MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR BY JACOB DOLSON COX, A. M. , LL. D. _Formerly Major-General commanding Twenty-Third Army Corps_ VOLUME I. APRIL 1861--NOVEMBER 1863 PREFACE My aim in this book has been to reproduce my own experience in ourCivil War in such a way as to help the reader understand just howthe duties and the problems of that great conflict presentedthemselves successively to one man who had an active part in it fromthe beginning to the end. In my military service I was so consciousof the benefit it was to me to get the personal view of men who hadserved in our own or other wars, as distinguished from the generalor formal history, that I formed the purpose, soon after peace wasrestored, to write such a narrative of my own army life. Myrelations to many prominent officers and civilians were such as togive opportunities for intimate knowledge of their personalqualities as well as their public conduct. It has seemed to me thatit might be useful to share with others what I thus learned, and tothrow what light I could upon the events and the men of that time. As I have written historical accounts of some campaigns separately, it may be proper to say that I have in this book avoided repetition, and have tried to make the personal narrative supplement and lendnew interest to the more formal story. Some of the earlier chaptersappeared in an abridged form in "Battles and Leaders of the CivilWar, " and the closing chapter was read before the Ohio Commandery ofthe Loyal Legion. By arrangements courteously made by the CenturyCompany and the Commandery, these chapters, partly re-written, arehere found in their proper connection. Though my private memoranda are full enough to give me reasonableconfidence in the accuracy of these reminiscences, I have made it aduty to test my memory by constant reference to the originalcontemporaneous material so abundantly preserved in the governmentpublication of the Official Records of the Union and ConfederateArmies. Where the series of these records is not given, myreferences are to the First Series, with the abbreviation O. R. , andI have preferred to adhere to the official designation of thevolumes in parts, as each volume then includes the documents of asingle campaign. J. D. C. NOTE. --The manuscript of this work had been completed by GeneralCox, and placed in the hands of the publishers several weeks beforehis untimely death at Magnolia, Mass. , August 4, 1900. He himselfhad read and revised some four hundred pages of the press-work. Thework of reading and revising the remaining proofs and of preparing ageneral index for the work was undertaken by the undersigned from adeep sense of obligation to and loving regard for the author, whichcould not find a more fitting expression at this time. No materialchanges have been made in text or notes. Citations have been lookedup and references verified with care, yet errors may have crept in, which his well-known accuracy would have excluded. For all such andfor the imperfections of the index, the undersigned must acceptresponsibility, and beg the indulgence of the reader, who will findin the text itself enough of interest and profit to excuse manyshortcomings. WILLIAM C. COCHRAN. CINCINNATI, October 1, 1900. CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR Ohio Senate, April 12--Sumter bombarded--"Glory to God!"--Thesurrender--Effect on public sentiment--Call for troops--Politicianschanging front--David Tod--Stephen A. Douglas--The insurrection mustbe crushed--Garfield on personal duty--Troops organized by theStates--The militia--Unpreparedness--McClellan at Columbus--MeetsGovernor Dennison--Put in command--Our stock of munitions--Makingestimates--McClellan's plan--Camp Jackson--Camp Dennison--Gatheringof the volunteers--Garibaldi uniforms--Officering the troops--Offfor Washington--Scenes in the State Capitol--Governor Dennison'slabors--Young regulars--Scott's policy--Alex. McCook--OrlandoPoe--Not allowed to take state commissions. CHAPTER II CAMP DENNISON Laying out the camp--Rosecrans as engineer--A comfortlessnight--Waking to new duties--Floors or no floors for thehuts--Hardee's Tactics--The watersupply--Colonel TomWorthington--Joshua Sill--Brigades organized--Bates'sbrigade--Schleich's--My own--McClellan's purpose--Divisionorganization--Garfield disappointed--Camp routine--Instruction anddrill--Camp cookery--Measles--Hospital barn--Sisters ofCharity--Ferment over re-enlistment--Musters by GordonGranger--"Food for powder"--Brigade staff--De Villiers--"A Captainof Calvary"--The "Bloody Tinth"--Almost a row--Summoned to thefield. CHAPTER III McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA Political attitude of West Virginia--Rebels take theinitiative--McClellan ordered to act--Ohio militia cross theriver--The Philippi affair--Significant dates--The vote onsecession--Virginia in the Confederacy--Lee incommand--Topography--The mountain passes--Garnett's army--RichMountain position--McClellan in the field--His forces--Advancesagainst Garnett--Rosecrans's proposal--His fight on themountain--McClellan's inaction--Garnett's retreat--Affair atCarrick's Ford--Garnett killed--Hill's efforts to intercept--Pegramin the wilderness--He surrenders--Indirect resultsimportant--McClellan's military and personal traits. CHAPTER IV THE KANAWHA VALLEY Orders for the Kanawha expedition--The troops and theirquality--Lack of artillery and cavalry--Assembling atGallipolis--District of the Kanawha--Numbers of the opposingforces--Method of advance--Use of steamboats--Advance guards onriver banks--Camp at Thirteen-mile Creek--Night alarm--The riverchutes--Sunken obstructions--Pocotaligo--Affair atBarboursville--Affair at Scary Creek--Wise's position at TylerMountain--His precipitate retreat--Occupation ofCharleston--Rosecrans succeeds McClellan--Advance toward GauleyBridge--Insubordination--The Newspaper Correspondent--Occupation ofGauley Bridge. CHAPTER V GAULEY BRIDGE The gate of the Kanawha valley--The wilderness beyond--West Virginiadefences--A romantic post--Chaplain Brown--An adventurousmission--Chaplain Dubois--"The river path"--Gauley Mount--ColonelTompkins's home--Bowie-knives--Truculent resolutions--TheEngineers--Whittlesey, Benham, Wagner--Fortifications--Distantreconnoissances--Comparison of forces--Dangers to steamboatcommunications--Allotment of duties--The Summersville post--SeventhOhio at Cross Lanes--Scares and rumors--Robert E. Lee at ValleyMountain--Floyd and Wise advance--Rosecrans's orders--The CrossLanes affair--Major Casement's creditable retreat--Colonel Tyler'sreports--Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton--Quarrels of Wise andFloyd--Ambushing rebel cavalry--Affair at Boone Court House--Newattack at Gauley Bridge--An incipient mutiny--Sad result--A notablecourt-martial--Rosecrans marching toward us--Communicationsrenewed--Advance toward Lewisburg--Camp Lookout--A private sorrow. CHAPTER VI CARNIFEX FERRY--TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK Rosecrans's march to join me--Reaches Cross Lanes--Advance againstFloyd--Engagement at Carnifex Ferry--My advance to SundayRoad--Conference with Rosecrans--McCook's brigade joins me--Advanceto Camp Lookout--Brigade commanders--Rosecrans's personalcharacteristics--Hartsuff--Floyd and Wise again--"Battle ofBontecou"--Sewell Mountain--The equinoctial--General Schenckarrives--Rough lodgings--Withdrawal from the mountain--Rear-guardduties--Major Slemmer of Fort Pickens fame--New positions coveringGauley Bridge--Floyd at Cotton Mountain--Rosecrans's methods withprivate soldiers--Progress in discipline. CHAPTER VII COTTON MOUNTAIN Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge--Effect on Rosecrans--Topography ofGauley Mount--De Villiers runs the gantlet--Movements of ourforces--Explaining orders--A hard climb on the mountain--In the postat Gauley Bridge--Moving magazine and telegraph--A balkymule-team--Ammunition train under fire--Captain Fitch a modelquartermaster--Plans to entrap Floyd--Moving supply trains atnight--Method of working the ferry--Of making flatboats--The CottonMountain affair--Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham--Vain plans toreach East Tennessee. CHAPTER VIII WINTER-QUARTERS An impracticable country--Movements suspended--Experienced troopsordered away--My orders from Washington--Rosecrans objects--Adisappointment--Winter organization of the Department--Sifting ourmaterial--Courts-martial--Regimental schools--Drill and picketduty--A military execution--Effect upon the army--Politicalsentiments of the people--Rules of conduct toward them--Case of Mr. Parks--Mr. Summers--Mr. Patrick--Mr. Lewis Ruffner--Mr. Doddridge--Mr. B. F. Smith--A house divided against itself--MajorSmith's journal--The contrabands--A fugitive-slavecase--Embarrassments as to military jurisdiction. CHAPTER IX VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS High quality of first volunteers--Discipline milder than that of theregulars--Reasons for the difference--Practical efficiency of themen--Necessity for sifting the officers--Analysis of theirdefects--What is military aptitude?--Diminution of number inascending scale--Effect of age--Of former life andoccupation--Embarrassments of a new business--Quick progress of theright class of young men--Political appointments--Professionalmen--Political leaders naturally prominent in a civil war--"Cuttingand trying"--Dishonest methods--An excellent army at the end of ayear--The regulars in 1861--Entrance examinations for WestPoint--The curriculum there--Drill and experience--Itslimitations--Problems peculiar to the vast increase of thearmy--Ultra-conservatism--Attitude toward the Lincolnadministration--"Point de zêle"--Lack of initiative--Civil work ofarmy engineers--What is military art?--Opinions of experts--Militaryhistory--European armies in the Crimean War--Truegeneralship--Anomaly of a double army organization. CHAPTER X THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT--SPRING CAMPAIGN Rosecrans's plan of campaign--Approved by McClellan withmodifications--Wagons or pack-mules--Final form of plan--Changes incommands--McClellan limited to Army of the Potomac--Halleck'sDepartment of the Mississippi--Frémont's MountainDepartment--Rosecrans superseded--Preparations in the KanawhaDistrict--Batteaux to supplement steamboats--Light wagons formountain work--Frémont's plan--East Tennessee as an objective--Thesupply question--Banks in the Shenandoah valley--Milroy'sadvance--Combat at McDowell--Banks defeated--Frémont's plansderanged--Operations in the Kanawha valley--Organization ofbrigades--Brigade commanders--Advance to Narrows of New River--Thefield telegraph--Concentration of the enemy--Affair atPrinceton--Position at Flat-top Mountain. CHAPTER XI POPE IN COMMAND--TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON A key position--Crook's engagement at Lewisburg--Watching andscouting--Mountain work--Pope in command--Consolidation ofDepartments--Suggestions of our transfer to the East--Pope's OrderNo. 11 and Address to the Army--Orders to march across themountains--Discussion of them--Changed to route by water andrail--Ninety-mile march--Logistics--Arriving in Washington--Tworegiments reach Pope--Two sent to Manassas--Jackson capturesManassas--Railway broken--McClellan at Alexandria--Engagement atBull Run Bridge--Ordered to Upton's Hill--CoveringWashington--Listening to the Bull Run battle--Ill news travels fast. CHAPTER XII RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES--REORGANIZATION--HALLECK AND HISSUBORDINATES McClellan's visits to my position--Riding the lines--Discussing thepast campaign--The withdrawal from the James--Prophecy--McClellanand the soldiers--He is in command of the defences--Intricacy ofofficial relations--Reorganization begun--Pope's army marchesthrough our works--Meeting of McClellan and Pope--Pope'scharacteristics--Undue depreciation of him--The situation whenHalleck was made General-in-Chief--Pope's part in it--Reasons fordislike on the part of the Potomac Army--McClellan's secretservice--Deceptive information of the enemy's force--Informationfrom prisoners and citizens--Effects of McClellan's illusion as toLee's strength--Halleck's previous career--Did he intend to takecommand in the field?--His abdication of the field command--Thenecessity for a union of forces in Virginia--McClellan's inactionwas Lee's opportunity--Slow transfer of the Army of thePotomac--Halleck burdened with subordinate's work--Burnside twicedeclines the command--It is given to McClellan--Pope relieved--Otherchanges in organization--Consolidation--New campaign begun. CHAPTER XIII SOUTH MOUNTAIN March through Washington--Reporting to Burnside--The NinthCorps--Burnside's personal qualities--To Leesboro--Straggling--Lee'sarmy at Frederick--Our deliberate advance--Reno at New Market--Themarch past--Reno and Hayes--Camp gossip--Occupation ofFrederick--Affair with Hampton's cavalry--Crossing CatoctinMountain--The valley and South Mountain--Lee's order found--Divisionof his army--Jackson at Harper's Ferry--Supporting Pleasonton'sreconnoissance--Meeting Colonel Moor--An involuntarywarning--Kanawha Division's advance--Opening of the battle--Carryingthe mountain crest--The morning fight--Lull at noon--Arrival ofsupports--Battle renewed--Final success--Death of Reno--Hooker'sbattle on the right--His report--Burnside's comments--Franklin'sengagement at Crampton's Gap. CHAPTER XIV ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS Lee's plan of invasion--Changed by McClellan's advance--The positionat Sharpsburg--Our routes of march--At the Antietam--McClellanreconnoitring--Lee striving to concentrate--Our delays--Tuesday'squiet--Hooker's evening march--The Ninth Corps command--Changing ourpositions--McClellan's plan of battle--Hooker's eveningskirmish--Mansfield goes to support Hooker--Confederatepositions--Jackson arrives--McLaws and Walker reach the field--Theirplaces. CHAPTER XV ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT Hooker astir early--The field near the Dunker Church--Artillerycombat--Positions of Hooker's divisions--Rocky ledges in thewoods--Advance of Doubleday through Miller's orchard andgarden--Enemy's fire from West Wood--They rush for Gibbon'sbattery--Repulse--Advance of Patrick's brigade--Fierce fightingalong the turnpike--Ricketts's division in the East Wood--Fresheffort of Meade's division in the centre--A lull in thebattle--Mansfield's corps reaches the field--Conflicting opinions asto the hour--Mansfield killed--Command devolves on Williams--Advancethrough East Wood--Hooker wounded--Meade in command of the corps--Itwithdraws--Greene's division reaches the Dunker Church--Crawford'sin the East Wood--Terrible effects on the Confederates--Sumner'scorps coming up--Its formation--It moves on the Dunker Church fromthe east--Divergence of the divisions--Sedgwick's passes to right ofGreene--Attacked in flank and broken--Rallying at the Poffenbergerhill--Twelfth Corps hanging on near the church--Advance of French'sdivision--Richardson follows later--Bloody Lane reached--The Piperhouse--Franklin's corps arrives--Charge of Irwin's brigade. CHAPTER XVI ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT Ninth Corps positions near Antietam Creek--Rodman's division atlower ford--Sturgis's at the bridge--Burnside's headquarters on thefield--View from his place of the battle on the right--French'sfight--An exploding caisson--Our orders to attack--The hour--Crisisof the battle--Discussion of the sequence of events--The Burnsidebridge--Exposed approach--Enfiladed by enemy'sartillery--Disposition of enemy's troops--His position verystrong--Importance of Rodman's movement by the ford--The fight atthe bridge--Repulse--Fresh efforts--Tactics of theassault--Success--Formation on further bank--Bringing upammunition--Willcox relieves Sturgis--The latter now insupport--Advance against Sharpsburg--Fierce combat--Edge of the townreached--Rodman's advance on the left--A. P. Hill's Confederatedivision arrives from Harper's Ferry--Attacks Rodman's flank--A rawregiment breaks--The line retires--Sturgis comes into thegap--Defensive position taken and held--Enemy's assaultsrepulsed--Troops sleeping on their arms--McClellan's reserve--Othertroops not used--McClellan's idea of Lee's force and plans--Lee'sretreat--The terrible casualty lists. CHAPTER XVII McCLELLAN AND POLITICS--HIS REMOVAL AND ITS CAUSE Meeting Colonel Key--His changes of opinion--His relations toMcClellan--Governor Dennison's influence--McClellan's attitudetoward Lincoln--Burnside's position--The Harrison Landingletter--Compared with Lincoln's views--Probable intent of theletter--Incident at McClellan's headquarters--John W. Garrett--Emancipation Proclamation--An after-dinner discussion ofit--Contrary influences--Frank advice--Burnside and JohnCochrane--General Order 163--Lincoln's visit to camp--Riding thefield--A review--Lincoln's desire for continuing thecampaign--McClellan's hesitation--His tactics of discussion--Hisexaggeration of difficulties--Effect on his army--Disillusion a slowprocess--Lee's army not better than Johnston's--Work done by ourWestern army--Difference in morale--An army rarely bolder than itsleader--Correspondence between Halleck and McClellan--Lincoln'sremarkable letter on the campaign--The army moves on November 2--Leeregains the line covering Richmond--McClellan relieved--Burnside incommand. CHAPTER XVIII PERSONAL RELATIONS OF McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER Intimacy of McClellan and Burnside--Private letters in the officialfiles--Burnside's mediation--His self-forgetful devotion--Themovement to join Pope--Burnside forwards Porter's dispatches--Hisdouble refusal of the command--McClellan suspends the organizationof wings--His relations to Porter--Lincoln's letter on thesubject--Fault-finding with Burnside--Whose work?--Burnside'sappearance and bearing in the field. CHAPTER XIX RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA Ordered to the Kanawha valley again--An unwelcome surprise--Reasonsfor the order--Reporting to Halleck at Washington--Affairs in theKanawha in September--Lightburn's positions--Enemy under Loringadvances--Affair at Fayette C. H. --Lightburn retreats--Gauley Bridgeabandoned--Charleston evacuated--Disorderly flight to theOhio--Enemy's cavalry raid under Jenkins--General retreat inTennessee and Kentucky--West Virginia not in any Department--Nowannexed to that of Ohio--Morgan's retreat from CumberlandGap--Ordered to join the Kanawha forces--Milroy's brigade also--Myinterviews with Halleck and Stanton--Promotion--My task--My divisionsent with me--District of West Virginia--Colonel Crookpromoted--Journey westward--Governor Peirpoint--GovernorTod--General Wright--Destitution of Morgan's column--Refitting atPortland, Ohio--Night drive to Gallipolis--An amusingaccident--Inspection at Point Pleasant--Milroy ordered toParkersburg--Milroy's qualities--Interruptions to movement oftroops--No wagons--Supplies delayed--Confederate retreat--Loringrelieved--Echols in command--Our march up the valley--Echolsretreats--We occupy Charleston and Gauley Bridge--Further advancestopped--Our forces reduced--Distribution of remainingtroops--Alarms and minor movements--Case of Mr. Summers--Histreatment by the Confederates. CHAPTER XX WINTER QUARTERS, 1862-63--PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS Central position of Marietta, Ohio--Connection with all parts ofWest Virginia--Drill and instruction of troops--Guerillawarfare--Partisan Rangers--Confederate laws--Disposal ofplunder--Mosby's Rangers as a type--Opinions of Lee, Stuart, andRosser--Effect on other troops--Rangers finally abolished--Rivalhome-guards and militia--Horrors of neighborhood war--Staff andstaff duties--Reduction of forces--General Cluseret--Laterconnection with the Paris Commune--His relations with Milroy--Heresigns--Political situation--Congressmen distrust Lincoln--Cutler'sdiary--Resolutions regarding appointments of general officers--Thenumber authorized by law--Stanton's report--Effect of Act of July, 1862--An excess of nine major-generals--The legal questionsinvolved--Congressional patronage and local distribution--Ready fora "deal"--Bill to increase the number of generals--A "slate" made upto exhaust the number--Senate and Housedisagree--Conference--Agreement in last hours of the session--Thenew list--A few vacancies by resignation, etc. --List of thosedropped--My own case--Faults of the method--Lincoln's humorouscomments--Curious case of General Turchin--Congestion in the highestgrades--Effects--Confederate grades of general andlieutenant-general--Superiority of our system--Cotemporaneousreports and criticisms--New regiments instead of recruiting oldones--Sherman's trenchant opinion. CHAPTER XXI FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA--BURNSIDE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO Desire for field service--Changes in the Army of thePotomac--Judgment of McClellan at that time--Our defectiveknowledge--Changes in West Virginia--Errors in neworganization--Embarrassments resulting--Visit to GeneralSchenck--New orders from Washington--Sent to Ohio to administer thedraft--Burnside at head of the department--District ofOhio--Headquarters at Cincinnati--Cordial relations of Governor Todwith the military authorities--System of enrolment anddraft--Administration by Colonel Fry--Decay of the veteranregiments--Bounty-jumping--Effects on political parties--Soldiersvoting--Burnside's military plans--East Tennessee--Rosecrans aimingat Chattanooga--Burnside's business habits--His frankness--Storiesabout him--His personal characteristics--Cincinnati as a bordercity--Rebel sympathizers--Order No. 38--Challenged byVallandigham--The order not a new departure--Lincoln'sproclamation--General Wright's circular. CHAPTER XXII THE VALLANDIGHAM CASE--THE HOLMES COUNTY WAR Clement L. Vallandigham--His opposition to the war--His theory ofreconstruction--His Mount Vernon speech--His arrest--Sent before themilitary commission--General Potter its president--Counsel for theprisoner--The line of defence--The judgment--Habeas Corpusproceedings--Circuit Court of the United States--Judge Leavittdenies the release--Commutation by the President--Sent beyond thelines--Conduct of Confederate authorities--Vallandigham inCanada--Candidate for Governor--Political results--Martiallaw--Principles underlying it--Practical application--The intent toaid the public enemy--The intent to defeat the draft--Armedresistance to arrest of deserters, Noble County--To the enrolment inHolmes County--A real insurrection--Connection of these withVallandigham's speeches--The Supreme Court refuses tointerfere--Action in the Milligan case after the war--Judge Davis'spersonal views--Knights of the Golden Circle--The Holmes Countyoutbreak--Its suppression--Letter to Judge Welker. CHAPTER XXIII BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS--THE SUMMER'S DELAYS Condition of Kentucky and Tennessee--Halleck's instructions toBurnside--Blockhouses at bridges--Relief of EastTennessee--Conditions of the problem--Vast wagon-trainrequired--Scheme of a railroad--Surveys begun--Burnside's efforts toarrange co-operation with Rosecrans--Bragg sending troops toJohnston--Halleck urges Rosecrans to activity--Continuedinactivity--Burnside ordered to send troops to Grant--Rosecrans'scorrespondence with Halleck--Lincoln's dispatch--Rosecrans collectshis subordinates' opinions--Councils of war--The situationconsidered--Sheridan and Thomas--Computation ofeffectives--Garfield's summing up--Review of the situation whenRosecrans succeeded Buell--After Stone's River--Relativeforces--Disastrous detached expeditions--Appeal to ambition--Themajor-generalship in regular army--Views of the Presidentjustified--Burnside's forces--Confederate forces in EastTennessee--Reasons for the double organization of the Union armies. CHAPTER XXIV THE MORGAN RAID Departure of the staff for the field--An amusingly quickreturn--Changes in my own duties--Expeditions to occupy theenemy--Sanders' raid into East Tennessee--His route--His success andreturn--The Confederate Morgan's raid--His instructions--Hisreputation as a soldier--Compared with Forrest--Morgan's startdelayed--His appearance at Green River, Ky. --Foiled by ColonelMoore--Captures Lebanon--Reaches the Ohio at Brandenburg--GeneralHobson in pursuit--Morgan crosses into Indiana--Was this hisoriginal purpose?--His route out of Indiana into Ohio--He approachesCincinnati--Hot chase by Hobson--Gunboats co-operating on theriver--Efforts to block his way--He avoids garrisoned posts andcities--Our troops moved in transports by water--Condition ofMorgan's jaded column--Approaching the Ohio atBuffington's--Gunboats near the ford--Hobson attacks--Part captured, the rest fly northward--Another capture--A long chase--Surrender ofMorgan with the remnant--Summary of results--A burlesquecapitulation. CHAPTER XXV THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE News of Grant's victory at Vicksburg--A thrilling scene at theopera--Burnside's Ninth Corps to return--Stanton urges Rosecrans toadvance--The Tullahoma manoeuvres--Testy correspondence--Its realmeaning--Urgency with Burnside--Ignorance concerning hissituation--His disappointment as to Ninth Corps--Rapid concentrationof other troops--Burnside's march into East Tennessee--Occupation ofKnoxville--Invests Cumberland Gap--The garrison surrenders--Goodnews from Rosecrans--Distances between armies--Divergent lines--Norailway communication--Burnside concentrates toward the Virginialine--Joy of the people--Their intense loyalty--Their faith in thefuture. CHAPTER XXVI BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE Organizing and arming the loyalists--Burnside concentrates nearGreeneville--His general plan--Rumors of Confederatereinforcements--Lack of accurate information--The Ninth Corps inKentucky--Its depletion by malarial disease--Death of General Welshfrom this cause--Preparing for further work--Situation on 16thSeptember--Dispatch from Halleck--Its apparent purpose--Necessity todispose of the enemy near Virginia border--Burnside personally atthe front--His great activity--Ignorance of Rosecrans'speril--Impossibility of joining him by the 20th--Ruinous effects ofabandoning East Tennessee--Efforts to aid Rosecrans without suchabandonment--Enemy duped into burning Watauga bridgethemselves--Ninth Corps arriving--Willcox's division garrisonsCumberland Gap--Reinforcements sent Rosecrans from allquarters--Chattanooga made safe from attack--The supplyquestion--Meigs's description of the roads--Burnside halted nearLoudon--Halleck's misconception of the geography--The peopleimploring the President not to remove the troops--How Longstreet gotaway from Virginia--Burnside's alternate plans--Minor operations inupper Holston valley--Wolford's affair on the lower Holston. APPENDIX A APPENDIX B MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR CHAPTER I THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR Ohio Senate April 12--Sumter bombarded--"Glory to God!"--Thesurrender--Effect on public sentiment--Call for troops--Politicianschanging front--David Tod--Stephen A. Douglas--The insurrection mustbe crushed--Garfield on personal duty--Troops organized by theStates--The militia--Unpreparedness--McClellan at Columbus--MeetsGovernor Dennison--Put in command--Our stock of munitions--Makingestimates--McClellan's plan--Camp Jackson--Camp Dennison--Gatheringof the volunteers--Garibaldi uniforms--Officering the troops--Offfor Washington--Scenes in the State Capitol--Governor Dennison'slabors--Young regulars--Scott's policy--Alex. McCook--OrlandoPoe--Not allowed to take state commissions. On Friday the twelfth day of April, 1861, the Senate of Ohio was insession, trying to go on in the ordinary routine of business, butwith a sense of anxiety and strain which was caused by the troubledcondition of national affairs. The passage of Ordinances ofSecession by one after another of the Southern States, and even theassembling of a provisional Confederate government at Montgomery, had not wholly destroyed the hope that some peaceful way out of ourtroubles would be found; yet the gathering of an army on the sandsopposite Fort Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun werefired, we knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement. Hoping almost against hope that blood would not be shed, and thatthe pageant of military array and of a rebel government would passby and soon be reckoned among the disused scenes and properties of apolitical drama that never pretended to be more than acting, wetried to give our thoughts to business; but there was no heart init, and the morning hour lagged, for we could not work in earnestand we were unwilling to adjourn. Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an excited way, andcatching the chairman's eye, exclaimed, "Mr. President, thetelegraph announces that the secessionists are bombarding FortSumter!" There was a solemn and painful hush, but it was broken in amoment by a woman's shrill voice from the spectators' seats, crying, "Glory to God!" It startled every one, almost as if the enemy werein the midst. But it was the voice of a radical friend of the slave, who after a lifetime of public agitation believed that only throughblood could freedom be won. Abby Kelly Foster had been attending thesession of the Assembly, urging the passage of some measuresenlarging the legal rights of married women, and, sitting beyond therailing when the news came in, shouted a fierce cry of joy thatoppression had submitted its cause to the decision of the sword. With most of us, the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in ourown land overshadowed everything, and seemed too great a price topay for any good; a scourge to be borne only in preference toyielding the very groundwork of our republicanism, --the right toenforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through theelection of President and Congress. The next day we learned that Major Anderson had surrendered, and thetelegraphic news from all the Northern States showed plain evidenceof a popular outburst of loyalty to the Union, following a briefmoment of dismay. Judge Thomas M. Key of Cincinnati, chairman of theJudiciary Committee, was the recognized leader of the Democraticparty in the Senate, [Footnote: Afterward aide-de-camp and actingjudge-advocate on McClellan's staff. ] and at an early hour moved anadjournment to the following Tuesday, in order, as he said, that thesenators might have the opportunity to go home and consult theirconstituents in the perilous crisis of public affairs. No objectionwas made to the adjournment, and the representatives took a similarrecess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense, --theRepublicans to know what initiative the Administration at Washingtonwould take, and the Democrats to determine what course they shouldfollow if the President should call for troops to put down theinsurrection. Before we meet again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and call forseventy-five thousand militia for three months' service were out, and the great mass of the people of the North, forgetting all partydistinctions, answered with an enthusiastic patriotism that sweptpoliticians off their feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning, Judge Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the railing inthe Senate chamber, broke out impetuously, "Mr. Cox, the people havegone stark mad!" "I knew they would if a blow was struck against theflag, " said I, reminding him of some previous conversations we hadhad on the subject. He, with most of the politicians of the day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current of public opinion, and partly by reaction of their own hearts against the falsetheories which had encouraged the secessionists, determined tosupport the war measures of the government, and to make no factiousopposition to such state legislation as might be necessary tosustain the federal administration. The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others, and makersone of the most striking features of the time. On the 8th of Januarythe usual Democratic convention and celebration of the Battle of NewOrleans had taken place, and a series of resolutions had beenpassed, which were drafted, as was understood, by Judge Thurman. Inthese, professing to speak in the name of "two hundred thousandDemocrats of Ohio, " the convention had very significantly intimatedthat this vast organization of men would be found in the way of anyattempt to put down secession until the demands of the South inrespect to slavery were complied with. A few days afterward I wasreturning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull County, and meetingupon the railway train with David Tod, then an active Democraticpolitician, but afterward one of our loyal "war governors, " theconversation turned on the action of the convention which had justadjourned. Mr. Tod and I were personal friends and neighbors, and Ifreely expressed my surprise that the convention should havecommitted itself to what must be interpreted as a threat ofinsurrection in the North if the administration should, in opposingsecession by force, follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whosehonor they had assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted thesubstance of the resolution, saying that we Republicans would findthe two hundred thousand Ohio Democrats in front of us, if weattempted to cross the Ohio River. My answer was, "We will give upthe contest if we cannot carry your two hundred thousand over theheads of your leaders. " The result proved how hollow the party professions had been; orperhaps I should say how superficial was the hold of such partydoctrines upon the mass of men in a great political organization. Inthe excitement of political campaigns they had cheered theextravagant language of party platforms with very little reflection, and the leaders had imagined that the people were really andearnestly indoctrinated into the political creed of Calhoun; but atthe first shot from Beauregard's guns in Charleston harbor theirlatent patriotism sprang into vigorous life, and they crowded to therecruiting stations to enlist for the defence of the national flagand the national Union. It was a popular torrent which no leaderscould resist; but many of these should be credited with the samepatriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivious of partyconsistency. Stephen A. Douglas passed through Columbus on his wayto Washington a few days after the surrender of Sumter, and inresponse to the calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke tothem from his bedroom window in the American House. There had beenno thought for any of the common surroundings of a public meeting. There were no torches, no music. A dark crowd of men filled full thedim-lit street, and called for Douglas with an earnestness of tonewholly different from the enthusiasm of common political gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and without any light near him, spoke solemnly to the people upon the terrible crisis which had comeupon the nation. Men of all parties were there: his own followers toget some light as to their duty; the Breckinridge Democrats ready, most of them, repentantly to follow a Northern leader, now thattheir recent candidate was in the rebellion; [Footnote: Breckinridgedid not formally join the Confederacy till September, but his accordwith the secessionists was well known. ] the Republicans eagerlyanxious to know whether so potent an influence was to beunreservedly on the side of the country. I remember well the serioussolicitude with which I listened to his opening sentences as Ileaned against the railing of the State House park, trying in vainto get more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at theunlighted window. His deep sonorous voice rolled down through thedarkness from above us, --an earnest, measured voice, the moresolemn, the more impressive, because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us literally as "a voice in the night, "--the night ofour country's unspeakable trial. There was no uncertainty in histone: the Union must be preserved and the insurrection must becrushed, --he pledged his hearty support to Mr. Lincoln'sadministration in doing this. Other questions must stand aside tillthe national authority should be everywhere recognized. I do notthink we greatly cheered him, --it was rather a deep Amen that wentup from the crowd. We went home breathing freer in the assurance wenow felt that, for a time at least, no organized opposition to thefederal government and its policy of coercion would be formidable inthe North. We did not look for unanimity. Bitter and narrow menthere were whose sympathies were with their country's enemies. Others equally narrow were still in the chains of the secessionlogic they had learned from the Calhounists; but the broader-mindedmen found themselves happy in being free from disloyal theories, andthrew themselves sincerely and earnestly into the popular movement. There was no more doubt where Douglas or Tod or Key would be found, or any of the great class they represented. Yet the situation hung upon us like a nightmare. Garfield and I werelodging together at the time, our wives being kept at home by familycares, and when we reached our sitting-room, after an eveningsession of the Senate, we often found ourselves involuntarilygroaning, "Civil war in _our_ land!" The shame, the outrage, thefolly, seemed too great to believe, and we half hoped to wake fromit as from a dream. Among the painful remembrances of those days isthe ever-present weight at the heart which never left me till Ifound relief in the active duties of camp life at the close of themonth. I went about my duties (and I am sure most of those Iassociated with did the same) with the half-choking sense of a griefI dared not think of: like one who is dragging himself to theordinary labors of life from some terrible and recent bereavement. We talked of our personal duty, and though both Garfield and myselfhad young families, we were agreed that our activity in theorganization and support of the Republican party made the duty ofsupporting the government by military service come peculiarly hometo us. He was, for the moment, somewhat trammelled by hishalf-clerical position, but he very soon cut the knot. My own pathseemed unmistakably clear. He, more careful for his friend than forhimself, urged upon me his doubts whether my physical strength wasequal to the strain that would be put upon it. "I, " said he, "am bigand strong, and if my relations to the church and the college can bebroken, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting; but you areslender and will break down. " It was true that I looked slender fora man six feet high (though it would hardly be suspected now that itwas so), yet I had assured confidence in the elasticity of myconstitution; and the result justified me, whilst it also showed howliable to mistake one is in such things. Garfield found that he hada tendency to weakness of the alimentary system which broke him downon every campaign in which he served and led to his retiring fromthe army much earlier than he had intended. My own health, on theother hand, was strengthened by out-door life and exposure, and Iserved to the end with growing physical vigor. When Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the existing lawsmade it necessary that these should be fully organized and officeredby the several States. Then, the treasury was in no condition tobear the burden of war expenditures, and till Congress couldassemble, the President was forced to rely on the States to furnishthe means necessary for the equipment and transportation of theirown troops. This threw upon the governors and legislatures of theloyal States responsibilities of a kind wholly unprecedented. A longperiod of profound peace had made every military organization seemalmost farcical. A few independent military companies formed themerest shadow of an army; the state militia proper was only anominal thing. It happened, however, that I held a commission asBrigadier in this state militia, and my intimacy with GovernorDennison led him to call upon me for such assistance as I couldrender in the first enrolment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arranging to be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might beneeded upon important legislation, I gave my time chiefly to suchmilitary matters as the governor appointed. Although, as I havesaid, my military commission had been a nominal thing, and in fact Ihad never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theoreticpreparation for such work. For some years the possibility of a warof secession had been one of the things which would force itselfupon the thoughts of reflecting people, and I had been led to givesome careful study to such books of tactics and of strategy as werewithin easy reach. I had especially been led to read militaryhistory with critical care, and had carried away many valuable ideasfrom this most useful means of military education. I had thereforesome notion of the work before us, and could approach its problemswith less loss of time, at least, than if I had been whollyignorant. [Footnote: I have treated this subject somewhat more fullyin a paper in the "Atlantic Monthly" for March, 1892, "Why the Menof '61 fought for the Union. "] My commission as Brigadier-General in the Ohio quota in nationalservice was dated on the 23d of April, though it had been understoodfor several days that my tender of service in the field would beaccepted. Just about the same time Captain George B. McClellan wasrequested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for consultation, and by the governor's request I met him at the railway station andtook him to the State House. I think Mr. Larz Anderson (brother ofMajor Robert Anderson) and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were withhim. The intimation had been given me that he would probably be mademajor-general and commandant of our Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan him closely. He was rather under the mediumheight, but muscularly formed, with broad shoulders and awell-poised head, active and graceful in motion. His wholeappearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out he showed nolack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain travellingsuit, with a narrow-rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed whathe was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At thetime his name was a good deal associated with that of Beauregard;they were spoken of as young men of similar standing in the EngineerCorps of the Army, and great things were expected of them bothbecause of their scientific knowledge of their profession, thoughMcClellan had been in civil life for some years. His report on theCrimean War was one of the few important memoirs our old army hadproduced, and was valuable enough to give a just reputation forcomprehensive understanding of military organization, and thepromise of ability to conduct the operations of an army. I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. Thedestitution of the State of everything like military material andequipment was very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task ofbuilding up a small army out of nothing was not blinked. Thegovernor spoke of the embarrassment he felt at every step from thelack of practical military experience in his staff, and of hisdesire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the detailsof military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood thedifficulties there would be before him, and said that no man couldwholly master them at once, although he had confidence that if a fewweeks' time for preparation were given, he would be able to put theOhio division into reasonable form for taking the field. The commandwas then formally tendered and accepted. All of us who were presentfelt that the selection was one full of promise and hope, and thatthe governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time. The next morning McClellan requested me to accompany him to theState Arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. Wefound a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issuedto militia companies and had been returned rusted and damaged. Nobelts, cartridge-boxes, or other accoutrements were with them. Therewere two or three smooth-bore brass fieldpieces, six-pounders, whichhad been honeycombed by firing salutes, and of which the vents hadbeen worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a heap in one cornerlay a confused pile of mildewed harness, which had probably beenonce used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had for many years been no money appropriated to buy militarymaterial or even to protect the little the State had. The federalgovernment had occasionally distributed some arms which were in thehands of the independent uniformed militia, and the arsenal wassimply an empty storehouse. It did not take long to complete ourinspection. At the door, as we were leaving the building, McClellanturned, and looking back into its emptiness, remarked, halfhumorously and half sadly, "A fine stock of munitions on which tobegin a great war!" We went back to the State House, where a room inthe Secretary of State's department was assigned us, and we sat downto work. The first task was to make out detailed schedules andestimates of what would be needed to equip ten thousand men for thefield. This was a unit which could be used by the governor andlegislature in estimating the appropriations needed then orsubsequently. Intervals in this labor were used in discussing thegeneral situation and plans of campaign. Before the close of theweek McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own views, andforwarded it to Lieutenant-General Scott. He read it to me, and myrecollection of it is that he suggested two principal lines ofmovement in the West, --one, to move eastward by the Kanawha valleywith a heavy column to co-operate with an army in front ofWashington; the other, to march directly southward and to open thevalley of the Mississippi. Scott's answer was appreciative andflattering, without distinctly approving his plan; and I have neverdoubted that the paper prepared the way for his appointment in theregular army which followed at so early a day. [Footnote: I am notaware that McClellan's plan of campaign has been published. Scott'sanswer to it is given in General Townsend's "Anecdotes of the CivilWar, " p. 260. It was, with other communications from GovernorDennison, carried to Washington by Hon. A. F. Perry of Cincinnati, an intimate friend of the governor, who volunteered as specialmessenger, the mail service being unsafe. See a paper by Mr. Perryin "Sketches of War History" (Ohio Loyal Legion), _vol. Iii. _ p. 345. ] During this week McClellan was invited to take the command of thetroops to be raised in Pennsylvania, his native State. Some thingsbeside his natural attachment to Pennsylvania made the proposal anattractive one to him. It was already evident that the army whichmight be organized near Washington would be peculiarly in the publiceye, and would give to its leading officers greater opportunities ofprompt recognition and promotion than would be likely to occur inthe West. The close association with the government would also be asource of power if he were successful, and the way to a chiefcommand would be more open there than elsewhere. McClellan told mefrankly that if the offer had come before he had assumed the Ohiocommand, he would have accepted it; but he promptly decided that hewas honorably bound to serve under the commission he had alreadyreceived and which, like my own, was dated April 23. My own first assignment to a military command was during the sameweek, on the completion of our estimates, when I was for a few daysput in charge of Camp Jackson, the depot of recruits which GovernorDennison had established in the northern suburb of Columbus and hadnamed in honor of the first squelcher of secessionism. McClellansoon determined, however, that a separate camp of instruction shouldbe formed for the troops mustered into the United States service, and should be so placed as to be free from the temptations andinconveniences of too close neighborhood to a large city, whilst itshould also be reasonably well placed for speedy defence of thesouthern frontier of the State. Other camps could be under statecontrol and used only for the organization of regiments which couldafterward be sent to the camp of instruction or elsewhere. Railwaylines and connections indicated some point in the Little Miamivalley as the proper place for such a camp; and Mr. Woodward, thechief engineer of the Little Miami Railroad, being taken intoconsultation, suggested a spot on the line of that railway aboutthirteen miles from Cincinnati, where a considerable bend of theLittle Miami River encloses wide and level fields, backed on thewest by gently rising hills. I was invited to accompany the generalin making the inspection of the site, and I think we wereaccompanied by Captain Rosecrans, an officer who had resigned fromthe regular army to seek a career as civil engineer, and had latelybeen in charge of some coal mines in the Kanawha valley. Mr. Woodward was also of the party, and furnished a special train toenable us to stop at as many eligible points as it might be thoughtdesirable to examine. There was no doubt that the point suggestedwas best adapted for our work, and although the owners of the landmade rather hard terms, McClellan was authorized to close a contractfor the use of the military camp, which, in honor of the governor, he named Camp Dennison. But in trying to give a connected idea of the first militaryorganization of the State, I have outrun some incidents of thosedays which are worth recollection. From the hour the call for troopswas published, enlistments began, and recruits were parading thestreets continually. At the Capitol the restless impulse to be doingsomething military seized even upon the members of the legislature, and a large number of them assembled every evening upon the eastterrace of the State House to be drilled in marching and facing, byone or two of their own number who had some knowledge of companytactics. Most of the uniformed independent companies in the citiesof the State immediately tendered their services, and began torecruit their numbers to the hundred men required for acceptance. There was no time to procure uniform, nor was it desirable; forthese independent companies had chosen their own, and would have tochange it for that of the United States as soon as this could befurnished. For some days companies could be seen marching anddrilling, of which part would be uniformed in some gaudy style, suchas is apt to prevail in holiday parades in time of peace, whilstanother part would be dressed in the ordinary working garb ofcitizens of all degrees. The uniformed files would also be armed andaccoutred; the others would be without arms or equipments, and asawkward a squad as could well be imagined. The material, however, was magnificent, and soon began to take shape. The fancy uniformswere left at home, and some approximation to a simple and usefulcostume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy furnished auseful idea, and the "Garibaldi uniform" of a red flannel shirt withbroad falling collar, with blue trousers held by a leathernwaist-belt, and a soft felt hat for the head, was extensivelycopied, and served an excellent purpose. It could be made by thewives and sisters at home, and was all the more acceptable for that. The spring was opening, and a heavy coat would not be much needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good blanket in animprovised knapsack, the new company was not badly provided. Thewarm scarlet color, reflected from their enthusiastic faces as theystood in line, made a picture that never failed to impress themustering officers with the splendid character of the men. The officering of these new troops was a difficult and delicatetask, and so far as company officers were concerned, there seemed nobetter way at the beginning than to let the enlisted men elect theirown, as was in fact done. In most cases where entirely new companieswere raised, it had been by the enthusiastic efforts of someenergetic volunteers who were naturally made the commissionedofficers. But not always. There were numerous examples ofself-denying patriotism which stayed in the ranks after expendingmuch labor and money in recruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to some one supposed to have military knowledge orexperience. The war in Mexico in 1847 was the latest conflict with acivilized people, and to have served in it was a sure passport toconfidence. It had often been a service more in name than in fact;but the young volunteers felt so deeply their own ignorance thatthey were ready to yield to any pretence of superior knowledge, andgenerously to trust themselves to any one who would offer to leadthem. Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were thus put intoresponsible places at the beginning, but the sifting work went onfast after the troops were once in the field. The election of fieldofficers, however, ought not to have been allowed. Companies werenecessarily regimented together, of which each could have but littlepersonal knowledge of the officers of the others; intrigue anddemagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mistakes were made inselection. After a time the evil worked its own cure, but the illeffects of it were long visible. The immediate need of troops to protect Washington caused most ofthe uniformed companies to be united into the first two regiments, which were quickly despatched to the East. It was a curious study towatch the indications of character as the officers commandingcompanies reported to the governor, and were told that the pressingdemand from Washington made it necessary to organize a regiment ortwo and forward them at once, without waiting to arm or equip therecruits. Some promptly recognized the necessity and took theundesirable features as part of the duty they had assumed. Otherswere querulous, wishing some one else to stand first in the breach, leaving them time for drill, equipment, and preparation. One figureimpressed itself very strongly on my memory. A sturdy form, a headwith more than ordinary marks of intelligence, but a bearing withmore of swagger than of self-poised courage, yet evidently a man ofsome importance in his own community, stood before the seat of thegovernor, the bright lights of the chandelier over the tablelighting strongly both their figures. The officer was wrapped in aheavy blanket or carriage lap-robe, spotted like a leopard skin, which gave him a brigandish air. He was disposed to protest. "If mymen were hellions, " said he, with strong emphasis on the word (a newone to me), "I wouldn't mind; but to send off the best young fellowsof the county in such a way looks like murder. " The governor, sitting with pale, delicate features, but resolute air, answeredthat the way to Washington was not supposed to be dangerous, and themen could be armed and equipped, he was assured, as soon as theyreached there. It would be done at Harrisburg, if possible, andcertainly if any hostility should be shown in Maryland. ThePresident wanted the regiments at once, and Ohio's volunteers werequite as ready to go as any. He had no choice, therefore, but toorder them off. The order was obeyed; but the obedience was with badgrace, and I felt misgivings as to the officer's fitness tocommand, --misgivings which about a year afterward were vividlyrecalled with the scene I have described. No sooner were these regiments off than companies began to stream infrom all parts of the State. On their first arrival they werequartered wherever shelter could be had, as there were no tents orsheds to make a camp for them. Going to my evening work at the StateHouse, as I crossed the rotunda, I saw a company marching in by thesouth door, and another disposing itself for the night upon themarble pavement near the east entrance; as I passed on to the northhall, I saw another, that had come a little earlier, holding aprayer-meeting, the stone arches echoing with the excitedsupplications of some one who was borne out of himself by theterrible pressure of events around him, whilst, mingling with hispathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country, came theshrill notes of the fife, and the thundering din of the inevitablebass drum from the company marching in on the other side. In theSenate chamber a company was quartered, and the senators were theresupplying them with paper and pens, with which the boys were writingtheir farewells to mothers and sweethearts whom they hardly daredhope they should see again. A similar scene was going on in theRepresentatives' hall, another in the Supreme Court room. In theexecutive office sat the governor, the unwonted noises, when thedoor was opened, breaking in on the quiet business-like air of theroom, --he meanwhile dictating despatches, indicating answers toothers, receiving committees of citizens, giving directions toofficers of companies and regiments, accommodating himself to thewilful democracy of our institutions which insists upon seeing theman in chief command and will not take its answer from asubordinate, until in the small hours of the night the noises werehushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undisturbed work uponthe matters of chief importance, he could leave the glare of hisgas-lighted office, and seek a few hours' rest, only to renew thesame wearing labors on the morrow. On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not more intensecharacter. A minority of unthinking partisans could not understandthe strength and sweep of the great popular movement, and wouldsometimes venture to speak out their sympathy with the rebellion ortheir sneers at some party friend who had enlisted. In the boilingtemper of the time the quick answer was a blow; and it was one ofthe common incidents of the day for those who came into the StateHouse to tell of a knockdown that had occurred here or there, whenthis popular punishment had been administered to some indiscreet"rebel sympathizer. " Various duties brought young army officers of the regular service tothe state capital, and others sought a brief leave of absence tocome and offer their services to the governor of their native State. General Scott, too much bound up in his experience of the MexicanWar, and not foreseeing the totally different proportions which thismust assume, planted himself firmly on the theory that the regulararmy must be the principal reliance for severe work, and that thevolunteers could only be auxiliaries around this solid nucleus whichwould show them the way to perform their duty and take the brunt ofevery encounter. The young regulars who asked leave to acceptcommissions in state regiments were therefore refused, and wereordered to their own subaltern positions and posts. There can be nodoubt that the true policy would have been to encourage the whole ofthis younger class to enter at once the volunteer service. Theywould have been the field officers of the new regiments, and wouldhave impressed discipline and system upon the organization from thebeginning. The Confederacy really profited by having no regulararmy. They gave to the officers who left our service, it is true, commissions in their so-called "provisional army, " to encourage themin the assurance that they would have permanent military positionsif the war should end in the independence of the South; but this wasonly a nominal organization, and their real army was made up (asours turned out practically to be) from the regiments of statevolunteers. Less than a year afterward we changed our policy, but itwas then too late to induce many of the regular officers to takeregimental positions in the volunteer troops. I hesitate to declarethat this did not turn out for the best; for although theorganization of our army would have been more rapidly perfected, there are other considerations which have much weight. The armywould not have been the popular thing it was, its closeidentification with the people's movement would have been weakened, and it perhaps would not so readily have melted again into the massof the nation at the close of the war. Among the first of the young regular officers who came to Columbuswas Alexander McCook. He was ordered there as inspection andmustering officer, and one of my earliest duties was to accompanyhim to Camp Jackson to inspect the cooked rations which thecontractors were furnishing the new troops. I warmed to his earnest, breezy way, and his business-like activity in performing his duty. As a makeshift, before camp equipage and cooking utensils could beissued to the troops, the contractors placed long trestle tablesunder an improvised shed, and the soldiers came to these and ate, asat a country picnic. It was not a bad arrangement to bridge over theinterval between home life and regular soldiers' fare, and theoutcry about it at the time was senseless, as all of us know who sawreal service afterward. McCook bustled along from table to table, sticking a long skewer into a boiled ham, smelling of it to see ifthe interior of the meat was tainted; breaking open a loaf of breadand smelling of it to see if it was sour; examining the coffeebefore it was put into the kettles, and after it was made; passinghis judgment on each, in prompt, peremptory manner as we went on. The food was, in the main, excellent, though, as a way of supportingan army, it was quite too costly to last long. While mustering in the recruits, McCook was elected colonel of theFirst Regiment Ohio Volunteers, which had, I believe, already goneto Washington. He was eager to accept, and telegraphed to Washingtonfor permission. Adjutant-General Thomas replied that it was not thepolicy of the War Department to permit it. McCook cut the knot ingallant style. He immediately tendered his resignation in theregular army, taking care to say that he did so, not to avoid hiscountry's service or to aid her enemies, but because he believed hecould serve her much more effectively by drilling and leading aregiment of Union volunteers. He notified the governor of hisacceptance of the colonelcy, and his _coup-de-main_ was a success;for the department did not like to accept a resignation under suchcircumstances, and he had the exceptional luck to keep his regularcommission and gain prestige as well, by his bold energy in thematter. Orlando Poe came about the same time, for all this was occurring inthe last ten days of April. He was a lieutenant of topographicalengineers, and was stationed with General (then Captain) Meade atDetroit, doing duty upon the coast survey of the lakes. He was inperson the model for a young athlete, tall, dark, and strong, withfrank, open countenance, looking fit to repeat his ancestor AdamPoe's adventurous conflicts with the Indians as told in the frontiertraditions of Ohio. He too was eager for service; but the same rulewas applied to him, and the argument that the engineers would beespecially necessary to the army organization kept him for a timefrom insisting upon taking volunteer service, as McCook had done. Hewas indefatigable in his labors, assisting the governor inorganizing the regiments, smoothing the difficulties constantlyarising from lack of familiarity with the details of theadministrative service of the army, and giving wise advice to thevolunteer officers who made his acquaintance. I asked him, one day, in my pursuit of practical ideas from all who I thought could helpme, what he would advise as the most useful means of becomingfamiliar with my duties. Study the Army Regulations, said he, as ifit were your Bible! There was a world of wisdom in this: much morethan I appreciated at the time, though it set me earnestly to workin a right direction. An officer in a responsible command, who hadalready a fair knowledge of tactics, might trust his common sensefor guidance in an action on the field; but the administrativeduties of the army as a machine must be thoroughly learned, if hewould hope to make the management of its complicated organization aneasy thing to him. Major Sidney Burbank came to take McCook's place as musteringofficer: a grave, earnest man, of more age and more variedexperience than the men I have named. Captain John Pope also visitedthe governor for consultation, and possibly others came also, thoughI saw them only in passing, and did not then get far in making theiracquaintance. CHAPTER II CAMP DENNISON Laying out the camp--Rosecrans as engineer--A comfortlessnight--Waking to new duties--Floors or no floors for thehuts--Hardee's Tactics--The water-supply--Colonel Tom. Worthington--Joshua Sill--Brigades organized--Bates'sbrigade--Schleich's--My own--McClellan's purpose--Divisionorganization--Garfield disappointed--Camp routine--Instruction anddrill--Camp cookery--Measles--Hospital barn--Sisters ofCharity--Ferment over re-enlistment--Musters by GordonGranger--"Food for powder"--Brigade staff--De Villiers--"A Captainof Calvary"--The "Bloody Tinth"--Almost a row--Summoned to thefield. On the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to proceed nextmorning to Camp Dennison, with the Eleventh and half of the ThirdOhio regiments. The day was a fair one, and when about noon ourrailway train reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellentplace for our work. The drawback was that very little of the landwas in meadow or pasture, part being in wheat and part in Indiancorn, which was just coming up. Captain Rosecrans met us, asMcClellan's engineer (later the well-known general), coming fromCincinnati with a train-load of lumber. He had with him his compassand chain, and by the help of a small detail of men soon laid offthe ground for the two regimental camps, and the general lines ofthe whole encampment for a dozen regiments. It was McClellan'spurpose to put in two brigades on the west side of the railway, andone on the east. My own brigade camp was assigned to the west side, and nearest to Cincinnati. The men of the two regiments shoulderedtheir pine boards and carried them up to the line of the companystreets, which were close to the hills skirting the valley, andwhich opened into the parade and drill ground along the railway. A general plan was given to the company officers by which the hutsshould be made uniform in size and shape. The huts of each companyfaced each other, three or four on each side, making the streetbetween, in which the company assembled before marching to its placeon the regimental color line. At the head of each street were thequarters of the company officers, and those of the "field and staff"still further in rear. The Regulations were followed in this plan asclosely as the style of barracks and nature of the ground wouldpermit. Vigorous work housed all the men before night, and it waswell that it did so, for the weather changed in the evening, a coldrain came on, and the next morning was a chill and dreary one. Myown headquarters were in a little brick schoolhouse of one story, which stood (and I think still stands) on the east side of the trackclose to the railway. My improvised camp equipage consisted of acommon trestle cot and a pair of blankets, and I made my bed in theopen space in front of the teacher's desk or pulpit. My only staffofficer was an aide-de-camp, Captain Bascom (afterward of theregular army), who had graduated at an Eastern military school, andproved himself a faithful and efficient assistant. He slept on thefloor in one of the little aisles between the pupils' seats. Onelesson learned that night remained permanently fixed in my memory, and I had no need of a repetition of it. I found that, having nomattress on my cot, the cold was much more annoying below than aboveme, and that if one can't keep the under side warm, it doesn'tmatter how many blankets he may have atop. I procured later an armycot with low legs, the whole of which could be taken apart andpacked in a very small parcel, and with this I carried a smallquilted mattress of cotton batting. It would have been warmer tohave made my bed on the ground with a heap of straw or leaves underme; but as my tent had to be used for office work whenever a tentcould be pitched, I preferred the neater and more orderly interiorwhich this arrangement permitted. This, however, is anticipating. The comfortless night passed without much refreshing sleep, thestrange situation doing perhaps as much as the limbs aching fromcold to keep me awake. The storm beat through broken window-panes, and the gale howled about us, but day at last began to break, andwith its dawning light came our first reveille in camp. I shallnever forget the peculiar plaintive sound of the fifes as theyshrilled out on the damp air. The melody was destined to become veryfamiliar, but to this day I can't help wondering how it happenedthat so melancholy a strain was chosen for the waking tune of thesoldiers' camp. The bugle reveille is quite different; it is evencheery and inspiriting; but the regulation music for the drums andfifes is better fitted to waken longings for home and all the sadderemotions than to stir the host from sleep to the active duties ofthe day. I lay for a while listening to it, finding its notessuggesting many things and becoming a thread to string my reveriesupon, as I thought of the past which was separated from me by agreat gulf, the present with its serious duties, and the futurelikely to come to a sudden end in the shock of battle. We rousedourselves; a dash of cold water put an end to dreaming; we ate abreakfast from a box of cooked provisions we had brought with us, and resumed the duty of organizing and instructing the camp. Thedepression which had weighed upon me since the news of the openingguns at Sumter passed away, never to return. The consciousness ofhaving important work to do, and the absorption in the work itself, proved the best of all mental tonics. The Rubicon was crossed, andfrom this time out, vigorous bodily action, our wild outdoor life, and the strenuous use of all the faculties, mental and physical, inmeeting the daily exigencies, made up an existence which, in spiteof all its hardships and all its discouragements, still seems a mostexhilarating one as I look back on it across a long vista of years. The first of May proved, instead, a true April day, of the mostfickle and changeable type. Gusts of rain and wind alternated withflashes of bright sunshine. The second battalion of the ThirdRegiment arrived, and the work of completing the cantonments wenton. The huts which were half finished yesterday were now put in goodorder, and in building the new ones the men profited by theexperience of their comrades. We were however suddenly thrown intoone of those small tempests which it is so easy to get up in a newcamp, and which for the moment always seems to have an importanceout of all proportion to its real consequence. Captain Rosecrans, asengineer, was superintending the work of building, and finding thatthe companies were putting floors and bunks in their huts, heperemptorily ordered that these should be taken out, insisting thatthe huts were only intended to take the place of tents and give suchshelter as tents could give. The company and regimental officersloudly protested, and the men were swelling with indignation andwrath. Soon both parties were before me; Rosecrans hot andimpetuous, holding a high tone, and making use of GeneralMcClellan's name in demanding, as an officer of his staff, that thefloors should be torn out, and the officers of the regiments heldresponsible for obedience to the order that no more should be made. He fairly bubbled with anger at the presumption of those whoquestioned his authority. As soon as a little quiet could be got, Iasked Rosecrans if he had specific orders from the general that thehuts should have no floors. No, he had not, but his staff positionas engineer gave him sufficient control of the subject. I said Iwould examine the matter and submit it to General McClellan, andmeanwhile the floors already built might remain, though no new onesshould be made till the question was decided. I reported to thegeneral that, in my judgment, the huts should have floors and bunks, because the ground was wet when they were built, --they could not bestruck like tents to dry and air the earth, and they were meant tobe permanent quarters for the rendezvous of troops for an indefinitetime. The decision of McClellan was in accordance with the report. Rosecrans acquiesced, and indeed seemed rather to like me the betteron finding that I was not carried away by the assumption ofindefinite power by a staff officer. This little flurry over, the quarters were soon got in ascomfortable shape as rough lumber could make them, and the work ofdrill and instruction was systematized. The men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to begin too soon with the manual of themusket, and they were kept industriously employed in marching insingle line, by file, in changing direction, in forming columns offours from double line, etc. , before their guns were put in theirhands. Each regiment was treated as a separate camp, with its ownchain of sentinels, and the officers of the guard were constantlybusy teaching guard and picket duty theoretically to the reliefs offduty, and inspecting the sentinels on post. Schools were establishedin each regiment for field and staff and for the company officers, and Hardee's Tactics was in the hands of everybody who could procurea copy. It was one of our great inconveniences that the supply ofthe authorized Tactics was soon exhausted, and it was difficult toget the means of instruction in the company schools. An abridgmentwas made and published in a very few days by Thomas Worthington, agraduate of West Point in one of the earliest classes, --of 1827, Ithink, --a son of one of the first governors of Ohio. This eccentricofficer had served in the regular army and in the Mexican War, andwas full of ideas, but was of so irascible and impetuous a temperthat he was always in collision with the powers that be, and spoiledhis own usefulness. He was employed to furnish water to the camp bycontract, and whilst he ruined himself in his efforts to do it well, he was in perpetual conflict with the troops, who capsized hiscarts, emptied his barrels, and made life a burden to him. Thequarrel was based on his taking the water from the river justopposite the camp, though there was a slaughter-house some distanceabove. Worthington argued that the distance was such that therunning water purified itself; but the men wouldn't listen to hisscience, vigorously enforced as it was by idiomatic expletives, andthere was no safety for his water-carts till he yielded. He thenmade a reservoir on one of the hills, filled it by a steam-pump, andcarried the water by pipes to the regimental camps at an expensebeyond his means, and which, as it was claimed that the scheme wasunauthorized, was never half paid for. His subsequent career ascolonel of a regiment was no more happy, and talents that seemed fitfor highest responsibilities were wasted in chafing againstcircumstances which made him and fate seem to be perpetually playingat cross purposes. [Footnote: He was later colonel of theForty-sixth Ohio, and became involved in a famous controversy withHalleck and Sherman over his conduct in the Shiloh campaign and thequestion of fieldworks there. He left the service toward the closeof 1862. ] A very different character was Joshua W. Sill, who was sent to us asordnance officer. He too had been a regular army officer, but of theyounger class. Rather small and delicate in person, gentle andrefined in manner, he had about him little that answered to thepopular notion of a soldier. He had resigned from the army someyears before, and was a professor in an important educationalinstitution in Brooklyn, N. Y. , when at the first act of hostilityhe offered his services to the governor of Ohio, his native State. After our day's work, we walked together along the railway, discussing the political and military situation, and especially themeans of making most quickly an army out of the splendid butuntutored material that was collecting about us. Under his modestand scholarly exterior I quickly discerned a fine temper in themetal, that made his after career no enigma to me, and his heroicdeath at the head of his division in the thickest of the strife atStone's River no surprise. The two regiments which began the encampment were quickly followedby others, and the arriving regiments sometimes had their firsttaste of camp life under circumstances well calculated to dampentheir ardor. The Fourth Ohio, under Colonel Lorin Andrews, Presidentof Kenyon College, came just before a thunderstorm one evening, andthe bivouac that night was as rough a one as his men were likely toexperience for many a day. They made shelter by placing boards fromthe fence tops to the ground, but the fields were level and soonbecame a mire, so that they were a queer-looking lot when theycrawled out next morning. The sun was then shining bright, however, and they had better cover for their heads by the next night. TheSeventh Ohio, which was recruited in Cleveland and on the WesternReserve, sent a party in advance to build some of their huts, andthough they too came in a rain-storm, they were less uncomfortablethan some of the others. Three brigades were organized from theregiments of the Ohio contingent, exclusive of the two which hadbeen hurried to Washington. The brigadiers, beside myself, wereGenerals Joshua H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Bates, who wasthe senior, was a graduate of West Point, who had served some yearsin the regular army, but had resigned and adopted the profession ofthe law. He lived at Cincinnati, and organized his brigade in thatcity. They marched to Camp Dennison on the 20th of May, when, byvirtue of his seniority, General Bates assumed command of the campin McClellan's absence. His brigade consisted of the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments, and encamped on the east side of therailroad in the bend of the river. General Schleich was a Democraticsenator, who had been in the state militia, and was also one of thedrill-masters of the legislative squad which had drilled upon theCapitol terrace. His brigade included the Third, Twelfth, andThirteenth regiments, and, with mine, occupied the fields on thewest side of the railroad close to the slopes of the hills. My ownbrigade was made up of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventhregiments, and our position was the southernmost in the generalcamp. McClellan had intended to make his own headquarters in thecamp; but the convenience of attending to official business inCincinnati kept him in the city. His purpose was to make the brigadeorganizations permanent, and to take them as a division to the fieldwhen they were a little prepared for the work. Like many other goodplans, it failed to be carried out. I was the only one of thebrigadiers who remained in the service after the first enlistmentfor ninety days, and it was my fate to take the field with newregiments, only one of which had been in my brigade in camp. Schleich did not show adaptation to field work, and though takeninto West Virginia with McClellan in June, he was relieved of activeservice in a few weeks. He afterward sought and obtained thecolonelcy of the Sixty-first Ohio; but his service with it did notprove a success, and he resigned in September, 1862, under charges. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 308-310. ] GeneralBates had some reason to expect an assignment to staff duty withMcClellan, and therefore declined a colonelcy in the line at the endof the three months' service. He was disappointed in thisexpectation after waiting some time for it, and returned to civillife with the regrets of his comrades. There were somedisappointments, also, in the choice of regimental officers who wereelected in the regiments first organized, but were afterwardappointed by the governor. The companies were organized and assignedto regiments before they came to camp, but the regimental electionswere held after the companies were assembled. Garfield was acandidate for the colonelcy of the Seventh Regiment, but as he wasstill engaged in important public duties and was not connected withany company, he was at a disadvantage in the sort of competitionwhich was then rife. He was defeated, --a greater disappointment tome than to him, for I had hoped that our close friendship would bemade still closer by comradeship in the field. In a few weeks he wasmade colonel of the Forty-second Ohio, in the second levy. Up to the time that General Bates relieved me of the command of thecamp, and indeed for two or three days longer, the littleschoolhouse was my quarters as well as telegraph and express office. We had cleared out most of the desks and benches, but were stillcrowded together, day and night, in a way which was anything butcomfortable or desirable. Sheds for quartermaster's and subsistencestores were of first necessity, and the building of a hut for myselfand staff had to be postponed till these were up. On the arrival ofGeneral Bates with two or three staff officers, the necessity formore room could not be longer ignored, and my own hut was built onthe slope of the hillside behind my brigade, close under the woodedridge, and here for the next six weeks was my home. The morningbrought its hour of business correspondence relating to the command;then came the drill, when the parade ground was full of marchingcompanies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with sword exerciseand pistol practice. The day closed with the inspection of theregiments in turn at dress parade, and the evening was allotted toschools of theoretic tactics, outpost duty, and the like. Besidestheir copies of the regulation tactics, officers supplied themselveswith such manuals as Mahan's books on Field Fortifications and onOutpost Duty. I adopted at the beginning a rule to have somemilitary work in course of reading, and kept it up even in thefield, sending home one volume and getting another by mail. In thisway I gradually went through all the leading books I could find bothin English and in French, including the whole of Jomini's works, hishistories as well as his "Napoleon" and his "Grandes OpérationsMilitaires. " I know of no intellectual stimulus so valuable to thesoldier as the reading of military history narrated by anacknowledged master in the art of war. To see what others have donein important junctures, and to have both their merits and theirmistakes analyzed by a competent critic, rouses one's mind tograpple with the problem before it, and begets a generousdetermination to try to rival in one's own sphere of action thebrilliant deeds of soldiers who have made a name in other times. Then the example of the vigorous way in which history will at lastdeal with those who fail when the pinch comes, tends to keep a manup to his work and to make him avoid the rock on which so many havesplit, the disposition to take refuge in doing nothing when he findsit difficult to decide what should be done. The first fortnight in camp was the hardest for the troops. Theploughed fields became deep with mud, which nothing could remove butthe good weather which should allow them to pack hard under thecontinued tramp of thousands of men. The organization of the campkitchens had to be learned by the hardest also, and the men in eachcompany who had some aptitude for cooking had to be found by a slowprocess of natural selection, during which many an unpalatable mealhad to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of information came to us in theproof that more than half the men had never had the contagiousdiseases of infancy. The measles broke out, and we had to organize acamp hospital at once. A large barn near by was taken for thispurpose, and the surgeons had their hands full of cases which, however trivial they might seem at home, were here aggravated intodangerous illness by the unwonted surroundings and the impossibilityof securing the needed protection from exposure. As soon as theincrease of sickness in the camp was known in Cincinnati, the goodwomen of that city took promptly in hand the task of providingnurses for the sick, and proper diet and delicacies for hospitaluses. The Sisters of Charity, under the lead of Sister Anthony, anoble woman, came out in force, and their black and white robesharmonized picturesquely with the military surroundings, as theyflitted about under the rough timber framing of the old barn, carrying comfort and hope from one rude couch to another. As tosupplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew how to make out arequisition for rations or for clothing, and easy as it is to railat "red tape, " the necessity of keeping a check upon embezzlementand wastefulness justified the staff bureaus at Washington ininsisting upon regular vouchers to support the quartermaster's andcommissary's accounts. But here, too, men were gradually found whohad special talent for the work. The infallible newspapers had no lack of material for criticism. There were plenty of real blunders to invite it, but the severestblame was quite as likely to be visited upon men and things whichdid not deserve it. The governor was violently attacked for thingswhich he had no responsibility for, or others in which he had doneall that forethought and intelligence could do. When everybody hadto learn a new business, it would have been miraculous if graveerrors had not frequently occurred. Looking back at it, the wonderis that the blunders and mishaps had not been tenfold more numerousthan they were. By the middle of May the confusion had given placeto reasonable system, but we were now obliged to meet theembarrassments of reorganization for three years, under thePresident's second call for troops. We had more than ten thousandmen who had begun to know something of their duties, and it wasworth a serious effort to transfer them into the permanent service;but no one who did not go through the ordeal can imagine how tryingit was. In every company some discontented spirits wanted to gohome, shrinking from the perils to which they had committedthemselves in a moment of enthusiasm. For a few to go back, however, would be a disgrace; and every dissatisfied man, to avoid the odiumof going alone, became a mischief-maker, seeking to prevent thewhole company from re-enlisting. The recruiting of a majority wasnaturally made the condition of allowing the company organization tobe preserved, and a similar rule applied to the regiment. Thegrowing discipline was relaxed or lost in the solicitations, theelectioneering, the speech-making, and the other common arts ofpersuasion. After a majority had re-enlisted and an organization wassecure, it would have been better to have discharged the remainingthree months' men and to have sent them home at once; but authorityfor this could not be got, for the civil officers could not see, anddid not know what a nuisance these men were. Dissatisfied withthemselves for not going with their comrades, they became sulky, disobedient, complaining, trying to make the others as unhappy asthemselves by arguing that faith was not kept with them, and doingall the mischief it was possible to do. In spite of all these discouragements, however, the daily drills andinstruction went on with some approach to regularity, and our rawvolunteers began to look more like soldiers. Captain Gordon Grangerof the regular army came to muster the re-enlisted regiments intothe three years' service, and as he stood at the right of the FourthOhio, looking down the line of a thousand stalwart men, all in theirGaribaldi shirts (for we had not yet received our uniforms), heturned to me and exclaimed: "My God! that such men should be foodfor powder!" It certainly was a display of manliness andintelligence such as had hardly ever been seen in the ranks of anarmy. There were in camp at that time three if not four companies, in different regiments, that were wholly made up of undergraduatesof colleges who had enlisted together, their officers being theirtutors and professors; and where there was not so striking evidenceas this of the enlistment of the best of our youth, every companycould still show that it was largely recruited from thebest-nurtured and most promising young men of the community. Granger had been in the Southwest when the secession movement began, had seen the formation of military companies everywhere, and theincessant drilling which had been going on all winter, whilst we, ina strange condition of political paralysis, had been doing nothing. His information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost noopportunity of impressing upon us the fact that the South was nearlysix months ahead of us in organization and preparation. He did notconceal his belief that we were likely to find the war a much longerand more serious piece of business than was commonly expected, andthat unless we pushed hard our drilling and instruction we shouldfind ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier encounters. What hesaid had a good effect in making officers and men take morewillingly to the laborious routine of the parade ground and theregimental school; for such opinions as his soon ran through thecamp, and they were commented upon by the enlisted men quite asearnestly as among the officers. Still, hope kept the upper hand, and if the question had been put to vote, I believe thatthree-fourths of us still cherished the belief that a singlecampaign would end the war. In the organization of my own brigade I had the assistance ofCaptain McElroy, a young man who had nearly completed the course atWest Point, and who was subsequently made major of the TwentiethOhio. He was sent to the camp by the governor as a drill officer, and I assigned him to staff duty. For commissary, I detailedLieutenant Gibbs, who accompanied one of the regiments fromCincinnati, and who had seen a good deal of service as clerk in oneof the staff departments of the regular army. I had also for a timethe services of one of the picturesque adventurers who turn up insuch crises. In the Seventh Ohio was a company recruited inCleveland, of which the nucleus was an organization of Zouaves, existing for some time before the war. It was made up of young menwho had been stimulated by the popularity of Ellsworth's Zouaves inChicago to form a similar body. They had had as their drill master aFrenchman named De Villiers. His profession was that of a teacher offencing; but he had been an officer in Ellsworth's company, and wasfamiliar with fancy manoeuvres for street parade, and with a specialskirmish drill and bayonet exercise. Small, swarthy, with angularfeatures, and a brusque, military manner, in a showy uniform andjaunty _képi_ of scarlet cloth, covered with gold lace, he createdquite a sensation among us. His assumption of knowledge andexperience was accepted as true. He claimed to have been a surgeonin the French army in Algiers, though we afterward learned to doubtif his rank had been higher than that of a barber-surgeon of acavalry troop. From the testimonials he brought with him, I thoughtI was doing a good thing in making him my brigade-major, as theofficer was then called whom we afterward knew as inspector-general. He certainly was a most indefatigable fellow, and went at his workwith an enthusiasm that made him very useful for a time. It wasworth something to see a man who worked with a kind of dash, --with aprompt, staccato movement that infused spirit and energy into allaround him. He would drill all day, and then spend half the nighttrying to catch sentinels and officers of the guard at fault intheir duty. My first impression was that I had got hold of a mostvaluable man, and others were so much of the same mind that in thereorganization of regiments he was successively elected major of theEighth, and then colonel of the Eleventh. We shall see more of himas we go on; but it turned out that his sharp discipline was notsteady or just; his knowledge was only skin-deep, and he had neitherthe education nor the character for so responsible a situation as hewas placed in. He nearly plagued the life out of the officers of hisregiment before they got rid of him, and was a most brilliantexample of the way we were imposed upon by military charlatans atthe beginning. He was, however, good proof also of the speed withwhich real service weeds out the undesirable material which seemedso splendid in the days of common inexperience and at a distancefrom danger. We had visits from clerical adventurers, too, for the"pay and emoluments of a captain of cavalry" which the law gave to achaplain induced some to seek the office who were not the bestrepresentatives of their profession. One young man who had spent amorning soliciting the appointment in one of the regiments, came tome in a shamefaced sort of way before leaving camp and said, "General, before I decide this matter, I wish you would tell me justwhat are the pay and emoluments of a _Captain of Calvary!_" Thoughmost of our men were native Ohioans, General Bates's brigade had init two regiments made up of quite contrasted nationalities. TheNinth Ohio was recruited from the Germans of Cincinnati, and wascommanded by Colonel "Bob" McCook. In camp, the drilling of theregiment fell almost completely into the hands of the adjutant, Lieutenant Willich (afterward a general of division), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own lack of military knowledge, usedto say that he was only "clerk for a thousand Dutchmen, " socompletely did the care of equipping and providing for his regimentengross his time and labor. The Tenth was an Irish regiment, and itsmen used to be proud of calling themselves the "Bloody Tinth. " Thebrilliant Lytle was its commander, and his control over them, evenin the beginning of their service and near the city of their home, showed that they had fallen into competent hands. It happened, ofcourse, that the guard-house pretty frequently containedrepresentatives of the Tenth who, on the short furloughs that wereallowed them, took a parting glass too much with their friends inthe city, and came to camp boisterously drunk. But the men of theregiment got it into their heads that the Thirteenth, which lay justopposite them across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure infilling the guard-house with the Irishmen. Some threats had beenmade that they would go over and "clean out" the Thirteenth, and onefine evening these came to a head. I suddenly got orders fromGeneral Bates to form my brigade, and march them at once between theTenth and Thirteenth to prevent a collision which seemed imminent. My brigade was selected because it was the one to which neither ofthe angry regiments belonged, the others being ordered into theirquarters. My little Frenchman, De Villiers, covered himself withglory. His horse flew, under the spur, to the regimentalheadquarters, the long roll was beaten as if the drummers realizedthe full importance of the first opportunity to sound that warlikesignal, and the brigade-major's somewhat theatrical energy was socontagious that many of the companies were assembled and ready tofile out of the company streets before the order reached them. Wemarched by the moonlight into the space between the belligerentregiments; but Lytle had already got his own men under control, andthe less mercurial Thirteenth were not disposed to be aggressive, sothat we were soon dismissed with a compliment for our promptness. Iordered the colonels to march the regiments back to the campsseparately, and with my staff rode through that of the Thirteenth, to see how matters were there. All was quiet, the men being in theirquarters; so, turning, I passed along near the railway, in rear ofthe quartermaster's sheds. In the shadow of the buildings I hadnearly ridden over some one on foot, when he addressed me, and Irecognized an officer of high rank in that brigade. He was in greatagitation, and exclaimed, "Oh, General, what a horrible thing thatbrothers should be killing each other!" I assured him the danger ofthat was all over, and rode on, wondering a little at his presencein that place under the circumstances. The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like months in theretrospect, so full were they crowded with new experiences. Thechange came in an unexpected way. The initiative taken by theConfederates in West Virginia had to be met by prompt action, andMcClellan was forced to drop his own plans to meet the emergency. The organization and equipment of the regiments for the three years'service were still incomplete, and the brigades were broken up, totake across the Ohio the regiments best prepared to go. One by onemy regiments were ordered away, till finally, when on the 3d of JulyI received orders to proceed to the Kanawha valley, I had but one ofthe four regiments to which I had been trying to give something ofunity and brigade feeling, and that regiment (the Eleventh Ohio) wasstill incomplete. General Bates fared even worse; for he saw all hisregiments ordered away, whilst he was left to organize new ones fromfreshly recruited companies that were sent to the camp. This wasdiscouraging to a brigade commander, for even with veteran troopsmutual acquaintance between the officer and his command is anecessary condition of confidence and a most important element ofstrength. My own assignment to the Great Kanawha district was one Ihad every reason to be content with, except that for several monthsI felt the disadvantage I suffered from assuming command of troopswhich I had never seen till we met in the field. The period of organization, brief as it was, had been valuable tothe regiments, and it had been of the utmost importance to securethe re-enlistment of those which had received some instruction. Ithad been, in the condition of the statute law, from necessity andnot from choice that the Administration had called out the statemilitia for ninety days. The new term of enrolment was for "threeyears or the war, " and the forces were now designated as UnitedStates Volunteers. It would have been well if the period ofapprenticeship could have been prolonged; but events would not wait. All recognized the necessity, and thankful as we should have beenfor a longer preparation and more thorough instruction, we wereeager to be ordered away. McClellan had been made a major-general in the regular army, and adepartment had been placed under his command which included theStates of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to which was added a littlelater West Virginia north of the Great Kanawha. [Footnote:McClellan's Report and Campaigns (New York, 1864), p. 8. McClellan'sOwn Story, p. 44. Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 633. ] Rosecrans wasalso appointed a brigadier-general in the regulars, and there wasmuch debate at the time whether the Administration had intendedthis. Many insisted that he was nominated for the volunteer service, and that the regular appointment was a clerical mistake in thebureaus at Washington. There was no solid foundation for thisgossip. A considerable increase of the regular army was authorizedby law, and corresponding appointments were made, from major-generaldownward. It was at this time that Sherman was made colonel of oneof the new regiments of regulars. It would perhaps have been wiserto treat the regular commissions as prizes to be won only byconspicuous and successful service in the field, as was done later;but this policy was not then adopted, and the newly created officeswere filled in all grades. They were, of course, given to men fromwhom great services could reasonably be expected; but when none hadbeen tested in the great operations of war, every appointment was atthe risk that the officer might not show the special talent forcommand which makes a general. It was something of a lottery, atbest; but the system would have been improved if a method ofretiring inefficient officers had been adopted at once. Theostensible reason for the different organization of volunteers andregulars was that the former, as a temporary force to meet anexigency, might be wholly disbanded when the war should end, withoutaffecting the permanent army, which was measured in size by theneeds of the country in its normal condition. CHAPTER III MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. Political attitude of West Virginia--Rebels take theinitiative--McClellan ordered to act--Ohio militia cross theriver--The Philippi affair--Significant dates--The vote onsecession--Virginia in the Confederacy--Lee incommand--Topography--The mountain passes--Garnett's army--Richmountain position--McClellan in the field--His forces--Advancesagainst Garnett--Rosecrans's proposal--His fight on themountain--McClellan's inaction--Garnett's retreat--Affair atCarrick's Ford--Garnett killed--Hill's efforts to intercept--Pegramin the wilderness--He surrenders--Indirect resultsimportant--McClellan's military and personal traits. The reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia weretwofold, political and military. The people were strongly attachedto the Union, and had generally voted against the Ordinance ofSecession which by the action of the Richmond Convention had beensubmitted to a popular vote on May 23d. Comparatively few slaveswere owned by them, and their interests bound them more to Ohio andPennsylvania than to eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Mr. Lincoln's administration, strongly backed and chiefly represented byGovernor Dennison of Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize aloyal Virginia government, repudiating that of Governor Letcher andthe state convention as self-destroyed by the act of secession. Governor Dennison, in close correspondence with the leadingloyalists, had been urging McClellan to cross the Ohio to protectand encourage the loyal men, when on the 26th of May news came thatthe Secessionists had taken the initiative, and that some bridgeshad been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad a little west ofGrafton, the crossing of the Monongahela River where the two westernbranches of the road unite as they come from Wheeling andParkersburg. The great line of communication between Washington andthe West had thus been cut, and action on our part was necessary. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 44. ] [Illustration: CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA 1861. ] Governor Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than thethirteen regiments which had been organized as Ohio's quota underthe President's first call, and had enrolled nine other regiments, numbering them consecutively with the others. These last he had putin camps near the Ohio River, where at a moment's notice they couldoccupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the Great Kanawha. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 46, 47. ] Two Union regiments were alsoorganizing in West Virginia itself, of which the first was commandedby Colonel B. F. Kelley of Wheeling. The left bank of the Ohio wasin McClellan's department, and on the 24th General Scott, havingheard that two Virginia companies had occupied Grafton, telegraphedthe fact to McClellan, directing him to act promptly incounteracting the effect of this movement. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 648. ] On the 27th Colonel Kelley was sent by rail from Wheeling to driveoff the enemy, who withdrew at his approach, and the bridges werequickly rebuilt. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 46, 49, 655. ] Several of theOhio regiments were ordered across the river at the same time, andan Indiana brigade under General Thomas A. Morris of that State washurried forward from Indianapolis. As the Ohio troops at CampDennison which had been mustered into national service were inprocess of reorganizing for the three years' term, McClellanpreferred not to move them till this was completed. He also adheredto his plan of making his own principal movement in the GreatKanawha valley, and desired to use there the Ohio division at ourcamp. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 50, 656, 674. ] The Ohio regiments firstsent into West Virginia were not mustered in, and were known asState troops. General Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, andwas intrusted with the command of all the troops in West Virginia. He found that Colonel Kelley had already planned an expeditionagainst the enemy, who had retired southward to Philippi, aboutfifteen miles in a straight line, but some twenty-five by thecrooked country roads. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 66. ]Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column, under Colonel E. Dumont of the Seventh Indiana, to co-operate withKelley. Both columns were directed to make a night march, startingfrom points on the railroad about twelve miles apart and convergingon Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak on June 3d. Eachcolumn consisted of about fifteen hundred men, and Dumont had alsotwo smooth six-pounder cannon. The Confederate force was commandedby Colonel G. A. Porterfield, and was something less than a thousandstrong, one-fourth cavalry. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 70, 72. ] The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had notlearned picket duty. The concerted movement against them was moresuccessful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's firstnotice of danger was the opening of the artillery upon his sleepingtroops. It had been expected that the two columns would enclose theenemy's camp and capture the whole; but, though in disorderly rout, Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness and courage, in gettingthem off with but few casualties and the loss of a few arms. Thecamp equipage and supplies were, of course, captured. Colonel Kelleywas wounded in the breast by a pistol-shot which was at firstsupposed to be fatal, though it did not turn out so, and this wasthe only casualty reported on the National side. [Footnote: ColonelKelley was a man already of middle age, and a leading citizen ofnorthwestern Virginia. His whole military career was in that region, where his services were very valuable throughout the war. He waspromoted to brigadier-general among the first, and wasbrevet-major-general when mustered out in 1865. ] No prisoners weretaken, nor did any dead or wounded fall into our hands. Porterfieldretreated to Beverly, some thirty miles further to the southeast, and the National forces occupied Philippi. The telegraphic reportshad put the Confederate force at 2000, and their loss at 15 killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners, and thenewspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaignthus opened with apparent _éclat_ for McClellan (who was personallyat Cincinnati), and the "Philippi races, " as they were locallycalled, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia andcorrespondingly depressed the Secessionists. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Ii. Pp. 64-74. ] Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that largeforces of the enemy were gathered at Beverly, McClellan determinedto proceed in person to that region with his best prepared troops, postponing his Kanawha campaign till northwestern Virginia should becleared of the enemy. Military affairs in West Virginia had been complicated by thepolitical situation, and it is necessary to recollect the dates ofthe swift following steps in Virginia's progress into theConfederacy. Sumter surrendered on Saturday, the 13th of April, andon Monday the 15th President Lincoln issued his first call fortroops. On Wednesday the 17th the Virginia Convention passed theOrdinance of Secession in secret session. On Friday the 19th it wasknown in Washington, and on Saturday Lee and Johnston resigned theircommissions in the United States Army, sorrowfully "going with theirState. " [Footnote: Johnston's Narrative, p. 10. Townsend's Anecdotesof the Civil War, p. 31. Long's Memoirs of Lee, pp. 94, 96. ] On thefollowing Tuesday (23d) the chairman of the Virginia Conventionpresented to Lee his commission as Major-General and Commander ofthe Virginia Forces. On the same day Governor Dennison handed toMcClellan his commission to command the Ohio forces in the serviceof the Union. Although the Confederate Congress at Montgomeryadmitted Virginia to the Confederacy early in May, this was notformally accepted in Virginia till after the popular vote onsecession (May 23d) and the canvassing of the returns of thatelection. Governor Letcher issued on June 8th his proclamationannouncing the result, and transferring the command of the Virginiatroops to the Confederate Government. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 911. ] During the whole of May, therefore, Virginia'sposition was unsettled. Her governor, by the authority of theconvention, regarded her as independent of the United States, but byan inchoate act of secession which would not become final tillratified by the popular vote. The Virginia troops were arrayed nearthe Potomac to resist the advance of national forces; butConfederate troops had been welcomed in eastern Virginia as early asthe 10th of May, and President Davis had authorized Lee, asCommander of the Virginia forces, to assume control of them. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 827. ] It was well known that the prevailing sentiment in West Virginia wasloyal to the Union, and each party avoided conflict there for fearof prejudicing its cause in the election. Hence it was that as soonas the vote was cast, the aggressive was taken by the Virginiagovernment in the burning of the bridges near Grafton. The fire ofwar was thus lighted. The crossing of the Ohio was with a fullunderstanding with Colonel Kelley, who recognized McClellan at onceas his military commander. [Footnote: I treated the relations of Leeand Virginia to the Confederacy in a paper in "The Nation, " Dec. 23, 1897, entitled "Lee, Johnston, and Davis. "] The affair at Philippiwas, in form, the last appearance of Virginia in the role of anindependent nation, for in a very few days Lee announced by apublished order that the absorption of the Virginia troops into theConfederate Army was complete. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 912. ] It will be well to understand the topography of theVirginia mountains and their western slope, if we would reach thereasons which determined the lines of advance chosen by theConfederates and the counter moves of McClellan. The Alleghany rangepassing out of Pennsylvania and running southwest through the wholelength of Virginia, consists of several parallel lines of mountainsenclosing narrow valleys. The Potomac River breaks through at thecommon boundary of Virginia and Maryland, and along its valley runsthe National Road as well as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. TheBaltimore and Ohio Railroad also follows this natural highway, whichis thus indicated as the most important line of communicationbetween Washington and the Ohio valley, though a high mountainsummit must be passed, even by this route, before the tributaries ofthe Ohio can be reached. Half-way across the State to the southward, is a high watershed connecting the mountain ridges and separatingthe streams tributary to the Potomac on the north from those fallinginto the James and New rivers on the south. The Staunton andParkersburg turnpike follows the line of this high "divide" lookingdown from among the clouds into the long and nearly straight defileson either hand, which separate the Alleghany Mountains proper fromthe Blue Ridge on the east and from Cheat Mountain and other rangeson the west. Still further to the southwest the James River and theNew River interlace their headwaters among the mountains, and breakout on east and west, making the third natural pass through whichthe James River and Kanawha turnpike and canal find their way. Thesethree routes across the mountains were the only ones on whichmilitary operations were at all feasible. The northern one wasusually in the hands of the National forces, and the other two werethose by which the Confederates attempted the invasion of WestVirginia. Beverly, a hundred miles from Staunton, was near the gatethrough which the Staunton road passes on its way northwestward toParkersburg and Wheeling, whilst Gauley Bridge was the key-point ofthe Kanawha route on the westerly slope of the mountains. General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines. General Henry A. Wise (formerly Governor of Virginia) took theKanawha route, and General Robert S. Garnett (lately Lee's ownadjutant-general) marched to Beverly. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. Pp. 908, 915. ] Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly, Garnett, who had also been an officer in the United States Army, wasordered to assume command there and to stimulate the recruiting andorganization of regiments from the secession element of thepopulation. Some Virginia regiments raised on the eastern slope ofthe mountains were sent with him, and to these was soon added theFirst Georgia. On the 1st of July he reported his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a completefailure, only 23 having joined. The West Virginians, he says, "arethoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 239. ] Other reinforcements were promisedGarnett, but none reached him except the Forty-fourth VirginiaRegiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of his engagementwith McClellan's troops, but did not take part in the fighting. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 240, 274. ] Tygart's valley, in which Beverly lies, is between Cheat Mountain onthe east, and Rich Mountain on the west. The river, of the same nameas the valley, flows northward about fifteen miles, then turnswestward, breaking through the ridge, and by junction with theBuckhannon River forms the Monongahela, which passes by Philippi andafterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The Staunton andParkersburg turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg routepassing over a saddle in Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling routefollowing the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at thegap is known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur ofit. Garnett regarded the two positions at Rich Mountain and LaurelMountain as the gates to all the region beyond and to the West. Arough mountain road, barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountainposition with Cheat River on the east, and it was possible to go bythis way northward through St. George to the Northwestern turnpike, turning the mountain ranges. [Illustration: COMBAT AT RICH MOUNTAIN. ] Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much the stronger andmore easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1300 ofhis men and four cannon, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 268. ] The position chosenwas on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it wasrudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abatis ofslashed timber along its front. The remainder of his force he placedin a similar fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain, where he also had four guns, of which one was rifled. Here hecommanded in person. His depot of supplies was at Beverly, which wassixteen miles from the Laurel Mountain position and five from thatat Rich Mountain. He was pretty accurately informed of McClellan'sforces and movements, and his preparations had barely been completedby the 9th of July, when the Union general appeared in his front. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 241, 248. ] McClellan entered West Virginia in person on the 21st of June, andon the 23d issued from Grafton a proclamation to the inhabitants. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 194, 196. ] He had gradually collected hisforces along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and these, at the timeof the affair at Rich Mountain, consisted of sixteen Ohio regiments, nine from Indiana, and two from West Virginia; in all, twenty-sevenregiments with four batteries of artillery of six guns each, twotroops of cavalry, and an independent company of riflemen. Of hisbatteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a company ofregulars (Company I, Fourth U. S. Artillery), was with him awaitingmountain howitzers, which arrived a little later. [Footnote: As partof the troops were State troops not mustered into the United Statesservice, no report of them is found in the War Department; but thefollowing are the numbers of the regiments found named as present inthe correspondence and reports, --viz. , 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 22dOhio; 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and1st and 2nd Virginia; also Howe's United States Battery, Barnett'sOhio Battery, Loomis's Michigan Battery, and Daum's VirginiaBattery; the cavalry were Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker'sIllinois Cavalry. VOL. I. --4] The regiments varied somewhat instrength, but all were recently organized, and must have averaged atleast 700 men each, making the whole force about 20, 000. Of these, about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some twohundred miles, under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, ofthe Ohio Militia; a strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris ofIndiana, was at Philippi, and the rest were in three brigadesforming the immediate command of McClellan, the brigadiers beingGeneral W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A. , General Newton Schleich of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L. McCook of Ohio. On the date of hisproclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, tomove his principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence atonce upon Beverly; [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 195. ]but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2nd that he reachedBuckhannon, which is twenty-four miles west of Beverly, on theParkersburg branch of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton therumors he heard had made him estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or7000 men, of which the larger part were at Laurel Mountain in frontof General Morris. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 205. ] On the 7th of July hemoved McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork bridge, abouthalf-way to Beverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to marchwith his brigade from Philippi to a position one and a half miles infront of Garnett's principal camp, which was promptly done. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 200. ] Three days later, McClellan concentratedthe three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about twomiles from Colonel Pegram's position at the base of Rich Mountain. The advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishingresistance, the Confederates being aware of McClellan's greatsuperiority in numbers, and choosing to await his attack in theirfortified positions. The National commander was now convinced thathis opponent was 10, 000 strong, of which about 2000 were before himat Rich Mountain. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 203, 204. ] A reconnoissancemade on the 10th showed that Pegram's position would be difficult toassail in front, but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed to hold firmly his position beforeGarnett, watching for the effect of the attack at Rich Mountain. Inthe evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a young man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles in rear ofPegram, and who thought he could guide a column of infantry to hisfather's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of theturnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go bythem, but Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seizethe road at the Hart farm. After some discussion McClellan adoptedthe suggestion, and it was arranged that Rosecrans should march atdaybreak of the 11th with about 2000 men, including a troop ofhorse, and that upon the sound of his engagement in the rear ofPegram McClellan would attack in force in front. By a blunder in oneof the regimental camps, the reveillé and assembly were sounded atmidnight, and Pegram was put on the _qui vive_. He, however, believed that the attempt to turn his position would be by a path orcountry road passing round his right, between him and Garnett (ofwhich the latter had warned him), and his attention was divertedfrom Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought impracticable. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. Pp. 215, 256, 260. Conduct ofthe War, vol. Vi. (Rosecrans), pp. 2, 3. ] The alert which hadoccurred at midnight made Rosecrans think it best to make a longercircuit than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severemarching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turningmovement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegram haddetached about 350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had orderedthem to guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with them asingle cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, andthey threw together a breastwork of logs. The turnpike at Hart'sruns in a depression of the summit, and as Rosecrans, early in theafternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by bothmusketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were for thefirst time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through twoor three hours, when a charge by part of Rosecrans's line, aided bya few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which hadsecured a good position, broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements fromPegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon; but they did notcome into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on thehill-top, dashing into the gun that was coming up, capsized it downthe mountain-side where the descending road was scarped diagonallyalong it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was inpossession of the field. The march and the assault had been made inrain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan; and the enemy, rallying on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance onthe crest a little further on, that Rosecrans directed his men torest upon their arms till next morning. When day broke on the 12th, the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans, feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's position, found it alsoabandoned, the two remaining cannon being spiked, and a few sick andwounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still nothing was seen ofMcClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyondRoaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position. Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederatesleft 20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lowercamp, including the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead wasmade. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii pp. 215, 260, 265. C. W. , vol. Vi. (Rosecrans) pp. 3-5. ] The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClellan's camp, andhe formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of thecannonade and some signs of exultation in Pegram's camp seem to havemade him think Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack inaccordance with the plan has never been explained. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. Vi. P. 6. McClellan seems to have expected Rosecrans to reachthe rear of Pegram's advanced work before his own attack should bemade; but the reconnoissance of Lieutenant Poe, his engineer, showsthat this work could be turned by a much shorter route than the longand difficult one by which Rosecrans went to the mountain ridge. SeePoe's Report, Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 14. ] Rosecrans'smessengers had failed to reach McClellan during the 11th, but thesound of the battle was sufficient notice that he had gained thesummit and was engaged; and he was, in fact, left to win his ownbattle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Towardevening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboringheight, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram'sposition untenable; but his lines were withdrawn again beyondRoaring Creek at nightfall, and all further action postponed to thenext day. About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing aroundRosecrans's right flank during the night and had gained Beverly. These, with the newly arrived Confederate regiment, fled southwardon the Staunton road. Garnett had learned in the evening, bymessenger from Beverly, that Rich Mountain summit was carried, andevacuated his camp in front of Morris about midnight. He firstmarched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that place whenhe received information (false at the time) that the National forcesalready occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon acountry road over Cheat Mountain into Cheat River valley, followingthe stream northward toward St. George and West Union, in theforlorn hope of turning the mountains at the north end of theridges, and regaining his communications by a very long detour. Hemight have continued southward through Beverly almost at leisure, for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th. Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuitas soon as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville, where he halted to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and getfurther orders. These reached him in the night, and at daybreak ofthe 13th he resumed the pursuit. His advance-guard of threeregiments, accompanied by Captain H. W. Benham of the Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column about noon and continueda skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett himself handledhis rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounterwas had. A mile or two further, at another ford and when theskirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing hisskirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as abarricade. One of his cannon had become stalled in the ford, andwith about forty wagons fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuitwas here discontinued, but McClellan had sent a dispatch to GeneralHill at Grafton, to collect the garrisons along the railroad andblock the way of the Confederates where they must pass around thenorthern spurs of the mountains. [Footnote: Reports of Morris andBenham, Official Records, vol. Ii. Pp. 220, 222. ] His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and thedispatch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded toHill till near noon of the 13th. This officer immediately orderedthe collection of the greater part of his detachments at Oakland, and called upon the railway officials for special trains to hurrythem to the rendezvous. About 1000 men under Colonel James Irvine ofthe Sixteenth Ohio were at West Union, where the St. George roadreaches the Northwestern Turnpike, and Hill's information was that adetachment of these held Red House, a crossing several miles inadvance, by which the retreating enemy might go. Irvine was directedto hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reinforced. Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oaklandwith about 500 men and three cannon, reached his destination atnightfall, and hurried his detachment forward by a night march toIrvine, ten or twelve miles over rough roads. It turned out thatIrvine did not occupy Red House, and the prevalent belief that theenemy was about 8000 in number, with the uncertainty of the road hewould take, made it proper to keep the little force concentratedtill reinforcements should come. The first of these reached Irvineabout six o'clock on the morning of the 14th, raising his command to1500; but a few moments after their arrival he learned that theenemy had passed Red House soon after daylight. He gave chase, butdid not overtake them. Meanwhile General Hill had spent the night in trying to hastenforward the railway trains, but none were able to reach Oakland tillmorning, and Garnett's forces had now more than twenty miles thestart, and were on fairly good roads, moving southward on theeastern side of the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that Hillhad the one opportunity of a lifetime to capture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided with wagonsor extra rations. When however the Union commander learned that theenemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuitstopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attemptto concentrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for therailroad to carry them to Oakland before the enemy had passed theturning-point, twenty miles to the southward. [Footnote: Report ofHill, Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 224. ] During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. Hehad intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line ofretreat taken by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the night and in the tangled woods and thicketsof the mountain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rearportion of it, he wandered all day of the 12th, seeking to make hisway to Garnett. He halted at evening at the Tygart Valley River, sixmiles north of Beverly, and learned from some country people ofGarnett's retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains eastof the valley, but beyond lay a hundred miles of wilderness and halfa dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be foundfor his men. He called a council of war, and, by advice of hisofficers, sent to McClellan, at Beverly, an offer of surrender. Thiswas received on the 13th, and Pegram brought in 30 officers and 525men. [Footnote: Report of Pegram, Official Records, vol. Ii. Pp. 265, 266. ] McClellan then moved southward himself, following theStaunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little force hadescaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments ofConfederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reinforceGarnett. These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridgeof the Alleghanies, and upon them the retreating forces rallied. Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson was assigned to command in Garnett'splace, and both Governor Letcher and General Lee made strenuousefforts to increase this army to a force sufficient to resumeaggressive operations. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 247, 254. ] OnMcClellan's part nothing further was attempted till on the 22d hewas summoned to Washington to assume command of the army which hadretreated to the capital after the panic of the first Bull Runbattle. The affair at Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were amongthe minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detaileddescription, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon theconduct of the war, by being the occasion of McClellan's promotionto the command of the Potomac army. The narrative which has beengiven contains the "unvarnished tale, " as nearly as official recordsof both sides can give it, and it is a curious task to compare itwith the picture of the campaign and its results which was thengiven to the world in the series of proclamations and dispatches ofthe young general, beginning with his first occupation of thecountry and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in whichhe announced that they had "annihilated two armies, commanded byeducated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnessesfortified at their leisure. " The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his success was followed by the disasterto McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by Providence as theideal chieftain who could repair the misfortune and lead our armiesto certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about himwas so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclamations, and correspondence are a psychological study, morepuzzling to those who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgidrhetoric and exaggerated pretence did not seem natural to him. Inthem he seemed to be composing for stage effect something to bespoken in character by a quite different person from the sensibleand genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The career ofthe great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admirationof young American soldiers, and it was perhaps not strange that whenreal war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personalbearing. It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to bepleased with McClellan's rendering of the rôle; they dubbed him theyoung Napoleon, and the photographers got him to stand with foldedarms, in the historic pose. For two or three weeks his dispatchesand letters were all on fire with enthusiastic energy. He appearedto be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. When he came outof it, he was as genial as ever. The assumed dash and energy of hisfirst campaign made the disappointment and the reaction more painfulwhen the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the Army ofthe Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. Therewas the same over-estimate of the enemy, the same tendency tointerpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the samehesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that hissubordinate was engaged. If Garnett had been as strong as McClellanbelieved him, he had abundant time and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance, while the Nationalcommander delayed attacking Pegram; and had Morris been beaten, Garnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent, andthere would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnettwas less strong and less enterprising than he was credited withbeing. Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitateretreat. CHAPTER IV THE KANAWHA VALLEY Orders for the Kanawha expedition--The troops and theirquality--Lack of artillery and cavalry--Assembling atGallipolis--District of the Kanawha--Numbers of the opposingforces--Method of advance--Use of steamboats--Advance guards onriver banks--Camp at Thirteen-mile Creek--Night alarm--The riverchutes--Sunken obstructions--Pocotaligo--Affair atBarboursville--Affair at Scary Creek--Wise's position at TylerMountain--His precipitate retreat--Occupation ofCharleston--Rosecrans succeeds McClellan--Advance toward GauleyBridge--Insubordination--The Newspaper Correspondent--Occupation ofGauley Bridge. When McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors heheard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of GeneralWise with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha valley, made himconclude to order a brigade to that region for the purpose ofholding the lower part of the valley defensively till he might tryto cut off Wise's army after Garnett should be disposed of. Thisduty was assigned to me. On the 22d of June I had received myappointment as Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, superseding mystate commission. I had seen the regiments of my brigade going oneby one, as fast as they were reorganized for the three years'service, and I had hoped to be ordered to follow them to McClellan'sown column. The only one left in camp was the Eleventh Ohio, ofwhich only five companies were present, though two more companieswere soon added. McClellan's letter directed me to assume command of the First andSecond Kentucky regiments with the Twelfth Ohio, and to call uponthe governor for a troop of cavalry and a six-gun battery: toexpedite the equipment of the whole and move them to Gallipolis_via_ Hampden and Portland, stations on the Marietta Railroad, fromwhich a march of twenty-five miles by country roads would take us toour destination. At Gallipolis was the Twenty-first Ohio, which Ishould add to my command and proceed at once with two regiments toPoint Pleasant at the mouth of the Kanawha, five miles above. Whenall were assembled, one regiment was to be left at Point Pleasant, two were to be advanced up the valley to Ten-mile Creek, and theother placed at an intermediate position. "Until further orders, "the letter continued, "remain on the defensive and endeavor toinduce the rebels to remain at Charleston until I can cut off theirretreat by a movement from Beverly. " Captain W. J. Kountz, anexperienced steamboat captain, was in charge ofwater-transportation, and would furnish light-draught steamboats formy use. [Footnote: What purports to be McClellan's letter to me isfound in the Records (Official Records, vol. Ii. Pt. I. P. 197), butit seems to be only an abstract of it, made to accompany hisdispatch to Washington (_Id_. , p. 198), and by a clerical errorgiven the form of the complete letter. It does not contain thequotation given above, which was reiterated before the letter wasclosed, in these words: "Remember that my present plan is to cutthem off by a rapid march from Beverly after driving those in frontof me across the mountains, and do all you can to favor that byavoiding offensive movements. " After the printing of the earlier volumes of the Records, coveringthe years 1861-1862, I learned that the books and papers of theDepartment of the Ohio had not been sent to Washington at the closeof the war, but were still in Cincinnati. I brought this fact to theattention of the Adjutant-General, and at the request of thatofficer obtained and forwarded them to the Archives office. Withthem were my letter books and the original files of mycorrespondence with McClellan and Rosecrans in 1861 and 1862. Colonel Robert N. Scott, who was then in charge of the publication, informed me that the whole would be prepared for printing and wouldappear in the supplemental volumes, after the completion of the restof the First Series. Owing to changes in the Board of Publication inthe course of twenty years, there were errors in the arrangement ofthe matter for the printer, and a considerable part of thecorrespondence between the generals named and myself wasaccidentally omitted from the supplemental volume (Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. ) in which it should have appeared. The originals areno doubt in the files of the Archives office, and for the benefit ofinvestigators I give in Appendix A a list of the numbers missingfrom the printed volume, as shown by comparison with my retainedcopies. ] Governor Dennison seconded our wishes with his usual earnestness, and ordered the battery of artillery and company of cavalry to meetme at Gallipolis; but the guns for the battery were not to be had, and a section of two bronze guns (six-pounder smooth-bores rifled)was the only artillery, whilst the cavalry was less than half atroop of raw recruits, useful only as messengers. I succeeded ingetting the Eleventh Ohio sent with me, the lacking companies to berecruited and sent later. The Twelfth Ohio was an excellent regimentwhich had been somewhat delayed in its reorganization and had notgone with the rest of its brigade to McClellan. The Twenty-first wasone of the regiments enlisted for the State in excess of the firstquota, and was now brought into the national service under thePresident's second call. The two Kentucky regiments had beenorganized in Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crewsand "longshoremen" thrown out of employment by the stoppage ofcommerce on the river. There were in them some companies of othermaterial, but these gave the distinctive character to the regiments. The colonels and part of the field officers were Kentuckians, butthe organizations were Ohio regiments in nearly everything but thename. The men were mostly of a rough and reckless class, and gave agood deal of trouble by insubordination; but they did not lackcourage, and after they had been under discipline for a while, became good fighting regiments. The difficulty of gettingtransportation from the railway company delayed our departure. Itwas not till the 6th of July that a regiment could be sent, andanother followed in two or three days. The two Kentucky regimentswere not yet armed and equipped, but after a day or two were readyand were ordered up the river by steamboats. I myself left CampDennison on the evening of Sunday the 7th with the Eleventh Ohio(seven companies) and reached Gallipolis in the evening of the 9th. The three Ohio regiments were united on the 10th and carried bysteamers to Point Pleasant, and we entered the theatre of war. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 416: my report toMcClellan. ] My movement had been made upon a telegram from General McClellan, and I found at Gallipolis his letter of instructions of the 2d, andanother of the 6th which enlarged the scope of my command. Aterritorial district was assigned to me, including the southwesternpart of Virginia below Parkersburg on the Ohio, and north of theGreat Kanawha, reaching back into the country as I should occupy it. [Footnote: The territorial boundary of McClellan's Department hadbeen placed at the Great Kanawha and the Ohio rivers, probably withsome political idea of avoiding the appearance of aggression uponregions of doubtful loyalty. ] The directions to restrict myself to adefensive occupation of the Lower Kanawha valley were changed toinstructions to march on Charleston and Gauley Bridge, and, with aview to his resumption of the plan to make this his main line ofadvance, to "obtain all possible information in regard to the roadsleading toward Wytheville and the adjacent region. " I was alsoordered to place a regiment at Ripley, on the road from Parkersburgto Charleston, and advised "to beat up Barbonsville, Guyandotte, etc, so that the entire course of the Ohio may be secured to us. "Communication with Ripley was by Letart's Falls on the Ohio, somethirty miles above Gallipolis, or by Ravenswood, twenty milesfurther. Guyandotte was a longer distance below Gallipolis, andBarboursville was inland some miles up the Gurandotte River. As toGeneral Wise, McClellan wrote: "Drive Wise out and catch him if youcan. If you do catch him, send him to Colombus penitentiary. " Aregiment at Parkersburg and another at Roane Court House on thenorthern border of my district were ordered to report to me, but Iwas not authorized to move them from the stations assigned them, andthey were soon united to McClellan's own column. At Gallipolis I heard that a steamboat on the Ohio had been boardedby a rebel party near Guyandotte, and the news giving point toMcClellan's suggestion to "beat up" that region, I dispatched asmall steamboat down the river to meet the Kentucky regiments withorders for the leading one to land at Guyandotte and suppress anyinsurgents in that neighborhood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. Pt. I. P. 417. ] It was hazardous to divide my little army intothree columns on a base of a hundred miles, but it was thought wiseto show some Union troops at various points on the border, and Ipurposed to unite my detachments by early convergent movementsforward to the Kanawha valley as soon as I should reach Red House, thirty-two miles up the river, with my principal column. Before I reached Charleston I added to my artillery one iron and onebrass cannon, smooth six-pounders, borrowed from the civilauthorities at Gallipolis; but they were without caissons or anyproper equipment, and were manned by volunteers from the infantry. [Footnote: Ibid. ] My total force, when assembled, would be a littleover 3000 men, the regiments having the same average strength asthose with McClellan. The opposing force under General Wise was 4000by the time the campaign was fully opened, though somewhat less atthe beginning. [Footnote: Wise reported his force on the 17th ofJuly as 3500 "effective" men and ten cannon, and says he received"perhaps 300" in reinforcements on the 18th. When he abandoned thevalley ten days later, he reported his force 4000 in round numbers. Official Records, vol. Ii. Pp. 290, 292; 1011. ] The Great Kanawha River was navigable for small steamboats aboutseventy miles, to a point ten or twelve miles above Charleston, theonly important town of the region, which was at the confluence ofthe Kanawha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were plenty, owing to theinterruption of trade, and wagons were wholly lacking; so that mycolumn was accompanied and partly carried by a fleet of stern-wheelsteamers. On Thursday the 11th of July the movement from Point Pleasant began. An advance-guard was sent out on each side of the river, marchingupon the roads which were near its banks. The few horsemen weredivided and sent with them to carry messages, and the boatsfollowed, steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most oftwo regiments were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to themen, who were as yet unused to their work, and many of whom werefootsore from their first long march of twenty-five miles toGallipolis from Hampden station, where they had been obliged toleave the railway. The arrangement was also a good one in a militarypoint of view, for if an enemy were met on either bank of thestream, the boats could land in a moment and the troops disembarkwithout delay. Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was thevery romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of thepilot-house of the leading boat, so that I might see over the banksof the stream and across the bottom lands to the high hills whichbounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely one. Summer cloudslazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed in theircolors and swarmed with the men like bees. The bands played nationaltunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmateswould wave their handkerchiefs to us, and were answered by cheersfrom the troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently windingriver making beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us atevery turn. On either side the advance-guard could be seen in thedistance, the main body in the road, with skirmishers exploring theway in front, and flankers on the sides. Now and then a horsemanwould bring some message to the bank from the front, and a smallboat would be sent to receive it, giving us the rumors with whichthe country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement andof the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in anenemy's country key everybody to just such a pitch as apparently todouble the vividness of every sensation. The landscape seemed morebeautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilaration ofout-door life more joyous than any we had ever known. The halt for the night had been assigned at a little village on theright (northern) bank of the stream, which was nestled beneath aridge which ran down from the hills toward the river, making anexcellent position for defence against any force which might comeagainst it from the upper valley. The sun was getting low behind usin the west, as we approached it, and the advance-guard had alreadyhalted. Captain Cotter's two bronze guns gleamed bright on the topof the ridge beyond the pretty little town, and before the sun wentdown, the new white tents had been carried up to the slope andpitched there. The steamers were moored to the shore, and the lowslanting rays of the sunset fell upon as charming a picture as wasever painted. An outpost with pickets was set on the southern sideof the river, both grand and camp guards were put out also on theside we occupied, and the men soon had their supper and went torest. Late in the evening a panic-stricken countryman came in withthe news that General Wise was moving down upon us with 4000 men. The man was evidently in earnest, and was a loyal one. He believedevery word he said, but he had in fact seen only a few of theenemy's horsemen who were scouting toward us, and believed theirstatement that an army was at their back. It was our initiation intoan experience of rumors that was to continue as long as the war. Wewere to get them daily and almost hourly; sometimes with a littlefoundation of fact, sometimes with none; rarely purposely deceptive, but always grossly exaggerated, making chimeras with which acommanding officer had to wage a more incessant warfare than withthe substantial enemy in his front. I reasoned that Wise's troopswere, like my own, too raw to venture a night attack with, andcontented myself with sending a strong reconnoitring party outbeyond my pickets, putting in command of it Major Hines of theTwelfth Ohio, an officer who subsequently became noted for hisenterprise and activity in charge of scouting parties. The camprested quietly, and toward morning Hines returned, reporting that atroop of the enemy's horse had come within a couple of miles of ourposition in search of information about us and our movement. Theyhad indulged in loud bragging as to what Wise and his army would dowith us, but this and nothing more was the basis of our honestfriend's fright. The morning dawned bright and peaceful, thesteamers were sent back for a regiment which was still at PointPleasant, and the day was used in concentrating the little army andpreparing for another advance. On July 13th we moved again, making about ten miles, and finding thenavigation becoming difficult by reason of the low water. At severalshoals in the stream rough wing-dams had been built from the sidesto concentrate the water in the channel, and at Knob Shoals, in oneof these "chutes" as they were called, a coal barge had sometimebefore been sunk. In trying to pass it our leading boat grounded, and, the current being swift, it was for a time doubtful if weshould get her off. We finally succeeded, however, and theprocession of boats slowly steamed up the rapids. We had hardly gotbeyond them when we heard a distant cannon-shot from ouradvance-guard which had opened a long distance between them and usduring our delay. We steamed rapidly ahead. Soon we saw a manpulling off from the south bank in a skiff. Nearing the steamer, hestood up and excitedly shouted that a general engagement had begun. We laughingly told him it couldn't be very general till we got in, and we moved on, keeping a sharp outlook for our parties on eitherbank. When we came up to them, we learned that a party of horsemenhad appeared on the southern side of the river and had opened askirmishing fire, but had scampered off as if the Old Nick wereafter them when a shell from the rifled gun was sent over theirheads. The shell, like a good many that were made in those days, didnot explode, and the simple people of the vicinity who had heard itslong-continued scream told our men some days after that they thoughtit was "going yet. " From this time some show of resistance was made by the enemy, andthe skirmishing somewhat retarded the movement. Still, about tenmiles was made each day till the evening of the 16th, when weencamped at the mouth of the Pocotaligo, a large creek which entersthe Kanawha from the north. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 418. ] The evening before, we had had one of thoseincidents, not unusual with new troops, which prove that nothing buthabit can make men cool and confident in their duties. We had, asusual, moored our boats to the northern bank and made our campthere, placing an outpost on the left bank opposite us supporting achain of sentinels, to prevent a surprise from that direction. Areport of some force of the enemy in their front made me orderanother detachment to their support after nightfall. The detachmenthad been told off and ferried across in small boats. They were dimlyseen marching in the starlight up the river after landing, whensuddenly a shot was heard, and then an irregular volley was bothseen and heard as the muskets flashed out in the darkness. Asupporting force was quickly sent over, and, no further disturbanceoccurring, a search was made for an enemy, but none was found. A gunhad accidentally gone off in the squad, and the rest of the men, surprised and bewildered, had fired, they neither knew why nor atwhat. Two men were killed, and several others were hurt. This andthe chaffing the men got from their comrades was a lesson to thewhole command. The soldiers were brave enough, and were thoroughlyashamed of themselves, but they were raw; that was all that could besaid of it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 421. ] We were here overtaken by the Second Kentucky, which had stopped atGuyandotte on its way up the river, and had marched across thecountry to join us after our progress had sufficiently covered thatlower region. From Guyandotte a portion of the regiment, undercommand of Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, had gone to Barboursville andhad attacked and dispersed an encampment of Confederates which wasorganizing there. It was a very creditable little action, in whichofficers and men conducted themselves well, and which made them forthe time the envy of the rest of the command. The situation at "Poca, " as it was called in the neighborhood, wasone which made the further advance of the army require someconsideration. Information which came to us from loyal men showedthat some force of the enemy was in position above the mouth ofScary Creek on the south side of the Kanawha, and about three milesfrom us. We had for two days had constant light skirmishing with theadvance-guard of Wise's forces on the north bank of the river, andsupposed that the principal part of his command was on our side, andnot far in front of us. It turned out in fact that this was so, andthat Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Mountain, a boldspur which reaches the river on the northern side (on which is alsothe turnpike road), about twelve miles above my position, while heoccupied the south side with a detachment. The Pocotaligo, whichentered the river from the north at our camp, covered us against anattack on that side; but we could not take our steam-boats furtherunless both banks of the river were cleared. We had scarcely anywagons, for those which had been promised us could not yet beforwarded, and we must either continue to keep the steamboats withus, or organize wagon transportation and cut loose from the boats. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 420; dispatch of17th also. ] My urgent dispatches were hurrying the wagons toward us, but meanwhile I hoped the opposition on the south bank of the riverwould prove trifling, for artillery in position at any point on thenarrow river would at once stop navigation of our light and unarmedtransports. On the morning of the 17th a reconnoitering party sentforward on the south side of the river under command ofLieutenant-Colonel White of the Twelfth Ohio, reported the enemyabout five hundred strong intrenched on the further side of ScaryCreek, which was not fordable at its mouth, but could be crossed alittle way up the stream. Colonel Lowe of the Twelfth requested theprivilege of driving off this party with his regiment accompanied byour two cannon. He was ordered to do so, whilst the enemy'sskirmishers should be pushed back from the front of the main column, and it should be held ready to advance rapidly up the north bank ofthe river as soon as the hostile force at Scary Creek should bedislodged. The Twelfth and two companies of the Twenty-first Ohio were ferriedover and moved out soon after noon. The first reports from them wereencouraging and full of confidence, the enemy were retreating andthey had dismounted one of his guns; but just before evening theyreturned, bringing the account of their repulse in the effort tocross at the mouth of the creek, and their failure to find the forda little higher up. Their ammunition had run short, some casualtieshad occurred, and they had become discouraged and given it up. Theirloss was 10 men killed and 35 wounded. If they had held on and askedfor assistance, it would have been well enough; but, as was commonwith new troops, they passed from confidence to discouragement assoon as they were checked, and they retreated. The affair was accompanied by another humiliating incident whichgave me no little chagrin. During the progress of the engagementColonel Woodruff and Lieutenant-Colonel Neff of the Second Kentucky, with Colonel De Villiers of the Eleventh Ohio, rode out in front, onthe north bank of the river, till they came opposite the enemy'sposition, the hostile party on our side of the stream having fallenback beyond this point. They were told by a negro that the rebelswere in retreat, and they got the black man to ferry them over in askiff, that they might be the first to congratulate their friends. To their amazement they were welcomed as prisoners by theConfederates, who greatly enjoyed their discomfiture. The negro hadtold the truth in saying that the enemy had been in retreat; for thefact was that both sides retreated, but the Confederates, beingfirst informed of this, resumed their position and claimed avictory. The officers who were captured had gone out withoutpermission, and, led on by the hare-brained De Villiers, had donewhat they knew was foolish and unmilitary, resulting for them in asevere experience in Libby Prison at Richmond, and for us in themomentary appearance of lack of discipline and order which could notfairly be charged upon the command. I reported the facts withoutdisguise or apology, trusting to the future to remove the badimpression the affair must naturally make upon McClellan. The report of the strength of the position attacked and ourknowledge of the increasing difficulty of the ground before us, ledme to conclude that the wisest course would be to await the arrivalof the wagons, now daily expected, and then, with supplies forseveral days in hand, move independent of the steamers, which becameonly an embarrassment when it was advisable to leave the river roadfor the purpose of turning a fortified position like that we hadfound before us. We therefore rested quietly in our strong camp forseveral days, holding both banks of the river and preparing to movethe main column by a country road leading away from the stream onthe north side, and returning to it at Tyler Mountain, where Wise'scamp was reported to be. I ordered up the First Kentucky fromRavenswood and Ripley, but its colonel found obstacles in his way, and did not join us till we reached Charleston the following week. On the 23d of July I had succeeded in getting wagons and teamsenough to supply the most necessary uses, and renewed the advance. We marched rapidly on the 24th by the circuitous route I havementioned, leaving a regiment to protect the steamboats. The countrywas very broken and the roads very rough, but the enemy had noknowledge of our movement, and toward evening we again approachedthe river immediately in rear of their camp at Tyler Mountain. Whenwe drove in their pickets, the force was panic-stricken and ran off, leaving their camp in confusion, and their supper which they werecooking but did not stop to eat. A little below the point where wereached the river, and on the other side, was the steamboat "Maffet"with a party of soldiers gathering the wheat which had been cut inthe neighboring fields and was in the sheaf. I was for a momentdoubtful whether it might not be one of our own boats which hadventured up the river under protection of the regiment left behind, and directed our skirmishers who were deployed along the edge of thewater to hail the other side. "Who are you?" was shouted from bothbanks simultaneously. "United States troops, " our men answered. "Hurrah for Jeff Davis!" shouted the others, and a rattling fireopened on both sides. A shell was sent from our cannon into thesteamer, and the party upon her were immediately seen jumpingashore, having first set fire to her to prevent her falling into ourhands. The enemy then moved away on that side, under cover of thetrees which lined the river bank. Night was now falling, and, sending forward an advance-guard to follow up the force whose campwe had surprised, we bivouacked on the mountain side. In the morning, as we were moving out at an early hour, we were metby the mayor and two or three prominent citizens of Charleston whocame to surrender the town to us, Wise having hurriedly retreatedduring the night. He had done a very unnecessary piece of mischiefbefore leaving, in partly cutting off the cables of a finesuspension bridge which spans the Elk River at Charleston. As thisstream enters the Kanawha from the north and below the city, it mayhave seemed to him that it would delay our progress; but as a largenumber of empty coal barges were lying at the town, it took ourcompany of mechanics, under Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio, but alittle while to improvise a good floating bridge, and part of thecommand passed through the town and camped beyond it. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 425. ] One day was now given tothe establishment of a depot of supplies at Charleston and to theorganization of regular communication by water with Gallipolis, andby wagons with such positions as we might occupy further up theriver. Deputations of the townspeople were informed that it was notour policy to meddle with private persons who remained quietly athome, nor would we make any inquisition as to the personal opinionsof those who attended strictly to their own business; but they werewarned that any communication with the enemy would be remorselesslypunished. We were now able to get more accurate information about Wise'sforces than we could obtain before, and this accorded pretty wellwith the strength which he reported officially. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 63 note. ] His infantry was therefore more than equal to thecolumn under my command in the valley, whilst in artillery and incavalry he was greatly superior. Our continued advance in the faceof such opposition is sufficient evidence that the Confederate forcewas not well handled, for as the valley contracted and the hillscrowded in closer to the river, nearly every mile offered positionsin which small numbers could hold at bay an army. Our success inreaching Charleston was therefore good ground for being content withour progress, though I had to blame myself for errors in themanagement of my part of the campaign at Pocataligo. I ought not tohave assumed as confidently as I did that the enemy was only fivehundred strong at Scary Creek and that a detachment could dispose ofthat obstacle whilst the rest of the column prepared to advance onour principal line. Wise's force at that point was in fact doublethe number supposed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. P. 1011. ]It is true it was very inconvenient to ferry any considerable bodyof troops back and forth across the river; but I should neverthelesshave taken the bulk of my command to the left bank, and by occupyingthe enemy's attention at the mouth of Scary Creek, covered themovement of a sufficient force upon his flank by means of the fordsfarther up that stream. This would have resulted in the completerouting of the detachment, and it is nearly certain that I couldhave pushed on to Charleston at once, and could have waited therefor the organization of my wagon train with the prestige of victory, instead of doing so at 'Poca' with the appearance of a check. McClellan recognized the fact that he was asking me to face theenemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that Wisewas disposed to make a stand he directed me not to risk attackinghim in front, but rather to await the result of his own movementtoward the Upper Kanawha. [Footnote: Dispatches of July 16 and 20. ]Rosecrans did the same when he assumed command; but I knew the hopehad been that I would reach Gauley Bridge, and I was vexed that mymovement should have the appearance of failing when I was consciousthat we had not fairly measured our strength with my opponent. Assoon, therefore, as the needful preparations could be made, Idecided upon the turning movement which I have already described, and our resolute advance seems to have thrown Wise into a panic fromwhich he did not recover till he got far beyond Gauley Bridge. At Charleston I learned of the Bull Run disaster, and that McClellanhad been ordered to Washington, leaving Rosecrans in command of ourdepartment. The latter sent me orders which implied that to reachCharleston was the most he could expect of me, and directing me toremain on the defensive if I should succeed in getting so far, whilst he should take up anew McClellan's plan of reaching the rearof Wise's army. [Footnote: Dispatches of July 26 and 29. ] Hisdispatches, fortunately, did not reach me till I was close to GauleyBridge and was sure of my ability to take possession of that defile, some forty miles above Charleston. An additional reason for myprompt advance was that the Twenty-first Ohio was not yetre-enlisted for the war, was only a "three months" regiment whosetime was about to expire, and Governor Dennison had telegraphed meto send it back to Ohio. I left this regiment as a post-garrison atCharleston till it could be relieved by another, or till my successin reaching Gauley Bridge should enable me to send back a detachmentfor that post, and, on the 26th July, pushed forward with the restof my column, which, now that the First Kentucky had joined me, consisted of four regiments. Our first night's encampment was abouteleven miles above Charleston in a lovely nook between spurs of thehills. Here I was treated to a little surprise on the part of threeof my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of mymilitary experience. The camp had got nicely arranged for the nightand supper was over, when these gentlemen waited upon me at my tent. The one who had shown the least capacity as commander of a regimentwas spokesman, and informed me that after consultation they hadconcluded that it was foolhardy to follow the Confederates into thegorge we were travelling, and that unless I could show themsatisfactory reasons for changing their opinion they would not leadtheir commands further into it. I dryly asked if he was quite surehe understood the nature of his communication. There was somethingprobably in the tone of my question which was not altogetherexpected, and his companions began to look a little uneasy. He thenprotested that none of them meant any disrespect, but that as theirmilitary experience was about as extensive as my own, they thought Iought to make no movements but on consultation with them and bytheir consent. The others seemed to be better pleased with this wayof putting it, and signified assent. My answer was that theirconduct very plainly showed their own lack both of militaryexperience and elementary military knowledge, and that thisignorance was the only thing which could palliate their action. Whether they meant it or not, their action was mutinous. Theresponsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and whilstI should be inclined to confer very freely with my principalsubordinates and explain my purposes, I should call no councils ofwar, and submit nothing to vote till I felt incompetent to decidefor myself. If they apologized for their conduct and showedearnestness in military obedience to orders, what they had now saidwould be overlooked, but on any recurrence of cause for complaint Ishould enforce my power by the arrest of the offender at once. Idismissed them with this, and immediately sent out the formal ordersthrough my adjutant-general to march early next morning. Before theyslept one of the three had come to me with earnest apology for hispart in the matter, and a short time made them all as subordinate asI could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the brigadewhich had been under my command at Camp Dennison, and was a notunnatural result of the sudden assembling of inexperienced men undera brigade commander of whom they knew nothing except that at thebeginning of the war he was a civilian like themselves. These verymen afterward became devoted followers, and some of them life-longfriends. It was part of their military education as well as mine. IfI had been noisy and blustering in my intercourse with them at thebeginning, and had done what seemed to be regarded as the"regulation" amount of cursing and swearing, they would probablyhave given me credit for military aptitude at least; but asystematic adherence to a quiet and undemonstrative manner evidentlytold against me, at first, in their opinion. Through my army life Imet more or less of the same conduct when assigned to a new command;but when men learned that discipline would be inevitably enforced, and that it was as necessary to obey a quiet order as one emphasizedby expletives, and especially when they had been a little underfire, there was no more trouble. Indeed, I was impressed with thefact that after this acquaintance was once made, my chiefembarrassment in discipline was that an intimation ofdissatisfaction on my part would cause deeper chagrin and moreevident pain than I intended or wished. The same march enabled me to make the acquaintance of another army"institution, "--the newspaper correspondent. We were joined atCharleston by two men representing influential Eastern journals, whowished to know on what terms they could accompany the column. Theanswer was that the quartermaster would furnish them with a tent andtransportation, and that their letters should be submitted to one ofthe staff, to protect us from the publication of facts which mightaid the enemy. This seemed unsatisfactory, and they intimated thatthey expected to be taken into my mess and to be announced asvolunteer aides with military rank. They were told that militaryposition or rank could only be given by authority much higher thanmine, and that they could be more honestly independent if free frompersonal obligation and from temptation to repay favors withflattery. My only purpose was to put the matter upon the foundationof public right and of mutual self-respect. The day before wereached Gauley Bridge they opened the subject again to CaptainMcElroy, my adjutant-general, but were informed that I had decidedit upon a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was, "Very well; General Cox thinks he can get along without us, and wewill show him. We will write him down. " They left the camp the same evening, and wrote letters to theirpapers describing the army as demoralized, drunken, and withoutdiscipline, in a state of insubordination, and the commander astotally incompetent. As to the troops, more baseless slander wasnever uttered. Their march had been orderly. No wilful injury hadbeen done to private property, and no case of personal violence toany non-combatant, man or woman, had been even charged. Yet theprinting of such communications in widely read journals was likelyto be as damaging as if it all were true. My nomination asBrigadier-General of U. S. Volunteers was then before the Senate forconfirmation, and "the pen" would probably have proved "mightierthan the sword" but for McClellan's knowledge of the nature of thetask we had accomplished, as he was then in the flood-tide of powerat Washington, and expressed his satisfaction at the performance ofour part of the campaign which he had planned. By good fortune also, the injurious letters were printed at the same time with thetelegraphic news of our occupation of Gauley Bridge and the retreatof the enemy out of the valley. [Footnote: As one of thesecorrespondents became a writer of history, it is made proper to saythat he was Mr. William Swinton, of whom General Grant has occasionto speak in his "Personal Memoirs" (vol. Ii. P. 144), and whosefacility in changing his point of view in historical writing wasshown in his "McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed, "which was published in 1864 by the Union Congressional Committee(first appearing in the "New York Times" of February, March, andApril of that year), when compared with his "History of the Army ofthe Potomac" which appeared two years later. Burnside accused him ofrepeated instances of malicious libel of his command in June, 1864. Official Records, vol. Xxxvi. Pt. Iii. P. 751. ] I was, however, deeply convinced that my position was the right one, and neverchanged my rule of conduct in the matter. The relations of newspapercorrespondents to general officers of the army became one of thecrying scandals and notorious causes of intrigue and demoralization. It was a subject almost impossible to settle satisfactorily; butwhoever gained or lost by cultivating this means of reputation, itis a satisfaction to have adhered throughout the war to the rule Ifirst adopted and announced. Wise made no resolute effort to oppose my march after I leftCharleston, and contented himself with delaying us by hisrear-guard, which obstructed the road by felling trees into it andby skirmishing with my head of column. We however advanced at therate of twelve or fifteen miles a day, reaching Gauley Bridge on themorning of the 29th of July. Here we captured some fifteen hundredstands of arms and a considerable store of munitions which theConfederate general had not been able to carry away or destroy. Itis safe to say that in the wild defile which we had threaded for thelast twenty miles there were as many positions as there were milesin which he could easily have delayed my advance a day or two, forcing me to turn his flank by the most difficult mountainclimbing, and where indeed, with forces so nearly equal, my progressshould have been permanently barred. At Gauley Bridge he burned thestructure which gave name to the place, and which had been a seriesof substantial wooden trusses resting upon heavy stone piers. Myorders definitively limited me to the point we had now reached in myadvance, and I therefore sent forward only a detachment to followthe enemy and keep up his precipitate retreat. Wise did not stoptill he reached Greenbrier and the White Sulphur Springs, and therewas abundant evidence that he regarded his movement as a finalabandonment of this part of West Virginia. [Footnote: Floyd'sDispatches, Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. Ii. Pp. 208, 213. ] A fewweeks later General Lee came in person with reinforcements over themountains and began a new campaign; but until the 20th of August wewere undisturbed except by a petty guerilla warfare. McClellan telegraphed from Washington his congratulations, [Footnote: Dispatch of August 1. ] and Rosecrans expressed hissatisfaction also in terms which assured me that we had done morethan had been expected of us. [Footnote: Dispatch of July 31. ] Thegood effect upon the command was also very apparent; for our successnot only justified the policy of a determined advance, but theofficers who had been timid as to results were now glad to get theirshare of the credit, and to make amends for their insubordination bya hearty change in bearing and conduct. My term of service as abrigadier of the Ohio forces in the three months' enrolment had nowended, and until the Senate should confirm my appointment as aUnited States officer there was some doubt as to my right tocontinue in command. My embarrassment in this regard was verypleasantly removed by a dispatch from General Rosecrans in which heconveyed the request of Lieutenant-General Scott and of himself thatI should remain in charge of the Kanawha column. It was only a week, however, before notice of the confirmation was received, anddropping all thoughts of returning home, I prepared my mind forcontinuous active duty till the war should end. CHAPTER V GAULEY BRIDGE The gate of the Kanawha valley--The wilderness beyond--West Virginiadefences--A romantic post--Chaplain Brown--An adventurousmission--Chaplain Dubois--"The River Path"--Gauley Mount--ColonelTompkins's home--Bowie-knives--Truculent resolutions--TheEngineers--Whittlesey, Benham, Wagner--Fortifications--Distantreconnoissances--Comparison of forces--Dangers to steamboatcommunications--Allotment of duties--The Summersville post--SeventhOhio at Cross Lanes--Scares and rumors--Robert E. Lee at ValleyMountain--Floyd and Wise advance--Rosecrans's orders--The CrossLanes affair--Major Casement's creditable retreat--Colonel Tyler'sreports--Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton--Quarrels of Wise andFloyd--Ambushing rebel cavalry--Affair at Boone Court House--Newattack at Gauley Bridge--An incipient mutiny--Sad result--A notablecourt-martial--Rosecrans marching toward us--Communicationsrenewed--Advance toward Lewisburg--Camp Lookout--A private sorrow. The position at Gauley Bridge was an important one from a militarypoint of view. It was where the James River and Kanawha turnpike, after following the highlands along the course of New River as itcomes from the east, drops into a defile with cliffs on one side anda swift and unfordable torrent upon the other, and then crosses theGauley River, which is a stream of very similar character. The tworivers, meeting at a right angle, there unite to form the GreatKanawha, which plunges over a ledge of rocks a mile below and windsits way among the hills, some thirty miles, before it becomes anavigable stream even for the lightest class of steamboats. FromGauley Bridge a road runs up the Gauley River to Cross Lanes andCarnifex Ferry, something over twenty miles, and continuingnorthward reaches Summersville, Sutton, and Weston, making almostthe only line of communication between the posts then occupied byour troops in northwestern Virginia and the head of the Kanawhavalley. Southwestward the country was extremely wild and broken, with few and small settlements and no roads worthy the name. Thecrossing of the Gauley was therefore the gate through which allimportant movements from eastern into southwestern Virginia mustnecessarily come, and it formed an important link in any chain ofposts designed to cover the Ohio valley from invasion. It was alsothe most advanced single post which could protect the Kanawhavalley. Further to the southeast, on Flat-top Mountain, was anothervery strong position, where the principal road on the left bank ofNew River crosses a high and broad ridge; but a post could not besafely maintained there without still holding Gauley Bridge inconsiderable force, or establishing another post on the right bankof New River twenty miles further up. All these streams flow inrocky beds seamed and fissured to so great a degree that they had nopracticable fords. You might go forty miles up New River and atleast twenty up the Gauley before you could find a place whereeither could be passed by infantry or wagons. The little ferrieswhich had been made in a few eddies of the rivers were destroyed inthe first campaign, and the post at the Gauley became nearlyimpregnable in front, and could only be turned by long and difficultdetours. An interval of about a hundred miles separated this mountainfastness from the similar passes which guarded eastern Virginiaalong the line of the Blue Ridge. This debatable ground was sparselysettled and very poor in agricultural resources, so that it couldfurnish nothing for subsistence of man or beast. The necessity oftransporting forage as well as subsistence and ammunition throughthis mountainous belt forbade any extended or continuous operationsthere; for actual computation showed that the wagon trains couldcarry no more than the food for the mule teams on the double trip, going and returning, from Gauley Bridge to the narrows of New Riverwhere the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad crossed upon an importantbridge which was several times made the objective point of anexpedition. This alone proved the impracticability of the planMcClellan first conceived, of making the Kanawha valley the line ofan important movement into eastern Virginia. It pointed veryplainly, also, to the true theory of operations in that country. Gauley Bridge should have been held with a good brigade which couldhave had outposts several miles forward in three directions, and, assisted by a small body of horse to scour the country fifty milesor more to the front, the garrison could have protected all thecountry which we ever occupied permanently. A similar post atHuttonsville with detachments at the Cheat Mountain pass andElkwater pass north of Huntersville would have covered the onlyother practicable routes through the mountains south of the line ofthe Baltimore and Ohio Railway. These would have been smallintrenched camps, defensive in character, but keeping detachmentsconstantly active in patrolling the front, going as far as could bedone without wagons. All that ever was accomplished in that regionof any value would thus have been attained at the smallest expense, and the resources that were for three years wasted in thosemountains might have been applied to the legitimate lines of greatoperations from the valley of the Potomac southward. [Illustration: GAULEY BRIDGE & VICINITY. ] Nothing could be more romantically beautiful than the situation ofthe post at Gauley Bridge. The hamlet had, before our arrival there, consisted of a cluster of two or three dwellings, a country store, alittle tavern, and a church, irregularly scattered along the base ofthe mountain and facing the road which turns from the Gauley valleyinto that of the Kanawha. The lower slope of the hillside behind thehouses was cultivated, and a hedgerow separated the lower fieldsfrom the upper pasturage. Above this gentler slope the wooded steepsrose more precipitately, the sandstone rock jutting out into cragsand walls, the sharp ridge above having scarcely soil enough tonourish the chestnut-trees, here, like Mrs. Browning's woods ofVallombrosa, literally "clinging by their spurs to the precipices. "In the angle between the Gauley and New rivers rose Gauley Mount, the base a perpendicular wall of rocks of varying height, with highwooded slopes above. There was barely room for the road between thewall of rocks and the water on the New River side, but after goingsome distance up the valley, the highway gradually ascended thehillside, reaching some rolling uplands at a distance of a couple ofmiles. Here was Gauley Mount, the country-house of Colonel C. Q. Tompkins, formerly of the Army of the United States, but now thecommandant of a Confederate regiment raised in the Kanawha valley. Across New River the heavy masses of Cotton Mountain rose rough andalmost inaccessible from the very water's edge. The western side ofCotton Mountain was less steep, and buttresses formed a bench aboutits base, so that in looking across the Kanawha a mile below thejunction of the rivers, one saw some rounded foothills which hadbeen cleared on the top and tilled, and a gap in the mountainouswall made room on that side for a small creek which descended to theKanawha, and whose bed served for a rude country road leading toFayette C. H. At the base of Cotton Mountain the Kanawha equals theunited width of the two tributaries, and flows foaming over brokenrocks with treacherous channels between, till it dashes over thehorseshoe ledge below, known far and wide as the Kanawha Falls. Oneither bank near the falls a small mill had been built, that on theright bank a saw-mill and the one on the left for grinding grain. Our encampment necessarily included the saw-mill below the falls, where the First Kentucky Regiment was placed to guard the roadcoming from Fayette C. H. Two regiments were encamped at the bridgeupon the hillside above the hedgerow, having an advanced post ofhalf a regiment on the Lewisburg road beyond the Tompkins farm, andscouting the country to Sewell Mountain. Smaller outposts werestationed some distance up the valley of the Gauley. My headquarterstents were pitched in the door-yard of a dwelling-house facing theGauley River, and I occupied an unfurnished room in the house foroffice purposes. A week was spent, without molestation, exploringthe country in all directions and studying its topography. A ferryguided by a cable stretching along the piers of the burnt bridgecommunicated with the outposts up the New River, and a smaller ferrybelow the Kanawha Falls connected with the Fayette road. Systematicdiscipline and instruction in outpost duty were enforced, and theregiments rapidly became expert mountaineers and scouts. Thepopulation was nearly all loyal below Gauley Bridge, but above theywere mostly Secessionists, a small minority of the wealthierslaveholders being the nucleus of all aggressive secessionmovements. These, by their wealth and social leadership, overawed orcontrolled a great many who did not at heart sympathize with them, and between parties thus formed a guerilla warfare became chronic. In our scouting expeditions we found little farms in secluded nooksamong the mountains, where grown men assured us that they had neverbefore seen the American flag, and whole families had never beenfurther from home than a church and country store a few miles away. From these mountain people several regiments of Union troops wererecruited in West Virginia, two of them being organized in rear ofmy own lines, and becoming part of the garrison of the district inthe following season. I had been joined before reaching Gauley Bridge by Chaplain Brown ofthe Seventh Ohio, who had obtained permission to make an adventurousjourney across the country from Sutton to bring me information as tothe position and character of the outposts that were stretching fromthe railway southward toward our line of operations. Disguised as amountaineer in homespun clothing, his fine features shaded by aslouched felt hat, he reported himself to me in anything but aclerical garb. Full of enterprise as a partisan leader of scoutscould be, he was yet a man of high attainments in his profession, ofnoble character and real learning. When he reached me, I had as myguest another chaplain who had accepted a commission at mysuggestion, the Rev. Mr. Dubois, son-in-law of Bishop McIlvaine ofOhio, who had been leader of the good people at Chillicothe inproviding a supper for the Eleventh Ohio as we were on our way fromCamp Dennison to Gallipolis. He had burned to have some part in thecountry's struggle, and became a model chaplain till his labors andexposure broke his health and forced him to resign. The presence oftwo such men gave some hours of refined social life in the intervalsof rough work. One evening walk along the Kanawha has ever sinceremained in my memory associated with Whittier's poem "The RiverPath, " as a wilder and more brilliant type of the scene he pictured. We had walked out beyond the camp, leaving its noise and its warlikeassociations behind us, for a turn of the road around a juttingcliff shut it all out as completely as if we had been transported toanother land, except that the distant figure of a sentinel on postreminded us of the limit of safe sauntering for pleasure. MyPresbyterian and Episcopalian friends forgot their differences ofdogma, and as the sun dropped behind the mountain tops, making anearly twilight in the valley, we talked of home, of patriotism, ofthe relation of our struggle to the world's progress, and other highthemes, when "Sudden our pathway turned from night, The hills swung open to the light; Through their green gates the sunshine showed, A long, slant splendor downward flowed. Down glade and glen and bank it rolled; It bridged the shaded stream with gold; And borne on piers of mist, allied The shadowy with the sunlit side!" The surroundings, the things of which we talked, our own sentiments, all combined to make the scene stir deep emotions for which thepoet's succeeding lines seem the only fit expression, and to linkthe poem indissolubly with the scene as if it had its birth there. When Wise had retreated from the valley, Colonel Tompkins had beenunable to remove his family, and had left a letter commending themto our courteous treatment. Mrs. Tompkins was a lady of refinement, and her position within our outposts was far from being acomfortable one. She, however, put a cheerful face upon hersituation, showed great tact in avoiding controversy with thesoldiers and in conciliating the good-will of the officers, andremained with her children and servants in her picturesque home onthe mountain. So long as there was no fighting in the near vicinity, it was comparatively easy to save her from annoyance; but when alittle later in the autumn Floyd occupied Cotton Mountain, andGeneral Rosecrans was with us with larger forces, such a householdbecame an object of suspicion and ill-will, which made it necessaryto send her through the lines to her husband. The men fancied theysaw signals conveyed from the house to the enemy, and believed thatsecret messages were sent, giving information of our numbers andmovements. All this was highly improbable, for the lady knew thather safety depended upon her good faith and prudence; but such camprumor becomes a power, and Rosecrans found himself compelled to endit by sending her away. He could no longer be answerable for hercomplete protection. This, however, was not till November, and inAugust it was only a pleasant variation, in going the rounds, tocall at the pretty house on Gauley Mount, inquire after the welfareof the family, and have a moment's polite chat with the mistress ofthe mansion. For ten days after we occupied Gauley Bridge, all our informationshowed that General Wise was not likely to attempt the reconquest ofthe Kanawha valley voluntarily. His rapid retrograde march ended atWhite Sulphur Springs and he went into camp there. His destructionof bridges and abandonment of stores and munitions of war showedthat he intended to take final leave of our region. [Footnote: Myreport to Rosecrans, Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 40. Wiseto Lee, _Id_. , vol. Ii. P. 1012; vol. V. P. 769. ] The contrastbetween promise and performance in his case had been ludicrous. Whenwe entered the valley, we heard of his proclamations and orders, which breathed the spirit of desperate hand-to-hand conflict. Hissoldiers had been told to despise long-range fire-arms, and to trustto bowie-knives, which our invading hordes would never dare to face. We found some of these knives among the arms we captured at theGauley, --ferocious-looking weapons, made of broad files ground to adouble edge, fitted with rough handles, and still bearing thecross-marking of the file on the flat sides. Such arms pointed manya sarcasm among our soldiers, who had found it hard in the latterpart of our advance to get within even the longest musket-range ofthe enemy's column. It was not strange that ignorant men shouldthink they might find use for weapons less serviceable than theancient Roman short-sword; but that, in the existing condition ofmilitary science, officers could be found to share and to encouragethe delusion was amusing enough! With the muskets we captured, wearmed a regiment of loyal Virginians, and turned over the rest toGovernor Peirpoint for similar use. [Footnote: In some documentswhich fell into our hands we found a series of resolutions passed ata meeting in the spring at which one of the companies now with Wisewas organized. It shows the melodramatic truculence which was echoedin the exhortations of the general and of other men who should havehad more judgment. The resolutions were these:-- "_Resolved:_ 1. That this company was formed for the defence of thisCommonwealth against her enemies of the North, and for no otherpurpose. _Resolved:_ 2. That the so-called President of the United States byhis war policy has deliberately insulted the people of thisCommonwealth, and if blood he wants, blood he can have. _Resolved:_ 3. That we are ready to respond to the call of theGovernor of this Commonwealth for resisting Abraham Lincoln and theNew York stock-jobbers, and all who sympathize with them. _Resolved:_ 4. That we have not forgotten Harper's Ferry and JohnBrown. "] On the 5th of August Lieutenant Wagner of the Engineers arrived atGauley Bridge with instructions from General Rosecrans tosuperintend the construction of such fortifications as might beproper for a post of three regiments. I had already with me ColonelWhittlesey, Governor Dennison's chief engineer, an old West Pointgraduate, who had for some years been devoting himself to scientificpursuits, especially to geology. In a few days these were joined byCaptain Benham, who was authorized to determine definitely the plansof our defences. I was thus stronger in engineering skill than inany other department of staff assistants, though in truth there waslittle fortifying to be done beyond what the contour of the groundindicated to the most ordinary comprehension. [Footnote: The causeof this visit of the Engineers is found in a dispatch sent byMcClellan to Rosecrans, warning him that Lee and Johnston were bothactually in march to crush our forces in West Virginia, anddirecting that Huttonsville and Gauley Bridge be strongly fortified. Official Records, vol. V. P. 555; _Id_. , vol. Ii. Pt.. 445, 446. ] Benham stayed but two or three days, modified Wagner's plans enoughto feel that he had made them his own, and then went back toRosecrans's headquarters, where he was met with an appointment asbrigadier-general, and was relieved of staff duty. He was a stoutred-faced man, with a blustering air, dictatorial and assuming, anarmy engineer of twenty-five years' standing. He was no doubt wellskilled in the routine of his profession, but broke down whenburdened with the responsibility of conducting the movement oftroops in the field. Wagner was a recent graduate of the MilitaryAcademy, a genial, modest, intelligent young man of great promise. He fell at the siege of Yorktown in the next year. Whittlesey was aveteran whose varied experience in and out of the army had all beenturned to good account. He was already growing old, but wasindefatigable, pushing about in a rather prim, precise way, advisingwisely, criticising dryly but in a kindly spirit, and helping bringevery department into better form. I soon lost both him and McElroy, my adjutant-general, for their three months' service was up, andthey were made, the one colonel, and the other major of theTwentieth Ohio Regiment, of which my friend General Force was thelieutenant-colonel. We fortified the post by an epaulement or two for cannon, high up onthe hillside covering the ferry and the road up New River. Aninfantry trench, with parapet of barrels filled with earth, was runalong the margin of Gauley River till it reached a creek coming downfrom the hills on the left. There a redoubt for a gun or two wasmade, commanding a stretch of road above, and the infantry trenchfollowed the line of the creek up to a gorge in the hill. On theside of Gauley Mount facing our post, we slashed the timber from theedge of the precipice nearly to the top of the mountain, making anentanglement through which it was impossible that any body of troopsshould move. Down the Kanawha, below the falls, we strengthened thesaw-mill with logs, till it became a block-house loopholed formusketry, commanding the road to Charleston, the ferry, and theopening of the road to Fayette C. H. A single cannon was here put inposition also. All this took time, for so small a force as ours could not make veryheavy details of working parties, especially as our outpost andreconnoitring duty was also very laborious. This duty was done byinfantry, for cavalry I had none, except the squad of mountedmessengers, who kept carefully out of harm's way, more to save theirhorses than themselves, for they had been enlisted under an old lawwhich paid them for the risk of their own horses, which risk theynaturally tried to make as small as possible. My reconnoitringparties reached Big Sewell Mountain, thirty-five miles up New River, Summersville, twenty miles up the Gauley, and made excursions intothe counties on the left bank of the Kanawha, thirty or forty milesaway. These were not exceptional marches, but were kept up with anindustry that gave the enemy an exaggerated idea of our strength aswell as of our activity. About the 10th of August we began to get rumors from the countrythat General Robert E. Lee had arrived at Lewisburg to assumedirection of the Confederate movements into West Virginia. We heardalso that Floyd with a strong brigade had joined that of Wise, whose"legion" had been reinforced, and that this division, reported to be10, 000 or 12, 000 strong, would immediately operate against me atGauley Bridge. We learned also of a general stir among theSecessionists in Fayette, Mercer, and Raleigh counties, and of themilitia being ordered out under General Chapman to support theConfederate movement by operating upon my line of communications, whilst Floyd and Wise should attack in front. The reported aggregate of the enemy's troops was, as usual, exaggerated, but we now know that it amounted to about 8000 men, aforce so greatly superior to anything I could assemble to oppose it, that the situation became at once a very grave one for me. [Footnote: On the 14th of August Wise reported to General Lee thathe had 2000 men ready to move, and could have 2500 ready in fivedays; that 550 of his cavalry were with Floyd, besides a detachmentof 50 artillerists. This makes his total force 3100. At that time hegives Floyd's force at 1200 with two strong regiments coming up, besides 2000 militia under General Chapman. The aggregate forceoperating on the Kanawha line he gives as 7800. (Official Recordsvol. V. P. 787. )] To resist this advance, I could keep but tworegiments at Gauley Bridge, an advance-guard of eight companiesvigorously skirmishing toward Sewell Mountain, a regimentdistributed on the Kanawha to cover steamboat communications, andsome companies of West Virginia recruits organizing at the mouth ofthe Kanawha. By extreme activity these were able to baffle theenemy, and impose upon him the belief that our numbers were morethan double our actual force. Small hostile parties began to creep in toward the navigable part ofthe Kanawha, and to fire upon the steamboats, which were our soledependence for supplying our depots at Charleston and at the head ofnavigation. General Rosecrans informed me of his purpose to march asufficiently strong column to meet that under Lee as soon as thepurpose of the latter should be developed, and encouraged me to holdfast to my position. I resolved, therefore, to stand a siege if needbe, and pushed my means of transportation to the utmost, toaccumulate a store of supplies at Gauley Bridge. I succeeded ingetting up rations sufficient to last a fortnight, but found it muchharder to get ammunition, especially for my ill-assorted littlebattery of cannon. The Twenty-sixth Ohio came into the Kanawha valley on the 8ththrough a mistake in their orders, and their arrival supplied for afew days the loss of the Twenty-first, which had gone home to bemustered out and reorganized. Some companies of the newly formingFourth Virginia were those who protected the village of PointPleasant at the mouth of the river, and part of the Twelfth andTwenty-sixth Ohio were in detachments from Charleston toward GauleyBridge, furnishing guards for the steamboats and assisting in thelanding and forwarding of supplies. The Eleventh Ohio, underLieutenant-Colonel Frizell, which still had only eight companies, had the task of covering and reconnoitring our immediate front, andwas the advance-guard already mentioned. Part of the Twelfth underMajor Hines did similar work on the road to Summersville, whereRosecrans had an advanced post, consisting of the Seventh Ohio(Colonel E. B. Tyler), the Thirteenth (Colonel Wm. Sooy Smith), andthe Twenty-third (Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Matthews). On the 13thof August the Seventh Ohio, by orders from Rosecrans, marched toCross Lanes, the intersection of the read from Summersville toGauley Bridge, with one from Carnifex Ferry, which is on the Gauleynear the mouth of Meadow River. A road called the Sunday Road is inthe Meadow River valley, and joins the Lewisburg turnpike aboutfifteen miles in front of Gauley Bridge. [Footnote: See OfficialAtlas, Plate IX. 3, and map, p. 106, _post_] To give warning againstany movement of the enemy to turn my position by this route or tointervene between me and Rosecrans's posts at Summersville andbeyond, was Tyler's task. He was ordered to picket all crossings ofthe river near his position, and to join my command if he weredriven away. I was authorized to call him to me in an emergency. On the 15th Tyler was joined at Cross Lanes by the Thirteenth andTwenty-third Ohio, in consequence of rumors that the enemy wasadvancing upon Summersville in force from Lewisburg. I would havebeen glad of such an addition to my forces, but knowing thatRosecrans had stationed them as his own outpost covering the Suttonand Weston road, I ordered Tyler to maintain his own position, andurged the others to return at once to Summersville. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 449, 453, 454. ] The road bywhich they had expected the enemy was the Wilderness road, whichcrossed the Gauley at Hughes' Ferry, six miles above Carnifex. Ifattacked from that direction, they should retire northward towardRosecrans, if possible. Rosecrans gave orders to the same effect as soon as he heard of themovement, saying that his intention had been to station Smith andMatthews at Sutton, where their retreat toward him in case ofnecessity would be assured. [Footnote: Dispatch of August 16. ] Hisorders for Tyler were that he should scout far toward the enemy, "striking him wherever he can, " and "hold his position at theferries as long as he can safely do it, and then fall back, asdirected, " toward Gauley Bridge. [Footnote: Dispatch of August 17. ]The incident throws important light upon the situation a week later, when Tyler was attacked by Floyd. Floyd and Wise were now really in motion, though General Leeremained at Valley Mountain near Huntersville, whence he directedtheir movements. On the 17th they had passed Sewell Mountain, butmade slow progress in the face of the opposition of the EleventhOhio, which kept up a constant skirmish with them. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 792, 799; _Id_. , vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 450-453. ] On the 19th Floyd's advance-guard passed the mouth of theSunday Road on the turnpike, and on the 20th made so determined apush at my advance-guard that I believed it a serious effort of thewhole Confederate column. I strengthened my own advance-guard bypart of the Twelfth Ohio, which was at hand, and placed them at PigCreek, a mile beyond the Tompkins place, where the turnpike crosseda gorge making a strongly defensible position. The advance-guard wasable to withstand the enemy alone, and drove back those whoassaulted them with considerable loss. It has since appeared thatthis movement of the enemy was by Wise's command making a directattack upon my position, whilst Floyd was moving by the diagonalroad to Dogwood Gap on the Sunday Road where it crosses the oldState Road. There he encamped for the night, and next day continuedhis march to the mouth of Meadow River near Carnifex Ferry. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. V. P. 800. ] It was an affair of advance-guardsin which Wise was satisfied as soon as he found serious resistance, and he retired during the night. On the first evidence of theenemy's presence in force, I called Tyler from Cross Lanes toTwenty-mile Creek, about six miles from Gauley Bridge, where it wasimportant to guard a road passing to my rear, and to meet anyattempt to turn my flank if the attack should be determinedly madeby the whole force of the enemy. [Footnote: Dispatch of August 20. ]As soon as the attack was repulsed, Tyler was ordered to return toCross Lanes and resume his watch of the roads and river crossingsthere. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 454. ] He was delayed bythe issue of shoes and clothing to his men, and when he approachedhis former position on the 24th, he found that Floyd was reported tohave crossed the Gauley at Carnifex Ferry. Without waiting toreconnoitre the enemy at all, Tyler retreated to Peters Creek, several miles. Floyd had in fact succeeded in raising two smallflatboats which Tyler had sunk but had not entirely destroyed. Withthese for a ferry, he had crossed and was intrenching himself wherehe was afterward attacked by Rosecrans. In the hope that only a small force had made the crossing, I orderedTyler to "make a dash at them, taking care to keep your force wellin hand so as to keep your retreat safe. " [Footnote: Dispatch ofAugust 24. ] I added: "It is important to give them such a check asto stop their crossing. " Meanwhile my advance-guard up New River wasordered to demonstrate actively in front and upon the Sunday Road, so as to disquiet any force which had gone towards Tyler, and I alsosent forward half a regiment to Peters Creek (six miles from CrossLanes) to hold the pass there and secure his retreat in case ofneed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 457. ] But Tyler was new to responsibility, and seemed paralyzed intocomplete inefficiency. He took nearly the whole of the 25th to moveslowly to Cross Lanes, though he met no opposition. He did nothingthat evening or night, and his disposal of his troops was soimproper and outpost duty so completely neglected that on themorning of the 26th, whilst his regiment was at breakfast, it wasattacked by Floyd on both flanks at once, and was routed before itcould be formed for action. Some companies managed to make a show offighting, but it was wholly in vain, and they broke in confusion. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 458, 459, 461. ] About 15 were killed and 50wounded, the latter with some 30 others falling into the enemy'shands. Tyler, with his lieutenant-colonel, Creighton, came intoGauley Bridge with a few stragglers from the regiment. Othersfollowed until about 200 were present. His train had reached thedetachment I had sent to Peters Creek, and this covered its retreatto camp, so that all his wagons came in safely. He reported all hiscommand cut to pieces and captured except the few that were withhim, and wrote an official report of the engagement, giving thatresult. On the 28th, however, we heard that Major Casement had carried 400of the regiment safely into Charleston. He had rallied them on thehills immediately after the rout, and finding the direct road toGauley Bridge intercepted, had led them by mountain paths over theridges to the valley of Elk River, and had then followed that streamdown to Charleston without being pursued. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 462. ] This put a new face on thebusiness, and Tyler in much confusion asked the return of his reportthat he might re-write it. I looked upon his situation as the notunnatural result of inexperience, and contented myself withinforming General Rosecrans of the truth as to the affair. Tyler wasallowed to substitute a new report, and his unfortunate affair wastreated as a lesson from which it was expected he would profit. [Footnote: Rosecrans's dispatch, _Id_. , p. 460. ] It made trouble inthe regiment, however, where the line officers did not conceal theiropinion that he had failed in his duty as a commander, and he wasnever afterward quite comfortable among them. The lieutenant-colonel, Creighton, was for a time in the abyss ofself-reproach. The very day they reached Gauley Bridge in theirunceremonious retreat, he came to me, crying with shame, and said, "General, I have behaved like a miserable coward, I ought to becashiered, " and repeated many such expressions of remorse. Icomforted him by saying that the intensity of his own feeling wasthe best proof that he had only yielded to a surprise and that itwas clear he was no coward. He died afterward at the head of hisregiment in the desperate charge up the hills at Ringgold, Georgia, in the campaign following that of Chickamauga in the autumn of 1863, having had the command for two years after Tyler became a brigadier. During those two years the Seventh had been in numberlessengagements, and its list of casualties in battle, made good byrecruiting, was said to have reached a thousand. Better soldiersthere were none, and Creighton proved himself a lion in every fight. Casement, who rallied and led the most of the regiment from CrossLanes over the mountains to Charleston, became afterward colonel ofthe One Hundred and Third Ohio. He came again under my command inEast Tennessee in the winter of 1863, and continued one of mybrigade commanders to the close of the war. He was a railway builderby profession, had a natural aptitude for controlling bodies of men, was rough of speech but generous of heart, running over with funwhich no dolefulness of circumstance could repress, as jolly acomrade and as loyal a subordinate as the army could show. After the Cross Lanes affair I fully expected that the Confederateforces would follow the route which Casement had taken toCharleston. Floyd's inactivity puzzled me, for he did no more thanmake an intrenched camp at Carnifex Ferry, with outposts at PetersMountain and toward Summersville. The publication of the ConfederateArchives has partly solved the mystery. Floyd called on Wise toreinforce him; but the latter demurred, insistent that the dutyassigned him of attacking my position in front needed all the men hehad. Both appealed to Lee, and Lee decided that Floyd was the seniorand entitled to command the joint forces. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. V. Pp. 155-165, 800, 802-813. ] The letters of Wiseshow a capacity for keeping a command in hot water which was unique. If he had been half as troublesome to me as he was to Floyd, Ishould indeed have had a hot time of it. But he did me royal serviceby preventing anything approaching to co-operation between the twoConfederate columns. I kept my advance-guards constantly feeling ofboth, and got through the period till Rosecrans joined me withnothing more serious than some sharp affairs of detachments. I was not without anxiety, however, and was constantly kept on thealert. Rosecrans withdrew the Twelfth Ohio from my command, excepting two companies under Major Hines, on the 19th of August, [Footnote: My dispatch to Rosecrans of August 19; also OfficialRecords, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 454. ] and the imperative need ofdetachments to protect the river below me was such that from thistime till the middle of September my garrison at Gauley Bridge, including advance-guards and outposts, was never more than two and ahalf regiments or 1800 men. My artillerists were also ordered backto Ohio to reorganize, leaving the guns in the hands of suchinfantry details as I could improvise. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 462. ] Iwas lucky enough, however, to get a very good troop of horse undercommand of Captain Pfau in place of the irregular squad I hadbefore. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 464. ] On the 25th my advance-guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Frizell verycleverly succeeded in drawing into an ambuscade a body of Floyd'scavalry under Colonel A. G. Jenkins. The principal body of our menlined a defile near the Hawk's Nest, and the skirmishers, retreatingbefore the enemy, led them into the trap. Our men began firingbefore the enemy was quite surrounded, and putting their horses uponthe run, they dashed back, running the gantlet of the fire. Wisereported that he met men with their subordinate officers flying atfour miles' distance from the place of the action, and sopanic-stricken that they could not be rallied or led back. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. V. P. 816; _Id_. , vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 457. ]Jenkins was hurt by the fall of his horse, but he succeeded ingetting away; for, as we had no horsemen to pursue with, even thewounded, except one, could not be overtaken. Hats, clothing, arms, and saddles were left scattered along the road in as complete abreakneck race for life as was ever seen. The result, if not greatin the list of casualties, which were only reported at 10 or 15 bythe enemy, was so demoralizing in its influence upon the hostilecavalry that they never again showed any enterprise in harassing ouroutposts, whilst our men gained proportionally in confidence. About the 30th of August we heard of an encampment of Confederatemilitia at Boone C. H. Which was so situated, southwest of theKanawha River, as to menace our communications with the Ohio. I sentLieutenant-Colonel Enyart with half of the First Kentucky Regimentto beat up this encampment, and he did so on the 2d of September, completely routing the enemy, who left 25 dead upon the field. Enyart's march and attack had been rapid and vigorous, and theterror of the blow kept that part of the district quiet for sometime afterward. [Footnote: C. R. , vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 465, 468, 472. ] We had heard for some days the news of the assembling of aconsiderable force of Confederate militia at Fayette C. H. UnderGeneral Chapman and Colonel Beckley. They were reported at 2500, which was a fair estimate of the numbers which answered to the call. On the 3d of September a pretty well combined attack was made byWise and this force; Wise pushing in sharply upon the turnpike, whilst Chapman, assisted by part of Wise's cavalry, drove back oursmall outpost on the Fayette road. Wise was met at Pig Creek as inhis former attack, the eight companies of the Eleventh Ohio beingstrengthened by half of the Twenty-sixth Ohio, which was broughtfrom below for this purpose. The effort was somewhat more persistentthan before, and Wise indulged in considerable noisy cannonading;but the pickets retreated to the creek without loss, and the wholeadvance-guard, keeping under good cover there, repelled the attackwith less than half a dozen casualties on our side, none beingfatal. Wise retreated again beyond Hawk's Nest. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 468, 470. Wise's Report, _Id_. , vol. V. P. 124. ] The irregular troops on the Fayette road were more boldlyled, and as there was no defensible position near the river for ouroutposts, these fell slowly back after a very warm skirmish, inflicting a loss, as reported by prisoners, of 6 killed among theenemy. I expected Floyd to move at the same time, and was obliged tocontinue upon the defensive by reason of his threatening position upthe Gauley River; I, however, sent Major Hines with his twocompanies in that direction, and Floyd appeared to be impressed withthe idea that my whole force was moving to attack him and attemptednothing aggressive. As at this time Wise, in his letters to GeneralLee, puts Floyd's force at 5600, and his own at 2200, [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. V. P. 840. ] I had good reason, therefore, to feelsatisfied with being able to keep them all at bay. In the midst of the alarms from every side, my camp itself wasgreatly excited by an incident which would have been occasion forregret at any time, but which at such a juncture threatened for amoment quite serious consequences. The work of intrenching theposition was going on under the direction of Lieutenant Wagner asrapidly as the small working parties available could perform it. Allwere overworked, but it was the rule that men should not be detailedfor fatigue duty who had been on picket the preceding night. OnAugust 28th, a detail had been called for from the Second Kentucky, which lay above the hedge behind my headquarters, and they hadreported without arms under a sergeant named Joyce. A supply ofintrenching tools was stacked by the gate leading into the yardwhere my staff tents were pitched, and my aide, Lieutenant Conine, directed the sergeant to have his men take the tools and report toMr. Wagner, the engineer, on the line. The men began to demur in ahalf-mutinous way, saying they had been on picket the night before. Conine, who was a soldierly man, informed them that that should beimmediately looked into, and if so, they would be soon relieved, butthat they could not argue the matter there, as their companycommander was responsible for the detail. He therefore repeated hisorder. The sergeant then became excited and said his men should notobey. Lieutenant Gibbs, the district commissary, was standing by, and drawing his pistol, said to Joyce, "That's mutiny; order yourmen to take the tools or I'll shoot you. " The man retorted with acurse, "Shoot!" Gibbs fired, and Joyce fell dead. When the sergeantfirst refused to obey, Conine coolly called out, "Corporal of theguard, turn out the guard!" intending very properly to put the manin arrest, but the shot followed too quick for the guard to arrive. I was sitting within the house at my camp desk, busy, when the firstthing which attracted my attention was the call for the guard andthe shot. I ran out, not stopping for arms, and saw some of the menrunning off shouting, "Go for your guns, kill him, kill him!" Istopped part of the men, ordered them to take the sergeant quicklyto the hospital, thinking he might not be dead. I then ordered Gibbsin arrest till an investigation should be made, and ran at speed toa gap in the hedge which opened into the regimental camp. It was nota moment too soon. The men with their muskets were alreadyclustering in the path, threatening vengeance on Mr. Gibbs. Iordered them to halt and return to their quarters. Carried away byexcitement, they levelled their muskets at me and bade me get out oftheir way or they would shoot me. I managed to keep cool, said theaffair would be investigated, that Gibbs was already under arrest, but they must go back to their quarters. The parley lasted longenough to bring some of their officers near. I ordered them to cometo my side, and then to take command of the men and march them away. The real danger was over as soon as the first impulse was checked. [Footnote: Dispatch to Rosecrans, August 29. ] The men then began tofeel some of their natural respect for their commander, and yieldedprobably the more readily because they noticed that I was unarmed. Ithought it wise to be content with quelling the disturbance, and didnot seek out for punishment the men who had met me at the gap. Theirexcitement had been natural under the circumstances, which werereported with exaggeration as a wilful murder. If I had been incommand of a larger force, it would have been easy to turn outanother regiment to enforce order and arrest any mutineers; but theSecond Kentucky was itself the only regiment on the spot. The FirstKentucky was a mile below, and the Eleventh Ohio was theadvance-guard up New River. Surrounded as we were by so superior aforce of the enemy with which we were constantly skirmishing, Icould not do otherwise than meet the difficulty instantly withoutregard to personal risk. The sequel of the affair was not reached till some weeks later whenGeneral Rosecrans assembled a court-martial at my request. Lieutenant Gibbs was tried and acquitted on the plain evidence thatthe man killed was in the act of mutiny at the time. The court was anotable one, as its judge advocate was Major R. B. Hayes of theTwenty-third Ohio, afterwards President of the United States, andone of its members was Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Matthews of thesame regiment, afterwards one of the Justices of the Supreme Court. [Footnote: Some twenty years later a bill passed the House ofRepresentatives pensioning the mother of the man killed, under thelaw giving pensions to dependent relatives of those who died in theline of duty! It could only have been smuggled through byconcealment and falsification of facts, and was stopped in theSenate. ] The constant skirmishing with the enemy on all sides continued tillthe 10th of September, when General Rosecrans with his columnreached Cross Lanes and had the action at Carnifex Ferry which Ishall describe in the next chapter. I had sent forward half aregiment from my little command to open communication with him assoon as possible. On September 9th a party from this detachment hadreached Cross Lanes and learned that Floyd was keeping close withinhis lines on the cliffs of Gauley above Carnifex Ferry. They, however, heard nothing of Rosecrans, and the principal body of theirtroops heard no sound of the engagement on the 10th, though within avery few miles. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 478. ] On the 12th communication was opened, and I learned of Floyd'sretreat across the Gauley. I immediately moved forward the Eleventhand Twenty-sixth Ohio to attack Wise, who retreated from Hawk's Nestto the mouth of the Sunday Road, and upon my closer approach retiredto Sewell Mountain. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 479, 481. ] At the SundayRoad I was stopped by orders from Rosecrans, who thought it unwiseto advance further till he had made a ferry at the Gauley andsucceeded in getting his command over; for Floyd had again sunk theflatboats within reach, and these had to be a second time raised andrepaired. At his request I visited the General at Carnifex Ferry, and then got permission to move my column forward a few miles toAlderson's, or Camp Lookout as we dubbed it, where a commandingposition controlled the country to the base of Sewell Mountain. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 482. ] I was now able to concentrate the SeventhOhio at Gauley Bridge, and ordered forward the Second Kentucky tojoin me in the new camp. The period of my separate responsibility and of struggle againstgreat odds was not to close without a private grief which was themore poignant because the condition of the campaign forbade myleaving the post of duty. On the day I visited General Rosecrans atCarnifex Ferry I got news of the critical illness of my youngestchild, a babe of eight months old, whom I had seen but a single dayafter his birth, for I had been ordered into camp from thelegislature without time to make another visit to my family. Thewarning dispatch was quickly followed by another announcing the end, and I had to swallow my sorrows as well as I could and face thepublic enemy before us, leaving my wife uncomforted in herbereavement and all the more burdened with care because she knew wewere resuming active operations in the field. CHAPTER VI CARNIFEX FERRY--TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND BACK Rosecrans's march to join me--Reaches Cross Lanes--Advance againstFloyd--Engagement at Carnifex Ferry--My advance to SundayRoad--Conference with Rosecrans--McCook's brigade joins me--Advanceto Camp Lookout--Brigade commanders--Rosecrans's personalcharacteristics--Hartsuff--Floyd and Wise again--"Battle ofBontecou"--Sewell Mountain--The equinoctial--General Schenckarrives--Rough lodgings--Withdrawal from the mountain--Rear-guardduties--Major Slemmer of Fort Pickens fame--New positions coveringGauley Bridge--Floyd at Cotton Mountain--Rosecrans's methods withprivate soldiers--Progress in discipline. General Rosecrans had succeeded McClellan as ranking officer in WestVirginia, but it was not until the latter part of September that theregion was made a department and he was regularly assigned tocommand. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 604, 616, 647. ]Meanwhile the three months' enlistments were expiring, manyregiments were sent home, new ones were received, and a completereorganization of his forces took place. Besides holding therailroad, he fortified the Cheat Mountain pass looking towardStaunton, and the pass at Elkwater on the mountain summit betweenHuttonsville and Huntersville. My own fortifications at GauleyBridge were part of the system of defensive works he had ordered. Bythe middle of August he had established a chain of posts, with aregiment or two at each, on a line upon which he afterwards marched, from Weston by way of Bulltown, Sutton, and Summersville to GauleyBridge. [Illustration Map--Affair At Carnifex Ferry] As soon as he received the news of Floyd's attack upon Tyler atCross Lanes, he hastened his preparations and began his marchsouthward from Clarksburg with three brigades, having left the UpperPotomac line in command of General Kelley, and the Cheat Mountainregion in command of General J. J. Reynolds. His route (alreadyindicated) was a rough one, and the portion of it between Sutton andSummersville, over Birch Mountain, was very wild and difficult. Hecrossed the mountain on the 9th, and left his bivouac on the morningof the 10th of September, before daybreak. Marching throughSummersville, he reached Cross Lanes about two o'clock in theafternoon. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 129. ] Floyd'sposition was now about two miles distant, and, waiting only for hiscolumn to close up, he again pressed forward. General Benham'sbrigade was in front, and soon met the enemy's pickets. Getting theimpression that Floyd was in retreat, Benham pressed forward ratherrashly, deploying to the left and coming under a sharp fire from theright of the enemy's works. Floyd had intrenched a line across abend of the Gauley River, where the road from Cross Lanes toLewisburg finds its way down the cliffs to Carnifex Ferry. Hisflanks rested upon precipices rising abruptly from the water's edge, and he also intrenched some rising ground in front of his principalline. Benham's line advanced through dense and tangled woods, ignorant of the enemy's position till it was checked by the firefrom his breastworks. It was too late for a proper reconnoissance, and Rosecrans could only hasten the advance and deployment of theother brigades under Colonels McCook and Scammon. [Footnote: Fororganization of Rosecrans's forces, see Id. , vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 471. ] Benham had sent a howitzer battery and two rifled cannon withhis head of column at the left, and these soon got a position fromwhich, in fact, they enfiladed part of Floyd's line, though it wasimpossible to see much of the situation. Charges were made byportions of Benham's and McCook's brigades as they came up, but theylacked unity, and Rosecrans was dissatisfied that his head of columnshould be engaged before he had time to plan an attack. Colonel Loweof the Twelfth Ohio had been killed at the head of his regiment, andColonel Lytle of the Tenth had been wounded; darkness was rapidlycoming on, and Rosecrans ordered the troops withdrawn from fire tillpositions could be rectified, and the attack renewed in the morning. Seventeen had been killed, and 141 had been wounded in the sharp butirregular combat. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 146. ]Floyd, however, had learned that his position could be subjected todestructive cannonade; he was himself slightly wounded, and hisofficers and men were discouraged. He therefore retreated across theGauley in the night, having great difficulty in carrying hisartillery down the cliffs by a wretched road in the darkness. He hadbuilt a slight foot-bridge for infantry in the bit of smooth waterknown as the Ferry, though both above and below the stream is animpassable mountain torrent. The artillery crossed in the flatboats. Once over, the bridge was broken up and the ferry-boats were sunk. He reported but twenty casualties, and threw much of theresponsibility upon Wise, who had not obeyed orders to reinforcehim. His hospital, containing the wounded prisoners taken fromTyler, fell into Rosecrans's hands. [Footnote: A very graphicdescription of this engagement and of Floyd's retreat fell into myhands soon afterward. It was a journal of the campaign written byMajor Isaac Smith of the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment, which hetried to send through our lines to his family in Charleston, W. Va. , but which was intercepted. A copy is on file in the War Archives. See also Floyd's report, _Id. _, vol. V. Pp. 146-148. ] General Rosecrans found the country so difficult a one that he wasin no little doubt as to the plan of campaign it was now best tofollow. It was out of the question to supply his column by wagontrains over the mountainous roads from Clarksburg, and the KanawhaRiver must therefore be made the line of communication with hisbase, which had to be transferred to Gallipolis. In anticipation ofthis, I had accumulated supplies and ordnance stores at GauleyBridge as much as possible with my small wagon trains, and hadarranged for a larger depot at the head of steamboat navigation. Iwas ready therefore to turn over the control of my supply lines toRosecrans's officers of the quartermaster and commissary departmentsas soon as his wagon trains could be transferred. It was to consultin regard to these matters, as was as in regard to the futureconduct of the campaign, that the general directed me to visit hisheadquarters at Carnifex Ferry. I rode over from my camp at theSunday Road junction on the morning of the 15th, found that one ofthe little flatboats had been again raised and repaired at Carnifex, and passing through the field of the recent combat, reached thegeneral's headquarters near Cross Lanes. I was able from personalobservation to assure him that it was easy for his command to followthe line of the march on which Floyd had retreated, if better meansof crossing the Gauley were provided; but when they should join meon the Lewisburg turnpike, that highway would be the proper line ofsupply, making Gauley Bridge his depot. He hesitated to commithimself to either line for decisive operations until the Gauleyshould be bridged, but on my description of the commodious ferry Ihad made at Gauley Bridge by means of a very large flatboat runningalong a hawser stretched from bank to bank, he determined toadvance, and to have a bridge of boats made in place of my ferry. McCook's brigade was ordered to report to me as soon as it could beput over the river, and I was authorized to advance some six milestoward the enemy, to Alberson's or Spy Rock, already mentionedbeyond which Big Sewell Mountain is fourteen miles further to thesouthwest. [Footnote: Official Records vol. V. P. 602. ] At Cross Lanes I met the commanders of the other brigades who werecalled in by General Rosecrans of an informal consultation basedupon my knowledge of the country and the enemy. I naturally scannedthem with some interest, and tried to make the most of theopportunity to become acquainted with them. General Benham I knewalready, from his visit to me at Gauley Bridge in his capacity ofengineer officer. I had met Colonel Robert McCook at Camp Dennison, and now that it was intimated that he would be for some days undermy command, I recalled a scene I had witnessed there which left manydoubts in my mind whether he would prove an agreeable subordinate. Ihad gone, one morning, to General Bates's office, and as I enteredfound McCook expressing himself with more vigor than elegance inregard to some order which had been issued respecting his regiment. My presence did not seem to interfere with the fluency of hisremarks or the force of his expletives, but after a moment or two heseemed to notice a look of surprise in my face, and his ownbroadened humorously as his manner changed from vehemence togeniality. General Bates and he were familiar acquaintances at thebar in Cincinnati, and McCook had evidently presumed upon this as awarrant for speaking his mind as he pleased. When he reported to meat this later period, I found a hearty and loyal character under hisbluff exterior and rough speech, with real courage, a quick eye fortopography, and no lack of earnest subordination when work was to bedone. Although our service together was short, I learned to havereal respect for him, and sincerely mourned his loss when, later inthe war, he met his tragic death. The other brigade commander was_Colonel E. P. Scammon_ of the Twenty-third Ohio. He had graduatedfrom West Point in 1837, and had served in the TopographicalEngineers of the regular army and as instructor in the MilitaryAcademy. In the Mexican War he had been aide-de-camp to GeneralScott. He had been out of the army for some years before therebellion, and was acting as professor of mathematics in St. Xavier's College, Cincinnati, when he was appointed to the colonelcyof the Twenty-third Ohio upon Rosecrans's promotion. Like Rosecrans, he was a Roman Catholic, though himself of Puritan descent. It seemsthat at the time of the Puseyite movement in England and in thiscountry there had been a good many conversions to Romanism among thestudents and teachers at West Point, under the influence of thechaplain of the post, and Scammon, among a number of young men whosubsequently became distinguished officers, was in this number. Itneed hardly be said that Scammon was well instructed in hisprofession. He was perhaps too much wedded to the routine of theservice, and was looked upon by his subordinates as a martinet whohad not patience enough with the inexperience of volunteer soldiers. He was one of the older men of our army, somewhat under the averageheight and weight, with a precise politeness of manner whichreminded one of a Frenchman, and the resemblance was increased byhis free use of his snuff-box. His nervous irritability was thecause of considerable chafing in his command, but this left himunder fire, and those who had been with him in action learned toadmire his courage and conduct. He was with me subsequently at SouthMountain and Antietam, and still later had the misfortune to be oneof those prisoners in the Confederates' hands who were exposed tothe fire of our batteries in front of Charleston, S. C. But being a subordinate, I was most interested in thecharacteristics of our commander. Our Camp Dennison acquaintance hadbeen a pleasant one, and he greeted me with a cordiality that wasreassuring. His general appearance was attractive. He was tall butnot heavy, with the rather long head and countenance that issometimes called Norman. His aquiline nose and bright eyes gave himan incisive expression, increased by rapid utterance in his speech, which was apt to grow hurried, almost to stammering, when he wasexcited. His impulsiveness was plain to all who approached him; hisirritation quickly flashed out in words when he was crossed, and hissocial geniality would show itself in smiles and in almost caressinggestures when he was pleased. In discussing military questions hemade free use of his theoretic knowledge, often quoted authoritiesand cited maxims of war, and compared the problem before him toanalogous cases in military history. This did not go far enough tobe pedantic, and was full of a lively intelligence; yet it did notimpress me as that highest form of military insight and knowledgewhich solves the question before it upon its own merits and withoutconscious comparison with historical examples, through a power ofjudgment and perception ripened and broadened by the mastery ofprinciples which have ruled the great campaigns of the world. He wasfond of conviviality, loved to banter good-humoredly his staffofficers and intimates, and was altogether an attractive andcompanionable man, with intellectual activity enough to make hissociety stimulating and full of lively discussion. I could easilyunderstand Garfield's saying, in his letter to Secretary Chase whichafterward became the subject of much debate, that he "loved everybone in his body. " [Footnote: An anecdote told at my table in 1890by the Rev. Dr. Morris, long Professor in Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati, is so characteristic of Rosecrans that it is worthrepeating. After the battle of Stone's River (January, 1863) Dr. Morris, who was then minister of a Presbyterian church in Columbus, was made by Governor Tod a member of a commission sent to look afterthe wounded soldiers. He called on General Rosecrans at hisheadquarters in Murfreesboro, and among others met there FatherTracy, the general's chaplain, a Roman Catholic priest. During thevisit Rosecrans was called aside (but in the same room) by a staffofficer to receive information about a spy who had been caughtwithin the lines. The general got quite excited over theinformation, talked loudly and hurriedly in giving directionsconcerning the matter, using some profane language. It seemedsuddenly to occur to him that the clergymen were present, and fromthe opposite side of the room he turned toward them, exclaimingapologetically, "Gentlemen, I sometimes _swear_, but I never_blaspheme!_"] Rosecrans's adjutant-general was Captain George L. Hartsuff, anofficer of the regular army, who was well qualified to supplement inmany ways the abilities and deficiencies of his chief. [Footnote:Hartsuff was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers in the nextyear and was severely wounded at Antietam, after which he was mademajor-general and commanded the Twenty-third Army Corps inBurnside's campaign of East Tennessee. ] He was a large man, of heavyframe; his face was broad, and his bald head, tapering high, gave apeculiar pyramidal appearance to his figure. He was systematic andaccurate in administrative work, patient and insistent in bringingthe young volunteer officers in his department into habits of orderand good military form. His coolness tempered the impulsiveness ofhis chief, and as they were of similar age and had about the samestanding in the army before the war, the familiarity between themwas that of comrades and equals more than of commander andsubordinate. My intercourse with these officers on the occasion of my visit toCross Lanes was only the beginning of the acquaintance on which Ibased the estimate of them which I have given; but it was a goodbeginning, for the cordial freedom of thought and speech in theconference was such as to bring out the characteristics of the men. I rode back to my camp in the evening, feeling a sense of relief atthe transfer of responsibility to other shoulders. The command of mybrigade under the orders of Rosecrans seemed an easy task comparedwith the anxieties and the difficulties of the preceding threemonths. And so it was. The difference between chief responsibilityin military movements and the leadership even of the largestsubordinate organizations of an army is heaven-wide; and I believethat no one who has tried both will hesitate to say that thesubordinate knows little or nothing of the strain upon the will andthe moral faculties which the chief has to bear. McCook's brigade joined me on the 16th, and we immediately marchedto Alderson's, where we made a camp afterward known as Camp Lookout. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Ii. Pt. I. P. 481. ] I was able tobring up the Second Kentucky Regiment from Gauley Bridge, giving mein hand three regiments of my own brigade. I sent forward MajorHines with five companies as an advance-guard, and with these hescouted the country as far as the top of Big Sewell Mountain, andwas able to give us definite information that Floyd had retreated asfar as Meadow Bluff, where the Wilderness road joins the turnpike. Wise halted at Big Sewell Mountain and persisted in keeping hiscommand separate from Floyd, who ordered him to join the rest of thecolumn at Meadow Bluff. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 854, 855, 862. ] On the 20th September my advance-guard occupied thecrest of the mountain, whilst Wise withdrew to a parallel ridge amile beyond, and loudly insisted that Floyd should join him thereinstead of concentrating the Confederate force at Meadow Bluff. General Lee reached the latter place in person on the 21st, butfound Wise's headstrong and captious spirit hardly more amenable tohis discipline than to Floyd's. He shared Floyd's opinion that itwas better to await Rosecrans's advance at Meadow Bluff, throwingupon the National forces the burden of transportation over theextended line, whilst guarding against a possible turning movementby the Wilderness road. But Wise was so noisy in his assertions thathis was the only position in which to fight, that Lee hesitated toorder him back peremptorily, and finally yielded to his clamor anddirected Floyd to advance to Wise's position. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 868, 874, 878, 879. ] The scandal of the quarrel between the twoofficers had, however, become so notorious that the Richmondgovernment had authorized Lee to send Wise elsewhere, and, probablyon his advice, the Confederate War Department ordered Wise to reportat Richmond in person. The last scene in the comedy was decidedlyamusing. Wise appealed passionately to Lee to say whether hismilitary honor did not require that he should disobey the order tillthe expected battle should be fought, and Lee, no doubt in dismaylest he should still fail to get rid of so intractable asubordinate, gravely advised him that both honor and duty would besafe in obeying promptly the order. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 879. ] Whilst waiting at Camp Lookout for authority to move forward, anincident occurred which gave us a little excitement and amusement, and which shows, better than much explanation could do, thedifficult and intricate character of the country in which we wereoperating. A wagon-master from our camp had gone out hunting forforage, which was very scarce. He soon came back in excitement, reporting that he had come upon an encampment of a regiment of theenemy between our camp and New River and somewhat in our rear. Hisreport was very circumstantial, but was so improbable that I wasconfident there was some mistake about it. He was, however, soearnest in his assertions that he could not be mistaken, thatMcCook, in whose brigade he was, sent out an officer with some men, guided by the wagon-master, to verify the report. The story wasconfirmed, and the matter was brought to me for action. Puzzled butnot convinced, and thinking that as McCook's command was new to thecountry, it would be better to send some one who was used toscouting in the mountains, I ordered a lieutenant named Bontecou, ofthe Second Kentucky Regiment, to take a small party and examine thecase anew. Bontecou had done a good deal of successful work in thisline, and was regarded as a good woodsman and an enterprising scout. He too came back at nightfall, saying that there could be no mistakeabout it. He had crept close to the sentinels of the camp, hadcounted the tents, and being challenged by the guard, had made a runfor it through the thicket, losing his hat. The position of theenemy was, by all the reports, about three miles from us, diagonallyin rear of our right flank. It now seemed that it must be true thatsome detachment had been delayed in joining the retreating column, and had found itself thus partly cut off by our advance. I thereforeordered McCook to start at earliest peep of day, upon theChestnutburg road (on which the wagon-master had been foraging), andpassing beyond the hostile detachment, attack from the other side, it being agreed by all the scouting parties that this would drivethe enemy toward our camp. My own brigade would be disposed of tointercept the enemy and prevent escape. McCook moved out as ordered, and following his guides came by many devious turns to a fork in theroad, following which, they told him, a few minutes would bring himupon the enemy. He halted the column, and with a small skirmishingparty went carefully forward. The guides pointed to a thicket fromwhich the Confederates could be seen. His instinct for topographyhad made him suspect the truth, as he had noted the courses inadvancing, and crawling through the thicket, he looked out from theother side upon what he at once recognized as the rear of his owncamp, and the tents of the very regiment from which he had sent anofficer to test the wagon-master's report. All the scouts had beenso deceived by the tangle of wooded hills and circling roads thatthey fully believed they were still miles from our position; and, bewildered in the labyrinth, they were sure the tents they saw werethe enemy's and not ours. The march had been through rain and mist, through dripping thickets and on muddy roads, and the first impulsewas wrath at the erring scouts; but the ludicrous side soonprevailed, and officers and men joined in hearty laughter over theirwild-goose chase. They dubbed the expedition the "Battle ofBontecou, " and it was long before the lieutenant heard the last ofthe chaffing at his talents as a scout. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 484, 485. ] Major Hines's reports of the strength of the position on SewellMountain which the enemy had occupied, and my own reconnoissance ofthe intervening country, satisfied me that if we meant to advance onthis line, we ought not to give the enemy time to reconsider and toreoccupy the mountain top from which he had retreated. Onrepresenting this to General Rosecrans, he authorized me to advancetwelve miles to the Confederate camp on Big Sewell, directing me, however, to remain upon the defensive when there, and to avoidbringing on any engagement till he could bring up the rest of thecolumn. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 484, 486. ]His means of crossing at Carnifex Ferry were so poor that what hehad thought would be done in two or three days from the time McCookjoined me, took a full fortnight to accomplish. I marched with my own and McCook's brigades on the 23d September, but when I reached the Confederate camp where Hines with theadvance-guard awaited me, it was evident at a glance that we must gofurther. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 487. ] The position was a very strongone for resisting an approach from our direction, but was commandedby higher ground beyond. The true crest of the mountain was twomiles further on, and there alone could we successfully bar the wayagainst a superior force coming from the east. I therefore marchedrapidly forward and occupied the crest in force. It was impossibleto hide the whole of our camp from view and properly hold theposition, but we made use of such cover as we could find, andprepared to defend the pass against all comers, since it was vain toattempt to mystify the enemy as to our advance in force. On the 24th we had a lively skirmish with Wise's legion in front, and forced it to retire to a ridge out of range of our artillery. Wedismounted one of his howitzers in the engagement, but contentedourselves with making him yield the ground which would interferewith our easy holding of our own position and the spurs of themountain directly connected with it. Wise had learned that Rosecranswas not with my column, and on the supposition that the advance wasmade by my brigade only, Lee concluded to order Floyd to Wise'scamp, being now satisfied that no movement of our troops had beenmade by way of the Wilderness road. It was at this time that Wisewas relieved of command and ordered to Richmond, and Lee found itadvisable to unite his forces and take command in person. The relations of these three distinguished Virginians had not begunwith this campaign, but dated back to the capture of John Brown atHarper's Ferry. Wise was then the governor of his State, andreceived from Lee the prisoner whose execution at Charlestown was tobecome an historical event. Floyd, who himself had once beengovernor of Virginia, was then Buchanan's Secretary of War, andordered Lee with the detachment of marines to Harper's Ferry, wherethey stormed the engine-house which Brown had made his fort. Dealingwith such men as his subordinates, and with such a history behindthem, it can easily be understood that Lee would feel no ordinarydelicacy in asserting his authority, and no common embarrassment attheir quarrels. Rosecrans was at first disturbed at my going further than had beenexpected; [Footnote: Rosecrans's Dispatches, Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 486, 487. ] but he was soon satisfied that nothingbetter could have been done. It is true that I was thirty-five milesfrom the supports in the rear, whether at Carnifex Ferry or GauleyBridge; but the position was almost impregnable in front, and bywatchfulness I should know of any attempt to turn it in time to makesafe my retreat to Camp Lookout. On the 26th Scammon's brigade camewithin easy supporting distance, and General Rosecrans came inperson to my camp. He had not been able to bring up his headquarterstrain, and was my guest for two or three days, sharing my tent withme. Cold autumnal rains set in on the very day the general came tothe front, and continued almost without intermission. In the hope ofstill having some favorable weather for campaigning, the otherbrigades were brought forward, and the whole force was concentratedat the mountain except the necessary garrisons for the posts in therear. Brigadier-General Robert C, Schenck reported for duty in theevening of a fearfully stormy day whilst Rosecrans was still mytent-mate. He had heard rumors of fighting at the front, and hadhurried forward with a couple of staff officers, but withoutbaggage. My staff officers were sharing their shelter with thegentlemen who had accompanied Rosecrans, but the new-comers weremade heartily welcome to what we had. In my own tent GeneralRosecrans occupied my camp cot; I had improvised a rough bunk formyself on the other side of the tent, but as General Schenck got intoo late for the construction of any better resting-place, he wasobliged to content himself with a bed made of three or fourcamp-stools set in a row. Anything was better than lying on the dampground in such a storm; but Schenck long remembered the achingweariness of that night, as he balanced upon the narrow and unstablesupports which threatened to tumble him upon the ground at the leasteffort to change the position of stiffened body and limbs. One couldnot desire better companionship than we had during our waking hours, for both my guests had had varied and interesting experience andknew how to make it the means of delightful social intercourse anddiscussion. The chilly temperature of the tent was pleasantlymodified by a furnace which was the successful invention of theprivate soldiers. A square trench was dug from the middle of thetent leading out behind it; this was capped with flat stones threeor four inches thick, which were abundant on the mountain. At theend of it, on the outside, a chimney of stones plastered with mudwas built up, and the whole topped out by an empty cracker-barrel byway of chimney-pot. The fire built in the furnace had good draught, and the thick stones held the heat well, making, on the whole, thebest means of warming a tent which I ever tried. The objection tothe little sheet-iron stoves furnished with the Sibley tent is thatthey are cold in a minute if the fire dies out. The rains, when once they began, continued with such violence thatthe streams were soon up, the common fords became impassable, andthe roads became so muddy and slippery that it was with the utmostdifficulty our little army was supplied. The four brigades were soreduced by sickness and by detachments that Rosecrans reported thewhole as making only 5200 effective men. Every wagon was put to workhauling supplies and ammunition, even the headquarters baggagewagons and the regimental wagons of the troops, as well thosestationed in the rear as those in front. We were sixty miles fromthe head of steamboat navigation, the wagon trains were too smallfor a condition of things where the teams could hardly haul halfloads, and by the 1st of October we had demonstrated the fact thatit was impossible to sustain our army any further from its baseunless we could rely upon settled weather and good roads. Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Loring, hissubordinate, on the Staunton line, to test the strength of the postsunder Reynolds at Cheat Mountain and Elkwater, and lively combatshad resulted on the 12th, and 14th of September. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. V. Pp. 185-193. ] Reynolds held firm, and as Rosecranswas not diverted from his plans and was pushing forward on theLewisburg line, Lee ordered Loring to report to him with most of hiscommand. Reynolds, in return, made a forced reconnoissance upon theConfederate position at Greenbrier River on October 2d, but found ittoo strong to be carried. The reinforcement by Loring gave Lee avery positive advantage in numbers, but the storms and founderingroads paralyzed both armies, which lay opposite each other upon thecrests of Big Sewell separated by a deep gorge. On the 5th ofOctober the condition of the Kanawha valley had become such thatRosecrans felt compelled to withdraw his forces to the vicinity ofGauley Bridge. The freshet had been an extraordinary one. AtCharleston the Kanawha River usually flows in a bed forty or fiftyfeet below the plateau on which the town is built; but the watersnow rose above these high banks and flooded the town itself, beingfour or five feet deep in the first story of dwelling-houses builtin what was considered a neighborhood safe from floods. Theinundation almost stopped communication, though our quartermasterstried to remedy part of the mischief by forcing light steamers up asnear to the Kanawha Falls as possible. But it was very difficult toprotect the supplies landed upon a muddy bank where were nowarehouses, and no protection but canvas covers stretched over thepiles of barrels and boxes of bread and sacks of grain. There wasenormous waste and loss, but we managed to keep our men in rations, and were better off than the Confederates, in regard to whom Floydafterward reported to his government that the eleven days of coldstorms at Sewell Mountain had "cost more men, sick and dead, thanthe battle of Manassas Plains. " It has been asserted by Confederate writers that Lee was executing amovement to turn Rosecrans's left flank when the latter marched backfrom Sewell Mountain. If so, it certainly had not gone far enough toattract our attention, and from my own knowledge of the situation, Ido not believe it had passed beyond the form of discussion of apossible movement when the weather should become settled. Such planswere discussed on both sides, but the physical condition of thecountry was an imperative veto upon aggressive action. During the 5th of October our sick and spare baggage were sent backto Camp Lookout. Tents were struck at ten o'clock in the evening, and the trains sent on their way under escort at eleven. The columnmoved as soon as the trains were out of the way, except my ownbrigade, to which was assigned the duty of rear-guard. We remainedupon the crest of the hill till half-past one, the men being formedin line of battle and directed to lie down till the time for them tomarch. Our sentinels had been posted with extra precaution, so thatthey might be withdrawn an hour or two after the brigade shouldmove. Extra reserves were assigned to them, and Major Hines put incommand of the whole detachment, with orders to keep incommunication with me at the extreme rear of the marching column. Itwas interesting to observe the effect of this night movement uponthe men. Their imagination was excited by the novelty of thesituation, and they furnished abundant evidence that the unknown isalways, in such cases, the wonderful. The night had cleared off andthe stars were out. The Confederate position was eastward from us, and as a bright star rose above the ridge on which the enemy was, wecould hear soldiers saying in a low tone to each other, "There goesa fire balloon--it must be a signal--they must have discovered whatwe are doing!" The exaggerated parallax at the horizon made therising star seem to move rapidly for the first few minutes, and men, ignorant of this, naturally mistook its character. In a similar wayan occasional shot on the picket line would be the cause of asubdued excitement. I doubt if soldiers ever make a night movementin an enemy's presence without being under a nervous strain whichexaggerates the importance of everything they see and hear, and thisgives uncertainty and increases the difficulty of such duty. It isno small part of the duty of officers, in such cases, to allay thistendency to excitement, to explain the situation, and by a wisemixture of information and discipline to keep the men intelligentlycool and in full command of their faculties. General Rosecrans had gone with the head of the column, and had leftwith me Major Slemmer, his inspector-general, to bring him word whenthe rear of the column should be in march. Slemmer was the officerwho, as a lieutenant, had distinguished himself by holding FortPickens in Pensacola harbor at the outbreak of the rebellion. He wasa man of marked character, and in view of his experience it mayeasily be understood that we had no lack of interesting matter forconversation as we paced in rear of the reclining men during themidnight hours. His failing health prevented his taking theprominent part in the war that his abilities warranted, but I haveretained, from that evening's work together, a pleasing impressionof his character and a respect for his military knowledge andtalents. In impressing on me the fact that my position was the oneof special honor in this movement, he expressed the wish thatRosecrans had himself remained there; but the result showed thathardly less than the commanding general's own authority and energycould have got the column forward in the mud and darkness. Thetroops had marched but a mile or two when they overtook part of thewagon train toiling slowly over the steep and slippery hills. Hereand there a team would be "stalled" in the mud, and it looked as ifdaylight would overtake us before even a tolerably defensiveposition would be reached. Rosecrans now gave his personalsupervision to the moving of the wagons andartillery, --wagon-master's work, it maybe said, but it was workwhich had to be done if the little army was not to be found in themorning strung out and exposed to the blows of the enemy if heshould prove enterprising. We who were at the rear did not know of the difficulty the columnwas having, and when my messenger reported the rear of the precedingbrigade a mile or more from the camp, I gave the order to march, andmy men filed into the road. Slemmer went forward to inform thegeneral that we were in movement, and I remained with Major Hinestill all was quiet, when he was directed to call in his pickets andsentinels and follow. I had gone hardly a mile when we were broughtto a halt by the head of the brigade overtaking those who hadpreceded us. Word was brought back that the artillery was findinggreat difficulty in getting over the first considerable hill west ofthe mountain. We ourselves were upon the downward road from themountain crest, but our way led along the side of a spur of themountain which towered above us on our left. We were in a dense woodthat shut out the stars, and in darkness that could almost be felt. I rode back a little to meet Hines and to keep some distance betweenthe column and his little rear-guard. We sent a chain of sentinelsover the hill commanding the road, and waited, listening for anyevidence that the enemy had discovered our movement and followed. Anhour passed in this way, and the column moved on a short distance. Again there was a halt, and again a deployment of our sentries. Whenat last day broke, we were only three or four miles from our camp ofthe evening before; but we had reached a position which was easilydefensible, and where I could halt the brigade and wait for theothers to get entirely out of our way. The men boiled their coffee, cooked their breakfast, and rested. Early in the forenoon a smallbody of the enemy's cavalry followed us, but were contented withvery slight skirmishing, and we marched leisurely to Camp Lookoutbefore evening. Such night marches from the presence of an enemy areamong the most wearing and trying in the soldier's experience, yet, in spite of the temptation to invest them with extraordinary peril, they are rarely interfered with. It is the uncertainty, thedarkness, and the effect of these upon men and officers that makethe duty a delicate one. The risk is more from panic than from thefoe, and the loss is more likely to be in baggage and in wagons thanin men. I have several times been in command of rear-guards on suchoccasions, and I believe that I would generally prefer an openwithdrawal by day. It is not hard to hold even a bold enemy at bayby a determined brigade or division, and a whole army may be savedfrom the exhaustion and exposure which rapidly fill the hospitals, and may cost more than several combats between rear and advanceguards. My brigade remained two or three days at Camp Lookout, where we wereput upon the alert on the 7th by a reported advance of the enemy, but it amounted to nothing more than a lively skirmish of somecavalry with our outposts. Lee was glad to move back to Meadow Bluffto be nearer his supplies, and Rosecrans encamped his troops betweenHawk's Nest and the Tompkins farm, all of them being now within afew miles of Gauley Bridge. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 253. See also Official Atlas, pl. Ix. ] Part of my brigade garrisonedthe post at the bridge, but by Rosecrans's direction my ownheadquarters tents were pitched near his own upon the Tompkins farm. Both parties now remained in observation till near the end ofOctober. Floyd, more enterprising in plans than resolute or skilfulin carrying them out, had obtained Lee's consent to make an attemptto render our position untenable by operations on the opposite sideof New River. Lee had intended to co-operate by moving against uswith the rest of his force, but on the 20th of October the reportsfrom the Staunton region were so threatening that he determined tosend Loring back there, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 908. ] and this, ofcourse, settled it that Lewisburg would be covered in front only byWise's Legion, commanded by Colonel Davis. Although Floyd complainedof this change of plan, he did not abandon his purpose, but orderingthe militia on that side of the river to reassemble, he marched toFayette C. H. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 286. ] Rosecrans had distributed his brigades in _echelon_ along theturnpike, --Schenck's, the most advanced, being ten miles from GauleyBridge; McCook's eight miles, where the road from Fayette C. H. Byway of Miller's Ferry comes in across New River; Benham's six miles, whilst of my own one regiment at the Tompkins farm guardedheadquarters, and the rest were at Gauley Bridge and lower postswhere they could protect the navigation of the Kanawha. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 253. ] McCook by Rosecrans's direction marched to FayetteC. H. About the 20th of October, and on his return reported thatonly guerilla parties were abroad in that vicinity. Rosecrans seemsto have expected that at least a foothold would be kept on the otherside of New River at Miller's Ferry, but McCook left nothing there, and when he tried to place a detachment on that side about the 25th, the shore and cliffs were found to be held by a force ofsharpshooters. This marked the advance of Floyd, who established hiscamp in front of Fayette C. H. At the forking of the roads toMiller's Ferry and to Gauley Bridge. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 285. ] Fora few days he made no serious demonstration, and Rosecrans hastenedforward the work of clothing and paying his men, recruiting histeams and bringing back to the ranks the soldiers whom exposure hadsent to the hospital. He had heard in a trustworthy way of Lee'sintention to move against us by the turnpike whilst Floyd advancedon the other side of the river, but Tie had not yet learned of thewithdrawal of Lee with Loring's troops. He therefore remained quietand expectant, awaiting the definite development of events. As this had been my first service in the field as part of a largercommand, I was keenly alive to the opportunity of comparing theprogress we had made in discipline and instruction with that ofother brigades, so that I might cure defects in my own methods andimprove the soldierly character as well as the administration of myown command. I was gratified to see in my troops evidence of a pridein their own organization and a wholesome emulation, which made themtake kindly to the drill and discipline which were necessary toimprovement. I was particularly interested in observing Rosecrans'smethods with the men. His standard of soldierly excellence was high, and he was earnest in insisting that his brigadiers and his staffofficers should co-operate vigorously in trying to attain it. Hisimpulsiveness, however, led him sometimes into personal efforts atdiscipline where the results were at least doubtful. He wouldsometimes go out through the camps in the evening, and if he saw atent lighted after "taps, " or heard men singing or talking, he wouldstrike loudly on the canvas with the flat of his sword and commandsilence or the extinguishment of the light. The men, in good-humoredmischief, would try different ways of "getting even" with him. Onethat gave much amusement to the camp was this: the men in a tentthus attacked pretended to believe that their regimentalwagon-master was playing a practical joke on them, and shouted backto him all sorts of rough camp chaff. When the exasperated generalappeared at the door of the tent, they were, of course, overwhelmedwith the most innocent astonishment, and explained that thatwagon-master was in the habit of annoying them, and that they reallyhad not heard the "taps. " I have been with the general inapproaching a picket, when he would hotly lecture a sentinel whoshowed ignorance of some of his duties or inattention to them. Ithought I could see in all such cases that it would have been wiserto avoid any unnecessary collision with the privates, but to takethe responsible officer aside and make him privately understand thathe must answer for such lack of instruction or of discipline amonghis men. An impulsive man is too apt to meddle with details, and soto weaken the sense of responsibility in the intermediate officers, who hate to be ignored or belittled before the soldiers. But ifRosecrans's method was not an ideal one, it was at least vigorous, and every week showed that the little army was improving indiscipline and in knowledge of duty. CHAPTER VII COTTON MOUNTAIN Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge--Effect on Rosecrans--Topography ofGauley Mount--De Villiers runs the gantlet--Movements of ourforces--Explaining orders--A hard climb on the mountain--In the postat Gauley Bridge--Moving magazine and telegraph--A balkymule-team--Ammunition train under fire--Captain Fitch a modelquartermaster--Plans to entrap Floyd--Moving supply trains atnight--Method of working the ferry--of making flatboats--The CottonMountain affair--Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham--Vain plans toreach East Tennessee. On the 1st of November the early morning was fair but misty, and afog lay in the gorge of New River nearly a thousand feet below thelittle plateau at the Tompkins farm, on which the headquarters tentswere pitched. General Rosecrans's tents were not more than a hundredyards above mine, between the turnpike and the steep descent to theriver, though both our little camps were secluded by thickets ofyoung trees and laurel bushes. Breakfast was over, the fog waslifting out of the valley, and I was attending to the usual morningroutine of clerical work, when the report and echo of a cannon-shot, down the gorge in the direction of Gauley Bridge, was heard. It wasunusual, enough so to set me thinking what it could mean, but thenatural explanation suggested itself that it was one of our ownguns, perhaps fired at a target. In a few moments an orderly came insome haste, saying the general desired to see me at his tent. As Iwalked over to his quarters, another shot was heard. As Iapproached, I saw him standing in front of his tent door, evidentlymuch excited, and when I came up to him, he said in the rapid, half-stammering way peculiar to him at such times: "The enemy hasgot a battery on Cotton Mountain opposite our post, and is shellingit! What d' ye think of that?" The post at the bridge and hisheadquarters were connected by telegraph, and the operator below hadreported the fact of the opening of the cannonade from the mountainside above him, and added that his office was so directly under firethat he must move out of it. Indeed he was gone and communicationbroken before orders could be sent to him or to the post. The factof the cannonade did not disturb me so much as the way in which itaffected Rosecrans. He had been expecting to be attacked by Lee infront, and knew that McCook was exchanging shots across the riverwith some force of the enemy at Miller's Ferry; but that the attackshould come two miles or more in our rear, from a point whereartillery had a plunging fire directly into our depot of suppliesand commanded our only road for a half-mile where it ran on a narrowbench along New River under Gauley Mountain cliffs, had been sostartling as to throw him decidedly off his balance. The error innot occupying Cotton Mountain himself was now not only made plain, but the consequences were not pleasant to contemplate. I saw thatthe best service I could render him for the moment was to help himback into a frame of mind in which cool reasoning on the situationwould be possible. I have already stated the contrast between my ownsense of care when in sole command and the comparative freedom fromit when a senior officer came upon the field; and I now realized howmuch easier it was for a subordinate to take things coolly. Itherefore purposely entered into a discussion of the probabilitiesof the situation, and drew it out at length enough to assist thegeneral in recovering full control of himself and of his ownfaculties. We could not, from where we stood, see the post at GauleyBridge nor even the place on Cotton Mountain where the enemy'sbattery was placed, and we walked a little way apart from our staffofficers to a position from which we could see the occasional puffsof white smoke from the hostile guns. From our camp the roaddescended sharply along the shoulders of steep hills covered withwood for a mile and a half, till it reached the bottom of the NewRiver gorge, and then it followed the open bench I have mentionedtill it reached the crossing of the Gauley. On the opposite side ofNew River there was no road, the mass of Cotton Mountain crowdingclose upon the stream with its picturesque face of steep inclinesand perpendicular walls of rock. The bridge of boats which Rosecranshad planned at Gauley Bridge had not been built, because it had beenfound impossible to collect or to construct boats enough to make it. We were therefore still dependent on the ferry. Whilst the generaland I were talking, Colonel De Villiers galloped up, having crossedat the ferry and run the gantlet of skirmishers whom he reported aslining the other side of New River opposite the unsheltered part ofour road. He had recently reported for duty, having, as he asserted, escaped in a wonderful way from captivity in Libby Prison atRichmond. [Footnote: The Confederates claimed that he had beenallowed to act as hospital attendant on parole, and that he violatedhis obligation in escaping. We had no means of verifying the factsin the case. ] His regiment was at the bridge and he was the seniorofficer there; but, in his characteristic light-headed way, insteadof taking steps to protect his post and re-establish the telegraphcommunications, he had dashed off to report in person atheadquarters. As he was willing to take the risks of the race backagain, he was allowed to go, after being fully instructed to set upa new telegraph office in a ravine out of range of fire, to put theferry-boat out of danger as soon as he should be over, and preparethe ordnance stores to be moved into the valley of Scrabble Creek atnight. I begged the general to be allowed to go back with DeVilliers, as the thing I most feared was some panic at the postwhich might result in the destruction of our stores in depot there. He, however, insisted on my staying at headquarters for a time atleast. Information of the attack was sent to the brigades up the river, andSchenck, who was farthest up, was directed to push out scoutingparties and learn if there was any advance of the enemy from SewellMountain. Benham, who was nearest, was ordered to send down part ofhis brigade to meet the efforts of the enemy to stop ourcommunication with Gauley Bridge. The battery of mountain howitzersunder Captain Mack of the regular army was also ordered to report atheadquarters, with the intention of placing it high up on Gauleycliffs, where it could drop shells among the enemy's skirmishers onthe opposite bank of the river. An hour or two passed and thedetachment from Benham's brigade approached. It was the ThirteenthOhio, led by one of its field officers, who halted the column androde up to General Rosecrans for orders. The general's manner wasstill an excited one, and in the rapidity with which his directionswere given the officer did not seem to get a clear idea of what wasrequired of him. He made some effort to get the orders explained, but his failure to comprehend seemed to irritate Rosecrans, and hetherefore bowed and rode back to his men with a blank look which didnot promise well for intelligent action. Noticing this, I quietlywalked aside among the bushes, and when out of sight hurried alittle in advance and waited at the roadside for the column. Ibeckoned the officer to me, and said to him, "Colonel, I thought youlooked as if you did not fully understand the general's wishes. " Hereplied that he did not, but was unwilling to question him as itseemed to irritate him. I said that was a wrong principle to act on, as a commanding officer has the greatest possible interest in beingclearly understood. I then explained at large what I knew to beRosecrans's purposes. The officer thanked me cordially and rodeaway. I have ventured to give this incident with such fulness, because subsequent events in Rosecrans's career strengthened theimpression I formed at the time, that the excitability of histemperament was such that an unexpected occurrence might upset hisjudgment so that it would be uncertain how he would act, --whether itwould rouse him to a heroism of which he was quite capable, or makehim for the time unfit for real leadership by suspending hisself-command. [Footnote: See Crittenden's testimony in Buell Courtof Inquiry, Official Records, vol. Xvi. Pt. I. P. 578. Cist'saccount of Chickamauga, Army of the Cumberland, p. 226, and chap, xxvii. , _post_. ] Soon after noon I obtained permission to go to Gauley Bridge andassume command there; but as the road along New River was nowimpracticable by reason of the increased fire of the enemy upon it, I took the route over the top of Gauley Mountain, intending to reachthe Gauley River as near the post as practicable. I took with meonly my aide, Captain Christie, and an orderly. We rode a littlebeyond the top of the mountain, and sending the orderly back withthe horses, proceeded on foot down the northern slope. We soon cameto the slashing which I had made in August to prevent the enemy'seasy approach to the river near the post. The mist of the morninghad changed to a drizzling rain. We had on our heavy horsemen'sovercoats with large capes, cavalry boots and spurs, swords andpistols. This made it toilsome work for us. The trees had beenfelled so that they crossed each other in utmost confusion on thesteep declivity. Many of them were very large, and we slid over thegreat wet trunks, climbed through and under branches, let ourselvesdown walls of natural rock, tripped and hampered by ouraccoutrements, till we came to the end of the entanglement at whatwe supposed was the edge of the river. To our dismay we found thatwe had not kept up stream far enough, and that at this point was asheer precipice some thirty feet high. We could find no crevices tohelp us climb down it. We tried to work along the edge till weshould reach a lower place, but this utterly failed. We were obligedto retrace our steps to the open wood above the slashing. But if thedownward climbing had been hard, this attempt to pull ourselves upagain, -- "... Superasque evadere ad auras, "-- was labor indeed. We stopped several times from sheer exhaustion, soblown that it seemed almost impossible to get breath again. Ourclothes were heavy from the rain on the outside and wet withperspiration on the inside. At last, however, we accomplished it, and resting for a while at the foot of a great tree till we gained alittle strength, we followed the upper line of the slashing till wepassed beyond it, and then turned toward the river, choosing toreach its banks high up above the camp rather than attempt again toclimb through the fallen timber. Once at the water's edge wefollowed the stream down till we were opposite the guard post abovethe camp, when we hailed for a skiff and were ferried over. It was now almost dark, but the arrangements were soon made to havewagons ready at the building on the Kanawha front used as amagazine, and to move all our ammunition during the night to theplace I had indicated in the ravine of Scrabble Creek, which runsinto the Gauley. The telegraph station was moved there andconnection of wires made. We also prepared to run the ferryindustriously during the night and to put over the necessarytrainloads of supplies for the troops above. A place was selectedhigh up on the hill behind us, where I hoped to get up a couple ofParrott guns which might silence the cannon of the enemy on CottonMountain. I was naturally gratified at the expressions of relief andsatisfaction of the officers of the post to have me in person amongthem. They had already found that the plunging fire from the heightsacross the river was not a formidable thing, and that littlemischief would happen if the men were kept from assembling in bodiesor large groups within range of the enemy's cannon. The fatigues of the day made sleep welcome as soon as the mostpressing duties had been done, and I went early to rest, givingorders to the guard at my quarters to call me at peep of day. Theweather cleared during the night, and when I went out in the morningto see what progress had been made in transferring the ammunition toa safe place, I was surprised to find the train of wagons stopped inthe road along the Gauley in front of the camp. General Rosecrans'sordnance officer was of the regular army, but unfortunately wasintemperate. He had neglected his duty during the night, leaving hissergeant to get on without guidance or direction. The result wasthat the ordnance stores had not been loaded upon the waiting wagonstill nearly daylight, and soon after turning out of the Kanawha roadinto that of the Gauley, the mules of a team near the head of thetrain balked, and the whole had been brought to a standstill. Therewas a little rise in the road on the hither side of Scrabble Creek, where the track, cutting through the crest of a hillock, was onlywide enough for a single team, and this rise was of course the placewhere the balky animals stopped. The line of the road was enfiladedby the enemy's cannon, the morning fog in the valley was beginningto lift under the influence of the rising sun, and as soon as thesituation was discovered we might reckon upon receiving the fire ofthe Cotton Mountain battery. The wagon-drivers realized the dangerof handling an ammunition train under such circumstances and beganto be nervous, whilst the onlookers not connected with the duty madehaste to get out of harm's way. My presence strengthened theauthority of the quartermaster in charge, Captain E. P. Fitch, helped in steadying the men, and enabled him to enforce promptly hisorders. He stopped the noisy efforts to make the refractory mulesmove, and sent in haste for a fresh team. As soon as it came, thiswas put in place of the balky animals, and at the word of commandthe train started quickly forward. The fog had thinned enough, however, to give the enemy an inkling of what was going on, and therattling of the wagons on the road completed the exposure. Withoutwarning, a ball struck in the road near us and bounded over the rearof the train, the report of the cannon following instantly. Thedrivers involuntarily crouched over their mules and cracked theirwhips. Another shot followed, but it was also short, and the lastwagon turned the shoulder of the hill into the gorge of the creek asthe ball bounded along up the Gauley valley. It was perhapsfortunate for us that solid shot instead of shrapnel were used, butit is not improbable that the need of haste in firing made thebattery officer feel that he had no time to cut and adjust fuses tothe estimated distance to our train; or it is possible that shellswere used but did not explode. It was my first acquaintance withCaptain Fitch, who had accompanied Rosecrans's column, and his coolefficiency was so marked that I applied for him as quartermasterupon my staff. He remained with me till I finally left West Virginiain 1863, and I never saw his superior in handling trains in thefield. He was a West Virginian, volunteering from civil life, whoseoutfit was a good business education and an indomitable rough energythat nothing could tire. During the evening of the 1st of November General Benham's brigadecame to the post at Gauley Bridge to strengthen the garrison, andwas encamped on the Kanawha side near the falls, where the wideningof the valley put them out of range of the enemy's fire. The ferrybelow the falls was called Montgomery's and was at the mouth of BigFalls Creek, up which ran the road to Fayette C. H. A detachment ofthe enemy had pushed back our outposts on this road, and had firedupon our lower camp with cannon, but the position was not afavorable one for them and they did not try to stay long. After aday or two we were able to keep pickets on that side with a flatboatand hawser to bring them back, covered by artillery on our side ofthe Kanawha. During November 2d Rosecrans matured a plan of operations againstFloyd, who was now definitely found to be in command of the hostileforce on Cotton Mountain. It was also learned through scoutingparties and the country people that Lee had left the region, withmost of the force that had been at Sewell Mountain. It seemedpossible therefore to entrap Floyd, and this was what Rosecransdetermined to attempt. Benham was ordered to take his brigade downthe Kanawha and cross to the other side at the mouth of Loup Creek, five miles below. Schenck was ordered to prepare wagon bodies astemporary boats, to make such flatboats as he could, and get readyto cross the New River at Townsend's Ferry, about fifteen milesabove Gauley Bridge. McCook was ordered to watch Miller's Ferry nearhis camp, and be prepared to make a dash on the short road toFayette C. H. I was ordered to hold the post at Gauley Bridge, forward supplies by night, keep down the enemy's fire as far aspossible, and watch for an opportunity to co-operate with Benham byway of Montgomery's Ferry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 254. ] Benham's brigade was temporarily increased by 1500 picked menfrom the posts between Kanawha Falls and Charleston. He was expectedto march up Loup Creek and cut off Floyd's retreat by way of RaleighC. H. , whilst Schenck should co-operate from Townsend's Ferry. Onthe 5th the preparations had been made, and Benham was ordered tocross the Kanawha. He did so on the night of the 6th, but exceptsending scouting parties up Loup Creek, he did nothing, as a suddenrise in New River made Rosecrans suspend the concerted movement, andmatters remained as they were, awaiting the fall of the river, tillthe 10th. For a week after the 1st, Floyd's battery on Cotton Mountain firedon very slight provocation, and caution was necessary in riding ormoving about the camp. The houses of the hamlet were not purposelyinjured, for Floyd would naturally be unwilling to destroy theproperty of West Virginians, and it was a safe presumption that wehad removed the government property from buildings within range offire, as we had in fact done. Our method of forwarding supplies wasto assemble the wagon trains near my lower camp during the day, andpush them forward to Gauley Mount and Tompkins farm during thenight. The ferry-boat at Gauley Bridge was kept out of harm's way inthe Gauley, behind the projection of Gauley Mount, but the hawser onwhich it ran was not removed. At nightfall the boat would be manned, dropped down to its place, made fast to the hawser by asnatch-block, and commence its regular trips, passing over thewagons. The ferries, both at the bridge and at Montgomery's, wereunder the management of Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio and hiscompany of mechanics. [Footnote: Captain P. P. Lane of Cincinnati, later colonel of the regiment. ] We had found at points along theKanawha the gunwales of flatboats, gotten out by lumbermen in thewoods and brought to the river bank ready to be put into boats forthe coal trade, which had already much importance in the valley. These gunwales were single sticks of timber, sixty or eighty feetlong, two or three feet wide, and say six inches thick. Each formedthe side of a boat, which was built by tying two gunwales togetherwith cross timbers, the whole being then planked. Such boats werethree or four times as large as those used for the country ferriesupon the Gauley and New rivers, and enabled us to make these largerferries very commodious. Of course the enemy knew that we used themat night, and would fire an occasional random shot at them, but didus no harm. The enemy's guns on the mountain were so masked by the forest thatwe did not waste ammunition in firing at them, except as theyopened, when our guns so quickly returned their fire that they neverventured upon continuous action, and after the first week we hadonly occasional shots from them. We had planted our sharpshootersalso in protected spots along the narrower part of New River nearthe post, and made the enemy abandon the other margin of the stream, except with scattered sentinels. In a short time matters thusassumed a shape in which our work went on regularly, and the onlyadvantage Floyd had attained was to make us move our supply trainsat night. His presence on the mountain overlooking our post was anirritation under which we chafed, and from Rosecrans down, everybodywas disgusted with the enforced delay of Benham at Loup Creek. Floydkept his principal camp behind Cotton Mountain, in the position Ihave already indicated, in an inaction which seemed to inviteenterprise on our part. His courage had oozed out when he hadcarried his little army into an exposed position, and here as atCarnifex Ferry he seemed to be waiting for his adversary to take theinitiative. To prepare for my own part in the contemplated movement, I hadordered Captain Lane to build a couple of flatboats of a smallersize than our large ferry-boats, and to rig these with sweeps orlarge oars, so that they could be used to throw detachments acrossthe New River to the base of Cotton Mountain, at a point selected alittle way up the river, where the stream was not so swift andbroken as in most places. Many of our men had become expert inmanaging such boats, and a careful computation showed that we couldput over 500 men an hour with these small scows. From the 5th to the both Rosecrans had been waiting for the watersto subside, and pressing Benham to examine the roads up Loup Creekso thoroughly that he could plant himself in Floyd's rear as soon asorders should be given. Schenck would make the simultaneous movementwhen Benham was known to be in march, and McCook's and my ownbrigade would at least make demonstrations from our severalpositions. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 255, 261-265. ]From my picket post at Montgomery's Ferry I had sent scouts up theFayette road, and by the 9th had discovered such symptoms ofweakness in the enemy that I thought the time had come to make aneffort to dislodge the battery and get command of the crest ofCotton Mountain overlooking my camp. On the both I made a combinedmovement from both my upper and lower camps. Colonel De Villiers wasordered to take all of the Eleventh Ohio fit for duty (being only200 men), and crossing by the small boats, make a vigorousreconnoissance over the New River face of Cotton Mountain, reachingthe crest if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Enyart of the FirstKentucky was directed to cross below the falls with a similar force, and push a reconnoissance out on the Fayette road, whilst he alsoshould try to co-operate with De Villiers in clearing the enemy fromthe heights opposite Gauley Bridge. The place at which De Villierscrossed was out of sight and range from the enemy's battery. Hisfirst boat-load of forty men reached the opposite shore safely, anddividing into two parties, one pushed up the New River to a ravinemaking a somewhat easy ascent toward the crest, whilst the othersskirmished up the almost perpendicular face of the rocks where theylanded. The remainder of the men of the Eleventh were put over asfast as possible, and joined their colonel in the ravine mentioned, up which they marched to a little clearing high up the hill, knownas Blake's farm, where the advanced party had found the enemy. Thebattery was withdrawn as soon as De Villiers' approach at the Blakefarm was known, supports being sent to the outpost there to checkour advance. The men of the Eleventh, led by Major Coleman, attackedsharply, drove back the enemy, and succeeded in extending theirright to the crest above the recent position of the battery. Theywere of course stretched out into a mere skirmish line, and Idirected them to hold the crest without advancing further tillEnyart should be heard from. He also found the enemy indisposed tobe stubborn, and skirmished up the opposite side of the mountaintill he joined hands with De Villiers on the top. The enemy seemedto be increasing before them, and our men held their position asdirected, having relieved us from the hostile occupation of groundcommanding our camps. Enyart's reconnoitring party sent towardFayette advanced a mile on that road and remained in observation, finding no enemy. I reported our success to Rosecrans, and doubtfulwhether he wished to press the enemy in front till Benham andSchenck should be in his rear, I asked for further instructions. General Rosecrans authorized me to take over the rest of myavailable force and press the enemy next day, as he was veryconfident that Benham would by that time be in position to attackhim in rear. Accordingly I passed the Second Kentucky regiment overthe river during the night and joined them in person on the crest atdaybreak. The remainder of the First Kentucky, under Major Lieper, was ordered to cross at Montgomery's Ferry later in the day, andadvance upon the Fayette road as far as possible. My climb to thecrest of Cotton Mountain was a repetition of the exhausting sort ofwork I had tried on Gauley Mount on the 1st. I took the short routestraight up the face of the hill, clambering over rocks, pullingmyself up by clinging to the laurel bushes, and often literallylifting myself from one great rocky step to another. This work washarder upon officers who were usually mounted than upon the men inthe line, as we were not used to it, and the labor of the whole daywas thus increased, for of course we could take no horses. Resumingthe advance along the mountain crest, the enemy made no seriousresistance, but fell back skirmishing briskly, till we came to moreopen ground where the mountain breaks down toward some open farmswhere detachments of Floyd's forces had been encamped. Their baggagetrain was seen in the distance, moving off upon the Fayetteturnpike. As we were now in the close neighborhood of the wholeforce of the enemy, and those in our presence were quite as numerousas we, I halted the command on the wooded heights commanding theopen ground below, till we should hear some sound from Benham'scolumn. Toward evening Major Lieper came up on our right to theplace where the Fayette road passes over a long spur of the mountainwhich is known in the neighborhood as Cotton Hill. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 272-275, and map, p. 82, _ante_. Thegreater mass in the angle of the rivers was not uniformly calledCotton Mountain then, and in my report I spoke of passing alongthose crests toward Cotton Hill, meaning this elevation on theFayette road. ] Here he was halted, and nothing being heard fromco-operating columns, the troops bivouacked for the night. Rosecrans had informed Benham of my advance and ordered him to pushforward; but he spent the day in discussing the topography which hewas supposed to have learned before, and did not move. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 266-268. ] Schenck had not been put across New River atTownsend's Ferry, because Rosecrans thought it hazardous to do thiswhilst Floyd was near that point in force, and he intended that whenFloyd should be forced to attack Benham (whose command was now equalto two brigades), it would withdraw the enemy so far that Schenckwould have room to operate after crossing. But as Benham had notadvanced, toward evening of the 11th Rosecrans sent him orders tomarch immediately up the Kanawha to my position and follow MajorLieper on the road that officer had opened to the top of CottonHill, and as much further toward Fayette C. H. As possible, takingLieper's detachment with him; meanwhile I was ordered to keep theremainder of my troops on the mountain in the position alreadyoccupied. Benham was expected to reach Lieper's position by teno'clock that evening, but he did not reach there in fact till threeo'clock in the following afternoon (12th). [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. V. Pp. 256, 273. ] After some skirmishing with anoutpost of the enemy at Laurel Creek behind which Major Lieper hadbeen posted, nothing more was done till the evening of the 13th. Floyd's report shows that he retired beyond Fayette C. H. On the12th, having conceived the mistaken idea that Benham's column was anew reinforcement of 5000 men from Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 287. ]Abandoning the hope of using Schenck's brigade in a movement fromTownsend's Ferry, Rosecrans now ordered him to march to GauleyBridge on the 13th, and joining Benham by a night march, assumecommand of the moving column. Schenck did so, but Floyd was nowretreating upon Raleigh C. H. And a slight affair with hisrear-guard was the only result. Fayette C. H. Was occupied and thecampaign ended. It would appear from official documents that Floyddid not learn of Benham's presence at the mouth of Loup Creek tillthe 12th, when he began his retreat, and that at any time during thepreceding week a single rapid march would have placed Benham'sbrigade without resistance upon the line of the enemy'scommunications. Rosecrans was indignant at the balking of hiselaborate plans, and ordered Benham before a court-martial formisconduct; [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 669. ] but Ibelieve that McClellan caused the proceedings to be quashed to avoidscandal, and Benham was transferred to another department. It isvery improbable that Schenck's contemplated movement across NewRiver at Townsend's Ferry could have been made successfully; for hisboats were few and small, and the ferrying would have been slow andtedious. Floyd would pretty surely learn of it soon after it began, and would hasten his retreat instead of waiting to be surrounded. Itwould have been better to join Schenck to Benham by a forced marchas soon as the latter was at the mouth of Loup Creek, and then topush the whole to the Fayette and Raleigh road, Rosecrans leadingthe column in person. As Floyd seems to have been ignorant of whatwas going on in Loup Creek valley, decisive results might havefollowed from anticipating him on his line of retreat. Capturingsuch a force, or, as the phrase then went, "bagging it, " is easiertalked of than done; but it is quite probable that it might havebeen so scattered and demoralized as to be of little further valueas an army, and considerable parts of it might have been takenprisoners. Rosecrans had begun the campaign in August with the announcedpurpose of marching to Wytheville and Abingdon in the Holstonvalley, and thence into East Tennessee. McClellan had cherished theidea of making the Kanawha line the base of operations into the sameregion; still later Fremont, and after him Halleck did the same. Looking only at the map, it seemed an easy thing to do; but thealmost wilderness character of the intervening country with its poorand sparsely scattered people, the weary miles of steepmountain-roads becoming impassable in rainy weather, and the totalabsence of forage for animals, were elements of the problem whichthey all ignored or greatly underestimated. It was easy, sitting atone's office table, to sweep the hand over a few inches of chartshowing next to nothing of the topography, and to say, "We willmarch from here to here;" but when the march was undertaken, thenatural obstacles began to assert themselves, and one general afteranother had to find apologies for failing to accomplish what oughtnever to have been undertaken. After a year or two, the militaryadvisers of the War Department began to realize how closely themovements of great bodies of soldiers were tied to rivers andrailways; but they seemed to learn it only as the merest civiliancould learn it, by the experience of repeated failures of plansbased on long lines of communication over forest-clad mountains, dependent upon wagons to carry everything for man and beast. Instead of reaching Wytheville or Abingdon, Rosecrans found that hecould not supply his little army even at Big Sewell Mountain; andexcept for a few days, he occupied no part of the country in advanceof my positions in August, then held by a single brigade in thepresence of the same enemy. It was not Floyd's army, but thephysical obstacles presented by the country that chained him toGauley Bridge. I shall have occasion hereafter to note how the sameignoring of nature's laws came near starving Burnside's command inEast Tennessee, where the attempt to supply it by wagon trains fromLexington in Kentucky or from Nashville failed so utterly as todisappear from the calculation of our problem of existence throughthe winter of 1863-64. CHAPTER VIII WINTER-QUARTERS An impracticable country--Movements suspended--Experienced troopsordered away--My orders from Washington--Rosecrans objects--Adisappointment--Winter organization of the Department--Sifting ourmaterial--Courts-martial--Regimental schools--Drill and picketduty--A military execution--Effect upon the army--Politicalsentiments of the people--Rules of conduct toward them--Case of Mr. Parks--Mr. Summers--Mr. Patrick--Mr. Lewis Ruffner--Mr. Doddridge--Mr. B. F. Smith--A house divided against itself--MajorSmith's journal--The contrabands--A fugitive-slavecase--Embarrassments as to military jurisdiction. Floyd's retreat was continued to the vicinity of Newberne and DublinDepot, where the Virginia and East Tennessee Railway crosses theupper waters of New River. He reported the country absolutelydestitute of everything and the roads so broken up that he could notsupply his troops at any distance from the railroad. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. V. Pp. 287, 288. ] Rosecrans was of a similaropinion, and on the 19th of November signified to General McClellan[Footnote: _id_. , p. 657. ] his purpose to hold Gauley Bridge, CheatMountain, and Romney as the frontier of his department, and todevote the winter to the instruction and discipline of his troops, and the sifting out of incompetent officers. About the 1st ofDecember he fixed his headquarters at Wheeling, [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 669, 685. On January 21 I called attention to the anomaly ofbounding the department by the Kanawha River on the south, andcorrection was at once made by General McClellan. _Id_. , p. 706. ]assigning the District of the Kanawha to my command, withheadquarters at Charleston. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 670, 691. ] Thisgave me substantially the same territorial jurisdiction I had in thesummer, but with a larger body of troops. Before we left Gauley Bridge, however, I received orders direct fromarmy headquarters at Washington to take my three oldest Ohioregiments and report to General Buell in Kentucky. This was exactlyin accordance with my own strong desire to join a large army on oneof the principal lines of operation. I therefore went joyfully toRosecrans, supposing, of course, that he also had received orders tosend me away. To my intense chagrin I found that he not only waswithout such orders, but that he was, naturally enough, disposed totake umbrage at the sending of orders direct to me. He protestedagainst the irregularity, and insisted that if his forces were to bereduced, he should himself indicate those which were to go. Hecarried his point on the matter, and was directed to send eightregiments to Buell. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 671. ] Heinsisted that I should stay, and whilst the reasons he gave weresufficiently complimentary, it was none the less a greatdisappointment to have to abandon the hope of service in a moreimportant field. [Footnote: _Id. _ pp. 259, 657. ] There was nothingto be done but to summon philosophy to my aid, and to hope that allwould turn out for the best. Before Rosecrans left Gauley Bridgefour more regiments were added to the eight already ordered away, together with four batteries of artillery. Some new regiments hadjoined us, and the aggregate of troops remaining was perhaps notmuch below the number present when Rosecrans reached Carnifex Ferryin September; but most of them were freshly organized regiments, with whom the work of drill and discipline had to begin at firstlessons. Three of the batteries taken away were regulars, and theother was Loomis's Michigan battery, one of the oldest and bestinstructed of our volunteer batteries. The places of these were notsupplied. The good policy of these reductions is not to bequestioned; for it was agreed that nothing aggressive could be donein the mountains during the winter, and it was wise to use part ofthe forces elsewhere. --Yet for those of us who had hoped to go withthe troops, and now found ourselves condemned to the apparentlyinsignificant duty of garrisoning West Virginia, the effect was, forthe time, a very depressing one. General Schenck had left us on account of sickness, and did notreturn. His brigade was again commanded by Colonel Scammon, as ithad been at Carnifex Ferry, and was stationed at Fayette C. H. Oneregiment was at Tompkins farm, another at Gauley Bridge, two othersat intervals between that post and Charleston, where were threeregiments out of what had been my own brigade. Three partiallyorganized West Virginia regiments of infantry and one of cavalrywere placed at recruiting stations in the rear, and one Ohioregiment was posted at Barboursville. The chain of posts which hadbeen established in the summer between Weston and Cross Lanes wasnot kept up; but the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Colonel George Crook, wasstationed at Cross Lanes, reporting to me, as did all the othertroops enumerated above. The Cheat Mountain district continued in command of General Milroy, his principal posts being at Beverly and Huttonsville, with smallgarrisons holding the mountain passes. General Kelley remained alsoin command of the railroad district covering the communication withWashington by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. General J. J. Reynolds was assigned to command a new division organizing atRomney, but was soon transferred to another department. Such was the general organization of the department for the winter, and we soon settled down to regular work in fitting the troops forthe next campaign. Courtsmartial were organized to try offenders ofall grades, and under charges of conduct prejudicial to good orderand military discipline, worthless officers were driven from theservice and negligent ones disciplined. Regimental schools wereopened, and strenuous efforts were made to increase the militaryknowledge and skill of the whole command. Careful drill wasenforced, and picket and outpost duty systematically taught. Eachpost became a busy camp of instruction, and the regiments repeatedunder more favorable circumstances the work of the original camp inOhio. The work of the military courts gave me one very unpleasant duty toperform, which, happily, was of rare occurrence and never again fellto my lot except on a single occasion in North Carolina near theclose of the war. A soldier of the First Kentucky Volunteers wascondemned to death for desertion, mutiny, and a murderous assaultupon another soldier. The circumstances were a little peculiar, andgave rise to fears that his regiment might resist the execution. Ihave already mentioned the affair of Captain Gibbs [Footnote:Appointed Captain and Assistant Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. Vols. , October 1. ] who had shot down a mutinous man of the SecondKentucky at Gauley Bridge in the summer, and who had been acquittedby a court-martial. The camp is very like a city in which popularimpressions and rumors have quick circulation and large influence. The two Kentucky regiments were so closely related as to be almostone, and were subject to the same influences. A bitter feelingtoward Captain Gibbs prevailed in them both, and camp demagoguesbusied themselves in trying to make mischief by commenting on thefact that the officer was acquitted whilst the private wascondemned. There was not a particle of justice in this, for the onehad simply suppressed a mutiny, whereas the other was inciting one. But it is not necessary for complaints to be just among those whoare very imperfectly informed in regard to the facts, and veryunpleasant reports were received as to the condition of things inthe regiment to which the condemned man belonged. It is the military custom, in executions by shooting, to select thefiring party from the regiment to which the condemned man belongs. To have changed the rule would have looked like timidity, and Idetermined that it must not be done, but resolved upon an order ofprocedure which would provide, as far as possible, against thechances of interference. On such occasions the troops are usuallyparaded upon three sides of a hollow square, without arms, the placeof execution being in the middle of the open side, where theprisoner kneels upon his coffin. The place chosen was in the meadowson the lower side of the Elk River, opposite Charleston, a shortdistance from the regimental camp. The camps of two other regimentsat the post were half a mile from the place of execution. Theseregiments were, therefore, marched to the field with their arms. That to which the prisoner belonged was marched without arms to itsposition as the centre of the parade, and the others were formed ontheir right and left at right angles, thus forming the three sidesof the enclosure. The arms of these last regiments were stackedimmediately behind them where they could be seized in a moment, butthe parade was formed without muskets. Captain Gibbs was on duty ascommissary at my headquarters, and his appearance with the staffwould have been unpleasant to himself as well as a possible cause ofexcitement in the Kentucky regiment. To solve the difficulty withoutmaking a significant exception, I ordered only the personal staffand the adjutant-general with the chief surgeon to accompany me, leaving out the administrative officers of both quartermaster's andcommissary's departments. When the parade was formed, I took my place with my staff at theright of the line, and, as upon a review, rode slowly down the wholeline, on the inside of the square. In going along the front of theFirst Kentucky, I took especial pains to meet the eyes of the men asthey were turned to me in passing, desirous of impressing them withmy own feeling that it was a solemn but inevitable duty. Immediatelyafter we returned to our places, the music of the dead-march washeard, and an ambulance was seen approaching from the camp, escortedby the provost-marshal and the execution party with the music. Thesolemn strains, the slow funereal step of the soldiers, the closedambulance, the statue-like stillness of the paraded troops made animpression deeper and more awful than a battle scene, because theexcitement was hushed and repressed. The ambulance stopped, the manwas helped out at the back, and led by the provost-marshal to hisplace upon the coffin, where he was blindfolded. The firing partysilently took its place. The muskets were cocked and aimed, whilethe noise of the retiring ambulance covered the sound. Theprovost-marshal, with a merciful deception, told the prisoner hemust wait a moment and he would return to him before the finalorder, but stepping quickly out of the range of the muskets, he gavethe signal with his handkerchief, and the man fell dead at thevolley, which sounded like a single discharge. The detail ofsoldiers for the firing had been carefully instructed thatsteadiness and accuracy made the most merciful way of doing theirunwelcome duty. The surgeon made his official inspection of thebody, which was placed in the coffin and removed in the ambulance. The drums and fifes broke the spell with quick marching music, theregiments took their arms, sharp words of command rattled along thelines, which broke by platoons into column and moved rapidly off thefield. I confess it was a relief to have the painful task ended, andespecially to have it ended in the most perfect order anddiscipline. The moral effect was very great, for our men were sointelligent that they fully appreciated the judicial character ofthe act, and the imposing solemnity of the parade and execution madethe impression all the more profound. As it was accompanied andfollowed by a searching test of the capacity and character of theirofficers, of which they daily saw the effects in the retirement ofsome from the service and in the increased industry and studiousdevotion to duty of all, it gave a new tone to the whole command. Ispared no effort to make the feeling pervade every regiment andcompany, that the cause of the country, their own success and honor, and even their own personal safety depended upon their entering thenext campaign with such improved discipline and instruction asshould make them always superior to an equal number of the enemy. Leaves of absence and furloughs were limited as closely as possible, and I set the example of remaining without interruption on duty, though there were many reasons why a visit home was very desirable. My wife made me a visit at Charleston in mid-winter, and thisnaturally brought me into more frequent social relations to thepeople, and led me to observe more closely their attitude to thegovernment and its cause. Before the secession of Virginia a very large majority of theinhabitants of the Kanawha valley were Unionists; but the attachmentto the state organization had become so exaggerated in allslave-holding communities, that most of the well-to-do peopleyielded to the plea that they must "go with their State. " The samestate pride led this class of people to oppose the division ofVirginia and the forming of the new State on the west of themountains. The better class of society in Charleston, therefore, asin other towns, was found to be disloyal, and in sympathy with therebellion. The young men were very generally in the Confederatearmy; the young women were full of the most romantic devotion totheir absent brothers and friends, and made it a point of honor toavow their sentiments. The older people were less demonstrative, andthe men who had a stake in the country generally professedacquiescence in the position of West Virginia within the Union, anda desire to bring back their sons from the Confederate service. Thenecessity of strict watch upon the communications sent through thelines brought to my notice a great deal of family history full ofsuffering and anxiety, and showed that that was indeed a fearfulsituation for a family when its young men were not only separatedfrom them by military service in the field, but could only be heardfrom by the infrequent chances of communication under flags oftruce, and with all the restrictions and reserves necessary to themethod. The rule I adopted in dealing personally with non-combatantsof either sex was to avoid all controversy or discussion, to statewith perfect frankness but courteously my own attitude and sense ofduty, and to apply all such stringent rules as a state of warcompels with an evenness of temper and tone of dispassionategovernment which should make as little chafing as possible. Mostintelligent people, when they are not excited, are disposed torecognize the obligations imposed upon a military officer in suchcircumstances, and it was rarely the case that any unpleasantcollisions occurred. The following incident will illustrate some of the embarrassmentslikely to occur. When I reached Charleston in July previous, I wasvisited by the wife of a gentleman named Parks, who told me that herhusband had left the valley with General Wise, but not in anymilitary capacity, being fearful that he might suffer arrest at ourhands on account of his sympathy with the Confederates. I told her, what I had told to a formal deputation of citizens, that I did notpropose to meddle with non-combatants if they in good faith remainedat home, minding their own business, and carefully abstaining fromgiving aid or information to the enemy. I had, on generalprinciples, a dislike for test oaths, and preferred to make conductthe test, and to base my treatment of people on that, rather than onoaths which the most unscrupulous would be first to take. Had herhusband known this, she said, he would not have left home, andbegged that she might be allowed to send an open letter through thelines to him to bring him back. I allowed her to do so at the firstproper opportunity, and Mr. Parks at once returned. In the latterpart of September, however, Governor Peirpoint of West Virginiathought it necessary to arrest some prominent citizens, known asSecessionists, and hold them as hostages for Union men that theConfederate troops had seized and sent to Richmond. It happened thatMr. Parks was arrested as one of these hostages, without anyknowledge on the part of the civil authorities of the circumstancesunder which he had returned home. I was ignorant of his arrest tillI received a letter from the lady, complaining bitterly of whatseemed to her a breach of faith. I was at Sewell Mountain at thetime, but lost no time in writing her a careful explanation of thecomplete disconnection between his arrest by the civil authoritiesas a hostage, and a promise of non-interference with him on my partas an officer of the United States army. I also showed her that thearrest of non-combatant Union men by the Confederate forces was thereal cause of her husband's unpleasant predicament. In view of thecircumstances, however, I thought it right to request the Governorto substitute some other hostage for Mr. Parks, so that there mightnot be the least question whether the letter or the spirit of mymilitary safeguard had been broken, and the result was that thegentleman was very soon at home again. The most prominent citizen of the valley was the Hon. GeorgeSummers, who had represented it in the Congress of the UnitedStates, and had opposed secession in the Virginia Convention with avigor that had brought him into personal peril. When, however, secession was an accomplished fact, his ideas of allegiance to hisState so far influenced him that he was unwilling to take activepart in public affairs, and sought absolute retirement at hispleasant home a little below Charleston on the Kanawha. His housewas on a hill overlooking the beautiful valley, broad enough at thispoint to give room for ample fields in the rich bottom lands. I hadcalled upon him, as I passed with my troops when I went up thevalley. He was a dignified and able man, just past middle life, butin full physical and mental force, and capable of exerting a verygreat influence if he could have thrown himself heartily into publicactivity. But he was utterly saddened and depressed by the outbreakof civil war, and deliberately chose the part of suffering inseclusion whatever it might bring, unable to rouse himself to acombative part. As a slave-holder, he was bitter against theanti-slavery movement, and as a Unionist he condemned theSecessionists. He was very glad to have the Kanawha valley in thepossession of the National troops, now that Wise had made the effortto occupy it for the Confederacy; though he had tried to procure theadoption of a policy which should leave it neutral ground, --a policyas impossible here as in Kentucky. The result was that he wasdistrusted by both sides, for in civil war each acts upon the maximthat "he that is not for us is against us. " I renewed myacquaintance with him in the winter, making his house the limit ofan occasional ride for exercise. I appreciated his feelings, andrespected his desire to set an example of obedient privatecitizenship with renunciation of all other or more active influence. There were other men of social prominence who had less hesitation inthrowing themselves actively upon the National side. Mr. Patrick wasan elderly man, of considerable wealth, whose home was a verysimilar one to Mr. Summers', a little nearer to Charleston upon thesame road. His wife was of old Virginia stock, a relative of ChiefJustice Marshall, and a pronounced Southern woman, though too good awife to make her sympathies give annoyance to her husband or hisguests. Lewis Ruffner was also a prominent Union man, and among theleaders of the movement to make West Virginia a separate State. Mr. Doddridge, long the cashier and manager of the Bank at Charleston, whose family was an old and well-known one, was an outspokenUnionist, and in the next year, when the war put an end for the timeto banking in the valley, he became a paymaster in the Nationalarmy. Colonel Benjamin F. Smith was a noteworthy character also. Hewas a leading lawyer, a man of vigorous and aggressive character, and of tough fibre both physically and mentally. He shared the wishof Summers to keep West Virginia out of the conflict if possible, but when we had driven Wise out of the valley, he took a pronouncedposition in favor of the new state movement. A little afterward hewas appointed District Attorney for the United States. Although theloyal people had such competent leaders, the majority of the men ofwealth and of the families recognized as socially eminent wereavowed Secessionists. They were a small minority of the wholepeople, but in all slave-holding communities social rank is sopowerful that their influence was out of proportion to theirnumbers. Even the leaders of the Unionists found their own "housedivided against itself, " for scarce one of them but had a son inWise's legion, and the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment was largelycomposed of the young men of Charleston and the vicinity. I havealready referred to the journal of Major Smith which fell into myhands as "captured rebel mail, " and its pages are full of patheticevidence of the conflicting emotions which such a situation excited. He was the son of B. F. Smith, whom I have just mentioned, andwhilst in Floyd's camp in front of us at Sewell Mountain he wrote:"My source of constant trouble is that my father will be in danger. Wicked and unscrupulous men, with whom he has lived in friendshipfor years, absolutely thirst for his blood, as I truly believe. Heand Summers, as one of their friends remarked to me to-day, areespecial objects of hatred and aversion to men here. I am actuallyleading a set of men one of whose avowed objects is the arrest andthe judicial or lynch murder of my father!" In the next month heheard "the startling news" that his father had fully identifiedhimself with the new state movement, and writes: "Those with whom Iwas connected, call and curse him as a traitor, --and he knew itwould be so! Why my dear father has chosen to place me in thisterrible situation is beyond my comprehension. I have been shockedbeyond description in contemplating the awful consequences to thepeace, safety, and happiness of both of us!" The family distress andgrief revealed by accident in this case is only an example of whatwas common in all the families of prominent Union men. In somecases, as in that of Major Smith, the young men resigned theircommissions and made their way home, finding the mental and moralstrain too great to bear; but in many more, pride and the influenceof comrades kept them in the Confederate service with the enlistedmen who could not resign, and with hearts sorely torn by conflictingduties, they fought it out to the end. The slavery question was the vexed one which troubled the relationsof the army and the people in all the border States. My own positionwas that of the party which had elected Mr. Lincoln. We disclaimedany purpose of meddling with the institution in the States whichremained loyal to the Union, whilst we held it to be within the warpowers of the government to abolish it in the rebellious States. Wealso took satisfaction in enforcing the law which freed the"contrabands" who were employed by their masters in any servicewithin the Confederate armies. These principles were generallyunderstood and acquiesced in by the West Virginians; but it wasimpossible to come to any agreement in regard to fugitive slaves whotook refuge in our camps. The soldiers and many of the officerswould encourage the negroes to assert their freedom, and wouldresist attempts to recapture them. The owners, if Union men, wouldinsist that the fugitives should be apprehended and restored to themby military authority. This was simply impossible, for the publicsentiment of the army as a whole was so completely with the slavesthat any such order would have been evaded and made a farcical deadletter. The commanders who made such orders uniformly suffered fromdoing it; for the temper of the volunteer army was such that theorders were looked upon as evidence of sympathy with the rebellion, and destroyed the usefulness of the general by creating an incurabledistrust of him among his own men. Yet nearly all the departmentcommanders felt obliged at first, by what they regarded as theletter of the law, to order that fugitive slaves claimed by loyalcitizens should be arrested, if within the camps, and delivered up. Within the district of the Kanawha I tried to avoid the difficultyby stringent orders that slaves should be kept out of the camps; butI declined to order the troops to arrest and return them. I had twolittle controversies on the subject, and in both of them I had tocome in collision with Colonel Benjamin Smith. After they were overwe became good friends, but the facts are too important anillustration of the war-time and its troubles to be omitted. The first raised the question of "contraband. " A negro man wasbrought into my camp by my advance-guard as we were following Floydto Sewell Mountain in September. He was the body-servant of MajorSmith, and had deserted the major, with the intention of gettingback to his family at Charleston. In our camp he soon learned thathe was free, under the Act of Congress, and he remained with us, theservants about headquarters giving him food. When I returned toGauley Bridge, Mr. Smith appeared and demanded the return of the manto him, claiming him as his slave. He, however, admitted that he hadbeen servant to Major Smith in the rebel army with his consent. Theman refused to go with him, and I refused to use compulsion, informing Mr. Smith that the Act of Congress made him free. Theclaimant then went to General Rosecrans, and I was surprised by thereceipt, shortly after, of a note from headquarters directing thegiving up of the man. [Footnote: Letter of Major Darr, acting A. A. G. , November 18. ] On my stating the facts the matter was dropped, and I heard no more of it for a month, the man meanwhiledisappearing. Soon after my headquarters were moved to Charleston, in December, I received another note from headquarters, againdirecting the delivery of the fugitive. [Footnote: Letter of CaptainHartsuff, A. A. G. , December 13. ] Again I gave a temperate and clearstatement of the facts, adding that I had reason to believe the manhad now taken advantage of his liberty to go to Ohio. Mr. Smith'scase thus ended, but it left him with a good deal of irritation atwhat he thought a wrong done to him as well as insubordination on mypart. In March following, another case arose, and I received a paper fromheadquarters containing an alleged statement of the facts, andreferred to me in usual course for report. I had been absent fromCharleston when the incidents occurred, but made careful inquirysatisfying myself of the truth, and perhaps cannot give anintelligent explanation better than by quoting the report itself, for its tone shows the sort of annoyance I felt, and it exhibitssome of the conditions of an army command involving administrativeduties that were far from pleasant. I said: "The document is in the handwriting of B. F. Smith, Esq. , U. S. District Attorney, residing here, though signed only by JohnSlack, Jr. , and William Kelly; the former an acting deputy U. S. Marshal, the latter the jailer at the county jail. Its compositionis so peculiar that it is difficult to tell what part of thestatement is Slack's or Kelly's and what is Colonel Smith's, andtherefore I do not know whom to hold responsible for themisstatements contained in it. "Mr. Slack is a respectable young man, who I believe would do hisduty as far as he understands it, but who has not energy enough tokeep him from being the tool of others. Mr. Kelly, the jailer, issufficiently described when I state the fact that he has attemptedto add to his profits as turnkey by selling bad whisky to soldiersput in his calaboose, at the rate of five dollars per pint bottle. Mr. Smith, the District Attorney, has lost no opportunity of beingannoying to the military officers here, since the controversy aboutthe negro man captured from his son, Major Isaac Smith of the rebelarmy. This reference to the parties concerned is necessary to enablethe commanding general to understand the _animus_ of theircomplaints. "The facts are substantially as follows: Henry H. Hopkins is anotorious Secessionist living near Coal River, and a man ofconsiderable property. Some time before his arrest he sent the negroman mentioned in the complaint _South_, in charge of some LoganCounty 'bushwhackers. ' On his way and in McDowell County the manmanaged to escape and returned into Hopkins's neighborhood, nearBoone C. H. , where he took his wife and three children alleged tohave been the property of a woman named Smoot, and brought them tothis post. Upon his representation that he had escaped from armedrebels in McDowell County, and without further knowledge of thefacts, the Post Quartermaster set him at work. About the 19th ofFebruary Hopkins came to town with Mrs. Smoot, and without notice tothe quartermaster or any color of authority by any civil process, procured the aid of Kelly, the jailer, seized the negro and took himto Wright's hotel. The provost-marshal, knowing that Hopkins was anactive Secessionist and that he had been personally engaged in thecombat at Boone C. H. Last fall, ordered his arrest. Shortly after, he was waited upon by B. F. Smith, Esq. , U. S. District Attorney, who stated that he had known Mr. Hopkins for a good many years andwas confident he was a good Union man, although in fact thedeputy-marshal at the very time held a warrant for the arrest ofHopkins for treason and conspiracy, under an indictment found in theU. S. Court, of which, to say the least of it, it is very strangeMr. Smith should have been ignorant. At the request of theprovost-marshal, the warrant was served on Hopkins, who was admittedto bail in the sum of $2000, which is most inadequate security forthe appearance of a man of Hopkins's wealth and influence, accusedof such a crime. After the arrest of Hopkins, the negro being leftto himself returned to his quarters, but sometime during the nightstole a skiff and attempted to escape with his family down theKanawha River. The circumstances of his accident in the river, thedrowning of his family and his subsequent capture, I have not beenable to investigate fully. "The only matter of controversy now is in regard to the horse. Thebar-keeper at the tavern denies that he has said it was taken byWagon-master West (a man who has since been discharged by the PostQuartermaster), and I have been unable to trace it, although everyeffort has been made in perfect good faith to do so. The man Westwas put under arrest, to see if that would make him admit anythingwith regard to it, but without effect. I advised Slack to procuresome one who knew the horse to pass through the government stablesand teams, and if he recognized the animal to let me know at once, and I would give an order to him to obtain it. The statement that'Slack says he told Cox he could not find him, that a soldier oremployee in his command got him, and if proper measures were takenhe could be had, ' is both impudent and false, and I respectfullysubmit that it is not, in matter or manner, such a complaint as theCommanding General should call upon me to reply to. "The statement of these civil officials at once gives me theopportunity and makes it my duty to state to the Commanding Generalthat the only occasions on which these gentlemen show any vitality, is when some Secessionist's runaway negroes are to be caught. Forany purpose of ordinary municipal magistracy they seem utterlyincompetent. I have urged the organization of the county and of thetown, but to no effect. Every street that is mended, every bridgethat is repaired, or wharf that is put in order, must be done by thearmy at the expense of the U. S. Government. They will not electofficers to look after the poor, but leave us to feed the starvingnear our camps. They will establish no police, and by force ofpublic opinion keep suitors out of the courts ordered to be held byGovernor Peirpoint. Yet a U. S. Commissioner, without any warrant oreven pretended jurisdiction, will stop any vagrant negro, drive himthrough the streets in person, and say that he does it as a U. S. Officer! Of course we simply look on and have had no controversywith them, unless driven to it by direct efforts on their part tointerfere with our necessary regulations. "The simple fact is that a few men of property who are avowedSecessionists control the town and make its public sentiment. Bythis means they practically control these officers also. Many of thenegroes employed at the salt-works, and under hire in othercapacities in the vicinity, are the slaves of rebels who are eitherin the rebel army or fled with it from the valley. The great problemupon which the Secessionists remaining here are exercising theiringenuity is to find the means of using the U. S. Commissioner andMarshal to secure to them the services of these persons without costor legitimate contract of hiring, for the present profit of thesegentlemen here, and the future advantage of their compatriots acrossthe lines. "Colonel Smith and Mr. Slack say that they made the statement at theexpress request of Major Darr of the Commanding General's staff. Asimple inquiry by the Major would have saved me the necessity ofwriting this long letter. " It is due to General Rosecrans to say that although he had beenanything but an anti-slavery man before the war, he made no pressureupon me to violate my own sense of right in these or similar cases, and they ended with my reports of the facts and of my reasons forthe course I pursued. The side lights thrown upon the situation bythe letter last quoted will be more instructive than any analysis Icould now give, and the spice of flavor which my evident annoyancegave it only helps to revive more perfectly the local color of thetime. In the case of Mr. Smith's "negro boy Mike, " I had thesatisfaction of finding in the intercepted correspondence of his sonthe major, the express recognition of the man's right to liberty byreason of his use in the enemy's service, and could not deny myselfthe pleasure of calling attention to it in my letters toheadquarters. My experience during the winter begot in me a rooted dislike for themilitary administration of the border districts, and strengthened mywish to be in the most active work at the front, where the problemswere the strictly military ones of attack and defence in thepresence of the armed enemy. [Footnote: I did not lack evidence thata steady rule, based on principles frankly avowed and easilyunderstood, was rapidly bringing the people to be content to be inthe Union, even those most inclined to secession. This result I amgratified to find attested by General Lee and General Floyd, who indispatches very lately printed confessed the effect myadministration had in quieting the valley during the first months ofmy occupation. Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. Ii. Pp. 220, 225. ] Notthat the winter was without compensating pleasures, for we wererecipients of much social attention of a very kindly and agreeablesort, and carried away cherished memories of refined family circlesin which the collision of opinions and the chafing of officialrelations were forgotten in hearty efforts to please. With theunconditionally loyal people our sympathies were very deep, for wefound them greatly torn and disturbed in the conflict of duties anddivided affections, where scarce a single household stood as a unitin devotion to the cause, and where the triumph of either side mustnecessarily bring affliction to some of them. CHAPTER IX VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS High quality of first volunteers--Discipline milder than that of theregulars--Reasons for the difference--Practical efficiency of themen--Necessity for sifting the officers--Analysis of theirdefects--What is military aptitude?--Diminution of number inascending scale--Effect of age--Of former life andoccupation--Embarrassments of a new business--Quick progress of theright class of young men--Political appointments--Professionalmen--Political leaders naturally prominent in a civil war--"Cuttingand trying"--Dishonest methods--An excellent army at the end of ayear--The regulars in 1861--Entrance examinations for WestPoint--The curriculum there--Drill and experience--Itslimitations--Problems peculiar to the vast increase of thearmy--Ultra-conservatism--Attitude toward the Lincolnadministration--"Point de zéle"--Lack of initiative--Civil work ofarmy engineers--What is military art?--Opinions of experts--Militaryhistory--European armies in the Crimean War--Truegeneralship--Anomaly of a double army organization. The work of sifting the material for an army which went on throughthe winter of 1861-62, naturally suggests an analysis of the classesof men who composed both parts of the military force of thenation, --the volunteers and the regulars. I need add nothing to whatI have already said of the unexampled excellence of the rank andfile in the regiments raised by the first volunteering. Later in thewar, when "bounty jumping" and substitution for conscripts came intoplay, the character of the material, especially that recruited inthe great cities and seaports, was much lower. I think, however, that the volunteers were always better men, man for man, than theaverage of those recruited for the regular army. The rigidity ofdiscipline did not differ so much between good volunteer regimentsand regulars, as the mode of enforcing it. There were plenty ofvolunteer regiments that could not be excelled in drill, in theperformance of camp duty, or in the finish and exactness of all theforms of parades and of routine. But it was generally brought aboutby much milder methods of discipline. A captain of volunteers wasusually followed by his neighbors and relatives. The patriotic zealof the men of the company as well as their self-respect made themeasily amenable to military rule so far as it tended to fit thembetter to do the noble work they had volunteered for, and on whichtheir hearts were as fully set as the hearts of their colonels orgenerals. In the regular army, officers and men belonged todifferent castes, and a practically impassable barrier was betweenthem. Most of the men who had enlisted in the long years of domesticpeace were, for one cause or another, outcasts, to whom life hadbeen a failure and who followed the recruiting sergeant as a lastdesperate resource when every other door to a livelihood was shut. [Footnote: Since inducements to enlist have been increased byoffering the chance to win a commission, I believe the quality ofthe rank and file of the regulars has been much improved, and as anatural consequence the officers have found it easy to enforcediscipline by less arbitrary methods. ] The war made some change inthis, but the habits and methods of the officers had been formedbefore that time and under the old surroundings. The rule wasarbitrary, despotic, often tyrannical, and it was notorious that theofficial bearing and the language used toward the regular soldierswas out of the question in a volunteer organization. Exceptionscould be found in both parts of the service, but there could be nodoubt as to the custom and the rule. To know how to commandvolunteers was explicitly recognized by our leading generals as aquality not found in many regular officers, and worth noting whenfound. A volunteer regiment might have a "free and easy" look to theeye of a regular drill sergeant, but in every essential for goodconduct and ready manoeuvre on the field of battle, or for heroicefforts in the crisis of a desperate engagement, it could not beexcelled if its officers had been reasonably competent and faithful. There was inevitable loss of time in the organization andinstruction of a new army of volunteers; but after the first year inthe field, in every quality which tends to give victory in battle toa popular cause, the volunteer regiment was, in my judgment, unquestionably superior. It is necessary to say this, because therehas been a fashion of speaking of regular regiments or brigades inthe civil war as though they were capable of accomplishing more inproportion to their numbers or on some occasion of peculiar perilthan the volunteers. I did not find it so. The material in the line, then, was as good as could be; theweakness was in the officers, and it was here that the sifting wasnecessary. Most of these officers had themselves enlisted asprivates, and their patriotic zeal was not to be questioned. Theyhad been chosen to be lieutenants, captains, and even colonels bytheir men because of faith in their ability to lead, or to recognizetheir influence in raising the troops. Yet a considerable part ofthem proved incompetent to command. The disqualifications werevarious. Some lacked physical strength and stamina. Some had orquickly developed intemperate habits. Some lacked the education andintelligence needful for official responsibility. Some were tooindolent to apply themselves to the work of disciplining themselvesor their men. Fitness for command is a very general term, yet itimplies a set of qualities which intelligent people easilyunderstand and attach to the phrase. Self-command is proverbiallyone of the chief. Courage and presence of mind are indispensable. Ability to decide and firmness to stick to a decision are necessary. Intelligence enough to understand the duties demanded of him and toinstruct his subordinates in theirs is another requisite. But besideall these, there is a constitution of body and mind for which we canfind no better name than military aptitude. For lack of it manyestimable, intelligent, and brave men failed as officers. Again, notevery good captain made a good colonel, and not every good brigadecommander was fit for a division or a larger command. There was aconstantly widening test of capacity, and a rapid thinning of thenumbers found fit for great responsibilities until the command ofgreat armies was reached, when two or three names are all that wecan enumerate as having been proven during the four years of ourcivil strife to be fully equal to the task. Besides the indications of unfitness for the subordinate commandswhich I have mentioned, another classification may be made. In anagricultural community (and the greater part of our population wasand is agricultural), a middle-aged farmer who had been thrifty inbusiness and had been a country magistrate or a representative inthe legislature, would be the natural leader in his town or county, and if his patriotism prompted him to set the example of enlisting, he would probably be chosen to a company office, and perhaps to afield office in the regiment. Absolutely ignorant of tactics, hewould find that his habits of mind and body were too fixed, and thathe could not learn the new business into which he had plunged. Hewould be abashed at the very thought of standing before a companyand shouting the word of command. The tactical lessons conned in histent would vanish in a sort of stage-fright when he tried topractise them in public. Some would overcome the difficulty byperseverance, others would give it up in despair and resign, stillothers would hold on from pride or shame, until some pressure fromabove or below would force them to retire. Some men of this stamphad personal fighting qualities which kept them in the service inspite of their tactical ignorance, like brave old Wolford ofKentucky, of whom it used to be jocosely said, that the command bywhich he rallied his cavalry regiment was "Huddle on the Hill, boys!" A man wholly without business training would always be inembarrassment, though his other qualifications for military lifewere good. Even a company has a good deal of administrative businessto do. Accounts are to be kept, rations, clothing, arms, accoutrements, and ammunition are to be receipted and accounted for. Returns of various kinds are to be made, applications for furlough, musters, rolls, and the like make a good deal of clerical work, andthough most of it may fall on the first sergeant, the captain andcommissioned officers must know how it should be done and when it iswell done, or they are sure to get into trouble. It was a very rarething for a man of middle age to make a good company officer. A goodmany who tried it at the beginning had to be eliminated from theservice in one way or another. In a less degree the same was foundto hold true of the regimental field officers. Some men retainflexibility of mind and body longer than others, and could moreeasily adapt themselves to new circumstances and a new occupation. Of course such would succeed best. But it is also true that in thelarger and broader commands solidity of judgment and weight ofcharacter were more essential than in the company, and theexperience of older men was a more valuable quality. Such reasonswill account for the fact that youth seemed to be an almostessential requisite for a company officer, whilst it was not so inthe same degree in the higher positions. It was astonishing to see the rapidity with which well-educated andearnest young men progressed as officers. They were alert in bothmind and body. They quickly grasped the principles of their newprofession, and with very little instruction made themselves mastersof tactics and of administrative routine. Add to this, bravery ofthe highest type and a burning zeal in the cause they were fightingfor, and a campaign or two made them the peers of any officers oftheir grade in our own or any other army. Another class which cannot be omitted and which is yet very hard todefine accurately, is that of the "political appointments. " Of the learned professions, the lawyers were of course most stronglyrepresented among officers of the line. The medical men were sogreatly needed in their own professional department that it was hardto find a sufficient number of suitable age and proper skill tosupply the regiments with surgeons and the hospitals with a properstaff. The clergy were non-combatants by profession, and a few onlywere found in other than chaplain's duty. Civil engineers, railroadcontractors, architects, and manufacturers were well represented andwere valuable men. Scarce any single qualification was more usefulin organizing the army than that of using and handling considerablebodies of men such as mechanics and railway employees. The profession of the law is in our country so closely allied topolitical activity that the lawyers who put on the uniform were mostlikely to be classed among political appointments. The term wasfirst applied to men like Banks, Butler, Baker, Logan, and Blair, most of whom left seats in Congress to serve in the army. If theyhad not done so, it would have been easy for critics to say that theprominent politicians took care to keep their own bodies out ofharm's way. Most of them won hard-earned and well-deserved fame asable soldiers before the war was over. In an armed struggle whichgrew out of a great political contest, it was inevitable that eagerpolitical partisans should be among the most active in the newvolunteer organizations. They called meetings, addressed the peopleto rouse their enthusiasm, urged enlistments, and often set theexample by enrolling their own names first. It must be keptconstantly in mind that we had no militia organization that bore anyappreciable proportion to the greatness of the country's need, andthat at any rate the policy of relying upon volunteering at thebeginning was adopted by the government. It was a foregoneconclusion that popular leaders of all grades must largely officerthe new troops. Such men might be national leaders or leaders ofcountry neighborhoods; but big or little, they were the necessity ofthe time. It was the application of the old Yankee story, "If theLord _will_ have a church in Paxton, he must take _sech as ther' be_for deacons. " I have, in a former chapter, given my opinion that the governmentmade a mistake in following General Scott's advice to keep itsregular army intact and forbid its officers from joining volunteerregiments; but good or bad, that advice was followed at thebeginning, and the only possible thing to do next was to let popularselection and natural leadership of any sort determine the companyorganizations. The governors of States generally followed a similarrule in the choice of field officers, and selected the generalofficers from those in the state militia, or from former officers ofthe army retired to civil life. In one sense, therefore, the wholeorganization of the volunteer force might be said to be political, though we heard more of "political generals" than we did ofpolitical captains or lieutenants. When the organization of theUnited States Volunteers took the place of the state contingentswhich formed the "three months' service, " the appointments by thePresident were usually selections from those acting already understate appointment. The National Government was more conservativethan the Confederacy in this respect. Our service was always full ofcolonels doing duty as brigadiers and brigadiers doing duty asmajor-generals, whilst the Southern army usually had a brigadier forevery brigade and a major-general for every division, withlieutenant-generals and generals for the highest commands. If somerigid method had been adopted for mustering out all officers whomthe government, after a fair trial, was unwilling to trust with thecommand appropriate to their grade, there would have been little tocomplain of; but an evil which grew very great was that men in highrank were kept upon the roster after it was proven that they wereincompetent, and when no army commander would willingly receive themas his subordinates. Nominal commands at the rear or of a merelyadministrative kind were multiplied, and still many passed no smallpart of the war "waiting orders. " As the total number of generalofficers was limited by law, it followed, of course, that promotionhad to be withheld from many who had won it by service in the field. This evil, however, was not peculiar to the class of appointmentsfrom civil life. The faults in the first appointments were such aswere almost necessarily connected with the sudden creation of a vastarmy. The failure to provide for a thorough test and sifting of thematerial was a governmental error. It was palliated by the necessityof conciliating influential men, and of avoiding antagonisms whenthe fate of the nation trembled in the balance; but this was apolitical motive, and the evil was probably endured in spite of itswell-known tendency to weaken the military service. A few months' campaigning in the field got us rid of most of the"town-meeting style" of conducting military affairs in the armyitself, though nothing could cure the practice on the part ofunscrupulous men of seeking reputation with the general public bydishonest means. The newspapers were used to give fictitious creditto some and to injure others. If the regular correspondents of thepress had been excluded from the camps, there would no doubt havebeen surreptitious correspondence which would have found its wayinto print through private and roundabout channels. But this againwas not a vice peculiar to officers appointed from civil life. Itshould be always remembered that honorable conduct and devotedpatriotism was the rule, and self-seeking vanity and ambition theexception; yet a few exceptions would be enough to disturb thecomfort of a large command. To sum up, the only fair way to estimatethe volunteer army is by its work and its fitness for work after theformative period was passed, and when the inevitable mistakes andthe necessary faults of its first organization had been measurablycured. My settled judgment is that it took the field in the springof 1862 as well fitted for its work as any army in the world, itssuperior excellences in the most essential points fully balancingthe defects which were incident to its composition. This opinion is not the offspring of partiality toward the volunteerarmy on the part of one himself a volunteer. It was shared by themost active officers in the field who came from the regular service. In their testimony given in various ways during the war, in theirOfficial Records, and in their practical conduct in the field whichshowed best of all where their reliance was placed, these officersshowed their full faith in and admiration for the volunteerregiments. Such an opinion was called out by the Committee on theConduct of the War in its examination of General Gibbon in regard tothe Gettysburg campaign, and his judgment may fairly be taken asthat of the better class of the regular officers. He declared ofsome of these regiments in his division, that they were as welldisciplined as any men he ever wished to see; that their officershad shown practical military talent; that a young captain from civillife, whom he instanced, was worthy to be made a general. He namedregiments of volunteers which he said were among the finestregiments that ever fought on any field, and in which every officerwas appointed from civil life. [Footnote: Report of Committee onConduct of the War, vol. Iv. Pp. 444-446. ] He added the criticismwhich I have above made, that no proper method of getting rid ofincompetent officers and of securing the promotion of themeritorious had been adopted; but this in no way diminishes theforce of his testimony that every kind of military ability wasabundantly found in our volunteer forces and needed only recognitionand encouragement. It would be easy to multiply evidence on thissubject. General Grant is a witness whose opinion alone may betreated as conclusive. In his Personal Memoirs [Footnote: PersonalMemoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. I. P. 573. ] he explicitly andunqualifiedly says that at the close of the Vicksburg campaign histroops fulfilled every requirement of an army, and his volunteerofficers were equal to any duty, some of them being in his judgmentcompetent to command an independent army in the field. Sherman fullyshared this opinion. [Footnote: Letter to Halleck, Official Records, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Iii. P. 413. ] In trying to form a just estimate of the officers of the regulararmy in 1861, we have to consider not only their education, but thecharacter of their military life and experience up to that time. Itis, on the whole, a salutary popular notion that "professionals" inany department of work are more likely to succeed than amateurs. Atthe beginning of the Civil War our only professional soldiers werethe officers of our little regular army, nearly all of whom weregraduates of the West Point Military Academy. Since the Mexican Warof 1848, petty conflicts with Indians on the frontier had been theironly warlike experience. The army was hardly larger than a singledivision, and its posts along the front of the advancing wave ofcivilization from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Canada borderwere so numerous that it was a rare thing to see more than two orthree companies of soldiers together. To most of the officers theirparade of the battalion of cadets at West Point was the largestmilitary assemblage they had ever seen. Promotion had been so slowthat the field officers were generally superannuated, and very fewwho had a rank higher than that of captain at the close of 1860 didany active field work on either side during the Civil War. The totalnumber of captains and lieutenants of the line would hardly havefurnished colonels for the volunteer regiments of the single Stateof New York as they were finally mustered into the National serviceduring the war; and they would have fallen far short of it whentheir own numbers were divided by the rebellion itself. Our available professional soldiers, then, were captains andsubalterns whose experience was confined to company duty at frontierposts hundreds of miles from civilization, except in the case of theengineers, the staff corps, and some of the artillery in sea-coastforts. With the same exceptions, the opportunities for enlargingtheir theoretic knowledge had been small. It was before the days ofpost libraries, and books of any sort were a rarity at thegarrisons. In the first year of the war, I expressed to GeneralGordon Granger my surprise at finding how little most line officershad added to the theoretic reading they got at the academy. "Whatcould you expect, " he said in his sweeping way, "of men who have hadto spend their lives at a two-company post, where there was nothingto do when off duty but play draw-poker and drink whiskey at thesutler's shop?" This was, of course, meant to be picturesquelyextravagant, but it hit the nail on the head, after all. Some of theofficers of the old regime did not conceal their contempt for books. It was a stock story in the army that when the Utah expedition wasfitting out in 1856, General Henry Hunt, chief of artillery of thearmy of the Potomac, then a young artillery officer, applied toGeneral Twiggs, from whose command part of the expedition was makingup, for leave to take a little box of military books. "No, sir, " wasthe peremptory response; "no room in the train for such nonsense. "Hunt retired chop-fallen; but soon after another officer came in, with "General, our mess has a keg of very nice whiskey we don't wantto lose; won't you direct the quartermaster to let it go in thewagons?" "Oh yes, sir. Oh yes, anything in reason!" If not true, thestory is good enough to be true, as its currency attests; butwhether true or no, the "fable teaches" that post-graduate study inthe old army was done under difficulties. The course of study at West Point had narrower limitations than mostpeople think, and it would be easy to be unfair by demanding toomuch of the graduates of that military college. The course of studywas of four years, but the law forbade any entrance examinations onsubjects outside of the usual work done in the rural common schools. The biographies of Grant, of Sherman, of Sheridan, of OrmsbyMitchell, and of others show that they in fact had little or noother preparatory education than that of the common country school. [Footnote: Grant, in his Personal Memoirs (vol. I. P. 24), says ofthe school in his early Ohio home, that the highest branches taughtthere were "the three R's, --Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rithmetic. Inever saw, " he says, "an algebra or other mathematical work higherthan the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until after I was appointed toWest Point. I then bought a work on algebra in Cincinnati, buthaving no teacher it was Greek to me. "] The course of study andamount of education given must necessarily be limited, therefore, towhat boys of average ability and such preparation could accomplishin the four years. They were no further advanced, on entering, thanthey would have to be to enter any ordinary fitting school for oneof our first-class colleges, or the high schools in the gradedsystems of public schools in our cities. Three years of study wouldput them abreast of students entering college elsewhere, and fouryears would carry them about as far as the end of the Freshman yearin Yale, Harvard, or Princeton. The corps of professors and teachersat West Point has always deservedly ranked high as instructors, butthere is no "royal road" to knowledge, and it cannot be claimed thatthree or four years at the Military Academy would count for more, asgeneral education, than the same period spent in any other goodschool. A very few men of high standing in the classes supplementedtheir education by obtaining appointments as temporary instructorsin the academy after graduating, but most of them left their booksbehind them and began at once the subaltern's life at the distantfrontier post. If we analyze the course of study they pursued, we find that itcovered two years' work in mathematics, one in physics andchemistry, and one in construction of fortifications. This was thescientific part, and was the heaviest part of the curriculum. Then, besides a little English, mental philosophy, moral philosophy, andelementary law, there were two years' study of the French and one ofSpanish. This was the only linguistic study, and began with thesimplest elements. At the close of the war there was no instructionin strategy or grand tactics, in military history, or in what iscalled the Art of War. The little book by Mahan on Out-post Duty wasthe only text-book in Theory, outside the engineering proper. At anearlier day they had used Jomini's introduction to his "GrandesOpérations Militaires, " and I am unable to say when its use wasdropped. It is not my wish to criticise the course of study; on theother hand, I doubt if it could be much improved for boys who hadonly the preparation required by the law. But since we are trying toestimate its completeness as professional education fitting men tocommand armies in the field, it is absolutely necessary to note thefact that it did not pretend to include the military art in thatsense. Its scientific side was in the line of engineering and thatonly. Its prize-men became engineers, and success at the academy wasgauged by the student's approach to that coveted result. That the French which was learned was not enough to open easily tothe young lieutenant the military literature which was then foundmost abundantly in that language, would seem to be indicated by thefollowing incident. In my first campaign I was talking with aregular officer doing staff duty though belonging in the line, andthe conversation turned on his West Point studies. The little workof Jomini's mentioned above being casually referred to as havingbeen in his course, I asked him if he had continued his reading intothe History of the Seven Years' War of Frederick the Great, to whichit was the introduction. He said no, and added frankly that he hadnot read even the Introduction in the French, which he had foundunpleasantly hard reading, but in the English translation publishedunder the title of the Art of War. This officer was a thoroughlyestimable, modest, and intelligent man, and seemed in no wayinferior to other line officers of his age and grade. It would ofcourse be true that some men would build industriously upon thefoundation laid at the academy, and perfect themselves in thosethings of which they had only acquired the elements; but thesurroundings of frontier life at a post were so unfavorable that Ibelieve few in fact did so. The officers of the engineer corps andthe ordnance were specifically devoted to scientific careers, andcould go steadily forward to expertness in their specialties. Thosewho were permanently attached to the staff corps or to bureaus atWashington had also opportunity to enlarge their professionalknowledge by study if they were so inclined. But all these wereexceptionally situated, and do not help us answer the question Whatkind and amount of military education was implied in the fact that aman had graduated at West Point and been sent to serve in the line?I have purposely omitted for the present to consider the physicaltraining and the practical instruction in tactics by means of drill, because the question is in terms one of science, not of practice;that will come later. The conclusion is that the intellectualeducation at the Military Academy was essentially the same, as faras it went, as that of any polytechnic school, the peculiarlymilitary part of it being in the line of engineering. In actualwarfare, the laying out and construction of regular forts or theconduct of a regular siege is committed to professional engineers. For field work with an army, therefore, the mental furnishing of theWest Point man was not superior to that of any other liberallyeducated man. In some of our volunteer regiments we had wholecompanies of private soldiers who would not have shunned acompetitive examination with West Point classes on the studies ofthe Military Academy, excepting the technical engineering offortifications. [Footnote: It must not be forgotten that mycriticisms are strictly confined to the condition of militaryeducation in our Civil War period. Since that time some excellentwork has been done in post-graduate schools for the different armsof the service, and field manoeuvres have been practised on a scalenever known in our army prior to 1861. A good beginning has alsobeen made, both here and in England, toward giving the young soldiera military library of English books. ] Let us look now at the physical and practical training of the cadet. The whole period of his student life at West Point had more or lessof this. He was taken as a raw recruit would be, taught the schoolof the soldier in marching, in the manual of arms, and in personalcarriage. He passed on to the drill of the squad, the platoon, thecompany. The tactics of the battalion came last, and the cadet mightbecome a corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, or captain in the corps ifhe showed aptitude for drill and tactics. It is noticeable, however, that Grant and Sheridan remained privates during their wholecadetship, and Sherman, though once he became sergeant, was put backin the ranks. The fair conclusion is that this part of the cadetdiscipline is not very closely connected with generalship, though itis important as preparation for the ready handling of a company or abattalion. Sherman tells us, in his Memoirs, that he studiedevolutions of the line out of the books, as a new subject, when hewas in camp in front of Washington, after the first battle of BullRun. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. I. P. 220. ] The tactical education ofthe cadet stopped at the evolutions of the battalion, and for nearlyall of them it was, even in that respect, the education of thesoldier in the ranks and not of the officer, since a very smallproportion became officers in the cadet corps. This practical drill was, of course, the same as that which was usedin organized militia regiments, and the famous Ellsworth Zouaves ofChicago, the New York Seventh Regiment, with a number of othermilitia regiments in different States, were sufficient proof thatthis training could be made as exact outside of the cadet corps asin it. It certainly was enough for the practical handling of thecompany and the regiment under the simplified tactics which not onlyprevailed during the war itself, but, with Upton's Manual as abasis, has been authoritatively adopted as an improvement upon theolder and more complicated methods. It must not be forgotten thatalthough our militia system had fallen into scandalous neglect, thevoluntary efforts of citizen soldiers had kept many good independentcompanies organized everywhere, as well as full regiments in most ofthe older States; so that there were in fact more well-drilledregiments in the militia than there were in the little regular army. It was the small ratio all these, of both classes, bore to thedemands of the gigantic war that was upon us, which made the problemso troublesome. The officers of the organized militia regiments, before the end of the three months' service, did what I have said itwas desirable that those of the regular regiments should havedone, --they scattered from their original commands and were activein organizing the new volunteer regiments. General De Trobriand, whowent out as Colonel of the Fifty-fifth New York, says that the NewYork Seventh Regiment furnished three hundred officers to volunteerregiments. [Footnote: De Trobriand, Four Years with Potomac Army, p. 64. ] In a similar way, though not to the same extent, the otherorganized and disciplined militia, in both Eastern and WesternStates, furnished the skeletons of numerous new regiments. The really distinguishing feature in the experience of the regularofficers of the line was their life in garrison at their posts, andtheir active work in guarding the frontier. Here they had becomefamiliar with duty of the limited kind which such posts wouldafford. This in time became a second nature to them, and to theextent it reached, was, as other men's employments are, theirbusiness. They necessarily had to learn pretty thoroughly the armyregulations, with the methods and forms of making returns andconducting business with the adjutant-general's office, with theordnance office, the quartermaster's and subsistence departments, etc. In this ready knowledge of the army organization and itsmethods their advantage over the new volunteer officers was moremarked, as it seemed to me, than in any and all other things. Theroutine of army business and the routine of drill had to be learnedby every army officer. The regular officer of some years' standingalready knew, as a matter of course, what a new volunteer officermust spend some time in learning. There is something of value alsoin the habit of mind formed in actual service, even if the serviceis in subaltern grades and on a petty scale. Familiarity with dangerand with the expectation of danger is acquired, both by the Indianwars of the frontier and by the hunting and field sports which fillmore or less of the leisure of garrison life. But there were some drawbacks upon the value of the preparation forwar which these officers possessed. There was a marked conservatismas to military methods and arms, and an almost slavish reverence forthings which were sanctioned by European authority, especially thatof the second French Empire. American invention was never morefruitful than when applied to military weapons. Repeating andmagazine small arms, breach-loading cannon, and Gatling guns withother repeating artillery, were brought out or improved withwonderful variety of form and of demonstrable excellence. Theregular army influence was generally against such innovations. Notonce, but frequently, regular army officers argued to me that theold smooth-bore musket with "buck and ball" cartridge was the bestweapon our troops could desire. We went through the war with amuzzle-loading musket, the utmost that any commander could do beingto secure repeating rifles for two or three infantry regiments in awhole army. Even to the end the "regular" chiefs of artilleryinsisted that the Napoleon gun, a light smooth-bore twelve-poundercannon, was our best field-piece, and at a time when a greatcampaign had reduced our forces so that a reduction of artillery wasadvisable, I received an order to send to the rear my three-inchrifled ordnance guns and retain my Napoleons. The order was issuedby a regular officer of much experience, but I procured itssuspension in my own command by a direct appeal to the armycommander. There was no more doubt then than there is to-day of thesuperiority of rifled guns, either for long-range practice withshells or in close work with canister. They were so much lighterthat we could jump them across a rough country where the teams couldhardly move a Napoleon. We could subdue our adversaries' fire withthem, when their smooth-bores could not reach us. Yet we wereordered to throw away our advantages and reduce ourselves to ourenemy's condition upon the obstinate prejudice of a worthy man whohad had all flexibility drilled out of him by routine. Models ofautomatic rapid-fire and repeating field-pieces were familiarobjects "at the rear, " but I saw none of them in action in any armyin which I served. The conservatism of the old army must be heldresponsible for this. The question of zeal and devotion to the cause for which we foughtcannot be ignored in such a war as ours was. It is notorious thatcomparatively few of the regular officers were political friends ofMr. Lincoln's administration at the beginning. Of those who did not"go with the South" but remained true to the National flag, somewere full of earnest patriotism, like the young officers whom I havementioned as volunteering to assist the governors of States inorganizing their contingents and as seeking places in volunteerregiments. There were others who meant to do their duty, but beganwith little hopefulness or zeal. There were still others who did nothesitate to predict defeat and to avow that it was only forprofessional honor or advancement that they continued to serve underthe National flag. These last were confessedly soldiers of fortune. The war was an education for all who were in it, and many a manbegan with reluctance and half-heartedness who was abundantlyradical before the conflict was over. There was, however, aconsiderable class who practised on Talleyrand's diplomatic motto, "point de zèle, " and limited their efforts to the strict requirementof duty. Such men would see disaster occur for lack of a littlespontaneity on their part, and yet be able to show that theyliterally obeyed every order received. I was once ordered to supportwith my command a movement to be made by another. It was animportant juncture in a campaign. Wondering at delay, I rode forwardand found the general officer I was to support. I told him I wasordered to support him in doing what we both saw was needing to bedone; but he had no explicit orders to begin the movement. I saidthat my orders to support him were sufficient to authorize hisaction, and it was plain that it would be unfortunate if the thingwere not done at once. He answered cynically, "If you had been inthe army as long as I have, you would be content to do the thingsthat are ordered, without hunting up others. " The English regulars, also, have a saying, "Volunteering brings bad luck. " There was altogether too much of this spirit in the army, and onewho can read between the lines will see it in the history of many acampaign. It did not necessarily mean wavering loyalty. It wassometimes the mental indecision or timidity which shrinks fromresponsibility. It was sometimes also the result of education in anarmy on the peace establishment, where any spontaneity was snubbedas an impertinence or tyrannically crushed as a breach ofdiscipline. I would not be understood to make more of these thingsthan is necessary to a just estimate of the situation, but it seemsto me an entirely fair conclusion that with us in 1861 as with thefirst French republic, the infusion of the patriotic enthusiasm of avolunteer organization was a necessity, and that this fully made upfor lack of instruction at the start. This hasty analysis of whatthe actual preparation for war was in the case of the average lineofficer of the regular army will show, to some extent, the basis ofmy judgment that there was nothing in it which a new volunteerofficer, having what I have called military aptitude, should notlearn in his first campaign. How far the officers of the engineers and of the staff corps appliedthemselves to general military study, would depend upon their tasteand their leisure. Their opportunities for doing so were much betterthan those of line officers, but there was also a tendency toimmerse themselves in the studies of their special department ofwork. Very eminent officers of engineers have told me since the warthat the pressure of their special professional work was such thatthey had found no time to read even the more noteworthy publicationsconcerning the history of our own great struggle. The surveys of thegreat lakes and the coast, the engineering problems of our greatrivers, etc. , have both formerly and in recent years absorbed theirtime and their strength. The ordnance and the staff corps, also, hadabundant special duties. Still it may reasonably be assumed thatofficers of the classes mentioned have usually made themselvessomewhat familiar with the best writings on military art. If we hadin the country in 1861 a class of men who could be called educatedsoldiers in the scientific sense, we certainly should find them inthe several corps just referred to. Here, however, we have to meet the question What is military art asapplied to the problem of winning battles or campaigns? We areobliged to answer that outside of the business administration andsupply of an army, and apart from the technical knowledge ofengineering and the construction of fire-arms and ammunition, itconsists in the tactical handling of bodies of men in accordancewith very few and very simple principles of strategy. The literatureof the subject is found in the history of wars analyzed by competentmen like Napoleon, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Sir William Napier, Clausewitz, Moltke, Hamley, and others; but it may be broadly saidthat the principles of this criticism and analysis may be so brieflystated as to be printed on the back of a visiting-card. [Footnote:Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, in his admirable "Letters onStrategy, " states them in five brief primary axioms. Letters onStrategy, vol. I. Pp. 9, 10. ] To trace the campaigns of greatsoldiers under the guidance of such a critic as Jomini is full ofinterest to any intelligent person, and there is nothing in thesubject of the slightest difficulty of comprehension if full andauthentic topographical maps are before the reader. To make muchinstructive use of military history in this way demands a good dealof voluminous reading and the command of charts and maps extensiveenough to allow the presentation of the face of a country on a largescale. With these advantages all wars, both ancient and modern, arefull of instructive examples of the application of the simpleprinciples of strategy under innumerable varying circumstances andsituations; and this union of simple theory in ever-changingpractical application is what constitutes the theoretic knowledge ofthe general as distinguished from the tactical and administrativeduties of the subordinate. [Footnote: Jomini expresses it thus:"J'en couclus que l'histoire militaire raisonnèe de plusieurscampagnes, seront la meilleure Ecole pour apprendre et parconséquent pour enseigner la grande guerre: _la science desgéneraux. _" Grandes Operations Militaires, vol. I. P. 7. ] It was thevery simplicity of the principles that made many successful generalsquestion whether there was any art in the matter, except to usecourage and natural sagacity in the actual situation in which thecommander found himself and the enemy. Marshal Saxe asserted in his"Rêveries" that down to his time there had been no formulation ofprinciples, and that if any had been recognized as such in the mindsof commanders of armies, they had not made it known. [Footnote:Jomini, in the work already cited, quotes Marshal Saxe thus: "Quetoutes les sciences avaient des principes, mais que la guerre seulen'en avait point encore; si ces principes ont existé dans la tête dequelques généraux, nulle part ils n'ont été indiqués ou développés. "The same idea has been put quite as trenchantly by one of the mostrecent writers of the English Army, Colonel J. F. Maurice, R. A. Professor in the Farnborough Staff College. In the able article on"War" in the last edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, he says, "it must be emphatically asserted that there does not exist, andnever except by pedants of whom the most careful students of war aremore impatient than other soldiers, has there ever been supposed toexist, an 'art of war' which was something other than the methodicstudy of military history. "] It was precisely in this department of military history "raisonnée"that frontier garrison life shut the young army officer out from theopportunities of profiting by his leisure. The valuable books wereall foreign publications in costly form with folio atlases, and wereneither easy to procure nor easily carried about with the limitedmeans and the rigid economy of transportation which marked army lifein the far West. That this was true even in the artillery isindicated by General Gibbon before the Committee on the Conduct ofthe War when questioned in reference to the relative amount ofartillery used at Gettysburg as compared with great Europeanbattles; that distinguished officer having himself been in theartillery when the Civil War began. [Footnote: "Question. You havestudied the history of battles a great deal: Now, in the battles ofNapoleon, had they at any time half as many artillery engaged asthere were at Gettysburg? Answer. I am not sufficiently conversantwith military history to tell you that. I think it very doubtfulwhether more guns were ever used in any one battle before. I do notbelieve Napoleon ever had a worse artillery fire. " Testimony ofGeneral John Gibbon, Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. Iv. P. 444. At Gettysburg the whole number of cannon employed was about twohundred. Compare this with Leipzig, for instance, the "battle of thegiants, " where _two thousand_ were employed! Thiers says, "deLeipzig à Schönfeld au nord, de Schönfeld à Probstheyda à l'est, deProbstheyda à Connewitz au sud, une cannonade de deux mille bouchesà feu termina cette bataille dit des géants, et jusqu'ici la plusgrande, certainement, de tous les siecles. " Thiers, Consulat etl'Empire, vol. Xvi. P. 607. ] If then the officers of the regular army, as a body, were not infact deeply read in what, as we have seen, Jomini calls "the scienceof generals, " their advantage over equally well-educated civiliansis reduced to a practical knowledge of the duties of the company andthe petty post, and in comparison with the officers of well-drilledmilitia companies it amounted to little more than a better knowledgeof the army regulations and the administrative processes. It is noreproach to them that this was so, for it resulted from theoperation of law in the course of education at the Military Academyand the insignificant size of our army in times of peace. It hadbeen the peculiar blessing of our country that a great standing armywas unnecessary, and it would be foolish to regret that our littlearmy could not have the experience with great bodies of troops andthe advantages of theoretical instruction which are part of the lifeof officers in the immense establishments of Continental Europe. Myonly purpose is to make an approximately true balance sheet of theactual advantages of the two parts of our National army in 1861. Whilst on the subject, however, I will go a little further and saythat prior to our Civil War, the history of European conflictsproves that there also the theoretic preparation of military men hadnot, up to that time, saved them from the necessity of learning bothgeneralship and army administration in the terrible school ofexperience, during their first year in the field when a new warbroke out after a long interval of peace. The first volume of Kinglake's "Crimean War" appeared in 1863, and Iimmediately and eagerly devoured it for the purpose of learning thelesson it could teach. It was one of the memorable sensations of alifetime, to find that the regular armies of England, of France, andof Russia had had to learn their lesson anew when they faced eachother on the shore of the Euxine, and that, whether in matters oftransportation, of subsistence, of the hospital, of grand tactics, or of generalship, they had no advantage over our army of volunteersfresh from their peaceful pursuits. The photographic fidelity todetail on the part of the historian, and his apparentunconsciousness of the sweeping conclusions to be drawn from hispictures, made the lesson all the more telling. I drew a long breathof relief, and nothing which happened to me in the whole war soencouraged me to hopeful confidence in the outcome of it, as theevidence I saw that our blunders at the beginning had been nogreater than those of old standing armies, and that our capacity tolearn was at least as quick as theirs. Their experience, like ours, showed that the personal qualities of a commanding officer countedfor much more than his theoretic equipment, and that a bold heart, acool head, and practical common-sense were of much more importancethan anything taught at school. With these, a brief experience wouldenable an intelligent man to fill nearly any subordinate positionwith fair success; without them any responsibility of a warlike kindwould prove too heavy for him. The supreme qualification of ageneral-in-chief is the power to estimate truly and grasp clearlythe situation on a field of operations too large to be seen by thephysical eye at once, [Footnote: Wellington said the great task ofhis military life was "trying to make out what was behind thehill. "] and the undaunted temper of will which enables him toexecute with persistent vigor the plan which his intellect approves. To act upon uncertainties as if they were sure, and to do it in themidst of carnage and death when immeasurable results hang uponit, --this is the supreme presence of mind which marks a greatcommander, and which is among the rarest gifts even of men who arephysically brave. The problem itself is usually simple. It is theconfusing and overwhelming situation under which it must be solvedthat causes timidity or dismay. It is the thought of the fearfulconsequences of the action that begets a nervous state of hesitationand mental timidity in most men, and paralyzes the will. Noeducation will ensure this greatest and most essential quality. Itis born in a man, not communicated. With it his acquired knowledgewill be doubly useful, but without it an illiterate slave-traderlike Forrest may far outshine him as a soldier. Nor does success asa subordinate give any certain assurance of fitness for supremecommand. Napoleon's marshals generally failed when trusted with anindependent command, as Hooker did with us; and I do not doubt thatmany men, like McClellan, who failed as generals-in-chief, wouldhave made brave and good subordinates. The test of quality isdifferent in kind, and, as I have said, the only proof of itspossession is in the actual trial. It is safe to say that a timidsubordinate will not be a good commander, but it cannot be affirmedthat a bold one will, though there are more chances in his favor. The education of peril is so powerful in bringing out the qualitiesthat can master it, and for any one who has true military couragethe acquirement of skill in the more mechanical part of his duty inwar is so rapid, that my experience has led me to reckon low, in thecomparison, the value of the knowledge a soldier gains in times ofpeace. I say "in the comparison. " Tactics are essential to thehandling of large bodies of men, and must be learned. But thezealous young soldier with aptitude for his work will learn thispart of his duty so fast that a single campaign will find himabreast of any. At the beginning of a great war and in theorganization of a great army, the knowledge of routine and ofdetails undoubtedly saves time and saves cost both of treasure andof life. I am therefore far from arguing that the knowledge whichwas found in the regular army should not be made the most of. I havealready said that it should have been scattered through the wholevolunteer organization. So I also say that it was quite right tolook for the higher qualities for command in those who had thetechnical information and skill. But I reckon patriotic zeal anddevotion so high that I have no hesitation in adding, that our armyas a whole would have been improved if the distinction betweenregular and volunteer had been abolished, and, after the firstbeginnings, a freer competition for even the highest commands hadbeen open to all. To keep up the regular army organization waspractically to say that a captaincy in it was equivalent to abrigade command in the volunteers, and to be a brigadier in it was areward which regular officers looked forward to as a result of thesuccessful conduct of a great campaign as general-in-chief of anarmy. The actual command in war was thus ridiculously belittled inthe official scale in comparison with grades of a petty peaceestablishment, and the climax of absurdity was reached when, at theclose of hostilities, men who had worthily commanded divisions andcorps found themselves reduced to subordinate places in regiments, whilst others who had vegetated without important activity in thegreat struggle were outranking them by virtue of seniority in thelittle army which had existed before the Rebellion! CHAPTER X THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT--SPRING CAMPAIGN Rosecrans's plan of campaign--Approved by McClellan withmodification--Wagons or pack-mules--Final form of plan--Changes incommands--McClellan limited to Army of the Potomac--Halleck'sDepartment of the Mississippi--Fremont's MountainDepartment--Rosecrans superseded--Preparations in the KanawhaDistrict--Batteaux to supplement steamboats--Light wagons formountain work--Fremont's plan--East Tennessee as an objective--Thesupply question--Banks in the Shenandoah valley--Milroy'sadvance--Combat at McDowell--Banks defeated--Fremont's plansderanged--Operations in the Kanawha valley--Organization ofbrigades--Brigade commanders--Advance to Narrows of New River--Thefield telegraph--Concentration of the enemy--Affair atPrinceton--Position at Flat-top Mountain. As the spring of 1862 approached, the discussion of plans for theopening of a new campaign was resumed. Rosecrans had suggested, early in February, that he would prefer to attempt reaching theVirginia and East Tennessee Railroad by two columns movingsimultaneously upon Abingdon in the Holston valley. One of thesewould start from Gauley Bridge and go by way of Fayette, Raleigh, and Princeton; the other would leave some point in the Big-Sandyvalley on the common boundary of Kentucky and Virginia, and march bymost direct route to Abingdon. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 721. ] If this plan were approved, he asked that the west side ofthe Big-Sandy valley be added to his department. He proposed todepend largely upon pack-mule trains in place of wagons, tosubstitute the French shelter tent for the larger tents still inuse, and to carry hand-mills by which the soldiers might grind intomeal the Indian corn to be found in the country. McClellan, asgeneral-in-chief, gave his approval, suggesting a modification inregard to the column to move from the Big-Sandy valley. Hisinformation led him to believe that the Big-Sandy River could berelied upon as navigable to Prestonburg, which was seventy milesfrom Abingdon by what was supposed to be a good road. He thought, therefore, that it would be easier to make Prestonburg the base andto use wagons. [Footnote: O, R. , vol. V. P. 722. ] On investigationRosecrans reported that the most feasible route in that region wasby steamboat transportation to Pikeville, twenty-five miles abovePrestonburg, in the Big-Sandy valley, and thence up the Louisa Forkof the Big-Sandy by way of Pound Gap to the Holston valley; butthere would still be eighty-eight miles of marching after leavingthe steamboats, and navigation on the Big-Sandy was limited to briefand infrequent periods of high water. On the 12th of March he submitted his modified plan to theadjutant-general of the army. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 744. ] It hadgrown more complex with the passage of time. The eastern line of thedepartment had been moved forward so as to bring the South Branch ofthe Potomac and the Cow-pasture branch of the James River underRosecrans's command. He now planned four separate columns. The firstwas to move up the south branch of the Potomac with a view to turnand to capture the enemy's position at Alleghany Summit or Montereyon the Staunton turnpike. The second and third were to be in mydistrict, and to move toward the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad onthe two sides of New River. The fourth should march from theBig-Sandy valley on the line indicated above. Rosecrans seems tohave limited his plan to the occupation of the mountain valleys asfar east as the Blue Ridge, and did not submit any scheme foruniting his columns for further work. He asked for reinforcements tothe extent of six regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and twofield batteries to enable him to perform his task. The use of packtrains was given up, as they required a greater number of animalsthan could be procured. In fact, it was never found to be aneconomical use of mule power, and important movements were alwaysconfined to lines upon which wheel vehicles could be used. A rapidcavalry raid could be thus supplied, but heavy columns of infantryand artillery demanded wagon trains. The weakness of Rosecrans's scheme is found in the wide separationof parallel columns, which could never have co-operated withsuccess, and which had no common object had success been possible. To be sure, it was presumed that McClellan with the Army of thePotomac, and Banks in the Shenandoah valley, would be operating ineastern Virginia; but as McClellan was already bent on makingChesapeake Bay his base, and keeping as far as possible from themountains, there was no real connection or correlation between hispurposed campaign and that of the others. Indeed, had he succeededin driving Lee from Richmond toward the west, as Grant did threeyears later, the feeble columns of National troops coming from WestVirginia would necessarily have fallen back again before the enemy. If the general scheme had been planned by Lee himself, it could nothave secured for him more perfectly the advantage of interior lines. Yet it was in substance that which was tried when the spring opened. When Rosecrans's letter, enclosing his final plan, reachedWashington, McClellan had taken the field, and President Lincoln hadmade use of the occasion to relieve him from the direction of allother forces, so that he might give undivided attention to hiscampaign with the Potomac army. This was done by an executive orderon March 11, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. V. P. 54. ] whichassigned General Halleck to the command of everything west of a linedrawn north and south through Knoxville, Tennessee, and formed theMountain Department from the territory between Halleck andMcClellan. This last department was put under the command ofMajor-General John C. Frémont. General Banks was commanding in theShenandoah valley, but he was at this time subordinate to McClellan. These changes were unexpected to both McClellan and Rosecrans. Thechange in McClellan's relations to the whole army was the naturalresult of his inactivity during the autumn of 1861, and theconsequent loss of confidence in him. The union of Buell's andHalleck's commands in the west was the natural counterpart to theconcentration of Confederate armies under A. S. Johnston at Corinth, Miss. , and was a step in the right direction. There was, however, alittle too much sentiment and too little practical war in theconstruction of the Mountain Department out of five hundred miles ofmountain ranges, and the appointment of the "path-finder" to commandit was consistent with the romantic character of the whole. Themountains formed a natural and admirable barrier, at whichcomparatively small bodies of troops could cover and protect theOhio valley behind them; but, for reasons which I have alreadypointed out, extensive military operations across and beyond theAlleghanies from west or east were impracticable, because awilderness a hundred miles wide, crossed by few and most difficultroads, rendered it impossible to supply troops from depots on eitherside. Such assurances of other satisfactory employment seem to have beengiven Rosecrans that he acquiesced without open complaint, andprepared to turn over his command to Frémont when the latter shouldarrive in West Virginia. Political motives had, no doubt, much to dowith Frémont's appointment. The President had lost faith in hismilitary capacity as well as in his administrative ability, but theparty which elected Mr. Lincoln had not. The Republicans of theNorthern States had a warm side for the man they had nominated forthe Presidency in 1856, and there was a general feeling among themthat Frémont should have at least another opportunity to show whathe could do in the field. I myself shared that feeling, and reportedto him as my immediate superior with earnest cordiality. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 35. ] In my own district, preparations had been made during the winter forthe expected advance in the spring. I had visited Rosecrans atWheeling, and he had conversed freely upon his plans for the newcampaign. Under his directions the old piers of the turnpike bridgeacross the Gauley had been used for a new superstructure. This was awire suspension bridge, hung from framed towers of timber built uponthe piers. Instead of suspending the roadway from the wire cables bythe ordinary connecting rods, and giving stiffness to it by atrussed railing, a latticed framing of wood hung directly from thecables, and the timbers of the roadway being fastened to this bystirrups, the wooden lattice served both to suspend and to stiffenthe road. It was a serviceable and cheap structure, built in twoweeks, and answered our purposes well till it was burned in the nextautumn, when Colonel Lightburn retreated before a Confederateinvasion. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 99. ] The variable position of the head of steamboat navigation on theKanawha made it impossible to fix a permanent depot as a terminusfor our wagon trains in the upper valley. My own judgment was infavor of placing it at Kanawha Falls, a mile below Gauley Bridge, and within the limits of that post. To connect this with thesteamboats wherever the shoaling water might force them to stop, Irecommended the use of batteaux or keelboats, a craft which anatural evolution had brought into use in the changeable mountainrivers. They were a canoe-shaped open boat, sixty feet long by eightwide, and were pushed up the stream by quants or poles. Theyrequired a crew of five men, --four to do the poling, and asteersman. In the swiftest "chutes" they carried a line ashore andmade fast to a tree, then warped the boat up to quieter water andresumed the poling. Each boat would carry eight tons, and, comparedwith teaming over roads of which the "bottom had dropped out, " itproved a most economical mode of transport. The batteaux droppedalongside the steamer wherever she had to stop, the freight wastransferred to them directly, covered with tarpaulins, and the boatspushed off. The number of hands was no greater than for teaming, andthe whole cost of the teams and their forage was saved. I had builttwo of these early in the winter and they were in successfuloperation. Two more were partly done when Frémont assumed command, and I urgently recommended a fleet of fifteen or twenty as anauxiliary to our transportation when active operations should beresumed. By their use Gauley Bridge could be made the practicaldepot of supply, and from ten to twenty miles of wretched and costlywagoning be saved. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 45-48. ] I became satisfied, also, that the regulation army wagon was tooheavy for the difficult mountain roads, and recommended a strong butmuch lighter farm wagon, in which four mules could draw nearly orquite as much as six usually drew in the heavier wagon. This becamea matter of great consequence in a country where forage could not befound, and where the wagon had to be loaded with the food for theteam as well as the rations and ordnance stores for the men. It had already been determined to substitute the shelter tent forother forms in the principal armies, and the change soon becamegeneral. We, however, had to wait our turn after more importantcolumns were supplied, and our turn did not come till the campaignwas over. Even our requisitions for ammunition were not filled, ourartillery was not reduced to uniformity, and we could not securemuskets enough of any one calibre for a single regiment. We made thebest of the situation, and whilst keeping "headquarters" informed ofour lack, were ready to do our best with the means we had. Noattention was paid, perhaps none could be paid, to ourrecommendations for any special supplies or means adapted to thepeculiar character of our work. We received, in driblets, smallsupplies of the regulation wagons, some droves of unbroken mules, some ordnance stores, and a fair amount of clothing. Subsistencestores had never been lacking, and the energy of the districtquartermaster and commissary kept our little army always well fed. The formal change in department commanders took place on the 29th ofMarch, Frémont having reached Wheeling the day before. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. I. P. 4. ] Mr. Lincoln's desire bysome means to free the loyal people of East Tennessee from theoppressive sway of the Confederates showed itself in theinstructions given to all the military officers in the West. He hadbeen pressing the point from the beginning. It had entered intoMcClellan's and Rosecrans's plans of the last campaign. It had beenthe object of General George H. Thomas's organization of troops atCamp Dick Robinson in Kentucky. For it General Ormsby Mitchell hadlabored to prepare a column at Cincinnati. It was not accomplishedtill the autumn of 1863, when Rosecrans occupied Chattanooga andBurnside reached Knoxville; but there had never been a day'scessation of the President's urgency to have it accomplished. It wasprominent in his mind when he organized the Mountain Department, andFrémont was called upon to suggest a plan to this end as soon as hewas appointed. His choice was to assemble the forces of hisdepartment in Kentucky at the southern terminus of the CentralKentucky Railroad, at Nicholasville, and to march southward directlyto Knoxville, upon what was substantially the line taken by Burnsidea year and a half later. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. I. P. 7. ] Frémont was mistaken, however, in saying that fromNicholasville to Knoxville supplies could be "transported over leveland good roads. " General Buell had, on the 1st of February, [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Vii. P. 931. ] reported that line to be sometwo hundred miles long from the end of the railway to Knoxville, thewhole of it mountainous, and the roads bad. He estimated a train ofa thousand wagons, constantly going and returning, as needful tosupply ten thousand men at Knoxville after allowance was made forwhat could be gathered from the country. General Buell wasunquestionably correct in his view of the matter, but the strongpolitical reasons for liberating East Tennessee made the Presidentunwilling to be convinced that it was then impracticable. He, however, could not furnish the transportation required for themovement proposed by Frémont, and hesitated to interfere furtherwith the conduct of military affairs within Buell's territoriallimits. Besides this, Rosecrans's plan had found such favor with theSecretary of War that it was laid before Frémont with officialapproval. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xii. Pt, iii. P. 8. ] The strippingof West Virginia of troops to make a column in Kentucky seemed toohazardous to the government, and Frémont changed his plan so as toadopt that of Rosecrans with some modifications. He proposed to leave General Kelley with sufficient troops toprotect the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and withBlenker's division (which was taken from the Army of the Potomac andgiven to him) to advance from Romney in the valley of the SouthBranch of the Potomac, ascending this valley toward the south, picking up Schenck's and Milroy's brigades in turn, the latterjoining the column at Monterey on the great watershed by way of theCheat Mountain pass. From Monterey Frémont purposed to move uponStaunton, and thence, following the southwestern trend of thevalleys, to the New River near Christiansburg. Here he would comeinto communication with me, whose task it would have been to advancefrom Gauley Bridge on two lines, the principal one by Fayette andRaleigh C. H. Over Flat-top Mountain to Princeton and the Narrows ofNew River, and a subordinate one on the turnpike to Lewisburg. Hisplan looked to continuing the march with the whole column to thesouthwest, down the Holston valley, till Knoxville should bereached, the last additions to the force to be from the troops inthe Big-Sandy valley. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. I. P. 7. ] General Garfield (then colonel of the Forty-second Ohio) had alreadybeen sent by General Buell with a brigade into the Big-Sandy valley, and General George W. Morgan was soon to be sent with a division toCumberland Gap. Although these were in Frémont's department, the WarDepartment issued an order that they should continue under GeneralBuell's command at least until Frémont should by his operations comeinto their vicinity and field of work. [Footnote: _Id_, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 14, 119. ] They would, of course, co-operate with himactively if he should reach the Holston valley. When he should formhis junction with me, he expected to supply the whole column from mydepots in the Kanawha valley, and when he reached Knoxville he wouldmake his base on the Ohio River, using the line of supply he firstsuggested, by way of central Kentucky. The plan was an improvement upon Rosecrans's in arranging for aprogressive concentration of his forces into one column led byhimself; but it would probably have failed, first, from theimpossibility of supplying the army on the route, and second, because the railroads east of the mountains ran on routes speciallywell adapted to enable the enemy quickly to concentrate any neededforce at Staunton, at Lynchburg, at Christiansburg, or atWytheville, to overpower the column. The Union army would becommitted to a whole season of marching in the mountains, while theConfederates could concentrate the needed force and quickly returnit to Richmond when its work was done, making but a brief episode ina larger campaign. But the plan was not destined to be thoroughlytried. Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat by Kimball at Kernstown, March 23d, had retired to the Upper Shenandoah valley with hisdivision, numbering about 10, 000 men; Ewell, with his division, waswaiting to co-operate with him at the gaps of the Blue Ridge on theeast, and Edward Johnson was near Staunton with a similar forcefacing Milroy. In April General N. P. Banks, commanding the Nationalforces in the Shenandoah valley, had ascended it as far asHarrisonburg, and Jackson observed him from Swift-Run Gap in theBlue Ridge, on the road from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville. Milroyalso pushed eastward from Cheat Mountain summit, in which highregion winter still lingered, and had made his way through snows andrains to McDowell, ten miles east of Monterey, at the crossing ofBull-Pasture River, where he threatened Staunton. But Banks wasthought to be in too exposed a position, and was directed by the WarDepartment to fall back to Strasburg. On the 5th of May he hadretired in that direction as far as New-Market. Blenker's divisionhad not yet reached Frémont, who was waiting for it in Hardy Countyat Petersburg. Jackson saw his opportunity and determined to joinGeneral Johnson by a rapid march to Staunton, to overwhelm Milroyfirst, and then return to his own operations in the Shenandoah. Moving with great celerity, he attacked Milroy at McDowell on the8th, the latter calling upon Frémont for help. Schenck was sentforward to support him, and reached McDowell after marchingthirty-four miles in twenty-four hours. Jackson had not fullyconcentrated his forces, and the Union generals held their groundand delivered a sharp combat in which their casualties of all kindsnumbered 256, while the Confederate loss was 498, General Johnsonbeing among the wounded. Schenck, as senior, assumed the command, and on the 9th began his retreat to Franklin, abandoning the CheatMountain road. Franklin was reached on the 11th, but Jacksonapproached cautiously, and did not reach there till the 12th, when, finding that Frémont had united his forces, he did not attack, butreturned to McDowell, whence he took the direct road toHarrisonburg, and then marched to attack Banks at Strasburg, Ewellmeeting and joining him in this movement. Frémont resumed preparations for his original campaign, but Banks'sdefeat deranged all plans, and those of the Mountain Department wereabandoned. A month passed in efforts to destroy Jackson byconcentration of McDowell's, Banks's, and Frémont's troops; but itwas too late to remedy the ill effects of the division of commandsat the beginning of the campaign. On the 26th of June General JohnPope was assigned to command all the troops in northern Virginia, Frémont was relieved at his own request, and the Mountain Departmentceased to exist. My own operations in the Kanawha valley had kept pace with those inthe northern portion of the department. The early days of April werespent by Frémont in obtaining reports of the condition of theseveral parts of his command. My report of the condition of affairsin the Kanawha valley was made on the 5th of April. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 45. ] In it I calledattention to the necessities of my troops and to the equipmentnecessary for any extended campaigning. Requisitions for suppliesand transportation had been sent to the proper staff departmentsduring the winter, but had not yet been filled. My forces consistedof eleven regiments of Ohio infantry, three new and incompleteregiments of West Virginia infantry, one regiment of cavalry (theSecond West Virginia) with three separate cavalry troops from othercommands, and, nominally, three batteries of artillery. One of thebatteries was of mountain howitzers, and the other two of mixedsmooth-bore and rifled guns of different calibres. My force at theopening of the campaign numbered 8500 present for duty. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 121. The regiments of thecommand were the 11th, 12th, 23d, 28th, 30th, 34th, 36th, 37th, 44th, 47th Ohio, the 4th, 8th, 9th West Virginia, the 2d WestVirginia Cavalry. Of these the 11th Ohio had only nine companies anddid not get the tenth till the autumn following. The 8th WestVirginia passed from the command before active operations. Thebatteries were McMullin's Ohio battery, Simmonds's Kentucky battery, and a battery of mountain howitzers at Gauley Mount, manned by adetachment of the 47th Ohio Infantry. Simmonds's company wasoriginally of the 1st Kentucky Infantry assigned by me to man theguns I first took into the Kanawha valley, and subsequentlytransferred to the artillery service by the Secretary of War. Theguns were two 20-pounder Parrott rifles, five 10-pounder Parrotts, two bronze 10-pounder rifles altered from 6-pounder smooth-bores, three bronze and one iron 6-pounder smooth-bores, and ten mountainhowitzers to be packed on mules. Some of these guns were left inposition at posts, and three small field batteries were organizedfor the marching columns. Besides the regiment of freshly recruitedWest Virginia cavalry, there were Schambeck's Independent troop ofIllinois cavalry, and Smith's (originally Pfau's) Independent troopof Ohio cavalry, both German troops. ] Detachments were at the mouthof the Big-Sandy River, at Guyandotte, at the mouth of the Kanawhaon the Ohio River, at several points in the Kanawha valley belowGauley Bridge, at Summersville on the upper Gauley, at GauleyBridge, at Gauley Mount or Tompkins farm on New River, and atFayette C. H. The last-named post had the only brigade organizationwhich had been retained in winter quarters, and was commanded byColonel Scammon of the Twenty-third Ohio. The post at Summersvillehad been brought into my command for the winter, and was garrisonedby the Thirty-sixth Ohio under Colonel George Crook. At GauleyBridge was the Twenty-eighth Ohio (a German regiment), under ColonelAugust Moor. When the decision of General Fremont to have my command advance onboth sides of the New River was received, I immediately submitted myplan of organization to that end. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 127. ] I proposed to leave the West VirginiaInfantry regiments with half the Second West Virginia Cavalry toguard the Kanawha valley and our depots of supply, with Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn of the Fourth West Virginia in command. The Ohioregiments were to be moved forward so that the Eleventh, Forty-fourth, and Forty-seventh could be quickly concentrated on theLewisburg turnpike in front of Gauley Bridge, where Colonel Crookcould join them with the Thirty-sixth by a diagonal road and takecommand of this column. I assigned to him a mixed battery offield-pieces and mountain howitzers. Colonel Scammon's brigade wasto advance from Fayette C. H. To Flat-top Mountain as soon as theweather would permit, and thus secure the barrier covering ourfurther movement southward. The brigade consisted of the Twelfth, Twenty-third, arid Thirtieth Ohio, with McMullin's battery, and onehalf the Second Virginia Cavalry. When Scammon advanced, theremaining Ohio regiments (Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, andThirty-seventh), with Simmonds's battery should concentrate atFayette C. H. And form a new brigade under Colonel Moor. Thisorganization was approved by Fremont, and the preliminary steps werequietly taken. By the 20th of April Scammon's brigade was atRaleigh, only awaiting the settling of the roads to advance toFlat-top. A week later he held the passes of the mountain, with adetachment on the New River at the mouth of the Blue-stone, where hecommunicated with the right of Crook's brigade. The front was thuscovered from Summersville to Flat-top Mountain, and the regiments inrear were moving into their assigned positions. My brigade commanders were all men of marked character. Colonel Moorwas a German of portly presence and grave demeanor, a gentleman ofdignity of character as well as of bearing, and a brave, resoluteman. He had been long a citizen of the United States, and had, as ayoung man, seen some military service, as was reported, in theSeminole War in Florida. He was a rigid disciplinarian, and his ownregiment was a model of accuracy in drill and neatness in theperformance of all camp duties. He was greatly respected by hisbrother officers, and his square head, with dark, smooth-shavenface, and rather stern expression, inspired his troops withsomething very like awe, insuring prompt obedience to his commands. At home, in Cincinnati, he was a man of influence among the Germanresidents, and his daughter was the wife of General Godfrey Weitzelof the regular army. My association with him was every way agreeableand satisfactory. Colonel Crook was an officer of the regular army who had taken earlyadvantage of the relaxation of the rule preventing such fromaccepting a volunteer appointment. A man of medium size, with lighthair and sandy beard, his manner was rather diffident and shy, andhis whole style quiet and reticent. His voice was light rather thanheavy, and he was so laconic of speech that this, with his othercharacteristics, caused it to be commonly said of him that he hadbeen so long fighting Indians on the frontier that he had acquiredsome of their traits and habits. His system of discipline was basedon these peculiarities. He aimed at a stoical command of himself asthe means of commanding others, and avoided noisy bluster of everysort, going, perhaps, to an excess in brevity of speech and inenforcing his orders by the consequences of any disobedience. Hissubordinates recognized his purpose to be just, and soon learned tohave the greatest confidence in him as a military officer. Unlesscommon fame did him injustice, he was one of those officers who had, at the beginning, no deep sympathy with the National cause, and hadno personal objection to the success of the Rebellion. But he was aNorthern man, and an ambitious professional soldier who did not meanto let political opinions stand in the way of military success. [Footnote: A romantic story is told of his experience a littlelater. He was in command on the Upper Potomac with headquarters atCumberland, where he fell in love with the daughter of theproprietor of the hotel at which he had his headquarters, and whomhe subsequently made his wife. The family was of secessionproclivities, and the son of the house was in the Confederate army. This young man led a party of the enemy who were able, by hisknowledge of the surroundings of his home, to capture General Crookin the night, and to carry him away a prisoner without any seriouscollision with the troops encamped about. Crook was soon exchanged, and in the latter part of the war served with distinction asdivision commander under Sheridan. ] In his case, as in many others, I believe this attitude was modified by his service under the flag, and that in 1864 he voted for Mr. Lincoln's re-election; he, withGeneral Sheridan, casting at the improvised army ballot-box, whatwas understood to be their first vote ever cast in a civil election. Colonel Lightburn was one of the loyal West Virginians whosestanding and intelligence made him naturally prominent among hispeople. He was a worthy man and an honorable officer, whoseknowledge of the country and of the people made him a fit selectionto preserve the peace and protect our communications in the valleyduring our forward movement. As his duties thus separated him fromthe principal columns, I saw less of him than of the other brigadecommanders. The two West Virginia regiments which remained in thedistrict were freshly organized, and were distributed in camps wherethey could practise company drill and instruction whilst they keptthe country in order. Of Colonel Scammon, my senior brigadecommander, I have already spoken in a former chapter. [Footnote:_Ante_, pp. 110, 111. ] Frémont limited our advance to the line of Flat-top Mountain untilhe should himself be ready to open the campaign in the north. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 89, 108. ]Blenker's division had been given to him from the Potomac army whenMcClellan began his movement to the peninsula, but on the 12th ofApril it had only reached Salem, a station on the Manassas GapRailway between the Bull-Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 71. ] The War Department now sent GeneralRosecrans to conduct the division with speed to Frémont, butextraordinary delays still occurred, and the command did not reachFrémont at Petersburg till the 11th of May, when he immediatelymoved forward with it to the support of Schenck and Milroy atFranklin. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 168, 177, pt. I. Pp. 8, 9. ] Thisdelay was one of a series of misfortunes; for could Frémont havebeen at McDowell with this strong reinforcement added to Schenck'sand Milroy's brigades, there can be no reasonable doubt thatJackson's attack, if delivered at all, would have proven a disasterfor the Confederates. This, however, would not have ensured successfor the general campaign, for Banks might still have been drivenback in the Shenandoah valley, and Frémont's position would havebeen compromised. Nothing but a union of the two columns would havemet the situation. At the beginning of May, the additional transportation necessary formy advance beyond Flat-top had not arrived, but we did not wait forit. [Footnote: . _Id_. , pt. Iii. Pp. 108, 112, 114, 127. ] Theregiments were ordered to leave tents behind, and to bivouac withoutshelter except such as they could make with "brush, " for theexpected shelter tents also were lacking. The whole distance fromthe head of navigation to the railroad at Newberne was one hundredand forty miles. Flat-top Mountain and Lewisburg were, respectively, about halfway on the two routes assigned to us. Some two thousand ofthe enemy's militia were holding the mountain passes in front of us, and a concentration of the regular Confederate troops was going onbehind them. These last consisted of two brigades under GeneralHenry Heth, as well as J. S. Williams's and Marshall's brigades, under General Humphrey Marshall, with the Eighth Virginia Cavalry. General Marshall appears to have been senior when the commands wereunited. Looking south from Flat-top Mountain we see the basin of theBlue-stone River, which flows northeastward into New River. Thisbasin, with that of the Greenbrier on the other side of New River, forms the broadest stretch of cultivated land found between themountain ranges, though the whole country is rough and broken evenhere. The crest of Flat-top Mountain curves southward around theheadwaters of the Blue-stone, and joins the more regular ranges inTazewell County. The straight ridge of East-River Mountain forms abarrier on the southern side of the basin, more than thirty milesaway from the summit of Flat-top where Scammon's camp was placed onthe road from Raleigh C. H. To Princeton, the county-seat of Mercer. The Narrows of New River were where that stream breaks through themountain barrier I have described, and the road from Princeton toGiles C. H. Passes through the defile. Only one other outlet fromthe basin goes southward, and that is where the road from Princetonto Wytheville passes through Rocky Gap, a gorge of the wildestcharacter, some thirty miles south-westward from the Narrows. Thesepasses were held by Confederate forces, whilst their cavalry, underColonel W. H. Jenifer, occupied Princeton and presented askirmishing resistance to our advance-guard. On the 1st of May a small party of the Twenty-third Ohio met theenemy's horse at Camp Creek, a branch of the Blue-stone, six milesfrom the crest of Flat-top, and had a lively engagement, repulsinggreatly superior numbers. On hearing of this, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes marched with part of the Twenty-third Ohio and part of theWest Virginia cavalry, and followed up the enemy with such vigorthat Jenifer was driven through Princeton too rapidly to permit himto remove the stores collected there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. I. Pp. 449, 450. ] To avoid their falling into ourhands, Jenifer set fire to the town. Hayes succeeded in saving sixor eight houses, but the rest were destroyed. Jenifer retreated onthe Wytheville road, expecting us to follow by that route; butHayes, learning that the Narrows were not strongly held, and beingnow reinforced by the rest of his regiment (the Twenty-third), marched on the 6th to the Narrows which he held, [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 140. ] whilst he sent Major Comly with a detachment intoPearisburg, the county-seat of Giles. [Footnote: James M. Comly, later Brevet Brigadier-General, and since the war at one time UnitedStates minister to the Sandwich Islands. ] The affair at Camp Creekhad cost Jenifer some twenty in killed and wounded, and an equalnumber were captured in the advance on Giles C. H. Our casualtieswere 1 killed and 20 wounded. Our line, however, was getting tooextended, and the utmost exertions were needed to supply the troopsin their present positions. Princeton, being at the forking of theroads to Pearisburg and Wytheville, was too important a point to beleft unguarded, and I at once sent forward Colonel Scammon with theThirtieth Ohio to hold it. [Footnote: _Id_. , p 148. ] On the 9th ofMay the Twelfth Ohio was put in march from Raleigh to join him, andMoor's brigade was approaching the last-named place where myheadquarters were, that being the terminus, for the time, of thetelegraph line which kept me in communication with Frémont. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P 157. ] The same daythe department commander informed me of the attack by Jackson onMilroy on the 7th, and ordered me to suspend movements in advanceuntil my forces should be concentrated. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 158. ]The weather was rainy, and the roads suffered badly from cutting upby the wagons, but I had hoped to push forward a strong advancedguard to the great railway bridge near Newberne, and destroy itbefore the enemy had time to concentrate there. This made itnecessary to take some risk, for it was not possible to move thewhole command till some supplies could be accumulated at Raleigh andat Flat-top Mountain. As fast as the supplies would permit, Moor went forward, taking notents beyond Raleigh, and all of the troops on this line now facedthe continuing rains without shelter. Guerilla parties were setactively at work by the Confederates in the region of the Guyandotteand at other points in our rear. Colonel Lightburn was directed tokeep his forces actively moving to suppress these outbreaks, and theforward movement was pressed. On the 10th of May Heth's two brigadesof the enemy attacked our advance-guard at Pearisburg, and these, after destroying the enemy's stores, which they had captured there, retired skirmishing, till they joined Scammon, who had advanced fromPrinceton to their support. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 176. ] Scammon'sbrigade was now together, a mile below the Narrows of New River, with the East River in front of him, making a strong, defensibleposition. The telegraph reached Flat-top Mountain on the 13th, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 184. ] even this being delayed because wagons tocarry the wire could not be spared from the task of supplying thetroops with food. I moved my headquarters to Princeton on this day, and pressed forward Moor's brigade in the hope of being able to pushagain beyond the barrier at the Narrows of New River, where Heth'sbrigades had now taken position. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 188. ] Neither Scammon nor Moor was able to takewith him ammunition enough for more than a slight engagement, norwas any accumulation of food possible. We were living "from hand tomouth, " no additional transportation had reached us, and every wagonand pack-mule was doing its best. As fast as Moor's regimentsreached Princeton they were hurried forward to French's Mill, fivemiles in rear of Scammon, on the road running up East River, andintersecting the Wytheville road so as to form a triangle with thetwo going from Princeton. During the 14th and 15th Moor's regimentsarrived, and were pushed on to their position, except one halfregiment (detachments of the Thirty-fourth and Thirty-seventh Ohio), under Major F. E. Franklin, and one troop of cavalry, which werekept at Princeton as a guard against any effort on the enemy's partto interrupt our communications. Moor was ordered to send adetachment up the East River to the crossing of the Wytheville road, so as to give early warning of any attempt of the enemy to come inupon our flank from that direction. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 505. ] My purpose was to attack Heth with Scammon's and Moor'sbrigades, drive him away from the Narrows of New River, and preventhim, if possible, from uniting with Marshall's command, which wasunderstood to be somewhere between Jeffersonville (Tazewell C. H. )and Wytheville. If we succeeded in beating Heth, we could then turnupon Marshall. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. Pp. 197-199. ] On the afternoon of the 15th Moor threw a detachment of twocompanies over East River Mountain as a reconnoissance to learnwhether the roads in that direction were practicable for a movementto turn the left of Heth. It attacked and handsomely routed a postof the enemy on Wolf Creek. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 505. ] The few wagons and pack-mules were hurrying forwardsome rations and ammunition; but the 17th would be the earliestpossible moment at which I could lead a general advance. Thetelegraph wire would reach Princeton by the evening of that day, andI waited there for the purpose of exchanging messages with Frémontbefore pushing toward Newberne, the expected rendezvous with theother troops of the department. But all our efforts could not giveus the needed time to anticipate the enemy. They had railwaycommunication behind a mountain wall which had few and difficultpasses. Marshall and Williams were already marching from Tazewell C. H. To strike our line of communications at Princeton, and were faron the way. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 199. ] About noon of the 16th Colonel Moor reported that his detachment onthe Wytheville road was attacked by a force of the enemy estimatedat 1500. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 505, 509. ] This seems to havebeen the command of Colonel Wharton, marching to join Marshall, whowas coming from the west by a road down the head-waters of EastRiver. Of this, however, we were ignorant. I ordered Moor to takethe remainder of his command (leaving half a regiment only atFrench's) to drive off the force at the cross-roads, and if he wereoverpowered to retreat directly upon Princeton by the western sideof the triangle of roads, of which each side was twelve or fifteenmiles long. Colonel Scammon reported no change in Heth's positionsor force in front of him. Patrols were sent out on all the roadswest and south of Princeton, our little force of horsemen beinglimited to Smith's troop of Ohio cavalry which was acting asheadquarters escort. About two o'clock the patrol on the Wyomingroad, five miles out of Princeton, was fired upon by the enemy'scavalry, and came rapidly in with the report. The four companies ofinfantry under Majors Franklin and Ankele were moved out on thatroad, and soon developed the infantry of Marshall's command. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 506. ] He andWilliams had marched across from the Tazewell to the Wyoming road, and were coming in upon our flank and rear. I reconnoitred thempersonally with care, and satisfied myself of their overwhelmingsuperiority to the little detachment I had in hand. Franklin andAnkele were ordered to deploy their whole force as skirmishers andto hold the enemy back as long as possible. Some of our trooperswere shown on the flanks, and so imposing a show was made thatMarshall advanced cautiously. Our men behaved beautifully, holdingevery tree and rock, delaying the enemy for more than three hoursfrom reaching the crests of the hills looking down upon the town. Ihad sent orderlies to stop and turn back our wagon trains on the wayfrom Flat-top, and had directed headquarters baggage and the fewstores in Princeton to be loaded and sent on the road toward Moorand Scammon. Our only tents were three or four wall tents forheadquarters (the adjutant-general's, quartermaster's, andcommissary's offices), and these I ordered to be left standing toimpose upon the enemy the idea that we did not mean to retire. Asevening approached, the hostile force occupied the summits ofsurrounding hills, and directing the infantry slowly to fall backand follow me, I galloped with my staff to bring back Scammon andrestore our broken communications. At French's, twelve miles fromPrinceton, I found that Moor had not had time to execute the ordersof the afternoon, and that ten companies from the Twenty-eighth andThirty-seventh Ohio were all that he had been able to send toWytheville road crossing. These, we learned later in the night, hadsucceeded in re-occupying the cross-roads. They were ordered to holdfast till morning, and if the enemy still appeared to be mainly atPrinceton, to march in that direction and attack them from the rear. Scammon was ordered to send half a regiment to occupy Moor'sposition at French's during the night, and to march his wholecommand at daybreak toward Princeton. There was but one and a halfregiments now with Moor, and these were roused and ordered toaccompany me at once on our return to Princeton. It was a dark andmuddy march, and as we approached the town we deployed skirmishersin front, though they were obliged to move slowly in the darkness. Day was just breaking as we came out of the forest upon theclearing, line of battle was formed, and the troops went forwardcheering. The enemy made no stubborn resistance, but retiredgradually to a strong position on rough wooded hills about a milefrom the village, where they covered both the Wytheville and theWyoming road. They had artillery on both flanks, and could only bereached over open and exposed ground. We recovered our headquarterstents, standing as we had left them. We had captured a few prisonersand learned that Marshall and Williams were both before us. Whilstpushing them back, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Blessingh with the tencompanies of Moor's brigade approached on the Wytheville road andattacked; but the enemy was aware of their approach and repulsedthem, having placed a detachment in a very strong position to meetthem. Von Blessingh withdrew his men, and later joined the commandby a considerable detour. With less than two regiments in hand, andwith the certainty of the enemy's great superiority, there wasnothing for it but to take the best position we could and awaitScammon's arrival. We made as strong a show of force as possible, and by skirmishing advances tempted the enemy to come down toattack; but he also was expecting reinforcements, and a littleartillery firing was the only response we provoked. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 506, 507. ] As some evidenceof the physical exhaustion from the continuous exertions of thepreceding day and night, I may mention the fact that during theartillery firing I threw myself for a little rest on the ground, close beside the guns; and though these were firing at frequentintervals, I fell asleep and had a short but refreshing nap almostwithin arm's length of the wheels of a gun-carriage. Toward evening Scammon arrived with his brigade, reporting thatHeth's force had followed his retiring movement as far as French's, and confirming the information that four brigades of the enemy werebefore us. Shortly after dark the officer of the day, on the right, reported the noise of artillery marching around that flank. Our lastday's rations had been issued, and our animals were without forage. Small parties of the enemy had gone far to our rear and cut thetelegraph, so that we had had no news from the Kanawha valley fortwo days. The interruption was likely to create disturbance thereand derange all our plans for supply. It was plain that we shouldhave to be content with having foiled the enemy's plan to inflict asevere blow upon us, and that we might congratulate ourselves thatwith two brigades against four we had regained our line withoutserious loss. I therefore ordered that the troops be allowed to resttill three o'clock in the morning of the 18th, and that the columnthen retire behind the Blue-stone River. The movement was madewithout interruption, and a camp on Flat-top Mountain was selected, from which the roads on every side were well guarded, and which wasalmost impregnable in itself. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 209. ]Our casualties of all kinds in the affairs about Princeton had beenonly 113, as the enemy had not delivered any serious attack, and thecontest on our side had been one of manoeuvre in which our onlychance of important results was in attacking either Heth or Marshallwhen they were so far separated that they could not unite against uson the field of battle. After the 15th this chance did not exist, and wisdom dictated that we should retire to a safe point from whichwe could watch for contingencies which might give us a betteropportunity. Our experience proved what I have before stated, thatthe facility for railway concentration of the enemy in our frontmade this line a useless one for aggressive movements, as they couldalways concentrate a superior force after they received the news ofour being in motion. It also showed the error of dividing my forceson two lines, for had Crook's brigade been with me, or my twobrigades with him, we should have felt strong enough to cope withthe force which was actually in our front, and would at least havemade it necessary for the enemy to detach still more troops fromother movements to meet us. Our campaign, though a little one, verywell illustrates the character of the subordinate movements so oftenattempted during the war, and shows that the same principles ofstrategy are found operating as in great movements. The scale is areduced one, but cause and effect are linked by the same necessityas on a broader theatre of warfare. CHAPTER XI POPE IN COMMAND--TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON A key position--Crook's engagement at Lewisburg--Watching andscouting--Mountain work--Pope in command--Consolidation ofDepartments--Suggestions of our transfer to the East--Pope's OrderNo. II and Address to the Army--Orders to march across themountains--Discussion of them--Changed to route by water andrail--Ninety-mile march--Logistics--Arriving in Washington--Tworegiments reach Pope--Two sent to Manassas--Jackson capturesManassas--Railway broken--McClellan at Alexandria--Engagement atBull Run Bridge--Ordered to Upton's Hill--CoveringWashington--Listening to the Bull Run battle--Ill news travels fast. Our retreat to Flat-top Mountain had been made without loss ofmaterial, except one baggage-wagon, which broke down irreparably, and was burned by my order. At the crossing of Blue-stone River wewere beyond the junction of roads by which our flank could beturned, and we halted there as the end of the first march. As themen forded the stream, the sun broke through the clouds, which hadbeen pretty steadily raining upon us, the brass band with theleading brigade struck up the popular tune, "Aren't you glad to getout of the wilderness?" and the soldiers, quick to see the humorousapplication of any such incident, greeted it with cheers andlaughter. All felt that we were again masters of the situation. Nextday we moved leisurely to the mountain summit, a broad undulatingtable-land with some cultivated farms, where our camp was perfectlyhidden from sight, whilst we commanded a most extensive view of thecountry in front. Outposts at the crossing of the Blue-stone and atPack's Ferry on New River, with active scouting-parties and patrolsscouring the country far and wide, kept me fully informed ofeverything occurring near us. We had time to organize the newwagon-trains which were beginning to reach us, and, while waitingtill Frémont could plan new co-operative movements, to prepare forour part in such work. The camp on Flat-top Mountain deserved the name of a "key point" tothe country in front as well, perhaps, as that much abused phraseever is deserved. [Footnote: Clausewitz says of the phrases"covering position, " "key of the country, " etc. , that they are forthe most part mere words without sense when they indicate only thematerial advantage which is given by the elevation of the land. "OnWar, " part ii. Chap. Xvii. ] The name of the mountain indicates itscharacter. The northern slope is gentle, so that the approach fromRaleigh C. H. Is not difficult, whilst the southern declivity fallsoff rapidly to the Blue-stone valley. The broad ridge at the summitis broken into rounded hills which covered the camp from view, whilst they still permitted manoeuvre to meet any hostile approach. The mountain abutted on the gorge of the New River on the northeast, and stretched also southwestward into the impracticable wildernessabout the headwaters of the Guyandotte and the Tug Fork of Sandy. The position was practically unassailable in front by any force lessthan double our own, and whilst we occupied it the enemy neverventured in force beyond the passes of East River Mountain. We builta flying-bridge ferry at Pack's, on New River, near the mouth of theBlue-stone, where a passable road up the valley of the Greenbrierconnected us with Colonel Crook's position at Lewisburg. The post atPack's Ferry was held by a detachment from Scammon's brigade incommand of Major Comly of the Twenty-third Ohio. On the 6th ofAugust a detachment of the enemy consisting of three regiments and asection of artillery under Colonel Wharton made an effort to breakup the ferry by an attack from the east side, but they accomplishednothing. Major Comly was quickly supported by reinforcements fromScammon's brigade, and drove off his assailants. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 127; pt. Iii. Pp. 541, 542. ] I have not yet spoken of the movements of Colonel Crook's brigade onthe Lewisburg route, because circumstances so delayed his advancethat it had no immediate relation to our movements upon Pearisburgand Princeton. As the march of my own column was beginning, GeneralFrémont, upon information of guerilla raids north of Summersville, directed that Crook be sent into Webster County to co-operate withtroops sent southward from Weston to destroy the lawless parties. This involved a march of more than seventy miles each way, andunforeseen delays of various kinds. Two of the guerillas capturedwere tried and convicted of murder, and Colonel Crook was obliged toremain in that region to protect the administration of justice tillthe execution of the murderers and the dispersion of the guerillabands. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 127, 159. ] The organization andmovement of his brigade upon Lewisburg was by this means put back sofar that his column could not get within supporting distance ofmine. He reached Lewisburg on the day of our affair at Princeton. Hehad been energetic in all his movements, but the diversion of partsof his command to so distant an enterprise as that into WebsterCounty had been fatal to co-operation. The Confederate General Hethhad been able to neglect the Lewisburg route and to carry hisbrigade to the assistance of Marshall in his opposition to myadvance. As it turned out, I should have done better to have waitedat Flat-top Mountain till I knew that Crook was at Lewisburg, andthen to have made a fresh combination of movements. Our experienceonly added another to the numerous proofs the whole campaignfurnished, of the futility of such combined operations from distantbases, Major-General Loring took command of all the Confederate forces insouthwestern Virginia on the 19th or 20th of May, and Heth wasalready in march to oppose Crook's forward movement. On the 23dHeth, with some 3000 men, including three batteries of artillery, attacked Crook at Lewisburg, soon after daybreak in the morning. Crook met him in front of the town, and after a sharp engagementrouted him, capturing four cannon, some 200 stand of arms and 100prisoners. His own loss was 13 killed and 53 wounded, with 7missing. He did not think it wise to follow up the retreating enemy, but held a strong position near Lewisburg, where his communicationswere well covered, and where he was upon the same range of highlandson which we were at Flat-top, though fifty miles of broken countryintervened. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 804-813. ] Meanwhile Frémont had been ordered to Banks's relief, andhad been obliged to telegraph me that we must be left to ourselvestill the results of the Shenandoah campaign were tested. [Footnote:_Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 264. ] Rumors were rife that after Jackson retiredfrom Frémont's front at Franklin, Johnson's division was ordered tomarch into our part of West Virginia. We were thus thrown, necessarily, into an expectant attitude, awaiting the outcome ofFrémont's eastward movement and the resumption of his plans. Our menwere kept busy in marching and scouting by detachments, putting downguerilla bands and punishing disorders. They thus acquired a powerof sustained exertion on foot which proved afterward of great value. There was, in a way, a resemblance in our situation and in our workto that of feudal chiefs in the middle ages. We held a lofty andalmost impregnable position, overlooking the country in everydirection. The distant ridges of the Alleghanies rose before us, thehigher peaks standing out in the blue distance, so that we seemed towatch the mountain passes fifty miles away without stirring from ourpost. The loyal people about us formed relations to us not unlikethose of the feudal retainers of old. They worked their farms, butevery man had his rifle hung upon his chimney-piece, and by day orby night was ready to shoulder it and thread his way by paths knownonly to the natives, to bring us news of open movement or of secretplots among the Secessionists. They were organized, also, in theirown fashion, and every neighborhood could muster its company or itssquad of home-guards to join in quelling seditious outbreaks or instrengthening a little column sent against any of the enemy'soutposts. No considerable hostile movement was possible within arange of thirty miles without our having timely notice of it. Thesmoke from the camp-fires of a single troop of horse could be seenrising from the ravines, and detachments of our regiments guided bythe native scouts would be on the way to reconnoitre within an hour. Officers as well as men went on foot, for they followed ridges wherethere was not even a bridle-path, and depended for safety, in nosmall degree, on their ability to take to the thickets of theforest-clad hillside if they found themselves in the presence of abody of the Confederate cavalry. Thirty miles a day was an easymarch for them after they had become hardened to their work, andtaking several days together they could outmarch any cavalry, especially when they could take "short cuts" over hills and awayfrom travelled roads. They knew at what farms they could find"rations, " and where were the hostile neighborhoods from whichequally enterprising scouts would glide away to carry news of theirmovements to the enemy. At headquarters there was a constant goingand coming. Groups of home-guards were nearly always about, aspicturesque in their homely costume as Leather-stocking himself, andmany of our officers and men were hardly less expert as woodsmen. Constant activity was the order of the day, and the whole commandgrew hardy and self-reliant with great rapidity. General Pope was, on the 26th of June, assigned to command the Armyof Virginia, including the forces under McDowell and Banks as wellas those in the Mountain Department. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 435. ] Fremont was relieved from command at hisown request, and the Mountain Department ceased to exist. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 437. ] Pope very wisely determined to unite in one armyunder his own command as many as possible of the troops reporting tohim, and meanwhile directed us to remain on the defensive. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 471. ] I ventured on the 3d of July to suggestby telegraph that my division would make a useful reinforcement tohis active army in the field, and reiterated it on the 5th, withsome explanation of my views. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 451, 457. ] Iindicated Fayetteville and Hawk's Nest as points in front of GauleyBridge where moderate garrisons could cover the valley defensively, as I had done in the preceding year. Getting no answer, I returnedto the subject on the 13th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 471. ] Pope, however, did not issue his address upon assuming active command tillthe 14th, when his much ridiculed manifesto to the army appeared. [Footnote: He had announced his assignment and his headquarters atWashington on June 27 (_Id_. , p. 436), but he now issued the addressas he was about to take the field (_Id_. , p. 473). ] Since the warGeneral Pope has himself told me that this, as well as the otherorders issued at that time and which were much criticised, weredrafted under the dictation, in substance, of Mr. Stanton, theSecretary of War. He admitted that some things in them were notquite in good taste; but the feeling was that it was desirable toinfuse vigor into the army by stirring words, which would byimplication condemn McClellan's policy of over-caution in militarymatters, and over-tenderness toward rebel sympathizers and theirproperty. The Secretary, as he said, urged such public declarationsso strongly that he did not feel at liberty to resist. They wereunfairly criticised, and were made the occasion of a bitter andlasting enmity toward Pope on the part of most of the officers andmen of the Potomac Army. It seems that Mr. Lincoln hesitated toapprove the one relating to the arrest of disloyal persons withinthe lines of the army, and it was not till Pope repeated his senseof the need of it that the President yielded, on condition that itshould be applied in exceptional cases only. It was probablyintended more to terrify citizens from playing the part of spiesthan to be literally enforced, which would, indeed, have been hardlypossible. No real severity was used under it, but the Confederategovernment made it the occasion of a sort of outlawry against Popeand his army. [Footnote: It is only fair to recollect that in thefollowing year Halleck found it necessary to repeat in substancePope's much abused orders, and Meade, who then commanded the PotomacArmy, issued a proclamation in accordance with them. (OfficialRecords, vol. Xxvii. Pt. I. P. 102; pt. Iii. P. 786. ) For Pope'ssubmission of Order No. 11 to Mr. Lincoln and the limitation placedon it, see _Id_. , vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 500, 540. For generalmilitary law on the subject, see Birkhimer's "Military Governmentand Martial Law, " chap. Viii. For the practice of the Confederates, see the treatment of the Hon. George Summers, chap. Xix. _post_. ]Only two days later he issued an order against pillaging ormolestation of persons and dwellings, as stringent as any one couldwish. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 573. ] On the 5th of August Pope suggested to Halleck that I should beordered to leave about 2500 men intrenched near Gauley Bridge, andmarch with the remainder of my command (say nine regiments) by wayof Lewisburg, Covington, Staunton, and Harrisonburg to join him. Halleck replied that it was too much exposed, and directed him toselect one more in the rear. Pope very rightly answered that therewas no other route which would not make a great circuit to the rear. Halleck saw that Jackson's army near Charlottesville with a probablepurpose of turning Pope's right flank might make a junctionimpossible for me, and stated the objection, but concluded withauthority to Pope to order as he deemed best, "but with caution. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 534, 540, 543. ] On the 8th of August Pope telegraphed me, accordingly, to march byway of Lewisburg, Covington, Warm Springs, and Augusta Springs toHarrisonburg, and there join him by shortest route. He indicatedWinchester or Romney as my secondary aim if I should find thejunction with him barred. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 460, 462, 551. ] Thisroute avoided Staunton, but by so short a distance that it wasscarcely safer, and the roads to be travelled were much harder andlonger. At this time several detachments of considerable size wereout, chasing guerilla parties and small bodies of Confederatetroops, and assisting in the organization or enlistment of Unionmen. The movement ordered could not begin for several days, and Itook advantage of the interval to lay before General Pope, bytelegraph, the proof that the march would take fifteen days ofuninterrupted travel through a mountainous region, most of it awilderness destitute of supplies, and with the enemy upon the flank. Besides this there was the very serious question whether the Army ofVirginia would be at Charlottesville when I should approach thatplace. On the other hand, my calculation was that we could reachWashington in ten days or less, by way of the Kanawha and Ohiorivers to Parkersburg, and thence by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroadto the capital. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xiii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 555, 559. ]My dispatches were submitted to General Halleck, and on the 11th ofAugust General Pope telegraphed a modified assent to my suggestions. He directed that 5000 men should remain in West Virginia under mycommand, and the remainder proceed to Washington by river and rail. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xiii. Pt. Iii. P. 560. ] Anincursion of the enemy's cavalry into Logan County on my right andrear was at the moment in progress, and we used great activity indisposing of it, so that the change in our dispositions might not betoo quickly known to our adversaries nor have the appearance ofretreat. [Footnote: I at one time supposed that the orders to marchacross the country originated with General Halleck, but the OfficialRecords of the War fix the history of the matter as is abovestated. ] It is a natural wish of every soldier to serve with the largest armyin the most important campaign. The order to remain with adiminished command in West Virginia was a great disappointment tome, against which I made haste to protest. On the 13th I wasrejoiced by permission to accompany my command to the East. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 567, 570. ] Preliminary orders had already beengiven for making Fayetteville and Hawk's Nest the principal advancedposts in the contracted operations of the district, with GauleyBridge for their common depot of supply and point of concentrationin case of an advance of the enemy in force. I organized two smallbrigades and two batteries of artillery for the movement toWashington. Colonels Scammon and Moor, who were my senior colonels, were already in command of brigades, and Colonel Lightburn was incommand of the lower valley. The arrangement already existingpractically controlled. Scammon's brigade was unchanged, and inMoor's the Thirty-sixth Ohio under Crook and the Eleventh weresubstituted for the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-fourth. Theorganization therefore was as follows; namely, First Brigade, Colonel Scammon commanding, consisted of the Twelfth, Twenty-third, and Thirtieth Ohio and McMullin's Ohio Battery; Second Brigade, Colonel Moor commanding, consisted of the Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-sixth Ohio and Simmonds's Kentucky Battery. One troop ofhorse for orderlies and headquarters escort, and another for similarservice, with the brigades, also accompanied us. The regiments leftin the Kanawha district were the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-fourth, and Forty-seventh Ohio, the Fourth and Ninth WestVirginia Infantry, the Second West Virginia Cavalry, a battery, andsome incomplete local organizations. Colonel J. A. J. Lightburn ofthe Fourth West Virginia was in command as senior officer within thedistrict. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 567, 570; vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 738, 742, 754. ] Portions of the troops were put in motion on the 14th of August, anda systematic itinerary was prepared for them in advance. [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 738. ] They marched fifty minutes, and thenrested the remaining ten minutes of each hour. The day's work wasdivided into two stages of fifteen miles each, with a long rest atnoon, and with a half day's interval between the brigades. Theweather was warm, but by starting at three o'clock in the morningthe heat of the day was reserved for rest, and they made theirprescribed distance without distress and without straggling. Theywent by Raleigh C. H. And Fayetteville to Gauley Bridge, thence downthe right bank of the Kanawha to Camp Piatt, thirteen miles aboveCharleston. The whole distance was ninety miles, and was coveredeasily in the three days and a half allotted to it. [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 629. ] The fleet of light-draftsteamboats which supplied the district with military stores was atmy command, and I gave them rendezvous at Camp Piatt, where theywere in readiness to meet the troops when the detachments began toarrive on the 17th. In the evening of the 14th I left the camp atFlat-top with my staff and rode to Raleigh C. H. On the 15th wecompleted the rest of the sixty miles to Gauley Bridge. From thatpoint I was able to telegraph General Meigs, theQuartermaster-General at Washington, that I should reachParkersburg, the Ohio River terminus of the Baltimore and OhioRailroad, on the evening of the 20th, and should need railwaytransportation for 5000 men, two batteries of six guns each, 1100horses, 270 wagons, with camp equipage and regimental trainscomplete, according to the army regulations then in force. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 577, 619, 629;vol. Li. P. 754. ] At Gauley Bridge I met Colonel Lightburn, to whom I turned over thecommand of the district, and spent the time, whilst the troops wereon the march, in completing the arrangements both for ourtransportation and for the best disposition of the troops which wereto remain. The movement of the division was the first in which therehad been a carefully prepared effort to move a considerable body oftroops with wagons and animals over a long distance within adefinitely fixed time, and it was made the basis of the calculationsfor the movement of General Hooker and his two corps from Washingtonto Tennessee in the next year. It thus obtained some importance inthe logistics of the war. The president of the railway put thematter unreservedly into the hands of W. P. Smith, the master oftransportation; Mr. P. H. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, represented the army in the management of the transfer, and by thusconcentrating responsibility and power, the business was simplified, and what was then regarded as a noteworthy success was secured. Thecommand could have moved more rapidly, perhaps, without its wagonsand animals, but a constant supply of these was needed for theeastern army, and it was wise to take them, for they were organizedinto trains with drivers used to their teams and feeling a personalinterest in them. It turned out that our having them was a mostfortunate thing, for not only were the troops of the Army of thePotomac greatly crippled for lack of transportation on their returnfrom the peninsula, but we were able to give rations to the NinthArmy Corps after the battle of Antietam, when the transportation ofthe other divisions proved entirely insufficient to keep up thesupply of food. From the head of navigation on the Kanawha to Parkersburg on theOhio was about one hundred and fifty miles; but the rivers were solow that the steamboats proceeded slowly, delayed by variousobstacles and impediments, At Letart's Falls, on the Ohio, the waterwas a broken rapid, up which the boats had to be warped one at atime, by means of a heavy warp-line made fast to the bank andcarried to the steam-capstan on the steamer. At the foot ofBlennerhassett's Island there was only two feet of water in thechannel, and the boats dragged themselves over the bottom by"sparring, " a process somewhat like an invalid's pushing hiswheel-chair along by a pair of crutches. But everybody worked with awill, and on the 21st the advanced regiments were transferred to therailway cars at Parkersburg, according to programme, and pulled outfor Washington. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 619, 629. ] These were the Thirty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Crook, and theThirtieth Ohio, Colonel Ewing. They passed through Washington toAlexandria, and thence, without stopping, to Warrenton, Virginia, where they reported at General Pope's headquarters. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 636, 637, 668, 676. ] The Eleventh Ohio(Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman) and Twelfth (Colonel White), withColonel Scammon commanding brigade, left Parkersburg on the 22d, reaching Washington on the 24th. One of them passed on toAlexandria, but the other (Eleventh Ohio) was stopped in Washingtonby reason of a break in Long Bridge across the Potomac, and marchedto Alexandria the next day. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 650, 677. ] The last of the regiments (Twenty-eighthOhio, Colonel Moor, and Twenty-third, Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes), with the artillery and cavalry followed, and on the 26th all the menhad reached Washington, though the wagons and animals were a day ortwo later in arriving. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 698. ] In Washington I reported to the Secretary of War, and was receivedwith a cordiality that went far to remove from my mind theimpression I had got from others, that Mr. Stanton was abrupt andunpleasant to approach. Both on this occasion and later, he was asaffable as could be expected of a man driven with incessant andimportunate duties of state. In the intervals of my constant visitsto the railway offices (for getting my troops and my wagons togetherwas the absorbing duty) I found time for a hurried visit toSecretary Chase, and found also my friend Governor Dennison in thecity, mediating between the President and General McClellan with thegood-will and diplomatic wisdom which peculiarly marked hischaracter. I had expected to go forward with three regiments to joinGeneral Pope on the evening of the 26th; but Colonel Haupt, themilitary superintendent of railways at Alexandria, was unable tofurnish the transportation by reason of the detention of trains atthe front. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 625, 677. ] Lee's flank movementagainst Pope's army had begun, and as the latter retreated all therailway cars which could be procured were needed to move his storesback toward Washington. On the afternoon of the 26th, however, arrangements had been made for moving the regiments at Alexandriaearly next morning. [Footnote: _Ibid_, and pp. 678, 679. ] The wagonsand animals were near at hand, and I ordered Colonel Moor with theTwenty-eighth Ohio to march with them to Manassas as soon as theyshould be unloaded from the railway trains. But during the nightoccurred a startling change in the character of the campaign whichupset all our plans and gave a wholly unexpected turn to my own partin it. About nine o'clock in the evening Colonel Haupt received atAlexandria the information that the enemy's cavalry had attacked ourgreat depot of supplies at Manassas Junction. The telegrapher hadbarely time to send a message, break the connection of the wires, and hurry away to escape capture. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 680. ] It was naturally supposed to be only acavalry raid, but the interruption of communication with Pope inthat crisis was in itself a serious mishap. The first thing to bedone was to push forward any troops at hand to protect the railwaybridge over Bull Run, and by authority of the War Department ColonelHaupt was authorized to send forward, under Colonel Scammon, theEleventh and Twelfth Ohio without waiting to communicate with me. They were started very early in the morning of the 27th, going tosupport a New Jersey brigade under General George W. Taylor whichhad been ordered to protect the Bull Run bridge. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. I. Pp. 379, 381. ] Ignorant of all this, I was busy on Wednesdaymorning (27th), trying to learn the whereabouts of the trains withmy wagon teams, which had not yet reached Washington, and reportedthe situation as to my command to the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 698. ]I then learned of Scammon's sudden movement to the front, and of theserious character of the enemy's movement upon Manassas. I marchedat once with the two regiments still in Washington, expecting tofollow the rest of the command by rail as soon as we should reachAlexandria. Arriving there, I hastened to the telegraph office atthe railway station, where I found not only Colonel Haupt, butGeneral McClellan, who had come from Fortress Monroe the nightbefore. Of the Army of the Potomac, Heintzelman's and Porter's corpswere already with Pope, Franklin's was at Alexandria, and Sumner'swas beginning to arrive. As soon as it was known at the WarDepartment that McClellan was present, General Halleck'scorrespondence was of course with him, and we passed under hisorders. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 688, 689, 691. ] It had already been learned that 'Stonewall' Jackson waswith infantry as well as cavalry at Manassas, and that the Bull Runbridge had been burned, our troops being driven back three or fourmiles from it. McClellan thought it necessary to organize the twocorps at Alexandria and such other troops as were there, includingmine, first to cover that place and Washington in the possiblecontingency that Lee's whole army had interposed between GeneralPope and the capital, and, second, to open communication with Popeas soon as the situation of the latter could be learned. Couch'sdivision was still at Yorktown, and orders had been issued byHalleck to ship 5000 new troops there to relieve Couch and allow hisveteran division to join the Potomac Army. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 689. ] McClellan directed me to take the two regiments with me into campwith Franklin's corps at Annandale, three miles in front ofAlexandria, and to obey Franklin's orders if any emergency shouldoccur. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 692. ] I found, at thepost-quartermaster's office, an officer who had served in WestVirginia a year before, and by his hearty and efficient good-willsecured some supplies for the regiments with me during the days thatwere yet to pass before we got our own trains and could feel that wehad an assured means of living and moving in an independent way. Webivouacked by the roadside without shelter of any sort, enveloped indense clouds of dust from the marching columns of the Army of thePotomac, their artillery and wagons, as they passed and went intocamp just in front of us. About noon, on Thursday (28th), ColonelScammon joined me with the two regiments he had taken towardManassas, and we learned the particulars of the sharp engagement hehad at the railway bridge. The train carrying the troops approached the bridge over Bull Runabout eight o'clock in the morning on Wednesday, and Colonel Scammonimmediately pushed forward the Twelfth Ohio (Colonel White) to thebridge itself and the bank of the stream. He met the New Jerseybrigade of four regiments coming back in confusion and panic. Thecommander, General Taylor, had taken position on the west side ofthe creek, covering the bridge; but he had no artillery, and thoughhis advance was made with great spirit (as Jackson recognized in hisreport [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 644. ] ), his lines had been subjected to a heavy artillery fire from thebatteries of A. P. Hill's and Jackson's own divisions, and broke, retreating in disorder to the eastern side of the stream. GeneralTaylor himself fell severely wounded whilst trying to rally them. Itwas at this moment that Scammon reached the field with the TwelfthOhio. He had heard the artillery fire, but little or no musketry, and was astonished at seeing the retreat. He sent hisadjutant-general, Lieutenant Robert P. Kennedy, [Footnote: Member ofCongress (1890), and recently Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio. ] tocommunicate with General Taylor and to try to rally the fugitives. Meanwhile he ordered Colonel White to line the bank of the creekwith his men and try to protect the bridge structure. Kennedy foundGeneral Taylor in a litter being carried to the rear, and thegeneral, though in anguish from his wound, was in great mentaldistress at the rout of his men. He begged every one to rally theflying troops if possible, and sent his own adjutant-general, Captain Dunham, to turn over the general command to Scammon. Allefforts to rally the panic-stricken brigade were fruitless, andScammon resisted the advance of Hill's division through nearly awhole day with the two regiments alone. A Lieutenant Wright of theFourth New Jersey, with ten men, reported to Colonel Scammon andbegged assignment in the line. Their names are honorably enrolled inScammon's report, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 407. ] and these, with Captain Dunham, did heroic service, but wereall of the brigade that took any further part in the fight. Dunhamsucceeded in rallying a portion of the brigade later in the day, buttoo late to enter the engagement. Taking advantage of the bridges near the stream, Scammon kept hismen covered from the artillery fire as well as possible, drivingback with his volleys every effort to pass by the bridge or to fordthe stream in his front. Hill moved brigades considerably to rightand left, and attempted to surround White and the Twelfth Ohio. ButColeman, with the Eleventh, had come up in support, and Scammonordered him to charge on the enemy's right, which was passingWhite's left flank. Coleman did so in splendid style, driving hisfoe before him, and crossing the bridge to the west side. The odds, however, were far too great where a brigade could attack eachregiment of ours and others pass beyond them, so that Scammon, having fully developed the enemy's force, had to limit himself todelaying their advance, retiring his little command in echelon fromone ridge to another, as his wings were threatened. This he did withperfect coolness and order, maintaining the unequal struggle withoutassistance till about half-past three in the afternoon. The enemy'sefforts now relaxed, and Scammon withdrew at leisure to a positionsome three miles from the bridge. Hill still showed a disposition tosurround the detachment by manoeuvres, and Scammon retired towardAnnandale in the night. He himself underestimated the enemy's forcein infantry, which Jackson's report puts at "several brigades. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 644. ] His loss inthe two Ohio regiments was 106 in killed, wounded, and missing. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 262. ] Those of the New Jersey brigade are notreported. The combat was a most instructive military lesson, teaching what audacity and skill may do with a very small force indelaying and mystifying a much larger one, which was imposed upon byits firm front and its able handling. Some of Scammon's wounded being too badly hurt to be removed, hedetailed a surgeon to remain with them and care for them till theyshould be exchanged or otherwise brought within our lines. Thissurgeon was taken to Jackson's headquarters, where he was questionedas to the troops which had held the Confederates at bay. General J. E. B. Stuart was with Jackson, and on the surgeon's stating that thefighting during most of the day had been by the two Ohio regimentsalone, Stuart's racy expressions of admiration were doublycomplimentary as coming from such an adversary, and, when repeated, were more prized by the officers and men than any praise from theirown people. [Footnote: The history of this engagement was currentlypublished with curious inaccuracies. Even Mr. Ropes in his "Campaignunder Pope" does not seem to have seen the Official Records on ourside, and supposed that Taylor's brigade was all that was engaged. See Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 405-411; also pt. Iii. Pp. 698, 699; also C. W. , vol. I. Pp. 379-382. ] Toward evening on Thursday, a thunderstorm and gale of wind came up, adding greatly to the wretched discomfort of the troops for themoment, but making the air clearer and laying the dust for a day ortwo. I found partial shelter with my staff, on the veranda of asmall house which was occupied by ladies of the families of somegeneral officers of the Potomac Army, who had seized the passingopportunity to see their husbands in the interval of the campaign. We thought ourselves fortunate in getting even the shelter of theveranda roof for the night. On Friday morning (29th), Captain Fitch, my quartermaster, was able to report his train and baggage safe atAlexandria, and we were ready for any service. Orders came fromGeneral McClellan during the forenoon to move the four regiments nowwith me into Forts Ramsey and Buffalo, on Upton's and Munson'shills, covering Washington on the direct road to Centreville byAqueduct Bridge, Ball's Cross-Roads, and Fairfax C. H. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 712, 726. For this he hadHalleck's authority, in view of the danger of cavalry raids into thecity. _Id_. , p. 722. ] General McClellan had established hisheadquarters on Seminary Ridge beyond the northern outskirts ofAlexandria, and after putting my command in motion I rode there toget fuller instructions from him as to the duty assigned me. Histents were pitched in a high airy situation looking toward thePotomac on the east; indeed he had found them a little too airy inthe thunder-squall of the previous evening which had demolished partof the canvas village. It must have been about noon when Idismounted at his tent. The distant pounding of artillery had beenin our ears as we rode. It was Pope's battle with Jackson along theturnpike between Bull Run and Gainesville and on the heights aboveGroveton, thirty miles away. [Illustration: Map] General Franklin had ridden over from Annandale and was withMcClellan receiving his parting directions under the imperativeorders which Halleck had sent to push that corps out to Pope. McClellan's words I was not likely to forget. "Go, " he said, "andwhatever may happen, don't allow it to be said that the Army of thePotomac failed to do its utmost for the country. " McClellan thenexplained to me the importance of the position to which I wasordered. The heights were the outer line of defence of Washington onthe west, which had been held at one time, a year before, by theConfederates, who had an earthwork there, notorious for a whileunder the camp name of "Fort Skedaddle. " From them the unfinisheddome of the Capitol was to be seen, and the rebel flag had flauntedthere, easily distinguishable by the telescopes which were dailypointed at it from the city. McClellan had little expectation thatPope would escape defeat, and impressed upon me the necessity ofbeing prepared to cover a perhaps disorderly retreat within thelines. Some heavy artillery troops (Fourth New York Heavy Artillery)were in garrison at one of the forts, and these with the forces atFalls Church were ordered to report to me. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 726. ] Assuring me that he would soonvisit me in my new quarters, McClellan dismissed me, and I gallopedforward to overtake my troops. I found the position of the forts a most commanding one, overlookingthe country in every direction. Westward the ground sloped away fromus toward Fairfax Court House and Centreville. Northward, in apretty valley, lay the village of Falls Church, and beyond it awooded ridge over which a turnpike road ran to Vienna and on toLeesburg. Behind us was the rolling country skirting the Potomac, and from Ball's Cross-Roads, a mile or two in rear, a northward roadled to the chain bridge above Georgetown, whilst the principal waywent directly to the city by the Aqueduct Bridge. Three knollsgrouped so as to command these different directions had been crownedwith forts of strong profile. The largest of these, Fort Ramsey, onUpton's Hill was armed with twenty-pounder Parrott rifles, and theheavy-artillery troops occupied this work. I had a pair of guns ofthe same kind and calibre in my mixed battery, and these with myother field artillery were put in the other forts. Lines of infantrytrench connected the works and extended right and left, and my fourregiments occupied these. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. Pp. 777, 779; vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 176. ] A regiment of cavalry(Eighth Illinois, joined later by the Eighth Pennsylvania) wasordered to report to me, and this, with Schambeck's squadron whichhad come with me, made a cavalry camp in front of Falls Church andpicketed and patrolled the front. [Footnote: See my order assigninggarrisons to the forts. Official Records, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 771. ] We pitched our headquarters tents on Upton's Hill, just in rear ofFort Ramsey, and had a sense of luxury in "setting our house inorder" after the uncomfortable experience of our long journey fromWest Virginia. The hurry of startling events in the past few daysmade our late campaign in the mountains seem as far away in time asit was in space. We were now in the very centre of excitement, andhad become a very small part of a great army. The isolation and theseparate responsibility of the past few months seemed like anotherexistence indefinitely far away. I lost no time in making a rapidride about my position, studying its approaches in the gatheringtwilight and trying to fix in mind the leading features of thetopography with their relation to the possible retreat of our armyand advance of the enemy. And all the while the rapid though muffledthumping of the distant cannon was in our ears, coming from thefield in front of Groveton, where Lee, having now united his wholearmy against Pope, was sending part of Longstreet's divisionsagainst McDowell's corps along the Warrenton turnpike. On Saturday the 30th ambulances began coming through our lines withwounded men, and some on foot with an arm in a sling or bandagesupon the head were wearily finding their way into the city. All suchwere systematically questioned, their information was collated andcorrected, and reports were made to General Halleck and GeneralMcClellan. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 405;pt. Iii. Pp. 748, 789; vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 170; vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 777. ] The general impression of all undoubtedly was that theengagement of Friday had been victorious for our army, and that theenemy was probably retreating at dark. During the day the cannonadecontinued with occasional lulls. It seemed more distant and fainter, requiring attentive listening to hear it. This was no doubt due tosome change in the condition of the atmosphere; but we naturallyinterpreted it according to our wishes, and believed that thesuccess of Friday was followed by the pursuit of the enemy. Aboutfour o'clock in the afternoon the distant firing became much morerapid; at times the separate shots could not be counted. Itelegraphed to McClellan the fact which indicated a crisis in thebattle. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 748. ] Itwas the fierce artillery duel which preceded the decisive advance ofLongstreet against Pope's left wing. This was the decisiveturning-point in the engagement, and Pope was forced to retreat uponCentreville. Early in the evening all doubt was removed about the result of thebattle. Ill news travels fast, and the retreat toward us shortenedthe distance to be travelled. But as Sumner's and Franklin's corpshad gone forward and would report to Pope at Centreville, we wereassured that Pope was "out of his scrape" (to use the words ofMcClellan's too famous dispatch to the President [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xi. Pt. I. P. 98. ] ), and that the worst that could now happenwould be the continuance of the retreat within our lines. The combatat Chantilly on the evening of September 1st was the last of Pope'slong series of bloody engagements, and though the enemy wasrepulsed, the loss of Generals Kearny and Stevens made it seem to uslike another disaster. CHAPTER XII RETREAT WITHIN THE LINES--REORGANIZATION--HALLECK AND HISSUBORDINATES McClellan's visits to my position--Riding the lines--Discussing thepast campaign--The withdrawal from the James--Prophecy--McClellanand the soldiers--He is in command of the defences--Intricacy ofofficial relations--Reorganization begun--Pope's army marchesthrough our works--Meeting of McClellan and Pope--Pope'scharacteristics--Undue depreciation of him--The situation whenHalleck was made General-in-Chief--Pope's part in it--Reasons fordislike on the part of the Potomac Army--McClellan's secretservice--Deceptive information of the enemy's force--Informationfrom prisoners and citizens--Effects of McClellan's illusion as toLee's strength--Halleck's previous career--Did he intend to takecommand in the field?--His abdication of the field command--Thenecessity for a union of forces in Virginia--McClellan's inactionwas Lee's opportunity--Slow transfer of the Army of thePotomac--Halleck burdened with subordinate's work--Burnside twicedeclines the command--It is given to McClellan--Pope relieved--Otherchanges in organization--Consolidation--New campaign begun. On Sunday, the 31st, McClellan rode over to Upton's Hill and spentmost of the day with me. He brought me a copy of the McDowell map ofthe country about Washington, the compilation of which had been thatofficer's first work at the beginning of hostilities. It covered theregion to and beyond the Bull Run battlefield, and although notwholly accurate, it was approximately so, and was the only authorityrelied upon for topographical details of the region. McClellan'sprimary purpose was to instruct me as to the responsibilities thatmight fall upon me if the army should be driven in. A day or twolater I received formal orders to prepare to destroy buildings infront within my lines of artillery fire, and to be ready to coverthe retreat of our army should any part be driven back near myposition. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 802, 805. ] All this, however, had been discussed with McClellan himself. We rode together over all the principal points in the neighborhood, and he pointed out their relation to each other and to positions onthe map which we did not visit. The discussion of the topography ledto reminiscences of the preceding year, --of the manner in which theenemy had originally occupied these hills, and of their withdrawalfrom them, --of the subsequent construction of the forts andconnecting lines, who occupied them all, and the system of mutualsupport, of telegraphic communication, and of plans for defence incase of attack. McClellan had received me at Alexandria on the 27th with all his oldcordiality, and had put me at once upon our accustomed footing ofpersonal friendship. On my part, there was naturally a littlewatchfulness not to overstep the proper line of subordination or tobe inquisitive about things he did not choose to confide to me; but, this being assumed, I found myself in a circle where he seemed tounbosom himself with freedom. I saw no interruption in this while Iremained in the Potomac Army. He was, at this time, a littledepressed in manner, feeling keenly his loss of power and command, but maintaining a quiet dignity that became him better than any showof carelessness would have done. He used no bitter or harsh languagein criticising others. Pope and McDowell he plainly disliked, andrated them low as to capacity for command; but he spoke of themwithout discourtesy or vilification. I think it necessary to saythis because of the curious sidelight thrown on his character by theprivate letters to his wife which have since been published in his"Own Story, " and of which I shall have more to say. Theirinconsistency with his expressions and manner in conversation, or atleast their great exaggeration of what he conveyed in familiar talk, has struck me very forcibly and unpleasantly. He discussed his campaign of the peninsula with apparent unreserve. He condemned the decision to recall him from Harrison's Landing, arguing that the one thing to do in that emergency was to reinforcehis army there and make it strong enough to go on with its work andcapture Richmond. He said that if the government had lost confidencein his ability to conduct the campaign to a successful end, still itwas unwise to think of anything else except to strengthen that armyand give it to some one they could trust. He added explicitly, "IfPope was the man they had faith in then Pope should have been sentto Harrison's Landing to take command, and however bitter it wouldhave been, I should have had no just reason to complain. " Hepredicted that they would yet be put to the cost of much life andtreasure to get back to the position left by him. On Monday, September 1st, he visited me again, and we renewed ourriding and our conversation. The road from his headquartersencampment near Alexandria to Upton's Hill was a pleasant one forhis "constitutional" ride, and my position was nearest the army infront where news from it would most likely be first found. The Armyof the Potomac had all passed to the front from Alexandria, andaccording to the letter of the orders issued, he was wholly withoutcommand; though Halleck personally directed him to exercisesupervision over all detachments about the works and lines. He camealmost alone on these visits, an aide and an orderly or two beinghis only escort. Colonel Colburn of his staff was usually hiscompanion. He wore a blue flannel hunting-shirt quite different fromthe common army blouse. It was made with a broad yoke at the neck, and belt at the waist, the body in plaits. He was without sash orside arms, or any insignia of rank except inconspicuousshoulder-straps. On this day he was going into Washington, and Irode down with him to the bridge. Bodies of troops of the new levieswere encamped at different points near the river. In these thereseemed to be always some veterans or officers who knew the general, and the men quickly gathered in groups and cheered him. He had ataking way of returning such salutations. He went beyond the formalmilitary salute, and gave his cap a little twirl, which with his bowand smile seemed to carry a little of personal good fellowship evento the humblest private soldier. If the cheer was repeated, he wouldturn in his saddle and repeat the salute. It was very plain thatthese little attentions to the troops took well, and had no doubtsome influence in establishing a sort of comradeship between him andthem. They were part of an attractive and winning deportment whichadapted itself to all sorts and ranks of men. On Tuesday he came a little later in the day, and I noticed at oncea change in his appearance. He wore his yellow sash with sword andbelt buckled over it, and his face was animated as he greeted mewith "Well, General, I am in command again!" I congratulated himwith hearty earnestness, for I was personally rejoiced at it. I wasreally attached to him, believed him to be, on the whole, the mostaccomplished officer I knew, and was warmly disposed to give himloyal friendship and service. He told me of his cordial interviewwith President Lincoln, and that the latter had said he believed himto be the only man who could bring organized shape out of the chaosin which everything seemed then to be. The form of his newassignment to duty was that he was to "have command of thefortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defenceof the capital. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 807. ] The order was made by the personal direction of the President, and McClellan knew that Secretary Stanton did not approve of it. General Halleck seemed glad to be rid of a great responsibility, andaccepted the President's action with entire cordiality. Still, hewas no doubt accurate in writing to Pope later that the action wasthat of the President alone without any advice from him. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 820. ] McClellan wasevidently and entirely happy in his personal relation to things. Hehad not been relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, though the troops had passed temporarily to Pope's army. Ascommandant of all within the defences, his own army reported to himdirectly when they came within our lines. Pope's army of northernVirginia would, of course, report through its commander, andBurnside's in a similar way. The first thing to be done was to getthe army in good condition, to strengthen its corps by the newregiments which were swarming toward the capital, and to prepare itfor a new campaign. McClellan seemed quite willing to postpone thequestion who would command when it took the field. Of the present hewas sure. It was in his own hands, and the work of reorganizationwas that in which his prestige was almost sure to increase. Thisattitude was plainly shown in all he said and in all he hinted atwithout fully saying it. Halleck had already directed Pope to bring the army within thefortifications, though the latter had vainly tried to induce him toride out toward Centreville, to see the troops and have aconsultation there before determining what to do. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 796. ] We were therefore expecting the head of column to approachmy lines, and I arranged that we should be notified when they camenear. McClellan had already determined to put the corps anddivisions of the Army of the Potomac in the works, at positionssubstantially the same as they had occupied a year before, --Porternear Chain Bridge, Sumner next, Franklin near Alexandria, etc. I wasdirected to continue in the position I already occupied, to besupported by part of McDowell's corps. About four o'clock McClellan rode forward, and I accompanied him. Wehalted at the brow of the hill looking down the Fairfax road. Thehead of the column was in sight, and rising dust showed its positionfar beyond. Pope and McDowell, with the staff, rode at the head. Their uniform and that of all the party was covered with dust, theirbeards were powdered with it; they looked worn and serious, butalert and self-possessed. When we met, after brief salutations, McClellan announced that he had been ordered to assume commandwithin the fortifications, and named to General Pope the positionsthe several corps would occupy. This done, both parties bowed, andthe cavalcade moved on. King's division of McDowell's corps was theleading one, General Hatch, the senior brigadier, being in commandby reason of King's illness. Hatch was present, near Pope, whenMcClellan assumed command, and instantly turning rode a few paces tothe head of his column and shouted, "Boys, McClellan is in commandagain; three cheers!" The cheers were given with wild delight, andwere taken up and passed toward the rear of the column. Warm friendof McClellan as I was, I felt my flesh cringe at the unnecessaryaffront to the unfortunate commander of that army. But no word wasspoken. Pope lifted his hat in a parting salute to McClellan androde quietly on with his escort. [Footnote: General Hatch had beenin command of the cavalry of Banks's corps up to the battle of CedarMountain, when he was relieved by Pope's order by reason ofdissatisfaction with his handling of that arm of the service. Hisassignment to a brigade of infantry in King's division was such areduction of his prominence as an officer that it would not bestrange if it chafed him. ] McClellan remained for a time, warmly greeted by the passing troops. He then left me, and rode off toward Vienna, northward. According tomy recollection, Colonel Colburn was the only member of his staffwith him; they had a small cavalry escort. My understanding also wasthat they proposed to return by Chain Bridge, avoiding the crowdingof the road on which they had come out, and on which McDowell'scorps was now moving. In his "Own Story" McClellan speaks of goingin that direction to see the situation of Sumner's troops, supposedto be attacked, and intimates a neglect on Pope's part of a duty inthat direction. I am confident he is mistaken as to this, and that Ihave given the whole interview between him and Pope. The telegraphicconnection with my headquarters was such that he could learn thesituation in front of any part of the line much more promptly therethan by riding in person. Lee did not pursue, in fact, beyondFairfax C. H. And Centreville, and nothing more than small bodies ofcavalry were in our vicinity. I had kept scouting-parties of our owncavalry active in our front, and had also collected news from othersources. On the 1st of September I had been able to send to armyheadquarters authentic information of the expectation of theConfederate army to move into Maryland, and every day thereafteradded to the evidence of that purpose, until they actually crossedthe Potomac on the 5th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 404, 405; vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 170; vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 777. ] Hatch's division was put into the lines on my left with orders toreport to me in case of attack. Patrick's brigade of that divisionwas next day placed near Falls Church in support of my cavalry, reporting directly to me. My two regiments which had been with Poperejoined the division, and made it complete again. The night of the2d was one in which I was on the alert all night, as it was probablethe enemy would disturb us then if ever; but it passed quietly. Askirmish in our front on the Vienna road on the 4th was the onlyenlivening event till we began the campaign of South Mountain andAntietam on the 6th. Pope's proposed reorganization of his army, [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 810. ] which would have put me withmost of Sigel's corps under Hooker, was prevented by a larger changewhich relieved him of command and consolidated his army with that ofthe Potomac on September 5th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 813. ] I had avery slight acquaintance with Pope at the beginning of the war, butno opportunity of increasing it till he assumed command in Virginiaand I reported to him as a subordinate. The events just sketched hadonce more interfered with my expected association with him, and Idid not meet him again till long afterward. Then I came to know himwell. His wife and the wife of my intimate friend General Force weresisters, and in Force's house we often met. He was then broken inhealth and softened by personal afflictions. [Footnote: Mrs. Popeand Mrs. Force were daughters of the Hon. V. B. Horton, of Pomeroy, Ohio, a public man of solid influence and character, and prominentin the development of the coal and salt industries of the Ohiovalley. I leave the text as I wrote it some years before GeneralPope's death. Since he died, the friendship of our families hasculminated in a marriage between our children. ] His reputation in1861 was that of an able and energetic man, vehement and positive incharacter, apt to be choleric and even violent toward those whodispleased him. I remember well that I shrunk a little from comingunder his immediate orders through fear of some chafing, though Ilearned in the army that choleric commanders, if they have ability, are often warmly appreciative of those who serve them with soldierlyspirit and faithfulness. No one who had any right to judgequestioned Pope's ability or his zeal in the National cause. Hismilitary career in the West had been a brilliant one. The necessityfor uniting the columns in northern Virginia into one army waspalpable; but it was a delicate question to decide who shouldcommand them. It seems to have been assumed by Mr. Lincoln that thecommander must be a new man, --neither Frémont, McDowell, nor Banks. The reasons were probably much the same as those which later broughtGrant and Sheridan from the West. Pope's introduction to the Eastern army, which I have alreadymentioned, was an unfortunate one; but neither he nor any one elsecould have imagined the heat of partisan spirit or the lengths itwould run. No personal vilification was too absurd to be credited, and no characterization was too ridiculous to be received as true tothe life. It was assumed that he had pledged himself to takeRichmond with an army of 40, 000 men when McClellan had failed to doso with 100, 000. His defeat by Lee was taken to prove himcontemptible as a commander, by the very men who lauded McClellanfor having escaped destruction from the same army. There was neitherintelligence nor consistency in the vituperation with which he wascovered; but there was abundant proof that the wounded _amourpropre_ of the officers and men of the Potomac Army made thempractically a unit in intense dislike and distrust of him. It may bethat this condition of things destroyed his possibility ofusefulness at the East; but it would be asking too much of humannature (certainly too much of Pope's impetuous nature) to ask him totake meekly the office of scapegoat for the disastrous result of thewhole campaign. His demand on Halleck that he should publish theapproval he had personally given to the several steps of themovements and combats from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly was just, butit was imprudent. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 812, 821. ] Halleck was irritated, and made more ready tosacrifice his subordinate. Mr. Lincoln was saddened and embarrassed;but being persuaded that Pope's usefulness was spoiled, he swallowedhis own pride and sense of justice, and turned again to McClellan asthe resource in the emergency of the moment. Pope seems to me entirely right in claiming that Jackson's raid toManassas was a thing which should have resulted in the destructionof that column. He seems to have kept his head, and to have preparedhis combinations skilfully for making Jackson pay the penalty of hisaudacity. There were a few hours of apparent hesitation on August28th, but champions of McClellan should be the last to urge thatagainst him. His plans were deranged on that day by the accident ofMcDowell's absence from his own command. This happened through anexcess of zeal on McDowell's part to find his commander and give himthe benefit of his knowledge of the topography of the country; yetit proved a serious misfortune, and shows how perilous it is for anyofficer to be away from his troops, no matter for what reason. Manystill think Porter's inaction on the 29th prevented the advantageover Jackson from becoming a victory. [Footnote: I have treated thissubject at large in "The Second Battle of Bull Run as connected withthe Fitz-John Porter Case. "] But after all, when the army was unitedwithin our lines, the injuries it had inflicted on the enemy sonearly balanced those it had received that if Grant or Sherman hadbeen in Halleck's place, Lee would never have crossed the Potomacinto Maryland. McClellan, Pope, and Burnside would have commandedthe centre and wings of the united and reinforced army, and under acompetent head it would have marched back to the Rappahannock withscarcely a halt. That Halleck was in command was, in no small measure, Pope's ownwork. He reminded Halleck of this in his letter of September 30th, written when he was chafing under the first effects of his removal. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. Pp. 816, etc. ] "Ifyou desire, " said he, "to know the personal obligation to which Irefer, I commend you to the President, the Secretary of War, or anyother member of the administration. Any of these can satisfy yourinquiries. " This means that he had, before the President and thecabinet, advocated putting Halleck in supreme command over himselfand McClellan to give unity to a campaign that would else behopelessly broken down. McClellan was then at Harrison's Landing, believing Lee's army to be 200, 000 strong, and refusing to listen toany suggestion except that enormous reinforcements should be sent tohim there. He had taught the Army of the Potomac to believeimplicitly that the Confederate army was more than twice as numerousas it was in fact. With this conviction it was natural that theyshould admire the generalship which had saved them fromannihilation. They accepted with equal faith the lessons which cameto them from headquarters teaching that the "radicals" at Washingtonwere trying for political ends to destroy their general and them. Inregard to the facts there were varying degrees of intelligence amongofficers and men; but there was a common opinion that they and hewere willingly sacrificed, and that Pope, the radical, was tosucceed him. This made them hate Pope, for the time, with holyhatred. If the army could at that time have compared authentictables of strength of Lee's army and their own, the whole theorywould have collapsed at once, and McClellan's reputation andpopularity with it. They did not have the authentic tables, andfought for a year under the awful cloud created by a blunderingspy-system. The fiction as to Lee's forces is the most remarkable in the historyof modern wars. Whether McClellan was the victim or the accompliceof the inventions of his "secret service, " we cannot tell. It isalmost incredible that he should be deceived, except willingly. Iconfess to a contempt for all organizations of spies and detectives, which is the result of my military experience. The only spies wholong escape are those who work for both sides. They sell to eachwhat it wants, and suit their wares to the demand. Pinkerton's manin the rebel commissariat at Yorktown who reported 119, 000 rationsissued daily, laughed well in his sleeve as he pocketed the secretservice money. [Footnote: For Pinkerton's reports, see OfficialRecords, vol. Xi. Pt. I. Pp. 264-272. ] A great deal of valuable information may be got from a hostilepopulation, for few men or women know how to hold their tongues, though they try never so honestly. A friendly population overdoesits information, as a rule. I had an excellent example of this inthe Kanawha valley. After I had first advanced to Gauley Bridge, theSecessionists behind me were busy sending to the enemy all theycould learn of my force. We intercepted, among others, a letter froman intelligent woman who had tried hard to keep her attention uponthe organization of my command as it passed her house. In countingmy cannon, she had evidently taken the teams as the easiest units tocount, and had set down every caisson as a gun, with thebattery-forge thrown in for an extra one. In a similar way, everyaccidental break in the marching column was counted as the head of anew regiment. She thus, in perfect good faith, doubled my force, andtaught me that such information to the enemy did them more harm thangood. As to the enemy's organization and numbers, the only information Iever found trustworthy is that got by contact with him. No dayshould pass without having some prisoners got by "feeling thelines. " These, to secure treatment as regular prisoners of war, mustalways tell the company and regiment to which they belong. Rightlyquestioned, they rarely stop there, and it is not difficult to getthe brigade, division, etc. The reaction from the dangers with whichthe imagination had invested capture, to the commonly good-humoredhospitality of the captors, makes men garrulous of whom one wouldnot expect it. General Pope's chief quartermaster, of the rank ofcolonel, was captured by Stuart's cavalry in this very campaign; andsince the war I have read with amazement General Lee's letters toPresident Davis, to the Secretary of War at Richmond, and to GeneralLoring in West Virginia, dated August 23d, in which he says:[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 940-941. ]"General Stuart reports that General Pope's chief quartermaster, whowas captured last night, positively asserts that Cox's troops arebeing withdrawn by the way of Wheeling. " Of course Lee suggests theimportance of "pushing things" in the Kanawha valley. Stuart thusknew my movement on the day I left Parkersburg. Even when the captured person tells nothing he is bound to conceal, enough is necessarily known to enable a diligent provost-marshal toconstruct a reasonably complete roster of the enemy in a short time. In the Atlanta campaign I always carried a memorandum book in whichI noted and corrected all the information of this sort which came tome, and by comparing this with others and with the lists at GeneralSherman's headquarters, there was no difficulty in keeping well upin the enemy's organization. It may therefore be said that everycommanding officer ought to know the divisions and brigades of hisenemy. The strength of a brigade is fairly estimated from theaverage of our own, for in people of similar race and education, themodels of organization are essentially the same, and subject to thesame causes of diminution during a campaign. Such considerations asthese leave no escape from the conclusion that McClellan's estimatesof Lee's army were absolutely destructive of all chances of success, and made it impossible for the President or for General Halleck todeal with the military problem before them. That he had continuedthis erroneous counting for more than a year, and through an activecampaign in the field, destroyed every hope of correcting it. Thereports of the peninsular campaign reveal, at times, the difficultythere was in keeping up the illusion. The known divisions in theConfederate army would not account for the numbers attributed tothem, and so these divisions occasionally figure in our reports as"grand divisions. " [Footnote: In his dispatch to Halleck on themorning after South Mountain (September 15), D. H. Hill's divisionis called a corps. Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 294. ] Thatthe false estimate was unnecessary is proven by the fact thatGeneral Meigs, in Washington, on July 28th, made up an estimate fromthe regiments, brigades, etc. , mentioned in the newspapers that gotthrough the lines, which was reasonably accurate. But McClellan heldMeigs for an enemy. [Footnote: General Meigs found ninety regimentsof infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and five batteries ofartillery designated by name in the "Confederate" newspaper reportsof the seven days' battles. Comparing this with other informationfrom similar sources, he concluded that Lee had about one hundredand fifty regiments. These, at 700 men each, would make 105, 000, orat 400 (which he found a full average) the gross of the infantrywould be 60, 000. General Webb, with official documents before him, puts it at 70, 000 to 80, 000. Does one need better evidence how muchworse than useless was McClellan's secret service? See OfficialRecords, vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 340. ] When I joined McClellan atWashington, I had no personal knowledge of either army except as Ihad learned it from the newspapers. My predilections in favor ofMcClellan made me assume that his facts were well based, as theyought to have been. I therefore accepted the general judgment ofhimself and his intimate friends as to his late campaign and Pope's, and believed that his restoration to command was an act of justiceto him and of advantage to the country. I did not stay long enoughwith that army to apply any test of my own to the question ofrelative numbers, and have had to correct my opinions of the men andthe campaigns by knowledge gained long afterward. I however usedwhatever influence I had to combat the ideas in McClellan's mindthat the administration meant to do him any wrong, or had any endbut the restoration of National unity in view. Whether Halleck was appointed on Pope's urgent recommendation or no, his campaign in the West was the ground of his promotion. Theadvance from the Ohio to Fort Donelson, to Nashville, to Shiloh, andto Corinth had been under his command, and he deservedly had creditfor movements which had brought Kentucky and Tennessee within theUnion lines. He had gone in person to the front after the battle ofShiloh, and though much just criticism had been made of his slowdigging the way to Corinth by a species of siege operations, he hadat any rate got there. Mr. Lincoln was willing to compromise upon aslow advance upon Richmond, provided it were sure and steady. Halleck's age and standing in the army were such that McClellanhimself could find no fault with his appointment, if any one were tobe put over him. Everything points to the expectation, at the time of hisappointment, that Halleck would assume the personal command in thefield. He visited McClellan at Harrison's Landing on July 25th, however, and promised him that if the armies should be promptlyreunited, he (McClellan) should command the whole, with Burnside andPope as his subordinates. [Footnote: McC. Own Story, p. 474;Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 360. ] That he did not informPope of this abdication of his generalship in the field is plainfrom Pope's correspondence during the campaign. It is madeindisputably clear by Pope's letter to him of the 25th of August. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 65, 66. ] He probably did nottell the President or Mr. Stanton of it. He seems to have waited forthe union of the parts of the army, and when that came his prestigewas forever gone, and he had become, what he remained to the closeof the war, a bureau officer in Washington. He had ordered thetransfer of the Potomac Army from the James to Acquia Creek, intending to unite it with Burnside's at Falmouth, oppositeFredericksburg, and thus begin a fresh advance from the line of theRappahannock. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. P. 5;vol. Xi. Pt. I. Pp. 80-84; _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 337. ] He believed, andapparently with reason, that ten days was sufficient to completethis transfer with the means at McClellan's disposal, but at the endof ten days the movement had not yet begun. [Footnote: The order wasgiven August 3; the movement began August 14. _Id_. , pt. I. Pp. 80, 89. ] He was right in thinking that the whole army should be united. McClellan thought the same. The question was where and how. McClellan said, "Send Pope's men to me. " Halleck replied that itwould not do to thus uncover Washington. McClellan had said thatvigorous advance upon the enemy by his army and a victory would bestprotect the capital. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 9, 10. ]Again he was right, but he seemed incapable of a vigorous advance. Had he made it when he knew (on July 30) that Jackson had gonenorthward with thirty thousand men to resist Pope's advance, hisarmy would not have been withdrawn. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 342. ] He was then nearly twice as strong as Lee, but he didnot venture even upon a forced reconnoissance. The situation of theprevious year was repeated. He was allowing himself to be besiegedby a fraction of his own force. Grant would have put himself intothe relation to McClellan which he sustained to Meade in 1864, andwould have infused his own energy into the army. Halleck did not dothis. It would seem that he had become conscious of his own lack ofnerve in the actual presence of an enemy, and looked back upon hiswork at St. Louis in administering his department, whilst Grant andBuell took the field, with more satisfaction than upon his ownadvance from Shiloh to Corinth. He seemed already determined tomanage the armies from his office in Washington and assume noresponsibility for their actual leadership. When the Army of the Potomac was arriving at Alexandria, anothercrisis occurred in which a single responsible head in the field wasa necessity. McClellan had been giving a continuous demonstration, since August 4th, how easy it is to thwart and hinder any movementwhilst professing to be accomplishing everything that is possible. No maxim in war is better founded in experience than that a man whobelieves that a plan is sure to fail should never be set to conductit. McClellan had written that Pope would be beaten before the Armyof the Potomac could be transferred to him, and Pope was beaten. [Footnote: Halleck to McClellan, August 10 and 12, and McClellan'sreply: Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. I. Pp. 86-88. See also O. S. , p. 466. ] The only chance for any other result was for Halleckhimself to conduct the transfer. If Halleck meant that Franklinshould have pushed out to Manassas on the 27th of August, he shouldhave taken the field and gone with the corps. He did not know andcould not know how good or bad McClellan's excuses were, and nothingbut his own presence, with supreme power, could certainly remove thecauses for delay. He wrote to Pope that he could not leaveWashington, when he ought not to have been in Washington. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 797. ] He worked and worriedhimself ill trying to make McClellan do what he should have donehimself, and then, overwhelmed with details he should never haveburdened himself with, besought his subordinate to relieve him ofthe strain by practically taking command. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 691;vol. Xi. Pt. I. P. 103. ] As soon as McClellan began the movement down the James, Lee tookLongstreet's corps to Jackson, leaving only D. H. Hill's atRichmond. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 177, 552. ] From that momentMcClellan could have marched anywhere. He could have marched toFredericksburg and joined Pope, and Halleck could have met them withBurnside's troops. But the vast imaginary army of the Confederacyparalyzed everything, and the ponderous task of moving the Army ofthe Potomac and its enormous material by water to Washington wenton. The lifeless and deliberate way in which it went on made it the1st of September when Sumner and Franklin reached Centreville, andthe second battle of Bull Run had ended in defeat on the eveningbefore. But the army was at last reunited, within the fortifications ofWashington, it is true, and not on the James or on the line of theRappahannock. There was another opportunity given to Halleck to puthimself at its head, with McClellan, Pope, and Burnside for histhree lieutenants. Again he was unequal to his responsibility. Mr. Lincoln saw his feebleness, and does not seem to have urged him. Halleck was definitely judged in the President's mind, though thelatter seems to have clung to the idea that he might be useful byallowing him to assume the role he chose, and confine himself tomere suggestions and to purely routine work. Pope's unpopularitywith the army was adopted by popular clamor, which always finds adefeated general in the wrong. The President, in real perplexity, compromised by assigning McClellan to command for the purpose oforganizing, a work in which he was admitted by all to be able. Thecommand in the field was a second time offered to Burnside, whodeclined it, warmly advocating McClellan's claims and proving hismost efficient friend. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. I. P. 650. ] Withinthree days from the time I had ridden with McClellan to meet theretreating army, the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and decisioncould not be postponed. The President met McClellan, and told him inperson that he was assigned to command in the field. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 453; Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. I. P. 103. ] On the 5th of September Halleck had sent to McClellan a confidentialnote, telling of the President's action relieving Pope, andanticipating the issue of formal orders: [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 182. ] "The President has directed thatGeneral Pope be relieved and report to the War Department; thatHooker be assigned to command of Porter's corps, and that Franklin'scorps be temporarily attached to Heintzelman's. The orders will beissued this afternoon. Generals Porter and Franklin are to berelieved from duty till the charges against them are examined. Igive you this memorandum in advance of orders, so that you may actaccordingly in putting forces in the field. " Later in the same dayHalleck sent to McClellan the opinion that the enemy was withoutdoubt crossing the Potomac, and said, "If you agree with me, let ourtroops move immediately. " The formal order to Pope was: "The armiesof the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report fororders to the Secretary of War. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 183. ] Pope hadcaused charges to be preferred against Porter and Franklin, and hadaccused McClellan of wilfully delaying reinforcements and so causinghis defeat. His indignation that the interpretation of affairs givenby McClellan and his friends should be made into public opinion bythe apparent acquiescence of Halleck and the administration overcamehis prudence. Had he controlled his feelings and schooled himselfinto patience, he would hardly have been relieved from activeservice, and his turn would probably have come again. As it stood, the President saw that McClellan and Pope could not work together, and the natural outcome was that he retired Pope, so that McClellanshould not have it to say that he was thwarted by a hostilesubordinate. McClellan himself was so manifestly responsible forFranklin's movements from the 27th to the 30th of August, that itwas a matter of course that when the chief was assigned to commandthe condonation should cover the subordinate, and at McClellan'srequest Franklin was allowed to take the field at once. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 190, 197. ] A few days laterhe urged the same action in Porter's case, and it was done. Porterjoined the army at South Mountain on the 14th of September. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 190, 254, 289. ] The same principle demandedthat McDowell, who was obnoxious to McClellan, should be relieved, and this was also done. As an ostensible reason for the public, McDowell's request for a Court of Inquiry upon his own conduct wasassumed to imply a desire to be relieved from the command of hiscorps. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 188, 189, 197. ] But the court was notassembled till the next winter. McDowell had been maligned almost asunscrupulously as Pope. A total abstainer from intoxicating drinks, he was persistently described as a drunkard, drunken upon the fieldof battle. One of the most loyal and self-forgetting ofsubordinates, he was treated as if a persistent intriguer forcommand. A brave and competent soldier, he was believed to beworthless and untrustworthy. As between Halleck, McClellan, andPope, the only one who had fought like a soldier and manoeuvred likea general was sent to the northwestern frontier to watch the pettyIndian tribes, carrying the burden of others' sins into thewilderness. Mr. Lincoln's sacrifice of his sense of justice to whatseemed the only expedient in the terrible crisis, was sublime. McClellan commanded the army, and Porter and Franklin each commandeda corps. If the country was to be saved, confidence and power couldnot be bestowed by halves. In his "Own Story" McClellan speaks of the campaign in Maryland asmade "with a halter round his neck, " [Footnote: O. S. , p. 551. ]meaning that he had no real command except of the defences ofWashington, and that he marched after Lee without authority, sothat, if unsuccessful, he might have been condemned for usurpationof command. It would be incredible that he adopted such a mereillusion, if he had not himself said it. It proves that some atleast of the strange additions to history which he thus publishedhad their birth in his own imagination brooding over the past, andare completely contradicted by the official records. [Footnote: Thisillusion, at least, is shown to be of later origin by his telegramto his wife of September 7. "I leave here this afternoon, " he says, "to take command of the troops in the field. The feeling of thegovernment towards me, I am sure, is kind and trusting. I hope, withGod's blessing, to justify the great confidence they now repose inme, and will bury the past in oblivion. " O. S. , p. 567. ] Theconsolidation of the armies under him was, in fact, a promotion, since it enlarged his authority and committed to him the task thatproperly belonged to Halleck as general-in-chief. For a few days, beginning September 1st, McClellan's orders and correspondence weredated "Headquarters, Washington, " because no formal designation hadbeen given to the assembled forces at the capital. When he took thefield at Rockville on the 8th of September, he assumed, as he hadthe right to do in the absence of other direction from the WarDepartment, that Burnside's and Pope's smaller armies were lost inthe larger Army of the Potomac by the consolidation, and resumed thecustom of dating his orders and dispatches from "Headquarters, Armyof the Potomac, " from the command of which he had never beenremoved, even when its divisions were temporarily separated fromhim. [Footnote: On August 31st Halleck had written to him, "You willretain the command of everything in this vicinity not temporarilybelonging to Pope's army in the field;" and in the general orderissued August 30, McClellan's command of the Army of the Potomac isaffirmed. Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. I. P. 103; _Id_. , vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 775. ] The defences of Washington were now entrusted toMajor-General Banks, strictly in subordination, however, to himself. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 202, 214. ] Theofficial record of authority and command is consistent and perfect, and his notion in his later years, that there was anything informalabout it, is proven to be imaginary. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 257. ]Halleck's direction, which I have quoted, to "let our troops moveimmediately, " would be absurd as addressed to the commandant of theArmy of the Potomac into which the Army of Virginia wasconsolidated, unless that commandant was to take the field, or aformal order relieved him of command as Pope was relieved. Certainlyno other commander was designated, and I saw enough of him in thosedays to say with confidence that he betrayed no doubt that the orderto "move immediately" included himself. McClellan's popularity withthe Army of the Potomac had seemed to Mr. Lincoln the only powersufficient to ensure its prompt and earnest action against theConfederate invasion. His leadership of it, to be successful, had tobe accompanied with plenary powers, even if the stultification ofthe government itself were the consequence. When the patriotism ofthe President yielded to this, the suggestion of McClellan twentyyears afterward, that it had all been a pitfall prepared for him, would be revolting if, in view of the records, the absurdity of itdid not prove that its origin was in a morbid imagination. It is farmore difficult to deal leniently with the exhibition of character inhis private letters, which were injudiciously added to his "OwnStory" by his literary executor. In them his vanity and his ill-willtoward rivals and superiors are shockingly naked; and since nohistorian can doubt that at every moment from September, 1861, toSeptember, 1862, his army greatly outnumbered his enemy, whilst inequipment and supply there was no comparison, his persistent outcrythat he was sacrificed by his government destroys even thatcharacter for dignity and that reputation for military intelligencewhich we fondly attributed to him. The general arrangement of the campaign seems to have been settledbetween Halleck and McClellan on the 5th of September. GeneralSumner with the Second and Twelfth corps moved up the Potomac by wayof Tenallytown, Burnside with the First and Ninth corps moved toLeesboro with a view to covering Baltimore, the front was exploredby the cavalry under Pleasonton, and the Sixth Corps, underFranklin, constituted a reserve. [Footnote: Confusion in the numbersof the First and Twelfth corps is found in the records anddispatches, owing to the fact that in the Army of Virginia the corpsnumbers were not those given them by the War Department. Sigel's, properly the Eleventh Corps, had been called First of that army. Banks's, properly Twelfth, had been called Second, and McDowell's, properly First, had been called Third. In the Maryland campaignHooker was assigned to McDowell's, and it sometimes figures asFirst, sometimes as Third; Mansfield was assigned to Banks's. Theproper designations after the consolidation were First and Twelfth. Reno had been assigned to the First, but McClellan got authority tochange it, and gave it to Hooker, sending Reno back to the Ninth. Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 197, 198, 279, 349. ] Thepreliminary movements occupied the 5th and 6th, but on the 7th thepositions were as I have stated them. The principal bodies weredesignated, respectively, as right and left wings instead of armies. The two corps from the Army of Virginia were separated, one beingassigned to the right wing under Burnside, and the other to the leftunder Sumner. CHAPTER XIII SOUTH MOUNTAIN March through Washington--Reporting to Burnside--The NinthCorps--Burnside's personal qualities--To Leesboro--Straggling--Lee'sarmy at Frederick--Our deliberate advance--Reno at New Market--Themarch past--Reno and Hayes--Camp gossip--Occupation ofFrederick--Affair with Hampton's cavalry--Crossing CatoctinMountain--The valley and South Mountain--Lee's order found--Divisionof his army--Jackson at Harper's Ferry--Supporting Pleasonton'sreconnoissance--Meeting Colonel Moor--An involuntarywarning--Kanawha Division's advance--Opening of the battle--Carryingthe mountain crest--The morning fight--Lull at noon--Arrival ofsupports--Battle renewed--Final success--Death of Reno--Hooker'sbattle on the right--His report--Burnside's comments--Franklin'sengagement at Crampton's Gap. Late in the night of the 5th I received orders from McClellan'sheadquarters to march from my position on Upton's Hill throughWashington toward Leesboro, [Footnote: Leesboro, a village ofMaryland eight or ten miles north of Washington, must bedistinguished from Leesburg in Virginia. ] as soon as my picketscould be relieved by troops of McDowell's corps. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 183; vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 789. ] My routewas designated as by the road which was a continuation northward ofSeventh Street, and I was directed to report to General Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding right wing, whose headquarters were in thesuburbs of the city on that road. This was in accordance with mywish, expressed to McClellan that I might have active field work. For two or three days we were not attached to a corps, but as theorganization of the army became settled we were temporarily assignedto the Ninth, which had been Burnside's, and had been with him inNorth Carolina. During this campaign it was commanded byMajor-General Jesse L. Reno, who had long had a division in it, andhad led the corps in the recent battle. We marched from Upton's Hillat daybreak of the 6th, taking the road to Georgetown by Ball'sCross-Roads. In Georgetown we turned eastward through Washington toSeventh Street, and thence northward to the Leesboro road. As wepassed General Burnside's quarters, I sent a staff officer to reportour progress. It was about ten o'clock, and Burnside had gone to theWhite House to meet the President and cabinet by invitation. Hischief of staff, General J. G. Parke, sent a polite note, saying wehad not been expected so soon, and directed us to halt and bivouacfor the present in some fields by the roadside, near where theHoward University now is. In the afternoon I met Burnside for thefirst time, and was warmly attracted by him, as everybody was. Hewas pre-eminently a manly man, as I expressed it in writing home. His large, fine eyes, his winning smile and cordial manners, bespokea frank, sincere, and honorable character, and these indicationswere never belied by more intimate acquaintance. The friendship thenbegun lasted as long as he lived. I learned to understand thelimitations of his powers and the points in which he fell short ofbeing a great commander; but as I knew him better I estimated moreand more highly his sincerity and truthfulness, his unselfishgenerosity, and his devoted patriotism. In everything which makes upan honorable and lovable personal character he had no superior. Ishall have occasion to speak frequently of his peculiarities and hisspecial traits, but shall never have need to say a word inderogation of the solid virtues I have attributed to him. Hischief-of-staff, General Parke, was an officer of the Engineers, andone of the best instructed of that corps. He had served withdistinction under Burnside in North Carolina, in command of abrigade and division. I always thought that he preferred staff duty, especially with Burnside, whose confidence in him was complete, andwho would leave to him almost untrammelled control of theadministrative work of the command. On September 7th I was ordered to take the advance of the NinthCorps in the march to Leesboro, following Hooker's corps. It was myfirst march with troops of this army, and I was shocked at thestraggling I witnessed. The "roadside brigade, " as we called it, wasoften as numerous, by careful estimate, as our own column moving inthe middle of the road. I could say of the men of the Kanawhadivision, as Richard Taylor said of his Louisiana brigade withStonewall Jackson, that they had not yet _learned_ to straggle. [Footnote: See Taylor's "Destruction and Reconstruction, " p. 50, fora curious interview with Jackson. ] I tried to prevent their learningit. We had a roll-call immediately upon halting after the march, andanother half an hour later, with prompt reports of the result. Ialso assigned a field officer and medical officer to duty at therear of the column, with ambulances for those who became ill andwith punishments for the rest. The result was that, in spite of theexample of others, the division had no stragglers, the firstroll-call rarely showing more than twenty or thirty not answering totheir names, and the second often proving every man to be present. [Footnote: See letters of General R. B. Hayes and General GeorgeCrook, Appendix B. ] In both the Army of the Potomac and the Army ofNorthern Virginia the evil had become a most serious one. After thebattle of Antietam, for the express purpose of remedying it, McClellan appointed General Patrick Provost-Marshal with a strongprovost-guard, giving him very extended powers, and permittingnobody, of whatever rank, to interfere with him. Patrick was a manof vigor, of conscience, and of system, and though he was greatlydesirous of keeping a field command, proved so useful, indeed sonecessary a part of the organization, that he was retained in itagainst his wishes, to the end of the war, each commander of theArmy of the Potomac in turn finding that he was indispensable. [Footnote: I have discussed this subject also in a review ofHenderson's Stonewall Jackson, "The Nation, " Nov. 24, 1898, p. 396. ] The Confederate army suffered from straggling quite as much, perhaps, as ours, but in a somewhat different way. At the close ofthe Antietam campaign General Lee made bitter complaints in regardto it, and asked the Confederate government for legislation whichwould authorize him to apply the severest punishments. As theConfederate stragglers were generally in the midst of friends, wherethey could sleep under shelter and get food of better quality thanthe army ration, this grew to be the regular mode of life with manyeven of those who would join their comrades in an engagement. Theywere not reported in the return of "effectives" made by theirofficers, but that they often made part of the killed, wounded, andcaptured I have little doubt. In this way a rational explanation maybe found of the larger discrepancies between the Confederate reportsof casualties and ours of their dead buried and prisoners taken. The weather during this brief campaign was as lovely as possible, and the contrast between the rich farming country in which we nowwere, and the forest-covered mountains of West Virginia to which wehad been accustomed, was very striking. An evening march, under abrilliant moon, over a park-like landscape with alternations ofgroves and meadows which could not have been more beautifullycomposed by a master artist, remains in my memory as a page out of alovely romance. On the day that we marched to Leesboro, Lee's armywas concentrated near Frederick, behind the Monocacy River, havingbegun the crossing of the Potomac on the 4th. There was a singulardearth of trustworthy information on the subject at our armyheadquarters. We moved forward by very short marches of six or eightmiles, feeling our way so cautiously that Lee's reports speak of itas an unexpectedly slow approach. The Comte de Paris excuses it onthe ground of the disorganized condition of McClellan's army afterthe recent battle. It must be remembered, however, that Sumner'scorps and Franklin's had not been at the second Bull Run, and wereveterans of the Potomac Army. The Twelfth Corps had been Banks's, and it too had not been engaged at the second Bull Run, its workhaving been to cover the trains of Pope's army on the retrogrademovement from Warrenton Junction. Although new regiments had beenadded to these corps, it is hardly proper to say that the army as awhole was not one which could be rapidly manoeuvred. I see no goodreason why it might not have advanced at once to the left bank ofthe Monocacy, covering thus both Washington and Baltimore, andhastening by some days Lee's movement across the Blue Ridge. Weshould at least have known where the enemy was by being in contactwith him, instead of being the sport of all sorts of vague rumorsand wild reports. [Footnote: McClellan was not wholly responsiblefor this tardiness, for Halleck was very timid about uncoveringWashington, and his dispatches tended to increase McClellan'snatural indecision. Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 280. ] The Kanawha division took the advance of the right wing when we leftLeesboro on the 8th, and marched to Brookville. On the 9th itreached Goshen, where it lay on the 10th, and on the 11th reachedRidgeville on the railroad. The rest of the Ninth Corps was an easymarch behind us. Hooker had been ordered further to the right on thestrength of rumors that Lee was making a circuit towards Baltimore, and his corps reached Cooksville and the railroad some ten mileseast of my position. The extreme left of the army was atPoolesville, near the Potomac, making a spread of thirty milesacross the whole front. The cavalry did not succeed in getting farin advance of the infantry, and very little valuable information wasobtained. At Ridgeville, however, we got reliable evidence that Leehad evacuated Frederick the day before, and that only cavalry waseast of the Catoctin Mountains. Hooker got similar information atabout the same time. It was now determined to move more rapidly, andearly in the morning of the 12th I was ordered to march to NewMarket and thence to Frederick. At New Market I was overtaken byGeneral Reno, with several officers of rank from the other divisionsof the corps, and they dismounted at a little tavern by the roadsideto see the Kanawha division go by. Up to this time they had seennothing of us whatever. The men had been so long in the WestVirginia mountains at hard service, involving long and rapidmarches, that they had much the same strength of legs and ease inmarching which was afterward so much talked of when seen inSherman's army at the review in Washington at the close of the war. I stood a little behind Reno and the rest, and had the pleasure ofhearing their involuntary exclamations of admiration at the marchingof the men. The easy swinging step, the graceful poise of the musketon the shoulder, as if it were a toy and not a burden, and thecompactness of the column were all noticed and praised with aheartiness which was very grateful to my ears. I no longer felt anydoubt that the division stood well in the opinion of my associates. I enjoyed this the more because, the evening before, a littleincident had occurred which had threatened to result in someill-feeling. It had been thought that we were likely to be attackedat Ridgeville, and on reaching the village I disposed the divisionso as to cover the place and to be ready for an engagement. Iordered the brigades to bivouac in line of battle, covering thefront with outposts and with cavalry vedettes from the Sixth NewYork Cavalry (Colonel Devin), which had been attached to thedivision during the advance. The men were without tents, and to makebeds had helped themselves to some straw from stacks in thevicinity. Toward evening General Reno rode up, and happening firstto meet Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, commanding theTwenty third Ohio, he rather sharply inquired why the troops werenot bivouacking "closed in mass, " and also blamed the taking of thestraw. Colonel Hayes referred him to me as the proper person toaccount for the disposition of the troops, and quietly said hethought the quartermaster's department could settle for the straw ifthe owner was loyal. A few minutes later the general came to my ownposition, but was now quite over his irritation. I, of course, knewnothing of his interview with Hayes, and when he said that it wasthe policy in Maryland to make the troops bivouac in compact mass, so as to do as little damage to property as possible, I cordiallyassented, but urged that such a rule would not apply to theadvance-guard when supposed to be in presence of the enemy; weneeded to have the men already in line if an alarm should be givenin the night. To this he agreed, and a pleasant conversationfollowed. Nothing was said to me about the straw taken for bedding, and when I heard of the little passage-at-arms with Colonel Hayes, Isaw that it was a momentary disturbance which had no realsignificance. Camp gossip, however, is as bad as village gossip, andin a fine volume of the "History of the Twenty-first MassachusettsRegiment, " I find it stated that the Kanawha division coming freshfrom the West was disposed to plunder and pillage, giving anexaggerated version of the foregoing story as evidence of it. Thismakes it a duty to tell what was the small foundation for thecharge, and to say that I believe no regiments in the army were lessobnoxious to any just accusation of such a sort. The gossip wouldnever have survived the war at all but for the fact that ColonelHayes became President of the United States, and the supposedincident of his army life thus acquired a new interest. [Footnote:This incident gives me the opportunity to say that after reading agood many regimental histories, I am struck with the fact that withthe really invaluable material they contain when giving the actualexperiences of the regiments themselves, they also embody a greatdeal of mere gossip. As a rule, their value is confined to whatstrictly belongs to the regiment; and the criticisms, whether ofother organizations or of commanders, are likely to be theexpression of the local and temporary prejudices and misconceptionswhich are notoriously current in time of war. They need to be readwith due allowance for this. The volume referred to is a favorableexample of its class, but its references to the Kanawha division(which was in the Ninth Corps only a month) illustrate the tendencyI have mentioned. It should be borne in mind that the Kanawha menhad the position of advance-guard, and I believe did not camp in theneighborhood of the other divisions in a single instance from thetime we left Leesboro till the battle of South Mountain. What issaid of them, therefore, is not from observation. The incidentbetween Reno and Hayes occurred in the camp of the latter, and couldnot possibly be known to the author of the regimental history but byhearsay. Yet he affirms as a fact that the Kanawha division"plundered the country unmercifully, " for which Reno "tookLieutenant-Colonel Hayes severely though justly to task. " He alsoasserts that the division set a "very bad example" in straggling. Asto this, the truth is as I have circumstantially stated it above. Hehas still further indulged in a "slant" at the "Ohioans" in a storyof dead Confederates being put in a well at South Mountain, --a storyas apocryphal as the others. Wise's house and well were within thecamp of the division to which the Twenty-first Massachusettsbelonged, and the burial party there would have been from thatdivision. Lastly, the writer says that General Cox, the temporarycorps commander, "robs us [the Twenty-first Massachusetts] of ourdearly bought fame" by naming the Fifty-first New York andFifty-first Pennsylvania as the regiments which stormed the bridgeat Antietam. He acquits Burnside and McClellan of the allegedinjustice, saying they "follow the corps report in this respect. "Yet mention is not made of the fact that my report literally copiesthat of the division commander, who himself selected the regimentsfor the charge! The "Ohioan" had soon gone west again with hisdivision, and was probably fair game. There is something akin toprovincialism in regimental _esprit de corps_, and such instances asthe above, which are all found within a few pages of the bookreferred to, show that, like Leech's famous Staffordshire rough inthe Punch cartoon, to be a "stranger" is a sufficient reason to"'eave 'arf a brick at un. " See letters of President Hayes andGeneral Crook on the subject, Appendix B. ] From New Market we sent the regiment of cavalry off to the right tocover our flank, and to investigate reports that heavy bodies of theenemy's cavalry were north of us. The infantry pushed rapidly towardFrederick. The opposition was very slight till we reached theMonocacy River, which is perhaps half a mile from the town. HereGeneral Wade Hampton, with his brigade as rear-guard of Lee's army, attempted to resist the crossing. The highway crosses the river by asubstantial stone bridge, and the ground upon our bank wasconsiderably higher than that on the other side. We engaged theartillery of the enemy with a battery of our own, which had theadvantage of position, whilst the infantry forced the crossing bothby the bridge and by a ford a quarter of a mile to the right. Assoon as Moor's brigade was over, it was deployed on the right andleft of the turnpike, which was bordered on either side by a highand strong post-and-rail fence. Scammon's was soon over, andsimilarly deployed as a second line, with the Eleventh Ohio incolumn in the road. Moor had with him a troop of horse and a singlecannon, and went forward with the first line, allowing it to keepabreast of him on right and left. I also rode on the turnpikebetween the two lines, and only a few rods behind Moor, having withme my staff and a few orderlies. Reno was upon the other bank of theriver, overlooking the movement, which made a fine military displayas the lines advanced at quick-step toward the city. Hampton'shorsemen had passed out of our sight, for the straight causewayturned sharply to the left just as it entered the town, and we couldnot see beyond the turn. We were perhaps a quarter of a mile fromthe city, when a young staff officer from corps headquarters rode upbeside me and exclaimed in a boisterous way, "Why don't they go infaster? There's nothing there!" I said to the young man, "DidGeneral Reno send you with any order to me?" "No, " he replied. "Then, " said I, "when I want your advice I will ask it. " He movedoff abashed, and I did not notice what had become of him, but, infact, he rode up to Colonel Moor, and repeated a similar speech. Moor was stung by the impertinence which he assumed to be acriticism upon him from corps headquarters, and, to my amazement, Isaw him suddenly dash ahead at a gallop with his escort and the gun. He soon came to the turn of the road where it loses itself among thehouses; there was a quick, sharp rattling of carbines, and Hampton'scavalry was atop of the little party. There was one discharge of thecannon, and some of the brigade staff and escort came back indisorder. I ordered up at "double quick" the Eleventh Ohio, which, as I have said, was in column in the road, and these, with bayonetsfixed, dashed into the town. The enemy had not waited for them, butretreated out of the place by the Hagerstown road. Moor had beenridden down, unhorsed, and captured. The artillery-men hadunlimbered the gun, pointed it, and the gunner stood with thelanyard in his hand, when he was struck by a charging horse; the gunwas fired by the concussion, but at the same moment it was capsizedinto the ditch by the impact of the cavalry column. The enemy had notime to right the gun or carry it off, nor to stop for prisoners. They forced Moor on another horse, and turned tail as the charginglines of infantry came up on right and left as well as the column inthe road, for there had not been a moment's pause in the advance. Ithad all happened, and the gun with a few dead and wounded of bothsides were in our hands, in less time than it has taken to describeit. Those who may have a fancy for learning how Munchausen wouldtell this story, may find it in the narrative of Major Heros vonBorke of J. E. B. Stuart's staff. [Footnote: Von Borke's account isso good an example of the way in which romance may be built up outof a little fact that I give it in full. The burning of the stonebridge half a mile in rear of the little affair was a peculiarlybrilliant idea; but he has evidently confused our advance with thaton the Urbana road. He says: "Toward evening the enemy arrived inthe immediate neighborhood of Monocacy bridge, and observing only asmall force at this point, advanced very carelessly. A six-poundergun had been placed in position by them at a very short distancefrom the bridge, which fired from time to time a shot at ourhorsemen, while the foremost regiment marched along at their ease, as if they believed this small body of cavalry would soon wheel inflight. This favorable moment for an attack was seized in splendidstyle by Major Butler, who commanded the two squadrons of the SecondSouth Carolina Cavalry, stationed at this point as our rear-guard. Like lightning he darted across the bridge, taking the piece ofartillery, which had scarcely an opportunity of firing a shot, andfalling upon the regiment of infantry, which was dispersed in a fewseconds, many of them being shot down, and many others, among whomwas the colonel in command, captured. The colors of the regimentalso fell into Major Butler's hands. The piece of artillery, in thehurry of the moment, could not be brought over to our side of theriver, as the enemy instantly sent forward a large body of cavalryat a gallop, and our dashing men had only time to spike it and trotwith their prisoners across the bridge, which, having been alreadyfully prepared for burning, was in a blaze when the infuriatedYankees arrived at the water's edge. The conflagration of the bridgeof course checked their onward movement, and we quietly continuedthe retreat. " Von Borke, vol. I. P. 203. Stuart's report is verynearly accurate: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 816. ] Moor'scapture, however, had consequences, as we shall see. The command ofhis brigade passed to Colonel George Crook of the Thirty-sixth Ohio. Frederick was a loyal city, and as Hampton's cavalry went out at oneend of the street and our infantry came in at the other, and whilstthe carbine smoke and the smell of powder still lingered, the closedwindow-shutters of the houses flew open, the sashes went up, thewindows were filled with ladies waving their handkerchiefs andnational flags, whilst the men came to the column with fruits andrefreshments for the marching soldiers as they went by in the hotsunshine of the September afternoon. [Footnote: Although at the headof the column, the "truth of history" compels me to say that I sawnothing of Barbara Frietchie, and heard nothing of her till I readWhittier's poem in later years. When, however, I visited Frederickwith General Grant in 1869, we were both presented withwalking-sticks made from timbers of Barbara's house which had beentorn down, and, of course, I cannot dispute the story of which Ihave the stick as evidence; for Grant thought the stick shut me upfrom any denial and established the legend. ] Pleasonton's cavalrycame in soon after by the Urbana road, and during the evening alarge part of the army drew near the place. Next morning (13th) thecavalry went forward to reconnoitre the passes of Catoctin Mountain, Rodman's division of our corps being ordered to support them and toproceed toward Middletown in the Catoctin valley. Through somemisunderstanding Rodman took the road to Jefferson, leading to theleft, where Franklin's corps was moving, and did not get upon theHagerstown road. About noon I was ordered to march upon the latterroad to Middletown. McClellan himself met me as my column moved outof town, and told me of the misunderstanding in Rodman's orders, adding that if I found him on the march I should take his divisionalso along with me. [Footnote: As is usual in such cases, thedirection was later put in writing by his chief of staff. OfficialRecords, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 827. ] I did not meet him, but the othertwo divisions of the corps crossed Catoctin Mountain that night, whilst Rodman returned to Frederick. The Kanawha division made aneasy march, and as the cavalry was now ahead of us, met noopposition in crossing Catoctin Mountain or in the valley beyond. Onthe way we passed a house belonging to a branch of the Washingtonfamily, and a few officers of the division accompanied me, at theinvitation of the occupant, to look at some relics of the Father ofhis Country which were preserved there. We stood for some minuteswith uncovered heads before a case containing a uniform he had worn, and other articles of personal use hallowed by their associationwith him, and went on our way with our zeal strengthened by closercontact with souvenirs of the great patriot. Willcox's divisionfollowed us, and encamped a mile and a half east of Middletown. Sturgis's halted not far from the western foot of the mountain, withcorps headquarters near by. My own camp for the night was pitched infront (west) of the village of Middletown along Catoctin Creek. Pleasonton's cavalry was a little in advance of us, at the forks ofthe road where the old Sharpsburg road turns off to the left fromthe turnpike. The rest of the army was camped about Frederick, except Franklin's corps (Sixth), which was near Jefferson, ten milesfurther south but also east of Catoctin Mountain. The Catoctin or Middletown valley is beautifully included betweenCatoctin Mountain and South Mountain, two ranges of the Blue Ridge, running northeast and southwest. It is six or eight miles wide, watered by Catoctin Creek, which winds southward among rich farmsand enters the Potomac near Point of Rocks. The National roadleaving Frederick passes through Middletown and crosses SouthMountain, as it goes northwestward, at a depression called Turner'sGap. The old Sharpsburg road crosses the summit at another gap, known as Fox's, about a mile south of Turner's. Still another, theold Hagerstown road, finds a passage over the ridge at about anequal distance north. The National road, being of easier grades andbetter engineering, was now the principal route, the others havingdegenerated to rough country roads. The mountain crests are from tento thirteen hundred feet above the Catoctin valley, and the "gaps"are from two to three hundred feet lower than the summits near them. [Footnote: These elevations are from the official map of the U. S. Engineers. ] These summits are like scattered and irregular hillsupon the high rounded surface of the mountain top. They are wooded, but along the southeasterly slopes, quite near the top of themountain, are small farms, with meadows and cultivated fields. The military situation had been cleared up by the knowledge of Lee'smovements which McClellan got from a copy of Lee's order of the dayfor the both. This had been found at Frederick on the 13th, and ittallied so well with what was otherwise known that no doubt was leftas to its authenticity. It showed that Jackson's corps with Walker'sdivision were besieging Harper's Ferry on the Virginia side of thePotomac, whilst McLaws's division supported by Anderson's wasco-operating on Maryland Heights. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 281, 603. ] Longstreet, with the remainder of hiscorps, was at Boonsboro or near Hagerstown. D. H. Hill's divisionwas the rear-guard, and the cavalry under Stuart covered the whole, a detached squadron being with Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws each. The order did not name the three separate divisions in Jackson'scommand proper (exclusive of Walker), nor those remaining withLongstreet except D. H. Hill's; but it is hardly conceivable thatthese were not known to McClellan after his own and Pope's contactwith them during the campaigns of the spring and summer. At anyrate, the order showed that Lee's army was in two parts, separatedby the Potomac and thirty or forty miles of road. As soon as Jacksonshould reduce Harper's Ferry they would reunite. Friday the 12th wasthe day fixed for the concentration of Jackson's force for hisattack, and it was Saturday when the order fell into McClellan'shands. Three days had already been lost in the slow advance sinceLee had crossed Catoctin Mountain, and Jackson's artillery was nowheard pounding at the camp and earthworks of Harper's Ferry. McLawshad already driven our forces from Maryland Heights, and had openedupon the ferry with his guns in commanding position on the north ofthe Potomac. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 607. ] McClellan telegraphed to thePresident that he would catch the rebels "in their own trap if mymen are equal to the emergency. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 281. ] There was certainly no time to lose. Theinformation was in his hands before noon, for he refers to it in adispatch to Mr. Lincoln at twelve. If his men had been ordered to beat the top of South Mountain before dark, they could have beenthere; but less than one full corps passed Catoctin Mountain thatday or night, and when the leisurely movement of the 14th began, hehimself, instead of being with the advance, was in Frederick tillafter 2 P. M. , at which hour he sent a dispatch to Washington, andthen rode to the front ten or twelve miles away. The failure to be"equal to the emergency" was not in his men. Twenty-four hours, asit turned out, was the whole difference between saving and losingHarper's Ferry with its ten or twelve thousand men and itsunestimated munitions and stores. It may be that the commanders ofthe garrison were in fault, and that a more stubborn resistanceshould have been made. It may be that Halleck ought to have orderedthe place to be evacuated earlier, as McClellan suggested. Nevertheless, at noon of the 13th McClellan had it in his power tosave the place and interpose his army between the two wings, of theConfederates with decisive effect on the campaign. He saw that itwas an "emergency, " but did not call upon his men for anyextraordinary exertion. Harper's. Ferry surrendered, and Lee unitedthe wings of his army beyond the Antietam before the final andgeneral engagement was forced upon him. At my camp in front of Middletown, I received no orders looking to ageneral advance on the 14th; but only to support, by a detachment, Pleasonton's cavalry in a reconnoissance toward Turner's Gap. Pleasonton himself came to my tent in the evening, and asked thatone brigade might report to him in the morning for the purpose. Sixo'clock was the hour at which he wished them to march. He saidfurther that he and Colonel Crook were old army acquaintances andthat he would like Crook to have the detail. I wished to please him, and not thinking that it would make any difference to my brigadecommanders, intimated that I would do so. But Colonel Scammon, learning what was intended, protested that under our custom hisbrigade was entitled to the advance next day, as the brigades hadtaken it in turn. I explained that it was only as a courtesy toPleasonton and at his request that the change was proposed. This didnot better the matter in Scammon's opinion. He had been himself aregular officer, and the point of professional honor touched him. Irecognized the justice of his demand, and said he should have theduty if he insisted upon it. Pleasonton was still in the campvisiting with Colonel Crook, and I explained to him the reasons whyI could not yield to his wish, but must assign Scammon's brigade tothe duty in conformity with the usual course. There was in fact noreason except the personal one for choosing one brigade more thanthe other, for they were equally good. Crook took the decision ingood part, though it was natural that he should wish for anopportunity of distinguished service, as he had not been the regularcommandant of the brigade. Pleasonton was a little chafed, and evenintimated that he claimed some right to name the officer and commandto be detailed. This, of course, I could not admit, and issued theformal orders at once. The little controversy had put Scammon andhis whole brigade upon their mettle, and was a case in which agenerous emulation did no harm. What happened in the morning onlyincreased their spirit and prepared them the better to perform whatI have always regarded as a very brilliant exploit. [Illustration: Map: South Mountain ] The morning of Sunday the 14th of September was a bright one. I hadmy breakfast very early and was in the saddle before it was time forScammon to move. He was prompt, and I rode on with him to see inwhat way his support was likely to be used. Two of the Ninth Corpsbatteries (Gibson's and Benjamin's) had accompanied the cavalry, andone of these was a heavy one of twenty-pounder Parrotts. They wereplaced upon a knoll a little in front of the cavalry camp, abouthalf a mile beyond the forks of the old Sharpsburg road with theturnpike. They were exchanging shots with a battery of the enemywell up in the gap. Just as Scammon and I crossed Catoctin Creek Iwas surprised to see Colonel Moor standing at the roadside. Withastonishment I rode to him and asked how he came there. He said thathe had been taken beyond the mountain after his capture, but hadbeen paroled the evening before, and was now finding his way back tous on foot. "But where are _you_ going?" said he. I answered thatScammon was going to support Pleasonton in a reconnoissance into thegap. Moor made an involuntary start, saying, "My God! be careful!"then checking himself, added, "But I am paroled!" and turned away. Igalloped to Scammon and told him that I should follow him in closesupport with Crook's brigade, and as I went back along the column Ispoke to each regimental commander, warning them to be prepared foranything, big or little, --it might be a skirmish, it might be abattle. Hurrying to camp, I ordered Crook to turn out his brigadeand march at once. I then wrote a dispatch to General Reno, saying Isuspected we should find the enemy in force on the mountain top, andshould go forward with both brigades instead of sending one. Starting a courier with this, I rode forward again and foundPleasonton. Scammon had given him an inkling of our suspicions, andin the personal interview they had reached a mutual goodunderstanding. I found that he was convinced that it would be unwiseto make an attack in front, and had determined that his horsemenshould merely demonstrate upon the main road and support thebatteries, whilst Scammon should march by the old Sharpsburg roadand try to reach the flank of the force on the summit. I told himthat in view of my fear that the force of the enemy might be toogreat for Scammon, I had determined to bring forward Crook's brigadein support. If it became necessary to fight with the whole division, I should do so, and in that case I should assume the responsibilitymyself as his senior officer. To this he cordially assented. One section of McMullin's six-gun battery was all that went forwardwith Scammon (and even these not till the infantry reached thesummit), four guns being left behind, as the road was rough andsteep. There were in Simmonds's battery two twenty-pounder Parrottguns, and I ordered these also to remain on the turnpike and to gointo action with Benjamin's battery of the same calibre. It wasabout half-past seven when Crook's head of column filed off from theturnpike upon the old Sharpsburg road, and Scammon had perhaps halfan hour's start. We had fully two miles to go before we should reachthe place where our attack was actually made, and as it was a prettysharp ascent the men marched slowly with frequent rests. On our wayup we were overtaken by my courier who had returned from GeneralReno with approval of my action and the assurance that the rest ofthe Ninth Corps would come forward to my support. When Scammon had got within half a mile of Fox's Gap (the summit ofthe old Sharpsburg road), [Footnote: The Sharpsburg road is alsocalled the Braddock road, as it was the way by which Braddock andWashington had marched to Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg) in the oldFrench war. For the same reason the gap is called Braddock's Gap. Ihave adopted that which seems to be in most common local use. ] theenemy opened upon him with case-shot from the edge of the timberabove the open fields, and he had judiciously turned off upon acountry road leading still further to the left, and nearly parallelto the ridge above. His movement had been made under cover of theforest, and he had reached the extreme southern limit of the openfields south of the gap on this face of the mountain. Here Iovertook him, his brigade being formed in line under cover of thetimber, facing open pasture fields having a stone wall along theupper side, with the forest again beyond this. On his left was theTwenty-third Ohio under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes, who had beendirected to keep in the woods beyond the open, and to strike ifpossible the flank of the enemy. His centre was the Twelfth Ohiounder Colonel Carr B. White, whose duty was to attack the stone wallin front, charging over the broad open fields. On the right was theThirtieth Ohio, Colonel Hugh Ewing, who was ordered to advanceagainst a battery on the crest which kept up a rapid and annoyingfire. It was now about nine o'clock, and Crook's column had comeinto close support. Bayonets were fixed, and at the word the linerushed forward with loud hurrahs. Hayes, being in the woods, was notseen till he had passed over the crest and turned upon the enemy'sflank and rear. Here was a sharp combat, but our men establishedthemselves upon the summit and drove the enemy before them. Whiteand Ewing charged over the open under a destructive fire of musketryand shrapnel. As Ewing approached the enemy's battery (Bondurant's), it gave him a parting salvo, and limbered rapidly toward the rightalong a road in the edge of the woods which follows the summit tothe turnpike near the Mountain House at Turner's Gap. White's mennever flinched, and the North Carolinians of Garland's brigade (forit was they who held the ridge at this point) poured in their firetill the advancing line of bayonets was in their faces when theybroke away from the wall. Our men fell fast, but they kept up theirpace, and the enemy's centre was broken by a heroic charge. Garlandstrove hard to rally his men, but his brigade was hopelessly brokenin two. He rallied his right wing on the second ridge a little inrear of that part of his line, but Hayes's regiment was here pushingforward from our left. Colonel Ruffin of the Thirteenth NorthCarolina held on to the ridge road beyond our right, near Fox's Gap. The fighting was now wholly in the woods, and though the enemy'scentre was routed there was stubborn resistance on both flanks. Hiscavalry dismounted (said to be under Colonel Rosser [Footnote:Stuart's Report, Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 817. ] ) wasfound to extend beyond Hayes's line, and supported the Stuartartillery, which poured canister into our advancing troops. I nowordered Crook to send the Eleventh Ohio (under Lieutenant-ColonelColeman) beyond Hayes's left to extend our line in that direction, and to direct the Thirty-sixth Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Clark) tofill a gap between the Twelfth and Thirtieth caused by diverginglines of advance. The only remaining regiment (the Twenty-eighth, Lieutenant-Colonel Becker) was held in reserve on the right. TheThirty-sixth aided by the Twelfth repulsed a stout effort of theenemy to re-establish their centre. The whole line again sprungforward. A high knoll on our left was carried. The dismountedcavalry was forced to retreat with their battery across the ravinein which the Sharpsburg road descends on the west of the mountain, and took a new position on a separate hill in rear of the heights atthe Mountain House. There was considerable open ground at this newposition, from which their battery had full play at a range of abouttwelve hundred yards upon the ridge held by us. But the Eleventh andTwenty-third stuck stoutly to the hill which Hayes had firstcarried, and their line was nearly parallel to the Sharpsburg road, facing north. Garland had rushed to the right of his brigade torally them when they had broken before the onset of the Twenty-thirdOhio upon the flank, and in the desperate contest there he had beenkilled and the disaster to his command made irreparable. On our sideColonel Hayes had also been disabled by a severe wound as hegallantly led the Ohio regiment. I now directed the centre and right to push forward toward Fox'sGap. Lieutenant Croome with a section of McMullin's battery had comeup, and he put his guns in action in the most gallant manner in theopen ground near Wise's house. The Thirtieth and Thirty-sixthchanged front to the right and attacked the remnant of Garland'sbrigade, now commanded by Colonel McRae, and drove it and tworegiments from G. B. Anderson's brigade back upon the wooded hillbeyond Wise's farm at Fox's Gap. The whole of Anderson's brigaderetreated further along the crest toward the Mountain House. Meanwhile the Twelfth Ohio, also changing front, had thridded itsway in the same direction through laurel thickets on the reverseslope of the mountain, and attacking suddenly the force at Wise's asthe other two regiments charged it in front, completed the rout andbrought off two hundred prisoners. Bondurant's battery was againdriven hurriedly off to the north. But the hollow at the gap aboutWise's was no place to stay. It was open ground and was swept by thebatteries of the cavalry on the open hill to the northwest, and bythose of Hill's division about the Mountain House and upon thehighlands north of the National road; for those hills run forwardlike a bastion and give a perfect flanking fire along our part ofthe mountain. The gallant Croome with a number of his gunners hadbeen killed, and his guns were brought back into the shelter of thewoods, on the hither side of Wise's fields. The infantry of theright wing was brought to the same position, and our lines werereformed along the curving crests from that point which looks downinto the gap and the Sharpsburg road, toward the left. The extremeright with Croome's two guns was held by the Thirtieth, with theTwenty-eighth in second line. Next came the Twelfth, with theThirty-sixth in second line, the front curving toward the west withthe form of the mountain summit. The left of the Twelfth dipped alittle into a hollow, beyond which the Twenty-third and Eleventhoccupied the next hill facing toward the Sharpsburg road. Our frontwas hollow, for the two wings were nearly at right angles to eachother; but the flanks were strongly placed, the right, which wasmost exposed, having open ground in front which it could sweep withits fire and having the reserve regiments closely supporting it. Part of Simmonds's battery which had also come up had done goodservice in the last combats, and was now disposed so as to check thefire of the enemy. It was time to rest. Three hours of up-hill marching and climbinghad been followed by as long a period of bloody battle, and it wasalmost noon. The troops began to feel the exhaustion of such laborand struggle. We had several hundred prisoners in our hands, and thefield was thickly strewn with dead, in gray and in blue, while ourfield hospital a little down the mountain side was encumbered withhundreds of wounded. We learned from our prisoners that the summitwas held by D. H. Hill's division of five brigades with Stuart'scavalry, and that Longstreet's corps was in close support. I wasmomentarily expecting to hear from the supporting divisions of theNinth Corps, and thought it the part of wisdom to hold fast to ourstrong position astride of the mountain top commanding theSharpsburg road till our force should be increased. The two Kanawhabrigades had certainly won a glorious victory, and had made soassured a success of the day's work that it would be folly toimperil it. [Footnote: For Official Records, see Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 458-474. ] General Hill has since argued that only part of his division couldoppose us; [Footnote: Century War Book, vol. Ii. Pp. 559, etc. ] buthis brigades were all on the mountain summit within easy support ofeach other, and they had the day before them. It was five hours fromthe time of our first charge to the arrival of our first supports, and it was not till three o'clock in the afternoon that Hooker'scorps reached the eastern base of the mountain and began itsdeployment north of the National road. Our effort was to attack theweak end of his line, and we succeeded in putting a stronger forcethere than that which opposed us. It is for our opponent to explainhow we were permitted to do it. The two brigades of the Kanawhadivision numbered less than 3000 men. Hill's division was 5000strong, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 1025. ] evenby the Confederate method of counting their effectives, which shouldbe increased nearly one-fifth to compare properly with our reports. In addition to these Stuart had the principal part of theConfederate cavalry on this line, and they were not idle spectators. Parts of Lee's and Hampton's brigades were certainly there, andprobably the whole of Lee's. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 819. ] With lessthan half the numerical strength which was opposed to it, therefore, the Kanawha division had carried the summit, advancing to the chargefor the most part over open ground in the storm of musketry andartillery fire, and held the crests they had gained through thelivelong day, in spite of all efforts to retake them. In our mountain camps of West Virginia I had felt discontented thatour native Ohio regiments did not take as kindly to the labors ofdrill and camp police as some of German birth, and I had warned themthat they would feel the need of accuracy and mechanical precisionwhen the day of battle came. They had done reasonably well, butsuffered in comparison with some of the others on dress parade andin the form and neatness of the camp. When, however, on the slopesof South Mountain I saw the lines go forward steadier and more evenunder fire than they ever had done at drill, their intelligencemaking them perfectly comprehend the advantage of unity in theireffort and in the shock when they met the foe--when their bodiesseemed to dilate, their step to have better cadence and a tread asof giants as they went cheering up the hill, --I took back all mycriticisms and felt a pride and glory in them as soldiers andcomrades that words cannot express. It was about noon that the lull in the battle occurred, and itlasted a couple of hours, while reinforcements were approaching themountain top from both sides. The enemy's artillery kept up a prettysteady fire, answered occasionally by our few cannon; but theinfantry rested on their arms, the front covered by a watchful lineof skirmishers, every man at his tree. The Confederate guns had soperfectly the range of the sloping fields about and behind us, thattheir canister shot made long furrows in the sod with a noise likethe cutting of a melon rind, and the shells which skimmed the crestand burst in the tree-tops at the lower side of the fields made asound like the crashing and falling of some brittle substance, instead of the tough fibre of oak and pine. We had time to noticethese things as we paced the lines waiting for the renewal of thebattle. Willcox's division reported to me about two o'clock, and would havebeen up earlier, but for a mistake in the delivery of a message tohim. He had sent from Middletown to ask me where I desired him tocome, and finding that the messenger had no clear idea of the roadsby which he had travelled, I directed him to say that GeneralPleasonton would point out the road I had followed, if inquired of. Willcox understood the messenger that I wished him to inquire ofPleasonton where he had better put his division in, and on doing so, the latter suggested that he move against the crests on the north ofthe National road. He was preparing to do this when Burnside andReno came up and corrected the movement, recalling him from thenorth and sending him by the old Sharpsburg road to my position. Ashis head of column came up, Longstreet's corps was already formingwith its right outflanking my left. I sent two regiments [Footnote:In my official report I said one regiment, but General Willcoxreported that he sent two, and he is doubtless right. For hisofficial report, see Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 428. ] toextend my left, and requested Willcox to form the rest of thedivision on my right facing the summit. He was doing this when hereceived an order from General Reno to take position overlooking theNational road facing northward. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] I can hardlythink the order could have been intended to effect this, as theturnpike is deep between the hills there, and the enemy quitedistant on the other side of the gorge. But Willcox, obeying theorder as he received it, formed along the Sharpsburg road, his leftnext to my right, but his line drawn back nearly at right angles toit. He placed Cook's battery in the angle, and this opened a rapidfire on one of the enemy's which was on the bastion-like hill northof the gorge already mentioned. Longstreet's men were now prettywell up, and pushed a battery forward to the edge of the timberbeyond Wise's farm, and opened upon Willcox's line, enfilading itbadly. There was a momentary break there, but Willcox was able tocheck the confusion, and to reform his lines facing westward as Ihad originally directed; Welch's brigade was on my right, closelysupporting Cook's battery and Christ's beyond it. The general lineof Willcox's division was at the eastern edge of the wood lookinginto the open ground at Fox's Gap, on the north side of theSharpsburg road. A warm skirmishing fight was continued along thewhole of our line, our purpose being to hold fast my extreme leftwhich was well advanced upon and over the mountain crest, and toswing the right up to the continuation of the same line of hillsnear the Mountain House. At nearly four o'clock the head of Sturgis's column approached. [Footnote: Sturgis's Report, _Id_. , pt. I. P. 443. ] McClellan hadarrived on the field, and he with Burnside and Reno was atPleasonton's position at the knoll in the valley, and from thatpoint, a central one in the midst of the curving hills, they issuedtheir orders. They could see the firing of the enemy's battery fromthe woods beyond the open ground in front of Willcox, and sentorders to him to take or silence those guns at all hazards. He waspreparing to advance, when the Confederates anticipated him (fortheir formation had now been completed) and came charging out of thewoods across the open fields. It was part of their general advanceand their most determined effort to drive us from the summit we hadgained in the morning. The brigades of Hood, Whiting, Drayton, andD. R. Jones in addition to Hill's division (eight brigades in all)joined in the attack on our side of the National road, batteriesbeing put in every available position. [Footnote: Longstreet'sReport, Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 839. ] The fight ragedfiercely along the whole front, but the bloodiest struggle wasaround Wise's house, where Drayton's brigade assaulted my right andWillcox's left, coming across the open ground. Here the Sharpsburgroad curves around the hill held by us so that for a little way itwas parallel to our position. As the enemy came down the hillforming the other side of the gap, across the road and up again toour line, they were met by so withering a fire that they werechecked quickly, and even drifted more to the right where theirdescent was continuous. Here Willcox's line volleyed into them adestructive fire, followed by a charge that swept them in confusionback along the road, where the men of the Kanawha division took upthe attack and completed their rout. Willcox succeeded in getting afoothold on the further side of the open ground and driving off theartillery which was there. Along our centre and left where theforest was thick, the enemy was equally repulsed, but the cover ofthe timber enabled them to keep a footing near by, whilst theycontinually tried to extend so as to outflank us, moving theirtroops along a road which goes diagonally down that side of themountain from Turner's Gap to Rohrersville. The batteries on thenorth of the National road had been annoying to Willcox's men asthey advanced, but Sturgis sent forward Durell's battery from hisdivision as soon as he came up, and this gave special attention tothese hostile guns, diverting their fire from the infantry. Hooker'smen, of the First Corps, were also by this time pushing up themountain on that side of the turnpike, and we were not againtroubled by artillery on our right flank. It was nearly five o'clock when the enemy had disappeared in thewoods beyond Fox's Gap and Willcox could reform his shattered lines. As the easiest mode of getting Sturgis's fresh men into position, Willcox made room on his left for Ferrero's brigade supported byNagle's, doubling also his lines at the extreme right. Rodman'sdivision, the last of the corps, now began to reach the summit, andas the report came from the extreme left that the enemy wasstretching beyond our flank, I sent Fairchild's brigade to assistour men there, whilst Rodman took Harland's to the support ofWillcox. A staff officer now brought word that McClellan directedthe whole line to advance. At the left this could only mean to clearour front decisively of the enemy there, for the slopes wentsteadily down to the Rohrersville road. At the centre and right, whilst we held Fox's Gap, the high and rocky summit at the MountainHouse was still in the enemy's possession. The order came to me assenior officer upon the line, and the signal was given. On the leftLongstreet's men were pushed down the mountain side beyond theRohrersville and Sharpsburg roads, and the contest there was ended. The two hills between the latter road and the turnpike were stillheld by the enemy, and the further one could not be reached till theMountain House should be in our hands. Sturgis and Willcox, supported by Rodman, again pushed forward, but whilst they madeprogress they were baffled by a stubborn and concentratedresistance. Reno had followed Rodman's division up the mountain, and came to mea little before sunset, anxious to know why the right could not getforward quite to the summit. I explained that the ground there wasvery rough and rocky, a fortress in itself and evidently verystrongly held. He passed on to Sturgis, and it seemed to me he washardly gone before he was brought back upon a stretcher, dead. Hehad gone to the skirmish line to examine for himself the situation, and had been shot down by the enemy posted among the rocks andtrees. There was more or less firing on that part of the field tilllate in the evening, but when morning dawned the Confederates hadabandoned the last foothold above Turner's Gap and retreated by wayof Boonsboro to Sharpsburg. The casualties in the Ninth Corps hadbeen 889, of which 356 were in the Kanawha division. Some 600 of theenemy were captured by my division and sent to the rear under guard. On the north of the National road the First Corps under Hooker hadbeen opposed by one of Hill's brigades and four of Longstreet's, andhad gradually worked its way along the old Hagerstown road, crowningthe heights in that direction after dark in the evening. Gibbon'sbrigade had also advanced in the National road, crowding up quiteclose to Turner's Gap and engaging the enemy in a lively combat. Itis not my purpose to give a detailed history of events which did notcome under my own eye. It is due to General Burnside, however, tonote Hooker's conduct toward his immediate superior and hischaracteristic efforts to grasp all the glory of the battle at theexpense of truth and of honorable dealing with his commander and hiscomrades. Hooker's official report for the battle of South Mountainwas dated at Washington, November 17th, when Burnside was in commandof the Army of the Potomac, and when the intrigues of the former toobtain the command for himself were notorious and near their finalsuccess. In it he studiously avoided any recognition of orders ordirections received from Burnside, and ignores his staff, whilst heassumes that his orders came directly from McClellan and complimentsthe staff officers of the latter, as if they had been the only meansof communication. This was not only insolent but a military offence, had Burnside chosen to prosecute it. He also asserts that the troopson our part of the line had been defeated and were at the turnpikeat the base of the mountain in retreat when he went forward. At theclose of his report, after declaring that "the forcing of thepassage of South Mountain will be classed among the most brilliantand satisfactory achievements of this army, " he adds, "its principalglory will be awarded to the First Corps. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 214-215. ] Nothing is more justly odious in military conduct than embodyingslanders against other commands in an official report. It puts intothe official records misrepresentations which cannot be met becausethey are unknown, and it is a mere accident if those who know thetruth are able to neutralize their effect. In most cases it will betoo late to counteract the mischief when those most interested learnof the slanders. All this is well illustrated in the present case. Hooker's report got on file months after the battle, and it was nottill the January following that Burnside gave it his attention. Ibelieve that none of the division commanders of the Ninth Corpslearned of it till long afterward. I certainly did not till 1887, aquarter of a century after the battle, when the volume of theofficial records containing it was published. Burnside had asked tobe relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac after thebattle of Fredericksburg unless Hooker among others was punished forinsubordination. As in the preceding August, the popular sentimentof that army as an organization was again, in Mr. Lincoln'sestimation, too potent a factor to be opposed, and the result wasthe superseding of Burnside by Hooker himself, though the Presidentdeclared in the letter accompanying the appointment that thelatter's conduct had been blameworthy. It was under thesecircumstances that Burnside learned of the false statements inHooker's report of South Mountain, and put upon file his stingingresponse to it. His explicit statement of the facts will settle thatquestion among all who know the reputation of the men, and thoughunprincipled ambition was for a time successful, that time was soshort and things were "set even" so soon that the ultimate result isone that lovers of justice may find comfort in. [Footnote: The text of Burnside's supplemental report is asfollows:-- "When I sent in my report of the part taken by my command in thebattle of South Mountain, General Hooker, who commanded one of thecorps of my command (the right wing), had not sent in his report, but it has since been sent to me. I at first determined to pass overits inaccuracies as harmless, or rather as harming only theirauthor; but upon reflection I have felt it my duty to notice twogross misstatements made with reference to the commands of GeneralsReno and Cox, the former officer having been killed on that day, andthe latter now removed with his command to the West. "General Hooker says that as he came up to the front, Cox's corpswas retiring from the contest. This is untrue. General Cox did notcommand a corps, but a division; and that division was in action, fighting most gallantly, long before General Hooker came up, andremained in the action all day, never leaving the field for onemoment. He also says that he discovered that the attack by GeneralReno's corps was without sequence. This is also untrue, and whensaid of an officer who so nobly fought and died on that same field, it partakes of something worse than untruthfulness. Every officerpresent who knew anything of the battle knows that Reno performed amost important part in the battle, his corps driving the enemy fromthe heights on one side of the main pike, whilst that of GeneralHooker drove them from the heights on the other side. "General Hooker should remember that I had to order him fourseparate times to move his command into action, and that I had tomyself order his leading division (Meade's) to start before he wouldgo. " Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 422. ]The men of the First Corps and its officers did their duty nobly onthat as on many another field, and the only spot on the honor of theday is made by the personal unscrupulousness and vainglory of itscommander. Franklin's corps had attacked and carried the ridge about five milesfurther south, at Crampton's Gap, where the pass had been sostubbornly defended by Mahone's and Cobb's brigades with artilleryand a detachment of Hampton's cavalry as to cause considerable lossto our troops. The principal fighting was at a stone wall near theeastern base of the mountain, and when the enemy was routed fromthis position, he made no successful rally and the summit was gainedwithout much more fighting. The attack at the stone wall not farfrom Burkettsville was made at about three o'clock in the afternoon. The Sixth Corps rested upon the summit at night. CHAPTER XIV ANTIETAM: PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS Lee's plan of invasion--Changed by McClellan's advance--The positionat Sharpsburg--Our routes of march--At the Antietam--McClellanreconnoitring--Lee striving to concentrate--Our delays--Tuesday'squiet--Hooker's evening march--The Ninth Corps command--Changing ourpositions--McClellan's plan of battle--Hooker's eveningskirmish--Mansfield goes to support Hooker--Confederatepositions--Jackson arrives--McLaws and Walker reach the field--Theirplaces. Before morning on the 15th of September it became evident that Leehad used the night in withdrawing his army. An advance of thepickets at daybreak confirmed this, and Pleasonton's cavalry waspushed forward to Boonsboro, where they had a brisk skirmish withthe enemy's rear-guard. At Boonsboro a turnpike to Sharpsburg leavesthe National road, and the retreat of the Confederate cavalry, aswell as other indications, pointed out the Sharpsburg road as theline of Lee's retreat. He had abandoned his plan of moving furthernorthward, and had chosen a line bringing him into surercommunication with Jackson. His movements before the battle of SouthMountain revealed a purpose of invasion identical with that which hetried to carry out in 1863 in the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet, with two divisions and a brigade (D. R. Jones, Hood, and Evans), hadadvanced to Hagerstown, and it seems that a large part of theConfederate trains reached there also. D. H. Hill's division heldBoonsboro and the passes of South Mountain at Turner's and Fox'sGaps. McLaws invested our fortifications on Maryland Heights, supported by R. H. Anderson's division. Jackson, with four divisions(A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Starke of his own corps, with Walkertemporarily reporting to him), was besieging Harper's Ferry. On Saturday, the 13th, Lee determined to draw back Longstreet fromhis advanced position, in view of the fact that Jackson had not yetreduced Harper's Ferry and that McClellan was marching to itsrelief. Longstreet's divisions therefore approached Boonsboro so asto support D. H. Hill, and thus it happened that they took part inthe battle of South Mountain. Hill again occupied the summit wherewe found him on the 14th. From all this it is very plain that ifMcClellan had hastened his advance on the 13th, the passes of SouthMountain at Turner's and Fox's gaps would not have been occupied inforce by the enemy, and the condition of things would have been whathe believed it was on the morning of the 14th, when a single brigadehad been thought enough to support Pleasonton's reconnoissance. Twenty-four hours had changed all that. The turnpike from Boonsboro to Sharpsburg continues southward acouple of miles, crossing the Potomac to Shepherdstown, which lieson the Virginia side of the river. A bridge which formerly carriedthe road over the stream had been burned; but not far below theruined piers was a ford, which was a pretty good one in the presentstage of water. Shepherdstown was the natural place of junction forLee and Jackson; but for Lee to have marched there at once wouldhave exposed Jackson to attack from the northern side of thePotomac. The precious stores and supplies captured at Harper's Ferrymust be got to a place of safety, and this was likely to delayJackson a day or two. Lee therefore ordered McLaws to obstructFranklin's movement as much as he could, whilst he himselfconcentrated the rest of Longstreet's corps at Sharpsburg, behindthe Antietam. If McClellan's force should prove overwhelming, thepast experience of the Confederate general encouraged him to believethat our advance would not be so enterprising that he could not makea safe retreat into Virginia. He resolved therefore to halt atSharpsburg, which offered an excellent field for a defensive battle, leaving himself free to resume his aggressive campaign or to retreatinto Virginia according to the result. McClellan had ordered Richardson's division of the Second Corps tosupport the cavalry in the advance, and Hooker's corps followedRichardson. [Footnote: Hooker's Report, Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 216. ] It would seem most natural that the whole ofSumner's wing should take the advance on the 15th, though thebreaking up of organizations was so much a habit with McClellan thatperhaps it should not be surprising that one of Sumner's divisionswas thus separated from the rest, and that Burnside's right wing wasalso divided. [Footnote: We must not forget the fact, however, thatthe order dividing the army into wings was suspended on thatmorning, and that this gives to the incident the air of anintentional reduction of the wing commanders to the control of asingle corps. Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 297. ] The NinthCorps was ordered to follow the old Sharpsburg road through Fox'sGap, our line of march being thus parallel to the others till weshould reach the road from Boonsboro to Sharpsburg. But we were not put in motion early in the day. We were orderedfirst to bury the dead, and to send the wounded and prisoners toMiddletown It was nearly noon when we got orders to march, and whenthe head of column filed into the road, the way was blocked byPorter's corps, which was moving to the front by the same road. Assoon as the way was clear, we followed, leaving a small detachmentto complete the other tasks which had been assigned us. In thewooded slope of the mountain west of the gap, a good many of theConfederate dead still lay where they had fallen in the fiercecombats for the possession of the crest near Wise's house. Our roadled through a little hamlet called Springvale, and thence toanother, Porterstown, near the left bank of the Antietam, where itruns into the Boonsboro and Sharpsburg turnpike. Sumner's two corpshad taken temporary position on either side of the turnpike, behindthe line of hills which there borders the stream. Porter's corps wasmassed in rear of Sumner, and Hooker's had been moved off to theright, around Keedysville. I was with the Kanawha division, assumingthat my temporary command of the corps ended with the battle on themountain. As we came up in rear of the troops already assembled, wereceived orders to turn off the road to the left, and halted ourbattalions closed in mass. It was now about three o'clock in theafternoon. McClellan, as it seemed, had just reached the field, andwas surrounded by a group of his principal officers, most of whom Ihad never seen before. I rode up with General Burnside, dismounted, and was very cordially greeted by General McClellan. He and Burnsidewere evidently on terms of most intimate friendship and familiarity. He introduced me to the officers I had not known before, referringpleasantly to my service with him in Ohio and West Virginia, puttingme upon an easy footing with them in a very agreeable and genialway. We walked up the slope of the ridge before us, and looking westwardfrom its crest, the whole field of the coming battle was before us. Immediately in front the Antietam wound through the hollow, thehills rising gently on both sides. In the background, on our left, was the village of Sharpsburg, with fields enclosed by stone fencesin front of it. At its right was a bit of wood (since known as theWest Wood), with the little Dunker Church standing out white andsharp against it. Farther to the right and left, the scene wasclosed in by wooded ridges with open farm lands between, the wholemaking as pleasing and prosperous a landscape as can easily beimagined. [Illustration: Map] We made a large group as we stood upon the hill, and it was not longbefore we attracted the enemy's attention. A puff of white smokefrom a knoll on the right of the Sharpsburg road was followed by thescreaming of a shell over our heads. McClellan directed that all butone or two should retire behind the ridge, while he continued thereconnoissance, walking slowly to the right. I think Fitz-JohnPorter was the only general officer who was retained as a companionin this walk. I noted with satisfaction the cool and business-likeair with which McClellan made his examination under fire. TheConfederate artillery was answered by a battery of ours, and alively cannonade ensued on both sides, though without any noticeableeffect. The enemy's position was revealed, and he was evidently inforce on both sides of the turnpike in front of Sharpsburg, coveredby the undulations of the rolling ground which hid his infantry fromour sight. The examination of the enemy's position and the discussion of itcontinued till near the close of the day. Orders were then given forthe Ninth Corps to move to the left, keeping off the road, which wasoccupied by other troops. We moved through fields and farm lands, anhour's march in the dusk of evening, going into bivouac about a milesouth of the Sharpsburg bridge, and in rear of the hills borderingthe Antietam. The village of Sharpsburg is in the midst of a plateau which isalmost enclosed by the Potomac River and the Antietam. The Potomacbounds it on the south and west, and the Antietam on the east. Theplateau in general outline may be considered a parallelogram, fourmiles in length from north to south, and two and a half miles inwidth inside the bends of the river. The northern side of thisterrain appears the narrowest, for here the river curves sharplyaway to the west, nearly doubling the width of the field above andbelow the bend. From the village the ground descends in alldirections, though a continuous ridge runs northward, on which isthe Hagerstown turnpike. The Boonsboro turnpike enters the villagefrom the northeast, crossing the Antietam on a stone bridge, andcontinuing through Sharpsburg to the southwest, reachesShepherdstown by the ford of the Potomac already mentioned. TheHagerstown turnpike enters the town from the north, passing theDunker Church a mile out, and goes nearly due south, crossing theAntietam at its mouth, and continuing down the Potomac towardHarper's Ferry. The Antietam is a deep creek, with few fords at an ordinary stage ofwater, and the principal roads cross it upon stone bridges. Of thesethere were three within the field of battle; the upper one in frontof Keedysville, the middle one upon the Boonsboro turnpike, and thelower one on the Sharpsburg and Rohrersville road, since known asBurnside's bridge. McClellan's staff was better supplied withofficers of engineers than the staff of most of our separate armies, and Captain Duane, his chief engineer, systematized the work ofgathering topographical information. This was communicated to thegeneral officers in connection with the orders which were giventhem. In this way we were instructed that the only fords of theAntietam passable at that time were one between the two upperbridges named, and another about half a mile below Burnside'sbridge, in a deep bend of the stream. We found, however, during theengagement of the 17th, another practicable crossing for infantry ashort distance above the bridge. This was not a ford in common use, but in the low stage of water at the time it was made available fora small force. It was about noon of the 15th of September that Lee placed theforces which he had in hand across the turnpike in front ofSharpsburg. D. H. Hill's division was on the north of the road, andon the south of it Longstreet's own old division (now under GeneralD. R. Jones), Hood's division, and Evans's independent brigade. Stuart's cavalry and the reserve artillery were also present. Therest of the army was with Jackson at Harper's Ferry, or co-operatingwith him in the neighborhood of Maryland Heights. Out of forty-fourbrigades, Lee could put but fourteen or fifteen in line that day tooppose McClellan. He was very strong in artillery, however, and hiscannon looked grimly over the hill-crests behind which his infantrywere lying. Cutts's and Jones's battalions of the reserve artillerywere ordered to report to Hill for the protection of the left of theConfederate line, and gave him in all the sixty or seventy gunswhich he speaks of in his report, and which have puzzled severalwriters who have described the battle. Whenever our troops showedthemselves as they marched into position, they were saluted fromshotted cannon, and the numerous batteries that were developed onthe long line of hills before us no doubt did much to impressMcClellan with the belief that he had the great bulk of Lee's armybefore him. The value of time was one of the things McClellan never understood. He should have been among the first in the saddle at every step inthe campaign after he was in possession of Lee's order of the 9th, and should have infused energy into every unit in his army. Insteadof making his reconnoissance at three in the afternoon of Monday, itmight have been made at ten in the morning, and the battle couldhave been fought before night, if, indeed, Lee had not promptlyretreated when support from Jackson would thus have becomeimpossible. Or if McClellan had pushed boldly for the bridge at themouth of the Antietam, nothing but a precipitate retreat by Leecould have prevented the interposition of the whole National armybetween the separated wings of the Confederates. The opportunity wasstill supremely favorable for McClellan, but prompt decision was noteasy for him. Nothing but reconnoitring was done on Monday afternoonor on Tuesday, whilst Lee was straining every nerve to concentratehis forces and to correct what would have proven a fatal blunder inscattering them, had his opponent acted with vigor. The strongestdefence the eulogists of the Confederate general have made for himis that he perfectly understood McClellan's caution and calculatedwith confidence upon it; that he would have been at liberty toperfect his combinations still more at leisure, but for the accidentby which the copy of his plan had fallen into our hands at FrederickCity. During the 16th we confidently expected a battle, and I kept with mydivision. In the afternoon I saw General Burnside, and learned fromhim that McClellan had determined to let Hooker make a movement onour extreme right to turn Lee's position. Burnside's manner inspeaking of this implied that he thought it was done at Hooker'ssolicitation, and through his desire, openly evinced, to beindependent in command. I urged Burnside to assume the immediatecommand of the corps and allow me to lead my own division. Heobjected that as he had been announced as commander of the rightwing of the army, composed of the two corps, he was unwilling towaive his precedence or to assume that Hooker was detached foranything more than a temporary purpose. I pointed out that Reno'sstaff had been granted leave of absence to take the body of theirchief to Washington, and that my division staff was too small forcorps duty; but he met this by saying that he would use his stafffor this purpose, and help me in every way he could till the crisisof the campaign should be over. Sympathizing with his very naturalfeeling, I ceased objecting, and accepted with as good grace as Icould the unsatisfactory position of nominal commander of the corpsto which I was a comparative stranger, and which, under thecircumstances, naturally looked to him as its accustomed and realcommander. Burnside's intentions in respect to myself werethoroughly friendly, as he afterward proved, and I had no ground forcomplaint on this score; but the position of second in command isalways an awkward and anomalous one, and such I felt it. The 16th passed without serious fighting, though we had desultorycannonading and picket firing. It was hard to restrain our men fromshowing themselves on the crest of the long ridge in front of us, and whenever they did so they drew the fire from some of the enemy'sbatteries, to which ours would respond. McClellan reconnoitred theline of the Antietam near us, and the country immediately on ourleft, down the valley. As the result of this we were ordered tochange our positions at nightfall, staff officers being sent toguide each division to its new camp. The selected positions weremarked by McClellan's engineers, who then took members of Burnside'sstaff to identify the locations, and these in turn conducted ourdivisions. There was far more routine of this sort in that army thanI ever saw elsewhere. Corps and division commanders should have theresponsibility of protecting their own flanks and in choosingordinary camps. To depend upon the general staff for this is to takeaway the vigor and spontaneity of the subordinate and make himperform his duty in a mechanical way. He should be told what isknown of the enemy and his movements so as to be put upon his guard, and should then have freedom of judgment as to details. The changesmade were as follows: Rodman's division went half a mile further tothe left, where a country road led to the Antietam ford, half a milebelow the Burnside bridge. Sturgis's division was placed on thesides of the road leading to the stone bridge just mentioned. Willcox's was put in reserve in rear of Sturgis. My own was divided, Scammon's brigade going with Rodman, and Crook's going with Sturgis. Crook was ordered to take the advance in crossing the bridge in casewe should be ordered to attack. This selection was made by Burnsidehimself as a compliment to the division for the vigor of its assaultat South Mountain. While we were moving we heard Hooker's guns faroff on the right and front, and the cannonade continued an hour ormore after it became dark. What, then, was the plan of battle of which the first step was thismovement of Hooker's? McClellan's dispositions on the 15th were madewhilst Franklin's corps was still absent, and, under the orders hereceived, was likely to be so for a day at least. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 29. ] Sumner's two corps hadbeen treated as the centre of the army in hand, Burnside's had beendivided by putting Hooker on the extreme right and the Ninth Corpson the extreme left, and Porter's corps was in reserve. This lookedas if a general attack in front with this organization of the armywere intended. But the more McClellan examined the enemy's positionthe less inclined he was to attack the centre. He could cross thebridge there and on the right, and deploy; but the gentle slopesrising toward Sharpsburg were swept by formidable batteries andoffered no cover to advancing troops. The enemy's infantry wasbehind stone fences and in sunken roads, whilst ours must advanceover the open. Lee's right rested upon the wooded bluffs above theBurnside bridge, where it could only be approached by a small headof column charging along the narrow roadway under a concentratedfire of cannon and small arms. No point of attack on the whole fieldwas so unpromising as this. Then, as Jackson was still at Harper'sFerry, there was the contingency of an attack in rear if anythingless than the mass of our army were pushed beyond Lee's right. On our right, in front of Hooker, it was easy to turn theConfederate line. The road from Keedysville through Smoketown to theHagerstown turnpike crossed the Antietam in a hollow, out of theline of fire, and a march around Lee's left flank could be madealmost wholly under cover. The topography of the field thereforesuggested a flank attack from our right, if the National commanderrejected the better strategy of interposing his army between Lee andJackson as too daring a movement. This flank attack McClellandetermined to make, and some time after noon of the 16th issued hisorders accordingly. In his preliminary report of the battle, madebefore he was relieved from command, McClellan says:-- "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left, --atleast to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with thehope of something more, by assailing the enemy's right, --and as soonas one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, toattack their centre with any reserve I might then have in hand. "[Footnote: O R. , vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 30. ] His report covering his whole career in the war, dated August 4, 1863 (and published February, 1864, after warm controversies hadarisen, and he had become a political character), modifies the abovestatement in some important particulars. It says:-- "My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack theenemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield supported bySumner's and if necessary by Franklin's, and as soon as matterslooked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against theenemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and rearof Sharpsburg, and having carried their position to press along thecrest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movementsshould be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces thendisposable. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix, pt. I, p. 55. ] The opinion I got from Burnside at the time, as to the part theNinth Corps was to take, was fairly consistent with the design firstquoted, namely, that when the attack by Sumner, Hooker, and Franklinshould be progressing favorably, we were "to create a diversion infavor of the main attack, with the hope of something more. " It isalso probable that Hooker's movement was at first intended to bemade by his corps alone, the attack to be taken up by Sumner's twocorps as soon as Hooker began, and to be shared in by Franklin if hereached the field in time, thus making a simultaneous oblique attackfrom our right by the whole army except Porter's corps, which was inreserve, and the Ninth Corps, which was to create the "diversion" onour left and prevent the enemy from stripping his right to reinforcehis left. It is hardly disputable that this would have been a betterplan than the one actually carried out. Certainly the assumptionthat the Ninth Corps could cross the Antietam alone at the onlyplace on the field where the Confederates had their line immediatelyupon the stream which must be crossed under fire by two narrow headsof column, and could then turn to the right along the high groundoccupied by the hostile army before that army had been broken orseriously shaken elsewhere, is one which would hardly be made tilltime had dimmed the remembrance of the actual position of Lee'sdivisions upon the field. It is also noticeable that the plan asgiven in the final report leaves no "centre" with which to "advance"when either of the flank movements should be successful, Porter'scorps in reserve being the only one not included in the movement asdescribed. Further evidence that the plan did not originally include the wideseparation of two corps to the right to make the extended turningmovement is found in Hooker's incomplete report, and in the wideinterval in time between the marching of his corps and that ofMansfield. Hooker was ordered to cross the Antietam at about twoo'clock in the afternoon of the 16th by the bridge in front ofKeedysville and the ford below it. He says that after his troopswere over and in march, he rode back to McClellan, who told him thathe might call for reinforcements, and that when they came theyshould be under his command. Somewhat later McClellan rode forwardwith his staff to observe the progress making, and Hooker againurged the necessity of reinforcements. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 217. ] Yet Sumner did not receive orders to sendMansfield's corps to his support till evening, and it marched onlyhalf an hour before midnight, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 275. ] reachingits bivouac, about a mile and a half in rear of that of Hooker, at 2A. M. Of the 17th. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 475. ] After crossing the Antietam, Hooker had shaped his course to thewestward, aiming to reach the ridge on which the Hagerstown turnpikeruns, and which is the dominant feature in the landscape. This ridgeis about two miles distant from the Antietam, and for the first mileof the way no resistance was met. However, his progress had beenobserved by the enemy, and Hood's two brigades were taken from thecentre and passed to the left of D. H. Hill. Here they occupied anopen wood (since known as the East Wood) northeast of the DunkerChurch. Hooker was now trying to approach the Confederate positions, Meade's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves being in the advance. A sharp skirmishing combat ensued, and artillery was brought intoaction on both sides. I have mentioned our hearing the noise of thisengagement from the other extremity of the field in the fading lightof evening. On our side Seymour's brigade had been chiefly engaged, and had felt the enemy so vigorously that Hood supposed he hadrepulsed a serious effort to take the wood. Hooker was, however, aiming to pass quite beyond the flank, and kept his other divisionsnorth of the hollow beyond the wood, and upon the ridge whichreaches the turnpike near the largest re-entrant bend of thePotomac, which is only half a mile distant. Here he bivouacked uponthe slopes of the ridge, Doubleday's division resting with its rightupon the turnpike, Ricketts's division upon the left of Doubleday, and Meade covering the front of both with the skirmishers ofSeymour's brigade. Between Meade's skirmishers and the ridge werethe farmhouse and barn of J. Poffenberger, on the east side of theroad, where Hooker made his own quarters for the night. Half a milefurther in front was the farm of D. R. Miller, the dwelling on theeast, and the barn surrounded by stacks on the west of the road. [Footnote: Hooker's unfinished report says he slept in the barn ofD. R. Miller, but he places it on the east of the road, and the spotis fully identified as Poffenberger's by General Gibbon, whocommanded the right brigade, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Rufus R. Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin (afterward Brevet Brigadier-General), both ofwhom subsequently visited the field and determined the positions. ]Mansfield's corps (the Twelfth), marching as it did late in thenight, kept further to the right than Hooker's, but moved on anearly parallel course, and bivouacked on the farm of another J. Poffenberger, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 275, 475. ] near the road which, branching from the Hagerstown turnpike atthe Dunker Church, intersects the one running from Keedysvillethrough Smoketown to the same turnpike about a mile north ofHooker's position. [Footnote: See map, p. 299. ] On the Confederate side, Hood's division had been so roughly handledthat it was replaced by two brigades of Ewell's division (commandedby Lawton), which with Jackson's own (commanded by J. R. Jones) hadbeen led to the field from Harper's Ferry by Jackson, reachingSharpsburg in the afternoon of the 16th. These divisions were formedon the left of D. H. Hill, and in continuation of his line along theturnpike, but with a brigade advanced to the East Wood, which washeld as a salient. Hood's division, on being relieved, was placed inreserve near the Dunker Church, and spent part of the night incooking rations, of which its supply had been short for a day ortwo. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 923. ] Thecombatants on both sides slept upon their arms, well knowing thatthe dawn would bring bloody work. During the evening McClellan issued orders looking toward thejoining of a general engagement at daybreak. McLaws's Confederatedivision, which had been opposing Franklin, crossed the Potomac atMaryland Heights, and marched by way of Shepherdstown, reachingSharpsburg on the morning of the 17th. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 855, 856. ] Walker's division, which had come from Harper's Ferry on the16th, extended Lee's right down the Antietam, covering the ford atwhich Rodman, on our side, was expected to cross. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 914. ] A. P. Hill's division was the only force of the enemycompleting the work at Harper's Ferry, and Franklin was ordered toleave Couch's division to observe Hill's movements from our side ofthe Potomac, and to bring the remainder of his corps on the fieldearly in the morning. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 376. ] In the respitegiven him since Sunday, Lee had therefore concentrated all his armybut one division, and was better ready for the battle thanMcClellan, for Franklin's corps could come upon the field only aftera considerable march, and he did not, in fact, reach it till teno'clock or later. Sumner was ordered to have the Second Corps readyto march an hour before day, but he had no authority to move tillexplicit orders to that effect should reach him. I have said thatHooker claims in his report that the promise was made him thatMansfield's corps, when it came to reinforce him, should be underhis orders. If this were so, it would unite all the troops nowpresent which had fought in Pope's Army of Virginia. I find notrace, however, in the reports of the battle, that Hooker exercisedany such command. He seems to have confined his work to theindependent action of his own corps until Mansfield's death, and washimself disabled almost immediately afterward. As there werecommanders of wings of the army duly designated, and two corps werenow separated by a long interval from the rest in an independentturning movement, it can hardly be debated that that was the placeof all others where one of them should have been, unless McClellanwere there in person. Had Burnside's two corps been kept together asthe right wing, the right attack could have been made a unit. IfSumner had then been directed to keep in communication withBurnside, and to advance when the latter did, nobody will doubt thatSumner would have been prompt in sustaining his comrades. But bothSumner and Burnside were made to feel that they were reduced fromtheir proper rank, and however conscientious they might be incarrying out such orders as reached them, it was not in human naturethat they should volunteer suggestions or anticipate commands. McClellan had thus thrown away the advantages, if there were any, inholding only two or three men directly responsible for theco-ordination of his movements, and had assumed the full personalresponsibility of watching each phase of the battle and suiting theproper orders to each conjuncture as it should arise. CHAPTER XV ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT Hooker astir early--The field near the Dunker Church--Artillerycombat--Positions of Hooker's divisions--Rocky ledges in thewoods--Advance of Doubleday through Miller's orchard andgarden--Enemy's fire from West Wood--They rush for Gibbon'sbattery--Repulse--Advance of Patrick's brigade--Fierce fightingalong the turnpike--Ricketts's division in the East Wood--Fresheffort of Meade's division in the centre--A lull in thebattle--Mansfield's corps reaches the field--Conflicting opinions asto the hour--Mansfield killed--Command devolves on Williams--Advancethrough East Wood--Hooker wounded--Meade in command of the corps--Itwithdraws--Greene's division reaches the Dunker Church--Crawford'sin the East Wood--Terrible effects on the Confederates--Sumner'scorps coming up--Its formation--It moves on the Dunker Church fromthe east--Divergence of the divisions--Sedgwick's passes to right ofGreene--Attacked in flank and broken--Rallying at the Poffenbergerhill--Twelfth Corps hanging on near the church--Advance of French'sdivision--Richardson follows later--Bloody Lane reached--The Piperhouse--Franklin's corps arrives--Charge of Irwin's brigade. Before the break of day on Wednesday the 17th, it was discoveredthat Doubleday's division of Hooker's corps lay exposed to artilleryfire from batteries of the enemy supposed to be in position on theirfront and right. In rousing the men and changing their place, thestillness of the night was so far broken that the Confederatesbelieved they were advancing to attack, and a lively cannonade andpicket firing anticipated the dawn. [Footnote: R. R. Dawes, Servicewith the Sixth Wisconsin, p. 87. ] The chance for getting theirbreakfast was thus destroyed, and Hooker prepared his whole commandfor action as soon as it should be light enough to move. Lookingsouth from the Poffenberger farm along the turnpike, he then saw agently rolling landscape of which the commanding point was theDunker Church, whose white brick walls appeared on the right of theroad, backed by the foliage of the West Wood, which came toward himfilling a hollow that ran parallel to the turnpike, with a singlerow of fields between. On the east side of the turnpike was theMiller house, with its barn and stack-yard across the road to theright, and beyond these the ground dipped into a little depression. Still further on was seen a large cornfield between the East Woodand the turnpike, rising again to the higher level, and Hookernoticed the glint from a long line of bayonets beyond the corn, struck by the first rays of the rising sun. There was, however, another little hollow at the further side of the cornfield, whichcould not be seen from Hooker's position; and on the farthest ridge, near the church and extending across the turnpike toward the EastWood, were the Confederate lines, partly sheltered by piles of railstaken from the fences. They looked to Hooker as if they weredeployed along the edge of the corn, but an open sloping field laybetween the corn and them, after passing the second hollow. It wasplain that the high ground about the little white church was the keyof the enemy's position, and if that could be carried, Hooker's taskwould be well done. The enemy's artillery had opened early from a high hill nearly eastof the Miller house in a position to strike our forces in flank andrear as they should go forward, and Hooker placed batteries on theequally commanding height above Poffenberger's and detachedHofmann's brigade from Doubleday's division to support it and toprevent the enemy from turning our extreme right. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 224. ] This force maintainedits position during the day, and was the nucleus about which bothHooker's and Sedgwick's men rallied after their fight. The enemy'sartillery referred to were several batteries under Stuart's commandsupported by his cavalry and by Early's brigade of infantry whichJackson detached for that purpose. [Footnote: Official Records vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 819. ] Doubleday's division (except Hofmann), was in two lines, Gibbon'sand Phelps's in front, supported by Patrick's. Of Meade's divisionSeymour's brigade, which had sustained the combat of the eveningbefore, had continued to cover the front with skirmishers during thenight, and remained on the northeast side of the East Wood. Theother brigades (Anderson and Magilton) were placed in reserve behindDoubleday. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 269. ] The Tenth RegimentPennsylvania Reserves was sent from Anderson's to a strong positionwest of the turnpike near the extremity of the strip of woodnorthwest of the Miller house. It was among ledges of rock lookinginto the ravine beyond which were Stuart and Early. The ravine wasthe continuation northward to the Potomac of a little watercoursewhich headed near the Dunker Church and along one side of which theWest Wood lay, the outcrop of rock making broken ledges along itswhole length. Indeed, all the pieces of wood in the neighborhoodseemed to be full of such rocks, and for that reason had beenallowed to remain in forest. The regiment was ordered to cover itsfront with skirmishers and to hold its position at all hazards. Ricketts's division had bivouacked in a wood east of Doubleday's. Its three brigades (Duryea's, Hartsuff's, and Christian's) weredeployed on the left of Doubleday, and were to march toward theDunker Church through the East Wood, passing the line of Seymour'sbrigade, which was then to become its support. The Confederates opened a rapid artillery fire from the open groundin front of the Dunker Church as well as from Stuart's position, andHooker answered the challenge by an immediate order for his line toadvance. Doubleday directed Gibbon, who was on the right, to guideupon the turnpike. Patrick remained for a time in the wood north ofthe Miller house, till he should be needed at the front. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 224. ] Doubleday and hisbrigade commanders seem to have supposed that Meade's men occupiedpart at least of the West Wood, and that they would cover Gibbon'sflank as he advanced. This belief was based on the stationing of theTenth Pennsylvania Reserves; but that regiment was fifteen or twentyrods north of the northern end of the West Wood, and Gibbon's rightflank, as he advanced, was soon exposed to attack from Ewell'sdivision (Lawton in command), which held the wood, hidden from viewand perfectly protected by the slope of the ground and the forest, as they looked over the rim into the undulating open fields infront. Part of Battery B, Fourth United States Artillery (Gibbon'sown battery), was run forward to Miller's barn and stack-yard on theright of the road, and fired over the heads of the advancingregiments. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 229, 248. ] Other batteries weresimilarly placed, more to the left, and our cannon roared from allthe hill crests encircling the field. The line moved swiftly forwardthrough Miller's orchard and kitchen garden, breaking through astout picket fence on the near side, down into the moist ground ofthe hollow, and up through the corn which was higher than theirheads and shut out everything from view. [Footnote: Dawes, SixthWisconsin, p. 88. ] At the southern side of the field they came to alow fence, beyond which was the open field already mentioned, andthe enemy's line at the further side of it. But the cornfield onlycovered part of the line, and Gibbon's right had outmarched theleft, which had been exposed to a terrible fire. The direction takenhad been a little oblique, so that the right wing of the SixthWisconsin (the flanking regiment) had crossed the turnpike and wassuddenly assailed by a sharp fire from the West Wood on its flank. They swung back into the road, lying down along the high, stoutpost-and-rail fence, keeping up their fire by shooting between therails. [Footnote: Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 89. ] Leaving this little band to protect their right, the main line, which had come up on the left, leaped the fence at the south edge ofthe cornfield, and charged up hill across the open at the enemy infront. But the concentrated fire of artillery and musketry was morethan they could bear. Men fell by scores and hundreds, and thethinned lines gave way and ran for the shelter of the corn. Theywere rallied in the hollow on the north side of the field. The enemyhad rapidly extended his left under cover of the West Wood, and nowmade a dash at the right flank and at Gibbon's exposed guns. His menon the right faced by that flank and followed him bravely, thoughwith little order, in a dash at the Confederates who were swarmingout of the wood. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 91. ] The gunnersdouble-charged the cannon with canister, and under a terrible fireof artillery and rifles Lawton's division broke and sought shelter. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 248. ] Patrick's brigade had now come up in support of Gibbon, and was sentacross the turnpike into the West Wood to cover that flank, tworegiments of Gibbon's going with him. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 243. ] Hismen pushed forward, the enemy retiring, until they were in advanceof the principal line in the cornfield upon which the Confederatesof Jackson's division were now marching to attack. Patrick faced hisbrigade to the left, parallel to the edge of the wood and to theturnpike, and poured his fire into the flank of the enemy, followingit by a charge through the field and up to the fence along the road. Again the Confederates were driven back, but their left came forwardin the wood again, attacking Patrick's right, forcing him to resumehis original direction of front and to retire to the cover of arocky ledge in the open at right angles to the turnpike not far fromthe northern end of the timber. Phelps's brigade had gone forwardwith Gibbon's, pushing nearly to the Confederate lines, and beingdriven back with great loss when they charged over open groundagainst the enemy. Ricketts's division advanced from the wood in which it had spent thenight, passed through Seymour's skirmishers and entered the EastWood, swinging his left forward as he went. This grove was open, butthe rocks made perfect cover for Jackson's men, and every stone andtree blazed with deadly fire. Hartsuff endeavored to reconnoitre theground, but was wounded and disabled immediately. Ricketts pushedon, suffering fearfully from an enemy which in open order could fallback from rock to rock and from tree to tree with little comparativeloss. He succeeded at last in reaching the west edge of this wood, forming along the road and fences that were just within its margin. Here he kept up a rapid fire till his ammunition was exhausted. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 258. ] When Doubleday's men had been finally repulsed, our line on theright curved from the ledge where Patrick took refuge, forward infront of Miller's orchard and garden, part of Gibbon's men lyingdown along the turnpike fence facing to the west. Meade's twobrigades in reserve were sent forward, but when they reached Gibbonand Phelps, Ricketts was calling for assistance in the East Wood andMagilton's brigade was sent to him, leaving a gap on the left ofAnderson. Another gallant effort was now made, Seymour's depletedbrigade striving to cover the opening, but the enemy dashed at it asAnderson came up the slope, and the left being taken in flank, thewhole broke again to the rear. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 269, 270. ]Ricketts's right was also imperilled, and he withdrew his exhaustedlines to reorganize and to fill their empty cartridge-boxes. Therewas a lull in the battle, and the combatants on both sides weremaking desperate efforts to reform their broken regiments. Mansfield had called the Twelfth Corps to arms at the first sound ofHooker's battle and marched to his aid. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 475. ] It consisted of two divisions, Williams'sand Greene's, the first of two and the other of three brigades. There were a number of new and undrilled regiments in the command, and in hastening to the front in columns of battalions in mass, proper intervals for deployment had not been preserved, and time wasnecessarily lost before the troops could be put in line. Indeed, some of them were not regularly deployed at all. They had left theirbivouac at sunrise which, as it was about the equinox, was not farfrom six o'clock. They had marched across the country withoutreference to roads, always a very slow mode of advancing, and doublyso with undrilled men. The untrained regiments must, in the natureof things, have been very much like a mob when their so-calledcolumns-in-mass approached the field of battle. It is impossible toreconcile the statements of the reports as to the time they becameengaged. General Williams says they were engaged before seveno'clock. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 476. ] General Meade says they relievedhis men not earlier than ten or eleven. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 270. ]It seems to be guesswork in both cases, and we are forced to judgefrom circumstantial evidence. Ricketts thinks he had been fightingfour hours when he retired for lack of ammunition, and the TwelfthCorps men had not yet reached him. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 259. ]Patrick, on the extreme right, says that his men had made theircoffee in the lull after his retreat to the sheltering ledge ofrocks, and had completed their breakfast before the first ofMansfield's men joined him there. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 244. ] Thecircumstantial details given by several officers make the intervalbetween the attack by the Twelfth Corps and the arrival of Sumner avery short one. It may be regarded as probable, therefore, thatHooker's battle covered the larger part of the time between sixo'clock and the arrival of Sumner at about ten. On reaching the field, Mansfield had a brief consultation withHooker, resulting in his ordering Williams to form his divisionnearly as Doubleday's had been, and to advance with his right uponthe turnpike. He himself led forward the left of Crawford's brigade, which was the first to arrive, and pushed toward the East Wood. Theregiments were still in columns of companies, and though Williamshad ordered them deployed, the corps commander himself, as Crawfordsays, countermanded this order and led them under fire in column. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 484. ] He evidentlybelieved Ricketts's men to be still holding the East Wood, and triedto keep his own from opening fire upon the troops that were seenthere. At this moment he was mortally wounded, before the deploymentwas made. General Alpheus S. Williams, on whom the command devolved, was acool and experienced officer. He hastened the deployment ofCrawford's and Gordon's brigades of his own division, sending one ofthe new and large regiments to assist the Pennsylvania regiment inholding the important position covering the right beyond theturnpike. As Greene's division came up, he ordered him to formbeyond Gordon's left, and when deployed to move on the Dunker Churchthrough the East Wood, guiding his left by the cloud of smoke fromthe Mumma house, which had been set on fire by D. H. Hill's men. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 475, 1033. ] At Doubleday's request, hedetached Goodrich's brigade from Greene, and sent it to Patrick onthe right with orders to advance into the West Wood from itsnorthern extremity. Patrick says the regiments came separately andat considerable intervals, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 244. ] and it is not unlikely that the older regiments weresent in to relieve Hooker's men as fast as they were ready, and themore disorganized ones were obliged to delay till they could be gotinto some sort of shape. Williams made his first disposition of histroops according to Hooker's suggestion, but the latter received aserious wound in the foot, as it would seem, before the attack bythe Twelfth Corps had begun. Hooker turned over the command toMeade, and a formal order confirming this was issued fromMcClellan's head-quarters later in the day. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 315. ] So many of the regiments were carried under fire while still incolumn that not only was the formation of the line an irregular one, but the deployment when made was more diagonal to the turnpike thanHooker's had been, and the whole line faced more to the westward. But they advanced with a courage equal to the heroism already shownon that field. The Confederates who now held the open space at theDunker Church were Hood's two brigades, and the rest of Jackson'scorps extended into the West Wood. Stuart had found his artilleryposition on the hill too far from Jackson's line, and the fightingwas so near the church that he could not fire upon our men withouthurting his own. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 820. ] He thereforemoved further to the south and west, and Early carried his brigade(except the Thirteenth Virginia) back toward Ewell's division, whichnow came under his command by the disabling of General Lawton in thefight. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 968, 969. ] Williams's first line was a good deal shortened, and the divisions, guiding as well as they could upon Greene, crowded so far to thesouth that even Crawford's brigade, which was on the right of all, went partly through the East Wood advancing on a line nearly atright angles to the turnpike. The enemy had followed Ricketts'sretiring battalions and were again in occupation of the East Wood. His work was to be done over again, though the stubborn courage ofHood's depleted brigades could not make up for the numbers which theNational officers now led against him. But the rocks, the ledges, and the trees still gave him such cover that it was at a fearfulcost that the Twelfth Corps men pushed him steadily back and then bya final rush drove him from the roads which skirted the grove onwest and south. What was left of Jackson's corps except Early'sbrigade had come out of the West Wood to meet Crawford's division, and the stout high fences along the turnpike were the scene offrightful slaughter. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 485, 487. ] The Confederates tried to climb them, but the levelfire of our troops swept over the field so that the top of the fenceseemed in the most deadly line of the leaden storm, and the men ingray fell in windrows along its panels. Our own men were checked bythe same obstacle, and lay along the ground shooting between therails and over the fallen bodies of the Confederate soldiers whichmade a sort of rampart. In obedience to his original orders, Greene took ground a littlemore to his left, occupying a line along a fence from the burningMumma house to the road leading from the East Wood directly to theDunker Church. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 505. ] The two brigades withthinned ranks barely filled this space, and Crawford's divisionconnected with them as well as it could. Batteries came forward onGreene's left and right, and helped to sweep the grove around thechurch. Hill attempted to hold him back, and a bold dash was made atGreene, probably by Hill's left brigades which were ordered forwardto support Hood. Greene's men lay on the ground just under the ridgeabove the burning house till the enemy were within a few rods ofthem, then rose and delivered a volley which an eyewitness (MajorCrane, Seventh Ohio) says cut them down "like grass before themower. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 506. ] Thosewho escaped sought refuge in the wood behind the church, where thecrowning ridge is some distance back from the road. Greene nowdashed forward and gained the grove immediately about the church, where he held on for an hour or two. Crawford's division, afterseveral ebbs and flows in the tide of battle, was holding thewestern skirt of the East wood with one or two of its regimentsstill close to the turnpike fence on his right. Meanwhile Goodrich had been trying to advance from the north end ofthe West Wood to attack the flank of the enemy there; but Early withhis own brigade held the ledges along the ravine so stubbornly thathe was making little progress. Greene was calling for support about the Dunker Church, for he wasclose under the ridge on which Hill and Jackson were forming suchline as they could, and he was considerably in advance of our othertroops. Williams withdrew one regiment from Goodrich's brigade andsent it to Greene, and directed Crawford to send also to him theThirteenth New Jersey, a new and strong regiment which had been leftin reserve, as we have seen, in a bit of wood northeast of the fieldof battle. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 476, 505. ] Gordon's brigade waswithdrawn by Crawford to enable it to reorganize in rear of the EastWood, and Crawford's own brigade held the further margin of it. Itwill thus be seen that the Twelfth Corps was now divided into threeportions, --Greene's division at the church, Crawford's in the EastWood, and Goodrich's brigade near the north end of the West Wood. Meade had withdrawn the First Corps to the ridge at Poffenberger's, where it had bivouacked the night before, except that Patrick'sbrigade remained in support of Goodrich. The corps had sufferedseverely, having lost 2470 in killed and wounded, but it was stillfurther depleted by straggling, so that Meade reported less than7000 men with the colors that evening. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 349. ] Its organization had been preserved, however, and the story that it was utterly dispersed was a mistake. The Twelfth Corps also had its large list of casualties, increased alittle later by its efforts to support Sumner, and aggregating, before the day was over, 1746. But the fighting of Hooker's and Mansfield's men, though lackingunity of force and of purpose, had also cost the enemy dear. J. R. Jones, who commanded Jackson's division, had been wounded; Starke, who succeeded Jones, was killed; Lawton, who commanded Ewell'sdivision, was wounded. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. P. 956. ] Lawton'sand Trimble's brigades had been fearfully crippled in the firstfight against Hooker on the plateau between the Dunker Church andthe East Wood, and Hood was sent back to relieve them. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 923. ] He, in turn, had been reinforced by the brigades ofRipley, Colquitt, and McRae (Garland's) from D. H. Hill's division. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 1022. ] When Greene reached the Dunker Church, therefore, the Confederates on that wing were more nearlydisorganized than our own troops. Nearly half their numbers werekilled and wounded, and Jackson's famous "Stonewall" division was socompletely broken up that only a handful of men under ColonelsGrigsby and Stafford remained, and attached themselves to Early'scommand. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 969. ] Of the division now under Early, his own brigade was all that retained much strength, and this, posted among the rocks in the West Wood and vigorously supported byStuart and the artillery on that flank, was all that covered theleft of Lee's army. Could Hooker and Mansfield have attackedtogether, or, still better, could Sumner's Second Corps have marchedbefore day and united with the first onset, Lee's left mustinevitably have been crushed long before the Confederate divisionsof McLaws, Walker, and A. P. Hill could have reached the field. Itis this failure to carry out any intelligible plan which thehistorian must regard as the unpardonable military fault on theNational side. To account for the hours between daybreak and eighto'clock on that morning, is the most serious responsibility of theNational commander. [Footnote: A distinguished officer (understoodto be Gen. R. R. Dawes) who visited the field in 1866 has publishedthe statement that at the Pry house, where McClellan had hisheadquarters, he was informed that on the morning of the 17th thegeneral rose at about seven o'clock and breakfasted leisurely afterthat hour. (Marietta, Ohio, Sentinel. )] Sumner's Second Corps was now approaching the scene of action, orrather two divisions of it, Sedgwick's and French's, forRichardson's was still delayed till his place could be filled byPorter's troops. Although ordered to be ready to move at daybreak, Sumner emphasizes in his report the fact that whilst his command wasprepared to move at the time ordered, he "did not receive fromheadquarters the order to march till 7. 20 A. M. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 275. ] By the time he could reach thefield, Hooker had fought his battle and had been repulsed. The samestrange tardiness in sending orders is noticeable in regard to everypart of the army, and Richardson was not relieved so that he couldfollow French till an hour or two later. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] Sumner advanced, after crossing the Antietam, in a triple column, Sedgwick's division in front, the three brigades marching by theright flank and parallel to each other. French followed in the sameformation. They crossed the Antietam by Hooker's route, but did notmarch so far to the northwest as Hooker had done. On the way Sumnermet Hooker, who was being carried from the field, and the few wordshe could exchange with the wounded general were enough to make himfeel the need of haste, but not enough to give him any clear idea ofthe situation. When the centre of the corps was opposite the DunkerChurch, and nearly east of it, the change of direction was given;the troops faced to their proper front, and advanced in line ofbattle in three lines, fully deployed and sixty or seventy yardsapart, Sumner himself being in rear of Sedgwick's first line andnear its left. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 305. ] As they approached the position held by Greene's division atthe church, French kept on so as to form on Greene's left, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 323. ] but Sedgwick, under Sumner's immediateleading, diverged somewhat to the right, passing through the EastWood, crossing the turnpike on the right of Greene and of the DunkerChurch, and plunged into the West Wood. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 305. ]The fences there had been destroyed by the Confederates before thebattle began, for the purpose of making room for their ownmanoeuvres as well as to make barricades in front of the cornfield. Sedgwick's right did not extend far enough north to be obstructed bythe fences where the Twelfth Corps men had lain along them inrepulsing Jackson. When he entered the wood, there were absolutelyno Confederate troops in front of him. The remnants of Jackson'smen, except Early's brigade, were clustered at the top of the ridgeimmediately in front of Greene, and Early was further to the right, opposing Goodrich and Patrick; Early, however, made haste undercover of the woods to pass around Sedgwick's right and to get infront of him to oppose his progress. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 970. ] Thisled to a lively skirmishing fight in which Early was making as greata demonstration as possible, but with no chance of solid success. Sedgwick pushed him back, and his left was coming obliquely into theopen at the bottom of the hollow beyond the wood, when, at the verymoment, McLaws's and Walker's Confederate divisions came upon thefield. The former had only just arrived by rapid marching fromShepherdstown beyond the Potomac; the latter had been hastily calledaway by Lee from his position on the lower Antietam opposite theleft wing of Burnside's Ninth Corps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 857, 914. ] Walker charged headlong upon the left flank of Sedgwick's lines, andMcLaws, passing by Walker's left, also threw his division diagonallyupon the already broken and retreating brigades. Taken at such adisadvantage, these had never a chance; and in spite of the heroicbravery of Sumner and Sedgwick with most of their officers (Sedgwickbeing severely wounded), the division was driven off to the northwith terrible losses, carrying along in their rout Goodrich'sbrigade of the Twelfth Corps which had been holding Early at bay. Goodrich was killed, and his brigade suffered hardly less than theothers. Patrick's brigade of Hooker's corps was in good order at therocky ledges north of the West Wood which are at right angles to theturnpike, and he held on stubbornly till the disorganized troopsdrifted past his left, and then made an orderly retreat in linetoward the Poffenberger hill. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 245. ] Meade wasalready there with the remnants of Hooker's men. Here some thirtycannon of both corps were quickly concentrated, and, supported byeverything which retained organization, easily checked the pursuersand repulsed all efforts of Jackson and Stuart to resume theoffensive or to pass between them and the Potomac. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 306. ] Sumner did not accompany the routed troops to this position, but assoon as it was plain that the division could not be rallied, hegalloped off to put himself in communication with French and withheadquarters of the army and to try to retrieve the situation. Fromthe flag station east of the East Wood he signalled to McClellan, "Reinforcements are badly wanted; our troops are giving way. "[Footnote: _Id_. , p. 134. ] Williams was in that part of the field, and Sumner sent a staff officer to him ordering that he should pushforward to Sedgwick's support anything he could. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 477. ] Williams in person orderedGordon's brigade to advance, for this, as we have seen, had beenreorganized behind the East Wood. He sent the same order to Crawfordfor the rest of that division. Crawford had withdrawn his men in theEast Wood to let Sedgwick pass diagonally along his front, and nowadvanced again to the west margin of the grove. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 485. ] Gordon was ahead of him in time and further to the right, andagain charged up to the turnpike fences. But the routed troops werealready swarming from the wood across his front, and their pursuerswere charging after them. Again the turnpike was made the scene of abloody conflict, and the bodies of many more of the slain of botharmies were added to those which already lined those fences. Gordon's men were overpowered and fell back in the direction theyhad come. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 495. ] The enemy's attack spread outtoward Greene and toward Crawford, who was now at the edge of theEast Wood again; but both of these held firm, and a couple ofbatteries on the rise of ground in front poured canister into theenemy till he took refuge again in the wood beyond the church. Itwas between nine and ten o'clock, probably about ten, [Footnote: Thereports on the Confederate side fix ten o'clock as the time McLawsand Walker reached the field, and corroborate the conclusion I drawfrom all other available evidence. ] when Sumner entered the WestWood, and in fifteen minutes or a little more the one-sided combatwas over. Sumner's principal attack was made, as I have already indicated, atright angles to that of Hooker. He had thus crossed the line ofHooker's movement in both the advance and the retreat of the latter. This led to some misconceptions on Sumner's part. Crawford'sdivision had retired to the right and rear to make way for Sedgwickas he came up. It thus happened that Greene's division was the onlypart of the Twelfth Corps troops Sumner saw, and he led Sedgwick'smen to the right of these. Ignorant as he necessarily was of whathad occurred before, he assumed that he formed on the extreme rightof the Twelfth Corps, and that he fronted in the same direction asHooker had done. This misconception of the situation led him intoanother error. He had seen only stragglers and wounded men on theline of his own advance, and hence concluded that Hooker's Corps wascompletely dispersed and its division and brigade organizationsbroken up. He not only gave this report to McClellan at the time, but reiterated it later in his statement before the Committee on theConduct of the War. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. I. P. 368. ] The truth wasthat he had marched westward more than a mile south of thePoffenberger hill where Meade was with the sadly diminished butstill organized First Corps, and half that distance south of theMiller farm buildings, near which Goodrich's brigade had entered thenorth end of the West Wood, and in front of which part of Williams'smen had held the ground along the turnpike till they were relievedby Sedgwick's advance. Sedgwick had gone in, therefore, betweenGreene and Crawford, and the four divisions of the two corpsalternated in their order from left to right, thus: French, Greene, Sedgwick, Crawford, the last being Williams's, of which Crawford wasin command. It was not Sumner's fault that he was so ill-informed of the actualsituation on our right; but it is plain that in the absence ofMcClellan from that part of the field he should have left thepersonal leadership of the men to the division commanders, andshould himself have found out by rapid examination the positions ofall the troops operating there. It was his part to combine and giveintelligent direction to the whole, instead of charging forward athaphazard with Sedgwick's division. Both Meade and Williams had menenough in hand to have joined in a concerted movement with him; andhad he found either of those officers before plunging into the WestWood, he would not have taken a direction which left his flankwholly exposed, with the terrible but natural results whichfollowed. The original cause of the mischief, however, wasMcClellan's failure to send Sumner to his position before daybreak, so that the three corps could have acted together from the beginningof Hooker's attack. But we must return to Sumner's divisions, which were advancingnearer the centre. The battle on the extreme right was ended by teno'clock in the morning, and there was no more serious fighting northof the Dunker Church. The batteries on the Poffenberger hill andthose about the East Wood swept the open ground and the cornfieldover which Hooker and Mansfield had fought, and for some time Greenewas able to make good his position at the church. The Confederateswere content to hold the line of the West Wood and the high groundback of the church, and French's attack upon D. H. Hill was nowattracting their attention. French advanced toward Greene's left, over the open farm lands, and after a fierce combat about theRullett and Clipp farm buildings, drove Hill's division from them. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 323. ] At what timethe Confederates made a rush at Greene and drove him back to theedge of the East Wood is uncertain; but it must have been soon afterthe disaster to Sedgwick. It seems to have been an incident of theaggressive movement against Sedgwick, though not coincident with it. It must certainly have been before French's advance reached theRullett and Clipp houses, for the enemy's men holding them wouldhave been far in rear of Greene at the church, and he must by thattime have been back near the burnt house of Mumma and the angle ofthe East Wood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 505. Greene says that he held the ground at the church for two hours, andthat his men were in action from 6. 30 A. M. To 1. 30 P. M. The lengthof time and hours of the day are so irreconcilable as given indifferent reports that we are forced to trust more to the generalcurrent of events than to the time stated. ] Richardson's division followed French after an hour or two, [Footnote: Hancock says the division crossed the Antietam about9. 30. Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 277. ] and then, foot byfoot, field by field, from fence to fence, and from hill to hill, the enemy was pressed back, till the sunken road, since known as"Bloody Lane, " was in our hands, piled full of the Confederate deadwho had defended it with their lives. Richardson had been mortallywounded, and Hancock had been sent from Franklin's corps to commandthe division. Colonel Barlow had been conspicuous in the thickest ofthe fight, and after a series of brilliant actions had been carriedoff desperately wounded. On the Confederate side equal courage and amagnificent tenacity had been exhibited. Men who had foughtheroically in one position no sooner found themselves free from thestruggle of an assault than they were hurried away to repeat theirexertions, without even a breathing-spell, on another part of thefield. They exhausted their ammunition, and still grimly heldcrests, as Longstreet tells us, with their bayonets, but without asingle cartridge in their boxes. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 840. ] Thestory of the fight at this part of the field is simpler than that ofthe early morning, for there was no such variety in the character ofthe ground or in the tactics of the opposing forces. It was asustained advance with continuous struggle, sometimes ebbing amoment, then gaining, but with the organization pretty wellpreserved and the lines kept fairly continuous on both sides. Ourmen fought their way up to the Piper house, near the turnpike, andthat position marks the advance made by our centre. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 279. ] The crest of the ridgeon which the Hagerstown turnpike runs had been secured from Piper'snorth to Miller's, and it was held until the Confederate retreat onthe 19th. The head of Franklin's Corps (the Sixth) had arrived about teno'clock, and had taken the position near the Sharpsburg bridge, which Sumner had occupied in the night. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 376. ]Before noon Smith's and Slocum's divisions were both ordered toSumner's assistance. As they passed by the farm buildings in frontof the East Wood, the enemy made a dash at Greene and French. Smithordered forward Irwin's brigade to their support, and Irwin chargedgallantly, driving the assailants back to the cover of the woodsabout the church. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 402, 409. ] Franklin's menthen formed under the crest already mentioned, from "Bloody Lane" bythe Clipp, Rullett, and Mumma houses to the East Wood and the ridgein front. The aggressive energy of both sides seemed exhausted. French and Richardson's battle may be considered as ended at one ortwo o'clock. There was no fighting later but that on the extremeleft, where Burnside's Ninth Corps was engaged, and we must turn ourattention to that part of the field. CHAPTER XVI ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT Ninth Corps positions near Antietam Creek--Rodman's division atlower ford--Sturgis's at the bridge--Burnside's headquarters on thefield--View from his place of the battle on the right--French'sfight--An exploding caisson--Our orders to attack--The hour--Crisisof the battle--Discussion of the sequence of events--The Burnsidebridge--Exposed approach--Enfiladed by enemy'sartillery--Disposition of enemy's troops--His position verystrong--Importance of Rodman's movement by the ford--The fight atthe bridge--Repulse--Fresh efforts--Tactics of theassault--Success--Formation on further bank--Bringing upammunition--Willcox relieves Sturgis--The latter now insupport--Advance against Sharpsburg--Fierce combat--Edge of the townreached--Rodman's advance on the left--A. P. Hill's Confederatedivision arrives from Harper's Ferry--Attacks Rodman's flank--A rawregiment breaks--The line retires--Sturgis comes into thegap--Defensive position taken and held--Enemy's assaultsrepulsed--Troops sleeping on their arms--McClellan's reserve--Othertroops not used--McClellan's idea of Lee's force and plans--Lee'sretreat--The terrible casualty lists. We have seen that the divisions of the Ninth Corps were conducted bystaff officers of Burnside's staff to positions that had beenindicated by McClellan and marked by members of his staff. Themorning of Wednesday the 17th broke fresh and fair. The men wereastir at dawn, getting breakfast and preparing for a day of battle. The artillery fire which opened Hooker's battle on the right spreadalong the whole line, and the positions which had been assigned usin the dusk of evening were found to be exposed, in some places, tothe direct fire of the Confederate guns. Rodman's division sufferedmore than the others, Fairchild's brigade alone reporting thirty-sixcasualties before they could find cover. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 451. ] My own tents had been pitched atthe edge of a little grove of forest trees, and the headquartersmess was at breakfast at sunrise when the cannonade began. The rapidexplosion of shrapnel about us hastened our morning meal; the tentswere struck and loaded upon the wagons, horses were saddled, andeverything made ready for the contingencies of the day. It was nottill seven o'clock that orders came to advance toward the creek asfar as could be done without exposing the men to unnecessary loss. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 424. ] Rodman wasdirected to acquaint himself with the situation of the ford in frontof him, and Sturgis to seek the best means of approach to the stonebridge. All were then to remain in readiness to obey further orders. When these arrangements had been made, I rode to the positionBurnside had selected for himself, which was upon a high knollnortheast of the Burnside bridge, near a haystack which was aprominent landmark. Near by was Benjamin's battery of twenty-pounderParrotts, and a little further still to the right, on the sameridge, General Sturgis had sent in Durell's battery. [Footnote:_Ibid_. ] These were exchanging shots with the enemy's guns opposite, and had the advantage in range and weight of metal. At this point Iremained until the order for our attack came, later in the day. Weanxiously watched what we could see at the right, and noted theeffect of the fire of the heavy guns of Benjamin's battery. We couldsee nothing distinctly that occurred beyond the Dunker Church, forthe East and West Woods with farm-houses and orchards between madean impenetrable screen. A column of smoke stood over the burningMumma house, marking plainly its situation. As the morning wore on, we saw lines of troops advancing from ourright upon the other side of the Antietam, and engaging the enemybetween us and the East Wood. The Confederate lines facing them nowalso rose into view. From our position we looked, as it were, downbetween the opposing lines as if they had been the sides of astreet, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men carried to therear and stragglers making off. Our lines halted, and we weretortured with anxiety as we speculated whether our men would chargeor retreat. The enemy occupied lines of fences and stone walls, andtheir batteries made gaps in the National ranks. Our long-range gunswere immediately turned in that direction, and we cheered everywell-aimed shot. One of our shells blew up a caisson close to theConfederate line. This contest was going on, and it was yetuncertain which would succeed, when one of McClellan's staff rode upwith an order to Burnside. The latter turned to me, saying we wereordered to make our attack. I left the hill-top at once to givepersonal supervision to the movement ordered, and did not return toit. My knowledge by actual vision of what occurred on the rightceased. The question at what hour Burnside received this order, has beenwarmly disputed. The manner in which we had waited, the freediscussion of what was occurring under our eyes and of our relationto it, the public receipt of the order by Burnside in the usual andbusiness-like form, all forbid the supposition that this was anyreiteration of a former order. [Footnote: I leave this as originally written, although the orderitself has since come to light; for the discussion of thecircumstantial evidence may be useful in determining the value ofMcClellan's report of 1863 where it differs in other respects fromhis original report of 1862 and from other contemporaneousdocuments. "HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, September 17, 1862, --9. 10 A. M. MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE:GENERAL, --General Franklin's command is within one mile and a halfof here. General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soonas you shall have uncovered the upper stone bridge you will besupported, and, if necessary, on your own line of attack. So far allis going well. Respectfully, GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, etc. " This order appears in the supplementary volume of the OfficialRecords, vol. Li. Pt. I. P. 844. From Pry's house, where McClellan'sheadquarters were that day, to Burnside's, was over two miles as thecrow flies. This establishes the accuracy of the original reports ofboth, which stated the hour of receipt at ten o'clock. Itcorroborates also the time of Franklin's arrival on the field, andthe connection of this with Burnside's advance. ]If then we can determine whose troops we saw engaged, we shall knowsomething of the time of day; for there has been a general agreementreached as to the hours of movement of Sumner's divisions during theforenoon on the right and right centre. The official map settlesthis. No lines of our troops were engaged in the direction of BloodyLane and the Rullett farm-house, and between the latter and ourstation on the hill, till French's division made its attack. We sawthem distinctly on the hither side of the farm buildings, upon theopen ground, considerably nearer to us than the Dunker Church or theEast Wood. In number we took them to be a corps. The place, thecircumstances, all fix it beyond controversy that they were French'smen or French's and Richardson's. No others fought on that part ofthe field until Franklin went to their assistance at noon or later. The incident of their advance and the explosion of the caisson wasillustrated by the pencil of Mr. Forbes on the spot, and was placedby him at the time Franklin's head of column was approaching fromthe direction of Rohrersville, which was about ten o'clock. [Footnote: Forbes's sketch is reproduced in "Battles and Leaders ofthe Civil War, " vol. Ii. P. 647, and is of historical importance inconnection with the facts stated above. ] It seems now very clear that about ten o'clock in the morning wasthe great crisis in this battle. The sudden and complete rout ofSedgwick's division was not easily accounted for, and, withMcClellan's theory of the enormous superiority of Lee's numbers, itlooked as if the Confederate general had massed overwhelming forceson our right. Sumner's notion that Hooker's corps was utterlydispersed was naturally accepted, and McClellan limited his hopes toholding on at the East Wood and the Poffenberger hill, whereHooker's batteries were massed and supported by the troops that hadbeen rallied there. Franklin's corps, as it came on the field, wasdetained to support the threatened right centre, and McClellandetermined to help it further by a demonstration upon the extremeleft by the Ninth Corps. At this time, therefore, he gave his orderto Burnside to cross the Antietam and attack the enemy, thuscreating a diversion in favor of our hard-pressed right. Hispreliminary report of the battle (dated October 16, 1862) explicitlystates that the order to Burnside to attack was "communicated to himat ten o'clock A. M. " This exactly agrees with the time stated byBurnside in his official report, and would ordinarily be quiteconclusive. [Footnote: See note, p. 334, _ante_. C. W. , pt. I. P. 41; Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 31, 416. ] In the book published in 1864 as his official report of his wholemilitary career, McClellan says he ordered Burnside to make thisattack at eight o'clock. The circumstances under which his finalpublished statements were made take away from them the character ofa calm and judicial correction of his first report. He was then ageneral set aside from active service and a political aspirant tothe Presidency. His book was a controversial one, issued as anargument to the public, and the earlier report must be regarded in amilitary point of view as the more authoritative unless good groundsare given for the changes. When he wrote his preliminary report hecertainly knew the hour and the condition of affairs on the fieldwhen he gave the order to Burnside. To do so at eight o'clock wouldnot accord with his plan of battle. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 30, 55. ]His purpose had been to move the Ninth Corps against the enemy "whenmatters looked favorably" on our right, after an attack by Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, supported, if necessary, by Franklin. ButSumner's attack was not made till after nine, and Franklin's head ofcolumn did not reach the field till ten. McClellan's book, indeed, erroneously postpones Franklin's arrival till past noon, which, iftrue, would tend to explain why the day wore away without anyfurther activity on the right; but the preliminary report betteragrees with Franklin's when it says that officer reached the fieldabout an hour after Sedgwick's disaster. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 30, 61, 376. ] Still further, matters had at no time "looked favorably" on theright up to ten o'clock. The condition, therefore, which was assumedas precedent to Burnside's movement, never existed; and this wasbetter known to McClellan than to any one else, for he received thefirst discouraging reports after Mansfield fell, and the subsequentalarming ones when Sedgwick was routed. Burnside's report was datedon the 30th of September, within two weeks of the battle, and at atime when public discussion of the incomplete results of the battlewas animated. It was made after he had in his hands my own report ashis immediate subordinate, in which I had given about nine o'clockas my remembrance of the time. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 424. ] As Idirected the details of the action at the bridge in obedience tothis order, it would have been easy for him to have accepted thehour named by me, for I should have been answerable for any delay inexecution after that time. But he then had in his possession theorder which came to him upon the hill-top overlooking the field, andno officer in the whole army has a better established reputation forcandor and freedom from any wish to avoid full personalresponsibility for his acts. It was not till his report waspublished in the Official Records (1887) [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 416. ]that I saw it or learned its contents, although I enjoyed hispersonal friendship down to his death. He was content to have statedthe fact as he knew it, and did not feel the need of debating it. The circumstances have satisfied me that his accuracy in giving thehour was greater than my own. [Footnote: Upon reflection, I think itprobable that the order from McClellan was read to me, and that Ithus got the hour of its date connected in my mind with thebeginning of our attack. ] It will not be wondered at, therefore, if to my mind the story ofthe eight o'clock order is an instance of the way in which anerroneous recollection is based upon the desire to make the factsaccord with a theory. The actual time must have been as much laterthan nine o'clock as the period during which, with absorbedattention, we had been watching the battle on the right, --a period, it is safe to say, much longer than it seemed to us. The judgment ofthe hour which I gave in my report was merely my impression frompassing events, for I hastened at once to my own duties withoutthinking to look at my watch; whilst the cumulative evidence seemsto prove, conclusively, that the time stated by Burnside, and byMcClellan himself in his original report, is correct. The order, then, to Burnside to attack was not sent at eight o'clock, butreached him at ten; it was not sent to follow up an advantage gainedby Hooker and Sumner, but to create, if possible, a strong diversionin favor of the imperilled right wing when the general outlook wasfar from reassuring. McClellan truly said, in his original report, that the task ofcarrying the bridge in front of Burnside was a difficult one. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 31. ] The hill onwhich I have placed the station of General Burnside was the bolderand more prominent crest of the line of hills which skirted theAntietam on the east, and was broken by depressions here and there, through which the country roads ran down to the stream. Such ahollow was just at the south of Burnside's position at the haystackon the Rohrback farm. In rear of him and a little lower down werethe farm buildings, and from these a road ran down the windinghollow to the Antietam, but reached the stream several hundred yardsbelow the bridge. Following the road, therefore, it was necessary toturn up stream upon the narrow space between the hills and thewater, without any cover from the fire of the enemy on the oppositeside. The bluffs on that side were wooded to the water's edge, andwere so steep that the road from the bridge could not go up at rightangles to the bank, but forked both ways and sought the upper landby a more gradual ascent to right and left. The fork to the rightran around a shoulder of the hill into a ravine which there reachesthe Antietam, and thence ascends by an easy grade toward Sharpsburg. The left branch of the road rises by a similar but less markeddepression. These roads were faced by stone fences, and the depth of the valleyand its course made it impossible to reach the enemy's position atthe bridge by artillery fire from the hill-tops on our side. Not sofrom the enemy's position, for the curve of the valley was such thatit was perfectly enfiladed near the bridge by the Confederatebatteries at the position now occupied by the National Cemetery. Thebridge itself was a stone structure of three arches with stoneparapets on the sides. These curved outward at the end of the bridgeto allow for the turn of the roadway. On the enemy's side, the stonefences came down close to the bridge. The Confederate defence of the passage was intrusted to D. R. Jones's division of six brigades, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 804. ] which was the one Longstreet himself haddisciplined and led till he was assigned to a larger command. Toombs's brigade was placed in advance, occupying the defences ofthe bridge itself and the wooded slopes above, while the otherbrigades supported him, covered by the ridges which looked down uponthe valley. The division batteries were supplemented by others fromthe enemy's reserve, and the valley, the bridge, and the ford belowwere under the direct and powerful fire of shot and shell from theConfederate cannon. Toombs's force, thus strongly supported, was aslarge as could be disposed of at the head of the bridge, andabundantly large for resistance to any that could be brought againstit. Our advance upon the bridge could only be made by a narrowcolumn, showing a front of eight men at most; but the front whichToombs deployed behind his defences was three or four hundred yardsboth above and below the bridge. He himself says in his report:[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 890. ] "From thenature of the ground on the other side, the enemy were compelled toapproach mainly by the road which led up the river near threehundred paces parallel with my line of battle and distant therefromfrom fifty to a hundred and fifty feet, thus exposing his flank to adestructive fire the most of that distance. " Under suchcircumstances the Confederate position was nearly impregnableagainst a direct attack over the bridge; for the column approachingit was not only exposed at almost pistol-range to the perfectlycovered infantry of the enemy and to two batteries which wereassigned to the special duty of supporting Toombs, having the exactrange of the little valley with their shrapnel; but, if it shouldsucceed in reaching the bridge, its charge across it must be madeunder a fire ploughing through its length, the head of the columnmelting away as it advanced, so that, as every soldier knows, itcould show no front strong enough to make an impression upon theenemy's breastworks, even if it should reach the other side. As adesperate sort of diversion in favor of the right wing, it might bejustifiable; but I believe that no officer or man who knew theactual situation at that bridge thinks that a serious attack upon itwas any part of McClellan's original plan. Yet, in his detailedreport of 1863, instead of speaking of it as the difficult task theoriginal report had called it, he treats it as little different froma parade or march across which might have been done in half an hour. Burnside's view of the matter was that the front attack at thebridge was so difficult that the passage by the ford below must bean important factor in the task; for if Rodman's division shouldsucceed in getting across there, at the bend of the Antietam, hewould come up in rear of Toombs, and either the whole of D. R. Jones's division would have to advance to meet Rodman, or Toombsmust abandon the bridge. In this I certainly concurred, and Rodmanwas ordered to push rapidly for the ford. It is important toremember, however, that Walker's Confederate division had beenposted during the earlier morning to hold that part of the Antietamline, supporting Toombs as well, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 914. ] and it was probably from him that Rodmansuffered the first casualties that occurred in his ranks. But, as wehave seen, Walker had been called away by Lee only an hour before, and had made the hasty march by the rear of Sharpsburg to fall uponSedgwick. If therefore Rodman had been sent to cross at eighto'clock, it is safe to say that his column, fording the stream inthe face of Walker's deployed division, would never have reached thefurther bank, --a contingency that McClellan did not consider whenarguing, long afterward, the favorable results that might havefollowed an earlier attack. As Rodman died upon the field, no fullreport for his division was made, and we only know that he met withsome resistance from both infantry and artillery; that the windingof the stream made his march longer than he anticipated, and that, in fact, he only approached the rear of Toombs's position from thatdirection about the time when our last and successful charge uponthe bridge was made, between noon and one o'clock. The attacks at the Burnside bridge were made under my own eye. Sturgis's division occupied the centre of our line, with Crook'sbrigade of the Kanawha division on his right front, and Willcox'sdivision in reserve, as I have already stated. Crook's position wassomewhat above the bridge, but it was thought that by advancing partof Sturgis's men to the brow of the hill, they could cover theadvance of Crook, and that the latter could make a straight dashdown the hill to our end of the bridge. The orders were accordinglygiven, and Crook advanced, covered by the Eleventh Connecticut (ofRodman's) under Colonel Kingsbury, deployed as skirmishers. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 419, 424. ] Inpassing over the spurs of the hills, Crook came out on the bank ofthe stream above the bridge and found himself under a heavy fire atshort range. He faced the enemy and returned the fire, getting suchcover for his men as he could and trying to drive off or silence hisopponents. The engagement was one in which the Antietam preventedthe combatants from coming to close quarters, but it was none theless vigorously continued with musketry fire. Crook reported thathis hands were full and that he could not approach closer to thebridge. Later in the contest, his men, lining the stream, madeexperiments in trying to get over, and found a fordable place alittle way above, by which he got over five companies of theTwenty-eighth Ohio at about the same time as the final andsuccessful charge. But on the failure of Crook's first effort, Sturgis ordered forward an attacking column from Nagle's brigade, supported and covered by Ferrero's brigade, which took position in afield of corn on one of the lower slopes of the hill opposite thehead of the bridge. The whole front was carefully covered withskirmishers, and our batteries on the heights overhead were orderedto keep down the fire of the enemy's artillery. Nagle's effort wasgallantly made, but it failed, and his men were forced to seek coverbehind the spur of the hill from which they had advanced. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 444. ] We were constantlyhoping to hear something from Rodman's advance by the ford, andwould gladly have waited for some more certain knowledge of hisprogress, but at this time McClellan's sense of the necessity ofrelieving the right was such that he was sending reiterated ordersto push the assault. Not only were these forwarded to me, but togive added weight to my instructions, Burnside sent direct toSturgis urgent messages to carry the bridge at all hazards. I directed Sturgis to take two regiments from Ferrero's brigade, which had not been engaged, and make a column by moving themtogether by the flank, the one left in front and the other right infront, side by side, so that when they passed the bridge they couldturn to left and right, forming line as they advanced on the run. Hechose the Fifty-first New York, Colonel Robert B. Potter, and theFifty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel John F. Hartranft (both namesafterward greatly distinguished), and both officers and men weremade to feel the necessity of success. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] At thesame time Crook succeeded in bringing a light howitzer of Simmonds'smixed battery down from the hill-tops, and placed it where it had apoint-blank fire on the further end of the bridge. The howitzer wasone we had captured in West Virginia, and had been added to thebattery, which was partly made up of heavy rifled Parrott guns. Wheneverything was ready, a heavy skirmishing fire was opened all alongthe bank, the howitzer threw in double charges of canister, and inscarcely more time than it takes to tell it, the bridge was passedand Toombs's brigade fled through the woods and over the top of thehill. The charging regiments were advanced in line to the crestabove the bridge as soon as they were deployed, and the rest ofSturgis's division, with Crook's brigade, were immediately broughtover to strengthen the line. These were soon joined by Rodman'sdivision, with Scammon's brigade, which had crossed at the ford, andwhose presence on that side of the stream had no doubt made thefinal struggle of Toombs's men less obstinate than it wouldotherwise have been, the fear of being taken in rear having always astrong moral effect upon even the best of troops. It was now about one o'clock, and nearly three hours had been spentin a bitter and bloody contest across the narrow stream. Thesuccessive efforts to carry the bridge had been as closely followingeach other as possible. Each had been a fierce combat, in which themen with wonderful courage had not easily accepted defeat, and even, when not able to cross the bridge, had made use of the walls at theend, the fences, and every tree and stone as cover, while theystrove to reach with their fire their well-protected and nearlyconcealed opponents. The lulls in the fighting had been short, andonly to prepare new efforts. The severity of the work was attestedby our losses, which, before the crossing was won, exceeded 500 men, and included some of our best officers, such as Colonel Kingsbury ofthe Eleventh Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Bell of the Fifty-firstPennsylvania, and Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman of the Eleventh Ohio, two of them commanding regiments. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 427. ] The proportion of casualties to the numberengaged was much greater than common; for the nature of the combatrequired that comparatively few troops should be exposed at once, the others remaining under cover. Our next task was to prepare to hold the heights we had gainedagainst the return assault of the enemy which we expected, and toreply to the destructive fire from the enemy's abundant artillery. Light batteries were brought over and distributed in the line. Themen were made to lie down behind the crest to save them from theconcentrated cannonade which the enemy opened upon us as soon asToombs's regiments succeeded in reaching their main line. ButMcClellan's anticipation of an overwhelming attack upon his rightwas so strong that he determined still to press our advance, andsent orders accordingly. The ammunition of Sturgis's and Crook's menhad been nearly exhausted, and it was imperative that they should befreshly supplied before entering into another engagement. Sturgisalso reported his men so exhausted by their efforts as to be unfitfor an immediate advance. On this I sent to Burnside the requestthat Willcox's division be sent over, with an ammunition train, andthat Sturgis's division be replaced by the fresh troops, remaining, however, on the west side of the stream as support to the others. This was done as rapidly as was practicable, where everything had topass down the steep hill-road and through so narrow a defile as thebridge. [Footnote: As a mode of ready reckoning, it is usual toassume that a division requires an hour to march past a given pointby the flank. With the crossing of an ammunition train, the intervalof time is more than accounted for. ] Still, it was three o'clockbefore these changes and preparations could be made. Burnside hadpersonally striven to hasten them, and had come over to the westbank to consult and to hurry matters, and took his share of personalperil, for he came at a time when the ammunition wagons weredelivering cartridges, and the road at the end of the bridge wherethey were was in the range of the enemy's constant and accuratefire. It is proper to mention this because it has been said that hedid not cross the stream. The criticisms made by McClellan as to thetime occupied in these changes and movements will not seem forcibleif one will compare them with any similar movements on the field;such as Mansfield's to support Hooker, or Sumner's or Franklin's toreach the scene of action. About this, however, there is fair roomfor difference of opinion: what I personally know is that it wouldhave been folly to advance again before Willcox had relievedSturgis, and that as soon as the fresh troops reported and could beput in line, the order to advance was given. McClellan is in accordwith all other witnesses in declaring that when the movement began, the conduct of the troops was gallant beyond criticism. Willcox's division formed the right, Christ's brigade being north, and Welsh's brigade south of the road leading from the bridge toSharpsburg. Crook's brigade of the Kanawha division supportedWillcox. Rodman's division formed on the left, Harland's brigadehaving the position on the flank, and Fairchild's uniting withWillcox at the centre. Scammon's brigade was the reserve for Rodmanat the extreme left. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 425, 430. ] Sturgis's division remained and held the crest of thehill above the bridge. About half of the batteries of the divisionsaccompanied the movement, the rest being in position on thehill-tops east of the Antietam. The advance necessarily followed thehigh ground toward Sharpsburg, and as the enemy made strongestresistance toward our right, the movement curved in that direction, the six brigades of Jones's Confederate division being deployeddiagonally across our front, holding the stone fences and crests ofthe cross-ridges and aided by abundant artillery, in which arm theenemy was particularly strong. The battle was a fierce one from the moment Willcox's men showedthemselves on the open ground. Christ's brigade, taking advantage ofall the cover the trees and inequalities of surface gave them, pushed on along the depression in which the road ran, a section ofartillery keeping pace with them in the road. The direction ofmovement brought all the brigades of the first line in echelon, butWelsh soon fought his way up beside Christ, and they together drovethe enemy successively from the fields and farm-yards till theyreached the edge of the village. Upon the elevation on the right ofthe road was an orchard in which the shattered and diminished forceof Jones made a final stand, but Willcox concentrated his artilleryfire upon it, and his infantry was able to push forward and occupyit. They now partly occupied the town of Sharpsburg, and held thehigh ground commanding it on the southeast, where the NationalCemetery now is. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 431. ] The struggle had been long and bloody. It was half-past fourin the afternoon, and ammunition had again run low, for the wagonshad not been able to accompany the movement. Willcox paused for hismen to take breath again and to fetch up some cartridges; butmeanwhile affairs were taking a serious turn on the left. As Rodman's division went forward, he found the enemy before himseemingly detached from Willcox's opponents, and occupying ridges onhis left front, so that he was not able to keep his own connectionwith Willcox in the swinging movement to the right. Still, he madegood progress in the face of stubborn resistance, though finding theenemy constantly developing more to his left, and the intervalbetween him and Willcox widening. The view of the field to the southwas now obstructed by fields of tall Indian corn, and under thiscover Confederate troops approached the flank in line of battle. Scammon's officers in the reserve saw them as soon as Rodman'sbrigades echeloned, as these were toward the front and right. Thishostile force proved to be A. P. Hill's division of six brigades, the last of Jackson's force to leave Harper's Ferry, and which hadreached Sharpsburg since noon. Those first seen by Scammon's menwere dressed in the National blue uniforms which they had capturedat Harper's Ferry, and it was assumed that they were part of our ownforces till they began to fire. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 468. ] Scammon quickly changed front to the left, drove back the enemy before him, and occupied a line of stonefences, which he held until he was afterward withdrawn from it. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 466. ] Harland's brigade was partly moving inthe corn-fields. One of his regiments was new, having been organizedonly three weeks, and the brigade had somewhat lost its order andconnection when the sudden attack came. Rodman directed ColonelHarland to lead the right of the brigade, while he himself attemptedto bring the left into position. In performing this duty he fell, mortally wounded. Harland's horse was shot under him, and thebrigade broke in confusion after a brief effort of its right wing tohold on. Fairchild also now received the fire on his left, and wasforced to fall back and change front. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 451, 453. ] Being at the centre when this break occurred on the left, I saw thatit would be impossible to continue the movement to the right, andsent instant orders to Willcox and Crook to retire the left of theirline, and to Sturgis to come forward into the gap made in Rodman's. The troops on the right swung back in perfect order; Scammon'sbrigade hung on at its stone wall at the extreme left withunflinching tenacity till Sturgis had formed on the curving hill inrear of them, and Rodman's had found refuge behind. Willcox's leftthen united with Sturgis, and Scammon was withdrawn to a newposition on the left flank of the whole line. That these manoeuvreson the field were really performed in good order is demonstrated bythe fact that although the break in Rodman's line was a bad one, theenemy was not able to capture many prisoners, the whole number ofmissing, out of the 2349 casualties which the Ninth Corps sufferedin the battle, being 115, which includes wounded men unable to leavethe field. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 200, 427. ] The enemy were not lacking in bold efforts to take advantage of thecheck we had received, but were repulsed with severe punishment, andas the day declined were content to entrench themselves along theline of the road leading from Sharpsburg to the Potomac at the mouthof the Antietam, half a mile in our front. The men of the NinthCorps lay that night upon their arms, the line being one whichrested with both flanks near the Antietam and curved outward uponthe rolling hill-tops which covered the bridge and commanded theplateau between us and the enemy. With my staff, I lay upon theground behind the troops, holding our horses by the bridles as werested, for our orderlies were so exhausted that we could not denythem the same chance for a little broken slumber. The Ninth Corps occupied its position on the heights west of theAntietam without further molestation, except an irritating picketfiring, till the Confederate army retreated on the 19th ofSeptember. But the position was one in which no shelter from theweather could be had, nor could any cooking be done; and the troopswere short of rations. My division wagon-train, which I had broughtfrom the West, here stood us in good stead, for the corps as a wholewas very short of transportation. The energy of Captain Fitch, myquartermaster, forced the train back and forth between us and thenearest depot of supplies, and for several days the whole corps hadthe benefit of the provisions thus brought forward. Late in theafternoon of Thursday the 18th, Morell's division of Porter's corpswas ordered to report to Burnside to relieve the picket line andsome of the regiments in the most exposed position. One brigade wassent over the Antietam for this purpose, and a few of the NinthCorps regiments were enabled to withdraw far enough to cook somerations, of which they had been in need for twenty-four hours. [Footnote: General Porter in his report says Morell took the placeof the whole Ninth Corps. In this he is entirely mistaken, as thereports from Morell's division, as well as those of the Ninth Corps, show. ] Harland's brigade of Rodman's division had been taken to theeast side of the stream to be reorganized, on the evening ofWednesday the 17th. The sounds heard within the enemy's lines by ourpickets gave an inkling of their retrograde movement in the night ofThursday, and at break of day on Friday morning the retreat of Lee'swhole army was discovered by advancing the picket line. Reconnoissances sent to the front discovered that the wholeConfederate army had crossed the Potomac. The conduct of the battle on the left has given rise to severalcriticisms, among which the most prominent has been that Porter'scorps, which lay in reserve, was not put in at the same time withthe Ninth Corps. It has been said that some of them were engaged orin support of the cavalry and artillery at the centre. This does notappear to have been so to any important extent, for no activefighting was going on elsewhere after Franklin's corps relievedSumner's about noon. McClellan's reports do not urge this. Heanswered the criticism by saying that he did not think it prudent todivest the centre of all reserve troops. No doubt a single strongdivision, marching beyond the left flank of the Ninth Corps, wouldhave so occupied A. P. Hill's division that our movement intoSharpsburg could not have been checked, and, assisted by the advanceof Sumner and Franklin on the right, would apparently have madecertain the complete rout of Lee. As troops are put in reserve, notto diminish the army, but to be used in a pinch, I am convinced thatMcClellan's refusal to use them on the left was the result of hisrooted belief, through all the day after Sedgwick's defeat, that Leewas overwhelmingly superior in force, and was preparing to return acrushing blow upon our right flank. He was keeping something in handto fill a gap or cover a retreat, if that wing should be drivenback. Except in this way, also, I am at a loss to account for theinaction of the right during the whole of our engagement on theleft. Looking at our part of the battle as only a strong diversionto prevent or delay Lee's following up his success against Hookerand the rest, it is intelligible. I certainly so understood it atthe time, as my report witnesses, and McClellan's original reportsustains this view. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 31, 426. ] If he had been impatient to have our attack deliveredearlier, he had reason for double impatience that Franklin's freshtroops should assail Lee's left simultaneously with our assault ofhis other wing, unless he regarded action there as hopeless, andlooked upon our movement as a sort of forlorn hope to keep Lee fromfollowing up his advantages. But even these are not all the troublesome questions requiring ananswer. It will be remembered that Franklin's corps, after forcingCrampton's Gap, had remained in Pleasant Valley between Rohrersvilleand Boonsboro until Tuesday night (16th September). McClellan thenordered Couch's division to be sent to occupy Maryland Heights andobserve the enemy in Harper's Ferry, whilst Franklin with Smith'sand Slocum's divisions should march to the battle-field at daybreakof Wednesday. Why could not Couch be called up and come on our leftas well as A. P. Hill's division, which was the last of theConfederate troops to leave the ferry, there being nothing toobserve after it was gone? Couch's division, coming with equal pacewith Hill's on the other side of the river would have answered ourneeds as well as one from Porter's corps. Hill came, but Couch didnot. Yet even then, a regiment of horse, watching that flank andscouring the country as we swung forward, would have developedHill's presence and enabled the commanding general either to stopour movement or to take the available means to support it. Thecavalry was put to no such use. It occupied the centre of the wholeline, only its artillery being engaged during the day. It would havebeen invaluable to Hooker in the morning, as it would have been tous in the afternoon. McClellan had marched from Frederick City with the information thatLee's army was divided, Jackson being detached with a large force totake Harper's Ferry. He had put Lee's strength at 120, 000 men. Assuming that there was still danger that Jackson might come uponour left with his large force, and that Lee had proven strong enoughwithout Jackson to repulse three corps on our right and rightcentre, McClellan might have regarded his own army as divided alsofor the purpose of meeting both opponents, and his cavalry wouldhave been upon the flank of the part with which he was attackingLee; Porter would have been in position to help either part in anextremity or to cover a retreat; and Burnside would have been theonly subordinate available to check Lee's apparent success. Will anyother hypothesis intelligibly account for McClellan's dispositionsand orders? The error in the above assumption would be thatMcClellan estimated Lee's troops at nearly double their actualnumbers, and that what was taken for proof of Lee's superiority inforce on the field was a series of partial reverses which resulteddirectly from the piecemeal and disjointed way in which McClellan'smorning attacks had been made. The same explanation is the most satisfactory one that I can givefor the inaction of Thursday, the 18th of September. Could McClellanhave known the desperate condition of most of Lee's brigades, hewould also have known that his own were in much better case, badlyas they had suffered. I do not doubt that most of his subordinatesdiscouraged the resumption of the attack, for the belief in Lee'sgreat preponderance in numbers had been chronic in the army duringthe whole year. That belief was based upon the inconceivablymistaken reports of the secret-service organization, accepted atheadquarters, given to the War Department at Washington as a reasonfor incessant demands of reinforcements, and permeating downwardthrough the whole organization till the error was accepted as truthby officers and men, and became a factor in their morale which canhardly be overestimated. The result was that Lee retreatedunmolested on the night of the 18th of September, and that whatmight have been a real and decisive success was a drawn battle inwhich our chief claim to victory was the possession of the field. The numbers engaged and the losses on each side have been thesubject of unending dispute. If we take the returns of Lee at thebeginning of his campaign against Pope, and deduct his acknowledgedlosses, he crossed the Potomac with over 72, 000 men. [Footnote: Seemy review of Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, "The Nation, " Nov. 24, 1898, p. 396. ] If we take his returns of September 22, and add theacknowledged losses of the month, he had over 57, 000. [Footnote: Seemy review of Allan's Army of Northern Virginia, "The Nation, " Feb. 2, 1893, p. 86. Also reply to General Fitzhugh Lee, _Id_. , Dec. 20, 1894, p. 462; Confederate Statistics, _Id_. , Jan. 24, 1895, p. 71;Review of Ropes's Story of the Civil War, _Id_. , March 9, 1899, p. 185. ] McClellan's 87, 000 present for duty is accepted by all, though various causes considerably reduced the number he broughtinto action. The best collation of reports of casualties at Antietamgives 12, 410 as those on the National side, and 11, 172 on theConfederate. [Footnote: Century War Book, vol. Ii. P. 603. ]Longstreet, comparing the fighting in the fiercest battles of thewar, says "on no single day in any one of them was there suchcarnage as in this fierce struggle. " [Footnote: From Manassas toAppomattox, p. 239. ] CHAPTER XVII MCCLELLAN AND POLITICS--HIS REMOVAL AND ITS CAUSE Meeting Colonel Key--His changes of opinion--His relations toMcClellan--Governor Dennison's influence--McClellan's attitudetoward Lincoln--Burnside's position--The Harrison Landingletter--Compared with Lincoln's views--Probable intent of theletter--Incident at McClellan's headquarters--John W. Garrett--Emancipation Proclamation--An after-dinner discussion ofit--Contrary influences--Frank advice--Burnside and JohnCochrane--General Order 163--Lincoln's visit to camp--Riding thefield--A review--Lincoln's desire for continuing thecampaign--McClellan's hesitation--His tactics of discussion--Hisexaggeration of difficulties--Effect on his army--Disillusion a slowprocess--Lee's army not better than Johnston's--Work done by ourWestern army--Difference in morale--An army rarely bolder than itsleader--Correspondence between Halleck and McClellan--Lincoln'sremarkable letter on the campaign--The army moves on November 2--Leeregains the line covering Richmond--McClellan relieved--Burnside incommand. When I rode up with Burnside on the afternoon of the 15th September, in the group around McClellan I met Judge Key, whom I had not seensince we parted in the Ohio Senate in April of the preceding year. He was now aide-de-camp on the headquarters staff with the rank ofcolonel, and doing duty also as judge-advocate. When McClellandirected us to leave the ridge because the display of numbersattracted the enemy's fire, Colonel Key took my arm and we walked alittle way down the slope till we found a fallen tree, on which wesat down, whilst he plunged eagerly into the history of his ownopinions since we had discussed the causes of the war in thelegislature of our State. He told me with earnestness that he hadgreatly modified his views on the subject of slavery, and he was nowsatisfied that the war must end in its abolition. The system was soplainly the soul of the rebellion and the tie which bound theseceded States together, that its existence must necessarily dependupon the success of the revolutionary movement, and it would be afair object of attack, if doing so would help our cause. I wasstruck by the zeal with which he dashed into the discussion, forgetful of his actual surroundings in his wish to make me quicklyunderstand the change that had come over his views since we partedat Columbus. He was so absorbed that even when a shell burst nearus, he only half gave it attention, saying in a parenthetical waythat he would change his position, as he would "rather not be hit inthe back by one of those confounded things. " We had been so sittingthat in facing me his back was toward the front and the line offire. Colonel Key has been regarded by many as McClellan's evil genius, whose influence had been dominant in the general's political conductand who was therefore the cause of his downfall. His influence onMcClellan was unquestionably great, --and what he said to me is animportant help in understanding the general's conduct and opinions. It accords with other statements of his which have been made publicby Judge William M. Dickson of Cincinnati, who at one time wasColonel Key's partner in the practice of the law. [Footnote: I havefailed in my efforts to find a communication on the subject in anewspaper, written by Judge Dickson, which he showed to me, reiterating his statements in it. ] General McClellan urged me to come to his headquarters withoutceremony, and after the battle of Antietam I had severalopportunities of unrestrained discussion of affairs in which heseemed entirely frank in giving me his opinions. It was plainlyevident that he was subjected to a good deal of pressure byopponents of the administration to make him commit himself to them. On the other hand, Governor Dennison of Ohio, who was his sincerefriend, took every opportunity to counteract such influences and topromote a good understanding between him and Mr. Lincoln. McClellanperfectly knew my own position as an outspoken Republican who fromthe first had regarded the system of slavery as the stake venturedby the Secessionists on their success in the war, and who held toJohn Quincy Adams's doctrine that the war powers were adequate todestroy the institution which we could not constitutionally abolishotherwise. With me, the only question was when the ripe time hadcome for action, and I had looked forward to Mr. Lincoln'sproclamation with some impatience at the delay. The total impression left upon me by the general's conversation wasthat he agreed with Colonel Key in believing that the war ought toend in abolition of slavery; but he feared the effects of haste, andthought the steps toward the end should be conservatively carefuland not brusquely radical. I thought, and still think, that heregarded the President as nearly right in his general views andpolitical purposes, but overcrowded by more radical men around himinto steps which as yet were imprudent and extreme. Such an attitudeon his part made Governor Dennison and myself feel that there was noneed of any political quarrel between him and the administration, and that if he would only rebuff all political intriguers and putmore aggressive energy into his military operations, his careermight be a success for the country as well as for himself. Theportions of his correspondence with Burnside which have becomepublic show that the latter also had, as a true friend, constantlyurged him to keep out of political controversy. Burnside himself, like Grant and Sherman, began with a dislike of the antislaverymovement; but, also like them, his patriotism being the dominantquality, the natural effect of fighting the Secessionists was tobeget in him a hearty acceptance of the policy of emancipation towhich Mr. Lincoln had been led by the same educational process. At the time I am speaking of, I knew nothing of McClellan's famousletter to the President from Harrison's Landing, of July 7, butsince it has come to light, I have interpreted it much less harshlythan many have done. Reading it in the light of his talk duringthose Antietam days, I think it fair to regard it as an effort toshow Mr. Lincoln that they were not far apart in opinion, and toinfluence the President to take the more conservative course towhich he thought him inclined when taking counsel only of his ownjudgment. McClellan knew that his "change of base" to the JamesRiver in June was not accepted as the successful strategy hedeclared it to be, and that strong influences were at work to removehim. Under the guise of giving advice to the President, he was infact assuring him that he did not look to the acknowledgment of theConfederacy as a conceivable outcome of the war; that the"contraband" doctrine applied to slaves was consistent withcompensated emancipation; that he favored the application of theprinciple to the border States so as to make them free States; thatconcentration of military force as opposed to dispersion of effortwas the true policy; that he opposed the rules of warfare which heassumed were announced in General Pope's much criticised orders; andlastly, that he would cordially serve under such general-in-chief asMr. Lincoln should select. Compare all this with Mr. Lincoln's known views. It was notoriousthat he was thought to be too conservative by many of his own party. He had urged a system of compensated emancipation for the borderStates. He had said that he held the slavery question to be only apart, and an absolutely subordinate part, of the greater question ofsaving the Union. He had disapproved of a portion of Pope's orderregarding the treatment of non-combatants. However ill-advisedMcClellan's letter was, it may be read between the lines as anattempt to strengthen himself with the President as against Stantonand others, and to make his military seat firmer in the saddle byshowing that he was not in political antagonism to Mr. Lincoln, butheld, in substance, the conservative views that were supposed to behis. Its purpose seems to me to have been of this personal sort. Hedid not publish it at the time, and it was not till he was removedfrom his command that it became a kind of political manifesto. Thisview is supported by what occurred after the publication of theEmancipation Proclamation, which I shall tell presently; but, topreserve the proper sequence, I must first give another incident. A few days after the battle of Antietam a prominent clergyman ofHagerstown spent the Sunday in camp, and McClellan invited a numberof officers to attend religious services in the parlors of the housewhere headquarters were. The rooms were well filled, severalcivilians being also present. I was standing by myself as we werewaiting for the clergyman to appear, when a stout man in civilian'sdress entered into conversation with me. He stood at my side as wefaced the upper part of the suite of rooms, and taking it to be acasual talk merely to pass the time, I paid rather languid attentionto it and to him as he began with some complimentary remarks aboutthe army and its recent work. He spoke quite enthusiastically ofMcClellan, and my loyalty to my commander as well as my personalattachment to him made me assent cordially to what he said. He thenspoke of the politicians in Washington as wickedly trying tosacrifice the general, and added, whispering the words emphaticallyin my ear, "But you military men have that matter in your own hands, you have but to tell the administration what they must do, and theywill not dare to disregard it!" This roused me, and I turned uponhim with a sharp "What do you mean, sir!" As I faced him, I saw atonce by his look that he had mistaken me for another; he mumbledsomething about having taken me for an acquaintance of his, andmoved away among the company. I was a good deal agitated, for though there was more or less ofcurrent talk about disloyal influences at work, I had been scepticalas to the fact, and to be brought face to face with that sort ofthing was a surprise. I was a stranger to most of those who werethere, and walked a little aside, watching the man who had left me. I soon saw him talking with General Fitz-John Porter, on theopposite side of the room, evidently calling attention to me as ifasking who I was. I made inquiries as to who the civilian was, andlater came to know him by sight very well. He was John W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. Mr. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was published on the 24th ofSeptember, and within a very few days I was invited to meet GeneralBurnside and General John Cochrane of New York at a camp dinner inMcClellan's tent. General Cochrane was a "War Democrat" in politics, and had been active as a politician in his State. He was also theson-in-law of Gerrit Smith, the well-known abolitionist, and hadadvocated arming the slaves as early as November, 1861. McClellantold us frankly that he had brought us there for the purpose ofasking our opinions and advice with regard to the course he shouldpursue respecting the Proclamation. He said that he was urged to puthimself in open opposition to it by politicians not only, but byarmy officers who were near to him. He named no names, but intimatedthat they were of rank and influence which gave weight to theiradvice. He knew that we were all friends of the administration, andhis object seemed to be to learn whether we thought he should sayanything or should maintain silence on the subject; for he assumedthat we would oppose any hostile demonstration on his part. This naturally led to inquiries as to his actual attitude to theslavery question, and he expressed himself in substance as I havebefore indicated; repeating with even stronger emphasis his beliefthat the war would work out the manumission of the slaves graduallyand ultimately, and that as to those who came within our lines as weadvanced the liberation would be complete and immediate. He thought, however, that the Proclamation was premature, and that it indicateda change in the President's attitude which he attributed to radicalinfluences at Washington. There had been no previous understanding between us who were hisguests. For my part, I then met General Cochrane for the first time, and had conversed with McClellan himself more freely on politicalsubjects than I had with Burnside. We found ourselves, however, inentire accord in advising him that any declaration on his partagainst the Proclamation would be a fatal error. We could easilyunderstand that he should differ from us in his way of viewing thequestion of public policy, but we pointed out very clearly that anypublic utterance by him in his official character criticising thecivil policy of the administration would be properly regarded as ausurpation. He intimated that this was his own opinion, but, by wayof showing how the matter was thrust at him by others, said thatpeople had assured him that the army was so devoted to him that theywould as one man enforce any decision he should make as to any partof the war policy. I had so recently gone through the little experience on this subjectwhich I have narrated above, that I here spoke out with someemphasis. I said that those who made such assurances were his worstenemies, and in my judgment knew much less of the army than theypretended; that our volunteer soldiers were citizens as well assoldiers, and were citizens more than soldiers; and that greatly asI knew them to be attached to him, I believed not a corporal's guardwould stand by his side if he were to depart from the strictsubordination of the military to the civil authority. Burnside andCochrane both emphatically assented to this, and McClellan addedthat he heartily believed both that it was true and that it ought tobe so. But this still left the question open whether the very factthat there was an agitation in camp on the subject, and intrigues ofthe sort I have mentioned, did not make it wise for him to saysomething which would show, at least, that he gave no countenance toany would-be revolutionists. We debated this at some length, withthe general conclusion that it might be well for him to remind thearmy in general orders that whatever might be their rights ascitizens, they must as soldiers beware of any organized effort tomeddle with the functions of the civil government. I left the Army of the Potomac before McClellan's general order onthis subject, dated October 7, was published, but when I read it inthe light of the conference in his tent, I regarded it as an honesteffort on his part to break through the toils which intriguers hadspread for him, and regretted that what seemed to me one of his mostlaudable actions should have been one of the most misrepresented andmisunderstood. [Footnote: The order is found in Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 395, and is as follows:-- General Orders. No. 163. HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD. , October 7, 1862. The attention of the officers and soldiers of the army of thePotomac is called to General Orders No, 139, War Department, September 24, 1862, publishing to the army the President'sproclamation of September 22. A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, officiallycommunicated to the army, affords to the general commanding anopportunity of defining specifically to the officers and soldiersunder his command the relation borne by all persons in the militaryservice of the United States toward the civil authorities of theGovernment. The Constitution confides to the civilauthorities--legislative, judicial, and executive--the power andduty of making, expounding, and executing the Federal laws. Armedforces are raised and supported simply to sustain the civilauthorities, and are to be held in strict subordination thereto inall respects. This fundamental rule of our political system isessential to the security of our republican institutions, and shouldbe thoroughly understood and observed by every soldier. Theprinciple upon which and the object for which armies shall beemployed in suppressing rebellion, must be determined and declaredby the civil authorities, and the Chief Executive, who is chargedwith the administration of the national affairs, is the proper andonly source through which the needs and orders of the Government canbe made known to the armies of the nation. Discussions by officers and soldiers concerning public measuresdetermined upon and declared by the Government, when carried at allbeyond temperate and respectful expressions of opinion, tend greatlyto impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops, bysubstituting the spirit of political faction for that firm, steady, and earnest support of the authorities of the Government, which isthe highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for politicalerrors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action ofthe people at the polls. In thus calling the attention of this army to the true relationbetween the soldier and the government, the general commandingmerely adverts to an evil against which it has been thoughtadvisable during our whole history to guard the armies of theRepublic, and in so doing he will not be considered by anyright-minded person as casting any reflection upon that loyalty andgood conduct which has been so fully illustrated upon so manybattle-fields. In carrying out all measures of public policy, this army will ofcourse be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity thathave ever controlled its conduct toward the defenceless. By Command of Major-General McClellan, JAS. A. HARDIE, Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-camp, and Act'g Ass't Adj't Gen'l. "] I have always understood that the order was drafted by Colonel Key, who afterward expressed in very strong terms his confidence in thehigh motives and progressive tendencies of McClellan at the time heissued it. General Cochrane, some time after the close of the war, in apamphlet outlining his own military history, made reference to thevisit to McClellan which I have narrated, and states that he was sogreatly impressed by the anti-slavery sentiments avowed by thegeneral, that he made use of them in a subsequent effort to bringhim and Secretary Chase into more cordial relations. [Footnote: TheWar for the Union, Memoir by General John Cochrane, pp. 29-31. ] Itis possible that, in a friendly comparison of views in which we weretrying to find how nearly we could come together, the general mayhave put his opinions with a liberality which outran his ordinarystatements of belief; but I am very sure that he gave every evidenceof sincerity, and that none of us entertained a doubt of his beingentirely transparent with us. He has since, in his "Own Story, "referred to his taking counsel of Mr. Aspinwall of New York at aboutthe same time, and there is evidence that General W. F. Smith alsothrew his influence against any opposition by McClellan to theEmancipation Proclamation. [Footnote: Nicolay and Hay's Lincoln, vol. Vi. P. 180. ] McClellan's letters show that his first impulsewas to antagonism; but there is no fair reason to doubt that hisaction at last was prompted by the reasons which he avowed in ourconversation, and by the honorable motives he professed. Heimmediately sent a copy of his order to Mr. Lincoln personally, andthis indicates that he believed the President would be pleased withit. The reference which he made to suggestions that the army wouldfollow him in a _coup d'e'tat_ is supported by what he formallydeclared in his memoirs. He there tells us that in 1861 he was oftenapproached in regard to a "dictatorship, " and that when he wasfinally removed many in the army were in favor of his marching uponWashington to take possession of the government. [Footnote: OwnStory, pp. 85, 652. ] It would seem that treasonable notions wererife about him to an extent that was never suspected, unless he wasmade the dupe of pretenders who saw some profit in what might beregarded as a gross form of adulation. He must be condemned for theweakness which made such approaches to him possible; but we areobliged to take the fact as he gives it, and to accept as one of thestrange elements of the situation a constant stream of treasonablesuggestions from professed friends in the army and out of it. Ananecdote which came to me in a way to make it more than ordinarilytrustworthy was that in the summer of 1861 McClellan was riding withan older officer of the regular army, [Footnote: General McCall. ]and said to him, "I understand there is a good deal of talk ofmaking a dictatorship. " "Ah!" said the other, "Mr. Lincoln, Isuppose. " "Oh, no, " replied McClellan, "it's me they're talking of. "Bits of evidence from many sources prove that there had been fromthe first too much such talk about Washington, and whilst McClellancannot be held responsible for it, there is no proof that he rebukedit as he should have done. It was part of the fermenting politicaland military intrigue which is found at the seat of government insuch a time, if anywhere, and I take satisfaction in testifying thataway from that neighborhood I never even heard the thing mentionedor referred to, that I can recollect. Washington would be spoken ofin a general way as a place of intrigues, but I never knew this tohave a wider meaning given to it than the ordinary one of politicalschemes within lawful limits and personal ambitions of no criminalcharacter. Mr. Lincoln visited our camp on the 1st of October, and remained twoor three days. I was with the party of officers invited by McClellanto accompany the President in a ride over the route which Sumner hadfollowed in the battle. We crossed the Antietam in front ofKeedysville, followed the hollows and byways to the East Wood, andpassed through this and the cornfields which had been the scene ofHooker's and Mansfield's fierce fighting. We visited the DunkerChurch and then returned to camp by Bloody Lane and the centralstone bridge. The President was observant and keenly interested inthe field of battle, but made no display of sentiment. On anotherday he reviewed the troops which were most accessible fromheadquarters. As my own corps was among the first on the list, I didnot join the escort of the President at the general's quarters, butwas with the troops attending to the details of the parade. We wereordered to be under arms at eight o'clock, but it was more than twohours after that when the reviewing cortège came on the ground. Theofficers were very hilarious over some grotesque story with whichMr. Lincoln had seasoned the conversation, and which seemed to havecaused some forgetfulness of the appointment with the troops. Wewere reviewed by divisions, and I met the party with my staff, riding down the lines with them, and answering the inquiries of thePresident and the general as to the history and the experience ofthe different organizations as we passed them. The usual march inreview was omitted for lack of time, the President contentinghimself with riding along the lines formed in parade. I had missedseeing the President in Washington when I paid my respects at theWhite House, and this was my first meeting with him after hisinauguration. His unpretending cordiality was what first impressedone, but you soon saw with what sharp intelligence and keen humor hedealt with every subject which came up. He referred very pleasantlyto his knowledge of me through Secretary Chase, showing the kindlyinstinct to find some compliment or evidence of recognition for allwho approached him. This geniality in Mr. Lincoln made him avoid personal criticism ofthe campaign, and gave an air of earnest satisfaction to what hesaid of the work done by McClellan. There was enough to praise, andhe praised it heartily. He was also thankful that the threatenedinvasion of the North had been defeated, and showed his sense ofgreat relief. He had adopted the rule for himself to limit hisdirect influence upon his generals to the presentation of his ideasof what was desirable, often taking pains even in his writtencommunications to say that he made no order, and left the definitedirection to General Halleck. McClellan gave the most favorableinterpretation to all that the President said, but could not ignorethe anxiety Mr. Lincoln showed that an energetic campaign should becontinued. He wrote home: "I incline to think that the real purposeof his visit is to push me into a premature advance into Virginia. "[Footnote: O. S. , p. 654. ] The President had coupled his earliest telegraphic congratulationswith the question, "Can't you beat them some more before they getoff?" and McClellan's private correspondence shows that he, on hispart, chafed at every suggestion of haste. As early as the 22d ofSeptember, the general had written that he looked upon the campaignas substantially ended, and intended to give some time to thereorganization of the army before beginning a new one. The vicinityof Harper's Ferry or Frederick seemed to him the proper place forthe camp meanwhile, and he wished for a rise in the Potomac Riverwhich should make it impracticable for Lee to ford it again. Hedelayed in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg, waiting for this. Tothose of us with whom he talked freely, he spoke of the necessity ofincorporating into the Army of the Potomac at least a hundredthousand of the new levies to make it really fit for an aggressivecampaign, and argued that it would save time in the end to use someof it now in the work of reorganizing. Mr. Lincoln was plainly troubled with the apprehension that thedelays of 1861 were to be repeated, and that the fine Octoberweather of that region would be again wasted and nothing done tillthe next spring. There were men enough about him at Washington toremind him of this in irritating ways, and to make him realize thatas he had personally restored McClellan to the command he would bepersonally responsible for keeping him moving. McClellan rightlyunderstood Mr. Lincoln's visit as meaning this. He did not refuse tomove; on the other hand, he professed to be anxious to do so at theearliest moment when it should be really practicable. His obstinacywas of a feminine sort. He avoided open antagonism which would havebeen a challenge of strength, but found constantly fresh obstaclesin the way of doing what he was determined from the first not to do. The need of clothing for the men and of horses for the cavalry was afruitful subject for debate, and the debate, if sufficientlyprolonged, would itself accomplish the delay that was desired. The official correspondence shows that the President went back toWashington determined to cut the knot in a peremptory way, if he wasforced to do so. McClellan could not have been blind to this. Hisprivate letters show that he thought it not improbable that he wouldbe relieved from command. His desire for military success was aruling one with him on both public and private grounds. We areforced, therefore, to conclude that he actually lacked faith insuccess, and regarded the crossing of the Potomac as too perilousuntil he should reorganize the army with the additional hundredthousand recruits. In this we see the ever-recurring effect of hisexaggeration of the enemy's force. We now know that thisover-estimate was inexcusable, but we cannot deny that he made it, nor, altogether, that he believed in it. It constituted adisqualification for such a command, and led to what must beregarded as the inevitable result, --his removal. The politicalquestions connected with the matter cut no important figure in it. If he had had faith in his ability to conquer Lee's army, we shouldnever have heard of them. Whilst I mean what I say in speaking of McClellan's exaggeration ofhis enemy as constituting incompetence for such a command, it hasreference to the necessity in which we were that our army should beaggressively handled. Few men could excel him in strictly defensiveoperations. He did not lack personal courage, nor did hisintellectual powers become obscured in the excitement of actual war. He showed the ordinary evidences of presence of mind and coolness ofjudgment under fire. His tendency to see his enemy doubled in forcewas, however, a constitutional one, and no amount of experienceseemed to cure it. Had it not been so he would have devised checksupon the reports of his secret-service agents, and corrected theirestimates by those more reliable methods which I have already spokenof. McClellan was, even in those days, often compared to MarshalDaun, whose fair ability but studiously defensive policy was so incontrast with the daring strategy of the great Frederick. Thecomparison was a fair one. The trouble was that we had need of aFrederick. It may seem strange that his subordinates so generally accepted hisview and supported him in his conduct; but it was a natural resultof forces always at work in an army. The old maxim that "Councils ofwar never fight" is only another way of saying that an army is neverbolder than its leader. It is the same as the old Greek proverb, "Better an army of deer with a lion for leader, than an army oflions with a deer for leader. " The body of men thus organized reliesupon its chief for the knowledge of the enemy and for the plan bywhich the enemy is to be taken at a disadvantage. It willcourageously carry out his plans so long as he has faith in themhimself and has good fortune in their execution. Let doubt arise asto either of these things and his troops raise the cry "We aresacrificed, " "We are slaughtered uselessly. " McClellan's arts ofmilitary popularity were such that his army accepted his estimate ofthe enemy, and believed (in the main) that he had shown greatability in saving them from destruction in a contest at such odds. They were inclined, therefore, to hold the government at Washingtonresponsible for sacrificing them by demanding the impossible. Undersuch circumstances nothing but a cautious defensive policy could bepopular with officers or men. If McClellan's data were true, he andthey were right. It would have been folly to cross the Potomac and, with their backs to the river, fight a greatly superior enemy. Because the data were not true there was no solution for the problembut to give the army another commander, and painfully to undo themilitary education it had for a year been receiving. The process ofdisillusion was a slow one. The disasters to Burnside and Hookerstrengthened the error. Meade's standstill after Gettysburg was verylike McClellan's after Antietam, and Mr. Lincoln had to deal with itin a very similar way. When Grant took command the army expected himto have a similar fate, and his reputation was treated as of littleworth because he had not yet "met Bobby Lee. " His terrible method of"attrition" was a fearfully costly one, and the flower of that armywas transferred from the active roster to the casualty lists beforethe prestige of its enemy was broken. But it was broken, andAppomattox came at last. It will not do to say that the Confederate army in Virginia was inany sense superior to their army in the West. When the superiorforce of the National army was systematically applied, General Leewas reduced to as cautious a defensive in Virginia as was GeneralJohnston in Georgia. Longstreet and Hood had no better success whentransferred to the West than the men who had never belonged to theArmy of Virginia. In fact, it was with Joseph E. Johnston as hisopponent that McClellan's career was chiefly run. Yet theConfederate army in the West was broken at Donelson and atVicksburg. It was driven from Stone's River to Chattanooga, and fromMissionary Ridge to Atlanta. Its remnant was destroyed at Franklinand Nashville, and Sherman's March to the Sea nearly completed thetraverse of the whole Confederacy. His victorious army was close inrear of Petersburg when Richmond was finally won. Now that we havegot rid of the fiction that the Confederate government gave to Leean enormously larger army than it gave to Bragg or to JosephJohnston, we have to account for the fact that with much less oddsin their favor our Western army accomplished so much more. As amilitary objective Richmond was in easier reach from the Potomacthan Nashville from the Ohio. From Nashville to Chattanooga wasfully as difficult a task. The vulnerable lines of communicationmultiplied in length as we went southward, and made the campaign ofAtlanta more difficult still. Vicksburg was a harder nut to crackthan Richmond. We must put away our _esprit de corps_, and squarelyface the problem as one of military art with the Official Recordsand returns before us. Our Western army was of essentially the samematerial as the Eastern. Regiments from nearly all the States weremingled in both. Wisconsin men fought beside those from Maine in theArmy of the Potomac, as men who had fought at Antietam and atGettysburg followed Sherman through the Carolinas. The differencewas not in the rank and file, it was not in the subordinates. It wasthe difference in leadership and in the education of the armiesunder their leaders during their first campaigns. That mysteriousthing, the morale of an army, grows out of its belief as to what itcan do. If it is systematically taught that it is hopelesslyinferior to its adversary, it will be held in check by a fraction ofits own force. The general who indoctrinates his army with thebelief that it is required by its government to do the impossible, may preserve his popularity with the troops and be received withcheers as he rides down the line, but he has put any great militarysuccess far beyond his reach. In this study of military morale, itscauses and its effects, the history of the Army of the Potomac isone of the most important and one of the gravest lessons the worldhas ever seen. I have to confess that at Antietam I shared, more or less fully, theopinions of those among whom I was. I accepted McClellan as the bestauthority in regard to the enemy's numbers, and, assuming that hewas approximately right in that, the reasonable prudence of waitingfor reinforcements could not be denied. I saw that he had lostvaluable time in the movements of the campaign, but the generalresult seemed successful enough to hide this for the time at least. My own experience, therefore, supports the conclusion I have alreadystated, that an army's enterprise is measured by its commander's, and, by a necessary law, the army reflects his judgment as to whatit can or cannot accomplish. Mr. Lincoln had told McClellan during his visit to the army that hisgreat fault was "overcautiousness. " He had intimated plainly enoughthat he must insist upon the continuance of the campaign. He haddiscussed the plans of advance, and urged McClellan to operate uponLee's communications by marching south on the east side of the BlueRidge. He had disclaimed any purpose of forcing a movement beforethe army was ready, but saw no reason why it should take longer toget ready after Antietam than after Pope's last battle. Soon afterhis return to Washington, Halleck sent a peremptory order toMcClellan to cross the Potomac. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 10. ] It was dated October 6th, and said: "ThePresident directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to theenemy or drive him South. Your army must move now while the roadsare good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can bereinforced with 30, 000 men. If you move up the valley of theShenandoah, not more than 12, 000 or 15, 000 can be sent to you. ThePresident advises the interior line between Washington and theenemy, but does not order it. " It also required him to reportimmediately which line he adopted. Halleck, as General-in-chief, ought to have given his own decision as to the line of operations, but his characteristic indecision was shown in failing to do so. Hedid not even express an opinion as to the relative merits of the twolines, and limited himself to his concurrence in the order to movein one way or the other. McClellan replied on the 7th, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 11. ] saying that he had determined to adopt the Shenandoahline, though he wished to "state distinctly" that he should only usethat line till the enemy should retire beyond Winchester, as he didnot expect to be able to supply his army more than twenty ortwenty-five miles beyond a railway or canal depot. If the enemyretreated, he would adopt some new and decisive line of operations. He objected to the interior line because it did not cover Marylandand Pennsylvania from a return of Lee's army, and because (as hesaid) the army could not be supplied by it. He indicated three daysas the time within which he could move. At the end of that time hecomplained of still lacking clothing. On the 12th he found it"absolutely necessary" that the cavalry should have more horses. Thediscussion over these things ran on till the 21st. Mr. Lincoln made a strong effort to save McClellan from the effectsof his mental deficiencies. He exhausted advice and exhortation. Heeven ventured upon mild raillery on the idleness of the army. On the13th he had written a remarkable letter to McClellan, in which hereminded him of what had occurred between them at the Antietam andargued in favor of the interior line of movement. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 13. ] He showed that Lee atWinchester supplied his army twice as far from his railway depot asMcClellan thought possible for the Army of the Potomac. He urged therecognized advantage of operating by a line which attacked theenemy's communications. He pointed out that if Lee should try tocross the Potomac, our army could be in his rear and should destroyhim. He showed that McClellan at Harper's Ferry was nearer toRichmond than Lee: "His route is the arc of a circle of which yoursis the chord. " He analyzed the map and showed that the interior linewas the easier for supplying the army: "The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see howturnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meetyou at all points from Washington. " He even gave the figures inmiles from gap to gap in the mountains, which would enable McClellanto strike the enemy in flank or rear; and this was of course to bedone if Lee made a stand. "It is all easy, " his letter concluded, "if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to saythey cannot do it. " Yet he expressly disclaimed making his letter anorder. [Footnote: Since writing this, I have had occasion to treatthis subject more fully, as bearing upon Mr. Lincoln's militaryjudgment and intelligence, in a review of Henderson's StonewallJackson, "The Nation, " Nov. 24, Dec. 1, 1898. ] As a mere matter of military comprehension and judgment of thestrategic situation, the letter puts Mr. Lincoln head and shouldersabove both his military subordinates. Halleck saw its force, butwould not order it to be carried out. McClellan shrank from thedecisive vigor of the plan, though he finally accepted it as themeans of getting the larger reinforcements. On the 21st of Octoberthe discussion of cavalry horses was pretty well exhausted, andMcClellan telegraphed Halleck [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 81. ] that in other respects he was nearly ready to move, and inquires whether the President desired him to march on the enemyat once or to wait the arrival of the new horses. Halleck answeredthat the order of the 6th October remained unchanged. "If you havenot been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be ableto show such want of ability. The President does not expectimpossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weathershould not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move andon what lines you propose to march. " This dispatch was plainly anotice to McClellan that he would be held responsible for thefailure to obey the order of the 6th unless he could exoneratehimself by showing that he could not obey it. In his final report, however, he says that he treated it as authority to decide forhimself whether or not it was possible to move with safety to thearmy; [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] "and this responsibility, " he says, "Iexercised with the more confidence in view of the strong assuranceof his trust in me, as commander of that army, with which thePresident had seen fit to honor me during his last visit. " Argumentis superfluous, in view of the correspondence, to show that ordersand exhortations were alike wasted. The movement began in the last days of October, the Sixth Corps, which was in the rear, crossing the Potomac on the 2d of November. McClellan had accepted Mr. Lincoln's plan, but lack of vigor in itsexecution broke down the President's patience, and on the 5th ofNovember, upon Lee's recrossing the Blue Ridge without a battle, heordered the general to turn over the command to Burnside, as he haddeclared he would do if Lee's was allowed to regain the interiorline. The order was presented and obeyed on the 7th, and McClellanleft the army. The fallen general brooded morbidly over it all fortwenty years, and then wrote his "Own Story, " a most curious pieceof self-exposure, in which he unconsciously showed that theillusions which had misguided him in his campaigns were stillrealities to him, and that he had made no use of the authentic factswhich Confederate as well as National records had brought within hisreach. He had forgotten much, but he had learned nothing. CHAPTER XVIII PERSONAL RELATIONS OF McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, AND PORTER Intimacy of McClellan and Burnside--Private letters in the officialfiles--Burnside's mediation--His self-forgetful devotion--Themovement to join Pope--Burnside forwards Porter's dispatches--Hisdouble refusal of the command--McClellan suspends the organizationof wings--His relations to Porter--Lincoln's letter on thesubject--Fault-finding with Burnside--Whose work?--Burnside'sappearance and bearing in the field. McClellan and Burnside had been classmates at West Point, and hadbeen associated in railway employment after they had left the army, in the years immediately before the war. The intimacy which began atthe Academy had not only continued, but they had kept up thedemonstrative boyish friendship which made their intercourse likethat of brothers. They were "Mac" and "Burn" to each other when Iknew them, and although Fitz-John Porter, Hancock, Parker, Reno, andPleasonton had all been members of the same class, the two seemed tobe bosom friends in a way totally different from their intimacy withthe others. Probably there was no one outside of his own family towhom McClellan spoke his secret thoughts in his letters, as he didto Burnside. The characteristic lack of system in business which wasvery noticeable in Burnside, made him negligent, apparently, indiscriminating between official letters and private ones, and so ithappens that there are a number in the official records which werenever meant to reach the public. They show, however, as nothing elsecould, the relations which the two men sustained to each other, andreveal strong traits in the characters of both. After Burnside had secured his first success in the Roanokeexpedition, he had written to McClellan, then in the midst of hiscampaign of the peninsula, and this was McClellan's reply on the21st of May, 1862:--[Footnote: Official Records, vol ix. P. 392. ] "MY DEAR BURN, --Your dispatch and kind letter received. I haveinstructed Seth [Williams] to reply to the official letter, and nowacknowledge the kind private note. It always does me good, in themidst of my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched oldscrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend with, but have metthem with a good heart, like your good old self, and have thus farstruggled through successfully.... I feel very proud of Yorktown: itand Manassas will be my brightest chaplets in history, for I knowthat I accomplished everything in both places by pure militaryskill. I am very proud, and very grateful to God that he allowed meto purchase such great success at so trifling a loss of life.... Thecrisis cannot long be deferred. I pray for God's blessing on ourarms, and rely far more on his goodness than I do on my own poorintellect. I sometimes think, now, that I can almost realize thatMahomet was sincere. When I see the hand of God guarding one so weakas myself, I can almost think myself a chosen instrument to carryout his schemes. Would that a better man had been selected.... Good-bye and God bless you, Burn. With the sincere hope that we maysoon shake hands, I am, as ever, Your sincere friend, MCCLELLAN. " When McClellan reached the James River after the seven days'battles, the first suggestion as to reinforcing him was thatBurnside should bring to his aid the bulk of his little army inNorth Carolina. This was determined upon, and the Ninth Corps wascarried by sea to Fortress Monroe. As soon as the movement wasstarted, Burnside hastened in advance to Washington, and onreturning to the fortress wrote McClellan as follows:--[Footnote:O. S. , p. 472. ] "OLD POINT, July 15, 1862. MY DEAR MAC, --I have just arrived from Washington, and have not timeto get ready to go up this morning, but will to-morrow. I've much tosay to you and am very anxious to see you.... The President hasordered me to remain here for the present, and when I asked him howlong, he said five or six days. I don't know what it means; but I doknow, my dear Mac, that you have lots of enemies. But you must keepcool; don't allow them to provoke you into a quarrel. You must comeout all right; I'll tell you all to-morrow. Your old friend, BURN. " He went up the river to Harrison's Landing and stayed a couple ofdays, consulting with McClellan as to the situation. He returned toOld Point Comfort on the 18th, and immediately telegraphed to theWar Department for leave to go to Washington and present the resultsof his conference with McClellan. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 326. ] This was granted, and he again presentedhimself before the President and Secretary Stanton as the friend ofMcClellan. He urged the increase of McClellan's army to an extentwhich would make the general resume the aggressive with confidence. Halleck visited McClellan at once after assuming command asgeneral-in-chief, but satisfied himself that the government couldnot furnish the thirty thousand additional troops which McClellanthen demanded. [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 337. ] This led to the decisionto bring the Army of the Potomac back by water, and to unite it withPope's army on the Rappahannock. On this visit to Washington the President and Secretary of War hadoffered to Burnside himself the command of the Army of the Potomac. He had refused it, earnestly asserting his faith that McClellan wasmuch fitter for the command than he, and trying hard to restoreconfidence and a mutual good understanding between his friend andthe government. He was discouraged at the result, and after hereturned to his command wrote a letter, every line of which showshis sadness and his disinterested friendship, for he does notmention, much less take credit to himself for, the refusal tosupersede his friend. [Footnote: O. S. , 472. ] "FORT MONROE, Aug. 2, 1862. MY DEAR MAC, --I'm laid up with a lame leg, and besides am muchworried at the decision they have chosen to make in regard to yourarmy. From the moment I reached Washington I feared it would be so, and I am of the opinion that your engineers [Footnote: This hints atGeneral Barnard's unfavorable criticisms of McClellan's management, which led to a request by the latter to have another officerassigned as chief engineer. See Halleck to McClellan, Aug. 7, 1862. Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 359. ] had much to do withbringing about the determination. When the conclusion was arrivedat, I was the only one who advocated your forward movement. I speaknow as if a positive decision had been arrived at, which I do notknow, and you of course do; my present orders indicate it. But youknow what they are and all about it, so I will accept it assomething that is ordered for the best. Let us continue to give ourundivided support to the cause and all will be well. It looks darksometimes, but a just God will order everything for the best. Wecan't expect to have it all as we wish. I'm off for my destination, and will write you a long letter from there. The troops are nearlyall embarked. Good-bye. God bless you! Your old friend, A. E. BURNSIDE. " Burnside was sent with the Ninth Corps to Falmouth on theRappahannock. Porter's corps joined him there, and both the corpswere sent forward to Warrenton to join Pope. When Pope'scommunication with Washington was cut, it was only through Burnsidethat the government could hear of him for several days, and inresponse to the calls for news he telegraphed copies of Porter'sdispatches to him. Like McClellan's private letters, thesedispatches told more of the writer's mind and heart than wouldwillingly have been made public. Burnside's careless outspokenfrankness as to his own opinions was such that he probably did notreflect what reticences others might wish to have made. Perhaps healso thought that Porter's sarcasms on Pope, coming from one who hadgained much reputation in the peninsula, would be powerful inhelping to reinstate McClellan. At any rate, the dispatches were theonly news from the battle-field he could send the President inanswer to his anxious inquiries, and he sent them. They were thecause of Mr. Lincoln's request to McClellan, on September 1st, thathe would write Porter and other friends begging them to give Popeloyal support. They were also the most damaging evidence againstPorter in his subsequent court-martial. Before the Maryland campaign began, Mr. Lincoln again urged uponBurnside the command of the army, and he again declined, warmlyadvocating McClellan's retention as before. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. I. P. 650. ] His advocacy was successful, as I have already stated. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 257. ] The arrangement that Burnside and Sumnerwere to command wings of the army of at least two corps each, wasmade before we left Washington, and Burnside's subordinates, Hookerand Reno, were, by direction of the President, assigned to corpscommands through orders from army headquarters. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 188, 197. ] McClellan did not publishto the Army of the Potomac this assignment of Burnside and Sumnertill the 14th of September, though it had been acted upon from thebeginning of the campaign. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 290. ] On the eveningof the same day Porter's corps joined the army at South Mountain, and before the advance was resumed on the following morning, theorder was again suspended and Burnside reduced to the command of asingle corps. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 297. ] I have already suggestedHooker's relation to this, and only note at this point thecoincidence, if it was nothing more, that the first evidence of anychange in McClellan's friendship toward Burnside occurs within a fewhours from Porter's arrival, and in connection with a complaint madeby the latter. McClellan and Burnside had slept in the same house the night afterthe battle of South Mountain. Porter seems to have joined themthere. During the evening McClellan dictated his orders for themovements of the 15th which were communicated to the army in themorning. That Porter should be unfriendly to Burnside was notstrange, for it had by this time become known that the dispatches ofAugust 27th to 30th were relied upon by General Pope's friends toshow Porter's hostile and insubordinate spirit in that campaign. Thecourt-martial was still impending over Porter, and he had beenallowed to take the field only at McClellan's special request. Although Burnside had not dreamed of doing Porter an ill service, his transmittal of the dispatches to the President had made themavailable as evidence, and Porter, not unnaturally, held himresponsible for part of his peril. The sort of favoritism whichMcClellan showed to Porter was notorious in the army. Had theposition of chief of staff been given him, it would have sanctionedhis personal influence without offending the self-respect of othergeneral officers; but that position was held by General Marcy, thefather-in-law of McClellan, and Porter's manifest power atheadquarters consequently wore the air of discourtesy toward others. The incident I have narrated of the examination of Lee's position atSharpsburg from the ridge near Pry's house was an example of this. It was Porter who in the presence of the commandants of the wings ofthe army was invited by McClellan to continue the examination whenthe others were sent below the crest of the hill. Governor Spraguetestified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War to thenotoriety of this from the beginning of the peninsular campaign andto the bad feeling it caused. [Footnote: C. W. , vol. I. P. 566. ]General Rosecrans testified that in the winter of 1861-62, on hisvisit to Washington, he found that Porter was regarded as theconfidential adviser of McClellan. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Vi. (Rosecrans) p. 14. ] It was matter of common fame, too well known tobe questioned by anybody who served in that army. Mr. Lincoln haddiscussed it to some extent in his correspondence with McClellan inthe month of May, and had warned the general of the mischiefs likelyto ensue, even whilst authorizing provisional corps to be organizedfor Porter and Franklin. He had used such exceptional plainness asto say to the general [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xi. Pt. Iii. P. 154. ] that "it is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper oneor two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. Thecommanders of these corps are of course the three highest officerswith you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation orcommunication with them; that you consult and communicate withnobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. Ido not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events itis proper you should know of their existence. " McClellan's dealing with the division of the army into wings waspart of the same persistent method of thwarting the purpose of theadministration while ostensibly keeping the letter. It was perfectlyeasy to advance from South Mountain upon Sharpsburg, keepingSumner's and Burnside's commands intact. The intermingling of themwas unnecessary at the beginning, and was mischievous during thebattle of Antietam. No military reason can be given for it, and thehistory of the whole year makes it plain that the reasons werepersonal. The offer of the command of the army to Burnside, though refused, was a sufficiently plain designation of McClellan's successor incase he should be relieved or be disabled. It needed a moremagnanimous nature than McClellan's proved to be, to bear theobligation of Burnside's powerful friendship in securing for himagain the field command of the army. When he was in personal contactwith Burnside, the transparent sincerity of the latter's friendshipalways brought McClellan to his better self, and to the eye of anobserver they were as cordially intimate as they had ever been. Yetunfriendly things which had been done officially could not easily beundone, and the friendship was maintained by the subordinatecondoning the sins against it. Hooker was allowed to separatehimself from Burnside's command on the morning of the 15th, againstthe protest of his commander; the order announcing the assignment ofthe wing command was suspended and was never renewed, thoughMcClellan afterward gave Burnside temporary command of several corpswhen detached from the rest of the army. Burnside spent several hours with his chief on Monday morning(15th), and was disturbed and grieved at the course things hadtaken. It is possible that his pre-occupation of mind made himneglect the prompt issue of orders for moving the Ninth Corps, though I know nothing definite as to this. [Footnote: My ownrecollection is that part of the corps had marched without rationson the preceding day, and had sent back during the night for them. Burnside took the responsibility of allowing the corps to wait untilthese supplies came and the men could be fed before marching again. It will be remembered that McClellan made no effort to bring on anengagement that day, nor during the whole of the next day. ] Porter'scorps was to follow us through Fox's Gap, and when his head ofcolumn came up the mountain at noon, we certainly were not inmotion. My own division was the rear one of the column that day, byway of change, as I had had the advance all the way from Washington. General Porter reported at McClellan's headquarters that themovement of his troops was obstructed by Burnside's, and got at hisown special request an order to push by them. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 296. ] The written order Porterpreserved, and put upon it an endorsement adding to what it containsthe accusation that "Burnside's corps was not moving three hoursafter the hour designated for him. " [Footnote: _Ibid. _] No doubtthere was many a delay in that campaign in divers corps. Thesignificant thing in this one was the pains taken to "make a record"of it against Burnside, and the inclusion in this of unofficialmatter by means of the endorsement. On the 16th another vexatious incident of a similar characteroccurred. After McClellan's reconnoitring on our left, he orallydirected that the divisions of the Ninth Corps should be moved topositions designated by members of his staff. When Burnside hadtaken his position on a hill-top from which the positions could beseen and the movement accurately directed, another staff officerfrom McClellan came and requested that the movement be delayed forfurther consideration by the commanding general. It was this thatoccasioned a halt and our subsequent march in the dusk of evening, as has been narrated in its place. That evening the following notewas written at McClellan's headquarters, but it was not delivered toBurnside till the next day, the day of the battle: [Footnote: _Id. _, p. 308. ]-- "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, September 16, 1862. MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps, etc. GENERAL, --The General commanding has learned that although yourcorps was ordered to be in a designated position at 12 M. To-day, ator near sunset only one division and four batteries had reached theground intended for your troops. The general has also been advisedthat there was a delay of some four hours in the movement of yourcommand yesterday. I am instructed to call upon you for explanationsof these failures on your part to comply with the orders given you, and to add, in view of the important military operations now athand, the commanding general cannot lightly regard such markeddeparture from the tenor of his instructions. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ----------, Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-camp, and Act'g Ass't Adj't. Gen'l. " To this missive Burnside dictated the following answer on the fieldduring the battle:--[Footnote: Official Records. , vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 314. ] "HEADQUARTERS, September 17, 1862. BRIG. GEN. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. GENERAL, --Your dispatch of yesterday this moment received. GeneralBurnside directs me to say that immediately upon the receipt of theorder of the general commanding, which was after twelve o'clock, heordered his corps to be in readiness to march, and instead of havingCaptain Duane [Footnote: Captain Duane was senior engineer officerin the field, on the staff of McClellan, and had conducted thereconnoitring of the Antietam. ] post the divisions in detail, and atthe suggestion of Captain Duane, he sent three aides to ascertainthe position of each of the three divisions, that they might postthem. These aides returned shortly before three o'clock, and theyimmediately proceeded to post the three columns. The general thenwent on an eminence above these positions to get a good view ofthem, and whilst there, during the progress of the movement of hiscorps, an aide from General McClellan came to him and said thatGeneral McClellan was not sure that the proper position had beenindicated, and advised him not to hasten the movement until the aidehad communicated with the general commanding. He (General Burnside)at once went to General McClellan's headquarters to inform him thathe had seen large bodies of the enemy moving off to the right. Notfinding the general commanding, General Burnside returned to hiscommand, and the movement was resumed and continued as rapidly aspossible. General Burnside directs me to say that he is sorry tohave received so severe a rebuke from the general commanding, andparticularly sorry that the general commanding feels that hisinstructions have not been obeyed; but nothing can occur to preventthe general from continuing his hearty co-operation to the best ofhis ability in any movement the general commanding may direct. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedientservant, LEWIS RICHMOND, Assistant Adjutant-General. " The answer was of course conclusive, but it leaves the difficultproblem, how came the reprimand to be written which GeneralMcClellan could not have dictated, as the interruption of Burnside'smovement was caused by a message from himself? The blank for thename of a staff officer who was to sign it, and the indication ofhis rank and position point to Lieutenant-Colonel James A. Hardie asthe one for whom it was prepared, but Colonel Hardie must havedemurred to signing it, since Colonel Richmond's answer implies thatGeneral Seth Williams's name was finally attached. All of us whoknew General Williams and his methods of doing business will be slowto believe that he volunteered a paper of that kind. He afterwardserved on Burnside's own staff and had his confidence. Theresponsibility must fall upon General Marcy, the chief of staff, andmost of the officers of that army will be likely to conclude that healso would act only by the direction of McClellan or of some onewhom he regarded as having decisive authority to speak for him inhis absence. I have already referred to an error contained in General Porter'sreport of the battle of Antietam, where he says that "Morell'sdivision in reporting to General Burnside relieved his corps, whichwas at once recalled from its position in front of Antietam bridge. "[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 339. ] I mention itagain only to say that since this was not only contrary to the fact, but is unsupported by the records, to accept it and to embody it inhis official report certainly indicates no friendly dispositiontoward Burnside. To that extent it supports any other circumstanceswhich point to Porter as the hostile influence which becomes somanifest at McClellan's headquarters after the 14th of September. Iknow by many expressions uttered by Burnside during those days andafterward, that though he was deeply grieved at some things whichhad occurred, he did not waver in his loyal friendship to McClellan. He uttered no unkind word in regard to him personally, either thenor ever in my hearing. He sometimes spoke of what he believed to bemischievous influences about McClellan and which he thought were toopowerful with him, but was earnest and consistent in wishing for himthe permanent command of that army till success should give aglorious end to the war. It was after the irritating incidents Ihave narrated that the visit to McClellan to dine with him occurred, and I saw them frequently together till I left the army on the 5thof October. Their manner toward each other was more than cordial, itwas affectionately intimate. Burnside never mentioned to me, although I was next him in command, the reprimand which is copiedabove. His real unwillingness to supersede McClellan, even when thefinal order came in November, is abundantly attested. McClellan onlyby degrees gave outward evidence of the souring of his own feelingstoward Burnside, but his private letters show that the process beganwith the battle of South Mountain. By the time that he wrote hisfinal report in the latter part of 1863 it had advanced far enoughto warp his memory of the campaign and to make him try to transferto Burnside the responsibility for some of his mishaps. When his"Own Story" was written, the process was complete, and no kindlyremembrance dictated a word which could give any indication of thefriendship that had died. Those who are not familiar with the customs of military servicemight see little significance in the fact that the fault-findingwith Burnside was put in the form of official communications whichthus became part of the permanent documentary history of the war. Tomilitary men, however, it would be almost conclusive proof of asettled hostility to him, formally calling his military character inquestion in a way to make it tell against him for ulterior purposes. Nothing is more common in an active campaign than for a commandingofficer to send messages hurrying the movement of a part of hisarmy. These are usually oral, and even when delays are complainedof, the commander, in the interests of cordial cooperation andcheerful alacrity, awaits a full opportunity for personalexplanation from his immediate subordinates before administering areprimand. It goes without saying that where intimate friendshipexists, still more delicate consideration is used. To send such aletter as that of September 16th, and in the course of suchdeliberate movements as were McClellan's during those days, would bescarcely conceivable unless there had been a formal breach ofpersonal relations, and it was equivalent to notice that they werehenceforth to deal at arm's-length only. McClellan's "Own Story" shows that in regard to the alleged delay onthe morning of the 15th, he had a personal explanation fromBurnside. [Footnote: O. S. , p. 586. ] Yet in the night of the 16ththe same querulous inquiry was repeated as if it had not beenanswered, with the addition of the new complaint of a delay on the16th which was caused by McClellan's personal request, and the wholeaccompanied by so formal a reprimand that the ordinary reply to itwould have been a demand for a court of inquiry. The occurrence wasunexampled in that campaign and stands entirely alone, althoughMcClellan's memoirs show that he alleged delays in other cases, notably in Hooker's march that same afternoon to attack the enemy, of which no recorded notice was taken. [Footnote: O. S. , p. 590. ]Considering the personal relations of the men before that time, andas I myself witnessed them from day to day afterward, it is simplyincredible that McClellan dictated the letters which went from hisheadquarters. Before ending the discussion of matters personal to these officers Iwill say a few words regarding Burnside's appearance and bearing inthe field. He was always a striking figure, and had a dashing waywith him which incited enthusiasm among his soldiers. Withoutseeming to care for his costume, or even whilst affecting a littlecarelessness, there was apt to be something picturesque about him. He had a hearty and jovial manner, a good-humored cordiality towardeverybody, that beamed in his face as he rode through the camps oralong the lines. When not on parade, he often discarded his uniformcoat, wearing a light undress jacket, with no indication of his rankexcept the yellow silk sash about his waist which showed that he wasa general officer. On one occasion when I accompanied him in achange of position, we passed the Ninth Corps column in march, andit was interesting to see how he was greeted by the troops which hadbeen with him in his North Carolina campaign. He wore that day a"Norfolk jacket, " a brown knit roundabout, fitting close to hisperson; his hat was the stiff broad-rimmed, high-crowned regulationhat, worn rather rakishly, with gold cord, acorn-tipped; hispistol-belt was a loose one, allowing the holster to hang on his hipinstead of being buckled tight about the waist; his boots were thehigh cavalry boots reaching to the knee; his large buckskingauntlets covered his forearm; he rode a large bony horse, bob-tailed, with a wall-eye which gave him a vicious look, andsuited well the brigandish air of his rider's whole appearance. Burnside's flashing eyes, his beard trimmed to the "Burnside cut"with the mustache running into the side whiskers whilst the square, clean-shaven chin and jaws gave a tone of decision and force to hisfeatures, made up a picture that at once arrested the eye. As wewent along the roadside at a fast trot, his high-stepping horseseemed to be keeping his white eye on the lookout for a chance tolash out at somebody. The men evidently enjoyed the scene, cheeringhim loudly. I was particularly amused with one group of soldiers atrest by their stacked muskets. They sat upon their haunches, andclapped their hands as he passed, exclaiming and laughing, "Just seethe old fellow! just look at him!" Burnside laughed at their fun asjollily as they did themselves, and took no offence at thefree-and-easy way in which they showed their liking for him. Therewas no affectation in all this, but an honest enjoyment in followinghis own whim in style and in accoutrement. His sincere earnestnessin the cause for which he was fighting was apparent to all who methim, and no one in his presence could question the single-heartedhonesty and unselfishness of the man. His bearing under fire wasgood, and his personal courage beyond question. He shrank fromresponsibility with sincere modesty, because he questioned his owncapacity to deal with affairs of great magnitude. He was not onlynot ambitious to command a great army, but he honestly sought to putit aside when it was thrust upon him, and accepted it at last from asense of obligation to the administration which had nominated him toit in spite of his repeated disclaimers. It carafe to him finally, without consulting him, as a military order he could not disobeywithout causing a most awkward dead-lock in the campaign. CHAPTER XIX RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA Ordered to the Kanawha valley again--An unwelcome surprise--Reasonsfor the order--Reporting to Halleck at Washington--Affairs in theKanawha in September--Lightburn's positions--Enemy under Loringadvances--Affair at Fayette C. H. --Lightburn retreats--Gauley Bridgeabandoned--Charleston evacuated--Disorderly flight to theOhio--Enemy's cavalry raid under Jenkins--General retreat inTennessee and Kentucky--West Virginia not in any Department--Nowannexed to that of Ohio--Morgan's retreat from CumberlandGap--Ordered to join the Kanawha forces--Milroy's brigade also--Myinterviews with Halleck and Stanton--Promotion--My task--My divisionsent with me--District of West Virginia--Colonel Crookpromoted--Journey westward--Governor Peirpoint--GovernorTod--General Wright--Destitution of Morgan's column--Refitting atPortland, Ohio--Night drive to Gallipolis--An amusingaccident--Inspection at Point Pleasant--Milroy ordered toParkersburg--Milroy's qualities--Interruptions to movement oftroops--No wagons--Supplies delayed--Confederate retreat--Loringrelieved--Echols in command--Our march up the valley--Echolsretreats--We occupy Charleston and Gauley Bridge--Further advancestopped--Our forces reduced--Distribution of remainingtroops--Alarms and minor movements--Case of Mr. Summers--Histreatment by the Confederates. In war it is the unexpected that happens. On the 4th of October mypermanent connection with the Army of the Potomac seemed assured. Iwas in command of the Ninth Corps, encamped in Pleasant Valley, awaiting the renewal of active operations. My promotion to the rankof Major-General had been recommended by McClellan and Burnside, with the assurance that the permanent command of the corps would beadded. On that evening an order came from Washington directing me toreturn to the Kanawha valley, from which our troops had been driven. I was to report in person at Washington immediately, and would thereget detailed directions. The order was as much a surprise to myimmediate superiors as it was to me, and apparently as littlewelcome. We all recognized the necessity of sending some one to theKanawha who knew the country, and the reasonableness, therefore, ofassigning the duty to me. McClellan and Burnside both promised thatwhen matters should be restored to a good footing in West Virginiathey would co-operate in an effort to bring me back, and as this wascoupled with a strong request to the War Department that mypromotion should be made immediate, [Footnote: McClellan to Halleck, Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 383. ] acquiesced withreasonably good grace. Going to Washington on the eth, I received my orders andinstructions from Halleck, the General-in-Chief. They were basedupon the events which had occurred in the Kanawha valley since Ileft it in August. The information got by General Stuart from Pope'scaptured quartermaster had led to a careful examination of theletter-books captured at the same time, and Lee thus learned that Ihad left 5000 men, under Colonel Lightburn, to garrison the postsabout Gauley Bridge. The Confederate forces were therefore greaterthan ours in that region, and General Loring, who was in command, was ordered to make at once a vigorous aggressive campaign againstLightburn, to "clear the valley of the Kanawha and operatenorthwardly to a junction" with the army of Lee in the Shenandoahvalley. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. P. 1069;_Id. _, vol. Xii. Pp. 940-943, 946. This correspondence fullyjustifies Pope's suspicion that Lee then planned to operate by theValley of Virginia. ] Loring marched, on the 6th of September, with acolumn which he reported about 5000 strong, expecting to add to itby organizing recruits and militia as Floyd had done in the previousyear. His line of operations was by way of Princeton, Flat-topMountain and Raleigh C. II. To Fayette C. H. His forces do not seemto have been noticeably increased by recruiting till ours hadretreated out of the valley. Lightburn's advanced positions were two, --a brigade under ColonelSiber of the Thirty-seventh Ohio being at Raleigh C. H. And anotherunder Colonel Gilbert of the Forty-fourth Ohio, near the Hawk'sNest, and at Alderson's on the Lewisburg road. A small post was keptup at Summersville and one at Gauley Bridge, where Lightburn had hisheadquarters, and some detachments guarded trains and steamboats inthe lower valley. Gauley Bridge was, as in the preceding year, thecentral point, and though it was necessary to guard both theLewisburg and the Raleigh roads on the opposite sides of the NewRiver gorge, a concentration on the line the enemy should take wasthe plain rule of action when the opposing armies were about equal. Or, by concentrating at Gauley Bridge, my experience had proved thatwe could hold at bay three or four times our numbers. In eithercase, fighting in detail was to be avoided, and rapid concentrationunder one leader to be effected. On the approach of the enemy Siber was withdrawn from Raleigh C. H. To Fayette, and Gilbert to Tompkins farm, three miles from GauleyBridge, but the brigades were not united. On the 10th of SeptemberLoring attacked Siber at Fayette, in the intrenchments made byScammon in the winter. Siber repulsed the efforts of Loring to drivehim out of his position, and held it during the day. Three companiesof the Fourth Virginia under Captain Vance, and a squad of horsewere sent by Lightburn from Gauley Bridge to Siber's assistance, butthe latter, being without definite orders and thinking he could nothold the position another day, retreated in the night, setting fireto a large accumulation of stores and abandoning part of his wagons. He halted on the ridge of Cotton Hill, covering the road to GauleyBridge, and was there joined by five companies of the Forty-seventhOhio, also sent to his assistance by Lightburn. Loring followed andmade a partial attack, which was met by the rear-guard under CaptainVance and repulsed, whilst Siber's principal column marched on toMontgomery's ferry on the Kanawha. Meanwhile Lightburn had called in Gilbert's force to Gauley Bridgeduring the night of the both, and placed them opposite the ferryconnecting with Siber, which was just below Kanawha Falls and in thelower part of the Gauley Bridge camp. On Siber's appearance at theferry, Lightburn seems to have despaired of having time to get himover, and directed him to march down the left bank of the river, burning the sheds full of stores which were on that side of thestream. When Captain Vance with the rear-guard reached the ferry, the buildings were blazing on both sides of the narrow pass underthe bluff, and his men ran the gantlet of fire, protecting theirheads with extra blankets which they found scattered near thestores. Vance easily held the enemy at bay at Armstrong's Creek, andSiber marched his column, next morning, to Brownstown, sometwenty-five miles below Kanawha Falls, where steamboats met him andferried him over to Camp Piatt. There he rejoined Lightburn. Gilbert's artillery was put in position on the right bank atMontgomery's Ferry, and checked the head of Loring's column when itapproached the Kanawha in pursuit of Siber. Lightburn had orderedthe detachment in post at Summersville to join him at Gauley, andColonel Elliot of the Forty-seventh Ohio, who commanded it, marcheddown the Gauley with his ten companies (parts of three regiments)and a small wagon train. He approached Gauley Bridge on the 11th, but Lightburn had not waited for him, and the enemy were inpossession. Elliot burned his wagons and took to the hills with hismen, cutting across the angle between the Gauley and the Kanawha andjoining Gilbert's column near Cannelton. A smaller detachment, onlya little way up the Gauley, was also left to its fate in theprecipitate retreat, and it also took to the hills and woods andsucceeded in evading the enemy. It was about ten o'clock in themorning when Loring's head of column approached the Kanawha and drewthe fire of Gilbert's guns. After about an hour's cannonade acrossthe river, Lightburn gave the order to retreat down the right bank, after burning the stores and blowing up the magazine at GauleyBridge. Loring found men to swim across the river and extinguish thefires kindled on the ferry-boats, which were soon put in use toferry Echols's brigade across. This followed Lightburn down theright bank, whilst Loring himself, with Williams's and Wharton'sbrigades, marched after Siber down the left. The over-hanging cliffsand hills echoed with the cannonade, and the skirmishers exchangedrifle-shots across the rapid stream; but few casualties occurred, and after Elliot joined the column, it marched with littleinterruption to Camp Piatt, thirteen miles from Charleston, whereSiber met them, and the steamboats he had used passed down the riverto the Ohio. Siber's brigade continued its retreat rapidly to Charleston, passedthrough the town and crossed the Elk River. Gilbert's brigade alsoretired, but in better order, and it kept up a skirmish with theadvance-guard of Echols's column which was following them. WhenGilbert reached the outskirts of Charleston, he checked the advanceof the enemy long enough to enable the quartermasters at the post tomove their trains across the Elk; but the haste of the evacuationwas so great that the stores in depot there were not removed, andwere burned to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. Gilbertretired across the Elk, and the suspension bridge was destroyed. Loring's artillery made a dash for a hill on the left bank of theKanawha, which commanded the new position taken up by Lightburn'stroops, and the Confederate battery soon opened an enfilade fireacross the river, taking the line of breastworks along the Elk inflank and in reverse. The trains and the stragglers started indirest confusion on the road to Ravenswood on the Ohio, whichoffered a line of retreat not subject to the enemy's fire. Siber'sbrigade followed, Gilbert's continued to bring up the rear. The roaddown the Kanawha was abandoned because it was in range of artilleryfrom the opposite side of the river throughout its whole course downthe valley. The road to Ripley and Ravenswood was therefore taken, and the flying troops were met at those towns on the Ohio bysteamboats which conveyed part of them to Point Pleasant at themouth of the Kanawha, where the whole command was concentrated inthe course of a few days. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. I. Pp. 1058-1060. ] Siber's loss was 16 killed, 87 wounded, and over100 missing. Gilbert reported 9 men killed and 8 wounded, with about75 missing; but as the enemy do not enumerate any captured prisonersin their reports except a lieutenant and 10 men, it is evident thatthe missing were mostly men who outran the others. Loring's lossesas reported by his surgeon were 18 killed and 89 wounded. The enemyclaim to have captured large numbers of wagons, horses, mules, andstores of all kinds which Loring estimated at a million dollars'worth, besides all that were burned. It was a panicky retreat after the hot little fight by Siber'sbrigade at Fayette C. H. , and it is not worth while to apply to itany military criticism, further than to say that either of thebrigades intrenched at Gauley Bridge could have laughed at Loring. The river would have been impassable, for all the ferry-boats werein the keeping of our men on the right bank, and Loring would notdare pass down the valley leaving a fortified post on the line ofcommunications by which he must return. The topography of the wildmountain region was such that an army could only pass from the lowerKanawha to the headwaters of the James River by the road Loring hadused in his advance, or by that leading through the post of GauleyBridge to Lewisburg and beyond. The Confederate War Department seemto have thought that their forces might have passed from Charlestonto the Ohio, thence to Parkersburg, and turning east from this town, have made their way to Beverly and to the Valley of Virginia by theroute Garnett had used in the previous year. They would have found, however, as Loring told them, that it would have been easy for theNational forces to overwhelm them with numbers while they weremaking so long and so difficult a march in a vast region most ofwhich was a wilderness. Lightburn's position had been made more embarrassing by the factthat a cavalry raid under Brigadier-General Jenkins was passingaround his left flank while Loring came upon him in front. Jenkinswith a light column of horse moved from Lewisburg by way of theWilderness Road to northwestern Virginia, captured posts anddestroyed stores at Weston, Buckhannon, and Roane C. H. , and made acircuit to the lower Kanawha, rejoining Loring after Lightburn'sretreat. Little real mischief was done by this raid, but it added tothe confusion, and helped to disturb the self-possession of thecommanding officer. In this way it was one of the causes of theprecipitate retreat. Several circumstances combined to make Lightburn's disasterembarrassing to the government. West Virginia had not been connectedwith any military department after Pope's command had been brokenup. McClellan's authority did not extend beyond his own army and itstheatre of operations. Halleck could hardly take personal charge ofthe affairs of remote districts. Thus the Kanawha valley had droppedout of the usual system and was an omitted case. The embarrassmentwas increased by the fact that Buell was retreating out of Tennesseebefore Bragg, Morgan had evacuated Cumberland Gap and was making apainful and hazardous retreat to the Ohio, and the Confederateforces under Kirby Smith were moving directly upon Cincinnati. Lightburn's mishap, therefore, was only the northern extremity of aline of defeats extending through the whole length of the Ohiovalley from Parkersburg to Louisville. The governors of WestVirginia and Ohio were naturally alarmed at the events in theKanawha valley, and were earnest in their calls upon the WarDepartment for troops to drive Loring back beyond the mountains andfor an officer to command them who knew something of the country. Halleck seems to have been puzzled at the condition of things, nothaving realized that Pope's retirement had left West Virginia "inthe air. " It took a week, apparently, to get satisfactory details ofthe actual situation, and on the 19th of September the firstimportant step was taken by annexing the region to the Department ofthe Ohio, then commanded by Major-General Horatio G. Wright, whoseheadquarters were at Cincinnati. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xvi. Pt. Ii. P. 328. ] Wright was directed to provide for therecovery of lost ground in West Virginia as rapidly as possible, butthe campaign in Kentucky was the more important and urgent, so thatno troops could be spared for secondary operations until theConfederates had ceased to threaten Cincinnati and Louisville. On the 1st of October Halleck again called General Wright'sattention to the need of doing something for West Virginia. GovernorPeirpoint, of that State, represented the Confederates under Loringas about 10, 000 in number, and this reflected the opinion whichLightburn had formed during his retreat. It became the basis ofcalculation in the campaign which followed, though it greatlyexaggerated Loring's force. Three days later Brigadier-GeneralGeorge W. Morgan was known to have reached the Ohio River with thedivision he had brought from Cumberland Gap, and General Halleckoutlined a plan of action. He ordered Morgan's division to be sentto Gallipolis to take part in the advance into the Kanawha valley, where some new Ohio regiments were also to join them. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 381. ] He at the same timecalled me to Washington to receive instructions under which I was totake command of the whole force operating on the Kanawha line. Brigadier-General Milroy had already (September 25th) been orderedto proceed thither with his brigade, which was in Washington and waspart of Banks's forces garrisoning the capital. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 355, 359. ] He was moved through Pennsylvania to Wheeling byrail, and thence down the Ohio River to Point Pleasant at the mouthof the Kanawha. My order to leave the Army of the Potomac reached me on Saturdayevening. Much business had to be closed up before I could properlyturn over the command of the Ninth Corps, but I was able to completeit and make the journey to Washington so as to report to GeneralHalleck on Monday morning. He received me very kindly, and explainedthe necessity they were under to send some one to the Kanawha valleywho knew the country. He was complimentary as to my former servicethere, and said my return to that region would meet the earnestwishes of the governors of West Virginia and Ohio, as well as thejudgment of the War Department and of himself. To compensate forseparating me from the command of the Ninth Corps, it had beendecided to make my promotion at once and to put the whole of WestVirginia under my command as a territorial district. He inquiredinto some details of the topography of the Kanawha valley and of myexperience there, and concluded by saying that reinforcements wouldbe sent to make the column I should lead in person stronger than the10, 000 attributed to Loring. My task would then be to drive back theenemy beyond the mountains. When that was accomplished, part of thetroops would probably be withdrawn. The actual position of Milroy'sbrigade was not definitely known, and Governor Peirpoint of WestVirginia had asked to have it sent to Clarksburg. This gave me theopportunity to urge that my own Kanawha division be detached fromthe Ninth Corps and sent back to Clarksburg, where with Milroy theywould make a force strong enough to take care of that part of theState and to make a co-operative movement toward Gauley Bridge. Thisalso was granted, and immediate promotion was given to Colonel Crookso that he might command the division, and a promise was made to dothe like for Colonel Scammon, who would then be available for thecommand of the division still under Lightburn, whose retreat wasstrongly condemned as precipitate. No soldier could object to anarrangement so satisfactory as this, and though I still preferred toremain with the Army of the Potomac, I could only accept the newduty with sincere thanks for the consideration shown me. TheGeneral-in-Chief accompanied me to the room of the Secretary of War, and Mr. Stanton added to my sense of obligation by warm expressionsof personal good-will. His manner was so different from the brusqueone commonly attributed to him that I have nothing but pleasantremembrances of my relations to him, both then and later. My ownappointment as major-general was handed me by him, the usualpromotions of my personal staff were also made, and directions weregiven for the immediate appointment of Crook to be brigadier. I called to pay my respects to the President, but he was in Cabinetmeeting and could not be seen. I had a short but warmly friendlyvisit with Mr. Chase later in the day, and was ready to leave townfor my new post of duty by the evening train. The Secretary of Wardirected me to visit Wheeling and Columbus on my way, and then toreport to General Wright at Cincinnati before going to the Kanawhavalley. This was in fact the quickest way to reach the mouth of theKanawha River, for the fall rains had not yet come to make the Ohionavigable, and from Columbus to Cincinnati, and thence by theMarietta Railway eastward, was, as the railway routes then ran, thebest method of joining my command. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroadwas interrupted between Harper's Ferry and Hancock (about fiftymiles) by the Confederate occupation of that part of Virginia. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 393, 394. ]General Crook was ordered to march the division from its camp inPleasant Valley to Hancock, where trains on the western division ofthe railway would meet him and transport the troops to Clarksburg. For myself and staff, we took the uninterrupted railway line fromWashington to Pittsburg, and thence to Wheeling, where we arrived onthe evening of October 8th. The 9th was given to consultation withGovernor Peirpoint and to communication with such military officersas were within reach. We reached Columbus on the both, when I had asimilar consultation with Governor Tod and his military staff inregard to new regiments available for my use. Leaving Columbus inthe afternoon, we arrived at Cincinnati late the same night, and onSaturday, the 11th, I reported to General Wright. He was an officer of the engineer corps of the regular army, a manof fine acquirements and of a serious and earnest character, whosemilitary service throughout the war was marked by solidity andmodesty. If there seemed at first a little _hauteur_ in his manner, one soon saw that it was a natural reserve free from arrogance. Thesort of confusion in which everything was, is indicated by the factthat he knew nothing of my whereabouts when informed from Washingtonthat I would be ordered to the Kanawha, and on the same day (6thOctober) addressed a dispatch to me at Point Pleasant whilst I wasreceiving instructions from General Halleck in Washington. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xvi. Pt. Ii. P. 579. ] Our personalconsultation established a thoroughly good understanding at once, and as long as I remained under his orders, I found him thoroughlyconsiderate of my wishes and appreciative of my suggestions and ofthe conduct of my own part of the work to be done. Morgan's division, after reaching the Ohio River, had been moved toPortland on the Marietta Railroad, the nearest point to Gallipolis, which was twenty-five miles away and nearly opposite the mouth ofthe Great Kanawha. His retreat had been through a sparsely settledcountry, much of which was a wilderness, rugged and broken in theextreme. His wagons had broken down, his teams were used up, hissoldiers were worn out, ragged, and barefoot. [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. I. P. 990. ] Many arms and accoutrements had been lost, and thecommand was imperatively in need of complete refitting and a littlerest. The men had been largely recruited in East Tennessee andKentucky, and were unwilling to serve in any other theatre of war. The Tennesseans, indeed, were reported to be mutinous at the newsthat they were to be sent to the Kanawha valley. General Wrightissued orders for the refitting of the command, and promised suchdelay and rest as might be found practicable. He detached threeregiments to serve in Kentucky, and directed their place to be madegood by three new Ohio regiments then organizing. The division waspermitted to remain at Portland till imperatively needed for mymovement. There were no trains running on the railroad on Sunday, and Mondaymorning, the 13th October, was the earliest possible start on theremainder of my journey. I left Cincinnati at that time, and with mypersonal staff reached Portland in the afternoon. Morgan's divisionwas found to be in quite as bad condition as had been reported, buthe was in daily expectation of the new equipments and clothing, aswell as wagons for his baggage-train and fresh horses for hisartillery. It was stated also that a paymaster had been ordered tojoin the division, with funds to pay part at least of the largearrears of pay due to the men. This looked hopeful, but stillimplied some further delay. Uneasy to learn the actual condition ofaffairs with Lightburn's command, I determined to reach Gallipolisthe same night. Our horses had been left behind, and being thusdismounted, we took passage in a four-horse hack, a square wagon onsprings, enclosed with rubber-cloth curtains. Night fell soon afterwe began our journey, and as we were pushing on in the dark, thedriver blundered and upset us off the end of a little sluicewaybridge into a mud-hole. He managed to jump from his seat and holdhis team, but there was no help for us who were buttoned in. The mudwas soft and deep, and as the wagon settled on its side, we weretumbled in a promiscuous heap into the ooze and slime, whichcompletely covered us. We were not long in climbing out, and seeinglights in a farm-house, made our way to it. As we came into thelight of the lamps and of a brisk fire burning on the open hearth, we were certainly as sorry a military spectacle as could beimagined. We were most kindly received, the men taking lanterns andgoing to our driver's help, whilst we stood before the fire, andscraped the thick mud from our uniforms with chips from the farmer'swoodyard, making rather boisterous sport of our mishap. Before thewagon had been righted and partly cleaned, we had scraped andsponged each other off and were ready to go on. We noticed, however, that the room had filled with men, women, and children from theneighborhood, who stood bashfully back in the shadows, and whomodestly explained that they had heard there was a "live general"there, and as they had never seen one, they had "come over. " Theymust have formed some amusing ideas of military personages, and wefound at least as much sport in being the menagerie as they did invisiting it. Our mishap made us wait for the moon, which rose in anhour or so, and we then took leave of our entertainers and ouraudience and drove on, with no desire, however, to repeat theperformance. We made some ten miles more of the road, but found itso rough, and our progress so slow, that we were glad to findquarters for the rest of the night, finishing the journey in themorning. On reaching my field of duty, my first task was to inspect theforces at Point Pleasant, and learn what was necessary to make aforward movement as soon as Morgan's troops should reach me. GeneralWright had originally expected that inclusive of Milroy's andMorgan's troops, I should find at the mouth of the Kanawha, onarriving there, some 20, 000 men. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 402. ] In fact, however, Lightburn's diminishedcommand had only been reinforced by three new Ohio regiments (theEighty-ninth, Ninety-first, and Ninety-second) and a new one fromWest Virginia (the Thirteenth), and with these his strength was lessthan 7300, officers and men, showing that his original command wassadly reduced by straggling and desertion during his retreat. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 522. ] The new regiments were made up of goodmaterial, but as they were raw recruits, their usefulness must forsome time be greatly limited. Two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry with a howitzerbattery were at Guyandotte, under Colonel Jonathan Cranor of theFortieth Ohio, and the Fifth West Virginia was at Ceredo near themouth of the Big Sandy River. They had been stationed at thesepoints to protect the navigation of the Ohio and to repel theefforts of the Confederate Cavalry General Jenkins to "raid" thatregion in which was his old home. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 459, 522. ] They formed, a little later, the ThirdBrigade of the Kanawha division under Crook. I found General Milroy in command as the ranking officer present, and he had sent Cranor's command down the river. When GovernorPeirpoint learned that Milroy's brigade had passed Wheeling on hisway to the Kanawha, he applied urgently to General Wright to sendhim, instead, from Parkersburg by rail to Clarksburg to form thenucleus of a column to move southward from that point upon the rearof Loring's forces. Wright assented, for both he and Halleckaccepted the plan of converging columns from Clarksburg and PointPleasant, and regarded that from the former place as the moreimportant. [Footnote: _Id_. P. 402. ] If directions were sent toMilroy to this effect, they seem to have miscarried. Besides hisoriginal brigade, some new Indiana regiments were ordered to reportto him. He had, with characteristic lack of reflection and withoutauthority, furloughed the Fifth West Virginia regiment in mass andsent the men home. I gave him a new one in place of this, orderedhim to reassemble the other as soon as possible, and to march atonce to Parkersburg, proceeding thence to Clarksburg by rail. Thenew troops added to his command enabled him to organize them into adivision of two brigades, and still other regiments were added tohim later. Milroy was a picturesque character, with some excellentqualities. A tall man, with trenchant features, bright eyes, a greatshock of gray hair standing out from his head, he was a markedpersonal figure. He was brave, but his bravery was of the excitablekind that made him unbalanced and nearly wild on the battle-field. His impulsiveness made him erratic in all performances of duty, andnegligent of the system without which the business of an army cannotgo on. This was shown in his furlough of a regiment whilst _enroute_ to reinforce Lightburn, who was supposed to be in desperatestraits. It is also seen in the absence of Official Records of theorganization of his command at this time, so that we cannot tellwhat regiments constituted it when his division was assembled atClarksburg. He is described, in the second Battle of Bull Run, ascrazily careering over the field, shouting advice to other officersinstead of gathering and leading his own command, which he said wasrouted and scattered. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 342, 362-364. ] Under the immediate control of a firm and steadyhand he could do good service, but was wholly unfit for independentresponsibility. His demonstrative manner, his boiling patriotism, and his political zeal gave him prominence and made him a favoritewith the influential war-governor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton, whopushed his military advancement. The Kanawha division left the Army of the Potomac on the 8th ofOctober and reached Hancock on the 10th. There it crossed the trackof a raid of the Confederate cavalry into Pennsylvania, underStuart. By McClellan's order one brigade was sent to McConnelsvilleto intercept the enemy, and the other was halted. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 62-78. ] By the 13th Crook had been allowed toconcentrate the division at Hancock again, but was kept waiting fororders, so that he was not able to report to me his arrival atClarksburg till the 20th. Colonel Scammon was on a short leave ofabsence during this march, and was promoted. [Footnote: His new rankdated from 15th October, that of Crook from 7th September. ArmyRegister, 1863. ] He reported to me in person in his new rank ofbrigadier a little later. The brigades of the Kanawha division werecommanded by the senior colonels present. The increase of troops in the district made immediate need oftransportation and munitions and supplies of all kinds. The Kanawhadivision had not been allowed to bring away with it its admirablyequipped supply train, but its energetic quartermaster, CaptainFitch, came with the troops, and I immediately made him chiefquartermaster of the district. Milroy's division had no wagons, neither had Morgan's. The fall rains had not yet raised the rivers, and only boats of lightest draught could move on the Ohio, whilstnavigation on the Kanawha was wholly suspended. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 433. ] Four hundred wagons and twothousand mules were estimated as necessary to supply two movingcolumns of ten thousand men each, in addition to such trains as werestill available in the district. Only one hundred wagons could bepromised from the depot at Cincinnati, none of which reached mebefore the enemy was driven out of the Kanawha valley. I wasauthorized to contract for one hundred more to be built at Wheeling, where, however, the shops could only construct thirty-five per week, and these began to reach the troops only after the 1st of November. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 535-537. ] We hoped for rains which would giveus navigation in the Kanawha in spite of the suffering which wetweather at that season must produce, and I ordered wagons and teamsto be hired from the country people as far as this could be done. Similar delays and trouble occurred in procuring advance stores andequipments. Part of Morgan's men were delayed at the last moment bytheir new knapsacks coming to them without the straps which fastenthem to the shoulders. General Wright blamed the depot officers forthis, and took from me and my subordinates all responsibility forthe delays; [Footnote: . , pp. 438, 475. ] but the incidents make aninstructive lesson in the difficulty of suddenly organizing a newand strong military column in a region distant from large depots ofsupply. It also shows the endless cost and mischief that may resultfrom an ill-advised retreat and destruction of property at suchposts as Gauley Bridge and Charleston. To put the localquartermasters at Gallipolis and other towns on the Ohio side of theriver under my command, General Wright enlarged the boundaries of mydistrict so as to include the line of Ohio counties bordering on theriver. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 381, 421. ] On visiting Lightburn's command at Point Pleasant, I ordered abrigade to be sent forward next day (15th) to Ten-mile Creek, repairing the road and bridges, whilst a scouting party ofexperienced men started out at once to penetrate the country bycircuitous ways and to collect information. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 433. ] In two or three days bits of news began to arrive, with rumorsthat Loring was retreating. The truth was that he in fact withdrewhis infantry, leaving Jenkins with the cavalry and irregular forcesto hold the valley for a time, and then to make a circuit northwardby way of Bulltown, Sutton, etc. , gaining the Beverly turnpike nearthe mountains and rejoining the infantry, which would march to joinLee by roads intersecting that highway at Monterey. Such at leastwas the purpose Loring communicated to the Confederate WarDepartment; but he was not allowed to attempt it. His instructionshad been to march his whole command by the route Jenkins was takingand at least to hold the valley stubbornly as far as Charleston. Onreceipt of the news that he was retreating, orders were sent him toturn over the command to Brigadier-General John Echols, the next inrank, and to report in person at Richmond. [Footnote: . , pp. 661, 667. ] Echols was ordered immediately to resume the positions whichhad been abandoned, and did so as rapidly as possible. Loring had infact begun his retreat on the 11th, three days before I reachedGallipolis, but the first information of it was got after thescouting had been begun which is mentioned above. By the 18th I wasable to give General Wright confirmation of the news and a correctoutline of Loring's plan, though we had not then learned that Echolswas marching back to Charleston. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 449. ] We heard of his return two or three dayslater. As evidence of the rapidity with which information reachedthe enemy, it is noteworthy that Lee knew my command had left theArmy of the Potomac for West Virginia on the 11th October, threedays after Crook marched from camp in Pleasant Valley. He reportedto Richmond that four brigades had gone to that region, which wasaccurate as to the number, though only half right as toidentification of the brigades. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 662, 663. ] Onthe 13th he sent further information that I had been promoted andassigned to command the district. By the 20th there had been a slight rise in the Kanawha River, sothat it was possible to use small steamboats to carry supplies forthe troops, and Lightburn was ordered to advance his whole divisionto Red House, twenty-five miles, and to remove obstructions tonavigation which had been planted there. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 456, 459. ] One brigade of Morgan's division was in condition to move, andit was ordered from Portland to Gallipolis. The rest were to followat the earliest possible moment. The discontent of the EastTennessee regiments had not been lessened by the knowledge they hadthat powerful political influences were at work to second theirdesire to be moved back into the neighborhood of their home. On the10th of October a protest against their being sent into WestVirginia was made by Horace Maynard, the loyal representative ofEast Tennessee in Congress, a man of marked character and abilityand deservedly very influential with the government. [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Xvi. Pt. Ii. Pp. 604, 635, 651. ] Maynard addressedHalleck a second time on the subject on the 22d, and on the 29thAndrew Johnson, then military governor of Tennessee, wrote toPresident Lincoln for the same purpose. It hardly need be said thatthe preparation of those regiments would proceed slowly, pendingsuch negotiations. Their distant homes and families were at themercy of the enemy, and it seemed to them intolerable that theirfaces should be turned in any other direction. I suggested anexchange for new Ohio regiments, but as these were not yet filledup, it could not be done. General Wright assured them that theyshould be sent to Kentucky as soon as we were again in possession ofWest Virginia. Most of these regiments came under my command againlater in the war, and I became warmly attached to them. Their drilland discipline were always lax, but their courage and devotion tothe national cause could not be excelled. It was not till the 23d that any of Morgan's men really entered intothe forward movement in the valley. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 474, 475. ] On that day the brigade of ColonelJohn F. DeCourcey (Sixteenth Ohio), composed of Ohio and Kentuckytroops, reached Ten-mile Creek and was ordered to march to Red Housethe day after. [Footnote: Colonel DeCourcey was an Irishman of goodfamily, who took service in our army, and was a good officer. Heafterwards inherited an Irish baronage. ] Lightburn was busy clearingthe river of obstructions and preparing to move to Pocataligo Riveras the next step in advance. Of the other brigades belonging toMorgan, that of Brigadier-General Samuel P. Carter, composed partlyof Tennesseans, was at Gallipolis, intending to enter the valley onthe 24th. The remaining brigade, under Brigadier-General James G. Spears, was entirely Tennessean, and was still at Portland where thepaymaster had just arrived and was giving the regiments partpayment. My purpose was to concentrate the force at Pocataligo, assume thecommand in person, and attack the enemy in the positions in front ofCharleston, in which Wise had resisted me in the previous year. Ishould have been glad to make the expected movement of a column fromClarksburg under Crook and Milroy co-operate directly with my own, but circumstances made it impracticable. The operations of theConfederate cavalry under Jenkins were keeping the country north ofthe Kanawha in a turmoil, and reports had become rife that he wouldwork his way out toward Beverly. The country was also full of rumorsof a new invasion from East Virginia. Milroy's forces were not yetfully assembled at Clarksburg on the 20th, but he was ordered tooperate toward Beverly, whilst Crook, with the old Kanawha division, should move on Summersville and Gauley Bridge. Both had to depend onhiring wagons for transportation of supplies. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 459, 481, 482. ] Separated as theywere, they would necessarily be cautious in their movements, makingthe suppression of guerillas, the driving out of raiders, and thegeneral quieting of the country their principal task. Their rôle wasthus, of course, made subordinate to the movement of my own column, which must force its own way without waiting for results from otheroperations. Half of Carter's brigade was, at the last moment, delayed atGallipolis, the clothing and equipments sent to them there beingfound incomplete. Just half of Morgan's division with two batteriesof artillery were in motion on the 24th. On that day Lightburn wasmoved to Pocataligo, about forty miles from the river mouth, where Ijoined him in person on the 27th. A cold storm of mingled rain andsnow had made the march and bivouac very uncomfortable for a coupleof days. General Morgan accompanied me, and during the 28th theactive column of three and a half brigades was concentrated, two orthree other regiments being in echelon along the river below. TylerMountain behind Tyler Creek was, as formerly, the place at which theenemy was posted to make a stand against our further progress, though he had no considerable force on the south side of the riverat the mouth of Scary Creek. Reconnoissances showed nothing butcavalry in our immediate front, and it afterwards appeared thatEchols began a rapid retreat from Charleston on that day. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 685. ] He had called to himJenkins with the greater part of the cavalry, and entrusted to thelatter the duty of holding us back as much as possible. Suspectingthis from evidence collected at Pocataligo, I determined to putSiber's brigade and a battery, all in light marching order, on thesouth side of the river, accompanied by a light-draught steamboat, which the rise in the river after the storm enabled us to use as faras Charleston. This brigade could turn the strong position at TylerMountain, and passing beyond this promontory on the opposite side ofthe river, could command with artillery fire the river road on theother bank behind the enemy in our front. The steamboat would enablethem to make a rapid retreat if the belief that no great force wason that side of the river should prove to be a mistake. Siber wasalso furnished with a battery of four mountain howitzers, whichcould be carried to the edge of the water or anywhere that men couldmarch. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 504, 509, 530. ] On the right bank of the river (north side) the principal column oftwo brigades (Toland's and DeCourcey's) advanced on the turnpike nearthe stream, having one six-gun battery and a section oftwenty-pounder Parrots with them. What was present of Carter'sbrigade was sent by the mountain road further from the stream, tocover our left and to turn the flank of the Tyler Mountain position, if a stubborn stand should be made there. A light six-gun batteryaccompanied it. All moved forward simultaneously on the morning ofthe 29th. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] The dispositions thus made rendered itvain for the enemy's cavalry to offer any stubborn resistance, andJenkins abandoned Tyler Mountain on our approach, thus giving uscertain knowledge that he was not closely supported by the infantry. Our advance-guard reached the Elk River opposite Charleston in theafternoon, and I made personal reconnoissance of the means ofcrossing. The suspension bridge had been ruined in Lightburn'sretreat, and the enemy had depended upon a bridge of boats forcommunication with their troops in the lower valley. These boats hadbeen taken to the further bank of the river and partly destroyed, but as the enemy had continued his retreat, we soon had a party overcollecting those that could be used, and other flatboats used in thecoal trade, and a practicable bridge was reconstructed before nightof the 30th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 530. ]Meanwhile I entered the town with the advance-guard as soon as wehad a boat to use for a ferry, and spent the night of the 29ththere. We had friends enough in the place to put us quickly inpossession of all the news, and I was soon satisfied that Echols hadno thought of trying to remain on the western side of the mountains. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 515, 520. ] The column crossed the Elk late in the afternoon of the 30th, and Ipushed Toland's and Carter's brigades to Malden and Camp Piatt thatevening, Siber's brigade advancing to Brownstown on the other sideof the Kanawha River. Lightburn's division was ordered forward nextday to Gauley Bridge, Carter's brigade at Malden was ordered to sendstrong parties southward into Boone County, to reconnoitre and toput down guerilla bands. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 530. ] DeCourcey'sbrigade was halted at Charleston, and Spears' Tennessee brigade wasdirected to remain at Gallipolis till further orders. Communicationwas opened with Crook, who was ordered to press forward viaSummersville to Gauley Bridge as quickly as possible. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 520. ] The retreating enemyhad burned the bridges, obstructed the roads with fallen timber, andcut and destroyed the flatboats along the river; so that the firstand most pressing task was to reopen roads, make ferries andbridges, and thus renew the means of getting supplies to the troops. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 536. ] The river was still low, unusually so forthe season, and the water was falling. Every energy was thereforenecessary to get forward supplies to Gauley Bridge and the otherup-river posts, for if the river should freeze whilst low, thewinter transportation would be confined to the almost impassableroads. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 537. ] I reported to General Wright there-occupation of the valley, our lack of wagon-trains for furtheradvance, and all the facts which would assist in deciding whetheranything further should be attempted. I did not conceal the opinionwhich all my experience had confirmed, that no military advantagecould be secured by trying to extend operation by this route acrossthe mountains into the James River valley. On the 2d of November Brigadier-General Scammon reported for duty, and I ordered him to Gauley Bridge to assume command of the divisionwhich was then under Colonel Lightburn, who resumed the command ofhis brigade. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] Scammon was directed to inspectcarefully all our old positions as far as Raleigh C. H. , to reportwhether the recent retreat of troops from Fayetteville had been dueto any improper location of the fortifications there, to examine theroad up Loup Creek, and any others which might be used by the enemyto turn our position at Gauley Bridge, to state the presentconditions of buildings at all the upper posts, and whether anystorehouses had escaped destruction. In short, we needed thematerial on which to base intelligent plans for a more secureholding of the region about the falls of the Kanawha, or for afurther advance to the eastward if it should be ordered. The information which came to me as soon as I was in actual contactwith the enemy, not only satisfied me that Loring's forces had beengreatly exaggerated, but led me to estimate them at a lower figurethan the true one. In reporting to General Wright on 1st November, Igave the opinion that they amounted to about 3500 infantry, but witha disproportionate amount of artillery, some twenty pieces. Thecavalry under Jenkins numbered probably 1000 or 1500 horse. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. P. 531. ] About thefirst of October Loring, in a dispatch to Richmond, stated his forceat "only a little more than 4000, " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 635. ] whichprobably means that the 5000 with which he entered the valley weresomewhat reduced by the sick and by desertions. He seems to refer tohis infantry, for Jenkins's command had been an independent one. Itwould be reasonable, therefore, to put his total strength at some6000 or a little higher. On our side, the column with which Iactually advanced was just about 9000 men, with 2000 more ofMorgan's command within reach, had there been need to call them upfrom the Ohio River. On the 8th of November Halleck telegraphed to General Wright that noposts need be established beyond Gauley Bridge, and that about halfof my command should be sent to Tennessee and the Mississippivalley. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 556, 557. ] On the same day GeneralWright formally approved my views as submitted to him, and orderedMorgan's division to be sent to Cincinnati at once. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 537. ] It was thus definitively settled that my task forthe winter would be to restore the condition of affairs in WestVirginia which had existed before Loring's invasion, and organize mydistrict with a view to prompt and easy supply of my posts, thesuppression of lawlessness and bushwhacking, the support of theState authorities, and the instruction and discipline of officersand men. My first attention was given to the question oftransportation, for the winter was upon us and wagons were veryscarce. The plan of using the river to the utmost was an economy aswell as a necessity, and I returned to my former arrangement ofusing batteaux for the shallow and swift waters of the upper river, connecting with the movable head of steamboat navigation. A tour ofinspection to Gauley Bridge and the posts in that vicinity satisfiedme that they were in good condition for mutual support, and forcarrying on a system of scouting which could be made a usefuldiscipline and instruction to the troops, as well as the means ofkeeping thoroughly informed of the movements of the enemy. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was kept under thecontrol of General Kelley, and his authority extended to activeco-operation with the Army of the Potomac in keeping opencommunication with Washington. In case of need, the commander ofthat army was authorized to give orders to General Kelley direct, without waiting to transmit them through my headquarters. GeneralMilroy was established on the Beverly front, communicating on hisleft with General Kelley and on his right with General Crook, atGauley Bridge. General Scammon had his station at Fayette C. H. , covering the front on the south side of New River, whilst Crookwatched the north side and extended his posts in Milroy's directionas far as Summersville. Colonel Cranor remained on the Ohio nearGuyandotte, scouting the valley of the Guyandotte River andcommunicating with Charleston and other posts on the Kanawha. On the 12th of November reports were received from General Kelleythat authentic information showed that Jackson was advancing fromthe Shenandoah valley upon West Virginia. Similar informationreached army headquarters at Washington, and in anticipation ofpossible necessity for it, I directed Milroy to hold himself inreadiness to march at once to join Kelley, if the latter should callupon him. I telegraphed General Wright that I did not think thereport would prove well founded, but it put everybody upon the alertfor a little while. Kelley had beaten up a camp of Confederatesunder Imboden about eighteen miles above Moorefield on the southbranch of the Potomac, causing considerable loss to the enemy inkilled and wounded and capturing fifty prisoners. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xix. Pt. Ii. Pp. 572, 573, 578, 585, 586. ]Some movement to support Imboden probably gave rise to the story ofJackson's advance, but Lee kept both corps of his army in hand andmoved the whole down the Rappahannock soon afterward, to meetBurnside's advance upon Fredericksburg. The invasion of the Kanawha valley by Loring had stirred up muchbitter feeling again between Union men and Confederates, and wasfollowed by the usual quarrels and recriminations among neighbors. The Secessionists were stimulated to drop the prudent reserve theyhad practised before, and some of them, in the hope that theConfederate occupation would be permanent, persecuted loyal men whowere in their power. The retreat of the enemy brought its day ofreckoning, and was accompanied by a fresh emigration to easternVirginia of a considerable number of the more pronouncedSecessionists. I have said [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 154. ] that Mr. George Summers, formerly the leading man of the valley, hadstudiously avoided political activity after the war began; but thisdid not save him from the hostility of his disloyal neighbors. Veryshortly after my re-occupation of Charleston he called upon me oneevening and asked for a private interview. He had gone through apainful experience, he said, and as it would pretty surely come tomy ears, he preferred I should hear it from himself, before enemiesor tale-bearers should present it with such coloring as they mightchoose. During the Confederate occupation he had maintained hissecluded life and kept aloof from contact with the militaryauthorities. Their officers, however, summoned him before them, charged him with treason to Virginia and to the Confederate States, and demanded of him that he take the oath of allegiance to theSouthern government. He demurred to this, and urged that as he hadscrupulously avoided public activity, it would be harsh and unjustto force him to a test which he could not conscientiously take. Theywere in no mood to listen to argument, and charged that hisacquiescence in the rule of the new state government of WestVirginia was, in his case, more injurious to the Confederate causethan many another man's active unionism. Finding Mr. Summersdisposed to be firm, they held him in arrest; and as he stillrefused to yield, he was told that he should be tied by a rope tothe tail of a wagon and forced to march in that condition, as aprisoner, over the mountains to Richmond. He was an elderly man, used to a refined and easy life, somewhatportly in person, and, as he said, he fully believed such treatmentwould kill him. The fierceness of their manner convinced him thatthey meant to execute the threat, and looking upon it as a sentenceof death, he yielded and took the oath. He said that being in duressof such a sort, and himself a lawyer, he considered that he had amoral right to escape from his captors in this way, though he wouldnot have yielded to anything short of what seemed to him an imminentdanger of his life. The obligation, he declared, was utterly odiousto him and was not binding on his conscience; but he had lost notime in putting himself into my hands, and would submit to whateverI should decide in the matter. It would be humiliating and subjecthim to misconstruction by others if he took conflicting oaths, buthe was willing to abjure the obligation he had taken, if I demandedit, and would voluntarily renew his allegiance to the United Stateswith full purpose to keep it. He was deeply agitated, and I thoroughly pitied him. My acquaintancewith him in my former campaign gave me entire confidence in hissincerity, and made me wish to spare him any fresh embarrassment orpain. After a moment's reflection, I replied that I did not doubtanything he had told me of the facts or of his own sentiments inregard to them. His experience only confirmed my distrust of alltest oaths. Either his conscience already bound him to the Nationalgovernment, or it did not. In either case I could not make hisloyalty more sure by a fresh oath, and believing that the one he hadtaken under duress was void in fact as well as in his ownconscience, I would leave the matter there and ask nothing more ofhim. He was greatly relieved by my decision, but bore himself withdignity. I never saw any reason to be sorry for the course I took, and believe that he was always afterward consistent and steady inhis loyalty to the United States. CHAPTER XX WINTER QUARTERS, 1862-63--PROMOTIONS AND POLITICS Central position of Marietta, Ohio--Connection with all parts ofWest Virginia--Drill and instruction of troops--Guerillawarfare--Partisan Rangers--Confederate laws--Disposal ofplunder--Mosby's Rangers as a type--Opinions of Lee, Stuart, andRosser--Effect on other troops--Rangers finally abolished--Rivalhome-guards and militia--Horrors of neighborhood war--Staff andstaff duties--Reduction of forces--General Cluseret--Laterconnection with the Paris Commune--His relations with Milroy--Heresigns--Political situation--Congressmen distrust Lincoln--Cutler'sdiary--Resolutions regarding appointments of general officers--Thenumber authorized by law--Stanton's report--Effect of Act of July, 1862--An excess of nine major-generals--The legal questionsinvolved--Congressional patronage and local distribution--Ready fora "deal"--Bill to increase the number of generals--A "slate" made upto exhaust the number--Senate and Housedisagree--Conference--Agreement in last hours of the session--Thenew list--A few vacancies by resignation, etc. --List of thosedropped--My own case--Faults of the method--Lincoln's humorouscomments--Curious case of General Turchin--Congestion in the highestgrades--Effects--Confederate grades of general andlieutenant-general--Superiority of our system--Cotemporaneousreports and criticisms--New regiments instead of recruiting oldones--Sherman's trenchant opinion. Early in December I established my winter headquarters at Mariettaon the Ohio River, a central position from which communication couldbe had most easily with all parts of the district and withdepartment headquarters. It was situated at the end of the railwayline from Cincinnati to the Ohio River near Parkersburg, where theBaltimore and Ohio Railroad met the Cincinnati line. The Baltimoreroad, coming from the east, forked at Grafton in West Virginia andreached Wheeling, as has been described in an earlier chapter. [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 40, 42. ] The river was usually navigableduring the winter and made an easy communication with Wheeling aswith the lower towns. I was thus conveniently situated for mostspeedily reaching every part of my command, in person or otherwise. It took but a little while to get affairs so organized that theroutine of work ran on quietly and pleasantly. No serious effort wasmade by the enemy to re-enter the district during the winter, andexcept some local outbreaks of "bush-whacking" and petty guerillawarfare, there was nothing to interrupt the progress of the troopsin drill and instruction. A good deal of obscurity still hangs about the subject of guerillawarfare, and the relation of the Confederate government to it. Therewas, no doubt, a good deal of loose talk that found its way intoprint and helped form a popular opinion, which treated almost everyscouting party as if it were a lawless organization of"bush-whackers. " But there was an authoritative and systematiceffort of the Richmond government to keep up partisan bodies withinour lines which should be soldiers when they had a chance to do us amischief, and citizens when they were in danger of capture andpunishment. When Fremont assumed command of the Mountain Department, he very early called the attention of the Secretary of War to thefact that Governor Letcher was sending commissions into WestVirginia, authorizing the recipients to enlist companies to be usedagainst us in irregular warfare. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. Iii. P. 75. ] The bands which were organized by the Confederate Government underauthority of law, but which were free from the control of armycommanders and unrestrained by the checks upon lawlessness which arefound in subordination to the operations of organized armies, werecalled "Partisan Rangers, " and protection as legitimate soldiers waspromised them. They were not required to camp with the army, or toremain together as troops or regiments. They wore uniforms or not, as the whim might take them. They remained, as much as they dared, in their home region, and assembled, usually at night, at apreconcerted signal from their leaders, to make a "raid. " They werenot paid as the more regular troops were, but were allowed to keepthe horses which they captured or "lifted. " They were nominallyrequired to turn over the beef-cattle and army stores to theConfederate commissariat, but after a captured wagon-train had beenlooted by them, not much of value would be found in it. Their raidswere made by such numbers as might chance to be got together. Stuart, the brilliant Confederate cavalry commander, whilstcrediting Mosby with being the best of the partisans, said of him, "he usually operates with only one-fourth of his nominal strength. Such organizations, as a rule, are detrimental to the best interestsof the army at large. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxxiii. P. 1082. ] General Lee, in forwarding one of Mosby's reports, commendedhis boldness and good management, but added: "I have heard that hehas now with him a large number of men, yet his expeditions areundertaken with very few, and his attention seems more directed tothe capture of sutlers' wagons, etc. , than to the injury of theenemy's communications and outposts.... I do not know the cause forundertaking his expeditions with so few men; whether it is frompolicy or the difficulty of collecting them. I have heard of hismen, among them officers, being in rear of this army, sellingcaptured goods, sutlers' stores, etc. This had better be attended toby others. It has also been reported to me that many deserters fromthis army have joined him. Among them have been seen members of theEighth Virginia Regiment. " [Footnote: _Id_. , vol xxix. Pt. Ii. P. 652. ] In the "Richmond Examiner" of August 18, 1863 (the same dateas General Lee's letter), was the statement that "At a sale ofYankee plunder taken by Mosby and his men, held at Charlottesvillelast week, thirty-odd thousand dollars were realized, to be dividedamong the gallant band. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxix. Pt. Ii. P. 653. ] The injury to the discipline of their own army gradually broughtleading officers of the Confederates to the conviction that the"Partisan Rangers" cost more than they were worth. In January, 1864, General Rosser, one of the most distinguished cavalry officers ofthe South, made a formal communication to General Lee on thesubject. "During the time I have been in the valley, " he said, "Ihave had ample opportunity of judging of the efficiency andusefulness of the many irregular bodies of troops which occupy thiscountry, known as partisans, etc. , and am prompted by no otherfeeling than a desire to serve my country, to inform you that theyare a nuisance and an evil to the service. Without discipline, order, or organization, they roam broadcast over the country, a bandof thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering, and doing every mannerof mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and aninjury to the cause. They never fight; can't be made to fight. Theirleaders are generally brave, but few of the men are good soldiers, and have engaged in this business for the sake of gain. " [Footnote:_Id_. , vol. Xxxiii. P. 1081. ] After classifying the mischiefs to theregular service, he continues: "It is almost impossible to managethe different companies of my brigade that are from Loudoun, Fauquier, Fairfax, etc. , the region occupied by Mosby. They seethese men living at their ease and enjoying the comforts of home, allowed to possess all that they capture, and their duties merepastime pleasures compared with their own arduous ones, and it is anatural consequence, in the nature of man, that he should becomedissatisfied under these circumstances. Patriotism fails, in a longand tedious war like this, to sustain the ponderous burdens whichbear heavily and cruelly upon the heart and soul of man. " [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxxiii. P. 1081. ] General Rosser recommendedthe absorption of the partisan bodies into the ordinary brigades, using their supposed talents for scouting by sending them onexpeditions as regular patrols and reconnoitring parties, reportingto their proper command as soon as the duty was done. It was upon Rosser's communication that Stuart made the endorsementalready quoted, and Lee sent it forward to the War Department, further endorsed thus: "As far as my knowledge and experienceextend, there is much truth in the statement of General Rosser. Irecommend that the law authorizing these partisan corps beabolished. The evils resulting from their organization more thancounterbalance the good they accomplish. " The Secretary of War, Mr. Siddon, drafted a bill to abolish them, and it passed theConfederate House. Delay occurring in the Senate, the matter wascompromised by transferring all the Rangers except Mosby's andMcNeill's to the line. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 1082, 1253. ] As it wasto Mosby's that the reported facts applied, and all agreed that hiswas the best of the lot, we may imagine what must have been thecharacter of the rest. In the first two winters of the war, these organizations were in theheight of their pernicious activity, and the loyal West Virginianswere their favorite victims. We knew almost nothing of theirorganization, except that they claimed some Confederate law fortheir being. We seldom found them in uniform, and had no means ofdistinguishing them from any other armed horse-stealers and"bush-whackers. " We were, however, made unpleasantly certain of thefact that in every neighborhood where secession sentiments wererife, our messengers were waylaid and killed, small parties wereambushed, and all the exasperating forms of guerilla warfare wereabundant. Besides all this, the Confederate authorities assumed tocall out the militia of counties into which they were intending tomake an expedition, so that they might have the temporaryco-operation of local troops. They claimed the right to do thisbecause they had not recognized the separation of West Virginia, andinsisted that the whole was subject to the laws of Virginia. Theresult was that the Union men formed companies of "Home Guards" forself-protection, and the conflict of arms was carried into everysettlement in the mountain nooks and along the valleys. In this kindof fighting there was no quarter given, or if prisoners were taken, they were too often reported as having met with fatal accidentsbefore they could be handed over to the regular authorities. As allthis could have no effect upon the progress of the war, the morecool and intelligent heads of both sides opposed it, and graduallydiminished it. Severe measures against it were in fact merciful, forthe horrors of war are always least when the fighting is left to thearmies of responsible belligerents, unprovoked by the petty butexasperating hostilities of irregulars. The trouble from this sourcewas less during the winter of 1862-63 than it had been the yearbefore, but it still gave occupation to small movable columns of ourtroops from time to time. The organization of my staff was somewhat increased with theenlargement of responsibilities. Lieutenant-Colonel McElroy, who hadbeen my adjutant-general in the campaign of 1861, returned to me asinspector-general and took the whole supervision of the equipment, drill, and instruction of the troops of the district. Major Bascom, who had received his promotion at the same time with mine, continuedto be adjutant-general. The increased work in looking after suppliesmade more force in the commissariat a necessity, and CaptainBarriger of the regular army was sent to me, my former commissary, Captain Treat, continuing on the staff. Barriger was a modest, clear-headed officer of admirable business qualifications, whom Ihad the good fortune to be again associated with late in the war. Three principal depots of supply were established at the bases ofthe principal lines of communication in the district, --Wheeling, Parkersburg, and Gallipolis. At each of these, depot commissariesand quartermasters were located, and the posts and commands at thefront drew their supplies from them. Captain Fitch, myquartermaster, supervised his department in a similar way to that ofthe commissariat. My aides were Captain Christie and LieutenantConine, as before, and I added to them my brother, Theodore Cox, whoserved with me as volunteer aide without rank in the battles ofSouth Mountain and Antietam, and was then appointed lieutenant inthe Eleventh Ohio Infantry. He was my constant companion from thistime till peace was established. The medical department remainedunder the care of Major Holmes, Brigade-Surgeon, who combinedscientific with administrative qualities in a rare measure. There was no military movement during the winter of sufficientimportance to be told at length. Constant scouting andreconnoissances were kept up, slight skirmishes were not infrequent, but these did not prevent our sense of rest and of preparation forthe work of the next spring. General Crook, with a brigade, wastransferred temporarily to the command of Rosecrans in Tennessee, and Kelley, Milroy, and Scammon divided the care of the threehundred miles of mountain ranges which made our front. My ownleisure gave me the opportunity for some systematic and usefulreading in military history and art. An amusing interlude occurredin a hot controversy which arose between General Milroy and one ofhis subordinates which would not be worth mentioning except for thefact that the subordinate had afterward a world-wide notoriety asmilitary chief of the Paris Commune in 1870. Gustave Cluseret was a Frenchman, who was appointed in the spring of1862 an aide-de-camp with the rank of colonel upon the staff ofGeneral Frémont, who (with questionable legality) assigned him tocommand a brigade, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xii. Pt. I. Pp. 9, 35. ] and recommended his appointment as brigadier for goodconduct in the May and June campaign against Jackson. Theappointment was made on October 14th, [Footnote: Army Register, 1863, p. 95. ] and during the fall and winter he had a brigade inMilroy's division. Milroy was, for a time, loud in his praises ofCluseret as the _beau ideal_ of an officer, and their friendship wasfraternal. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxi. P. 779. ] In thewinter, however, their mutual admiration was nipped by a killingfrost, and a controversy sprung up between them which soon led tomutual recrimination also in the superlative degree. They addressedtheir complaints to General Halleck, and as the papers passedthrough my headquarters, I was a witness of their berating of eachother. They made a terrible din, on paper, for a while, but I cannotrecall anything very serious in their accusations. Halleckpigeon-holed their correspondence, but Milroy had powerful politicalfriends, and Cluseret, learning that his appointment would not beconfirmed by the Senate, anticipated their action, and terminatedhis military career in the United States by resigning two daysbefore the close of the session of Congress. [Footnote: ArmyRegister, 1863, p. 101. His name does not appear in the lists in thebody of the Register, because he was not in the Army April 1, 1863, the date of publication. ] This brings me to the subject of Congressional action in the matterof the promotions and appointments in the army during this wintersession which closed the Thirty-seventh Congress. By it I was myselfto suffer the one severe disappointment of my military career. Thetime was one of great political excitement, for the fall electionshad resulted in a great overturning in the Congressionaldelegations. The Democrats had elected so many representatives forthe Thirty-eighth Congress that it was doubtful whether theadministration would be able to command a majority in the House. Theretirement of McClellan from the command had also provoked muchopposition, and in the lack of full knowledge of the reasons fordisplacing him, political ones were imagined and charged. Publicpolicy forbade the President to make known all his grounds ofdissatisfaction with the general, and many of his own party openlyquestioned his wisdom and his capacity to govern. Men whosepatriotism cannot be questioned shared in this distrust, and intheir private writings took the most gloomy view of the situationand of the future of the country. This was intensified when Burnsidewas so bloodily repulsed at Fredericksburg at the close of the firstweek of the session. [Footnote: Mr. W. P. Cutler, Representativefrom Ohio, a modest but very intelligent and patriotic man, wrote inhis diary under December 16th: "This is a day of darkness and perilto the country... Lincoln himself seems to have no nerve or decisionin dealing with great issues. We are at sea, and no pilot orcaptain. God alone can take care of us, and all his ways _seem_ tobe against us and to favor the rebels and their allies theDemocrats. Truly it is a day of darkness and gloom. " "Life andTimes" of Ephraim Cutler, with biographical sketches of JervisCutler and W. P. Cutler, p. 296. ] As is usual in revolutionary times, more radical measures weresupposed by many to be the cure for disasters, and in caucuses heldby congressmen the supposed conservatism of Mr. Lincoln and part ofhis cabinet was openly denounced, and the earnestness of the armyleaders was questioned. [Footnote: Mr. Cutler reports a caucus ofthe House held January 27th, in which "Mr. ---- stated that the greatdifficulty was in holding the President to anything. He pridedhimself on having a divided cabinet, so that he could play oneagainst the other... The earnest men are brought to a deadlock bythe President. The President is tripped up by his generals, who forthe most part seem to have no heart in their work. " _Id_. , p. 301. Mr. Cutler himself expresses similar sentiments and reiterates: "Itreally seems as if the ship of state was going to pieces in thestorm. " "How striking the want of a leader. The nation is without ahead. " "The true friends of the government are groping aroundwithout a leader, " etc. _Id_. , pp. 297, 301, 302] Much of this was amisunderstanding of the President and of events which time hascorrected, but at the moment and in the situation of the country itwas natural. It strongly affected the conduct of the federallegislators, and must be taken into the account when we try tounderstand their attitude toward the army and the administration ofmilitary affairs. In the Senate, at a very early day after the opening of the session, Mr. Wilson, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, offered aresolution (which passed without opposition) calling upon theSecretary of War for "the number and names of the major-generals andbrigadier-generals in the service of the United States, and whereand how they are employed. " [Footnote: Senate Journal, 3d Session, 37th Congress, Dec. 8, 1862. ] This was, no doubt, the offspring ofan opinion in vogue in Congress, that the President had gone beyondthe authority of law in the number of these officers he hadappointed. If this were true, the course taken was not a friendlyone toward the administration. The whole list of appointments andpromotions would be submitted to the Senate for confirmation, and ifthe statutory number had been exceeded, that body could stopconfirming when it reached the legal limit. There were, of course, frequent consultations between the Congressional committees or theindividual members and the Secretary of War; but whatever effortsthere may have been to reach a quiet understanding failed. On the21st of January, the Secretary not having responded to Mr. Wilson'sresolution, Mr. Rice of Minnesota offered another (which also passedby unanimous consent), directing the Secretary of War "to inform theSenate whether any more major and brigadier generals have beenappointed and paid than authorized by law; and if so, how many; givenames, dates of appointment and amounts paid. " [Footnote: _Id_. , Jan. 21, 1863. ] Two days later the Secretary sent in his reports in response to bothresolutions. To the first he replied that the interests of thepublic service would not permit him to state "where and how" thegeneral officers were employed, but he gave the list of names. Hegave also a separate list of six major-generals who were notassigned to any duty. [Footnote: These were McClellan, Frémont, Cassius M. Clay, Buell (ordered before a military commission), McDowell, and F. J. Porter (both before military courts inconnection with the second battle of Bull Run). ] To the secondresolution he replied that "It is believed by this Department thatthe law authorizing the increase of the volunteer and militia forcesnecessarily implied an increase of officers beyond the numberspecified in the Act of July 17, 1862, to any extent required by theservice, and that the number of appointments is not beyond suchlimit. " If the limit of the statute named were strictly applied, hesaid there would be found to be nine major-generals and forty-sixbrigadier-generals in excess. There had been no payments ofincreased salary to correspond with the increased rank, except inone instance. [Footnote: Executive Documents of Senate, 3d Session, 37th Congress, Nos. 21 and 22. The nine major-generals were SchuylerHamilton, Granger, Cox, Rousseau, McPherson, Augur, Meade, Hartsuff, and N. B. Buford. If the number were thirteen, it would includeFoster, Parke, Schenck, and Hurlbut. ] The list submitted showedfifty-two major-generals in service, and one (Buford) was omitted, so that if forty should prove to be the limit, there would bethirteen in excess. This, however, was only apparently true, for theSecretary's list included the four major-generals in the regulararmy, whose case was not covered by the limitation of the statute. This seems to have been overlooked in the steps subsequently takenby members of Congress, and as the action was unwelcome to thePresident, he did not enlighten the legislators respecting theirmiscalculation. The business proceeded upon the supposition that theappointments in the highest rank were really thirteen in excess ofthe number fixed by the statute. The state of the law was this. The Act of July 22, 1861, authorizedthe President to call for volunteers, not exceeding half a million, and provided for one brigadier-general for four regiments and onemajor-general for three brigades. The Act of 25th July of the sameyear authorized a second call of the same number, and provided for"such number of major-generals and brigadier-generals as may in his(the President's) judgment be required for their organization. " Inthe next year, however, a "rider" was put upon the clause in theappropriation bill to pay the officers and men of the volunteerservice, which provided "that the President shall not be authorizedto appoint more than forty major-generals, nor more than two hundredbrigadier-generals, " and repealed former acts which allowed more. [Footnote: The several acts referred to may be found in vol. Xii. U. S. Statutes at Large, pp. 268, 274, 506. The appropriation bill waspassed July 5, 1862. The date July 17, 1862, in the Secretary'sreport seems to be a misprint. ] This limit just covered those whohad been appointed up to the date of the approval of theappropriation bill. Two questions, however, were still open fordispute. First, whether a "rider" upon the appropriation shouldchange a general law on the subject of army organization, andsecond, whether the new limit might not allow appointments to be_thereafter_ made to the extent of the numbers stated. The report ofMr. Stanton evidently suggests such questions. The matter was now in good shape for what politicians call "a deal, "and negotiations between members of Congress and the executive wereactive. The result appears to have been an understanding that a billshould be passed increasing the number of general officers, so asnot only to cover the appointments already made, but leaving aconsiderable margin of new promotions to be filled by arrangementbetween the high contracting parties. On the 12th of February, 1863, the Senate passed a bill providing for the appointment of twentymajor-generals of volunteers and fifty brigadiers. This was notacceptable to the House. The battle of Stone's River had lately beenfought in Tennessee, and representatives from the West were urgentin arguing that affairs near Washington unduly filled the view ofthe administration. There was some truth in this. At any rate theHouse amended the bill so as to increase the numbers to fortymajor-generals and one hundred brigadiers, to be made by promotions, for meritorious service, from lower grades. As soon as it was knownthat the Military Committee of the House would report such anamendment, it was assumed that the Senate would concur, and a"slate" was made up accordingly. On the hypothesis that the list ofmajor-generals was thirteen in excess of the forty fixed by statute, a new list of twenty-seven was made out, which would complete theforty to be added by the new bill. A similar list was prepared forthe brigadiers and precisely similar negotiations went on, but forbrevity's sake I shall confine myself to the list for the highestrank, in which I was personally concerned. The House passed the amended bill on the 27th of February, and itwent back to the Senate for concurrence in the amendments. But nowan unexpected difficulty arose. The Senate refused to concur in thechanges made by the House. It matters little whether the senatorswere offended at the determination of the lower House to have solarge a share in the nominations, or desired to punish the Presidentfor having gone beyond the letter of the law in his promotions of1862; the fact was that they voted down the amendments. A committeeof conference between the two houses was appointed, and a compromisereport was made fixing the additional number of major-generals atthirty and of brigadiers at seventy-five. Both Houses finallyconcurred in the report, the bill went to the President on the 1stof March, and he signed it on the next day. There was but a single working-day of the session left, for thesession must end at noon of the 4th of March. The list must bereduced. The manner in which this was done clinches the proof, ifthere had been any doubt before, that the list of twenty-seven wasthe result of negotiations with congressmen. No meddling with thatlist was permitted, though the use of patronage as "spoils" had somevery glaring illustrations in it. The President had to make thereduction from his own promotions made earlier, and which weretherefore higher on the list and in rank, instead of dropping thoselast added, as had seemed to be demanded by the earlier action ofCongress. The only exception to this was in the case of GeneralSchofield, whose even-handed administration of the District ofMissouri and army of the frontier had excited the enmity of extremepoliticians in that State and in Kansas, led by Senator "Jim" Lane, the prince of "jay-hawkers. " Schofield was dropped from thetwenty-seven. A few changes had occurred in the original roster of officers, making additional vacancies. Governor Morgan of New York, who had acomplimentary appointment as major-general, but had never served, resigned. Schuyler Hamilton also resigned, and Fitz-John Porter wascashiered. The number to be sacrificed was thus reduced to six, and the lotfell on Generals N. B. Buford, G. W. Morell, W. F. Smith, H. G. Wright, J. M. Schofield, and myself. The last four won theirpromotion a second time and were re-appointed and confirmed atvarying intervals; but of that later. Of course, in such a scrambleit was only a question as to who had or had not powerful friends onthe spot who would voluntarily champion his cause. No one at adistance could have any warning. The passage of the bill and actionunder it came together. For myself, I had gone quietly on in theperformance of duty, never dreaming of danger, and it was long yearsafter the war before I learned how the thing had in fact been done. My place had been near the top of the list, the commands which I hadexercised and the responsibilities intrusted to me had been greaterthan those of the large majority of the appointees, and I hadconclusive evidence of the approval of my superiors. The news was atfirst, therefore, both astonishing and disheartening. As a result ofpolitical "influences, " it is sufficiently intelligible. I had atthat time a barely speaking acquaintance with Senator Wade of Ohio. It was the same with Senator Sherman, but with the addeddisadvantage that in the senatorial contest of 1860 between him andGovernor Dennison I had warmly espoused the cause of the latter. Mr. Hutchins, the representative from my district, had not beenrenominated, and Garfield, who was elected in his place, had not yettaken his seat, but was still in the military service in the field. Mr. Chase had been a constant friend, but this was just the timewhen his differences with Mr. Lincoln had become acute, and sincethe 20th of December the President had in his hands the resignationsof both Seward and Chase, which enabled him to refuse both, and tobaffle the party in the Senate which was trying to force him toreorganize his cabinet by excluding Seward and those who werethought the more conservative. As he expressed it, "he had a pumpkinin each end of his bag, and could now ride. " [Footnote: Hay andNicolay's "Lincoln, " vol. Vi. P. 271. ] If, on the theory ofapportioning the promotions to States, it were held that Ohio mustlose one of the six nominated, it was easy to see where the balanceof influence would be. General Halleck was well known to bepersistent in favoring appointments from the regular army, and wouldurge that the reduction should be made from those originallyappointed from civil life. These were Schenck and myself. ButGeneral Schenck was a veteran member of the House of Representativesand had now been elected to the next house, in which it was known hewould be a prominent character. It goes without saying, therefore, that on such a basis the black ball would come to me. [Footnote: Thepromotions of Ohio officers then pending, besides my own, were ofSchenck, McCook, Rosecrans, Stanley, McPherson, and Sheridan. ] Tocomplete the story of the promotions made at this time, it may beadded that a short executive session of the Senate was held afterthe regular adjournment of Congress on the 4th of March, and thatthe President sent in the names of Carl Schurz and Julius Stahel tobe made major-generals. For one of these a vacancy was made by thearrangement that Cassius M. Clay was reappointed minister to St. Petersburg and resigned the military rank which he had never used. The other seems to have been made by a resignation to take effectthe next month. General Sumner died on the 21st of March, makinganother vacancy, but it is difficult to fix with accuracy the exactdate of the changes which occurred. [Footnote: The reason for thisdifficulty is in part found in the frequent assignment of rank toofficers from an earlier date than their appointment, and as theofficial lists are arranged according to rank, they are sometimesmisleading as to date of appointment. Thus Rosecrans dates in theregister from March 21, 1862, but he was not appointed till some sixmonths later. So also Schofield when reappointed in May, 1863, wasmade to rank as in his first appointment, from Nov. 29, 1862. ] Inthe case of the last two promotions Mr. Lincoln openly declared thathe made them in recognition of the German element in the army and inpolitics. [Footnote: For an illustration of Mr. Lincoln's way ofputting things in such cases, see "Military Miscellany" by ColonelJames B. Fry, p. 281. ] It would be unjust to assume that members of Congress and thePresident were not guided by patriotic motives. The reform of thepublic service in matters of appointment had not then attracted muchattention. Patronage was used for political purposes with completefrankness and openness. In civil offices this custom was boldlydefended and advocated. There was some consciousness shown thatpromotions in the army ought to be controlled by a somewhatdifferent rule, but it seemed to be thought that enough was done inthe way of safeguard when the choice was confined to officersalready in service, and appointments for the highest grades were notgiven to entirely new men from civil life. Each aspirant could findfriends to sound his praises, and it was easy to assert that it wasonly giving preference to one's friends among officers of equalmerit. Many excellent appointments were in fact made, and theproportion of these would have been greater if the judgment ofmilitary superiors had been more controlling in determining thewhole list. Mr. Lincoln's humorous way of explaining his actions maygive an impression of a lower standard than he actuallyacknowledged; but it cannot be denied that he allowed himself to bepressed into making military promotions, at times, upon purelypolitical or personal reasons. [Footnote: Colonel Fry, who wasassistant adjutant-general at Washington and in personal intercoursewith the President, gives the following as a memorandum made by Mr. Lincoln himself in reference to an application to have aregular-army officer made a brigadier-general of volunteers. "Onthis day Mrs. ----- called upon me: she is the wife of Major -----of the regular army. She is a saucy little woman, and I think shewill torment me till I have to do it. " Colonel Fry adds, "It was notlong till that little woman's husband was appointed abrigadier-general. " Miscellany, pp. 280, 281. ] It did not seem to occur to the authorities that the judgment ofsuperior officers in the field should be called for and carefullyconsidered when it was a question of promoting one of theirsubordinates. An instance which occurred in General Buell's armycarried this beyond the verge of the grotesque. Colonel Turchin, ofan Illinois regiment, was a Russian, an educated officer who hadserved in the Russian staff corps. An excellent soldier in manyrespects, his ideas of discipline were, unfortunately, lax, and inthe summer of 1862 he was courtmartialled for allowing his men topillage a town in Tennessee. The court was an intelligent one, ofwhich General Garfield was president. The story current in the armyat the time, and which I believe to be true, is that after the courthad heard part of the testimony it became apparent that they mustconvict, and Mrs. Turchin, who usually accompanied her husband inthe field, started to the rear to procure political "influences" tosave him. With various recommendations she went to Washington, andwas so successful that although the sentence of the court dismissinghim from the service was promulgated on the 6th of August, he hadbeen appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers on the 5th, and hewas not one of those who were dropped from the list on March 3, 1863. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xvi. Pt. Ii. P. 277. ] Thetrial was one of considerable notoriety, yet it is probable that itwas overlooked by the President and Secretary of War at the time theappointment was made; but it cannot need to be said that whatevergrounds for leniency might have existed, it turns the whole businessinto a farce when they were made the basis of a promotion in therevised list six months later. To add to the perfection of thestory, Mrs. Turchin had acted on her own responsibility, and thecolonel did not know of the result till he had gone home, and in anassembly of personal friends who called upon him ostensibly to cheerhim in his doleful despondency, his wife brought the little drama toits _dénouement_ by presenting him with the appointment in theirpresence. One of the worst features of the method of appointment by "slate"made up between congressmen and the executive was that it filled upevery place allowed by law, and left nothing to be used as arecognition for future services in the field, except as vacanciesoccurred, and these were few and far between. The politicalinfluences which determined the appointment were usually powerfulenough to prevent dismissal. Whoever will trace the employment ofofficers of the highest grades in the last half of the war, willfind large numbers of these on unimportant and nominal duty, whilsttheir work in the active armies was done by men of lower grade, towhom the appropriate rank had to be refused. The system was about asbad as could be, but victory was won in spite of it. It wasfortunate, on the whole, that we did not have the grades oflieutenant-general and general during the war, as the Confederateshad. They made the one the regular rank of a corps commander and theother of the commander of an army in the field. With us theassignment of a major-general by the President to command a corpsgave him a temporary precedence over other major-generals not soassigned, and in like manner for the commander of an army. [Footnote: Our system was essentially that of the first FrenchRepublic and the Consulate, under which any general of division wasassignable to an army command in chief. ] If these were relieved, they lost the precedence, and thus there was a sort of temporaryrank created, giving a flexibility to the grade of major-general, without which we should have been greatly embarrassed. Grant's rankof lieutenant-general was an exceptional grade, made for him alone, when, after the battle of Missionary Ridge, he was assigned to thecommand of all the armies. These opinions of mine are not judgments formed after the fact. Theweak points in our army organization were felt at the time, and Itook every means in my power to bring them to the attention of theproper authorities, State and National. At the close of 1862 acommission was appointed by the Secretary of War to revise thearticles of war and army regulations. Of this commissionMajor-General Hitchcock was chairman. They issued a circular callingfor suggestions as to alterations supposed to be desirable, and acopy was sent to me among others. I took occasion to report theresults of my own experience, and to trace the evils which existedto their sources in our military system. I called attention to thestriking parallel between our practices and those that had been inuse in the first French Republic, and to the identical mischiefswhich had resulted. Laxity of discipline, straggling, desertion, demagoguery in place of military spirit, giving commissions as thereward of mere recruiting, making new regiments instead of fillingup the old ones, absence of proper staff corps, --every one of thesethings had been suffered in France till they could no longer beendured, and we had faithfully copied their errors without profitingby the lesson. In the freedom of private correspondence with Mr. Chase I enlargedupon the same topics, and urged him to get the serious attention ofthe President and the cabinet to them. I gave him examples of themischiefs that were done by the insane efforts to raise newregiments by volunteering when we ought to apply a conscription asthe only fair way of levying a tax on the physical strength of thenation. I said: "I have known a lieutenant to be forced by hiscaptain (a splendid soldier) to resign on account of his generalinefficiency. I have seen that same lieutenant take the field a fewmonths later as lieutenant-colonel of a new regiment, whilst thecaptain still stood at the head of his fraction of a company in theline. This is not a singular instance, but an example of casesoccurring literally by the thousand in our vast army during the yearpast.... Governor Tod (of Ohio) said to me some time ago, with thedeepest sorrow, that he was well aware that in raising the newregiments by volunteering, the distribution of offices to thesuccessful recruiters was filling the army with incompetent men whomwe should have to sift out again by such process as we could!.... Have we time for the sifting process? Even if we had, howinefficient the process itself when these officers have theircommissions in their pockets, and cannot be brought before a courtor a military commission till much of the mischief they can do isaccomplished, bad habits amongst the soldiers formed, and the workof training them made infinitely more difficult than with absolutelyraw recruits. It was in view of such probable results that Iexpressed the hope that no more new regiments would be raised byvolunteering, when, in July last, the levy of an additional forcewas mooted. It seemed to me that the President could well say to theworld, 'Our people have shown abundant proof of their enthusiasm insupport of the government by volunteering already to the number ofmore than half a million, a thing unprecedented in the world'shistory: we now, as a matter of military expediency, call for adraft to fill up the broken battalions. '" [Footnote: From privateletter of Jan. 1, 1863. ] I urged with equal frankness the need of giving unity to the army byabolishing the distinction between regulars and volunteers, and by acomplete reorganization of the staff. I said it seemed absurd thatwith nearly a million of men in the field, the Register of the Armyof the United States should show an organization of some twentyregiments only, of which scarce a dozen had been in active service. "If a volunteer organization is fit to decide the _great_ wars ofthe nation, is it not ridiculous to keep an expensive organizationof regulars for the petty contests with Indians or for an ornamentalappendage to the State in peace?" The thing to be aimed at seemed tome to be to have a system flexible enough to provide for theincrease of the army to any size required, without losing any of theadvantage of character or efficiency which, in any respect, pertained to it as a regular army. Circumstances to which I havealready alluded, probably prevented Mr. Chase from taking any activepart again in the discussion of army affairs in the cabinet. Probably many of the same ideas were urged upon the President fromother quarters, for there was much agitation of the subject in thearmy and out of it. But nothing came of it, for even the draft, whenit became the law, was used more as a shameful whip to stimulatevolunteering than as an honorable and right way to fill the ranks ofthe noble veteran regiments. General Sherman found, in 1864, thesame wrong system thwarting his efforts to make his army what itshould be, and broke out upon it in glorious exasperation. [Footnote: Letter to Halleck, Sept. 4, 1864. "To-morrow is the dayfor the draft, and I feel more interested in it than in any eventthat ever transpired. I do think it has been wrong to keep our oldtroops so constantly under fire. Some of these old regiments that wehad at Shiloh and Corinth have been with me ever since, and some ofthem have lost seventy per cent in battle. It looks hard to putthese brigades, now numbering less than 800 men, into battle. Theyfeel discouraged, whereas, if we could have a steady influx ofrecruits, the living would soon forget the dead. The wounded andsick are lost to us, for once at a hospital, they become worthless. It has been a very bad economy to kill off our best men and pay fullwages and bounties to the drift and substitutes. " Official Records, vol. Xxxviii. Pt. V. P. 793. ] CHAPTER XXI FAREWELL TO WEST VIRGINIA--BURNSIDE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO Desire for field service--Changes in the Army of thePotomac--Judgment of McClellan at that time--Our defectiveknowledge--Changes in West Virginia--Errors in neworganization--Embarrassments resulting--Visit to GeneralSchenck--New orders from Washington--Sent to Ohio to administer thedraft--Burnside at head of the department--District ofOhio--Headquarters at Cincinnati--Cordial relations of Governor Todwith the military authorities--System of enrolment anddraft--Administration by Colonel Fry--Decay of the veteranregiments--Bounty-jumping--Effects on political parties--Soldiersvoting--Burnside's military plans--East Tennessee--Rosecrans aimingat Chattanooga--Burnside's business habits--His frankness--Storiesabout him--His personal characteristics--Cincinnati as a bordercity--Rebel sympathizers--Order No. 38--Challenged byVallandigham--The order not a new departure--Lincoln'sproclamation--General Wright's circular. My purpose to get into active field service had not slept, and soonafter the establishment of a winter organization in the district, Ihad applied to be ordered to other duty. My fixed conviction that nouseful military movements could be made across the mountain regionimplied that the garrisons of West Virginia should be reduced to aminimum and confined to the duty of defending the frontier of thenew State. The rest of the troops might properly be added to theactive columns in the field. McClellan had been relieved of commandwhilst I was conducting active operations in the Kanawha valley, andBurnside suffered his repulse at Fredericksburg within a few daysafter I was directed to make my headquarters at Marietta and perfectthe organization of the district. I was therefore at a loss tochoose where I would serve, even if I had been given _carte blanche_to determine my own work. Enough was known of the reasons for thePresident's dissatisfaction with McClellan to make me admit that thechange of command was an apparent necessity, yet much was unknown, and the full strength of the President's case was not revealed tillthe war was over. My personal friendship for McClellan remainedwarm, and I felt sure that Hooker as a commander would be a longstep downward. In private I did not hesitate to express the wishthat McClellan should still be intrusted with the command of thePotomac army, that it should be strongly reinforced, and that byconstant pressure upon its commander his indecision of charactermight be overcome. Those who were near to McClellan believed that hewas learning greater self-confidence, for the Antietam campaignseemed a decided improvement on that of the Chickahominy. The event, in great measure, justified this opinion, for it was not till Granttook command a year later that any leadership superior toMcClellan's was developed. Yet it must be confessed that we did notknow half the discouragements that were weighing upon the Presidentand his Secretary of War, and which made the inertia of the Easternarmy demand a desperate remedy. My personal affairs drifted in this way: the contest over the listsof promotions, of which I knew next to nothing, prevented any actionon the request for a change of duty, and the close of the session ofCongress brought the official notice that the promotion had expiredby legal limitation. [Footnote: March 24th; received the 30th. ] Thefirst effect was naturally depressing, and it took a little time andsome philosophy to overcome it; but the war was not ended yet, andreflection made the path of duty appear to be in the line ofcontinued active service. To form a new department for General Schenck, West Virginia wasdetached from the Department of the Ohio and annexed to Maryland. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxv. Pt. Ii. P. 145. ] This was amistake from a military point of view, for not only must the postsnear the mountains be supplied and reinforced from the Ohio as theirbase, toward which would also be the line of retreat if retreat werenecessary, but the frequent advances of the Confederate forces, through the Shenandoah valley to the Potomac, always separated theWest from any connection with Baltimore, and made it impossible foran officer stationed there (as General Schenck was) to directaffairs in the western district at the very time of greatestnecessity. Another important fact was overlooked. The river counties of Ohioformed part of the district, and the depots on the river weresupplied from Cincinnati. Not only was Gallipolis thus put inanother department from the posts directly dependent on that depotas a base of supplies and the principal station for hospitals, butthe new boundary line left me, personally, and my headquarters inthe Department of the Ohio. I at once called the attention of theWar Department to these results, sending my communication in thefirst instance through General Wright. He was in the same boat withmyself, for his rank had also been reduced on the 4th of March, buthe thought the intention must have been to transfer me with thedistrict to the Eastern Department. On this I wrote to Washingtondirect, asking for definite orders. I also wrote to General Schenck, telling him of General Wright's supposition that I was transferredwith the district, and inquiring if he had any definite decision ofthe question. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 159, 160. ] About the 3d of April I was directed to report in person to GeneralSchenck at Baltimore, [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 175. ] and reached thatcity on the 4th. My relations with General Schenck had been, personally, cordial, and our friendship continued till his death, many years after the war. Whatever plans he may have had were setaside by orders from Washington, which met me at his headquarters, ordering me to report at Columbus, Ohio, to assist the governor inorganizing the troops to be called out under the new enrolment andconscription law. This was accompanied by the assurance that thisduty would be but temporary, and that my desire to be assigned toactive field duty would then be favorably considered. It is notimprobable that my report on army organization, which has beenmentioned, had something to do with this assignment; but I did notask permission to visit Washington, though within a couple of hours'ride of the capital, and hastened back to my assigned post. Besidesmy wish to cut my connection with West Virginia on general militarytheories of its insignificance as a theatre of war, my stay therewould have been intolerable, since General Milroy, in whose judgmentI had less confidence than in that of any of my other subordinates, was, by the curious outcome of the winter's promotions, the one ofall others who had been put over my head. I could not then foreseethe cost the country would pay for this in the next summer'scampaign in the Shenandoah, but every instinct urged me to sever aconnection which could bode no good. The reasonableness of myobjection to serving as a subordinate where I had been in commandwas recognized, and the arrangement actually made was as acceptableas anything except a division in an active army. It greatly added to my contentment to learn that General Burnsidehad been ordered to the Department of the Ohio, and would be myimmediate superior. I hastened back to Marietta, closed up thebusiness pending there, and went to Columbus on the 9th of April. The arrangement between Governor Tod and General Burnside proved tobe the formation of the Military District of Ohio, including thewhole State. I was placed in command of this district, reportingdirectly to the general, who himself conferred with the governor. Myown relations to my superiors were thus made strictly military, which was a much pleasanter thing for me than direct connection withthe civil authorities would be; for this involved a danger ofcross-purposes and conflicting orders. Brigadier-General John S. Mason, an excellent officer, was ordered to report to me as myimmediate subordinate in command of the camps and the post atColumbus, and before the end of the month Burnside directed me tofix my own headquarters at Cincinnati, where I could be in constantcommunication with himself. All this was done with the most cordialunderstanding between Burnside and the governor. Indeed, nothingcould be more perfect than the genial and reasonable tone ofGovernor Tod's intercourse with the military officers stationed inOhio. My duties under the Enrolment Act turned out to be very slight. TheAct (passed March 3, 1863) made, in general, each congressionaldistrict an enrolment district under charge of a provost-marshalwith the rank of captain. A deputy provost-marshal supervised theenrolment and draft for the State, and the whole was under thecontrol of the provost-marshal-general at Washington, Colonel JamesB. Fry. The law provided for classification of all citizens capableof military duty between the ages of twenty and forty-five, so as tocall out first the unmarried men and those not having familiesdependent on them. The exemptions on account of physical defectswere submitted to a board of three, of which the localprovost-marshal was chairman, and one was a medical man. Substitutesmight be accepted in the place of drafted men, or a payment of threehundred dollars would be taken in place of personal service, thatsum being thought sufficient to secure a voluntary recruit by thegovernment. The principal effect of this provision was to establisha current market price for substitutes. The general provisions of the law for the drafting were wise andwell matured, and the rules for the subordinate details were welldigested and admirably administered by Colonel Fry and his bureau. It was a delicate and difficult task, but it was carried out withsuch patience, honesty, and thoroughness that nothing better couldbe done than copy it, if a future necessity for like work shouldarise. There was no good ground for complaint, and in those caseswhere, as in New York, hostile political leaders raised the cry ofunfairness and provoked collision between the mob and the Nationalauthorities, the victims were proved to be the dupes of ignoranceand malice. The administration of the law was thoroughly vindicated, and if there were to be a draft at all, it could not be more fairlyand justly enforced. There was room for difference of opinion as to some of theprovisions of the law regarding exemption and substitution, but themost serious question was raised by the section which applied to oldregiments and which had nothing to do with the enrolment and draft. This section directed that when regiments had become reduced innumbers by any cause, the officers of the regiment should beproportionately diminished. As new regiments were still received andcredited upon the State's liability under the draft, it of courseresulted that the old regiments continued to decay. A publicsentiment had been created which looked upon the draft as adisgrace, and the most extraordinary efforts were made to escape it. Extra bounties for volunteering were paid by counties and towns, andthe combination of influences was so powerful that it was successfulin most localities, and very few men were actually put in the ranksby the draft. The offer of extra bounties to induce volunteering brought intoexistence "bounty-jumping, " a new crime analogous to that of"repeating" at elections. A man would enlist and receive the bounty, frequently several hundred dollars, but varying somewhat indifferent places and periods. He would take an early opportunity todesert, as he had intended to do from the first. Changing his name, he would go to some new locality and enlist again, repeating thefraud as often as he could escape detection. The urgency to getrecruits and forward them at once to the field, and the wide countrywhich was open to recruiting, made the risk of punishment verysmall. Occasionally one was caught, and he would of course be liableto punishment as a deserter. The final report of theprovost-marshal-general mentions the case of a criminal in theAlbany penitentiary, New York, who confessed that he had "jumped thebounty" thirty-two times. [Footnote: Provost-Marshal-General'sReport, p. 153. ] Another evil incidental to the excessive stimulus of volunteeringwas a political one, which threatened serious results. It derangedthe natural political balance of the country by sending the mostpatriotic young men to the field, and thus giving an undue power tothe disaffected and to the opponents of the administration. This ledto the State laws for allowing the soldiers to vote wherever theymight be, their votes being certified and sent home. In its verynature this was a makeshift and a very dubious expedient to cure themischief. It would not have been necessary if we had had at an earlyday a system of recruiting that would have drawn more evenly fromdifferent classes into the common service of the country. The military officers of the department and district had nothing todo with the enrolment and drafting, unless resistance to theprovost-marshals should make military support for these officersnecessary. We had hoped to have large camps of recruits to beorganized and instructed, but the numbers actually drafted in Ohio, in 1863, were insignificant, for reasons already stated. Three orfour very small post garrisons were the only forces at my command, and these were reduced to the minimum necessary to guard the prisoncamps and the depots of recruiting and supply. General Burnside had not come West with a purpose to content himselfwith the retiracy of a department out of the theatre of actual war. His department included eastern Kentucky, and afforded a base foroperations in the direction of East Tennessee. Mr. Lincoln had neverlost his eagerness and zeal to give assistance to the loyalmountaineers, and had arranged with Burnside a plan of co-operationwith Rosecrans by which the former should move from Lexington, Ky. , upon Knoxville, whilst the latter marched from Murfreesboro, Tenn. , upon Chattanooga. This was better than the impracticable plan of1861, which aimed at the occupation of East Tennessee beforeChattanooga had been taken, and the task was at last accomplished bythe method now used. It was by no means the best or most economicalmethod, which would have been to have but one strong army tillChattanooga were firmly in our hands, and then direct a subordinatecolumn upon the upper Holston valley. It was utterly impossible tokeep up a line of supply for an army in East Tennessee by the wagonroads over the mountains. The railroad through Chattanooga wasindispensable for this purpose. But Mr. Lincoln had not fullyappreciated this, and was discontented that both Buell and Rosecranshad in turn paid little attention, as it seemed, to his desire tomake the liberation of East Tennessee the primary and immediate aimof their campaigns. He had therefore determined to show his ownfaith in Burnside, and his approval of the man, by giving him asmall but active army in the field, and to carry out his cherishedpurpose by having it march directly over the Cumberland Mountains, whilst Rosecrans was allowed to carry out the plan on which thecommanders of the Cumberland army seemed, in the President'sopinion, too stubbornly bent. Burnside's old corps, the Ninth, was taken from the Army of thePotomac and sent to Kentucky, and a new corps, to be called theTwenty-third, was soon authorized, to contain the Tennesseeregiments which had been in General Morgan's command, and twodivisions made up of new regiments organized in Ohio, Indiana, andIllinois under the last call for volunteers. To these were addedseveral Kentucky regiments of different ages in service. GeneralParke, so long Burnside's chief of staff, was to command the NinthCorps, and Major-General George L. Hartsuff was assigned to theTwenty-third. In a former chapter I have spoken of Hartsuff'sabilities as a staff officer in West Virginia. [Footnote: Chap, vi. , _ante_. ] His qualities as a general officer had not been tried. Hewas wounded at the beginning of the engagement at Antietam, where hecommanded a brigade in Hooker's corps. [Footnote: Chap, xv. , _ante_. ] That was his first service under his appointment asbrigadier, and he had necessarily been out of the field since thattime. My own expectation was that he would make an excellentreputation as a corps commander, but it was not his fortune to seemuch continuous field service. His health was seriously affected byhis wounds, and after a short trial of active campaigning he wasobliged to seek more quiet employment. The establishment of my headquarters at Cincinnati threw me oncemore into close personal relations with Burnside, and enabled me tolearn his character more intimately. His adjutant-general's officewas on East Fourth Street, and most of the routine work was donethere. The general had his own quarters on Ninth Street, where hehad also an office for himself and his aides-de-camp. My own officeand the official headquarters of the district were on Broadway belowFourth, in the house now occupied by the Natural History Society. There was thus near half a mile between us, though I was but alittle way from the adjutant-general of the department, throughwhose office my regular business with the general went. Burnside, however, loved to discuss department affairs informally, and withthe perfect freedom of unrestrained social intercourse. When he gavehis confidence he gave it without reserve, and encouraged thefullest and freest criticism of his own plans and purposes. Hisdecisions would then be put in official form by the proper officersof the staff, and would be transmitted, though I was nearly alwayspersonally aware of what was to be ordered before the formal papersreached me. He had very little pride of opinion, and was perfectlycandid in weighing whatever was contrary to his predilections; yethe was not systematic in his business methods, and was quite apt todecide first and discuss afterward. He never found fault with asubordinate for assuming responsibility or acting without orders, provided he was assured of his earnest good purpose in doing so. Insuch cases he would assume the responsibility for what was done ascheerfully as if he had given the order. In like manner he wascareless of forms himself, in doing whatever seemed necessary orproper, and might pass by intermediate officers to reach immediatelythe persons who were to act or the things to be done. There was nointentional slight to any one in this: it was only a characteristiccarelessness of routine. Martinets would be exasperated by it, andwould be pretty sure to quarrel with him. No doubt it was a badbusiness method, and had its mischiefs and inconveniences. A storyused to go the rounds a little later that soldiers belonging to thelittle army in East Tennessee were sometimes arrested at their homesand sent back as deserters, when they would produce a furloughwritten by Burnside on a leaf of his pocket memorandum-book, which, as they said, had been given by him after hearing a pitiful storywhich moved his sympathies. Such inventions were a kind of popularrecognition of his well-known neglect of forms, as well as of hiskind heart. There was an older story about him, to the effect that, when a lieutenant in the army, he had been made post-quartermasterat some little frontier garrison, and that his accounts and returnsgot into such confusion that after several pretty sharp remindersthe quartermaster-general notified him, as a final terror, that hewould send a special officer and subject him and his papers to asevere scrutiny. As the story ran, Burnside, in transparent honesty, wrote a cordial letter of thanks in reply, saying it was just whathe desired, as he had been trying hard to make his accounts up, buthad to confess he could do nothing with them, but was sure such anexpert would straighten them. In my own service under him I oftenfound occasion to supply the formal links in the official chain, sothat business would move on according to "regulations;" but anytrouble that was made in this way was much more than compensated bythe generous trust with which he allowed his name and authority tobe used when prompt action would serve the greater ends in view. My habit was to go to his private quarters on Ninth Street, when theregular business of the day was over, and there get the militarynews and confer with him on pending or prospective businessaffecting my own district. His attractive personality made him thecentre of a good deal of society, and business would drop into thebackground till late in the evening, when his guests voluntarilydeparted. Then, perhaps after midnight, he would take up the arrearsof work and dictate letters, orders, and dispatches, turning nightinto day. It not unfrequently happened that after making my usualofficial call in the afternoon, I had gone to my quarters and to bedat my usual hour, when I would be roused by an orderly from thegeneral begging that I would come up and consult with him on somematter of neglected business. He was always bright and clear inthose late hours, and when he buckled to work, rapidly disposed ofit. He did not indulge much in retrospect, and rarely referred to hismisfortunes in the Army of the Potomac. On one or two occasions hediscussed his Fredericksburg campaign with me. The delay in sendingpontoons from Washington to Falmouth, which gave Lee time toconcentrate at Fredericksburg, he reasonably argued, was the faultof the military authorities at Washington; but I could easily seethat if his supervision of business had been more rigidlysystematic, he would have made sure that he was not to bedisappointed in his means of crossing the Rappahannock promptly. Asto the battle itself he steadily insisted that the advance ofMeade's division proved that if all the left wing had acted withequal vigor and promptness, Marye's heights would have been turnedand carried. It is due to him to repeat that in such discussions hisjudgment of men and their motives was always kind and charitable. Inever heard him say anything bitter, even of those whom I knew hedistrusted. At the time I am speaking of, Cincinnati was in a curious politicaland social condition. The advance through Kentucky of Bragg andKirby Smith in the preceding year had made it a centre for "rebelsympathizers. " The fact that a Confederate army had approached thehills that bordered the river had revived the hopes and theconfidence of many who, while wishing success to the Southern cause, had done so in a vague and distant way. Now it seemed nearer tothem, and the stimulus to personal activity was greater. There wasalways, in the city, a considerable and influential body of businessmen who were of Southern families; and besides this, the tradeconnections with the South, and the personal alliances by marriage, made a ground of sympathy which had noticeable effects. There weretwo camps in the community, pretty distinctly defined, as there werein Kentucky. The loyal were ardently and intensely so. The disloyalwere bitter and not always restrained by common prudence. A goodmany Southern women, refugees from the theatre of active war, werevery open in their defiance of the government, and in their effortsto aid the Southern armies by being the bearers of intelligence. The"contraband mail" was notoriously a large and active one. Burnside had been impressed with this condition of things from theday he assumed command. His predecessor had struggled with itwithout satisfactory results. It was, doubtless, impossible to domore than diminish and restrain the evil, which was the mostannoying of the smaller troubles attending the anomaloushalf-military and half-civil government of the department. Withinthree weeks from his arrival in Cincinnati, Burnside was soconvinced of the widespread and multiform activity of the disloyalelement that he tried to subdue it by the publication of his famousGeneral Order No. 38. The reading of the order gives a fair idea ofthe hostile influences he found at work, for of every class named byhim there were numerous examples. [Footnote: The text of the order is as follows: "General Orders. No. 38. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, CINCINNATI, OHIO, April 13, 1863. The commanding general publishes, for the information of allconcerned, that hereafter all persons found within our lines whocommit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will betried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death. This order includes the following classes of persons: Carriers ofsecret mails; writers of letters sent by secret mails; secretrecruiting officers within the lines; persons who have entered intoan agreement to pass our lines for the purpose of joining the enemy;persons found concealed within our lines, belonging to the serviceof the enemy; and, in fact, all persons found improperly within ourlines who could give private information to the enemy; and allpersons within our lines who harbor, protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies of our country. The habit of declaringsympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offences will be at once arrested with aview to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines intothe lines of their friends. It must be distinctly understood thattreason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in thisdepartment. All officers and soldiers are strictly charged with theexecution of this order, By command of Major-General Burnside, LEWIS RICHMOND, Assistant Adjutant General. "] It was no doubt true that the Confederate authorities had constantcorrespondence with people in the Northern States, and thatsystematic means were used to pass information and contrabandmerchandise through the lines. Quinine among drugs, and percussioncaps among ordnance stores were the things they most coveted, anddealers in these carried on their trade under pretence of beingspies for each side in turn. But besides these who were merelymercenary, there were men and women who were honestly fanatical intheir devotion to the Confederate cause. The women were especiallytroublesome, for they often seemed to court martyrdom. Theypractised on our forbearance to the last degree; for they knew ourextreme unwillingness to deal harshly with any of their sex. Personally, I rated the value of spies and informers very low, andmy experience had made me much more prone to contempt than to fearof them. But examples had to be made occasionally; a few men werepunished, a few women who belonged in the South were sent throughthe lines, and we reduced to its lowest practical terms an evil andnuisance which we could not wholly cure. The best remedy for theseplots and disturbances at the rear always was to keep the enemy busyby a vigorous aggressive at the front. We kept, however, a speciesof provost court pretty actively at work, and one or two officerswere assigned to judge-advocate's duty, who ran these courts under acareful supervision to make sure that they should not fall intoindiscretions. So long as the hand of military power was laid only on privatepersons who were engaged in overt acts of giving aid and comfort tothe rebellion in the ways specified in Order No. 38, there waslittle criticism. But the time came when General Burnside seemed tobe challenged by a public character of no little prominence toenforce his order against him. The Vallandigham case became thesensation of the day, and acquired a singular historical importance. The noise which was made about it seemed to create a current opinionthat Burnside's action was a new departure, and that his Order No. 38 was issued wholly on his own responsibility. This was not so. Inthe preceding year, and about the time of his EmancipationProclamation, the President had also proclaimed against treasonablepractices in very emphatic terms. He had declared that "all rebelsand insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resistingmilitia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aidand comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishmentby courts-martial or military commission. " [Footnote: Messages andPapers of the Presidents, vol. Vi. P. 98. See also Order No. 42 ofGeneral Burbridge, commanding District of Kentucky. OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxix. Pt. Ii. P. 27. ] Burnside's order was in strict accordance with this authority, andhe had no ultimate responsibility for the policy thus proclaimed. Hewas simply reiterating and carrying out in his department thedeclared purpose of the administration. Even in the matter ofnewspaper publications, his predecessor, General Wright, had feltobliged, upon Bragg and Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky, to put astop to treasonable editorials and to the publication of militaryinformation likely to benefit the enemy. He issued a circular onSeptember 13, 1862, notifying the publishers of the Cincinnatipapers that the repetition of such offence would be immediatelyfollowed by the suppression of the paper and the arrest andconfinement of the proprietors and writers. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xvi. Pt. Ii. P. 514. See a characteristic letter bySherman on this subject, _Id_. , vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 765: "Now I amagain in authority over you, and you must heed my advice. Freedom ofspeech and freedom of the press, precious relics of former history, must not be construed too largely. You must print nothing thatprejudices government or excites envy, hatred, and malice in acommunity. Persons in office or out of office must not be flatteredor abused. Don't publish an account of any skirmish, battle, ormovement of an army, unless the name of the writer is given in fulland printed. I wish you success; but my first duty is to maintain'order and harmony. '" (To editors of "Memphis Bulletin. ")] It isnecessary to keep these facts in mind if we would judge fairly ofBurnside's responsibility when it was his fortune to apply the ruleto a case attracting great public attention. CHAPTER XXII THE VALLANDIGHAM CASE--THE HOLMES COUNTY WAR Clement L. Vallandigham--His opposition to the war--His theory ofreconstruction--His Mount Vernon speech--His arrest--Sent before themilitary commission--General Potter its president--Counsel for theprisoner--The line of defence--The judgment--Habeas Corpusproceedings--Circuit Court of the United States--Judge Leavittdenies the release--Commutation by the President--Sent beyond thelines--Conduct of Confederate authorities--Vallandigham inCanada--Candidate for Governor--Political results--Martiallaw--Principles underlying it--Practical application--The intent toaid the public enemy--The intent to defeat the draft--Armedresistance to arrest of deserters, Noble County--To the enrolment inHolmes County--A real insurrection--Connection of these withVallandigham's speeches--The Supreme Court refuses tointerfere--Action in the Milligan case after the war--Judge Davis'spersonal views--Knights of the Golden Circle--The Holmes Countyoutbreak--Its suppression--Letter to Judge Welker. Clement L. Vallandigham had been representative in Congress of theMontgomery County district of Ohio, and lived at Dayton. He was aman of intense and saturnine character, belligerent and denunciatoryin his political speeches, and extreme in his views. He was theleader in Ohio of the ultra element of opposition to theadministration of Mr. Lincoln, and a bitter opponent of the war. Hewould have prevented the secession of the Southern States byyielding all they demanded, for he agreed with them in thinking thattheir demands for the recognition of the constitutionalinviolability of the slave system were just. After the war began hestill advocated peace at any price, and vehemently opposed everyeffort to subdue the rebellion. To his mind the war was absolutelyunconstitutional on the part of the national government, and hedenounced it as tyranny and usurpation. His theory seemed to be thatif the South were "let alone, " a reconstruction of the Union couldbe satisfactorily effected by squelching the anti-slavery agitation, and that the Western States, at any rate, would find their trueinterest in uniting with the South, even if the other NorthernStates should refuse to do so. Beyond all question he answered tothe old description of a "Northern man with Southern principles, "and his violence of temper made it all a matter of personal hatredwith him in his opposition to the leaders of the party in power atthe North. His denunciations were the most extreme, and hisexpressions of contempt and ill-will were wholly unbridled. Heclaimed, of course, that he kept within the limits of a"constitutional opposition, " because he did not, in terms, advisehis hearers to combine in armed opposition to the government. About the first of May he addressed a public meeting at Mount Vernonin central Ohio, where, in addition to his diatribes against theLincoln administration, he denounced Order No. 38, and Burnside asits author. His words were noted down in short-hand by a captain ofvolunteers who was there on leave of absence from the army, and thereport was corroborated by other reputable witnesses. He charged theadministration with designing to erect a despotism, with refusing torestore the Union when it might be done, with carrying on the warfor the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites. He declared that the provost-marshals for the congressionaldistricts were intended to restrict the liberties of the people;that courts-martial had already usurped power to try citizenscontrary to law; that he himself would never submit to the orders ofa military dictator, and such were Burnside and his subordinates;that if those in authority were allowed to accomplish theirpurposes, the people would be deprived of their liberties and amonarchy established. Such and like expressions, varied by"trampling under his feet" Order No. 38, etc. , made the staple ofhis incendiary speech. When the report was made to Burnside and he had satisfied himself ofits substantial truth, he promptly accepted the challenge to testthe legality of his order, and directed the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. It was characteristic of him that he did not consultwith his subordinates or with lawyers. He did not even act throughmy district organization, but sent his own aide-de-camp with a guardto make the arrest at Dayton. My recollection is that I did not knowof the purpose till it was accomplished. His reason for directaction, no doubt, was that if there were many links in the chain ofroutine, there were multiplied chances of failure. He did not wantto be baffled in the arrest, or to give the opportunity for raisinga mob, which there would be if his purposes were to become known inadvance, The arrest was made in the early morning of the 5th of May, beforedawn, and the prisoner was brought to Cincinnati. He was at firsttaken under guard to the Burnet House, where he breakfasted, and wasthen put in the military prison connected with the houses used asbarracks for the troops in the city. A military commission had beenordered on the 21st of April from Department Headquarters for thetrial of the classes of offenders named in Order No. 38, and of thiscommission Brigadier-General R. B. Potter of the Ninth Corps wasPresident. General Potter was a distinguished officer throughout thewar. He was a brother of Clarkson N. Potter, the prominent lawyerand Democratic member of Congress later, and both were sons of theEpiscopal Bishop Potter of Pennsylvania. The character of the wholecourt was very high for intelligence and standing. Before this courtMr. Vallandigham was arraigned on the charge of publicly expressingsympathy with those in arms against the government, and utteringdisloyal sentiments and opinions with intent to weaken the power ofthe government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. Vallandigham consulted with the Hon. George E. Pugh and others ashis counsel, and then adopted the course of protesting against thejurisdiction of the court and against the authority for his arrest. His grounds were that he was not amenable to any militaryjurisdiction, and that his public speech did not constitute anoffence known to the Constitution and laws. To avoid the appearanceof waiving the question of jurisdiction, his counsel did not appear, though offered the opportunity to do so, and Mr. Vallandighamcross-examined the witnesses himself, and called those who testifiedfor him. The question of fact raised by him was that he had notadvised forcible resistance to the government, but had urged actionat the elections by defeating the party in power at the polls. Thathe did not in terms advocate insurrection was admitted by the judgeadvocate of the court, but the commission were persuaded that theeffect of his speech was intended and well calculated to beincendiary, and to arouse any kind of outbreak in sympathy with thearmed enemies of the country. The trial ended on the 7th of May, butthe judgment was not promulgated till the 16th, proceedings in_habeas corpus_ having intervened. The finding of the court was thatthe prisoner was guilty, as charged, and the sentence was closeconfinement in Fort Warren, Boston harbor, during the continuance ofthe war. On the 9th of May Mr. Pugh made application to the United StatesCircuit Court, Judge Leavitt sitting, for a writ of _habeas corpus_directed to General Burnside, in order that the lawfulness of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest and trial might be tested. The court directednotice of the application to be given to the general, and set the11th for the hearing. The case was elaborately argued by Mr. Pughfor the prisoner, and by Mr. Aaron F. Perry and the DistrictAttorney Flamen Ball for General Burnside. The hearing occupiedseveral days, and the judgment of the court was given on the morningof the 16th. Judge Leavitt refused the writ on the ground that, civil war being flagrant in the land, and Ohio being under themilitary command of General Burnside by appointment of thePresident, the acts and offences described in General Order No. 38were cognizable by the military authorities under the powers of war. General Burnside had awaited the action of the court, and nowpromulgated the sentence under the judgment of the militarycommission. Three days later (May 19th) the President commuted thesentence by directing that Mr. Vallandigham be sent "under secureguard, to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by himbeyond our military lines, and that in case of his return within ourline, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the termspecified in his sentence. " This was done accordingly. TheConfederate officials adopted a careful policy of treating himcourteously without acknowledging that he was one of themselves, andfacilities were given him for running the blockade and reachingCanada. There he established himself on the border and put himselfin communication with his followers in Ohio, by whom he was soonnominated for the Governorship of the State. The case, of course, excited great public interest, and was, nodoubt, the occasion of considerable embarrassment to theadministration. Mr. Lincoln dealt with it with all that shrewdpractical judgment for which he was so remarkable, and in the finalresult it worked to the political advantage of the National cause. Sending Vallandigham beyond the lines took away from him thepersonal sympathy which might have been aroused had he been confinedin one of the casemates of Fort Warren, and put upon him anindelible badge of connection with the enemies of the country. Thecautious action of the Confederates in regard to him did not tend toremove this: for it was very apparent that they really regarded himas a friend, and helped him on his way to Canada in the expectationthat he would prove a thorn in Mr. Lincoln's side. The President'sproposal to the leading politicians who applied to him to rescindthe sentence, that as a condition of this they should make certaindeclarations of the duty to support the government in a vigorousprosecution of the war, was a most telling bit of policy on hispart, and took the sting entirely out of the accusations of tyrannyand oppression. It must be admitted, however, that the case was one in which theadministration ought to have left Burnside wholly untrammelled incarrying out the proclamation of September 25, 1862, or should haveformulated a rule for its military officers, so that they would haveacted only in accordance with the wishes of the government, and incases where the full responsibility would be assumed at Washington. When Burnside arrested Mr. Vallandigham, the Secretary of Wartelegraphed from Washington his approval, saying, "In yourdetermination to support the authority of the government andsuppress treason in your department, you may count on the firmsupport of the President. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 316. ] Yet when a little later Burnside suppressed the"Chicago Times" for similar utterances, the President, on therequest of Senator Trumbull, backed by prominent citizens ofChicago, directed Burnside to revoke his action. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 385, 386. ] This the latter did by General Order No. 91, issuedon the 4th of June. He read to me on June 7th a letter from Mr. Stanton, which practically revoked the whole of his Order No. 38 bydirecting him not to arrest civilians or suppress newspapers withoutconferring first with the War Department. This would have been verywell if it had been done at the beginning; but to have it come afterpolitical pressure from the outside, and in so marked contradictionto the approval first expressed, shows that there was nowell-considered policy. It put Burnside himself in an intolerableposition, and, of course, made him decline further responsibilityfor such affairs in his department. [Footnote: I do not find in theOfficial Records the letter of Mr. Stanton above referred to; but Ispeak of it from a written memorandum I made at the time. ] The whole question as to the right and the policy of militaryarrests and orders in such a time bristles with difficulties. Had Ibeen consulted before Burnside took action, I should have advisedhim to collect carefully the facts and report them to Washington, asking for specific instructions. The subject called for directionswhich would be applicable in all the military departments whichincluded States out of the theatre of active warlike operations; andsuch general directions should be given by the government. ButBurnside was apt to act impulsively, and his impulse was to followthe bent of his ardent patriotism. He was stirred to burning wrathby what seemed to him an intent to give aid and comfort to therebellion, and meant to punish such conduct without stopping to askwhat complications might come of it. I had found it desirable to form a judgment of my own with referenceto the extent or limitation of military authority in the actualcircumstances, and I quote the form in which I then cast it, so thatI may not seem to be giving opinions formed after my own militaryduties were ended. I concluded, "First: That martial law operateseither by reason of its proclamation by competent authority, or _exnecessitate rei_ in the immediate theatre of military operations. Second; That when the struggle is in the nature of a revolution, andso long as the attempted revolution is in active progress, nodefinite limits can be given to the 'theatre of operations, ' but theadministration must be regarded as possessing a limiteddiscretionary power in the use of martial law. " As to the practicalapplication of this power, "the presumptions are always in favor ofthe established civil law of the land, whenever and wherever it hasa reasonable chance of unobstructed operation. In a State or portionof the country not the theatre of actual fighting, and where thecivil courts are actually organized and working, there must be somestrong reason for sending criminals or State prisoners before amilitary tribunal; such as that the government had reason to believethat a conspiracy was so powerful as to make an actual presentdanger of its overthrowing the loyal governments in some of theStates before the civil courts could act in the ordinary process ofbusiness. In such a case, the arrest and admission to bail of theconspirators might be only the signal for their adherents to seizethe reins of civil power, overthrow the courts, and consummate arevolution. The quick and summary action of military power wouldthen be the only thing which could avert the danger. Thejustification of the use of a military tribunal depends on theexistence of 'probable cause' for believing the public danger to begreat. " I see no reason to change the form of stating the principle I thenadopted. The limitations given it seem sufficient to secure propercaution in applying it, and will show that I thought then, as I donow, that the administration ought to have laid down rules by whichthe commandants of military departments could be guided, and whichwould have saved us from the weakness of acting with seeming vigoron one day, only to retreat from our position the next. In Vallandigham's case the common argument was used by his friendsthat he was not exceeding a lawful liberty of speech in politicalopposition to the administration. When, however, a civil war is inprogress, it is simply a question of fact whether words used areintended to give aid and comfort to the enemy and are evidence ofconspiracy with the public enemy. If so, it is too clear forargument that the overt acts of the enemy are brought home to allwho combine and confederate with them, and all are involved in thesame responsibility. This question of fact and intent was officiallysettled by the findings of the military court. But there was anotherconnection of the speech with overt acts, which the public mind tookfirm hold of. Among the most incendiary of Vallandigham's appealshad been those which urged the people to resist the provost-marshalsin the several districts. It is nonsense to say that resisting thedraft or the arrest of deserters only meant voting for an oppositionparty at the elections. There had been armed and organizedresistance to arrest of deserters in Noble County just before hisspeech, and soon after it there was a still more formidable armedorganization with warlike action against the enrolling officers inHolmes County, in the same region in which the speech was made. Thislast took the form of an armed camp, and the insurgents did notdisperse till a military force was sent against them and attackedthem in fortified lines, where they used both cannon and musketry. It did not seem plausible to the common sense of the people that wecould properly charge with volleying musketry upon the barricades ofthe less intelligent dupes, whilst the leader who had incited andcounselled the resistance was to be held to be acting within thelimits of proper liberty of speech. Law and common sense areentirely in harmony in regarding the conspiracy as a unit, thespeech at Mount Vernon and the armed collision on the Holmes Countyhill being parts of one series of acts in which the instigator wasresponsible for the natural consequences of the forces he set inmotion. To complete the judicial history of the Vallandigham case, it may besaid that he applied to the Supreme Court of the United States a fewmonths afterward for a writ to revise and examine the proceedings ofthe military commission and to determine their legality. The courtdismissed his application on the ground that the writ applied forwas not a legal means of bringing the proceedings of the militarycourt under review. The charges and specifications and the sentencewere all set forth in the application, so that the court was madeofficially aware of the full character of the case. This wasnaturally accepted at the time as practically sustaining the actionof the President and General Burnside. When, however, the war wasover, there was taken up to the Supreme Court the case of Milliganfrom Indiana, who had been condemned to death for treasonableconduct in aid of the rebellion, done as a member of the Knights ofthe Golden Circle, an organization charged with overt acts inattempting to liberate by force the Confederate prisoners of war inthe military prisons, and otherwise to assist the rebellion. Thecurrent public sentiment in regard to executive power hadunquestionably changed with the return to peace, and Lincoln havingbeen assassinated and Johnson being in the presidential chair, thetide was running strongly in favor of congressional rather thanexecutive initiative in public affairs. It cannot be denied that thecourt responded more or less fully to the popular drift, then as inother important historical junctures. In the opinion as delivered byJudge Davis, it went all lengths in holding that the militarycommission could not act upon charges against a person not in themilitary service, and who was a citizen of the State where tried, when in such State the civil courts were not actually suspended bythe operations of war. Chief Justice Chase and three of the justicesthought this was going too far, and whilst concurring in dischargingMilligan, held that Congress could authorize military commissions totry civilians in time of actual war, and that such militarytribunals might have concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts. [Footnote: Ex parte Vallandigham, Wallace's Reports, i. 243. Exparte Milligan, _Id_. , iv. 2, etc. ] We must not forget that whilst the judicial action determines therights of the parties in a suit, the executive has always assertedhis position as an independent co-ordinate branch of the government, authorized by the Constitution to determine for himself, asexecutive, his duties, and to interpret his powers, subject only tothe Constitution as he understands it. Jefferson, Jackson, andLincoln in turn found themselves in exigencies where they held it tobe their duty to decide for themselves on their high politicalresponsibility in matters of constitutional power and duty. Lincolnsuspended the privilege of _habeas corpus_ by his own proclamation, and adhered to his view, although Judge Taney in the Circuit Courtfor Maryland denied his power to do so. When Congress passed aregulating act on the subject which seemed to him sufficient, hesigned the statute because he was quite willing to limit his actionby the provisions embodied in it, and not because he thought the actnecessary to confer the power. An incident in the history of the treasonable organizations believedto exist in Indiana emphasizes the change of mental attitude ofJudge Davis between 1863 and 1866. During the progress of theVallandigham case, General Burnside conceived a distrust of thewisdom of the course pursued by Brigadier-General Carrington, whocommanded at Indianapolis, and sent Brigadier-General Hascall thereto command that district. Carrington had been the right hand ofGovernor Morton in ferreting out the secrets of the Golden Circle, and applying Order No, 38 to them, but Burnside's lack of confidencein the cool-headed caution and judgment of his subordinate led himto make the change. Hascall was a brave and reliable Indianaofficer, who had seen much active field service, and with whom I wasassociated in the Twenty-third Corps during the Atlanta campaign. Hewas ardently loyal, but an unexcitable, matter-of-fact sort ofperson. He did not suit Governor Morton, who applied to theSecretary of War to have him removed from command, declaring thatimmediate action was important. Judge Davis, who was inIndianapolis, was induced to co-operate with the governor in thematter, and telegraphed to Mr. Stanton that Hascall's removal wasdemanded by the honor and interests of the government. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 369. See also _Id_. , p. 194. ]Hascall was sent to the field, and after a short interval Carringtonwas restored to duty at Indianapolis. In the continued investigationand prosecution of the Golden Circle, and finally in the trial ofMilligan, General Carrington was, under Governor Morton, the mostactive instrument; and it was, of course, to keep him at work onthat line that the changes in command were secured. Yet it was thefruit of this very work of Carrington that was so strongly andsweepingly declared to be illegal by the Supreme Court, Judge Davishimself delivering the opinion and going beyond the chief-justiceand others in denying all power and authority to military courts insuch cases. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would no doubt have avoidedany question before the Supreme Court in regard to his authority, bypardoning Milligan as he granted amnesty to so many who had beenactive in the rebellion. But Mr. Johnson was so much hampered by hisquarrel with Congress over reconstruction that he was disposed toavoid interference with criminal cases where his action couldsubject him to the charge of sympathy with the accused. He carefullyabstained from meddling with Jefferson Davis as he did withMilligan, and left the responsibility with the courts. The final development of the investigation of the Society of theGolden Circle took place after I had again obtained a field command, and I was glad to have no occasion to form a personal judgment aboutit. The value of evidence collected by means of detectives dependsso greatly on the character of the men employed and the instructionsunder which they act, that one may well suspend judgment unless hehas more than ordinarily full knowledge on these points. Thefindings of the military commission must stand as a _prima facie_historical determination of the facts it reported, and the burden ofproof is fairly upon those who assert that the conclusions were notsustained by trustworthy evidence. I have mentioned the open resistance to the draft and to the arrestof deserters in Noble and in Holmes counties. The first of these wasscarcely more than a petty riotous demonstration, which melted awaybefore the officers as soon as they were able to show that they werebacked by real power. The second looked for a time more formidable, and assumed a formal military organization. Governor Tod issued aproclamation warning the offenders of the grave consequences oftheir acts, and exhorting them for their own sake and the sake oftheir families to disperse and obey the laws. I directed GeneralMason at Columbus to be sure, if military force had to be used, thatenough was concentrated to make stubborn resistance hopeless. Theinsurgents maintained a bold face till the troops were close uponthem; but when they saw a strong line of infantry charging up towardthe stone fences on the hillside where they had made their camp, andheard the whistling of bullets from the skirmishers, their couragegave way and they fled, every man for himself. Only two or threewere seriously wounded, and comparatively few arrests were made. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 395-397. ]Submission to law was all that was demanded, and when this was fullyestablished, the prisoners were soon released without furtherpunishment. The fear of further prosecutions operated to preservethe peace, and the men who had been allowed to go at large were aguaranty, in effect, for the good behavior of the community. Before dropping the subject, I may properly add that the arrest ofMr. Vallandigham very naturally raised the question how far we werewilling to go in bringing disloyal men before the military courts. Prominent citizens, and especially men in official position, oftenfound themselves urged to ask for the arrest of the more outspokenfollowers of Vallandigham in every country neighborhood. In answerto inquiries which had come through the Hon. Martin Welker, [Footnote: Afterward for many years Judge of the U. S. DistrictCourt for northern Ohio. ] member of Congress for the Wayne Countydistrict, I wrote him a letter which shows the efforts we made to beprudent and to avoid unnecessary collisions. Judge Welker had servedas Judge Advocate on my staff in the three months' service in thespring of 1861, and my intimacy with him made me speak as to ourpolicy without reserve. "We are hopeful, " I wrote, "now that the United States Circuit Courthas refused to release Mr. Vallandigham on _habeas corpus_, that hisfollowers will take warning and that their course will be somodified that there may be no occasion to make many more arrests. "I am persuaded that our policy should be to repress disloyalty andsedition at home rather by punishment of prominent examples than bya general arrest of all who may make themselves obnoxious to GeneralOrder No. 38, as the latter course will involve a more frequentapplication of military authority than we choose to resort to, unless circumstances should make it imperatively necessary... I amfull of hope that the seditious designs of bad men will fail byreason of the returning sense of those who have been their dupes, and that the able and patriotic opinion of Judge Leavitt in the_habeas corpus_ case will cause great numbers to take positiveground in favor of the government, who have hitherto been more orless under the influence of our northern traitors. If such shall bethe result we can afford to overlook bygones, and I am inclined toawait the development of public sentiment before following upVallandigham's arrest by many others. " This letter was written before the Secretary of War made anylimitation of Burnside's authority in enforcing his famous order, and shows that in the District of Ohio, at least, there was nodesire to set up a military despotism, or to go further in applyingmilitary methods to conduct in aid of the rebellion than we might beforced to go. Burnside's action in suppressing disloyal newspapers was notpeculiar to himself. General Wright, his predecessor, had done thesame, and other military commandants, both before and after and inother parts of the country, had felt obliged to take the samecourse. These facts only make more clear the desirability of awell-considered system of action determined by the government atWashington, and applicable to all such cases. CHAPTER XXIII BURNSIDE AND ROSECRANS--THE SUMMER'S DELAYS Condition of Kentucky and Tennessee--Halleck's instructions toBurnside--Blockhouses at bridges--Relief of EastTennessee--Conditions of the problem--Vast wagon-trainrequired--Scheme of a railroad--Surveys begun--Burnside's efforts toarrange co-operation with Rosecrans--Bragg sending troops toJohnston--Halleck urges Rosecrans to activity--Continuedinactivity--Burnside ordered to send troops to Grant--Rosecrans'scorrespondence with Halleck--Lincoln's dispatch--Rosecrans collectshis subordinates' opinions--Councils of war--The situationconsidered--Sheridan and Thomas--Computation ofeffectives--Garfield's summing up--Review of the situation whenRosecrans succeeded Buell--After Stone's River--Relativeforces--Disastrous detached expeditions--Appeal to ambition--Themajor-generalship in regular army--Views of the Presidentjustified--Burnside's forces--Confederate forces in EastTennessee--Reasons for the double organization of the Union armies. Burnside was not a man to be satisfied with quasi-military duty andthe administration of a department outside of the field of activewarfare. He had been reappointed to the formal command of the NinthCorps before he came West, and the corps was sent after him as soonas transportation could be provided for it. He reached Cincinnati inperson just as a raid into Kentucky by some 2000 Confederate cavalryunder Brigadier-General John Pegram was in progress. Pegram marchedfrom East Tennessee about the middle of March, reaching Danville, Ky. , on the 23d. He spread reports that he was the advance-guard ofa large force of all arms intending a serious invasion of the State. These exaggerations had their effect, and the disturbance in theDepartment of the Ohio was out of proportion to the strength of thehostile column. [Footnote: Letter of Governor Robinson, OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 97; _Id_. , pp. 121, 126. ] The troopsbelonging to the post at Danville retreated to the hither side ofthe Kentucky River at Hickman's Bridge, where they took up adefensive position. They saved the railway bridge from destruction, and Brigadier-General Quincy A. Gillmore, who commanded the Districtof Central Kentucky with headquarters at Lexington, was able toconcentrate there a sufficient force to resume the offensive againstPegram. Burnside ordered reinforcements to Gillmore from the other parts ofKentucky, and Pegram, whose report indicates that a foray for beef, cattle, and horses was the principal object of his expedition, commenced his retreat. Gillmore followed him up vigorously, recapturing a considerable part of the cattle he had collected, andovertaking his principal column at Somerset, routed him and drovehim beyond the Cumberland River. The month of March had begun with pleasant spring weather, and onthe 15th General Wright had written to Halleck that an invasion ofKentucky was probable, especially as Rosecrans showed no signs ofresuming the aggressive against Bragg's army in middle Tennessee. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 143. ] In Halleck's letter of instructions toBurnside as the latter was leaving Washington to relieve Wright, thegeneral plan of an advance on East Tennessee in connection with thatof Rosecrans toward Chattanooga was outlined, but theGeneral-in-Chief acknowledged that the supply of an army in EastTennessee by means of the wagon roads was probably impracticable. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 163. ] He pointed out the necessity of reducingthe number and size of garrisons in the rear, and making everythingbend to the great object of organizing the army for activeinitiative against the enemy. He recommended building block-housesto protect the principal bridges on the railroads, where very smallgarrisons could give comparative security to our lines ofcommunication. This plan was ultimately carried out on a largescale, and was the necessary condition of Sherman's Atlanta campaignof 1864. Taken as a whole, Halleck's instructions to Burnsidepresented no definite objective, and were a perfunctory sort ofintroduction to his new command, which raises a doubt whether theorganization of a little army in the Department of the Ohio met hisapproval. The fact was that Burnside was acting on an understanding withPresident Lincoln himself, whose ardent wish to send a column forthe relief of the loyal people of East Tennessee never slumbered, and who was already beginning to despair of its accomplishment byRosecrans's army. The uneasiness at Washington over Rosecrans'sinaction was becoming acute, and Mr. Lincoln was evidently turningto Burnside's department in hope of an energetic movement there. Inthis hope Burnside was sent West, and the Ninth Corps was detachedfrom the Army of the Potomac and sent after him. The project offollowing up his advance by the construction of a railroad fromDanville, then the terminus of the railway line reaching southwardfrom Cincinnati, was discussed, and the President recommended it toCongress, but no appropriation of money was made. The scheme washardly within the limits of practicable plans, for the building of arailway through such difficult country as the Cumberland mountainregion implied laborious engineering surveys which could only bemade when the country was reduced to secure possession, and theexpenditure of time as well as of money would be likely to exceedthe measure of reasonable plans for a military campaign. The truething to do was to push Rosecrans's army to Chattanooga and beyond. With the valley of the Tennessee in our possession, and Chattanoogaheld as a new base of supply for a column in East Tennessee as wellas another in Georgia, the occupation of Knoxville and the Clinchand Holston valleys to the Virginia line was easy. Without it, allEast Tennessee campaigns were visionary. It was easy enough to getthere; the trouble was to stay. Buell's original lesson inlogistics, in which he gave the War Department a computation of thewagons and mules necessary to supply ten thousand men at Knoxville, was a solid piece of military arithmetic from which there was noescape. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 199. Official Records, vol. Vii. P. 931. ] When Burnside reached Cincinnati and applied himself practically tothe task of organizing his little army for a march over themountains, his first requisitions for wagons and mules were a littlestartling to the Quartermaster-General and a little surprising tohimself. He began at once an engineering reconnoissance of thecountry south of Lexington and Danville, as far as it was within ourcontrol, and employed an able civil engineer, Mr. Gunn, to locatethe preliminary line for a railway. [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 610. ] These surveys were the starting-points from whichthe actual construction of the road between Cincinnati andChattanooga was made after the close of the war. Burnside also urged that the troops in Kentucky, exclusive of theNinth Corps, be organized into a new corps with General Hartsuff asits commander. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 259. ] Halleck demurred to this, but the President directed it to be done, and the order was issuedby the War Department on 27th April. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 269, 283, 400. ] Burnside also applied himself earnestly to procuring fromRosecrans a plan of active co-operation for an advance. As soon asHartsuff assumed command of the new Twenty-third Corps, Burnsidesent him, on May 3d, to visit Rosecrans in person, giving himauthority to arrange an aggressive campaign. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 312. ] Hartsuff's old relations to Rosecrans made him a very fitperson for the negotiation. Rosecrans hesitated to decide, andcalled a council of his principal officers. He suggested that theNinth Corps be sent down the Louisville and Nashville Railroad toGlasgow, near the Tennessee line, but did not indicate any immediatepurpose of advancing. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 313, 315. ] Burnside meant to take the field with both corpsof his command, which he had organized under the name of the Army ofthe Ohio; but to reassure Rosecrans, he wrote that if inco-operation the two armies should come together, he would waive hiselder rank and serve under Rosecrans whilst he should remain inmiddle Tennessee. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 331. ] It was now the 15th ofMay, and he sent a confidential staff officer again to Rosecrans totry to settle a common plan of operations. On the 18th Halleck hadheard of Bragg's army being weakened to give General Joseph E. Johnston a force with which to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg, andhe became urgent for both Rosecrans and Burnside to advance. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 337. ] He thought it probable that raids wouldbe attempted by the enemy to distract attention from his realobject, and pointed out concentration and advance as the best way toprotect the rear as well as to reach the enfeebled adversary. Burnside hastened in good faith his preparations for movement. Hewas collecting a pack mule train to supply the lack of wagons, andput his detachments in motion to concentrate. He begged for thethird division of his corps (Getty's), which had been detained inthe Army of the Potomac and could not yet be spared, but did notwait for it. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 338. ] By the 1st of June he wasready to leave in person for the front, and on the 3d was atLexington, definitely committed to the movement into East Tennessee. There he was met by an order from Halleck to send 8000 men at onceto reinforce General Grant at Vicksburg. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 384. ]The promise was made that they should be returned as soon as theimmediate exigency was over, but the order was imperative. Burnsidenever hesitated in obedience. The two divisions of the Ninth Corpsmade about the number required, and they were immediately turnedback and ordered to the Ohio River to be shipped on steamboats. Sorely disappointed, Burnside asked that he might go with his men, but was told that his departmental duties were too important tospare him from them. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 384, 386. ] Major-General Parke was therefore sent in commandof the corps. Burnside returned to Cincinnati, grieving at theinterruption of his plans, yet hoping it would not be for long. Hisduties at the rear were not agreeable, especially as this was justthe time when he was directed to recall his order suppressingdisloyal newspapers, and to refrain from arrests of civilianswithout explicit authority from Washington. We may safely assume that the President and his War Secretary wereas little pleased at having to order the Ninth Corps away asBurnside was to have them go. In fact the order was not made tillthey entirely despaired of making Rosecrans advance with the vigornecessary to checkmate the Confederates. On the receipt of Halleck'sdispatch of the 18th May, Rosecrans entered into a telegraphicdiscussion of the probable accuracy of Halleck's information, sayingthat whatever troops were sent by the enemy to Mississippi were nodoubt sent from Charleston and Savannah and not from Bragg. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 337. ] He insisted that it was not good policyto advance at present. On the 21st he said, "If I had 6000 cavalryin addition to the mounting of the 2000 now waiting horses, I wouldattack Bragg within three days. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 351. ] He alsointerposed the unfavorable judgment of his corps commanders inregard to an advance. Military history shows that this is prettyuniformly an excuse for a delay already fully resolved on by acommanding general. Halleck had no more cavalry to send, and couldonly say so. Burnside notified Rosecrans on the 22d that his columnshad begun the movements of concentration and that they would becomplete in three or four days. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 355. ] On the 28th Mr. Lincoln himself telegraphedRosecrans, "I would not push you to any rashness, but I am veryanxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Braggfrom getting off to help Johnston against Grant. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 369. ] Rosecrans curtly answered, "Dispatch received. I willattend to it. " In his dispatches to Mr. Stanton of similar datethere is no intimation of any purpose whatever to move. [Footnote:_Ibid_. ] In telegraphing to Burnside, Rosecrans said that he wasonly waiting for the development of the former's concentration, andthat he wished to advance by the 4th of June. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 372, 376. ] Burnside had already informed him that he would be readyby June 2d, and repeated it. On the date last named Rosecranstelegraphed Burnside that his movement had already begun, and thathe wanted the Army of the Ohio to come up as near and as quickly aspossible. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 381. ] Still he gave no intimation tothe authorities at Washington of an advance, for none had in factbeen made by his army, nor even of any near purpose to make one. OnJune 3d, Halleck telegraphed him: "Accounts received here indicatethat Johnston is being heavily reinforced from Bragg's army. If youcannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you. " He followed thisby his dispatch to Burnside ordering reinforcements to be sent toGrant, and the remainder of the troops in the Department of the Ohioto be concentrated defensively in Kentucky. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 383, 384. ] The only move that Rosecrans made was to send on the 8thto his general officers commanding corps and divisions, aconfidential circular asking their opinion in writing in answer tothe following questions, in substance, -- 1. Has the enemy been so materially weakened that this army couldadvance on him at this time with strong reasonable chances offighting a great and successful battle? 2. Is an advance of our army likely to prevent additionalreinforcements being sent against General Grant by Bragg? 3. Is an immediate or early advance of our army advisable?[Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 395. ] With substantial unanimity they answered that it was not advisableto move, though they seem generally to have been aware thatBreckinridge with about 10, 000 men of all arms had gone from Braggto Johnston. When Rosecrans reported the result of this council toHalleck, the latter reminded him of the maxim that "councils of warnever fight, " and that the responsibility for his campaign restsupon a commanding general and cannot be shared by a council of war. The careful study of the correspondence elicited by Rosecrans'scircular would make a most valuable commentary upon the theme, "_Why_ Councils of War never fight. " The three questions wereaddressed to sixteen general officers commanding corps anddivisions. [Footnote: Their answers are found in Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. As follows: Davis, p. 395, Johnson, do. , McCook, 396, Turchin, 397, Brannan, 402, Crittenden, 403, Granger, 403, Wood, 405, Negley, 407, Palmer, do. , Reynolds, 409, Rousseau, 410, Sheridan, 411, Stanley, 412, Thomas, 414, Van Cleve, 415, Mitchell, 417, and Garfield's summing up, 420. ] In reading the responses theimpression grows strong that there was what may be called a popularfeeling among these officers that their duty was to back up theircommanding general in a judgment of his on the subjects submitted, which could hardly be other than well known. On the question as tothe probable reduction of Bragg's army by detachments sent toJohnston, whilst they nearly all have some knowledge of thediminution of the Confederate army to about the extent mentionedabove, most of them answer that they do not think it a _material_weakening, that being the tenor of the inquiry put to them. Some ofthem, however, say very naturally that as the secret service ismanaged from headquarters and all the information received isforwarded there, General Rosecrans should be much better able toanswer this question than his subordinates. As to the second part ofthat question, nearly all seem to assume that the battle would be inthe nature of a direct attack on the fortifications at Shelbyvilleand are not sanguine of a successful result. The few who speak ofturning manoeuvres feel that the further retreat of Bragg would onlylengthen their own line of communications and do no good. Strangely, too, they argue, many of them, that an advance would not preventfurther depletion of Bragg to strengthen Johnston. They consequentlyand almost unanimously advise against an immediate or early advance. It is instructive to compare these opinions with the actual facts. The inaction of the summer had led directly to the detachment of twodivisions of infantry and artillery and one of cavalry to reinforceJohnston, just as the inactivity of Meade later in the seasonencouraged the Richmond government to send Longstreet to Bragg fromVirginia. If Rosecrans had moved early in the season, not only mustBragg have kept his army intact, but the battle of Chickamauga, iffought at all, must have been decided without Longstreet, andtherefore most probably with brilliant success for our arms. It wasdelay in advancing, both in Tennessee and in Virginia, that thusdirectly led to disaster. If a brilliant victory at Chickamauga hadbeen coincident with the fall of Vicksburg and Lee's defeat atGettysburg, it does not seem rash to believe that the collapse ofthe Confederacy would have been hastened by a year. Two of the generals who answered these questions attained afterwardto such distinction that their replies are an interesting means oflearning their mental character and gauging their development. Sheridan answered briefly that he believed Bragg had no more than25, 000 or 30, 000 infantry and artillery, with a "large" cavalryforce. In this he was very close to the mark. Bragg's report for thelatter part of May, before sending reinforcements to Johnston, showed his forces present for duty to be 37, 000 infantry, a littleless than 3000 artillery, and 15, 000 cavalry, in round numbers. Deduct 10, 000 from these, and Sheridan is found to be sufficientlyaccurate. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 846. The reference to Bragg's returns of strength to theAdjutant-General's office makes this an appropriate place to notethe method of making these returns and its bearing on the muchdebated question of the "Effective Total" commonly given byConfederate writers as the force of their armies compared with ours. The blanks for these reports were sent out from theAdjutant-and-Inspector-General's office at Richmond, with the orderthat the numerical returns be made "on the forms furnished andaccording to the directions expressed on them" (General Orders No. 64, Sept. 8, 1862). The column "Effective Total" in these returnsincluded only enlisted men carrying arms and actually in the line ofbattle. It excluded all officers, the non-commissioned staff, extra-duty men, the sick in hospital, and those in arrest. To secureuniformity in the method of reporting in his army and to correctsome irregularity, General Bragg issued a circular, as follows(Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 619):-- [Circular. ] "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, TULLAHOMA, January 29, 1863. Hereafter, under the column of 'Effective Total' in the reports fromthis army, extra-duty men and men in arrest will not be included. The 'Effective Total' must include only the fighting fieldforce--those who are carried into the field of battle with fire-armsin their hands. By command of General Bragg. GEORGE WM. BRENT, Assistant Adjutant-General. " Before the publication of the Official Records, I had occasion tocall attention to the subject: see "The Nation, " May 21, 1874, p. 334; also "Atlanta" (Scribners' Series), pp. 27, 28; and again in"The Nation, " February 2, 1893, p. 86. A fair comparison between theConfederate and the National armies, therefore, demands acomputation of numbers by the same method; and as we did not useforms containing the "Effective Total" as reported by theConfederates, the columns of officers and men "present for duty"which are computed alike in the returns on both sides are the mostsatisfactory and fair basis of comparison. ] He did not think Braggwould fight, but would retreat, and thought that in such a case hewould not be hindered from sending more help to Johnston. Again, asforage in the country was scarce, he voted against an early advance. Thomas did not believe Bragg had been materially weakened, for ifany troops had been sent away, he thought they had returned or theirplaces had been supplied. He concluded that Bragg was ready to fightwith an army at least as large as that of Rosecrans; that to holdour army where it was would sufficiently prevent further reductionof Bragg's; that an advance would give the latter the advantage andwas not advisable. His preference for defensive warfare was veryevident. He said it was true that Bragg might be reinforced and takethe initiative, but that he "should be most happy to meet him herewith his reinforcements. " In conclusion he indicated the necessityof 6000 more cavalry to be added to the army. [Footnote: See also_ante_, p. 478. ] When the answers were all received, Garfield summed them up in apaper, which must be admitted to be a remarkable production for ayoung volunteer officer deliberately controverting the opinions ofsuch an array of seniors. He gave, as the best information atheadquarters, the force of Bragg, before sending help to Johnston, as 38, 000 infantry, 2600 artillery, and 17, 500 cavalry. This madethe infantry about 1000 too many, the artillery nearly exactlyright, and the cavalry 2500 too many, --on the whole a very closeestimate. From these he deducted 10, 000, which was right. He statedRosecrans's force at 82, 700 "bayonets and sabres" with about 3000more on the way, but deducted 15, 000 for necessary posts andgarrisons. The balancing showed 65, 000 to throw against Bragg's41, 500. He further showed that delay would give time for the enemy'sdetachments to return, whilst we could hope for no further increaseduring the rest of the season. He then analyzed the military andcivil reasons for activity, declared that he believed we could bevictorious, and that the administration and the country had theright to expect the army to try. The result was a curious but encouraging result of bold and cogentreasoning. Although Rosecrans reported to General Halleck on the11th of June the opinion of his corps and division commandersagainst an early advance, the logic and the facts pressed upon himby his chief of staff evidently took strong hold of his activeintellect, so that when Halleck on the 16th asked for a categoricalanswer whether he would make an immediate movement forward, hereplied, "If it means to-night or to-morrow, no. If it means as soonas all things are ready, say five days, yes. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 8-10. ] No doubt the rather plainintimation that a categorical "no" would be followed by action atWashington helped the decision; but it would have helped it to adecided negative if Garfield's paper, reinforced by the personaladvice and oral discussions which we now know were of dailyoccurrence between them, had not had a convincing weight with him, both as to the feasibility of the campaign of turning manoeuvreswhich he devised and adopted, and as to its probable success. Theresult is reckoned one of his chief claims to military renown. But to judge properly the relations of the government to both thecommanding generals in Kentucky and Tennessee, it is necessary to goback to the days immediately after the battle of Stone's River, andto inquire what were the tasks assigned these commanders and themeans furnished to perform them. The disappointment of theadministration at Washington with Rosecrans's conduct of hiscampaign dated, indeed, much earlier than the time indicated. He hadsucceeded Buell at the end of October when Bragg was in full retreatto the Tennessee River. The continuance of a vigorous pursuit andthe prompt reoccupation of the country held by us in the earlysummer was regarded as of the utmost importance for political, quiteas much as for military reasons. It was not a time to halt andreorganize an army. The question of foreign intervention wasapparently trembling in the balance, and to let European powers restunder the belief that we had lost most of what had been gained inthe advance from Donelson to Shiloh and Corinth, was to invitecomplications of the most formidable character. The Washingtonauthorities had therefore a perfect right to decide that to pressBragg vigorously and without intermission was the imperative duty ofthe commander of the Army of the Cumberland. He would be rightlyheld to have disappointed the expectations of his government if hefailed to do so. Rosecrans had been chosen to succeed Buell becauseof the belief that his character was one of restless vehemencebetter adapted to this work than the slower but more solid qualitiesof Thomas, who was already second in command in that army. [Footnote: Since the text was written the Life of O. P. Morton hasappeared, and in it his part in the change from Buell to Rosecransis given. He urged the change upon Lincoln on the ground thataggressive vigor was imperatively demanded. "Another three monthslike the last six, and we are lost, " said he. "Reject the wickedincapables whom you have patiently tried and found utterly wanting. "On October 24th he telegraphed, "The removal of General Buell andthe appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. " Life, vol. I. Pp. 197, 198. ] Halleck was obliged very soon to remind Rosecransof this, and to claim the right of urging him onward because hehimself had given the advice which had been decisive when thequestion of the choice was under consideration. Yet as soon as the army was again concentrated about Nashville, Rosecrans's correspondence took the form of urgent demands for themeans of reorganization. He insisted that his cavalry force must begreatly increased, that he must have repeating arms for hishorsemen, that he must organize a selected corps of mounted infantryand obtain horses for them--in short, that he must take months toput his army in a condition equal to his desires before resuming thework of the campaign. His energy seemed to be wholly directed todriving the administration to supply his wants, whilst Bragg wasallowed not only to stop his rather disorganized flight, but toretrace his steps toward middle Tennessee. On the 4th of December Halleck telegraphed that the President was sodisappointed and dissatisfied that another week of inaction wouldresult in another change of commanders. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xx. Pt. Ii. P. 118. ] Rosecrans replied detailing hisnecessities, but taking a high tone and declaring himself insensibleto threats of removal. The next day Halleck patiently but decidedlygave the reasons which made the demand for activity a reasonableone, adding the reminder that no one had doubted that Buell wouldeventually have succeeded, and that Rosecrans's appointment had beenmade because they believed he would move more rapidly. [Footnote:_Id_. , p. 124. ] Meanwhile every effort was made to furnish him withthe arms, equipments, and horses he desired. The battle of Stone's River had many points of resemblance to thatof Antietam, and like that engagement was indecisive in itself, thesubsequent retreat of the Confederates making it a victory for thenational arms. The condition of the Army of the Cumberland after thebattle was a sufficient reason for some delay, and a short time forrecuperation and reinforcement was cordially accepted by everybodyas a necessity of the situation. Congratulations and thanks wereabundantly showered on the army, and promotions were given in morethan common number. It was not concealed, however, that thegovernment was most anxious to follow up the success and to make thedelays as short as possible. An aggressive campaign was demanded, and the demand was a reasonable one because the means furnished weresufficient for the purpose. At the close of the month of January, Rosecrans's forces present forduty in his department numbered 65, 000, [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 29. ] the Confederates under Bragg were 40, 400. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 622. ] The end of February showed the Nationalforces to be 80, 000, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 93. ] the enemy 43, 600. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 654. ] After thisBragg's army gradually increased till midsummer, when it reached amaximum of about 57, 000, and Rosecrans's grew to 84, 000. TheConfederates had a larger proportion of cavalry than we, but thiswas at the expense of being much weaker in infantry, the decisivearm in serious engagements. In fact this disproportion was anotherreason for active work, since experience showed that the enemy kepthis cavalry at home when he was vigorously pushed, and sent them onraids to interrupt our communications when we gave him a respite. Our superiority in numbers was enough, therefore, to make itentirely reasonable and in accord with every sound rule ofconducting war, that the government should insist upon an active andaggressive campaign from the earliest day in the spring when theweather promised to be favorable. Such weather came at the beginningof March, and the Confederates took advantage of it, as we haveseen, by sending Pegram into Kentucky. Their cavalry under Wheelerattacked also Fort Donelson, but were repulsed. A reconnoissance bya brigade under Colonel Coburn from Franklin toward Spring Hillresulted in the capture of the brigade by the Confederates under VanDorn. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 115. ] In the same month Forrest made adaring raid close to Nashville and captured Colonel Bloodgood andsome 800 men at Brentwood. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 171, 732. ]Rosecrans organized a raid by a brigade of infantry mounted onmules, commanded by Colonel Streight, with the object of cutting therailroad south of Chattanooga. It was delayed in starting till nearthe end of April, and was overtaken and captured near Rome inGeorgia. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 232, 321. ] These exasperatingincidents were occurring whilst the Army of the Cumberland lay stillabout Murfreesboro, and its commander harassed the departments atWashington with the story of his wants, and intimated that nothingbut carelessness as to the public good stood between him and theirfull supply. He was assured that he was getting his full share ofeverything which could be procured, --rifles, revolvers, carbines, horses, and equipments, --but the day of readiness seemed as far offas ever. On the 1st of March the President, feeling that the time had comewhen his armies should be in motion, and plainly discouraged at thepoor success he had had in getting Rosecrans ready for an advance, authorized General Halleck to say to him that there was a vacantmajor-generalcy in the regular army which would be given to thegeneral in the field who should first win an important and decisivevictory. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 95. ]The appeal to ambition was treated as if it had been an insult. Itwas called an "auctioneering of honor, " and a base way to come by apromotion. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 111. ] Halleck retorted conclusivelythat Rosecrans himself had warmly advocated giving promotion in thelower grades only for distinguished services in the field, and said:"When last summer, at your request, I urged the government topromote you for success in the field, and, again at your request, urged that your commission be dated back to your services in WestVirginia, I thought I was doing right in advocating your claim tohonors for services rendered. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 138. ] In view ofthis unique correspondence it is certainly curious to find Rosecransa few days later enumerating his personal grievances to Mr. Lincoln, and putting among them this, that after the battle of Stone's Riverhe had asked "as a personal favor" that his commission asmajor-general of volunteers should be dated back to December, 1861, and that it was not granted. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 146. ] It wasconsiderably antedated, so as to make him outrank General Thomas, much to the disgust of the latter when he learned it; but the datewas not made as early as Rosecrans desired, which would have madehim outrank Grant, Buell, and Burnside as well as Thomas. Persuasion and exhortation having failed, Grant must either be leftto take the chances that part of Bragg's army would be concentratedunder Johnston in Mississippi, or he must be strengthened by sendingto him that part of our forces in Kentucky and Tennessee which couldmost easily be spared. There can be no doubt that it was well judgedto send the Ninth Corps to him, as it would be less mischievous tosuspend Burnside's movement into East Tennessee than to diminish theArmy of the Cumberland under existing circumstances. It is, however, indisputably clear that the latter army should have been in activecampaign at the opening of the season, whether we consider theadvantage of the country or the reputation of its commander. If we inquire what means the administration gave Burnside to performhis part of the joint task assigned him, we shall find that it wasnot niggardly in doing so. His forces were at their maximum at theend of May, when they reached but little short of 38, 000 present forduty in his whole department. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 380. ] This included, however, all the great Statesof Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan as well as the eastern halfof Kentucky, and there were several camps of prisoners and postsnorth of the Ohio which demanded considerable garrisons. Eightthousand men were used for this purpose, and nobody thought this anexcess. Thirty thousand were thus left him for such posts inKentucky as would be necessary to cover his communications and forhis active column. He expected to make his active army about 25, 000, and the advance movements had begun when, as has been stated, he wasordered to suspend, and to send the Ninth Corps to Grant. The enemy in East Tennessee were under the command of General DabneyMaury at first, but when he was sent to Mobile, General S. B. Buckner was made the commandant. His returns of forces for May 31stshow that he had 16, 267 present for duty, with which to oppose theadvance of Burnside. The information of the latter was that hisopponent had 20, 000, and he reckoned on having to deal with thatnumber. The passes of the Cumberland Mountains were so few and sodifficult that it was by no means probable that his campaign wouldbe an easy one; yet the difficulties in the first occupation werenot so serious as those which might arise if Bragg were able tomaintain an interior position between the two National armies. Inthat case, unless he were kept thoroughly employed by Rosecrans, hemight concentrate to crush Burnside before his decisive conflictwith the Army of the Cumberland. This was the inherent vice of aplan which contemplated two independent armies attempting toco-operate; and if Rosecrans had been willing to open his campaignon the 1st of March, it is almost certain that the troops inKentucky would have been ordered to him. The President did notdetermine to send Burnside to the West and to give him a little armyof his own till he despaired of the liberation of East Tennessee inthat season by any activity of Rosecrans. This cannot be overlookedin any candid criticism of the summer's work. CHAPTER XXIV THE MORGAN RAID Departure of the staff for the field--An amusingly quickreturn--Changes in my own duties--Expeditions to occupy theenemy--Sanders' raid into East Tennessee--His route--His success andreturn--The Confederate Morgan's raid--His instructions--Hisreputation as a soldier--Compared with Forrest--Morgan's startdelayed--His appearance at Green River, Ky. --Foiled by ColonelMoore--Captures Lebanon--Reaches the Ohio at Brandenburg--GeneralHobson in pursuit--Morgan crosses into Indiana--Was this hisoriginal purpose?--His route out of Indiana into Ohio--He approachesCincinnati--Hot chase by Hobson--Gunboats co-operating on theriver--Efforts to block his way--He avoids garrisoned posts andcities--Our troops moved in transports by water--Condition ofMorgan's jaded column--Approaching the Ohio atBuffington's--Gunboats near the ford--Hobson attacks--Part captured, the rest fly northward--Another capture--A long chase--Surrender ofMorgan with the remnant--Summary of results--A burlesquecapitulation. The departure of General Burnside and his staff for active servicein the field was quite an event in Cincinnati society. The young menwere a set of fine fellows, well educated and great socialfavorites. There was a public concert the evening before they leftfor Lexington, and they were to go by a special train after theentertainment should be over. They came to the concert hall, therefore, not only booted and spurred, but there was perhaps a bitof youthful but very natural ostentation of being ready for thefield. Their hair was cropped as close as barber's shears could cutit, they wore the regulation uniform of the cavalry, with trimround-about jackets, and were the "cynosure of all eyes. " Theirparting words were said to their lady friends in the intervals ofthe music, and the pretty dramatic effect of it all suggested to anonlooker the famous parting scene in "Belgium's capital" which"Childe Harold" has made so familiar. It was quite an anti-climax, however, when the gay young officerscame back, before a week was over, crestfallen, the detaching of theNinth Corps having suspended operations in Kentucky. They were alittle quizzed about their very brief campaign, but sogood-humoredly that they bore it pretty well, and were able to seemamused at it, as well as the fair quizzers. In preparation for a lengthened absence, Burnside had turned over tome some extra duties. He ordered the District of Michigan to beadded to my command, and gave general directions that the currentbusiness of the department headquarters should pass through myhands. As General Parke, his chief of staff, had gone to Vicksburgin command of the Ninth Corps, Burnside made informal use of me tosupply in some measure his place. Our relations therefore becamecloser than ever. He hoped his troops would soon come back to him, as was promised, and in resuming business at the Cincinnatiheadquarters, he tried to keep it all in such shape that he coulddrop it at a moment's notice. To keep the enemy occupied he organized two expeditions, one underBrigadier-General Julius White into West Virginia, and the otherunder Colonel W. P. Sanders into East Tennessee. The latter was oneof the boldest and longest raids made during the war, and besideskeeping the enemy on the alert, destroying considerable militarystores and a number of important railway bridges, it was apreliminary reconnoissance of East Tennessee and the approaches toit through the mountains, which was of great value a little later. The force consisted of 1500 mounted men, being detachments fromdifferent regiments of cavalry and mounted infantry, among whichwere some of the loyal men of East Tennessee under Colonel R. K. Byrd. Sanders was a young officer of the regular army who was nowcolonel of the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry. He rapidly made a first-classreputation as a bold leader of mounted troops, but was unfortunatelykilled in the defence of Knoxville in November of this same year. His expedition started from Mount Vernon, Kentucky, on the 14th ofJune, marched rapidly southward sixty miles to Williamsburg, wherethe Cumberland River was fordable. Thence he moved southwest aboutthe same distance by the Marsh Creek route to the vicinity ofHuntsville in Tennessee. Continuing this route southward some fiftymiles more, he struck the Big Emory River, and following thisthrough Emory Gap, he reached the vicinity of Kingston on the ClinchRiver in East Tennessee, having marched in all rather more than twohundred miles. Avoiding Kingston, which was occupied by a superiorforce of Confederates, he marched rapidly on Knoxville, destroyingall the more important railway bridges. Demonstrating boldly infront of Knoxville, and finding that it was strongly held and itsstreets barricaded for defence, he passed around the town andadvanced upon Strawberry Plains, where a great bridge and trestlecrosses the Holston River, 2100 feet in length, a place to becomevery familiar to us in later campaigning. Crossing the Holston atFlat Creek, where other bridges were burned, he moved up the left(east) bank of the river to attack the guard at the big bridge, theConfederate forces being on that side. He drove them off, capturing150 of the party and five cannon. He not only destroyed the bridge, but captured and burnt large quantities of military stores and campequipage. On he went along the railway to Mossy Creek, where anotherbridge 300 feet long was burned. He now turned homeward toward thenorth-west, having greatly injured a hundred miles of the EastTennessee Railroad. Turning like a fox under the guidance of hisEast Tennessee scouts, he crossed the Clinch Mountains and thevalley of the Clinch, and made his way back by way of Smith's Gapthrough the Cumberland Mountains to his starting-place in Kentucky. He had captured over 450 prisoners, whom he paroled, had taken tencannon and 1000 stands of small arms which he destroyed, besides thelarge amounts of military stores which have been mentioned. Hemarched about five hundred miles in the whole circuit, and thoughfrequently skirmishing briskly with considerable bodies of theenemy, his losses were only 2 killed, 4 wounded, and 13 missing. Ofcourse a good many horses were used up, but as a preliminary to thecampaign which was to follow and in which Sanders was to have aprominent place, it was a raid which was much more profitable thanmost of them. He was gone ten days. [Footnote: Sanders' Report, Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 385, 386. ] The expedition under Brigadier-General Julius White was sent to beatup the Confederate posts in the Big Sandy valley and to aidincidentally the raid under Sanders into East Tennessee. Burnsidesent another southward in the direction of Monticello, Kentucky. Theobject of these was to keep the enemy amused near home and preventthe raids his cavalry had been making on the railway line by whichRosecrans kept up his communication with Louisville. They seemrather to have excited the emulation of the Confederate cavalrymanBrigadier-General John H. Morgan, who, a few days before Rosecrans'sadvance on Tullahoma, obtained permission to make a raid, startingfrom the neighborhood of McMinnville, Tenn. , crossing the Cumberlandnear Burkesville, and thence moving on Louisville, which he thoughthe might capture with its depots of military stores, as it wassupposed to be almost stripped of troops. His division consisted ofabout 3000 horsemen, and he took the whole of it with him, thoughWheeler, his chief, seems to have limited him to 2000. Hisinstructions were to make a rapid movement on the line of theLouisville and Nashville Railroad in Kentucky and to get back to hisplace in Bragg's army as quickly as possible. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 817. ] Morgan's reputation as a soldier was a peculiar one. He had made anumber of raids which showed a good deal of boldness in the generalplan and a good deal of activity in the execution, but it cannot besaid that he showed any liking for hard fighting. Like boys skatingnear thin ice, he seemed to be trying to see how close he could cometo danger without getting in. A really bold front showed by a smallbody of brave men was usually enough to turn him aside. It isinstructive to compare his career with Forrest's. They began withsimilar grade, but with all the social and personal prestige inMorgan's favor. Forrest had been a local slave-trader, a callingwhich implied social ostracism in the South, and which put a greatobstacle in the way of advancement. Both were fond of adventurousraids, but Forrest was a really daring soldier and fought his way torecognition in the face of stubborn prejudice. Morgan achievednotoriety by the showy temerity of his distant movements, but nobodywas afraid of him in the field at close quarters. The official order to Morgan to start on his expedition was dated onthe 18th of June, but he did not get off till the close of themonth. It would seem that he remained in observation on the flank ofRosecrans's army as the left wing moved upon Manchester, and beganhis northward march after Bragg had retreated to Decherd on the wayto Chattanooga. At any rate, he was first heard of on the north sideof the Cumberland on the 2d of July, near Burkesville and marchingon Columbia. Burnside immediately ordered all his cavalry andmounted infantry to concentrate to meet him, but his route had beenchosen with full knowledge of the positions of our detachments andhe was able to get the start of them. Brigadier-General H. M. Judah, who commanded the division of the Twenty-third Corps which coveredthat part of our front, seems to have wholly misconceived thesituation, and refused to listen to the better information which hissubordinates gave him. [Footnote: Sketches of War History, vol. Iv. (Papers of the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion). A paper byCapt. H. C. Weaver, Sixteenth Kentucky Infantry, who was on thestaff of Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson during the pursuit ofMorgan. ] After a slight skirmish at Columbia, Morgan made for theGreen River bridge at Tebb's Bend, an important crossing of theLouisville Railroad. The bend was occupied by Colonel O. H. Moore ofthe Twenty-fifth Michigan Infantry, who, under previous instructionsfrom Brigadier-General E. H. Hobson, intrenched a line across theneck of the bend, some distance in front of the stockade at thebridge. Morgan advanced upon the 4th of July, and after a shot ortwo from his artillery, sent in a flag demanding the surrender ofMoore's little force, which amounted to only 200 men. Moore did notpropose to celebrate the national anniversary in that way, andanswered accordingly. The enemy kept up a lively skirmishing fightfor some hours, when he withdrew. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 645. ] Moore had beaten him off with a loss of 6killed and 23 wounded of the brave Michigan men. He reportedMorgan's loss at 50 killed and 200 wounded. The Confederateauthorities admit that they had 36 killed, but put their wounded atonly 46, an incredibly small proportion to the killed. The raiders continued their route to Lebanon, where was theTwentieth Kentucky Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Hanson, numbering less than 400 men, without artillery. A brigadeordered to reinforce the post delayed its advance, and Hanson wasleft to his own resources. After several hours of a livelyskirmishing fight without much loss, he surrendered to save thevillage from destruction by fire, which Morgan threatened. The lossin the post was 4 killed and 15 wounded. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 649. ] Hanson reported 29 rebel deadleft on the field and 30 wounded, also abandoned. No doubt others ofthe wounded were taken care of and concealed by their sympathizersin the vicinity. Some military stores had been burned with therailway station-house before Hanson surrendered. He and his men wereparoled in the irregular way adopted by Morgan on the raid. Bardstown was the next point reached by the enemy, but Morgan'sappetite for Louisville seems now to have diminished, and he turnedto the westward, reaching the Ohio River on the 8th, at Brandenburg, some thirty miles below the city. The detachments of mounted troopswhich were in pursuit had been united under the command of GeneralHobson, the senior officer present, and consisted of two brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Shackelford and Colonel F. Wolford. They approached Brandenburg on the evening of the 8th andcaptured the steamboat "McCombs" with a remnant of Morgan's men andstores the next morning when they entered the town. They saw on theopposite bank the smoking wreck of the steamboat "Alice Dean" whichMorgan had set on fire after landing his men on the Indiana shore. The steamboat "McCombs" was sent to Louisville for other transports. A delay of twenty-four hours thus occurred, and when Hobson'scommand was assembled in Indiana, Morgan had the start by nearly twodays. [Footnote: Hobson's Report, Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 659. ] It is claimed by Morgan's intimate friend and chronicler that heintended to cross the Ohio from the day he left camp in Tennessee, although it would be contrary to his orders; [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 818. History of Morgan's Cavalry, by B. W. Duke, p. 410. ] and thathe had made investigations in advance in regard to fords on theupper Ohio and particularly at Buffington Island, where heultimately tried to cross into West Virginia. If true, this wouldforfeit every claim on his part to the character of a valuable andintelligent subordinate; for operations on a large scale would beabsolutely impossible if the commander of a division of cavalry maygo off as he pleases, in disobedience to the orders which assign hima specific task. Except for this statement, it would be natural toconclude that when he approached Louisville he began to doubtwhether the city were so defenceless as he had assumed, and knowingthat twenty-four hours' delay would bring Hobson's forces upon hisback, he then looked about for some line of action that would savehis prestige and be more brilliant than a race back again toTennessee. It is quite probable that the feasibility of crossing theOhio and making a rapid ride through the country on its northernbank had been discussed by him, and conscious as he was that he hadthus far accomplished nothing, he might be glad of an excuse fortrying it. This interpretation of his acts would be more honorableto him as an officer than the deliberate and premeditateddisobedience attributed to him. But whether the decision was madeearlier or later, the capture of the steamboats at Brandenburg wasat once made use of to ferry over his command, though it was notaccomplished without some exciting incidents. A party of theConfederates under Captain Hines had crossed into Indiana a few daysbefore without orders from Morgan, being as independent of him, apparently, as he was of General Bragg. Hines's party had roused themilitia of the State, and he had made a rapid retreat to the Ohio, reaching it just as Morgan entered Brandenburg. It may be that thelucky daredeviltry of Hines's little raid fired his commander'sheart to try a greater one; at any rate, Morgan forgave his trespassagainst his authority as he prayed to be forgiven by Bragg, andturned his attention to driving off the Indiana militia who hadfollowed Hines to the bank of the river and now opened fire with asingle cannon. Morgan's artillery silenced the gun and caused theforce to retreat out of range, when he put over two of hisregiments, dismounted, to cover the ferrying of the rest. At thispoint one of the "tin-clad" gunboats of the river fleet made itsappearance and took part in the combat. The section of Parrot gunsin Morgan's battery proved an overmatch for it, however, and itretired to seek reinforcements. The interval was used to hasten thetransport of the Confederate men and horses, and before furtheropposition could be made, the division was in the saddle andmarching northward into Indiana. At the first news of Morgan's advance into Kentucky, Burnside haddirected General Hartsuff, who commanded in that State, toconcentrate his forces so as to capture Morgan if he should attemptto return through the central part of it. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 13, 679, etc. ] Judah's and Boyle'sdivisions were put in motion toward Louisville, and the remainder ofthe mounted troops not already with Hobson were also hurriedforward. These last constituted a provisional brigade under ColonelSanders. It may help to understand the organization of the Nationaltroops to note the fact that all which operated against Morgan wereparts of the Twenty-third Corps, which was composed of fourdivisions under Generals Sturgis, Boyle, Judah, and White. Thebrigades were of both infantry and mounted troops, united for thespecial purposes of the contemplated campaign into East Tennessee. For the pursuit of Morgan the mounted troops were sent off first, and as these united they formed a provisional division under Hobson, the senior brigadier present. Quite a number of the regiments weremounted infantry, who after a few months were dismounted and resumedtheir regular place in the infantry line. For the time being, however, Hobson had a mounted force that was made up of fractions ofbrigades from all the divisions of the corps; and Shackelford, Wolford, Kautz, and Sanders were the commanders of the provisionalbrigades during the pursuit. Its strength did not quite reach 3000men. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 658. ] Morgan's first course was due north, and he marched with somedeliberation. On the 10th he reached Salem, about forty miles fromthe river, on the railway between Louisville and Chicago. [Footnote:_Id_. , pp. 717, 719. ] A small body of militia had assembled here, and made a creditable stand, but were outflanked and forced toretreat after inflicting on him a score of casualties. The evidencesMorgan here saw of the ability of the Northern States to overwhelmhim by the militia, satisfied him that further progress inland wasnot desirable, and turning at right angles to the road he hadfollowed, he made for Madison on the Ohio. There was evidently someunderstanding with a detachment he had left in Kentucky, for on the11th General Manson, of Judah's division, who was on his way with abrigade from Louisville to Madison by steamboats under naval convoy, fell in with a party of Morgan's men seeking to cross the river atTwelve-mile Island, a little below Madison. Twenty men andforty-five horses were captured. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 729, 745. ] If any of this party had succeeded in crossing before (as wasreported) they would of course inform their chief of thereinforcements going to Madison, and of the gunboats in the river. Morgan made no attack on Madison, but took another turn northward inhis zigzag course, and marched on Vernon, a railway-crossing sometwenty miles from Madison, where the line to Indianapolis intersectsthat from Cincinnati to Vincennes. Here a militia force had beenassembled under Brigadier-General Love, and the town was wellsituated for defence. Morgan, declining to attack, now turnedeastward again, his course being such that he might be aiming forthe river at Lawrenceburg or at Cincinnati. The deviousness of his route had been such as to indicate a want ofdistinct purpose, and had enabled Hobson greatly to reduce thedistance between them. Hanson's brigade on the steamboats was nowabout 2500 strong, and moved on the 12th from Madison toLawrenceburg, keeping pace as nearly as possible with Morgan'seastward progress. Sanders's brigade reached the river twenty milesabove Louisville, and General Boyle sent transports to put him alsoin motion on the river. At the request of Burnside, Governor Tod, ofOhio, called out the militia of the southern counties, as GovernorMorton had done in Indiana. Burnside himself, at Cincinnati, kept inconstant telegraphic communication with all points, assembling themilitia where they were most likely to be useful and trying to puthis regular forces in front of the enemy. It would have been easy tolet the slippery Confederate horsemen back into Kentucky. The forcein the river, both naval and military, unquestionably prevented thisat Madison, and probably at Lawrenceburg. On the 13th Morgan was atHarrison on the Ohio State line, and it now became my turn asdistrict commander to take part in the effort to catch him. I had nodirect control of the troops of the Twenty-third Corps, and the onlygarrisons in Ohio were at the prison camps at Columbus and Sandusky. These of course could not be removed, and our other detachments werehardly worth naming. Burnside declared martial law in the countiesthreatened with invasion, so that the citizens and militia might formilitary purposes come directly under our control. The relationsbetween the general and myself were so intimate that no strictdemarcation of authority was necessary. He authorized me to givecommands in his name when haste demanded it, and we relieved eachother in night watching at the telegraph. A small post had been maintained at Dayton, since the Vallandighamdisturbance, and Major Keith, its commandant, was ordered to takehis men by rail to Hamilton. He went at once and reported himselfholding that town with 600 men, including the local militia, butonly 400 were armed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 742, 743. ] Lieutenant-Colonel Neff commanded at Camp Dennison, thirteen miles from Cincinnati, and had 700 armed men there, with1200 more of unarmed recruits. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 749. ] At boththese posts systematic scouting was organized so as to keep track ofthe enemy, and their active show of force was such that Morgan didnot venture to attack either, but threaded his way around them. AtCincinnati there was no garrison. A couple of hundred men formed thepost at Newport on the Kentucky side of the river, but the mainreliance was on the local militia. These were organized as soon asthe governor's call was issued on the evening of the 12th. Batterieswere put in position covering the approaches to the city from thenorth and west, and the beautiful suburban hills of Clifton andAvondale afforded excellent defensive positions. The militia that were called out were of course infantry, and beingboth without drill and unaccustomed to marching, could only be usedin position, to defend a town or block the way. In such work theyshowed courage and soldierly spirit, so that Morgan avoidedcollision with all considerable bodies of them. But they could notbe moved. All we could do was to try to assemble them at such pointsin advance as the raiders were likely to reach, and we especiallylimited their task to the defensive one, and to blockading roads andstreams. Particular stress was put on the orders to take up theplanking of bridges and to fell timber into the roads. Little wasdone in this way at first, but after two or three days of constantreiteration, the local forces did their work better, and delays tothe flying enemy were occasioned which contributed essentially tothe final capture. No definite news of Morgan's crossing the Ohio line was receivedtill about sunset of the 13th when he was marching eastward fromHarrison. Satisfied that Lawrenceburg and lower points on the Ohiowere now safe, Burnside ordered the transports and gunboats at onceto Cincinnati. Manson and Sanders arrived during the night, and thelatter with his brigade of mounted men was, at dawn of the 14th, placed on the north of the city in the village of Avondale. Mansonwith the transports was held in readiness to move further up theriver. Feeling the net drawing about him, Morgan gave his men but two orthree hours' rest near Harrison, and then took the road towardCincinnati. He reached Glendale, thirteen miles northwest of thecity, late in the night, and then turned to the east, apparently forCamp Dennison, equally distant in a northeast direction. His menwere jaded to the last degree of endurance, and some were droppingfrom the saddle for lack of sleep. Still he kept on. Colonel Neff, in accordance with his orders, had blockaded the principal roads tothe west, and stood at bay in front of his camp. Morgan threw a fewshells at Neff's force, and a slight skirmish began, but again hebroke away, forced to make a detour of ten miles to the north. Wehad been able to warn Neff of their approach by a message sent aftermidnight, and he had met them boldly, protecting the camp and therailroad bridge north of it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 748, 750. ] The raiders reached Williamsburg inClermont County, twenty-eight miles from Cincinnati, in theafternoon of the 14th, and there the tired men and beasts took thefirst satisfactory rest they had had for three days. Morgan had verynaturally assumed that there would be a considerable regular forceat Cincinnati, and congratulated himself that by a forced nightmarch he had passed round the city and avoided being cut off. Hehad, in truth, escaped by the skin of his teeth. Could Burnside havefelt sure that Lawrenceburg was safe a few hours earlier, Manson andSanders might have been in Cincinnati early enough on the 13th tohave barred the way from Harrison. He had in fact ordered Manson upat two o'clock in the afternoon, but the latter was making areconnoissance north of the town, and was detained till late in thenight. As soon as it was learned on the 14th that Morgan had passedeast of the Little Miami River, Sanders was ordered to join Hobsonand aid in the pursuit. [Footnote: In the reports of Hobson andSanders there seems to be a mistake of a day in the dates, from the12th to the 16th. This may be corrected by the copies of currentdispatches given in Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 730-750. ] Hobson's horses were almost worn out, for following closeupon Morgan's track, as he was doing, he found only broken downanimals left behind by the rebels, whilst these gathered up thefresh animals as they advanced. Still he kept doggedly on, seldommore than ten or fifteen miles behind, but unable to close that gaptill his opponent should be delayed or brought to bay. After entering Clermont County, the questions as to roads, etc, indicated that Morgan was making for Maysville, hoping to cross theriver there. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 749. ] Manson's brigade and thegunboats were accordingly sent up the river to that vicinity. Themilitia of the Scioto valley were ordered to destroy the bridges, inthe hope that that river would delay him, but they were tardy orindifferent, and it was a day or two later before the means ofobstruction were efficiently used. Judah's forces reached Cincinnation the 14th, a brigade was there supplied with horses, and they weresent by steamers to Portsmouth. Judah was ordered to spare no effortto march northward far enough to head off the enemy's column. On the16th General Scammon, commanding in West Virginia, was asked toconcentrate some of his troops at Gallipolis or Pomeroy on the upperOhio, and promptly did so. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 756. ] The militiawere concentrated at several points along the railway to Marietta. Hobson was in the rear, pushing along at the rate of forty miles aday. Morgan had soon learned that the river was so patrolled that nochance to make a ferry could be trusted, and he made his finaleffort to reach the ford at Buffington Island, between Marietta andPomeroy. He reached Pomeroy on the 18th, but Scammon was occupyingit, and the troops of the Kanawha division soon satisfied Morganthat he was not dealing with militia. He avoided the roads held byour troops, and as they were infantry, could move around them, though a running skirmish was kept up for some miles. Hobson wasclose in rear, and Judah's men were approaching Buffington. Morganreached the river near the ford about eight o'clock in the evening. The night was pitchy dark, and his information was that a smallearthwork built to command the ford was occupied by a permanentgarrison. He concluded to wait for daylight. The work had in factbeen abandoned on the preceding day, but at daybreak in the morninghe was attacked. Hobson's men pushed in from west and north, andJudah from the south. The gunboats came close up to the island, within range of the ford, and commanded it. Hobson attackedvigorously and captured the artillery. The wing of the Confederateforces, about 700 in number, surrendered to General Shackelford, andabout 200 to the other brigades under Hobson. The rest of the enemy, favored by a fog which filled the valley, evaded their pursuers andfled northward. Hobson ordered all his brigades to obey the commandsof Shackelford, who was in the lead, and himself sought Judah, whoseapproach had been unknown to him till firing was heard on the otherside of the enemy. Judah had also advanced at daybreak, but inmaking a reconnoissance he himself with a small escort had stumbledupon the enemy in the fog. Both parties were completely surprised, and before Judah could bring up supports, three of his staff werecaptured, Major Daniel McCook, paymaster, who had volunteered as anaide, was mortally wounded, ten privates were wounded, and twenty orthirty with a piece of artillery captured. Morgan hastily turned inthe opposite direction, when he ran into Hobson's columns; Judah'sprisoners and the gun were recaptured, and the enemy driven inconfusion, with the losses above stated. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 775-777. ] As Hobson was regularly a brigade commander in Judah's division, thelatter now asserted command of the whole force, against Hobson'sprotest, who was provisionally in a separate command by Burnside'sorder. Fortunately, Shackelford had already led Hobson's men inrapid pursuit of the enemy, and as soon as Burnside was informed ofthe dispute, he ordered Judah not to interfere with the troops whichhad operated separately. By the time this order came Shackelford wastoo far away for Hobson to rejoin him, and continued in independentcommand till Morgan's final surrender. He overtook the flyingConfederates on the 20th, about sixty miles further north, and theywere forced to halt and defend themselves. Shackelford succeeded ingetting a regiment in the enemy's rear, and after a lively skirmishbetween 1200 and 1300 surrendered. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 778, 781. ]Morgan himself again evaded with about 600 followers. Shackelfordtook 500 volunteers on his best horses and pressed the pursuit. Thechase lasted four days of almost continuous riding, when the enemywas again overtaken in Jefferson County, some fifteen milesnorthwest of Steubenville. General Burnside had collected atCincinnati the dismounted men of Hobson's command, had given themfresh horses, and had sent them by rail to join Shackelford. Theywere under command of Major W. B. Way of the Ninth Michigan Cavalryand Major G. W. Rue of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry. They brought fiveor six hundred fresh men to Shackelford's aid, and their assistancewas decisive. Morgan's course to the river at Smith's Ferry on theborder of Columbiana County was intercepted, and near Salineville hewas forced to surrender with a little less than 400 men who stillfollowed him. About 250 had surrendered in smaller bodies within aday or two before, and stragglers had been picked up at many pointsalong the line of pursuit. Burnside reported officially that about3000 prisoners were brought to Cincinnati. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. P. 14. ] General Duke states that some300 of Morgan's command succeeded in crossing the Ohio about twentymiles above Buffington, and escaped through West Virginia. He alsogives us some idea of the straggling caused by the terrible fatiguesof the march by telling us that the column was reduced by nearly 500effectives when it passed around Cincinnati. [Footnote: Hist. OfMorgan's Cavalry, pp. 442, 443. ] It is probable that these figuresare somewhat loosely stated, as the number of prisoners is verynearly the whole which the Confederate authorities give as Morgan'stotal strength. [Footnote: A note attached to Wheeler's return ofthe cavalry of his corps for July 31st says that Morgan's divisionwas absent "on detached service, " effectives 2743. Add to this theofficers, etc. , and the total "present for duty" would be a littleover 3000. Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 941. For Bragg'scircular explaining the term "effectives" as applying only toprivate soldiers actually in the line of battle, see _Id_. , p. 619, and _ante_, p. 482. ] Either a considerable reinforcement must havesucceeded in getting to him across the river, or a very small bodymust have escaped through West Virginia. Burnside directed theofficers to be sent to the military prison camp for officers onJohnson's Island in Sandusky Bay, and the private soldiers to go toCamp Chase at Columbus and Camp Morton at Indianapolis. Soonafterward, however, orders came from Washington that the officersshould be confined in the Ohio penitentiary, in retaliation forunusual severities practised on our officers who were prisoners inthe South. Morgan's romantic escape from the prison occurred justafter I was relieved from the command of the district in the fall, for the purpose of joining the active army in East Tennessee. A glance at the raid as a whole, shows that whilst it naturallyattracted much attention and caused great excitement at the North, it was of very little military importance. It greatly scattered fora time and fatigued the men and horses of the Twenty-third Corps whotook part in the chase. It cost Indiana and Ohio something in theplunder of country stores and farm-houses, and in the pay andexpenses of large bodies of militia that were temporarily calledinto service. But this was all. North of the Ohio no military postswere captured, no public depots of supply were destroyed, not evenan important railway bridge was burned. There was no fighting worthyof the name; the list of casualties on the National side showingonly 19 killed, 47 wounded, and 8 missing in the whole campaign, from the 2d of July to the final surrender. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxlii. Pt. I. P. 637. ] For this the whole Confederatedivision of cavalry was sacrificed. Its leader was never againtrusted by his government, and his prestige was gone forever. Hismen made simply a race for life from the day they turned away fromthe militia at Vernon, Indiana. Morgan carefully avoided everyfortified post and even the smaller towns. The places he visitedafter he crossed the Ohio line do not include the larger towns andvillages that seemed to lie directly in his path. He avoided therailroads also, and these were used every day to convey the militiaand other troops parallel to his route, to hedge him in and finallyto stop him. His absence was mischievous to Bragg, who wasretreating upon Chattanooga and to whom the division would have beena most welcome reinforcement. He did not delay Burnside, for thelatter was awaiting the return of the Ninth Corps from Vicksburg, and this did not begin to arrive till long after the raid was over. None of the National army's communications were interrupted, and nota soldier under Rosecrans lost a ration by reason of the pretentiousexpedition. It ended in a scene that was ridiculous in the extreme. Morgan had pressed into his service as guides, on the last day ofhis flight, two men who were not even officers of the local militia, but who were acting as volunteer homeguards to protect theirneighborhood. When he finally despaired of escape, he begged hiscaptive guides to change their _rôle_ into commanders of animaginary army and to accept his surrender upon merciful andfavorable terms to the vanquished! He afterward claimed the right toimmediate liberation on parole, under the conditions of thisburlesque capitulation. Shackelford and his rough riders wouldaccept no surrender but an unconditional one as prisoners of war, and were sustained in this by their superiors. The distance by theriver between the crossing at Brandenburg and the ferry aboveSteubenville near which Morgan finally surrendered, was some sixhundred miles. This added to the march from Tennessee throughKentucky would make the whole ride nearly a thousand miles long. Itsimportance, however, except as a subject for an entertaining story, was in an inverse ratio to its length. Its chief interest to thestudent of military history is in its bearing on the question of therational use of cavalry in an army, and the wasteful folly ofexpeditions which have no definite and tangible military object. [Footnote: For Official Records and correspondence concerning theraid, see Burnside's report (Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. I. Pp. 13, 14) and the miscellaneous documents (_Id_. , pp. 632-818). ] CHAPTER XXV THE LIBERATION OF EAST TENNESSEE News of Grant's victory at Vicksburg--A thrilling scene at theopera--Burnside's Ninth Corps to return--Stanton urges Rosecrans toadvance--The Tullahoma manoeuvres--Testy correspondence--Its realmeaning--Urgency with Burnside--Ignorance concerning hissituation--His disappointment as to Ninth Corps--Rapid concentrationof other troops--Burnside's march into East Tennessee--Occupation ofKnoxville--Invests Cumberland Gap--The garrison surrenders--Goodnews from Rosecrans--Distances between armies--Divergent lines--Norailway communication--Burnside concentrates toward the Virginialine--Joy of the people--Their intense loyalty--Their faith in thefuture. During the Morgan Raid and whilst we in Ohio were absorbed in theexcitement of it, events were moving elsewhere. Lee had advancedfrom Virginia through Maryland into Pennsylvania and had beendefeated at Gettysburg by the National army under Meade. Grant hadbrought the siege of Vicksburg to a glorious conclusion and hadreceived the surrender of Pemberton with his army of 30, 000Confederates. These victories, coming together as they did and onthe 4th of July, made the national anniversary seem more than ever aday of rejoicing and of hope to the whole people. We did not get thenews of Grant's victory quite so soon as that of Meade's, but itcame to us at Cincinnati in a way to excite peculiar enthusiasm. An excellent operatic company was giving a series of performances inthe city, and all Cincinnati was at Pike's Opera House listening to_I Puritani_ on the evening of the 7th of July. General Burnside andhis wife had one of the proscenium boxes, and my wife and I weretheir guests. The second act had just closed with the famous trumpetsong, in which Susini, the great basso of the day, had created a_furore_. A messenger entered the box where the general wassurrounded by a brilliant company, and gave him a dispatch whichannounced the surrender of Vicksburg and Pemberton's army. Burnside, overjoyed, announced the great news to us who were near him, andthen stepped to the front of the box to make the whole audiencesharers in the pleasure. As soon as he was seen with the paper inhis hand, the house was hushed, and his voice rang through it as heproclaimed the great victory and declared it a long stride towardthe restoration of the Union. The people went almost wild withexcitement, the men shouted hurrahs, the ladies waved theirhandkerchiefs and clapped their hands, all rising to their feet. Thecheering was long as well as loud, and before it subsided theexcitement reached behind the stage. The curtain rose again, andSusini came forward with a national flag in each hand, waving thementhusiastically whilst his magnificent voice resounded in arepetition of the song he had just sung, and which seemed asappropriate as if it were inspired for the occasion, -- "Suoni la tromba, e intrepido Io pugnerò da forte, Bello è affrontar la morte, Gridando libertà!" The rejoicing and the cheers were repeated to the echo, and when atlast they subsided, the rest of the opera was only half listened to, suppressed excitement filling every heart and the thought of thegreat results to flow from the victories absorbing every mind. Burnside reckoned with entire certainty on the immediate return ofthe Ninth Corps, and planned to resume his expedition into EastTennessee as soon as his old troops should reach him again. TheMorgan raid was just beginning, and no one anticipated its finalscope. In the dispatch from the Secretary of War which announcedGrant's great victory, Burnside was also told that the corps wouldimmediately return to him. In answering it on the 8th July, he said, "I thought I was very happy at the success of General Grant andGeneral Meade, but I am still happier to hear of the speedy returnof the Ninth Corps. " He informed Rosecrans of it on the same day, adding, "I hope soon to be at work again. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 522, 524. ] The Washington authorities very naturally and very properly wishedthat the tide of success should be kept moving, and SecretaryStanton had exhorted Rosecrans to further activity by saying, on the7th, "You and your noble army now have the chance to give thefinishing blow to the rebellion. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 518. ] Will youneglect the chance?" Rosecrans replied: "You do not appear toobserve the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels frommiddle Tennessee, of which my dispatches advised you. I beg inbehalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook sogreat an event because it is not written in letters of blood. " He, however, did not intimate any purpose of advancing. No doubt themanoeuvering of Bragg out of his fortified positions at Shelbyvilleand Tullahoma had been well done; but its chief value was that itforced Bragg to meet the Army of the Cumberland in the open field ifthe advantage should be promptly followed up. If he were allowed tofortify another position, nothing would be gained but the ground thearmy stood on. Had Rosecrans given any intimation of an early dateat which he could rebuild the Elk River bridge and resume activeoperations, it would probably have relieved the strain so noticeablein the correspondence between him and the War Department. He didnothing of the kind, and the necessity of removing him from thecommand was a matter of every-day discussion at Washington, as isevident from the confidential letters Halleck sent to him. Thecorrespondence between the General-in-Chief and his subordinate is acurious one. A number of the most urgent dispatches representing thedissatisfaction of the President and the Secretary were accompaniedby private and confidential letters in which Halleck explains thesituation and strongly asserts his friendship for Rosecrans and theerror of the latter in assuming that personal hostility to himselfwas at bottom of the reprimands sent him on account of his delays. It was with good intentions that Halleck wrote thus, but the wisdomof it is very questionable. It gave Rosecrans ground to assume thatthe official dispatches were only the formal expression of the ideasof the President and Secretary whilst the General-in-Chief did notjoin in the condemnation of his dilatory mode of conducting thecampaign. To say to Rosecrans, as Halleck did on July 24th, "Whetherwell founded or without any foundation, the dissatisfaction reallyexists, and I deem it my duty as a friend to represent it to youtruly and fairly, " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 552, 555, 601. ] is to neglect his duty as commander of the wholearmy to express his own judgment and to give orders which would havethe weight of his military position and presumed knowledge inmilitary matters. When, therefore, a few days later he gaveperemptory orders to begin an active advance, these orders wereinterpreted in the light of the preceding correspondence, and losttheir force and vigor. They were met by querulous and insubordinateinquiries whether they were intended to take away all discretion asto details from the commander of an army in the field. [Footnote:Aug. 4, _Id_. , p. 592. ] It has been argued that Rosecrans's weaknessof character consisted in a disposition to quarrel with those inpower over him, and that a spirit of contradiction thwarted the goodmilitary conduct which his natural energy might have produced. Icannot help reading his controversial correspondence in the light ofmy personal observation of the man, and my conviction is that hisquarrelsome mode of dealing with the War Department was the resultof a real weakness of will and purpose which did not take naturallyto an aggressive campaign that involved great responsibilities andrisks. Being really indecisive in fixing his plan of campaign andacting upon it, his infirmity of will was covered by a belligerencein his correspondence. A really enterprising commander in the fieldwould have begun an active campaign in the spring before anydissatisfaction was exhibited at Washington; and if he had a decidedpurpose to advance at any reasonably early period, there was nothingin the urgency shown by his superiors to make him abandon hispurpose. He might have made testy comments, but he would have acted. Halleck's correspondence with Burnside in July is hard tounderstand, unless we assume that it was so perfunctory that he didnot remember at one time what he said or did earlier. In a dispatchto the General-in-Chief dated the 11th, Rosecrans had said, "It isimportant to know if it will be practicable for Burnside to come inon our left flank and hold the line of the Cumberland; if not, aline in advance of it and east of us. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 529. ] It was already understood betweenRosecrans and Burnside that the latter would do this and more assoon as he should have the Ninth Corps with him; and the dispatchmust be regarded as a variation on the form of excuses for inaction, by suggesting that he was delayed by the lack of an understanding asto co-operation by the Army of the Ohio. On receipt of Rosecrans'sdispatch, Halleck answered it on the 13th, saying, "General Burnsidehas been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left byentering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He seemstied fast to Cincinnati. " On the same day he telegraphed Burnside, "I must again urge upon you the importance of moving forward intoEast Tennessee, to cover Rosecrans's left. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 531. ] It is possible that Burnside's telegraphic correspondence withthe Secretary of War was not known to Halleck, but it is hard tobelieve that the latter was ignorant of the proportions the Morganraid had taken after the enemy had crossed the Ohio River. The 13thof July was the day that Morgan marched from Indiana into Ohio andcame within thirteen miles of Cincinnati. Burnside was organizingall the militia of southern Ohio, and was concentrating twodivisions of the Twenty-third Corps to catch the raiders. One ofthese was on a fleet of steamboats which reached Cincinnati thatday, and the other, under Hobson, was in close pursuit of the enemy. Where should Burnside have been, if not at Cincinnati? If the raidhad been left to the "militia and home guards, " as Halleck afterwardsaid all petty raids should be, this, which was not a petty raid, would pretty certainly have had results which would have producedmore discomfort at Washington than the idea that Burnside was "tiedfast to Cincinnati. " Burnside was exactly where he ought to be, anddoing admirable work which resulted in the capture of the divisionof 3000 rebel cavalry with its officers from the general in commanddownward. That the General-in-Chief was entirely ignorant of whatwas going on, when every intelligent citizen of the country wasexcited over it and every newspaper was full of it, reflects farmore severely upon him than upon Burnside. But this was by no means the whole. He forgot that when he stoppedBurnside's movement on 3d June to send the Ninth Corps to Grant, itwas with the distinct understanding that it prevented its resumptiontill the corps should return. He had himself said that this shouldbe as early as possible, and meanwhile directed Burnside toconcentrate his remaining forces as much as he could. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 384. ] Burnside had been toldon the 8th of July, without inquiry from him, that the corps wascoming back to him, and had immediately begun his preparation toresume an active campaign as soon as it should reach him. Nothearing of its being on the way, on the 18th he asked Halleck iforders for its return had been given. To this dispatch no answer wasgiven, and it was probably pigeonholed and forgotten. Burnsidecontinued his campaign against Morgan, and on the 24th, when thelast combinations near Steubenville were closing the career of theraider, Halleck again telegraphs that there must be no further delayin the movement into East Tennessee, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 553. ] and orders an immediate report of theposition and number of Burnside's troops organized for that purpose!He was still ignorant, apparently, that there had been any occasionto withdraw the troops in Kentucky from the positions near theCumberland River. Burnside answered temperately, reciting the facts and reminding himof the actual state of orders and correspondence, adding only, "Ishould be glad to be more definitely instructed, if you think thework can be better done. " Morgan's surrender was on the 26th, andBurnside immediately applied himself with earnest zeal to get hisforces back into Kentucky. Judah's division at Buffington was threehundred miles from Cincinnati and five hundred from the place it hadleft to begin the chase. Shackelford's mounted force was two hundredmiles further up the Ohio. This last was, as has been recited, madeup of detachments from all the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and its four weeks of constant hard riding had used up men andhorses. These all had to be got back to the southern part of centralKentucky and refitted, returned to their proper divisions, andprepared for a new campaign. The General-in-Chief does not seem tohave had the slightest knowledge of these circumstances orconditions. On the 28th another Confederate raid developed itself in southernKentucky, under General Scott. It seemed to be intended as adiversion to aid Morgan to escape from Ohio, but failed toaccomplish anything. Scott advanced rapidly from the south with hisbrigade, crossing the Cumberland at Williamsburg and moving throughLondon upon Richmond. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 568. ] Colonel Sanders endeavored to stop the enemy atRichmond with about 500 men hastily collected, but was driven back. He was ordered to Lexington and put in command of all the mountedmen which could be got together there, 2400 in all, and advancedagainst Scott, who now retreated by Lancaster, Stanford, andSomerset. At Lancaster the enemy was routed in a charge and 200 ofthem captured. Following them up with vigor, their train wasdestroyed and about 500 more prisoners were taken. At the CumberlandRiver Sanders halted, having been without rations for four days. Theremnant of Scott's force had succeeded in crossing the river afterabandoning the train. Scott claimed to have taken and paroled about200 prisoners in the first part of his raid, but such irregularparoles of captured men who could not be carried off wereunauthorized and void. The actual casualties in Sanders's commandwere trifling. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. I. Pp. 828-843; pt. Ii. Pp. 568, 589. ] The effect of this last raid was still further to wear outBurnside's mounted troops, but he pressed forward to the front allhis infantry and organized a column for advance. In less than aweek, on August 4, he was able to announce to the War Departmentthat he had 11, 000 men concentrated at Lebanon, Stanford, andGlasgow, with outposts on the Cumberland River, and that he couldpossibly increase this to 12, 000 by reducing some posts in guard ofthe railway. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 591. ] Upon this, Halleck gave toRosecrans peremptory orders for the immediate advance of the Army ofthe Cumberland, directing him also to report daily the movement ofeach corps till he should cross the Tennessee. On the next dayBurnside was ordered in like manner to advance with a column of12, 000 men upon Knoxville, on reaching which place he was toendeavor to connect with the forces under Rosecrans. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. Pp. 592-593. ] The dispatchclosed with what was called a repetition of a former order from theSecretary of War for Burnside to leave Cincinnati and take commandof his moving column in person. Burnside had never dreamed of doinganything else, as everybody near him knew, though he had in factbeen quite ill during the latter part of July. The mention of aformer order was another sheer blunder on General Halleck's part, and Burnside indignantly protested against the imputation containedin it. [Footnote: _Id_. , pp. 593, 594. ] The truth seems to be thatHalleck was in such a condition of irritation over hiscorrespondence with Rosecrans, that nothing pertaining to theDepartment of the Ohio was accurately placed in his mind oraccurately stated when he had occasion to refer to it. In cuttingthe knot by peremptory orders to both armies to move, he was right, and was justified in insisting that the little column of 12, 000under Burnside should start although it could only be got togetherin greatest haste and with the lack of equipment occasioned by the"wear and tear" of the operations against Morgan. If, in insistingon this, he had recognized the facts and given Burnside and histroops credit for the capture of the rebel raiders and theconcentration, in a week, of forces scattered over a distance ofnearly a thousand miles, no one would have had a right to criticisehim. The exigency fairly justified it. But to treat Burnside as ifhe had been only enjoying himself in Cincinnati, and his troops allquietly in camp along the Cumberland River through the wholesummer, --to ignore the absence of the Ninth Corps and his ownsuspension of a movement already begun when he took it away, --toassume in almost every particular a basis of fact absolutelycontrary to the reality and to telegraph censures for what had beendone, under his own orders or strictly in harmony with them, --allthis was doing a right thing in as absurdly wrong a way as waspossible. A gleam of humor and the light of common sense is thrownover one incident, when Mr. Lincoln, seeing that Burnside had fullright from the dispatches to suppose the Ninth Corps was to come atonce to him from Vicksburg and that no one had given him anyexplanation, himself telegraphed that the information had been basedon a statement from General Grant, who had not informed them why thetroops had not been sent. "General Grant, " the President quaintlyadded, "is a copious worker and fighter, but a very meagre writer ortelegrapher. No doubt he changed his purpose for some sufficientreason, but has forgotten to notify us of it. " [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxiii. Pt. Ii. P. 561. ] The reference to copious workas contrasted with the _copia verborum_ gains added point from adispatch of Halleck to Rosecrans, quite early in the season, inwhich the latter is told that the cost of his telegraph dispatchesis "as much or perhaps more than that of all the other generals inthe field. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 255. ] The form of the reference toGrant enables us also to read between the lines the progress he wasmaking in reputation and in the President's confidence. He kept"pegging away, " and was putting brains as well as energy into hiswork. The records show also that Burnside took the hint, whetherintended or not, and in this campaign did not err on the side ofcopiousness in dispatches to Washington. To avoid the delay which would be caused by the distribution of hismounted force to the divisions they had originally been attached to, Burnside organized these into a division under Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, and an independent brigade under Colonel F. Wolford. Healso reorganized the infantry divisions of the Twenty-third Corps. The first division, under Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle, was toremain in Kentucky and protect the lines of communication. Thesecond was put under command of Brigadier-General M. D. Manson, andthe third under Brigadier-General M. S. Hascall. Each marchingdivision was organized into two brigades with a battery of artilleryattached to each brigade. Three batteries of artillery were inreserve. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. Pp. 553-555. ] On the 11th of August General Burnside went to Hickman's Bridge, andthe forward movement was begun. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 16. Hickman's Bridge, as has already been mentioned, was at the terminusof the Central Kentucky Railroad. There, on the bank of the KentuckyRiver, Burnside made a fortified depot from which his wagon trainsshould start as a base for the supply system of his army in EastTennessee. It was called Camp Nelson in honor of the dead Kentuckygeneral. ] At this date the Confederate forces in East Tennesseeunder General Buckner numbered 14, 733 "present for duty, " with an"aggregate present" of 2000 or 3000 more. Conscious that the columnof 12, 000 which Halleck had directed him to start with was less thanthe hostile forces in the Holston valley, Burnside reduced to theutmost the garrisons and posts left behind him. Fortunately theadvanced division of the Ninth Corps returning from Vicksburgreached Cincinnati on the 12th, and although the troops were whollyunfit for active service by reason of malarial diseases contractedon the "Yazoo, " they could relieve some of the Kentucky garrisons, and Burnside was thus enabled to increase his moving column to about15, 000 men. The earlier stages of the advance were slow, as thecolumns were brought into position to take up their separate linesof march and organize their supply trains for the road. On the 20thHanson's division was at Columbia, Hascall's was at Stanford, Carter's cavalry division was at Crab Orchard, and independentbrigades of cavalry under Colonels Wolford and Graham were atSomerset and Glasgow. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 548. ] On that dayorders were issued for the continuous march. General Julius Whiterelieved Manson in command of the second division, and the twoinfantry divisions were to move on Montgomery, Tenn. , Hascall's byway of Somerset, Chitwoods, and Huntsville, and White's by way ofCreelsboro, Albany, and Jamestown. Carter's cavalry, which coveredthe extreme left flank, marched through Mt. Vernon and London toWilliamsburg, where it forded the Cumberland, thence over theJellico Mountains to Chitwoods where it became the advance ofHascall's column to Montgomery. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 548. ] At this point the columns were united and allmoved together through Emory Gap upon Kingston. Burnside accompaniedthe cavalry in person, and sent two detachments, one to go by way ofBig Creek Gap to make a demonstration on Knoxville, and the otherthrough Winter's Gap for the same purpose of misleading the enemy asto his line of principal movement. [Illustration: Map of East Tennessee. ] Nothing could be more systematic and vigorous than the march ofBurnside's columns. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 569. ] They made fromfifteen to twenty or twenty-five miles a day with the regularity ofclock-work, though the route in many parts of it was most difficult. There were mountains to climb and narrow gorges to thread. Streamswere to be forded, roads were to be repaired and in places to bemade anew. On the 1st of September Burnside occupied Kingston, having passed through Emory Gap into East Tennessee and communicatedwith Crittenden's corps of Rosecrans's army. [Footnote: Itinerary, Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. Pp. 576-578. ] Here he learnedthat upon the development of the joint plan of campaign of theNational commanders, Bragg had withdrawn Buckner's forces south ofthe Tennessee at Loudon, there making them the right flank of hisarmy about Chattanooga. There was, however, one exception inBuckner's order to withdraw. Brigadier-General John W. Frazer wasleft at Cumberland Gap with 2500 men, and though Buckner had onAugust 30th ordered him to destroy his material and retreat intoVirginia, joining the command of Major-General Samuel Jones, thisorder was withdrawn on Frazer's representation of his ability tohold the place and that he had rations for forty days. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 608. ] There being thereforeno troops in East Tennessee to oppose its occupation, Burnside'sadvance-guard entered Knoxville on the 3d of September. Part of theTwenty-third Corps had been sent toward London on the 2d, and upontheir approach the enemy burned the great railroad bridge at thatplace. A light-draught steamboat was building at Kingston, and thiswas captured and preserved. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 333. ] Itplayed a useful part subsequently in the transportation of supplieswhen the wagon-trains were broken down and the troops were reducednearly to starvation. No sooner was Burnside in Knoxville than heput portions of his army in motion for Cumberland Gap, sixty milesnorthward. He had already put Colonel John F. DeCourcey (SixteenthOhio Infantry) in command of new troops arriving in Kentucky, andordered him to advance against the fortifications of the gap on thenorth side. General Shackelford was sent with his cavalry fromKnoxville, but when Burnside learned that DeCourcey and he were notstrong enough to take the place, he left Knoxville in person withColonel Samuel Gilbert's brigade of infantry and made the sixty-milemarch in fifty-two hours. Frazer had refused to surrender on thesummons of the subordinates; but when Burnside arrived and made thedemand in person, he despaired of holding out and on the 9th ofSeptember surrendered the garrison. A considerable number got awayby scattering after the flag was hauled down, but 2, 205 men laiddown their arms, and twelve pieces of cannon were also among thespoils. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. Pp. 548, 599, 604, 611. ]DeCourcey's troops were left to garrison the fortifications, and therest were sent to occupy the upper valley of the Holston toward theVirginia line. On the 10th, and while still at Cumberland Gap, Burnside received adispatch from General Crittenden with the news that he was inpossession of Chattanooga, that Bragg had retreated toward Rome, Ga. , and that Rosecrans hoped with his centre and right to interceptthe enemy at Rome, which was sixty miles south of Chattanooga. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 523. ] Everythingwas therefore most promising on the south, and Burnside had only toprovide for driving back the Confederates under Jones, at theVirginia line, a hundred and thirty miles northeast of Knoxville. Itbecomes important here to estimate these distances rightly. Knoxville is a hundred and eleven miles distant from Chattanooga bythe railroad, and more by the country roads. From Bristol on thenortheast to Chattanooga on the southwest is two hundred andforty-two miles, which measures the length of that part of theHolston and Tennessee valley known as East Tennessee. If Rosecranswere at Rome, as General Crittenden's dispatch indicated, he wasmore than a hundred and seventy miles distant from Knoxville, andnearly three hundred miles from the region about Greeneville and theWatauga River, whose crossing would be the natural frontier of theupper valley, if Burnside should not be able to extend hisoccupation quite to the Virginia line. It will be seen thereforethat the progress of the campaign had necessarily made Rosecrans'sand Burnside's lines of operation widely divergent, and they werefar beyond supporting distance of each other, since there was norailway communication between them, and could not be for a longtime. Burnside captured some locomotives and cars at Knoxville; butbridges had been destroyed to such an extent that these were oflittle use to him, for the road could be operated but a shortdistance in either direction and the amount of rolling stock was, atmost, very little. Complete success for Rosecrans, with thereopening and repair of the whole line from Nashville throughChattanooga, including the rebuilding of the great bridge at London, were the essential conditions of further co-operation between thetwo armies, and of the permanent existence of Burnside's in EastTennessee. Efforts had been made to extend the lines of telegraph as Burnsideadvanced, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 574; pt. Iii. P. 717. ] but it took some time to do this, and even when thewires were up there occurred a difficulty in making the electriccircuit, so that through all the critical part of the Chickamaugacampaign, Burnside had to communicate by means of so long a line ofcouriers that three days was the actual time of transmittal ofdispatches between himself and Washington. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Iii. P. 718. ] The news from Rosecrans on the 10th was so reassuringthat Burnside's plain duty was to apply himself to clearing theupper valley of the enemy, and then to further the great object ofhis expedition by giving the loyal inhabitants the means ofself-government, and encouraging them to organize and arm themselveswith the weapons which his wagon trains were already bringing fromKentucky. He had also to provide for his supplies, and must use thegood weather of the early autumn to the utmost, for the long roadsover the mountains would be practically impassable in winter. Theroute from Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap was the shortest, and, on the whole, the easiest, and a great system of transportation bytrains under escort was put in operation. The camp at Cumberland Gapcould give this protection through the mountain district, and made aconvenient stopping-place in the weary way when teams broke down orhad to be replaced. Other roads were also used whilst they seemed tobe safe, and the energies and resources of the quartermaster'sdepartment were strained to the utmost to bring forward arms, ammunition for cannon and muskets, food and medical supplies, andall the munitions of war. The roads were covered with herds ofbeeves and swine, and feeding stations for these were establishedand the forage had to be drawn to them, for nothing could be got, along the greater part of the route. Burnside hoped that the railwayby Chattanooga would be put in repair and be open before wintershould shut in, but he very prudently acted on the principle ofmaking the most of his present means. It was well he did so, forotherwise his little army would have been starved before the winterwas half over. From Cumberland Gap the courier line was sixty miles shorter thanfrom Knoxville, and the first dispatches of Burnside announcing hiscapture of Frazer's troops reached Washington more quickly thanlater ones. At noon of the 11th Mr. Lincoln answered it with heartycongratulations and thanks. This was quickly followed by acongratulatory message from Halleck accompanied by formal orders. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 555. ] These lastonly recapitulated the points in Burnside's further operations andadministration which were the simplest deductions from thesituation. Burnside was to hold the country eastward to the gaps ofthe North Carolina mountains (the Great Smokies) and the valley ofthe Holston up to the Virginia line. Halleck used the phrase "theline of the Holston, " which would be absurd, and was probably only aslip of the pen. The exact strength of General Jones, theConfederate commander in southwestern Virginia, was not known, but, to preserve his preponderance, Burnside could not prudently sendless than a division of infantry and a couple of brigades of cavalryto the vicinity of Rogersville or Greeneville and the railroadcrossing of the Watauga. This would be just about half his availableforce. The other division was at first divided, one of the twobrigades being centrally placed at Knoxville, and the other atSevierville, thirty miles up the French Broad River, where itcovered the principal pass over the Smokies to Asheville, N. C. Therest of his cavalry was at London and Kingston, where it covered thenorth side of the Tennessee River and communicated with Rosecrans'soutposts above Chattanooga. Halleck further informed Burnside that the Secretary of War directedhim to raise all the volunteers he could in East Tennessee and toselect officers for them. If he had not already enough arms andequipments he could order them by telegraph. As to Rosecrans, theGeneral-in-Chief stated that he would occupy Dalton or some otherpoint south of Chattanooga, closing the enemy's line from Atlanta, and when this was done, the question would be settled whether thewhole would move eastward into Virginia or southward into Georgiaand Alabama. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 555. ] Burnside's present work being thus cut out for him, he sethimself about it with the cordial earnestness which marked hischaracter. He had suggested the propriety of his retiring as soon asthe surrender of Frazer had made his occupation of East Tennessee anassured success, but he had not formally asked to be relieved. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 523. ] His reasons for doing so dated back tothe Fredericksburg campaign, in part; for he had believed that hisalternative then presented to the government, that he should beallowed to dismiss insubordinate generals or should himself resign, ought to have been accepted. His case had some resemblance to Pope'swhen the administration approved his conduct and his courage butretired him and restored McClellan to command, in deference to thesupposed sentiment of the Army of the Potomac. Halleck's persistentignoring of the officially recorded causes of the delay in thiscampaign, and his assumption that the Morgan raid was not anincident of any importance in Burnside's responsibilities, had nottended to diminish the latter's sense of discomfort in dealing witharmy head-quarters. A debilitating illness gave some added force tohis other reasons, which, however, we who knew him well understoodto be the decisive ones with him. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 523; vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 757. ] Mr. Lincoln'ssincere friendship and confidence he never doubted, but his naturecould not fully appreciate the President's policy of bending toexisting circumstances when current opinion was contrary to his own, so that he might save his strength for more critical action atanother time. Burnside had now the _éclat_ of success in a campaignwhich was very near the heart of the President and full of interestfor the Northern people. This, he felt, was a time when he couldretire with honor. Mr. Lincoln postponed action in the kindest andmost complimentary words, [Footnote: _Id_. , vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 554. "Yours received. A thousand thanks for the late successes youhave given us. We cannot allow you to resign until things shall be alittle more settled in East Tennessee. If then, purely on your ownaccount you wish to resign, we will not further refuse you. "] andwhen he finally assigned another to command the department, did notallow Burnside to resign, but laid out other work for him where hispatriotism and his courage could be of use to the country. The advent of the army into East Tennessee was, to its loyal people, a resurrection from the grave. Their joy had an exultation whichseemed almost beyond the power of expression. Old men fell downfainting and unconscious under the stress of their emotions as theysaw the flag at the head of the column and tried to cheer it! Womenwept with happiness as their husbands stepped out of the ranks ofthe loyal Tennessee regiments when these came marching by the home. [Footnote: Temple's East Tennessee and the Civil War, pp. 476, 478. Humes's The Loyal Mountaineers, pp. 211, 218. ] These men hadgathered in little recruiting camps on the mountain-sides and hadfound their way to Kentucky, travelling by night and guided by thepole-star, as the dark-skinned fugitives from bondage had used tomake their way to freedom. Their families had been marked astraitors to the Confederacy, and had suffered sharpest privationsand cruel wrong on account of the absence of the husband and father, the brother, or the son. Now it was all over, and a jubilee began inthose picturesque valleys in the mountains, which none canunderstand who had not seen the former despair and the presentrevulsion of happiness. The mountain coves and nooks far up towardthe Virginia line had been among the most intense in loyalty to thenation. Andrew Johnson's home was at Greeneville, and he was now theloyal provisional governor of Tennessee, soon to be nominatedVice-President of the United States. General Carter, who had askedto be transferred from the navy to organize the refugee loyalistsinto regiments, was a native of the same region. It was at theWatauga that the neighboring opponents of secession had given thefirst example of daring self-sacrifice in burning the railwaybridge. For this they were hanged, and their memory was revered bythe loyal men about them, as was Nathan Hale's by our revolutionaryfathers. East Tennessee was full of such loyalty, but here were goodreasons why Burnside should push his advance at least to theWatauga, and if possible to the Virginia line. His sympathies wereall alive for this people. The region, he telegraphed the President, is as loyal as any State of the North. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 523. ] It threw off all disguise, it blossomedwith National flags, it took no counsel of prudence, it refused tothink of a return of Confederate soldiers and Confederate rule as apossibility. It exulted in every form of defiance to the Richmondgovernment and what had been called treason to the ConfederateStates. The people had a religious faith that God would not abandonthem or suffer them to be again abandoned. If such an incrediblewrong were to happen, they must either leave their country in mass, or they must be ready to die. They could see no other alternative. CHAPTER XXVI BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE Organizing and arming the loyalists--Burnside concentrates nearGreeneville--His general plan--Rumors of Confederatereinforcements--Lack of accurate information--The Ninth Corps inKentucky--Its depletion by malarial disease--Death of General Welshfrom this cause--Preparing for further work--Situation on 16thSeptember--Dispatch from Halleck--Its apparent purpose--Necessity todispose of the enemy near Virginia border--Burnside personally atthe front--His great activity--Ignorance of Rosecrans'speril--Impossibility of joining him by the 20th--Ruinous effects ofabandoning East Tennessee--Efforts to aid Rosecrans without suchabandonment--Enemy duped into burning Watauga bridgethemselves--Ninth Corps arriving--Willcox's division garrisonsCumberland Gap--Reinforcements sent Rosecrans from allquarters--Chattanooga made safe from attack--The supplyquestion--Meigs's description of the roads--Burnside halted nearLoudon--Halleck's misconception of the geography--The peopleimploring the President not to remove the troops--How Longstreet gotaway from Virginia--Burnside's alternate plans--Minor operations inupper Holston valley--Wolford's affair on the lower Holston. For a week after the capture of Cumberland Gap Burnside devotedhimself to the pleasing task of organizing the native loyalists intoa National Guard for home defence, issuing arms to them uponcondition that they should, as a local militia, respond to his calland reinforce for temporary work his regular forces whenever theneed should arise. The detailed reports from the upper valleyreported the enemy under Jones at first to be 4000, and later to be6000 strong. These estimates came through cool-headed and prudentofficers, and were based upon information brought in by loyal menwho had proven singularly accurate in their knowledge throughout thecampaign. Point was added to these reports by the experience of oneof his regiments. A detachment of 300 men of the One Hundredth Ohiohad been sent to support a cavalry reconnoissance near LimestoneStation on the railroad, whilst Burnside was investing CumberlandGap, and these had been surrounded and forced to surrender by theenemy. This showed the presence of a considerable body ofConfederates in the upper valley, and that they were bold andaggressive. It was the part of prudence to act upon thisinformation, and Burnside ordered all his infantry except onebrigade to march toward Greeneville. Two brigades of cavalry werealready there, and his purpose was to concentrate about 6000infantry, try to obtain a decisive engagement with the Confederates, and to punish them so severely that the upper valley would be safe, for a time at least, from invasion by them, so that he might be freeto withdraw most of his troops to co-operate with Rosecrans in aGeorgia campaign, if that alternative in Halleck's plans should beadopted. He felt the importance of this the more, as the newsreceived from Virginia mentioned the movement of railwayrolling-stock to the East to bring, as rumor had it, Ewell's corpsfrom Lee to reinforce Jones. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. Pp. 661, 717. ] The sending of the railway trains was afact, but the object, as it turned out, was to transportLongstreet's corps to reinforce Bragg. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 731. ] Ofthis, however, Burnside had no intimation, and must act upon theinformation which came to him. The Ninth Corps began to arrive at Cincinnati from Vicksburg on the12th of August, half of it coming then, and the second divisionarriving on the 20th. It was reduced to 6000 by casualties and bysickness, and was in a pitiable condition. Being made up of troopswhich had served in the East, the men were not acclimated to theMississippi valley, and in the bayous and marshes about Vicksburghad suffered greatly. Malarial fevers ate out their vitality, andeven those who reported for duty dragged themselves about, the mereshadows of what they had been. General Parke reported their arrivaland was then obliged to go upon sick-leave himself. General Welsh, who had distinguished himself at Antietam, reported that hisdivision must recuperate for a few weeks before it could take thefield. He made a heroic effort to remain on duty, but died suddenlyon the 14th, and his loss was deeply felt by the corps. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 45. ] Potter's division wasas badly off as Welsh's, and both were for a short time scattered athealthful camps in the Kentucky hills. Each camp was, at first, ahospital; but the change of climate and diet rapidly restored thetone of the hardy soldiery. General Willcox, who commanded the Indiana district, belonged to thecorps, and asked to be returned to duty with it. He was allowed todo so on the 11th of September, and the War Department sent with hima new division of Indiana troops which had been recruited andorganized during the summer. Burnside had ordered recruits and newregiments to rendezvous in Kentucky, and prepared to bring them aswell as the Ninth Corps forward as soon as the latter should be fitto march. Every camp and station at the rear was full of busypreparation during the last of August and the beginning ofSeptember, and at the front the general himself was nowconcentrating his little forces to strike a blow near the Virginialine which would make him free to move afterward in any directionthe General-in-Chief should determine. On the 16th of September Hascall's division was echeloned along theroad from Morristown back toward Knoxville; White's division passedKnoxville, moving up the valley to join Hascall. Hartsuff, whocommanded the Twenty-third Corps, had been disabled for field workby trouble from his old wounds and was at Knoxville. Burnside wasalso there, intending to go rapidly forward and overtake hisinfantry as soon as they should approach Greeneville. In the nightthe courier brought him a dispatch from Halleck, [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 617. ] dated the 13th, directing arapid movement of all his forces in Kentucky toward East Tennessee, where the whole Army of the Ohio was to be concentrated as soon aspossible. [Footnote: _Id_. , pt. Ii. P. 550. ] He also directedBurnside to move his infantry toward Chattanooga, giving as a reasonthat Bragg might manoeuvre to turn Rosecrans's right, and in thatcase Rosecrans would want to hand Chattanooga over to Burnside sothat he himself could move the whole Army of the Cumberland to meetBragg. There was nothing in this dispatch which intimated that Rosecranswas in any danger, nor was Burnside informed that Bragg had beenreinforced by Longstreet's corps. On the other hand, his informationlooked to Ewell's joining Jones against himself. The object Halleckhad in view seemed to be to get the Ninth Corps and other troops nowin Kentucky into East Tennessee as rapidly as possible, and then tomove the whole Army of the Ohio down toward Rosecrans. It certainlycould not be that he wished Cumberland Gap abandoned, and the trainsand detachments coming through it from Kentucky left to the tendermercies of Jones and his Confederates, who could capture them attheir leisure and without a blow. It was equally incredible that thegovernment could wish to stop the organization of the loyalists justas weapons were being distributed to them, and to abandon them tothe enemy when their recent open demonstrations in favor of theUnion would make their condition infinitely worse than if our troopshad never come to them. The rational interpretation, and the oneBurnside gave it, was that the alternative which had been stated inthe earlier dispatch of the 11th had been settled in favor of ageneral movement southward instead of eastward, and that this madeit all the more imperative that he should disembarrass himself ofGeneral Jones and establish a line on the upper Holston which asmall force could hold, whilst he with the rest of the two corpsshould move southward as soon as the Ninth Corps could make themarch from Kentucky. This was exactly what General Schofield did inthe next spring when he was ordered to join Sherman with the Army ofthe Ohio; and I do not hesitate to say that it was the only thingwhich an intelligent military man on the ground and knowing thetopography would think of doing. To make a panicky abandonment ofthe country and of the trains and detachments _en route_ to it, would have been hardly less disgraceful than a surrender of thewhole. To Burnside's honor and credit it should be recorded that hedid not dream of doing it. He strained every nerve to hasten themovement of his troops so as to get through with his little campaignagainst Jones by the time the Ninth Corps could come from Kentucky, and if he could accomplish it within that limit, he would have theright to challenge the judgment of every competent critic, whetherhe had not done that which became a good soldier and a good general. On the 17th of September the concentration of Burnside's infantrytoward Greeneville had so far progressed that he was preparing to gopersonally to the front and lead them against the enemy. It isnoticeable in the whole campaign that he took this personalleadership and activity on himself. In Hartsuff's condition ofhealth it would have been within the ordinary methods of action thatthe next in rank should assume command of the Twenty-third Corps, and that the department commander should remain at his headquartersat Knoxville. But Hartsuff was able to attend to office business, and so Burnside practically exchanged places with him, leaving hissubordinate with discretion to direct affairs in the department atlarge, whilst he himself did the field work with his troops. He haddone it at Cumberland Gap when he received the surrender of Frazer;he was doing it now, and he was to do it again, still later, when hemet Longstreet's advance at the crossing of the Holston River. In preparation for an absence of some days, he wrote, on the datelast mentioned, a long dispatch to General Halleck, in the nature ofa report of the state of affairs at that date. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 717. ] He explained the failure of thetelegraph and the efforts that were making to get it in workingorder. He gave the situation of the troops and stated his purpose toattack the enemy. He noticed the report of Ewell's coming againsthim and promised stout resistance, finding satisfaction in thethought that it would give Meade the opportunity to strike adecisive blow against Lee's reduced army. He reported the conditionof his trains and cattle droves on the road from Kentucky, and thecontact of his cavalry in the south part of the valley withRosecrans's outposts. The bridge over the Hiwassee at Calhoun, hesaid, could be finished in ten days, and the steamboat at Kingstonwould soon be completed and ready for use. All this promised bettermeans of supply at an early day, though at present "twenty-odd cars"were all the means of moving men or supplies on the portion of therailroad within his control. Later in the same day he received Halleck's dispatch of the 14th, which said it was believed the enemy would concentrate to giveRosecrans battle, and directed him to reinforce the latter with allpossible speed. [Footnote: Burnside's dispatches of the 17th inanswer to Halleck's seem to show that both those of 13th and 14thwere received by him after he had written the long one in themorning. The internal evidence supports this idea, and his seconddispatch on the 17th acknowledges the receipt of Halleck's twotogether. Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 718. In hisofficial report, however, Burnside says the dispatch of 13th wasreceived "on the night of the 16th" (Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 550), and I have followed this statement, although his reportwas not written till November, 1865, when lapse of time might easilygive rise to an error in so trifling a detail. The matter is of noreal consequence in the view I have taken of the situation. ] Still, no information was given of the movement of Longstreet to joinBragg, and indeed it was only on the 15th that Halleck gave the newsto Rosecrans as reliable. [Footnote: Official Records, xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 643. ] Burnside must therefore regard the enemy concentrating inGeorgia as only the same which Rosecrans had been peremptorilyordered to attack and which he had been supposed to be strong enoughto cope with. No time was stated at which the battle in Georgiawould probably occur. To hasten the work in hand, to put affairs atthe Virginia line in condition to be left as soon as might be, andthen to speed his forces toward Chattanooga to join in the Georgiacampaign, was plainly Burnside's duty. If it would be too rash forRosecrans to give battle without reinforcements, that officer wascompetent to manoeuvre his army in retreat and take a defensibleposition till his reinforcements could come. That course would becertainly much wiser than to abandon East Tennessee to the enemy, with all the consequences of such an act, quite as bad as the lossof a battle. As matters turned out, even such instantaneous andruinous abandonment would not have helped Rosecrans. It was now theafternoon of the 17th of September. The battle of Chickamauga was tobegin in the early morning of the 19th and to end disastrously onthe 20th. One full day for the marching of troops was all thatintervened, or two at most, if they were only to reach the fieldupon the second day of the battle. And where were Burnside's men?One division at Greeneville and above, more than two hundred milesfrom Chattanooga, and the other near New Market and Morristown, ahundred and fifty miles. Burnside's "twenty-odd cars" were confinedto a section of the railroad less than eighty miles long, and couldhardly carry the necessary baggage and ammunition even for thatfraction of the way. The troops must march, and could not by anyphysical possibility make a quarter of the distance beforeRosecrans's fate at Chickamauga should be decided. The authoritiesat Washington must bear the responsibility for complete ignorance ofthese conditions, or, what would be equally bad, a forgetfulness ofthem in a moment of panic. But Burnside did not know and could not guess that a battle was tobe fought so soon. All he could do was to prepare to carry out thewishes of the War Department as speedily as could be, without thetotal ruin of East Tennessee and all he had accomplished. Such ruinmight come by the fate of war if he were driven out by superiorforce, but he would have been rightly condemned if it had come byhis precipitate abandonment of the country. He did more to carry outHalleck's wish than was quite prudent. He stopped the troops whichhad not yet reached Greeneville and ordered a countermarch. Hehastened up the country to make the attack upon the Confederateswith the force he already had in their presence, and then to bringthe infantry back at once, hoping the cavalry could hold in check adefeated enemy. The necessity of delivering a blow at General Jones was afterwardscriticised by Halleck, but it was in accordance with the sound rulesof conducting war. To have called back his troops without a fightwould have been to give the enemy double courage by his retreat, andhis brigades would have been chased by the exulting foe. They wouldeither have been forced to halt and fight their pursuers under everydisadvantage of loss of prestige and of the initiative, or have madea precipitate flight which would have gone far to ruin the wholecommand as well as the Tennessee people they had just liberated. Itis true that this involved an advance from Greeneville uponJonesboro, but the cavalry were already in contact with the enemynear there, and this was the only successful mode of accomplishinghis purpose. [Footnote: Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, in their "Life ofLincoln, " give the draft of a letter to Burnside which Mr. Lincolnwrote but did not send, in which he expressed his surprise thatBurnside should be moving toward Virginia when they at Washingtonwere so anxious to have him in Georgia. Mr. Lincoln's judgments ofmilitary affairs were excellent when he was fully possessed of thefacts; and I have elaborated somewhat my statement of thecircumstances in East Tennessee, and of the distances, etc. , to showhow little they were known or understood in Washington. Nicolay andHay's Lincoln, vol. Viii. P. 166. ] Making use of the portion of the railroad which could be operated, Burnside reached Greeneville on the 18th and rode rapidly toJonesboro. On the 19th a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Fosterattacked the enemy at Bristol, defeated them, tore up the railroad, and destroyed the bridges two miles above the town. [Footnote:Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Ii. P. 592. ] Foster then returned toBlountsville, and marched on the next day to Hall's Ford on theWatauga, where, after a skirmishing fight lasting several hours, heagain dislodged the enemy, capturing about fifty prisoners and apiece of artillery with slight loss to himself. These were flankingmovements designed to distract the attention of the enemy whilstBurnside concentrated most of his force in front of their principalposition at Carter's Station, where the most important of therailway bridges in that region crosses the Watauga. To impress hisopponent with the belief that he meant to make an extended campaign, Burnside, on the 22d, notified Jones to remove the non-combatantsfrom the villages of the upper valley. Foster's brigade of cavalrywas again sent to demonstrate on the rear, whilst Burnsidethreatened in front with the infantry. The enemy now evacuated theposition and retreated, first burning the bridge. This was whatBurnside desired, and the means of resuming railway communication tosupport an advance toward Knoxville being taken from theConfederates for a considerable time, he was now able to put all hisinfantry except two regiments in march for Knoxville. A brigade ofcavalry with this small infantry support at Bull's Gap was entrustedwith the protection of this region, and by the help of the homeguards of loyal men, was able to hold it during the operations ofthe next fortnight. Burnside's purpose had been, if he had not beeninterrupted, to have pressed the Confederates closely with asufficient force in front to compel a retreat, whilst he interceptedthem with the remainder of his army, moving by a shorter line fromBlountsville. He made, however, the best of the situation, andhaving driven the enemy over the State line and disengaged his owntroops, he was free to concentrate the greater part of them foroperations at the other end of the valley. The Ninth Corps was now beginning to arrive, and was ordered torendezvous first at Knoxville. Willcox had assembled his division ofnew troops, mostly Indianans, and marched with them to CumberlandGap, where he relieved the garrison of that post, and was himselfentrusted by Burnside with the command of that portion of thedepartment, covering the upper valleys of the Clinch and Holston aswell as the lines of communication with Cincinnati and the OhioRiver. In the days immediately preceding the battle of Chickamauga, Halleckhad urged reinforcements forward toward Rosecrans from all parts ofthe West. Pope in Minnesota, Schofield in Missouri, Hurlbut atMemphis, and Sherman at Vicksburg had all been called upon for help, and all had put bodies of troops in motion, though the distanceswere great and the effect was a little too much like the proverbialone of locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen. Asthere was no telegraphic communication with Burnside, theGeneral-in-Chief gave orders through the adjutant-general's officein Cincinnati directly to the Ninth Corps and to the detachments ofthe Twenty-third Corps remaining or assembling in Kentucky, to marchat once into East Tennessee. An advisory supervision of thedepartment offices in Cincinnati had been left with me, and CaptainAnderson, the assistant adjutant-general, issued orders in GeneralBurnside's name after consultation with me. General Parke cut shorthis sick-leave, and, though far from strong, assumed command of theNinth Corps and began the march for Cumberland Gap. The guards forthe railways and necessary posts were reduced to the lowest limitsof safety, and every available regiment was hurried to the front. By the end of September Burnside's forces were pretty wellconcentrated between Knoxville and Loudon, the crossing of theHolston River. It had now been learned that Bragg's army hadsuffered even more than Rosecrans's in the battle of Chickamauga, and notwithstanding the rout of the right wing of the CumberlandArmy, the stubborn fighting of the centre and left wing under Thomashad made the enemy willing to admit that they had not won a decisivevictory. Our army was within its lines at Chattanooga, and these hadbeen so strengthened that General Meigs, who had been sent out inhaste as a special envoy of the War Department, reported to Mr. Stanton on the 27th of September that the position was very strong, being practically secure against an assault, and that the army washearty, cheerful, and confident. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 890. ] Meigs was himself a distinguished officer ofthe Engineer Corps as well as quartermaster-general, and the weightof his opinion at once restored confidence in Washington. He saw ata glance that the only perilous contingency was the danger ofstarvation, for the wagon roads over the mountains on the north sideof the Tennessee were most difficult at best, and soon likely tobecome impassable. The army was safe from the enemy till it chose toresume the offensive, provided it could be fed. He concluded hisdispatch by saying, "Of the rugged nature of this region I had noconception when I left Washington. I never travelled on such roadsbefore. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 890. ] Itwas only too evident that Halleck shared this ignorance, and hadadded to it a neglect to estimate the distances over these mountainsand through these valleys, and the relations of the points, hedirected Burnside to hold, with the immediate theatre of Rosecrans'soperations. On the same date as Meigs's report, Burnside was also sending a fullstatement of his situation and an explanation of his conduct. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 904. ] The telegraphic communication was openedjust as he finished his dispatch, and for the first time he had themeans of rapid intercourse with army headquarters. He patientlyexplained the misconceptions and cross purposes of the precedingfortnight, and showed how impossible and how ruinous would have beenany other action than that which he took. Halleck had said that itwould now be necessary to move the Army of the Ohio along the northside of the Tennessee till it should be opposite Chattanooga andreinforce Rosecrans in that way. Burnside pointed out that thiswould open the heart of East Tennessee to Bragg's cavalry ordetachments from his army. He offered to take the bolder course ofmoving down the south side of the rivers, covering Knoxville and thevalley as he advanced. Mr. Lincoln replied by authorizing Burnside to hold his presentpositions, sending Rosecrans, in his own way, what help he couldspare. [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 905. ] Halleck's answer was an amazingproof that he had never comprehended the campaign. He reiteratedthat Burnside's orders, before leaving Kentucky and continuouslysince, had been "to connect your right with General Rosecrans'sleft, so that if the enemy concentrated on one, the other would beable to assist. " [Footnote: _Id_. , p. 906. ] If this meant anything, it meant that Burnside was to keep within a day's march ofRosecrans; for two days was more than enough to fight out a battlelike Chickamauga. Yet he and everybody else knew that Burnside'ssupply route from Kentucky was through Cumberland Gap, and he hadwarmly applauded when Burnside turned that position, and byinvesting it in front and rear, had forced Frazer to surrender. Hehad explicitly directed Burnside to occupy and hold the upperHolston valley nearly or quite to the Virginia line, and one getsweary of repeating that between these places and Chattanooga was abreadth of two hundred miles of the kind of country Meigs haddescribed and more than ten days of hard marching. His presentorders are equally blind. Burnside is directed to reinforceRosecrans with "all your available force, " yet "East Tennessee mustbe held at all hazards, if possible. " To "hold at all hazards" mightbe understood, but what is the effect of the phrase "if possible"?It must amount in substance to authority to do exactly what Burnsidewas doing, --to hold East Tennessee with as small means as he thoughtpracticable, and to reinforce Rosecrans with what he could spare. It was, on the whole, fortunate for the country that Burnside wasnot in telegraphic communication with Washington sooner. Had he beenactually compelled to abandon East Tennessee on the 13th or 14th ofSeptember, incalculable mischief would have followed. The NinthCorps was _en route_ for Cumberland Gap, and it with all the trainsand droves on the road must either have turned back or pushed onblindly with no probability of effecting a junction with theTwenty-third Corps. Even as it was, the terror in East Tennessee, when it became known that they were likely to be abandoned, wassomething fearful. Public and private men united in passionateprotests, and the common people stood aghast. Two of the mostprominent citizens only expressed the universal feeling when, in adispatch to Mr. Lincoln, they used such language as this, -- "In the name of Christianity and humanity, in the name of God andliberty, for the sake of their wives and children and everythingthey hold sacred and dear on earth, the loyal people of Tennesseeappeal to you and implore you not to abandon them again to themerciless dominion of the rebels, by the withdrawal of the Unionforces from East Tennessee. " [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iv. P. 401. ] With the evidence of the ability of the Army of the Cumberland tohold its position at Chattanooga, there came a breathing spell and aquick end of the panic. It was seen that there was time to get alldesirable reinforcements to Rosecrans from the West, and Hooker wassent with two corps from the East, open lines of well-managedrailways making this a quicker assistance than could be given byeven a few days' marches over country roads. The culmination of theperil had been caused by the inactivity of the Army of the Potomac, which had permitted the transfer of Longstreet across four States;and now Hooker was sent from that army by a still longer routethrough the West to the vicinity of Bridgeport, thirty miles by railbelow Chattanooga on the Tennessee River, but nearer fifty by thecircuitous mountain roads actually used. It became evident also thatBurnside's army could only subsist by making the most of its ownlines of supply through Kentucky. To add its trains to those whichwere toiling over the mountains between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, would risk the starvation of the whole. Until a better line could beopened, Burnside was allowed to concentrate most of his forces inthe vicinity of Loudon, where he guarded the whole valley. Hiscavalry connected with Rosecrans on the north side of the Tennessee, and also held the line of the Hiwassee on the left. On the last day of September Burnside reported the concentration ofhis forces and submitted three alternate plans of assistingRosecrans: [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iii. P. 954. ]First, to abandon East Tennessee and move all his forces by thenorth bank of the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. This was whatHalleck had seemed to propose. Second, to cross the Holston andmarch directly against Bragg's right flank whilst Rosecrans shouldattack in front. This was essentially what Grant afterward did, putting Sherman in a position similar to that which Burnside wouldhave taken. Third, to march with 7000 infantry and 5000 cavalryentirely around Bragg by the east, and strike his line ofcommunications at Dalton or thereabouts. This had a strongresemblance to the strategy of Sherman next spring, when he forcedJohnston out of Dalton by sending McPherson to his rear at Resaca. Burnside added to it the plan of a march to the sea, proposing thatif Bragg pursued him, he should march down the railroad to Atlanta, destroying it as thoroughly as possible, and then make his way tothe coast, living on the country. The last of these plans was that which Burnside preferred andoffered to put into immediate execution. Neither of them was likelyto succeed at that moment, for Rosecrans was so far demoralized bythe effects of his late battle that he was in no condition to carryout any aggressive campaign with decisive energy. He declared infavor of the first [Footnote: _Id. _, pt. Iv. P. 72. ] (for they werecommunicated to him as well as to Halleck), and this only meant thathe wanted his army at Chattanooga reinforced by any and every means, though he could not supply them, and the fortifications were alreadyso strong that General Meigs reported that 10, 000 men could verysoon hold them against all Bragg's army. The plans, however, give usinteresting light on Burnside's character and abilities, and showthat he was both fertile in resources and disposed to adopt theboldest action. Halleck in reply said that distant expeditions intoGeorgia were not now contemplated, nor was it now necessary to joinRosecrans at Chattanooga. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. Xxx. Pt. Iv. P. 25. ] It was sufficient for Burnside to be in position to goto Rosecrans's assistance if he should require it. He was, however, to "hold some point near the upper end of the valley, " which keptalive the constant occasion for misunderstanding, since it impliedthe protection and occupation of all East Tennessee, and the generalthere in command was the only one who could judge what was necessaryto secure the object. The necessity for activity soon showed itself. About the 6th of October General Jones was reported to be showing adisposition to be aggressive, and Burnside determined to strike ablow at him again and with more force than that which had beeninterrupted a fortnight before. Willcox was ordered from CumberlandGap to Morristown with his four new Indiana regiments; the NinthCorps (having now only about 5000 men present for duty) was moved upthe valley also, whilst the Twenty-third Corps, with two brigades ofcavalry, was left in its positions near Loudon. The rest of thecavalry, under Shackelford, accompanied the movement up the valleyof which Burnside took command in person. Leaving the cavalry postat Bull's Gap and advancing with his little army, he found the enemystrongly posted about midway between the Gap and Greeneville. Engaging them and trying to hold them by a skirmishing fight, hesent Foster's cavalry brigade to close the passage behind them. Foster found the roads too rough to enable him to reach the desiredposition in time, and the enemy retreating in the night escaped. Thepursuit was pushed beyond the Watauga River, and a more thoroughdestruction was made of the railroad to and beyond the Virginialine. Considerable loss had been inflicted on the enemy and 150prisoners had been captured, but no decisive engagement had beenbrought about, Jones being wary and conscious of inferiority offorce. Willcox was left at Greeneville with part of the cavalry, while Burnside brought back the Ninth Corps to Knoxville. Theactivity was good for the troops and was successful in curbing theenemy's enterprise, besides encouraging the loyal inhabitants. Therewas now a lull in affairs till November, broken only by a mishap toColonel Wolford's brigade of cavalry on the south of the Holston, where he was watching the enemy's advanced posts in the direction ofAthens and Cleveland. Burnside had sent a flag of truce through thelines on the 19th of October, and the enemy taking advantage of it, delivered an unexpected blow upon Wolford, capturing 300 or 400 ofhis men and a battery of mountain howitzers, together with a wagontrain which was several miles from camp. [Footnote: OfficialRecords, vol. Xxxi. Pt. I. P. 273. ] Wolford heard that his train wasattacked and sent two regiments to protect it. These were surroundedby a superior force, and Wolford then brought up the rest of hiscommand, only 700 strong, and made a bold effort to rescue hiscomrades. This he did, with the loss of the prisoners mentioned andthe howitzers, which were taken after they had fired their lastcartridge. The wagons were burned, but the men bravely cut their wayout. Approaching Loudon, they were met by General Julius White withinfantry reinforcements. The tables were now turned on theConfederates, who fled over the Hiwassee again, losing in their turnabout 100 prisoners. [Footnote: _Id. _, pp. 5, 6. ] APPENDIX A _List of Letters and Dispatches relating to the campaign in theGreat Kanawha valley, 1861, which are not found in the publicationof the Official Records of the Union and Confederate armies (seefootnote, chapter iv. P. 60). _ Letters and Dispatches of General McClellan to General J. D. Cox, ofdates July 6th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 20th, August 1st. Letters and Dispatches of General J. D. Cox to General McClellan, ofdates July 4th, 6th, 10th, 17th. Letters and Dispatches of General Rosecrans to General Cox of datesJuly 26th, 29th, 31st, four of August 5th, one of August 6th, 8th, two of 13th, three of 16th, one of 17th, 18th, two of 20th, one eachof 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th. Letters and Dispatches of General Cox to General Rosecrans, of datesAugust 6th, 7th, 10th, 19th, 28th, two each of 30th and 31st, one ofSeptember 2d (enclosing Colonel Tyler's report of engagement atCross Lanes), 3d, 9th, 22d, October 5th (order of withdrawal fromSewell Mountain), two of October 7th, one each of 8th, 9th, three of10th, one of 16th. There are also missing numerous ones from and to Colonel Tyler, Colonel W. Sooy Smith, Colonel J. V. Guthrie, and other officers. APPENDIX B _Letters of Generals R. B. Hayes and George Crook as to thediscipline and conduct of the Kanawha Division in the campaign ofSeptember, 1862. The death of President Hayes has removed anyobjections to the publication of his letter. _ FREMONT, OHIO, 8th September, 1882. MY DEAR GENERAL, --Your note of the 4th instant came during a briefabsence from home. I appreciate your kindness and your friendlysuggestions. After sleeping on it, I am not inclined to depart frommy custom in dealing with attacks upon me.... Besides, to give acorrect relation of the Reno altercation would be to disparage anofficer who died in battle a few days after the affair, and whocannot now give his side of the controversy. One of the brigades of the division was commanded by General Crookand another by General Scammon, both regular army officersconspicuous for attention to strictness of discipline. GeneralScammon was at the time still colonel of the Twenty-third. Theregiment on that march repeatedly reported, as I was glad to do, nota single absentee on the first roll-call immediately after the halt. The altercation, in its general facts, was as you recall it. But theoccasion of it was this. The regiment halted to bivouac in astubble-field. The men got bundles of straw, or possibly of wheatunthreshed, from a stack in the field to lie upon. General Reno sawit. I was temporarily absent. The general, as you say, "in a roughway" accosted the men, and as I returned, I heard his language andretorted in behalf of my men, not in my own case at all, for he hadsaid nothing to me. Hence the row between us. I was told, while Iwas lying wounded, [Footnote: During the battle of SouthMountain. --J. D. C. ] that General Reno was greatly pleased by ourvigorous attack, and that he paid us a high compliment, expressinggratification that our difficulty had gone no further than it did. Now excuse my suggestion. Let officers tell the story whose namesare not called in question in the note referred to--say GeneralScammon, General Crook, and yourself. I am grateful for yourattention to this misrepresentation, and hope you will not differwidely from me as to the correctness of the course I take. Sincerely, (Signed) R. B. HAYES. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA, WHIPPLE BARRACKS, PRESCOTT, A. T. , November 27, 1882. MY DEAR GENERAL, --Referring to your letter of the 3d instant askingreplies to certain queries with reference to the conduct of theKanawha Division during the Antietam campaign, I can only replygenerally. The twenty years which have elapsed make my memoryindistinct, and I can now recall only prominent features orparticular incidents in which I was especially interested. Iremember distinctly, however, that the Kanawha Division comparedfavorably in discipline and general good conduct with the besttroops of the army. In my own brigade there was no straggling, or, if any, so little that it did not come to my notice. I am quite surethere was no pillaging in my brigade. My men probably took fencerails for their bivouac fires, and straw and hay for their beds, butto the best of my belief there was nothing done that could be calledpillaging. I heard, at the time, something with reference to a controversybetween Generals Reno and Hayes, but if ever I knew what it wasabout, I have forgotten it. In this matter it seems as if thestatement of General Hayes should be conclusive. I am very glad that you have interested yourself in refuting thenumberless charges which the writers of personal histories havefound it convenient to lay against the Kanawha Division, and whichin almost every instance are base slanders. The _personnel_ of thedivision should in itself be a sufficient refutation. The regimentswere mainly of '61 men from country districts who enlisted frommotives of patriotism, and as a rule were never disgraced by conductwhich many of the regiments enlisted in the large cities of the Eastwere notorious for throughout the army. The Kanawha Division did not belong to the Army of the Potomac, andit was therefore an easy matter to shift responsibility from its ownorganization by throwing it on the shoulders of the troops servingwith it. The subsequent reputation of this division is in itself asufficient answer, and I challenge history to show an organizationwhich was more distinguished for all soldierly qualities than theone you had the honor to command during the campaign, until thedeath of Reno gave you the Ninth Corps. You are at liberty to use this letter in any way you deem best, andI am only sorry that I can do no more to assist you. Very Sincerely, Your friend, GEORGE CROOK, Brig. Gen'l. To General J. D. Cox.