 -- -- Total 12 14

 HEAVY GUNS Quick-firers. Guns. 12-inch. 10-inch. 9-inch. 8-inch. |---------------| 6-inch. 4. 7-inch. Japan 16 1 -- 30 160 -- Russia 26 15 4 8 102 30[24]

 [24] These tables are from Sir George Sydenham Clarke's preface to Captain Lindsay's translation of Semenoff's "Tsu-shima, " p. 11. 

The annexed tables (pp. 315, 316) give some details of Russian and Japanesearmoured ships. 

With regard to the armour it must be kept in mind for purposes ofcomparison that the armoured belts of the newer ships, nine inches at thethickest part, were of Harveyized or Krupp steel, and could resistpenetration better than the thicker belts of the older ships. It will benoticed that the Japanese carried fewer of the heavier types of guns, buthad more 6-inch quick-firers than the Russians. This is a point to bear inmind in following the story of the battle. It was the steady rain of100-pounder shells from the quick-firers that paralysed the fighting powerof the Russian ships. 

Far more important than the mere number of guns was the fact that theJapanese shot straighter and had a more effective projectile. There wassuch a marked difference between the effect of the Japanese shells atTsu-shima and in the naval battle of 10 August, 1904, that CaptainSemenoff, who was present at both battles, thought that in the interval theJapanese must have adopted a more powerful kind of high explosive for theirbursting charges. This was not the case. Throughout the war the Japaneseused for their bursting charges the famous Chimose powder. But perhapsbetween 10 August, 1904, and the following May they had improved theirfuses, so as to detonate the charge more certainly and thoroughly. 

The first five battleships on the Russian list were up-to-date modernvessels. The "Navarin" was fairly fit to lie in line with them. The restwere, to use a familiar expression, "a scratch lot, " coast-defence ships ofsmall speed and old craft quite out of date. The decks of the larger shipswere encumbered with an extra supply of coal, and this must have seriouslydiminished their margin of stability, with, as we shall see, disastrousresults. 

Admiral Togo could oppose to them only four modern battleships. But his twoheavy cruisers, the "Nisshin" and "Kasuga" (the ships bought from Argentinaon the eve of the war), might almost have been classed as smallerbattleships, and certainly would have been given that rank a few yearsearlier. His fine fleet of armoured cruisers were at least a match for theRussian coast-defence ships and the older battleships. 

 RUSSIA ----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------- Class. | | | | | | | Ships. | | | | | | |Displacement. Tons. | | | | |Thickest Armour. Inches. | | | |Principal Armament. Guns. | | | | |Men. | | | | | | | Remarks. ----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------- {|_Knias Suvaroff_ |} | | | |Flagship of Admiral {| |} | | | |Rojdestvensky. {|_Imperator |} | | | | These four {| Alexander III_ |}13, 516| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 740| ships were B {|_Borodino_ |} | |{12 6-inch }| | all completed a {|_Orel_ |} | | | | in 1904. T {| | | | | | t {|_Ossliabya_ | 12, 674| 9 |{ 4 10-inch }| 732|Flagship of Rear- l {| | | |{11 6-inch }| |Admiral Fölkersham. E {| | | | | |Completed 1901. S {| | | | | | h {|_Sissoi Veliki_ | 8, 880|15. 7|{ 4 12-inch }| 550|Completed 1894. I {| | | |{ 6 6-inch }| | p {| | | | | | s {|_Navarin_ | 10, 206|16 |{ 4 12-inch }| 550| " 1895. {| | | |{ 8 6-inch }| | {| | | | | | {|_Imperator | 9, 672|14 |{ 4 9-inch }| 604| " 1892. {| Nikolai I_ | | |{ 8 6-inch }| |Flagship of Rear- {| | | | | |Admiral Nebogatoff. | | | | | | C d A c | | | | | | o e r l {|_General Admiral | 4, 162|10 |{ 3 10-inch }| 400|Completed 1898. A f m a {| Apraxin_ | | |{ 4 6-inch }| | s e o d {| | | | | | t n u s {|_Admiral Senyavin_ |} 4, 684|10 |{ 4 9-inch }| 400| " 1895. - c r {|_Admiral Ushakoff_ |} | |{ 4 6-inch }| | e - | | | | | | | | | | | | A C {|_Admiral Nakhimoff_ | 8, 524|10 |{ 8 8-inch }| 567|Completed 1888. R r {| | | |{10 6-inch }| |Reconstructed 1895. M u {| | | | | | o i {|_Dimitri Donskoi_ | 6, 200| 7 |{ 6 6-inch }| 510|Completed 1885. U s {| | | |{10 4. 7-inch}| |Reconstructed 1896. R e {| | | | | | e r {|_Vladimir Monomach_ | 5, 593|10 |{ 5 8-inch }| 550|Completed 1885. D s {| | | |{12 6-inch }| |Rearmed 1898. ----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------

 JAPAN ------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------------- Class. | | | | | | | Ships. [25] | | | | | | |Displacement. Tons. | | | | |Thickest Armour. Inches. | | | |Principal Armaments. Guns. | | | | |Men. | | | | | | | Remarks. ------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------------- B s {|_Mikasa_ | 15, 200| 9 |{ 4 12-inch } |795|Completed 1902. Flagship a h {| | | |{14 6-inch }| |of Admiral Togo. T i {| | | | | | t p {|_Skikishima_ |}14, 850| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 810|Completed 1899. L s {|_Asahi_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| | e {| | | | | | - {|_Fuji_ |12, 320 | 14 |{ 4 12-inch }| 600| " 1897. {| | | |{10 6-inch }| | | | | | | | | | | | | | {|_Nisshin_ |} 7, 294| 6 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1904. _Nisshin_ {|_Kasuga_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |was flagship {| | | | | |of Vice-Admiral Misu. {| | | | | | A C {|_Idzumo_ |} 9, 750| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901. R r {|_Iwate_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |_Idzumo_--flagship of m u {| | | | | |Vice-Admiral Kamimura. O i {| | | | | | u s {|_Adzumo_ | 9, 436| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901. R e {| | | |{12 6-inch }| | e r {| | | | | | d s {|_Asama_ |} 9, 700| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1899. {|_Tokiwa_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| | {| | | | | | {|_Yakumo_ | 9, 850| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 498| " 1901. {| | | |{12 6-inch }| | ------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+-------------------------

 [25] The old turret-ship _Chin-yen_--captured from the Chinese (formerly the _Chen-yuen_) (4 12-inch and 4 6-inch guns)--was with the fleet, but is not included in a list of effective armour-clads. 

Besides his armoured ships, Admiral Rojdestvensky had a squadron of sixprotected cruisers under Rear-Admiral Enquist, whose flag flew in the"Oleg, " a vessel of 6750 tons launched in 1903, and completed next year. She had for her principal armament twelve six-inch quick-firers. The othercruisers were the "Aurora, " of a little over 6000 tons, the "Svietlana, " ofnearly 4000, the "Jemschug, " and "Izumrud, " of 3000 tons (these two armedwith 47 quick-firing guns), and the "Almaz, " of 3285, a "scout" of goodspeed, carrying nothing heavier than 12-pounders. There was one auxiliarycruiser, the "Ural, "[26] a flotilla of nine destroyers, four transports, two repairing ships, and two hospital steamers. 

 [26] A German Atlantic liner purchased at the beginning of the war--formerly known as the "Königin Maria Theresa"--"roomy and luxurious, but as a warship useless, " says the Naval Constructor Politovsky, Chief Engineer of the Baltic Fleet. 

Awaiting the battle in sight of his own shores, Togo had concentrated asauxiliary squadrons to his armoured fleet a considerable number ofprotected cruisers and a whole swarm of torpedo craft. At this stage of hernaval development, and on the eve of a life-and-death struggle, Japan hadno idea of "scrapping" even the older ships. Anything that could carry afew good guns, and brave men to fight them, might be useful, so even theold Chinese ironclad which had carried Ting's flag at the Yalu battle, aship dating from 1882, was under steam in one of the auxiliary squadrons, with four new 12-inch guns in her barbettes. 

There were three of these auxiliary squadrons, commanded by Rear-AdmiralDewa, Rear-Admiral Uriu, and Rear-Admiral Kataoka, the last having as asubordinate commander Rear-Admiral Togo, a relative of thecommander-in-chief. Dewa's flag flew in the "Kasagi, " a fine cruiser ofnearly 5000 tons, built in America, and he had with him her sister ships, the "Chitose" and "Taka-sago. " Uriu's flag flew in the "Naniwa, " Togo'sship when he was a captain in the Chinese war. Several of the fine cruiserswhich Ito had then led to victory were present, many of them remodelled, and all provided with new guns. Then there were a number of small protectedcruisers, built in Japanese dockyards since the Chinese war, the heralds ofthe later time when the Japanese navy would all be home-built. Battleships, armoured cruisers, and protected cruisers were all swifter than the Russianships. The fleet as a whole could manoeuvre at fully fifty per cent greaterspeed than the enemy, and this meant that it could choose its own positionin battle. 

The five torpedo squadrons included two or three torpedo-gunboats, twenty-one fine destroyers, and some eighty torpedo-boats. Togo's plans hadthe simplicity which is a necessity in the rough game of war, whereelaborate schemes are likely to go wrong. Some of the swift protectedcruisers were scouting south of the straits. The fleet was anchored in abody in Masampho Bay, and in wireless communication with its scouts. Thearmoured fleet was to make the main attack on the head of the Russianadvance. The protected cruiser squadrons were to sweep round the enemy'sflanks, fall upon his rear, and destroy his transports and auxiliaries. Thetorpedo flotilla was to be ready to dash in and complete the defeat of theenemy when his fleet was crippled by the fight with the heavy ships. 

Most of the officers and men of the Russian fleet had the dogged couragethat could carry them through even a hopeless fight, but they lookedforward to the immediate future with forebodings of disaster. Even amongthe officers on board the great "Suvaroff" there was a feeling that themost that could be hoped for was that a few ships would struggle throughto Vladivostock, if there was a battle, and that the best thing that couldhappen would be for the thick weather and rough seas to enable them toavoid anything like a close fight with the Japanese. 

During the last day before the fight Rojdestvensky, who did not want tohurry forward, but was timing his advance so as to pass the straits in themiddle of the next day, spent some time in manoeuvres. Captain Semenoff'snotes on the proceedings convey a useful lesson. 

 "Once again" (he says), "and for the last time, we were forcibly reminded of the old truism that a 'fleet' is created by long practice at sea in time of peace (cruising, not remaining in port), and that a collection of ships of various types hastily collected, which have only learned to sail together on the way to the theatre of operations, is no fleet, but a chance concourse of vessels. "[27]

 [27] "Tsu-shima, " p. 10. 

Wireless telegraphy had come into use since the last naval war, and a fleetcould now try to overhear the aerial messages of an enemy. In the Russianfleet the order had been given that no wireless messages were to be sent. In other words, the operators were to keep silence, and listen by watchingtheir apparatus. In the morning of the 26th they thought they detectedmessages passing. In the evening these were more frequent--"short messagesof a word or two" was the interpretation that the experts in the signalcabins put upon the unintelligible flickerings of the indicator, and theysuggested that they were mere negative code-signals from the Japanesescouts to their main fleet, repeating an indication that they were on thealert, and had seen nothing. This was mere guesswork, however, andPolitovsky's diary of the voyage[28] shows that near the Cape, atMadagascar, and out in the midst of the Indian Ocean, Rojdestvensky'swireless operators had thought that they detected Japanese aerialsignalling, simply because the receivers gave indications they could notunderstand. Possibly these were merely the effect of electric storms on theapparatus. 

 [28] "From Libau to Tsu-shima. " By the late Eugene S. Politovsky. Translated by Major F. R. Godvey, R. M. L. I. 1906. 

Once or twice, on 26 May, they thought they could read fragments ofsentences, such as--"Last night--nothing--eleven lights--not in line. " Theshort messages in the evening came at fixed times. This showed thatprearranged signalling was really going on. It gave the impression thatperhaps the fleet was being watched by unseen enemies. 

As the sun went down the ships closed up, and half the officers weredetailed for duty at the guns during the hours of darkness. The rest laydown fully dressed, ready to turn out at a moment's notice. Many slept onthe decks. No lights were shown. Semenoff's description of that night ofanxious expectation is worth quoting. He was on board the flagship, the"Suvaroff":--

 "The night came on dark. The mist seemed to grow denser, and through it but few stars could be seen. On the dark deck there prevailed a strained stillness, broken at times only by the sighs of the sleepers, the steps of an officer, or by an order given in an undertone. Near the guns the motionless figures of their crews seemed like dead, but all were wide awake, gazing keenly into the darkness. Was not that the dark shadow of a torpedo-boat? They listened attentively. Surely the throb of her engines and the noise of steam would betray an invisible foe. Stepping carefully, so as not to disturb the sleepers, I went round the bridges and decks, and then proceeded to the engine-room. For a moment the bright light blinded me. Here life and movement were visible on all sides. Men were nimbly running up and down the ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and a buzzing of voices. Orders were being transmitted loudly, but on looking more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed. "[29]

 [29] "Tsu-shima, " pp. 27, 28. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA SKETCH MAP TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF THE WATERS IN WHICH THE FIRST PART OF THE FIGHT TOOK PLACE. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE KOREAN (OR TSU-SHIMA) STRAITS ARE MAPPED IN BLACK, & AN OUTLINE MAP OF THE NORTH SEA BETWEEN THE EASTERN COUNTIES OF ENGLAND & THE OPPOSITE COAST OF THE CONTINENT IS SKETCHED OVER THE MAP IN RED ON THE SAME SCALE]

At daybreak the Japanese scouts were in touch. As the day came in greylight over the misty broken sea, one of their scouts, the auxiliary cruiser"Siano Maru" (an armed passenger liner), sweeping round through the haze, almost collided with the hospital ships, and then dashed off anddisappeared in the twilight. In former wars she would have had to run backto the fleet with her news. Now from her wireless apparatus the informationwas sent through the air to the receivers of the "Mikasa" in Masampho Bay, and in a few minutes Togo knew that "the enemy's fleet was in square No. 203 of the chart, apparently steering for the eastern passage, " i. E. Thestrait between Tsu-shima Island and Japan. 

In the straits and outside Masampho Bay a heavy sea was running, and thoughthe wind blew strongly from the south-west, the weather was still hazy atsunrise, with patches of fog here and there. The main body of the Japanesefleet began to get up anchors and slip from its moorings. [30]

 [30] English people have so seldom occasion or opportunity of consulting large-scale maps of Japan, that there is an impression that the battle of Tsu-shima was fought in narrow waters, where there was no chance of the Russians eluding Togo and little room for manoeuvring. The strait in which the battle took place is really about as wide as the North Sea between Harwich and the Hook of Holland. (See accompanying sketch map. )

At dawn Rojdestvensky had called in the "Almaz, " leaving the "Jemschug" and"Izumrud" steaming in advance of his two divisions. The six auxiliary shipshad closed up, so that the leading ship, the transport "Anadir, " wasabreast of the centre of the two lines. The "Almaz, " "Svietlana, " and"Ural, " steamed at the rear of this central line of transports, to protectthem in that direction. The two hospital ships, flying the Red Cross flagand trusting to it for safety, were well astern. About 6 a. M. The huge"Ural" came running up between the lines, and semaphored to the flagshipthat four ships in line ahead were passing across the rear of the fleet, but could not be clearly made out in the mist. 

They could only be some of Togo's cruisers "shepherding" the fleet. Justbefore seven a fine cruiser was seen some five miles away on the starboardbeam of the "Suvaroff. " She closed up to three miles, and was soonidentified as the "Idzumo. " The big turret-guns were swung round to bear onher, but the Japanese cruiser, having seen what she wanted, increased herdistance, but could be seen still keeping the fleet in sight. Togo's reportnotes that at 7 a. M. The "Idzumo" sent by wireless the second definitereport of the enemy, stating that he was twenty-five miles north-west ofUkushima, steering north-east. This would make the Russian position aboutthirty miles south of the Tsu-shima Islands, heading for the channel to theeast of them. An hour later, about 8 a. M. , some Japanese ships showedthemselves the other side of the fleet. Semenoff notes how:--

 "The 'Chin-yen, ' 'Matsushima, ' 'Itsukushima, ' and 'Hashidate, ' appeared out of the mist, steaming on an almost parallel course. Ahead of them was a small, light cruiser, apparently the 'Akitsushu, ' which hurriedly drew off to the north as soon as we were able to see her well (and equally she us), and the whole squadron began slowly to increase their distance and gradually to disappear from sight. "

This was Vice-Admiral Takeomi's division, composed of three of the cruisersthat had fought at the Yalu battle, eleven years before, and the"Chin-yen, " which had fought against them as the "Ting-yuen. " The ship thatran out ahead was the only quick or modern ship in the squadron, the smallClyde-built armoured cruiser "Chiyoda. " If Rojdestvensky had had any speedycruisers available, he might have severely punished this slow squadron ofold ships. Takeomi showed he knew his enemy by thus boldly approaching inthe mist. 

The Russians now realized that they had watchful enemies all round them, and rightly conjectured that they would find the enemy's heavy ships inthe straits ready for battle. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. GENERAL MAP]

At 10 a. M. Another cruiser squadron appeared on the port beam. This wasDewa's division, made up of the American-built sister ships "Kasagi" and"Chitose, " of nearly 5000 tons, and two smaller protected cruisers, the"Niitaka" and "Otowa, " lately turned out by Japanese yards. They seemed toinvite attack. At a signal from the admiral, the eight armour-clads of thestarboard line steamed ahead of the port line, turned together to port, andthen, turning again, formed line ahead, leading the whole fleet. At thesame time the transports moved out to Starboard, guarded by the "VladimirMonomach" (detached from the port division), the "Svietlana, " "Almaz, " and"Ural. "

Dewa's cruisers held a parallel course with the Russian battleships formore than an hour, still apparently unsupported. The range was about fivemiles. At 11. 20 the Russians opened fire on them. Semenoff says that it wasthe result of a mistake. "The 'Orel' fired an accidental shot (which sheimmediately reported by semaphore). Unable, with smokeless powder, to tellby which of the leading ships it had been fired, the fleet took it as asignal from the 'Suvaroff' and opened fire. Of the whole fleet the fire ofthe 3rd Squadron was the heaviest. "

This squadron was made up of Nebogatoff's "old tubs. " Their heavy fire wasprobably the result of undisciplined excitement. The Japanese fired a fewshots in reply, but no harm was done on either side. Rojdestvensky, who hadkept the guns of his flagship silent, signalled "Ammunition not to bewasted, " and the firing ceased in five minutes, just as the Japanese turnedslowly and increased their distance. 

Orders were now signalled for the men of the Russian fleet to have theirdinners, and the officers lunched in turn. The harmless skirmish encouragedsome of the Russian crews with the idea that they had been in action andwere none the worse, and had driven the Japanese away. At noon the fleetwas due south of Tsu-shima, which towered like a mountain out of the sea afew miles ahead. The signal was hoisted, "Change course N. 23°E. ForVladivostock. " It was the anniversary of the Tsar's coronation. Round thewardroom tables in his doomed fleet the officers stood up and drank withenthusiasm to the Emperor, the Empress, and "victory for Russia!"

The cheering had hardly died down when the bugles sounded the alarm. Everyone hurried to his post. The enemy's cruisers had again shown themselves, this time accompanied by a flotilla of destroyers, that came rollingthrough the rough sea with the waves foaming over their bows. On a signalfrom the admiral the four leading battleships turned to starboard and stoodtowards the enemy, then re-formed line ahead on a course parallel to therest of the fleet, and slightly in advance of it. The Japanese on thethreat of attack had turned also and went off at high speed to thenorthwards. 

At 1. 20 p. M. The admiral signalled to the four next ships of the fleet tojoin the line of battleships, forming astern of them. The Russian armadawas now well into the wide eastern strait of Tsu-shima, and far aheadthrough the mist a crowd of ships could be dimly seen. The crisis was nearat hand. 

On receiving the first wireless message from the "Shinano Maru" atdaybreak, Togo had weighed anchor and come out of Masampho Bay, with hismain fleet steering east, so as to pass just to the north of Tsu-shima. Hehad with him his twelve armoured ships, and Rear-Admiral Uriu's division ofprotected cruisers ("Naniwa, " "Takachico, " "Tsushima, " and "Akashi"), and astrong flotilla of destroyers. The smaller torpedo-boats, more than sixtyin number, had been already sent to shelter in Miura Bay in the island ofTsu-shima, on account of the heavy seas. 

During the morning Togo received a succession of wireless messages from hiscruisers, and every mile of the enemy's progress, every change in hisformation was quickly signalled to him. Shortly after noon he was able tonote that the Russians were entering the straits, steaming at about 12knots on a north-easterly course; that they were formed in two columns inline ahead, the starboard column being the stronger, and that they hadtheir transports astern between the columns. He decided to attack them onthe weaker side at 2 p. M. , when he calculated that they would be nearOkinoshima, a small island in the middle of the eastern strait, abouthalf-way between Tsu-shima and the south-western headlands of Nippon. 

At half-past one he was joined by Dewa's division of cruisers, and a fewminutes later the divisions of Kataoka and the younger Togo rejoined. Theyhad till now hung on the flanks of the Russian advance. At a quarter to twothe enemy's fleet came in sight away to the south-westward of Okinoshima. Flags fluttered up to the signal yards of the "Mikasa, " and the fleet readwith enthusiasm Togo's inspiring message:--

 "_The rise or fall of the Empire depends upon to-day's battle. Let every man do his utmost. _"

He had been about ten miles north of Okinoshima at noon (by which time hehad steamed some 90 miles from Douglas Bay since 5 a. M. ), thence he turnedback slowly, going west and a little south, till he sighted the Russians. He crossed their line of advance diagonally at about 9500 yards distance. His light cruiser divisions had received orders to steam southwards andattack the Russian rear, and were already well on their way. 

The heavy Japanese ships, circling on the left front of the enemy'sadvance, put on speed, and were evidently intending to recross the bows ofthe battleship division, bringing a converging fire to bear on the leadingships--the manoeuvre known as "crossing the T. " As the "Mikasa" led theJapanese line on its turning movement Rojdestvensky swung round tostarboard and opened fire at 8500 yards. Togo waited till the distance hadshortened to 6500, and then the guns of the "Mikasa" flashed out. At thatmoment only three other of his ships had made the turn. They also openedfire, and ship after ship as she came round into line joined in thecannonade. The Russians turned more slowly, and it was some time before thewhole of their line was in action. Meanwhile a storm of fire had burst uponthe leading ships of Rojdestvensky's lines, the "Suvaroff" and the"Ossliabya" at the head of the starboard and port divisions being each madea target by several of the enemy. 

The Japanese gunners were firing with a rapidity that surprised even thosewho had been in the action of 10 August, and with much more terribleeffect. In Captain Semenoff's narrative of the fate of the "Suvaroff" wehave a remarkably detailed description of the execution done by theJapanese shells in this first stage of the battle. The opening shots wenthigh. They flew over the "Suvaroff, " some of the big 12-inch projectilesturning over and over longitudinally in their flight. But at once Semenoffremarked that the enemy were using a more sensitive fuse than on 10 August. Every shell as it touched the water exploded in a geyser of smoke andspray. As the Japanese corrected the range shells began to explode on boardor immediately over the deck, and again there was proof of the improvedfusing. The slightest obstacle--the guy of a funnel, the lift of a boatderrick--was enough to burst the shell. 

 [Illustration: BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA DIAGRAMS OF MOVEMENTS DURING THE FIGHTING OF MAY 27TH]

The first fair hit was on the side, abreast of the forward funnel. It sentup a "gigantic column of smoke, water, and flame. " Then several men werekilled and wounded near the fore-bridge, and then there was a crash besideone of the quick-firers, and, the shell bursting as it penetrated the deck, set the ship on fire. In the battle of 10 August the flagship "Tsarevitch, "which had borne the brunt of the Japanese fire, had been hit just nineteentimes, but now that the "Mikasa" and her consorts had got the range hitfollowed hit on the leading Russian ships. "It seemed impossible, " saysSemenoff, "even to count the number of projectiles striking us. I had notonly never witnessed such a fire before, but I had never imagined anythinglike it. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one afteranother. .. . The steel plates and superstructure on the upper deck were tornto pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders werecrumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from theirmountings. Such havoc would never be caused by the simple impact of ashell, still less by that of its splinters. It could only be caused by theforce of the explosion. .. . In addition to this there was the unusually hightemperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread overeverything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Ofcourse, the steel did not burn, but the paint on it did. Such almostincombustible materials as hammocks and rows of boxes, drenched with water, flared up in a moment. At times it was almost impossible to see anythingwith glasses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering, heated air. No! It was different to the 10th of August!"

In this storm of fire there was heavy loss of life. A shell-burst killedand wounded most of the signallers as they stood together at their station. An explosion against the opening of the conning-tower killed two officersbeside Rojdestvensky, and slightly wounded the admiral. The fight had notlasted more than twenty minutes, and the "Suvaroff, " the "Alexander, " and"Borodino, " the three leading Russian ships, were all wrapped in blacksmoke from the fires lighted on board of them by the Chimose shells. 

How was the Japanese line faring? I talked over his battle experiences witha Japanese officer not long after the day of Tsu-shima. He told me hisimpression was that at first the Russians shot fairly well, causing someloss of life at the more exposed stations on board the leading Japaneseships. "But, " he added, "after the first twenty minutes they seemedsuddenly to go all to pieces, and their shooting became wild and almostharmless. " No wonder that under such a tornado of explosions, death anddestruction, and with their ships ablaze, and range-finding andfire-controlling stations wrecked, the gunnery of the Russians broke down. One of the pithy sayings of the American Admiral Farragut was: "The bestprotection against the enemy's fire is the steady fire of your own guns. "Tsu-shima gave startling proof of it. 

Semenoff hoped that the Japanese were also suffering from the stress ofbattle. From the fore-bridge of the "Suvaroff" he scanned their line withhis glasses. In the sea-fights of other wars both fleets were wrapped in adense fog of powder smoke, but now with the new powder there was no smokeexcept that of bursting shells and burning material. So he coulddistinguish everything plainly. 

 "The enemy had finished turning. His twelve ships were in perfect order at close intervals, steaming parallel to us, but gradually forging ahead. No disorder was noticeable. It seemed to me that with my Zeiss glasses (the distance was a little more than two miles) I could distinguish the mantlets of hammocks on the bridges and the groups of men. But with us? I looked round. What havoc! Burning bridges, smouldering débris on the decks, piles of dead bodies. Signalling and judging distance stations, gun-directing positions, all were destroyed. And astern of us the 'Alexander' and the 'Borodino' were also wrapped in smoke. "

Men were killed in the turrets by shell splinters flying through the narrowgun openings. The fire hose was repeatedly cut to ribbons, and the menfighting the fire killed. The injuries caused by near explosions wereterrible. Men were literally blown to atoms, or limbs were torn off. Elevenwooden boats piled up on the spar-deck were a mass of roaring flame. Gunafter gun was disabled. And all the while a glance at the Japanese fleetshowed them steaming and firing as if at peace manoeuvres, without evenone of their numerous flagstaffs and signal yards shot away. The battle hadnot lasted an hour, and it was already evident that it could have only oneending. 

In the smoke and confusion Semenoff could only see what was happening inthe front of the line, but the other ships were exposed to a heavy fire, and had less resisting power. The "Ossliabya, " the fifth of thebattleships, and Fölkersham's flagship during the voyage, [31] was the firstto succumb. The firing had hardly begun when a 12-inch projectilepenetrated her forward above the water-line. In fine weather the effectwould not have been very serious, but the heavy sea flooded her two bowcompartments. Then another shell started an armour plate on the water-lineamidships, flooded the bunkers on the port side, and gave her a heavy listin that direction. Unsuccessful attempts were made to right her by openingvalves and admitting water on the other side. Then a shell burst in thefore-turret and put all the crews of the two guns out of action. She wasnow settling down by the head and heeling over more and more to port. Suddenly the sea reached her lower gun-ports and poured into her. Then, like the unfortunate "Victoria, " she "turned turtle, " and sank. It was at2. 25 that she disappeared thus suddenly, the first battleship ever sunk bygun-fire. Three of the destroyers picked up some of the crew who had jumpedoverboard. 

 [31] Admiral Fölkersham had a paralytic stroke while at Honkohe Bay, and died at sea two days before the battle. 

As she sank, the three other ships of her division ("Sissoi, " "Navarin, "and "Nakhimoff"), under the stress of the Japanese fire, sheered for awhile out of the line with their upper works ablaze in several places. Thefour stately battleships at the head of the line had then to face theconcentrated attack of the enemy. The "Orel" was suffering like herconsorts. Though her armour was nowhere penetrated, the shells burst theirway into her unarmoured superstructure, and reduced everything on her upperdecks to tangled wreckage. Five minutes after the "Ossliabya" sank a shellwrecked the after-turret of the "Suvaroff, " tearing the after-bridge topieces with the flying fragments. Her steering gear was temporarilydisabled, and she drifted from her station at the head of the line. One byone in quick succession the heavy steel masts and two huge funnels crasheddown. The upper deck was impassable from end to end. In the midst of theconfused wreckage handfuls of brave men fought the fires with buckets asthey broke out now here now there. Most of the guns were silent. "She nolonger looked like a ship, " says a Japanese account. 

When the "Suvaroff" swerved out of the line at a few minutes before threeo'clock her steering gear had been disabled, and probably for a few minutesbefore the crisis she had not been answering her helm. The course of thefleet, while she led it during the fight with the Japanese armoured fleet, had been due east, but, as she lost her direction, it turned slightly tothe south. When she drifted away from the line the "ImperatorAlexander III" became the leading ship. Captain Buchvostoff, who commandedher, led the fleet in a circle round the disabled "Suvaroff, " first runningsouthwards, increasing the distance from the enemy, and then sweeping roundas if trying to break through to the northward. Togo followed on a parallelcourse until the Russian fleet seemed to be going due south, then hesignalled an order, and, as accurately as if they were performing apractice evolution at manoeuvres, his twelve ships turned simultaneouslythrough half a circle, thus reversing the direction and changing the orderof the fleet so that the last ship in the line became the leader. As theRussians swept round to the north Togo was thus ready to cross their bows, and the "Alexander" received the concentrated fire of several ships. 

She turned eastwards, followed by her consorts in a straggling line, andthen drifted out of her place at the head of it, leaking badly, and withher upper works ablaze. On a smoother sea the "Tsarevitch" had been hitonce below the armour belt on 10 August. 

 [Illustration: THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP 'OREL' _Taken after the battle of Tsu-Shima, showing effects of Japanese shell fire_]

The "Borodino" now had the dangerous post at the head of the line. Itsteamed eastwards for nearly an hour, followed by Togo on a parallelcourse, the Japanese fire only slackening when fog and smoke obscured itstargets, and the fire of the Russians dwindling minute by minute, as gunposition after position became untenable or guns were disabled anddismounted. 

Long before this the divisions of protected cruisers under Admiral Dewa andhis colleagues had worked round to the southward of the Russians. Dewa andUriu, with their swift ships, were in action by a quarter to three. Theslower ships of Takeomi and the younger Togo's squadrons, united under thecommand of Rear-Admiral Kataoka, came into the fight a little later. In theheavy sea that was running the light cruisers afforded a less steadyplatform for the guns than the big armoured ships, and their fire was notso terribly destructive. But it was effective enough, and that of theRussian rear ships was hopelessly bad. The Japanese cruisers drove thetransports and their escort, in a huddled crowd, north-eastwards towardsthe main Russian fleet. The great wall sides of the German liner, now theauxiliary cruiser "Ural, " were riddled, and the giant began to settle downin the water. The cruiser "Svietlana, " hit badly in the forepart, wasdangerously down by the head. The transports "Kamschatka" and "Irtish" wereboth set on fire, and the latter was also pierced along the water-line. Shesank at four o'clock. The "Oleg" and "Aurora" were both badly damaged. Butthe Japanese unarmoured cruisers did not escape scathless. Dewa's finecruiser, the "Kasagi, " was badly hit below the waterline, and was in suchdanger of sinking that he handed the command of his squadron over to Uriuand, escorted by the "Chitose, " steamed out of the fight, steering for theJapanese coast. Togo's old ship, the famous "Naniwa Kan, " was also hitbelow the water-line, and had to cease firing and devote all the energy ofthe crew to saving the ship. 

At five o'clock the Russian fleet, battleships, cruisers, and transports, were huddled together in a confused crowd, attacked from the eastward byTogo and Kamimura with the heavy squadrons, while from the south the lineof light cruisers under Uriu and Kataoka poured a cross-fire into them. Away to the westward lay the disabled and burning "Suvaroff" with theRussian naval flag, the blue cross of St. Andrew on a white ground, stillflying from a flagstaff in the smoke. The admiral had been twice wounded, the second blow slightly fracturing his skull, and making it difficult forhim to speak. Her captain, Ignazius, had been simply blown to pieces by aJapanese shell while, after being already twice wounded, he was directing adesperate effort to master the conflagration on board. The decks werestrewn with dead, the mess-deck full of helpless wounded men. Most of theguns were out of action, but a 6-inch quick-firer and a few lighter gunswere kept in action, and drove off the first attempt of the Japanesedestroyers to dash in and sink her. Still there was no thought ofsurrender. The few survivors of her crew fought with dogged Russian courageto the last. A torpedo destroyer, the "Buiny, " taking terrible risks, cameup to her, hung on for a few moments to her shattered side, and succeededin getting off the wounded admiral and a few officers and men. Rojdestvensky sent a last message to Nebogatoff, telling him to take overthe command and try to get through with some part of the fleet toVladivostock. 

About half-past five some of the Russian ships struggled out of the press, led by the burning "Borodino, " with the "Orel" next to her. In thestraggling line battleships and cruisers, armoured and unarmoured, weremingled together. The "Alexander" had succeeded in stopping some of herleaks and had rejoined the line. She was near the end of it. The "Ural, "deserted by her crew, was drifting, till one of Togo's battleships sank herwith a few shots. 

The Russians were now steering northwards, and for the moment there was nolarge ship in front of them. The Japanese could have easily headed themoff, but Togo now regarded them as a huntsman regards a herd of deer thathe is driving before him. The Japanese squadron steamed after them atreduced speed, just keeping at convenient range, the heavy ships on theirright, the light squadrons behind them. At first the armoured shipsconcentrated their fire on the "Alexander. " Shells were bursting all overher, and throwing up geysers of water about her bows. Then the mercilessfire was turned on the "Borodino. " A few minutes after seven the"Alexander" was seen to capsize and disappear. A quarter of an hour laterthere was an explosion on board of the "Borodino. " Next moment a patch offoam on the waves showed where she had been. About the same time a divisionof torpedo-boats came upon the unfortunate "Suvaroff, " torpedoed her, andsaved some of the crew, who were found floating on the water after shesank. 

As the sun went down, and the twilight darkened into night, the firing diedaway. What was left of the Russian fleet was steaming slowly into the Seaof Japan, some of the ships isolated, others holding together in improviseddivisions, all bearing terrible marks of the fight, some of them still onfire, others leaking badly. 

Togo had been hit during the fight, but it was only a slight bruise. Thelosses of his fleet had been trifling. Of the armoured ships the only onethat had been badly hit was the "Asama. " She was struck by three shells aftnear the water-line, her rudder was disabled, and she was leaking badly. She left the fighting-line for a while, but was able temporarily to repairdamages, and rejoined later in the day. 

At sunset Togo ordered his squadrons to steam north-eastward during thenight, and unite at sunrise at a point south of Matsu-shima or UllondoIsland. They were to keep away from the Russian ships in the darkness. Thevictorious admiral was about to let loose his torpedo flotillas, tocomplete the destruction of the flying enemy, and meant that his torpedoofficers should have no anxiety about hitting friends in the dark. 

He had with the main fleet twenty-one destroyers organized in fivesquadrons. In the bays of Tsu-shima nearly eighty torpedo-boats had beensheltering all day. The destroyers had been directed to pursue and attackthe beaten enemy during the night. No orders had been given to thetorpedo-boats. The sea was going down, but it was still rough, and Togo haddoubts about risking the smaller craft. But without orders, sixteen groupsof four boats each, sixty-four in all, got up steam and sallied out intothe darkness. 

It was an awful night for the Russians. After dark they had extinguishedthe fires lighted by the enemy's shells, and in some cases got collisionmats over the leaks. The dead were committed to the sea, the woundedcollected and cared for. For more than an hour they were allowed to holdtheir course uninterrupted, and the lights of the Japanese fleet weredisappearing far astern. After all, Vladivostock might be reached. But justafter eight o'clock the throb of engines, the hurtling beat of propellers, came sounding through the night from all sides. On the sea black, lowobjects were rushing along with foaming phosphorescent wakes trailingbehind them. Bugles ran out the alarm; crews rushed to quarters;searchlights blazed out, and the small quick-firers that were stillserviceable mingled their sharp ringing reports with the crackle ofmachine-gun fire. The sea seemed to be swarming with torpedo craft. Theyappeared and disappeared in the beams of the searchlights, and the surfaceof the water was marked with the long white ripples raised by the rush ofdischarged torpedoes. Loud explosions, now here now there, told that someof them had found their target, though in the confusion and the rough seathere were more misses than hits. The "Sissoi Veliki, " which had been onfire in the action, and pierced below the waterline, had a new and moreserious leak torn open in her stern, the rudder was damaged and twopropeller blades torn off. But she floated till next day. Several shipsreceived minor injuries, but kept afloat with one or more compartmentsflooded. But the effect of the attack was to disperse the fugitive Russiansin all directions. 

When it began Nebogatoff was at the head of a line of ships in the oldbattleship "Imperator Nikolai I. " In the confusion only three of the linekept up with him, the much-battered "Orel" and the "Admiral Apraxin" and"Admiral Senyavin. " The "Orel" had no searchlight left intact. The"Nikolai" and the two others did not switch on their searchlights, and keptall other lights shaded. The remarkable result was that as they movednorthwards through the darkness they were never attacked, though more thanonce between 8 p. M. And midnight they saw the enemy's torpedo craft rushingpast them. The ships with searchlights drew all the attacks. 

Admiral Enquist, with his flag in the "Oleg, " and followed by the "Aurora"and "Jemschug, " had run in amongst the remains of the transport flotilla atthe first alarm, narrowly escaping collision with them. Then he turnedsouth, in the hope of shaking the enemy off, but came upon another flotillaarriving from that direction. He had some narrow escapes. The look-outs ofthe "Oleg" counted seventeen torpedoes that just missed the ship. Havinggot away, he tried more than once to turn back to the northward, but eachtime he ran in among hostile torpedo-boats, and saw that beyond them wereships with searchlights working and guns in action, so he steered againsouth. At last he gave up the attempt and headed for the Tsu-shima Straits. He got safely through them, because the main Japanese fleet was miles away, steaming steadily north, with tired men sleeping by the guns. Next day hewas in the open sea with no enemy in sight, and set his course forShanghai. 

At midnight the defeated Russians thought they had at last shaken off thepursuit of the sea-wolves. But at 2 a. M. The attacks began again. The"Navarin" and the "Admiral Nakhimoff, " among the rearmost ships, wereattacked by Commander Suzuki's squadron of destroyers. The "Navarin" wassunk after being hit by two torpedoes. The "Nakhimoff" was severelydamaged. About the same time the "Vladimir Monomach" and the "DimitriDonskoi" were torpedoed, but managed to keep afloat. The attacking forcehad a good many casualties. Torpedo-boats Nos. 35 and 65 were sunk by theRussian fire. Their crews were rescued by their consorts. Four destroyers(the "Harusami, " "Akatsuki, " "Izazuchi, " and "Yugiri") and twotorpedo-boats (Nos. 31 and 68) were so seriously damaged by hostile fire, or by collision in the darkness, that they were put out of action. As thedawn began to whiten the eastern sky the torpedo flotillas drew off. 

At sunrise the Russian fleet was scattered far over the Sea of Japan. Someof the ships for a while steamed alone with neither consort nor enemy insight within the circle of the horizon. But new dangers came with the day. Togo's fleet was at hand, flinging out a wide net of which the meshes weresquadrons and detached cruisers to sweep the sea northwards, and gather upthe remnants of the defeated enemy. The weather was clearing up, and it wasa fine, bright day--just the day for the work the Japanese had to do. 

Steaming steadily through the night, Togo, with the main body of theJapanese fleet, had passed to eastward of the scattered Russians, and wasabout twenty miles south of Ullondo. The distances covered in this battleof Tsu-shima were beyond any that had ever been known in naval war. Therunning fight during the night had passed over more than 150 miles of sea. At 5. 20 a. M. The admiral on board the "Mikasa" received a wireless messagefrom Kataoka's cruisers, reporting that they were sixty miles away to thesouthward of him, and that they could see several columns of black smokeon the horizon to the eastward. Shortly after Kataoka sent another wirelessmessage--"Four of the enemy's battleships and two cruisers are in sight, steering north-west. " Togo at once signalled to his own ships to head offthis detachment of the enemy, and sent wireless orders to Kataoka and Uriuto close in on their rear. It was probably the main fighting division leftto the Russians, and would soon be surrounded by an overwhelming Japaneseforce. 

The ships sighted by the cruisers were those that Admiral Nebogatoff hadled through the night, and was trying to take to Vladivostock. He had withhim the battleships "Nikolai I" and "Orel, " the coast-defence armour-clads"Admiral Apraxin" and "Admiral Senyavin, " and the cruisers "Izumrud" and"Svietlana. " This last ship was leaking badly and down by the bows. Shecould not keep up with the others, and at daylight fell far astern and lostsight of them. At 7 a. M. Uriu's division in chase of Nebogatoff came upwith her, and the cruisers "Niitaka" and "Otowa" were detached to captureher. The Russian captain, Schein, had held a council with his officers. Hehad only a hundred shells left in the magazines, and the "Svietlana" wasbeing kept afloat by her steam pumps. Under the regulations he could havehonourably surrendered to a superior force, but it was unanimously resolvedto fight to the last shot, and then sink with colours flying. The fightlasted an hour. There were heavy losses. The Japanese fire riddled theship, and first the starboard, then the port engine was disabled. As thehundredth shot rang out from the "Svietlana's" guns, Captain Schein stoppedthe pumps and opened the sea-cocks, and the ship settled down rapidly inthe water. The Japanese cruisers went off to join the fleet as the"Svietlana" disappeared, but an armed Japanese liner, the "America Maru, "stood by and picked up about a hundred men. 

At 10. 30 a. M. Nebogatoff was completely surrounded eighteen miles south ofthe island of Takeshima. The "Izumrud" had used her superior speed to getaway to the south-west. The four battered ships that remained with him sawmore than twenty enemies appear from all points of the compass, includingTogo's battleships and heavy armoured cruisers, all as fit for work as whenthe first fighting began. They opened fire at long range with their heavyguns. 

The situation was desperate. Nebogatoff consulted his officers, and allthose on board the "Nikolai" agreed that he must surrender. In a memorandumhe subsequently wrote he pointed out that, though some ammunition was left, the Japanese were using their superior speed to keep a distance at which hecould not reply effectively to their overwhelming fire; neither the shorenor other ships were within reach; most of the boats had been shattered, the rest could not be lowered; even the life-belts had been burned or usedto improvise defences in the ships; continued resistance or the act ofsinking the ships would only mean the useless sacrifice of some 2000 men. After the ships had been only a short time in action, during which timethey received further severe damage, he hauled down his colours. Togoallowed the Russian officers to retain their swords, as a proof of hisopinion that they had acted as befitted brave and honourable men. 

While the brief action with Nebogatoff's squadron was in progress, thethird of the Russian coast-defence battleships, the "Admiral Ushakoff, "hove in sight. She turned off to the westward pursued by the armouredcruisers "Iwate" and "Yakumo. " They soon overhauled her, and signalled asummons to surrender, adding that Nebogatoff had already done so. The"Ushakoff" replied with her 9-inch guns. The cruisers sank her in an hour, and then rescued some three-fourths of her crew of 400 men. 

The "Sissoi Veliki, " badly injured in the action of the day before, andtorpedoed during the night, was in a sinking condition when the sun rose on28 May. No ships were in sight, all the boats had been destroyed, and whilethe pumps were still kept going the crew was set to work to constructrafts. While this was being done with very scanty materials, the "VladimirMonomach" hove in sight, accompanied by the destroyer "Iromki. " In reply toa signal for help, the "Monomach" answered that she could do nothing, asshe was herself expecting to sink soon. The "Iromki" offered to take a fewmen, but the captain of the "Sissoi" generously refused to deprive the"Monomach" of her help. The two ships then steamed away. An hour later the"Sissoi" was just settling down in the water, when three Japanese armedmerchant steamers appeared and took off her crew. At half-past ten the"Sissoi" heeled over to starboard and sank. 

Soon after she lost sight of the "Sissoi, " the "Monomach" came upon thearmoured cruiser "Admiral Nakhimoff, " which also signalled that she was ina sinking condition. Presently there was smoke on the horizon, and then thearmed steamer "Sadu Maru" and the Japanese destroyer "Shiranui" appeared. In such conditions the enemy proved a friend. The crews of the twounfortunate ships were transferred to the "Sadu, " which stood by till, about ten o'clock, both the "Nakhimoff" and the "Monomach" went to thebottom. 

The "Navarin" was comparatively little injured in the battle, but wastorpedoed during the night. Leaking badly, she struggled northward at aslow rate till two in the afternoon of the 28th, when she was found andattacked by a Japanese destroyer flotilla. She still made a fight with herlighter guns, and was hit by two torpedoes. The crew were all at theirbattle stations when she began suddenly to sink. The order, "All hands ondeck, " came too late, and very few lives were saved. 

The armoured cruiser "Dimitri Donskoi, " last survivor of Rojdestvensky'sfourteen battleships and armoured cruisers, escaped the torpedo attacks inthe night, and eluded pursuit all through the morning of the 28th. At 4p. M. , when she was near the island of Ullondo, she sighted some Japaneseships in the distance, Uriu's cruiser division and some destroyers. Theyclosed slowly on her, and it was not till six o'clock that she was attackedby the cruisers "Niitaka" and "Otowa, " and three destroyers. The "Donskoi"made a gallant fight for two hours, beating off the torpedo-boats, losingsixty killed and twice as many wounded, and finally disengaging herself inthe darkness about eight o'clock. The water-line armour was intact, but oneboiler was penetrated and ammunition was nearly exhausted. In the night, the captain, who was himself slightly wounded, decided to land his men onUllondo Island and sink the ship. All the boats had been shattered and thecutter that was left had to be hastily repaired before it could be lowered. With the one boat the disembarkation went on slowly during the night. Atdawn the enemy's torpedo-boats were sighted. The rest of the crew jumpedoverboard and swam ashore, leaving a few men with the second-in-command onthe ship. They ran the "Donskoi" out into a hundred fathoms of water, opened the sea-cocks, embarked in their one boat, and saw their ship godown as they pulled ashore. The Japanese sent a couple of steamers to takethe crew off the island. 

The torpedo destroyer that conveyed the wounded Admiral Rojdestvensky, Captain Semenoff, and a few other officers and men away from the fight wasfound and captured by a Japanese flotilla during the afternoon of the 28th. 

The cruiser "Izumrud, " one of the few fast ships the Russians had withthem, escaped the torpedo attacks in the night. In the morning she waschased by several of the enemy's cruisers. She kept up a good speed, andone by one they abandoned the chase, the "Chitose" being the last to giveit up. By 2 p. M. All pursuit was left behind, and she reduced speed. In thebattle and the chase she had burned so much coal that she had not enoughleft to make for Vladivostock, so she steered for Vladimir Bay, in theRussian Coast Province of Siberia, north of Korea. She was off theentrance of the Bay at midnight with only ten tons of coal left in herbunkers. Unfortunately, in trying to go in in the dark on the flood-tideshe drove hard on a reef. Next day unsuccessful efforts were made to gethis ship off and in the afternoon, as her captain expected the enemy'sships might arrive to secure the "Izumrud" and refloat her, he landed hiscrew on Russian ground, destroyed his guns one by one with blastingcharges, and then blew up the ship. 

The destroyer "Groki" was chased and captured by the Japanese destroyer"Shiranui" and a torpedo-boat, and after a sharp fight close to Tsu-shimaIsland surrendered at 11. 30 a. M. She was so injured that she sank within anhour of her capture. Admiral Enquist, with the three protected cruisers"Oleg, " "Aurora, " and "Jemschug, " had, after turning south for the lasttime during the night of torpedo attacks, got through the Tsu-shima Straitsin the darkness. Next day no enemy was in sight, and he steered forShanghai under easy steam, repairing damages on the way. He intended to lieoff the port, bring a couple of colliers out of the Woosung River, fill hisbunkers at sea, and try to reach Vladivostock by the Pacific and the LaPérouse Straits. On the morning of the 29th he was overtaken by therepairing ship and tug "Svir, " and from her learned the full extent of thedisaster. Fearing that if he approached Shanghai he would be driven intothe port and blockaded by the enemy, he changed his course for Manila, where he arrived on 3 June. The "Svir, " after communicating with him, hadgone on to the Woosung River. She was joined on her way there by thetransport "Anadir, " which had got successfully south through the Tsu-shimaStraits. The transport "Korea, " which had escaped in the same way, and hada cargo of coal, did not go to Woosung, but crossed the Indian Ocean andappeared unexpectedly in the French port of Diego Suarez in Madagascar. Ofthe nine torpedo destroyers with the Russian fleet seven were hunted downand sunk or taken by the Japanese. 

The only ships of all the Russian armada that finally reached Vladivostockwere the two destroyers "Brawy" and "Gresny, " and the small swift cruiser"Almaz. " She had been with Enquist's cruiser division in the first hours ofthe night after the battle. During the torpedo attacks she had becomeseparated from her consorts. Escaping from the destroyers, she headed atfull speed first towards the coast of Japan, then northward. At sunrise onthe 28th she was well on her way and many miles north-east of Togo's fleet. Next day she reached Vladivostock with 160 tons of coal still on board. 

A hundred years after Trafalgar Togo had won a victory as complete and asdecisive. The Russian power had been swept from the Eastern Seas, and thegrey-haired admiral who had secured this triumph for his nativeland--"Father Togo, " as the Japanese affectionately call him--had livedthrough the whole evolution of the Imperial Navy, had shared in its firstsuccesses, and for years had been training it for the great struggle thatwas to decide who was to be master in the seas of the Far East. 

The war was followed by an immediate expansion of the Japanese Navy. Numbers of captured Russian ships were repaired, re-armed, and placed inthe Navy List under Japanese names. No longer dependent on foreignbuilders, the Japanese yards were kept busy turning out yet a new navy ofevery class, from the battleship to the torpedo-boat. The laying down ofthe gigantic "Aki" and "Satsuma, " battleships of over 20, 000 tons, opened anew period in naval construction, and nations began to count theirsea-power by the number of "Dreadnoughts" afloat or on the slips. 

The great maritime powers are now engaged in a race of construction, andthe next naval war will see forces in action far surpassing even thearmadas that met at Tsu-shima. And maritime war, hitherto confined to thesurface of the sea, will have strange auxiliaries in the submarine stealingbeneath it, and the airship and aeroplane scouting in the upper air. Butstill, whatever new appliances, whatever means of mutual destructionscience supplies, the lesson taught by the story of all naval war willremain true. Victory will depend not on elaborate mechanical structures andappliances, but on the men, and will be the reward of long training, irondiscipline, calm, enduring courage, and the leadership that can inspireconfidence, command self-sacrificing obedience, divine an enemy's plans, and decide swiftly and resolutely on the way in which they are to befrustrated. 

INDEX

A

Actium, 25, etc. ; topography of, 30; the battle of, 32, etc. 

Æschylus, 2, 21

Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius, 27

Alava, Spanish rear-admiral at Trafalgar, 192; surrenders to Collingwood, 199

Albemarle. _See_ Monk, Duke of

Albini, Italian admiral, second in command at Lissa, 242, etc. 

Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral, 85, 86, 88, 93, 103

Alexandria, bombardment of, 253, 254

Allen, Sir Thomas, English admiral in Second Dutch War, 152, etc. 

Antony, Mark, 25; flight from Actium, 35; death, 38

Antwerp, the great fire-ship of, 130

Aristides, 15; at Salamis, 21

Armada of 1588, 105, etc. ; organisation and statistics, 111

Armour-clads, early: Erik Jarl's "Iron Beard, " 49; the "Finis Belli" (1585), 209; floating batteries, 211

Armour-clads, first modern sea-going: the "Gloire" (French), 211; the "Warrior" (British), 213

Artemisia of Halicarnassus, 11, 15; at Salamis, 21; at the council after the battle, 22

Athens, beginnings of its sea-power, 4; occupied by the Persians, 7

Augustus, 25; founder of the Roman Empire, 38; naval policy, 39

B

Bahuchet, French admiral, 61

Baltic Fleet organised by Russia for the Far East, 304; voyage of, 306; Dogger Bank incident, 307; passes Malacca, 309

Barbarigo, Agostino, Venetian admiral, 80, 92; killed at Lepanto, 103

Barbavera, Genoese admiral at Sluys, 61; his escape after the battle, 65

Bertendona, admiral of the Levant squadron of the Armada, 112

Bingham, Queen Elizabeth's Governor of Connaught, 138, etc. 

Blackwood, captain of Nelson's look-out frigate "Euryalus, " 181, 186, 188, 191

Blake, 143, 144

Bragadino, Venetian commandant of Famagusta, 73; tortured and put to death by the Turks, 74

Bragadino, Ambrogio and Antonio, Venetian captains at Lepanto, 92

British Navy: in Middle Ages, _see_ chap. IV. , Sluys, 55; in Tudor period, _see_ chap. VI. , the Armada, 105; in Stuart period, _see_ chap. VII. , the battle off the Gunfleet, 142; in the eighteenth century, _see_ chap. VIII. , the Battle of the Saints' Passage, 158; in Nelson's time, _see_ chap. IX. , Trafalgar, 173

Brunel, 208

Buchanan, commodore, C. S. N. , captain of the "Merrimac, " 219, etc. 

Byron, captain, under Rodney, 163

C

Cæsar, Julius, 25

Calais, importance to England, 55

Calder, Sir Robert, action off Finisterre, 177

Cardona, Juan de, Spanish admiral, 80

Cervantes, Miguel de (author of "Don Quixote"), at Lepanto, 82; wounded, 99

Cervera, Spanish admiral, 280; voyage to Cuba, 282, etc. ; goes out of Santiago to battle, 287; taken prisoner, 293

Charlemagne and the Norsemen, 41

Chatham, Dutch raid on, 156, 157

Churucca, Commodore, at Trafalgar, 200, 201

Cinque Ports, 57, 58

Cisneros, Spanish rear-admiral at Trafalgar, 197, 198

Cleopatra, 25; flight from Actium, 35; death, 38

Clerk of Eldin, his naval theories, 168

Collingwood, 179, 180, 183; breaks through French line at Trafalgar, 192; takes command of fleet after Nelson's death, 204

Colonna, Marco Antonio, Papal admiral, 71, 76; at Lepanto, 99

Cromwell, 143

Cyprus, Turkish invasion of, under Selim II, 70; fall of Nicosia, 71; siege of Famagusta, 71, 73

D

Damme, naval victory at, 56

Darius, 4

Decrès, Admiral, Minister of Marine under Napoleon I, 178, 180

Dewa, Admiral, 323, 331

Dewey, Admiral, 280

Doria, Giovanni Andrea, Genoese admiral, 80; at Lepanto, 99, etc. 

Douglas, Sir Charles, share in Rodney's victory, 167-9

Dover with Calais made England mistress of the Channel, 56; De Burgh's naval victory off, 57

Drake, Francis, 107, 109, 116, 119, 124, 132

Drake, Samuel, rear-admiral under Rodney, 164

Dumanoir, admiral of French van squadron at Trafalgar, his blunders, 194; subsequent loss of his ships, 203

E

Edward I, use of navy in Scottish wars, 56

Edward III, 55; the French War, 59; at Sluys, 64

Egypt, early navigators of, 2

Enquist, Russian admiral, 335, etc. 

Ericsson, John, designer of the "Monitor, " 213; _See_ "Monitor"

Erik Jarl, 46; his ship the "Iron Beard, " a primitive armour-clad, 49; in the fight at Svold, 51, etc. 

Euboea, battles of Greeks and Persians off, 11, etc. 

Eulate, captain of the "Vizcaya" at Santiago, 294, 295

Eurybiades, 11, 22

Evans, Captain Robley, U. S. N. , 294, 295

Evertszoon, Dutch admiral, 148, etc. 

F

Famagusta. _See_ Cyprus

Farragut, Admiral, sayings of, 231, 238

Fenner, 116

Fitzwilliam, Elizabeth's Lord Deputy in Ireland, 138, etc. 

Fremantle, captain of the "Neptune" at Trafalgar, 197, 198

Frobisher, 117, 128, 132

Fulton and early steamships, 206

G

Galley-slaves, 87

Ganteaume, French admiral, 174

Giustiniani, Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, 81, 103

Grasse, Comte de, Rodney's battle with, 158, etc. 

Gravelines, the Armada battle off, 131, etc. 

Gravina, Spanish admiral, 176, 181, 187

Guichen, de, 160

H

Hanneken, Major von, German officer in Chinese service, 261

Hardy, captain of the "Victory, " 195, 196

Harold Haarfager, 42

Hawkins, 107, 116, 119, 127, 128, 132

Hobart Pasha, 253

Holland, rise of naval power, 142; first war with England, 143; second war, 144

Hood, 164, etc. 

Howard of Effingham, 116, 124, etc. 

Howard, Lord Thomas, 127

Howe, 173

I

Infernet, captain of the "Intrépide" at Trafalgar, 202, 203

Ireland and the Armada, 137

Ito, Count, Japanese admiral at the Yalu, 259, etc. 

J

Japan, rise of naval power, 254; policy after Chinese War, 297; war with Russia, 300

Josephine, the Empress, 161

Juan of Austria, Don, admiral of the Christian League, 76, 78; at Lepanto, 91, etc. 

K

Kamimura, Admiral, defeats the Vladivostock squadron, 303; at Tsu-shima, 332

Kara Khodja, his scouting expeditions, 85

Kempenfeldt, Admiral, 161

Kiriet, French admiral, 61

L

Leotychides, 23

Lepanto, 67, etc. 

Lepidus, 25

Leyva, general of the troops embarked in the Armada, 114, 120, 123, 127, 135; shipwrecked and drowned, 140

Lissa, battle of (1866), 231, etc. 

Longsword, William, his victory at Damme, 56

Lucas, captain of the "Redoutable, " 193, 195

M

Macaulay and the Armada, 105, 120

McGiffen, Commander, American officer in Chinese service, 261, 265, 272, 273

Magon, French admiral at Trafalgar, 199

Mahomet II takes Constantinople, 67

Makharoff, Admiral, death of, 301

Manila, battle of, 180

Marathon, 4

Mark Antony. _See_ Antony

Maurice of Nassau, 134

Maximilian, Archduke and Austrian admiral (afterwards Emperor of Mexico), 235

Medina, Lopez de, wrecked on Fair Isle, 137, 138

Medina-Sidonia, Guzman, Duke of, commander-in-chief of the Armada, 109, 115, etc. ; return to Spain, 140

"Merrimac, " improvised Confederate armour-clad, 214, etc. ; attack on the wooden ships at Hampton Roads, 215; sinks the "Cumberland, " 218; fight with the "Monitor, " 224, etc. ; "Merrimac" destroyed later, 230

Missiessy, French admiral, 174

Mohacs, battle of, 68

Moncada, admiral of the galleasses in the Armada, 131

"Monitor, " design and construction, 221, etc. ; voyage to Hampton Roads, 223; fight with "Merrimac, " 224, etc. ; lost at sea later on, 230

Monk, Duke of Albemarle, 146, etc. 

Mycale, destruction of Persian fleet at, 24

Mylæ, naval battle of, 27

N

Napier, Sir Charles, first to take steamships into action, 207

Napoleon I, naval projects, 174, etc. , 178, 179; refuses Fulton's inventions, 206

Napoleon III and the introduction of armoured ships, 210, 211; Ericsson's offer to, 213

Nebogatoff sent with squadron of old ships to reinforce Baltic Fleet, 308; at Tsu-shima, 323; surrenders, 337, 338

Nelson, alleged Danish descent, 41; the Trafalgar campaign, 173, etc. ; plans for the battle, 182, 189, 190; opening of the battle, 192; wounded, 195, 196; his death, 203

Nicholls, English gunner in Chinese service, killed at Yalu, 271

Nicopolis, 29, 38

Norsemen, 41, etc. 

North Sea battles in Dutch War, 143, etc. 

O

Octavian. _See_ Augustus

Olaf, Saint, 54

Olaf Tryggveson, his career, 42; becomes King of Norway, 44; his famous ships, 45; in the fight at Svold, 47, etc. ; death in battle, 53

Opdam, Dutch admiral, 145

Orde, Sir John, and blockade of Cadiz, 176

Ottomans. _See_ Turks

P

Parma, Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 114, 128, 129, 130

Pepys, Samuel, 146, 153

Persano, Italian admiral in command at Lissa, 237, etc. 

Pertev Pasha, Turkish seraskier at Lepanto, 86, 88, 95

Petz, Commodore, Austrian second in command at Lissa, 241, etc. 

Philip II of Spain, 105

Philip of Valois, King of France, 59, 66

Piracy in early days, 3; of Turks and Algerines in the Mediterranean, 68

Pius V, efforts to form a league against the Turks, 70, 72, 75

Platæa, battle of, 23

Port Arthur, naval operations around, 300, etc. ; surrender of, 308

Purvis, English engineer killed at the Yalu, 270

R

Raleigh, Sir Walter, 122

Recalde, Martinez de, admiral of the Biscay squadron of the Armada, 114, 123, 127, 135, 140

Reitzenstein, admiral of the Vladivostock squadron, 302, 303

Rodney, 159, etc. 

Rojdestvensky, admiral in command of the Baltic Fleet, 304, etc. ; taken prisoner, 340

Rupert, Prince, as an admiral, 146, etc. 

Ruyter, de, 146, etc. 

S

Saints' Passage, battle of, 158, etc. 

Salamis, refuge of the Athenians, 6; Greek fleets concentrate at, 13; the battle, 16, etc. 

Sampson, U. S. Admiral, 278, etc. 

Santa Cruz, Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of, 80, 108

Santiago, blockade of, 285; battle outside, 287, etc. 

Schley, U. S. Admiral, 278, etc. 

Sebastopol, attack on sea-front, 209, 211

Selim II, 70

Semenoff, Captain, personal narrative of Tsu-shima, 313, 319, 320, 322, 327, 328; taken prisoner, 340

Seymour, Lord Henry, 118, 126, 129, 132

Shafter, General, operations against Santiago, 286, etc. 

Sigvald Jarl, 47

Sluys, 55, etc. 

Steam applied to warships, 206, etc. 

Steevens, John and Robert, inventors, 210

Strachan, Sir Richard, takes Dumanoir's squadron, 203

Suleiman the Magnificent, 70

Svold Island, battle of, 40, etc. 

T

Takeomi, Admiral, 322, 331

Tegethoff, Austrian commander at Lissa, 235, etc. 

Terschelling, sack of, 156

Themistocles, 4, 13, 14, 22

Ting, Chinese admiral at the Yalu, 259, etc. 

Togo, captain of the "Naniwa" in the Chinese War, 260; admiral commanding in chief in war with Russia, 301, etc. ; preparations for Baltic Fleet, 310, etc. ; his battle signal, 325; slightly wounded, 333

Torpedoes, 252, 253

Trafalgar, 173, etc. 

Troy, 4

Tsu-shima, battle of, 321, etc. 

Turks, growth of their power, 67

U

Ulugh Ali, renegade Turkish admiral, 77, 84, 85; counter-attack at Lepanto, 101; his escape, 102

United States: the navy and the Civil War, 213, etc. ; the navy after the war, 277; the new navy, 278; situation at outbreak of war with Spain, 278, 279

Uriu, Admiral, 331

Urs de Margina, defender of fortress of Lissa, 237

V

Valdes, Diego Flores de, admiral of the Castilian squadron of the Armada, 114

Valdes, Pedro de, admiral of the Andalusian squadron, 114, 123

Van Tromp, 148, etc. 

Veniero, Sebastian, Venetian admiral, 76; at Lepanto, 97

Vikings. _See_ Norsemen

Viking ships, 43

Villeneuve, French admiral commanding at Trafalgar, 174, etc. ; wounded and taken prisoner, 197

W

Winter, Sir W. , 118, 129, 132

Wireless telegraphy, 319

Witjeft, Russian admiral, killed in battle on the 10th of August, 302

Worden (afterwards Admiral), commander of the "Monitor, " 223, etc. ; wounded in fight with "Merrimac, " 227

X

Xantippus, 23

Xerxes, 4; his great expedition, 5, etc. ; watches the battle of Salamis, 16; return to Asia, 21, 22

Y

Yalu, naval battle of the, 255, etc. 

York, Duke of (afterwards James II), 145, 158

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