FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP

REVISED

A Review of American Foreign Policy

BY

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE, PH. D. , LL. D. 

 PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

 Author of "The United States and Latin America" "America as a World Power" Etc. 

GARDEN CITY ------ NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1922

COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1922, BY

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF

TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

PREFACE

The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeksbefore the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at thehigh tide of its power and influence. In view of the subsequent courseof events, some of my readers may question the propriety of theoriginal title. In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a moreappropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation toLeadership, and Back. " But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as anexpression of the final judgment of the American people. The worldstill waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize andassume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power. 

The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes. Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added. 

JOHN H. LATANÉ. 

Baltimore, June 10, 1922. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

 I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE INDEX

From Isolation to Leadership

I

ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION

The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are twophases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writersappear to draw any distinction between them. The Monroe Doctrine wasin its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special applicationto the American continents, of the right of independent states topursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention, domination, or subjugation by other states. President Monroe announcedto the world that this principle would be upheld by the United Statesin this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was the outgrowth ofWashington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and Jefferson'swarning against _entangling_ alliances. Both Washington and Jeffersonhad in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in theirday, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically andby force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concernedthe interests of the first state or not. Such alliances were usuallyof the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, orbetween different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treatiesbetween nations. In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently, if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoplesaffected. It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jeffersonintended that the United States should refrain permanently from theexercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern thepeace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did notobject to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jeffersonobject to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects. Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning thatthe United States must hold aloof from world politics and attendstrictly to its own business. 

The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has beenfully justified by nearly a century of experience. It has saved SouthAmerica from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africaand Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. The policyof isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americansas a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinctfrom the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with theposition and importance of the United States as a world power. Thedifference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best beillustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were tosign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposalin the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on conditionthat England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of anyEuropean power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violationof the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle. Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditionalpolicy of isolation. Of the two policies, that of avoiding politicalalliances is the older. It was announced by Washington undercircumstances that will be considered in a moment. 

In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately soughtforeign alliances. In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the UnitedStates was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratifiedin 1778. The aid which France extended under this treaty to ourrevolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them toestablish the independence of our country. A few years later came theFrench Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed bythe execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between England andFrance. With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of thenewly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in thenewspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under thetreaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778. PresidentWashington requested the opinions in writing of the members of hiscabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new governmentwhich had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treatieswere still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutralityshould be issued. Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length, taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to thebinding force of the treaties. Hamilton took the view that as thegovernment of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated, had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill theirstipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them. Jefferson tookthe correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and thatthey were binding under whatever government the French people chose toset up. This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrinesof international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his wordsare well worth quoting. 

"I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the sourceof all authority in that nation, as free to transact their commonconcerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agentsindividually, or the organization of them in form or function wheneverthey please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authorityof the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, andenure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by anychange in the form of the government, or of the persons administeringit. Consequently the Treaties between the United States and Francewere not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, butbetween the two nations of America and France, and the nationsremaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed theirforms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes. "

The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to pressmatters to a definite conclusion. From his subsequent action itappears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding, but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and thatwe were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such asshe was then waging. He accordingly issued his now famous proclamationof neutrality, April, 1793. Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leadingEnglish authority on international law, writing one hundred yearslater, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes anepoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be nodoubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to theobligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by farthe most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were;and in some points it even went farther than authoritativeinternational custom has up to the present time advanced. In the main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is nowadopted by the community of nations. " Washington's proclamation laidthe real foundations of the American policy of isolation. 

The very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by Washington madethe policy a difficult one to pursue. In the Revolutionary andNapoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, theUnited States was the principal neutral. The problems to which thissituation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during theearly years of the World War that many of the diplomatic notes preparedby Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates, be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing. Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European warstill hanging heavy on the horizon. Under these circumstances hedelivered his famous Farewell Address in which he said:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, inextending our commercial relations to have with them as little_political_ connection as possible. So far as we have already formedengagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let usstop. 

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a veryremote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificialties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinarycombinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. 

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue adifferent course. If we remain one people, under an efficientgovernment, the period is not far off when we may defy material injuryfrom external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as willcause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulouslyrespected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of makingacquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving usprovocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guidedby justice, shall counsel. 

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit ourown to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destinywith that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity inthe toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with anyportion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at libertyto do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizinginfidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no lessapplicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always thebest policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed intheir genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would beunwise to extend them. 

"Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on arespectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporaryalliances for extraordinary emergencies. "

It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against_permanent_ alliances. He expressly said that we might "safely trustto _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies. " Further thanthis many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warningagainst alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which theadvice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned. In asucceeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said:

"With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to ourcountry to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and toprogress without interruption to that degree of strength andconsistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, thecommand of its own fortunes. "

The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the FarewellAddress, but was given currency by Jefferson. In his first inauguraladdress he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulatehis foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, commerce, and honestfriendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none. "

During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in1801, Napoleon undertook the reëstablishment of French power in SantoDomingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire whichhe determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louisiana toFrance by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800. Fortunately forus the ill-fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the oppositionof half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages ofyellow fever. As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisianato France, he instructed Livingston, his representative at Paris, toopen negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida, stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation likeFrance would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. "The day thatFrance takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is torestrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union oftwo nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of theocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleetand nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, forwhich our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formedand cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of hersettlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, whichshall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement shemay have made, and for holding the two continents of America insequestration for the common purposes of the united British andAmerican nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. Itis one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, asnecessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on itsnecessary effect. "

Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he wasinstructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination ofthe negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in themeantime enter into conferences with the British Government, throughtheir ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave usin peace until Congress meets. " Jefferson had already informed theBritish minister at Washington that if France should, by closing themouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they wouldthrow away the scabbard. " Monroe and Livingston were now instructed, in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilitiesagainst the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and tostipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without theconsent of the other. Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities andhis warning against "entangling alliances, " the author of the immortalDeclaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency toform an alliance with England. The unexpected cession of the entireprovince of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplatedalliance with England unnecessary. 

The United States was no more successful in its effort to remainneutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war, though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused thestruggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period oftime. Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rightswhich they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairlybombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There wasreally not much more reason why we should have fought England thanFrance, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere moreeffectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference wasaccompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into theBritish service, we finally declared war against her. No effort wasmade, however, to form an alliance or even to coöperate with Napoleon. The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while wegained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on LakeErie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupyCanada, and the final result of the conflict was that our nationalcapitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas. Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, tookplace two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had, consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war. 

II

FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine wasthe most unusual in some respects that modern history records. TheEuropean alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose ofbringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate theaffairs of Europe until 1823. This alliance, which met at the Congressof Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822, undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to aworld government that had ever been tried. While this alliancepublicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance ofpeace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, itsreal object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress everyattempt at the establishment of representative government. As long asEngland remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraininginfluence, for England was the only one of the allies which professedto have a representative system of government. As Castlereagh wassetting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who wasthen prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feelthat we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policywhich are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government. "

The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance wassoon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed oneanother in 1820. In March the Spanish army turned against thegovernment of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of theconstitution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approvedand sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim theconstitution and to promise to uphold it. The Spanish revolution wasfollowed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in Augustby a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year witnessed theoutbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three ofthe peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for theright of self-government. The great powers at once took alarm at therapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures forthe suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. AtTroppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of therevolutionary movements in Italy. An Austrian army entered Naples inMarch, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had beeninaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. Therevolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by adetachment of the Austrian army. England held aloof from allparticipation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though herambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings. 

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spaincame up for consideration. At this congress all five powers of thealliance were represented. France was especially concerned about thecondition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out ofself-defense. The Congress of Verona was devoted largely to adiscussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to useall his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention inSpain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this stepand that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of theTreaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 byAustria, Russia, and Prussia. This last mentioned treaty sprang fromthe erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of BaronessKrüdener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant. No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had beenwithout influence upon the politics of Europe. The text of the treatyof Verona was never officially published, but the following articlessoon appeared in the press of Europe and America:

"Article I. --The high contracting powers being convinced that thesystem of representative government is equally as incompatible with themonarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the peoplewith the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, touse all their efforts to put an end to the system of representativegovernments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to preventits being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. 

"Article II. --As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press isthe most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rightsof nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contractingparties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppressit, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe. 

"Article III. --Convinced that the principles of religion contributemost powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience whichthey owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it tobe their intention to sustain, in their respective states, thosemeasures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating theirown interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of theauthority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering theirthanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicithis constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations. 

"Article IV. --The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily allthe circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. Thehigh contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting anend to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the leastcompromise them with their own people and the people of France, bymeans of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millionsof francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty tothe end of the war. "

Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted forEurope and which they later proposed to extend to America. It was anattempt to make the world safe for autocracy. Wellington's protest atVerona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance whichhad overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward arapprochement with the United States. The aim of the Holy Allies, asthe remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was toundo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all thepeoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns. After the overthrow of the constitutional movements in Piedmont, Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in westernEurope, but the Holy Allies felt that their task was not completed solong as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained unsubjugated. These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon'sbrother Joseph was on the throne of Spain. Nelson's great victory atTrafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon norJoseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's Americancolonies. When Ferdinand was restored to his throne in 1814, heunwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the oldcolonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up withEngland and with the United States. The different colonies soonproclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued. By1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resubjugate them, and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the newrepublics and established diplomatic intercourse with them. England, although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies ofSpain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take thefinal step of recognition. 

In the late summer of 1823 circular letters were issued inviting thepowers to a conference at Paris to consider the Spanish-Americanquestion. George Canning, the British foreign secretary, at oncecalled into conference Richard Rush, the American minister, andproposed joint action against the schemes of the Holy Alliance. Rushreplied that he was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, butthat he would communicate the proposal at once to his government. Assoon as Rush's dispatch was received President Monroe realized fullythe magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of anAnglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinethe transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson andMadison and the following interesting correspondence took place. Inhis letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

"I transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of thehighest importance. They contain two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence ofSo. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the UStates, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. Theproject aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. ByMr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light inwhich he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many important considerations are involved in this proposition. 1stShall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, onthe side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, byagreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a casecan exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, isnot the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not the epocharriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of themonarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either infavor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, awareof that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark thecommenc'ment of that career?

"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the Britishgovt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on thepart of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeededwith them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of theextent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, &Mr. Madison's opinions on it. "

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only aprofound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision ofthe possibilities involved. He said:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the mostmomentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that ofIndependence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and pointsthe course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening onus. And never could we embark on it under circumstances moreauspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never toentangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never tosuffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, Northand South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, andpeculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring tobecome the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to makeour hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturbus in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us init. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, andemancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger longin doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do usthe most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side weneed not fear the whole world. With her then, we should mostsedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more toknit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in thesame cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price oftaking part in her wars. But the war in which the present propositionmight engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, butours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, ofkeeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting thoseof Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is tomaintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, tofacilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the Europeanpowers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely weshould do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it willprevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn fromtheir scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europecombined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose toget at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to beslighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protestagainst the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by theinterference of any one in the internal affairs of another, soflagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equallylawless Alliance, calling itself Holy. "

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of acceptingthe British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went evenfurther and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to theAmerican republics, but that it should express disapproval of the lateinvasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks who were thenstruggling for independence from Turkey. Monroe, it appears, wasstrongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet tooka different view of the situation. From the diary of John QuincyAdams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole ofNovember was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals andon Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed anyalliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition ofthe President's message remained in doubt until the 27th, when the moreconservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of thecase, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on thepart of the United States, without direct reference to Canning'sproposals, though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined hisposition as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnestremonstrance against the interference of the European powers by forcewith South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part withEurope; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that. "Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partlyto the influence of Clay who advocated a Pan-American system, partly tothe fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bindthe United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of theSpanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States asthe ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could beaccomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident thatthe sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquestof South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen, thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure fromthe sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he wassupported by his two predecessors in the presidency. 

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliancewith Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention ofthe great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of theworld, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculedby others, but time and circumstances often bring about a completechange in our point of view. After the beginning of the great worldconflict, especially after our entrance into it, several writers raisedthe question as to whether, after all, the three elder statesmen werenot right and Adams and Clay wrong. If the United States and Englandhad come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention inthe concerns of small states and established it as a world-wideprinciple, the course of human history during the next century mighthave been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the wholestory. On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured byposterity for persuading the president to take a narrow American viewof a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An importantelement in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitudebetween the time of his conference with Rush in August and theformulation of the president's message. Two days after the delivery ofhis now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of theform the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated oflate. " It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing whichstood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning'sunwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South Americanrepublics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it wouldgreatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at oncethe full independence of the South American colonies. In communicatingthe account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:"Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition bemade by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared tomake a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will notremain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those statesby the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is thatI will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before theworld. " About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless atthe delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act withoutwaiting for specific instructions from his government. He tried toshow that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with theAmerican policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question atissue was American as much as European, if not more. Rush thenindicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediatelyand unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states. "Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South Americanstates until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spainand the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent tothe proposal on a promise of future recognition. Mr. Rush refused toaccede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and sothe matter ended. 

As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the UnitedStates, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of theBritish cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview withPrince Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, inwhich he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hastenrecognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not gointo a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon anequal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed uponthat question. " This declaration drew from Polignac the admission thathe considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless andthat France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against thecolonies by force of arms. " This admission was a distinct victory forCanning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition byEngland, and an account of the interview was communicated without delayto the allied courts. The interview was not communicated to Rush untilthe latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon theformation of Monroe's message. 

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphsthat occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating toRussia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near thebeginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that theAmerican continents had assumed an independent condition and were nolonger open to European colonization. This may be regarded as astatement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remainedunclaimed. The second paragraph, relating to Spanish America andoccurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against theextension to the American continents of the system of interventionadopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular governmentin Europe. 

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

1. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made throughthe minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power andinstructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United Statesat St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respectiverights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of thiscontinent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty tothe Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendlyproceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariablyattached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude tocultivate the best understanding with his Government. In thediscussions to which this interest has given rise and in thearrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judgedproper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interestsof the United States are involved, that the American continents, by thefree and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonizationby any European powers. "

2. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating tothemselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with ourpolicy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriouslymenaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity moreimmediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to allenlightened and impartial observers. The political system of theallied powers is essentially different in this respect from that ofAmerica. This difference proceeds from that which exists in theirrespective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has beenachieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by thewisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we haveenjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between theUnited States and those powers to declare that we should consider anyattempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of thishemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existingcolonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interferedand shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declaredtheir independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we couldnot view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, orcontrolling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power inany other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly dispositiontoward the United States. "

The message made a profound impression on the world, all the moreprofound for the fact that Canning's interview with Polignac was knownonly to the chancelleries of Europe. To the public at large itappeared that the United States was blazing the way for democracy andliberty and that Canning was holding back through fear of givingoffense to the allies. The governments of Europe realized only toowell that Monroe's declaration would be backed by the British navy, andall thought of intervention in Latin America was therefore abandoned. A few months later England formally recognized the independence of theSpanish-American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on thefloor of the House of Commons. In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the Frenchinvasion of Spain, he said: "I looked another way--I sought forcompensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as ourancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, itshould not be Spain _with the Indies_. I called the New World intoexistence to redress the balance of the Old. "

III

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER

President Monroe said in effect that the western hemisphere must bemade safe for democracy. It was reserved for our own generation andfor President Wilson to extend the declaration and to say that theworld must be made safe for democracy. President Monroe announced thatwe would uphold international law and republican government in thishemisphere, and as _quid pro quo_ he announced that it was the settledpolicy of the United States to refrain from all interference in theinternal affairs of European states. He based his declaration, therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of theseparation of the European and American spheres of politics. TheMonroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked togetherin the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which couldstand without the other. Even Secretary Olney as late as 1895 declaredthat "American non-intervention in Europe implied Europeannon-intervention in America. " It is not strange, therefore, that thepublic at large should regard the policy of isolation as the solejustification for the Monroe Doctrine. There is, however, neitherlogic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in thishemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of lawand humanity in Europe. The real difficulty is that the MonroeDoctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certainimperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of thepolicy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the Europeanpowers. 

For three quarters of a century after Monroe's declaration the policyof isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principaldeparture from it being the signature and ratification of theClayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850. By the terms of this treaty werecognized a joint British interest in any canal that might be builtthrough the isthmus connecting North and South America, undertook toestablish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed toinvite other powers, European and American, to unite in protecting thesame. Owing to differences that soon arose between the United Statesand England as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clauseproviding for the adherence of other powers was never carried out. 

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the MonroeDoctrine without a resort to force. The policy has never beenfavorably regarded by the powers of continental Europe. Bismarckdescribed it as "an international impertinence. " In recent years ithas stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of LatinAmerica. Until recently no American writers appear to have consideredthe real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How isit that without an army and until recent years without a navy of anysize we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described asan impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it aninherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it. Inview of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not holdgood and some other must be sought. Americans have been so littleconcerned with international affairs that they have failed to see anyconnection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power inEurope. The existence of a European balance of power is the onlyexplanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine forso long a time without a resort to force. Some one or more of theEuropean powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they becameengaged with us some other European power would attack them in therear. A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis. 

The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjectedwas the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War toestablish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. Hewas clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjectsagainst the government of Mexico. Before the joint intervention hadgone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleonhad ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. Napoleon's Mexicanventure was deliberately calculated on the success of the SouthernConfederacy. Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederatecommissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy andMaximilian backed by the power of France. Against each successive steptaken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, protested. As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion hisprotests became more and more emphatic. Finally, in the spring of1866, the United States Government began massing troops on the Mexicanborder and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to theFrench Emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawalof the French troops would take place. Napoleon replied, fixing thedates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments. 

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown toSeward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the UnitedStates, which was, of course, greater then than at any previous time inour history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular momenthad an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexicanscheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatumNapoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war withAustria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realizedthat the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without anycorresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestigeand in fact endanger his throne. He at once entered upon a long andhazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him andeventually forced him into war. In order to have a free hand to meetthe European situation he decided to yield to the American demands. Asthe European situation developed he hastened the final withdrawal ofhis troops and left Maximilian to his fate. Thus the Monroe Doctrinewas vindicated!

Let us take next President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelanboundary dispute. Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindicationof the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount. Let us brieflyexamine the facts. Some 30, 000 square miles of territory on the borderof Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute. Venezuela, a weak andhelpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration. Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused. After SecretaryOlney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move theBritish Government, President Cleveland decided to intervene. In amessage to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed the controversy atlength, declared that the acquisition of territory in America by aEuropean power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was aclear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and asked Congress for anappropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed toappoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he saidit would then be our duty to uphold. Lest there should be anymisunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In makingthese recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurredand keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. " Congresspromptly voted the appropriation. 

Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England. No one before hadever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity. TheEnglish-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned andamazed. Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that anysubject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no onehad any idea that it was of a serious nature. Suddenly the two nationsfound themselves on the point of war. After the first outburst ofindignation the storm passed; and before the American boundarycommission completed its investigation England signed an arbitrationagreement with Venezuela. Some persons, after looking in vain for anexplanation, have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal moreseriously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British Government wasdue to his sense of humor. 

But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that werehappening in another quarter of the globe. Cleveland's Venezuelanmessage was sent to Congress on December 17th. At the end of the yearcame Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of Januarythe German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to PaulKruger. The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America toGermany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United Statesover a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to Englandin order to be free to deal with a question involving much greaterinterests in South Africa. The Monroe Doctrine was none the lesseffectively vindicated. 

In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to testout the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. In thatyear Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration againstVenezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certainclaims of their subjects. How England was led into the trap is still amystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed, that if England once started in with him she could not turn againsthim. But he had evidently not profited by the experience of NapoleonIII in Mexico. Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the Americanminister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of theforeign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy acceptedthis offer and withdrew their squadrons. Germany, however, remainedfor a time obdurate. This much was known at the time. 

A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently beenmade public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay. " Into themerits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of theRoosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. Thesignificant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure, is, however, amply established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly that theentire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command inPorto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. Why did Germanyback down from her position? Her navy was supposed to be at least aspowerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measurestrength with the United States was that England had acceptedarbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack theUnited States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicelyadjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being putto the test of actual war. 

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollariesdeduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been notunfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. Thereason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-doorpolicy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy offree trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for theestablishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors. In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as afield for the development of American commerce. The failure tocultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, butto the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home andconsequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrialdevelopment of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact thatour exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of bothNorth and South America has been mainly with Europe. There has, therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powersof Europe in the field of South American commerce. Our interest hasbeen political rather than commercial. We have prevented theestablishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door. This situation has been in full accord with British policy. Had GreatBritain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demandcommercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrinewould long since have gone by the board and been forgotten. Americansshould not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the pasttwenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstandingdifficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrineand give her rival a free hand in South America. In the face of such acombination our navy would have been of little avail. 

IV

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE

President Monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positiveside. It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would notuse force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the WesternHemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business. Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation ongrounds of expediency. Washington, as we have seen, regarded thispolicy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separateoccasions was ready to form an alliance with England. Probably neitherone of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirkingits responsibilities as a member of the family of nations. Monroe'smessage contained the implied promise that if Europe would refrain frominterfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we wouldabstain from all intervention in Europe. From that day until ourentrance into the World War it was generally understood, and onnumerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the United States wouldnot resort to force on any question arising outside of America exceptwhere its material interests were directly involved. We have notrefrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, butit has always been understood that such action would not be backed byforce. In the existing state of world politics this limitation hasbeen a serious handicap to American diplomacy. To take what we couldget and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for ourdiplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities. Diplomaticaction without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplishedsomething in the world at large, so that American influence has by nomeans been limited to the western hemisphere. 

During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slaveryabsorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen. The factthat they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of theAmerican hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time andattention to this subject than they would otherwise have done. Slaveryand isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life, especially during the period from 1830 to 1860. As the movementagainst slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retentionof the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect ofincreasing our isolation. The effort of the American ColonizationSociety to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very neargiving us a colony in Africa. In fact, Liberia, the negro republicfounded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was inall essentials an American protectorate, though the United Statescarefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doingmore than expressing its good will for the little republic. As Liberiawas founded years before Africa became a field for Europeanexploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outsideinterference, and the United States was never called upon to decidewhether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force. 

The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the UnitedStates and England during the first half of the nineteenth century, andan arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIIIof the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The only reason why the twocountries had never been able to act in accord on this question beforewas that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right ofimpressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of1812. The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement whichwould permit British naval officers to search American vessels in timeof peace. In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be aform of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there wasno doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a shipsuspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit andsearch ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flagwhich were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. The UnitedStates stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view. In theWebster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of thetwo powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron"to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, andobligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of theslave trade. " It was further agreed that the officers should act inconcert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoidall possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance. 

The United States has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarianinterest in the natives of Africa. In 1884 two delegates were sent tothe Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognizedstatus to the Kongo Free State. The American delegates signed thetreaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it wasnot submitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated asfollows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8, 1885:

"A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was heldat Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin mightbe kept open to the world's trade. Delegates attended on behalf of theUnited States on the understanding that their part should be merelydeliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character sofar as the United States were concerned. This reserve was due to theindisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by aninternational congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreignterritories. The results of the conference were embodied in a formalact of the nature of an international convention, which laid downcertain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories, subject to ratification within one year. Notwithstanding thereservation under which the delegates of the United States attended, their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner asthose of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making theUnited States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatoriesto a joint international engagement imposing on the signers theconservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where wehave no established interests or control. 

"This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of libertyof action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that anengagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in theremote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilitieswe are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanctionof the Senate to that general act. "

The United States also sent delegates to the international conferenceheld at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slavetrade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa. TheAmerican delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposedon the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo. The Europeanrepresentatives, being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals, framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the Americandelegates refused to sign. The latter did, however, affix theirsignatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression ofthe African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms, ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the Africancontinent. In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the Americanpolicy of isolation in the following resolution:

"That the United States of America, having neither possessions norprotectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifyingthis treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions orprotectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the otherpowers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulnessthereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Actwhich might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and, for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution beinserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange ofthe ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States. "

The United States has always stood for legality in internationalrelations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration ofinternational disputes. Along these lines we have achieved notablesuccess. It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questionsof international law from questions of international politics. We havebeen so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of politicalentanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of lawin the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation. We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of theland, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities thatrested on us as a member of the society of nations. In fact, theConstitution of the United States expressly recognizes the bindingforce of the law of nations and of treaties. As international law isthe only law that governs the relations between states, we are, ofcourse, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and inthe development of new law. When the Declaration of Paris was drawn upby the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, theUnited States was invited to give its adherence. The four rulesembodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis ofmaritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains, abolished. Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with theexception of contraband of war. Third, neutral goods, with theexception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under theenemy's flag. Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must beeffective. The United States Government was in thorough accord withthe second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters thenstood, to commit itself to the first rule. It had never been ourpolicy to maintain a large standing navy. In the War of 1812, as inthe Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce ofthe enemy. In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to thedeclaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, thatthe powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private property, except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas intime of war. He said that if they would agree to this, the UnitedStates would agree to abolish privateering. The powers of Europerefused to accept this amendment. We refrained from signing theDeclaration of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, butbecause it did not go far enough. 

During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomaticefforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of theConfederacy and the formation of hostile alliances. It made no effortto form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regardedas an American question. The dispute with England over the _Alabama_Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjustedby the Treaty of Washington. The most significant feature of thistreaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formaladoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision ofthe "Alabama Claims, " but which were to be binding upon England and theUnited States for the future. It was further agreed that these rulesshould be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who shouldbe invited to accede to them. The rules forbade the fitting out, arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended tocruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is atpeace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base ofnaval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of duediligence to prevent these things from being done. While these ruleshave never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they aregenerally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbentupon all neutrals. 

When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar ofRussia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, gravemisgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men inpublic life. The participation of the United States with the powers ofEurope in this conference was taken by many Americans to mark the endof the old order and the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy. The conference, however, was concerned with questions of generalinternational interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs ofany state, European or American. Lest there should be anymisapprehension as to the historic policy of the United States, thefinal treaty was signed by the American delegation under the expressreservation of a declaration previously read in open session. Thisdeclaration was as follows:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as torequire the United States of America to depart from its traditionalpolicy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself inthe political questions or policy or internal administration of anyforeign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention beconstrued to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America ofits traditional attitude toward purely American questions. " Theestablishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague whichresulted from the first conference was a notable achievement, althoughthe Court has accomplished less than its advocates hoped. This was themost important occasion on which American delegates had sat togetherwith European diplomats in a general conference. Our delegation wasthe object of considerable interest and was not without influence inshaping the provisions of the final treaty. It was through thepersonal influence of Andrew D. White that the Emperor of Germany waspersuaded to permit his delegation to take part in the proceedingsestablishing the Court of Arbitration. 

The second Hague Conference revised the Convention for the PacificSettlement of International Disputes, drew up a plan for anInternational Prize Court, and attempted a codification of the rules ofinternational law on a number of subjects relating to the conduct ofwar and the rights of neutrals. The American delegates, headed by Mr. Choate, not only took a prominent part in these proceedings, but, acting under instructions from Secretary Root, they proposed to theConference the creation of a permanent international court of justice. The creation of an international court of justice whose decisions wouldhave the force of law, as distinguished from an international court ofarbitration whose decisions are usually arrived at by a compromise ofconflicting legal or political points of view, had long been advocatedby advanced thinkers, but the proposition had always been held bypractical statesmen to be purely academic. The serious advocacy of theproposition at this time by a great nation like the United States andthe able arguments advanced by Mr. Choate marked an important stepforward and made a profound impression. There were two difficulties inthe way of establishing such a court at the second Hague Conference. In the first place, the delegation of the United States was the onlyone which had instructions on this subject, and in the second place itwas found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting thejudges. The great world powers, with the exception of the UnitedStates, demanded permanent representation on the court. The smallernations, relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, demandedlikewise to be represented. If each nation could have been given theright to appoint a judge, the court could have been organized, butthere would have been forty-four judges instead of fifteen, the numbersuggested in the American plan. The Draft Convention for theEstablishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as it was agreed thenew court should be designated, was submitted to the Conference and itsadoption recommended to the signatory powers. This Draft containedthirty-five articles and covered everything except the method ofappointing judges. This question was to be settled by diplomaticnegotiation, and it was agreed that the court should be established assoon as a satisfactory agreement with regard to the choice of judgescould be reached. After the adjournment of the Conference the UnitedStates continued its advocacy of the international court of justicethrough the ordinary diplomatic channels. The proposal was made thatthe method of selecting judges for the Prize Court be adopted for thecourt of justice, that is, that each power should appoint a judge, thatthe judges of the larger powers should always sit on the court whilethe judges of the other powers should sit by a system of rotation forlimited periods. It was found, however, that many of the smallerstates were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and as difficultieswhich we will mention presently prevented the establishment of thePrize Court, the whole question of the court of justice was postponed. 

Most of the conventions adopted by the second Hague Conference wereratified by the United States without reservation. The fact, however, that certain of these conventions were not ratified by all the powersrepresented at the Conference, and that others were ratified withimportant reservations, left the status of most of the conventions indoubt, so that at the beginning of the World War there was greatconfusion as to what rules were binding and what were not binding. TheConference found it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many of themost vital questions of maritime law. Under these circumstances thepowers were not willing to have the proposed International Prize Courtestablished without the previous codification of the body of law whichwas to govern its decisions. 

In order to supply this need the London Naval Conference was convenedin December, 1908, and issued a few months later the Declaration ofLondon. The London Naval Conference was attended by representatives ofthe principal maritime powers including the United States, and theDeclaration which it issued was avowedly a codification of the existingrules of international law. This was not true, however, of all theprovisions of the Declaration. On several of the most vital questionsof maritime law, such as blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage, the destruction of neutral prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs inthe list of conditional contraband, the Declaration was a compromiseand therefore unsatisfactory. It encountered from the start the mostviolent opposition in England. In Parliament the Naval Prize Bill, which was to give the Declaration effect, was discussed at considerablelength. It passed the House of Commons by a small vote, but wasdefeated in the House of Lords. It was denounced by the press, and apetition to the king, drawn up by the Imperial Maritime Leagueprotesting against it, was signed by a long list of commercialassociations, mayors, members of the House of Lords, general officers, and other public officials. One hundred and thirty-eight navalofficers of flag rank addressed to the prime minister a public protestagainst the Declaration. In the debate in the House of Lords the mainobjections to the Declaration were (1) that it made food stuffsconditional contraband instead of placing them on the free list, (2)that the clause permitting the seizure of conditional contraband boundfor a fortified place or "other place serving as a base for the armedforces of the enemy" would render all English ports liable to betreated as bases by an enemy, and (3) that it permitted the destructionof neutral prizes. 

The refusal of England to ratify the Declaration of London sealed itsfate. The United States Senate formally ratified it, but thisratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of otherpowers. At the beginning of the Great War the United States made aformal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree toadopt the Declaration for the period of the war in order that theremight be a definite body of law for all parties concerned. Thisproposal was accepted by Germany and Austria, but England, France, andRussia were not willing to accept the Declaration of London withoutmodifications. The United States, therefore, promptly withdrew itsproposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concernedit would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rulesof international law and existing treaties. 

The Hague Conferences were concerned with questions of generalinternational interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs ofstates. Such, however, was not the character of the conference whichconvened at Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the purpose ofadjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between France andGermany over the status of Morocco. France had been engaged for someyears in the peaceful penetration of Morocco. By the terms of theEntente of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being within the Frenchsphere of influence and France agreed to recognize England's positionin Egypt. The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of theworld to be divided up without his consent. In March, 1905, while on acruise in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tangier and paid a visitto the Sultan "in his character of independent sovereign. " As theRussian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of theJapanese, France could not count on aid from her ally and the Kaiserdid not believe that the recently formed Entente was strong enough toenable her to count on English support. His object in landing atTangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate France while she wasisolated and to break up the Entente before it should develop into analliance. Delcassé, the French foreign minister, wanted to stand firm, but Germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted hisresignation. In recognition of this triumph, the German chancellorCount von Bülow was given the title of Prince. Not satisfied with thisachievement, the Kaiser demanded a general European conference on theMoroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, President Rooseveltpersuaded France to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested. The Algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment toGermany. Not only did France receive the loyal support of England, butshe was also backed by the United States and even by Italy--a warningto Germany that the Triple Alliance was in danger. As the conferencewas called nominally for the purpose of instituting certainadministrative reforms in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in viewof our rights under a commercial treaty of 1880, to take part in theproceedings. The American delegates were Henry White, at that timeambassador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummeré, minister to Morocco. Asthe United States professed to have no political interests at stake, its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficultiesthat arose during the conference and their influence was exerted topreserve the European balance of power. The facts in regard toAmerica's part in this conference were carefully concealed from thepublic. There was nothing in any published American document toindicate that the participation of our representatives was anythingmore than casual. André Tardieu, the well-known French publicist, whoreported the conference and later published his impressions in bookform, first indicated that President Roosevelt was a positive factor inthe proceedings. But it was not until the publication of Bishop's"Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" that the full extent of Roosevelt'sactivities in this connection became known. 

There can be no doubt that our participation in the Moroccan conferencewas the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy ofisolation. Roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving thebalance of power in Europe. As we look back upon the events of thatyear we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fullyjustified in the course he pursued. Had his motives for participatingin the conference been known at the time, they would not have beenupheld either by the Senate or by public opinion. There are manyserious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely doneaway with even under a republican form of government until the peopleare educated to a fuller understanding of international politics. TheGerman Kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatictriumph while France was isolated. He was thwarted, however, by themoral support which England, Italy, and the United States gave toFrance. 

During the proceedings of the conference the American delegatesdeclared in open session that the United States had no politicalinterest in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with theunderstanding that the United States would thereby assume no"obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof. " Thisdeclaration did not satisfy the United States Senate, which no doubtsuspected the part that was actually played by America in theconference. At any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified theSenate attached to its resolution of ratification the followingdeclaration:

"Resolved further. That the Senate, as a part of this act ofratification, understands that the participation of the United Statesin the Algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of thegeneral act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the solepurpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, theprotection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residingor traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices andefforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menacethe peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treatyof 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government; andwithout purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policywhich forbids participation by the United States in the settlement ofpolitical questions which are entirely European in their scope. "

The determination of the United States not to interfere in the internalpolitics of European States has not prevented occasional protests inthe name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the Jews incertain European countries. On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay protestedin a note to the Rumanian government against a policy which was forcingthousands of Jews to emigrate from that country. The United States, heclaimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for theenforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania in a condition of utterdestitution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produceddiseased growth to a new place"; and, as the United States waspractically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly establishedright of remonstrance. In the case of Russia information hasrepeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent ofdestitution among the Jewish population, and permission has beenrequested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the UnitedStates. Such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomaticprotests. In his annual message of 1904 President Roosevelt wentfurther and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the massacreof the Jews at Kishenef. These protests, however, were purelydiplomatic in character. There was not the slightest hint atintervention. During the early stages of the Great War in Europe theGovernment of the United States endeavored to adhere strictly to itshistoric policy. The German invasion of Belgium with its attendanthorrors made a deep impression upon the American people and arousedtheir fighting spirit even more perhaps than the German policy ofsubmarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which theinterests and rights of the United States were directly involved, thatwe finally entered the war. 

V

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY

In the Orient American diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than inEurope. Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852-1854 was quite aradical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to ourown business. It would hardly have been undertaken against a countrylying within the European sphere of influence. There were, it is true, certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for theexpedition was that Japan refused to recognize her obligations as amember of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercoursewith the outside world. American sailors who had been shipwrecked onthe coast of Japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accordedby civilized nations. Finally the United States decided to send anaval force to Japan and to force that country to abandon her policy ofexclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries. Japan yielded only under the threat of superior force. The conduct ofthe expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations withJapan, was highly creditable to the United States, and the Japanesepeople later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spotwhere he first landed. 

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands tended to bring us more fullyinto the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturbthe balancing of European and American spheres as set up by PresidentMonroe. Various explanations have been given of President McKinley'sdecision to retain the Philippine group, but the whole truth has in allprobability not yet been fully revealed. The partition of Chinathrough the establishment of European spheres of influence was wellunder way when the Philippine Islands came within our grasp. Americancommerce with China was at this time second to that of England alone, and the concessions which were being wrung from China by the Europeanpowers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us. TheUnited States could not follow the example of the powers of Europe, forthe seizure of a sphere of influence in China would not have beensupported by the Senate or upheld by public opinion. It is probablethat President McKinley thought that the Philippine Islands would notonly provide a market for American goods, which owing to the Dingleytariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but thatthey would provide a naval base which would be of great assistance inupholding our interests in China. 

Talcott Williams made public some years later another explanation ofPresident McKinley's decision which is interesting and appears to bewell vouched for. He was informed by a member of McKinley's cabinetthat while the President's mind was not yet made up on the question, apersonal communication was received from Lord Salisbury who warned thePresident that Germany was preparing to take over the PhilippineIslands in case the United States should withdraw; that such a stepwould probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests ofpeace and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain theentire group. 

The famous open-door policy was outlined by Secretary Hay in notesdated September 6, 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, andRussia. Each of these powers was requested to give assurance and tomake a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would notinterfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-calledsphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff tocontinue in force in such sphere and to be collected by Chineseofficials; (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreignersin the matter of port dues or railroad rates. Similar notes were lateraddressed to France, Italy, and Japan. England alone expressed herwillingness to sign such a declaration. The other powers, whileprofessing thorough accord with the principles set forth by Mr. Hay, avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no suchdeclaration was ever made. Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, toclinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note hadbeen addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the otherpowers, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States wasconsidered "as final and definitive. "

Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originatedthe open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the UnitedStates. Neither of these impressions is correct. A few months beforeJohn Hay formulated his famous note Lord Charles Beresford came throughAmerica on his return from China and addressed the leading chambers ofcommerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what wasactually taking place in China and urging this country to unite withEngland and Japan in an effort to maintain the open door. Like theMonroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus Anglo-American inorigin. There is little doubt that England and Japan were willing toform an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintainingthe open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolationprevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force. President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe, preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the otherpowers to consent to it. Had John Hay been able to carry out the planwhich he favored of an alliance with England and Japan, the mereannouncement of the fact would have been sufficient to check theaggressions of the powers in China. Instead of such an alliance, however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door wewould not fight for it under any conditions. 

The utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response toHay's note of September 6, 1899, became fully apparent in thediscussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the variousspheres of influence. Japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass witha lease and that even if China should surrender jurisdiction over herown people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction overforeigners in leased territory. This position was undoubtedly correctif the territorial integrity of China was really to be preserved, butafter negotiations with Russia and the other powers concerned Mr. Haywrote to Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that "The United Statesconsuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are tobe instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorialconsular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular actswithin the leased territory under their present Chinese exequaturs. "Application was then made to the European powers for the admission ofAmerican consuls in the leased territories for the performance of theordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exerciseextra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory. 

The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturallyaroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxeruprising. Events moved with startling rapidity and United Statestroops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, andJapan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations. In anote to the powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining theattitude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "Thepolicy of the government of the United States is to seek a solutionwhich may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserveChinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rightsguaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, andsafeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade withall parts of the Chinese empire. " Mr. Hay's notes were skillfullyworded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion onthe Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know nowfrom his private letters which have recently been made public that herealized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay thecourse of events. During the exciting days of June, 1900, when theforeign legations at Peking were in a state of siege, Mr. Hay wrote toJohn W. Foster as follows:

"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind?There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapersand politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care ofour imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to GreatBritain'. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't letit appear we have any understanding with England. ' How can I makebricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse theassistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our ownpolicy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans arefools--is enough to drive a man mad. Yet we shall do what we can. "

A little later (September 20, 1900) in confidential letters to HenryAdams, he exclaimed:

"About China, it is the devil's own mess. We cannot possibly publishall the facts without breaking off relations with several Powers. Weshall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which willbe pretty serious, I do not doubt. 'Give and take'--the axiom ofdiplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, byboth the Senate and public opinion. We must take what we can and givenothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities. 

"I take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possibleour military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at theearliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the finaladjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform ofChina, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . . "

Again, November 21, 1900:

"What a business this has been in China! So far we have got on bybeing honest and naïf. . . . At least we are spared the infamy of analliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will takeanything nowadays from a German? Bülow said yesterday insubstance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. Ifwe think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--andnot a man in the world kicks. "

During the long negotiations that followed the occupation of Peking bythe powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on theside of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens onChina and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong, independent, responsible Chinese government. Contrary to the terms ofthe final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troopsconcentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exactingfurther concessions from China. The open-door policy was againignored. The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan tosign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England'sinterest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that ifeither party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the otherparty would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in whichevent the second party would come to the assistance of the first. Aformal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some ofthe demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that theAmerican government had an understanding with England and Japan, butMr. Hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about theAnglo-Japanese agreement until it was made public. He succeeded insecuring from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuateManchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near, Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberatelymisrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals. 

After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extendthe scope of her commercial treaties with the powers. When thenegotiation of a new treaty with the United States was begun, ourrepresentative demanded that at least two new ports in Manchuria beopened to foreign trade and residence. The Chinese commissionersdeclined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had noinstructions to do so. It was evident that there was secret oppositionsomewhere, and after considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally securedevidence that it came from Russia. When confronted with the evidencethe Russian Government finally admitted the facts. We were told thatwe could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designatedbecause it was situated within the Russian railway zone, and thereforenot under the complete jurisdiction of China, but that another portwould be substituted for it. Secretary Hay and President Rooseveltwere helpless. They accepted what they could get and kept quiet. "Theadministrative entity" of China was again utterly ignored. Thedifficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the Pacificto fight Russia alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hayrealized that neither the Senate nor public opinion would consent to analliance with England and Japan. Had these three powers made a jointdeclaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation ofChina would have ceased, there would have been no Russo-Japanese war, and the course of world history during the period that has sinceintervened might have been very different. 

When we backed down and abandoned Manchuria to Russian exploitationJapan stepped into the breach. After long negotiations the JapaneseGovernment finally delivered an ultimatum to Russia which resulted inthe rupture of diplomatic relations and war. After a series of notablevictories on land and sea Japan was fast approaching the end of herresources, and it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote apersonal letter to President Roosevelt requesting him to intervenediplomatically and pave the way for peace. The President was quick toact on the suggestion and the commissioners of Russia and Japan met atPortsmouth, New Hampshire. Here President Roosevelt's interventionshould have ceased. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were abitter disappointment to the Japanese people and the Japanesecommissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders bystating that President Roosevelt had urged them to surrender theirclaim to the Island of Saghalien and to give up all idea of anindemnity. Japanese military triumph had again, as at the close of theChino-Japanese War, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for thisdefeat Japanese public opinion held President Roosevelt responsible. From the days of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty ofPortsmouth, relations between the United States and Japan had beenalmost ideal. Since the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been aconsiderable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relationshave been subjected to a severe strain. 

Having fought a costly war in order to check the Russian advance inManchuria, the Japanese naturally felt that they had a paramountinterest in China. They consequently sharply resented the attemptswhich the United States subsequently made, particularly SecretaryKnox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria, toformulate policies for China. They took the position that we had hadour day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as Chinawas concerned. This attitude of mind was not unnatural and during theWorld War the United States, in order to bind the Japanese governmentmore closely to the Allied Cause, agreed to recognize, in theLansing-Ishii agreement, the "special interests" of Japan in China. 

VI

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of Britishcolonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at allimprobable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may takesuch a course that the American Revolution will lose the greatsignificance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as thetemporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similaritywas obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilareconomic and social conditions. " This statement does not appear asextravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. As early as 1894, CaptainMahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essayentitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion, " in which hepointed out that these two countries were the only great powers whichwere by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armiesand dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations. 

In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy, published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph withthis statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes isthe development of cordial relations with England; and it seems nowthat the course of world politics is destined to lead to the furtherreknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon racein bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cementedby any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and ofaims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of thepolitical stability and moral progress of the world. "

The United States has very naturally had closer contact with Englandthan with any other European power. This has been due to the fact thatEngland was the mother country, that after independence was establisheda large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, thatour northern boundary touches British territory for nearly fourthousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine havedominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway ofintercourse with other nations. Having had more points of contact wehave had more disputes with England than with any other nation. Somewriters have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our commonlanguage. The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, andknows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, andin neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the nationalpride. 

Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England aboutAmerica and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war wasavoided. A large number of English travellers came to the UnitedStates during this period and published books about us when they gothome. The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great Englishperiodicals, the _Edinburgh Review_, _Blackwood's_, the _BritishReview_, and the _Quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionablepassages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans andAmerican institutions. American men were described as "turbulentcitizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers, and treacherous friends. " Our soldiers and sailors were charged withcowardice in the War of 1812. It was stated that "in the southernparts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost neverpractised. . . . Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religiousinstruction. The religious principle is gaining ground in the northernparts of the Union; it is becoming fashionable among the better ordersof society to go to church . . . The greater number of states declareit to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of God in any oftheir public acts. " The _Quarterly Review_ informed its readers that"the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body andinanity of mind. " Dickens's _American Notes_ was an ungrateful returnfor the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in thiscountry. De Tocqueville's _Democracy in America_ was widely read inEngland and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerningAmerica. Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman tointerpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force. His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that Britishpolicy should be more concerned with economic relations with Americathan with European politics. As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden madethe United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarismand protectionism. "

Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, andfur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questionsof neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for morethan a hundred years. Upon several occasions, notably during theCanadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War, disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, butabsence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on thepart of either government. The agreement of 1817, effectingdisarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries theenormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it hasprevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis. 

During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the borderexpressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms andmunitions from the American side. In December a British force crossedthe Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the _Caroline_, avessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannonand other supplies. The ship was fired and sent over the Falls. Whenthe _Caroline_ was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed andseveral others wounded. The United States at once demanded redress, but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the_Caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whomtheir own government either could not or would not control. 

The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 aCanadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on theAmerican side that he had slain Durfee. He was taken at his word, examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport. McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border. The British minister at Washington called upon the Government of theUnited States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation ofMr. McLeod. " Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense withwhich McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of NewYork; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was, within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the FederalGovernment; that the latter could not interfere. The date set for thetrial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841. Van Buren's termended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster becameSecretary of State. The British minister was given instructions by hisgovernment to demand the immediate release of McLeod. This demand wasmade, he said, because the attack on the _Caroline_ was an act of apublic character; because it was a justifiable use of force for thedefense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "Britishrebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principlesof civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done byorder of the constituted authorities of the State; and because HerMajesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the FederalGovernment had no power to interfere and that the decision must restwith the State of New York. The relations of foreign powers were withthe Federal Government. To admit that the Federal Government had nocontrol over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so faras foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreigndiplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separateState. Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-generalto Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel. Afterconsiderable delay, during which Webster replied to the main argumentsof the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released. 

In the midst of the dispute over the case of the _Caroline_ serioustrouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick overthe undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and theHighlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War. " During thesummer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along theAroostook River in large numbers. The governor of Maine sent a body ofmilitia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswickauthorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up theirposition. Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General WinfieldScott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities. Theadministration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlementof the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter wasunder consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vainattempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of thetreaty. As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devotedhimself earnestly to the boundary question. He decided to drop themass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reachan agreement by direct negotiation. 

In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Washingtonand the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed. Theboundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half thearea which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150, 000 tocompensate Maine for the territory which she had lost. 

The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace withEngland. Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident thatthe joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soonhave to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon. Great Britaininsisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far asthe Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of thedisputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight. " At the same time Great Britainactively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States. Hermain reason for this course was that she wished to encourage thedevelopment of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she coulddraw a large enough supply to make her independent of the UnitedStates. If Texas should thus devote herself to the production ofcotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt afree-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for Britishgoods. 

As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definitesteps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the coöperation of thegovernment of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by theAmerican republic. While the treaty for the annexation of Texas wasbefore the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition thatEngland and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomaticact or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as anindependent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territorybeyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union. While the UnitedStates would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected thatthe government of that country would agree to it. Mexico obstinatelyrefused to recognize the independence of Texas. Lord Aberdeen was soanxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, ifsupported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, butthe French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme wasabandoned. 

The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation ofTexas and the occupation of Oregon. Texas was annexed by jointresolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk. This act, itwas foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's firsttask was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complicationswith England. The fate of California was also involved. That provincewas not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico. In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for severalyears been urging upon their government the great value of UpperCalifornia. Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionarymovement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilantwatch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in thatprovince. Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding andjoined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are thatEngland would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, butCalifornia besides. In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on thepoint of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officiallyproposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan. Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had noreason for wishing to go to war with the United States. Mexico's offerwas therefore rejected. Polk managed the diplomatic situation withadmirable promptness and firmness. Notwithstanding the fact that thedemocratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight, " as soonas Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the49th parallel. When this offer was declined he asked permission ofCongress to give England the necessary notice for the termination ofthe joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense ofthe territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the UnitedStates. A few months later notice was given to England, but at thesame time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusteddiplomatically. As soon as it was evident that the United States wasin earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which hadbeen first proposed. 

As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of theOregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the Norththat the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slaveterritory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory. Infact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Yearsof Peace, " says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninthparallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which everbefell the United States. Whether it could have been obtained withouta war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said, officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we werefully prepared to do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded inthe end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value, and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a completecontrol of the Pacific coast. "

That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "theroaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less thana miracle. During the next fifteen years relations were much moreamicable, though by no means free from disputes. The most importantdiplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treatywhich conceded to England a joint interest in any canal that might bebuilt through the isthmus connecting North and South America. One ofthe interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton, the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the UnitedStates for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales intoinsignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorffdid during the early stages of the Great War. 

Relations between the United States and England during the AmericanCivil War involved so many highly technical questions that it isimpossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection. Diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity ofthe blockade established by President Lincoln, the recognition byEngland of Confederate belligerency, the _Trent_ affair, and theresponsibility of England for the depredations committed by the_Alabama_ and other Confederate cruisers. When the United States firstdemanded reparation for the damage inflicted on American commerce bythe Confederate cruisers, the British Government disclaimed allliability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had notbeen completed within British jurisdiction. Even after the close ofthe war the British Government continued to reject all proposals for asettlement. The American nation, flushed with victory, was bent onredress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against England, thatthe Fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of anindependent republic in Ireland, met with open encouragement in thiscountry. The House of Representatives went so far as to repeal the lawforbidding Americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senatefailed to concur. The successful war waged by Prussia against Austriain 1866 disturbed the European balance, and rumblings of theapproaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasiness in British cabinetcircles. Fearing that if Great Britain were drawn into the conflictthe American people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out"Alabamas" for her enemies, the British Government assumed a moreconciliatory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clarendon signed withReverdy Johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixedcommission of all claims which had arisen since 1853. Though theconvention included, it did not specifically mention, the _Alabama_Claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for thecourse pursued by the British Government during the war. The Senate, therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify thearrangement. 

When Grant became President, Hamilton Fish renewed the negotiationsthrough Motley, the American minister at London, but the latter wasunduly influenced by the extreme views of Sumner, chairman of theSenate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed hisappointment, and got things in a bad tangle. Fish then transferred thenegotiations to Washington, where a joint high commission, appointed tosettle the various disputes with Canada, convened in 1871. A fewmonths later the treaty of Washington was signed. Among other thingsit provided for submitting the _Alabama_ Claims to an arbitrationtribunal composed of five members, one appointed by England, one by theUnited States, and the other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. When this tribunal met at Geneva, the following year, theUnited States, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not onlythe direct claims for the damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers, but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer ofAmerican shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war, and for increased rates of insurance. Great Britain threatened towithdraw from the arbitration, but Charles Francis Adams, the Americanmember of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided againstthe contention of his own government. The indirect claims wererejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the United Stateswas awarded the sum of $15, 500, 000. Although the British member of thetribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid theaward. This was the most important case that had ever been submittedto arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope thatthe two great branches of the English-speaking peoples would neveragain have to resort to war. 

Between the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims and the controversy overthe Venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the twocountries was enlivened by the efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen toconvince the British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was outof date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of Americanownership in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt to preventCanadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summarydismissal of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minister to receivehis passports from the United States without request. 

President Cleveland's bold assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in theVenezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at thetime both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportuneassertion of the intention of the United States to protect the Americancontinents from the sort of exploitation to which Africa and Asia havefallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on ourrelations with England, whose attitude has since been uniformlyfriendly. 

The Venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of Lord Salisbury torenew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which hadbeen first entered into by Secretary Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote. In the spring of 1890 the Congress of the United States had adopted aresolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties withfriendly nations, and the British House of Commons had in July, 1893, expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty betweenthe United States and England. The matter was then taken updiplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the Venezuelanboundary dispute became acute. Lord Salisbury's proposal was favorablyreceived by President Cleveland, and after mature deliberation thedraft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Secretary Olneyand Sir Julian Pauncefote. This treaty provided for the submission ofpecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire orreferee to decide disputed points. Controversies involving thedetermination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunalcomposed of six members, three justices of the Supreme Court of theUnited States or judges of the Circuit Court to be nominated by thepresident of the United States, and three judges of the British SupremeCourt of Judicature or members of the Judicial Committee of the PrivyCouncil to be nominated by the British sovereign, and an award made bya majority of not less than five to one was to be final. In case of anaward made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also tobe final unless either power should within three months protest againstit, in which case the award was to be of no validity. This treaty wasconcluded in January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the Senate. WhenPresident Cleveland's term expired in March no action had been taken. President McKinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address andurged the Senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken, May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty. It thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification. The failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends ofinternational arbitration. The opposition within his own party toPresident Cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had beennegotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good dealto do with its defeat. Public opinion, especially in the NorthernStates of the Union, was still hostile to England. Irish agitatorscould always get a sympathetic hearing in America, and politicianscould not resist the temptation to play on anti-British prejudices inorder to bring out the Irish vote. 

The Spanish War was the turning point in our relations with England asin many other things. The question as to who were our friends in 1898was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon theoccasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United Statesin February, 1902, even the cabinets of Europe could not refrain fromtaking part in the controversy. In order to diminish the enthusiasmover the Prince's visit the British press circulated the story thatLord Pauncefote had checked a movement of the European powers toprevent any intervention of the United States in Cuba; while the Germanpapers asserted that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative inopposing American intervention. It is certain that the attitude of theBritish Government, as well as of the British people, from the outbreakof hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly. As for Germany, while the conduct of the government was officially correct, publicsentiment expressed itself with great violence against the UnitedStates. The conduct of the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila Bayhas never been satisfactorily explained. Shortly after Dewey's victorya German squadron, superior to the American in strength, steamed intothe Bay and displayed, according to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregardof the usual courtesies of naval intercourse. " Dewey finally sent hisflag-lieutenant, Brumby, to inform the German admiral that "if he wantsa fight he can have it right now. " The German admiral at onceapologized. It is well known now that the commander of the Britishsquadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on theGermans, gave Dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moralsupport from him in case of trouble. In fact, John Hay wrote fromLondon at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at ourdisposal for the asking. 

Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was somarked that some writers have naïvely concluded that a secret treaty ofalliance between the two countries was made in 1897. The absurdity ofsuch a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For ahundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued thepolicy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With therapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenthcentury, England realized that she could no longer pursue this policy. Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted extensive naval programswhen we went to war with Spain. Our acquisition of the Philippines andPorto Rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made alarge American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore, that she would have to cast about for future allies. She thereforesigned the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a defensivealliance with Japan in 1902. 

In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out thelong-deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a furtherinsistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would lead tofriction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, torecede from the position which she had held for half a century and togive us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal atwhatever point we might choose to build it. While the Hay-Pauncefotetreaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality ofmuch wider significance. It amounted, in fact, to the recognition ofAmerican naval supremacy in the West Indies, and since its signatureGreat Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategicarea. The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is nowfirmly established and in fact unquestioned. The American public didnot appreciate at the time the true significance of the Hay-PauncefoteTreaty, and a few years later Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Acta clause exempting American ships engaged in the coast-wise trade fromthe payment of tolls. Great Britain at once protested against theexemption clause as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty andanti-British sentiment at once flared up in all parts of the UnitedStates. Most American authorities on international law and diplomacybelieved that Great Britain's interpretation of the treaty was correct. Fortunately President Wilson took the same view, and in spite of strongopposition he persuaded Congress to repeal the exemption clause. Thiswas an act of simple justice and it removed the only outstandingsubject of dispute between the two countries. 

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was by no means the only evidence of a changeof attitude on the part of Great Britain. As we have already seen, Great Britain and the United States were in close accord during theBoxer uprising in China and the subsequent negotiations. During theRusso-Japanese war public sentiment in both England and the UnitedStates was strongly in favor of Japan. At the Algeciras conference onMoroccan affairs in 1905 the United States, in its effort to preservethe European balance of power, threw the weight of its influence on theside of England and France. 

The submission of the Alaskan boundary dispute to a form of arbitrationin which Canada could not win and we could not lose was anotherevidence of the friendly attitude of Great Britain. The boundarybetween the southern strip of Alaska and British Columbia had neverbeen marked or even accurately surveyed when gold was discovered in theKlondike. The shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing regionwas by the trails leading up from Dyea and Skagway on the headwaters ofLynn Canal. The Canadian officials at once advanced claims tojurisdiction over these village ports. The question turned on thetreaty made in 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. Whatever rightsRussia had under that treaty we acquired by the purchase of Alaska in1867. Not only did a long series of maps issued by the Canadiangovernment in years past confirm the American claim to the region indispute, but the correspondence of the British negotiator of the treatyof 1825 shows that he made every effort to secure for England an outletto deep water through this strip of territory and failed. Under thecircumstances President Roosevelt was not willing to submit the case tothe arbitration of third parties. He agreed, however, to submit it toa mixed commission composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and LordAlverstone, chief justice of England. As there was little doubt as tothe views that would be taken by the three Americans and the twoCanadians it was evident from the first that the trial was reallybefore Lord Alverstone. In case he sustained the American contentionthere would be an end of the controversy; in case he sustained theCanadian view, there would be an even division, and matters would standwhere they stood when the trial began except that a great deal morefeeling would have been engendered and the United States might have hadto make good its claims by force. Fortunately Lord Alverstone agreedwith the three Americans on the main points involved in thecontroversy. The decision was, of course, a disappointment to theCanadians and it was charged that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed theirinterest in order to further the British policy of friendly relationswith the United States. 

At the beginning of the Great War the interference of the British navywith cargoes consigned to Germany at once aroused the latentanti-British feeling in this country. Owing to the fact that cottonexports were so largely involved the feeling against Great Britain waseven stronger in the Southern States than in the Northern. The StateDepartment promptly protested against the naval policy adopted by GreatBritain, and the dispute might have assumed very serious proportionshad not Germany inaugurated her submarine campaign. The dispute withEngland involved merely property rights, while that with Germanyinvolved the safety and lives of American citizens. The main featureof British policy, that is, her application of the doctrine ofcontinuous voyage, was so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted bythe United States during the Civil War that the protests of our StateDepartment were of little avail. In fact Great Britain merely carriedthe American doctrine to its logical conclusions. 

We have undertaken in this brief review of Anglo-American relations tooutline the more important controversies that have arisen between thetwo countries. They have been sufficiently numerous and irritating tojeopardize seriously the peace which has so happily subsisted for onehundred years between the two great members of the English-speakingfamily. After all, they have not been based on any fundamentalconflict of policy, but have been for the most part superficial and inmany cases the result of bad manners. In this connection Lord Brycemakes the following interesting observations:

"There were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the Britishforeign secretary exasperated the American negotiators, or when ademagogic Secretary of State at Washington tried by a bullying tone towin credit as the patriotic champion of national claims. But wheneverthere were bad manners in London there was good temper at Washington, and when there was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on the Thames. It was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any momentrashness or vehemence was found on one side, it never happened to bemet by the like quality on the other. "

"The moral of the story of Anglo-American relations, " Lord Bryce says, "is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds ofcontroversy, between peoples that wish to keep it. " He adds that GreatBritain and the United States "have given the finest example ever seenin history of an undefended frontier, along which each people hastrusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no navalarmaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped toprevent hostile demonstrations. Neither of them has ever questionedthe sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the morallaw. "

It is not strange that so many controversies about more or less trivialmatters should have obscured in the minds of both Englishmen andAmericans the fundamental identity of aim and purpose in the largerthings of life. For notwithstanding the German influence in Americawhich has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, ourcivilization is still English. Bismarck realized this when he saidthat one of the most significant facts in modern history was that allNorth America was English-speaking. Our fundamental ideals are thesame. We have a passion for liberty; we uphold the rights of theindividual as against the extreme claims of the state; we believe ingovernment through public opinion; we believe in the rule of law; webelieve in government limited by fundamental principles andconstitutional restraints as against the exercise of arbitrary power;we have never been subjected to militarism or to the dominance of amilitary caste; we are both so situated geographically as to bedependent on sea power rather than on large armies, and not only donavies not endanger the liberty of peoples but they are negligiblequantities politically. Great Britain had in 1914 only 137, 500officers and men in her navy and 26, 200 reserves, a whollyinsignificant number compared to the millions that formed the army ofGermany and gave a military color to the whole life and thought of thenation. 

Not only are our political ideals the same, but in general our attitudetoward world politics is the same, and most people are surprised whenthey are told that our fundamental foreign policies are identical. Thetwo most characteristic American foreign policies, the Monroe Doctrineand the Open Door, were both, as we have seen, Anglo-American in origin. 

VII

IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In its original form the Monroe Doctrine was a direct defiance ofEurope, and it has never been favorably regarded by the nations of theold world. Latterly, however, it has encountered adverse criticism insome of the Latin-American states whose independence it helped tosecure and whose freedom from European control it has been instrumentalin maintaining. The Latin-American attacks on the Doctrine during thelast few years have been reflected to a greater or less extent bywriters in this country, particularly in academic circles. TheAmerican writer who has become most conspicuous in this connection isProfessor Bingham of Yale, who has travelled extensively in SouthAmerica and who published in 1913 a little volume entitled "The MonroeDoctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth. " The reasons why the Monroe Doctrinehas called forth so much criticism during the last few years are notfar to seek. The rapid advance of the United States in the CaribbeanSea since 1898 has naturally aroused the apprehensions of the feeblerLatin-American states in that region, while the building of the PanamaCanal has rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of navalsupremacy in the Caribbean and has led to the formulation of newpolitical policies in the zone of the Caribbean--what Admiral Chestercalls the larger Panama Canal Zone--that is, the West Indies, Mexicoand Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. Some of these policies, which have already been formulated to a far greater extent than isgenerally realized, are the establishment of protectorates, thesupervision of finances, the control of all available canal routes, theacquisition of coaling stations, and the policing of disorderlycountries. 

The long-delayed advance of the United States in the Caribbean Seaactually began with the Spanish War. Since then we have made rapidstrides. Porto Rico was annexed at the close of the war, and Cubabecame a protectorate; the Canal Zone was a little later leased onterms that amounted to practical annexation, and the Dominican Republiccame under the financial supervision of the United States; PresidentWilson went further and assumed the administration of Haitian affairs, leased from Nicaragua for a term of ninety-nine years a naval base onFonseca Bay, and purchased the Danish West Indies. As a result of thisrapid extension of American influence the political relations of thecountries bordering on the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundlyaffected. Our Latin-American policy has been enlarged in meaning andlimited in territorial application so far as its newer phases areconcerned. 

In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical departure from ourtraditional policy in proposing that we should assume financialsupervision over the Dominican Republic in order to prevent certainEuropean powers from forcibly collecting debts due their subjects. Germany seemed especially determined to force a settlement of herdemands, and it was well known that Germany had for years regarded theMonroe Doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of her acquiring afoothold in Latin America. The only effective method of collecting theinterest on the foreign debt of the Dominican Republic appeared to bethe seizure and administration of her custom houses by some foreignpower or group of foreign powers. President Roosevelt foresaw thatsuch an occupation of the Dominican custom houses would, in view of thelarge debt, constitute the occupation of American territory by Europeanpowers for an indefinite period of time, and would, therefore, be aviolation of the Monroe Doctrine. He had before him also the resultsof a somewhat similar financial administration of Egypt undertakenjointly by England and France in 1878, and after Arabi's revoltcontinued by England alone, with the result that Egypt soon became apossession of the British crown to almost as great a degree as if ithad been formally annexed, and during the World War it was in facttreated as an integral part of the British Empire. President Rooseveltconcluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place a bankruptAmerican republic in the hands of a receiver, the United States mustundertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of itsfinances. He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctantSenate to acquiesce. The arrangement has worked admirably. In spiteof the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administrationnot only continued it in Santo Domingo, but tried to extend it toNicaragua and Honduras. In January, 1911, a treaty placing thefinances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States wassigned by Secretary Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed withNicaragua. These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreigndebt, in each case through loans made by American bankers and securedby the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by theUnited States and to make an annual report to the Department of State. These treaties were not ratified by the Senate. 

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. OnFebruary 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to theSenate by the terms of which Nicaragua agreed to give the United Statesan exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a navalbase in Fonseca Bay, in return for the payment of three millions ofdollars. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of theTaft administration was then at hand. The Wilson administrationfollowed the same policy, however, and in July, 1913, Mr. Bryansubmitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing theprovisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition certain provisionsof the Platt amendment, which defines our protectorate over Cuba. Thistreaty aroused strong opposition in the other Central American states, and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed formal protests with theUnited States Government against its ratification on the ground that itwould convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United States andthus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the Central Americanrepublics. The Senate of the United States objected to theprotectorate feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but thenegotiations were renewed by the Wilson administration and on February18, 1916, a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Plattamendment, was accepted by the Senate. This treaty grants to theUnited States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal byway of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to the UnitedStates for ninety-nine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, andalso the Great Corn and Little Corn islands as coaling stations. Theconsideration for these favors was the sum of three millions of dollarsto be expended, with the approval of the Secretary of State of theUnited States, in paying the public debt of Nicaragua and for otherpublic purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties. 

The treaty with the black Republic of Haiti, ratified by the SenateFebruary 28, 1916, carries the new Caribbean policies of the UnitedStates to the farthest limits short of actual annexation. It providesfor the establishment of a receivership of Haitian customs under thecontrol of the United States similar in most respects to thatestablished over the Dominican Republic. It provides further for theappointment, on the nomination of the President of the United States, of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of theforeign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the developmentof the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the republic. It provides further for a native constabulary under American officersappointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President ofthe United States. It further extends to Haiti the main provisions ofthe Platt amendment. By controlling the internal financialadministration of the government the United States hopes to remove allincentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for theirobject a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customsand maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid all possibilityof foreign intervention. The treaty is to remain in force for a periodof ten years and for another period of ten years if either partypresents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that itspurpose has not been fully accomplished. 

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regardedby the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. The UnitedStates did not undertake to control the financial administration or theforeign policy of any of these republics. It was only after theirmisconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, orgroup of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation byforce that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it thatforeign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territoryor interference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has alwaysbeen in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose ofpreventing European intervention, but American intervention alwaysawaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some Europeanpower. President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser torestrain the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics beforedisorders or public debts should reach a point which gave Europeanpowers an excuse for intervening. In a message to Congress in 1904 helaid down this new doctrine, which soon became famous as the Big Stickpolicy. He said: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act withreasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, ifit keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interferencefrom the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence whichresults in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may inAmerica, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by somecivilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of theUnited States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. " In other words, since we could not permit European powers to restrain or punishAmerican states in cases of wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertakethat task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy ofbenevolent protection which Latin-American states could invoke aftertheir unwise or evil conduct had brought European powers to the pointof demanding just retribution, it was regarded with favor and noobjection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt doctrine, that if we wereto continue to protect Latin-American states against Europeanintervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain fromconduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite adifferent thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition. 

The Roosevelt application of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly aperfectly logical step. It was endorsed by the Taft administration andfurther extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our mostimportant policies in regard to the zone of the Caribbean. PresidentRoosevelt was right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at apoint where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extendits application so as to cover the constantly increasing number ofdisputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loosefinancial administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly by andwitness the utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligationsthat would inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertaketo fix the bounds and limits of that intervention. It is interestingto note that President Wilson did not hesitate to carry the new policyto its logical conclusion, and that he went so far as to warnLatin-American countries against granting to foreign corporationsconcessions which, on account of their extended character, would becertain to give rise to foreign claims which would, in turn, give anexcuse for European intervention. In discussing our Latin-Americanpolicy shortly after the beginning of his administration, PresidentWilson said: "You hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in LatinAmerica. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in theUnited States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited tomake investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to investin it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. Itis an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, becausetheir territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterpriseand action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreigninterests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs--a condition ofaffairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . Whatthese states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from thesubordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and anassertion of the splendid character which, in spite of thesedifficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. "

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession whichPearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This concession is said to have covered practically all of the oilinterests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harborsand dig canals in the country. However, before the meeting of theColombian congress in November, 1913, which was expected to confirm theconcession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrewthe contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the UnitedStates. 

Unfortunately President Roosevelt's assertion of the Big Stick policyand of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the westernhemisphere was accompanied by his seizure of the Canal Zone. Thisaction naturally aroused serious apprehensions in Latin America andgave color to the charge that the United States had converted theMonroe Doctrine from a protective policy into a policy of selfishaggression. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling wasnot alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech several years later to thestudents of the University of California, in which he boasted of havingtaken the Canal Zone and said that if he had not taken it as he did, the debate over the matter in Congress would still be going on. Beforethe close of his administration President Roosevelt undertook toplacate Colombia, but the sop which he offered was indignantlyrejected. In January, 1909, Secretary Root proposed three treaties, one between the United States and Panama, one between the United Statesand Colombia, and one between Colombia and Panama. These treatiesprovided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia andfor the transference to Colombia of the first ten installments of theannual rental of $250, 000 which the United States had agreed to pay toPanama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaties were ratified bythe United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia. 

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to appease Colombia, resulting in the formulation of a definite proposition by SecretaryKnox shortly before the close of President Taft's term. His proposalswere that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaties just referred to, the United States would be willing to pay $10, 000, 000 for an exclusiveright of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetuallease of the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence as coalingstations. These proposals were also rejected. The American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting, he said, on his own responsibility, then inquiredinformally whether $25, 000, 000 without options of any kind wouldsatisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothingbut the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox, inreporting the matter to the President, said that Colombia seemeddetermined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration. Secretary Bryan took up the negotiations where Knox dropped them, andconcluded a treaty, according to the terms of which the United Stateswas to express regret at what had occurred and to pay Colombia$25, 000, 000. The Senate of the United States refused to ratify thistreaty while Wilson was in the White House, but as soon as Hardingbecame president they consented to the payment and ratified the treatywith a few changes in the preamble. 

The facts stated above show conclusively that the two most significantdevelopments of American policy in the Caribbean during the last twentyyears have been the establishment of formal protectorates and theexercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states. Ourprotectorate over Cuba was clearly defined in the so-called Plattamendment, which was inserted in the army appropriation bill of March2, 1901, and directed the President to leave control of the island ofCuba to its people so soon as a government should be established undera constitution which defined the future relations with the UnitedStates substantially as follows: (1) That the government of Cuba wouldnever enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign powerwhich would impair the independence of the island; (2) that the saidgovernment would not contract any public debt which could not be met bythe ordinary revenues of the island; (3) that the government of Cubawould permit the United States to exercise the right to intervene forthe preservation of Cuban independence, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; (4) that all acts of the UnitedStates in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof should be ratifiedand validated; (5) that the government of Cuba would carry out theplans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of the island;and finally that the government of Cuba would sell or lease to theUnited States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certainspecified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the UnitedStates. 

It is understood that these articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted byElihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, discussed at length byPresident McKinley's Cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt ofConnecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriationbill. The Wilson administration, as already stated, embodied the firstthree provisions of the Platt amendment in the Haitian treaty of 1916. Prior to the World War, which has upset all calculations, it seemedhighly probable that the Platt amendment would in time be extended toall the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean. If the UnitedStates is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right tointervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly definedand publicly proclaimed. Hitherto whatever action we have taken inLatin America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine--a policywithout legal sanction--which an international court might notrecognize. Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality. In other words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states haveconverted American policy into law. 

The charge that in establishing protectorates and financial supervisionover independent states we have violated the terms of the MonroeDoctrine is one that has been frequently made. Those who have made itappear to be laboring under the illusion that the Monroe Doctrine waswholly altruistic in its aim. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrinehas never been regarded by the United States as in any sense aself-denying declaration. President Monroe said that we shouldconsider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extendtheir system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to ourpeace and safety. " The primary object of the policy outlined byPresident Monroe was, therefore, the peace and safety of the UnitedStates. The protection of Latin-American states against Europeanintervention was merely a means of protecting ourselves. While theUnited States undertook to prevent the encroachment of European powersin Latin America, it never for one moment admitted any limitation uponthe possibility of its own expansion in this region. The whole courseof American history establishes the contrary point of view. Since theMonroe Doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at the expense ofLatin-American states, Texas, New Mexico, California, and the CanalZone. Upon other occasions we emphatically declined to bind ourselvesby treaty stipulations with England and France that under nocircumstance would we annex the island of Cuba. Shortly after thebeginning of his first term President Wilson declared in a publicaddress at Mobile that "the United States will never again seek oneadditional foot of territory by conquest. " This declaration introducesa new chapter in American diplomacy. 

VIII

THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM

When President Wilson assumed office March 4, 1913, there was nothingbut the Huerta revolution, the full significance of which was not thenappreciated, to suggest to his mind the forecast that before the closeof his term questions of foreign policy would absorb the attention ofthe American people and tax to the limit his own powers of mind andbody. It seems now a strange fact that neither in his writings nor inhis public addresses had President Wilson ever shown any markedinterest in questions of international law and diplomacy. He had, onthe contrary, made a life-long study of political organization andlegislative procedure. Those who knew him had always thought that hewas by nature fitted to be a great parliamentary leader and it soonappeared that he had a very definite legislative program which heintended to put through Congress. The foreign problems that confrontedhim so suddenly and unexpectedly were doubtless felt to be annoyingdistractions from the work which he had mapped out for himself andwhich was far more congenial to his tastes. As time went by, however, he was forced to give more and more thought to our relations with LatinAmerica on the one hand and to the European war on the other. Hisideas on international problems at first cautiously set forth, sooncaught step with the rapid march of events and guided the thought ofthe world. 

The Mexican situation, which reached a crisis a few days before Mr. Wilson came into office, at once demanded his attention and led to theenunciation of a general Latin-American policy. He had scarcely beenin office a week when he issued a statement which was forwarded by thesecretary of state to all American diplomatic officers in LatinAmerica. In it he said:

"One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate thefriendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics ofCentral and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorableway the interests which are common to the peoples of the twocontinents. . . . 

"The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South Americaexcept the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, thesecurity of governments intended for the people and for no specialgroup or interest, and the development of personal and traderelationships between the two continents which shall redound to theprofit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights andliberties of neither. 

"From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of thisgovernment as it is necessary now to forecast, and in the spirit ofthese principles I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence asearnestness, to extend to the governments of all the republics ofAmerica the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge myown honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peaceand amity that a fortunate future may disclose. "

The policy here outlined, and elaborated a few months later in anaddress before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, hasbeen termed the New Pan-Americanism. The Pan-American ideal is an oldone, dating back in fact to the Panama Congress of 1826. The object ofthis congress was not very definitely stated in the call, which wasissued by Simon Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independenceand peace of the new Spanish republics through either a permanentconfederation or a series of diplomatic congresses. President Adamsthrough Henry Clay, who was at that time Secretary of State, promptlyaccepted the invitation to send delegates. The matter was debated atsuch length, however, in the House and Senate that the Americandelegates did not reach Panama until after the congress had adjourned. In view of the opposition which the whole scheme encountered inCongress, the instructions to the American delegates were verycarefully drawn and their powers were strictly limited. They werecautioned against committing their government in any way to theestablishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power fully todecide controversies between the American states or to regulate in anyrespect their conduct. " They were also to oppose the formation of anoffensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, asMr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea ofassisting Spain in the reconquest of her late colonies. Afterreferring to "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim" ofour foreign policy, Mr. Clay continued: "Without, therefore, assertingthat an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the mostintimate kind between the United States and the other Americanrepublics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely saidthat the occasion which would warrant a departure from that establishedmaxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believednow to exist. "

The British Government sent a special envoy to reside near the Congressand to place himself in frank and friendly communication with thedelegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that, "Any project for putting the U. S. Of North America at the head of anAmerican Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing toyour Government. It would be felt as an ill return for the servicewhich has been rendered to those States, and the dangers which havebeen averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and publicdeclarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no distantperiod, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe. "

The Panama Congress was without practical results and it was more thanhalf a century before the scheme for international coöperation on thepart of American states was again taken up. In 1881 Secretary Blaineissued an invitation to the American republics to hold a conference atWashington, but the continuance of the war between Chile and Perucaused an indefinite postponement of the proposed conference. Towardthe close of President Cleveland's first administration the invitationwas renewed and the First International Conference of American Statesconvened at Washington in 1890. It happened that when the Conferencemet Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State and presided over itsopening sessions. The most notable achievement of this Conference wasthe establishment of the Bureau of American Republics, now known as thePan-American Union. The Second International Conference of AmericanStates, held in the City of Mexico in 1901, arranged for all Americanstates to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for thepacific settlement of international disputes and drafted a treaty forthe compulsory arbitration, as between American states, of pecuniaryclaims. The Third Conference, held at Rio Janeiro in 1906, extendedthe above treaty for another period of five years and proposed that thesubject of pecuniary claims be considered at the second HagueConference. Added significance was given to the Rio Conference by thepresence of Secretary Root who, although not a delegate, made it theoccasion of a special mission to South America. The series of notableaddresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to thePan-American movement. The Fourth Conference, held at Buenos Ayres in1910, was occupied largely with routine matters. It extended thepecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period. 

The conferences above referred to were political or diplomatic incharacter. There have been held two Pan-American Scientific Congressesin which the United States participated, one at Chile in 1908 and oneat Washington, December, 1915, to January, 1916. A very importantPan-American Financial Congress was held at Washington in May, 1915. These congresses have accomplished a great deal in the way of promotingfriendly feeling as well as the advancement of science and commerceamong the republics of the Western Hemisphere. 

The American Institute of International Law, organized at Washington inOctober, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence inpromoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute iscomposed of five representatives from the national society ofinternational law in each of the twenty-one American republics. At asession held in the city of Washington, January 6, 1916, the Instituteadopted a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. Thisdeclaration, designed to give a solid legal basis to the newPan-Americanism, was as follows:

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserveits existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifiesthe act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence bythe commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states. 

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it hasa right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itselfwithout interference or control from other states, provided that in sodoing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states. 

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every othernation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have theright to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of theUnited States, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separateand equal station to which the laws of nature and of Nature's Godentitle them. "

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and allpersons whether native or foreign found therein. 

V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitledto have that right respected and protected by all other nations, forright and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of allto observe. 

VI. International law is at one and the same time both national andinternational; national in the sense that it is the law of the land andapplicable as such to the decision of all questions involving itsprinciples; international in the sense that it is the law of thesociety of nations and applicable as such to all questions between andamong the members of the society of nations involving its principles. 

This Declaration has been criticised as being too altruistic for aworld in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims, yet Mr. Root, in presenting it at the annual meeting of the American Society ofInternational Law, claimed that every statement in it was "based uponthe decisions of American courts and the authority of Americanpublicists. "

The Mexican situation put the principles of the new Pan-Americanism toa severe test. On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized andimprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator. Fourdays later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, promptly urged hisgovernment to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term wasrapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to hissuccessor. 

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when heassumed control of affairs at Washington. He refused to recognizeHuerta, whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs invarious parts of the country. It was claimed by the critics of theadministration that the refusal to recognize Huerta was a directviolation of the well-known American policy of recognizing de factogovernments without undertaking to pass upon the rights involved. Itis perfectly true that the United States has consistently followed thepolicy of recognizing de facto governments as soon as it is evident ineach case that the new government rests on popular approval and islikely to be permanent. This doctrine of recognition is distinctivelyan American doctrine. It was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson whenhe was Secretary of State as an offset to the European doctrine ofdivine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that otherJeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powersfrom the consent of the governed. Huerta could lay no claim toauthority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of theMexican people. He was a self-constituted dictator, whose authorityrested solely on military force. President Wilson and Secretary Bryanwere fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would neverrecognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidentialcontest. This announcement made him deaf to advice from Washington andutterly indifferent to the destruction of American life and property. 

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico wasthe occupation of Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President askedCongress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United Statesin demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines atVera Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize thecustom house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight withHuerta's troops in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventywounded. The American chargé d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was atonce handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations between theUnited States and Mexico were severed. 

A few days later the representatives of the so-called ABC Alliance, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for apeaceful settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptlyaccepted their mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in theelimination of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority wasdisputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief. OnCarranza's promise to respect the lives and property of Americancitizens the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz inNovember, 1914. 

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson, the six rankingrepresentatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessfuleffort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On theiradvice, however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize thegovernment of Carranza, who now controlled three fourths of theterritory of Mexico. As a result of this action Villa began a seriesof attacks on American citizens and raids across the border, which inMarch, 1916, compelled the President to send a punitive expedition intoMexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodiesof militia to the border. 

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not onlymade no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed thesteps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along theborder, and even assumed a threatening attitude. There was a loud andpersistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico. American investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and otherenterprises were very large, and these financial interests wereparticularly outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting. "The President remained deaf to this clamor. No country had been soshamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore, itwas suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutionshad been financed by American capital. President Wilson was determinedto give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their nationallife on a better basis and to lend them every assistance in the task. War with Mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even asuccessful war would have meant the military occupation of Mexico foran indefinite period. After our entrance into the World War many ofthose Americans who dissented radically from Wilson's Mexican policybecame convinced that his refusal to become involved in war with Mexicowas a most fortunate thing for us. 

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between thePresident's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy. The differencebetween the two cases, however, was that order could be restored inHaiti with a relatively small force of marines, while any attempt toapply force to Mexico would have led to a long and bloody conflict. The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was hisacceptance of the mediation of the ABC Alliance and his subsequentconsultation with the leading representatives of Latin America. Thisaction brought the Pan-American ideal almost to the point ofrealization. It was received with enthusiasm and it placed ourrelations with Latin America on a better footing than they had been foryears. 

It was suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policythat if we were to undertake to set the world right, we must comebefore the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before wedenounced the imperialistic policies of Europe, we should haveabandoned imperialistic policies at home. The main features ofPresident Wilson's Latin-American policy, if we may draw a generalconclusion, were to pledge American republics not to do anything whichwould invite European intervention, and to secure by treaty the rightof the United States to intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for the establishment of self-government. Such apolicy, unselfishly carried out, was not inconsistent with the generalwar aims defined by President Wilson. 

IX

THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION

In Washington's day the United States was an experiment in democracy. The vital question was not our duty to the rest of the world, butwhether the rest of the world would let us live. The policy of wisdomwas to keep aloof from world politics and give as little cause foroffense as possible to the great powers of Europe. Washington pointedout that "our detached and distant situation" rendered such a coursepossible. This policy was justified by events. We were enabled tofollow unhindered the bent of our own political genius, to extend ourinstitutions over a vast continent and to attain a position of greatprosperity and power in the economic world. While we are still a youngcountry, our government is, with the possible exception of that ofGreat Britain, the oldest and most stable in the world, and since wedeclared ourselves a nation and adopted our present constitution theBritish Government has undergone radical changes of a democraticcharacter. By age and stability we have long been entitled to a voiceand influence in the world, and yet we have been singularly indifferentto our responsibilities as a member of the society of nations. We havebeen in the world, but not of it. 

Our policy of isolation corresponded with the situation as it existed ahundred years ago, but not with the situation as it exists to-day andas it has existed for some years past. We no longer occupy a "detachedand distant situation. " Steam and electricity, the cable and wirelesstelegraphy have overcome the intervening space and made us the closeneighbors of Europe. The whole world has been drawn together in a waythat our forefathers never dreamed of, and our commercial, financial, and social relations with the rest of the world are intimate. Undersuch circumstances political isolation is an impossibility. It has foryears been nothing more than a tradition, but a tradition which hastied the hands of American diplomats and caused the American public toignore what was actually going on in the world. The Spanish War andthe acquisition of the Philippines brought us into the full current ofworld politics, and yet we refused to recognize the changes thatinevitably followed. 

The emergence of Japan as a first-class power, conscious of achievementand eager to enter on a great career, introduced a new and disturbingelement into world politics. Our diplomacy, which had hitherto beencomparatively simple, now became exceedingly complex. Formerly theUnited States was the only great power outside the European balance. The existence of a second detached power greatly complicated theinternational situation and presented opportunities for newcombinations. We have already seen how Germany undertook to use theopportunity presented by Russia's war with Japan to humiliate Franceand that the United States took a prominent part in the AlgecirasConference for the purpose of preventing the threatened overthrow ofthe European balance of power. Thus, even before the World War began, it had become evident to close observers of international affairs thatthe European balance would soon be superseded by a world balance inwhich the United States would be forced to take its place. 

It took a world war, however, to dispel the popular illusion ofisolation and to arouse us to a temporary sense of our internationalresponsibilities. When the war began the President, following thetraditions of a hundred years, issued, as a matter of course, aproclamation of neutrality, and he thought that the more scrupulouslyit was observed the greater would be the opportunity for the UnitedStates to act as impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peaceterms. As the fierceness of the conflict grew it became evident thatthe role of neutral would not be an easy one to play and that the vitalinterests of the United States would be involved to a far greaterextent than anyone had foreseen. 

Neutrality in the modern sense is essentially an American doctrine andthe result of our policy of isolation. If we were to keep out ofEuropean conflicts, it was necessary for us to pursue a course of rigidimpartiality in wars between European powers. In the Napoleonic warswe insisted that neutrals had certain rights which belligerents werebound to respect and we fought the War of 1812 with England in order toestablish that principle. Half a century later, in the American CivilWar, we insisted that neutrals had certain duties which everybelligerent had a right to expect them to perform, and we forced GreatBritain in the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims to pay us damages tothe extent of $15, 500, 000 for having failed to perform her neutralobligations. We have thus been the leading champion of the rights andduties of neutrals, and the principles for which we have contended havebeen written into the modern law of nations. When two or three nationsare engaged in war and the rest of the world is neutral, there isusually very little difficulty in enforcing neutral rights, but when amajority of the great powers are at war, it is impossible for theremaining great powers, much less for the smaller neutrals, to maintaintheir rights. This was true in the Napoleonic wars, but at that timethe law of neutrality was in its infancy and had never been fullyrecognized by the powers at war. The failure of neutrality in theGreat War was far more serious, for the rights of neutrals had beenclearly defined and universally recognized. 

Notwithstanding the large German population in this country and thepropaganda which we now know that the German Government hadsystematically carried on for years in our very midst, the invasion ofBelgium and the atrocities committed by the Germans soon arrayedopinion on the side of the Allies. This was not a departure fromneutrality, for it should be remembered that neutrality is not anattitude of mind, but a legal status. As long as our Governmentfulfilled its obligations as defined by the law of nations, no chargeof a violation of neutrality could be justly made. To deny to thecitizens of a neutral country the right to express their moraljudgments would be to deny that the world can ever be governed bypublic opinion. The effort of the German propagandists to draw adistinction between so-called ethical and legal neutrality wasplausible, but without real force. While neutrality is based on thegeneral principle of impartiality, this principle has been embodied ina fairly well-defined set of rules which may, and frequently do, in anygiven war, work to the advantage of one belligerent and to thedisadvantage of the other. In the Great War this result was broughtabout by the naval superiority of Great Britain. So far as our legalobligations to Germany were concerned she had no cause for complaint. If, on the other hand, our conduct had been determined solely byethical considerations, we would have joined the Allies long before wedid. 

The naval superiority of Great Britain made it comparatively easy forher to stop all direct trade with the enemy in articles contraband ofwar, but this was of little avail so long as Germany could import thesearticles through the neutral ports of Italy, Holland, and theScandinavian countries. Under these circumstances an ordinary blockadeof the German coast would have had little effect. Therefore, no suchblockade was proclaimed by Great Britain. She adopted other methods ofcutting off overseas supplies from Germany. She enlarged the lists ofboth absolute and conditional contraband and under the doctrine ofcontinuous voyage seized articles on both lists bound for Germanythrough neutral countries. 

As to the right of a belligerent to enlarge the contraband lists therecan be no doubt. Even the Declaration of London, which undertook forthe first time to establish an international classification ofcontraband, provided in Article 23 that "articles and materials whichare exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolutecontraband by means of a notified declaration, " and Article 25 providedthat the list of conditional contraband might be enlarged in the samemanner. Under modern conditions of warfare it would seem impossible todetermine in advance what articles are to be treated as contraband. During the Great War many articles regarded in previous wars asinnocent became indispensable to the carrying on of the war. 

Great Britain's application of the doctrine of continuous voyage wasmore open to dispute. She assumed that contraband articles shipped toneutral countries adjacent to Germany and Austria were intended forthem unless proof to the contrary was forthcoming, and she failed todraw any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. TheUnited States protested vigorously against this policy, but the forceof its protest was weakened by the fact that during the Civil War theAmerican Government had pursued substantially the same policy in regardto goods shipped by neutrals to Nassau, Havana, Matamoros, and otherports adjacent to the Confederacy. Prior to the American Civil Wargoods could not be seized on any grounds unless bound directly for abelligerent port. Under the English doctrine of continuous voyage asadvanced during the Napoleonic wars, goods brought from the French WestIndies to the United States and reshipped to continental Europe werecondemned by the British Admiralty Court on the ground thatnotwithstanding the unloading and reloading at an American port thevoyage from the West Indies to Europe was in effect a continuousvoyage, and under the Rule of 1756 Great Britain refused to admit theright of neutral ships to engage in commerce between France and hercolonies. Great Britain, however, seized ships only on the second legof the voyage, that is, when bound directly for a belligerent port. During the American Civil War the United States seized goods under anextension of the English doctrine on the first leg of the voyage, thatis, while they were in transit from one neutral port to another neutralport, on the ground that they were to be subsequently shipped inanother vessel to a Confederate port. Great Britain adopted andapplied the American doctrine during the Boer War. The doctrine ofcontinuous voyage, as applied by the United States and England, wasstrongly condemned by most of the continental writers on internationallaw. The Declaration of London adopted a compromise by providing thatabsolute contraband might be seized when bound through third countries, but that conditional contraband was not liable to capture under suchcircumstances. As the Declaration of London was not ratified by theBritish Government this distinction was ignored, and conditional aswell as absolute contraband was seized when bound for Germany throughneutral countries. 

While Great Britain may be charged with having unwarrantably extendedthe application of certain rules of international law and may haverendered herself liable to pecuniary damages, she displayed in all hermeasures a scrupulous regard for human life. Her declaration that "Thewhole of the North Sea must be considered a military area, " wasexplained as an act of retaliation against Germany for having scatteredfloating mines on the high seas in the path of British commerce. Shedid not undertake to exclude neutral vessels from the North Sea, butmerely notified them that certain areas had been mined and warned themnot to enter without receiving sailing directions from the Britishsquadron. 

The German decree of February 4, 1915, establishing a submarineblockade or "war zone" around the British Isles, on the other hand, wasabsolutely without legal justification. It did not fulfill therequirements of a valid blockade, because it cut off only a very smallpercentage of British commerce, and the first requirement of a blockadeis that it must be effective. The decree was aimed directly at enemymerchant vessels and indirectly at the ships of neutrals. It utterlyignored the well-recognized right of neutral passengers to travel onmerchant vessels of belligerents. The second decree announcingunrestricted submarine warfare after February 1, 1917, was directedagainst neutral as well as enemy ships. It undertook to exclude allneutral ships from a wide zone extending far out on the high seas, irrespective of their mission or the character of their cargo. It wasan utter defiance of all law. 

The citizens of neutral countries have always had the right to travelon the merchant vessels of belligerents, subject, of course, to therisk of capture and detention. The act of the German ambassador ininserting an advertisement in a New York paper warning Americans not totake passage on the _Lusitania_, when the President had publiclyasserted that they had a perfect right to travel on belligerent ships, was an insolent and unparalleled violation of diplomatic usage andwould have justified his instant dismissal. Some action would probablyhave been taken by the State Department had not the incident beenovershadowed by the carrying out of the threat and the actualdestruction of the _Lusitania_. 

The destruction of enemy prizes at sea is recognized by internationallaw under exceptional circumstances and subject to certain definiterestrictions, but an unlimited right of destruction even of enemymerchant vessels had never been claimed by any authority oninternational law or by any government prior to the German decree. Thedestruction of neutral prizes, though practised by some governments, has not been so generally acquiesced in, and when resorted to has beenattended by an even more rigid observance of the rules designed tosafeguard human life. Article 48 of the Declaration of London providedthat, "A captured neutral vessel is not to be destroyed by the captor, but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determinethere the rights as regards the validity of the capture. "Unfortunately Article 49 largely negatived this statement by leavingthe whole matter to the discretion of the captor. It is as follows:"As an exception, a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent ship, andwhich would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if theobservance of Article 48 would involve danger to the ship of war or tothe success of the operations in which she is at the time engaged. "The next article provided the following safeguards: "Before thedestruction the persons on board must be placed in safety, and all theship's papers and other documents which those interested considerrelevant for the decision as to the validity of the capture must betaken on board the ship of war. "

The Declaration of London was freely criticised for recognizing anunlimited discretionary right on the part of a captor to destroy aneutral prize. Under all the circumstances the main grievance againstGermany was not that she destroyed prizes at sea, but that she utterlyignored the restrictions imposed upon this right and the rules designedto safeguard human life. 

Germany sought to justify her submarine policy on the ground (1) thatthe American manufacture and sale of munitions of war was one-sided andtherefore unneutral, and (2) that the United States had practicallyacquiesced in what she considered the unlawful efforts of Great Britainto cut off the food supply of Germany. The subject of the munitionstrade was brought to the attention of the United States by Germany in anote of April 4, 1915. While not denying the legality of the trade inmunitions under ordinary circumstances the contentions of the GermanGovernment were that the situation in the present war differed fromthat of any previous war; that the recognition of the trade in the pasthad sprung from the necessity of protecting existing industries, whilein the present war an entirely new industry had been created in theUnited States; and it concluded with the following statement which wasthe real point of the note: "This industry is actually delivering goodsto the enemies of Germany. The theoretical willingness to supplyGermany also, if shipments were possible, does not alter the case. Ifit is the will of the American people that there should be a trueneutrality, the United States will find means of preventing thisone-sided supply of arms or at least of utilizing it to protectlegitimate trade with Germany, especially that in food stuffs. " Tothis note Secretary Bryan replied that "Any change in its own laws ofneutrality during the progress of the war which would affect unequallythe relations of the United States with the nations at war would be anunjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality. "

Two months later the discussion was renewed by the Austro-HungarianGovernment. The Austrian note did not question the intention of theUnited States to conform to the letter of the law, but complained thatwe were not carrying out its spirit, and suggested that a threat towithhold food stuffs and raw materials from the Allies would besufficient to protect legitimate commerce between the United States andthe Central Powers. To this note Secretary Lansing replied at length. He held: (1) that the United States was under no obligation to changeor modify the rules of international usage on account of specialconditions. (2) He rejected what he construed to be the contention ofthe Austrian Government that "the advantages gained to a belligerent byits superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers bythe establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor. " (3)He called attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany hadduring the years preceding the present European war produced "a greatsurplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world andespecially to belligerents. Never during that period did either ofthem suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial andRoyal Government. " (4) "But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of theUnited States has from the foundation of the Republic to the presenttime advocated and practised unrestricted trade in arms and militarysupplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain intime of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms andammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerfulenemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoidany appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies andnavies. In consequence of this standing policy the United Stateswould, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset ofthe war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms andammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities tosupply the requirements of national defense. The United States hasalways depended upon the right and power to purchase arms andammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others. "

The German and Austrian authorities were fully aware that theirarguments had no basis in international law or practice. Indeed, theirnotes were probably designed to influence public opinion and help theGerman propagandists in this country who were making a desperate effortto get Congress to place an embargo on the export of munitions. Havingfailed in this attempt, an extensive conspiracy was formed to break upthe trade in munitions by a resort to criminal methods. Numerousexplosions occurred in munition plants destroying many lives andmillions of dollars' worth of property, and bombs were placed in anumber of ships engaged in carrying supplies to the Allies. TheAustrian ambassador and the German military and naval attachés atWashington were involved in these activities and their recall waspromptly demanded by Secretary Lansing. 

The violations of international law by Germany were so flagrant, hermethods of waging war so barbarous, the activities of her diplomats sodevoid of honor, and her solemn pledges were so ruthlessly broken thatthe technical discussion of the rules of maritime law was completelyovershadowed by the higher moral issues involved in the contest. Allfurther efforts to maintain neutrality finally became intolerable evento President Wilson, who had exercised patience until patience ceasedto be a virtue. Having failed in his efforts to persuade Congress toauthorize the arming of merchantmen, the President finally concluded, in view of Germany's threat to treat armed guards as pirates, thatarmed neutrality was impracticable. He accepted the only alternativeand on April 2, 1917, went before Congress to ask for a formaldeclaration of war against Germany. 

Had Germany observed the rules of international law, the United Stateswould probably have remained neutral notwithstanding the imminentdanger of the overthrow of France and the possible invasion of England. The upsetting of the European balance would eventually have led to aconflict between Germany and the United States. The violation ofAmerican rights forced us to go to war, but having once entered thewar, we fought not merely for the vindication of American rights, butfor the establishment of human freedom and the recognition of humanrights throughout the world. In his war address President Wilson said:"Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of theworld is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace tothat peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic Governmentsbacked by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, notby the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality insuch circumstances. " Having once abandoned neutrality and isolation weare not likely to remain neutral again in any war which involves thebalance of power in the world or the destinies of the major portion ofmankind. Neutrality and isolation were correlative. They were bothbased on the view that we were a remote and distant people and had nointimate concern with what was going on in the great world across theseas. 

The failure of neutrality and the abandonment of isolation marked aradical, though inevitable, change in our attitude toward worldpolitics. President Wilson did not propose, however, to abandon thegreat principles for which we as a nation had stood, but rather toextend them and give them a world-wide application. In his address tothe Senate on January 22, 1917, he said:

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accordadopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world;that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nationor people, but that every people should be left free to determine itsown polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. 

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling allianceswhich would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a netof intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs withinfluences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in aconcert of power. "

In other words, the Monroe Doctrine, stripped of its imperialistictendencies, was to be internationalized, and the American policy ofisolation, in the sense of avoiding secret alliances, was to become afundamental principle of the new international order. If the UnitedStates was to go into a league of nations, every member of the leaguemust stand on its own footing. We were not to be made a buffer betweenalliances and ententes. 

X

THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

The advent of the United States into the family of nations nearly acentury and a half ago was an event of worldwide significance. Ourrevolutionary ancestors set up a government founded on a new principle, happily phrased by Jefferson in the statement that governments derivetheir just powers from the consent of the governed. This principlethreatened, although remotely, the existence of the aristocraticgovernments of the Old World which were still based on the doctrine ofdivine right. The entrance of the United States into the World War wasan event of equal significance because it gave an American president, who was thoroughly grounded in the political philosophy of the VirginiaBill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the writings ofthe founders of the Republic, an opportunity to proclaim to the worldthe things for which America has always stood. In this connection H. W. V. Temperley in "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris" (vol. I, page 173) says: "The utterances of President Wilson have a uniquesignificance, not only because they were taken as the legal basis ofthe Peace negotiations, but because they form a definite and coherentbody of political doctrine. This doctrine, though developed andexpanded in view of the tremendous changes produced by the war, was notformed or even altered by them. His ideas, like those of no othergreat statesman of the war, are capable of being worked out as acomplete political philosophy. A peculiar interest, therefore, attaches to his pre-war speeches, for they contain the germs of hispolitical faith and were not influenced by the terrifying portents ofto-day. The tenets in themselves were few and simple, but theirconsequences, when developed by the war, were such as to produce themost far-reaching results. It is not possible or necessary to discusshow far these tenets were accepted by the American people as a whole, for, as the utterances of their legal representative at a suprememoment of world history, they will always retain their value. "

The principal features of Wilson's political philosophy were revealedin his policy toward Latin America before he had any idea ofintervening in the European situation. At the outset of hisadministration he declared that the United States would "never againseek one additional foot of territory by conquest. " In December, 1915, he declared: "From the first we have made common cause with allpartisans of liberty on this side of the sea and . . . Have set Americaaside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and politicalfreemen. " A few weeks later he proposed that the nations of Americashould unite "in guaranteeing to each other absolute politicalindependence and territorial integrity. " This proposal was actuallyembodied in a treaty, but this plan for an American league of nationsdid not meet with the approval of the other states, who probably fearedthat the United States would occupy too dominant a position in such aleague. President Wilson's refusal to recognize the despotic power ofHuerta, while expressing sympathy for the people of Mexico, was thefirst application of the policy which later so successfully drove awedge in between the Kaiser and the German people. His refusal toinvade Mexico and his determination to give the people of that countrya chance to work out their own salvation gave evidence to the world ofthe unselfishness and sincerity of his policies, and paved the way forthe moral leadership which he later exercised over the peoples ofEurope. 

President Wilson's insistence on neutrality in "thought, word, anddeed, " the expression "too proud to fight, " and his statement in regardto the war, May 27, 1916, that "with its causes and objects we are notconcerned, " caused deep offense to many of his countrymen and werereceived with ridicule by others at home and abroad. His reasons forremaining neutral were best stated in the speech accepting his secondnomination for the presidency, September 2, 1916: "We have been neutralnot only because it was the fixed and traditional policy of the UnitedStates to stand aloof from the politics of Europe and because we hadhad no part either of action or of policy in the influences whichbrought on the present war, but also because it was manifestly our dutyto prevent, if it were possible, the indefinite extension of the firesof hate and desolation kindled by that terrible conflict and seek toserve mankind by reserving our strength and our resources for theanxious and difficult days of restoration and healing which mustfollow, when peace will have to build its house anew. "

Other speeches made during the year 1916 show, however, that he wasbeing gradually forced to the conclusion that "peace is not alwayswithin the choice of the nation" and that we must be "ready to fightfor our rights when those rights are coincident with the rights of manand humanity. "

After the German peace proposals of December 12, 1916, President Wilsoncalled on all the belligerents to state publicly what they werefighting for. This demand caused a searching of hearts everywhere, ledto a restatement of aims on the part of the Allies, and threw theCentral Governments on the defensive. In formulating their replies theAllies were somewhat embarrassed by the secret treaties relating toRussia and Italy, which were later made public by the Bolsheviki. InMarch, 1915, England and France had made an agreement with Russia bywhich she was to get Constantinople, the aim of her policy since thedays of Peter the Great. By the secret Treaty of London, signed April26, 1915, England, France, and Russia had promised Italy that sheshould receive the Trentino and Southern Tyrol, including in itspopulation more than 250, 000 Germans. Italy was also promised Triesteand the Istrian peninsula, the boundary running just west of Fiume, over which city, it should be remembered, she acquired no claim underthis treaty. Italy was also to receive about half of Dalmatia, including towns over half of whose population were Jugo-Slavs. ToPresident Wilson's note the Allies had to reply, therefore, in somewhatgeneral terms. Their territorial demands were: "The restitution ofprovinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish oftheir inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of theSlavs, Roumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination, thesetting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of theTurks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedlyforeign to Western civilization. " The German reply contained nostatement of territorial claims and gave no pledge even as to thefuture status of Belgium. 

In reporting the results of this interchange of views to the Senate, January 22, 1917, President Wilson delivered the first of that seriesof addresses on the essentials of a just and lasting peace which madehim the recognized spokesman of the liberal element in all countriesand gained for him a moral leadership that was without parallel in thehistory of the world. "In every discussion of the peace that must endthis war, " he declared, "it is taken for granted that that peace mustbe followed by some definite concert of power which will make itvirtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm usagain. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must takethat for granted. " In fact, there was no dissent from this statement. Most of our leading men, including Taft, Roosevelt, and Lodge, werecommitted to the idea of a league of nations for the maintenance of lawand international peace. The League to Enforce Peace, which hadbranches in all the Allied countries, had done a great work inpopularizing this idea. The President came before the Senate, he said, "as the council associated with me in the final determination of ourinternational obligations, " to formulate the conditions upon which hewould feel justified in asking the American people to give "formal andsolemn adherence to a League for Peace. " He disclaimed any right to avoice in determining what the terms of peace should be, but he didclaim a right to "have a voice in determining whether they shall bemade lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant. " Firstof all, the peace must be a "peace without victory, " for "only a peacebetween equals can last. " And, he added, "there is a deeper thinginvolved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peacecan last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept theprinciple that governments derive all their just powers from theconsent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to handpeoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they wereproperty. " He cited Poland as an example, declaring that statesmeneverywhere were agreed that she should be "united, independent, andautonomous. "

He declared that every great people "should be assured a direct outletto the sea, " and that "no nation should be shut away from free accessto the open paths of the world's commerce. " He added: "The freedom ofthe seas is the _sine qua non_ of peace, equality, and coöperation. "This problem, he said, was closely connected with the limitation ofnaval armaments. "The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected withthe future fortunes of nations and of mankind. "

The Russian revolution, which came in March, 1917, and resulted in theoverthrow of the Czar's government, cleared the political atmospherefor the time being, and enabled President Wilson in his address toCongress on April 2 to proclaim a war of democracy against autocracy. The new Russian government repudiated all imperialistic aims andadopted the formula: "Self-determination, no annexations, noindemnities. " Poland was given her freedom and the demand forConstantinople was abandoned. The Allies were thus relieved from oneof their most embarrassing secret treaties. 

Even after America entered the war, President Wilson continued toadvance the same ideas as to the ultimate conditions of peace. Hisattitude remained essentially different from that of the Allies, whowere hampered by secret treaties wholly at variance with thePresident's aims. In his war address he declared that we had "noquarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them butone of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse thattheir government acted in entering this war. " Prussian autocracy wasthe object of his attack. "We are now about to accept gauge of battlewith this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend thewhole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and itspower. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of falsepretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the worldand for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: forthe rights of nations great and small and the privilege of meneverywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The worldmust be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon thetested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends toserve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities forourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freelymake. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. Weshall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as thefaith and the freedom of nations can make them. "

About the time that the United States declared war, Austria and Germanybegan another so-called "peace offensive. " Overtures were made byAustria to France in March, and in August the Pope made a direct appealto the Powers. This move was unmasked by President Wilson in a publicaddress at the Washington Monument, June 14, 1917. "The militarymasters under whom Germany is bleeding, " he declared, "see very clearlyto what point fate has brought them: if they fall back or are forcedback an inch, their power abroad and at home will fall to pieces. Itis their power at home of which they are thinking now more than oftheir power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under theirvery feet. Deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but onechance to perpetuate their military power, or even their controllingpolitical influence. If they can secure peace now, with the immenseadvantage still in their hands, they will have justified themselvesbefore the German people. They will have gained by force what theypromised to gain by it--an immense expansion of German power and animmense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their politicalpower. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside. Agovernment accountable to the people themselves will be set up inGermany, as has been the case in England, the United States, andFrance--in all great countries of modern times except Germany. If theysucceed they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone. If theyfail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If theysucceed, America will fall within the menace, and we, and all the restof the world, must remain armed, as they will remain, and must makeready for the next step in their aggression. If they fail, the worldmay unite for peace and Germany may be of the union. "

The task of replying to the Pope was left by the Allied governments toWilson, who was not hampered by secret treaties. In this remarkabledocument he drove still further the wedge between the German people andthe Kaiser. "The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs atthe hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire noreprisal upon the German people who have themselves suffered all thingsin this war which they did not choose. They believe that peace shouldrest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments--therights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal rightto freedom and security and self-government and to a participation uponfair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the Germanpeople of course included if they will accept equality and not seekdomination. "

In conclusion he said: "We cannot take the word of the present rulersof Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unlessexplicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will andpurpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of theworld would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set uparbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidenceof the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grantit may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of allpeoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility ofcovenanted peace. "

Early in November, 1917, the Kerensky Government was overthrown inRussia and the Bolsheviki came into power. They at once proposed ageneral armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter intopeace negotiations. The Central Powers accepted the invitation, andearly in December negotiations began at Brest-Litovsk. The Russianpeace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories, self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no warindemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonialquestions in accordance with the above principles. The Austrianminister, Count Czernin, replied for the Central Powers, accepting moreof the Russian program than had been expected, but rejecting theprinciple of a free plebiscite for national groups not hithertoindependent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the Alliesof the offer of general peace. The conference called on the Allies foran answer by January 4. No direct reply was made to this demand, butthe Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboringclasses in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilsonfelt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies. 

In a speech delivered January 5, 1918, Lloyd George made the firstcomprehensive and authoritative statement of British war aims. He hadconsulted the labor leaders and Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as wellas some of the representatives of the overseas dominions, and he wasspeaking, he said, for "the nation and the Empire as a whole. " Heexplained first what the British were not fighting for. He disclaimedany idea of overthrowing the German Government, although he consideredmilitary autocracy "a dangerous anachronism"; they were not fighting todestroy Austria-Hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to"those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it"; theywere not fighting "to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich andrenowned lands of Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race, " butthe passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea must be"internationalized and neutralized. " The positive statement of aimsincluded the complete restoration of Belgium, the return ofAlsace-Lorraine to France, rectification of the Italian boundary, theindependence of Poland, the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and theoccupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania, and a disposition of theGerman colonies with "primary regard to the wishes and interests of thenative inhabitants of such colonies. " He insisted on reparation forinjuries done in violation of international law, but disclaimed ademand for war indemnity. In conclusion he declared the followingconditions to be essential to a lasting peace: "First, the sanctity oftreaties must be reëstablished; secondly, a territorial settlement mustbe secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent ofthe governed; and lastly, we must seek, by the creation of someinternational organization, to limit the burden of armaments anddiminish the probability of war. "

On January 8, 1918, three days after Lloyd George's speech, PresidentWilson appeared before both Houses of Congress and delivered the mostimportant of all his addresses on war aims. It contained the famousFourteen Points:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shallbe no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacyshall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorialwaters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed inwhole or in part by international action for the enforcement ofinternational covenants. 

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and theestablishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nationsconsenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will bereduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 

V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of allcolonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle thatin determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of thepopulations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claimsof the Government whose title is to be determined. 

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement ofall questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freestcoöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her anunhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independentdetermination of her own political development and national policy andassure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations underinstitutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistancealso of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. Thetreatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be the acid testof their good will, of their comprehension of her needs asdistinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent andunselfish sympathy. 

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated andrestored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoysin common with all other free nations. No other single act will serveas this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the lawswhich they have themselves set and determined for the government oftheir relations with one another. Without this healing act the wholestructure and validity of international law is forever impaired. 

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portionsrestored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matterof Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world fornearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may oncemore be made secure in the interest of all. 

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected alongclearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations wewish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freestopportunity of autonomous development. 

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated: occupiedterritories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to thesea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one anotherdetermined by friendly counsel along historically established lines ofallegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of thepolitical and economic independence and territorial integrity of theseveral Balkan states should be entered into. 

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should beassured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are nowunder Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life andan absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and theDardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the shipsand commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which shouldinclude the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whosepolitical and economic independence and territorial integrity should beguaranteed by international covenant. 

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specificcovenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of politicalindependence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 

In February negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were broken off as a resultof the excessive demands of the Germans and the armistice was declaredat an end. The Germans quickly overran Poland and the Baltic provincesand occupied Ukraine under a treaty which virtually placed the materialresources of that country at the disposal of the Central Powers. In anaddress at Baltimore, April 6, the anniversary of our entrance into thewar, President Wilson denounced the insincerity and perfidy of theGerman rulers, who, he said, were "enjoying in Russia a cheap triumphin which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. " He concludedwith these strong words: "Germany has once more said that force, andforce alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in theaffairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion asshe conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to theutmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphantforce which shall make right the law of the world and cast everyselfish dominion down in the dust. "

Between the addresses of January 8 and the Armistice, the Presidentdelivered other addresses in which he elaborated some of the principlesof the Fourteen Points. Of special significance were his speeches ofFebruary 11, July 4, and September 27. In the last his mind centeredon the League of Nations. "There can be no leagues or alliances orspecial covenants and understandings within the general and commonfamily of the League of Nations, " he declared, and "there can be nospecial selfish economic combinations within the League, and noemployment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as thepower of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of disciplineand control. " In conclusion he said that the United States wasprepared "to assume its full share of responsibility for themaintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peacemust henceforth rest. "

We now know from the published memoirs of German and Austrian statesmenthat President Wilson's speeches made a profound impression on thepeoples of Central Europe. His utterances in behalf of the oppressednationalities, not only Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, but also theCzecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, became stronger and more frequentduring the spring and summer of 1918, and solidified the opposition toGermany at a critical period of the war. On September 3 he recognizedthe Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent government. Thismeant the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had not beencontemplated at an earlier period, but, as he stated in his reply tothe Austrian request for an armistice in October, conditions hadchanged since the announcement of the Fourteen Points, and thesepeoples would no longer be satisfied with mere autonomy. 

As a result of the Russian collapse and the negotiations atBrest-Litovsk, the Germans withdrew their divisions from the easternfront and staked everything on the great western drive of March, 1918. When this movement was finally checked and the Allied advance began, the German military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did nothave the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeatmeant the overthrow of the old system of government based on militarysuccess. They waited in vain for some military advantage which wouldgive them an opportunity to open negotiations without openlyacknowledging defeat. Finally the state of demoralization atHeadquarters became so complete that there was no alternative but toask for an immediate armistice. In order to pave the way for thisstep, the ministry resigned October 1, and Prince Max of Baden wascalled on to form a new government. On the 4th he dispatched a note toPresident Wilson through the Swiss Government, requesting him to call apeace conference and stating that the German Government "accepts theprogram set forth by the President of the United States in his messageto Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of the 27th September, as a basis for peacenegotiations. "

In reply the President asked for a clearer understanding on threepoints: (1) Did the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Governmentaccepted the terms laid down in the President's addresses referred to, and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agreeupon the practical details of their application?" (2) The Presidentwould not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the AlliedGovernments so long as the armies of the Central Powers were upon theirsoil. (3) The President asked whether the Chancellor was speaking forthe constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted thewar. 

The German reply of October 12 was satisfactory on the first point. With respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territorythey proposed a mixed commission to arrange the details. On the thirdpoint it was stated that the new government had been formed inagreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. Havingaccomplished this much, the President's next step was skilfully taken. He replied that the process of evacuation and the conditions of anarmistice were matters which must be left to the judgment of themilitary advisers of the United States and the Allied Governments, butthat he would not agree to any arrangement which did not provide"absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenanceof the present military supremacy of the armies of the United Statesand of the Allies in the field. " Referring next to submarine warfare, he declared that the United States and the Allied Governments could notconsider an armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continuethe illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in. " Inconclusion he referred to a clause contained in his speech of July 4, now accepted by the German Government as one of the conditions ofpeace, namely, "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere thatcan separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace ofthe world. " He added: "The power which has hitherto controlled theGerman nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choiceof the German nation to alter it. " He demanded that the United Statesand the Allied Governments "should know beyond a peradventure" withwhom they were dealing. 

In reply the Chancellor assured the President that a bill had beenintroduced in the Reichstag to alter the constitution of the Empire soas to give the representatives of the people the right to decide forwar or peace, but the President was not satisfied that there had beenany real change. "It may be that future wars have been brought underthe control of the German people, but the present war has not been; andit is with the present war that we are dealing. " He was not willing toaccept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on thepart of Germany impossible. If, he concluded, the United States "mustdeal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germanynow, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard tothe international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand notpeace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leavingthis essential thing unsaid. " This note was written October 23. Fourdays later the Chancellor replied: "The President knows the deep-rootedchanges which have taken place and are still taking place in Germanconstitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by aPeople's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests inaccordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power willalso be subject. The German Government now awaits the proposals for anarmistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the Presidentin his manifestations has described. "

The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council atVersailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severethan the public had expected them to be. Germany was requiredimmediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, andLuxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the leftbank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, andTurkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery andairplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. This was practically unconditional surrender. Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Fochand Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germanywould not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany wouldaccept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "thecomplete disarmament and demobilization of the military and navalforces of the enemy. " In America there was much criticism of thePresident for being willing to negotiate with Germany at all. "On toBerlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the President waspreventing a complete military triumph. On October 10 Senator Lodgedeclared in the Senate: "The Republican party stands for unconditionalsurrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood. My own belief isthat the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender. Theymean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace. "

After reviewing the Armistice negotiations André Tardieu, a member ofthe French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says:

"What remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armisticesecretly determined upon by an American dictator; submitted to by theEuropean governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victoriousarmies, despite the opposition of the generals? The Armistice wasdiscussed in the open light of day. President Wilson only consented tocommunicate it to his associates on the triple condition that itsprinciple be approved by the military authorities and its clauses wouldbe drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and notdiscussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption ofhostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms ofpeace. So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin till October23, and in Paris from that date till November 5. It was to theCommander-in-Chief [Foch] that final decision was left not only on theprinciple of the Armistice but upon its application. He it was whodrew up the text. And it was his draft that was adopted. The actionof the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it moresevere. That is the truth:--it is perhaps less picturesque butcertainly more in accord with common sense. "

The terms of the Armistice were delivered to the Germans by MarshalFoch November 7, and they were given seventy-two hours to accept orreject them. Meanwhile Germany's allies were rapidly deserting her. Bulgaria surrendered September 30, and on October 30 Turkey signed anarmistice. Finally on November 4, the rapidly disintegratingAustro-Hungarian Monarchy also signed an armistice. On October 28there had been a naval mutiny at Kiel which spread rapidly to the otherports. On the 31st the Emperor departed for Army Headquarters, leavingBerlin on the verge of revolution. On the 7th of November the SocialDemocrats demanded the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown Prince. On the 9th Prince Max resigned the Chancellorship, and the Kaiserabdicated and ignominiously fled across the border into Holland. Onthe 11th at 5 A. M. The Armistice was signed by the German delegatesand Marshal Foch, and it went into effect at 11 o'clock that day. 

In two particulars the Wilson principles had been modified by theAllies. In the American note to Germany of November 5 SecretaryLansing stated that the President had submitted his correspondence withthe German authorities to the Allied Governments and that he hadreceived in reply the following memorandum:

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to thecorrespondence which has passed between the President of the UnitedStates and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications whichfollow, they declare their willingness to make peace with theGovernment of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in thePresident's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principlesof settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must pointout, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described asthe freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some ofwhich they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselvescomplete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference. Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address toCongress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invadedterritories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and theAllied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist asto what this provision implies. By it they understand thatcompensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to thecivilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggressionof Germany by land, by sea, and from the air. " In transmitting thismemorandum Secretary Lansing stated that he was instructed by thePresident to say that he agreed with this interpretation. 

With these modifications the Wilson principles were accepted by allparties as the legal basis of the peace negotiations. 

XI

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, andPresident Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude thathe decided to head the American delegation himself. Great Britain, France, and Italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it wasfitting that the United States should be represented by its mostresponsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman ofthe Allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace wasto be made. But the decision of the President to go to Paris waswithout precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticismand opposition. When he announced the names of the other members ofthe delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe. They were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador toFrance, Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. Therehad been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, andmany people thought that the President should have taken Root, orRoosevelt, or Taft. Mr. White was a Republican but he had never beenactive in party affairs or in any sense a leader. In the Senate therewas deep resentment that the President had not selected any members ofthat body to accompany him. President McKinley had appointed threesenators as members of the commission of five that negotiated thetreaty of peace at the close of the Spanish War. With that exception, senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty. The delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military, economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whomwere men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines weredrawn. 

But just before the signing of the Armistice, the President hadsuffered a serious political defeat at home. There had been severecriticism of Democratic leadership in Congress and growingdissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet. In responseto the appeals of Democratic Congressmen, the President issued astatement from the White House on October 25, asking the people, ifthey approved of his leadership and wished him to continue to be their"unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, " to vote forthe Democratic candidates for Congress. He acknowledged that theRepublicans in Congress had loyally supported his war measures, but hedeclared that they were hostile to the administration and that the timewas too critical for divided leadership. This statement created astorm of criticism, and did more than any other act in hisadministration to turn the tide of public opinion against thePresident. The elections resulted in a Republican majority ofthirty-nine in the House and two in the Senate. The President hadfollowed the practice of European premiers in appealing to the people, but under our constitutional system he could not very well resign. Hadhe not issued his appeal, the election would have been regarded as arepudiation of the Democratic Congress, but not necessarily as arepudiation of the President. The situation was most unfortunate, butthe President made no comments and soon after announced his intentionof going to Paris. In December Lloyd George went to the country, andon pledging himself to make Germany pay for the war and to hang theKaiser, he was returned by a substantial majority. These pledges wereunnecessary and had a most unfortunate influence on the subsequentnegotiations at Paris. 

The President sailed for France December 4, leaving a divided countrybehind him. His enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him. Senator Sherman introduced a resolution declaring the presidency vacantbecause the President had left the territory of the United States, andSenator Knox offered another resolution declaring that the Conferenceshould confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that theproposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at somefuture time. 

While his enemies in the Senate were busily organizing all the forcesof opposition against him, the President was welcomed by the war-wearypeoples of Europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as hadbeen the lot of few men in history to receive. Sovereigns and heads ofStates bestowed the highest honors upon him, while great crowds ofworking men gathered at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpseof the man who had led the crusade for a peace that would end war andestablish justice as the rule of conduct between the nations of theworld, great and small nations alike. 

No mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations thatcentered in Wilson when he landed on the shores of France in December, 1918. The Armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, andthe peoples of Europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodiedin the treaty of peace. He still held the moral leadership of theworld, but the war was over, the German menace ended, and nationalrivalries and jealousies were beginning to reappear, even among thosenations who had so recently fought and bled side by side. This changewas to be revealed when the Conference met. There was no sign of it inthe plaudits of the multitudes who welcomed the President in France, inEngland, and in Italy. He returned on January 7, 1919, from Italy toParis, where delegates to the Conference from all the countries whichhad been at war with Germany were gathering. 

The first session of the Peace Conference was held January 18. Themain work of the Conference was carried on by the Supreme Council, constituted at this meeting and composed of the two ranking delegatesof each of the five great powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, theUnited States, and Japan. The decisions which this Council arrived at, with the aid of the large groups of technical advisers whichaccompanied the delegations of the great powers, were reported to theConference in plenary session from time to time and ratified. TheSupreme Council was, however, gradually superseded by the "Big Four, "Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, while the "Five, "composed of ministers of foreign affairs, handled much of the routinebusiness, and made some important decisions, subject to the approval ofthe "Four. " According to statistics compiled by Tardieu, the Councilof Ten held seventy-two sessions, the "Five" held thirty-nine, and the"Four" held one hundred and forty-five. As one of the American expertsputs it: "The 'Ten' fell into the background, the 'Five' never emergedfrom obscurity, the 'Four' ruled the Conference in the culminatingperiod when its decisions took shape. "

At the plenary session of January 25, President Wilson made a notablespeech in which he proposed the creation of a league of nations, and aresolution to organize such a league and make it an integral part ofthe general treaty was unanimously adopted. A commission to draft aconstitution for the League was appointed with President Wilson aschairman. On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the Leaguewas presented by him to the Conference, and on the following day hesailed for the United States in order to consider the bills passed byCongress before the expiration of the session on March 4. The firstdraft of the Covenant was hastily prepared, and it went back to thecommission for revision. As soon as the text was made known in theUnited States, opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate. During the President's brief visit to Washington, he gave a dinner atthe White House to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relationsand of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose ofexplaining to them the terms of the Covenant. There was no officialreport of what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some ofthe senators objected to the Covenant on the ground that it wascontrary to our traditional policies and inconsistent with ourConstitution and form of government. On March 4, the day before thePresident left New York to resume his duties at the Conference, Senators Lodge and Knox issued a round robin, signed by thirty-sevensenators, declaring that they would not vote for the Covenant in theform proposed, and that consideration of the League of Nations shouldbe postponed until peace had been concluded with Germany. That samenight the President made a speech at the Metropolitan Opera House inNew York City in which, after explaining and defining the Covenant, hesaid: "When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find theCovenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to theCovenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty withoutdestroying the whole vital structure. " In this same address he alsosaid: "The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other sideof the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people isin favour of the League of Nations. I know that this is true. I havehad unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, andthe voice rings true in every case. " The President was evidently quiteconfident that public sentiment would compel the Senate to ratify thepeace treaty, including the Covenant of the League. A nation-widepropaganda was being carried on by the League to Enforce Peace andother organizations, and public sentiment for the League appeared to beoverwhelming. The President took back to Paris with him varioussuggestions of changes in the Covenant, and later ex-President Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hughes proposed amendments which wereforwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission. Some ofthese suggestions, such as the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine andthe right of withdrawal from the League, were embodied in the finaldraft. 

When the President returned to Paris he found that Secretary Lansingand Colonel House had consented to the separation of the League fromthe treaty of peace. He immediately reversed this decision, but thefinal adoption of the Covenant was delayed by the demand of Japan thata clause be inserted establishing "the principle of equality of nationsand just treatment of their nationals, " which would have brought withinthe jurisdiction of the League the status of Japan's subjects inCalifornia and in the British dominions. France urged the inclusion ofa provision creating a permanent General Staff to direct the militaryoperations of the League, and Belgium insisted that Brussels ratherthan Geneva should be the seat of the League. Meanwhile other nationalaspirations were also brought forward which delayed the general treatyof peace. France wanted the entire left bank of the Rhine; Italy putforth a claim to Fiume; and Japan, relying on secret agreements withEngland, France, and Italy, insisted on her claims to Shantung. Noeconomic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question ofreparations was threatening the disruption of the Conference. 

The most difficult problem that the Conference had to solve was theestablishment of a new Franco-German frontier. There was no questionabout Alsace-Lorraine. That had been disposed of by the FourteenPoints, and Germany had acquiesced in its return to France in thepre-Armistice agreement. But no sooner was the Armistice signed thanFoch addressed a note to Clemenceau, setting forth the necessity ofmaking the Rhine the western frontier of Germany. The Left Bank, extending from Alsace-Lorraine to the Dutch frontier, embraced about10, 000 square miles and 5, 500, 000 people. The debate on this questioncontinued at intervals for six months and at times became veryacrimonious. The French representatives did not demand the directannexation of the Left Bank, but they proposed an independent orautonomous Rhineland and French, or inter-Allied, occupation of theRhine for an indefinite period, or at least until the full execution byGermany of the financial clauses of the treaty. Both the British andAmerican delegates opposed the French proposals. Lloyd Georgerepeatedly said: "We must not create another Alsace-Lorraine. " He alsoremarked on one occasion: "The strongest impression made upon me by myfirst visit to Paris was the statue of Strasburg veiled in mourning. Do not let us make it possible for Germany to erect a similar statue. "

This discussion was being carried on with great earnestness andintensity of feeling when Wilson returned to Paris March 14. That veryafternoon he met Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The French argument wasset forth again at length and with great skill. The fact was againpointed out that the destruction of the German fleet had relievedEngland from all fear of German invasion, and that the Atlantic Oceanlay between Germany and the United States, while France, which hadsuffered two German invasions in half a century, had no safeguard butthe League of Nations, which she did not deem as good a guarantee asthe Rhine bridges. Finally Wilson and Lloyd George offered theguarantee treaties, and Clemenceau agreed to take the proposal underconsideration. Three days later he came back with a counterproposition and a compromise was reached. France gave up her demandfor a separate Rhineland, but secured occupation of the Left Bank, including the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years as aguarantee of the execution of the treaty. In return the United Statesand Great Britain pledged themselves to come to the immediate aid ofFrance, in case of an unprovoked attack, by an agreement which was tobe binding only if ratified by both countries. This treaty the UnitedStates Senate refused to ratify. Foch was opposed to this compromise, and adopted a course of action which was very embarrassing toClemenceau. Fierce attacks on the French Government and on therepresentatives of Great Britain and the United States, inspired byhim, appeared in the papers. When the treaty was finally completed, heeven went so far as to refuse to transmit the note summoning the Germandelegates to Versailles to receive it. Wilson and Lloyd George finallyprotested so vigorously to Clemenceau that Foch had to give way. 

In view of the promises of Clemenceau and Lloyd George that Germanyshould pay the cost of the war, the question of reparations was anexceedingly difficult one to adjust. President Wilson stoutly opposedthe inclusion of war costs as contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau finally had to give in. The entireAmerican delegation and their corps of experts endeavored to limit thecharges imposed on Germany rigidly to reparation for damage done tocivilians in the occupied areas and on land and sea. Lloyd George, remembering the promises which he had made prior to the Decemberelections, insisted that pensions paid by the Allied governments shouldbe included as damage done to the civilian population. This claim wasutterly illogical, for pensions fall properly into the category ofmilitary expenses, but it was pressed with such skill and determinationby Lloyd George and General Smuts that President Wilson finally gavehis assent. 

From the first the American delegates and experts were in favor offixing definitely the amount that Germany was to pay in the way ofreparations and settling this question once for all. They hoped toagree upon a sum which it was within Germany's power to pay. ButClemenceau and Lloyd George had made such extravagant promises to theirpeople that they were afraid to announce at this time a sum which wouldnecessarily be much less than the people expected. They, therefore, insisted that the question should be left open to be determined laterby a Reparations Commission. They declared that any other course wouldmean the immediate overthrow of their governments and thereorganization of the British and French delegations. President Wilsondid not care to put himself in the position of appearing to precipitatea political crisis in either country, so he finally gave way on thispoint also. These concessions proved to be the most serious mistakesthat he made at Paris, for they did more than anything else toundermine the faith of liberals everywhere in him. 

The Italian delegation advanced a claim to Fiume which was inconsistentboth with the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points. Whendisagreement over this question had been delaying for weeks thesettlement of other matters, President Wilson finally made a publicstatement of his position which was virtually an appeal to the Italianpeople over the heads of their delegation. The entire delegationwithdrew from the Conference and went home, but Premier Orlandoreceived an almost unanimous vote of confidence from his parliament, and he was supported by an overwhelming tide of public sentimentthroughout Italy. This was the first indication of Wilson's loss ofprestige with the peoples of Europe. 

As already stated, the Japanese had insisted on the insertion in theCovenant of the League of the principle of racial equality. It is verydoubtful whether they ever expected to succeed in this. Theprobability is that they advanced this principle in order to compelconcessions on other points. Japan's main demand was that the Germanleases and concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung should bedefinitely confirmed to her by the treaty. Two weeks after theoutbreak of the World War, Japan had addressed an ultimatum to Germanyto the effect that she immediately withdraw all German vessels fromChinese and Japanese waters and deliver not later than September 15 "tothe Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation theentire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a view to the eventualrestoration of the same to China. " In a statement issued to the pressCount Okuma said:

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the peopleof America and all the world that Japan has no ulterior motive ordesire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or anyother peoples of anything which they now possess. "

The Germans had spent about $100, 000, 000 in improving Tsing-tau, theprincipal city of Kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering. After a siege of two months the city was captured by the Japanese armyand navy, assisted by a small force of British troops. This was thefirst act in the drama. On January 8, 1915, Japan suddenly presentedto the Chinese government the now famous Twenty-one Demands, deliberately misrepresenting to the United States and other powers thenature of these demands. Among other things, Japan demanded not onlythat China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung thatJapan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but thatshe should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantungthan Germany had enjoyed. China was finally forced to agree to thesedemands. 

Japan's next step was to acquire from the Allies the assurance thatthey would support her claims to Shantung and to the islands in thePacific north of the equator on the conclusion of the war. This shedid in secret agreements signed in February and March, 1917, withEngland, France, Italy, and Russia. England agreed to support Japan'sclaim on condition that Japan would support her claims to the Pacificislands south of the equator. France signed on condition that Japanwould use her influence on China to break relations with Germany andplace at the disposal of the Allies the German ships interned inChinese ports. The Allies were evidently uneasy about Japan, and werewilling to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. Thisuncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of theLansing-Ishii agreement signed November 2, 1917, in which the UnitedStates recognized the "special interests" of Japan in China. 

The secret treaties of the Allies relating to the Japanese claims werenot revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacificwas under discussion at the Peace Conference. When informed by BaronMakino that the islands north of the equator had been pledged to Japanby agreements signed two years before, President Wilson inquiredwhether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that theGerman rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan. As theother powers were pledged to support Japan's claims, President Wilsonfound himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he hadalso to oppose Japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equalitybe inserted in the Covenant of the League. This was a moral claim thatJapan urged with great strategic effect. In pushing her claims toShantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely uponher legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies, (2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest. When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915, Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with Chinahad been extorted by force. Japan declared, however, that she had nointention of holding Shantung permanently, but that she would restorethe province in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economicprivileges transferred from Germany. In view of this oral promise, President Wilson finally acquiesced in the recognition of Japan's legalstatus in Shantung. 

On May 7 the completed treaty was presented to the German delegates whohad been summoned to Versailles to receive it. When the text was madepublic in Berlin there was an indignant outcry against the allegedinjustice of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent withthe pledges given by President Wilson in the pre-Armisticenegotiations, and the Germans made repeated efforts to draw the Alliesinto a general discussion of principles. They were, however, finallygiven to understand that they must accept or reject the treaty as itstood, and on June 28 it was signed in the Hall of Mirrors atVersailles--the same hall in which William I had been crowned Emperorof Germany forty-eight years before. 

The next day President Wilson sailed for the United States, and on July10 personally presented the treaty to the Senate with an earnest appealfor prompt ratification. The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whichthe treaty was referred, proceeded with great deliberation, and on July31 began a series of public hearings which lasted until September 12. The Committee called before it Secretary Lansing and several of thetechnical advisors to the American delegation, including B. M. Baruch, economic adviser, Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and David HunterMiller, legal adviser. The Committee also called before it a number ofAmerican citizens who had had no official connection with thenegotiations but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups, including Thomas F. Millard for China, Joseph W. Folk for Egypt, DudleyField Malone for India, and a large delegation of Americans of Irishdescent, who opposed the League of Nations on the ground that it wouldstand in the way of Ireland's aspiration for independence. The rivalclaims of Jugo-Slavs and Italians to Fiume, the demand of Albania forself-determination, the claims of Greece to Thrace, and arguments forand against the separation of Austria and Hungary were all presented atgreat length to the Committee. On August 19 the President received theCommittee at the White House, and after submitting a written statementon certain features of the Covenant, he was questioned by members ofthe Committee and a general discussion followed. 

Meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the Senate. ThePresident had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as inother things, and the Senate now undertook to use his own weaponagainst him by a public attack on the treaty. Although the oppositionto the treaty was started in the Senate by Lodge, Borah, Johnson, Sherman, Reed, and Poindexter, it was not confined to that body. Throughout the country there were persons of liberal views who favoredthe League of Nations but objected to the severe terms imposed onGermany, and charged the President with having proved false to theprinciples of the Fourteen Points. There were others who did notobject to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the tradition ofisolation and thought membership in the League of Nations would involvethe sacrifice of national sovereignty. The main object of attack wasArticle X, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and politicalindependence of all the members of the League. President Wilson statedto the Senate Committee that he regarded Article X as "the verybackbone of the whole Covenant, " and that "without it the League wouldbe hardly more than an influential debating society. " The opponents ofthe League declared that this article would embroil the United Statesin the internal affairs of Europe, and that it deprived Congress of itsconstitutional right to declare war. 

In the Senate there were three groups: the small number of"irreconcilables" who opposed the ratification of the treaty in anyform; a larger group who favored ratification without amendments, butwho finally expressed their willingness to accept "interpretativereservations"; and a large group composed mainly of Republicans whofavored the ratification of the treaty only on condition that thereshould be attached to it reservations safeguarding what they declaredto be the fundamental rights and interests of the United States. Thisgroup differed among themselves as to the character of the reservationsthat were necessary, and some of them became known as "mildreservationists. "

It is probable that at the outset only the small group of"irreconcilables" hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of thetreaty, but as the debate proceeded and the opposition to the treatyreceived more and more popular support, the reservationists determinedto defeat the treaty altogether rather than to accept any compromise. The Republican leaders were quick to realize that the tide of publicopinion had turned and was now running strongly against the President. They determined, therefore, to ruin him at all hazards, and thus tobring about the election of a Republican president. 

When President Wilson realized that the treaty was really in danger ofdefeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for thepurpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure tobear on the Senate. Beginning at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, heproceeded through the northern tier of states to the Pacific coast, then visited California and returned through Colorado. He addressedlarge audiences who received him with great enthusiasm. He was"trailed" by Senator Hiram Johnson, who was sent out by the oppositionin the Senate to present the other side. Johnson also attracted largecrowds. On the return trip, while delivering an address at Wichita, Kansas, September 26, the President showed signs of a nervous breakdownand returned immediately to Washington. He was able to walk from thetrain to his automobile, but a few days later he was partiallyparalyzed. The full extent and seriousness of his illness wascarefully concealed from the public. He was confined to the WhiteHouse for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of thetreaty. 

On September 10 the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treatyto the Senate with a number of amendments and reservations. TheCommittee declared that the League was an alliance, and that it would"breed wars instead of securing peace. " They also declared that theCovenant demanded "sacrifices of American independence and sovereigntywhich would in no way promote the world's peace, " and that theamendments and reservations which they proposed were intended "to guardAmerican rights and American sovereignty. " The following day theminority members of the Committee submitted a report opposing bothamendments and reservations. A few days later Senator McCumberpresented a third report representing the views of the "mildreservationists. " It objected to the phraseology of the Committee'sreservations as unnecessarily severe and recommended substitutereservations. The treaty then became the regular order in the Senateand was read section by section and debated each day for over twomonths. The amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected bysubstantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would havemade it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the Allies butalso to Germany. The majority of the senators were opposed to such acourse. The Committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservationsfor amendments, and Senator Lodge finally submitted, on behalf of theCommittee, fourteen reservations preceded by a preamble, which declaredthat the ratification of the treaty was not to take effect or bind theUnited States until these reservations had been accepted as a conditionof ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied andassociated powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. 

The first reservation provided that in case of withdrawal from theLeague the United States should be the sole judge as to whether itsinternational obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled. Thisreservation was adopted by a vote of 50 to 35. 

The second reservation declared that the United States assumed noobligation to preserve the territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any other country or to interfere in controversiesbetween nations under the provisions of Article X "or to employ themilitary or naval forces of the United States under any article of thetreaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war orauthorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the UnitedStates, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. " This reservationwas adopted by a vote of 46 to 33. 

Reservation Number 3, providing that no mandate under the treaty shouldbe accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, wasadopted by a vote of 52 to 31. 

Number 4, excluding domestic questions from consideration by theCouncil or the Assembly of the League, was adopted by a vote of 59 to26. 

Number 5, declaring the Monroe Doctrine "to be wholly outside thejurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by anyprovision contained in said treaty of peace with Germany, " andreserving to the United States the sole right to interpret the MonroeDoctrine, was adopted by a vote of 55 to 34. 

Number 6, withholding the assent of the United States from theprovisions of the treaty relating to Shantung and reserving fullliberty of action with respect to any controversy which might ariseunder said articles between China and Japan, was adopted by a vote of53 to 41. 

Number 7, reserving to Congress the right to provide by law for theappointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assemblyand Council of the League and members of commissions, committees orcourts under the League, and requiring the confirmation of all by theSenate, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 40. 

Number 8, declaring that the Reparations Commission should not beunderstood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exportsfrom the United States to Germany or from Germany to the United Stateswithout an act or joint resolution of Congress, was adopted by a voteof 54 to 40. 

Number 9, declaring that the United States should not be under anyobligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the League withoutan act of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39. 

Number 10, providing that if the United States should at any time adoptany plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of theLeague, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without theconsent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened withinvasion or engaged in war, " was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39. 

Number 11, reserving the right of the United States to permit thenationals of a Covenant-breaking State residing within the UnitedStates to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relationswith the nationals of the United States, was adopted by a vote of 53 to41. 

Number 12, relating to the very complicated question of private debts, property rights and interests of American citizens, was adopted by avote of 52 to 41. 

Number 13, withholding the assent of the United States from the entiresection of the treaty relating to international labor organizationuntil Congress should decide to participate, was adopted by a vote of54 to 35. 

Number 14 declared that the United States would not be bound by anyaction of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League andits self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregatemore than one vote. This reservation was adopted by a vote of 55 to 38. 

A number of other reservations were offered and rejected. Under therules of the Senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may beadopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by atwo-thirds vote. A number of senators who were opposed to the treatyvoted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat. Whenthe vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken November 19, itstood 39 for and 55 against. A motion to reconsider the vote was thenadopted, and Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader, proposed fivereservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, theMonroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the employment ofthe naval and military forces of the United States in any case arisingunder Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers ofself-governing colonies or dominions. These reservations wererejected, the vote being 41 to 50. Another vote was then taken on thetreaty with the Lodge reservations, the result being 41 for and 51against. Senator Underwood then offered a resolution to ratify thetreaty without reservations of any kind. The vote on this resolutionwas 38 for and 53 against. 

It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing theratification of the treaty without compromise. On January 8, 1920, aletter from the President was read at the Jackson Day dinner inWashington, in which he refused to accept the decision of the Senate asfinal and said: "There can be no reasonable objection tointerpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But whenthe treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we haveratified or rejected it. We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must takeit without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then, after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkabletask of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany. " Inconclusion he declared: "If there is any doubt as to what the people ofthe country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out isto submit it for determination at the next election to the voters ofthe nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemnreferendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play incompleting the settlements of the war and in the prevention in thefuture of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate. "

During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by aninformal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter sayinghe would accept the Hitchcock reservations, but Lodge refused to acceptany compromise. On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty tothe Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it backimmediately with the reservations previously adopted. After severalweeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathyfor Ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of 38 to 36. It was asfollows: "In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germanythe United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and tothe resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people fora government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is obtained by Ireland, aconsummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted asa member of the League of Nations. "

With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and animportant change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finallyput to the vote March 19, 1920. The result was 49 votes for and 35against. On the following day the secretary of the Senate wasinstructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the Presidentand to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it. 

The treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign, but unfortunately it was not the only issue. The election proved to bea referendum on the Wilson administration as a whole rather than on thetreaty. The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, attacked the Wilsonadministration for its arbitrary and unconstitutional methods andadvocated a return to "normalcy. " He denounced the Wilson League as anattempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored anassociation of nations and an international court. Governor Cox, theDemocratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularlyduring the latter part of his campaign. The result was an overwhelmingvictory for Harding. President Wilson had been too ill to take anypart in the campaign. His administration had been the chief issue, andthe people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it. Heaccepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments, content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairsto the verdict of history. In December, 1920, the Nobel Peace Prizewas awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he hadrendered to humanity. 

XII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

After the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate, President Wilson withdrew as far as possible from participation inEuropean affairs, and after the election of Harding he let it be knownthat he would do nothing to embarrass the incoming administration. Thepublic had been led to believe that when Harding became President therewould be a complete reversal of our foreign policy all along the line, but such was not to be the case. The new administration continuedunchanged the Wilson policy toward Mexico and toward Russia, and beforemany months had passed was seeking from Congress the authority, withheld from Wilson, to appoint a member on the ReparationsCommission. On the question of our rights in mandated areas, SecretaryHughes adopted in whole the arguments which had been advanced bySecretary Colby in his note to Great Britain of November 20, 1920, inregard to the oil resources of Mesopotamia. By the San Remo agreementof April 25, 1920, Great Britain and France had agreed upon a divisionof the oil output of Mesopotamia by which France was to be allowed 25per cent. And Great Britain 75 per cent. The British Government hadintimated that the United States, having declined to join the League ofNations, had no voice in the matter. On this point Secretary Colbytook sharp issue in the following statement: "Such powers as the Alliedand Associated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of thegovernmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a directresult of the war against the Central Powers. The United States, as aparticipant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successfulissue, cannot consider any of the Associated Powers, the smallest notless than herself, debarred from the discussion of any of itsconsequences, or from participation in the rights and privilegessecured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace. "

Japan likewise assumed that we had nothing to do with the dispositionof the former German islands in the Pacific. When the Supreme Councilat Paris decided to give Japan a mandate over the islands north of theequator, President Wilson reserved for future consideration the finaldisposition of the island of Yap, which lies between Guam and thePhilippines, and is one of the most important cable stations in thePacific. The entire question of cable communications was reserved fora special conference which met at Washington in the autumn of 1920, butthis conference adjourned about the middle of December without havingreached any final conclusions, and the status of Yap became the subjectof a very sharp correspondence between the American and Japanesegovernments. When Hughes became Secretary of State, he restated theAmerican position in a note of April 2, 1921, as follows:

"It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseaspossessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of theAllied and Associated Powers, and it is also believed that there is nodisposition on the part of the Japanese Government to deny theparticipation of the United States in that victory. It would seem tofollow necessarily that the right accruing to the Allied and AssociatedPowers through the common victory is shared by the United States andthat there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseaspossessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the assent ofthe United States. "

The discussion between the two governments was still in progress whenthe Washington Conference convened, and at the close of the Conferenceit was announced that an agreement had been reached which would beembodied in a treaty. The United States recognized Japan's mandateover the islands north of the equator on the condition that the UnitedStates should have full cable rights on the island of Yap, and that itscitizens should enjoy certain rights of residence on the island. Theagreement also covered radio telegraphic service. 

During the presidential campaign Harding's position on the League ofNations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect, but when Hughes and Hoover were appointed members of the Cabinet, itwas generally expected that the new administration would go into theLeague with reservations. This expectation was not to be fulfilled, however, for the President persistently ignored the existence of theLeague, and took no notice of the establishment of the permanent Courtof International Justice provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant. Meanwhile Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State had instructed ourdelegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 to propose the establishmentof such a court, had been invited by the Council of the League to beone of a commission of distinguished jurists to draft the statuteestablishing the court. This service he performed with conspicuousability. As another evidence of Europe's unwillingness to leave usout, when the court was organized John Bassett Moore, America's mostdistinguished authority on international law, was elected one of thejudges. 

Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and Americantroops were still on the Rhine. On July 2, 1921, Congress passed ajoint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking toreserve to the United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" to which it was entitled under the terms ofthe Armistice, or by reason of its participation in the war, or whichhad been stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or towhich it was entitled as one of the Principal Allied and AssociatedPowers, or to which it was entitled by virtue of any act or acts ofCongress. On August 25 the United States Government, through itscommissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a separate treaty of peacewith Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the jointresolution of Congress. About the same time a similar treaty wassigned with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senateof the United States October 18. The proclamation of peace produced noimmediate results of any importance. American troops continued on theRhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had beencarried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses. 

If mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the eventsleading up to the World War should have exploded the fallacy that theway to preserve peace is to prepare for war. Competition in armament, whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead tonothing else. And yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war, the race for armaments continued with increased momentum. France, Russia, and Poland maintained huge armies, while the United States andJapan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs inthe history of the world. Great Britain, burdened with debt, wasmaking every effort to keep pace with the United States. 

This naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united inthe war against Germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probableoutcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming. We had noquarrel with England, but England was the ally of Japan, and relationsbetween Japan and the United States in the Pacific and in Eastern Asiawere far from reassuring. The question of the continuance of theAnglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed at the British ImperialConference, which met at London in the early summer of 1921. Theoriginal purpose of this compact was to check the Russian advance inManchuria. It was renewed in revised form in 1905 against Germany, andagain renewed in 1911 against Germany for a period of ten years. Withthe removal of the German menace, what reasons were there for GreatBritain to continue the alliance? It bore too much the aspect of acombination against the United States, and was of course the mainreason for the naval program which we had adopted. So long as therewere only three navies of importance in the world and two of themunited in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard ourposition as a sea power. 

One of the main objects of the formation of the League of Nations wasto bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and acommission was organized under the League to consider this question, but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation ofnavies so long as a great naval power like the United States refused tocoöperate with the League of Nations or even to recognize itsexistence. As President Harding had promised the American people somesubstitute for the League of Nations, he decided, soon after cominginto office, to convene an international conference to consider thelimitation of armament on land and sea. By the time the Conferenceconvened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subjectof land armament. It was recognized from the first that the mereproposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective stepscould be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflictwhich make navies necessary. Therefore the formal invitation to theConference extended to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italyand Japan, August 11, 1921, linked the subject of Limitation ofArmament with Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The European powersaccepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but Japan's answer washeld back for some time. She was reluctant to have the powers reviewthe course she had pursued in China and Siberia while they were at warwith Germany. After agreeing to attend the Conference, Japanendeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, andshe soon entered into negotiations with China over the Shantungquestion with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would preventthat question from coming before the Conference. Invitations to theConference were later sent to the governments of Belgium, theNetherlands, Portugal, and China. Portugal was interested because ofher settlement at Macao, the oldest European settlement in China. Holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the Pacific. While Belgium has no territorial interests in the Orient, she has foryears been interested in Chinese financial matters. 

The Washington Conference convened in plenary session November 12, 1921, in Memorial Continental Hall. Seats were reserved on the mainfloor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved forofficials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to securetickets of admission. The question of open diplomacy which had beenmuch discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes, who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals forthe limitation of navies before the Conference. There were in allseven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little morethan confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee. The real work of the Conference was carried on by committees, and fromthe meetings of these committees the public and press representativeswere as a matter of course excluded. There were two principalcommittees, one on the Limitation of Armament, and the other on Pacificand Far Eastern Questions. There were various sub-committees, in thework of which technical delegates participated. Minutes were kept ofthe meetings of the two principal committees, and after each meeting acommuniqué was prepared for the press. In fact, the demand forpublicity defeated to a large extent its own ends. So much matter wasgiven to the press that when it was published in full very few peoplehad time to read it. As a general rule, the less real informationthere was to give out, the longer were the communiqués. Experiencedcorrespondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions weremade with as much secrecy in Washington as at Paris. 

The plan of the United States for the limitation of armament presentedby Secretary Hughes at the first session proposed (1) that all programsfor the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, beabandoned; (2) that a large number of battleships of older types stillin commission be scrapped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliarycombatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplanecarriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital ships. Theseproposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under considerationin the same relative positions. Under this plan the United Stateswould be allowed 500, 000 tons of capital ships, Great Britain 500, 000tons, and Japan 300, 000 tons. 

Japan objected to the 5-5-3 ratio proposed by Secretary Hughes, andurged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength. TheAmerican proposal included the scrapping of the _Mutsu_, the pride ofthe Japanese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed. The sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navywere much greater than those which England or Japan were called upon tomake, and in this lay the strength of the American position. TheJapanese refused, however, to give up the _Mutsu_, and they werefinally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the 5-5-3ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the UnitedStates and Great Britain. In the treaty as finally agreed upon, Japanwas allowed 315, 000 tons of capital ships and the United States andGreat Britain each 525, 000 tons. 

In his address at the opening session, Secretary Hughes said: "In viewof the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting theexisting strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thoughtto be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnageallowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that thissubject be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference. "This somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gaveunexpected offense to the French delegation. During the next four orfive weeks, while Great Britain, the United States, and Japan werediscussing the case of the _Mutsu_ and the question of fortificationsin the Pacific, the French delegates were cherishing their resentmentat being treated as the representatives of a second-class power. Hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation likeFrance undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of thatpart of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines. 

When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of theallowance of capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up incommittee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demandof 350, 000 tons of capital ships. According to Hughes's figures basedon existing strength, she was entitled to 175, 000 tons. It is notprobable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a largetonnage. It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in thecommittee in order to give the other delegates to understand thatFrance could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in orderto pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfortunately the Frenchdemands were given to the press through some misunderstanding andcaused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers. Inthe committee the relations between the British and French delegatesbecame very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon thesubmarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarinetonnage. On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over theheads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris. As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1. 75 ratio forcapital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits uponcruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the sameratio as France. 

Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, thetreaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, ifthey so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerialwarfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as SirPercy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe thatthe capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of thefuture will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surfaceships. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the navaltreaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship asobsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press theirsubmarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon thebuilding of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10, 000 tonsdisplacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches. 

By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, andJapan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications andnaval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions, notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. Thisagreement relieves Japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hopethat it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on theGreat Lakes. 

The 5-5-3 ratio puts the navies of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis. Each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one ofthem will be able to attack the home territory of the others. Ofcourse it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines, together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alterthe situation. Hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: nationaldefense and the enforcement of foreign policies. The new treaty meansthat as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be usedfor defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies indistant quarters of the globe. In other words, when disputes arise, British policies will prevail in the British area, American policies inthe American area, and Japanese policies in the Japanese area. Havingagreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attackJapan, the only pressure we can bring to bear upon her in China orelsewhere is moral pressure. Through what was considered by some agrave strategical error, the naval treaty was completed before anysettlement of the Chinese and Siberian questions had been reached. 

The French insistence on the practically unlimited right to buildsubmarines caused much hard feeling in England. The British delegateshad proposed the total abolition of submarines, and this proposal hadbeen ably supported by the arguments of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee. Unfortunately the United States delegation stood for the submarine, proposing merely certain limits upon its use. The five naval powersfinally signed a treaty reaffirming the old rules of international lawin regard to the search and seizure of merchant vessels, and declaringthat "any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any ofthose rules, whether or not such person is under orders of agovernmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of warand shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracyand may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities ofany Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found. " By thesame treaty the signatory powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibitthe use in war of poisonous gases. 

The attempt to limit by treaty the use of the submarine and to prohibitaltogether the use of gases appears to many to be utterly futile. After the experience of the late war, no nation would readily trust thegood faith of another in these matters. Each party to a war wouldprobably feel justified in being prepared to use the submarine andpoison gases, contrary to law, in case the other party should do so. We would thus have the same old dispute as in the late war in regard tofloating mines as to which party first resorted to the outlawedpractice. What is the use in solemnly declaring that a submarine shallnot attack a merchant vessel, and that the commander of a submarine whoviolates this law shall be treated as a pirate, when the contractingparties found it utterly impossible to agree among themselves upon adefinition of a merchant vessel?

But the reader may ask, what is the use in signing any treaty ifnations are so devoid of good faith? The answer is that the vastmajority of treaties are faithfully kept in time of peace, but thatvery few treaties are fully observed in time of war. Had these fivepowers signed a treaty pledging themselves not to build or maintainsubmarines of any kind or description, we would have every reason toexpect them to live up to it. But when a nation is engaged in war andhas a large flotilla of submarines which it has agreed to use only forcertain purposes, there is apt to come a time when the temptation touse them for wholly different purposes will be overwhelming. 

The Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions held its firstmeeting November 16. This committee was primarily concerned with thevery delicate situation created by the aggressive action and expansionof Japan during the past twenty years. In 1905, by the Treaty ofPortsmouth, Japan succeeded to the Russian rights in southernManchuria; in 1910 she annexed Korea; in 1911, during the ChineseRevolution, she stationed troops at Hankow and later constructedpermanent barracks; in 1914, after the defeat of the Germans atKiao-chau, she took over all the German interests in the Shantungpeninsula; in 1915 she presented the Twenty-one Demands to China andcoerced that power into granting most of them; and in 1918, inconjunction with the United States, Great Britain, and France, shelanded a military force in the Maritime Province of Siberia for thedefinite purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops who had madetheir way to that province and of guarding the military stores atVladivostok. The other powers had all withdrawn their contingents, butJapan had increased her force from one division to more than 70, 000troops. The eastern coast of Asia was thus in the firm grip of Japan, and she had secured concessions from China which seriously impaired theindependence of that country. 

It was commonly supposed that the United States delegation had prepareda program on the Far Eastern question, and that this would be presentedin the same way that Hughes had presented the naval program. If thiswas the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for between oneand two o'clock at night the Chinese delegates were aroused from theirslumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for them topresent China's case before the committee at eleven o'clock thatmorning. They at once went to work with their advisers, and a fewminutes before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of theTen Points, which Minister Sze read before the committee. These Pointsconstituted a Chinese declaration of independence, and set forth aseries of general principles to be applied in the determination ofquestions relating to China. Several days later the committee adoptedfour resolutions, presented by Mr. Root, covering in part some of theChinese principles. By these resolutions the powers agreed to respectthe independence and territorial integrity of China, to give China thefullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stablegovernment, to recognize the principle of equality for the commerce andindustry of all nations throughout the territory of China, and torefrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seekspecial rights or privileges. This somewhat vague and generaldeclaration of principles appeared to be all that China was likely toget. Had Mr. Hughes presented a Far Eastern program and gotten nothingmore than this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige ofthe United States. That is probably why he decided at the last momentto let China present her own case. 

At the fourth plenary session of the Conference the treaty relating tothe Pacific islands, generally known as the Four-Power Treaty, waspresented by Senator Lodge. By the terms of this treaty, the UnitedStates, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed "to respect theirrights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominionsin the region of the Pacific Ocean, " and in case of any dispute arisingout of any Pacific question to refer the matter to a joint conferencefor consideration and adjustment. This article appeared harmlessenough, but Article 2 seemed to lay the foundations of an alliancebetween these powers. It was as follows: "If the said rights arethreatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the HighContracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully andfrankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficientmeasures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies ofthe particular situation. " This treaty is to remain in force for tenyears, after which it may be terminated by any of the High ContractingParties on twelve months' notice. It supersedes the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance which, it expressly provided, should terminate on the exchangeof ratifications. 

In presenting the treaty, Senator Lodge assured his hearers that "nomilitary or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or undercover of these plain and direct clauses, " and Secretary Hughes inclosing the discussion declared that it would probably not be possibleto find in all history "an international document couched in moresimple or even briefer terms, " but he added, "we are again remindedthat the great things are the simple ones. " In view of thesestatements the members of the Conference and the public generally werecompletely flabbergasted some days later when Secretary Hughes and thePresident gave out contradictory statements as to whether the treatyincluded the Japanese homeland. Hughes stated to the correspondentsthat it did, the President said it did not. Whereupon some wagremarked that at Paris President Wilson did not let the Americandelegation know what he did, while at Washington the delegates did notlet President Harding know what they were doing. In deference to thePresident's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the Japanese pressa supplementary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that theterm "insular possessions and insular dominions" did not include theJapanese homeland. 

Meanwhile the Shantung question was being discussed by China and Japanoutside of the Conference, but with representatives of the British andAmerican governments sitting as observers ready to use their goodoffices if called on. The reason for not bringing the question beforethe Conference was that Great Britain, France, and Italy were partiesto the Treaty of Versailles, which gave Japan a legal title to theGerman leases in Shantung. The restoration of the province to Chinawas vital to a satisfactory adjustment of Chinese affairs generally. Japan, however, was in no hurry to reach an agreement with China, wishing for strategical purposes to keep the matter in suspense to thelast, if not to avoid a settlement until after the adjournment of theConference and continue negotiations under more favorable conditions atPeking or Tokio. 

By Christmas it seemed that the Conference had accomplished about allthat was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreementsalready reached could be put into treaty form and signed. At the endof the first week in January it looked as if the Chinese and Japanesehad reached a deadlock, and that the Conference would adjourn without asatisfactory adjustment of any of the Chinese problems. Mr. Balfourand other important delegates had engaged return passage, and allindications pointed to an early dissolution of the Conference. But theunexpected happened. At an informal gathering of Administrationleaders at the White House on Saturday night, January 7, stock wastaken of the work of the Conference, and some of the senators presentexpressed the opinion that if it adjourned without doing more forChina, there would be little hope of getting the treaties ratified. Asa result Secretary Hughes persuaded the British and Japanese delegatesto cancel their sailings, and with characteristic energy anddetermination took personal charge of the Far Eastern situation, whichup to this time had been left mainly to Mr. Root. After a littlepressure had been brought to bear on the Chinese by President Harding, and probably on the Japanese by Mr. Balfour, Secretary Hughes wasfinally able to announce at the plenary session of February 1 thatChina and Japan had reached an agreement as to the terms on whichShantung was to be restored. At the same session the agreements inregard to China reached by the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs wereannounced. These agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, onedealing with the tariff and the other with the open door, and a seriesof ten resolutions. 

Since the middle of the last century Chinese tariffs have beenregulated by treaties with foreign powers, the customs serviceorganized and administered by foreigners, and the receipts mortgaged tomeet the interest on foreign loans. China has never been permitted tolevy duties in excess of 5 per cent. , and, in fact, as a result of themethods of valuation the duties have not averaged above 3 1/2 per cent. This has been an unjust state of affairs, and has deprived the ChineseGovernment of what would naturally be one of its main sources ofrevenue. By the new agreement there is to be an immediate revision oftariff valuations so as to make the 5 per cent. Effective. China isalso to be allowed to levy a surtax on certain articles, mainlyluxuries, which will yield an additional revenue. It is estimated thatthe total annual increase in revenue derived from maritime customs willbe about $150, 000, 000 silver. It is claimed by some, with a certaindegree of truth, that any increase in Chinese customs duties will beimmediately covered by liens to secure new loans, and that puttingmoney into the Chinese treasury just now is like pouring it into a rathole. As soon as China is able to establish a stable and honestgovernment, she should, without question, be relieved of all treatyrestrictions on her tariffs. 

The Conference also took certain steps to restore to China othersovereign rights long impaired by the encroachments of foreign powers. A commission is to be appointed to investigate the administration ofjustice with a view to the ultimate extinction of extraterritorialrights now enjoyed by foreigners. The powers also agreed to abandonnot later than January 1, 1923, their existing postal agencies inChina, provided an efficient Chinese postal service be maintained. Thesystem of foreign post offices in China has been the subject of greatabuses, as through these agencies goods of various kinds, includingopium and other drugs, have been smuggled into China. The powersfurther made a general promise to aid the Chinese Government in theunification of railways into a general system under Chinese control. They also agreed to restore to China all radio stations other thanthose regulated by treaty or maintained by foreign governments withintheir legation limits. 

In the treaty relating to the open door, the Contracting Powers otherthan China pledged themselves to the following principles:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorialand administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to Chinato develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishingand maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce andindustry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in orderto seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights ofsubjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing actioninimical to the security of such States. "

China on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, andpledged herself for the first time to respect it. Pledges to respectthe open door in China have been made by foreign powers upon variousoccasions in the past and broken as often as made. The expression"equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" is notnew. It occurs in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, in theRoot-Takahira agreement of 1908, and in numerous other documents. Inrecent years, however, the United States has been the only power whichhas tried to preserve the open door in China. Most of the other powershave regarded the Chinese situation as hopeless, and have believed thatthe only solution was to let foreign powers come in and divide and rulethe territory of the empire. In view of the new treaty the open dooris no longer merely an American policy, but an international policy, and responsibility for its enforcement rests not on the United Statesalone but on all nine parties to the treaty. 

The agenda or program of the Conference offered as one of the subjectsto be considered the status of existing commitments in China. WhenSecretary Hughes brought this subject up before the Far EasternCommittee, Japan entered an emphatic objection to its consideration, and the matter was dropped immediately without argument. The treaty, therefore, is not retroactive, for it recognizes the status quo inManchuria and to a less extent in other parts of China. The savingclause of the new agreement is, however, a resolution providing for theestablishment of an international board of reference, to whichquestions arising in regard to the open door may be referred. 

Will Japan respect the pledges she has made and live up to the spiritof her promises? If she does, the Washington Conference will prove tobe a great success. If, on the contrary, Japan does not intend to liveup to her pledges or intends to fulfill them only in part, her positionin Asia has been greatly strengthened. She is more firmly intrenchedin Manchuria than ever. She holds the Maritime Province of Siberiaunder a promise to get out, which she has repeatedly made andrepeatedly broken, as was plainly stated by Secretary Hughes before thefull Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, and repeated at a plenarysession of the Conference. His statement was one of the mostremarkable, by reason of its directness and unvarnished truth, in thehistory of American diplomacy. After reviewing the correspondencebetween the two governments and the reiterated assurances of Japan ofher intention to withdraw from Siberia, assurances which so far had notbeen carried out, Mr. Hughes expressed his gratification at the renewalof these assurances before the Conference in plenary session. UnlessJapan is utterly devoid of moral shame, she will have to make good herword this time. 

When the treaties drafted by the Conference were submitted by thePresident to the Senate, they encountered serious opposition, but werefinally ratified. The Republican leaders, particularly Senator Lodge, were twitted with charges of inconsistency in advocating certainfeatures of these treaties when they had violently opposed the Leagueof Nations. The Four-Power Treaty is much more of an entanglingalliance than the Covenant of the League, and the Naval Treaty deprivesCongress for a period of fifteen years of its constitutional right todetermine the size of the navy and to provide for the defense of Guamand the Philippines. In fact, there were very few objections raised tothe League of Nations which could not with equal force be applied tothe Four-Power and Naval Treaties. The Four-Power Treaty was the mainobject of attack, and Senators Lodge and Underwood were greatlyembarrassed in attempting to explain its meaning. Its "bafflingbrevity" demanded explanations, but no satisfactory explanations wereforthcoming. They talked in general terms about the tremendousimportance of the treaty, but they dared not state the real fact thatthe treaty was drafted by Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato as the mostconvenient method of terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance withoutmaking it appear to the Japanese public that their government hadsurrendered the alliance without due compensation. According to anAssociated Press Dispatch from Tokio, January 31, 1922, Baron Uchida, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying to interpolations inthe House of Peers, said: "The Four-Power Treaty was not intended toabrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but rather to widen and extendit. " The real _quid pro quo_ for the termination of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance was the agreement of the United States not to construct navalbases or new fortifications in Guam and the Philippines, and the clauseterminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might just as well have beenattached to the Naval Treaty, but this would not have satisfiedJapanese public opinion. Great Britain and Japan were permitted toterminate their alliance in any way that they might deem best. Afterthe Four-Power Treaty was accepted by the American delegates, theyfeared that it would look too much as if the United States had merelybeen drawn into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was decided, therefore, at the eleventh hour to give the agreement a more generalcharacter by inviting France to adhere to it. France agreed to sign, although she resented not having been consulted during the negotiationof the treaty. 

The achievements of the Conference, although falling far short of theextravagant claims made by the President and the American delegates, are undoubtedly of great importance. The actual scrapping of millionsof dollars' worth of ships in commission or in process of constructiongives the world an object lesson such as it has never had before. Oneof the most significant results of the Conference was the developmentof a complete accord between England and the United States, madepossible by the settlement of the Irish question and furthered by thetact and gracious bearing of Mr. Balfour. One of the unfortunateresults was the increased isolation of France, due to the failure ofher delegates to grasp the essential elements of the situation and toplay any but a negative role. The success of the Conference was duelargely to Secretary Hughes who, though handicapped at every point byfear of the Senate and by the unfortunate commitments of PresidentHarding during the last campaign, may be said on the whole to haveplayed his hand reasonably well. 

Meanwhile we are still drifting, so far as a general European policy isconcerned. President Harding's idea of holding aloof from "Europe'sleague, " as he prefers to designate the League of Nations, and ofhaving a little league of our own in the Pacific, will not work. Theworld's problems cannot be segregated in this way. Europe's leagueincludes all of the principal American nations except the United Statesand Mexico, while our Pacific league includes the two leading Europeanpowers. As soon as the American people realize--and there areindications that they are already waking up to the reality--that thedepression in domestic industry and foreign commerce is due toconditions in Europe and that prosperity will not return until we takea hand in the solution of European problems, there will be a generaldemand for a constructive policy and America will no longer hesitate toreassume the leadership which she renounced in the referendum of 1920, but which the rest of the world is ready to accord to her again. 

INDEX

ABC alliance, 162, 165. 

Aberdeen, Lord, opposes annexation of Texas by United States, 108. 

Adams, Charles Francis, 114. 

Adams, Henry, letter from Hay to, 90. 

Adams, John Quincy, opposes joint action with England, 31; acceptsinvitation to send delegates to Panama Congress, 154. 

"Alabama Claims, " 66, 113, 114. 

Alaskan Boundary Dispute, 122, 124. 

Algeciras Conference, 74; American participation in, 76, 77. 

Alliance, of 1778 with France, 5-8; proposed alliance with England, 13, 26; Holy Alliance, 22, 24; Anglo-Japanese alliance, 92, 120. _See_"Entangling Alliances. "

Alverstone, Lord, member of Alaskan boundary commission, 123. 

American Colonisation Society, 59. 

American delegation to Peace Conference, 225. 

American Institute of International Law, 157. 

American Republics, Bureau of, 156. 

American Revolution, significance of, 99. 

Anglo-American ideals, 126, 127. 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 92, 120, 265, 279, 288. 

Arbitration, international, 64. _See_ Hague Court, Olney-PauncefoteTreaty. 

Armistice, negotiations preceding, 213-217. 

Arms and ammunition. _See_ Munitions of war. 

"Aroostook War, " 106. 

Austria-Hungary, protests against trade in munitions, 182. 

Balfour, Arthur James, 274, 288, 289. 

Beer, George L. , quoted, 99. 

Belgium, German invasion of, 79; restoration of, demanded, 207. 

Beresford, Lord Charles, advocates open door in China, 86. 

Berlin Conference of 1884, 6l. 

"Big Four, " at Peace Conference, 230. 

Bingham, Hiram, on Monroe Doctrine, 131. 

Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe Doctrine, 45; on English control of NorthAmerica, 126; forces war on Austria, 47; forces war on France, 48. 

Blaine, James G. , efforts to modify Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 115; issuesinvitation to International Conference of American States, 155, 156. 

Bliss, Gen. Tasker H. , 225. 

Board of Reference, in China, 286. 

Bolivar, Simon, 153. 

Bolsheviki, 203. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, acquires Louisiana, 12; fails to establish controlover Spain's Colonies, 25. 

Bowen, Herbert, 51. 

Boxer uprising in China, 88

Brest-Litovsk, peace negotiations at, 203, 210, 212. 

Brussels Conference on African slave trade, 62. 

Bryan, William Jennings, negotiates treaty with Nicaragua, 135; withColombia, 144; refuses to modify neutrality laws at demand of Germany, 182. 

Bryce, Lord, quoted, 125, 126. 

Bülow, Prince von, 75, 91. 

California, danger of English occupation of, 109. 

Canada, insurrection of 1837, 103. 

Canning, George, British foreign secretary, proposes Anglo-Americanalliance, 26; delays recognition of South American republics, 33, 34;interview with Prince Polignac, 35; boasts of calling new world intoexistence, 39; opposes Pan-American movement, 155. 

Caribbean Sea, American supremacy in, 121; advance of United States in, 132; new American policies in, 132, 137, 144. 

_Caroline_, the, 103. 

Carranza, Venustiano, 162, 163. 

Castlereagh, Viscount, 20. 

China, treaties relating to tariff and open door, 282-285. _See_Open-door policy. 

Choate, Joseph H. , at Second Hague Conference, 68, 69. 

Civil War, foreign policy of United States during, 65; disputes withEngland, 112. 

Clay, Henry, opposes joint action with England, 31; instructions todelegates to Panama Congress, 154. 

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 44, 111. 

Cleveland, Grover, intervenes in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 48;withholds Kongo treaty from Senate, 61; Venezuelan policy justified byevents, 115; favours general arbitration treaty with England, 116. 

Cobden, Richard, essay on America, 102. 

Colby, Bainbridge, secretary of state, 259, 260. 

Colombia, aggrieved at seizure of Canal Zone, 142; attempts of UnitedStates to settle controversy, 143, 144. 

Consuls, status of, in European leases in China, 87, 88. 

Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 72, 124, 176, 177. 

Cowdray, Lord, seeks concession from Colombia, 142. 

Cox, James M. , candidate for President, 255. 

Crampton, British Minister to United States, dismissal of, 111. 

Declaration of London, 71-73, 175, 177. 

Declaration of Paris, 64, 65. 

Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted by AmericanInstitute of International Law, 158, 159. 

Democracy against autocracy, 198. 

Dewey, Admiral George, on withdrawal of Germany from Venezuela, 51;demands apology from German admiral in Manila Bay, 119. 

Dickens, Charles, "American Notes, " 102. 

Diederichs, German Admiral, 119. 

Diplomacy, secret, 76, 77. 

Dunning, William A. , "British Empire and the United States, " quoted, 102, 111. 

Durfee, Amos, 103. 

Egypt, financial administration of, by Great Britain, 134. 

England. _See_ Great Britain. 

"Entangling Alliances, " warning of Jefferson against, 12; Wilson'sviews on, 187. 

Entente treaty of 1904 between England and France, 74. 

European balance of power, interest of United States in preserving, 76;disturbed by Japan, 171. 

Fenian movement, encouraged in United States, 112, 113. 

Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 20, 25. 

Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state, renews negotiations for settlementof "Alabama Claims, " 113, 114. 

Fiume, and Treaty of London, 195. 

Foch, Ferdinand, 217-219, 236. 

Fonseca Bay, United States acquires naval base on, 135, 136. 

Forsyth, John, secretary of state, 104. 

Fortifications in the Pacific, limitation of, 272. 

Foster, John W. , letter from Hay, to, 89. 

Four-power Treaty, 278-280, 287-289. 

Fourteen Points, 205-210, 220, 221. 

France, treaty of alliance with, 5-8; refuses to accept plan forlimitation of navies, 270, 271; isolation of, 289. 

Gases, use of poisonous, prohibited, 274, 275. 

Gênet, Edmond C. , minister of the French Republic, 6. 

George, David Lloyd, defines British war aims, 204-205; pre-electionpledges of, 227; opposes French demand for Left Bank of Rhine, 234. 

Germany, intervenes in Venezuela, 50; excluded from South America byaid of England, 53; designs of, on Philippine Islands, 85; adopts navalpolicy, 120; influence of, in America, 126; submarine policy of, 178, 179; attempts of, to justify, 181; protests against munitions trade, 181; organizes propaganda and conspiracy in United States, 184. 

Great Britain, withdraws from European alliance, 22; intervenes inMexico, 46; not unfavorable to Monroe Doctrine, 52, 53; forms alliancewith Japan, 92; points of contact with United States, 100; unfriendlyattitude, 101; change of attitude in Spanish War, 118; naval policy of, 120; interference with shipments to Germany resented in United States, 124; size of navy, 127; so-called blockade of Germany, 174-178. _See_Anglo-American ideals. 

Great Lakes, disarmament on, 103. 

Guarantee treaties, offered to France, 235. 

Gummeré, S. R. , delegate to Algeciras Conference, 75. 

Hague Conference, of 1899, 67; of 1907, 68. 

Hague Conventions, status of, 71. 

Hague Court of Arbitration, 68. 

Haiti, Republic of, United States acquires financial supervision over, 136, 137. 

Hamilton, Alexander, opinion on French treaty of 1778, 6. 

Harding, Warren G. , elected president, 255; ignores League of Nations, 262; calls Washington Conference, 266; differs with Hughes as tomeaning of Four-Power Treaty, 279; attitude toward Europe, 290. 

Harris, Townsend, 95. 

Hay, John, secretary of state, protests against persecution of Jews inRumania, 78; formulates open-door policy for China, 85; defines statusof consuls in European leases in China, 88; insists on "territorial andadministrative entity" of China, 89; private correspondence on Chinesesituation, 89-91. 

Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 120, 121. 

Henry, of Prussia, Prince, visit of, to United States, 118. 

Hitchcock, Senator G. H. , 252. 

Holy Alliance, 22, 24. 

House, Edward M. , 225, 233. 

Huerta, Victoriano, 160, 162, 193. 

Hughes, Charles E. , suggests changes in Covenant of League, 232;asserts rights of the United States in mandated areas, 261; proposesreduction of navies, 267; details of plan, 268, 269; offends the Frenchdelegates, 270; takes personal charge of Far Eastern question, 281;success of Washington Conference, due to, 290. 

International Conference of American States, 156. 

International Court of Arbitral Justice, plan for, 70; Permanent Courtof International Justice, 263. 

International Law, attitude of United States toward, 64; attempts tocodify, 68, 72. 

International Law, American Institute of, 157. 

International Prize Court, plan for, adopted by Second HagueConference, 68. 

Isolation, policy of, distinct from Monroe Doctrine, 3, 5; policy nolonger possible, 170. 

Jameson Raid, in the Transvaal, 50. 

Japan, beginning of American intercourse with, 83, 84; forms alliancewith Great Britain, 92; goes to war with Russia, 94; disturbing factorin world politics, 171; advocates principle of racial equality, 233, 238; demands German leases in Shantung, 239; secures consent of Allies, 240; reluctantly accepts invitation to Washington Conference, 266;objects to 5-5-3 ratio, 269; expansion of, 276. 

Jefferson, Thomas, opinion on French treaty of 1778, 7; warns against"entangling alliances, " 12; plans alliance with England against France, 12-14; favors joint action with England against Holy Alliance, 28-30;author of doctrine of recognition, 161. 

Jews, diplomatic protests against harsh treatment of, 78, 79. 

Johnson, Senator Hiram, 246. 

Johnson-Clarendon convention, 113. 

Knox, Philander C. , proposes neutralisation of railways of Manchuria, 95; negotiates treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua, 134, 135; proposessettlement with Colombia, 143; opposes League of Nations, 228, 231. 

Kongo Free State, treaty establishing, signed by American delegates butwithheld from Senate by President Cleveland, 6l, 62. 

Kruger, Paul, 50. 

Lansing, Robert, secretary of state, replies to Austro-Hungarian noteon munitions trade, 182, 183; dismisses Austrian Ambassador and Germanmilitary and naval attachés, 185; delegate to Peace Conference, 225, 233. 

Lansing-Ishii agreement, 95. 

League of Nations, 188, 196, 205, 209, 211, 230, 244-254. 

League to Enforce Peace, 197, 232. 

Left Bank of Rhine, French demand for, 234. 

Liberia, Republic of, 59

Limitation of Armament, commission of League on, 265; Conference on, 266-290. 

Liverpool, Lord, 20. 

Livingston, Robert R. , minister to France, 12. 

Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, on Oregon dispute, 110, 111; deniesexistence of secret treaty with England, 120; stands for unconditionalsurrender of Germany, 217; issues round robin, 231; presentsreservations to Treaty of Versailles, 248; presents Four-Power Treaty, 278, inconsistency of, 287. 

London Naval Conference, 71. 

_Lusitania_, sinking of, 179. 

Madero, Francisco, 160. 

Madison, James, favors joint action with England against Holy Alliance, 30. 

Mahan, Alfred T. , 99. 

Maine, boundary dispute with New Brunswick, 106. 

Manchuria, Russian encroachments on, 91-93, 95. 

Marcy, William L. , secretary of state, views on Declaration of Paris, 65. 

Maximilian, Prince, placed by Louis Napoleon on throne of Mexico, 46. 

Merchant vessels, proposal to arm, 185. 

Mexico, French intervention in, 46; Huerta revolution in, 160; Americanpolicy toward, 160-164. 

Monroe, James, sent to Paris to aid Livingston in negotiations forpurchase of New Orleans and West Florida, 13; consults Jefferson andMadison on subject of British proposals for joint action against HolyAlliance, 26-28; message of December 2, 1823, 36-39; emphasizesseparation of European and American politics, 43. 

Monroe Doctrine, compared with policy of isolation, 3; justificationof, 4; formulation of, 19; text of, 36-39; reception of, in Europe, 39;basis of, 43; sanction of, 45; relation of, to European balance ofpower, 46, 52; attitude of England toward, 52; negative side of, 57;adverse criticism of, 131; not a self-denying declaration, 147;reservation of, 232, 249. 

Moore, John Bassett, 263. 

Moroccan question. _See_ Algeciras Conference. 

Motley, John L. , 113. 

Munitions of war, sale of to belligerents, 181-184. 

McKinley, William, reasons for retaining Philippine Islands, 84, 85. 

McLeod, Alexander, arrest of, 104; acquittal of, 105. 

Napoleon, Louis, intervenes in Mexico, 46; decides to withdraw, 47, 48. 

Neutral prizes, destruction of, 72, 180. 

Neutrality, Washington's proclamation of 1793, 8; failure of, inNapoleonic wars, 14, 15; Wilson's proclamation of, 172; nature of, 172, 173; so-called ethical neutrality, 174; abandonment of, 186. 

New Brunswick, boundary dispute with Maine, 106. 

Niagara conference on Mexican question, 162. 

Olney, Richard, on Monroe Doctrine, 43; conducts correspondence onVenezuelan boundary dispute, 48; signs general arbitration treaty withEngland, 116. 

Olney-Pauncefote treaty, 116, 117. 

Open-door policy in China, Hay's note of September 6, 1890, 85;Anglo-American origin of, 87; guaranteed by treaty, 284. 

Oregon, joint occupation of, 107. 

O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 162. 

Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Conference on, 266-290. 

Panama Canal, effect of, on naval policy, 132. 

Panama Canal Zone, seizure of, 142. 

Panama Congress of 1826, 153, 154. 

Panama Tolls Act, 121. 

Pan-American Financial Congress, 157. 

Pan-American Scientific Congress, 157. 

Pan-American Union, 156. 

Pan-Americanism, 153-157. 

Pauncefote, Sir Julian, signs general arbitration treaty with UnitedStates, 116; signs Canal treaty, 120. 

Platt Amendment, provisions of, 144, 145. 

Peace Conference of Paris, 225-242. _See_ Hague Conference. 

Perry, Commodore Matthew C. Commands expedition to Japan, 83, 84, 95. 

Philippine Islands, McKinley's reasons for retaining, 84, 85. 

Polignac, Prince, interview with Canning on subject of the Spanishcolonies, 35. 

Polk, James K. , settles Oregon dispute, 110. 

Portsmouth, treaty of, 94. 

Prize Court. _See_ International Prize Court. 

Prizes, destruction of, 179, 180. 

Recognition, doctrine of, discussed with reference to Mexican question, 161. 

Reparations, 236, 237. 

Reservations to Treaty of Versailles, 248-251, 254. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, forces Germany to withdraw from Venezuela, 51;sends delegates to Algeciras Conference, 75; exerts influence topreserve European balance of power, 76; protests against persecution ofJews in Rumania and Russia, 78, 79; invites Russia and Japan to peaceconference, 94; incurs ill will of Japan, 95; submits Alaskan boundarydispute to limited arbitration, 123; establishes financial supervisionover Dominican Republic, 133, 138; Big-Stick policy, 139; extension ofMonroe Doctrine, 140; seizure of Canal Zone, 142. 

Root, Elihu, proposes international court of justice, 69; author ofPlatt Amendment, 146; visits South America, 156; suggests changes inCovenant of League, 232; member of commission to draft statute ofPermanent Court of International Justice, 263; presents resolutions onChina, 277. 

Rush, Richard, conferences with Canning on South American situation, 26, 33, 34. 

Russia, occupies Manchuria, 91, 92; opposes opening of Manchurian portsto American commerce, 93; goes to war with Japan, 94; revolution, ofMarch, 1917, 198; of November, 1917, 203. 

Russo-Japanese war, 94. 

Sackville-West, Lord, dismissal of, 115. 

Salisbury, Lord, backs down in Venezuelan dispute, 50; warns PresidentMcKinley of Germany's designs on Philippines. 

San Remo agreement, 259, 260. 

Santo Domingo, financial supervision over, 133, 134. 

Secret Treaties, 193. 

Self-determination, 198, 203, 205. 

Senate of the United States, debates Treaty of Versailles, 244-254. 

Seward, William H. , protests against French occupation of Mexico, 47. 

Shantung question, at Peace Conference of Paris, 239-242; at WashingtonConference, 280-282. 

Siberia, Japanese troops in, 276; promise of Japan to evacuate, 286. 

Slave trade, provision for suppression of, in Webster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60; Brussels conference on, 62. 

Slavery, and isolation, 58. 

South America, neglected by United States as field for commercialdevelopment, 52; open door in, 53. 

Spanish colonies, revolt of, 25. 

Spanish revolution of 1820, 20. 

Spanish War, turning point in relations of United States and England, 118. 

Submarines, question of, discussed at Washington Conference, 271, 272;use of, limited by treaty, 274, 275. 

Sumner, Charles, 113. 

Taft, William H. , proposes to bring Nicaragua and Honduras underfinancial supervision of United States, 134, 135; tries to reëstablishfriendly relations with Colombia, 143; suggests changes in Covenant ofLeague, 232. 

Tardieu, André, report of Algeciras Conference, 76; quoted on Armisticenegotiations, 217, 218. 

Temperley, H. W. V. , "History of the Peace Conference of Paris, " 191. 

"Ten Points, " 278. 

Texas, annexation of, opposed by Great Britain, 107, 108. 

Thayer, William R. , gives version of Roosevelt-Holleben interview, 51. 

Tocqueville, Alexis de, "Democracy in America, " 102. 

Treaty of London, 195. 

Treaty of Peace with Austria, 263. 

Treaty of Peace with Germany, 263. 

Treaty of Versailles, signed, 242; laid before Senate, 243; debate on, 244-254; votes on, 252-254. 

Twenty-One Demands, 276. 

Vera Cruz, American occupation of, 162; evacuation of, 163. 

Verona, Congress of, 19, 21, secret treaty of, 22-24. 

Vienna, Congress of, 19. 

Villa, Francisco, 162, 163. 

War aims, of Allies, 196; British, 204. 

War of 1812, 15. 

Washington, George, requests opinions of cabinet on French treaty, 6;issues proclamation of neutrality, 8; Farewell Address, 9-11. 

Washington Conference, 266-290. 

Washington, treaty of, 66, 114. 

Webster, Daniel, secretary of state, 104, 105. 

Webster-Ashburton treaty, 59, 60, 107. 

Wellington, Duke of, at Congress of Verona, 21; protest and withdrawal, 22. 

West Indies, American supremacy in, 120. 

White, Henry, delegate to Algeciras Conference, 75; to PeaceConference, 225. 

William II, German Kaiser, telegram to President Kruger, 50; forced towithdraw from Venezuela, 51; visits Morocco, 74; demands retirement ofDelcassé, 75; insists on general conference on Morocco, 75; thwarted inefforts to humiliate France, 77; abdicates and flees to Holland, 219. 

Williams, Talcott, on McKinley's reasons for retaining Philippines, 85. 

Wilson, Henry Lane, 160. 

Wilson, Woodrow, secures modification of Panama Tolls Act, 121; extendsfinancial supervision over Nicaragua and Haiti, 136, 137; warnsLatin-American states against granting concessions to Europeansyndicates, 140, 141; attitude of, on questions of international lawand diplomacy, 151, 152; general Latin-American policy, 152, 165; NewPan-Americanism, 153; Mexican policy, 160-164; asks for declaration ofwar on Germany, 185; views on extension of Monroe Doctrine, 187;political philosophy of, 192; refusal to recognize Huerta, 193; reasonsfor neutrality, 194; calls on all belligerents to state war aims, 195;first discussion of war aims, 196; war address, 199; draws distinctionbetween German people and German Government, 200-202; reply to Pope, 201; announces Fourteen Points, 205-210; decides to go to Paris, 225;suffers political defeat, 226, 227; greeted with enthusiasm in Europe, 228; proposes League of Nations, 230; returns temporarily to the UnitedStates, 231; makes concessions to French and British, 238; returns tothe United States and lays treaty before Senate, 242; tours the countryon behalf of League of Nations, 246; illness of, 247; letter read atJackson day dinner proposing referendum on Treaty of Versailles, 252, 253; awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 255; withdraws from participation inEuropean affairs, 259. 

Wood, General Leonard, 146. 

Yap, island of, 260-262.