HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT; LIFE AND SERVICES OF WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER IN THE CIVIL WAR

A Sketch by

JAMES HARRISON WILSON, MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. V. 

The John M. Rogers PressWilmington, Del. 

1904

[Illustration]

William Farrar Smith, the subject of this sketch, graduated at WestPoint in 1845, fourth in a class of forty-one members. He died atPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania, on the 28th of February, 1903 in hisseventy-ninth year. 

The publication of the Rebellion Records puts within the reach of everystudent the official reports of the various campaigns and battles ofthe Great Conflict, but something more is needed. They deal butslightly with men's motives, and still less with their personalpeculiarities. They give only here and there any idea whatever of theorigin of the plans of campaigns or battles and rarely any adequatedescription of the topography of the theatre of war, or of thedifficulties to be overcome. They describe but superficially theorganization, equipment, armament and supply of the troops, and leavetheir trials, hardships and extraordinary virtues largely to theimagination. They are entirely silent as to the qualities andidiosyncrasies of the leaders. Neither romance nor personal adventurefinds any place within their pages, and fine writing is entirelyforeign to their purpose. They are for the most part dry andunemotional in style, and are put together so far as possiblechronologically in the order of their importance without the slightestreference to literary effect. While nothing is more untrustworthygenerally than personal recollections of events which took place over athird of a century ago, those which are supported by letters anddiaries are of inestimable value in construing and reconciling theofficial reports. But this is not all. The daily journals and othercontemporaneous publications are quite important and cannot be safelyleft out of account. All must be taken into consideration before thefinal distribution of praise and blame is made, or the last word iswritten in reference to events or to the great actors who controlled ortook part in them. 

In the list of the most notable men of the day the name of MajorGeneral WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH must be recorded. He belonged at theoutbreak of the Civil War, to that distinguished group of which Lee onthe Southern side and McClellan on the Northern, were the center. Joseph E. Johnston and William B. Franklin were his most intimatefriends, and I but recall what was then the popular belief when I statethat they were widely regarded as the best educated and the mostbrilliant officers in the service. They were in middle life, in thefull enjoyment of their powers, and it was the confident opinion ofthose who knew them best, that they were sure to become conspicuousleaders in the impending conflict. Great things were expected of them, and in this the world was not disappointed. They all reached high rankand great distinction, but only one of the group was fortunate enoughto enroll himself amongst the world's great commanders. Johnston roseto the leadership of an independent army but failed to win a greatvictory or to secure the entire approval of his superiors. Franklin waswithout doubt a corps commander of sound judgment and unshakablecourage, but he also failed to achieve the success that was expected ofhim, and to secure the support and confidence that his high characterfully entitled him to look for from his Government. Smith who was notinferior to the ablest of his friends and contemporaries, in the artand science of war, had a career of great usefulness, in which herendered services of extraordinary value and brilliancy but which endedin disappointment and unhappiness. 

He was however not only a conspicuous officer connected with importantevents throughout his life, and especially during the Great Conflict, but he was a singularly virile and independent character who exertedgreat influence over all with whom he came in contact. He was strong, self-contained and deliberate in speech, and having been an industriousstudent and an acute thinker all his life, his opinions alwayscommanded attention and respect. It so happened that his servicesbrought him into the very focus of events on more than one occasion. Itso happened also that I was more or less intimate with him to the timeof his death, from the date of my entry into the Military Academy, where I had the good fortune to receive his instruction in mathematics. I first met him in the field, while I was serving temporarily on thestaff of General McClellan, and he was commanding a division in theAntietam campaign, and next at Chattanooga, whither I was sent inadvance of General Grant to prepare for his coming, after thedisastrous battle of Chickamauga. 

Shortly afterwards Smith was transferred to Grant's staff as ChiefEngineer, and we messed and served together, in the closest intimacythroughout that campaign, and until I was assigned to duty in the WarDepartment in charge of the Cavalry Bureau. I saw him frequently whileI was commanding a division of cavalry and he an army corps in Grant'soverland campaign against Richmond. During the latter period we wereexceedingly intimate, and when we were not serving together an activecorrespondence was kept up between us. It is a source of pleasure andsatisfaction to me that this intimacy became still closer after GeneralSmith was appointed agent of the United States and assigned as a civilengineer to the charge of the river and harbor works on the Delawareand Maryland peninsula, with his office at Wilmington, Delaware. Thislong and close intimacy, extending as it did over the greater part of alifetime, has afforded me an ample opportunity of studying hischaracter and familiarizing myself with the facts of his militarycareer, and with the point of view from which he considered hisrelations to the men and events with which he was so conspicuouslyconnected. 

A man of great purity of character and great singleness of purpose, hetook an intense interest in whatever his hand found to do. He felt adeep and abiding concern in all public and professional questions, andwas both a tender and affectionate friend and an unrelenting enemy. Hewas a bold and resolute thinker who indulged in no half way measures. The bolder his plans and the more dangerous his undertakings, the morecareful was he in working out the details, and the more attentive washe in supervising their execution. He left nothing to chance, butprovided for every possible contingency with infinite care and yet hewas a rapid worker. Methodical in his habits, untiring in hisapplication and deliberate in his manner, he was always ready, alwayson time and nearly always successful. 

In following him through the trials and vicissitudes of his active lifeit will be seen that he was one of the most interesting personalitiesof his day. He played a bold and distinguished part in the war for theUnion, quite out of proportion to the actual command which fell to hislot. Indeed, it may well be doubted if any other single officer exerteda more potential or beneficial influence than he did upon the plans andoperations in which he took part. While he was austere and reserved inmanners, he was most highly esteemed by all with whom he served, andreceived unstinted praise for his suggestions and assistance, and yetstrangely enough he became involved in several notable militarycontroversies, which so enlisted his interest and wounded his pride asto materially change his career and cause him great unhappiness, duringthe later years of his life. 

It may be truly said that he came to know by experience the dangers offrankness and friendly criticism, and that even the most patriotic andunselfish men in these modern times, like those of antiquity "havetheir ambitions which neither seas nor mountains nor unpeopled desertscan limit;" their egotism and personal interests "which neither victorynor far-reaching fame can suppress;" their secret motives and purposeswhich "cause them to injure one another when they touch and are closetogether. " After all, generals and statesmen are but fallible men, themost magnanimous of whom are watchful of their rivals, and love notthose who despitefully use them. In the vindication of his claims thathe has rendered some service to his country, General Smith has madeseveral valuable contributions[1] to current American history, and has in addition left a manuscript volume of personal memoirs uponwhich I shall draw as occasion offers, and which will doubtless bepublished in due time. They were written during the last two years ofhis life and throw an interesting light, not only upon his own deedsand character, but upon the life and services of his friends andcontemporaries. They are conceived in a kindly and charitable veinwhich does credit both to his heart and to his understanding. 

[Footnote 1: From Chattanooga to Petersburg under Generals Grant andButler, Houghton, Muffin & Co. , N. Y. 1893. ]

WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH was born at St. Albans, in Northern Vermont, onthe 17th of February, 1824. He came of good New England stock, whichemigrated from Massachusetts to the valley of Lake Champlain before thebeginning of the last century. Both his paternal and maternal ancestorsand relations were notable people, and took prominent parts in thetroubles of a thinly-settled frontier, and especially in the French andIndian war, and in the Committee of Safety, as well as in the militiaand volunteers during the Revolutionary War. They fought at the battleof Lake George, at the capture of Fort Ticonderoga, and at the affairsat Hubbardton and Bennington. They were the companions of Stark, SethWarner and Ethan Allen, and appear to have borne themselves bravely andwell upon all occasions. They were by name Robinsons, Saffords, Fays, Butlers and Smiths. There is a well-founded tradition that his father'sfamily, which came from the old hill town of Barré, Massachusetts, wereknown during the earlier colonial days as Smithson, but beforeemigrating to Vermont dropped the second syllable for the sake ofsimplicity, and always thereafter called themselves Smith. 

William's father was a respectable farmer at or near St. Albans. Hisuncle John was a lawyer and a judge of distinction, and during theexcitement growing out of the Canadian rebellion of 1837, was electedto the next Congress. He was a Democrat and the only one up to thattime ever elected from the State. During his term of service he gavethe appointment of cadet at West Point to his nephew William. Hiscousin John Gregory Smith, also a lawyer of distinction, was afterwardsGovernor of Vermont, and for many years president of the VermontCentral and Northern Pacific Railroads. His grandmother Smith also fromBarré, was the sister of a certain Captain Gregory of the Highlandregiment serving in Boston before the Revolution. Through thisconnection the General always believed he received a strain of McGregorblood, for many of that clan took the name of Gregory after theirimmigration to the colonies. 

His own mother was Sarah Butler, a direct descendent of Isaac andSamuel Robinson who were believed to have come in the direct line fromthe celebrated puritan pastor, John Robinson, of Leyden, who was longrecognized by even those who differed with him on questions of doctrineas "the most learned, polished and modest spirit that ever separatedfrom the Church of England. " To the prepotency of this distinguisheddivine, General Smith often, in a tone of mingled banter andseriousness, attributed not only his habit of mature reflection andlove of learning, but also his "moderation combined with firmness" uponall questions which engaged his attention. 

Be all this as it may, it is certain that his family were straightAnglo-Saxons, who like the rest, came into New England under thepressure of religious and political disturbance at home, and broughtwith them the sturdy virtues and ineradicable prejudices of their race. It is equally certain that this race, whatever its origin and howeverit may have been compounded and produced, has thriven and expanded inAmerica, and that our country is indebted to it for not only itsgreatest scholars, divines and statesmen, but for its greatest soldiersas well. General Smith belonged by nature and education to bothclasses, and before this sketch is concluded I hope to show that in thehighest walks of his chosen profession he had few equals and nosuperiors. 

Like many another youth, his latent love of arms and his determinationto go to West Point were aroused by seeing a company of regularsoldiers, and making the acquaintance of its officers, at his nativetown. They were sent there to maintain order and prevent violations ofthe neutrality laws during the Canadian disturbances in 1837-8. Fromthe day of his cadetship he received the sobriquet and was alwaysthereafter designated familiarly by his more intimate friends as BaldySmith in contradistinction from other officers of the same patronymic. In the old days his name would have been written Baldysmith. 

He was a brilliant and faithful student and became in turn acadet-corporal, color-sergeant and lieutenant. When it is recalled thathe received those honors from that prince of soldiers Captain(afterwards Major General) Charles F. Smith, then commandant of cadets, and in whose presence it is said no graduate of his time could everappear without involuntarily assuming the position of a soldier, itwill be understood that young Smith was brought up under properinfluences and sent forth with the highest ideals of his profession. Hegraduated in the "fives" of his class. He was commissioned as a BrevetSecond Lieutenant in the corps of Topographical Engineers, and servedwith it continuously till, for convenience and simplicity ofadministration, it was merged with the Corps of Engineers after theoutbreak of the Rebellion. At the request of his chief, he gave uptwo-thirds of the usual graduating leave of absence to lend a hand toan under-manned surveying party on Lake Erie. His services were fromthe first of the scientific and useful rather than the showy sort. Theybrought him a wide range of valuable experience, extending from thesurveys of the great lakes to explorations of Texas and Arizona, covering a period of seven years, two of which were spent under JosephE. Johnston and William H. Emory, then of the same corps, while engagedin establishing the new boundary line between Mexico and the UnitedStates. During his service in that region he located the stage andwagon-route from San Antonio to El Paso, surveyed a part of the RioGrande Valley, and familiarized himself with the topography andresources of Northwestern Texas and the state of Chihuahua in Mexico. Later he was transferred to Florida and made surveys for a ship canalacross the peninsula from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently he had charge of the Eleventh District in the light-houseservice with his headquarters at Detroit. He then became AssistantSecretary, and finally on the retirement of his friend, CaptainFranklin, Engineer Secretary of the Light-House Board. He hadpreviously asked for service with the army in Mexico, but this had beendenied. His service in Texas and Florida had brought him in contactwith a number of officers who afterwards became distinguished in theCivil War. Among the most notable of these were Buell, Joseph E. Johnston, McClellan, Meade, Burnside and Emory. His light-house servicegave him a friendly association with Commodore Shubrick and Captain(afterwards Admiral) Jenkins of the navy, General Totten of the army, Professor Bache of the Coast survey and Professor Henry of theSmithsonian Institute, and opened to him a wide acquaintance with thescientific thought of the day. While connected with the Light-Houseboard he planned and supervised the construction of four first-classlight-houses, one for Montauk Point, two for Navesink Highlands andSandy Hook, and one for Cape Canaveral. These were all works of thehighest class, fully abreast of the world's best practice at the time. 

His experience in connection with the Light-House Board prepared theway for a piece of specially useful service to the country during theexciting period just prior to the outbreak of actual hostilitiesbetween the North and the South. His position gave him access to theSecretary of the Treasury, as the chief of the department to which theLight-House Board belonged. The storm then brewing showed itself inthat board, made up, as it was, of Northern and Southern men, as wellas elsewhere, and being intensely loyal, Smith took measures to protectand supply the principal light-houses on the southern coast. It will beremembered that Howell Cobb of Georgia was succeeded by General John A. Dix of New York as Secretary of the Treasury, and that the latteraroused the drooping hopes of the country by his celebrated order: "Ifany man attempts to haul down the American flag shoot him on the spot. "Smith was privy to and encouraged the issuance of that order. Immediately afterwards General Dix gave him _carte-blanche_ over thelight-house service, in pursuance of which he visited all the importantsouthern light stations, winding up at Key West. He found that placecut off from communication with Washington, and liable to fall at onceunder the control of the Secessionists. The Collector of Customs was asouthern man and disloyal. The people of the town were in sympathy withhim, and were doing all they could to overawe Captains Hunt andBrannan, who were stationed there with a small force of regularartillery. They were loyal and able officers. Both rose to distinctionafterwards, but having been left without instructions they were at aloss as to their proper course till Smith arrived with the latest newsfrom Washington. His clear and determined counsel gave them heart andencouragement, under which they made good their hold upon the fort andthe island. They were reinforced in due time, which enabled thegovernment to hold this important strategic position at the entrance tothe Gulf of Mexico till the termination of the war put an end to alldanger. Before returning to the north, Smith visited Havana, where heobtained valuable information for future use. 

So far his work had been preparatory, and one of the most usefulfeatures of it was his tour of duty at West Point. His services in thesouth, and especially at Corpus Christi, had brought on a severe attackof malarial poisoning, ending in congestive chills and shatteredhealth, followed by sick-leave and a return to the north. Before he hadentirely recovered he was ordered to West Point, as principal AssistantProfessor of Mathematics. This was in 1855, but his illness had soseriously affected his head as to make it impossible for him todischarge the duties of his position in a manner satisfactory tohimself. As one of his pupils, I failed to discover any lack ofknowledge or perspicacity on his part. To the contrary, he impressedthe sections of which he had charge as a very clear-headed man withremarkable powers of mind and great aptitude as a disciplinarian andteacher. It is now known, however, that the close attention and mentalexertion which his duties required of him gave him such pain as to makeit imperative that he should be relieved, and this was done at his ownrequest after a year's hard work and suffering. The injury he hadreceived was unfortunately never entirely overcome. Throughout thewhole of his subsequent life he was subject to recurrent attacks ofmalaria, accompanied by pain in the head with a tendency to mentaldepression, which disabled him entirely at times, and upon one mostimportant occasion compelled him to leave the field, when his interestsand his inclinations demanded that he should remain. I refer nowespecially to the time when he was assigned by General Grant to thecommand of the Army of the James, to succeed Major General Butler, whowas at the same time ordered to return to Fortress Monroe. It will beremembered that this order was never carried into effect, but thatGeneral Smith, who was suffering from one of his attacks, took leave ofabsence, much to the concern of his friends, and went by the way ofFortress Monroe to New York. There was no great movement under way atthe time, but before his leave of absence had expired he was notifiedthat the order in question had been countermanded. Various explanationswere given for this action, and I shall recur to it again. But it isbelieved by those who were interested in General Smith, and hadconfidence in his unusual capacity for high command, that his reliefwas largely, if not altogether, due to intrigue, on the part of GeneralButler, aided perhaps by an exaggerated estimate on the part of GeneralGrant of that officer's political importance, which General Smith couldeasily have defeated had he been on the ground in actual command of thearmy to which he had been assigned. 

But to return to his services at West Point. It was during this yearthat he greatly widened his knowledge of military history and the artof war. Although far from well, he led the studious life of ascientist, and in the daily companionship of the professors and ofLieutenants Silvey and Holabird, two officers of distinguished talentand learning, he obtained new and broader views of professionalsubjects. He had early become noted as having an investigating mindwhich could not be satisfied with superficial knowledge, and for asound and conservative judgment which gave great weight to hisconclusions. He was most deliberate and methodical in his habits ofthought, and had an unusually tenacious grip upon the thread of hisargument. His manners and movements, while free from every appearanceof hurry and excitement, were habitually so well ordered that he wasenabled to cover a great deal of ground in a small space of time. Always a close student of the higher branches of his profession, andbelonging to an élite corps which at that time had no part in thecommand of troops, he became a proficient in military organization, administration and logistics, and also in strategy and grand-tactics, as taught in the text books, long before the outbreak of the war forthe Union, but it is to be observed that he never claimed to havebecome specially skilled in minor tactics, or in the daily routine ofcompany or regimental service. He was, however, so profoundly devotedto the military profession in a larger way, that at times he gave tothose less learned than himself the idea that he was a pedant inknowledge and a martinet on duty. With imperturbable self-possession, great lucidity of statement and a decidedly deliberate and austeremanner, he was widely recognized as a masterful man, who won easily andwithout effort the respect and admiration, not only of the cadets whofell under his charge at West Point, but afterwards of the men andofficers who came under his command from the volunteers. To such as areacquainted with West Point life, or with the relations existing betweenofficers and men in the army, no higher evidence can be given ofSmith's real abilities and strength of character. It is a creditablefact that no cadet, however adroit or skilful can cheat his way throughthe Military Academy, and that no officer, however plausible, can forany considerable time deceive or impose upon the cadets with a pretenseof knowledge or a show of character which he does not possess. The sameis true perhaps in a less degree of the volunteers and their officers. Occasionally a cadet or an officer may be so modest or unobtrusive orso slow of development as to escape the critical observation of hisassociates, but in most cases he becomes sufficiently known to justifya correct estimate of his character and a fair prediction, underfavorable opportunities, as to his probable course and success in life. Of WILLIAM F. SMITH it may be truthfully said that he made his bestfriends among the cadets he taught and the subordinates he commanded, not one of whom ever deserted him in trouble or adversity, denied thegreatness of his talents or questioned the elevation of his character. His troubles and differences were always with those above him, neverwith those under his command. 

As is frequently the fate of the strong man gifted with an analyticalmind, and an outspoken contempt of pretense and sham, it was Smith'smisfortune upon more than one occasion to arouse the animosity andopposition of those having higher rank than himself. Direct andvigorous in his methods, and confident of the rectitude of hispurposes, he never hesitated to give his views to such as he believedto be entitled to them, without reference to whether they would be wellreceived or not. Loyal and truthful by nature, he always held others tothe high standard which he set up for himself. Brought up to a rigidobservance of military discipline, it is not to be denied that he wasexacting in a high degree, with those over whom he found himself incommand. While he never permitted those below him to vary from or todisregard his instructions, it is perhaps true that like most men oftalent, he was somewhat impatient of restraint, especially in caseswhere he felt himself to be abler than his commanding officer, orbetter informed as to the actual conditions of his work, and yet no manknew better than he when the time for discussion and the exercise ofdiscretion ended and that for obedience and vigorous action began. Ifat any time later in life he seemed to forget the true rule for his ownguidance, it must be inferred that he was sorely tried by the ignoranceor incompetency of those above him, or had overestimated theirforebearance or friendship for him, or their zeal for the publicservice. Always highly conscientious in his purposes and independent inhis thoughts it was but natural that he should scorn "to crook thepregnant hinges of the knee where thrift may follow fawning. " Notalways as patient and conciliatory with his equals as a less virile orrugged nature would have made him, he occasionally aroused antagonismsand made enemies, as such characters always do, and those enemies werenot slow to impugn his motives, nor to do what they could to mar hiscareer. Withal, it will appear from a careful study of his life andservices as set forth in the records, and as explained by his ownwritings, that his critics have signally failed to mar the foundationof his reputation or to deprive him of the fame to which his brilliantachievements so justly entitle him. 

The culmination of the political agitation for the dissolution of theFederal Union, and the commencement of actual hostilities between thegovernment and the seceding states, found WILLIAM F. SMITH, only acaptain by law, after fourteen years of continuous service, a fewmonths over thirty-seven years of age, and in the full maturity of hisfaculties. As before stated, his health was never afterwards altogetherstable, but it was sufficiently re-established to enable him to throwhimself heartily into the struggle and to perform such duties as fellto his lot with a fair degree of endurance. Although a Democrat, as faras he had any party connection, his sympathies were all with the Unionand National Government, and impelled him to lose no time, but makehaste, on his return from Key West and Havana, to obtain suchemployment as might be open to him. The first duty that was offered himwas in New York, where he was engaged for several weeks in musteringthe volunteers into the United States service. 

During this period, on the 24th of April, 1861, he was married to MissSarah Lyon, a young lady of New York, who was famous for the lovelinessof her person and character, whom he had first met two years before. Itwas on a short wedding trip to his native state that he offered hisservices to the Governor. The latter had already raised and organizedtwo regiments of infantry but without hesitation he promised CaptainSmith the next, as soon as it should be called for. 

Meanwhile he was still subject to duty as an engineer officer, and assuch, strangely enough was ordered to report to Major General BenjaminF. Butler, fresh from the life of a successful lawyer, then in commandat Fortress Monroe, where he arrived on the 1st of June, 1861. Whilethere he conducted several important reconnaissances in the directionof Yorktown and Big Bethel, and thus became acquainted with a region inwhich he was afterwards to play a most important part. His serviceslasted something less than two months, and became still more notablefrom the fact that they made him thoroughly acquainted with GeneralButler. They were brought suddenly to an end by the reappearance of hisold trouble, which in time made it necessary for him to take asick-leave. The surgeon who had him in charge directed him to againseek the tonic climate of Brattleborough in his native State. Accordingto promise, his good friend, the Governor, took the earliestopportunity to send him his commission as Colonel of the Third Regimentof Vermont Volunteer Infantry, to date from July 16th. But owing to thescarcity of regular officers, he had previously been ordered to duty onthe staff of General McDowell, then commanding the army in front ofWashington, though, his health did not permit him to join in time totake part in the forward movement which ended in the disastrous battleof Bull Run. 

As soon however as his strength was sufficiently re-established ColonelSmith repaired to Washington, and in the rush and excitement whichprevailed after the return of the defeated army to that neighborhood, he was engaged in helping to fortify and defend that city till thedanger was past and the requirements of his regiment made it necessaryfor him to take command and begin its preparation for active service. It is to be noted that there was an unaccountable reluctance on thepart of the War Department at the time, to permit the detachment ofofficers belonging to the various staff corps, for the purpose ofcommanding volunteers, but this was overcome without much difficulty inhis case, and he began his career as an infantry colonel opportunely atthe very time that McClellan was re-organizing the defeated army andbadly needed the assistance of educated officers. Deeply impressed withthe importance of stimulating the pride of the volunteers, and ofkeeping alive the heroic traditions of their state by all proper means, Colonel Smith recommended that the Vermont regiments should be brigadedand trained together, and fortunately this was approved by GeneralMcClellan. The Green Mountain men had won great renown in the Colonialand Revolutionary Wars by virtue of their state organization andservices and the marked individuality which characterized them. It wasa happy thought to keep them together during the Civil War. The sequelshowed that it was not only highly beneficial to the national cause, but that it added greatly to the fame of the Vermont men. 

As the war was a sectional one in its origin, many of our best officersbelieved that the volunteer regiments should be formed into brigadesand divisions, without reference to the States from which they came. They held that an army organized in this way would more rapidly developthe national spirit and become a more efficient military machine thanone formed on state or sectional lines, and the general practice to theend of the war, in the Union army, was in accordance with this idea. 

The Vermont brigade, composed of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth andSixth Vermont Regiments, was the one notable exception to this practiceand the result was in every way satisfactory. It preserved its identitytill the end of the war and became famous as one of the best and mostdistinctive organizations that ever upheld the Union cause. It wascomposed almost entirely of native Vermont men, racy of the soil, hardy, self-reliant and courageous, and always ready for the seriousbusiness of warfare. It owned its early and enduring discipline toSmith, who was appointed Brigadier General on the 13th of August, andfrom that time forth it never ceased to have a place in his affections. From the first he took a special pride in his regiment, and devotedhimself earnestly to its instruction and discipline, for the perfectionof which it soon became noted, but in those days of rapid changes, whenthe loyal states were sending forth their volunteers by the hundredthousand, brigades soon grew into divisions, and divisions intoarmy-corps and armies. 

General Smith was then at exactly the right age, and had alreadyachieved such a high reputation as a scientific and competent soldier, that he was called upon after only a few weeks' service as a brigadecommander to take charge of a division of three brigades. Looking abouthim with anxious care for a suitable successor, he assigned the VermontBrigade to the command of Brigadier General William T. H. Brooks, agraduate of West Point from Ohio, but a grandson of Vermont. He was aveteran of the Mexican and Indian Wars, in which he had gained greatexperience, and from which he became justly famous as one of the finestsoldiers of his time. A man of striking countenance, great physicalvigor and dauntless courage, he was an ideal leader of the Vermont menand at once won their confidence and respect. It is one of thetraditions of the times that under him "The Iron Brigade, " as it sooncame to be known throughout the army, was never repulsed and neverfailed to accomplish the task before it. Its "skirmish line" wasbelieved to be "stronger than an old-fashioned line of battle, " andwhen it covered the advance, the column behind it had to put forth itsbest efforts to keep up. From the brigadier general to the lowestprivate, they not only knew their business, but just when they shouldbe called upon to take the lead. It was one of the grizzled privatesduring the pursuit of Lee from the field of Gettysburg, who perceivingthat the cavalry was making but poor progress, said from the ranks asGeneral Sedgwick was passing: "I 'low you want to get to Williamsporttonight, don't you, Uncle John?" "Yes, my man, " said the General. "Well, in that case you had better put the Vermont brigade to thefront!" The suggestion was at once adopted, and under the sturdyadvance which followed the desired camp was reached that night withouta check or a halt by the way. 

The other two brigades of Smith's division were commanded, respectively, by Windfield Scott Hancock and Isaac I. Stevens, twosoldiers of the highest quality, and both destined to achieve undyingfame. When their subsequent career is considered it may well be doubtedif there was ever a division in the Union army commanded by abler menthan Hancock, Stevens, Brooks and Baldy Smith. During the formativeperiod of the Army of the Potomac, when all were drilling, all studyingtactics, all teaching guard duty and all striving hard to establish asatisfactory state of military discipline, Smith varied this irksomework by an occasional review, or by the still more exciting exercise ofa reconnaissance in force, thus adding practice to precept, andbringing regiments and brigades to act coherently together. In all thishe handled his division skillfully and well, and consequently soon hadthe satisfaction of showing those in authority over him that it was inadmirable spirits and condition. 

How far he favored the policy of delay for the purpose of increasingthe army's strength and perfecting its organization is not certainlyknown, but it must be admitted on his own testimony that he belonged tothe coterie of officers who fully trusted and supported McClellan inthe determination to make complete preparation before moving againstthe enemy. Nor is it known what part he took in the selection of theline of operations ultimately adopted by McClellan for the capture ofRichmond. Perhaps this is not important, for neither the duty nor theresponsibility of the choice was his. It is not likely, however, thathe was consulted for his acquaintance with McClellan was not at firstclose or intimate. At a later period he joined his friend GeneralFranklin, then generally acknowledged as one of the leading militarymen of the day, in a letter to the President recommending the transferof the Army of the Potomac from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to theJames River, as near to Richmond as practicable, and urging itsreinforcement by all the troops that could be gathered from thedepartments of the Atlantic seaboard. Without discussing here theorigin or the wisdom of this controverted proposition, it may beremarked that it was supported by such an array of arguments andinfluence as would doubtless have secured another trial for it, even inthe face of its failure under McClellan, had the condition and strengthof the army, and the resources of the country been considered by theadministration sufficient to meet all the requirements of the civil andmilitary situation. 

At a still later period after General Grant had come to the head ofmilitary affairs, had decided to take personal charge of operations inVirginia, and was seriously considering the appointment of GeneralSmith to the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, it becameknown to me, through a letter from the latter, that he strongly favoreda "powerful movement from the lower James River, or even from thesounds of North Carolina" against the interior of the Confederacy. Iwas at that time serving in Washington, as the Chief of the CavalryBureau, and upon receipt of the letter laid it before General Rawlins, Grant's able Chief of Staff, but without giving it my concurrence orapproval, for such consideration as he might think best to give it. Itwas received at a juncture when the selection of a proper plan ofoperations was conceded to be a matter of the gravest importance. It isan interesting fact that the plan in question did not receive thesupport of Rawlins, although both he and Grant, fresh from the victoryof Chattanooga, were warm friends and admirers of General Smith as astrategist. Rawlins, with unerring instinct, took strong groundsagainst it, for the reason, as he vigorously expressed it, that hecould not see the sense of going so far, and taking so much time tofind Lee with a divided army, when he could be reached within a halfday's march directly to the front, with the entire army united andreinforced by all the men the government had at its disposal. Knowingthat this was Grant's argument as well, I have always supposed that hisfinal decision to advance directly from Culpepper Court House againstLee's army, and to retain Meade in immediate command of the Army of thePotomac, while the entire available force of Butler's Department shouldadvance directly from Fort Monroe under the immediate command ofGeneral Smith, was due partly to Smith's decided opposition to theoverland line of operations, and to his tenacious adherence to theprincipal features of the plan which he and Franklin had recommended toLincoln. Meade's approval of the direct line of advance, and hischeerful support of Grant's plans as explained in detail, aided byButler's assurances of hearty co-operation, doubtless had much to dowith the retention of those officers in their respective places, and inthe assignment of Smith, much to his disappointment, to a relativelysubordinate position on the line he had so openly preferred. It mayalso account in some degree for the failure of those distinguishedgenerals to work as harmoniously with each other to the common end, aswas necessary to ensure success. 

Before following this interesting subject to its conclusion, the partactually played by General Smith in McClellan's Peninsular Campaignshould be briefly recounted. After the Army of the Potomac had beentransferred to the lower Chesapeake, by water, instead of landing atUrbana or on the estuary of the Rappahannock, as was at first intended, out of fear of the Merrimac, which had played such havoc with thewooden frigates of Goldborough's fleet, in Hampton Roads, it wasdisembarked at Fortress Monroe. It necessarily lost some time herebefore it could be reunited and begin its march up the Peninsula. Ithad hardly got well under way, when much to the disappointment of thecountry it found itself stopped for thirty days, by an insignificantstream and a weak line of entrenchments held by a few guns and a singledivision of Confederate Infantry, under the command of GeneralMagruder. 

The so-called "Siege of Yorktown" followed, and General Smith, chafingat the delay which he conceived to be unnecessary set about studyingthe situation in his own front, with the keen eye of an experiencedengineer. Having the year before familiarized himself with the lay ofthe land near Fort Monroe, he was quick to grasp every condition whichfavored an advance. A careful reconnaissance of his immediate frontenabled him to surprise a crossing of Warwick River and to carry asection of the fortified line beyond. This as might have been expectedwas done by a detachment of the Vermont Brigade, which made a gallanteffort to maintain the lodgement it had gained, but as it was notsupported by McClellan, it was withdrawn after suffering a loss of 165men killed, wounded and missing. This was the first engagement in acampaign destined to cost the lives of many brave men and to end in aterrible disaster to the national arms. 

After making a heroic stand and holding McClellan and his overwhelmingforce at bay for nearly a month, Magruder abandoned his lines and fellback to Williamsburgh on the road up the Peninsula to Richmond. He wasslowly followed by McClellan's army. Smith's division having crossedthe Warwick at Lee's mill, led in the pursuit, coming up with the enemystrongly posted in a new line of fortifications covering the town ofWilliamsburg. Smith's engineering skill and his quick intelligenceserved him again most fortunately, and with the aid of Captain West ofthe Coast Survey then serving on his staff, soon enabled him to findthe weak spot in the enemy's position. This time it turned out to be onthe extreme left, where he had failed, probably through lack of troops, to occupy the extensive works which had been previously constructed. Realizing intuitively the futility of a front attack against suchentrenchments, Smith threw Hancock's brigade promptly to the right andunder cover of the woods, succeeded without serious loss or delay inoccupying one of the works from which, with his division he couldeasily have swept the whole line had he not been restrained by thepresence of his seniors. 

Unfortunately McClellan was in the rear, but Sumner and Heintzelman, corps commanders, were soon upon the ground, and with prudent butill-timed conservatism declined to sanction the proper movement toreinforce Hancock, for fear that it would bring on a general engagementbefore the army could be properly closed up and placed in position toparticipate. Smith recognizing, the great advantage certain to arisefrom pushing promptly through the opening he had already found, besought Sumner for permission to go with the rest of his division toHancock's assistance, but this was also denied. As other troops arrivedon the field, Smith moved to the right to make place for them, with thehope that he might be permitted to continue his march unobserved tillhe had come up with his advanced brigade, but orders were sent whicharrested him before he had accomplished the object he had in view. Allday long he was held in the leash with certain victory in sight. McClellan arrived on the field late in the afternoon, but before hecould get a satisfactory understanding of the condition of affairs, night came on. Consequently nothing decisive was done that day and agreat opportunity was lost. The wily Magruder, seeing that his left hadbeen turned, and that his position was untenable, abandoned his worksunder cover of darkness and fell back towards Richmond. Obviously thisresult was due, first, to the fortunate discovery made by General Smithand his engineer, and to the successful turning movement of Hancock, based thereon; and, second, to the certainty that if properlyreinforced by the rest of Smith's division, and by other divisions, ifnecessary, as it surely would be as soon as the national commander hadcome to comprehend the real condition of affairs, the Confederateforces would be taken in flank and rear and overwhelmed. 

This was Smith's last chance at anything like independent action. During the remainder of this ill-starred campaign he played the part ofa subordinate division commander, in a large army engaged in acomplicated series of movements and battles, and of course had nocontrol over the general plans or operations. There is no evidence thathe was ever consulted by anyone except his corps commander Franklin whowas himself also a subordinate. The army lacking field experience, didnot work well together as a whole. The corps commanders had beenselected and appointed by the Secretary of War, without reference toMcClellan's wishes or recommendations. Several of them were veterans, who received their assignments because of seniority rather than forspecial aptitudes, and this naturally begot a disposition on the partof the division commanders, who were generally younger and perhaps moreambitious men, to look carefully after their own troops and leavelarger affairs to their seniors. At all events, Smith's principal carehenceforth was to handle his own division and look out exclusively forits requirements, and this he did prudently and well, especially duringthe Seven days' battle, and during the change of base from the York tothe James River. His brigades, led as I have pointed out, by very ablemen, were more or less constantly and successfully engaged. They took amost creditable part in the battles of Golding's Farm, Savage Stationand White Oak Swamp. 

Throughout the whole of this trying time of incessant marching andfighting Smith remained watchful and wary, directing his divisionthrough every peril, and finally conducting it, without material loss, but with increased confidence in itself and in its leader, to the newbase which had been selected for the army. His cool and confidentbearing, and his skillful conduct throughout this campaign, won for himthe brevet of Lieutenant Colonel in the regular army and the rank ofMajor General of Volunteers. 

It was during the night march from Malvern Hill that General Smithencountered General Fitz-John Porter, his class-mate whom he alwaysregarded as a first-class soldier, and with whom upon this occasion hehad a conversation, the facts of which go far to justify this highestimate. Noting that Porter seemed greatly depressed he asked what wasthe matter. In reply, Porter told him that as soon as he had becomecertain the evening before that the enemy had been broken and beatenback from his reckless attack on the Union lines at Malvern Hill, andhad withdrawn in disorder from the field, he had gone to McClellan onboard the boat which he had occupied with his headquarters, and hadbegged him with all the arguments he could bring to bear, and all theforce he could command, to assume the offensive at dawn. He said he hadspent half the night in advocacy of this policy, expressing theconfident belief that if adopted it would result, not only in thedestruction of Lee's army, but in the capture of Richmond. He had nodoubt that our own army, encouraged by the sanguinary repulse it hadfinally inflicted upon the enemy, would respond to every demand whichcould be made upon it, and would thus turn a series of indecisivecombats, which the country would surely regard as defeats, into amagnificent victory. Smith's testimony shows this splendid conceptionto have been no afterthought with Porter, as it was with many whosubsequently came to understand the facts of the case, but coming as itdid hot from a desperate battle field, must be regarded as theinspiration of true military genius, while the fact that McClellanrejected it must always be considered as the best possible evidence ofhis unreadiness to meet great emergencies. Smith does not sayspecifically that he approved it, but the context of his narrativeleaves but little doubt that he thought favorably of it and would havegiven it hearty support. 

In the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, andits transfer to Washington, as ordered by Halleck and the Secretary ofWar, Smith and his division necessarily played a subordinate part. Withthe rest of the army they formed a tardy junction with Pope in front ofWashington, and did their share towards making the capital safe andunassailable, but they were not again engaged till they met the enemyin the bloody and successful action at Crampton's Gap, in the SouthMountain. The division also took part three days later in the battle ofAntietam, but notwithstanding McClellan's claim that the battle was a"master piece of art, " neither Smith's troops, nor the corps to whichthey belonged, were seriously engaged. This was not the fault of eitherFranklin or Smith, both of whom were greatly displeased with thedisjointed and irresolute manner in which the Union forces were handledand the battle was fought. The most that can be said is that bothGeneral Smith and his division did all that was asked of them, not onlyin the battle of Antietam, but in following Lee's army back toVirginia. These operations are now justly regarded as reflecting butlittle credit on the generalship by which the national army wascontrolled during that period of its history. While they endedMcClellan's military career, they afforded but little chance for any ofhis subordinates to gain distinction, and those who escapedresponsibility for supporting his policy of delay had good reasons toregard themselves as fortunate. 

The withdrawal of McClellan and the accession of the weak andvacillating Burnside to command was followed by a re-arrangement of theArmy of the Potomac into three grand divisions, and a re-assignment ofleading generals. Franklin was placed in command of the Third GrandDivision, consisting of the First Corps under General Reynolds, and theSixth Corps under General Smith. In the abortive Fredericksburgcampaign which followed, these corps had the extreme left of the Unionline, but it should have been evident from the start that with theopposing armies separated by a broad river occupying a deep valley, from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half between the oppositecrests, the movement which was to bring on the battle must necessarilybe fought under extraordinary disadvantages to the attacking army. Inthe mind of those who were to carry out the details of the movements, success must have seemed hopeless from the first. Burnside was from thebeginning of the campaign overcome by the weight of hisresponsibilities, and between tears at one time and lack of sleep atanother, his fatuous mind failed to evolve for itself, or to acceptfrom others a definite and comprehensive plan of operations. He seemedat successive times to have had hopes of surprising Lee, of breakinghis center and overwhelming his left, of seizing two important pointsin his main line of defence and completely turning his left, but withalit is certain that he gave to none of these operations sufficientattention to justify the slightest hope that it could be successfullycarried into effect. 

On the other hand, Lee was on the alert with his army of 78, 000 men, well and compactly posted in a commanding and almost impregnableposition along the wooded heights which overlooked Fredericksburg andthe valley of the Rappahannock from the south. Burnside had 113, 000 menof all arms, well supplied and thoroughly organized, commanded by theablest generals in the service. His preponderance of force wastherefore close to fifty per cent. , but unfortunately that was notenough to outweigh the natural and artificial obstacles, the heights, stone walls, entrenchments, open fields and river to be overcome by theadvancing army. The task was a hopeless one from the start, and to makematters worse, Burnside, who at best had but a vague and uncertaincomprehension of the work before him, seems to have lost what littlehead he was endowed with before his operations were fully under way. 

The result was unfortunate in the extreme. Two Grand Divisionssucceeded in crossing the river without material opposition, but atonce found themselves confronted by difficulties and forces they couldnot overcome. Franklin, in compliance with his instructions, took twodays to get into position, but when his two corps had reached the placeassigned them on the old Richmond Road, with the aid of Smith andReynolds, he looked over the ground and made up his mind that the onlychance of victory was offered by an assault upon the enemy's rightcenter, with the full force of his two corps, amounting to 40, 000 men. Burnside, at his invitation, came to that part of the field, and afterlistening to the views of the three generals, either of whom was vastlyhis superior as a soldier, approved the plan and promised to give awritten order for its execution. Franklin waited all night for theorder, telegraphed twice, and finally sent a staff officer for it, butit never came. Indeed it was never issued but a different orderdirecting him to seize the heights at Hamilton's House, nearly threemiles from his right division, and to keep the whole of his command inreadiness to move at once, was sent instead. Sumner received an orderequally inane, in reference to Marye's Heights. The resultingoperations which should have been carefully co-ordinated and vigorouslysupported, were weak and indecisive. As the day wore away Lee tookadvantage of the delays and the opportunities which they offered him, and assumed the offensive. There was much severe but desultory anddisconnected fighting. The Union generals with their officers and mendid their best, but Burnside was on the opposite side of the river andcould neither give intelligent orders nor act promptly upon thesuggestions which were sent to him from the field. There was no chancefor maneuvering. It was from the first head-on, face-to-face fightingwith no hope of victory for the assailants. The Union losses were over12, 500 men killed, wounded and missing, of which 4, 962 belonged toFranklin's Grand Division, while Jackson's corps which confronted himlost 5, 364. 

A full description of this mid-winter campaign would be out of place inthis sketch, and the same may be said of the abortive Mud Campaign sixweeks later, which had for its object the passage of the Rappahannockby a movement above Fredericksburg. Both Franklin and Smith took partin this ill planned and poorly executed undertaking. The weather andthe roads were against it, and it soon came to an end quite as pitiful, though not so costly, as its predecessor. 

Following these failures, Burnside, in futile desperation, prepared anorder relieving Franklin, Smith and several other officers of inferiorrank from duty, and dismissing Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane fromthe service. He made no further charge against these officers than thatthey had no confidence in himself, and this much was probably true, butit would have been equally as true of any other generals serving atthat time in the Army of the Potomac. The President, instead ofapproving the order, it should he noted, at once relieved Burnside andassigned Hooker to the command. Sumner and Franklin both of whomoutranked Hooker were relieved from further service with that army, while Smith was transferred to the command of the Ninth Corps, which heheld but a short time, owing to the failure of the Senate to confirmhim as a major general. This was doubtless brought about bymisrepresentation, made to the Senate committee on the Conduct of theWar, but as the action of the Senate and its committees in reference toconfirmations were secret, no correct explanation can now he given ofthe allegations against Smith, though they were generally attributed atthe time to Burnside and his friends, and while they were neitherproperly investigated nor supported, they resulted in reducing Smith tothe rank of brigadier general and depriving him of the high commandwhich he would have otherwise continued to hold. 

It is worthy of note that before these changes were made, and while theArmy of the Potomac was still floundering in the mud under theinefficient command of Burnside, Franklin and Smith joined in theletter previously referred to, advising the President to abandon theline on which the Army was then operating, with such ill success, andafter reinforcing it to the fullest extent, to send it back again tothe line of the James River. This letter was doubtless written inentire good faith, but at a time when it seemed to be impossible forthe government, even if it had so desired, to carry out itsrecommendations. Its only immediate effect was to arouse the antagonismof Mr. Stanton against these two able officers, and to deprive thecountry for a while of their services. A wiser and more temperateSecretary of War would have filed and ignored it, or sent for theofficers and explained why he deemed their advice to be impracticableat that time. That, however, was not Mr. Stanton's way. Althoughintensely patriotic and in earnest, he was imperious and overbearingboth to high and low alike, and preferred to banish and offend ratherthan to listen and conciliate. 

The winter of 1862-3 is now by common consent regarded as the darkestperiod of the war for the Union. The failure of Burnside's plans andthe defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville severely tried the disciplineand organization of the Army of the Potomac, and filled the loyal Northwith alarm, while it correspondingly encouraged the Confederategovernment and raised the confidence of its army. As soon as the winterwas over and the roads were settled Lee assumed the initiative, droveHooker back from the Rappahannock, crossed the Potomac, advancedconfidently to Chambersburg and pushed his cavalry as far north asHarrisburg and York. 

Hooker had also proven himself to be incompetent, and desperate as themeasure was, the Washington government relieved him in the midst of anactive campaign, and entrusted the army and its fortunes to thedirection of Major General George G. Meade, a gallant and able soldier, who checked the high tide of rebellion at Gettysburg on the 2nd and 3rdof July, 1863. During this campaign Smith, who was on leave of absencewhen it began, made haste to offer his services, without conditions, and was at once sent to Harrisburg to assist Major General Couch, whohad been assigned to the command of the Pennsylvania and New Yorkmilitia. Taking command of an improvised division, he moved against theenemy, then threatening Carlisle, with all the assurance of a veteran, and while the prompt retreat of the enemy prevented any severeengagement, the movement was entirely efficacious. With the trueinstincts of a soldier he pressed on in the direction of theConfederate army, and took part in its pursuit from Gettysburg back toVirginia. Curiously enough, instead of commending and thanking him andhis raw troops for their gallant services, the Secretary of War orderedhis arrest for taking his command beyond the limits of Pennsylvania, for the special defence of which the militia had been called out, butfortunately the remonstrance of General Couch caused this order to berecalled, and the gallant but unappreciated general again withdrew fromthe field, as soon as the scare was over and his forces were permittedto return to their homes. 

It will be remembered that the news of Lee's defeat and his retreatfrom Gettysburg reached the country on the 4th of July, and that thesame day was made triply memorable by the capture of Vicksburg withPemberton's entire army of 30, 000 men with all their guns andammunitions. These two striking events threw the country into thewildest enthusiasm. Even the most despondent now became confident thatthe Southern Confederacy would soon be destroyed, and that thetriumphant Union would be finally re-established. But this confidencewas destined to be rudely shaken. 

Later in the summer, taking advantage of the lull in operationselsewhere, the Confederate leaders sent Longstreet's splendid corps ofveterans from Virginia, and that part of Johnston's army which had beenparoled, together with such detachments as could be got from Alabama, to reinforce Bragg, who had been driven by Rosecrans from MiddleTennessee to Northern Georgia. Turning fiercely upon his over-confidentpursuer, as soon as his reinforcements were at hand, Bragg struck astaggering blow at Chickamauga, which not only came near givingChattanooga back to him, but filled the northern states withconsternation. The war was not only not ended, but had burst forth withrenewed vigor. Reinforcements in large numbers were hurried forwardfrom all parts of the country to Chattanooga. Hooker, with Howard's andSlocum's corps, was sent out by rail from Virginia, while the greaterpart of Grant's Army of the Tennessee was withdrawn from the lowerMississippi, where it was resting after the capture of Vicksburg, andmarched over-land from Memphis to the same place. The separatedepartments in the Mississippi Valley were consolidated into a militarygrand division, under the supreme command of General Grant, and whatturned out to be of almost equal importance was the fact that BrigadierGeneral William F. Smith was relieved from service in West Virginia, where he had been recently assigned to duty, and sent to contribute hispart towards strengthening the national grasp upon the vast region ofwhich Chattanooga was justly considered the strategic center. 

Whatever the government at that time may have thought of him as acommander of troops, it is certain that it was willing to recognize anduse his experience and marked intellectual resources as an engineerofficer to their fullest extent. As it turned out, it could not havepaid him a greater compliment, nor given him a better opportunity fordistinction. His fame had gone before him, and on his arrival atChattanooga, although he preferred the command of troops, he wasassigned at once to duty as Chief Engineer of the Department and Armyof the Cumberland. Fortunately this gave him the control, not only ofthe engineer troops and materials, and the engineer operations of thatarmy, but carried with it the right and duty of knowing the army'scondition and requirements as well as all the plans which might beconsidered for extricating it from the extraordinary perils anddifficulties which surrounded it. 

Although efforts have been made at various times and by variouswriters, to minimize these perils and difficulties, it cannot be deniedthat the situation of that army was at that epoch an exceedingly graveone. It had been rudely checked, if not completely beaten, in one ofthe most desperate and bloody battles of the war, and shut up inChattanooga by Bragg's army on the south, and by an almost impassablemountain region on the north and west. Its communication by rail withits secondary base at Bridgeport, and with its primary base atNashville, had been broken by the Confederate cavalry and rendered mostuncertain. Its supplies were scanty and growing daily less, while itsartillery horses and draft mules were dying by hundreds, for lack offorage. The only safe wagon roads to the rear were by a long andcircuitous route through the mountains north of the Tennessee River, which was besides so rough and muddy that the teams could haul hardlyenough for their own subsistence, much less an adequate supply for thetroops. 

All the contemporary accounts go to show that Rosecrans, whilepersonally brave enough, was himself more or less confused and excitedby the great disaster which had overtaken his army at Chickamauga. Hehad been cut off and greatly shaken by the overthrow of his right wing, and consequently retired with it to Chattanooga. Notwithstanding thisunfortunate withdrawal and his failure to rejoin the organized portionof his army, which under General George H. Thomas, held on firmly toits position against every attack, those who knew Rosecrans best stillbelieved him to be a most loyal and gallant gentleman who was anxiousand willing to do all that could be done to save his army and maintainits advanced position. But there is no satisfactory evidence that up tothe time he turned over his command to his successor, he had formed anyadequate or comprehensive plan for supplying it or getting it ready toresume the offensive. Every general in it knew that it needed and musthave supplies, and that the only way to get them, without falling back, was to open and keep open the direct road or "cracker line" toBridgeport. But how and when this was to be done was the greatquestion. 

Much has been written upon this subject; a military commission has hadit under consideration; the records have been consulted; a report hasbeen made, and comments upon it have been issued by General Smith andhis friends. Even the late Secretary of War, Elihu Root, has passedjudgment upon it, and yet it can be safely said that nothing has beendone to disturb the conclusion reached at the time, that General Smithin consultation with his superiors worked out the plan as to how, whenand by what means the short supply line by the way of Brown's Ferry andthe Lookout Valley should he opened and maintained. He certainlysecured its adoption first by Thomas and afterwards by Grant, andfinally when he had arranged all the details of the complicated anddelicate operations, and had prepared all engineer's materials andpontoons which were required, he personally commanded the troops andcarried that part of the plan which was based on Chattanooga, to asuccessful conclusion. 

When it is remembered that Rosecrans had left Chattanooga, that he hadbeen succeeded by Thomas, and that Grant himself had arrived on theground and assumed supreme command, before the first practical step hadbeen taken to carry the plan into effect, and that the plan itselfinvolved a descent and passage of the Tennessee River by night, thedefeat and capture of the enemy's outposts, the laying of a pontoonbridge across a broad and rapid river, the rebuilding of the railroad, and its maintenance within easy reach of the enemy's front fortwenty-five miles, and that all of this was done without the slightestmishap and with but little loss, and that it resulted in relieving thearmy from want and in putting it in condition to resume the offensiveas soon as its reinforcements had arrived, some fair idea may be had ofthe value of General Smith's services and the part he actuallyperformed in all that took place. If General Rosecrans had actuallyconceived and worked out all the details of the plan, which cannot besuccessfully claimed, there would still be enough left to the credit ofGeneral Smith to immortalize him, but when Grant, Thomas and all theother officers who were present and in position to know what wasactually done gave Smith the praise, not only for conceiving it, butcarrying the plan into successful effect, there is but little room leftfor further controversy. 

If any additional testimony is needed as to the masterful part playedby Smith at Chattanooga, it is found in the fact that Grant made hasteto attach him to his own staff and to recommend him for promotion tothe grade of major-general to take rank from the date of his originalappointment, declaring in support of his recommendation that he felt"under more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in whichhe discharged the duties of his position. " Later he recommended thatSmith be put first of all the army on the list for promotion, adding:"He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army, isvery practical and industrious, " and emphasized it all with the highlyeulogistic declaration that "no man in the army is better qualifiedthan he for the largest military commands. "

It is noteworthy that about the same time General Butler with whom hehad served for a short season, made an application to have GeneralSmith re-assigned to his command, but the Secretary of War, havingevidently forgotten his order for Smith's arrest at the close of theGettysburg campaign, wrote: "The services of William F. Smith, nowChief Engineer in the Army of the Cumberland, are indispensable in thatcommand, and it will be impossible to assign him to your Department. "But this was not all. General George H. Thomas, the soul of honor andfair dealing on the 20th of November, 1863, although General Smith hadalready been transferred from his own to the staff of General Grant, formally recommended him for promotion in the following striking andcomprehensive words:

 "For industry and energy displayed by him from the time of his reporting for duty at these headquarters, in organizing the Engineer Department, and for his skillful execution of the movements at Brown's Ferry, Tennessee, on the night of October 26th, 1863, in surprising the enemy and throwing a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at that point, a vitally important service necessary to the opening of communications between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. "

Certainly no language could be more clear and unequivocal than this, and yet, as though General Thomas wished to remove all chance of doubtas to whom the highest credit was due, he declared in a later and moreformal official report:

 "To Brigadier General William F. Smith, Chief Engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movements at Brown's Ferry. "

While even the best memory so long after the event is but little to bedepended upon for details, it may serve especially when supplementingthe records, to strengthen the conclusions therefrom. In this instanceit should be stated that it was perfectly well known to the lateCharles A. Dana, then present at Chattanooga as Assistant Secretary ofWar, and also to myself, who was serving at the time on General Grant'sstaff as Inspector General, and was in daily contact with all theleading officers, that it was General Smith, and General Smith alone, who conceived and carried out the plan actually used for the capture ofBrown's Ferry and the re-establishment of the direct line ofcommunication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Indeed, there was noquestion in that army, or at that time, in regard to the matter. Rosecrans was never mentioned in connection with it, while Smith'spraise was in everybody's mouth till the close of the campaign, notonly for the Brown's Ferry movement, but, what was still moreimportant, for the plan of operations against Bragg's position onMissionary Ridge. He it was who personally familiarized himself withthe _terrain_ in the entire field of operations, which, with themountains, valleys, rivers and creeks, that gave it its uniquecharacter, was the most complicated and difficult one of the entirewar, if not the most complicated and difficult one upon which a greatbattle was ever fought. It was he alone who worked out every detail ofthe combinations and movements by which the great victory of MissionaryRidge was won. I state this upon my own knowledge and not upon hearsay. 

Moreover, it was conceded by all in high command that Smith was easilythe leading strategist in that entire host. He knew all the details ofthe ground and all the difficulties to be overcome, better than anyother man. He studied them more closely, and with more intelligencethan any other man, not only because it was his duty to do so, butbecause he was conscious of the portentous fact now so commonly lostsight of that the safety and success of the army depended upon thediscovery and adoption of a feasible plan of action. Grant, thegeneralissimo, had neither the time nor opportunity to gather thefacts. He was neither an engineer nor strange as it may seem, a closecalculator of the chances. 

He necessarily depended upon the Chief Engineer, and the criticismwhich was sure to come from others, to gather and sift the data uponwhich final action must be based. Thomas was there from the first, able, methodical and invincible, a great field tactician, but notspecially distinguished for his knowledge of engineering, grand tacticsor strategy. Sherman came afterwards. He was bold, active andenergetic, and had a fine eye for topography. He knew as well as anyonewhat could be done and what could not be done by an army, but he cametoo late to take part in the original investigations, or to do anythingmore than to accept the part assigned to him, and from an examinationof the ground say whether or not he could carry it out. The importantfact is that Smith was, beyond any question, the first mind among themall for working out just such problems as confronted the leaders of theUnion army at Chattanooga, and that task was by common consent assignedto him. The responsibility was Grant's. His judgment and resolutionmust necessarily decide and execute, but it was Smith's place to gatherthe facts and work out the details of one of the most complicatedmilitary problems that was ever presented for solution, and it canhardly be too much to say that he discharged his task with suchpatience, skill and success as to justly entitle himself to be known inhistory as the Strategist of Chattanooga. Were his distinguishedassociates living, it cannot be doubted they would willingly concedethat honor to him. In their official reports and correspondence at thetime they went far beyond the usual limit to give him praise, andalthough Grant finally withdrew his friendship from him, for reasonswhich will be given hereafter, he never in the slightest degreewithdrew or modified the praise he had awarded him for his services inthe Chattanooga campaign. 

But to return to the details of the plan of operations. It was Smithwho discovered the possibility of turning Bragg's position onMissionary Ridge, by the Army of the Tennessee. After personalexamination of the lay of the ground he suggested that Sherman's armycoming up from Bridgeport through Lookout Valley should cross to thenorth side of the Tennessee by the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and afterpassing to the east side of Moccasin Point, under cover of the woods, to a position opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, should re-crossthe Tennessee River, by a bridge to be thrown under cover of darkness, and land on the end of Missionary Ridge with the obvious purpose ofmarching along the Ridge and rolling up and destroying Bragg's army, ortaking it in reverse and driving it from its line of supply andretreat. As early as the 8th of November, Mr. Dana, writing to theSecretary of War, speaks of a reconnaissance made by Thomas, Smith andBrannan on the north side of the river to a point opposite the mouth ofCitico Creek, near the head of Missionary Ridge, which he thought atthat time "proved Smith's plan of attack impractical. " But furtherinvestigation proved that a passage could he made higher up the river, and when Sherman was taken to the place that had been selected, examining both the place for the bridge and its approaches, on bothsides of the river, with his usual care, he closed his field glasseswith a snap and turning to Smith said with emphasis: "Baldy, it can bedone!"

And so much of it as referred to the passage of the river was donewithout halt or fault, just as it had been planned. Sherman's entirearmy, except his rear division that had been cut off by a break in theBrown's Ferry floating bridge, was brought upon the field just in theway suggested and by the means which had been provided by GeneralSmith. I assisted in transferring the troops to the South bank of theriver at the point of crossing, by the use of the river steamer"Dunbar, " which had been put under my command so as to make certainthat a sufficient force should be on the ground in time to cover theconstruction of the bridge. The bridge was laid successfully and thearmy was transferred without delay. Every stage of the movement pointedto an onward and victorious march against Bragg's commanding position, and a complete victory was finally achieved, but much to the surpriseand disappointment of all, it was not attained at the time nor in theway that had been expected. The prearranged plan, so far as it concernsSherman's army, had no other legitimate purpose than to land it onBragg's exposed right flank and double him up or drive him from hisregular line of supply and retreat. And there is nothing more certainthan that there was no man in authority on either side who intended thebattle to be fought as it was actually fought, nor who seriouslyexpected the victory to be won in the way it finally was won byThomas's army, and not by Sherman's. 

It is here worthy of remark that for nearly a quarter of a century bothGrant and Sherman believed and contended--in fact both died in thebelief--that Sherman's lodgement on the foot-hills at the north end ofMissionary Ridge, and his unsuccessful attack from that place, causedBragg to so weaken his center by withdrawing troops from his center andleft, to resist Sherman, that Thomas met with but little resistancewhen he advanced to the attack about ten hours later, in obedience toGrant's personal order. But it has been shown by irrefutable testimony, and is now conceded, that there is not a word of truth in thissupposition--"that nothing of the kind occurred, " and that in face ofall statements and suppositions to the contrary, however natural theymay have seemed at the time, "not a single regiment, nor a single pieceof artillery, " not even "a single Confederate soldier was withdrawnfrom Thomas's front to Sherman's on the final day of the battle. Allthe Confederate reports are clear and specific on that point. "

The simple fact is that the plan of operations for Sherman were clearand perfect, and they were carried out in their initial stage withoutfault or accident, but their execution in the final and vital stage wasmarred by Sherman himself or by his subordinates, who never reached thepoint from which they could strike a fatal blow, or from which theycould have taken possession of Bragg's communications with the rear. 

That Sherman was entirely satisfied with Smith's part in carrying outthe plan, is shown beyond dispute by his report, which bears

 "willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well, and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of * * 1350 feet, laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith. "

The genuineness of this praise is strikingly attested by General Grant, who almost immediately after the battle again urged the Secretary ofWar to give Smith the promotion which he had previously recommended. Unmistakably referring to the part taken by Smith in making andcarrying out the plans which had yielded such notable results, hewrote, among other things: "Recent events have entirely satisfied me ofhis great capabilities and merits. I hasten to renew the recommendationand to urge it. "

Shortly afterwards Grant followed this letter by another asking forSmith's assignment to the command of East Tennessee, to succeed theluckless Burnside, with whom he was dissatisfied, but in so doing heintimated that it would be agreeable to him if the government should, in pursuance of a personal suggestion sent to the War Department aboutthe same time by Mr. Dana, give General Smith even a higher command. Itis now well known that Grant had in mind the command of the Army of thePotomac, and not only then, but frequently afterwards, assured GeneralSmith of his support for that great position. 

The friendship of Grant, Sherman and Thomas, for Smith, was at thattime genuine and unmistakable. Neither of these great generals had everserved with him before. He was a comparative stranger to them, and thathe should have come amongst them from the East under a cloud as he did, and should in less than two months have won such unusual praise andrecommendations is stronger testimony than their words themselves tothe masterful part he had played at Chattanooga, and in recognition ofwhich the President made haste to promote him again to the rank ofMajor General, at that time the highest grade in the service. It is tobe regretted, however, that the vacancy made by his previousnon-confirmation, having long since been filled, and opposition havingarisen on the part of other generals already promoted and confirmed, the President did not feel justified in dating his new commission backto the date of his original appointment. The action of the President, the Secretary of War, who concurred in it, and the Senate which actedupon it, this time without reference to the military committee, set theseal of government approval in the most signal manner upon the servicesand abilities of General Smith. No subsequent action or criticism candeprive him of the great praise and unusual honors which were thenbestowed upon him. 

But a new and far less fortunate era was about to open upon GeneralSmith's career. Grant's work in the west had reached its close, and hisextraordinary success had secured for him the full rank of LieutenantGeneral, with the command of all the armies of the United States. It atonce became known to me, and to others serving at that time on hisstaff; that it was from the first, and till he went east to take chargeof his new duties, Grant's intention to assign Smith to the command ofthe Army of the Potomac. He had come to trust his intelligence, --hisjudgment and his extraordinary _coup d'oeil_ implicitly, and to regardhim as a strategist of consummate ability. He made no concealment ofhis confidence in him, nor of his intentions in his behalf, and therecan be but little doubt that he would have carried those intentionsinto effect could he have done so without injustice to others. But itis also true that after going to the eastern theatre of war andconferring with the President, Secretary Stanton, General Meade andGeneral Butler, the Lieutenant General completely changed his mind, notonly as to the proper plan of campaign for the army of the Potomac, which he had not previously visited or studied, but as to thedisposition to be made of Smith and the other leading generals. In allthis he had the sagacious advice and support of General Rawlins, hisChief of Staff and doubtless of other influential persons. Exactly whyhe did so, or what were the details of the argument which brought himto his final conclusions, is still one of the most interestingunsettled questions of the war. The general argument has already beenindicated in the comprehensive language of Rawlins and that wasdoubtless strengthened by Mr. Lincoln, whose homely but astutereasoning convinced him that the better and safer line of operationswas overland against Lee's army wherever it might be encountered, andnot through a widely eccentric movement by water to a secondary base onthe James River and thence against Richmond. 

It is also doubtless true that finding Meade, who had shown himself tobe a prudent and safe commander, if not a brilliant one, not onlyfavorable to the overland route, but deservedly well thought of by thePresident, the cabinet and the army, while Smith, on the other hand, ifnot openly opposed to this plan of operations, was somewhat persistentas was his custom, in favoring a campaign from the lower James, or evenfrom the sounds of North Carolina, Grant reached the conclusion that itwould be better to retain Meade in immediate command of the principalarmy, and to place Smith over all the troops that could be mobilizedfrom Fortress Monroe in Butler's department. Whatever may have been theopen or secret influences at work, or the reasoning based upon thefacts, this was Grant's first decision, but it is to be observed thatthe plan as adopted was afterwards fatally modified by permittingButler, notwithstanding his partiality for Smith, as shown by hisrecent request for his re-assignment to his department, to take thefield in person, with Smith commanding one of his army corps andGillmore the other. In other words, Grant was not altogether a freeagent, though the government had ostensibly given him a free hand. Ofcourse, Smith knew that in any case he could not be permitted to makeall the plans, even if he held the first subordinate command, and it isalways possible that he had not specially endeared himself to theleading officers of the eastern armies, but there can hardly be a doubtthat he would have given efficient and loyal support to Grant withoutreference to the plan of operations which it might be found necessaryto adopt. 

Without pausing here to recapitulate the arguments for and against theline and general plan of operations actually selected by General Grant, or to consider further his choice of subordinate commanders, it may hewell to call attention to the fact that the organization andarrangements made by him for the control and co-operation of the forcesin Virginia, are now generally regarded by military critics as havingbeen nearly as faulty as they could have been. It will he rememberedthat Meade, with a competent staff had immediate command of the Army ofthe Potomac, but was followed closely wherever he went by General Grantand his staff. At the same time Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, havingan older commission than Meade, and having been once in command of theArmy of the Potomac, was for reasons which must be regarded as largelysentimental, permitted to report directly to and receive his ordersdirectly from Grant, while Butler with two army corps operating atfirst at a considerable distance and later in a semi-detached and lessindependent manner, made his reports to and received his instructionsdirectly from Grant's headquarters. 

This arrangement, as might have been foreseen, was fatal to coherentand prompt co-operative action, and the result was properly describedby Grant himself as comparable only to the work of a "balky team. " Itwas in the nature of things impossible to make either the armies or theseparate army-corps work harmoniously and effectively together. Theorders issued from the different headquarters were necessarily lackingin uniformity of style and expression, and failed to secure that promptand unfailing obedience that in operations extending over so wide anddifficult a field was absolutely essential, and this was entirelyindependent of the merits of the different generals or thepeculiarities of their Chiefs of Staff and Adjutants General. Theforces were too great; they were scattered too widely over the field ofoperations; the conditions of the roads, the width of the streams andthe broken and wooded features of the battle fields were too various, and the means of transport and supply were too inadequate to permit ofsimultaneous and synchronous movements, even if they had beenintelligently provided for, and the generals had uniformly done theirbest to carry them out. 

But when it is considered that Grant's own staff, although presidedover by a very able man from civil life, and containing a number ofzealous and experienced officers from both the regular army and thevolunteers, was not organized for the arrangement of the multifariousdetails and combinations of the marches and battles of a greatcampaign, and indeed under Grant's special instructions made no effortsto arrange them, it will be apparent that properly co-ordinatedmovements could not be counted upon. When it is further considered thatMeade, Burnside, Butler, Hunter and afterwards Sheridan, as well as thecorps commanders, were left almost invariably to work out the detailsfor themselves, it will be seen that prompt, orderly, simultaneous andproperly co-operating movements on an extended scale, from differentparts of the same theatre of operations, and that properly combinedmarches and battle movements were almost impossible. As a fact theyrarely ever took place, and it is not to be wondered at that the bestofficers of every grade in the armies operating in Virginia found muchthroughout the campaign, from beginning to end, to criticise andcomplain of. Nor is it to be thought strange that many of their bestmovements were successful rather because of good luck than of goodmanagement, or failed rather because of their defective execution, thanby the enemy's better arrangements or superior generalship, though itis evident that the Confederates kept their forces better in hand andoperated more in masses than did the Union generals. Theirorganizations were simpler and more compact, their generals were betterchosen and better supported. Operating generally on the defensive andfighting behind breastworks whenever it was possible, it was all themore necessary to bring overwhelming forces to bear against them, inorder to ensure their final overthrow. In addition to the defectiveorganization and inefficient staff arrangements which have beenmentioned, neither the Union government nor the Union generals evermade provisions, or seemed to understand the necessity, for asufficient preponderance of force, to neutralize the advantages whichthe Confederate armies enjoyed, when fighting on the defensive, or torender victory over them reasonably certain. 

Looking back over the long series of partial victories, vexatiousdelays and humiliating failures, and considering the inadequateorganization and defective staff arrangements for which Grant wasmainly responsible, it is evident that the terrible losses in the Unionarmy in the overland campaign were due quite as frequently to thelatter causes as to incompetency or lack of vigor on the part of thesubordinate commanders. The blind grapplings in the forests of theWilderness could not be helped, when both armies were marching throughit, for they could not see each other through the tangled underbrushtill they were almost face to face, but it is now certain that if themarches of the Union army corps had been properly timed and properlyconducted, they could have reached the open country before theConfederate corps could have engaged them. But when the senselessassaults of fortified positions, which occurred in endless succession, from Spottsylvania Court House to Petersburg are considered, it will beimpossible to find sufficient excuse for them. They were in nearlyevery case the direct result of defective staff arrangements and thelack of proper prevision. In a few instances they were due to positiveincompetency on the part of subordinate commanders, while on severalnotable occasions there was a woeful lack of responsible oversight andsupervision on the part of those whose duty it should have been toexercise both. Before the campaign was half over it had come to be anaxiom among both officers and men that a well-defended rifle trenchcould not be carried by a direct attack without the most carefulpreparation nor even then without fearful loss. Such undertakings werefar too costly, and far too frequently ended in failure, to justifythem when they could be avoided. But no experience, however frequent orbloody, no remonstrance however forcible, could eradicate the practiceof resorting to them occasionally. Rawlins was utterly opposed to themand never failed to inveigh against them but the advice of more thanone trusted and influential staff officer was uniformly in favor ofassaulting fortified positions. The favorite refrain at generalheadquarters is said to have been "Smash `em up! Smash `em up!"

It was with special reference to the application of this method ofprocedure at Cold Harbor, that General Smith afterwards gave vent tohis indignation in words of the bitterest criticism. It will beremembered that the entire army confronting the enemy had advanced onthat fatal day in compliance with a general order to attack "all alongthe line, " which was done in a half-hearted, desultory manner, foreboding failure and defeat. Not a soul among the generals or in thefighting line dreamed of success and not a commander from highest tolowest except Smith and Upton, made any adequate preparation to achieveit. Officers and men alike felt that they had been ordered to a suredefeat. Knowing intuitively what awaited them, they wrote their nameson scraps of paper and pinned them to their coats in order that theirbodies might be identified after the slaughter was over. This done theyadvanced in long and wavering lines of blue against the enemy'sbristling breastworks and rifle pits, and were mowed down like ripegrain before the scythe. In almost as short a time as it takes torecount the useless sacrifice, over twelve thousand Union soldiers werekilled and wounded, without shaking the enemy's position or inflictingserious injury upon him. 

Smith and his gallant corps, did their part bravely in the futileattack. They were just back from Butler's abortive movement to BermudaHundred, in which by good management on the part of the General, and bysteadiness on the part of the men, they had saved the expedition from adisgraceful defeat. They were not only hungry and tired, but disgustedwith the incompetency of Butler and his abortive plans. The situationwhich confronted them was most discouraging. They were on new andunknown ground, but they had not yet worn themselves out against Lee'sveterans and therefore they cheerfully took the position assigned them. Smith with his usual foresight and deliberation made haste to examinethe ground in his front, and by availing himself of the advantageswhich his trained eye soon detected he was enabled to direct his mainattack along a sheltering depression against a weak point, where hereached and broke through the enemy's line. He needed only the promptand vigorous support that intelligent prevision and co-operation wouldhave given, to make his lodgement safe and his victory certain. But asno one above him seems to have expected victory, no proper provisionwas made to ensure it. No supports were at hand. Each corps commanderwas looking out for his own front only, and not for his neighbor's. TheConfederates were more wise and more alert, and seeing the danger whichthreatened the continuity of their line, made haste to concentratetheir forces against Smith and of course hurled him back with terribleloss. 

Smarting under this unnecessary disaster, and grieving over the uselessloss and suffering of his gallant men, it was but natural that heshould vent his feelings in sharp and caustic denunciation of all whowere in any degree responsible for the blunder. He was especiallyoutspoken with Grant and Rawlins, whose confidence he had won in theChattanooga campaign, and with whom he had since been on terms of theclosest intimacy and friendship. It is but just to note that they didnot at that time appear to consider his criticism as in any sensedirected against them nor did they rebuke or condemn it, but to thecontrary they gave him every assurance of sympathy and approval. 

But Smith although one of the heaviest sufferers, was not the only oreven the severest critic, of the mismanagement or lack of managementwhich characterized that disastrous day. The result was mostdemoralizing to the army. Officers of every grade were unreserved intheir condemnation. The newspaper criticism was wide-spread andcontinuous. 

It was with special reference to the useless slaughter at Cold Harborthat the gallant and invincible Upton, then coming to be widelyrecognized as the best practical soldier of his day, immediately wrotein confidence to his sister. 

 "I am disgusted with the generalship displayed. Our men have in many instances been foolishly and wantonly sacrificed. Thousands of lives might have been spared by the exercise of a little skill; but as it is, the courage of the men is expected to obviate all difficulties. I must confess that so long as I see such incompetency, there is no grade in the army to which I do not aspire. "

Later referring to the same battle, he adds:

 "On that day [at Cold Harbor] we had a murderous engagement. I say murderous, because we were recklessly ordered to assault the enemy's entrenchments knowing neither their strength nor position. * * * I am very sorry to add that I have seen but little generalship during the campaign. Some of our corps commanders are not fit to be corporals. Lazy and indifferent they will not even ride along their lines, yet without hesitancy they will order us to attack the enemy, no matter what their position or numbers. "

As the assault on Cold Harbor was a general one, it follows of coursethat it must have been ordered by someone higher in authority thaneither Smith of the Eighteenth or Upton of the Sixth Corps. 

It was doubtless in allusion to this and to similar instances that theveracious and outspoken Humphreys, at that time Meade's Chief of Staff, and afterwards the peerless commander of the Second Army Corps, wrote:

 "The incessant movements day and night for so long a period, the constant close contact with the enemy during all that time, the almost daily assaults upon intrenchments having entanglements in front and defended by artillery and musketry in front and flank, exhausted both officers and men. "

Although all the orders which brought about this unfortunate conditionof affairs must have passed through Humphreys himself, it is obviousthat they could not have originated with him, but must have come fromhigher authority. 

If the imperturbable and painstaking Smith, fresh from the triumphs andconfidences of Chattanooga, should have lost his patience under thesedistressing circumstances, and declared to General Grant, frankly andfearlessly as he did as was clearly his duty, that "there had been afearful slaughter at Cold Harbor, " surely it should not have beenbrought up against him later as one of the reasons for relieving himfrom the command of the troops of the Department of the James, to whichhe had been assigned after this criticism had been made. If in the sameinterview Grant acknowledged, as it is credibly stated he did, "thatthere had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothingabout it, because it could do no good, " his remembrance of thecircumstance to the prejudice of Smith, must be regarded as anafterthought which had its origin in some cause not yet fullyexplained. 

It is altogether likely that Smith's criticism was repeated to othersless entitled to speak than himself and that it was exaggerated into adirect attack upon both Meade and Grant, which could not be passed overlightly. Be this as it may, it must be apparent that it was fullyjustified as a mere matter of military criticism and quite independentof both Smith and Upton, it was generally approved both by the army andthe country at large. 

It was shortly after the assault in question, while I was commanding adivision of cavalry, that I visited Grant's headquarters. During theconversation which followed the Lieutenant General asked me: "What isthe matter with this army?" To which I replied:

 "It will take too long to explain, but I can tell you how to cure it. Give Parker [the Indian Chief] a tomahawk, a supply of commissary whiskey and a scalping knife and send him out with orders to bring in the scalps of general officers. "

During this same visit and frequently afterwards Rawlins, in a whiterage, inveighed against the desperate practice of blindly assaultingfortified lines, and denounced in unmeasured terms all who favored themor failed to make adequate preparation for success, where any justexcuse could be found for resorting to them. It is worthy of remark, without reference to the origin of the practice, or to the persons whowere responsible for it, that General Grant alone had the power to stopit, and that later there was a noticeable change in the Army of thePotomac in regard to that practice, although it should be noted thatSherman followed it as an example in his desperate, but unsuccessfulassault of the enemy's impregnable fortifications on Kenesaw Mountain, for the purpose, as he frankly explained, of showing that his armycould also assault strongly fortified lines. 

That such a costly practice could spring up and obtain imitation in ourarmy is a striking commentary upon the lack of intelligent supervisionover the essential details of its daily operations. It affords amplejustification for again calling attention to the fact that in thisrespect the Confederate Army was much better off and more fortunatethan the Union Army. Its generals, although not without fault, weremuch more careful in the management of their military details than ourswere. Jefferson Davis was himself an educated soldier of greatcapacity, and selected none but educated and experienced military menfor high command. While Lee's staff was far from faultless inorganization, he had supreme authority in the field, with no army orindependent corps commanders between him and the troops. His army corpswere led by generals of the first rank, who took their orders directlyfrom him, and no unnecessary time was lost in their transmission orexecution, nor was there any uncertainty as to whose duty it was towork out and superintend the details of attack and defence. Butwhatever may be said in further elucidation of this important subject, I cannot help expressing regret that General Smith, who had shown suchrare talents in another field, for planning and executing the mostcomplicated movements, should not have had in this an opportunity toadd to his fame, instead of being sent out as a subordinate to ageneral who, however great his talents as a lawyer and a militiaman, had developed no special aptitude as an army commander. In thisconnection the important fact should he recalled that Generals Barnardand Meigs, officers of the highest training and distinction, at therequest of General Grant, shortly after the fiasco of Bermuda Hundred, had been sent by the Washington authorities to make an investigation ofGeneral Butler's fitness for command in the field, and had with duedeliberation reported that while "General Butler was a man of rare andgreat ability, he had not had either the training or experience toenable him to direct and control movements in battle. " It was doubtlessthe verification of this report to Grant's satisfaction that caused himfinally to relieve that General from duty in the field, and in doing soto incur both his active and his covert hostility. 

Meanwhile however valid and important, in either a military or apolitical sense, the considerations may have been which sent Butler outin command of an army with such men as Smith and Gilmore, bothprofessional soldiers of the highest standing, as his subordinates, thearrangement was unfortunate from beginning to end, and from its verynature it was foredoomed to failure. It is to be observed that whilethese admirable soldiers were constantly with their troops movingagainst or confronting the enemy, Butler was generally at FortressMonroe, or at a more central point some distance in the rear, and whenhis orders were not ill-timed or inapplicable to the case in hand, theywere not infrequently deemed impracticable, or at cross purposes withthe convictions of the generals whose duty it was to carry them intoeffect. The simple and incontrovertible fact is that General Butler'spresence with that army was from the start embarrassing if notabsolutely unnecessary. It interposed an intermediate commander betweenthe generalissimo and two entire army corps, and however good theintentions of that commander or great his abilities, his principalinfluence was necessarily to derange and delay the orderly conduct anddevelopment of the campaign. It was productive of no good whatever, andwas besides in direct violation of the rule of experience which teachesthat better results are to be expected with one poor commander in fullauthority than with two or more good ones liable to pull against eachother. 

The chief conclusion to be reached from these considerations, and froma study of the records, in connection with the writings and unpublishedmemoirs of General Smith, is that his conduct during the continuance, of the arrangement was not only natural and blameless, but that thefailure of Butler's army to play an important and decisive part, wasdue primarily, if not entirely, to Butler's own misunderstanding ormismanagement of what was entrusted to him, or the inherent defects inthe organization and staff arrangements of the Union forces operatingin Virginia. Under the conditions as they actually existed, effectiveco-operation and control, it has been shown, could not have beenreasonably expected, and for this the verdict of the military criticand historian must be that the Lieutenant General who had ample power, if he chose to exercise it, was primarily responsible. Under theincontrovertible facts of the case it is difficult to see how thisconclusion can be avoided. 

It will he recalled by those who have read "Butler's Book, " that inaddition to a number of trivial derelictions of duty, General Smith wascharged with the more serious one of having failed through negligenceand an untimely cessation of operations, to capture Petersburg, when itwas claimed that all the conditions were favorable to success. Itshould also be recalled that several weeks after this failure had takenplace and all the necessary explanations had been made and considered, the President had, on Grant's recommendation, relieved Butler fromfurther service in the field and had assigned General Smith to thecommand of the Eighteenth Corps which was composed of the troops fromButler's department, serving with the Army of the Potomac. It should beremembered at the same time that before General Smith received thisorder he had applied for and been granted leave of absence on accountof illness, or as he explained, "because of his old trouble with hishead, " and that while he was absent, the Lieutenant General was by somemeans never fully or satisfactorily explained, induced to restoreButler to his former command and to dispense entirely with the servicesof General Smith. In reply to a letter from Smith, he authorizedColonel Comstock of his staff to inform him that he had been relieved"because of the impossibility of his getting along with GeneralButler, " who was his senior in rank. But General Grant assured me aboutthis time that it was with great regret that he had taken this action;that he had tried in vain to utilize Smith's great talents; that he hadbeen too free in his criticisms, and that Smith himself had made itnecessary that either he should be relieved or that Meade, Burnside andButler should he deprived of command and sent out of the army. Someconversation followed, in which it was suggested that he should havegiven the preference to the alternative as a means of simplifying theorganization and increasing the efficiency of the army, and it is asingular coincidence at least, that this suggestion was partly carriedinto effect, with most excellent results, by the relief of both Butlerand Burnside, shortly afterwards, from the command of troops in thattheatre of operations. It has besides long been a question amongmilitary men whether still better results would not have been obtainedif Grant had at the same time relieved Meade, who was certainly a mostcompetent and loyal general, from the immediate command of the Army ofthe Potomac and placed him instead at the head of an army corps. 

It may not be out of place here to call attention to the fact thatwhile no specific limitations were ever put upon the responsibilitiesof Meade as an army commander, Grant thenceforth took upon himself acloser supervision of the details of the campaign, while upon manyoccasions during the final operations, he gave his orders directly tothe corps commanders, instead of sending them through the regularofficial channels. The result of this practice after it becameconfirmed, was in every case beneficial, though it should he observedthat it was far from increasing the cordial relations between Grant andMeade or between their respective headquarters. 

But to return to the breach between Grant and Smith, to the exact stateof facts which led up to it, and to the immediate pressure whichfinally brought about Smith's relief from further command in the field. Much that is as well forgotten, has been written about this unfortunateepisode. Smith felt to the day of his death that he had beenmisrepresented to Grant and unjustly injured by his action. He alwayscontended that the whole truth had not been told, and it must beconfessed that no consecutive and exhaustive analysis of the case hasever been made. Perhaps none can be made. But from such information asI have been able to gather, I have always supposed that Grant's actionwas based upon Smith's criticisms, exaggerated reports of which weremade by certain officers of Butler's staff with whom Smith dined andspent the night at Fortress Monroe on his way home, that Butlerpresented these reports in person to General Grant, without theknowledge or concurrence of Meade or Burnside, and made them the basisof a demand for Smith's immediate relief. Exactly what took place atthe interview must for reasons which will appear hereafter, alwaysremain a matter of conjecture. It however seems to be probable that hadGeneral Smith deferred his leave of absence till he had seated himselffirmly in his new command, or had he been sent for and allowed to makehis own explanation, he would have been spared the humiliation, whichended his military career, while the country would have continued toreceive the assistance of one of its greatest military minds. 

General Smith, by his military writings, has not only refuted theunjust criticisms of General Butler's Book, but he has modestly andconclusively set forth his own military services during the variouscampaigns in which he took part. He points out with pardonable pridethe friendship which sprang up during the Chattanooga campaign, betweenhimself and General Grant. He makes it clear that his failure tocapture Petersburg was due to a number of causes more or less potentialand altogether beyond his control. First among them was the physicalexhaustion of himself and his troops; second, an order which was sentto him through the signal corps from General Butler, who was all dayJune 15 at Point Lookout Signal Station, to stay his advance; and, third, the failure of General Hancock, who was with the Second Corpswithin supporting distance, to take up the movement and give thefinishing stroke to the day's work. To these should be added thedefective staff arrangements by which the various forces in the fieldof operations were controlled, the inadequate strength of Smith'scommand, which was inexcusable where such a vast force was within call, the lack of engineer officers and of exact information as to thecharacter of the ground over which the troops were compelled tooperate, and the total absence of proper support and co-operation onthe part of the Army of the Potomac. Above all, it should be kept inmind that the enemy held the defensive and had interior lines uponwhich he could throw his troops from point to point on his threatenedfront, with greater celerity than the attacking force could beconcentrated by outside lines and across wide rivers against him. 

When Smith began his movement against Petersburg, which was to be inthe nature of a surprise, the greater part of Grant's army was stillnorth of the James River, and both Meade and Hancock allege that theywere not notified that a new effort was to be made to capturePetersburg by Smith alone, after Butler had tried and failed with hiswhole army to isolate and cut it off from Richmond by the movement toBermuda Hundred. Both of these able officers declare that if they hadknown in time that Petersburg was to have been captured, Petersburgwould have been captured. This simple statement, without reference toits truth, which has never been questioned, is conclusive evidence thatthe staff arrangements and the organization of the machinery of commandwere fatally defective, for had it been otherwise, every officer whocould have been called upon to take part in the movement, or could havebeen expected to co-operate with it, would have been so clearlyinstructed as to make his duty entirely plain. 

General Smith, in explanation of why he was relieved from command inthe field, not only reflects strongly upon the conduct of GeneralButler, but endeavors to show that General Grant "was forced" by Butlerto restore him to full command, in order to prevent the exposure of hisown conduct, yet even if this were true it necessarily leaves both thequestion of fact and the question of motives in the dark. Certainletters which passed between Smith, Grant, Rawlins and Butler have beenquoted, for the purpose of illustrating the character of the personsconcerned. They will he found in the Records and they throw much lightupon the subject, but they still leave the reason of Smith's removal inobscurity. 

It cannot be denied that Smith was a man of great talents andconspicuous services, with unusual powers of caustic Criticism, who hadbeen badly injured by the way in which his connection with the Army ofthe James had been severed. His views and conduct had been impugned, not only then, but afterwards, in both the newspapers and the personalstatements of the day, and hence it was but natural that he shouldretort with an appeal to the facts of a private nature more or lesscommented upon at the time, to expose the reasons for official actionand to vindicate his own conduct. He strenuously contended that he wasunder no obligation to conceal any important facts of the caseconnected either personally or officially with those who were using himunkindly to the prejudice of the public welfare, especially where thosefacts were believed to be a potential factor in influencing theirofficial acts and in shaping history. 

It must he confessed that Grant's explanations of his later attitudetowards Smith, and of the reasons for relieving him and restoringButler to command, were neither full nor always stated in the sameterms. He ignores the subject entirely in his memoirs, but it sohappens that Mr. Dana, then Assistant Secretary of War, was sittingwith General Grant when Butler, clad in full uniform, called atheadquarters and was admitted. Dana describes Butler as entering theGeneral's presence with a flushed face and a haughty air, holding outthe order, relieving him from command in the field, and asking:"General Grant, did you issue this order?" To which Grant in ahesitating manner replied: "No, not in that form. " Dana, perceiving atthis point that the subject under discussion was an embarrassing one, and that the interview was likely to be unpleasant, if not stormy, atonce took his leave, but the impression made upon his mind by what hesaw while present was that Butler had in some measure "cowed" hiscommanding officer. What further took place neither General Grant norMr. Dana has ever said. Butler's Book, however, contains what purportsto be a full account of the interview, but it is to be observed that itsignally fails to recite any circumstance of an overbearing nature. Itis abundantly evident, however, from the history of the times and fromcontemporaneous documents published in the Records, that neither theworking arrangements by which Butler commanded an army from hisheadquarters at Fortress Monroe or in the field while the major part ofit, under the command of Smith, was co-operating with the Army of thePotomac, nor his relations with either his superiors or subordinates, were at all satisfactory. In the nature of the case, they could not be. Butler was a lawyer and politician accustomed to browbeat where hecould not persuade. He and Smith while starting out as friends, earlycame to distrust each other. Smith, who was as before stated onintimate terms at general headquarters, made his views fully known fromtime to time, and especially in a frank and manly letter of July 2, 1884, to both Rawlins and Grant, and from the correspondence of thelatter with Halleck, it is certain that both sympathized with Smith atfirst. It was evidently at Grant's request to Halleck, then acting aschief of staff and military adviser at Washington, that Smith wasassigned to the Eighteenth Corps, and at Grant's request that he wasrelieved from it, without explanation. The undisputed fact is that thecountermanding order was issued after a personal interview betweenGrant and Butler, the details of which are only partly known, and thatno further explanation consistent with the continuance of friendlyrelations between Grant and Smith has ever been given. 

The inference to be drawn from the records, the correspondence, theconversations and the writings of all the parties thereto, is that therepresentations of Butler, and especially his comments upon Smith'scriticism of the battles and management of the campaign, were theprincipal factors in convincing Grant that the best way out of thecomplications was to relieve Smith and restore Butler to full command. This way had been foreseen and suggested by Smith himself for he hadasked more than once to be relieved from further service in the fieldon account of ill health, which made it impossible for him to undergoexposure to the hot sun, but his request had been denied, doubtlessfrom a sincere desire on Grant's part to have the advantages of hisservices in the solution of the complicated problem which yetconfronted the army. Had this request been granted when made, or had itbeen granted afterwards, and placed on the ground of a personal favorfor the benefit of his health, which might well have been done, GeneralSmith has frankly admitted that he would have had no shadow of excusefor anything but thanks. But when he was relieved without notice or anyassignment of cause, as he was starting on sick leave, and the orderwas concealed from him till he had returned, a suspicion at once arosein his mind as to the motives which inspired it, and the suspicion wasclaimed by him as a sufficient justification for telling the world allhe knew in regard to those who were responsible for the action of whichhe complains. His military criticism, however indiscreet, had alwaysbeen direct and manly. Its soundness had been approved by some of thebest officers ill the service, including Grant himself, but it must beobserved that the latter in his final report of the campaign, takespains to make the point, evidently to forestall criticism, that he heldhimself responsible for only the general plans of the campaigns andoperations, and that in accordance with an invariable habit, he leftthe details and the actual conduct of the battles to his subordinatecommanders. The wisdom of this arrangement is not here in question, though much might be said against it. Its effect, if admitted, as asound rule of action, must be to transfer the responsibility for abloody and costly campaign to the shoulders of Meade, Humphreys, Burnside, Butler, Sheridan, Hunter, and in a number of cases even tothose of corps and division commanders, instead of leaving it where itmore justly belongs, on the shoulders of those who were responsible forthe working organization of the army, and for the details of its staffarrangements. 

General Smith's true place in history does not depend solely on theseconsiderations, nor on his contributions to the history or criticism ofthe war. Fortunately for him the military committee of the House ofRepresentatives of the Fiftieth Congress on its own motion, long afterall these incidents had been closed, investigated his military career, for the purpose of deciding upon his fitness for the retired list, andon April 20, 1888, it submitted to the House of Representatives ahighly favorable report, from which the following extract is taken:

 "On October, 1863, he [General Smith] was transferred to the West, where he in turn became Chief Engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, on the staff of General George H. Thomas, and of the Military Division of the Mississippi, on the staff of General Grant. As such he devised the plan of operations by which the Army of the Cumberland was saved from starvation and capture at Chattanooga, and was duly credited with the same by General Thomas. He also devised the plan of operations by which Bragg's army was overthrown and driven back from Missionary Ridge, for which services he was again appointed and this time confirmed as Major General of Volunteers, also as Brevet Brigadier General, United States Army. "

After referring to other incidents of his life, which have beenconsidered more fully in this account of his public services and neednot he repeated here, this report added, although General Smith hadresigned from the army many years before, that he was

 "fully entitled at the hands of the government to be retired for a lifetime of hard and conspicuous service, in which he has displayed the most incorruptible honesty, the most outspoken patriotism and devotion and the highest ability. It has been the good fortune of but few men in any age or in any country to save an army and to direct it to victory, from a subordinate position. Such service in Europe would secure honor and riches. In ours it should certainly result in an assignment to a place on the retired list of the army, with the rank of Major General, and the appropriate pay for the remaining years of his life. The committee therefore unanimously recommend the passage of the bill. "

The final action taken in this case, while highly creditable to GeneralSmith, was not as liberal as the House Committee thought it ought tobe. The Senate Committee, while concurring in the commendation of theGeneral, in conformity to its own practice cut his rank on the retiredlist down to that of Major, which was the actual grade he held in theregular army at the date of his resignation. It was a piece ofungracious and niggardly economy, for the services which entitled himto retirement were those of a general officer, and as he was actuallypromoted from Brigadier General to Major General in recognitionthereof, the House of Representatives was clearly right in recommendinghis retirement with the higher grade. General Smith, who had not in anyway asked for this recognition, was strongly inclined to decline it, but on the solicitation of his friends he finally accepted it. 

At the end of the war General Smith, notwithstanding the differenceswhich had arisen between him and his official superiors, received thebrevet of Major General for "gallant and meritorious services in thefield during the rebellion. "

After his relief from further service in the field, General Smithremained at New York, awaiting orders, till November 24th, 1864, atwhich time he was assigned to special duty under the orders of theSecretary of War. This detail was voluntarily tendered and took him toNew Orleans, where he was engaged in looking into the militaryadministration of the department, under Butler and his successors, andin reference to which he made several confidential reports which havenever been given to the public. Perceiving that his military career waspractically at an end, and that he was not likely to receivesatisfactory recognition on the reorganization of the army, he resignedhis volunteer commission on the 4th of November, 1865, and took a leaveof absence as a Major of Engineers, from December 15th, 1865, to March7th, 1867, on which later date his resignation from the army wasaccepted. He had meanwhile taken employment as President of theInternational Ocean Telegraph Company, and had visited Florida, Cubaand Spain for the purpose of obtaining an exclusive concession for aterm of years, for laying, maintaining and operating an ocean telegraphcable from Jacksonville to Havana. He was most successful in hisnegotiations, and in the construction and management of his lines, till1873, when he and his associates sold out under advantageous terms tothe Western Union Telegraph Company. For the next two years he residedabroad, mostly in England, with his family. During this time he visitednearly all the countries of western Europe, where he met and made theacquaintance of many leading men in the highest walks of life. 

In May, 1873, General Smith was appointed one of the policecommissioners for New York City, which place he filled till December31st of that year, when he was appointed president of the board. Heheld this office till March 11th, 1881, during which time he took animportant part in elevating and perfecting the police service. He was, however, too honest and independent to get on harmoniously with thepoliticians, and after an open breach with a number of them, includingthe Mayor, he resigned his position and retired to private life. 

While engaged in this service he took an active interest in thepresidential campaign. It will be remembered that the closeness of thevote between Mr. Tilden and General Hayes, and the high degree oftension between the opposing parties and their managers, filled thecountry with alarm, in the midst of which General Smith was consultedby the friends of Mr. Tilden, with the view of devising measuresagainst the possibility of a subversion of the government by militaryor arbitrary power, but fortunately the device and action of theElectoral Commission averted all danger of that sort. The timid andvacillating behavior of Mr. Tilden during the emergency and afterwardswas, however, a powerful factor in the estrangement of his supporters, and did much to bring about the nomination of General Hancock by thenext Democratic National Convention. General Smith and his friendGeneral Franklin took an active interest in the canvass and convention, and although they were soldiers without political experience, it isbelieved that their endorsement of Hancock and their work in his behalfwas one of the most powerful influences in securing his nomination. They had been his life-long friends and his comrade during the greatconflict, and hence felt justified in giving him their most earnestsupport. 

At the close of the presidential campaign, the result of which wasnecessarily disappointing to General Smith, he was compelled, byunfortunate investments, to look about for an occupation. His friend, General John Newton was then Chief of Engineers and the system ofInternal Improvements, which had long been favored by the Republicanparty, was being carried forward by bountiful appropriations fromCongress. Many officers and civil engineers were required for thesupervision of the various river and harbor works, and General Smith, having had wide experience, was, by the act of his friend, appointedGovernment Agent, and placed in charge of the works on the Peninsulabetween the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, with his headquarters atWilmington, Delaware. On March 1st, 1889, he was, in compliance with aspecial Act of Congress, put upon the retired list of the army, withthe rank of Major. This at once raised the question whether he coulddraw the pay appropriate to his retired rank, and at the same timereceive pay as a Government Agent. After argument by his friend, theHonorable Anthony Higgins, the United States Senator from Delaware, thecase was decided in his favor on the theory that an "agent" was not anofficer, within the meaning of the law. The decision in this case wassimilar to that made in the case of Quartermaster General Meigs, whowas employed to supervise the construction of the Pension Office inWashington, after he had been placed on the retired list. Under thedecision General Smith continued to perform the duties and draw the payof Agent, till 1901, when he voluntarily gave up the appointment anddefinitively retired from business of every kind. For the last tenyears or more he resided in Philadelphia, where he enjoyed theacquaintance and society of his chosen friends to within a few weeks ofhis death, which occurred on the 28th day of February, 1903, four yearssubsequent to the death of his wife. 

He retained his wonderful intellectual powers, absolutely unimpaired, to the date of his final illness. With keen wit, sparkling repartee anda mind always on the alert for fresh information and the beauties ofliterature, he remained a delightful and instructive companion to theend. Firm in the Christian faith and fully satisfied that life hadnothing further in store for him worth waiting for, he took hisdeparture in to the Silent Land composed and free from regret, like astrong man going to sleep. He left a son and daughter with many friendsand hosts of companions scattered throughout the country to mourn hisloss. His native State had filled his heart with pride and satisfactionby giving on the walls of its capital to a bronze effigy and tabletwith a laudatory inscription celebrating his virtues and his mostdistinguished services, and handing down his memory to futuregenerations as one in every way worthy of their respect and admiration. 

[Illustration:

This tablet is presented to Vermont by soldiers from other states whoadmire so much her great soldier son

Brevet Major GeneralWilliam Farrar Smith, U. S. Army. 

The extracts here quoted from the letter of the assistant secretary ofwar C. A. Dana, to General Grant, dated December 21, 1863, show that ata crisis in the Nation's life he was in the thoughts of Lincoln, Stanton and Grant, as the general best qualified for the most importantcommand. 

 "The surest means of getting the rebels altogether out of East Tennessee is to be found in the Army of the Potomac. This naturally led to your second proposition, namely that either Sherman or W. F. Smith should be put in command of that army. Both the Secretary of War and Gen. Halleck said 'Gen. W. F. Smith would be the best person to try'. The President, the Secretary of War and Gen Halleck agree with you in thinking that it would be on the whole much better to select him. "

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Series I Vol. XXXI Page 457 Official Records Union and ConfederateArmies. (War of the Rebellion)]

I cannot close this sketch without repeating in part my personaltestimony to the strength and elevation of General Smith's character. He was blessed by a singularly clear, orderly and comprehensive mind, and was most industrious and persistent in its use. Somewhat phlegmaticand deliberate in temperament and manner, he gave the impressionoccasionally that he was lacking in push and energy, but such was notthe case in fact. During his services on the Rio Grande he suffered, aspreviously related, a malarial attack from which it is now evident henever entirely recovered. Under exposure to the summer sun, he was forthe rest of his life liable to a recurrence of the symptoms especiallythose pertaining to the head, and this may have made him more or lessirascible at times. Military habits are at best not calculated todevelop a mild and patient behavior, nor to beget a spirit ofresignation to unjust or arbitrary treatment, especially if it comesfrom higher authority, and is not merited. 

General Smith was the last man to lay claim to a saint-like character, but according to those who knew him best he possessed a just and even acharitable disposition, which made him fair towards his equals and mostconsiderate towards his subordinates. He was, however, above allthings, logical, and as a close student of his profession, heinvariably followed the established principles of the military art totheir legitimate conclusions. In the presence of great militaryproblems and responsibilities such as those with which he had to dealat Chattanooga, he became absorbed and reticent if not austere and hadbut little to say except to those with whom it was his duty to talk. There the solution was so clearly his own that no one thought ofdisputing it with him till years afterwards. But in the conduct ofoperations against Lee, there were so many roads open, so manycommanders in the field, and so many plans of operations suggested, somany considerations to be observed that no one man except Grant who wasclad with special powers for the emergency, could hope for the honor ofdirecting all movements. That became his exclusive function as soon ashe was made Lieutenant General, but unfortunately, as has been shown, he and Smith began drifting apart from the day of their arrival in theEast, and long before the great task before them was accomplished theyhad by their own peculiarities, looking at the problem from differentpoints of view, and aided doubtless by the misrepresentations andselfish purposes of others, become hopelessly out of harmony with eachother. 

This is not the place to pronounce final judgment between them. Theyknew each other well, and although Grant had said towards the close oftheir friendship, "General Smith, while a very able officer, isobstinate, and is likely to condemn whatever is not suggested byhimself, " he had shown an earnest desire that his great talents shouldbe utilized. On the other hand Smith, who was intimately acquaintedwith both the strength and the weaknesses of Grant's character, hadfull confidence in the soundness of his judgment, when left free fromprejudice and misrepresentation, to act upon a full statement of thefacts. Neither had hitherto shown himself to be particularly sensitiveto criticism from the other, and both were in the highest degreepatriotic and loyal to the cause. They had worked harmoniously and withmarked success together in the West. Not a shadow had come betweenthem. The case must therefore have been a most complicated one whichmade it impossible for them to work together in the same manner and tothe same end in the East. The severance of their relationship, towhatever influence it may be attributed, is profoundly to be regretted, not only because it prematurely ended the military career of GeneralSmith, but because it must have injuriously affected the fortunes ofGeneral Grant as well as of the country and the army, at a time whenboth sorely needed the help of every capable soldier. These results areall the more to be deplored because no one can study the circumstancesconnected therewith, without reaching the conclusion that they werebrought about by methods which were themselves not above criticism, andwhich finally resulted in the downfall of their author.