GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD: OR FREETHOUGHTS OPPOSED TO SUPERNATURAL IDEAS By Baron D'holbach "Freethinker's Library" Series London: W. Stewart & Co. A Translation Of Baron D'holbach's "Le Bon Sens" Transcriber's note: this e-text is based on an undated English translationof "Le Bon Sens" published c. 1900. The name of the translator was notstated. "_Atheism_ leaves men to Sense, to Philosophy, to Laws, to Reputation, all which may be guides to moral Virtue, tho' Religion were not: but Superstition dismounts all these, and erects an absolute Monarchy in the Minds of Men. Therefore, Atheism did never perturb States; but Superstition hath been the confusion of many. The causes of Superstition are pleasing and sensual rights, and Ceremonies; Excess of Pharisaical and outside holiness, Reverence to Traditions and the stratagems of Prelates for their own Ambition and Lucre. "--_Lord Bacon. _ CONTENTS 1. APOLOGUE 2. What is Theology? 3. What is Theology? 4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion 5. It is not necessary to believe in a God 6. Religion is founded on credulity 7. All religion is an absurdity 8. The idea of God is impossible 9. On the Origin of Superstition 10. On the Origin of all Religion 11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters 12. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous 13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous 14. No Religion, if not ages of Stupidity and Barbarism 15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination 16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain 17. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God 18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God 19. The existence of God is not proved 20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit 21. Spirituality is an absurdity 22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter 23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology? 24. Less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than adore a spiritual Deity 25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action 26. What is God? 27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology 28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction 29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God 30. Believing not safer than not believing in God 31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy 32. Belief in God is a prejudice ov successive generations 33. On the Origin of Prejudices 34. On the effects of Prejudices 35. Theology must be instilled before the age of reason 36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God 37. Nature may be explained by natural causes 38. Nature may be explained by natural causes 39. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself 40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself 41. Motion is essential to Matter: no Spiritual Mover 42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God 43. Neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance 44. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God 45. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God 46. Absurd to adore a divine intelligence 47. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him 48. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him 49. Absurd to say that the human race is the object of the Universe 50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God 51. Untrue that the object of the Universe was to render Man happy 52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning 53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man 54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being 55. God cannot be considered immutable 56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes 57. The consolations of Theology and paradise are imaginary 58. Another romantic reverie 59. Vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human defects 60. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power 61. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power 62. Theology's God a monster of absurdity and injustice 63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears 64. Religion, the same as the most somber and servile Superstition 65. The love of God is impossible 66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being 67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions 68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections 69. The perfection of God and the pretended creation of angels 70. Theology preaches Omnipotence of its God, yet makes impotent 71. Per all religious systems, God is capricious and foolish 72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God 73. The foreknowledge of God proves his cruelty 74. Absurdity of the stories concerning Original Sin, and Satan 75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests 76. God has no right to punish man 77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God a mystery 78. Ought we look for consolation, from the author of our misery? 79. God who punishes the faults which he might have prevented 80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity 81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish 82. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will 83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will 84. God, if there were a God, would not be free 85. According to Theology, man is not free a single instant 86. There is no evil, and no sin, but must be attributed to God 87. The prayers prove dissatisfaction of the divine will 88. Absurd to imagine repair of misfortune in another world 89. Theology justifies the evil permitted by its God 90. Jehovah, exterminations prove an unjust and barbarous God 91. Is God a generous, equitable, and tender father? 92. Man's life, deposes against goodness of a pretended God 93. We owe no gratitude to what is called _Providence_ 94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the favourite of God 95. A comparison between Man and brutes 96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants 97. A refutation of the excellence of Man 98. An oriental Tale 99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God 100. What is the Soul? 101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition 102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_ 103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul 104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes 105. It is false that Materialism degrades 106. It is false that Materialism degrades 107. Idea of future life only useful to priest's trade 108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling 109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination 110. Religion a system to reconciles contradictions by mysteries 111. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests 112, Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests 113. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests 114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion 115. Religion is unnecessary, as it is unintelligible 116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds 117. Opinion of a famous Theologian 118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory 119. Aged belief in a Deity does not prove the existence of God 120. All Gods are savage: all Religions are monuments of ignorance 121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism 122. The more a religion is ancient and general, the more suspect 123. Scepticism in religious matters from very superficial study 124. Revelations examined 125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself or spoke to Men 126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed 127. Strange that God spoke differently to different sects 128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles 129. Absurdity of all miracles 130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal on miracles 131. Every new revelation is necessarily false 132. Blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles 133. Fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries 134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense 135. Faith irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason preferable to Faith 136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms the religious are reduced 137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man 138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds 139. That one Religion has greater pretensions to truth an absurdity 140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality 141. Religion the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions 142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion 143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings 144. Origin of "the divine right of kings" 145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations 146. Christianity preaching implicit obedience to despotism 147. One object of religious principles: eternize the tyranny of kings 148. Fatal it is to persuade kings they are responsible to God alone 149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom 150. Tyranny finds Religion a weak obstacle to the despair of the people 151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes 152. What is an enlightened Sovereign? 153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood 154. The quackery of priests 155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils 156. Every Religion is intolerant 157. The evils of a state Religion 158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime 159. The argument, that evils attributed to Religion are faults of men 160. Religion is incompatible with Morality 161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable 162. A society of Saints would be impossible 163. Human nature is not depraved 164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission 165. The remission of sins was invented for the interest of priests 166. Who fear God? 167. Hell is an absurd invention 168. The bad foundation of religious morals 169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!! 170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine 171. Supposition of the existence of a God unnecessary to Morality 172. Supernatural Morality are fatal to the public welfare 173. The union of Church and State is a calamity 174. National Religions are ruinous 175. Religion paralyses Morality 176. Fatal consequences of Devotion 177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man 178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man 179. An Atheistical king far preferable to a religious king 180. Philosophy produces Morality 181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct 182. Reason leads man to Atheism 183. Fear alone makes Theists 184. Can we, and ought we, to love God? 185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities 186. The existence of God, has not yet been demonstrated 187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers 188. Presumption, and badness, more in priests, than in Atheists 189. Prejudices last but for a time 190. What if priests the apostles of reason 191. If Philosophy were substituted for Religion! 192. Recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves nothing 193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society 194. Refutation of the opinion, that Religion necessary for the vulgar 195. Logical systems are not adapted to the capacity of the vulgar 196. On the futility and danger of Theology 197. On the evils produced by implicit faith 198. On the evils produced by implicit faith 199. All Religions were established by impostors, in days of ignorance 200. All Religions borrow from one another ridiculous ceremonies 201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path 202. Theology explains nothing 203. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress 204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress 205. Religion is an extravagance and a calamity 206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes PUBLISHER'S NOTE The chief design in reprinting this translation, is to preserve "_thestrongest atheistical work_" for present and future generations of EnglishFreethinkers. The real author was, unquestionably, Paul Thyry; Baron D'Holbach, and notJohn Meslier, to whom this work has been wrongly attributed, under thetitle of "Le Bon Sens" (Common Sense). In 1770, Baron D'Holbach published his masterpiece, "Systeme de laNature, " which for a long time passed as the posthumous work of M. DeMirabaud. That text-book of "Atheistical Philosophy" caused a greatsensation, and two years later, 1772, the Baron published this excellentabridgment of it, freed from arbitrary ideas; and by its clearness ofexpression, facility, and precision of style, rendered it most suitablefor the average student. "Le Bon Sens" was privately printed in Amsterdam, and the author's namewas kept a profound secret; hence, Baron D'Holbach escaped persecution. THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE When we examine the opinions of men, we find that nothing is moreuncommon, than common sense; or, in other words, they lack judgmentto discover plain truths, or to reject absurdities, and palpablecontradictions. We have an example of this in Theology, a system reveredin all countries by a great number of men; an object regarded by themas most important, and indispensable to happiness. An examination ofthe principles upon which this pretended system is founded, forces usto acknowledge, that these principles are only suppositions, imaginedby ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or knavery, adopted by timidcredulity, preserved by custom which never reasons, and revered solelybecause not understood. In a word, whoever uses common sense upon religious opinions, and willbestow on this inquiry the attention that is commonly given to mostsubjects, will easily perceive that Religion is a mere castle in theair. Theology is ignorance of natural causes; a tissue of fallaciesand contradictions. In every country, it presents romances void ofprobability, the hero of which is composed of impossible qualities. Hisname, exciting fear in all minds, is only a vague word, to which, menaffix ideas or qualities, which are either contradicted by facts, orinconsistent. Notions of this being, or rather, _the word_ by which he is designated, would be a matter of indifference, if it did not cause innumerable ravagesin the world. But men, prepossessed with the opinion that this phantom isa reality of the greatest interest, instead of concluding wisely from itsincomprehensibility, that they are not bound to regard it, infer on thecontrary, that they must contemplate it, without ceasing, and never losesight of it. Their invincible ignorance, upon this subject, irritatestheir curiosity; instead of putting them upon guard against theirimagination, this ignorance renders them decisive, dogmatic, imperious, and even exasperates them against all, who oppose doubts to the reverieswhich they have begotten. What perplexity arises, when it is required to solve an insolvableproblem; unceasing meditation upon an object, impossible to understand, but in which however he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but exciteman, and produce a fever in his brain. Let interest, vanity, and ambition, co-operate ever so little with this unfortunate turn of mind, and societymust necessarily be disturbed. This is the reason that so many nationshave often been the scene of extravagances of senseless visionaries, who, believing their empty speculations to be eternal truths, and publishingthem as such, have kindled the zeal of princes and their subjects, andmade them take up arms for opinions, represented to them as essential tothe glory of the Deity. In all parts of our globe, fanatics have cut eachother's throats, publicly burnt each other, committed without a scrupleand even as a duty, the greatest crimes, and shed torrents of blood. Forwhat? To strengthen, support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures ofsome enthusiasts, or to give validity to the cheats of impostors, in thename of a being, who exists only in their imagination, and who has madehimself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused. Savage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers names, some God, conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous, selfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all the religions, "a God of armies, "a "jealous God, " an "avenging God, " a "destroying God, " a "God, " whois pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers consider it a duty toserve. Lambs, bulls, children, men, and women, are sacrificed to him. Zealous servants of this barbarous God think themselves obliged even tooffer up themselves as a sacrifice to him. Madmen may everywhere be seen, who, after meditating upon their terrible God, imagine that to please himthey must inflict on themselves, the most exquisite torments. The gloomyideas formed of the deity, far from consoling them, have every wheredisquieted their minds, and prejudiced follies destructive to happiness. How could the human mind progress, while tormented with frightfulphantoms, and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance andfears? Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupidity: he hasbeen taught stories about invisible powers upon whom his happiness wassupposed to depend. Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligiblereveries, he has always been at the mercy of priests, who have reserved tothemselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions. Thus, man has remained a slave without courage, fearing to reason, andunable to extricate himself from the labyrinth, in which he has beenwandering. He believes himself forced under the yoke of his gods, knownto him only by the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who, afterbinding each unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain hismasters, or else abandon him defenceless to the absolute power of tyrants, no less terrible than the gods, of whom they are the representatives. Oppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it has beenimpossible for the people to be happy. Religion became sacred, and menhave had no other Morality, than what their legislators and priestsbrought from the unknown regions of heaven. The human mind, confusedby theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers, mistrustedexperience, feared truth and disdained reason, in order to followauthority. Man has been a mere machine in the hands of tyrants andpriests. Always treated as a slave, man has contracted the vices ofslavery. Such are the true causes of the corruption of morals. Ignorance andservitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge, Reason, and Liberty, can alone reform and make men happier. But everything conspires to blind them, and to confirm their errors. Priests cheatthem, tyrants corrupt and enslave them. Tyranny ever was, and ever willbe, the true cause of man's depravity, and also of his calamities. Almostalways fascinated by religious fiction, poor mortals turn not their eyesto the natural and obvious causes of their misery; but attribute theirvices to the imperfection of their natures, and their unhappiness to theanger of the gods. They offer to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents, toobtain the end of sufferings, which in reality, are attributable only tothe negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to the folly oftheir customs, and above all, to the general want of knowledge. Let men'sminds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated; and therewill be no need of opposing to the passions, such a feeble barrier, as thefear of gods. Men will be good, when they are well instructed; and whenthey are despised for evil, or justly rewarded for good, which they do totheir fellow citizens. In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we begin bycuring them of their prejudices. It is only by showing them the truth, that they will perceive their true interests, and the real motives thatought to incline them to do good. Instructors have long enough fixed men'seyes upon heaven; let them now turn them upon earth. An incomprehensibletheology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies, are to be no longer endured. Let the human mind apply itself to what isnatural, to intelligible objects, truth, and useful knowledge. Does it not suffice to annihilate religious prejudice, to shew, thatwhat is inconceivable to man, cannot be good for him? Does it require anything, but plain common sense, to perceive, that a being, incompatiblewith the most evident notions--that a cause continually opposed tothe effects which we attribute to it--that a being, of whom we can saynothing, without falling into contradiction--that a being, who, farfrom explaining the enigmas of the universe, only makes them moreinexplicable--that a being, whom for so many ages men have vainlyaddressed to obtain their happiness, and the end of sufferings--does itrequire, I say, any thing but plain, common sense, to perceive--that theidea of such a being is an idea without model, and that he himself ismerely a phantom of the imagination? Is any thing necessary but commonsense to perceive, at least, that it is folly and madness for men to hateand damn one another about unintelligible opinions concerning a being ofthis kind? In short, does not every thing prove, that Morality and Virtueare totally incompatible with the notions of a God, whom his ministersand interpreters have described, in every country, as the most capricious, unjust, and cruel of tyrants, whose pretended will, however, must serve aslaw and rule the inhabitants of the earth? To discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of theology, of revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common sense. They haveonly to commune with themselves, to reflect upon their own nature, toconsider the objects of society, and of the individuals, who composeit; and they will easily perceive, that virtue is advantageous, and vicedisadvantageous to themselves. Let us persuade men to be just, beneficent, moderate, sociable; not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but, because it is pleasant to men. Let us advise them to abstain from viceand crime; not because they will be punished in another world, but becausethey will suffer for it in this. --_These are, _ says Montesquieu, _meansto prevent crimes--these are punishments; these reform manners--these aregood examples. _ The way of truth is straight; that of imposture is crooked and dark. Truth, ever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all uprightminds; the lessons of reason are to be followed by all honest men. Men areunhappy, only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant, only becauseevery thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened; they are wickedonly because their reason is not sufficiently developed. By what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given totheir gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts? Can we imaginea conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us his God showedtowards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds boldly to declare, inthe name and by the order of _his God_, that Egypt shall be afflictedwith the greatest calamities, that can happen to man? Of all the differentideas, which they give us of a supreme being, of a God, creator andpreserver of mankind, there are none more horrible, than those of theimpostors, who represented themselves as inspired by a divine spirit, and"Thus saith the Lord. " Why, O theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrablemysteries of a being, whom you consider inconceivable to the human mind?You are the blasphemers, when you imagine that a being, perfect accordingto you, could be guilty of such cruelty towards creatures whom he hasmade out of nothing. Confess, your ignorance of a creating God; and ceasemeddling with mysteries, which are repugnant to _Common Sense_. DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS GIVEN IN THE FRENCH EDITION Section 1. APOLOGUE 2, 3. What is Theology? 4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion 5. It is not necessary to believe in a God 6. Religion is founded on credulity 7. All religion is an absurdity 8. The idea of God is impossible 9. On the Origin of Superstition 10. On the Origin of all Religion 11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters 12, 13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous 14. There would never have been any Religion, if there had not been ages of Stupidity and Barbarism 15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination 16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain 17, 18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God 19. The existence of God is not proved 20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit 21. Spirituality is an absurdity 22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter 23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology? 24. It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than to adore a spiritual Deity 25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action 26. What is God? 27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology 28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction 29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the impossibility of knowing the Divine essence 30. Believing in God is neither safer nor less criminal than not believing in him 31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy 32. Belief in God is a prejudice established by successive generations 33. On the Origin of Prejudices 34. On the effects of Prejudices 35. The Religious principles of modern Theology could not be believed if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason 36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God 37, 38. Nature may be explained by natural causes 39, 40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself 41. Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and that consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual Mover 42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God 43. Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance 44, 45. The order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God 46. A Spirit cannot be intelligent it is absurd to adore a divine intelligence 47, 48. All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God are contrary to the Essence which is attributed to him 49. It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and end of the formation of the Universe 50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God 51. It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe was to render Man happy 52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning 53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man 54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being 55. God cannot be considered immutable 56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes. What is a God that cannot change any thing? 57. The consolations of Theology and the hope of paradise and of a future life, are imaginary 58. Another romantic reverie 59. It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human defects: either this God is not free, or else he is more wicked than good 60, 61. It is impossible to believe that there exists a God of infinite goodness and power 62. Theology makes its God a monster of absurdity, injustice, malice, and atrocity 63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears 64. There is no difference between Religion, and the most somber and servile Superstition 65. To judge from the ideas which Theology gives of the Deity, the love of God is impossible 66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being 67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions 68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections 69. The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by the pretended creation of angels 70. Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet constantly makes him appear impotent 71. According to all religious systems, God would be the most capricious and most foolish of beings 72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God 73. The foreknowledge attributed to God would give men a right to complain of his cruelty 74. Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original Sin, and concerning Satan 75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests 76. If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin, he has no right to punish man 77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be a mystery for man 78. Ought the unfortunate look for consolation, to the sole author of their misery 79. A God, who punishes the faults which he might have prevented, is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly 80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity 81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish 82, 83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will 84. God himself, if there were a God, would not be free: hence the inutility of all Religion 85. According to the principles of Theology, man is not free a single instant 86. There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be attributed to God: consequently God has no right either to punish or recompence 87. The prayers offered to God sufficiently prove dissatisfaction of the divine will 88. It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries and misfortunes, endured in this world, will be repaired in another world 89. Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God, only by attributing to him the principle, that "Might makes Right, " which is the violation of all Right 90. The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent exterminations attributed to Jehovah, impress one with the idea of an unjust and barbarous God 91. Can a being, who has called us into existence merely to make us miserable, be a generous, equitable, and tender father? 92. Man's life, and all that occurs, deposes against the liberty of Man, and against the justice and goodness of a pretended God 93. It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is called _Providence_ 94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the king of nature, the favourite of God, and unique object of his labours 95. A comparison between Man and brutes 96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants 97. A refutation of the excellence of Man 98. An oriental Tale 99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God, or to think that this universe is only made for Man 100. What is the Soul? 101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition; and the existence of an _immortal_ Soul still more absurd 102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_ 103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul 104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which Theologians are constantly having recourse 105, 106. It is false that Materialism degrades 107. The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who trade on public credulity 108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling 109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination. God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him, reciprocally destroy one another 110. Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile contradictions by the aid of mysteries 111, 112, 113. Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries, which were only invented for the interests of Priests 114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion 115. What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is unintelligible 116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds, all opposite to one another, and all equally foolish 117. Opinion of a famous Theologian 118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less chimerical than the God of the Christians 119. It by no means proves the existence of God to say, that, in every age, all nations have acknowledged some Deity or other 120. All Gods are of a savage origin: all Religions are monuments of the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of former times: modern Religions are but ancient follies, re-edited with additions and corrections 121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism 122. The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the more it ought to be suspected 123. Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the effect of a very superficial examination 124. Revelations examined 125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to Men, or ever spoke to them? 126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed 127. If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should have spoken so differently to the different religious sects? 128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles 129. Absurdity of all miracles 130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal concerning the manner in which we must judge of miracles 131. Every new revelation is necessarily false 132. The blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles, and _against_ the divine origin attributed to Christianity 133. The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries, by no means prove the truth of Religion 134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense 135. Faith is irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason is preferable to Faith 136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is reduced, who would substitute Faith for Reason! 137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man, what is of the greatest importance to himself 138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds 139. To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions to truth than another, is an absurdity, and cause of tumult 140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality 141. Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions 142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion 143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings 144. Origin of "the divine right of kings, " the most absurd, ridiculous, and odious, of usurpations 145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes despots licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject and miserable 146. Christianity has propagated itself by preaching implicit obedience to despotism 147. One object of religious principles is to eternize the tyranny of kings 148. How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for their actions to God alone 149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom 150. Tyranny sometimes finds the aegis of Religion a weak obstacle to the despair of the people 151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering them from fear and remorse 152. What is an enlightened Sovereign? 153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood 154. The quackery of priests 155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils 156. Every Religion is intolerant 157. The evils of a state Religion 158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime 159. Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to Religion are but the bad effects of human passions 160. Religion is incompatible with Morality 161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable 162. A society of Saints would be impossible 163. Human nature is not depraved 164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission 165. The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the interest of priests 166. Who fear God? 167. Hell is an absurd invention 168. The bad foundation of religious morals 169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!! 170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine, and the destruction of the true principles of Morality 171. The supposition of the existence of a God is by no means necessary to Morality 172. Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the public welfare 173. The union of Church and State is a calamity 174. National Religions are ruinous 175. Religion paralyses Morality 176. Fatal consequences of Devotion 177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man 178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man, and has better motives for doing good 179. An Atheistical king would be far preferable to a religious king 180. Philosophy produces Morality 181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct 182. Reason leads man to Atheism 183. Fear alone makes Theists 184. Can we, and ought we, to love God? 185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the different ideas formed of them 186. The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion, has not yet been demonstrated 187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers 188. Pride, presumption, and badness, are more often found in priests, than in Atheists 189. Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable which is not founded upon truth 190. What an honourable power ministers of the Gods would obtain, if they became the apostles of reason and the defenders of liberty! 191. What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for the world, if Philosophy were substituted for Religion! 192. The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief 193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society 194. Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion is necessary for the vulgar 195. Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to the capacity of the vulgar 196. On the futility and danger of Theology 197, 198. On the evils produced by implicit faith 199. History teaches us, that all Religions were established by impostors, in days of ignorance 200. All Religions, ancient or modern, have borrowed from one another ridiculous ceremonies 201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path 202. Theology explains nothing 203, 204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress 205. It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an extravagance and a calamity 206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD APOLOGUE 1. There is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose strange conduct isto confound the minds of his subjects. He wishes to be known, loved, respected, obeyed; but never shows himself to his subjects, and everythingconspires to render uncertain the ideas formed of his character. The people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and laws oftheir invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers give them. They, however, confess, that they have no idea of their master; that hisways are impenetrable; his views and nature totally incomprehensible. These ministers, likewise, disagree upon the commands which they pretendhave been issued by the sovereign, whose servants they call themselves. They defame one another, and mutually treat each other as impostors andfalse teachers. The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselvesto promulgate, are obscure; they are enigmas, little calculated to beunderstood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction theywere intended. The laws of the concealed monarch require interpreters;but the interpreters are always disputing upon the true manner ofunderstanding them. Besides, they are not consistent with themselves; allthey relate of their concealed prince is only a string of contradictions. They utter concerning him not a single word that does not immediatelyconfute itself. They call him supremely good; yet many complain of hisdecrees. They suppose him infinitely wise; and under his administrationeverything appears to contradict reason. They extol his justice; and thebest of his subjects are generally the least favoured. They assert, hesees everything; yet his presence avails nothing. He is, say they, thefriend of order; yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion anddisorder. He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answerhis designs. He foresees everything; but cannot prevent anything. Heimpatiently suffers offence, yet gives everyone the power of offendinghim. Men admire the wisdom and perfection of his works; yet his works, full of imperfection, are of short duration. He is continually doing andundoing; repairing what he has made; but is never pleased with his work. In all his undertakings, he proposes only his own glory; yet is neverglorified. His only end is the happiness of his subjects; and hissubjects, for the most part want necessaries. Those, whom he seems tofavour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost all appearin perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they never cease toadmire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to adore, whose justice tofear, and whose laws to reverence, though never obeyed! This EMPIRE is the WORLD; this MONARCH GOD; his MINISTERS are the PRIESTS;his SUBJECTS MANKIND. 2. There is a science that has for its object only things incomprehensible. Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what cannot fall underour senses. Hobbes calls it the _kingdom of darkness_. It is a country, where every thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind arepermitted to know in the world they inhabit. In this marvellous region, light is only darkness; evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilitiesare credible: reason is a deceitful guide; and good sense becomes madness. This _science_ is called _theology_, and this theology is a continualinsult to the reason of man. 3. By the magical power of "ifs, " "buts, " "perhaps's, " "what do we know, "etc. , heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed, perplexing mankind, by obliterating from their minds, the most clear ideasand rendering uncertain truths most evident. By reason of this systematicconfusion, nature is an enigma; the visible world has disappeared, to giveplace to regions invisible; reason is compelled to yield to imagination, who leads to the country of her self-invented chimeras. 4. The principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of a GOD. Now, it is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who acts upon none of oursenses. All our ideas are representations of sensible objects. What thencan represent to us the idea of God, which is evidently an idea without anobject? Is not such an idea as impossible, as an effect without a cause?Can an idea without an archetype be anything, but a chimera? There are, however, divines, who assure us that the idea of God is innate; or thatwe have this idea in our mother's womb. Every principle is the result ofreason; all reason is the effect of experience; experience is acquiredonly by the exercise of our senses: therefore, religious principles arenot founded upon reason, and are not innate. 5. Every system of religion can be founded only upon the nature of God andman; and upon the relations, which subsist between them. But to judgeof the reality of those relations, we must have some idea of the divinenature. Now, the world exclaims, the divine nature is incomprehensible toman; yet ceases not to assign attributes to this incomprehensible God, andto assure us, that it is our indispensable duty to find out that God, whomit is impossible to comprehend. The most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend. If Godis incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to think ofhim; but religion maintains, man cannot with impunity cease a moment tothink (or rather dream) of his God. 6. We are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be comprehendedby finite minds. The natural consequence must be, that divine qualitiesare not made to occupy finite minds. But religion tells us, that the poorfinite mind of man ought never to lose sight of an inconceivable being, whose qualities he can never comprehend. Thus, we see, religion is theart of turning the attention of mankind upon subjects they can nevercomprehend. 7. Religion unites man with God, or forms a communication between them; yetdo they not say, God is infinite? If God be infinite, no finite being canhave communication or relation with him. Where there is no relation, therecan be no union, communication, or duties. If there be no duties betweenman and his God, there is no religion for man. Thus, in saying God isinfinite, you annihilate religion for man, who is a finite being. The ideaof infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype, withoutobject. 8. If God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the present orfuture world, any relative proportion between man and his God. Thus, theidea of God can never enter the human mind. In supposition of a life, inwhich man would be much more enlightened, than in this, the idea of theinfinity of God would ever remain the same distance from his finite mind. Thus the idea of God will be no more clear in the future, than in thepresent life. Thus, intelligences, superior to man, can have no morecomplete ideas of God, than man, who has not the least conception of himin his present life. 9. How has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that the thing, most impossible to comprehend, was most essential to them? It is becausethey have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear, they ceaseto reason; because, they have been taught to mistrust their ownunderstanding; because, when the brain is troubled, they believe everything, and examine nothing. 10. Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion. The uncertainty inwhich man finds himself in relation to his God, is precisely the motivethat attaches him to his religion. Man is fearful in the dark--in moral, as well as physical darkness. His fear becomes habitual, and habit makesit natural; he would think that he wanted something, if he had nothing tofear. 11. He, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble when he hearspronounced certain words, requires those words and needs to tremble. He istherefore more disposed to listen to one, who entertains him in his fears, than to one, who dissuades him from them. The superstitious man wishes tofear; his imagination demands it; one might say, that he fears nothing somuch, as to have nothing to fear. Men are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested toencourage, in order to have sale for their drugs. They listen rather tothe physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies, than to him, whorecommends good regimen, and leaves nature to herself. 12. If religion were more clear, it would have less charms for the ignorant, who are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables, prodigies, andthings incredible. Romances, silly stories, and the tales of ghosts andwizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than true histories. 13. In point of religion, men are only great children. The more a religion isabsurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy it acquires overthem. The devout man thinks himself obliged to place no bounds to hiscredulity; the more things are inconceivable, they appear to him divine;the more they are incredible, the greater merit, he imagines, there is inbelieving them. 14. The origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the time, whensavage nations were yet in infancy. It was to gross, ignorant, andstupid people, that the founders of religion have in all ages addressedthemselves, when they wished to give them their Gods, their mode ofworship, their mythology, their marvellous and frightful fables. Thesechimeras, adopted without examination by parents, are transmitted, withmore or less alteration, to their children, who seldom reason any morethan their parents. 15. The object of the first legislators was to govern the people; and theeasiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and to preventthe exercise of reason. They led them through winding bye-paths, lest theymight perceive the designs of their guides; they forced them to fix theireyes in the air, for fear they should look at their feet; they amused themon the way with idle stories; in a word, they treated them as nurses dochildren, who sing lullabies, to put them to sleep, and scold, to makethem quiet. 16. The existence of a God is the basis of all religion. Few appear to doubthis existence; yet this fundamental article utterly embarrasses every mindthat reasons. The first question of every catechism has been, and everwill be, the most difficult to resolve. (In the year 1701, theholy fathers of the oratory of Vendome maintained in a thesis, thisproposition--that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God is not, and cannot be, a subject of faith. ) 17. Can we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence of a being, whose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to all our senses; whoseattributes, we are assured, are incomprehensible to us? To persuade methat a being exists or can exist, I must be first told what that being is. To induce me to believe the existence or the possibility of such abeing, it is necessary to tell me things concerning him that are notcontradictory, and do not destroy one another. In short, to fully convinceme of the existence of that being, it is necessary to tell me things thatI can understand. 18. A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroyone another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in thought. Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses, which alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to judge of theiragreement or disagreement. That, which exists necessarily, is that, whosenon-existence implies a contradiction. These principles, universallyacknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence of aGod. Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is eitherunintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurdto every rational man. 19. All human knowledge is more or less clear. By what strange fatality havewe never been able to elucidate the science of God? The most civilizednations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are in this respect nomore enlightened than the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants; and, examining the subject closely, we shall find, that, by the speculationsand subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more andmore obscured. Every religion has hitherto been founded only upon what iscalled, in logic, _begging the question_; it takes things for granted, andthen proves, by suppositions, instead of principles. 20. Metaphysics teach us, that God is a _pure spirit_. But, is modern theologysuperior to that of the savages? The savages acknowledge a _great spirit_, for the master of the world. The savages, like all ignorant people, attribute to _spirits_ all the effects, of which their experience cannotdiscover the true causes. Ask a savage, what works your watch? He willanswer, _it is a spirit_. Ask the divines, what moves the universe? Theyanswer, _it is a spirit_. 21. The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some idea tothe word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze, the breath, that invisibly produces discernible effects. By subtilizing every thing, the modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to himself as to others. Ask him, what he understands by a spirit? He will answer you, that it isan unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, that hasnothing common with matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form theleast idea of such a substance? What then is a spirit, to speak in thelanguage of modern theology, but the absence of an idea? The idea of_spirituality_ is an idea without model. 22. Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence fromthe matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses, and whoseeffects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate motion, andincessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of things to anunknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his naturewhat he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can createneither matter nor motion? Nothing is more evident, than that the ideathey endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter, representsno object. It is an idea without model. 23. The material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy, and create beings, similar to himself; but the God of modern theology issterile. He can neither occupy any place in space, nor move matter, norform a visible world, nor create men or gods. The metaphysical God is fitonly to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes. 24. Since a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did they not worshipthe Sun, that visible God, adored by so many nations? What being hadgreater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star, who enlightens, warms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens and regeneratesnature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom and languor? If anybeing announced to mankind, power, activity, beneficence, and duration, itwas certainly the Sun, whom they ought to have regarded as the parent ofnature, as the divinity. At least, they could not, without folly, disputehis existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence. 25. The theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands nor arms toact; that _he acts by his will_. But pray, who or what is that God, whohas a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will? Are the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc. , more absurdand difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mindupon matter? When we admit such a God, fables and reveries may claimbelief. Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity makes thembelieve all the stories they hear. 26. To shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian tospeak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, theleast reflection will convince us, that his observations are totallyincompatible with the essence he ascribes to his God. What then is God?It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is amathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. DavidHume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that they havediscovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--a point inthe heavens, whence they move the world_. 27. Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension, isinfinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful, whonever executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates onlydisquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government allis in confusion and disorder. What then, can we imagine, can be the God oftheology? 28. To avoid all embarrassment, we are told, "that it is not necessary to knowwhat God is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted to extendour views to his attributes. " But, before we know that we must adore aGod, must we not know certainly, that he exists? But, how can we assureourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the variousqualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him? Indeed, to adore God, is to adore only the fictions of one's own imagination, orrather, it is to adore nothing. 29. In view of confounding things the more, theologians have not declared whattheir God is; they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations andabstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect being. Mindis that, which is _not_ body. An infinite being is a being, who is _not_finite. A perfect being is a being, who is _not_ imperfect. Indeed, isthere any one, who can form real ideas of such a mass of absence of ideas?That, which excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing? To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of humanconception, is to grant, that God is not made for man. To assure us, that, in God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing common to himand his creatures. If there be nothing common to God and his creatures, God is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered useless to him. "God, "they say, "has made man intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;"hence it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him facultiessufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, itis evident, that God has not been able nor willing to be known by hiscreatures. By what right then would God be angry with beings, who werenaturally incapable of knowing the divine essence? God would be evidentlythe most unjust and capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheistfor not having known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he shouldknow. 30. To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more convincingthan fear. It is therefore, that theologians assure us, _we must take thesafest part_; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity; that God willpunish without pity every one who has the temerity to doubt his existence;that his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can makeus deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avengeshimself on Atheists. If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shallfind, they always suppose the thing in question. They must first prove theexistence of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, andhorrible to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it ispossible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punishes men for havingbeen in a state of madness, that prevented their believing the existenceof a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive. In a word, they must prove, that an infinitely just God can infinitely punish theinvincible and natural ignorance of man with respect to the divine nature. Do not theologians reason very strangely? They invent phantoms, theycompose them of contradictions; they then assure us, it is safest notto doubt the existence of these phantoms they themselves have invented. According to this mode of reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it wouldnot be more safe to believe, than not to believe. All children are born Atheists; they have no idea of God. Are they thencriminal on account of their ignorance? At what age must they begin tobelieve in God? It is, you say, at the age of reason. But at what timeshould this age commence? Besides, if the profoundest theologians losethemselves in the divine nature, which they do not presume to comprehend, what ideas must man have of him? 31. Men believe in God only upon the word of those, who have no more idea ofhim than themselves. Our nurses are our first theologians. They talkto children of God as if he were a scarecrow; they teach them from theearliest age to join their hands mechanically. Have nurses then more trueideas of God than the children whom they teach to pray? 32. Religion, like a family estate, passes, with its incumbrances, fromparents to children. Few men in the world would have a God, had notpains been taken in infancy to give them one. Each would receive from hisparents and teachers the God whom they received from theirs; but each, agreeably to his disposition, would arrange, modify, and paint him in hisown manner. 33. The brain of man, especially in infancy, is like soft wax, fit to receiveevery impression that is made upon it. Education furnishes him with almostall his ideas at a time, when he is incapable of judging for himself. Webelieve we have received from nature, or have brought with us at birth, the true or false ideas, which, in a tender age, had been instilled intoour minds; and this persuasion is one of the greatest sources of errors. 34. Prejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those who have beencharged with our instruction. We believe them much more experienced thanourselves; we suppose they are fully convinced of the things which theyteach us; we have the greatest confidence in them; by the care they havetaken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable of wishing to deceive us. These are the motives that make us adopt a thousand errors, without otherfoundation than the hazardous authority of those by whom we have beenbrought up. The prohibition likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us, by no means lessens our confidence; but often contributes to increase ourrespect for their opinions. 35. Divines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles beforethey are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or their lefthand from their right. It would be as difficult to instill into the mindof a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that are given us ofthe divinity, as to eradicate them from the mind of him who had imbibedthem from infancy. 36. It is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to lead us tothe existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this important truth. But how many are there in the world who have the time, capacity, ordisposition, necessary to contemplate Nature and meditate her progress?Men, for the most part, pay no regard to it. The peasant is not struckwith the beauty of the sun, which he sees every day. The sailor is notsurprised at the regular motion of the ocean; he will never draw from ittheological conclusions. The phenomena of nature prove the existence of aGod only to some prejudiced men, who have been early taught to behold thefinger of God in every thing whose mechanism could embarrass them. In thewonders of nature, the unprejudiced philosopher sees nothing but thepower of nature, the permanent and various laws, the necessary effects ofdifferent combinations of matter infinitely diversified. 37. Is there any thing more surprising than the logic of these divines, who, instead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes, seek beyondnature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than that nature, of which they can form at least some idea? To say, that God is the authorof the phenomena of nature, is it not to attribute them to an occultcause? What is God? What is a spirit? They are causes of which we have noidea. O wise divines! Study nature and her laws; and since you canthere discover the action of natural causes, go not to those that aresupernatural, which, far from enlightening, will only darken your ideas, and make it utterly impossible that you should understand yourselves. 38. Nature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God. That is to say, to explain what you understand very little, you have need of a cause whichyou understand not at all. You think to elucidate what is obscure, bydoubling the obscurity; to solve difficulties, by multiplying them. Oenthusiastic philosophers! To prove the existence of a God, write completetreatises of botany; enter into a minute detail of the parts of the humanbody; launch forth into the sky, to contemplate the revolution of thestars; then return to the earth to admire the course of waters; beholdwith transport the butterflies, the insects, the polypi, and the organizedatoms, in which you think you discern the greatness of your God. All thesethings will not prove the existence of God; they will prove only, that youhave not just ideas of the immense variety of matter, and of the effects, producible by its infinitely diversified combinations, that constitute theuniverse. They will prove only your ignorance of nature; that you have noidea of her powers, when you judge her incapable of producing a multitudeof forms and beings, of which your eyes, even with the assistance ofmicroscopes, never discern but the smallest part. In a word, they willprove, that, for want of knowing sensible agents, or those possibleto know, you find it shorter to have recourse to a word, expressing aninconceivable agent. 39. We are gravely and repeatedly told, that, _there is no effect withouta cause_; that, _the world did not make itself_. But the universe isa cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work; it has not been made, because it is impossible that it should have been made. The world hasalways been; its existence is necessary; it is its own cause. Nature, whose essence is visibly to act and produce, requires not, to dischargeher functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than herself. Mattermoves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence of its heterogeneity. The diversity of motion, or modes of mutual action, constitutes alone thediversity of matter. We distinguish beings from one another only by thedifferent impressions or motions which they communicate to our organs. 40. You see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that nature, byitself, is dead and without power. You imagine, that this all, essentiallyacting, needs a mover! What then is this mover? It is a spirit; a beingabsolutely incomprehensible and contradictory. Acknowledge then, thatmatter acts of itself, and cease to reason of your spiritual mover, who has nothing that is requisite to put it in action. Return fromyour useless excursions; enter again into a real world; keep to _secondcauses_, and leave to divines their _first cause_, of which nature has noneed, to produce all the effects you observe in the world. 41. It can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects, which bodiesmake upon us, that we feel them; that we have perceptions and ideasof them; that we distinguish one from another; that we assign themproperties. Now, to see or feel an object, the object must act upon ourorgans; this object cannot act upon us, without exciting some motion inus; it cannot excite motion in us, if it be not in motion itself. Atthe instant I see an object, my eyes are struck by it; I can have noconception of light and vision, without motion, communicated to myeye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body. At the instant I smellsomething, my sense is irritated, or put in motion, by the parts thatexhale from the odoriferous body. At the moment I hear a sound, thetympanum of my ear is struck by the air, put in motion by a sonorous body, which would not act if it were not in motion itself. Whence it evidentlyfollows, that, without motion, I can neither feel, see, distinguish, compare, judge, nor occupy my thoughts upon any subject whatever. We are taught, that _the essence of a thing is that from which all itsproperties flow_. Now, it is evident, that all the properties of bodies, of which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone informs us oftheir existence, and gives us the first conceptions of them. I cannot beinformed of my own existence but by the motions I experience in myself. Iam therefore forced to conclude, that motion is as essential to matter asextension, and that matter cannot be conceived without it. Should any person deny, that motion is essential and necessary to matter;they cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies, which seem dead andinert, produce motion of themselves, when placed in a fit situation toact upon one another. For instance; phosphorus, when exposed to the air, immediately takes fire. Meal and water, when mixed, ferment. Thus deadmatter begets motion of itself. Matter has then the power of self-motion;and nature, to act, has no need of a mover, whose pretended essence wouldhinder him from acting. 42. Whence comes man? What is his origin? Did the first man spring, readyformed, from the dust of the earth? Man appears, like all other beings, aproduction of nature. Whence came the first stones, the first trees, thefirst lions, the first elephants, the first ants, the first acorns? Weare incessantly told to acknowledge and revere the hand of God, of aninfinitely wise, intelligent and powerful maker, in so wonderful a work asthe human machine. I readily confess, that the human machine appears to mesurprising. But as man exists in nature, I am not authorized to say thathis formation, is above the power of nature. But I can much less conceiveof this formation, when to explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, whohas neither eyes, feet, hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man bytaking a little clay, and breathing upon it. We laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraguay, for calling themselvesthe descendants of the moon. The divines of Europe call themselves thedescendants, or the creation, of a pure spirit. Is this pretension anymore rational? Man is intelligent; thence it is inferred, that he can bethe work only of an intelligent being, and not of a nature, which is voidof intelligence. Although nothing is more rare, than to see man make useof this intelligence, of which he seems so proud, I will grant that he isintelligent, that his wants develop this faculty, that society especiallycontributes to cultivate it. But I see nothing in the human machine, andin the intelligence with which it is endued, that announces very preciselythe infinite intelligence of the maker to whom it is ascribed. I see thatthis admirable machine is liable to be deranged; I see, that his wonderfulintelligence is then disordered, and sometimes totally disappears; Iinfer, that human intelligence depends upon a certain disposition of thematerial organs of the body, and that we cannot infer the intelligence ofGod, any more from the intelligence of man, than from his materiality. Allthat we can infer from it, is, that God is material. The intelligence ofman no more proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man provesthe malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man. In spite of allthe arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted by itseffects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its works. We shallalways see evil, imperfection and folly result from such a cause, that issaid to be full of goodness, perfection and wisdom. 43. "What?" you will say, "is intelligent man, is the universe, and all itcontains, the effect of _chance_?" No; I repeat it, _the universe is notan effect_; it is the cause of all effects; every being it contains isthe necessary effect of this cause, which sometimes shews us its manner ofacting, but generally conceals its operations. Men use the word _chance_to hide their ignorance of true causes, which, though not understood, actnot less according to certain laws. There is no effect without a cause. Nature is a word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, variousmatter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we behold. All bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effects of certaincauses. Nothing in nature can happen by chance. Every thing is subjectto fixed laws. These laws are only the necessary connection of certaineffects with their causes. One atom of matter cannot meet another _bychance_; this meeting is the effect of permanent laws, which cause everybeing necessarily to act as it does, and hinder it from acting otherwise, in given circumstances. To talk of the _fortuitous concourse of atoms_, orto attribute some effects to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorantof the laws, by which bodies act, meet, combine, or separate. Those, who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of beings, andthe effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence of certaincauses, think, that every thing takes place by chance. It is not chance, that has placed the sun in the centre of our planetary system; it is byits own essence, that the substance, of which it is composed, must occupythat place, and thence be diffused. 44. The worshippers of a God find, in the order of the universe, an invincibleproof of the existence of an intelligent and wise being, who governs it. But this order is nothing but a series of movements necessarily producedby causes or circumstances, which are sometimes favourable, and sometimeshurtful to us: we approve of some, and complain of others. Nature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same causes producethe same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed by othercauses, which force them to produce different effects. When the operationof causes, whose effects we experience, is interrupted by causes, which, though unknown, are not the less natural and necessary, we are confounded;we cry out, _a miracle!_ and attribute it to a cause much more unknown, than any of those acting before our eyes. The universe is always in order. It cannot be in disorder. It is ourmachine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder. The bodies, causes, and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner inwhich we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects. Earthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effectsas necessary, or as much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavybodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, theblowing of the winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, forwhich men praise God, and thank him for his goodness. To be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to besurprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects. Tobe shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or areinterrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same. Towonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist; itis to be surprised at any one's own existence. What is order to one being, is disorder to another. All wicked beings find that every thing is inorder, when they can with impunity put every thing in disorder. They find, on the contrary, that every thing is in disorder, when they are disturbedin the exercise of their wickedness. 45. Upon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature, there couldbe no disorder with respect to him. Would not all the causes, that heshould have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences, and impulses given them? If God should change the ordinary course ofnature, he would not be immutable. If the order of the universe, inwhich man thinks he sees the most convincing proof of the existence, intelligence, power and goodness of God, should happen to contradictitself, one might suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him ofinconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement ofthings; one would have a right to accuse him of an oversight in the choiceof the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts inaction. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and intelligenceof the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability, andirrationality. You say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with hisimmensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could not actwithout his agency. But in this case, you admit, that your God is theauthor of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature, that he is thefather of confusion, that he is in man, and moves him at the moment hesins. If God is every where, he is in me, he acts with me, he is deceivedwith me, he offends God with me, and combats with me the existence of God!O theologians! you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God. 46. In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes, it is necessaryto have organs; to have organs, it is necessary to have a body; to actupon bodies, it is necessary to have a body; to experience disorder, it isnecessary to be capable of suffering. Whence it evidently follows, that apure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in theuniverse. Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common withthose of men. Very well. How then can men judge, right or wrong, of theseviews; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence? This would beto judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have no ideas. To adorethe profound views of divine wisdom, is it not to adore that, of which wecannot possibly judge? To admire these views, is it not to admire withoutknowing why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men admireand adore only what they do not comprehend. 47. All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible with abeing, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with human beings. It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from thisdifficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to theDivinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to understandthemselves. What results from this combination of man with God? A merechimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined with somuch pains, instantly vanishes. Dante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appearedto him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose livelycolours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon the dazzlinglight, he saw only his own figure. While adoring God, it is himself, thatman adores. 48. Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can have noneof the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections? Our virtues andperfections are consequences of the modifications of our passions. Buthas God passions as we have? Again: our good qualities consist in ourdispositions towards the beings with whom we live in society. God, according to you, is an insulated being. God has no equals--nofellow-beings. God does not live in society. He wants the assistance of noone. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your ownprinciples, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man cannotbe virtuous with respect to him. 49. Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to be the soleobject of God in creating the universe. Upon what does he found thisflattering opinion? We are told: that man is the only being endued withintelligence, which enables him to know the Deity, and to render himhomage. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own glory, and that it was necessary that the human species should come into thisplan, that there might be some one to admire his works, and glorify himfor them. But, according to these suppositions, has not God evidentlymissed his object? 1st. Man, according to yourselves, will always labourunder the completest impossibility of knowing his God, and the mostinvincible ignorance of his divine essence. 2ndly. A being, who has noequal, cannot be susceptible of glory; for glory can result only from thecomparison of one's own excellence with that of others. 3rdly. If God beinfinitely happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homageof his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours, is not glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the worldrepresent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcilesinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God. 50. If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than man withants. Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the intentions, desires, and projects of the gardener? Could they justly imagine, that apark was planted for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that thesole object of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence?But, according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below whatthe vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is whollydevoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology appears acomplete folly. 51. We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only object wasthe happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governedby an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy? Are his enjoymentsdurable? Are not his pleasures mixed with pains? Are many personssatisfied with their fate? Is not man continually the victim of physicaland moral evils? Is not the human machine, which is represented as amaster-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousandways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a mechanic, who shouldshew us a complex machine, ready to stop every moment, and which, in ashort time, would break in pieces of itself? 52. The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the wants, and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures, is called_Providence_. But, when we open our eyes, we find that God providesnothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part of the inhabitants ofthis world. For a very small number of men who are supposed to be happy, what an immense multitude groan under oppression, and languish in misery!Are not nations forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer tothe extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than theiroppressed slaves? At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the goodnessof Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence in her, dowe not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes, exclaim, that_Providence sports with the vain projects of man_, that she frustratestheir designs, that she laughs at their efforts, that profound wisdomdelights to bewilder the minds of mortals? But, shall we put confidence ina malignant Providence, who laughs at, and sports with mankind? How willone admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting isinexplicable? Judge of it by effects, you will say. We do; and find, thatthese effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful. Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world, thereis much more good than evil to every individual of mankind. Supposing thegood, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as a _hundred to ten_;will it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees of goodness, Providence possesses ten of malignity; which is incompatible with thesupposed perfection of the divine nature. Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises ofProvidence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem asif man, to live happily here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet, without his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live, he isobliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission. Without these second causes, the first cause, at least in most countries, would provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the globe, we seesavage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence. He isnecessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by Providence, in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms, inundations, droughts, andthe various accidents, which so often render useless all his labours. In aword, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill officesof that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness. A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to passthrough those places, where men have built large cities. Is not this man'sreasoning as rational, as that of many learned men, who incessantlytalk of _final causes_, or who pretend that they clearly perceive thebeneficent views of God in the formation of all things? 53. Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in thepreservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If itis she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, asin forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every momentdestroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfarewe suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight ofher beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes sheannihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimesshe desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man. She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates hisexistence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe? If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providencetowards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that farfrom resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather thoseunnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of theirlicentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who, content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice offortune. The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, whotreat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because, theysay, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner ofreasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men, who are determined to see, in their God, nothing but goodness, wisdom, andforesight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which thisworld is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss withdelight? 54. Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause, but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when itconstantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, issometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys allthis. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we beholdin this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; andthis cause is God. Although this world is full of evils; although disorderoften reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate;we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent andimmutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe. Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearestmanner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge ofthe intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which heemploys to attain his proposed object. The object of God, is the happinessof a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings, who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of manis filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil;order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction. If you say, that the designs of God are mysterious and that his ways areimpenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judgewhether God be intelligent. 55. You pretend, that God is immutable! What then produces a continualinstability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state, subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknownmonarch? How can we attribute to an immutable God, sufficiently powerfulto give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is incontinual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character inall the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can I see intheir continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compelhim to punish. I answer, that God, according to yourselves, is then notimmutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towardsthem. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, beconstantly the same? 56. The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy andsuffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in adisagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarilyfrom causes, which act only according to their properties. These effectsnecessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This samenature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek, desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary, a God, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessarycourse, --is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is adeaf and useless God, who can effect no change in general laws, to whichhe is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of abeing, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinitegoodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is thefavour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even afinite one? 57. When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government ofa good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present worldis only a passage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divinesassure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, theyshut our mouths, by saying, that God could communicate to his creaturesneither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved forhimself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence ofanother life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who, by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of survivingthemselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durablehappiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing, and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures, should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of theirdispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists, our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time, nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human speciesat all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; bywars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likelyto inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of thefuture state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If God is so kindlydisposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness, could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of whichfinite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an_infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If God could not make men happierthan they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_, where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffablebliss? If God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the onlyresidence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can orwill avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurusobserved: "either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; orhe can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, hehas both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, thisshews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has thepower, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contraryto his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent andmalignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing and able(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes evil, orwhy does he not prevent it?" Reflecting minds are still waiting for areasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, thatthey will be removed only in a future life. 58. We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that Godhas divided his creatures into different classes, in which each enjoysthe degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to thisromantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, allbeings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experienceexplicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensiblebeings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk withouthurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible beings, which arein his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude ofevils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. Duringthe whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, amoment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and whichhe regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity. 59. The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it issusceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have great qualitiesand great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily havegreat defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of agood God, not to have created a world, which he could not make completelyhappy. If God was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, andcould have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world, why did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Ofwhat importance is his existence to God? Nothing, or something? If man'sexistence is not useful or necessary to God, why did God make man? Ifman's existence is necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he wasdeficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilfulworkman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill, upon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but God is not. According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? Hehas, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does henot do it? Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unlessyou admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done, withoutbeing able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that God is free. Yousay also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he beganand ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of thisworld. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your God from defects. This perfect God has always some human imperfections. 60. "Is not God master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not takethem away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons forhis conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases. Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery, according to his good pleasure. " Such are the solutions given bytheologians to console us for the evils which God inflicts upon us. We reply, that a God, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of hisfavours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon hiscreatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good;that a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; andthat every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right tocomplain of finding ungrateful men. How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe toGod, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutualengagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures, they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is foundedupon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from theDeity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and Iwill make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, befaithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you, and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures, distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting hisgifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of allreligion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable toman, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness canbe manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he isunhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinitegoodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God beinfinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappinessof a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under aninfinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a singleman should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invinciblearguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness. 61. According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life arechastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why aremen guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let everything in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, andfortunate, " than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficultfor this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of ahell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness, God reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after havingrendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that Godcan render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets overthis, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to hisjustice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty, is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having beeninfinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutablebeing? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God filledwith implacable fury? 62. Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality veryproper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideasof modern theology, it is evident, that God has created the majority ofmen, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternalpunishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason, and equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have createdsensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this worldmight subject them to endless punishment in the other? A God perfidiousand malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him tothe danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; butas an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composinga perfect God, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings. According to theological notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, havingput out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them upin a dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe theirconduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those, who, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who wouldmagnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, inavoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which thedogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity! Although men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely good;yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of thekind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whosecharacter is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can welove a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object ofutter detestation? 63. Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion andsuperstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fearof the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God, and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man sees in him onlyan enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself asa distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of hischastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the sameideas of God? At the same time that we are told, that God is infinitelygood, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that hegrants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastisesthose, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours? 64. If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we find amixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of whichwe experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimesgood, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting ourlove, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then noreal difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servilesuperstition. If the theist sees God only in a favourable light; the bigotviews him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful, that of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious. 65. If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion. Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God, are eitherliars or fools, who see their God only in profile. It is impossible tolove a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whosejudgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upona God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us? Let not divinestalk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which menought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father, whenhe knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments forthe least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least sparkof love for a God, who reserves chastisements, infinite in duration andviolence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children. 66. The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made of that God, whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men isthe last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the barerecital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but crueltyis much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The mostsanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, atleast, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were, either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design offrightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of makinga display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarouscuriosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victimsof his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger hisimmoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the otherhand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living, who cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to thedamned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and thetime of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise ofhis eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself, and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole humanrace;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I donot say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, withoutemolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thingto fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your ownprinciples, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men. Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments. I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; thatthe offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God, whois unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of hiscreatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither beinfinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely forthe pleasure of eternal torments. Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or theblindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments. If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not uponearth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same Godis a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the uselesstorments of his feeble creatures. 67. To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men, is toannihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in otherrespects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of theuniverse; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God; thathe can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his God, that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to changehis goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand, what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God, who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpablecontradiction. All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of theDeity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothingbut imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. God, it is said, created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been ableto make himself suitably honoured by it. God created men in order to have, in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see menin continual revolt against him. 68. They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demandproofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us, theseperfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are, however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as themost marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full ofimperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almightyBeing, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting andodious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But, if the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of thedivine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so littlepleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, consideredin a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberlessevils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults;yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of themost perfect of beings. 69. In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore Godhas not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection. Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted todethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he hasnever been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice, sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will ofthe perfect Creator. 70. All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _God does whathe can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to usan unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on theother, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstandinghis omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his handssuch as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is areligion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind; andyet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what God wouldhave them. 71. Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinityact in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the mostcapricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, thatGod made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars withhis creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to makeadversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men freeto offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate tosubmit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased, reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity atonce formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would henot have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would henot have relieved his theologians! Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. Heresembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have anopportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment. But we see not, that the Deity has hitherto been able radically to curehimself of the evil, which he suffers from man. 72. God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not comefrom God. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? God. Evilthen comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sinwould not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is thereforechargeable to God. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we areforced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man, has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effectcontrary to the cause, from which he derives his being. 73. Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehandwhatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory, nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknowsthe future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If heresolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because itwas his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not havehappened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had beennecessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained byhis justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing, and the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon Godnot to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispensewith creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing, and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it, whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree, an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect ofhis justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of theunhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God, who, being able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them, although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner orlater, to punish them? 74. "Man, " you say, "when he came from the hand of God, was pure, innocent, and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin. "If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature wasimperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?Why did God permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feebleto resist temptation? Why did God create _satan_, an evil spirit, atempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race, annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies ofour happiness; or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victoriesand fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by whatstrange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principlesuch a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity? 75. There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heartof an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thoughthe must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at lastdiscovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy. "The devil, " said he, "tempts men only to have in hell companions of hismisery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heavenand hell; let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the wholechurch, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him tofavour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put anend to his malicious projects against mankind. " Perhaps the honest monkdid not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministersof religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to beinstrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combatstheir own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be temptedand to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism isevidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, inventedto clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, everymoment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary. 76. The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. Godcould not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienableattribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make manimpeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose naturemust necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? Onthe other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, bywhat right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be onlyby the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is calledviolence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings. God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for not sharing withhim his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him. Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind ofperfection, of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good, or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done thesame favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings of our species?Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good?Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which itdepended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true, that, in heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men whoshall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not havehad a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composedit of all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree ofgoodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it nothave been shorter not to have made man, than to have created him a beingfull of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to causehis own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty? Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angelsvery docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free; some havesinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty by revoltingagainst their master. Could not God have created only angels of the goodkind? If God has created angels, who have not sinned, could he not havecreated impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? Ifthe elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have madeimpeccable men upon earth? 77. Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance whichseparates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God a mysteryto us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answersatisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a rightto examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happinessthat men submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submitonly through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereigntotally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings. If the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neitheradore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct, in which every thing isinconceivable, or, of which he can often form only revolting ideas; unlessit is pretended, that we ought to adore every thing of which we are forcedto be ignorant, and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes forthat reason an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us, that the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not ourways, nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain ofhis administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totallyignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice, because we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, doyou not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your profoundsystems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity, which, you say, are impenetrable? Have you penetrated his judgments, hisways, his designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason aboutthem without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If, bychance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to admire, whilemost people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, andreasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are asignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuouslyconfess, they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothingdivine. Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothingyourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures, whichevery thing seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible andreally useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways ofGod, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves. By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbiddingus to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God before the tribunalof our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divinesteach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required toaccount for the conduct of a God, whose conduct they think marvellous onlybecause they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves. 78. Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases, famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wickedmen. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severityof a just and good God. But, do not these scourges fall indiscriminatelyupon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent andguilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justiceand goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so manywretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes, since they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of theevents of this world. This being the case, ought they not to impute theirsufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunatefather! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence, for the loss ofa dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou notsee, that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable, and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions hehas sent thee! The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded indestroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural ideas, that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves toregard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestialgoodness. When in affliction, they are ordered to believe that God lovesthem, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion hasattained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said withreason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestlybeseech him never to think of me_. Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who iscalled so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercingafflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon, be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodnesssometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearestfriends? 79. What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches withoutintermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak andshort-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander atrandom among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely hinders them fromfollowing their inordinate appetites; who permits them to handle, withoutprecaution, murderous arms, at the risk of their life? What should wethink of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil thathappens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderingsin the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father isa madman, who unites injustice to folly. A God, who punishes faults, whichhe could have prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, andequity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having topunish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to beinherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punishhim for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. _To punishweakness is the most unjust tyranny. _ Is it not calumniating a just God, to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in the present life?How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, andwho, while they have not _grace_, cannot act otherwise than they do? According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his presentstate of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace, he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself, or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or rendershim incapable of good, what becomes of the free-will of man? According tosuch principles, man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man forthe good he does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for theevil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace, without whichhe could not possibly do better. 80. Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all theirprinciples conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to justifythe Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. Theysuppose, that without grace, man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm, that God will punish him, because God has not given him grace to do good! Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitatedin all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the system oftheologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents?Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of hisparents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mahometanparents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet, divines gravely assure us, that a just God will damn without pity allthose, to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion! Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whetherhe is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature does not consulthim upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, hisopinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the educationwhich he has received, and of which he has not been the director. Hispassions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament givenhim by nature. During his whole life, his volitions and actions aredetermined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, andconversations; by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to hismind; in a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is outof his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity, he knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that ofhis death, he is never free. You will say, that he wills, deliberates, chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude, that his actions arefree. It is true, that man wills, but he is not master of his will orhis desires; he can desire and will only what he judges advantageous tohimself; he can neither love pain, nor detest pleasure. It will besaid, that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefersa momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durablepleasure. In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarilydetermines him to forego a less considerable good. The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him; heis not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his tenderness;he is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidentlyfollows, that man is not master of his volitions and desires. "But man, "you will say, "can resist his desires; therefore he is free. " Man resistshis desires, when the motives, which divert him from an object, arestronger than those, which incline him towards it; but then his resistanceis necessary. A man, whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater thanhis love of money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing. "Are we not free, when we deliberate?" But, are we masters of knowing ornot knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessaryeffect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. Whenwe are sure, or think we are sure, of these consequences, we necessarilydecide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or falsejudgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free; they are necessarilydetermined by the ideas, we have received, or which our minds have formed. Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose whathe judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free, when he suspendshis choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows, or thinks he knows, the qualities of the objects presented to him, or, until he has weighedthe consequences of his actions. "Man, " you will say, "often decides infavour of actions, which he knows must be detrimental to himself; mansometimes kills himself; therefore he is free. " I deny it. Is man masterof reasoning well or ill? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon theopinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine? Asneither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof ofliberty. "If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not do a thing, am Inot free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not?" No, I answer; thedesire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or notto do the thing in question. "But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?"Then the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become astronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motivewill have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing inquestion. "But, " you will say, "I feel free. " This is an illusion, that may becompared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the pole ofa heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, whothinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to move theuniverse, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it. The inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a thing, is buta mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our actions, we shallfind, that they are always necessary consequences of our volitions anddesires, which are never in our power. You think yourself free, becauseyou do what you will; but are you free to will, or not to will; to desire, or not to desire? Are not your volitions and desires necessarily excitedby objects or qualities totally independent of you? 81. "If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by what rightdoes society punish criminals? Is it not very unjust to chastise beings, who could not act otherwise than they have done?" If the wicked actnecessarily according to the impulses of their evil nature, society, in punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation. Certain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain; ournature then forces us against them, and avert them from us. A tiger, pressed by hunger, springs upon the man, whom he wishes to devour; butthis man is not master of his fear, and necessarily seeks means to destroythe tiger. 82. "If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of menare fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them?" Theerrors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance. Their ignorance, prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their inexperience, negligence, and want of reflection, in the same manner as delirium orlethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience, reflection, and reason, are remedies calculated to cure ignorance, fanaticism and follies. But, you will ask, why does not truth produce thiseffect upon many disordered minds? It is because some diseases resist allremedies; because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients, who refusethe remedies presented to them; because the interest of some men, and thefolly of others, necessarily oppose the admission of truth. A cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted bystronger causes, which then weakens or render useless, the action of theformer. It is impossible that the best arguments should be adopted by men, who are interested in error, prejudiced in its favour, and who decline allreflection; but truth must necessarily undeceive honest minds, who seekher sincerely. Truth is a cause; it necessarily produces its effects, whenits impulse is not intercepted by causes, which suspend its effects. 83. "To deprive man of his free will, " it is said, "makes him a mere machine, an automaton. Without liberty, he will no longer have either merit orvirtue. " What is merit in man? It is a manner of acting, which rendershim estimable in the eyes of his fellow-beings. What is virtue? It is adisposition, which inclines us to do good to others. What can there becontemptible in machines, or automatons, capable of producing effects sodesirable? Marcus Aurelius was useful to the vast Roman Empire. By whatright would a machine despise a machine, whose springs facilitate itsaction? Good men are springs, which second society in its tendency tohappiness; the wicked are ill-formed springs, which disturb the order, progress, and harmony of society. If, for its own utility, societycherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses and destroys the wicked, as useless or hurtful. 84. The world is a necessary agent. All the beings, that compose it, areunited to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they do, so long asthey are moved by the same causes, and endued with the same properties. When they lose properties, they will necessarily act in a different way. God himself, admitting his existence, cannot be considered a freeagent. If there existed a God, his manner of acting would necessarilybe determined by the properties inherent in his nature; nothing would becapable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted, neither ouractions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend, or change his invariableconduct and immutable designs; whence we are forced to infer, that allreligion would be useless. 85. Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they wouldsee, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed free aninstant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his God? Are wefree, when we cannot exist and be preserved without God, and when we ceaseto exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If God has made man out ofnothing; if his preservation is a continued creation; if God cannot, aninstant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him, is aneffect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all theevents, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees; if hedoes no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain, that a manenjoys a moment's liberty? If God did not preserve him in the momentof sin, how could man sin? If God then preserves him, God forces him toexist, that he may sin. 86. The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects arethe greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a right to reward thesubjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish the rebellious. Thiscomparison is not just in any of its parts. God presides over a machine, every spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to themanner, in which God has formed them; he ought to impute it to his ownunskilfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of themachine, into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king, who has created to himself subjects of every description; who has formedthem according to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance. If God has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God hasresolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the orderof the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order shouldbe disturbed. Nobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under thegovernment of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice andviolence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished fromthe earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property, liberty, and life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a God who issaid to be infinitely displeased with disorder. 87. Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, andbeautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied withit. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew, that menare by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to Godfor a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care; to pray to him toavert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour to obstruct the courseof his justice; to implore the assistance of God in our calamities, is toaddress the author himself of these calamities, to represent to him, thathe ought, for our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord withour interest. The Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantlycries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, shouldnever pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will behappier. Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_? Sometheologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having intimatedthat God could not produce a better world, than that in which we live. According to these doctors, it is to limit the power of God, and tooffer him insult. But do not these divines see, that it shews much lessindignity to God, to assert that he has done his best in producing thisworld, than to say, that, being able to produce a better, he has hadmalice enough to produce a very bad one? If the Optimist, by his system, detracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as ablasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of God inespousing the cause of his omnipotence. 88. When we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre, we arereferred to the other world, where it is said, God will make reparationfor all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he permits here below. But if God, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a longtime, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our presentworld, what assurance have we, that, during the continuance of anotherworld, divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery ofits inhabitants? The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is patient, and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But dothey not see, that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, andomnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice, even for an instant? Totemporize with a known evil, announces either weakness, uncertainty, or collusion. To tolerate evil, when one has power to prevent it, is toconsent to the commission of evil. 89. Divines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just; but that _hisjustice is not the justice of man_. Of what kind or nature then isthis divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice, which so oftenresembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust, to say, that what is equitable in God is iniquitous in his creatures?How can we receive for our model a being, whose divine perfections areprecisely the reverse of human? "God, " it is said, "is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supremepower, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the worksof his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like man, has noright even to complain. " This arrogant style is evidently borrowed fromthe language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouthsof those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the languageof the ministers of a God, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not madeto be imposed upon a being, who reasons. Ministers of a just God! I willinform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your Godhimself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of his creatures. Adespot is not a God. A God, who arrogates to himself the right of doingevil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is not a model for men; he must be an objectexecrable to their eyes. Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they makehim every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as we complain of hisconduct, they think to silence us by alleging, that _God is master_; whichsignifies, that God, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules. But the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seemsright only to the eyes of a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his furyimagines, that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims, whom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only toslaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whomthey feel too weak to resist. In the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculoussimplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that_the Almighty is master_. Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that the_Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness, ) sends youpestilence, war, and famine! You believe that the _Almighty_, this goodbeing, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils, you can bear!Cease, at least, to call your God _good_, when he does you evil; say not, that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossiblefor you to ward off the blows of his caprice. _God_, say you, _chastises only for our good_. But what real good canresult to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars, corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed underthe iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by thescourges of a bad government, whose destructive effects are often felt forages? If chastisements are good, then they cannot have too much of a goodthing! _The eyes of faith_ must be strange eyes, if with them they seeadvantages in the most dreadful calamities, in the vices and follies withwhich our species are afflicted. 90. What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who are taughtto believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to himself the humanrace, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put todeath his own son, who was innocent and incapable of sinning? What shouldwe say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appeasehimself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir ofhis crown, who had not participated in the general rebellion? "It is, "the Christian will say, "through goodness to his subjects, unable ofthemselves to satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the crueldeath of his son. " But the goodness of a father to strangers does notgive him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. Allthe qualities, which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally destroy oneanother. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expenseof the exercise of another. Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes thepestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand subjectsare exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom the goodness ofGod resolved to spare. 91. Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religionsdelight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him ofiniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this world, truth willoffend him, and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny. They hearken therefore to their priests, who tell them, that their Godis a tender father; that this God is an equitable monarch whose object inthis world is to assure himself of the love, obedience and respect ofhis subjects; who gives them liberty of acting only to afford theman opportunity of meriting his favours, and of acquiring an eternalhappiness, which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discoverthe tenderness of a father, who has given life to the greater part of hischildren merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitterexistence? Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretendedliberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby toincur eternal misery? 92. By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not theDeity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent, provided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated bypassions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares whichthey have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could notforesee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, whichmay lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence. Travellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantasticalideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this princespent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed three dice and adice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designedto excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing thefoible of his subjects, addresses them as follows: _Slaves, I wish yourhappiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you, and make you all happy. Doyou see these treasures? Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; leteach, in his turn, take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throwsixes, shall be master of the treasure. But, I forewarn you, that he whohas not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitatedfor ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burnedwith a slow fire. _ Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look ateach other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerousa chance. _What!_ says the enraged Sultan, _does no one offer to play? Itell you then you must; My glory requires that you should play. Play then;obey without replying. _ It is well to observe, that the dice of the despotare so prepared, that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one, which can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has thepleasure of seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravishedfrom him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your GOD; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; hisDUNGEON IS HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE! 93. Divines repeatedly assure us, that we owe Providence infinite gratitudefor the numberless blessings it bestows. They loudly extol the happinessof existence. But, alas! how many mortals are truly satisfied with theirmode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it notmixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the mostpeaceable and fortunate life? Are there many, who, if it were in theirpower would begin again, at the same price, the painful career, in which, without their consent, destiny has placed them? They say, that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existencecontinually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and littledeserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be tornfrom us any moment? Where is the man, who has not been deprived of a dearwife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudesupon his thoughts? There are few, who have not been forced to drink of thecup of misfortune; there are few, who have not desired their end. Finally, it did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird thenbe very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining himin his cage for his diversion? 94. Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo, he has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the favourite of his God, the object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines, that the whole universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the_king of nature_, and values himself far above other animals. Mortal! uponwhat canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, uponthy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable theeto exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround thee. But, weak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment, of the continuanceof thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter, which thou despisest, suffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive thee of life? Finally, does not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thouspeakest of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou notsee, that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs, from whichresults life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals, who live, think, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain, like thee; and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties, ofwhich thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dostthou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest, and towhich religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes, which thoudisdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art, subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousandimaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee, tormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to thepresent, does not what you call their _instinct_, and what I call their_intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply themwith all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest withcontempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is nottheir peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them, than those extravagantmeditations and worthless researches, which render thee unhappy, andfor which thy zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy noblespecies? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubledimagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternaltorments? Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death, exclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_. As muchmay be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risksthan all other animals; having suffered much in this world, does he notimagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another? 95. Where is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals whomhe calls brutes? In what does he differ essentially from beasts? It is, we are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind, and by hisreason, that man appears superior to all other animals, who, in all theiractions, move only by physical impulses, in which reason has no share. But finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily do without hisintellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode ofexistence. Their instinct is sufficient; while all the faculties of manscarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy thewants, which his imagination and his prejudices multiply to his torment. Brutes are not influenced by the same objects, as man; they have not thesame wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive to maturity, while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and freeexercise of its faculties and to such a use of them, as is conducive tohis happiness. 96. We are assured, that the human soul is a simple substance. It shouldthen be the same in every individual, each having the same intellectualfaculties; yet this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualitiesof the mind, as in the features of the face. There are human beingsas different from one another, as man is from a horse or a dog. Whatconformity or resemblance do we find between some men? What an infinitedistance is there between the genius of a Locke or a Newton, and that of apeasant, Hottentot, or Laplander? Man differs from other animals only in his organization, which enableshim to produce effects, of which animals are not capable. The variety, observable in the organs of individuals of the human species suffices toexplain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties. More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobilityin the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres and nerves, mustnecessarily produce the infinite diversity, which we observe in the mindsof men. It is by exercise, habit and education, that the mind isunfolded and becomes superior to that of others. Man, without culture andexperience, is as void of reason and industry, as the brute. A stupid manis one, whose organs move with difficulty, whose brain does not easilyvibrate, whose blood circulates slowly. A man of genius is he, whoseorgans are flexible, whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrateswith celerity. A learned man is he, whose organs and brain have been longexercised upon objects to which he is devoted. Without culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible andworthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts? Isthere in nature a more detestable being, than a Tiberius, a Nero, or aCaligula? Have those destroyers of the human race, known by the name ofconquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions, or panthers? Are thereanimals in the world more detestable than tyrants? 97. The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over otheranimals, soon vanishes in the light of reason, when we reflect on humanextravagances. How many animals shew more mildness, reflection, andreason, than the animal, who calls himself reasonable above all others?Are there among men, so often enslaved and oppressed, societies aswell constituted as those of the ants, bees, or beavers? Do we eversee ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy one anotherwithout profit? Do we ever see religious wars among them? The crueltyof beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the necessity ofnourishment; the cruelty of man towards man arises only from the vanity ofhis masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men, who endeavour to make us believe, that all in the universe was made forman, are much embarrassed, when we ask, how so many hurtful animals cancontribute to the happiness of man? What known advantage results tothe friend of the gods, from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat, devoured by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, etc. ? Would not all theseanimals reason as justly as our theologians, should they pretend that manwas made for them? 98. AN EASTERN TALE. At some distance from Bagdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity, passedhis days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtainan interest in his prayers, daily flocked to his hermitage, to carry himprovisions and presents. The holy man, without ceasing, gave thanks to Godfor the blessings, with which providence loaded him. "O Allah!" said he, "how ineffable is thy love to thy servants. What have I done to merit thefavours, that I receive from thy bounty? O Monarch of the skies! O Fatherof nature! what praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence, and thypaternal care! O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of men!"Penetrated with gratitude, the hermit made a vow to undertake, for theseventh time, a pilgrimage to Mecca. The war which then raged between thePersians and Turks, could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise. Full of confidence in God, he sets out under the inviolable safeguard ofa religious habit. He passes through the hostile troops without anyobstacle; far from being molested, he receives, at every step, marks ofveneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, borne downwith fatigue, he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorchingsun; he rests under the cool shade of a group of palm-trees. In thissolitary place, the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat, buta delicious repast. He has only to put forth his hand to gather datesand other pleasant fruits; a brook affords him the means of quenching histhirst. A green turf invites him to sleep; upon waking he performs thesacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy: "O Allah! how greatis thy goodness to the children of men!" After this perfect refreshment, the saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues his way; it leads himacross a smiling country, which presents to his eyes flowery hillocks, enamelled meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight, heceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of providence, which appearsevery where providing for the happiness of the human race. Going a littlefarther, the mountains are pretty difficult to pass; but having oncearrived at the summit, a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view. His soul is filled with horror. He discovers a vast plain laid wastewith fire and sword; he beholds it covered with hundreds of carcases, the deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought upon this field. Eagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily devouring the deadbodies with which the ground was covered. This sight plunges our pilgriminto a gloomy meditation. Heaven, by special favour, had enabled him tounderstand the language of beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with humanflesh, cry out in the excess of his joy: "O Allah! how great is thygoodness to the children of wolves. Thy provident wisdom takes care tocraze the minds of these detestable men, who are so dangerous to ourspecies. By an effect of thy Providence, which watches over thy creatures, these destroyers cut one another's throats, and furnish us with sumptuousmeals. O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves!" 99. A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings of heaven;a calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. "I exist, " say you; but isthis existence always a good? "Behold, " you say, "that sun, which lights;this earth, which for you is covered with crops and verdure; theseflowers, which bloom to regale your senses; these trees, which bend underthe weight of delicious fruits; these pure waters, which run only toquench your thirst; those seas, which embrace the universe to facilitateyour commerce; these animals, which a foreseeing nature provides for youruse. " Yes; I see all these things, and I enjoy them. But in many climates, this beautiful sun is almost always hidden; in others, its excessive heattorments, creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches thefields; the pastures are without verdure, the trees without fruit, thecrops are scorched, the springs are dried up; I can only with difficultysubsist, and now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to youalways appears so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices, and uselesscommodities, do they not destroy numberless mortals, who are foolishenough to seek them? The vanity of man persuades him, that he is thesole center of the universe; he creates for himself a world and a God;he thinks himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at hispleasure. But, concerning other animals, he reasons like an atheist. Doeshe not imagine, that the individuals different from his own are automatonsunworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes cannotbe objects of his justice or goodness? Mortals regard the happy or unhappyevents, health or sickness, life or death, plenty or want, as rewards orpunishments for the right use or abuse of the liberty, with which theyerroneously imagine themselves endowed. Do they reason in the same mannerconcerning the brutes? No. Although they see them, under a just God, enjoyand suffer, equally subject to health and sickness, live and die, likethemselves, it never occurs to them to ask by what crime, these beastscould have incurred the displeasure of their Creator? Have not men, blinded by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves fromembarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts haveno feeling? Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they neveracknowledge that nature is not made for them? Will they never see thatnature has placed equality among all beings she has produced? Will theynever perceive that all organized beings are equally made to be born anddie, enjoy and suffer? Finally, far from having any cause to be puffedup with their mental faculties, are they not forced to grant, that thesefaculties often make them more unhappy than beasts, in which we findneither opinions, prejudices, vanities, nor follies, which every momentdecide the welfare of man? 100. The superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is chiefly foundedupon their opinion, that they have the exclusive possession of an immortalsoul. But ask them what this soul is, and they are puzzled. They will say, it is an unknown substance--a secret power distinct from their bodies--aspirit, of which they have no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which theysuppose to be like their God wholly void of extension, could combineitself with their material bodies, and they will tell you, they knownothing about it; that it is to them a mystery; that this combination isan effect of the omnipotence of God. These are the ideas that men form ofthe hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider as the mainspring of all their actions! If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body, andcan have no relation to it, their union would be, not a mystery, but animpossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different from thebody, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we see that thispretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by the body, andthat these two substances, essentially different, always acts in concert. You will say that this harmony is also a mystery. But I will tell you, that I see not my soul, that I know and am sensible of my body only, thatit is this body which feels, thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; andthat all these faculties are necessary results of its own mechanism, ororganization. 101. Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of the soul, orthe pretended spirit, which animates them; yet they persuade themselvesthat this unknown soul is exempt from death. Every thing proves to them, that they feel, that they think, that they acquire ideas, that they enjoyand suffer, only by means of the senses, or material organs of the body. Admitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging, that it depends entirely upon the body, and undergoes, all itsvicissitudes; and yet it is imagined, that this soul has nothing, inits nature, similar to the body; that it can act and feel without theassistance of the body; in a word, that this soul, freed from the body, and disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experiencehappiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue ofabsurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the _immortality of thesoul_. If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul immortal, they immediately answer, that it is because man naturally desires to beimmortal: but, because you desire a thing ardently, can you infer thatyour desire will be fulfilled? By what strange logic can we dare affirm, that a thing cannot fail to happen, because we ardently desire it? Aredesires, begotten by the imagination, the measure of reality? The impious, you say, deprived of the flattering hope of another life, wish to beannihilated. Very well: may they not then as justly conclude, from _their_desire, that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from _your_desire, that you shall exist for ever. 102. Man dies, and the human body after death is no longer anything but a massincapable of producing those motions, of which the sum total constitutedlife. We see, that it has no longer circulation, respiration, digestion, speech, or thought. It is pretended, that the soul is then separated fromthe body; but to say, that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, isthe principle of life, is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power isthe hidden principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more naturaland simple, than to believe, that the dead man no longer lives: nothingis more extravagant, than to believe, that the dead man is still alive. Welaugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury provisionwith the dead, under an idea that it will be useful and necessary to themin the other life. Is it then more ridiculous or absurd to suppose, thatmen will eat after death, than to imagine, that they will think, that theywill be actuated by agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoyor suffer, and that they will experience repentance or delight, after theorgans, adapted to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved. To saythat the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death, is in otherwords to say, that men will see without eyes, hear without ears, tastewithout palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands. Andpersons, who consider themselves very reasonable, adopt these ideas! 103. The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul to be a simplesubstance; in a word, a spirit. But I ask again, what is a spirit? "Itis, " say you, "a substance void of extension, incorruptible, havingnothing common with matter. " If so, how is your soul born, and how does itgrow, how does it strengthen or weaken itself, how does it get disorderedand grow old, in the same progression as your body? To all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries. If so, youcannot understand them. If you cannot understand them, why do you decideabout a thing, of which you are unable to form the least idea? To believeor affirm any thing, it is necessary, at least, to know in what itconsists. To believe in the existence of your immaterial soul, is tosay, that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing, of which it isimpossible for you to form any true notion; it is to believe in wordswithout meaning. To affirm that the thing is as you say, is the height offolly or vanity. 104. Are not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they cannot divine the_natural_ causes of things, they invent what they call _supernatural_;such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents, or rather _words_, much more obscure than the _things_ they endeavour to explain. Let usremain in nature, when we wish to account for the phenomena of nature; letus be content to remain ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs;and let us be persuaded, that, by going beyond nature, we shall neversolve the problems which nature presents. Even upon the hypothesis of theology, (that is, supposing an all-powerfulmover of matter, ) by what right would theologians deny, that their Godhas power to give this matter the faculty of thought? Was it then moredifficult for him to create combinations of matter, from which thoughtmight result, than spirits who could think? At least, by supposing matter, which thinks, we should have some notions of the subject of thought, or ofwhat thinks in us; whereas, by attributing thought to an immaterial being, it is impossible to form the least idea of it. 105. It is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere machine, which is said to be very dishonourable. But, will it be much morehonourable for man, if we should say, that he acts by the secret impulsesof a spirit, or by a certain _I know not what_, that animates him in amanner totally inexplicable. It is easy to perceive, that the supposed superiority of _spirit_ overmatter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation than men'signorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized with _matter_, with which they imagine they are acquainted, and of which they think theycan discern the origin. But the most simple movements of our bodies are toevery man, who studies them, as inexplicable as thought. 106. The high value, which so many people set upon spiritual substance, has noother motive than their absolute inability to define it intelligibly. Thecontempt shewn for _matter_ by our metaphysicians, arises only from thecircumstance, that familiarity begets contempt. When they tell us, that_the soul is more excellent and noble than the body_, they say what theyknow not. 107. The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful. Itis maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction, it isadvantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to virtue. Butis it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous? Are thenations, who believe this fiction, remarkable for purity of morals? Hasnot the visible world ever the advantage over the invisible? If those, whoare trusted with the instruction and government of men, had knowledge andvirtue themselves, they would govern them much better by realities, thanby fictions. But crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators, have everywhere found it better to amuse with fables, than to teach them truths, to unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and realmotives, in fine, to govern them in a rational manner. Priests undoubtedlyhad reasons for making the soul immaterial; they wanted souls to peoplethe imaginary regions, which they have discovered in the other life. Material souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to dissolution. Now, if men should believe, that all must perish with the body, thegeographers of the other world would evidently lose the right of guidingmen's souls towards that unknown abode; they would reap no profits fromthe hope with which they feed them, and the terrors with which theyoppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is, atleast, of the greatest utility to those, who have assumed the office ofconducting them thither. 108. "But, " it will be said, "is not the dogma of the immortality of the soulcomforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here below? Though itshould be an error, is it not pleasing? Is it not a blessing to man tobelieve, that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness, whichis denied him upon earth?" Thus, poor mortals! you make your wishes themeasure of truth; because you desire to live for ever, and to be happier, you at once conclude, that you shall live for ever, and that you shall bemore fortunate in an unknown world, than in this known world, where youoften find nothing but affliction! Consent therefore to leave, withoutregret, this world which gives the greater part of you much more tormentthan pleasure. Submit to the order of nature, which demands that you, aswell as all other beings, should not endure for ever. We are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for theunfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a happierlife, is very proper to elevate man, and to support him under adversity, which awaits him upon earth. It is said, on the contrary, that materialismis an afflicting system, calculated to degrade man; then it puts himupon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage, and shows him no otherprospect than frightful annihilation, capable of driving him to despairand suicide, whenever he is unhappy. The great art of theologians is toblow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and encourage. It appears by theological fictions, that the regions of the other life arehappy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of theabode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain a place in the abodeof torment, which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims ofeternal fury. Have those then, who think the other life so pleasant andflattering, forgotten, that according to them, that life is to be attendedwith torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of totalannihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence, attended with anguish and _gnashing of teeth_? Is the fear of an end moreafflicting, than that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing toexist is a real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogmaof another life. Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous. Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than thathe enjoys here. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant, that hell isfrightful. Heaven is very difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Doyou not say, that a _narrow_ way leads to the happy regions, and a _broad_way to the regions of misery? Do you not often say, that _the number ofthe elect is very small, and that of the reprobate very large_? Is notGrace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?Now, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I hadrather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that thefate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that theopinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world, appears tome more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God, who, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites, andpermits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing butenthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures, attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears. 109. All religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in whichexperience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combatthem, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras, whichastonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion andits phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using a sword to kill gnats;as soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and chimeras come hovering roundagain, and resume in the mind the place, from which they were thought tohave been for ever banished. When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God, they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence, an _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born inevery man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the idea of analmighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind, and whom heis compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that canbe urged. But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_, upon which suchstress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rootedhabit, which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs, subjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, tothe prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense, or this deeppersuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whateverimplies a contradiction cannot exist_? We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated. Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is betterdemonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is totallyimpossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannotpossess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, asthose, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity. Is notthe theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause incompatiblewith the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will, it isnecessary either to invent another God, or to grant, that he, who, for somany ages, has been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same timevery good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable andfickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of orderand permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skilful andunskilful. In short, are we not forced to confess, that it is impossibleto reconcile the discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whomwe cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let anyone attribute a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universallycontradicted by the effects, ascribed to this cause. 110. Theology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_. Everyreligion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions. By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the greatestabsurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner. Allreligions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated. Reasonavails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb, _a secondnature_. Many persons, in other respects sensible, even after havingexamined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contemptof the most striking arguments. Whenever we complain of religion, itsshocking absurdities, and impossibilities, we are told that we are notmade to understand the truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and iscapable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that _what is follyin the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God_, to whom nothingis impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the mostinsurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology, they getrid of them by saying, these are _mysteries_! 111. What is a mystery? By examining the thing closely, I soon perceive, thata mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable absurdity, a manifestimpossibility, over which theologians would oblige men humbly to shuttheir eyes. In a word, a mystery is whatever our spiritual guides cannotexplain. It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understandnothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we do notcomprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led. Ifreligion were clear, priests would find less business. Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms. The God, who serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or _deism_, is himselfthe greatest of mysteries. 112. Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas, unintelligibleprinciples, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals, which appear to havebeen invented solely to confound reason. Every religion announces a hiddenGod, whose essence is a mystery; consequently, the conduct, ascribed tohim, is no less inconceivable than his essence. The Deity has never spokenonly in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions, which have been founded in different regions of our globe; he haseverywhere revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, toinform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions, impossibilities, and things to which they were incapable of affixing anyclear ideas. The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power it hasto please the imagination of men. The darker a religion is, the more itappears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of a hidden being, ofwhom they have no ideas. Ignorance prefers the unknown, the hidden, thefabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to what isclear, simple, and true. Truth does not operate upon the imagination in solively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects, everyone is able toarrange in his own way. The vulgar like to listen to fables. Priests andlegislators, by inventing religions and forging mysteries have served thevulgar people well. They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools. Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they areincapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth is to befound only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by study andreflection. The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson, than when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant alwaysimagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand, isa learned man. Such is the true principle of the credulity of the people, and of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations. 113. To announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is to talk inorder not to be understood. He, who speaks only obscurely, either seeks toamuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes, or finds his interestin not explaining himself too clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust, impotence, and fear. Princes and their ministers make a mystery of theirprojects, for fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive. Can a good God amuse himself by perplexing his creatures? What interestthen could he have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles andmysteries? It is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapableof understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to him only aseries of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets, necessarily abovehis reach. If so, I answer again, that man is not made to attend to thedivine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no meansinteresting; that he has no need of mysteries, which he cannot understand;and consequently, that a mysterious religion is no more fit for him, thanan eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep. 114. The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in the differentcountries of our globe, that in point of religion, men regard one anotherwith hatred and contempt. The partisans of the different sects thinkeach other very ridiculous and foolish. Mysteries, most revered in onereligion, are objects of derision to another. God, in revealing himselfto mankind, ought at least, to have spoken the same language to all, andsaved their feeble minds the perplexity of inquiring which religion reallyemanated from him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in hissight. A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion. By whatfatality then are there so many different religions upon earth? Which isreally right, among the great number of those, each of which exclusivelypretends to be the true one? There is great reason to believe, that noreligion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions areindubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles, uponwhich they build. 115. If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. Ifthis religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of Godwould seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the mostclear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonishing, that thisthing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, whichthey understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachershave most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner ofunderstanding the will of a God, who has revealed himself. The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are severalempirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by decryingthe remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, whoare persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; andnotwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacyof these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after thequacks of a different shop. Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. Thedevout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by theapplication of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he paysattention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course. 116. To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions, which the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertainof each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divinerevelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinentreveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on theother hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He seesnothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right tosubdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive thereligion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing ismore impious and unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in theTrinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man, and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_, ridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous, because he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God. Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnationsof _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, whocalls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that ofnature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea, makes a jestof all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world. 117. Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than thecreation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operatescontinual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with everynotion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise, equitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directsthe movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders, which by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine, whenever we admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how canwe reject the most improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profoundmysteries. 118. The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from worshipping the cruel and capricious Godof theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father ofmen, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with hisbenefits. " But do you not see that every thing in this world contradictsthe good qualities, which you ascribe to your God? In the numerous familyof this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government ofthis just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Amongthose blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold amultitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forcedto acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction with himself, distributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification youmust, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent, therefore, another God; for yours is no less contradictory than that oftheologians. A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; aGod full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; aperfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are notsuch a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation? You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded, that the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upona cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to youvery absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God, who transformshimself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousanddifferent places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory toreason than a God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man, according to you, free, or not free? In either case, your God, if he hasthe shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free, it is God, who has made him free; therefore God is the primitive cause ofall his actions; in punishing him for his faults, he would punish him forhaving executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free toact otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing manfor faults, which he could not help committing. The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, areto many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to tracethe source of these absurdities. They see not, that a God full ofcontradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only servedto disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession ofchimeras. 119. The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence ofGod, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledgedsome divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisibleand powerful being, who has been the object of their worship andveneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are notpersuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature. But, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? Thegreat philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that "general tradition, orthe unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth. " There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round theearth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when nobody believedthe existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, whohad temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmlybelieves it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are lesscredulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensibleman now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider ittheir duty to believe in a universal spirit! 120. All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidentlybeen imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and craftylegislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacitynor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made toworship. By closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidentlybears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no rightbut force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's owncaprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who callyourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, theGod, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions givenyou of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous, revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who hasnot cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whomyou regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as asovereign full of perfection. Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity, cowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a childfond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing. Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and tomagic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to himsorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom hisconfounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallibledecrees which it would be dangerous to contradict. In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitivebarbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presentedunder some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers, serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage tocrocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselveswiser than they, worship bread, into which they imagine, that throughthe enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not theBread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are asirrational, as the most savage? 121. The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosedthemselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spiritof barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of themost polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered tothe divinity? To appease the anger of a God, who is always supposed asferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose mannerof thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments, by the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation oftheir priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarousnations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savagesto torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for theinvisible movements of their brains? When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc. , continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarousGod of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide intosects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculousopinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God;when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate thewill of this God, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cryout: O men, you are still savage!!! 122. Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, andstupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he findsthem generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: theyblindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, aboveall others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity toexamine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to besilent, or at least are soon destitute of arguments. Ask any man, whetherhe believes in a God? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Askhim again, what he understands by the word _God_. You throw him intothe greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately, that he isincapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats. He will tell you, that God is God. He knows neither what he thinks of it, nor his motives for believing in it. All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? By no means. But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a signof uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himselfin the notions he forms of his God? No. His idea varies with the changes, which he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree indemonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every oneknows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the wholeis greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit theaffection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible withgoodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of God? Whatever theythink, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects theyattribute to him. Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in adifferent manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, eachhas given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in givingus a picture of God, give us one of a great chimera, in whose featuresthey never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists onlyin their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or canhave, the same ideas of their God. 123. It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics oratheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God. How can webe assured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine, and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How canwe convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we areevery moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we hadendeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannotconceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without havingany of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselvesacknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that afull and entire conviction of the existence of God is not so general, asis imagined. Scepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment. Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments whichcombat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and withheld theirassent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined. Is it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule anabsolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted hisown existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this moreextravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossiblebeing? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitateupon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroyone another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence ofa spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is thenotion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permitsan infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a squaretriangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result onlyfrom a superficial examination of theological principles, which are inperpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles. To doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination, resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible forany one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revertto its principles, and closely examine the notion of God, who servesas its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness, indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear thetrouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religionbeing presented to men as their most important concern in this and thefuture world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetualanxiety and must really constitute a bed of thorns. Every man who has notcourage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religionis founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not whathe should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear. Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. Thisindifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any rate uponthe probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion thata thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is onlyindifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without whichit would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselvessceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly eitherindolent or incapable of examining. 124. In every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself. Whathas he taught men? Has he proved evidently that he exists? Has he informedthem where he resides? Has he taught them what he is, or in what hisessence consists? Has he clearly explained to them his intentions andplan? Does what he says of this plan correspond with the effects, whichwe see? No. He informs them solely, that _he is what he is_; that he isa _hidden God_; that his ways are unspeakable; that he is exasperatedagainst all who have the temerity to fathom his decrees, or to consultreason in judging him or his works. Does the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas whichtheologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice, andomnipotence? By no means. In every revelation, this conduct announces apartial and capricious being, the protector of favourite people, and theenemy of all others. If he deigns to appear to some men, he takes care tokeep all others in an invincible ignorance of his divine intentions. Everyprivate revelation evidently announces in God, injustice, partiality andmalignity. Do the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their sublime reasonor wisdom? Do they evidently tend to promote the happiness of the people, to whom the Divinity discloses them? Upon examining the divine commands, one sees in every country, nothing but strange ordinances, ridiculousprecepts, impertinent ceremonies, puerile customs, oblations, sacrifices, and expiations, useful indeed to the ministers of God, but veryburthensome to the rest of the citizens. I see likewise, that these lawsoften tend to make men unsociable, disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome, unjust, and inhuman, to those who have not received the same revelations, the same ordinances, or the same favours from heaven. 125. Are the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity, really divine, or superior to those which every reasonable man might imagine? They aredivine solely because it is impossible for the human mind to discovertheir utility. They make virtue consist in a total renunciation of nature, in a voluntary forgetfulness of reason, a holy hatred of ourselves. Finally, these sublime precepts often exhibit perfection in a conduct, cruel to ourselves, and perfectly useless to others. Has a God appeared? Has he himself promulgated his laws? Has he spoken tomen with his own mouth? I am told, that God has not appeared to a wholepeople; but that he has always manifested himself through the mediumof some favourite personages, who have been intrusted with the care ofannouncing and explaining his intentions. The people have never beenpermitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods have alone hadthe right to relate what passes there. 126. If in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not seeing eitherthe wisdom, goodness, or equity of God; if I suspect knavery, ambition, orinterest; it is replied, that God has confirmed by miracles the mission ofthose, who speak in his name. But was it not more simple for him to appearin person, to explain his nature and will? Again, if I have the curiosityto examine these miracles, I find, that they are improbable tales, relatedby suspected people, who had the greatest interest in giving out that theywere the messengers of the Most High. What witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe incrediblemiracles? Weak people, who existed thousands of years ago, and who, eventhough they could attest these miracles, may be suspected of being dupedby their own imagination, and imposed upon by the tricks of dexterousimpostors. But, you will say, these miracles are written in books, which by tradition have been transmitted to us. By whom were these bookswritten? Who are the men who have transmitted them? They are either thefounders of religions themselves, or their adherents and assigns. Thus, in religion, the evidence of interested parties becomes irrefragable andincontestable. 127. God has spoken differently to every people. The Indian believes not a wordof what He has revealed to the Chinese; the Mahometan considers as fableswhat He has said to the Christian; the Jew regards both the Mahometan andChristian as sacrilegious corrupters of the sacred law, which his God hadgiven to his fathers. The Christian, proud of his more modern revelation, indiscriminately damns the Indian, Chinese, Mahometan, and even theJew, from whom he receives his sacred books. Who is wrong or right? Eachexclaims, _I am in the right!_ Each adduces the same proofs: each mentionshis miracles, diviners, prophets, and martyrs. The man of sense tellsthem, they are all delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is truethat he is a spirit, and can have neither mouth nor tongue; that withoutborrowing the organ of mortals, God could inspire his creatures with whathe would have them learn; and that, as they are all equally ignorant whatto think of God, it is evident that it has not been the will of God toinform them on the subject. The followers of different forms of worship which are established, accuseone another of superstition and impiety. Christians look with abhorrenceupon the Pagan, Chinese, and Mahometan superstition. Roman Catholicstreat, as impious, Protestant Christians; and the latter incessantlydeclaim against the superstition of the Catholics. They are all right. To be impious, is to have opinions offensive to the God adored; to besuperstitious, is to have of him false ideas. In accusing one another ofsuperstition, the different religionists resemble humpbacks, who reproachone another with their deformity. 128. Are the oracles, which the Divinity has revealed by his differentmessengers, remarkable for clearness? Alas! no two men interpret themalike. Those who explain them to others are not agreed among themselves. To elucidate them, they have recourse to interpretations, to commentaries, to allegories, to explanations: they discover _mystical sense_ verydifferent from the _literal sense_. Men are every where wanted to explainthe commands of a God, who could not, or would not, announce himselfclearly to those, whom he wished to enlighten. 129. The founders of religion, have generally proved their missions bymiracles. But what is a miracle? It is an operation directly opposite tothe laws of nature. But who, according to you, made those laws? God. Thus, your God, who, according to you, foresaw every thing, counteractsthe laws, which his wisdom prescribed to nature! These laws were thendefective, or at least in certain circumstances they did not accord withthe views of the same God, since you inform us that he judged it necessaryto suspend or counteract them. It is said, that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received powerto perform miracles. But to perform a miracle, it is necessary to haveability to create new causes capable of producing effects contrary tothose of common causes. Is it easy to conceive, that God can give men theinconceivable power of creating causes out of nothing? Is it credible, that an immutable God can communicate to men power to change or rectifyhis plan, a power, which by his essence an immutable being cannot savehimself? Miracles, far from doing much honour to God, far from provingthe divinity of a religion, evidently annihilate the God idea. How cana theologian tell us, that God, who must have embraced the whole of hisplan, who could have made none but perfect laws, and who cannot alterthem, is forced to employ miracles to accomplish his projects, or cangrant his creatures the power of working prodigies to execute his divinewill? An omnipotent being, whose will is always fulfilled, who holds inhis hand his creatures, has only to _will_, to make them believe whateverhe desires. 130. What shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by miracles? Howcan we credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians, where God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom he wishesto destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to workmiracles as great as those of his servants; where it is predicted, that_Antichrist_ shall have power to perform prodigies capable of shaking thefaith even of the elect? In this case, by what signs shall we know whetherGod means to instruct or ensnare us? How shall we distinguish whetherthe wonders, we behold, come from God or devil? To remove our perplexity, Pascal gravely tells us, that _it is necessary to judge the doctrine bythe miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine; that the doctrine provesthe miracles, and the miracles the doctrine_. If there exist a vicious andridiculous circle, it is undoubtedly in this splendid reasoning of one ofthe greatest defenders of Christianity. Where is the religion, that doesnot boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which does not producenumerous miracles for its support? Is a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth?Although a man should have the secret of healing all the sick, of makingall the lame to walk, of raising in all the dead of a city, of ascendinginto the air, of stopping the course of the sun and moon, can he therebyconvince me, that two and two do not make four, that one makes three, andthat three make only one; that a God, whose immensity fills the universe, could have been contained in the body of a Jew; that the ETERNAL candie like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable, provident, andsensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion, and reformed hisown work by a new revelation? 131. According to the very principles either of natural or revealed theology, every new revelation should be regarded as false; every change ina religion emanated from the Deity should be reputed an impiety andblasphemy. Does not all reform suppose, that, in his first effort, Godcould not give his religion the solidity and perfection required? To say, that God, in giving a first law, conformed to the rude ideas of the peoplewhom he wished to enlighten, is to pretend that God was neither able norwilling to render the people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable aswas necessary in order to please him. Christianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion whichhas really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent, and foreseeingGod. The religion of Christ supposes either defects in the law which Godhimself had given by Moses, or impotence or malice in the same God, whowas either unable or unwilling to render the Jews such as they ought tohave been in order to please him. Every new religion, or reform ofancient religions, is evidently founded upon the impotence, inconstancy, imprudence, or malice of the Divinity. 132. If history informs me, that the first apostles, the founders or reformersof religions, wrought great miracles; history also informs me, that thesereformers and their adherents were commonly buffeted, persecuted, and putto death, as disturbers of the peace of nations. I am therefore tempted tobelieve, that they did not perform the miracles ascribed to them;indeed, such miracles must have gained them numerous partisans among theeye-witnesses, who ought to have protected the operators from abuse. Myincredulity redoubles, when I am told, that the workers of miracleswere cruelly tormented, or ignominiously executed. How is it possible tobelieve, that missionaries, protected by God, invested with his divinepower, and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have wrought such asimple miracle, as to escape the cruelty of their persecutors? Priests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves, aconvincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted. But areligion, which boasts of having cost the lives of many martyrs, andinforms us, that its founders, in order to extend it, have sufferedpunishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent, equitable andomnipotent God. A good God would not permit men, intrusted with announcinghis commands, to be ill-treated. An all-powerful God, wishing to found areligion, would proceed in a manner more simple and less fatal to the mostfaithful of his servants. To say that God would have his religion sealedwith blood, is to say that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary;and that he is cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views ofhis ambition. 133. To die for religion proves not that the religion is true, or divine; itproves, at most, that it is supposed to be such. An enthusiast provesnothing by his death, unless that religious fanaticism is often strongerthan the love of life. An impostor may sometimes die with courage; he thenmakes, in the language of the proverb, _a virtue of necessity_. People are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous courageand disinterested zeal, which has prompted missionaries to preach theirdoctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most rigorous treatment. Fromthis ardour for the salvation of men, are drawn inferences favourable tothe religion they have announced. But in reality, this disinterestednessis only apparent. He, who ventures nothing should gain nothing. Amissionary seeks to make his fortune by his doctrine. He knows that, if heis fortunate enough to sell his commodity, he will become absolute masterof those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming theobject of their attention, respect, and veneration. Such are the truemotives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers andmissionaries. To die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinionno more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in whichthousands have the folly to devote their lives. The courage of a martyr, elated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural, than thecourage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory, or impelledby the fear of disgrace. What is the difference between an Iroquois, whosings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr ST. LAURENCE, who uponthe gridiron insults his tyrant? The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;apostles generally practise a perilous trade. Their courageous deathproves neither the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity, any more than the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber, proves, that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thoughtthemselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was alwaysflattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of living at theexpense of the vulgar. These advantages have often been enough to effaceevery idea of danger. 134. You tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men, iswisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_. Butdo you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven? In saying thiswisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is pleasedto confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only of ignorantpeople, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which thisperfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at some future day. Isit not strange, that one can be the friend of your God, only by declaringone's self the enemy of reason and good sense? 135. According to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_. Whence itfollows, that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, andpropositions often improbable or contrary to reason. But when we rejectreason as a judge of faith, do we not confess, that reason is incompatiblewith faith? As the ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason, they must have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with faith, whichis visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority seems tomany persons more weighty than evidence itself, and preferable to thetestimony of the senses. "Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony ofyour senses; submit without enquiry to what we announce to you in the nameof heaven. " Such is the uniform language of priests throughout the world;they agree upon no point, except upon the necessity of never reasoningupon the principles which they present to us as most important to ourfelicity! I will _not_ sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables meto distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood. If, as you say, myreason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God, whom you callgood, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me to perdition. Priests!do you not see, that, by decrying reason, you calumniate your God, fromwhom you declare it to be a gift. I will _not_ renounce experience; because it is a guide much more surethan the imagination or authority of spiritual guides. Experienceteaches me, that enthusiasm and interest may blind and lead them astraythemselves; and that the authority of experience ought to have much moreinfluence upon my mind, than the suspicious testimony of many men, who Iknow are either very liable to be deceived themselves, or otherwise arevery much interested in deceiving others. I _will_ mistrust my senses; because I am sensible they sometimes misleadme. But, on the other hand, I know that they will not always deceive me. I well know, that the eye shews me the sun much smaller than it reallyis; but experience, which is only the repeated application of the senses, informs me, that objects always appear to diminish, as their distanceincreases; thus I attain to a certainty, that the sun is much larger thanthe earth; thus my senses suffice to rectify the hasty judgments, whichthey themselves had caused. In warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priestsannihilate the proofs of all religion. If men may be dupes of theirimagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we believe themiracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our ancestors? If mysenses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to credit even the miracleswrought before my eyes. 136. You incessantly repeat that _the truths of religion are above reason_. Ifso, do you not perceive, that these truths are not adapted to reasonablebeings? To pretend that reason can deceive us, is to say, that truthcan be false; that the useful can be hurtful. Is reason any thing but aknowledge of the useful and true? Besides, as our reason and senses areour only guides in this life, to say they are unfaithful, is to say, thatour errors are necessary, our ignorance invincible, and that, without theextreme of injustice, God cannot punish us for following the only guidesit was his supreme will to give. To say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is ridiculous. To assure us, that upon some objects we are not allowed to consult reason, is to say, that, in the most interesting matter, we must consult onlyimagination, or act only at random. Our divines say, we must sacrifice ourreason to God. But what motives can we have to sacrifice our reason to abeing, who makes us only useless presents, which he does not intend us touse? What confidence can we put in a God, who, according to our divinesthemselves, is malicious enough to harden the heart, to strike withblindness, to lay snares for us, to _lead us into temptation?_ In fine, what confidence can we put in the ministers of this God, who, to guide usmore conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes? 137. Men are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things the mostserious, while it is precisely what they least examine for themselves. Inpursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house, a place of profit; in anytransaction or contract whatever, every one carefully examines all, takes the greatest precaution, weighs every word of a writing, is guardedagainst every surprise. Not so in religion; every one receives it at aventure, and believes it upon the word of others, without ever taking thetrouble to examine. Two causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of men, withregard to their religious opinions. The first is the despair of overcomingthe obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily enveloped. Their firstprinciples are only adapted to disgust lazy minds, who regard them as achaos impossible to be understood. The second cause is, that every oneis averse to being too much bound by severe precepts, which all admire intheory, but very few care to practice with rigour. The religion of manypeople is like old family ties, which they have never taken pains toexamine, but which they deposit in their archives to have recourse to themoccasionally. 138. The disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine of theirmaster; _he has said it_, was to them the solution of every problem. Thegenerality of men are not more rational. In matters of religion, a curate, a priest, an ignorant monk becomes master of the thoughts. Faith relievesthe weakness of the human mind, to which application is commonly painful;it is much more convenient to depend upon others, than to examine forone's self. Inquiry, being slow and difficult, equally, displeases thestupidity of the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened. Such isundoubtedly the reason why Faith has so many partisans. The more men are deficient in knowledge and reason, the more zealous theyare in religion. In theological quarrels, the populace, like ferociousbeasts, fall upon all those, against whom their priest is desirous ofexciting them. A profound ignorance, boundless credulity, weak intellect, and warm imagination, are the materials, of which are made bigots, zealots, fanatics, and saints. How can the voice of reason be heard bythem who make it a principle never to examine for themselves, but tosubmit blindly to the guidance of others? The saints and the populace are, in the hands of their directors, automatons, moved at pleasure. 139. Religion is an affair of custom and fashion. _We must do as others do. _But, among the numerous religions in the world, which should men choose?This inquiry would be too painful and long. They must therefore adhereto the religion of their fathers, to that of their country, which, havingforce on its side, must be the best. If we judge of the intentions of Providence by the events and revolutionsof this world, we are compelled to believe, that He is very indifferentabout the various religions upon earth. For thousands of years, paganism, polytheism, idolatry, were the prevailing religions. We are now assured, that the most flourishing nations had not the least idea of God; an idea, regarded as so essential to the happiness of man. Christians say, allmankind lived in the grossest ignorance of their duties towards God, andhad no notions of him, but what were insulting to his Divine Majesty. Christianity, growing out of Judaism, very humble in its obscure origin, became powerful and cruel under the Christian emperors, who, prompted byholy zeal, rapidly spread it in their empire by means of fire and sword, and established it upon the ruins of paganism. Mahomet and his successors, seconded by Providence or their victorious arms, in a short time banishedthe Christian religion from a part of Asia, Africa, and even Europe; andthe _gospel_ was then forced to yield to the _Koran_. In all the factions or sects, which, for many ages have distractedChristianity, _the best argument has been always that of the strongestparty_; arms have decided which doctrine is most conducive to thehappiness of nations. May we not hence infer, either that the Deity feelslittle interested in the religion of men, or that he always declares infavour of the opinions, which best suit the interest of earthly powers; infine, that he changes his plan to accommodate their fancy? Rulers infallibly decide the religion of the people. The true religionis always the religion of the prince; the true God is the God, whom theprince desires his people to adore; the will of the priests, who governthe prince, always becomes the will of God. A wit justly observed, that_the true religion is always that, on whose side are the prince and thehangman. _ Emperors and hangmen long supported the gods of Rome against theGod of Christians; the latter, having gained to his interest the emperors, their soldiers, and their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the worship ofthe Roman gods. The God of Mahomet has dispossessed the God of Christiansof a great part of the dominions, which he formerly occupied. In the eastern part of Asia, is a vast, flourishing, fertile, populouscountry, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest conquerors haveadopted them with respect. I mean China. Excepting Christianity, which wasbanished as dangerous, the people there follow such superstitions asthey please, while the _mandarins_, or magistrates, having long known theerrors of the popular religion, are vigilant to prevent the _bonzes_ orpriests from using it as an instrument of discord. Yet we see not, that Providence refuses his blessing to a nation, whose chiefs are soindifferent about the worship that is rendered to him. On the contrary, the Chinese enjoy a happiness and repose worthy to be envied, by the manynations whom religion divides, and often devastates. We cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their follies; but wemay perhaps cure the follies of those who govern the people, and whowill then prevent the follies of the people from becoming dangerous. Superstition is to be feared only when princes and soldiers rally roundher standard; then she becomes cruel and sanguinary. Every sovereign, whois the protector of one sect or religious faction, is commonly the tyrantof others, and becomes himself the most cruel disturber of the peace ofhis dominions. 140. It is incessantly repeated, and many sensible persons are induced tobelieve, that religion is a restraint necessary to men; that withoutit, there would no longer exist the least check for the vulgar; and thatmorality and religion are intimately connected with it. "The fear ofthe Lord, " cries the priest, "is the beginning of wisdom. The terrors ofanother life are _salutary_, and are proper to curb the passions of men. " To perceive the inutility of religious notions, we have only to open oureyes and contemplate the morals of those nations, who are the mostunder the dominion of religion. We there find proud tyrants, oppressiveministers, perfidious courtiers, shameless extortioners, corruptmagistrates, knaves, adulterers, debauchees, prostitutes, thieves, androgues of every kind, who have never doubted either the existence of anavenging and rewarding God, the torments of hell, or the joys of paradise. Without the least utility to the greater part of mankind, the ministersof religion have studied to render death terrible to the eyes of theirfollowers. If devout Christians could but be consistent, they would passtheir whole life in tears, and die under the most dreadful apprehensions. What can be more terrible than death, to the unfortunate who are told, _that it is horrible to fall into the hands of the living God; that wemust work out our salvation with fear and trembling!_ Yet we are assured, that the death of the Christian is attended with infinite consolations, ofwhich the unbeliever is deprived. The good Christian, it is said, dies inthe firm hope of an eternal happiness which he has strived to merit. Butis not this firm assurance itself a presumption punishable in the eyes ofa severe God? Ought not the greatest saints to be ignorant whether theyare _worthy of love or hatred?_ Ye Priests! while consoling us with thehope of the joys of paradise; have you then had the advantage to see yournames and ours inscribed _in the book of life?_ 141. To oppose the passions and present interests of men the obscure notions ofa metaphysical, inconceivable God, --the incredible punishments of anotherlife, --or the pleasures of the heaven, of which nobody has the leastidea, --is not this combating realities with fictions? Men have never anybut confused ideas of their God: they see him only in clouds. Theynever think of him when they are desirous to do evil: whenever ambition, fortune, or pleasure allures them, God's threatenings and promises areforgotten. In the things of this life, there is a degree of certainty, which the most lively faith cannot give to the things of another life. Every religion was originally a curb invented by legislators, who wishedto establish their authority over the minds of rude nations. Like nurseswho frighten children to oblige them to be quiet, the ambitious used thename of the gods to frighten savages; and had recourse to terror in orderto make them support quietly the yoke they wished to impose. Are then thebugbears of infancy made for riper age? At the age of maturity, no manlonger believes them, or if he does, they excite little emotion in him, and never alter his conduct. 142. Almost every man fears what he sees much more than what he does not see;he fears the judgments of men of which he feels the effects, more thanthe judgments of God of whom he has only fluctuating ideas. The desireof pleasing the world, the force of custom, the fear of ridicule, andof censure, have more force than all religious opinions. Does not thesoldier, through fear of disgrace, daily expose his life in battle, evenat the risk of incurring eternal damnation? The most religious persons have often more respect for a varlet, than forGod. A man who firmly believes, that God sees every thing, and that he isomniscient and omnipresent, will be guilty, when alone, of actions, which he would never do in presence of the meanest of mortals. Those, who pretend to be the most fully convinced of the existence of God, everymoment act as if they believed the contrary. 143. "Let us, at least, " it will be said, "cherish the idea of a God, whichalone may serve as a barrier to the passions of kings. " But, can wesincerely admire the wonderful effects, which the fear of this Godgenerally produces upon the minds of princes, who are called his images?What idea shall we form of the original, if we judge of it by the copies! Sovereigns, it is true, call themselves the representatives of God, hisvicegerents upon earth. But does the fear of a master, more powerful thanthey are, incline them seriously to study the welfare of the nations, whomProvidence has intrusted to their care? Does the pretended terror, whichought to be inspired into them by the idea of an invisible judge, to whomalone they acknowledge themselves accountable for their actions, renderthem more equitable, more compassionate, more sparing of blood andtreasure of their subjects, more temperate in their pleasures, moreattentive to their duties? In fine, does this God, by whose authoritykings reign, deter them from inflicting a thousand evils upon the peopleto whom they ought to act as guides, protectors, and fathers? Alas! If wesurvey the whole earth, we shall see men almost every where governed bytyrants, who use religion merely as an instrument to render more stupidthe slaves, whom they overwhelm under the weight of their vices, or whomthey sacrifice without mercy to their extravagancies. Far from being a check upon the passions of kings, Religion, by itsvery principles, frees them from all restraint. It transforms them intodivinities, whose caprice the people are never permitted to resist. Whileit gives up the reins to princes, and on their part breaks the bonds ofthe social compact, it endeavours to chain the minds and hands of theiroppressed subjects. Is it then surprising, that the gods of the earthimagine every thing lawful for them, and regard their subjects only asinstruments of their caprice or ambition? In every country, Religion has represented the Monarch of nature as acruel, fantastical, partial tyrant, whose caprice is law; the Monarch God, is but too faithfully imitated by his representatives upon earth. Religionseems every where invented solely to lull the people in the lap ofslavery, in order that their masters may easily oppress them, or renderthem wretched with impunity. 144. To guard against the enterprises of a haughty pontiff who wished toreign over kings, to shelter their persons from the attempts of credulousnations excited by the priests, several European princes have pretended tohold their crowns and rights from God alone, and to be accountable onlyto him for their actions. After a long contest between the civil andspiritual power, the former at length triumphed; and the priests, forcedto yield, acknowledged the divine right of kings and preached them to thepeople, reserving the liberty of changing their minds and of preachingrevolt, whenever the divine rights of kings clashed with the divine rightsof the clergy. It was always at the expense of nations, that peace wasconcluded between kings and priests; but the latter, in spite of treaties, always preserved their pretensions. Tyrants and wicked princes, whose consciences continually reproach themwith negligence or perversity, far from fearing their God, had rather dealwith this invisible judge who never opposes any thing, or with his priestswho are always condescending to the rulers of the earth, than with theirown subjects. The people, reduced to despair, might probably _appeal_ fromthe divine right of their chiefs. Men when oppressed to the last degree, sometimes become turbulent; and the divine rights of the tyrant are thenforced to yield to the natural rights of the subjects. It is cheaper dealing with gods than men. Kings are accountable for theiractions to God alone; priests are accountable only to themselves. There ismuch reason to believe, that both are more confident of the indulgence ofheaven, than of that of earth. It is much easier to escape the vengeanceof gods who may be cheaply appeased, than the vengeance of men whosepatience is exhausted. "If you remove the fear of an invisible power, what restraint will youimpose upon the passions of sovereigns?" Let them learn to reign; let themlearn to be just; to respect the rights if the people; and to acknowledgethe kindness of the nations, from whom they hold their greatness andpower. Let them learn to fear men, and to submit to the laws of equity. Let nobody transgress these laws with impunity; and let them be equallybinding upon the powerful and the weak, the great and the small, thesovereign and the subjects. The fear of gods, Religion, and the terrors of another life, are themetaphysical and supernatural bulwarks, opposed to the impetuous passionsof princes! Are these bulwarks effectual? Let experience resolve thequestion. To oppose Religion to the wickedness of tyrants, is to wish, that vague, uncertain, unintelligible speculations may be stronger thanpropensities which every thing conspires daily to strengthen. 145. The immense service of religion to politics is incessantly boasted; but, alittle reflection will convince us, that religious opinions equally blindboth sovereigns and people, and never enlighten them upon their trueduties or interests. Religion but too often forms licentious, immoraldespots, obeyed by slaves, whom every thing obliges to conform to theirviews. For want of having studied or known the true principles of administration, the objects and rights of social life, the real interests of men andtheir reciprocal duties, princes, in almost every country, have becomelicentious, absolute, and perverse; and their subjects abject, wicked, andunhappy. It was to avoid the trouble of studying these important objects, that recourse was had to chimeras, which, far from remedying any thing, have hitherto only multiplied the evils of mankind, and diverted them fromwhatever is most essential to their happiness. Does not the unjust and cruel manner in which so many nations aregoverned, manifestly furnish one of the strongest proofs, not only ofthe small effect produced by the fear of another life, but also of thenon-existence of a Providence, busied with the fate of the human race? Ifthere existed a good God, should we not be forced to admit, that in thislife he strangely neglects the greater part of mankind? It would seem, that this God has created nations only to be the sport of the passions andfollies of his representatives upon earth. 146. By reading history with attention, we shall perceive that Christianity, at first weak and servile, established itself among the savage and freenations of Europe only intimating to their chiefs, that its religiousprinciples favoured despotism and rendered them absolute. Consequently, we see barbarous princes suddenly converted; that is, we see them adopt, without examination, a system so favourable to their ambition, and useevery art to induce their subjects to embrace it. If the ministers of thisreligion have since often derogated from their favourite principles, itis because the theory influences the conduct of the ministers of the Lord, only when it suits their temporal interests. Christianity boasts of procuring men a happiness unknown to precedingages. It is true, the Greeks knew not the _divine rights_ of tyrants orof the usurpers of the rights of their country. Under paganism, it neverentered the head of any man to suppose, that it was against the will ofheaven for a nation to defend themselves against a ferocious beast, whohad the audacity to lay waste their possessions. The religion of theChristians was the first that screened tyrants from danger, by laying downas a principle that the people must renounce the legitimate defenceof themselves. Thus Christian nations are deprived of the first lawof nature, which orders man to resist evil, and to disarm whoever ispreparing to destroy him! If the ministers of the church have oftenpermitted the people to revolt for the interest of heaven, they have neverpermitted them to revolt for their own deliverance from real evils orknown violences. From heaven came the chains, that were used for fettering the minds ofmortals. Why is the Mahometan every where a slave? Because his prophetenslaved him in the name of the Deity, as Moses had before subdued theJews. In all parts of the earth, we see, that the first legislators werethe first sovereigns and the first priests of the savages, to whom theygave laws. Religion seems invented solely to exalt princes above their nations, andrivet the fetters of slavery. As soon as the people are too unhappy herebelow, priests are ready to silence them by threatening them with theanger of God. They are made to fix their eyes upon heaven, lest theyshould perceive the true causes of their misfortunes, and apply theremedies which nature presents. 147. By dint of repeating to men, that the earth is not their true country;that the present life is only a passage; that they are not made to behappy in this world; that their sovereigns hold their authority from Godalone, and are accountable only to him for the abuse of it; that it is notlawful to resist them, etc. , priests have eternized the misgovernment ofkings and the misery of the people; the interests of nations have beenbasely sacrificed to their chiefs. The more we consider the dogmas andprinciples of religion, the more we shall be convinced, that their soleobject is the advantage of tyrants and priests, without regard to that ofsocieties. To mask the impotence of its deaf gods, religion has persuaded mortals, that iniquities always kindle the wrath of heaven. People impute tothemselves alone the disasters that daily befal them. If nations sometimesfeel the strokes of convulsed nature, their bad governments are buttoo often the immediate and permanent causes, from whence proceedthe continual calamities which they are forced to endure. Are notthe ambition, negligence, vices, and oppressions of kings and nobles, generally the causes of scarcity, beggary, wars, pestilences, corruptmorals, and all the multiplied scourges which desolate the earth? In fixing men's eyes continually upon heaven; in persuading them, thatall their misfortunes are effects of divine anger; in providing none butineffectual and futile means to put an end to their sufferings, we mightjustly conclude, that the only object of priests was to divert nationsfrom thinking about the true sources of their misery, and thus to renderit eternal. The ministers of religion conduct themselves almost like thoseindigent mothers, who, for want of bread, sing their starved children tosleep, or give them playthings to divert their thoughts from afflictinghunger. Blinded by error from their very infancy, restrained by the invisiblebonds of opinion, overcome by panic terrors, their faculties bluntedby ignorance, how should the people know the true causes of theirwretchedness? They imagine that they can avert it by invoking the gods. Alas! do they not see, that it is, in the name of these gods, that theyare ordered to present their throats to the sword of their mercilesstyrants, in whom they might find the obvious cause of the evils underwhich they groan, and for whom they cease not to implore, in vain, theassistance of heaven? Ye credulous people! In your misfortunes, redouble your prayers, offerings, and sacrifices; throng to your temples; fast in sack-cloth andashes; bathe yourselves in your own tears; and above all, completely ruinyourselves to enrich your gods! You will only enrich their priests. Thegods of heaven will be propitious, only when the gods of the earth shallacknowledge themselves, men, like you, and shall devote to your welfarethe attention you deserve. 148. Negligent, ambitious, and perverse Princes are the real causes of publicmisfortunes. Useless, unjust Wars depopulate the earth. Encroaching anddespotic Governments absorb the benefits of nature. The rapacity of Courtsdiscourages agriculture, extinguishes industry, produces want, pestilenceand misery. Heaven is neither cruel nor propitious to the prayers of thepeople; it is their proud chiefs, who have almost always hearts of stone. It is destructive to the morals of princes, to persuade them that theyhave God alone to fear, when they injure their subjects, or neglect theirhappiness. Sovereigns! It is not the gods, but your people, that youoffend, when you do evil. It is your people and yourselves that youinjure, when you govern unjustly. In history, nothing is more common than to see Religious Tyrants; nothingmore rare than to find equitable, vigilant, enlightened princes. Amonarch may be pious, punctual in a servile discharge of the duties of hisreligion, very submissive and liberal to his priests, and yet at the sametime be destitute of every virtue and talent necessary for governing. Toprinces, Religion is only an instrument destined to keep the peoplemore completely under the yoke. By the excellent principles of religiousmorality, a tyrant who, during a long reign, has done nothing but oppresshis subjects, wresting, from them the fruits of their labour, sacrificingthem without mercy to his insatiable ambition, --a conqueror, who hasusurped the provinces of others, slaughtered whole nations, and who, during his whole life, has been a scourge to mankind, --imagines hisconscience may rest, when, to expiate so many crimes, he has wept at thefeet of a priest, who generally has the base complaisance to console andencourage a robber, whom the most hideous despair would too lightly punishfor the misery he has caused upon earth. 149. A sovereign, sincerely devout, is commonly dangerous to the state. Credulity always supposes a contracted mind; devotion generally absorbsthe attention, which a prince should pay to the government of his people. Obsequious to the suggestions of his priests, he becomes the sport oftheir caprices, the favourer of their quarrels, and the instrument andaccomplice of their follies, which he imagines to be of the greatestimportance. Among the most fatal presents, which religion has made theworld, ought to be reckoned those devout and zealous monarchs, who, underan idea of working for the welfare of their subjects, have made ita sacred duty to torment, persecute, and destroy those, who thoughtdifferently from themselves. A bigot, at the head of an empire, is one ofthe greatest scourges. A single fanatical or knavish priest, listened toby a credulous and powerful prince, suffices to put a state in disorder. In almost all countries, priests and pious persons are intrusted withforming the minds and hearts of young princes, destined to govern nations. What qualifications have instructors of this stamp! By what interests canthey be animated? Full of prejudices themselves, they will teach theirpupil to regard superstition, as most important and sacred; its chimericalduties, as most indispensable, intolerance and persecution, as the truefoundation of his future authority. They will endeavour to make him aparty leader, a turbulent fanatic, a tyrant; they will early stifle hisreason, and forewarn him against the use of it; they will prevent truthfrom reaching his ears; they will exasperate him against true talents, andprejudice him in favour of contemptible ones; in short, they will make hima weak devotee, who will have no idea either of justice or injustice, norof true glory, nor of true greatness, and who will be destitute of theknowledge and virtues necessary to the government of a great nation. Suchis the plan of the education of a child, destined one day to create thehappiness or misery of millions of men! 150. Priests have ever shewn themselves the friends of despotism, and theenemies of public liberty: their trade requires abject and submissiveslaves, who have never the audacity to reason. In an absolute government, who ever gains an ascendancy over the mind of a weak and stupid prince, becomes master of the state. Instead of conducting the people tosalvation, priests have always conducted them to servitude. In consideration of the supernatural titles, which religion has forged forthe worst of princes, the latter have commonly united with priests, who, sure of governing by opinion the sovereign himself, have undertaken tobind the hands of the people and to hold them under the yoke. But thetyrant, covered with the shield of religion, in vain flatters himself thathe is secure from every stroke of fate; opinion is a weak rampart againstthe despair of the people. Besides, the priest is a friend of the tyrantonly while he finds his account in tyranny; he preaches sedition, anddemolishes the idol he has made, when he finds it no longer sufficientlyconformable to the interest of God, whom he makes to speak at his will, and who never speaks except according to his interests. It will no doubt be said, that sovereigns, knowing all the advantageswhich religion procures them, are truly interested in supporting it withall their strength. If religious opinions are useful to tyrants, it isvery evident, that they are useful to those, who govern by the laws ofreason and equity. Is there then any advantage in exercising tyranny? Areprinces truly interested in being tyrants? Does not tyranny deprive themof true power, of the love of the people, and of all safety? Ought notevery reasonable prince to perceive, that the despot is a madman, andan enemy to himself? Should not every enlightened prince beware offlatterers, whose object is to lull him to sleep upon the brink of theprecipice which they form beneath him? 151. If sacerdotal flatteries succeed in perverting princes and making themtyrants; tyrants, on their part, necessarily corrupt both the great andthe humble. Under an unjust ruler, void of goodness and virtue, who knowsno law but his caprice, a nation must necessarily be depraved. Will thisruler wish to have, about his person, honest, enlightened, and virtuousmen? No. He wants none but flatterers, approvers, imitators, slaves, baseand servile souls, who conform themselves to his inclinations. His courtwill propagate the contagion of vice among the lower ranks. All willgradually become corrupted in a state, whose chief is corrupt. It was longsince said, that "Princes seem to command others to do whatever they dothemselves. " Religion, far from being a restraint upon sovereigns, enables them toindulge without fear or remorse, in acts of licentiousness as injurious tothemselves, as to the nations whom they govern. It is never with impunity, that men are deceived. Tell a sovereign, that he is a god; he will verysoon believe that he owes nothing to any one. Provided he is feared, hewill care very little about being loved: he will observe neither rules, nor relations with his subjects, nor duties towards them. Tell thisprince, that he is _accountable for his actions to God alone_, and he willsoon act as if he were accountable to no one. 152. An enlightened sovereign is he, who knows his true interests; who knows, that they are connected with the interests of his nation; that a princecannot be great, powerful, beloved, or respected, while he commands onlyunhappy slaves; that equity, beneficence, and vigilance will give himmore real authority over his people, than the fabulous titles, said to bederived from heaven. He will see, that Religion is useful only to priests, that it is useless to society and often troubles it, and that it ought tobe restrained in order to be prevented from doing injury. Finally, he willperceive, that, to reign with glory, he must have good laws and inculcatevirtue, and not found his power upon impostures and fallacies. 153. The ministers of religion have taken great care to make of their God, aformidable, capricious, and fickle tyrant. Such a God was necessary totheir variable interests. A God, who should be just and good, withoutmixture of caprice or perversity; a God, who had constantly the qualitiesof an honest man, or of a kind sovereign, would by no means suit hisministers. It is useful to priests, that men should tremble before theirGod, in order that they may apply to them to obtain relief from theirfears. "No man is a hero before his valet de chambre. " It is notsurprising, that a God, dressed up by his priests so as to be terribleto others, should rarely impose upon them, or should have but very littleinfluence upon their conduct. Hence, in every country, their conduct isvery much the same. Under pretext of the glory of their God, they everywhere prey upon ignorance, degrade the mind, discourage industry, and sowdiscord. Ambition and avarice have at all times been the ruling passionsof the priesthood. The priest every where rises superior to sovereigns andlaws; we see him every where occupied with the interests of his pride, of his cupidity, and of his despotic, revengeful humour. In the roomof useful and social virtues, he everywhere substitutes expiations, sacrifices, ceremonies, mysterious practices, in a word, inventionslucrative to himself and ruinous to others. The mind is confounded and the reason is amazed upon viewing theridiculous customs and pitiful means, which the ministers of the gods haveinvented in every country to purify souls, and render heaven favourable. Here they cut off part of a child's prepuce, to secure for him divinebenevolence; there, they pour water upon his head, to cleanse him ofcrimes, which he could not as yet have committed. In one place, theycommand him to plunge into a river, whose waters have the power of washingaway all stains; in another, he is forbidden to eat certain food, the useof which will not fail to excite the celestial wrath; in other countries, they enjoin upon sinful man to come periodically and confess his faults toa priest, who is often a greater sinner than himself, etc. , etc. , etc. 154. What should we say of a set of empirics, who, resorting every day to apublic place, should extol the goodness of their remedies, and vend themas infallible, while they themselves were full of the infirmities, whichthey pretend to cure? Should we have much confidence in the recipes ofthese quacks, though they stun us with crying, "take our remedies, theireffects are infallible; they cure every body; except us. " What should weafterwards think, should those quacks spend their lives in complaining, that their remedies never produced the desired effect upon the sick, who take them? In fine, what idea should we form of the stupidity of thevulgar, who, notwithstanding these confessions, should not cease to paydearly for remedies, the inefficacy of which every thing tends to prove?Priests resemble these alchymists, who boldly tell us, they have thesecret of making gold, while they have scarcely clothes to cover theirnakedness. The ministers of religion incessantly declaim against the corruption ofthe age, and loudly complain of the little effect of their lessons, whileat the same time they assure us, that religion is the _universal remedy_, the true _panacea_ against the wickedness of mankind. These priests arevery sick themselves, yet men continue to frequent their shops, and tohave faith in their divine antidotes, which, by their own confession, never effect a cure! 155. Religion, especially with the moderns, has tried to identify itself withMorality, the principles of which it has thereby totally obscured. It hasrendered men unsociable by duty, and forced them to be inhuman to everyonewho thought differently from themselves. Theological disputes, equallyunintelligible to each of the enraged parties, have shaken empires, causedrevolutions, been fatal to sovereigns, and desolated all Europe. Thesecontemptible quarrels have not been extinguished even in rivers of blood. Since the extinction of paganism, the people have made it a religiousprinciple to become outrageous, whenever any opinion is advanced whichtheir priests think contrary to _sound doctrine_. The sectaries of areligion, which preaches, in appearance, nothing but charity, concord, andpeace, have proved themselves more ferocious than cannibals or savages, whenever their divines excited them to destroy their brethren. There isno crime, which men have not committed under the idea of pleasing theDivinity, or appeasing his wrath. The idea of a terrible God, whom we paint to ourselves as a despot, mustnecessarily render his subjects wicked. Fear makes only slaves, and slavesare cowardly, base, cruel, and think every thing lawful, in order togain the favour or escape the chastisements of the master whom they fear. Liberty of thinking alone can give men humanity and greatness of soul. The notion of a tyrant-god tends only to make them abject, morose, quarrelsome, intolerant slaves. Every religion, which supposes a God easily provoked, jealous, revengeful, punctilious about his rights or the etiquette with which he is treated;--aGod little enough to be hurt by the opinions which men can form of him;--aGod unjust enough to require that we have uniform notions of his conduct;a religion which supposes such a God necessarily becomes restless, unsociable, and sanguinary; the worshippers of such a God would neverthink, that they could, without offence, forbear hating and evendestroying every one, who is pointed out to them, as an adversary ofthis God; they would think, that it would be to betray the cause oftheir celestial Monarch, to live in friendly intercourse with rebelliousfellow-citizens. If we love what God hates, do we not expose ourselves tohis implacable hatred? Infamous persecutors, and devout men-haters! Will you never discern thefolly and injustice of your intolerant disposition? Do you not see, thatman is no more master of his religious opinions, his belief or unbelief, than of the language, which he learns from infancy? To punish a man forhis errors, is it not to punish him for having been educated differentlyfrom you? If I am an unbeliever, is it possible for me to banish from mymind the reasons that have shaken my faith? If your God gives men leaveto be damned, what have you to meddle with? Are you more prudent and wise, than this God, whose rights you would avenge? 156. There is no devotee, who does not, according to his temperament, hate, despise, or pity the adherents of a sect, different from his own. The _established_ religion, which is never any other than that of thesovereign and the armies, always makes its superiority felt in a verycruel and injurious manner by the weaker sects. As yet there is no truetoleration upon earth; men every where adore a jealous God, of whom eachnation believes itself the friend, to the exclusion of all others. Every sect boasts of adoring alone the true God, the universal God, theSovereign of all nature. But when we come to examine this Monarch of theworld, we find that every society, sect, party, or religious cabal, makesof this powerful God only a pitiful sovereign, whose care and goodnessextend only to a small number of his subjects, who pretend that theyalone have the happiness to enjoy his favours, and that he is not at allconcerned about the others. The founders of religions, and the priests who support them, evidentlyproposed to separate the nations, whom they taught, from the othernations; they wished to separate their own flock by distinguishing marks;they gave their followers gods, who were hostile to the other gods; theytaught them modes of worship, dogmas and ceremonies apart; and aboveall, they persuaded them, that the religion of others was impious andabominable. By this unworthy artifice, the ambitious knaves established, their usurpation over the minds of their followers, rendered themunsociable, and made them regard with an evil eye all persons who had notthe same mode of worship and the same ideas as they had. Thus it is, thatReligion has shut up the heart and for ever banished from it the affectionthat man ought to have for his fellow-creature. Sociability, indulgence, humanity, those first virtues of all morality, are totally incompatiblewith religious prejudices. 157. Every national religion is calculated to make man vain, unsociable, andwicked; the first step towards humanity is to permit every one peaceablyto embrace the mode of worship and opinions, which he judges to be right. But this conduct cannot be pleasing to the ministers of religion, who wishto have the right of tyrannizing over men even in their thoughts. Blind and bigoted princes! You hate and persecute heretics, and order themto execution, because you are told, that these wretches displease God. Butdo you not say, that your God is full of goodness? How then can you expectto please him by acts of barbarity, which he must necessarily disapprove?Besides, who has informed you, that their opinions displease your God?Your priests? But, who assures you, that your priests are not themselvesdeceived or wish to deceive you? The same priests? Princes! It isthen upon the hazardous word of your priests, that you commit the mostatrocious crimes, under the idea of pleasing the Divinity! 158. Pascal says, "that man never does evil so fully and cheerfully, as when heacts from a false principle of conscience. " Nothing is more dangerous thana religion, which lets loose the ferocity of the multitude, and justifiestheir blackest crimes. They will set no bounds to their wickedness, whenthey think it authorized by their God, whose interests, they are told, canmake every action legitimate. Is religion in danger?--the most civilizedpeople immediately becomes true savages, and think nothing forbidden. Themore cruel they are, the more agreeable they suppose they are to theirGod, whose cause they imagine cannot be supported with too much warmth. All religions have authorized innumerable crimes. The Jews, intoxicatedwith the promises of their God, arrogated the rights of exterminatingwhole nations. Relying on the oracles of their God, the Romans conqueredand ravaged the world. The Arabians, encouraged by their divine prophet, carried fire and sword among the Christians and the idolaters. TheCHRISTIANS, under pretext of extending their holy religion, have oftendeluged both hemispheres in blood. In all events favourable to their own interest, which they always call_the cause of God_, priests show us the _finger of God_. According tothese principles, the devout have the happiness to see the _finger ofGod_ in revolts, revolutions, massacres, regicides, crimes, prostitutions, horrors; and, if these things contribute ever so little to the triumphof religion, we are told, that "God uses all sorts of means to attain hisends. " Is any thing more capable of effacing every idea of morality fromthe minds of men, than to inform them, that their God, so powerful andperfect, is often forced to make use of criminal actions in order toaccomplish his designs? 159. No sooner do we complain of the extravagancies and evils, which Religionhas so often caused upon the earth, than we are reminded, that theseexcesses are not owing to Religion; but "that they are the sad effects ofthe passions of men. " But I would ask, what has let loose these passions?It is evidently Religion; it is zeal, that renders men inhuman, and servesto conceal the greatest atrocities. Do not these disorders then prove, that religion, far from restraining the passions of men, only covers themwith a veil, which sanctifies them, and that nothing would be more useful, than to tear away this sacred veil of which men often make such a terribleuse? What horrors would be banished from society, if the wicked weredeprived of so plausible a pretext for disturbing it! Instead of being angels of peace among men, priests have been demons ofdiscord. They have pretended to receive from heaven the right of beingquarrelsome, turbulent, and rebellious. Do not the ministers of theLord think themselves aggrieved, and pretend that the divine Majesty isoffended, whenever sovereigns have the temerity to prevent them fromdoing evil? Priests are like the spiteful woman who cried _fire! murder!assassination!_ while her husband held her hands to prevent her fromstriking him. 160. Notwithstanding the bloody tragedies, which Religion often acts, it isinsisted, that, without Religion, there can be no Morality. If we judgetheological opinions by their effects, we may confidently assert, that allMorality is perfectly incompatible with men's religious opinions. "Imitate God, " exclaim the pious. But, what would be our Morality, shouldwe imitate this God! and what God ought we to imitate? The God of theDeist? But even this God cannot serve us as a very constant model ofgoodness. If he is the author of all things, he is the author both of goodand evil. If he is the author of order, he is also the author of disorder, which could not take place without his permission. If he produces, hedestroys; if he gives life, he takes it away; if he grants abundance, riches, prosperity, and peace, he permits or sends scarcity, poverty, calamities, and wars. How then can we receive as a model of permanentbeneficence, the God of Deism or natural religion, whose favourabledispositions are every instant contradicted by all the effects we behold?Morality must have a basis less tottering than the example of a God, whoseconduct varies, and who cannot be called good, unless we obstinately shutour eyes against the evil which he causes or permits in this world. Shall we imitate the _beneficent, mighty Jupiter_ of heathen antiquity? Toimitate such a god, is to admit as a model, a rebellious son, who ravishesthe throne from his father. It is to imitate a debauchee, an adulterer, one guilty of incest and of base passions, at whose conduct everyreasonable mortal would blush. What would have been the condition of menunder paganism, had they imagined, like Plato, that virtue consisted inimitating the gods! Must we imitate the God of the Jews! Shall we find in _Jehovah_ a modelfor our conduct? This is a truly savage god, made for a stupid, cruel, and immoral people; he is always furious, breathes nothing but vengeance, commands carnage, theft, and unsociability. The conduct of this god cannotserve as a model to that of an honest man, and can be imitated only by achief of robbers. Shall we then imitate the _Jesus_ of the Christians? Does this God, whodied to appease the implacable fury of his father, furnish us an examplewhich men ought to follow? Alas! we shall see in him only a God, orrather a fanatic, a misanthrope, who, himself plunged in wretchedness andpreaching to wretches, will advise them to be poor, to combat with andstifle nature, to hate pleasure, seek grief, and detest themselves. Hewill tell them to leave father, mother, relations, friends, etc. , tofollow him. "Fine morality!" you say. It is, undoubtedly, admirable: itmust be divine, for it is impracticable to men. But is not such sublimemorality calculated to render virtue odious? According to the so muchboasted morality of the _man_-God of the Christians, a disciple of his inthis world must be like _Tantalus_, tormented with a burning thirst, whichhe is not allowed to quench. Does not such morality give us a wonderfulidea of the author of nature? If, as we are assured, he has created allthings for his creatures, by what strange whim does he forbid them theuse of the goods he has created for them? Is pleasure then, which mancontinually desires, only a snare, which God has maliciously laid tosurprise his weakness? 161. The followers of Christ would have us regard, as a miracle, theestablishment of their Religion, which is totally repugnant to nature, opposite to all the propensities of the heart, and inimical to sensualpleasures. But the austerity of a doctrine renders it the more marvellousin the eyes of the vulgar. The same disposition, which respectsinconceivable mysteries as divine and supernatural, admires, as divine andsupernatural, a Morality, that is impracticable, and beyond the powers ofman. To admire a system of Morality, and to put it in practice, are two verydifferent things. All Christians admire and extol the Morality of thegospel; which they do not practise. The whole world is more or less infected with a Religious morality, founded upon the opinion, that to please the Divinity, it is absolutelynecessary to render ourselves unhappy upon earth. In all parts of ourglobe, we see penitents, fakirs, and fanatics, who seem to have profoundlystudied the means of tormenting themselves, in honour of a being whosegoodness all agree in celebrating. Religion, by its essence, is an enemyto the joy and happiness of men. "Blessed are the poor, blessed arethey, who weep; blessed are they, who suffer; misery to those, who arein abundance and joy. " Such are the rare discoveries, announced byChristianity! 162. What is a Saint in every religion? A man, who prays, and fasts, whotorments himself, and shuns the world; who like an owl, delights onlyin solitude, abstains from all pleasure, and seems frightened of everyobject, which may divert him from his fanatical meditations. Is thisvirtue? Is a being of this type, kind to himself, or useful to others?Would not society be dissolved, and man return to a savage state, if everyone were fool enough to be a Saint? It is evident, that the literal and rigorous practice of the divineMorality of the Christians would prove the infallible ruin of nations. AChristian, aiming at perfection, ought to free his mind from whatever candivert it from heaven, his true country. Upon earth, he sees nothing buttemptations, snares, and rocks of perdition. He must fear science, ashurtful to faith; he must avoid industry, as a means of obtaining riches, too fatal to salvation; he must renounce offices and honours, as capableof exciting his pride, and calling off his attention from the care ofhis soul. In a word, the sublime Morality of Christ, were it practicable, would break all the bonds of society. A Saint in society is as useless, as a Saint in the desert; his humour ismorose, discontented, and often turbulent; his zeal sometimes obliges himin conscience to trouble society by opinions or dreams, which his vanitymakes him consider as inspirations from on high. The annals of everyreligion are full of restless Saints, intractable Saints, and seditiousSaints, who have become famous by the ravages, with which, _for thegreater glory of God_, they have desolated the universe. If Saints, wholive in retirement, are useless, those who live in the world, are oftenvery dangerous. The vanity of acting, the desire of appearing illustrious and peculiar inconduct, commonly constitute the distinguishing character of Saints. Pridepersuades them, that they are extraordinary men far above human nature, beings much more perfect than others, favourites whom God regards withmuch more complaisance than the rest of mortals. Humility, in a Saint, is commonly only a more refined pride than that of the generality of men. Nothing but the most ridiculous vanity can induce man to wage continualwar against his own nature. 163. A morality, which contradicts the nature of man, is not made for man. "But, " say you, "the nature of man is depraved. " In what consists thispretended depravity? In having passions? But, are not passions essentialto man? Is he not obliged to seek, desire, and love what is, or what hethinks is, conducive to his happiness? Is he not forced to fear and avoidwhat he judges disagreeable or fatal? Kindle his passions for usefulobjects; connect his welfare with those objects; divert him, by sensibleand known motives, from what may injure either him or others, and you willmake him a reasonable and virtuous being. A man without passions would beequally indifferent to vice and to virtue. Holy Doctors! you are always repeating to us that the nature of man isperverted; you exclaim, "that _all flesh has corrupted its way_, thatall the propensities of nature have become inordinate. " In this case, youaccuse your God; who was either unable, or unwilling, that this natureshould preserve its primitive perfection. If this nature is corrupted, whyhas not God repaired it? The Christian immediately assures me, "that humannature is repaired; that the death of his God has restored its integrity. "How then, I would ask, do you pretend that human nature, notwithstandingthe death of a God, is still depraved? Is then the death of your Godwholly fruitless? What becomes of his omnipotence and of his victory overthe Devil, if it is true that the Devil still preserves the empire, which, according to you, he has always exercised in the world? According to Christian theology, Death is the _wages of sin_. This opinionis conformable to that of some negro and savage nations, who imagine thatthe Death of a man is always the supernatural effect of the anger of theGods. Christians firmly believe, that Christ has delivered them from sin;though they see, that, in their Religion, as in others, man is subject toDeath. To say that Jesus Christ has delivered us from sin, is it not tosay, that a judge has pardoned a criminal, while we see that he leaves himfor execution? 164. If shutting our eyes upon whatever passes in the world, we would creditthe partisans of the Christian Religion, we should believe, that thecoming of their divine Saviour produced the most wonderful and completereform in the morals of nations. If we examine the Morals of Christian nations, and listen to the clamoursof their priests, we shall be forced to conclude, that Jesus Christ, theirGod, preached and died, in vain; his omnipotent will still finds in men, a resistance, over which he cannot, or will not triumph. The Moralityof this divine Teacher, which his disciples so much admire and so littlepractise, is followed, in a whole century only by half a dozen obscuresaints, and fanatics, and unknown monks, who alone will have the gloryof shining in the celestial court, while all the rest of mortals, thoughredeemed by the blood of this God, will be the prey of eternal flames. 165. When a man is strongly inclined to sin, he thinks very little abouthis God. Nay more, whatever crimes he has committed, he always flattershimself, that this God will soften, in his favour, the rigour of hisdecrees. No mortal seriously believes, that his conduct can damn him. Though he fears a terrible God, who often makes him tremble, yet, wheneverhe is strongly tempted, he yields; and he afterwards sees only the Godof _mercies_, the idea of whom calms his apprehensions. If a man commitsevil, he hopes, he shall have time to reform, and promises to repent at afuture day. In religious pharmacy, there are infallible prescriptions to quietconsciences: priests, in every country, possess sovereign secrets todisarm the anger of heaven. Yet, if it be true that the Deity is appeasedby prayers, offerings, sacrifices, and penances, it can no longer be said, that Religion is a check to the irregularities of men; they will firstsin, and then seek the means to appease God. Every Religion, whichexpiates crime and promises a remission of them, if it restrain somepersons, encourages the majority to commit evil. Notwithstanding hisimmutability, God, in every Religion, is a true _Proteus_. His priestsrepresent him at one time armed with severity, at another full of clemencyand mildness; sometimes cruel and unmerciful, and sometimes easily meltedby the sorrow and tears of sinners. Consequently, men see the Divinityonly on the side most conformable to their present interests. A God alwaysangry would discourage his worshippers, or throw them into despair. Men must have a God, who is both irritable, and placable. If his angerfrightens some timorous souls, his clemency encourages the resolutelywicked, who depend upon recurring, sooner or later, to the means ofaccommodation. If the judgments of God terrify some faint-hearted piouspersons, who by constitution and habit are not prone to evil, _thetreasures of divine mercy_ encourage the greatest criminals, who havereason to hope they participate therein equally with the others. 166. Most men seldom think of God, or, at least, bestow on him seriousattention. The only ideas we can form of him are so devoid of object, andare at the same time so afflicting, that the only imaginations they canarrest are those of melancholy hypochondriacs, who do not constitute themajority of the inhabitants of this world. The vulgar have no conceptionof God; their weak brains are confused, whenever they think of him. The man of business thinks only of his business; the courtier of hisintrigues; men of fashion, women, and young people of their pleasures;dissipation soon effaces in them all the fatiguing notions of Religion. The ambitious man, the miser and the debauchee carefully avoidspeculations too feeble to counterbalance their various passions. Who is awed by the idea of a God? A few enfeebled men, morose anddisgusted with the world; a few, in whom the passions are already deadenedby age, by infirmity, or by the strokes of fortune. Religion is a check, to those alone who by their state of mind and body, or by fortuitouscircumstances, have been already brought to reason. The fear of Godhinders from sin only those, who are not much inclined to it, or elsethose who are no longer able to commit it. To tell men, that theDeity punishes crimes in this world, is to advance an assertion, whichexperience every moment contradicts. The worst of men are commonly thearbiters of the world, and are those whom fortune loads with her favours. To refer us to another life, in order to convince us of the judgmentsof God, is to refer us to conjectures, in order to destroy facts, whichcannot be doubted. 167. Nobody thinks of the life to come, when he is strongly smitten withthe objects he finds here below. In the eyes of a passionate lover, thepresence of his mistress extinguishes the flames of hell, and her charmsefface all the pleasures of paradise. Woman! you leave, say you, yourlover for your God. This is either because your lover is no longer thesame in your eyes, or because he leaves you. Nothing is more common, than to see ambitious, perverse, corrupt, andimmoral men, who have some ideas of Religion, and sometimes appear evenzealous for its interest. If they do not practise it at present, they hopeto in the future. They lay it up, as a remedy, which will be necessaryto salve the conscience for the evil they intend to commit. Besides, theparty of devotees and priests being very numerous, active, and powerful, is it not astonishing, that rogues and knaves seek its support to attaintheir ends? It will undoubtedly be said, that many honest people aresincerely religious, and that without profit; but is uprightness of heartalways accompanied with knowledge? It is urged, that many learned men, many men of genius have been stronglyattached to Religion. This proves, that men of genius may have prejudices, be pusillanimous, and have an imagination, which misleads them andprevents them from examining subjects coolly. Pascal proves nothing infavour of Religion, unless that a man of genius may be foolish on somesubjects, and is but a child, when he is weak enough to listen to hisprejudices. Pascal himself tells us, that _the mind may be strong andcontracted, enlarged and weak_. He previously observes, that _a man mayhave a sound mind, and not understand every subject equally well; forthere are some, who, having a sound judgment in a certain order of things, are bewildered in others_. 168. What is virtue according to theology? _It is_, we are told, _theconformity of the actions of man to the will of God_. But, what is God?A being, of whom nobody has the least conception, and whom every oneconsequently modifies in his own way. What is the will of God? It is whatmen, who have seen God, or whom God has inspired, have declared to be thewill of God. Who are those, who have seen God? They are either fanatics, or rogues, or ambitious men, whom we cannot believe. To found Morality upon a God, whom every man paints to himselfdifferently, composes in his way, and arranges according to his owntemperament and interest, is evidently to found Morality upon the capriceand imagination of men; it is to found it upon the whims of a sect, afaction, a party, who believe they have the advantage to adore a true Godto the exclusion of all others. To establish Morality or the duties of man upon the divine will, is tofound it upon the will, the reveries and the interests of those, who makeGod speak, without ever fearing that he will contradict them. In everyReligion, priests alone have a right to decide what is pleasing ordispleasing to their God, and we are certain they will always decide, thatit is what pleases or displeases themselves. The dogmas, the ceremonies, the morals, and the virtues, prescribed by every Religion, are visiblycalculated only to extend the power or augment the emoluments of thefounders and ministers of these Religions. The dogmas are obscure, inconceivable, frightful, and are therefore well calculated to bewilderthe imagination and to render the vulgar more obsequious to the will ofthose who wish to domineer over them. The ceremonies and practices procurethe priests, riches or respect. Religion consists in a submissive faith, which prohibits the exercise of reason; in a devout humility, whichinsures priests the submission of their slaves; in an ardent zeal, whenReligion, that is, when the interest of these priests, is in danger. Theonly object of all religions is evidently the advantage of its ministers. 169. When we reproach theologians with the barrenness of their divine virtues, they emphatically extol _charity_, that tender love of one's neighbour, which Christianity makes an essential duty of its disciples. But, alas!what becomes of this pretended charity, when we examine the conduct of theministers of the Lord? Ask them, whether we must love or do good to ourneighbour, if he be an impious man, a heretic, or an infidel, that is, if he do not think like them? Ask them, whether we must tolerate opinionscontrary to those of the religion, they profess? Ask them, whether thesovereign can show indulgence to those who are in error? Their charityinstantly disappears, and the established clergy will tell you, that _theprince bears the sword only to support the cause of the Most High_: theywill tell you that, through love for our neighbour, we must prosecute, imprison, exile, and burn him. You will find no toleration except among afew priests, persecuted themselves, who will lay aside Christian charitythe instant they have power to persecute in their turn. The Christian religion, in its origin preached by beggars and miserablemen, under the name of _charity_, strongly recommends alms. The religionof Mahomet also enjoins it as an indispensable duty. Nothing undoubtedlyis more conformable to humanity, than to succour the unfortunate, toclothe the naked, to extend the hand of beneficence to every one indistress. But would it not be more humane and charitable to prevent thesource of misery and poverty? If Religion, instead of deifying princes, had taught them to respect the property of their subjects, to be just, toexercise only their lawful rights, we should not be shocked by the sightof such a multitude of beggars. A rapacious, unjust, tyrannical governmentmultiplies misery; heavy taxes produce discouragement, sloth, and poverty, which in their turn beget robberies, assassinations, and crimes of everydescription. Had sovereigns more humanity, charity, and equity, theirdominions would not be peopled by so many wretches, whose misery itbecomes impossible to alleviate. Christian and Mahometan states are full of large hospitals, richlyendowed, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings and sultans, who erected them. But would it not have been more humane to govern thepeople justly, to render them happy, to excite and favour industry andcommerce, and to let men enjoy in safety the fruit of their labours, thanto crush them under a despotic yoke, to impoverish them by foolish wars, to reduce them to beggary, in order that luxury may be satisfied, and thento erect splendid buildings, which can contain but a very small portionof those, who have been rendered miserable? Religion has only deluded men;instead of preventing evils, it always applies ineffectual remedies. The ministers of heaven have always known how to profit by the calamitiesof others. Public misery is their element. They have every where becomeadministrators of the property of the poor, distributors of alms, depositaries of charitable donations; and thereby they have at all timesextended and supported their power over the unhappy, who generally composethe most numerous, restless, and seditious part of society. Thus thegreatest evils turn to the profit of the ministers of the Lord. Christianpriests tell us, that the property they possess is the property of thepoor, and that it is therefore sacred. Consequently they have eagerlyaccumulated lands, revenues, and treasures. Under colour of charity, spiritual guides have become extremely opulent, and in the face ofimpoverished nations enjoy wealth, which was destined solely for theunfortunate; while the latter, far from murmuring, applaud a piousgenerosity, which enriches the church, but rarely contributes to therelief of the poor. According to the principles of Christianity, poverty itself is a virtue;indeed, it is the virtue, which sovereigns and priests oblige their slavesto observe most rigorously. With this idea, many pious Christians have oftheir own accord renounced riches, distributed their patrimony among thepoor, and retired into deserts, there to live in voluntary indigence. Butthis enthusiasm, this supernatural taste for misery, has been soon forcedto yield to nature. The successors of these volunteers in poverty sold tothe devout people their prayers, and their intercessions with the Deity. They became rich and powerful. Thus monks and hermits lived in indolence, and under colour of charity, impudently devoured the substance of thepoor. The species of poverty, most esteemed by Religion, is _poverty of mind_. The fundamental virtue of every Religion, most useful to its ministers, is _faith_. It consists in unbounded credulity, which admits, withoutenquiry, whatever the interpreters of the Deity are interested in makingmen believe. By the aid of this wonderful virtue, priests became thearbiters of right and wrong, of good and evil: they could easily cause thecommission of crimes to advance their interest. Implicit faith has beenthe source of the greatest outrages that have been committed. 170. He, who first taught nations, that, when we wrong Man, we must ask pardonof God, appease _him_ by presents, and offer _him_ sacrifices, evidentlydestroyed the true principles of Morality. According to such ideas, manypersons imagine that they may obtain of the king of heaven, as of kingsof the earth, permission to be unjust and wicked, or may at least obtainpardon for the evil they may commit. Morality is founded upon the relations, wants, and constant interestsof mankind; the relations, which subsist between God and Men, are eitherperfectly unknown, or imaginary. Religion, by associating God with Man, has wisely weakened, or destroyed, the bonds, which unite them. Mortalsimagine, they may injure one another with impunity, by making suitablesatisfaction to the almighty being, who is supposed to have the right ofremitting all offences committed against his creatures. Is any thing better calculated to encourage the wicked or harden them incrimes, than to persuade them that there exists an invisible being, whohas a right to forgive acts of injustice, rapine, and outrage committedagainst society? By these destructive ideas, perverse men perpetrate themost horrid crimes, and believe they make reparation by imploring divinemercy; their conscience is at rest, when a priest assures them that heavenis disarmed by a repentance, which, though sincere, is very useless to theworld. In the mind of a devout man, God must be regarded more than his creatures;it is better to obey him, than men. The interests of the celestial monarchmust prevail over those of weak mortals. But the interests of heaven areobviously those of its ministers; whence it evidently follows, that inevery religion, priests, under pretext of the interests of heaven or theglory of God, can dispense with the duties of human Morality, when theyclash with the duties, which God has a right to impose. Besides, mustnot he, who has power to pardon crimes, have a right to encourage thecommission of crimes? 171. We are perpetually told, that, without a God there would be no _moralobligation_; that the people and even the sovereigns require a legislatorpowerful enough to constrain them. Moral constraint supposes a law; butthis law arises from the eternal and necessary relations of things withone another; relations, which have nothing common with the existence of aGod. The rules of Man's conduct are derived from his own nature which heis capable of knowing, and not from the Divine nature of which he has noidea. These rules constrain or oblige us; that is, we render ourselvesestimable or contemptible, amiable or detestable, worthy of reward or ofpunishment, happy or unhappy, accordingly as we conform to, or deviatefrom these rules. The law, which obliges man not to hurt himself, isfounded upon the nature of a sensible being, who, in whatever way he cameinto this world, is forced by his actual essence to seek good and shunevil, to love pleasure and fear pain. The law, which obliges man notto injure, and even to do good to others, is founded upon the nature ofsensible beings, living in society, whose essence compels them to despisethose who are useless, and to detest those who oppose their felicity. Whether there exists a God or not, whether this God has spoken or not, themoral duties of men will be always the same, so long as they are sensiblebeings. Have men then need of a God whom they know not, of an invisiblelegislator, of a mysterious religion and of chimerical fears, in order tolearn that every excess evidently tends to destroy them, that to preservehealth they must be temperate; that to gain the love of others it isnecessary to do them good, that to do them evil is a sure means to incurtheir vengeance and hatred? "Before the law there was no sin. " Nothing ismore false than this maxim. It suffices that man is what he is, or thathe is a sensible being, in order to distinguish what gives him pleasure ordispleasure. It suffices that one man knows that another man is a sensiblebeing like himself, to perceive what is useful or hurtful to him. Itsuffices that man needs his fellow-creature, in order to know that he mustfear to excite sentiments unfavourable to himself. Thus the feeling andthinking being has only to feel and think, in order to discover what hemust do for himself and others. I feel, and another feels like me; this isthe foundation of all morals. 172. We can judge of the goodness of a system of Morals, only by its conformityto the nature of man. By this comparison, we have a right to reject it, if contrary to the welfare of our species. Whoever has seriously meditatedReligion; whoever has carefully weighed its advantages and disadvantages, will be fully convinced, that both are injurious to the interests of Man, or directly opposite to his nature. "To arms! the cause of your God is at stake! Heaven is outraged! The faithis in danger! Impiety! blasphemy! heresy!" The magical power of theseformidable words, the real value of which the people never understand, have at all times enabled priests to excite revolts, to dethrone kings, tokindle civil wars, and to lay waste. If we examine the important objects, which have produced so many ravages upon earth, it appears, that eitherthe foolish reveries and whimsical conjectures of some theologian who didnot understand himself, or else the pretensions of the clergy, have brokenevery social bond and deluged mankind with blood and tears. 173. The sovereigns of this world, by associating the Divinity in thegovernment of their dominions, by proclaiming themselves his vicegerentsand representatives upon earth, and by acknowledging they hold their powerfrom him, have necessarily constituted his ministers their own rivals ormasters. Is it then astonishing, that priests have often made kings feelthe superiority of the Celestial Monarch? Have they not more than onceconvinced temporal princes, that even the greatest power is compelled toyield to the spiritual power of opinion? Nothing is more difficult thanto serve two masters, especially when they are not agreed upon what theyrequire. The association of Religion with Politics necessarily introduced doublelegislation. The law of God, interpreted by his priests, was oftenrepugnant to the law of the sovereign, or the interest of the state. Whenprinces have firmness and are confident of the love of their subjects, the law of God is sometimes forced to yield to the wise intentions of thetemporal sovereign; but generally the _sovereign_ authority is obligedto give way to the _divine_ authority, that is, to the interests of theclergy. Nothing is more dangerous to a prince, than to _encroach upon theauthority of the Church_, that is, to attempt to reform abuses consecratedby religion. God is never more angry than when we touch the divine rights, privileges, possessions, or immunities of his priests. The metaphysical speculations or religious opinions of men influence theirconduct, only when they judge them conformable to their interest. Nothingproves this truth more clearly, than the conduct of many princes withrespect to the spiritual power, which they often resist. Ought not asovereign, persuaded of the importance and rights of Religion, to believehimself in conscience bound to receive respectfully the orders of itspriests, and to regard them as the orders of the Divinity? There wasa time, when kings and people, more consistent in their conduct, wereconvinced of the rights of spiritual power, and becoming its slaves, yielded to it upon every occasion, and were but docile instruments inits hands. That happy time is passed. By a strange inconsistency the mostdevout monarchs are sometimes seen to oppose the enterprises of those, whom they yet regard as the ministers of God. A sovereign, deeplyreligious, ought to remain prostrate at the feet of his ministers, andregard them as true sovereigns. Is there upon earth a power which has aright to put itself in competition with that of the Most High? 174. Have princes then, who imagine themselves interested in cherishing theprejudices of their subjects, seriously reflected upon the effects, whichhave been, and may be again produced by certain privileged demagogues, whohave a right to speak at pleasure, and in the name of heaven to inflamethe passions of millions of subjects? What ravages would not these sacredharanguers cause, if they should conspire, as they have so often done, todisturb the tranquillity of a state! To most nations, nothing is more burthensome and ruinous than the worshipof their gods. Not only do the ministers of these gods every whereconstitute the first order in the state, but they also enjoy the largestportion of the goods of society, and have a right to levy permanent taxesupon their fellow-citizens. What real advantages then do these organs ofthe Most High procure the people, for the immense profits extorted fromtheir industry? In exchange for their riches and benefits, what do theygive them but mysteries, hypotheses, ceremonies, subtle questions, andendless quarrels, which states are again compelled to pay with blood? 175. Religion, though said to be the firmest prop of Morality, evidentlydestroys its true springs, in order to substitute imaginary ones, inconceivable chimeras, which, being obviously contrary to reason, nobodyfirmly believes. All nations declare that they firmly believe in a God, who rewards and punishes; all say they are persuaded of the existence ofhell and paradise; yet, do these ideas render men better or counteractthe most trifling interests? Every one assures us, that he trembles atthe judgments of God; yet every one follows his passions, when he thinkshimself sure of escaping the judgments of Man. The fear of invisiblepowers is seldom so strong as the fear of visible ones. Unknown or remotepunishments strike the multitude far less forcibly than the sight ofthe gallows. Few courtiers fear the anger of their God so much as thedispleasure of their master. A pension, a title, or a riband suffices toefface the remembrance both of the torments of hell, and of the pleasuresof the celestial court. The caresses of a woman repeatedly prevail overthe menaces of the Most High. A jest, a stroke of ridicule, a witticism, make more impression upon the man of the world, than all the grave notionsof his Religion. Are we not assured that _a true repentance_ is enough to appease theDeity? Yet we do not see that this _true repentance_ is very sincere;at least, it is rare to see noted thieves, even at the point of death, restore goods, which they have unjustly acquired. Men are undoubtedlypersuaded, that they shall fit themselves for eternal fire, if they cannotinsure themselves against it. But, "Some useful compacts may be made withheaven. " By giving the church a part of his fortune, almost every devoutrogue may die in peace, without concerning himself in what he gained hisriches. 176. By the confession of the warmest defenders of Religion and of its utility, nothing is more rare than sincere conversions, and, we might add, nothingmore unprofitable to society. Men are not disgusted with the world, untilthe world is disgusted with them. If the devout have the talent of pleasing God and his priests, theyhave seldom that of being agreeable or useful to society. To a devotee, Religion is a veil, which covers all passions; pride, ill-humour, anger, revenge, impatience, and rancour. Devotion arrogates a tyrannicalsuperiority, which banishes gentleness, indulgence, and gaiety; itauthorizes people to censure their neighbours, to reprove and revile theprofane for the greater glory of God. It is very common to be devout, andat the same time destitute of every virtue and quality necessary to sociallife. 177. It is asserted, that the dogma of another life is of the utmost importanceto peace and happiness; that without it, men would be destitute of motivesto do good. What need is there of terrors and fables to make man sensiblehow he ought to conduct himself? Does not every one see, that he has thegreatest interest, in meriting the approbation, esteem, and benevolence ofthe beings who surround him, and in abstaining from every thing, by whichhe may incur the censure, contempt, and resentment of society? Howevershort an entertainment, a conversation, or visit, does not each desire toact his part decently, and agreeably to himself and others? If life is buta passage, let us strive to make it easy; which we cannot effect, if wefail in regard for those who travel with us. Religion, occupied withits gloomy reveries, considers man merely as a pilgrim upon earth; andtherefore supposes that, in order to travel the more securely, he mustforsake company, and deprive himself of pleasure and amusements, whichmight console him for the tediousness and fatigue of the journey. Astoical and morose philosopher sometimes gives us advice as irrationalas that of Religion. But a more rational philosophy invites us to spreadflowers upon the way of life, to dispel melancholy and banish terrors, toconnect our interest with that of our fellow-travellers, and by gaiety andlawful pleasures, to divert our attention from difficulties and accidents, to which we are often exposed; it teaches us, that, to travel agreeably, we should abstain from what might be injurious to ourselves, and carefullyshun what might render us odious to our associates. 178. It is asked, _what motives an Atheist can have to do good?_ The motive toplease himself and his fellow-creatures; to live happily and peaceably;to gain the affection and esteem of men. "Can he, who fears not the gods, fear any thing?" He can fear men; he can fear contempt, dishonour, thepunishment of the laws; in short, he can fear himself, and the remorsefelt by all those who are conscious of having incurred or merited thehatred of their fellow-creatures. Conscience is the internal testimony, which we bear to ourselves, ofhaving acted so as to merit the esteem or blame of the beings, with whomwe live; and it is founded upon the clear knowledge we have of men, and ofthe sentiments which our actions must produce in them. The Conscience ofthe religious man consists in imagining that he has pleased or displeasedhis God, of whom he has no idea, and whose obscure and doubtful intentionsare explained to him only by men of doubtful veracity, who, like him, areutterly unacquainted with the essence of the Deity, and are little agreedupon what can please or displease him. In a word, the conscience of thecredulous is directed by men, who have themselves an erroneous conscience, or whose interest stifles knowledge. "Can an Atheist have a Conscience? What are his motives to abstain fromhidden vices and secret crimes of which other men are ignorant, and whichare beyond the reach of laws?" He may be assured by constant experience, that there is no vice, which, by the nature of things, does not punishitself. Would he preserve this life? he will avoid every excess, thatmay impair his health; he will not wish to lead a languishing life, whichwould render him a burden to himself and others. As for secret crimes, hewill abstain from them, for fear he shall be forced to blush at himself, from whom he cannot flee. If he has any reason, he will know the valueof the esteem which an honest man ought to have for himself. He willsee, that unforeseen circumstances may unveil the conduct, which he feelsinterested in concealing from others. The other world furnishes no motivesfor doing good, to him, who finds none on earth. 179. "The speculative Atheist, " says the Theist, "may be an honest man, but hiswritings will make political Atheists. Princes and ministers, no longerrestrained by the fear of God, will abandon themselves, without scruple, to the most horrid excesses. " But, however great the depravity of anAtheist upon the throne, can it be stronger and more destructive, thanthat of the many conquerors, tyrants, persecutors, ambitious men, andperverse courtiers, who, though not Atheists, but often very religious anddevout, have notwithstanding made humanity groan under the weight of theircrimes? Can an atheistical prince do more harm to the world, than aLouis XI. , a Philip II. , a Richelieu, who all united Religion with crime?Nothing is more rare, than atheistical princes; nothing more common, thantyrants and ministers, who are very wicked and very religious. 180. A man of reflection cannot be incapable of his duties, of discoveringthe relations subsisting between men, of meditating his own nature, ofdiscerning his own wants, propensities, and desires, and of perceivingwhat he owes to beings, who are necessary to his happiness. Thesereflections naturally lead him to a knowledge of the Morality mostessential to social beings. Dangerous passions seldom fall to the lot ofa man who loves to commune with himself, to study, and to investigate theprinciples of things. The strongest passion of such a man will be to knowtruth, and his ambition to teach it to others. Philosophy cultivates themind. On the score of morals and honesty, has not he who reflects andreasons, evidently an advantage over him, who makes it a principle neverto reason? If ignorance is useful to priests, and to the oppressors of mankind, it isfatal to society. Man, void of knowledge, does not enjoy reason; withoutreason and knowledge, he is a savage, liable to commit crimes. Morality, or the science of duties, is acquired only by the study of Man, and ofwhat is relative to Man. He, who does not reflect, is unacquainted withtrue Morality, and walks with precarious steps, in the path of virtue. Theless men reason, the more wicked they are. Savages, princes, nobles, and the dregs of the people, are commonly the worst of men, because theyreason the least. The devout man seldom reflects, and rarely reasons. Hefears all enquiry, scrupulously follows authority, and often, through anerror of conscience, makes it a sacred duty to commit evil. The Atheistreasons: he consults experience, which he prefers to prejudice. If hereasons justly, his conscience is enlightened; he finds more real motivesto do good than the bigot whose only motives are his fallacies, and whonever listens to reason. Are not the motives of the Atheist sufficientlypowerful to counteract his passions? Is he blind enough to be unmindfulof his true interest, which ought to restrain him? But he will be neitherworse nor better, than the numerous believers, who, notwithstandingReligion and its sublime precepts, follow a conduct which Religioncondemns. Is a credulous assassin less to be feared, than an assassin whobelieves nothing? Is a very devout tyrant less tyrannical than an undevouttyrant? 181. Nothing is more uncommon, than to see men consistent. Their opinions neverinfluence their conduct except when conformable to their temperaments, passions, and interests. Daily experience shows, that religious opinionsproduce much evil and little good. They are hurtful, because they oftenfavour the passions of tyrants, of ambitious men, of fanatics, and ofpriests; they are of no effect, because incapable of counter-balancing thepresent interests of the greater part of mankind. Religious principlesare of no avail, when they act in opposition to ardent desires; though notunbelievers, men then conduct themselves as if they believed nothing. We shall always be liable to err, when we judge of the opinions of menby their conduct, or of their conduct by their opinions. A religious man, notwithstanding the unsociable principles of a sanguinary religion, willsometimes by a happy inconsistency, be humane, tolerant, and moderate; theprinciples of his religion do not then agree with the gentleness of hischaracter. Libertines, debauchees, hypocrites, adulterers, and rogues, often appear to have the best ideas upon morals. Why do they not reducethem to practice? Because their temperament, their interest, and theirhabits do not accord with their sublime theories. The rigid principles ofChristian morality, which many people regard as divine, have but littleinfluence upon the conduct of those, who preach them to others. Do theynot daily tell us, _to do what they preach, and not what they practise?_ The partisans of Religion often denote an infidel by the word _libertine_. It is possible that many unbelievers may have loose morals, which isowing to their temperament, and not to their opinions. But how doestheir conduct affect their opinions? Cannot then an immoral man be a goodphysician, architect, geometrician, logician, or metaphysician? A man ofirreproachable conduct may be extremely deficient in knowledge and reason. In quest of truth, it little concerns us from whom it comes. Let us notjudge men by their opinions, nor opinions by men; let us judge men bytheir conduct, and their opinions by their conformity with experience andreason and by their utility to mankind. 182. Every man, who reasons, soon becomes an unbeliever; for reason shows, thattheology is nothing but a tissue of chimeras; that religion is contrary toevery principle of good sense, that it tinctures all human knowledge withfalsity. The sensible man is an unbeliever, because he sees, that, farfrom making men happier, religion is the chief source of the greatestdisorders, and the permanent calamities, with which man is afflicted. Theman, who seeks his own welfare and tranquillity, examines and throws asidereligion, because he thinks it no less troublesome than useless, to spendhis life in trembling before phantoms, fit to impose only upon silly womenor children. If licentiousness, which reasons but little, sometimes leads toirreligion, the man of pure morals may have very good motives forexamining his religion, and banishing it from his mind. Religious terrors, too weak to impose upon the wicked in whom vice is deeply rooted, afflict, torment and overwhelm restless imaginations. Courageous and vigorousminds soon shake off the insupportable yoke. But those, who are weak andtimorous, languish under it during life; and as they grow old their fearsincrease. Priests have represented God as so malicious, austere, and terrible abeing, that most men would cordially wish, that there was no God. It isimpossible to be happy, while always trembling. Ye devout! you adore aterrible God! But you hate him; you would be glad, if he did not exist. Can we refrain from desiring the absence or destruction of a master, theidea of whom destroys our happiness? The black colours, in which priestspaint the Divinity, are truly shocking, and force us to hate and rejecthim. 183. If fear created the gods, fear supports their empire over the minds ofmortals. So early are men accustomed to shudder at the mere name of theDeity, that they regard him as a spectre, a hobgoblin, a bugbear, whichtorments and deprives them of courage even to wish relief from theirfears. They apprehend, that the invisible spectre, will strike them themoment they cease to be afraid. Bigots are too much in fear of their Godto love him sincerely. They serve him like slaves, who, unable to escapehis power, resolve to flatter their master, and who, by dint of lying, atlength persuade themselves, that they in some measure love him. They makea virtue of necessity. The love of devotees for their God, and of slavesfor their despots, is only a feigned homage. 184. Christian divines have represented their God so terrible and so littleworthy of love, that several of them have thought they must dispensewith loving him; a blasphemy, shocking to other divines, who were lessingenuous. St. Thomas having maintained, that we are obliged to love Godas soon as we attain the use of reason, the Jesuit Sirmond answered him, _that is very soon_. The Jesuit Vasquez assures us, that _it is enough tolove God at the point of death_. Hurtado, more rigid, says, _we mustlove God very year_. Henriquez is contented that we love him _every fiveyears_; Sotus, _every Sunday_. Upon what are these opinions grounded? asksfather Sirmond; who adds, that Suarez requires us to _love God sometimes_. But when? He leaves that to us; he knows nothing about it himself. _Now_, says he, _who will be able to know that, of which such a learned divine isignorant?_ The same Jesuit Sirmond further observes, that _God_ "does notcommand us to love him with an affectionate love, nor does he promise ussalvation upon condition that we give him our hearts; it is enough to obeyand love him with an effective love by executing his orders; this is theonly love we owe him; and he has not so much commanded us to love him, asnot to hate him. " This doctrine appears heretical, impious, and abominableto the Jansenists, who, by the revolting severity they attribute to theirGod, make him far less amiable, than the Jesuits, their adversaries. Thelatter, to gain adherents, paint God in colours capable of encouragingthe most perverse of mortals. Thus nothing is more undecided with theChristians, than the important question, whether they can, ought, orought not to love God. Some of their spiritual guides maintain, that itis necessary to love him with all one's heart, notwithstanding all hisseverity; others, like father Daniel, think that, _an act of pure loveto God is the most heroic act of Christian virtue, and almost beyond thereach of human weakness_. The Jesuit Pintereau goes farther; he says, _adeliverance from the grievous yoke of loving God is a privilege of the newcovenant_. 185. The character of the Man always decides that of his God; every bodymakes one for himself and like himself. The man of gaiety, involved indissipation and pleasure, does not imagine, that, God can be stern andcross; he wants a good-natured God, with whom he can find reconciliation. The man of a rigid, morose, bilious, sour disposition, must have a Godlike himself, a God of terror; and he regards, as perverse, those, whoadmit a placable, indulgent God. As men are constituted, organized, andmodified in a manner, which cannot be precisely the same, how can theyagree about a chimera, which exists only in their brains? The cruel and endless disputes between the ministers of the Lord, are notsuch as to attract the confidence of those, who impartially consider them. How can we avoid complete infidelity, upon viewing principles, about whichthose who teach them to others are never agreed? How can we help doubtingthe existence of a God, of whom it is evident that even his ministerscan only form very fluctuating ideas? How can we in short avoid totallyrejecting a God, who is nothing but a shapeless heap of contradictions?How can we refer the matter to the decision of priests, who areperpetually at war, treating each other as impious and heretical, defamingand persecuting each other without mercy, for differing in the manner ofunderstanding what they announce to the world? 186. The existence of a God is the basis of all Religion. Nevertheless, thisimportant truth has not as yet been demonstrated, I do not say so asto convince unbelievers, but in a manner satisfactory to theologiansthemselves. Profound thinkers have at all times been occupied in inventingnew proofs. What are the fruits of their meditations and arguments?They have left the subject in a worse condition; they have demonstratednothing; they have almost always excited the clamours of their brethren, who have accused them of having poorly defended the best of causes. 187. The apologists of religion daily repeat, that the passions alone makeunbelievers. "Pride, " say they, "and the desire of signalizing themselves, make men Atheists. They endeavour to efface from their minds the ideaof God, only because they have reason to fear his terrible judgments. "Whatever may be the motives, which incline men to Atheism, it is ourbusiness to examine, whether their sentiments are founded in truth. No manacts without motives. Let us first examine the arguments and afterwardsthe motives. We shall see whether these motives are not legitimate, andmore rational than those of many credulous bigots, who suffer themselvesto be guided by masters little worthy of the confidence of men. You say then, Priests of the Lord! that the passions make unbelievers;that they renounce Religion only through interest, or because itcontradicts their inordinate propensities; you assert, that they attackyour gods only because they fear their severity. But, are you yourselves, in defending Religion and its chimeras, truly exempt from passions andinterests? Who reap advantages from this Religion, for which priestsdisplay so much zeal? Priests. To whom does Religion procure power, influence, riches, and honours? To Priests. Who wage war, in everycountry, against reason, science, truth, and philosophy, and render themodious to sovereigns and people? Priests. Who profit by the ignorance andvain prejudices of men? Priests. --Priests! you are rewarded, honouredand paid for deceiving mortals, and you cause those to be punished whoundeceive them. The follies of men procure you benefices, offerings, andexpiations; while those, who announce the most useful truths, are rewardedonly with chains, gibbets and funeral-piles. Let the world judge betweenus. 188. Pride and vanity have been, and ever will be, inherent in the priesthood. Is any thing more capable of rendering men haughty and vain, than thepretence of exercising a power derived from heaven, of bearing a sacredcharacter, of being the messengers and ministers of the Most High? Are notthese dispositions perpetually nourished by the credulity of the people, the deference and respect of sovereigns, the immunities, privileges, anddistinctions enjoyed by the clergy? In every country, the vulgar are muchmore devoted to their spiritual guides, whom they regard as divine, thanto their temporal superiors, whom they consider as no more than ordinarymen. The parson of a village acts a much more conspicuous part, than thelord of the manor or the justice of the peace. Among the Christians, apriest thinks himself far above a king or an emperor. A Spanish grandeehaving spoken rather haughtily to a monk, the latter arrogantly said, "Learn to respect a man, who daily has your God in his hands, and yourQueen at his feet. " Have priests then a right to accuse unbelievers ofpride? Are they themselves remarkable for uncommon modesty or profoundhumility? Is it not evident, that the desire of domineering over men isessential to their trade? If the ministers of the Lord were truly modest, should we see them so greedy of respect, so impatient of contradiction, sopositive in their decisions, and so unmercifully revengeful to thosewhose opinions offend them? Has not Science the modesty to acknowledgehow difficult it is to discover truth? What other passion but ungovernablepride can make men so savage, revengeful, and void of indulgence andgentleness? What can be more presumptuous, than to arm nations and delugethe world in blood, in order to establish or defend futile conjectures? You say, that presumption alone makes Atheists. Inform them then what yourGod is; teach them his essence; speak of him intelligibly; say somethingabout him, which is reasonable, and not contradictory or impossible. Ifyou are unable to satisfy them, if hitherto none of you have been able todemonstrate the existence of a God in a clear and convincing manner; ifby your own confession, his essence is completely veiled from you, as fromthe rest of mortals, forgive those, who cannot admit what they can neitherunderstand nor make consistent with itself; do not tax with presumptionand vanity those who are sincere enough to confess their ignorance; donot accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believingcontradictions; and for once, blush at exciting the hatred and fury ofsovereigns and people against men, who think not like you concerning abeing, of whom you have no idea. Is any thing more rash and extravagant, than to reason concerning an object, known to be inconceivable? You say, that the corruption of the heart produces Atheism, that men shake off theyoke of the Deity only because they fear his formidable judgments. But, why do you paint your God in colours so shocking, that he becomesinsupportable? Why does so powerful a God permit men to be so corrupt? Howcan we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able todo as he pleases with men, consents to their perversion, who hardens, andblinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may have the satisfactionto punish them eternally, for having been hardened, and blinded, and fornot having the grace which he refused? Theologians and priests must bevery confident of the grace of heaven and a happy futurity, to refrainfrom detesting a master so capricious as the God they announce. A God, who damns eternally, is the most odious of beings that the human mind caninvent. 189. No man upon earth is truly interested in the support of error, which isforced sooner or later to yield to truth. The general good must at lengthopen the eyes of mortals: the passions themselves sometimes contributeto break the chains of prejudices. Did not the passions of sovereigns, centuries ago, annihilate in some countries of Europe the tyrannicalpower, which a too haughty pontiff once exercised over all princes of hissect? In consequence of the progress of political science, the clergywere then stripped of immense riches, which credulity had accumulatedupon them. Ought not this memorable example to convince priests, thatprejudices triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure solidhappiness? By caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights for them, bydeifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot, to theirwill, the ministers of the Most High must see, that they are labouring tomake them tyrants. Have they not reason to apprehend, that the giganticidols, which they raised to the clouds, will one day crush them bytheir enormous weight? Do not a thousand examples remind them that thesetyrants, after preying upon the people, may prey upon them in their turn. We will respect priests, when they become sensible men. Let them, if theyplease, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes who arecontinually desolating the earth; but let them no more adjudge to them thehorrid right of being unjust with impunity. Let them acknowledge, that noman is interested in living under tyranny; and let them teach sovereigns, that they themselves are not interested in exercising a despotism, which, by rendering them odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts fromtheir power and greatness. Finally, let priests and kings become sofar enlightened as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is notfounded upon truth, reason, and equity. 190. By waging war against Reason, which they ought to have protected anddeveloped, the ministers of the gods evidently act against their owninterest. What power, influence, and respect might they not have gainedamong the wisest of men, what gratitude would they not have excited in thepeople, if, instead of wasting their time about their vain disputes, theyhad applied themselves to really useful science, and investigated thetrue principles of philosophy, government, and morals! Who would dare toreproach a body with its opulence or influence, if the members dedicatingthemselves to the public good, employed their leisure in study, andexercised their authority in enlightening the minds both of sovereigns andsubjects? Priests! Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas, yourcontemptible quarrels! Banish those phantoms which could be useful only inthe infancy of nations. Assume, at length, the language of reason. Insteadof exciting persecution; instead of entertaining the people with sillydisputes; instead of preaching useless and fanatical dogmas, preach humanand social morality; preach virtues really useful to the world; become theapostles of reason, the defenders of liberty, and the reformers of abuses. 191. Philosophers have every where taken upon themselves a part, which seemeddestined to the ministers of Religion. The hatred of the latter forphilosophy was only a jealousy of trade. But, instead of endeavouringto injure and decry each other, all men of good sense should unite theirefforts to combat error, seek truth, and especially to put to flight theprejudices, that are equally injurious to sovereigns and subjects, and ofwhich the abettors themselves sooner or later become the victims. In the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would become themost useful of the citizens. Already richly paid by the state, and freefrom the care of providing for their own subsistence, how could theybe better employed than in qualifying themselves for the instructionof others? Would not their minds be better satisfied with discoveringluminous truths, than in wandering through the thick darkness of error?Would it be more difficult to discern the clear principles of Morality, than the imaginary principles of a divine and theological Morality? Wouldmen of ordinary capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads thesimple notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries, unintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can neverform a clear idea? What time and pains are lost in learning and teachingthings, which are not of the least real utility! What resources for theencouragement of the sciences, the advancement of knowledge, and theeducation of youth, well disposed sovereigns might find in the manymonasteries, which in several countries live upon the people without inthe slightest degree profiting them! But superstition, jealous of itsexclusive empire, seems resolved to form only useless beings. To whatadvantage might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes, who, in many countries, are amply endowed for doing nothing? Insteadof overwhelming them with fasting and austerities; instead of barrencontemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies; why shouldwe not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may incline them to seekthe means, not of being _dead_ to the world, but of being _useful_ to it?Instead of filling the youthful minds of their pupils with fables, steriledogmas, and puerilities, why are not priests obliged, or invited to teachthem truths, and to render them useful citizens of their country? Underthe present system, men are only useful to the clergy who blind them, andto the tyrants who fleece them. 192. The partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insincerity, because they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their minds insickness, and retract at death. When the body is disordered, the facultyof reasoning is commonly disordered with it. At the approach of death, man, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself sensible that Reason abandonshim, and that Prejudice returns. There are some diseases, which tend toweaken the brain; to create despondency and pusillanimity; and there areothers, which destroy the body, but do not disturb the reason. At anyrate, an unbeliever who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary, than a devotee who neglects in health the duties which his religionexplicitly enjoins. Ministers of Religion openly contradict in their daily conduct therigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of which, unbelievers, in their turn, may justly accuse them of insincerity. Is iteasy to find many prelates humble, generous, void of ambition, enemiesof pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty? In short, is the conduct ofChristian ministers conformable to the austere morality of Christ, theirGod, and their model? 193. _Atheism_, it is said, _breaks all the ties of society. Without the beliefof a God, what will become of the sacredness of oaths? How shall we obligea man to speak the truth, who cannot seriously call the Deity to witnesswhat he says?_ But, does an oath strengthen our obligation to fulfil theengagements contracted? Will he, who is not fearful of lying, be lessfearful of perjury? He, who is base enough to break his word, or unjustenough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men, willnot be more faithful therein for having called all the gods to witness hisoaths. Those, who disregard the judgments of men, will soon disregard thejudgments of God. Are not princes, of all men, the most ready to swear, and the most ready to violate their oaths? 194. _The vulgar_, it is repeatedly said, _must have a Religion. If enlightenedpersons have no need of the restraint of opinion, it is at least necessaryto rude men, whose reason is uncultivated by education_. But, is it indeeda fact, that religion is a restraint upon the vulgar? Do we see, thatthis religion preserves them from intemperance, drunkenness, brutality, violence, fraud, and every kind of excess? Could a people who have no ideaof the Deity conduct themselves in a more detestable manner, than thesebelieving people, among whom we find dissipation and vices, the mostunworthy of reasonable beings? Upon going out of the churches, do not theworking classes, and the populace, plunge without fear into their ordinaryirregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage, which theyrender to their God, authorizes them to follow, without remorse, theirvicious habits and pernicious propensities? Finally, if the people areso low-minded and unreasonable, is not their stupidity chargeable tothe negligence of their princes, who are wholly regardless of publiceducation, or who even oppose the instruction of their subjects? Is notthe want of reason in the people evidently the work of the priests, who, instead of instructing men in a rational morality, entertain them withfables, reveries, ceremonies, fallacies, and false virtues which theythink of the greatest importance? To the people, Religion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to whichthey are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes, and producesa transient emotion in their torpid understandings, without influencingtheir conduct or reforming their morals. Even by the confession of theministers of the altars, nothing is more rare than that _internal_ and_spiritual_ Religion, which alone is capable of regulating the life ofman and of triumphing over his evil propensities. In the most numerousand devout nation, are there many persons, who are really capable ofunderstanding the principles of their religious system, and who find thempowerful enough to stifle their perverse inclinations? Many persons will say, that _any restraint whatever is better than none. _They will maintain, that _if religion awes not the greater part, it servesat least to restrain some individuals, who would otherwise without remorseabandon themselves to crime_. Men ought undoubtedly to have a restraint, but not an imaginary one. Religion only frightens those whose imbecilityof character has already prevented them from being formidable to theirfellow-citizens. An equitable government, severe laws, and sound moralityhave an equal power over all; at least, every person must believe in them, and perceive the danger of not conforming to them. 195. Perhaps it will be asked, _whether Atheism can be proper for themultitude?_ I answer, that any system, which requires discussion, isnot made for the multitude. _What purpose then can it serve to preachAtheism?_ It may at least serve to convince all those who reason, thatnothing is more extravagant than to fret one's self, and nothing moreunjust than to vex others, for mere groundless conjectures. As for thevulgar who never reason, the arguments of an Atheist are no more fit forthem than the systems of a natural philosopher, the observations ofan astronomer, the experiments of a chemist, the calculations of ageometrician, the researches of a physician, the plans of an architect, or the pleadings of a lawyer, who all labour for the people without theirknowledge. Are the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which have solong engrossed the time and attention of so many profound thinkers, betteradapted to the generality of men than the reasoning of an Atheist? Nay, as the principles of Atheism are founded upon plain common sense, are theynot more intelligible, than those of a theology, beset with difficulties, which even the persons of the greatest genius cannot explain? In everycountry, the people have a religion, the principles of which theyare totally ignorant, and which they follow from habit without anyexamination: their priests alone are engaged in theology, which is toodense for vulgar heads. If the people should chance to lose this unknowntheology, they mighty easily console themselves for the loss of a thing, not only perfectly useless, but also productive of dangerous commotions. It would be madness to write for the vulgar, or to attempt to cure theirprejudices all at once. We write for those only, who read and reason;the multitude read but little, and reason still less. Calm and rationalpersons will require new ideas, and knowledge will be gradually diffused. 196. If theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians, it isevidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest of society. Self-interest will sooner or later open the eyes of men. Sovereignsand subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference and contempt, merited by a futile system, which serves only to make men miserable. All persons will be sensible of the inutility of the many expensiveceremonies, which contribute nothing to public felicity. Contemptiblequarrels will cease to disturb the tranquility of states, when we blush athaving considered them important. Instead of Parliament meddling with the senseless combats of your clergy;instead of foolishly espousing their impertinent quarrels, and attemptingto make your subjects adopt uniform opinions--strive to make them happyin this world. Respect their liberty and property, watch over theireducation, encourage them in their labours, reward their talents andvirtues, repress licentiousness; and do not concern yourselves with theirmanner of thinking. Theological fables are useful only to tyrants and theignorant. 197. Does it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to comprehend, that what is above the capacity of man, is not made for him; that thingssupernatural are not made for natural beings; that impenetrable mysteriesare not made for limited minds? If theologians are foolish enough todispute upon objects, which they acknowledge to be unintelligible even tothemselves, ought society to take any part in their silly quarrels? Mustthe blood of nations flow to enhance the conjectures of a few infatuateddreamers? If it is difficult to cure theologians of their madness andthe people of their prejudices, it is at least easy to prevent theextravagancies of one party, and the silliness of the other from producingpernicious effects. Let every one be permitted to think as he pleases; butnever let him be permitted to injure others for their manner of thinking. Were the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological opinionswould not affect the public tranquillity, more than the disputes ofnatural philosophers, physicians, grammarians, and critics. It istyranny which causes theological quarrels to be attended with seriousconsequences. Those, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought to shewus its happy effects, the advantages for instance, which the disputesand abstract speculations of theology can be to porters, artisans, andlabourers, and to the multitude of unfortunate women and corrupt servantswith which great cities abound. All these beings are religious; they havewhat is called _an implicit faith_. Their parsons believe for them; andthey stupidly adhere to the unknown belief of their guides. They go tohear sermons, and would think it a great crime to transgress any of theordinances, to which, in childhood, they are taught to conform. But ofwhat service to morals is all this? None at all. They have not the leastidea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the roguery, fraud, rapine, and excess, that is out of the reach of law. The populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call Religionis nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions and mysteriouspractices. In fact, to deprive people of Religion is to deprive themof nothing. By overthrowing their prejudices, we should only lessen orannihilate the dangerous confidence they put in interested guides, andshould teach them to mistrust those, who, under the pretext of Religion, often lead them into fatal excesses. 198. While pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion in reality keepsthem in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing the most interestingobjects. The people have no other rule of conduct, than what their priestsare pleased to prescribe. Religion supplies the place of every thing else:but being in itself essentially obscure, it is more proper to lead mortalsastray than to guide them in the path of science and happiness. Religionrenders enigmatical all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation andPolitics. A man blinded by religious prejudices, fears truth, wheneverit clashes with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature he cannotcultivate his reason, he cannot perform experiments. Everything concurs to render the people devout; but every thing tends toprevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous. Religion seems tohave no other object, than to stupefy the mind. Priests have been ever at war with genius and talent, becausewell-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human mind, andwould keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by fables andfrightened by phantoms. Incapable of improvement itself, Theology opposedinsurmountable barriers to the progress of true knowledge; its sole objectis to keep nations and their rulers in the most profound ignorance oftheir duties, and of the real motives, that should incline them to dogood. It obscures Morality, renders its principles arbitrary, and subjectsit to the caprice of the gods or of their ministers. It converts theart of governing men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourgeof nations. It changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and thepeople into ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit thefavour of their masters. 199. By tracing the history of the human mind, we shall be easily convinced, that Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress. It began bygiving out fables as sacred truth: it produced poetry, which filled theimagination of men with its puerile fictions: it entertained them with itsgods and their incredible deeds. In a word, Religion has always treatedmen, like children, whom it lulled to sleep with tales, which itsministers would have us still regard as incontestable truths. If the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries, theyhave always been careful to give them a dogmatical tone, and envelope themin the shades of mystery. Pythagoras and Plato, in order to acquire sometrifling knowledge, were obliged to court the favour of priests, to beinitiated in their mysteries, and to undergo whatever trials they werepleased to impose. At this price, they were permitted to imbibe thoseexalted notions, still so bewitching to all those who admire only whatis perfectly unintelligible. It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldeanpriests, from the schools of these visionaries, professionally interestedin bewildering human reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow itsfirst rudiments. Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictionsand fables, and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of thisphilosophy was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead ofenlightening, it blighted the mind, and diverted it from objects trulyuseful. The theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients arestill law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being adopted bymodern theology, it is heresy to abandon them. They tell us "of aerialbeings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii, " and other phantoms, which arethe object of their meditations, and serve as the basis of _metaphysics_, an abstract and futile science, which for thousands of years the greatestgeniuses have vainly studied. Hypothesis, imagined by a few visionariesof Memphis and Babylon, constitute even now the foundations of a science, whose obscurity makes it revered as marvellous and divine. The first legislators were priests; the first mythologists, poets, learnedmen, and physicians were priests. In their hands science became sacredand was withheld from the profane. They spoke only in allegories, emblems, enigmas, and ambiguous oracles--means well calculated to excite curiosity, and above all to inspire the astonished vulgar with a holy respect formen, who when they were thought to be instructed by the gods, and capableof reading in the heavens the fate of the earth, boldly proclaimedthemselves the oracles of the Deity. 200. The religions of ancient priests have only changed form. Although ourmodern theologians regard their predecessors as impostors, yet they havecollected many scattered fragments of their religious systems. In modernReligions we find, not only their metaphysical dogmas, which theology hasmerely clothed in a new dress, but also some remarkable remains of theirsuperstitious practices, their magic, and their enchantments. Christiansare still commanded to respect the remaining monuments of the legislators, priests, and prophets of the Hebrew Religion, which had borrowed itsstrange practices from Egypt. Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves oridolatrous visionaries, are still sacred among Christians! If we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance among allReligions. In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious notions, periodically depress and elevate the people. The attention of man isevery where engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by mysteries alwaysformidable, which become the sole objects of meditation. The differentsuperstitions borrow, from one another, their abstract reveries andceremonies. Religions are in general mere unintelligible rhapsodies, combined by new teachers, who use the materials of their predecessors, reserving the right of adding or retrenching whatever is not conformableto the present age. The religion of Egypt was evidently the basis of thereligion of Moses, who banished the worship of idols: Moses was merely aschismatic Egyptian. Christianism is only reformed Judaism. Mahometanismis composed of Judaism, Christianity, and the ancient religion of Arabia, etc. 201. Theology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time, has had theexclusive privilege of directing philosophy. What assistance has beenderived from its labours? It changed philosophy into an unintelligiblejargon, calculated to render uncertain the clearest truths; it hasconverted the art of reasoning into a jargon of words; it has carried thehuman mind into the airy regions of metaphysics, and there employed it invainly fathoming an obscure abyss. Instead of physical and simple causes, this transformed philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather, _occult_ causes; it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived byagents still more inconceivable. It has filled language with words, voidof sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated to obscurethan enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to discourage man, to guard him against the powers of his mind, to make him mistrust theprinciples of reason and evidence, and to raise an insurmountable barrierbetween him and truth. 202. Were we to believe the partisans of Religion, nothing could be explainedwithout it; nature would be a perpetual enigma, and man would be incapableof understanding himself. But, what does this Religion in reality explain?The more we examine it, the more we are convinced that its theologicalnotions are fit only to confuse our ideas; they change every thing intomystery: they explain difficult things by things that are impossible. Isit a satisfactory explanation of phenomena, to attribute them to unknownagents, to invisible powers, to immaterial causes? Does the human mindreceive much light by being referred to _the depths of the treasures ofdivine wisdom_, to which, we are repeatedly told, it is vain to extendour rash enquiries? Can the divine nature, of which we have no conception, enable us to conceive the nature of man? Ask a Christian, what is the origin of the world? He will answer, that Godcreated it. What is God? He cannot tell. What is it to create? He knowsnot. What is the cause of pestilence, famine, wars, droughts, inundationsand earthquakes? The anger of God. What remedies can be applied to thesecalamities? Prayers, sacrifices, processions, offerings, and ceremoniesare, it is said, the true means of disarming celestial fury. But why isheaven enraged? Because men are wicked. Why are men wicked? Because theirnature is corrupt. What is the cause of this corruption? It is, says thetheologian, because the first man, beguiled by the first woman, ate anapple, which God had forbidden him to touch. Who beguiled this woman intosuch folly? The devil. Who made the devil? God. But, why did God make thisdevil, destined to pervert mankind? This is unknown; it is a mystery whichthe Deity alone is acquainted with. It is now universally acknowledged, that the earth turns round the sun. Centuries ago, this opinion was blasphemy, as being irreconcileable withthe sacred books which every Christian reveres as inspired by the Deityhimself. Notwithstanding divine revelation, astronomers now depend ratherupon evidence, than upon the testimony of their inspired books. What is the hidden principle of the motions of the human body? The soul. What is a soul? A spirit. What is a spirit? A substance, which has neitherform, nor colour, nor extension, nor parts. How can we form any ideaof such a substance? How can it move a body? That is not known; it is amystery. Have beasts souls? But, do they not act, feel, and think, in amanner very similar to man? Mere illusion! By what right do you deprivebeasts of a soul, which you attribute to man, though you know nothing atall about it? Because the souls of beasts would embarrass our theologians, who are satisfied with the power of terrifying and damning the immaterialsouls of men, and are not so much interested in damning those of beasts. Such are the puerile solutions, which philosophy, always in the leadingstrings of theology, was obliged to invent, in order to explain theproblems of the physical and moral world? 203. How many evasions have been used, both in ancient and modern times, inorder to avoid an engagement with the ministers of the gods, who have everbeen the tyrants of thought? How many hypotheses and shifts were such menas Descartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, forced to invent, in order toreconcile their discoveries with the fables and mistakes which Religionhad consecrated! In what guarded phrases have the greatest philosophersexpressed themselves, even at the risk of being absurd, inconsistent, orunintelligible, whenever their ideas did not accord with the principles oftheology! Priests have been always attentive to extinguish systems whichopposed their interest. Theology was ever the bed of Procrustes, to beadapted to which, the limbs of travellers, if too long were cut off, andif too short were lengthened. Can any sensible man, delighted with the sciences and attached to thewelfare of his fellow-creatures, reflect, without vexation and anguish, how many profound, laborious, and subtle brains have been for agesfoolishly occupied in the study of absurdities? What a treasure ofknowledge might have been diffused by many celebrated thinkers, if insteadof engaging in the impertinent disputes of vain theology, they had devotedtheir attention to intelligible objects really important to mankind? Halfthe efforts which religious opinions have cost genius, and half the wealthwhich frivolous forms of worship have cost nations would have sufficedto instruct them perfectly in morality, politics, natural philosophy, medicine, agriculture, etc. Superstition generally absorbs the attention, admiration, and treasures of the people; their Religion costs them verydear; but they have neither knowledge, virtue, nor happiness, for theirmoney. 204. Some ancient and modern philosophers have been bold enough to assumeexperience and reason for their guides, and to shake off the chains ofsuperstition. Democritus, Epicurus, and other Greeks presumed to tearaway the veil of prejudice, and to deliver philosophy from theologicalshackles. But their systems, too simple, too sensible, and too free fromthe marvellous, for imaginations enamoured with chimeras, were obliged toyield to the fabulous conjectures of such men as Plato and Socrates. Amongthe moderns, Hobbes, Spinosa, Bayle, etc. , have followed the steps ofEpicurus; but their doctrine has found very few followers, in a world, still intoxicated with fables, to listen to reason. In every age, it has been dangerous to depart from prejudices. Discoveriesof every kind have been prohibited. All that enlightened men could do, wasto speak ambiguously, hence they often confounded falsehood with truth. Several had a _double doctrine_, one public and the other secret; thekey of the latter being lost, their true sentiments, have often becomeunintelligible and consequently useless. How could modern philosophers, who, under pain of cruel persecution, werecommanded to renounce reason, and to subject it to faith, that is, to theauthority of priests; how, I say, could men, thus bound, give free scopeto their genius, improve reason, and accelerate the progress of the humanmind? It was with fear and trembling that even the greatest men obtaineda glimpse of truth; rarely had they the courage to announce it; and those, who did, were terribly punished. With Religion, it has ever been unlawfulto think, or to combat the prejudices of which man is every where thevictim and the dupe. 205. Every man, sufficiently intrepid to announce truths to the world, is sureof incurring the hatred of the ministers of Religion, who loudly call totheir aid secular powers; and want the assistance of laws to support boththeir arguments and their gods. Their clamours expose too evidently theweakness of their cause. "None call for aid but those who feel distressed. " In Religion, man is not permitted to err. In general, those who err arepitied, and some kindness is shewn to persons who discover new truths;but, when Religion is thought to be interested either in the errors orthe discoveries, a holy zeal is kindled, the populace become frantic, andnations are in an uproar. Can any thing be more afflicting, than to see public and private felicitydepending upon a futile system, which is destitute if principles, foundedonly on a distempered imagination, and incapable of presenting any thingbut words void of sense? In what consists the so much boasted utility ofa Religion, which nobody can comprehend, which continually torments thosewho are weak enough to meddle with it, which is incapable of rendering menbetter, and which often makes them consider it meritorious to be unjustand wicked? Is there a folly more deplorable, and more justly to becombated, than that, which far from doing any service to the human race, only makes them blind, delirious, and miserable, by depriving them ofTruth, the sole cure for their wretchedness. 206. Religion has ever filled the mind of man with darkness, and kept him inignorance of his real duties and true interests. It is only by dispellingthe clouds and phantoms of Religion, that we shall discover Truth, Reason, and Morality. Religion diverts us from the causes of evils, and from theremedies which nature prescribes; far from curing, it only aggravates, multiplies, and perpetuates them. Let us observe with the celebratedLord Bolingbroke, that "_theology is the box of Pandora; and if it isimpossible to shut it, it is at least useful to inform men, that thisfatal box is open_. " THE END.