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 +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber's Note: | | | | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | Some footnotes have two anchors in the text, the second | | of these has 'a' appended to distinguish it from the | | first, i. E. [1] and [1a]. | | | | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+

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 [Illustration: The Impressment of an American Seaman]

SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONSTO THE WAR OF1812

BY

CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D. C. L. , LL. D. 

United States Navy

AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, " "THEINFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONAND EMPIRE, " "THE INTEREST OF AMERICAIN SEA POWER, " ETC. 

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

LONDONSAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANYLIMITED

PREFACE

The present work concludes the series of "The Influence of Sea Powerupon History, " as originally framed in the conception of the author. In the previous volumes he has had the inspiring consciousness ofregarding his subject as a positive and commanding element in thehistory of the world. In the War of 1812, also, the effect is real anddread enough; but to his own country, to the United States, as amatter of national experience, the lesson is rather that of theinfluence of a negative quantity upon national history. The phrasescarcely lends itself to use as a title; but it represents the truthwhich the author has endeavored to set forth, though recognizingclearly that the victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain doillustrate, in a distinguished manner, his principal thesis, thecontrolling influence upon events of naval power, even whentransferred to an inland body of fresh water. The lesson there, however, was the same as in the larger fields of war heretoforetreated. Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skilful combination. It mattersnot that the particular force be small. The art of war is the samethroughout; and may be illustrated as really, though lessconspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard, or the three units of the Horatii, as by a host of a hundredthousand. 

The interest of the War of 1812, to Americans, has commonly been feltto lie in the brilliant evidence of high professional tone andefficiency reached by their navy, as shown by the single-ship actions, and by the two decisive victories achieved by little squadrons uponthe lakes. Without in the least overlooking the permanent value ofsuch examples and such traditions, to the nation, and to the militaryservice which they illustrate, it nevertheless appears to the writerthat the effect may be even harmful to the people at large, if it bepermitted to conceal the deeply mortifying condition to which thecountry was reduced by parsimony in preparation, or to obscure thelessons thence to be drawn for practical application now. It isperhaps useless to quarrel with the tendency of mankind to turn itseyes from disagreeable subjects, and to dwell complacently upon thosewhich minister to self-content. We mostly read the newspapers in whichwe find our views reflected, and dispense ourselves easily with theless pleasing occupation of seeing them roughly disputed; but a writeron a subject of national importance may not thus exempt himself fromthe unpleasant features of his task. 

The author has thought it also essential to precede his work by asomewhat full exposition of the train of causes, which through a longseries of years led to the war. It may seem at first far-fetched to goback to 1651 for the origins of the War of 1812; but without suchpreliminary consideration it is impossible to understand, or to makedue allowance for, the course of Great Britain. It will be found, however, that the treatment of the earlier period is brief, and onlysufficient for a clear comprehension of the five years of intenseinternational strain preceding the final rupture; years the fullnarrative of which is indispensable to appreciating the grounds anddevelopment of the quarrel, --to realize what they fought each otherfor. 

That much of Great Britain's action was unjustifiable, and at timeseven monstrous, regarded in itself alone, must be admitted; but weshall ill comprehend the necessity of preparation for war, if weneglect to note the pressure of emergency, of deadly peril, upon astate, or if we fail to recognize that traditional habits of thoughtconstitute with nations, as with individuals, a compulsive moral forcewhich an opponent can control only by the display of adequate physicalpower. Such to the British people was the conviction of their rightand need to compel the service of their native seamen, wherever foundon the high seas. The conclusion of the writer is, that at a veryearly stage of the French Revolutionary Wars the United States shouldhave obeyed Washington's warnings to prepare for war, and to build anavy; and that, thus prepared, instead of placing reliance upon asystem of commercial restrictions, war should have been declared notlater than 1807, when the news of Jena, and of Great Britain's refusalto relinquish her practice of impressing from American ships, becameknown almost coincidently. But this conclusion is perfectly compatiblewith a recognition of the desperate character of the strife that GreatBritain was waging; that she could not disengage herself from it, Napoleon being what he was; and that the methods which she pursued didcause the Emperor's downfall, and her own deliverance, although theywere invasions of just rights, to which the United States should nothave submitted. 

If war is always avoidable, consistently with due resistance to evil, then war is always unjustifiable; but if it is possible that twonations, or two political entities, like the North and South in theAmerican Civil War, find the question between them one which neithercan yield without sacrificing conscientious conviction, or nationalwelfare, or the interests of posterity, of which each generation inits day is the trustee, then war is not justifiable only; it isimperative. In these days of glorified arbitration it cannot beaffirmed too distinctly that bodies of men--nations--have convictionsbinding on their consciences, as well as interests which are vital incharacter; and that nations, no more than individuals, may surrenderconscience to another's keeping. Still less may they rightfullypre-engage so to do. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by a triumphof the unjust in war. Subjugation to wrong is not acquiescence inwrong. A beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but thenation or man is disgraced who shirks an obligation to defend right. 

From 1803 to 1814 Great Britain was at war with Napoleon, withoutintermission; until 1805 single handed, thenceforth till 1812 mostlywithout other allies than the incoherent and disorganized mass of theSpanish insurgents. After Austerlitz, as Pitt said, the map of Europebecame useless to indicate distribution of political power. Thenceforth it showed a continent politically consolidated, organizedand driven by Napoleon's sole energy, with one aim, to crush GreatBritain; and the Continent of Europe then meant the civilized world, politically and militarily. How desperate the strife, the author in aprevious work has striven fully to explain, and does not intend hereto repeat. In it Great Britain laid her hand to any weapon she couldfind, to save national life and independence. To justify all hermeasures at the bar of conventional law, narrowly construed, isimpossible. Had she attempted to square herself to it she would havebeen overwhelmed; as the United States, had it adhered rigidly to itsConstitution, must have foregone the purchase of the territoriesbeyond the Mississippi. The measures which overthrew Napoleongrievously injured the United States; by international law grievouslywronged her also. Should she have acquiesced? If not, war wasinevitable. Great Britain could not be expected to submit todestruction for another's benefit. 

The author has been indebted to the Officers of the Public RecordsOffice in London, to those of the Canadian Archives, and to the Bureauof Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, forkind and essential assistance in consulting papers. He owes also anexpression of personal obligation to the Marquis of Londonderry forpermission to use some of the Castlereagh correspondence, bearing onthe peace negotiations, which was not included in the extensivepublished Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; and to Mr. Charles W. Stewart, the Librarian of the United States NavyDepartment, for inexhaustible patience in searching for, or verifying, data and references, needed to make the work complete on the navalside. 

 A. T. MAHAN. 

SEPTEMBER, 1905. 

CONTENTS

ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL CONDITIONS PageRemote origin of the causes of the War of 1812 1

Two principal causes: impressment and the carrying trade 2

Claim of Great Britain as to impressment 3

Counter-claim of the United States 4

Lack of unanimity among the American people 5

Prevailing British ideas as to sea power and its relations to carrying trade and impressment 9

The Navigation Acts 10

Distinction between "Commerce" and "Navigation" 11

History and development of the Navigation Acts, and of the national opinions relating to them 13

Unanimity of conviction in Great Britain 22

Supposed benefit to the British carrying trade from loss of the American colonies 23

British _entrepôt_ legislation 24

Relation of the _entrepôt_ idea to the Orders in Council of 1807 27

Colonial monopoly a practice common to all European maritime states 27

Effect of the Independence of the United States upon traditional commercial prepossessions 29

Consequent policy of Great Britain 29

Commercial development of the British transatlantic colonies during the colonial period 31

Interrelation of the continental and West India colonies of Great Britain 35

Bearing of this upon the Navigation Acts 36

Rivalry of American-built ships with British navigation during the colonial period 37

Resultant commercial rivalry after Independence 40

Consequent disagreements, derived from colonial restrictions, and leading to war 41

CHAPTER II

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO JAY'S TREATY

Rupture of the colonial relation 42

Transitional character of the period 1774-1794, to the United States 43

Epochal significance of Jay's Treaty 43

The question of British navigation, as affected by the loss of the colonies 45

British commercial expectations from the political weakness of the United States, 1783-1789 46

System advocated by Lord Sheffield 47

Based upon considerations of navigation and naval power 49

Navigation Acts essentially military in purpose 51

Jefferson's views upon this question 52

Imperial value of the British Navigation Act before American Independence 53

Influence of the inter-colonial trade at the same period 55

Essential rivalry between it and British trade in general 55

Common interest of continental America and of Great Britain in the West Indies 56

Pitt's Bill, of March, 1783 58

Controversy provoked by it in Great Britain 60

British jealousy of American navigation 63

Desire to exclude American navigation from British colonial trade 65

Lord Sheffield's pamphlet 65

Reply of the West India planters 66

Lapse of Pitt's bill 67

Navigation Acts applied in full rigor to intercourse between the United States and West Indies 68

This policy continues till Jay's Treaty 69

Not a wrong to the United States, though an injury 70

Naval impotence of the United States 71

Dependence on Portugal against Barbary pirates 72

Profit of Great Britain from this impotence 74

Apparent success of Sheffield's trade policy, 1783-1789 75

Increase of British navigation 75

American counteractive legislation after the adoption of the Constitution 76

Report of the committee of the British Privy Council on this subject, 1790 77

Aggressive spirit of the Navigation Acts 79

Change of conditions through American navigation laws 80

Recommendations of the British committee 81

Effects of the French Revolution 85

Collapse of French colonial system 85

Failure of Sheffield's policy, in supplying the West Indies from Canada 86

Great Britain's war necessities require aid of American shipping 86

Her resolve to deprive France of the same aid 88

Consequent lawless measures towards American ships and commerce 88

Jay's mission. --Impressment not mentioned in his instructions 88

CHAPTER III

FROM JAY'S TREATY TO THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1794-1807

Arbitrary war measures of Great Britain, 1793 89

Rule of 1756 90

Peculiar relation of the United States to this Rule 92

Jay's arrival in London 93

Characteristics of his negotiations 94

Great Britain concedes direct trade with West Indies 95

Rejection of this article by the Senate, on account of accompanying conditions 96

Concession nevertheless continued by British order 97

Reasons for this tolerance 97

Conditions of trade from Jay's mission to the Peace of 1801 97

No concession of the principle of the Rule of 1756 98

Renewal of war between Great Britain and France, 1803 99

Prosperity of American commerce 100

Question raised of "direct trade" 100

Decision in British Admiralty Court adverse to United States, 1805 101

United States subjected again to colonial regulation 103

Remonstrance and negotiation of Monroe, American Minister in London 104

Death of Pitt. Change of ministry in Great Britain. Position of Charles James Fox 105

Fox's attempt at compromise 108

The blockade of May 16, 1806 108

Its lawfulness contested by the United States 110

Its importance in history 112

Retaliatory commercial action by the United States 113

Pinkney sent to England as colleague to Monroe 113

Colonial trade, and impressment of seamen from American vessels, the leading subjects mentioned in their instructions 114

Historical summary of the impressment question 114

Opening of negotiations by Monroe and Pinkney 128

Death of Fox 131

Course of the negotiations 131

Provisional treaty, signed December 31, 1806 133

Rejected by United States Government 133

Monroe and Pinkney directed to reopen negotiations 133

Change of ministry in Great Britain. Canning becomes Foreign Secretary 134

The British Government refuses further negotiation 135

Monroe leaves England, Pinkney remaining as minister 135

"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" 135

Consistency of Jefferson's Administration on the subject of impressment 137

It neglects to prepare for war 138

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL TO WAR

Reservation of the British Government in signing the treaty of December 31, 1806 141

The Berlin Decree 142

Ambiguity of its wording 143

The question of "private property, " so called, embarked in commercial venture at sea. Discussion 144

Wide political scope of the Berlin Decree 148

Twofold importance of the United States in international policy 149

Consequent aims of France and Great Britain 149

British Order in Council of January 7, 1807 150

Attitude of the United States Government 152

Military purpose of the Berlin Decree and the Continental System 153

The "Chesapeake" affair 155

Conference concerning it between Canning and Monroe 156

Action of President Jefferson 160

Use made of it by Canning 161

Correspondence concerning the "Chesapeake" affair 161

Rose appointed envoy to Washington to negotiate a settlement 165

Failure of his mission 167

Persistent British refusal to punish the offending officer 169

Significance of the "Chesapeake" affair in the relations of the two nations 168

Its analogy to impressment 170

Enforcement of the Berlin Decree by Napoleon 172

Its essential character 174

The Decree and the Continental System are supported by the course of the American Government 175

Pinkney's conviction of Great Britain's peril 177

The British Orders in Council, November, 1807 177

Their effect upon the United States 178

Just resentment in America 178

Action of the Administration and Congress 181

The Embargo Act of December, 1807 182

Explanations concerning it to Great Britain 183

Its intentions, real and alleged 185

Its failure, as an alternative to war 186

Jefferson's aversion to the carrying trade 187

Growing ill-feeling between the United States and Great Britain 190

Relief to Great Britain from the effects of the Continental System, by the Spanish revolt against Napoleon 191

Depression of United States industries under the Embargo 192

Difficulty of enforcement 194

Evasions and smuggling 195

The Embargo beneficial to Canada and Nova Scotia 198

Effects in Great Britain 199

Relief to British navigation through the Embargo 200

Effect of the Embargo upon American revenue 202

Numbers of American vessels remain abroad, submitting to the Orders in Council, and accepting British licenses and British convoy 203

Napoleon's Bayonne Decree against them; April 17, 1808 203

Illustrations of the working of Napoleon's Decrees and of the Orders in Council 204

Vigorous enforcement of the Embargo in 1808 206

Popular irritation and opposition 207

Act for its further enforcement, January 9, 1809 208

Evidences of overt resistance to it 209

Act for partial repeal, introduced February 8 210

Conflicting opinions as to the Embargo, in and out of Congress 211

The Non-Intercourse Act, March 1, 1809 214

Its effect upon commercial restrictions 215

Canning's advances, in consequence of Non-Intercourse Act 215

Instructions sent to Erskine, British Minister at Washington 216

Erskine's misleading communication of them, April 18, 1809 218

Consequent renewal of trade with Great Britain 219

Erskine disavowed. Non-Intercourse resumed, August 9, 1809 219

Orders in Council of November, 1807, revoked; and substitute issued, April 26, 1809 220

Consequent partial revival of American commerce 220

Francis J. Jackson appointed as Erskine's successor 221

His correspondence with the American Secretary of State 222

Further communication with him refused 225

Criticism of the American side of this correspondence 226

Wellesley succeeds Canning as British Foreign Secretary 229

Jackson's dismissal communicated to Wellesley by Pinkney 229

Wellesley delays action 230

British view of the diplomatic situation 231

Failure of the Non-Intercourse Act 232

Difficulty of finding a substitute 233

Act of May 1, 1810. --Its provisions 234

Napoleon's Rambouillet Decree, March 23, 1810 235

Act of May 1, 1810, communicated to France and Great Britain 236

Napoleon's action. Champagny's letter, August 5, 1810 237

Madison accepts it as revoking the French Decrees 238

The arguments for and against this interpretation 239

Great Britain refuses to accept it 242

Statement of her position in the matter 243

Wellesley's procrastinations 245

Pinkney states to him the American view, at length, December 10, 1810 245

Wellesley's reply 246

Inconsistent action of the French Government 247

Non-Intercourse with Great Britain revived by statute, March 2, 1811 249

The American Minister withdraws from London, February 28, 1811 251

Non-Intercourse with Great Britain remains in vigor to, and during, the war 252

Augustus J. Foster appointed British Minister to the United States, February, 1811 252

His instructions 253

His correspondence with the Secretary of State 254

Settlement of the "Chesapeake" affair 255

The collision between the "President" and the "Little Belt" 256

Special session of Congress summoned 259

The President's Message to Congress, November 5, 1811 259

Increase of the army voted 259

Debate on the navy 260

Congress refuses to increase the navy, January 27, 1812 263

Embargo of ninety days preparatory to war, April 4 263

The evasions of this measure 264

Increasing evidence of the duplicity of Napoleon's action 266

Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1812 269

Consequent British declaration 270

Use of these papers by Barlow, American Minister to France 271

The spurious French Decree of April 28, 1811, communicated to Barlow 272

Communicated to the British Government 273

Considerations influencing the British Government 274

The Orders in Council revoked 276

Madison sends a war message to Congress, June 1, 1812 279

Declaration of war, June 18, 1812 279

Conditions of the army, navy, and treasury 279

CHAPTER V

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

Limitations on American action through deficient sea power 283

Warfare against commerce considered 284

Its financial and political effects 285

Its military bearing 285

Distinction between military and commercial blockade 286

Commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying by cruisers 287

Recognition of this by Napoleon 287

Commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger navy; by cruisers, of the weaker 288

Inefficiency of the American Government shown in the want of naval preparation 289

Conditions in the army even worse 290

Jefferson's sanguine expectations 291

Propriety of the invasion of Canada discussed 292

The United States, weak on the seaboard, relatively strong towards Canada 295

Function of the seaboard in the war; defensive 296

Offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence 298

Application of this principle; in general, and to 1812 298

Conditions on the Canada frontier, favoring the offensive by the United States 300

Importance of the Great Lakes to military operations 301

Over-confidence of Americans 303

Corresponding apprehension of British officers 304

Decisive points on the line between the countries 305

Importance of the Indians as an element in the situation 306

Proper offensive policy of the United States 307

Natural advantages favoring the United States 309

The land frontier the proper scene of American offensive action 310

Seaboard conditions, for offence and defence 311

CHAPTER VI

EARLY CRUISES AND ENGAGEMENTS. HULL'S OPERATIONS AND SURRENDER

Composition of Commodore Rodgers' squadron at outbreak of war 314

Indecisions of the Navy Department 315

Question between small squadrons and single cruisers for commerce-destroying 315

Opinions of prominent officers 316

British convoy system for protecting trade 319

The Navy Department formulates a plan of operations 320

Discussion of its merits 321

Rodgers sails without receiving Department's plan 322

Encounter with the "Belvidera" 323

The cruise unproductive, offensively 324

But not therefore unsuccessful, defensively 325

Its effect upon the movements of British vessels 326

The sailing of the "Constitution" 328

Chased by a British squadron 329

Cruise of the "Constitution" under Hull 329

Engagement with the "Guerrière" 330

Hull and Rodgers meet in Boston 335

Misfortune on land 336

Wretched condition of the American army 336

Appointment of Henry Dearborn and William Hull as generals. Hull to command in the Northwest 337

Isaac Brock, the British general commanding in Upper Canada 337

His well-considered scheme of operation 338

Incompetency of the American War Department 339

Hull takes command at Dayton 340

Advances to Detroit 341

Crosses to Canada 341

Brock causes seizure of Michilimackinac 341

Hull's delays in Canada, before Malden 343

The danger of his position 343

The British attack his communications 345

Hull recrosses to Detroit 345

Brock's difficulties 346

Moves against Hull, and reaches Malden 346

Crosses to Detroit, and advances 346

Hull surrenders 347

Criticism of his conduct 348

Extenuating circumstances 349

Ultimate responsibility lies upon the Governments which had been in power for ten years 350

CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AFTER HULL'S SURRENDER. EUROPEAN EVENTS BEARING ON THE WAR

Brock returns to Niagara from Detroit 351

Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, arranges with Dearborn a suspension of hostilities 352

Suspension disapproved by the American Government. Hostilities resumed 353

Brock's advantage by control of the water 353

Two of his vessels on Lake Erie taken from him by Lieutenant Elliott, U. S. Navy 354

Brock's estimate of this loss 356

American attack upon Queenston 357

Repulsed, but Brock killed 357

Abortive American attack on the Upper Niagara 358

Inactivity of Dearborn on the northern New York frontier 359

Military inefficiency throughout the United States 360

Improvement only in the naval situation on the lakes 361

Captain Chauncey appointed to command on Lakes Erie and Ontario 361

His activity and efficiency 362

Disadvantages of his naval base, Sackett's Harbor 363

Chauncey's early operations, November, 1812 364

Fleet lays up for the winter 366

Effect of his first operations 366

General Harrison succeeds to Hull's command 367

Colonel Procter commands the British forces opposed 367

His instructions from Prevost and Brock 367

Harrison's plan of operations 368

The American disaster at Frenchtown 370

Effect upon Harrison's plans 371

The army remains on the defensive, awaiting naval control of Lake Erie 371

Chauncey visits Lake Erie 374

Disadvantages of Black Rock as a naval station 374

Chauncey selects Presqu'Isle (Erie) instead 375

Orders vessels built there 375

Advantages and drawbacks of Erie as a naval base 375

Commander Perry ordered to the lakes 376

Assigned by Chauncey to command on Lake Erie 376

Naval conditions on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at close of 1812 377

Contemporary European conditions 378

Napoleon's expedition against Russia 379

Commercial embarrassments of Great Britain 379

Necessity of American supplies to the British armies in Spain 381

Preoccupation of the British Navy with conditions in Europe and the East 382

Consequent embarrassment from the American war 383

Need of the American market 384

Danger to British West India trade from an American war 384

Burden thrown upon the British Admiralty 385

British anxiety to avoid war 385

CHAPTER VIII

OCEAN WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE--PRIVATEERING--BRITISHLICENSES--NAVAL ACTIONS: "WASP" AND "FROLIC, " "UNITED STATES"AND "MACEDONIAN"

Consolidation of British transatlantic naval commands 387

Sir John Borlase Warren commander-in-chief 387

British merchant ships forbidden to sail without convoy 388

Continued hope for restoration of peace 389

Warren instructed to make propositions 390

Reply of the American Government 391

Cessation of impressment demanded. Negotiation fails 391

Warren's appreciation of the dangers to British commerce 392

Extemporized character of the early American privateering 394

Its activities therefore mainly within Warren's station 394

Cruise of the privateer "Rossie, " Captain Barney 395

Privateering not a merely speculative undertaking 396

Conditions necessary to its success 397

Illustrated by the privateer "America" 398

Comparative immunity of American shipping and commerce at the beginning of hostilities 399

Causes for this 400

Controversial correspondence between Warren and the Admiralty 401

Policy of the Admiralty. Its effects 404

American ships of war and privateers gradually compelled to cruise in distant seas 406

American commerce excluded from the ocean 406

Sailing of the squadrons of Rodgers and Decatur 407

Their separation 408

Cruise of Rodgers' squadron 409

British licenses to American merchant vessels 410

Action between the "Wasp" and "Frolic" 412

Cruise of the "Argus, " of Decatur's division 415

Action between the "United States" and "Macedonian" 416

The "United States" returns with her prize 422

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

VOLUME ONE. 

THE IMPRESSMENT OF AN AMERICAN SEAMAN _Frontispiece_ From a drawing by Stanley M. Arthurs. 

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS Page 6 From the painting by Marchant, after Sully, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. 

JOHN JAY Page 88 From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bedford (Jay) House, Katonah, N. Y. 

JAMES MONROE Page 104 From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the possession of Hon. T. Jefferson Coolidge. 

THOMAS JEFFERSON Page 120 From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. 

JAMES MADISON Page 223 From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. 

THE CHASE OF THE _Belvidera_ Page 322 From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman. 

THE FORECASTLE OF THE _Constitution_ DURING THE CHASE Page 328 From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl. 

CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL Page 330 From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the painting by Gilbert Stuart. 

THE BURNING OF THE _Guerrière_ Page 334 From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl. 

CAPTAIN STEPHEN DECATUR Page 420 From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. 

MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS. 

VOLUME ONE. 

Theatre of Land and Coast Warfare Page 283

The Atlantic Ocean, showing the positions of the Ocean Actions of the War of 1812 and the Movements of the Squadrons in July and August, 1812 Page 326

Plan of the Engagement between the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_ Page 332

Map of Lake Frontier to illustrate Campaigns of 1812-1814 Page 370

The Cruises of the Three American Squadrons in the Autumn of 1812 Page 408

Plan of the Engagement between the _United States_ and _Macedonian_ Page 418

Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812

ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL CONDITIONS

The head waters of the stream of events which led to the War of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain, must be sought far backin the history of Europe, in the principles governing commercial, colonial, and naval policy, accepted almost universally prior to theFrench Revolution. It is true that, before that tremendous epoch wasreached, a far-reaching contribution to the approaching change inmen's ideas on most matters touching mercantile intercourse, and thetrue relations of man to man, of nation to nation, had been made bythe publication, in 1776, of Adam Smith's "Inquiry into the Nature andCauses of the Wealth of Nations;" but, as is the case with most markedadvances in the realm of thought, the light thus kindled, thoughfinding reflection here and there among a few broader intellects, wasunable to penetrate at once the dense surface of prejudice andconservatism with which the received maxims of generations hadincrusted the general mind. Against such obstruction even the mostpopular of statesmen--as the younger Pitt soon after thisbecame--cannot prevail at once; and, before time permitted theBritish people at large to reach that wider comprehension of issues, whereby alone radical change is made possible, there set in an era ofreaction consequent upon the French Revolution, the excesses of whichinvolved in one universal discredit all the more liberal ideas thatwere leavening the leaders of mankind. 

The two principal immediate causes of the War of 1812 were theimpressment of seamen from American merchant ships, upon the highseas, to serve in the British Navy, and the interference with thecarrying trade of the United States by the naval power of GreatBritain. For a long time this interference was confined by the BritishMinistry to methods which they thought themselves able to defend--asthey did the practice of impressment--upon the ground of rights, prescriptive and established, natural or belligerent; although theAmerican Government contended that in several specific measures nosuch right existed, --that the action was illegal as well asoppressive. As the war with Napoleon increased in intensity, however, the exigencies of the struggle induced the British cabinet toformulate and enforce against neutrals a restriction of trade which itconfessed to be without sanction in law, and justified only upon theplea of necessary retaliation, imposed by the unwarrantable course ofthe French Emperor. These later proceedings, known historically as theOrders in Council, [1] by their enormity dwarfed all previous causes ofcomplaint, and with the question of impressment constituted the vitaland irreconcilable body of dissent which dragged the two states intoarmed collision. Undoubtedly, other matters of difficulty arose fromtime to time, and were productive of dispute; but either they were ofcomparatively trivial importance, easily settled by ordinarydiplomatic methods, or there was not at bottom any vital difference asto principle, but only as to the method of adjustment. For instance, in the flagrant and unpardonable outrage of taking men by force fromthe United States frigate "Chesapeake, " the British Government, although permitted by the American to spin out discussion over aperiod of four years, did not pretend to sustain the act itself; theact, that is, of searching a neutral ship of war. Whatever the motiveof the Ministry in postponing redress, their pretexts turned uponpoints of detail, accessory to the main transaction, or upon thesubsequent course of the United States Government, which showedconscious weakness by taking hasty, pettish half-measures; instead ofabstaining from immediate action, and instructing its minister topresent an ultimatum, if satisfaction were shirked. 

In the two causes of the war which have been specified, the differencewas fundamental. Whichever was right, the question at stake was ineach case one of principle, and of necessity. Great Britain neverclaimed to impress American seamen; but she did assert that hernative-born subjects could never change their allegiance, that she hadan inalienable right to their service, and to seize them whereverfound, except within foreign territory. From an admitted premise, thatthe open sea is common to all nations, she deduced a commonjurisdiction, in virtue of which she arrested her vagrant seamen. Thisargument of right was reinforced by a paramount necessity. In a lifeand death struggle with an implacable enemy, Great Britain withdifficulty could keep her fleet manned at all; even with indifferentmaterial. The deterioration in quality of her ships' companies wasnotorious; and it was notorious also that numerous British seamensought employment in American merchant ships, hoping there to findrefuge from the protracted confinement of a now dreary maritime war. Resort to impressment was not merely the act of a high-handedGovernment, but the demand of both parties in the state, coerced bythe sentiment of the people, whose will is ultimately irresistible. Noministry could hope to retain power if it surrendered the claim totake seamen found under a neutral flag. This fact was thoroughlyestablished in a long discussion with United States plenipotentiaries, five years before the war broke out. 

On the other hand, the United States maintained that on the sea commonthe only jurisdiction over a ship was that of its own nation. Shecould not admit that American vessels there should be searched, forother purposes than those conceded to the belligerent by internationallaw; that is, in order to determine the nature of the voyage, toascertain whether, by destination, by cargo, or by persons carried, the obligations of neutrality were being infringed. If there wasreasonable cause for suspicion, the vessel, by accepted law andprecedent, might be sent to a port of the belligerent, where thequestion was adjudicated by legal process; but the actual captor couldnot decide it on the spot. On the contrary, he was bound, to theutmost possible, to preserve from molestation everything on board theseized vessel; in order that, if cleared, the owner might undergo nodamage beyond the detention. So deliberate a course was not suited tothe summary methods of impressment, nor to the urgent needs of theBritish Navy. The boarding officer, who had no authority to take awaya bale of goods, decided then and there whether a man was subject toimpressment, and carried him off at once, if he so willed. 

It is to the credit of the American Government under Jefferson, that, though weak in its methods of seeking redress, it went straight backof the individual sufferer, and rested its case unswervingly on thebroad principle. [2] That impressment, thus practised, swept inAmerican seamen, was an incident only, although it grievouslyaggravated the injury. Whatever the native allegiance of individualson board any vessel on the open ocean, their rights were not to beregulated by the municipal law of the belligerent, but by that of thenation to which the ship belonged, of whose territory she wasconstructively a part, and whose flag therefore was dishonored, ifacquiescence were yielded to an infringement of personal liberty, except as conceded by obligations of treaty, or by the general law ofnations. Within British waters, the United States suffered no wrong bythe impressment of British subjects--the enforcement of localmunicipal law--on board American vessels; and although it wassuggested that such visits should not be made, and that an arrivingcrew should be considered to have the nationality of their ship, thisconcession, if granted, would have been a friendly limitation by GreatBritain of her own municipal jurisdiction. It therefore could not beurged upon the British Government by a nation which took its standresolutely upon the supremacy of its own municipal rights, on boardits merchant shipping on the high seas. 

It is to be noted, furthermore, that the voice of the people in theUnited States, the pressure of influence upon the Government, was notas unanimous as that exerted upon the British Ministry. The feeling ofthe country was divided; and, while none denied the grievous wrongdone when an American was impressed, a class, strong at least inintellectual power, limited its demands to precautions against suchmistakes and to redress when they occurred. The British claim tosearch, with the object of impressing British subjects, was consideredby these men to be valid. Thus Gouverneur Morris, who on asemi-official visit to London in 1790 had had occasion to remonstrateupon the impressment of Americans in British ports, and who, as apamphleteer, had taken strong ground against the measures of theBritish Government injurious to American commerce, wrote as follows in1808 about the practice of seizing British subjects in American ships:"That we, the people of America, should engage in ruinous warfare tosupport a rash opinion, that foreign sailors in our merchant ships areto be protected against the power of their sovereign, is downrightmadness. " "Why not, " he wrote again in 1813, while the war was raging, "waiving flippant debate, lay down the broad principle of nationalright, on which Great Britain takes her native seamen from ourmerchant ships? Let those who deny the right pay, suffer, and fight, to compel an abandonment of the claim. Men of sound mind will see, andmen of sound principle will acknowledge, its existence. " In hisopinion, there was but one consistent course to be pursued by thosewho favored the war with Great Britain, which was to insist that sheshould, without compensation, surrender her claim. "If that ground betaken, " he wrote, "the war [on our part] will be confessedly, as it isnow impliedly, unjust. "[3] Morris was a man honorably distinguished inour troubled national history--a member of the Congress of theRevolution and of the Constitutional Convention, a trained lawyer, apractised financier, and an experienced diplomatist; one whothroughout his public life stood high in the estimation of Washington, with whom he was in constant official and personal correspondence. Itis to be added that those to whom he wrote were evidently in sympathywith his opinions. 

 [Illustration: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS From the painting by Marchant, after Sully, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. ]

So again Representative Gaston, of North Carolina, a member of thesame political party as Morris, speaking from his seat in the House inFebruary, 1814, [4] maintained the British doctrine of inalienableallegiance. "Naturalization granted in another country has no effectwhatever to destroy the original primary allegiance. " EvenAdministration speakers did not deny this, but they maintained thatthe native allegiance could be enforced only within its territoriallimits, not on the high seas. While perfectly firm and explicit as tothe defence of American seamen, --even to the point of war, ifneedful, --Gaston spoke of the British practice as a right. "If youcannot by substitute obtain an abandonment of the right, or practice, to search our vessels, regulate it so as to prevent its abuse; waivingfor the present, not relinquishing, your objections to it. " Heexpressed sympathy, too, for the desperate straits in which GreatBritain found herself. "At a time when her floating bulwarks were herwhole safeguard against slavery, she could not view without alarm andresentment the warriors who should have manned those bulwarks pursuinga more gainful occupation in American vessels. Our merchant ships werecrowded with British seamen, most of them deserters from their shipsof war, and all furnished with fraudulent protections to prove themAmericans. To us they were not necessary. " On the contrary, "they atethe bread and bid down the wages of native seamen, whom it was ourfirst duty to foster and encourage. " This competition with nativeseamen was one of the pleas likewise of the New England opposition, too much of which was obstinately and reprehensibly factious. "Manythousands of British seamen, " said Governor Strong of Massachusetts, in addressing the Legislature, May 28, 1813, "deserted that servicefor a more safe and lucrative employment in ours. " Had they not, "thehigh price for that species of labor would soon have induced asufficient number of Americans to become seamen. It appears, therefore, that British seamen have been patronized at the expense ofour own; and should Great Britain now consent to relinquish the _rightof taking her own subjects_, it would be no advantage to our nativeseamen; it would only tend to reduce their wages by increasing thenumbers of that class of men. "[5] Gaston further said, that NorthCarolina, though not a commercial state, had many native seamen; but, "at the moment war was declared, though inquiry was made, I could nothear of a single native seaman detained by British impressment. "

It is desirable, especially in these days, when everything is to bearbitrated, that men should recognize both sides of this question, andrealize how impossible it was for either party to acquiesce in anyother authority than their own deciding between them. "As I never hada doubt, " said Morris, "so I thought it a duty to express myconviction that British ministers would not, _dared not_, submit tomediation a question of essential right. "[6] "The way to peace is openand clear, " he said the following year. "Let the right of search andimpressment be acknowledged as maxims of public law. "[7]

These expressions, uttered in the freedom of private correspondence, show a profound comprehension of the constraint under which theBritish Government and people both lay. It was impossible, at such amoment of extreme national peril, to depart from political convictionsengendered by the uniform success of a policy followed consistentlyfor a hundred and fifty years. For Great Britain, the time had longsince passed into a dim distance, when the national appreciation ofthe sea to her welfare was that of mere defence, as voiced byShakespeare:

 England, hedged in with the main, That water-walled bulwark, still secure And confident from foreign purposes. [8]

 This little world, This precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the office of a wall, Or as a moat defensive to a house Against the envy of less happier lands. [9]

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the perception of GreatBritain's essential need to predominate upon the sea had dawned uponmen's minds, and thence had passed from a vague national consciousnessto a clearly defined national line of action, adopted first through arecognition of existing conditions of inferiority, but after these hadceased pursued without any change of spirit, and with no importantchanges of detail. This policy was formulated in a series of measures, comprehensively known as the Navigation Acts, the first of which waspassed in 1651, during Cromwell's Protectorate. In 1660, immediatelyafter the Restoration, it was reaffirmed in most essential features, and thenceforward continued to and beyond the times of which we arewriting. In form a policy of sweeping protection, for the developmentof a particular British industry, --the carrying trade, --it was soonrecognized that, in substance, its success had laid the foundations ofa naval strength equally indispensable to the country. Upon thisground it was approved even by Adam Smith, although in directopposition to the general spirit of his then novel doctrine. Whileexposing its fallacies as a commercial measure, he said it exemplifiedone of two cases in which protective legislation was to be justified. "The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon thenumber of its sailors and shipping. The Act of Navigation thereforevery properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of GreatBritain the monopoly of the trade of their own country. .. . It is notimpossible that some of the regulations of this famous Act may haveproceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, asthough they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. .. . The Act is not favorable to foreign commerce, nor to the opulencewhich can arise from that; but defence is of much more importance thanopulence. The Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest of all thecommercial regulations of England. "[10] It became a dominantprepossession of British statesmen, even among Smith's converts, inthe conduct of foreign relations, that the military power of the statelay in the vast resources of native seamen, employed in its merchantships. Even the wealth returned to the country, by the monopoly of theimperial markets, and by the nearly exclusive possession of thecarrying trade, which was insured to British commerce by the elaborateregulations of the Act, was thought of less moment. "Every commercialconsideration has been repeatedly urged, " wrote John Adams, the firstUnited States Minister to Great Britain, "but to no effect; seamen, the Navy, and power to strike an awful blow to an enemy at the firstoutbreak of war, are the ideas which prevail. "[11] This object, andthis process, are familiar to us in these later days under the term"mobilization;" the military value of which, if rapidly effected, iswell understood. 

In this light, and in the light of the preceding experience of ahundred and fifty years, we must regard the course of the BritishMinistry through that period, extremely critical to both nations, which began when our War of Independence ended, and issued in the Warof 1812. We in this day are continually told to look back to ourfathers of the Revolutionary period, to follow their precepts, toconfine ourselves to the lines of their policy. Let us then eitherjustify the British ministries of Pitt and his successors, in theirobstinate adherence to the traditions they had received, or let usadmit that even ancestral piety may be carried too far, and thatvenerable maxims must be brought to the test of existing conditions. 

The general movement of maritime intercourse between countries iscommonly considered under two principal heads: Commerce andNavigation. The first applies to the interchange of commodities, however effected; the second, to their transportation from port toport. A nation may have a large commerce, of export and import, carried in foreign vessels, and possess little shipping of its own. This is at present the condition of the United States; and once, infar gone days, it was in great measure that of England. In such casethere is a defect of navigation, consequent upon which there will be adeficiency of native seamen; of seamen attached to the country and itsinterests, by ties of birth or habit. For maritime war such a statewill have but small resources of adaptable naval force; a conditiondangerous in proportion to its dependence upon control of the sea. Therefore the attention of British statesmen, during the period inwhich the Navigation Act flourished, fastened more and more upon thenecessity of maintaining the navigation of the kingdom, asdistinguished from its commerce. Subsidiary to the movement ofcommerce, there is a third factor, relatively stationary, theconsideration of which is probably less familiar now than it was tothe contemporaries of the Navigation Act, to whom it was known underthe name _entrepôt_. This term was applied to those commercialcentres--in this connection maritime centres--where goods accumulateon their way to market; where they are handled, stored, ortransshipped. All these processes involve expenditure, which inures tothe profit of the port, and of the nation; the effect being the exactequivalent of the local gains of a railroad centre of the present day. It was a dominant object with statesmen of the earlier period to drawsuch accumulations of traffic to their own ports, or nations; to forcetrade, by ingenious legislation, or even by direct coercion, to bringits materials to their own shores, and there to yield to them theadvantages of the _entrepôt_. Thus the preamble to one of the seriesof Navigation Acts states, as a direct object, the "making thisKingdom a staple[12] [emporium], not only of the commodities of ourplantations, but also of the commodities of other countries, andplaces, for the supply of the plantations. "[13] An instructive exampleof such indirect effort was the institution of free ports; portswhich, by exemption from heavy customary tolls, or by the admission offoreign ships or goods, not permitted entrance to other nationalharbors, invited the merchant to collect in them, from surroundingregions, the constituents of his cargoes. On the other hand, theColonial System, which began to assume importance at the time of theNavigation Act, afforded abundant opportunity for the compulsion oftrade. Colonies being part of the mother country, and yet transoceanicwith reference to her, maritime commerce between them and foreigncommunities could by direct legislation be obliged first to seek theparent state, which thus was made the distributing centre for boththeir exports and imports. 

For nearly three centuries before the decisive measures taken by theParliament of the Commonwealth, the development and increase ofEnglish shipping, by regulation of English trade, had been recognizedas a desirable object by many English rulers. The impulse had takenshape in various enactments, giving to English vessels privileges, exclusive or qualified, in the import or export carriage of thekingdom; and it will readily be understood that the matter appeared ofeven more pressing importance, when the Navy depended upon themerchant service for ships, as well as for men; when the war fleets ofthe nation were composed of impressed ships, as well as manned byimpressed sailors. These various laws had been tentative in character. Both firmness of purpose and continuity of effort were lacking tothem; due doubtless to the comparative weakness of the nation in thescale of European states up to the seventeenth century. During thereigns of the first two Stuarts, this weakness was emphasized byinternal dissensions; but the appreciation of the necessity for someradical remedy to the decay of English naval power remained andincreased. To this conviction the ship-money of Charles the Firstbears its testimony; but it was left to Cromwell and his associates toformulate the legislation, upon which, for two centuries to come, thekingdom was thought to depend, alike for the growth of its merchantshipping and for the maintenance of the navy. All that preceded hasinterest chiefly as showing the origin and growth of an enduringnational conviction, with which the United States came into collisionimmediately after achieving independence. 

The ninth of October, 1651, is the date of the passing of the Act, thegeneral terms of which set for two hundred years the standard forBritish legislation concerning the shipping industry. The title of themeasure, "Goods from foreign ports, by whom to be imported, " indicatedat once that the object in view was the carrying trade; navigation, rather than commerce. Commerce was to be manipulated and forced intoEnglish bottoms as an indispensable agency for reaching Britishconsumers. At this time less than half a century had elapsed since thefirst English colonists had settled in Massachusetts and Virginia. TheBritish plantation system was still in its beginnings, alike inAmerica, Asia, and Africa. When the then recent Civil War ended, inthe overthrow of the royal power, it had been "observed with concernthat the merchants of England had for several years usually freightedDutch ships for fetching home their merchandise, because the freightswere lower than in English ships. Dutch ships, therefore, were usedfor importing our own American products, while English ships layrotting in harbor. "[14] "Notwithstanding the regulations made forconfining that branch of navigation to the mother country, it is saidthat in the West India Islands there used, at this time, out of fortyships to be thirty-eight ships Dutch bottoms. "[15] English marinersalso, for want of employment, went into the Dutch service. In this wayseamen for the navy disappeared, just as, at a later day, they didinto the merchant shipping of the United States. 

The one great maritime rival of England, Holland, had thus engrossed, not only the carrying trade of Europe at large, most of which, fromport to port, was done by her seamen, but that of England as well. Even of the English coasting trade much was done by Dutch ships. Underthis competition, the English merchant marine was dwindling, and hadbecome so inadequate that, when the exclusion of foreigners wasenforced by the Act, the cry at once arose in the land that theEnglish shipping was not sufficient for the work thus thrust upon it. "Although our own people have not shipping enough to import from allparts what they want, they are needlessly debarred from receiving newsupplies of merchandise from other nations, who alone can, and untilnow did, import it. "[16] The effect of this decadence of shipping uponthe resources of men for the navy is apparent. 

The existence of strained relations between England and Hollandfacilitated the adoption of the first Navigation Act, which, as thingswere, struck the Dutch only; they being the one great carryingcommunity in Europe. Although both the letter and the purpose of thenew law included in its prohibitions all foreign countries, thecommercial interests of other states were too slight, and theircommercial spirit too dull, to take note of the future effect uponthemselves; whether absolutely, or in relation to the maritime powerof Great Britain, the cornerstone of which was then laid. This firstAct directed that no merchandise from Asia, Africa, or America, including therein English "plantations, " as the colonies were thenstyled, [17] should be imported into England in other thanEnglish-built ships, belonging to English subjects, and of which "themaster and mariners are also, for the most part of them, of the peopleof this commonwealth. " This at once reserved a large part of theexternal trade to English ships; and also, by the regulation of thelatter, constituted them a nursery for English seamen. To the generaltenor of this clause, confining importation wholly to English vessels, an exception was made for Europe only; importations from any part ofwhich was permitted to "such foreign ships and vessels as do truly andproperly belong to the people of that country or place of which thesaid goods are the growth, production, or manufacture. "[18] Foreignmerchantmen might therefore import into England the products of theirown country; but both they and English vessels must ship such cargoesin the country of origin, not at any intermediate port. The purpose ofthese provisos, especially of the second, was to deprive Holland ofthe profit of the middleman, or the _entrepôt_, which she had enjoyedhitherto by importing to herself from various regions, warehousing thegoods, and then re-exporting. The expense of these processes, pocketedby Dutch handlers, and the exaction of any dues levied by the DutchTreasury, reappeared in increased cost to foreign consumers. Thisappreciation of the value of the _entrepôt_ underlay much of thesubsequent colonial regulation of England, and actuated the famousOrders in Council of 1807, which were a principal factor in causingthe War of 1812. A second effect of these restrictions, which in latertimes was deemed even more important than the pecuniary gain, was tocompel English ships to go long voyages, to the home countries of thecargoes they sought, instead of getting them near by in Dutch depots. This gave a corresponding development to the carrying trade--thenavigation--of the Commonwealth; securing greater employment for shipsand seamen, increasing both their numbers and experience, andcontributing thereby to the resources of the navy in men. "Aconsiderable carrying trade would be lost to us, and would remain withthe merchants of Holland, of Hamburg, and other maritime towns, if ourmerchants were permitted to furnish themselves by short voyages tothose neighboring ports, and were not compelled to take uponthemselves the burden of bringing these articles from the countrieswhere they were produced. "[19]

The Act of 1660, officially known as that of 12 Charles II. , modifiedthe provisos governing the European trade. The exclusion of goods ofEuropean origin from all transportation to England, save in ships oftheir own nation, was to some extent removed. This surrender wascensured by some, explicitly, because it again enabled the Dutch tocollect foreign articles and send them to England, thereby "permittingcompetition with this country in the longer part of the voyage;" tothe injury, therefore, of British navigation. The remission, thoughreal, was less than appeared; for the prohibitions of the Commonwealthwere still applied to a large number of specified articles, theproduce chiefly of Russia and Turkey, which could be imported only intheir national ships, or those of England. As those countries hadsubstantially no long voyage shipping, trade with them was to allpractical purposes confined to English vessels. [20] The concession toforeign vessels, such as it was, was further qualified by heavierduties, called aliens' duties, upon their cargoes; and by therequirement that three-fourths of their crew, entering English ports, should be of the same nationality as the ship. The object of thisregulation was to prevent the foreign state from increasing itstonnage, by employing seamen other than its own. This went beyond mereprotection of English vessels, and was a direct attack, though byEnglish municipal law, upon the growth of foreign shipping. 

This purpose indeed was authoritatively announced from the bench, construing the Act in the decision of a specific case. "Parliament hadwisely foreseen that, if they restrained the importation orexportation of European goods, unless in our own ships, and mannedwith our own seamen, other states would do the same; and this, in itsconsequences, would amount to a prohibition of all such goods, whichwould be extremely detrimental to trade, and in the end defeat thevery design of the Act. It was seen, however, that many countries inEurope, as France, Spain, and Italy, could more easily buy ships thanbuild them; that, on the other hand, countries like Russia, and othersin the North, had timber and materials enough for building ships, butwanted sailors. It was from a consideration of this inaptness in mostcountries to accomplish a complete navigation, that the Parliamentprohibited the importation of most European goods, unless in shipsowned and navigated by English, or in ships of the _build of_ andmanned by sailors of that country of which the goods were the growth. The consequence would be that foreigners could not make use of shipsthey bought, though English subjects might. This would force them tohave recourse to our shipping, and the general intent of the Act, tosecure the carrying trade to the English, would be answered as far asit possibly could. " It was therefore ruled that the tenor of the Actforbade foreigners to import to England in ships not of their ownbuilding; and, adds the reporter, "This exposition of the Act ofNavigation is certainly the true one. "[21] Having thus narrowedforeign competition to the utmost extent possible to municipalstatutes, Parliament made the carrying industry even more exclusivelythan before a preserve for native seamen. The Commonwealth'srequirement, that "the most" of the crew should be English, waschanged to a definite prescription that the master and three-fourthsof the mariners should be so. 

Under such enactments, with frequent modification of detail, but noessential change of method, British shipping and seamen continued tobe "protected" against foreign competition down to and beyond the Warof 1812. In this long interval there is no change of conception, norany relaxation of national conviction. The whole history affords aremarkable instance of persistent policy, pursued consecutively forfive or six generations. No better evidence could be given of its holdupon the minds of the people, or of the serious nature of the obstacleencountered by any other state that came into collision with it; asthe United States during the Napoleonic period did, in matters oftrade and carriage, but especially in the closely related question ofImpressment. 

Whether the Navigation Act, during its period of vigor, was successfulin developing the British mercantile marine and supporting the BritishNavy has been variously argued. The subsequent growth of Britishnavigation is admitted; but whether this was the consequence of themeasure itself has been disputed. It appears to the writer that thosewho doubt its effect in this respect allow their convictions of thestrength of economical forces to blind them to the power ofunremitting legislative action. To divert national activities fromnatural channels into artificial may be inexpedient and wasteful; andit may be reasonable to claim that ends so achieved are not reallysuccesses, but failures. Nevertheless, although natural causes, tillthen latent, may have conspired to further the development which theNavigation Act was intended to promote, and although, since itsabolition, the same causes may have sufficed to sustain the imposingnational carrying trade built up during its continuance, it isdifficult to doubt the great direct influence of the Act itself;having in view the extent of the results, as well as the corroborativesuccess of modern states in building up and maintaining otherdistinctly artificial industries, sometimes to the injury of thenatural industries of other peoples, which the Navigation Act also inits day was meant to effect. 

The condition of British navigation in 1651 has been stated. Theexperience of the remaining years of the Protectorate appears to haveconfirmed national opinion as to the general policy of the Act, and tohave suggested the modifications of the Restoration. To trace the fullsequence of development, in legislation or in shipping, is not herepermissible; the present need being simply to give an account, and anexplanation, of the strength of a national prepossession, which in itsmanifestation was a chief cause of the events that are the theme ofthis book. A few scattered details, taken casually, seem strikingly tosustain the claims of the advocates of the system, bearing always inmind the depression of the British shipping industry before thepassage of the law. In 1728 there arrived in London from all partsbeyond sea 2052 ships, of which only 213 were under foreign flags;less than one in nine. In Liverpool, in 1765, of 1533 entered andcleared, but 135 were foreign; in Bristol, the same year, of 701 but91 foreign. Of the entire import of that year only 28 per cent, inmoney value, came from Europe; the carriage of the remaining 72 percent was confined to British ships. It may, of course, be maintainedthat this restriction of shipping operated to the disadvantage of thecommerce of the kingdom; that there was direct pecuniary loss. Thiswould not be denied, for the object of the Act was less national gainthan the upbuilding of shipping as a resource for the navy. Nevertheless, at this same period, in 1764, of 810 ships entering thegreat North German commercial centre, Hamburg, 267--overone-third--were British; the Dutch but 146, the Hamburgers themselves157. A curious and suggestive comparison is afforded by the same portin 1769. From the extensive, populous, and fruitful country of France, the _entrepôt_ of the richest West Indian colony, Santo Domingo, thereentered Hamburg 203 ships, of which not one was French; whereas fromGreat Britain there came a slightly larger total, 216, of which 178were British. 

Such figures seem to substantiate the general contemporary opinion ofthe efficacy of the Navigation Act, and to support the particularclaim of a British writer of the day, that the naval weakness ofHolland and France was due to the lack of similar measures. "The Dutchhave indeed pursued a different policy, but they have thereby fallento a state of weakness, which is now the object of pity, or ofcontempt. It was owing to the want of sailors, and not to the fault oftheir officers, that the ten ships of the line, which during theirlate impudent quarrel with Britain had been stipulated to join theFrench fleet, never sailed. "[22] "The French Navy, which at all timesdepended chiefly upon the West India trade for a supply of seamen, must have been laid up, if the war (of American Independence) hadcontinued another year. "[23] Whatever the accuracy of thesestatements, [24]--and they are those of a well-informed man, --theyrepresented a general conviction, not in Great Britain only but inEurope, of the results of the Navigation legislation. A French writerspeaks of it as the source of England's greatness, [25] and sums up hisadmiration in words which recognize the respective shares of naturaladvantages and sagacious supervision in the grand outcome. "Called tocommerce by her situation, it became the spirit of her government andthe lever of her ambition. In other monarchies, it is privateindividuals who carry on commerce; but in that happy constitution itis the state, or the nation in its entirety. "

In Great Britain itself there was substantial unanimity. This coloredall its after policy towards its lately rebellious and now independentchildren, who as carriers had revived the once dreaded rivalry of theDutch. To quote one writer, intimately acquainted with the wholetheory and practice of the Navigation Acts, they "tend to theestablishment of a monopoly; but our ancestors . .. Considered thedefence of this island from foreign invasion as the first law in thenational policy. Judging that the dominion of the land could not bepreserved without possessing that of the sea, they made every effortto procure to the nation a maritime power of its own. They wished thatthe merchants should own as many ships, and employ as many mariners aspossible. To induce, and sometimes to force, them to this applicationof their capital, restrictions and prohibitions were devised. Theinterests of commerce were often sacrificed to this object. " Yet heclaims that in the end commerce also profited, for "the increase inthe number of ships became a spur to seek out employment for them. " In1792, British registered shipping amounted to 1, 365, 000 tons, employing 80, 000 seamen. Of these, by common practice, two-thirds--say50, 000--were available for war, during which it was the rule to relaxthe Act so far as to require only one-fourth of the crew to beBritish. "That the increase in our shipping is to be ascribed to ournavigation system appears in the application of it to the trade of theUnited States. When those countries were part of our plantations, agreat portion of our produce was transported to Great Britain and ourWest India Islands in American bottoms; they had a share in thefreight of sugars from those islands to Great Britain; they builtannually more than one hundred ships, which were employed in thecarrying trade of Great Britain; but since the Independence of thosestates, since their ships have been excluded from our plantations, andthat trade is wholly confined to British ships, we have gained thatshare of our carrying trade from which they are now excluded. "[26] Incorroboration of the same tendency, it was also noted during the warwith the colonies, that "the shipyards of Britain in every port werefull of employment, so that new yards were set up in places neverbefore so used. "[27] That is, the war, stopping the intrusion ofAmerican colonists into the British carrying trade, just as theNavigation Act prohibited that of foreign nations, created a demandfor British ships to fill the vacancy; a result perfectly in keepingwith the whole object of the navigation system. But when hostilitieswith France began again in 1793, and lasted with slight intermissionfor twenty years, the drain of the navy for seamen so limited thedevelopment of the British navigation as to afford an opening forcompetition, of which American maritime aptitude took an advantage, threatening British supremacy and arousing corresponding jealousy. 

Besides the increase of national shipping, the idea of _entrepôt_received recognition in both the earlier and later developments of thesystem. Numerous specified articles, produced in English colonies, could be carried nowhere but to England, Ireland, or another colony, where they must be landed before going farther. Because regularlylisted, such articles were technically styled "enumerated;""enumerated commodities being such as must first be landed in Englandbefore being taken to foreign parts. "[28] From this privilege Irelandwas soon after excepted; enumerated goods for that country havingfirst to be landed in England. [29] Among such enumerated articles, tobacco and rice held prominent places and illustrate the system. Ofthe former, in the first half of the eighteenth century, it wasestimated that on an average seventy-two million pounds were sentyearly to England, of which fifty-four million were re-exported; anexport duty of sixpence per pound being then levied, besides the costof handling. Rice, made an enumerated article in 1705, exemplifiesaptly the ideas which influenced the multifold manipulation of thenation's commerce in those days. The restriction was removed in 1731, so far as to permit this product to be sent direct from South Carolinaand Georgia to any part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre; but onlyin British ships navigated according to the Act. In this there is apartial remission of the _entrepôt_ exaction, while the nursing of thecarrying trade is carefully guarded. The latter was throughout thesuperior interest, inseparably connected in men's minds with thesupport of the navy. At a later date, West India sugar received thesame indulgence as rice; it being found that the French were gainingthe general European market, by permitting French vessels to carry theproducts of their islands direct to foreign continental ports. Riceand sugar for northern Europe, however, still had to be landed inEngland before proceeding. 

The colonial trade in general was made entirely subservient to thesupport and development of English shipping, and to the enrichment ofEngland, as the half-way storehouse. Into England foreign goods couldbe imported in some measure by foreign vessels, though under markedrestrictions and disabilities; but into the colonies it was earlyforbidden to import any goods, whatever their origin, except inEnglish-built ships, commanded and manned in accordance with the Act. Further, even in such ships they must be imported from England itself, not direct; not from the country of origin. The motive for thisstatute of 1663[30] is avowed in the preamble: to be with a view ofmaintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between them and themother country, keeping the former in a firmer dependence upon thelatter, and to make this kingdom the staple both of the commodities ofthe plantations, and of other countries in order to supply them. Further, it was alleged that it was the usage of nations to keep theirplantation trade to themselves. [31] In compensation for thissubjection of their trade to the policy of the mother country, thesupplying of the latter with West India products was reserved to thecolonists. 

Thus, goods for the colonies, as well as those from the colonies, fromor to a foreign country, --from or to France, for example, --must firstbe landed in England before proceeding to the ultimate destination. Yet even this cherished provision, enforced against the foreigner, wasmade to subserve the carrying trade--the leading object; for, uponre-exportation to the colonies, there was allowed a drawback of dutiespaid upon admission to England, and permanent upon residents there. The effect of this was to make the articles cheaper in the coloniesthan in England itself, and so to induce increased consumption. It wastherefore to the profit of the carrier; and the more acceptable, because the shipping required to bring home colonial goods was much inexcess of that required for outward cargoes, to the consequentlowering of outward freights. "A regard to the profits of freights, "writes a contemporary familiar with the subject, "as much as theaugmentation of seamen, dictated this policy. "[32] From theconditions, it did not directly increase the number of seamen; but byhelping the shipping merchant it supported the carrying industry as awhole. 

Upon the legislative union of Scotland with England, in 1707, this_entrepôt_ privilege, with all other reserved advantages of Englishtrade and commerce, was extended to the northern kingdom, and was aprominent consideration in inducing the Scotch people to accept apolitical change otherwise distasteful, because a seeming sacrifice ofindependence. Before this time they had had their own navigationsystem, modelled on the English; the Acts of the two parliamentsembodying certain relations of reciprocity. Thenceforward, theNavigation Act is to be styled more properly a British, than anEnglish, measure; but its benefits, now common to all Great Britain, were denied still to Ireland. 

It will be realized that the habit of receiving exclusive favors atthe expense of a particular set of people--the colonist and theforeigner--readily passed in a few generations into an unquestioningconviction of the propriety, and of the necessity, of such measures. It should be easy now for those living under a high protective tariffto understand that, having built up upon protection a principalnational industry, --the carrying trade, --involving in itsramifications the prosperity of a large proportion of thewealth-producers of the country, English statesmen would fear to touchthe fabric in any important part; and that their dread would beintensified by the conviction, universally held, that to remove any ofthese artificial supports would be to imperil at the same time theRoyal Navy, the sudden expansion of which, from a peace to a warfooting, depended upon impressment from the protected merchant ships. It will be seen also that with such precedents of _entrepôt_, for thenourishing of British commerce, it was natural to turn to the samemethods, --although in a form monstrously exaggerated, --when Napoleonby his decrees sought to starve British commerce to death. Inconception and purpose, the Orders in Council of 1807 were simply adevelopment of the _entrepôt_ system. Their motto, "No trade savethrough England, "--the watchword of the ministry of Canning, Castlereagh, and Perceval, 1807-12, --was merely the revival towardsthe United States, as an independent nation, of the methods observedtowards her when an assemblage of colonies, forty years before; theobject in both cases being the welfare of Great Britain, involved inthe monopoly of an important external commerce, the material of which, being stored first in her ports, paid duty to her at the expense ofcontinental consumers. 

Nor was there in the thought of the age, external to Great Britain, any corrective of the impressions which dominated her commercialpolicy. "Commercial monopoly, " wrote Montesquieu, "is the leadingprinciple of colonial intercourse;" and an accomplished West Indian, quoting this phrase about 1790, says: "The principles by which thenations of Europe were influenced were precisely the same: (1) tosecure to themselves respectively the most important productions oftheir colonies, and (2) to retain to themselves exclusively theadvantage of supplying the colonies with European goods andmanufactures. "[33] "I see, " wrote John Adams from France, in 1784, "that the French merchants regard their colonies as English merchantsconsidered us twenty years ago. " The rigor of the French colonialtrade system had been relaxed during the War of American Independence, as was frequently done by all states during hostilities; but whenLouis XVI. , in 1784, sought to continue this, though in an extremelyqualified concession, allowing American vessels of under sixty tons alimited trade between the West Indies and their own country, themerchants of Marseilles, Bordeaux, Rochelle, Nantes, St. Malo, allsent in excited remonstrances, which found support in the provincialparliaments of Bordeaux and Brittany. [34]

A further indication of the economical convictions of the Frenchpeople, and of the impression made upon Europe generally by thesuccess of the British Navigation Act, is to be seen in the fact thatin 1794, under the Republic, the National Convention issued a decreeidentical in spirit, and almost identical in terms, with the EnglishAct of 1651. In the latter year, said the report of the Committee tothe Convention, "one-half the navigation of England was carried on byforeigners. She has imperceptibly retaken her rights. Towards the year1700 foreigners possessed no more than the fifth part of thisnavigation; in 1725 only a little more than the ninth; in 1750 alittle more than a twelfth; and in 1791 they possessed only thefourteenth part of it. "[35] It is perhaps unnecessary to add that thecolonial system of Spain was as rigid as that of Great Britain, thoughfar less capably administered. So universal was the opinion of theday as to the relation of colonies to navigation, that a contemporaryAmerican, familiar with the general controversy, wrote: "Thoughspeculative politicians have entertained doubts in regard to favorableeffects from colonial possessions, taking into view the expenses oftheir improvement, defence, and government, no question has been madebut that the monopoly of their trade greatly increases the commerce ofthe nations to which they are appurtenant. "[36] Very soon after theadoption of the Constitution, the Congress of the United States, forthe development of the carrying trade, enacted provisions analogous tothe Navigation Act, so far as applicable to a nation having nocolonies, but with large shipping and coasting interests to befavored. 

To such accepted views, and to such traditional practice, theindependence of the thirteen British colonies upon the Americancontinent came not only as a new political fact, but as a portentousbreach in the established order of things. As such, it was regardedwith uneasy jealousy by both France and Spain; but to Great Britain itwas doubly ominous. Not only had she lost a reserved market, singlythe most valuable she possessed, but she had released, howeverunwillingly, a formidable and recognized rival for the carrying trade, the palladium of her naval strength. The market she was not withouthopes of regaining, by a compulsion which, though less direct, wouldbe in effect as real as that enforced by colonial regulation; but thecapacity of the Americans as carriers rested upon natural conditionsnot so easy to overcome. The difficulty of the problem was increasedby the fact that the governments of the world generally were awakingto the disproportionate advantages Great Britain had been reaping fromthem for more than a century, during which they had listlesslyacquiesced in her aggressive absorption of the carriage of the seas. America could count upon their sympathies, and possible co-operation, in her rivalry with the British carrier. "It is manifest, " wrote Coxein 1794, "that a prodigious and almost universal revolution in theviews of nations has taken place with regard to the carrying trade. "When John Adams spoke of the United States retaliating upon GreatBritain, by enacting a similar measure of its own, the minister ofPortugal, then a country of greater weight than now, replied: "Not anation in Europe would suffer a Navigation Act to be made by any otherat this day. That of England was made in times of ignorance, when fewnations cultivated commerce, and no country but she understood orcared anything about it, but now all courts are attentive to it;"[37]so much so, indeed, that it has been said this was the age ofcommercial treaties. It was the age also of commercial regulation, often mistaken and injurious, which found its ideals largely in theNavigation Act of Great Britain, and in the resultant extraordinaryprocesses of minute and comprehensive interference, with every speciesof commerce, and every article of export or import; for, while thegeneral principles of the Navigation Act were few and simple enough, in application they entailed a watchful and constant balancing ofadvantages by the Board of Trade, and a consequent manipulation of thecourse of commerce, --a perfectly idealized and sublimated protection. The days of its glory, however, were passing fast. Great Britain wasnow in the position of one who has been first to exploit a greatinvention, upon which he has an exclusive patent. Others were nowentering the field, and she must prepare for competition, in which shemost of all feared those of her own blood, the children of her loins;for the signs of the menacing conditions following the War ofIndependence had been apparent some time before the revolt of thecolonies gained for them liberty of action, heretofore checked infavor of the mother country. In these conditions, and in the nationalsentiment concerning them, are to be found the origin of a course ofaction which led to the War of 1812. 

Under the Navigation Act, and throughout the colonial period, thetransatlantic colonies of Great Britain had grown steadily; developinga commercial individuality of their own, depending in each upon localconditions. The variety of these, with the consequent variety ofoccupations and products, and the distance separating all from themother country, had contributed to develop among them a certain degreeof mutual dependence, and consequent exchange; the outcome of whichwas a commercial system interior to the group as a whole, and distinctfrom the relations to Great Britain borne by them individually andcollectively. There was a large and important intercolonialcommerce, [38] consistent with the letter of the Navigation Act, aswell as a trade with Great Britain; and although each of these exertedan influence upon the other, it was indirect and circuitous. The twowere largely separate in fact, as well as in idea; and the interchangebetween the various colonies was more than double that with the mothercountry. It drew in British as well as American seamen, and wasconsidered thus to entail the disadvantage that, unless America werethe scene of war, the crews there were out of reach of impressment;that measure being too crude and unsystematic to reach effectively sodistant a source of supply. Curiously enough, also, by an act passedin the reign of Queen Anne, seamen born in the American colonies wereexempted from impressment. [39] "During the late Civil War (of AmericanIndependence) it has been found difficult sufficiently to man ourfleet, from the seamen insisting that, since they had been born inAmerica, they could not be pressed to serve in the British navy. "[40]In these conditions, and especially in the difficulty ofdistinguishing the place of birth by the language spoken, is seen theforeshadowing of the troubles attending the practice of Impressment, after the United States had become a separate nation. 

The British American colonies were divided by geographical conditionsinto two primary groups: those of the West India Islands, and those ofthe Continent. The common use of the latter term, in the thought andspeech of the day, is indicated by the comprehensive adjective"Continental, " familiarly applied to the Congress, troops, currency, and other attributes of sovereignty, assumed by the revolted coloniesafter their declaration of independence. Each group had specialcommercial characteristics--in itself, and relatively to GreatBritain. The islands, whatever their minor differences of detail, ortheir mutual jealousies, or even their remoteness from oneanother, --Jamaica being a thousand miles from her easternsisters, --were essentially a homogeneous body. Similarity of latitudeand climate induced similarity of social and economical conditions;notably in the dependence on slave labor, upon which the industrialfabric rested. Their products, among which sugar and coffee were themost important, were such as Europe did not yield; it was therefore totheir advantage to expend labor upon these wholly, and to depend uponexternal sources for supplies of all kinds, including food. Theirexports, being directed by the Navigation Act almost entirely uponGreat Britain, were, in connection with Virginia tobacco, the mostlucrative of the "enumerated" articles which rendered tribute to the_entrepôt_ monopoly of the mother country. It was in this respectparticularly, as furnishing imports to be handled and re-exported, that the islands were valuable to the home merchants. To the welfareof the body politic they contributed by their support of the carryingtrade; for the cargoes, being bulky, required much tonnage, and theentire traffic was confined to British ships, manned three-fourths byBritish seamen. As a market also the islands were of consequence; alltheir supplies coming, by law, either from or through Great Britain, or from the continental colonies. Intercourse with foreign states wasprohibited, and that with foreign colonies allowed only under rare anddisabling conditions. But although the West Indies thus maintained alarge part of the mother country's export trade, the smallness oftheir population, and the simple necessities of the slaves, who formedthe great majority of the inhabitants, rendered them as Britishcustomers much inferior to the continental colonies; and thisdisparity was continually increasing, for the continent was growingrapidly in numbers, wealth, and requirements. In the five years1744-48, the exports from Great Britain to the two quarters werenearly equal; but a decade later the continent took double the amountthat the islands demanded. The figures quoted for the period 1754-58are: to the West Indies, £3, 765, 000; to North America, £7, 410, 000. [41]In the five years ending 1774 the West Indies received £6, 748, 095; thethirteen continental colonies, £13, 660, 180. [42]

Imports from the continent also supported the carrying trade of GreatBritain, but not to an extent proportionate to those from the islands;for many of the continental colonies were themselves large carriers. The imports to them, being manufactured articles, less bulky than theexports of the islands, also required less tonnage. The most markedsingle difference between the West India communities and those of thecontinent was that the latter, being distributed on a nearly north andsouth line, with consequent great divergences of climate and products, were essentially not homogeneous. What one had, another had not. Suchdifferences involve of course divergence of interests, with consequentcontentions and jealousies, the influence of which was felt mostpainfully prior to the better Union of 1789, and never can whollycease to act; but, on the other hand, it tends also to promoteexchange of offices, where need and facility of transport combine tomake such exchange beneficial to both. That the intercourse betweenthe continental colonies required a tonnage equal to that employedbetween them and the West Indies, --testified by the return of 1770before quoted, [43]--shows the existence of conditions destinedinevitably to draw them together. The recognition of such mutualdependence, when once attained, furthers the practice of mutualconcession for the purpose of combined action. Consequently, in theprotracted struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal forces inNorth America, the former prevailed, though not till after long andpainful wavering. 

While thus differing greatly among themselves in the nature of theirproductions, and in their consequent wants, the continental colonistsas a whole had one common characteristic. Recent occupants of a new, unimproved, and generally fertile country, they turned necessarily tothe cultivation of the soil as the most remunerative form of activity, while for manufactured articles they depended mainly upon externalsupplies, the furnishing of which Great Britain reserved to herself. For these reasons they afforded the great market which they were toher, and which by dint of habit and of interest they long continued tobe. But, while thus generally agricultural by force of circumstances, the particular outward destinations of their surplus products varied. Those of the southern colonies, from Maryland to Georgia, were classedas "enumerated, " and, with the exception of the rice of South Carolinaand Georgia, partially indulged as before mentioned, must be directedupon Great Britain. Tobacco, cotton, indigo, pitch, tar, turpentine, and spars of all kinds for ships, were specifically named, andconstituted much the larger part of the exports of those colonies. These were carried also chiefly by British vessels, and not bycolonial. The case was otherwise in the middle colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and in Connecticut and Rhode Island of theeastern group. They were exporters of provisions, --of grain, flour, and meat, the latter both as live stock and salted; of horses also. Asthe policy of the day protected the British farmer, these articleswere not required to be sent to Great Britain; on the contrary, grainwas not allowed admission except in times of scarcity, determined bythe price of wheat in the London market. The West Indies, therefore, were the market of the middle colonies; the shortness of the voyage, and the comparatively good weather, after a little southing had beengained, giving a decisive advantage over European dealers in thetransportation of live animals. Flour also, because it kept badly inthe tropics, required constant carriage of new supplies from sourcesnear at hand. Along with provisions the continental vessels tookmaterials for building and cooperage, both essential to the industryof the islands, --to the housing of the inhabitants, and to thetransport of their sugar, rum, and molasses. In short, so great wasthe dependence of the islands upon this trade, that a well-informedplanter of the time quotes with approval the remark of "a verycompetent judge, " that, "if the continent had been wholly in foreignhands, and England wholly precluded from intercourse with it, it isvery doubtful whether we should now have possessed a single acre inthe West Indies. "[44]

Now this traffic, while open to all British shipping, was very largelyin the hands of the colonists, who built ships decidedly cheaper thancould be done in England, and could distribute their tonnage invessels too small to brave the Atlantic safely, but, from theirnumbers and size, fitted to scatter to the numerous small ports ofdistribution, which the badness of internal communications renderedadvantageous for purposes of supply. A committee of the Privy Councilof Great Britain, constituted soon after the independence of theUnited States to investigate the conditions of West India trade, reported that immediately before the revolt the carriage between theislands and the continent had occupied 1610 voyages, in vesselsaggregating 115, 634 tons, navigated by 9718 men. These transportedwhat was then considered "the vast" American cargo, of £500, 000outward and £400, 000 inward. But the ominous feature from the point ofview of the Navigation Act was that this was carried almost wholly inAmerican bottoms. [45] In short, not to speak of an extensive practiceof smuggling, facilitated by a coast line too long and indented to beeffectually watched, --mention of which abounds in contemporaryannals, [46]--a very valuable part of the British carrying trade was inthe hands of the middle colonists, whose activity, however, did notstop even there; for, not only did they deal with foreign WestIndies, [47] but the cheapness of their vessels, owing to the abundanceof the materials, permitted them to be used also to advantage in adirect trade with southern Europe, their native products being for themost part "not enumerated. " As early as 1731, Pennsylvania employedeight thousand tons of shipping, while the New England colonies at thesame time owned forty thousand tons, distributed in six hundredvessels, manned by six thousand seamen. 

The New Englanders, like their countrymen farther south, were mostlyfarmers; but the more rugged soil and severer climate gave them littleor no surplus for export. For gain by traffic, for material forexchange, they therefore turned to the sea, and became the greatcarriers of America, as well as its great fishers. An Englishauthority, writing of the years immediately preceding the War ofIndependence, states that most of the seamen sailing out of thesouthern ports were British; from the middle colonies, half Britishand half American; but in the New England shipping he admitsthree-fourths were natives. [48] This tendency of British seamen totake employment in colonial ships is worthy of note, as foreshadowingthe impressment difficulties of a later day. These, like most of thedisagreements which led to the War of 1812, had their origin inante-revolutionary conditions. For example, Commodore Palliser, anofficer of mark, commanding the Newfoundland station in 1767, reportedto the Admiralty the "cruel custom, " long practised by commanders offishing ships, of leaving many men on the desert coast ofNewfoundland, when the season was over, whereby "these men wereobliged to sell themselves to the colonists, or piratically run offwith vessels, which they carry to the continent of America. By thesepractices the Newfoundland fishery, supposed to be one of the mostvaluable nurseries for seamen, [49] has long been an annual drain. "[50]In the two years, 1764-65, he estimates that 2, 500 seamen thus went tothe colonies; in the next two years, 400. The difference was probablydue to the former period being immediately after a war, the effects ofwhich it reflected. 

The general conditions of 1731 remained thirty years later, simplyhaving become magnified as the colonies grew in wealth and population. In 1770 twenty-two thousand tons of shipping were annually built bythe continental colonists. They even built ships for Great Britain;and this indulgence, for so it was considered, was viewed jealously bya class of well-informed men, intelligent, but fully imbued with theideas of the Navigation Act, convinced that the carrying trade was thecorner-stone of the British Navy, and realizing that where ships werecheaply built they could be cheaply sailed, even if they paid higherwages. It is true, and should be sedulously remembered, especially nowin the United States, that the strength of a merchant shipping lies inits men even more than in its ships; and therefore that the policy ofa country which wishes a merchant marine should be to allow its shipsto be purchased where they most cheaply can, in order that the ownermay be able to spend more on his crew, and the nation consequently tokeep more seamen under its flag. But in 1770 the relative conditionsplaced Great Britain under serious disadvantages towards America inthe matter of ship-building; for the heavy drafts upon her native oakhad caused the price to rise materially, and even the forests ofcontinental Europe felt the strain, while the colonies had scarcelybegun to touch their resources. In 1775, more than one-third of theforeign trade of Great Britain was carried in American-built ships;the respective tonnage being, British-built, 605, 545; American, 373, 618. [51]

British merchants and ship-owners knew also that the colonial carrierswere not ardent adherents of the Navigation Act, but conducted theiroperations in conformity with it only when compelled. [52] They tradedwith the foreigner as readily as with the British subject; and, whatwas quite unpardonable in the ideas of that time, after selling acargo in a West Indian port, instead of reloading there, they wouldtake the hard cash of the island to a French neighbor, buying of himmolasses to be made into rum at home. In this commercial shrewdnessthe danger was not so much in the local loss, or in the singletransaction, for in the commercial supremacy of England the money waspretty sure to find its way back to the old country. The sting wasthat the sharp commercial instinct, roving from port to port, with akeen scent for freight and for bargains, maintained a close rivalryfor the carrying trade, which was doubly severe from the naturaladvantages of the shipping and the natural aptitudes of theship-owners. Already the economical attention of the New Englanders tothe details of their shipping business had been noted, and had earnedfor them the name of the Dutchmen of North America; an epithet thanwhich there was then none more ominous to British ears, and especiallywhere with the carrying trade was associated the twin idea of anursery of seamen for the British Navy. 

A fair appreciation of the facts and relations, summarized in thepreceding pages from an infinitude of details, is necessary to acorrect view of the origin and course of the misunderstandings anddisagreements which finally led to the War of 1812. In 1783, therestoration of peace and the acknowledgment of the independence of theformer colonies removed from commerce the restrictions incident tohostilities, and replaced in full action, essentially unchanged, thenatural conditions which had guided the course of trade in colonialdays. The old country, retaining all the prepossessions associatedwith the now venerable and venerated Navigation Act, saw herselfconfronted with the revival of a commercial system, a commercialindependence, of which she had before been jealous, and which could nolonger be controlled by political dependence. It was to be feared thatsupplying the British West Indies would increase American shipping, and that British seamen would more and more escape into it, withconsequent loss to British navigation, both in tonnage and men, anddiscouragement to British maritime industries. Hence, by the ideas ofthe time, was to be apprehended weakness for war, unless someeffective check could be devised. 

What would have been the issue of these anxieties, and of the measuresto which they gave rise, had not the French Revolution intervened toaggravate the distresses of Great Britain, and to constrain her toviolent methods, is bootless to discuss. It remains true that, bothbefore and during the conflict with the French Republic and Empire, the general character of her actions, to which the United States tookexception, was determined by the conditions and ideas that have beenstated, and can be understood only through reference to them. Nosooner had peace been signed, in 1783, than disagreements sprang upagain from the old roots of colonial systems and ideals. To theseessentially was due the detailed sequence of events which, influencedby such traditions of opinion and policy as have been indicated, brought on the War of 1812, which has not inaptly been styled thesecond War of Independence. Madison, who was contemporary with theentire controversy, and officially connected with it from 1801 to theend of the war, first as Secretary of State, and later as President, justly summed up his experience of the whole in these words: "To haveshrunk from resistance, under such circumstances, would haveacknowledged that, on the element which forms three-fourths of theglobe which we inhabit, and where all independent nations have equaland common rights, the American People were not an independent people, but colonists and vassals. With such an alternative war waschosen. "[53] The second war was closely related to the first in fact, though separated by a generation in time. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Order in Council was a general term applied to all orders touchingaffairs, internal as well as external, issued by the King in Council. The particular orders here in question, by their extraordinarycharacter and wide application, came to have a kind of sole title tothe expression in the diplomatic correspondence between the twocountries. 

[2] Instructions of Madison, Secretary of State, to Monroe, Ministerto Great Britain, January 5, 1804. Article I. American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 82. 

[3] Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, vol. Ii. Pp. 508, 546. 

[4] Annals of Congress. Thirteenth Congress, vol. Ii. Pp. 1563;1555-1558. 

[5] Niles' Register, vol. Iv. P. 234. Author's italics. 

[6] Diary and Letters, vol. Ii. P. 553. 

[7] Ibid. , p. 560. Those unfamiliar with the subject should becautioned that the expression "right of search" is confined here, notquite accurately, to searching for British subjects liable toimpressment. This right the United States denied. The "right ofsearch" to determine the nationality of the vessel, and the characterof the voyage, was admitted to belligerents then, as it is now, by allneutrals. 

[8] King John, Act II. Scene 1. 

[9] King Richard II. , Act II. Scene 1. 

[10] Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by J. E. Thorold Rogers. Oxford, 1880, pp. 35-38. In asubsequent passage (p. 178), Smith seems disposed somewhat to qualifythe positive assertion here quoted, on the ground that the NavigationAct had not had time to exert much effect, at the period when some ofthe most decisive successes over the Dutch were won. It is to beobserved, however, that a vigorous military government, such asCromwell's was, can assert itself in the fleet as well as in the army, creating an effective organization out of scanty materials, especiallywhen at war with a commercial state of weak military constitution, like Holland. It was the story of Rome and Carthage repeated. LouisXIV. For a while accomplished the same. But under the laxity of aliberal popular government, which England increasingly enjoyed afterthe Restoration, naval power could be based securely only upon astrong, available, and permanent maritime element in the civil bodypolitic; that is, on a mercantile marine. 

As regards the working of the Navigation Act to this end, whatever maybe argued as to the economical expediency of protecting a particularindustry, there is no possible doubt that such an industry can bebuilt up, to huge proportions, by sagacious protection consistentlyenforced. The whole history of protection demonstrates this, and theNavigation Act did in its day. It created the British carrying trade, and in it provided for the Royal Navy an abundant and accessiblereserve of raw material, capable of being rapidly manufactured intonaval seamen in an hour of emergency. 

[11] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. Pp. 389-390. 

[12] This primary meaning of the word "staple" seems to havedisappeared from common use, in which it is now applied to thecommercial articles, the concentration of which at a particular portmade that port a "staple. "

[13] Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. Ii. P. 448. 

[14] Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. Ii. P. 443. 

[15] Reeves, History of the Law of Navigation, Dublin, 1792, p. 37. 

[16] Macpherson, vol. Ii. P. 444. 

[17] Reeves, writing in 1792, says that there seemed then nodistinction of meaning between "plantation" and "colony. " Plantationwas the earlier term; "'colony' did not come much into use till thereign of Charles II. , and it seems to have denoted the politicalrelation. " (p. 109. ) By derivation both words express the idea ofcultivating new ground, or establishing a new settlement; but"plantation" seems to associate itself more with the industrialbeginnings, and "colony" with the formal regulative purpose of theparent state. 

[18] The Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1662, and 1663, as well asother subsequent measures of the same character, can be found, conveniently for American readers, in MacDonald's Select ChartersIllustrative of American History. Macmillan, New York. 1899. 

[19] Reeves, History of the Law of Navigation, p. 162. 

[20] For instance, in 1769, eighteen hundred and forty vessels passedthe Sound in the British trade. Of these only thirty-five wereRussian. Considerably more than half of the trade of St. Petersburgwith Europe at large was done in British ships. Macpherson, vol. Iii. P. 493. 

[21] Opinion of Chief Baron Parker, quoted by Reeves, pp. 187-189. 

[22] Chalmers, Opinions on Interesting Subjects of Public Law andCommercial Policy Arising from American Independence, p. 32. 

[23] Ibid. , p. 55. 

[24] A French naval historian supports them, speaking of the year1781: "The considerable armaments made since 1778 had exhausted theresources of personnel. To remedy the difficulty the complements werefilled up with coast-guard militia, with marine troops until thenemployed only to form the guards of the ships, and finally with whatwere called 'novices volontaires, ' who were landsmen recruited bybounties. It may be imagined what crews were formed with suchelements. "--Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. Ii. P. 202. 

[25] Raynal, Histoire Philosophique des deux Indes, vol. Vii. P. 287(Edition 1820). Raynal's reputation is that of a plagiarist, but hisbest work is attributed to far greater names of his time. He died in1796. 

[26] Reeves, pp. 430-434. 

[27] Macpherson, vol. Iv. P. 10. 

[28] Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. I. P. 485-486. 

[29] Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. Ii. P. 450. 

[30] Officially, Statute of 15 Charles II. 

[31] Reeves, p. 50. 

[32] Chalmers, Opinions on Interesting Subjects, p. 28. 

[33] Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. Ii. P. 443-444 (3d Edition). 

[34] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 228. 

[35] Compare with Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of theAmerican States (Edition February, 1784), p. 137, note; from which, indeed, these figures seem to have been taken, or from some commonsource. 

[36] Coxe's View of the United States of America, Philadelphia, 1794, p. 330. 

[37] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 341. Adams says again, himself: "It is more and more manifest every day that there is, andwill continue, a general scramble for navigation. Carrying trade, ship-building, fisheries, are the cry of every nation. "--Vol. Viii. P. 342. 

[38] From an official statement, made public in 1784, it appears thatin the year 1770 the total trade, inward and outward, of the colonieson the American Continent, amounted to 750, 546 tons. Of this 32 percent was coastwise, to other members of the group; 30 with the WestIndies; 27 with Great Britain and Ireland; and 11 with SouthernEurope. Bermuda and the Bahamas, inconsiderable as to trade, werereturned among continental colonies by the Custom House. --Sheffield, Commerce of the American States, Table VII. 

[39] Chalmers, Opinions, p. 73. 

[40] Ibid. , p. 18. 

[41] Macpherson, vol. Iii. P. 317. 

[42] Report of Committee of Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, pp. 21-23. 

[43] Ante, p. 31 (note). 

[44] Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. Ii. P. 486. 

[45] Chalmers, Opinions, p. 133. 

[46] See, for instance, the Colden Papers, Proceedings N. Y. HistoricalSociety, 1877. There is in these much curious economical informationof other kinds. 

[47] A comparison of the figures just quoted, as to the British WestIndies, with Sheffield's Table VII. , indicates that the trade of theContinent with the foreign islands about equalled that with theBritish. The trade with the French West Indies, "open or clandestine, was considerable, and wholly in American vessels. "--Macpherson, vol. Iii. P. 584. 

[48] Sheffield, Commerce of the American States, p. 108. 

[49] That is, for the navy. 

[50] Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. Iii. P. 472. 

[51] Macpherson, vol. Iv. P. 11. The great West India cargo of 1772, an especial preserve of the Navigation Act, was carried to England in679 ships, of which one-third were built in America. 

[52] "The contraband trade carried on by plantation ships in defianceof the Act of Navigation was a subject of repeated complaint. " "Thelaws of Navigation were nowhere disobeyed and contemned so openly asin New England. The people of Massachusetts Bay were from the firstdisposed to act as if independent of the mother country. "--Reeves, pp. 54, 58. The particular quotations apply to the early days of themeasure, 1662-3; but the complaint continued to the end. In 1764-5, "one of the great grievances in the American trade was, that greatquantities of foreign molasses and syrups were clandestinely run onshore in the British Colonies. "--p. 79. 

[53] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 82. 

CHAPTER II

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO JAY'S TREATY, 1794

The colonial connection between Great Britain and the thirteencommunities which became the original States of the American Union wasbrought to a formal conclusion in 1776, by their Declaration ofIndependence. Substantially, however, it had already terminated in1774. This year was marked by the passage of the Boston Port Bill, with its accessory measures, by the British Parliament, and likewiseby the renewal, in the several colonies, of the retaliatorynon-importation agreements of 1765. The fundamental theory of theeighteenth century concerning the relations between a mother countryand her colonies, that of reciprocal exclusive benefit, had thus inpractice yielded to one of mutual injury; to coercion and deprivationon the one side, and to passive resistance on the other. On September5 the representatives of twelve colonies assembled in Philadelphia;Georgia alone sending no delegates, but pledging herself inanticipation to accept the decisions taken by the others. One of thefirst acts of this Congress of the Continental Colonies was to indorsethe resolutions by which Massachusetts had placed herself in anattitude of contingent rebellion against the Crown, and to pledgetheir support to her in case of a resort to arms. These several stepswere decisive and irrevocable, except by an unqualified abandonment, by one party or the other, of the principles which underlay anddictated them. The die was cast. To use words attributed to George theThird, "the colonies must now either submit or triumph. "

The period which here began, viewed in the aggregate of the nationallife of the United States, was one of wavering transition anduncertain issue in matters political and commercial. Its ending, inthese two particulars, is marked by two conspicuous events: theadoption of the Constitution and the Commercial Treaty with GreatBritain. The formation of the Federal Government, 1788-90, gave to theUnion a political stability it had hitherto lacked, removing elementsof weakness and dissensions, and of consequent impotence in foreignrelations; the manifestation of which since the acknowledgment ofindependence had justified alike the hopes of enemies and theforebodings of friends. Settled conditions being thus established athome, with institutions competent to regulate a national commerce, internal and external, as well as to bring the people as a whole intofixed relations with foreign communities, there was laid thefoundations of a swelling prosperity to which the several parts of thecountry jointly contributed. The effects of these changes were soonshown in a growing readiness on the part of other nations to enterinto formal compacts with us. Of this, the treaty negotiated by JohnJay with Great Britain, in 1794, is the most noteworthy instance;partly because it terminated one long series of bickerings with ourmost dangerous neighbor, chiefly because the commercial power of thestate with which it was contracted had reached a greater eminence, andexercised wider international effect, than any the modern world hadthen seen. 

Whatever the merits of the treaty otherwise, therefore, thewillingness of Great Britain to enter into it at all gave it anepochal significance. Since independence, commercial intercoursebetween the two peoples had rested on the strong compelling force ofnatural conditions and reciprocal convenience, the true foundation, doubtless, of all useful relations; but its regulation had been bymunicipal ordinance of either state, changeable at will, not bymutual agreement binding on both for a prescribed period. Since theseparation, this condition had seemed preferable to Great Britain, which, as late as 1790, had evaded overtures towards a commercialarrangement. [54] Her consenting now to modify her position was animplicit admission that in trade, as in political existence, theformer mother country recognized at last the independence of heroffspring. The latter, however, was again to learn that independence, to be actual, must rest on something stronger than words, and surerthan the acquiescence of others. This was to be the lesson of theyears between 1794 and 1815, administered to us not only by thepreponderant navy of Great Britain, but by the petty piratical fleetsof the Barbary powers. 

From the Boston Port Bill to Jay's Treaty was therefore a period oftransition from entire colonial dependence, under complete regulationof all commercial intercourse by the mother country, to that ofnational commercial power, self-regulative and efficient, through theadoption of the Constitution. Upon this followed internationalinfluence, the growing importance of which Great Britain finallyrecognized by formal concessions, hitherto refused or evaded. Duringthese years the policy of her government was undergoing a process ofadjustment, conditioned on the one hand by the still vigoroustraditional prejudices associated with the administration ofdependencies, and on the other by the radical change in politicalrelations between her remaining colonies in America and the new stateswhich had broken from the colonial bond. This change was the moreembarrassing, because the natural connection of specific mutualusefulness remained, although the tie of a common allegiance had beenloosed. The old order was yielding to the new, but the process wassignalized by the usual slowness of men to accept events in theirfull significance. Hitherto, all the western hemisphere had beenunder a colonial system of complete monopoly by mother countries, andhad been generally excluded from direct communication with Europe, except the respective parent states. In the comprehensive provisionsof the British Navigation Act, America was associated with Asia andAfrica. Now had arisen there an independent state, in politicalstanding identical with those of Europe, yet having towards colonialAmerica geographical and commercial relations very different fromtheirs. Consequently there was novelty and difficulty in the question, What intercourse with the remaining British dominions, and especiallywith the American colonies, should be permitted to the new nation?Notwithstanding the breach lately made, it continued a controlling aimwith the British people, and of the government as determined bypopular pressure, to restore the supremacy of British trade, by thesubjection of America, independent as well as colonial, to the welfareof British commerce. Notably this was to be so as regards the onedominant interest called Navigation, under which term was comprisedeverything relating to shipping, --ship-building, seafaring men, andthe carrying trade. Independence had deprived Great Britain of theright she formerly had to manipulate the course of the export andimport trade of the now United States. It remained to try whetherthere did not exist, nevertheless, the ability effectually to controlit to the advantage of British navigation, as above defined. "Ourremaining colonies on the Continent, and the West India Islands, " itwas argued, "with the favorable state of English manufactures, maystill give us almost exclusively the trade of America;" provided thesecircumstances were suitably utilized, and their advantages rigorouslyenforced, where power to do so still remained, as it did in the WestIndies. 

Although by far the stronger and more flourishing part of hercolonial dominions had been wrested from Great Britain, there yetremained to her upon the continent, in Canada and the adjacentprovinces, a domain great in area, and in the West India Islandsanother of great productiveness. Whatever wisdom had been learned asregards the political treatment of colonies, the views as to thenature of their economical utility to the mother country, and theirconsequent commercial regulation, had undergone no enlargement, butrather had been intensified in narrowness and rigor by the loss of sovaluable a part of the whole. No counteractive effect to thisprepossession was to be found in contemporary opinion in Europe. TheFrench Revolution itself, subversive as it was of received views inmany respects, was at the first characterized rather by anexaggeration of the traditional exclusive policy of the eighteenthcentury relating to colonies, shipping, and commerce. In America, theunsettled commercial and financial conditions which succeeded thepeace, the divergence of interests between the several new states, thefeebleness of the confederate government, its incompetency to dealassuredly with external questions, and lack of all power to regulatecommerce, inspired a conviction in Great Britain that the continentcould not offer strong, continued resistance to commercial aggression, carried on under the peaceful form of municipal regulation. It wasgenerally thought that the new states could never unite, but insteadwould drift farther apart. 

The belief was perfectly reasonable; a gift of prophecy only couldhave foretold the happy result, of which many of the most prominentAmericans for some time despaired. "It will not be an easy matter, "wrote Lord Sheffield, [55] "to bring the American States to act as anation; they are not to be feared as such by us. It must be a longtime before they can engage, or will concur, in any materialexpense. .. . We might as reasonably dread the effects of combinationsamong the German as among the American states, and deprecate theresolves of the Diet, as those of Congress. " "No treaty can be madethat will be binding on the whole of them. " "A decided cast has beengiven to public opinion here, " wrote John Adams from London, inNovember, 1785, "by two presumptions. One is, that the American statesare not, and cannot, be united. "[56] Two years later Washington wrote:"The situation of the General Government, if it can be called agovernment, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturnedat every blast. In a word, it is at an end. .. . The primary cause ofall our disorders lies in the different state governments, and in thetenacity of that power which underlies the whole of their systems. Independent sovereignty is so ardently contended for. " "At present, under our existing form of confederation, it would be idle to think ofmaking commercial regulations on our part. One state passes aprohibitory law respecting one article; another state opens wide theavenue for its admission. One assembly makes a system, anotherassembly unmakes it. "[57]

Under such conditions it was natural that a majority of Englishmenshould see power and profit for Great Britain in availing herself ofthe weakness of her late colonists, to enforce upon them a commercialdependence as useful as the political dependence which had passedaway. Were this realized, she would enjoy the emoluments of the landwithout the expense of its protection. This gospel was preached atonce to willing ears, and found acceptance; not by the strength of itsarguments, for these, though plausible, were clearly inferior inweight to the facts copiously adduced by those familiar withconditions, but through the prejudices which the then generation hadreceived from the three or four preceding it. The policy beingadopted, the instrument at hand for enforcing it was the relation ofcolonies to mother countries, as then universally maintained by thegovernments of the day. The United States, like other independentnations, was to be excluded wholly from carrying trade with theBritish colonies, and as far as possible from sending them supplies. It was urged that Canada, and the adjacent British dominions, encouraged by this reservation of the West India market for theirproduce, would prove adequate to furnishing the provisions and lumberpreviously derived from the old continental colonies. The prosperityonce enjoyed by the latter would be transferred, and there would bereconstituted the system of commercial intercourse, interior to theempire, which previously had commanded general admiration. The newstates, acting commercially as separated communities, could oppose nosuccessful rivalry to this combination, and would revert to isolatedcommercial dependence; tributary to the financial supremacy of GreatBritain, as they recently had been to her political power. In debt toher for money, and drawing from her manufactures, returns for bothwould compel their exports to her ports chiefly, whence distributionwould be, as of old, in the hands of British middlemen and navigators. Just escaped from the fetters of the carrying trade and _entrepôt_regulations, the twin monopolies in which consisted the value of acolonial empire, it was proposed to reduce them again under bondage bymeans for which the West India Islands furnished the leverage; for"the trade carried on by Great Britain with the countries now becomethe United States was, and still is, so connected with the tradecarried on to the remaining British colonies in America, and theBritish islands in the West Indies, that it is impossible to form atrue judgment of the past and present of the first, without taking acomprehensive view of all, as they are connected with, and influence, each other. "[58]

Before the peace of 1783, the writings of Adam Smith had gravelyshaken belief in the mercantile system of extraordinary traderegulation and protection as conducive to national prosperity. Thoughundermined, however, it had not been overthrown; and even to doubtersthere remained the exception, which Smith himself admitted, of thenecessity to protect navigation as a nursery for the navy, andconsequently as a fundamental means of national defence. Existencetakes precedence of prosperity; the life is more than the meat. Commercial regulation, though unfitted to increase wealth, could bejustified as a means to promote ship-building; to retain ship-buildersin the country; to husband the raw materials of their work; to forcethe transport of merchandise in British-built ships and by Britishseamen; and thus to induce capital to invest, and men to embark theirlives, in maritime trade, to the multiplication of ships and seamen, the chief dependence of the nation in war. "Keeping ships forfreight, " said Sheffield, "is not the most profitable branch of trade. It is necessary, for the sake of our marine, to force or encourage itby exclusive advantages. " "Comparatively with the number of our peopleand the extent of our country, we are doomed almost always to wageunequal war; and as a means of raising seamen it cannot be too oftenrepeated that it is not possible to be too jealous on the head ofnavigation. " He proceeds then at once to draw the distinction betweenthe protection of navigation and that of commerce generally. "Thisjealousy should not be confounded with that towards neighboringcountries as to trade and manufactures; nor is the latter jealousy inmany instances reasonable or well founded. Competition is useful, forcing our manufacturers to act fairly, and to work reasonably. "Sheffield was the most conspicuous, and probably the most influential, of the controversialists on this side of the question at this period;the interest of the public is shown by his pamphlet passing throughsix editions in a twelvemonth. He was, however, far from singular inthis view. Chalmers, a writer of much research, said likewise: "Inthese considerations of nautical force and public safety we discoverthe fundamental principle of Acts of Navigation, which, thoughestablished in opposition to domestic and foreign clamors, haveproduced so great an augmentation of our native shipping and sailors, and which therefore should not be sacrificed to any projects ofprivate gain, "--that is, of commercial advantage. "There areintelligent persons who suggest that the imposing of alien duties onalien ships, rather than on alien merchandise, would augment our navalstrength. "[59]

Colonies therefore were esteemed desirable to this end chiefly. To usethe expression of a French officer, [60] they were the fruitful nurseryof seamen. French writers of that day considered their West Indiaislands the chief nautical support of the state. But in order tosecure this, it was necessary to exercise complete control of theirtrade inward and outward; of the supplies they needed as well as ofthe products they raised, and especially to confine the carriage ofboth to national shipping. "The only use and advantage of the(remaining) American colonies[61] or West India islands to GreatBritain, " says Sheffield, "are the monopoly of their consumption andthe carriage of their produce. It is the advantage to our navigationwhich in any degree countervails the enormous expense of protectingour islands. Rather than give up their carrying trade it would bebetter to give up themselves. " The _entrepôt_ system herein foundadditional justification, for not only did it foster navigation by thehomeward voyage, confined to British ships, and extort toll intransit, but the re-exportation made a double voyage which was morethan doubly fruitful in seamen; for from the nearness of the BritishIslands to the European continent, which held the great body ofconsumers, this second carriage could be done, and actually was done, by numerous small vessels, able to bear a short voyage but not tobrave an Atlantic passage. Economically, trade by many small vesselsis more expensive than by a few large, because for a given aggregatetonnage it requires many more men; but this economical loss wasthought to be more than compensated by the political gain inmultiplying seamen. It was estimated in 1795 that there was adifference of from thirty-five to forty men in carrying the samequantity of goods in one large or ten small vessels. This illustratesaptly the theory of the Navigation Act, which sought wealth indeed, but, as then understood, subordinated that consideration distinctly tothe superior need of increasing the resources of the country in shipsand seamen. Moreover, the men engaged in these short voyages were moreimmediately at hand for impressment in war, owing to the narrow rangeof their expeditions and their frequent returns to home ports. 

In 1783, therefore, the Navigation Act had become in generalacceptance a measure not merely commercial, but military. It wasdefended chiefly as essential to the naval power of Great Britain, which rested upon the sure foundation of maritime resources thus laid. Nor need this view excite derision to-day, for it compelled then theadhesion of an American who of all in his time was most adverse to thegeneral commercial policy of Great Britain. In a report on the subjectmade to Congress in 1793, by Jefferson, as Secretary of State, hesaid: "Our navigation involves still higher considerations than ourcommerce. As a branch of industry it is valuable, but as a resource ofdefence essential. It will admit neither neglect nor forbearance. Theposition and circumstances of the United States leave them nothing tofear on their land-board; . .. But on their seaboard they are open toinjury, and they have there too a commerce (coasting) which must beprotected. This can only be done by possessing a respectable body ofcitizen-seamen, and of artists and establishments in readiness forship-building. "[62] The limitations of Jefferson's views appear hereclearly, in the implicit relegation of defence, not to a regular andtrained navy, but to the occasional unskilled efforts of a distinctlycivil force; but no stronger recognition of the necessities of GreatBritain could be desired, for her nearness to the great militarystates of the world deprived her land-board of the security which theremoteness of the United States assured. With such stress laid uponthe vital importance of merchant seamen to national safety, it is buta step in thought to perceive how inevitable was the jealousy andindignation felt in Great Britain, when she found her fleets, bothcommercial and naval, starving for want of seamen, who had soughtrefuge from war in the American merchant service, and over whom theAmerican Government, actually weak and but yesterday vassal, sought toextend its protection from impressment. 

Up to the War of American Independence, the singular geographicalsituation of Great Britain, inducing her to maritime enterprise andexempting her from territorial warfare, with the financial andcommercial pre-eminence she had then maintained for three-fourths of acentury, gave her peculiar advantages for enforcing a policy whichuntil that time had thriven conspicuously, if somewhat illusively, inits commercial results, and had substantially attained its especialobject of maritime preponderance. Other peoples had to submit to thecompulsion exerted by her overweening superiority. The obligation uponforeign shipping to be three-fourths manned by their own citizens, forinstance, rested only upon a British law, and applied only in aBritish port; but the accumulations of British capital, with theconsequent facility for mercantile operations and ability to extendcredits, the development of British manufactures, the extent of theBritish carrying trade, the enforced storage of colonial products inBritish territory, with the correlative obligation that foreign goodsfor her numerous and increasing colonists must first be brought to hershores and thence transshipped, --all these circumstances made theBritish islands a centre for export and import, towards which foreignshipping was unavoidably drawn and so brought under the operation ofthe law. The nation had so far out-distanced competition that hersupremacy was unassailable, and remained unimpaired for a centurylonger. To it had contributed powerfully the economical distributionof her empire, greatly diversified in particulars, yet symmetrical inthe capacity of one part to supply what the other lacked. There was inthe whole a certain self-sufficingness, resembling that claimed inthis age for the United States, with its compact territory but wideextremes of boundary, climates, and activities. 

This condition, while it lasted, in large degree justified theNavigation Act, which may be summarily characterized as a greatprotective measure, applied to the peculiar conditions of a particularmaritime empire, insuring reciprocal and exclusive benefit to theseveral parts. It was uncompromisingly logical in its action, nothesitating at rigid prohibition of outside competition. Protection, inits best moral sense, may be defined as the regulation of all thebusiness of the nation, considered as an interrelated whole, by theGovernment, for the best interests of the entire community, likewiseregarded as a whole. This the Navigation Act did for over a centuryafter its enactment; and it may be plausibly argued that, as a warresort at least, it afterwards measurably strengthened the hands ofGreat Britain during the wars of the French Revolution. No mensuffered more than did the West India planters from its unrelievedenforcement after 1783; yet in their vehement remonstrance they said:"The policy of the Act is justly popular. Its regulations, until theloss of America, under the various relaxations which Parliament hasapplied to particular events and exigencies as they arose, have guidedthe course of trade without oppressing it; for the markets which thoseregulations left open to the consumption of the produce of thecolonies were sufficient to take off the whole, and no foreign countrycould have supplied the essential part of their wants materiallycheaper than the colonies of the mother country could supply oneanother. "

Thus things were, or were thought to be, up to the time when therevolt of the continental colonies made a breach in the wall ofreciprocal benefit by which the whole had been believed to beenclosed. The products of the colonies sustained the commercialprosperity of the mother country, ministering to her export trade, andsupplying a reserve of consumers for her monopoly of manufactures, which they were forbidden to establish for themselves, or to receivefrom foreigners. She on her part excluded from the markets of theempire foreign articles which her colonies produced, constituting forthem a monopoly of the imperial home market, as well in Great Britainas in the sister colonies. The carriage of the whole was confined toBritish navigation, the maintenance of which by this means raised theBritish Navy to the mastery of the seas, enabling it to afford to theentire system a protection, of which convincing and brilliant evidencehad been afforded during the then recent Seven Years' War. As a matterof political combination and adjustment, for peace or for war, thegeneral result appeared to most men of that day to be consummate inconception and in development, and therefore by all means to beperpetuated. In that light men of to-day must realize it, if theywould adequately understand the influence exercised by thisprepossession upon the course of events which for the United Statesissued in the War of 1812. 

In this picture, so satisfactory as a whole, there had been certainshadows menacing to the future. Already, in the colonial period, thesehad been recognized by some in Great Britain as predictive ofincreasing practical independence on the part of the continentalcolonies, with results injurious to the empire at large, and to theparticular welfare of the mother kingdom. In the last analysis, thisdanger arose from the fact that, unlike the tropical West Indies, these children were for the most part too like their parent inpolitical and economical character, and in permanent naturalsurroundings. There was, indeed, a temporary variation of activitiesbetween the new communities, where the superabundance of soil kepthandicrafts in abeyance, and the old country, where agriculture wasalready failing to produce food sufficient for the population, and menwere being forced into manufactures and their export as a means oflivelihood. There was also a difference in their respective productswhich ministered to beneficial exchange. Nevertheless, in theirtendencies and in their disposition, Great Britain and the UnitedStates at bottom were then not complementary, but rivals. The truecomplement of both was the West Indies; and for these the advantage ofproximity, always great, and especially so with regard to the specialexigencies of the islands, lay with the United States. Hence it cameto pass that the trade with the West Indies, which then had almost amonopoly of sugar and coffee production for the world, became the mostprominent single factor in the commercial contentions between the twocountries, and in the arbitrary commercial ordinances of GreatBritain, which step by step led the two nations into war. Theprecedent struggle was over a market; artificial regulation andsuperior naval power seeking to withstand the natural course ofthings, and long successfully retarding it. 

The suspension of intercourse during the War of Independence hadbrought the economical relations into stronger relief, andaccomplished independence threatened the speedy realization of theirtendencies. There were two principal dangers dreaded by Great Britain. The West India plantation industry had depended upon the continentalcolonies for food supplies, and to a considerable extent alsofinancially; because these alone were the consumers of one importantproduct--rum. Again, ship-building and the carrying trade of theempire had passed largely into the hands of the continental colonists, keeping on that side of the Atlantic, it was asserted, a great numberof British-born seamen. While vessels from America visited many partsof the world, the custom-house returns showed that of the total inwardand outward tonnage of the thirteen colonies, over sixty per cent hadbeen either coastwise or with the West Indies; and this left out ofaccount the considerable number engaged in smuggling. Of theremainder, barely twenty-five per cent went to Great Britain orIreland. In short, there had been building upon the western side ofthe ocean, under the colonial connection, a rival maritime system, having its own products, its own special markets, and its own carryingtrade. The latter also, being done by very small vessels, adapted tothe short transit, had created for itself, or absorbed fromelsewhere, a separate and proportionately large maritime population, rivalling that of the home country, while yet remaining out of easyreach of impressment and remote from immediate interest in Europeanwars. One chief object of the Navigation Act was thus thwarted; andindeed, as might be anticipated from quotations already made, it wasupon this that British watchfulness more particularly centred. As faras possible all interchange was to be internal to the empire, a kindof coasting trade, which would naturally, as well as by statute, fallto British shipping. Protective regulation therefore should develop inthe several parts those productions which other parts needed, --thematerial of commerce; but where this could not be done, and suppliesmust be sought outside, they should go and come in British vessels, navigated according to the Act. "Our country, " wrote Sheffield, inconcluding his work, "does not entirely depend upon the monopoly ofthe commerce of the thirteen American states, and it is by no meansnecessary to sacrifice any part of our carrying trade for imaginaryadvantages never to be attained. "[63]

A further injury was done by the cheapness with which the Americansbuilt and sold ships, owing to their abundance of timber. They builtthem not only to order, but as it were for a market. Althoughacceptable to the mercantile interest, and even indirectly beneficialby sparing the resources for building ships of war, this was aninvasion of the manufacturing industry of the kingdom, in a particularpeculiarly conducive to naval power. The returns of the Britishunderwriters for twenty-seven shipping ports of Great Britain andIreland, during a series of years immediately preceding the Americanrevolt, no ship being counted twice, showed the British-built vesselsentered to be 3, 908, and the American 2, 311. [64] The tonnage of thelatter was more than one-third of the total. The intercourse betweenthe American continent and the West Indies, not included in thisreckoning, was almost wholly in American bottoms. The proportion ofAmerican-built shipping in the total of the empire is hence apparent, as well as the growth of the ship-building industry. This of coursewas accompanied by a tendency of mechanics, as well as seamen, toremove to a situation so favorable for employment. But the maintenanceof home facilities for building ships was as essential to thedevelopment of naval power as was the fostering of a class of seamen. In this respect, therefore, the ship-building of America wasdetrimental to the objects of the Navigation Act; and the evilthreatened to increase, because of a discernible approaching shortnessof suitable timber in the overtaxed forests of Europe. 

Such being the apparent tendency of things, owing to circumstancesrelatively permanent in character, the habit of mind traditional withBritish merchants and statesmen, formed by the accepted colonial andmercantile systems, impelled them at once to prohibitory measures ofcounteraction, as soon as the colonies, naturally rival, had become byindependence a foreign nation. For a moment, indeed, it appeared thatbroader views might prevail, based upon a sounder understanding ofactual conditions and of the principles of international commerce. Thesecond William Pitt was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time theprovisional articles of peace with the United States were signed, inNovember, 1782; and in March, 1783, he introduced into the House ofCommons a bill for regulating temporarily the intercourse between thetwo nations, so far as dependent upon the action of Great Britain, until it should be possible to establish a mutual arrangement bytreaty. This measure reflected not only a general attitude of goodwill towards America, characteristic of both father and son, but alsothe impression which had been made upon the younger man by thewritings of Adam Smith. Professing as its objects "to establishintercourse on the most enlarged principles of reciprocal benefit, "and "to evince the disposition of Great Britain to be on terms of mostperfect amity with the United States of America, " the bill admittedthe ships and vessels of the United States, with the merchandise onboard, into all the ports of Great Britain in the same manner as thevessels of other independent states; that is, manned three-fourths byAmerican seamen. This preserved the main restrictions of theNavigation Act, protective of British navigation; but the merchandise, even if brought in American ships, was relieved of all alien duties. These, however, wherever still existing for other nations, were light, and this remission slight;[65] a more substantial concession was arebate upon all exports from Great Britain to the United States, equalto that allowed upon goods exported to the colonies. As regardedintercourse with the West Indies, there was to be made in favor of thethirteen states a special and large remission in the rigor of the Act;one affecting both commerce and navigation. To British colonies, bylong-standing proscription, no ships except British had been admittedto export or import. By the proposed measure, the United States, aloneamong the nations of the world, were to be allowed to import freelyany goods whatsoever, of their own growth, produce, or manufacture, intheir own ships; on the same terms exactly as British vessels, ifthese should engage in the traffic between the American continent andthe islands. Similarly, freedom to export colonial produce was grantedto American bottoms from the West Indies to the United States. Bothexports and imports, thus to be authorized, were to be "liable to thesame duties and charges only as the same merchandise would be subjectto, if it were the property of British native-born subjects, andimported in British ships, navigated by British seamen. "[66] In short, while the primary purpose doubtless was the benefit of the islands, the effect of the measure, as regarded the West India trade, was torestore the citizens of the now independent states to the privilegesthey had enjoyed as colonists. The carrying trade between the islandsand the continent was conceded to them, and past experience gaveground to believe it would be by them absorbed. 

It was over this concession that the storm of controversy arose andraged, until the outbreak of the French Revolution, by theconservative reaction it provoked in other governments, arrested forthe time any change of principle in regard to colonial administration, whatever modifications might from time to time be induced by momentaryexigencies of policy. The question immediately argued was probably onall hands less one of principle than of expediency. Superior ascommercial prosperity and the preservation of peace were to most othermotives in the interest of Pitt's mind, he doubtless would haveadmitted, along with his most earnest opponents, that the fostering ofthe national carrying trade, as a nursery to the navy and socontributory to national defence, took precedence of purely commerciallegislation. With all good-will to America, his prime objectnecessarily was the welfare of Great Britain; but this he, contrary tothe mass of public opinion, conceived to lie in the restoration of theold intercourse between the two peoples, modified as little aspossible by the new condition of independence. He trusted that thehabit of receiving everything from England, the superiority of Britishmanufactures, a common tongue, and commercial correspondences onlytemporarily interrupted by the war, would tend to keep the new statescustomers of Great Britain chiefly, as they had been before; and whatthey bought they must pay for by sending their own products in return. This constraint of routine and convenience received additional forcefrom the scarcity of capital in America, and its abundance in GreatBritain, relatively to the rest of Europe. The wealthiest nation couldhold the Americans by their need of accommodations which others couldnot extend. 

In so far there probably was a general substantial agreement in GreatBritain. The Americans had been consumers to over double the amount ofthe West Indies before the war, and it was desirable to retain theircustom. Nor was the anticipation of success deceived. Nine yearslater, despite the rejection of Pitt's measure, an experiencedAmerican complained "that we draw so large a proportion of ourmanufactures from one nation. The other European nations have had theeight years of the war (of Independence) exclusively, and the nineyears of peace in fair competition, and do not yet supply us withmanufactures equivalent to half of the stated value of the shoes madeby ourselves. "[67] In the first year of the government under theConstitution, from August, 1789, to September 30, 1790, after sevenyears of independence, out of a total of not quite $20, 000, 000 importsto the United States, over $15, 000, 000 were from the dominions ofGreat Britain;[68] and nearly half the exports went to the samedestination, either as raw material for manufactures, or as to thedistributing centre for Europe. The commercial dependence is evident;it had rather increased than diminished since the Peace. As regardsAmerican navigation, the showing was somewhat better; but even here217, 000 tons British had entered United States ports, against a totalof only 355, 000 American. As of the latter only 50, 000 had sailed fromGreat Britain, it is clear that the empire had retained its hold uponits carrying trade, throughout the years intervening between the Peaceand the adoption of the Constitution. 

As regards the commercial relations between the two nations, theseresults corresponded in the main with the expectations of those whofrustrated Pitt's measure. He had conceived, however, that it was wisefor Great Britain not only to preserve a connection so profitable, butalso to develop it; to multiply the advantage by steps which wouldpromote the prosperity and consequent purchasing power of thecommunities involved. This was the object of his proposed concession. During the then recent war, no part of the British dominions--savebesieged Gibraltar--had suffered so severely as the West Indies. Though other causes concurred, this was due chiefly to the cessationof communications with the revolted colonies, entailing failure ofsupplies indispensable to their industries. Despite certainalleviations incidental to the war, such as the capture of Americanvessels bound to foreign islands, and the demand for tropical productsby the British armies and fleets, there had been great misery amongthe population, as well as financial loss. The restoration ofcommercial intercourse would benefit the continent as well as theislands; but the latter more. The prosperity of both would redound tothe welfare of Great Britain; for the one, though now politicallyindependent, was chained to her commercial system by imperativecircumstances, while of the trade of the other she would have completemonopoly, except for this tolerance of a strictly local traffic withthe adjoining continent. As for British navigation, the supremeinterest, Pitt believed that it would receive more enlargement fromthe increase of productiveness in the islands, and of consequentdemand for British manufactures, than it would suffer loss by Americannavigation. More commerce, more ships. Then, as at the present day, the interests of Great Britain and of the United States, in theirrelations to a matter of common external concern, were not opposed, but complementary; for the prosperity of the islands through Americawould make for the prosperity of Great Britain through the islands. 

This, however, was just the point disputed; and, in default of theexperience which the coming years were to furnish, fears not whollyunreasonable, from the particular point of view of sea power, as thenunderstood, were aroused by the known facts of American shippingenterprise, both as ship-builders and carriers, even under colonialtrammels. John Adams, who was minister to Great Britain from 1785 to1788, had frequent cause to note the deep and general apprehensionthere entertained of the United States as a rival maritime state. Thequestion of admission to the colonial trade, as it presented itself tomost men of the day, was one of defence and of offence, and wascomplicated by several considerations. As a matter of fact, there wasno denying the existence of that transatlantic commercial system, inwhich the former colonies had been so conspicuous a factor, the solesource of certain supplies to an important market, reflecting thereinexactly Great Britain's own position relatively to the consumers ofthe European continent. The prospect of reviving what had always beenan _imperium in imperio_, but now uncontrolled by the previousconditions of political subjection, seemed ominous; and besides, therewas cherished the hope, ill-founded and delusive though it was, thatthe integrity of the empire as a self-sufficing whole, broken byrecent revolt, might be restored by strong measures, coercive towardsthe commerce of the United States, and protective towards Canada andthe other remaining continental colonies. It was believed by some thatthe agriculture, shipping, and fisheries of Canada, Nova Scotia, andNewfoundland, despite the obstacles placed by nature, could be sofostered as to supply the needs of the West Indies, and to developalso a population of consumers bound to take off British manufactures, as the lost colonists used to do. This may be styled the constructiveidea, in Sheffield's series of propositions, looking to themaintenance of the British carrying trade at the expense of that ofthe United States. This expectation proved erroneous. Up to andthrough the War of 1812, the British provinces, so far from having asurplus for export, had often to depend upon the United States formuch of the supplies which Sheffield expected them to send to the WestIndies. 

The proposition was strongly supported also by a wish to aid theAmerican loyalists, who, to the number of many thousands, had fledfrom the old colonies to take refuge in the less hospitable North. These men, deprived of their former resources, and having a new startin life to make, desired that the West India market should be reservedfor them, to build up their local industries. Their influence wasexerted in opposition to the planters, and the mother country justlyfelt itself bound to their relief by strong obligation. Conjoined tothis was doubtless the less worthy desire to punish the successfulrebellion, as well as to hinder the growth of a competitor. "If I hadnot been here and resided here some time, " wrote John Adams, in 1785, "I should not have believed, nor could have conceived, such an unionof all Parliamentary factions against us, which is a demonstration ofthe unpopularity of our cause. "[69] "Their direct object is not somuch the increase of their own wealth, ships, or sailors, as thediminution of ours. A jealousy of our naval power is the true motive, the real passion which actuates them. They consider the United Statesas their rival, and the most dangerous rival they have in the world. Ican see clearly they are less afraid of the augmentation of Frenchships and sailors than American. They think they foresee that if theUnited States had the same fisheries, carrying trade, and same marketfor ready-built ships, they had ten years ago, they would be in sorespectable a position, and in so happy circumstances, that Britishseamen, manufacturers, and merchants too, would hurry over tothem. "[70] These statements, drawn from Adams's association with manymen, reflect so exactly the line of argument in the best known of themany controversial pamphlets published about that time, --LordSheffield's "Observations on the Commerce of the American States, "--asto prove that it represented correctly a preponderant popular feeling, not only adverse to the restoration of the colonial privilegescontemplated by Pitt, but distinctly inimical to the new nation; afeeling born of past defeat and of present apprehension. 

Inextricably associated with this feeling was the conviction that thenavigation supported by the sugar islands, being a monopoly alwaysunder the control of the mother country, and ministering to the_entrepôt_ on which so much other shipping depended, was the one suresupport of the general carrying trade of the nation. "Considering thebulk of West India commodities, " Sheffield had written, "and theuniversality and extent of the consumption of sugar, a consumptionstill in its infancy even in Europe, and still more in America, it isnot improbable that in a few ages the nation which may be inpossession of the most extensive and best cultivated sugar islands, _subject to a proper policy_, [71] will take the lead at sea. " Men ofall schools concurred in this general view, which is explanatory ofmuch of the course pursued by the British Government, alike inmilitary enterprise, commercial regulation, and political belligerentmeasures, during the approaching twenty years of war with France. Itunderlay Pitt's subsequent much derided, but far from unwise, care toget the whole West India region under British control, by conqueringits sugar islands. It underlay also the other measures, eitherinstituted or countenanced by him, or inherited from his general warpolicy, which led through ever increasing exasperation to the war withthe United States. The question, however, remained, "What is theproper policy conducive to the end which all desire?" Those whothought with Pitt in 1783 urged that to increase the facilities of theislands, by abundant supplies from the nearest and best source, inAmerica, would so multiply the material of commerce as most to promotethe necessary navigation. The West India planters pressed this viewwith forcible logic. "Navigation and naval power are not the parentsof commerce, but its happy fruits. If mutual wants did not furnish thesubject of intercourse between distant countries, there would soon bean end of navigation. The carrying trade is of great importance, butit is of greater still to have trade to carry. " To this the replysubstantially was that if the trade were thrown open to Americans, byallowing them to carry in their own vessels, the impetus so given totheir navigation, with the cheapness of their ships, owing to thecheapness of materials, would make them carriers to the whole world, breaking up the monopoly of British merchants, and supplanting theemployment of British ships. 

A few statesmen, more far seeing and deeper reasoning, --notably EdmundBurke, --came to Pitt's support, and the West India proprietors, largely resident in England, by their knowledge of details contributedmuch to elucidate the facts; but their efforts were unavailing. Theirargument ran thus: "Only the American continent can furnish atreasonable rates the animals required for the agriculture of theislands, the food for the slaves, the lumber for buildings and forpacking produce. Only the continent will take the rum which Europerefuses, and with which the planter pays his running expenses. Owingto irreversible currents of trade, neither British nor island shippingcan carry this traffic at a profit to themselves, except by ruinouslyovercharging the planter. Americans only can do it. Concede theexchange by this means, and the development of sugar and coffeeraising, owing to their bulk as freight, will enlarge British shippingto Europe by an amount much beyond that lost in the local transport. Of the European carriage you will retain a monopoly, as you will ofthe produce, which goes into your storehouses alone; whence you reapthe advantage of brokerage and incidental handling, at the expense ofthe continental consumer, while your home navigation is enlarged byits export. Refuse this privilege, and your islands sink under Frenchand Spanish competition. French Santo Domingo, especially, exceeds byfar all your possessions, both in the extent of soil and quality ofproduct. " Very shortly they were able also to say that the Frenchallowed ships to be bought from Americans; and, although in theirtreaty with the United States they had refused free intercourse toAmerican vessels, a royal ordinance of 1784 permitted it to vessels ofunder sixty tons' burden. 

Within a month of the introduction of Pitt's bill the ministry towhich he then belonged fell. The one which followed refrained fromdealing at all with the subject, except by recourse to an expedientnot uncommon with party leaders, dealing with a new question ofadmitted intricacy. They passed a bill leaving the whole matter to theCrown for executive action. Accordingly, in July, 1783, a proclamationwas issued permitting intercourse between the islands and theAmerican continent, in a long list of specified articles, but only byBritish ships, owned and navigated as required by the Navigation Act. American vessels were excluded by omission, and while most necessariesfor food, agriculture, and commerce were admitted, one staple article, salt fish, urgently requested by the planters, was forbidden. This waspartly to encourage the Newfoundland fisheries and those of GreatBritain, and partly to injure American. Both objects were in the lineof the Navigation Act, to foster home navigation and impede that offoreigners; fisheries being considered a prime support of each. Ageneration before, the elder Pitt had inveighed against the Peace ofParis, in 1763, on account of the concession of the cod fisheries. "You leave to France, " he said, "the opportunity of reviving hernavy. " Before the separation, the near and great market of the WestIndia negro population had consumed one-third of the American catch offish. So profitable a condition could no longer be continued. Saltprovisions also, butter, and cheese, were not allowed, being reservedfor Irish producers. [72]

The next December the enabling bill was renewed and the proclamationre-issued. At this moment Pitt returned to office. A few months later, in the spring of 1784, Parliament was dissolved, and the ensuingelections carried him into power at the head of a great majority. Hemade no immediate attempt to resume legislation favoring the Americantrade with the West Indies. The disposition of the majority ofEnglishmen in the matter had been plainly shown, and other more urgentcommercial reforms engaged his attention. Soon after the receipt ofthe news in America, some of the states passed retaliatory measures, on their own account, or authorized the Continental Congress so to actfor them. The bad feeling already caused by the non-fulfilment, onboth sides, of certain stipulations of the treaty of peace wasparticularly exasperated by this proclamation; for anticipation, aroused by Pitt's proposed measure, had been nursed into confidentexpectation during the four months' interval, in which intercourse hadbeen openly or tacitly allowed. It was at this period that Nelsonfirst came conspicuously into public notice, by checking theconnivance of the West Indian governors in the infractions of theNavigation Laws; the Act authorizing commanders of Kings' ships toseize offending vessels, and bring them before the Court ofAdmiralty. [73] It is said also that his experience had much to do withshaping subsequent legislation upon the same prohibitory lines. InAmerica disappointment was bitter. Little concern was felt in England. Concerted action by several states was thought most unlikely, and amore perfect union impossible. While Massachusetts, for example, in1785 forbade import or export in any vessel belonging in whole or inpart to British subjects, the state then next to her in maritimeimportance, Pennsylvania, in 1786 repealed laws imposing extra chargeson British ships, and admitted all nations on equal terms with hersister states. "The ministry in England, " wrote Adams, "build alltheir hopes and schemes upon the supposition of such divisions inAmerica as will forever prevent a combination of the States, either inprohibition or in retaliatory duties. "[74]

Effective retaliation consequently was not feared, and as for resultsotherwise, it was doubtless thought best to await the test ofexperience. Proclamation, annually authorized and re-issued, remainedtherefore the mode of regulating commerce between the Britishdominions and the United States up to the date of Jay's treaty. Onceonly, in 1788, Parliament interfered so far as to pass a law, confining the trade with the West Indies to British-built ships andto certain enumerated articles, in the strict spirit of the Navigationsystem. Otherwise, intercourse with the United States was throughoutthis period subject at any moment to be modified or annulled by thesingle will of the Executive; whereas that with other nations, fixedby statute, --the Navigation Act, --could be altered only by thelegislature. [75]

Of this British commercial policy, following immediately upon therecognition of independence, Americans had not the slightest reason tocomplain. They had insisted upon being independent, and it would bebabyish to fret about the consequences, when unpalatable. It wasunpleasant to find that Great Britain, satisfied that the carryingtrade was the first of her interests, upon which depended her navalsupremacy, rigorously excluded Americans from branches of that tradebefore permitted to them; but in so doing she was simply seeking herown advantage by means of her own laws, as a nation does, forinstance, when it imposes heavy protective duties. It is quite aslegitimate to protect the carrying trade as any other form ofindustry; and the Navigation Act was no new device, for the specialannoyance of Americans. It is very possible that the action of GreatBritain at this time was so stupid, that, to use words of Jefferson's, the only way to prophesy what she would do was to ascertain what sheought to do, and infer the contrary. The rule, he said, never failed. This particular stupidity, if such it were, --and there was at leastpartial ground for the charge, --was simply another case of a mostcommon form of human dulness of perception, preoccupation with a fixedidea. But were the policy wise or foolish, as regards herself, towardsthe Americans it was not a wrong, but an injury; and, consequently, what the newly independent people had to do was not to complain, butto strike back with retaliatory commercial measures. Jefferson, nofriend generally to coercive action, wrote concerning this particularsituation, "It is not to the moderation or justice of others we are totrust for fair and equal access to market with our productions, or forour due share in the transportation of them; but to our own means ofindependence, and the firm will to use them. "[76]

Equally, when Great Britain, under the emergencies of the FrenchRevolution, resorted to measures that overpassed her rights, eithermunicipal or international, and infringed our own, the resort shouldhave been to the remedy with which nations defend their rights, asdistinct from their interest. The American people, then poor, andhabituated to colonial dependence, failed to create for themselves indue time the power necessary to self-assertion; nor did they as anation realize, what men like John Adams and Gouverneur Morris saw andpreached, that in the complicated tangle of warring interests whichconstitutes every contemporary situation, the influence of any singlefactor depends, not merely upon its own value, but upon that valuetaken in connection with other conditions. A pound is but a pound; butwhen the balance is nearly equal, a pound may turn a scale. BecauseAmerica could not possibly put afloat the hundred--or twohundred--ships-of-the-line which Great Britain had in commission, therefore, many argued, as many do to-day, it was vain to have anynavy. "I believe, " wrote Morris in 1794, [77] and few men betterunderstood financial conditions, "that we could now maintain twelveships-of-the-line, perhaps twenty, with a due proportion of frigatesand smaller vessels. And I am tolerably certain that, while the UnitedStates of America pursue a just and liberal conduct, _with twentysail-of-the-line at sea_, no nation on earth will dare to insult them. I believe also, that, not to mention individual losses, five years ofwar would involve more national expense than the support of a navy fortwenty years. One thing I am thoroughly convinced of, that, if we donot render ourselves respectable, we shall continue to be insulted. "

A singular, and too much disregarded, instance of the insults to whichthe United States was exposed, by the absence of naval strength, isfound in the action of the Barbary Powers towards our commerce, whichscarcely dared to enter the Mediterranean. It is less known that thiscondition of things was eminently satisfactory to British politiciansof the old-fashioned school, and as closely linked as was theNavigation system itself to the ancient rivalry with Holland. "Ourships, " wrote the Dutch statesman De Witt, who died in 1672, "shouldbe well guarded by convoy against the Barbary pirates. Yet it would byno means be proper to free that sea of those pirates, because weshould hereby be put upon the same footing with East-landers, [_i. E. _, Baltic nations, Denmark, Sweden, etc. ] English, Spaniards, andItalians; wherefore it is best to leave that thorn in the sides ofthose nations, whereby they will be distressed in that trade, while weby convoy engross all the European traffic and navigation. "[78] Thiscynical philosophy was echoed in 1784 by the cultured Englishstatesman, Lord Sheffield, the intimate friend of the historianGibbon, and editor of his memoirs. "If the great maritime powers knowtheir interests, " he wrote, "they will not encourage the Americans tobe carriers. That the Barbary States are an advantage to the maritimepowers is obvious. If they were suppressed, the little states ofItaly, etc. , would have much more of the carrying trade. The ArmedNeutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers as theBarbary States are useful. "[79]

It may be a novel thought to many Americans, that at that timeAmerican commerce in the Mediterranean depended largely for protectionupon Portuguese cruisers; its own country extending none. When peacewas unexpectedly made between Portugal and Algiers in 1793, throughthe interposition of a British consular officer, a wail of dismay wentup to heaven from American shipmen. "The conduct of the British inthis business, " wrote the American consul at Lisbon, "leaves no roomto doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, andthat they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin. " Itproved, indeed, that the British consul's action was not that of hisGovernment, but taken on his own initiative; but the incident not onlyrecalls the ideas of the time, long since forgotten, but in itsindications, both of British commercial security and Americanexposure, illustrates the theory of the Navigation Act as to thereciprocal influence of the naval and merchant services. There wasthen nothing, in the economical conditions of the United States, toforbid a navy stronger than the Portuguese; yet the consul, in hispitiful appeal to the Portuguese Court, had to write: "My countrymenhave been led into their present embarrassment by confiding in thefriendship, power, and protection of her Most Faithful Majesty, " . .. Which "lulled our citizens into a fatal security. "[80] Our lamentabledependence upon others, for the respect we should have extortedourselves, is shown in the instructions issued to Jay, on his missionto England in 1794. "It may be represented to the British Ministry, how productive of perfect conciliation it might be to the people ofthe United States, if Great Britain would use her influence with theDey of Algiers for the liberation of the American citizens incaptivity, and for a peace upon reasonable terms. It has beencommunicated from abroad, to be the fixed policy of Great Britain tocheck our trade in grain to the Mediterranean. This is too doubtful tobe assumed, but fit for inquiry. "[81] The Dey had declared war in1785, this being with the Barbary rulers the customary method ofopening piratical action. "If the Dey makes peace with every one, "said one of his captains to Nelson, "what is he to do with his ships?"

The experience of the succeeding fifteen years was to give ampledemonstration of the truth of Morris's prophecy; but what isinteresting now to observe is, that he, who certainly did not imaginetwenty ships to be equal to a hundred, accurately estimated thedeterrent force of such a body, prepared to act upon an enemy'scommunications, --or interests, --at a great distance from the strategiccentre of operations. A valuable military lesson of the War of 1812 isjust this: that a comparatively small force--a few frigates andsloops--placed as the United States Navy was, can exercise aninfluence utterly disproportionate to its own strength. Instances ofGreat Britain's extremity, subsequent to Morris's prediction, areeasily cited. In 1796, her fleet was forced to abandon theMediterranean. In 1799, a year after the Nile, Nelson had to implore asmall Portuguese division not to relinquish the blockade of Malta, which he could not otherwise maintain. Under such conditions, apprehension of even a slight additional burden of hostility imposesrestraint. Had Morris's navy existed in 1800, we probably should havehad no War of 1812; that is, if Jefferson's passion for peace, andabhorrence of navies, could have been left out of the account. War, asNapoleon said, is a business of positions. The commercial importanceof the United States, and the position of its navy relatively to themajor interests of Great Britain, would together have produced aneffect, to which, under the political emergency of the time, the merecommercial retaliation then attempted was quite inadequate. Thisdistressed the enemy, but did not reduce him; and it bitterlyalienated a large part of our own community, so that we went into thewar a discordant, almost a disunited, nation. 

During the years of American impotence under the early confederation, the trade regulations of the British Government, framed on the linesadvocated by Lord Sheffield, met with a measure of success which wasperhaps more apparent than real; due attention being scarcely paid tothe actual loss entailed upon British planters by the heightened costof supplies, and the consequent effect upon British commerce andnavigation. "Under the present limited intercourse with America, "wrote the planter, Edwards, "the West Indies are subject to three setsof devouring monopolies: 1, the British ship-owners; 2, their agentsin American ports; 3, their agents in the ports of the islands; all ofwhom exact an unnatural profit of the planters. "[82] Chalmers, lookingonly to the navigation of the kingdom, which these culpritsrepresented, admits that in the principal supplies Great Britaincannot compete with America; but, "whatever may be the difference inprice to the West Indians, this is but a small equivalent which theyought to pay to the British consumer, for enjoying the exclusivesupply of sugar, rum, and other West India products. "[83] A fewfigures show conclusively that under all disadvantages the islandsincreased in actual prosperity, although they fell behind their Frenchcompetitors, favored by a more liberal policy. In the quiet year 1770, before the revolt of the continent, the British West Indies shippedto the home country produce amounting to £3, 279, 204;[84] in 1787 thishad risen to £4, 839, 145, [85] a gain of over 30 per cent. Between thesame years, exports to the United States, limited after the peace toBritish ships, had fallen from £481, 407 to £196, 461. American produce, confined to British bottoms for admission to British colonies, hadgone largely to the French islands, with which before the Revolutionthey could have only surreptitious intercourse. The result was thatthe British planter had to pay much more for his plantation suppliesthan did the French, who were furnished by American vessels, built andrun much cheaper than British. [86] He was rigidly forbidden also toseek stores in the French islands. Such circuitous intercourse withAmerica, by depriving British ships of the long voyage to thecontinent, would place the French islands in the obnoxious relation of_entrepôt_ to their neighbors, which Holland had once occupied towardsEngland. In all legislation minute care was taken to prevent suchinjury to navigation. Direct trade with British dominions was thefetich of British policy; circuitous trade its abomination. 

Despite drawbacks, a distinct advance was observable also in Britishnavigation; in the development of the British-American colonies, continental and island; and in the intercolonial intercourse andshipping. Immediately after the institution of the new government, theUnited States enacted laws protective of her own navigation; notablyby an alien duty laid upon all foreign tonnage. To consider theprobable effects of this legislation, and of the new Americaninstitutions, upon British commerce and navigation, a committee of thePrivy Council was appointed, to which we owe a digested andauthoritative summary of the change of conditions effected by theBritish measures, between 1783 and 1790. From its report, based uponaverages of several years, it appears that in the direct trade betweenGreat Britain and the United States, in which American ships stood onequal terms with British, there had been little variation in value ofimports or exports, with the single exception of tobacco and rice. These two articles, which formerly had to pass through Great Britainas an _entrepôt_, now went direct to their destination. The Americanshipping--navigation--employed in the trade with Great Britainherself, was only one-third of the British; the respective tonnagebeing 26, 564 and 52, 595. As this was nearly the proportion of Americanto British built ships in the colonial period, American shippingbefore the adoption of the Constitution had not gained at all, underthe most favorable treatment conceded to it in British dominions. TheReport, indeed, estimated that it had lost by nearly 20 per cent. [87]

In the colonial trade, on the other hand, very marked British gainscould be reported. The commercially backward communities of Canada, etc. , forbidden now to admit American ships, or to import manyarticles from the United States, and given special privileges in theWest Indies, had more than doubled their imports from the mothercountry; the amount rising from £379, 411 to £829, 088. These sums arenot to be regarded in their own triviality, but as harbingers of adevelopment, which it was hoped would fill the void in the Britishimperial system caused by the loss of the former colonies. The WestIndies showed a more gradual increase, though still satisfactory;their exports since 1774 had risen 20 per cent. It was, however, innavigation, avowedly the chief aim of the protective legislation, thatthe intercolonial results were most encouraging. Through the exclusionof American competition, British tonnage to Canada and the neighboringcolonies had enlarged fourfold, from 11, 219 to 46, 106. The nationaltonnage engaged between the West Indies and the mother country hadgrown from 80, 482 to 133, 736; 60 per cent. More encouraging still, from the ideal point of view of a restored system of mutual support, embracing both sides of the Atlantic, the tonnage employed betweenCanada and the West Indies had risen from 996 only in 1774, to 14, 513in 1789. In brief, after a careful and systematic examination of thewhole field, the committee considered that British navigation hadgained 111, 638 tons by excluding Americans from branches of trade theyhad once shared, and still eagerly desired. 

The effects of the system were most conspicuous in the trade betweenthe West Indies and the United States. The tonnage here employed hadfallen from 107, 739, before the war, to 62, 738. The reflections of theCommittee upon this particular are so characteristic of nationalconvictions as to be worth quoting. [88] "This decrease is rather lessthan half what it was before the war;[89] but before the warfive-eighths belonged to merchants, permanent inhabitants of thecountries now under the dominion of the United States, andthree-eighths to British merchants residing occasionally in the saidcountries. At that time, very few vessels belonging to Britishmerchants, resident in the British European dominions, or in theBritish Islands in the West Indies, had a share in this trade. Thevessels employed in this trade can now only belong to British subjects_residing_ in the present British dominions. Many vessels now go fromthe ports of Great Britain, carrying British manufactures to theUnited States, there load with lumber and provisions for the BritishIslands in the West Indies, and return with the produce of theseislands to Great Britain. The whole of this branch of freight may alsobe considered as a new acquisition, and was obtained by your Majesty'sOrder in Council before mentioned, [90] which has operated to theincrease of British Navigation, compared to that of the United Statesin a double ratio; _but it has taken from the navigation of the UnitedStates more than it has added to that of Great Britain_. "

The last sentence emphasizes the fact, which John Adams had noted, that the object of the Navigation system was scarcely more defensivethan offensive, in the military sense of the word. The Act carriedprovisions meant distinctly to impede the development of foreignshipping, as far as possible to do so by municipal regulation. Theprohibition of entrance to a port of Great Britain by a foreigntrader, unless three-fourths manned by citizens of the country whoseflag she bore, was distinctly offensive in intent. But for this, otherstates might increase their tonnage by employing seamen not their own, which Great Britain could not do without weakening the reservesavailable for her navy, and imperative to her defence. Rivalry wasthus engendered, and became bitter and apprehensive in proportion tothe national interests involved; but at no time had suchconsiderations persuaded the country to depart from its purpose. "Theforeign war which those measures first brought upon us, and the odiumwhich they have never ceased to cause, to the present day (1792) amongneighboring nations, have not induced the legislature to give up anyone of its principles. "[91] In the case of the United States, theexasperation aroused was very great. It perpetuated the nationalanimosity surviving from the War of Independence, and provokedretaliation. Before the formation of the better Union this was toodesultory and divided to have much effect, and the artificial systemof which Sheffield was the chief public champion had the appearance ofsuccess which has been described; but as soon as the thirteen statescould wield their power as one whole, under a system at onceconsistent and permanent, American navigation began to make rapidheadway. In 1790 there entered American ports from abroad 355, 000 tonsof American shipping and 251, 000 foreign, of which 217, 000 wereBritish. [92] After one year of the discriminating tonnage dues laid bythe national Congress, the American tonnage entering home ports fromGreat Britain had risen, from the 26, 564 average of the three years, 1787 to 1789, ascertained by the British committee, to 43, 580. [93] In1801 there entered 799, 304 tons of native shipping, [94] and but138, 000 foreign. [95] The amount of British among the latter is notstated; but in the year 1800 there cleared from Great Britain, underher own flag, for the United States, but 14, 381 tons. [96] Thisreversal of the conditions in 1787-89, before quoted, [97] was theresult of a gradual progress, noticeable immediately after theAmerican imposition of tonnage duties, and increasing up to 1793, whenit was accelerated by the war between Great Britain and France. 

It is carefully to be remembered that the British committee, representing strictly the prepossessions of the body by which it wasconstituted, looked primarily to the development of national carryingtrade. "As the security of the British dominions principally dependson the greatness of your Majesty's naval power, it has ever been thepolicy of the British Government to watch with a jealous eye everyattempt that has been made by foreign nations to the detriment of itsnavigation; and even in cases where the interests of commerce andthose of navigation could not be wholly reconciled, the Government ofGreat Britain has always given the preference to the interests ofnavigation; and it has never yet submitted to the imposition of anytonnage duties by foreign nations on British ships trading to theirports, without proceeding immediately to retaliation. "[98] It had, however, submitted to several such measures, retaliatory for theexclusion from the West India trade, enacted by the separate states inthe years 1783 to 1789; as well as to other legislation, taxingBritish shipping by name much above that of other foreigners. Thisquiescence was due to confidence, that the advantages possessed byGreat Britain would enable her to overcome all handicaps. It wastherefore with satisfaction that, after six years of commercialantagonism, the committee was able, not only to report the growth ofBritish shipping, already quoted, but to show by the first officialstatement of entries issued by the American Government, [99] for thefirst year of its own existence, that for every five American tonsentering American ports from over sea, there entered also threeBritish; and that of the whole foreign tonnage there were six Britishto one of all other nations together. 

Upon the whole, therefore, while regretting the evidence in theAmerican statement which showed increasing activity by Americanshipping over that ascertained by themselves for the previousyears, --to be accounted for, as was believed, by transientcircumstances, --the committee, after consultation with the leadingmerchants in the American trade, thought better to postponeretaliation for the new tonnage duties, which contained no invidiousdistinction in favor of other foreign shipping against British. Thesystem of trade regulation so far pursued had given good results, andits continuance was recommended; though bitterly antagonizingAmericans, and maintaining ill-will between the two countries. Uponone point, especially desired by the United States, the committee wasparticularly firm. It considered that its Government might judiciouslymake one proposition--and one only--for a commercial treaty; namely, that there should be entire equality of treatment, as to duties andtonnage, towards the ships of both nations in the home ports of eachother. "But if Congress should propose (as they certainly will) thatthis principle of equality should be extended to the ports of ourColonies and Islands, and that the ships of the United States shouldthere be treated as British ships, it should be answered that thisdemand cannot be admitted even as a subject of negotiation. .. . Thisbranch of freight is of the same nature with the freight from oneAmerican state to another" (that is, trade internal to the empire isessentially a coasting trade). "Congress has made regulations toconfine the freight, employed between the different states, to theships of the United States, and Great Britain does not object to thisrestriction. "[100] "The great advantages which have resulted fromexcluding American ships appear in the accounts given in this report;many of the merchants and planters of the West Indies, who formerlyresisted this advice, now acknowledge the wisdom of it. "[101]

The committee recognized that exclusion from the carrying trade of theBritish West Indies was in some degree compensated to the Americancarrier, by the permission given by the Government of France forvessels not exceeding sixty tons to trade with her colonies, actuallymuch greater producers, and therefore larger customers. Santo Domingoin particular, in the period following the American war, had enjoyed aheyday of prosperity, far eclipsing that of all the British islandstogether. This was due partly to natural advantages, and partly tosocial conditions, --the planters being generally resident, which theBritish were not; but cheaper supplies through free intercourse withthe American continent also counted for much. From the French WestIndies there entered the United States in 1790, 101, 417 tons ofshipping, of which only 3, 925 were French. [102] From the BritishIslands there came 90, 375, but of these all but 4, 057 wereBritish. [103] Returning, the exports from the United States to the twowere respectively, $3, 284, 656 and $2, 077, 757. [104] The flatteringtestimony borne by these figures to the meagreness of Frenchnavigation, in the particular quarter, needed doubtless to bequalified by reference to their home trade from the West Indies, bornein French ships. This amounted in 1788 to 296, 435 tons from SantoDomingo alone;[105] whereas the British trade from all their islandsemployed but 133, 736. [106] This, however, was the sole great carryingtrade of France; to the United States she sent from her home portsless than 13, 000 tons. 

It was the opinion of the British committee that the privilegeconceded to American shipping in the French islands was so contrary toestablished colonial policy as to be of doubtful continuance. Still, in concluding its report with a summary of American commercialconditions, which it deemed were in a declining way, it took occasionto utter a warning, based upon these relations of America with theforeign colonies. In case of a commercial treaty, "Should it beproposed to treat on maritime regulations, any article allowing theships of the United States to protect the property of the enemies ofGreat Britain in time of war" (that is, the flag to cover the goods), "should on no account be admitted. It would be more dangerous toconcede this privilege to the United States than to any other foreigncountry. From their situation, the ships of these states would be ableto cover the whole trade of France and Spain with their islands andcolonies, in America and the West Indies, whenever Great Britain shallbe engaged with either of those Powers; and the navy of Great Britainwould, in such case, be deprived of the means of distressing theenemy, by destroying his commerce and thereby diminishing hisresources. " It is well to note in these words the contemporaryrecognition of the importance of the position of the United States; ofthe value of the colonial trade; of the bearing of commercedestruction on war, by "diminishing the resources" of an enemy; and ofthe opportunity of the United States, "from their situation, " to coverthe carriage of colonial produce to Europe; for upon these severalpoints turned much of the troubles, which by their accumulation causedmutual exasperation, and established an antagonism that inevitablylent itself to the war spirit when occasion arose. The specificwarning of the committee was doubtless elicited by the terms of thethen recent British commercial treaty with France, in 1786, by whichthe two nations had agreed that, in case of war to which one was aparty, the vessels of the other might freely carry all kinds of goods, the property of any person or nation, except contraband. Such aconcession could be made safely to France, --was in fact perfectlyone-sided in favoring Great Britain; but to America it would openunprecedented opportunity. 

To the state of things so far described came the French Revolution;already begun, indeed, when the committee sat, but the course of whichcould not yet be foreseen. Its coincidence with the formation of thenew government of the United States is well to be remembered; for thetwo events, by their tendencies, worked together to promote theantagonism between the United States and Great Britain, which wasalready latent in the navigation system of the one and the maritimeaptitudes of the other. Washington, the first American President, wasinaugurated in March, 1789; in May, the States General of France met. In February, 1793, the French Republic declared war against GreatBritain, and in March Washington entered on his second term. In theintervening four years the British Government had persisted inmaintaining the exclusion of American carrying trade from her colonialports. During the same period the great French colony Santo Domingohad undergone a social convulsion, which ended in the wreck of itsentire industrial system by the disappearance of slavery, and with itof all white government. The huge sugar and coffee product of theisland vanished as a commercial factor, and with it the greater partof the colonial carriage of supplies, which had indemnified Americanshippers and agriculturists for their exclusion from British ports. Of167, 399 American tonnage entering American ports from the West Indiesin 1790, 101, 417 had been from French islands. 

The removal of so formidable a competitor as Santo Domingo of courseinured to the advantage of the British sugar and coffee planter, whowas thus more able to bear the burden laid upon him to maintain thenavigation of the empire, by paying a heavy percentage on hissupplies. This, however, was not the only change in conditionsaffecting commerce and navigation. By 1793 it had become evident thatCanada, Nova Scotia, and their neighbors, could not fill the place inan imperial system which it had been hoped they would take, asproducers of lumber and food stuffs. This increased the relativeimportance of the West India Islands to the empire, just when the risein price of sugar and coffee made it more desirable to develop theirproduction. Should war come, the same reason would make it expedientto extend by conquest British productive territory in the Caribbean, and at the same time to cut off the supplies of such enemy'spossessions as could not be subdued; thus crippling them, and removingtheir competition by force, as that of Santo Domingo had been byindustrial ruin. These considerations tended further to fasten theinterest of Great Britain upon this whole region, as particularlyconducive to her navigation system. That cheapening supplies wouldstimulate production, to meet the favorable market and growing demandsof the world, had been shown by the object-lesson of the Frenchcolonies; though as yet the example had not been followed. 

At this time also Great Britain had to recognize her growingdependence upon the sea, because her home territory had ceased to beself-sufficing. Her agriculture was becoming inadequate to feeding herpeople, in whose livelihood manufactures and commerce were playing anincreasing part. Both these, as well as food from abroad, required thecommand of the sea, in war as in peace, to import raw materials andexport finished products; and control of the sea required increase ofnaval resources, proportioned to the growing commercial movement. According to the ideas of the age, the colonial monopoly was thesurest means to this. It was therefore urgent to resort to measureswhich should develop the colonies; and the question was inevitablewhether reserving to British navigation the trade by which they weresupplied was not more than compensated by the diminished production, with its effect in lessening the cargoes employing shipping for thehomeward voyage. 

Thus things were when war broke out. The two objects, or motives, which have been indicated, came then at once into play. The conquestof the French West Indies, a perfectly legitimate move, was speedilyundertaken; and meanwhile orders passing the bounds of recognizedinternational law were issued, to suppress, by capture, theirintercourse with the United States, alike in import and export. Theblow of course fell upon American shipping, by which this traffic wasalmost wholly maintained. This was the beginning of a long series ofarbitrary measures, dictated by a policy uniform in principle, thoughoften modified by dictates of momentary expediency. It lasted foryears in its various manifestations, the narration of which belongs tosubsequent chapters. Complementary to this was the effort to developproduction in British colonies, by extending to them the neutralcarriage denied to their enemies. This was effected by allowing directtrade between them and the United States to American vessels of notover seventy tons; a limit substantially the same as that beforeimposed by France, and designed to prevent their surreptitiouslyconveying the cargoes to Europe, to the injury of British monopoly ofthe continental supply, effected by the _entrepôt_ system, and doublyvaluable since the failure of French products. 

This concession to American navigation, despite the previousopposition, had become possible to Pitt, partly because itsadvisability had been demonstrated and the opportunity recognized;partly, also, because the immense increase of the active navy, causedby the war, created a demand for seamen, which by impressment toldheavily upon the merchant navigation of the kingdom, fostered for thisvery purpose. To meet this emergency, it was clearly politic todevolve the supply of the British West Indies upon neutral carriers, who would enjoy an immunity from capture denied to merchant ships of abelligerent, as well as relieve British navigation of a function whichit had never adequately fulfilled. The measure was in strict accordwith the usual practice of remitting in war the requirement of theNavigation Act, that three-fourths of all crews should be Britishsubjects; by which means a large number of native seamen became atonce released to the navy. To throw open a reserved trade to foreignships, and a reserved employment to foreign seamen, are evidently onlydifferent applications of the one principle, viz. : to draw uponforeign aid, in a crisis to which the national navigation was unequal. 

Correlative to these measures, defensive in character, was thedetermination that the enemy should be deprived of these benefits;that, so far as international law could be stretched, neutral shipsshould not help him as they were encouraged to help the British. Thewelfare of the empire also demanded that native seamen should not beallowed to escape their liability to impressment, by serving inneutral vessels. The lawless measures taken to insure these twoobjects were the causes avowed by the United States in 1812 fordeclaring war. The impressment of American seamen, however, althoughnumerous instances had already occurred, had not yet made upon thenational consciousness an impression at all proportionate to themagnitude of the wrong; and the instructions given to Jay, [107] asspecial envoy in 1794, while covering many points at issue, does notmention this, which eventually overtopped all others. 

FOOTNOTES:

[54] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 121. 

[55] Commerce of the American States (Edition February, 1784), pp. 198-199. 

[56] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 290. 

[57] Washington's Correspondence, 1787, edited by W. C. Ford, vol. Viii. Pp. 159, 160, 254. 

[58] Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, p. 20. 

[59] Chalmers, Opinions, p. 32. 

[60] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, Paris, 1847, vol. Ii. P. 238. 

[61] Canada, Newfoundland, Bermuda, etc. 

[62] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 303. 

[63] p. 288. 

[64] Coxe, View of the United States, p. 346. 

[65] Reeves, p. 381. Nevertheless, foreign nations frequentlycomplained of this as a distinction against them (Report of theCommittee of the Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, p. 10). 

[66] Bryan Edwards, West Indies, vol. Ii. P. 494 (note). 

[67] Coxe's View, p. 318. 

[68] American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, vol. I. P. 301. Jeffersonadded, "These imports consist mostly of articles on which industry hasbeen exhausted, "--_i. E. _, completed manufactures. The State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, give the tabulated imports and exports formany succeeding years. 

[69] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 333. 

[70] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 291. 

[71] My italics. 

[72] Chalmers, Opinions, p. 65. 

[73] Reeves, pp. 47, 57. 

[74] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 281. 

[75] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 307. 

[76] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 304. 

[77] Morris to Randolph (Secretary of State), May 31, 1794. AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 409. The italics areMorris's. 

[78] Quoted from De Witt's Interest of Holland, in Macpherson's Annalsof Commerce, vol. Ii. P. 472. 

[79] Observations on the Commerce of the American States, 1783, p. 115. Concerning this pamphlet, Gibbon wrote, "The Navigation Act, thepalladium of Britain, was defended, perhaps saved, by his pen. "

[80] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. Pp. 296-299. 

[81] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 474. 

[82] West Indies, vol. Ii. Page 522, note. 

[83] Opinions, p. 89. 

[84] Macpherson, vol. Iii. P. 506. 

[85] Ibid. , vol. Iv. P. 158. 

[86] Bryan Edwards, himself a planter of the time, says (vol. Ii. P. 522) that staves and lumber had risen 37 per cent in the Britishislands, which he attributes to the extortions of the navigationmonopoly, "under the present limited intercourse with America. " Coxe(View, etc. , p. 134) gives lists of comparative prices, in 1790, Juneto November, in the neighboring islands of Santo Domingo and Jamaica, which show forcibly the burdens under which the latter labored. 

[87] Chalmers, in one of his works quoted by Macpherson (vol. Iii. P. 559), estimates the annual entries of American-built ships to Britishports, 1771-74, to be 34, 587 tons. From this figure the falling offwas marked. 

[88] Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, Jan. 28, 1791, p. 39. 

[89] This awkward expression means that the amount of decrease wasrather less than half the before-the-war total. 

[90] June 18, 1784, substantially the re-issue of that of Dec. 26, 1783, which Reeves (p. 288) considers the standard exemplar. 

[91] Reeves, p. 431. 

[92] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. X. P. 389. 

[93] Ibid. , Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 301. 

[94] Ibid. , Commerce and Navigation, vol. X. P. 528. 

[95] Ibid. , p. 584. 

[96] Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. Iv. P. 535. 

[97] Ante, pp. 77, 78. 

[98] Report of the Committee, p. 85. 

[99] Ibid. , p. 52. 

[100] Report, p. 96. 

[101] Ibid. , p. 94. 

[102] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. X. P. 47. 

[103] Ibid. , p. 45. 

[104] Ibid. , p. 24. 

[105] Coxe, p. 171. 

[106] Committee's estimate; Report, p. 43. 

[107] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 472. 

 [Illustration: JOHN JAY From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bedford (Jay) House, Katonah, N. Y. ]

CHAPTER III

FROM JAY'S TREATY TO THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL

1794-1807

While there were many matters in dispute between the two countries, the particular occasion of Jay's mission to London in 1794 was themeasures injurious to the commerce of the United States, taken by theBritish Government on the outbreak of war with France, in 1793. Neutrals are certain to suffer, directly and indirectly, from everywar, and especially in maritime wars; for then the great common of allnations is involved, under conditions and regulations which by generalconsent legalize interference, suspension, and arrest of neutralvoyages, when conflicting with acknowledged belligerent rights, orunder reasonable suspicion of such conflict. It was held in the UnitedStates that in the treatment of American ships Great Britain hadtranscended international law, and abused belligerent privilege, byforced construction in two particulars. First, in June, 1793, she sentinto her own ports American vessels bound to France with provisions, on the ground that under existing circumstance these were contrabandof war. She did indeed buy the cargoes, and pay the freight, thusreducing the loss to the shipper; but he was deprived of the surplusprofit arising from extraordinary demand in France, and it was claimedbesides that the procedure was illegal. Secondly, in November of thesame year, the British Government directed the seizure of "all shipsladen with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, orcarrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony. "Neutrals were thus forbidden either to go to, or to sail from, anyFrench colony for purposes of commercial intercourse. For the injuriessuffered under these measures Jay was to seek compensation. 

The first order raised only a question of contraband, of frequentrecurrence in all hostilities. It did not affect the issues which ledto the War of 1812, and therefore need not here be further considered. But the second turned purely on the question of the intercourse ofneutrals with the colonies of belligerents, and rested upon thosereceived opinions concerning the relations of colonies to mothercountries, which have been related in the previous chapters. TheBritish Government founded the justification of its action upon aprecedent established by its own Admiralty courts, which, though notstrictly new, was recent, dating back only to the Seven Years' War, 1756-63, whence it had received the name of the Rule of 1756. At thattime, in the world of European civilization, all the principalmaritime communities were either mother countries or colonies. Acolonial system was the appendage of every maritime state; and amongall there obtained the invariable rule, the formulation of which byMontesquieu has been already quoted, that "commercial monopoly is theleading principle of colonial intercourse, " from which foreign stateswere rigorously excluded. Dealing with such a recognized internationalrelation, at a period when colonial production had reachedunprecedented proportions, the British courts had laid down theprinciple that a trade which a nation in time of peace forbade toforeigners could not be extended to them, if neutrals, in time of war, at the will and for the convenience of the belligerent; because bysuch employment they were "in effect incorporated in the enemy'snavigation, having adopted his commerce and character, and identifiedthemselves with his interests and purposes. "[108]

During the next great maritime war, that of American Independence, theUnited States were involved as belligerents, and the only maritimeneutrals were Holland and the Baltic States. These drew together in aleague known historically as the Armed Neutrality of 1780, inopposition to certain British interpretations of the rights ofneutrals and belligerents; but in their formulated demands that ofopen trade with the colonies of belligerents does not appear, althoughthere is found one closely cognate to it, --an asserted right tocoasting trade, from port to port, of a country at war. The Rule of1756 therefore remained, in 1793, a definition of internationalmaritime law laid down by British courts, but not elsewhere accepted;and it rested upon a logical deduction from a system of colonialadministration universal at that period. The logical deduction may bestated thus. The mother country, for its own benefit, reserves toitself both the inward and outward trade; the products of the colony, and the supplying of it with necessaries. The carriage of thesecommodities is also confined to its own ships. Colonial commerce andnavigation are thus each a national monopoly. To open to neutrals thenavigation, the carriage of products and supplies, in time of war, isa war measure simply, designed to preserve a benefit endangered by theother belligerent. As a war measure, it tends to support the financialand naval strength of the nation employing it; and therefore, to anopponent whose naval power is capable of destroying that element ofstrength, the stepping in of a neutral to cover it is clearly aninjury. The neutral so doing commits an unfriendly act, partialbetween the two combatants; because it aids the one in a proceeding, the origin and object of which are purely belligerent. 

When the United States in 1776 entered the family of nations, she camewithout colonies, but in the war attendant upon her liberation she hadno rights as a neutral. In the interval of peace, between 1783 and1793, she had endeavored, as has been seen, to establish betweenherself and the Caribbean region those conditions of open navigationwhich were indicated as natural by the geographical relations of thetwo and their several products. This had been refused by GreatBritain; but France had conceded it on a restricted scale, plainlycontrived, by the limitation of sixty tons on the size of vesselsengaged, to counteract any attempt at direct carriage from the islandsto Europe, which was not permitted. Under these circumstances theUnited States was brought into collision with the Rule of 1756, forthe first time, by the Order in Council of November 6, 1793. A peoplewithout colonies, and with a rapidly growing navigation, could have nosympathy with a system, coextensive with Europe, which monopolized thecarriage of colonial products. The immediate attitude assumed was oneof antagonism; and the wrong as felt was the greater, because thedirect intercourse between the United States and the then great Frenchcolonies was not incidental to war, but had been established in peace. In principle, the Rule rested for its validity upon an exception madein war, for the purposes of war. 

The British Government in fact had overlooked that the Rule hadoriginated in European conditions; and, if applicable at all to thenew transatlantic state, it could only be if conditions were the same, or equivalent. Till now, by universal usage, trade from colonies hadbeen only to the mother country; the appearance of an American statewith no colonies introduced two factors hitherto non-existent. Herewas a people not identified with a general system of colonialexclusiveness; and also, from their geographical situation, it waspossible for a European government to permit them to trade with itscolonies, without serious trespass on the privileges reserved to themother country. The monopoly of the latter consisted not only in thecommerce and carrying trade of the colony, but in the _entrepôt_; thatis, in the receipt and storage of the colonial produce, and itsdistribution to less favored European communities, --the profit, inshort, of the middleman, or broker. France had recognized, though butpartially, this difference of conditions, and in somewhat grudgingmanner had opened her West Indian ports to American vessels, forintercourse with their own country. This trade, being permitted inpeace, did not come under the British Rule; therefore by its ownprinciple the seizures under it were unlawful. Accordingly, on January8, 1794, the order was revoked, and the application limited to vesselsbound from the West Indies direct to Europe. 

This further Order in Council preserved the principle of the Rule of1756, but it removed the cause of a great number of the seizures whichhad afflicted American shipping. There were nevertheless, among these, some cases of vessels bound direct to France from French colonies, laden with colonial produce; one of which was the first presented toJay on his arrival in London. In writing to the Secretary of State hesays, "It unfortunately happens that this is not among the strongestof the cases;" and in a return made three years later to Congress, oflosses recovered under the treaty, this vessel's name does not appear. In the opinion of counsel, submitted to Jay, it was unlikely that thecase would be reversed on appeal, because it unequivocally fell underthe Rule. [109] It is therefore to be inferred that this principle, theoperation of which was revived so disastrously in 1805, was notsurrendered by the British Government in 1794. In fact, in thediscussions between Mr. Jay and the British Minister of ForeignAffairs, there seems to have been on both sides a disposition to avoidpronouncements upon points of abstract right. It remained the constantpolicy of British negotiators, throughout this thorny period, to seekmodes of temporary arrangement, which should obviate immediate causesof complaint; leaving principles untouched, to be asserted, ifdesirable, at a more favorable moment. This was quite contrary to thewishes of the United States Government, which repeatedly intimated toJay that in the case of the Rule of 1756 it desired to settle thequestion of principle, which it denied. To this it had attachedseveral other topics touching maritime neutral rights, such as theflag covering the cargo, and matters of contraband. [110]

Jay apparently satisfied himself, by his interviews and observation ofpublic feeling in England, that at the moment it was vain for acountry without a navy to expect from Great Britain any surrender ofright, as interpreted by her jurists; that the most to be accomplishedwas the adoption of measures which should as far as possible extendthe immediate scope of American commerce, and remove its presentinjuries, presenting withal a probability of future furtherconcessions. In his letter transmitting the treaty, he wrote: "ThatBritain, at this period, and involved in war, should not admitprinciples which would impeach the propriety of her conduct in seizingprovisions bound to France, and enemy's property on board neutralvessels, does not appear to me extraordinary. The articles, as theynow stand, secure compensation for seizures, and leave us at libertyto decide whether they were made in such cases as to be warranted bythe _existing_ law of nations. "[111] The italics are Jay's, and theexpression is obscure; but it seems to imply that, while eithernation, in their respective claims for damages, would be bound by thedecision of the commissioners provided for their settlement by thetreaty, it would preserve the right to its own opinion as to whetherthe decision was in accordance with admitted law, binding in thefuture. In short, acceptance of the Rule of 1756 would not be affectedby the findings upon the claims. If adverse to Great Britain, shecould still assert the Rule in times to come, if expedient; if againstthe United States, she likewise, while submitting, reserved the rightof protest, with or without arms, against its renewed enforcement. 

"As to the principles we contend for, " continued Jay, "you will findthem saved in the conclusion of the twelfth article, from which itwill appear that we still adhere to them. " This conclusion specifiesthat after the termination of a certain period, during which GreatBritain would open to American vessels the carrying trade between herWest India Islands and the United States, there should be furthernegotiation, looking to the extension of mutual intercourse; "and thesaid parties will then endeavor to agree whether, in any, and what, cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property; and in whatcases provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, maybecome such. But in the meantime, their conduct towards each other inthese respects shall be regulated by the articles hereinafter insertedon those subjects. "[112] The treaty therefore was a temporaryarrangement, to meet temporary difficulties, and involved no surrenderof principle on either side. Although the Rule of 1756 is notmentioned, it evidently shared the same fate as the other Americanpropositions looking to the settlement of principles; the more so thatsubsequent articles admitted, not only the undoubted rule that theneutral flag did not cover enemy's goods, but also the vehementlydisputed claim that naval stores and provisions were, or might be, contraband of war. Further evidence of the understanding of GreatBritain in this matter is afforded by a letter of the law adviser ofthe Crown, transmitted in 1801 by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs toMr. King, then United States Minister. "The direct trade between themother country and its colonies has not during this present war beenrecognized as legal, either by his Majesty's Government or by histribunals. "[113]

It is to be inferred that the Administration and the Senate, whilepossibly thinking Jay too yielding as a negotiator, reached theconclusion that his estimate of British feeling, formed upon the spot, was correct as to the degree of concession then to be obtained. At allevents, the treaty, which provided for mixed commissions to adjudicateupon the numerous seizures made under the British orders, and, undercertain conditions, admitted American vessels to branches of Britishtrade previously closed to them, was ratified with the exception ofthe twelfth article. This conferred on Americans the privilege, longand urgently desired, of direct trade between their own country andthe British West Indies on the same terms as British ships, though invessels of limited size. Greatly desired as this permission had been, it came coupled with the condition, not only that cargoes from theislands should be landed in the United States alone, but also, whilethe concession lasted, American vessels should not carry "molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton" from the United States to any part ofthe world. By strict construction, this would prevent re-exporting theproduce of French or other foreign colonies; a traffic, the extent ofwhich during this war may be conceived by the returns for a singleyear, 1796, when United States shipping carried to Europe thirty-fivemillion pounds of sugar and sixty-two million pounds of coffee, products of the Caribbean region. This article was rejected by theSenate, and the treaty ratified without it; but the coveted privilegewas continued by British executive order, the regulations in thematter being suspended on account of the war, and the trade opened toAmerican as well as British ships. Ostensibly a favor, not resting onthe obligations of treaty, but on the precarious ground of theGovernment's will, its continuance was assured under the circumstancesof the time by its practical utility to Great Britain; for the tradeof that country, and its vital importance in the prevailing wars, weredeveloping at a rate which outstripped its own tonnage. The numbers ofnative seamen were likewise inadequate, through the heavy demands ofthe Navy for men. The concurrence of neutrals was imperative. Underthe conditions it was no slight advantage to have the islands suppliedand the American market retained, by the services of American vessels, leaving to British the monopoly of direct carrying between thecolonies and Europe. 

Although vexations to neutrals incident to a state of war continuedsubsequent to this treaty, they turned upon points of construction andpractice rather than upon principle. Negotiation was continuous; andin September, 1800, towards the close of Adams's administration, Mr. John Marshall, then Secretary of State, summed up existing complaintsof commercial injury under three heads, --definitions of contraband, methods of blockade, and the unjust decisions of Vice-AdmiraltyCourts; coupled with the absence of penalty to cruisers makingunwarranted captures, which emboldened them to seize on any ground, because certain to escape punishment. But no formal pronouncementfurther injurious to United States commerce was made by the BritishGovernment during this war, which ended in October, 1801, to berenewed eighteen months later. On the contrary, the progress of eventsin the West Indies, by its favorable effect upon British commerce, assisted Pitt in taking the more liberal measures to which byconviction he was always inclined. The destruction of Haiti as aFrench colony, and to a great degree as a producer of sugar andcoffee, by eliminating one principal source of the world's supply, raised values throughout the remaining Caribbean; while the capture ofalmost all the French and Dutch possessions threw their commerce andnavigation into the hands of Great Britain. In this swellingprosperity the British planter, the British carrier, and the Britishmerchant at home all shared, and so bore without apparent grudging theissuance of an Order, in January, 1798, which extended to Europeanneutrals the concession, made in 1795 to the United States, ofcarrying West Indian produce direct from the islands to their owncountry, or to Great Britain; not, however, to a hostile port, or toany other neutral territory than their own. 

Although this Order in no way altered the existing status of theUnited States, it was embraced in a list of British measures affectingcommerce, [114] transmitted to Congress in 1808. From the Americanstandpoint this was accurate; for the extension to neutrals to carryto their own country, and to no other, continued the exclusion of theUnited States from a direct traffic between the belligerent coloniesand Europe, which she had steadily asserted to be her right, but whichthe Rule of 1756 denied. The utmost the United States had obtained wasthe restitution of privileges enjoyed by them as colonists of GreatBritain, in trading with the British West Indies; and this undercircumstances of delay and bargain which showed clearly that thetemporary convenience of Great Britain was alone consulted. Noadmission had been made on the point of right, as maintained byAmerica. On the contrary, the Order of 1798 was at pains to state asits motive no change of principle, but "consideration of the presentstate of the commerce of Great Britain, as well as of that of neutralcountries, " which makes it "expedient. "[115]

Up to the preliminaries of peace in 1801, nothing occurred to changethat state of commerce which made expedient the Order of January, 1798. It was renewed in terms when war again began between France andGreat Britain, in May, 1803. In consideration of present conditions, the direct trade was permitted to neutral vessels between an enemy'scolony and their own country. The United States remained, as before, excluded from direct carriage between the West Indies and Europe; butthe general course of the British Administration of the moment gavehopes of a line of conduct more conformable to American standards ofneutral rights. Particularly, in reply to a remonstrance of the UnitedStates, a blockade of the whole coast of Martinique and Guadaloupe, proclaimed by a British admiral, was countermanded; instructions beingsent him that the measure could apply only to particular ports, actually invested by sufficient force, and that neutrals attempting toenter should not be captured unless they had been previouslywarned. [116] Although no concession of principle as to colonial tradehad been made, the United States acquiesced in, though she did notaccept, the conditions of its enforcement. These were well understoodby the mercantile community, and were such as admitted of greatadvantage, both to the merchant and to the carrying trade. In 1808, Mr. Monroe, justifying his negotiations of 1806, wrote that, evenunder new serious differences which had then arisen, "The UnitedStates were in a prosperous and happy condition, compared with that ofother nations. As a neutral Power, they were almost the exclusivecarriers of the commerce of the whole world; and in commerce theyflourished beyond example, notwithstanding the losses theyoccasionally suffered. "[117]

Under such circumstances matters ran along smoothly for nearly twoyears. In May, 1804, occurred a change of administration in England, bringing Pitt again into power. As late as November 8 of this year, Jefferson in his annual message said, "With the nations of Europe, ingeneral, our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed; and, from thegovernments of the belligerent powers, especially, we continue toreceive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to anhonest neutrality. " Monroe in London wrote at the same time, "Ourcommerce was never so much favored in time of war. "[118] These wordstestify to general quietude and prosperity under existing conditions, but are not to be understood as affirming absence of subjects ofdifference. On the contrary, Monroe had been already some time inLondon, charged to obtain from Great Britain extensive concessions ofprinciple and practice, which Jefferson, with happy optimism, expecteda nation engaged in a life and death struggle would yield in virtue ofreams of argument, maintaining views novel to it, advanced by acountry enjoying the plenitude of peace, but without organized powerto enforce its demands. 

About this time, but as yet unknown to the President, the question hadbeen suddenly raised by the British Government as to what constituteda direct trade; and American vessels carrying West Indian productsfrom the United States to Europe were seized under a construction of"direct, " which was affirmed by the court before whom the cases camefor adjudication. As Jefferson's expressions had reflected thecontentment of the American community, profiting, as neutrals oftenprofit, by the misfortunes of belligerents, so these measures of Pittproceeded from the discontents of planters, shippers, and merchants. These had come to see in the prosperity of American shipping, and thegains of American merchants, the measure of their own losses by atrade which, though of long standing, they now claimed was one ofdirect carriage, because by continuous voyage, between the hostilecolonies and the continent of Europe. The losses of planter andmerchant, however, were but one aspect of the question, and not themost important in British eyes. The products of hostile origin carriedby Americans to neutral or hostile countries in Europe did bycompetition reduce seriously the profit upon British colonial articlesof the same kind, to the injury of the finances of the kingdom; andthe American carriers, the American ships, not only supplanted so muchBritish tonnage, but were enabled to do so by British seamen, whofound in them a quiet refuge--relatively, though not wholly, secure--from the impressment which everywhere pursued the Britishmerchant ship. It was a fundamental conviction of all Britishstatesmen, and of the general British public, that the welfare of thenavy, the one defence of the empire, depended upon maintaining thecarrying trade, with the right of impressment from it; and Pitt, uponhis return to office, had noted "with considerable concern, theincreasing acrimony which appears to pervade the representations madeto you [the British Minister at Washington] by the American Secretaryof State on the subject of the impressment of seamen from on boardAmerican ships. "[119]

The issue of direct trade was decided adversely to the contention ofthe United States, in the test case of the ship "Essex, " in May, 1805, by the first living authority in England on maritime internationallaw, Sir William Scott. Resting upon the Rule of 1756, he held thatdirect trade from belligerent colonies to Europe was forbidden toneutrals, except under the conditions of the relaxing Orders of 1798and 1803; but the privilege to carry to their own country having beenby these extended, it was conceded, in accordance with precedent, that products thus imported, if they had complied with the legalrequirements for admission _to use_ in the importing country, thenceforth had its nationality. They became neutral in character, andcould be exported like native produce to any place open to commerce, belligerent or neutral. United States shippers, therefore, were atliberty to send even to France French colonial products which had beenthus Americanized. The effect of this procedure upon the articles inquestion was to raise their price at the place of final arrival, byall the expense incident to a broken transit; by the cost of landing, storing, paying duties, and reshipping, together with that of thedelay consequent upon entering an American port to undergo theseprocesses. With the value thus enhanced upon reaching the continent ofEurope, the British planter, carrier, and merchant might hope thatBritish West India produce could compete; although various changes ofconditions in the West Indies, and Bonaparte's efforts at theexclusion of British products from the continent, had greatly reducedtheir market there from the fair proportions of the former war. In thecases brought before Sir William Scott, however, it was found that theduties paid for admission to the United States were almost whollyreleased, by drawback, on re-exportation; so that the articles werebrought to the continental consumer relieved of this principal elementof cost. He therefore ruled that they had not complied with theconditions of an actual importation; that the articles had not losttheir belligerent character; and that the carriage to Europe was bydirect voyage, not interrupted by an importation. The vessels weretherefore condemned. 

The immediate point thus decided was one of construction, and inparticular detail hitherto unsettled. The law adviser of the Crown hadstated in 1801, as an accepted precedent, "that landing the goods andpaying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of thevoyage;"[120] but the circumstance of drawback, which belonged to themunicipal prerogative of the independent neutral state, had not thenbeen considered. The foundation on which all rested was the principleof 1756. The underlying motive for the new action taken--theprotection of a British traffic--linked the War of 1812 with theconditions of colonial dependence of the United States, which was amatter of recent memory to men of both countries still in the vigor oflife. The American found again exerted over his national commerce acontrol indistinguishable in practice from that of colonial days; fromwhat port his ships should sail, whither they might go, what cargoesthey might carry, under what rules be governed in their own ports, were dictated to him as absolutely, if not in as extensive detail, asbefore the War of Independence. The British Government placed itselfin the old attitude of a sovereign authority, regulating the commerceof a dependency with an avowed view to the interest of the mothercountry. This motive was identical with that of colonialadministration; the particular form taken being dictated, of course, then as before, by the exigencies of the moment, --by a "considerationof the present state of the commerce of this country. " Messrs. Monroeand Pinkney, who were appointed jointly to negotiate a settlement ofthe trouble, wrote that "the British commissioners did not hesitate tostate that their wish was to place their own merchants on an equalfooting in the great markets of the continent with those of the UnitedStates, by burthening the intercourse of the latter with severerestrictions. "[121] The wish was allowable; but the method, theregulation of American commercial movement by British force, restingfor justification upon a strained interpretation of a contestedbelligerent right, was naturally and accurately felt to be are-imposition of colonial fetters upon a people who had achieved theirindependence. 

The motive remained; and the method, the regulation of American tradeby British orders, was identical in substance, although other in form, with that of the celebrated Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809. Mr. Monroe, who was minister to England when this interesting periodbegan, had gone to Spain on a special mission in October, 1804, shortly after his announcement, before quoted, that "American commercewas never so much favored in time of war. " "On no principle orpretext, so far, has more than one of our vessels been condemned. "Upon his return in July, 1805, he found in full progress the seizures, the legality of which had been affirmed by Sir William Scott. Aprolonged correspondence with the then British Government followed, but no change of policy could be obtained. In January, 1806, Pittdied; and the ministry which succeeded was composed largely of menrecently opposed to him in general principles of action. Inparticular, Mr. Fox, between whom and Pitt there had been anantagonism nearly lifelong, became Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Hisgood dispositions towards America were well known, and dated from theWar of Independence. To him Monroe wrote that under the recentmeasures "about one hundred and twenty vessels had been seized, several condemned, all taken from their course, detained, andotherwise subjected to heavy losses and damages. "[122] The injury wasnot confined to the immediate sufferers, but reacted necessarily onthe general commercial system of the United States. 

 [Illustration: JAMES MONROE From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the possession of Hon. T. Jefferson Coolidge. ]

In his first conversations with Monroe, Fox appeared to coincide withthe American view, both as to the impropriety of the seizures and thegeneral right of the United States to the trade in dispute, undertheir own interpretation of it; namely, that questions of duties anddrawbacks, and the handling of the cargoes in American ports, werematters of national regulation, upon which a foreign state had noclaim to pronounce. The American envoy was sanguine of a favorableissue; but the British Secretary had to undergo the experience, whichlong exclusion from office made novel to him, that in thecomplications of political life a broad personal conviction has oftento yield to the narrow logic of particular conditions. It is clearthat the measures would not have been instituted, had he been incontrol; but, as it was, the American representative demanded not onlytheir discontinuance, but a money indemnity. The necessity ofreparation for wrong, if admitted, stood in the way of admitting as awrong a proceeding authorized by the last Government, and pronouncedlegal by the tribunals. To this obstacle was added the weight of astrong outdoor public feeling, and of opposition in the Cabinet, by nomeans in accord upon Fox's general views. Consequently, to Monroe'sdemands for a concession of principle, and for pecuniary compensation, Fox at last replied with a proposition, consonant with the usualpractical tone of English statesmanship, never more notable than atthis period, that a compromise should be effected; modifying causes ofcomplaint, without touching on principles. "Can we not agree tosuspend our rights, and leave you in a satisfactory manner theenjoyment of the trade? In that case, nothing would be said about theprinciple, and there would be no claim to indemnity. "[123]

The United States Government, throughout the controversy which beganhere and lasted till the war, clung with singular tenacity to theestablishment of principles. To this doubtless contributed much thepersonality of Madison, then Secretary of State; a man of the pen, clear-headed, logical, incisive, and delighting like all men in theexercise of conscious powers. The discussion of principles, theexposure of an adversary's weakness or inconsistencies, the weightymarshalling of uncounted words, were to him the breath of life; andwith happy disregard of the need to back phrases with deeds, there nowopened before him a career of argumentation, of logical deduction andexposition, constituting a condition of political and personalenjoyment which only the deskman can fully appreciate. It was not, however, an era in which the pen was mightier than the sword; and inthe smooth gliding of the current Niagara was forgotten. LikeJefferson, he was wholly oblivious of the relevancy of Pompey's retortto a contention between two nations, each convinced of its own right:"Will you never have done with citing laws and privileges to men whowear swords?"

To neither President nor Secretary does it seem to have occurred thatthe provision of force might lend weight to argument; a considerationto which Monroe, intellectually much their inferior, was dulysensible. "Nothing will be obtained without some kind of pressure, such a one as excites an apprehension that it will be increased incase of necessity; and to produce that effect it will be proper to putour country in a better state of defence, by invigorating the militiasystem and increasing the naval force. " "Victorious at sea, GreatBritain finds herself compelled to concentrate her force so much inthis quarter, that she would not only be unable to annoy usessentially in case of war, but even to protect her commerce andpossessions elsewhere, which would be exposed to our attacks. "[124]Most true when written, in 1805; the time had passed in 1813. "Harassed as they are already with war, and the menaces of a powerfuladversary, a state of hostility with us would probably go far to throwthis country into confusion. It is an event which the ministry wouldfind it difficult to resist, and therefore cannot, I presume, bewilling to encounter. "[1] But he added, "There is here an opinion, which many do not hesitate to avow, that the United States are, by thenature of their Government, incapable of any great, vigorous, orpersevering exertion. "[125] This impression, for which it mustsorrowfully be confessed there was much seeming ground in contemporaryevents, and the idiosyncrasies of Jefferson and Madison, in their fulldependence upon commercial coercion to reduce Great Britain to concedetheir most extreme demands, contributed largely to maintain thesuccessive British ministries in that unconciliatory and disdainfulattitude towards the United States, which made inevitable a war that ahigher bearing might have averted. 

Monroe had been instructed that, if driven to it, he might waive thepractical right to sail direct from a belligerent colony to the mothercountry, being careful to use no expression that would imply yieldingof the abstract principle. But the general insistence of hisGovernment upon obtaining from Great Britain acknowledgment of rightwas so strong that he could not accept Fox's suggestion. The BritishMinister, forced along the lines of his predecessors by the logic ofthe situation, then took higher ground. "He proceeded to insist that, "to break the continuity of the voyage, "our vessels which should beengaged in that commerce must enter our ports, their cargoes belanded, and the duties paid. "[126] This was the full extent of Pitt'srequirements, as of the rulings of the British Admiralty Court; andmade the regulation of transactions in an American port depend uponthe decisions of British authorities. Monroe unhesitatingly rejectedthe condition, and their interview ended, leaving the subject where ithad been. The British Cabinet then took matters into its own hands, and without further communication with Monroe adopted a practicalsolution, which removed the particular contention from the field ofcontroversy by abandoning the existing measures, but without anyexpression as to the question of right or principle, which by thistacit omission was reserved. Unfortunately for the wishes of bothparties, this recourse to opportunism, for such it was, howeverameliorative of immediate friction, resulted in a further series ofquarrels; for the new step of the British Government was considered bythe American to controvert international principles as much cherishedby it as the right to the colonial trade. 

Monroe's interview was on April 25. On May 17 he received a letterfrom Fox, dated May 16, notifying him that, in consequence of certainnew and extraordinary means resorted to by the enemy for distressingBritish commerce, a retaliatory commercial blockade was ordered of thecoast of the continent, from the river Elbe to Brest. This blockade, however, was to be absolute, against all commerce, only between theSeine and Ostend. Outside of those limits, on the coast of France westof the Seine, and those of France, Holland, and Germany east ofOstend, the rights of capture attaching to blockades would be forbornein favor of neutral vessels, bound in, which had not been laden at aport hostile to Great Britain; or which, going out, were not destinedto such hostile port. [127] No discrimination was made against thecharacter of the cargo, except as forbidden by generally recognizedlaws of war. This omission tacitly allowed the colonial trade by wayof American ports, just as the measure as a whole tacitly waived allquestions of principle upon which that difference had turned. Afterthis, a case coming before a British court would require from it noconcession affecting its previous rulings. By these the vessel stillwould stand condemned; but she was relieved from the application ofthem by the new Order, in which the Government had relinquished itsasserted right. The direct voyage from the colony to the mothercountry was from a hostile port, and therefore remained prohibited;but the proceedings in the United States ports, as affecting thequestion of direct voyage, though held by the Court to be properlyliable to interpretation by itself on international grounds, ifbrought before it, was removed from its purview by the act of its ownGovernment, granting immunity. 

The first impressions made upon Monroe by this step were favorable, asit evidently relieved the immediate embarrassments under whichAmerican commerce was laboring. There would at least be no moreseizures upon the plea of direct voyages. While refraining fromexpressing to Fox any approbation of the Order of May 16, he wrotehome in this general sense of congratulation; and upon his letters, communicated to Congress in 1808, was founded a claim by the BritishMinister at Washington in 1811, that the blockade thus instituted wasnot at the time regarded by him "as founded on other than just andlegitimate principles. " "I have not heard that it was considered in acontrary light when notified as such to you by Mr. Secretary Fox, noruntil it suited the views of France to endeavor to have it consideredotherwise. "[128] Monroe, who was then Secretary of State, replied thatwith Fox "an official formal complaint was not likely to be resortedto, because friendly communications were invited and preferred. Thewant of such a document is no proof that the measure was approved byme, or no complaint made. "[129] The general tenor of his homeletters, however, was that of satisfaction; and it is natural to mendealing with questions of immediate difficulty to hail relief, withouttoo close scrutiny into its ultimate consequences. It may be addedthat ministers abroad, in close contact with the difficulties andperplexities of the government to which they are accredited, recognizethese more fully than do their superiors at home, and are moresusceptible to the advantages of practical remedies over themaintenance of abstract principle. 

The legitimacy of the blockade of May 16, 1806, was afterwards sharplycontested by the United States. There was no difference between thetwo governments as to the general principle that a blockade, to belawful, must be supported by the presence of an adequate force, makingit dangerous for a vessel trying to enter or leave the port. "GreatBritain, " wrote Madison, "has already in a formal communicationadmitted the principle for which we contend. " The difficulty turned ona point of definition, as to what situation, and what size, of ablockading division constituted adequacy. The United Statesauthorities based themselves resolutely on the position that theblockaders must be close to the ports named for closure, and deniedthat a coast-line in its entirety could thus be shut off fromcommerce, without specifying the particular harbors before which shipswould be stationed. Intent, as neutrals naturally are, upon narrowingbelligerent rights, usually adverse to their own, they placed thestrictest construction on the words "port" and "force. " This isperhaps best shown by quoting the definition proposed by Americannegotiators to the British Government over a year later, --July 24, 1807. "In order to determine what characterizes a blockade, thatdenomination is given only to a _port_, where there is, by thedisposition of the Power which blockades it _with ships stationary_, an evident danger in entering. "[130] Madison, in 1801, discussingvexations to Americans bound into the Mediterranean, by a Spanishalleged blockade of Gibraltar, had anticipated and rejected theBritish action of 1806. "Like blockades might be proclaimed by anyparticular nation, enabled by its naval superiority to distribute itsships at the mouth of that or any similar sea, _or across channels orarms of the sea_, so as to make it dangerous for the commerce of othernations to pass to its destination. These monstrous consequencescondemn the principle from which they flow. "[131]

The blockade of May 16 offered a particularly apt illustration of thepoint at issue. From the entrance of the English Channel to theStraits of Dover, the whole of both shore-lines was belligerent. Onone side all was British; on the other all French. Evidently a line ofships disposed from Ushant to the Lizard, the nearest point on theEnglish coast, would constitute a very real danger to a vessel seekingto approach any French port on the Channel. Fifteen vessels wouldoccupy such a line, with intervals of only six miles, and incombination with a much smaller body at the Straits of Dover wouldassuredly bring all the French coast between them within the limits ofany definition of danger. That these particular dispositions wereadopted does not appear; but that very much larger numbers werecontinually moving in the Channel, back and forth in every direction, is certain. As to the remainder of the coast declared underrestriction, from the Straits to the Elbe, --about four hundredmiles, --with the great entrances to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, theEms, the Weser, and the Elbe, there can be no doubt that it was withinthe power of Great Britain to establish the blockade within therequirements of international law. Whether she did so was a questionof fact, on which both sides were equally positive. The British to thelast asserted that an adequate force had been assigned, "and actuallymaintained, "[132] while the blockade lasted. 

The incident derived its historical significance chiefly fromsubsequent events. It does not appear at the first to have engaged thespecial attention of the United States Government, the generalposition of which, as to blockades, was already sufficiently defined. The particular instance was only one among several, and interest wasthen diverted to two other leading points, --impressment and thecolonial trade. Peculiar importance began to attach to it only in thefollowing November, when Napoleon issued his Berlin decree. Upon thisensued the exaggerated oppressions of neutral commerce by bothantagonists; and the question arose as to the responsibility forbeginning the series of measures, of which the Berlin and MilanDecrees on one side, and the British Orders in Council of 1807 and1809 on the other, were the most conspicuous features. Napoleoncontended that the whole sprang from the extravagant pretensions ofGreat Britain, particularly in the Order of May 16, which he, incommon with the United States, characterized as illegal. The BritishGovernment affirmed that it was strictly within belligerent rights, and was executed by an adequate force; that consequently it gave noground for the course of the French Emperor. American statesmen, whiledisclaiming with formal gravity any purpose to decide with which ofthe two wrong-doers the ill first began, [133] had no scruples aboutreiterating constantly that the Order of May 16 contravenedinternational right; and in so far, although wholly within the limitsof diplomatic propriety, they supported Napoleon's assertion. Thus itcame to pass that the United States was more and more felt, not onlyin Europe, but by dissentients at home, to side with France; and asthe universal contest grew more embittered, this feeling becameemphasized. 

While these discussions were in progress between Monroe and Fox, theUnited States Government had taken a definite step to bring thedispute to an issue by commercial restriction. The remonstrances fromthe mercantile community, against the seizures under the new ruling asto direct trade, were too numerous, emphatic, and withal reasonable, to be disregarded. Congress therefore, before its adjournment on April23, 1806, passed a law shutting the American market, after thefollowing November 15, against certain articles of Britishmanufacture, unless equitable arrangements between the two countriesshould previously be reached. This recourse was in line with thepopular action of the period preceding the War of Independence, andforeshadowed the general policy upon which the Administration was soonto enter on a larger scale. The measure was initiated before news wasreceived of Pitt's death, and the accession of a more friendlyministry; but, having been already recommended in committee, it wasnot thought expedient to recede in consequence of the change. At thesame time, the Administration determined to constitute anextraordinary mission, for the purpose of "treating with the BritishGovernment concerning the maritime wrongs which have been committed, and the regulation of commercial navigation between the parties. " Forthis object Mr. William Pinkney, of Maryland, was nominated ascolleague to Monroe, and arrived in England on June 24. 

The points to be adjusted by the new commissioners were numerous, butamong them two were made pre-eminent, --the question of colonialtrade, already explained, and that of impressment of seamen fromAmerican vessels. These were named by the Secretary of State as themotive of the recent Act prohibiting certain importations. The envoyswere explicitly instructed that no stipulation requiring the repeal ofthat Act was to be made, unless an effectual remedy for these twoevils was provided. The question of impressment, wrote Madison, "derives urgency from the licentiousness with which it is stillpursued, and from the growing impatience of this country underit. "[134] When Pinkney arrived, the matter of the colonial trade hadalready been settled indirectly by the Order of May 16, and it wassoon to disappear from prominence, merged in the extreme measures ofwhich that blockade was the precursor; but impressment remained anunhealed sore to the end. 

To understand the real gravity of this dispute, it is essential toconsider candidly the situation of both parties, and also theinfluence exerted upon either by long-standing tradition. The BritishGovernment did not advance a crude claim to impress American seamen. What it did assert, and was enforcing, was a right to exercise overindividuals on board foreign merchantmen, upon the high seas, theauthority which it possessed on board British ships there, and overall ships in British ports. The United States took the ground that nosuch jurisdiction existed, unless over persons engaged in the militaryservice of an enemy; and that only when a vessel entered the ports orterritorial waters of Great Britain were those on board subject toarrest by her officers. There, as in every state, they came under thelaw of the land. 

The British argument in favor of this alleged right may be stated inthe words of Canning, who became Foreign Secretary a year later. Writing to Monroe, September 23, 1807, he starts from the premise, then regarded by many even in America as sound, that allegiance bybirth is inalienable, --not to be renounced at the will of theindividual; consequently, "when mariners, subjects of his Majesty, areemployed in the private service of foreigners, they enter intoengagements inconsistent with the duty of subjects. In such cases, thespecies of redress which the practice of all times has admitted andsanctioned is that of taking those subjects at sea out of the serviceof such foreign individuals, and recalling them to the discharge ofthat paramount duty, which they owe to their sovereign and to theircountry. That the exercise of this right involves some of the dearestinterests of Great Britain, your Government is ready toacknowledge. .. . It is needless to repeat that these rights existed intheir fullest force for ages previous to the establishment of theUnited States of America as an independent government; and it would bedifficult to contend that the recognition of that independence canhave operated any change in this respect. "[135]

Had this been merely a piece of clever argumentation, it would havecrumbled rapidly under an appreciation of the American case; but itrepresented actually a conviction inherited by all the British people, and not that of Canning only. Whether the foundation of the allegedright was solidly laid in reason or not, it rested on allegedprescription, indorsed by a popular acceptance and suffrage which noministry could afford to disregard, at a time when the manning of theRoyal Navy was becoming a matter of notorious and increasingdifficulty. If Americans saw with indignation that many of theirfellow-citizens were by the practice forced from their own ships toserve in British vessels of war, it was equally well known, inAmerica as in Great Britain, that in the merchant vessels of theUnited States were many British seamen, sorely needed by theircountry. Public opinion in the United States was by no means united insupport of the position then taken by Jefferson and Madison, as wellas by their predecessors in office, proper and matter-of-course asthat seems to-day. Many held, and asserted even with vehemence, thatthe British right existed, and that an indisputable wrong wascommitted by giving the absentees shelter under the American flag. Theclaim advanced by the United States Government, and the only onepossible to it under the circumstances, was that when outside ofterritorial limits a ship's flag and papers must be held to determinethe nation, to which alone belonged jurisdiction over every person onboard, unless demonstrably in the military service of a belligerent. 

As a matter involving extensive practical consequences, thiscontention, like that concerning the colonial trade, had its originfrom the entrance into the family of European nations of a new-comer, foreign to the European community of states and their commontraditions; indisposed, consequently, to accept by mere force ofcustom rules and practices unquestioned by them, but traversing itsown interests. As Canning argued, the change of political relation, bywhich the colonies became independent, could not affect rights ofGreat Britain which did not derive from the colonial connection; butit did introduce an opposing right, --that of the American citizen tobe free from British control when not in British territory. This theUnited States possessed in common with all foreign nations; but in hercase it could not, as in theirs, be easily reconciled with the claimof Great Britain. When every one whose native tongue was English wasalso by birth the subject of Great Britain, the visitation of aforeign neutral, in order to take from her any British seamen, involved no great difficulty of discrimination, nor--granting thetheory of inalienable allegiance--any injustice to the person taken. It was quite different when a large maritime English-speakingpopulation, quite comparable in numbers to that remaining British, hadbecome independent. The exercise of the British right, if right itwas, became liable to grievous wrong, not only to the individualsaffected, but to the nation responsible for their protection; and theinjury was greater, both in procedure and result, because theofficials intrusted with the enforcement of the British claim werepersonally interested in the decisions they rendered. No one whounderstands the affection of a naval officer for an able seaman, especially if his ship be short-handed, will need to have explainedhow difficult it became for him to distinguish between an Englishmanand an American, when much wanted. In short, there was on each side apractical grievance; but the character of the remedy to be appliedinvolved a question of principle, the effect of which would be unequalbetween the disputants, increasing the burden of the one while itdiminished that of the other, according as the one or the othersolution was adopted. 

Except for the fact that the British Government had at its disposaloverwhelming physical force, its case would have shared that of allother prescriptive rights when they come into collision with presentactualities, demanding their modification. It might be never so truethat long-standing precedent made legal the impressment of Britishseamen from neutral vessels on the open sea; but it remained that inpractice many American seamen were seized, and forced into involuntaryservitude, the duration of which, under the customs of the BritishNavy, was terminable certainly only by desertion or death. The verydifficulty of distinguishing between the natives of the two countries, "owing to similarity of language, habits, and manners, "[136] allegedin 1797 by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, to RufusKing, the American Minister, did but emphasize the incompatibility ofthe British claim with the security of the American citizen. TheConsul-General of Great Britain at New York during most of this stormyperiod, Thomas Barclay, a loyalist during the War of Independence, affirms from time to time, with evident sincerity of conviction, thewishes of the British Government and naval officers not to impressAmerican seamen; but his published correspondence contains none theless several specific instances, in which he assures British admiralsand captains that impressed men serving on board their ships arebeyond doubt native Americans, and his editor remarks that "only a fewof his many appeals on behalf of Americans unlawfully seized are hereprinted. "[137] This, too, in the immediate neighborhood of the UnitedStates, where evidence was most readily at hand. The condition wasintolerable, and in principle it mattered nothing whether one man ormany thus suffered. That the thing was possible, even for a singlemost humble and unknown native of the United States, condemned thesystem, and called imperiously for remedy. The only effectual remedy, however, was the abandonment of the practice altogether, whether ornot the theoretic ground for such abandonment was that advanced by theUnited States. Long before 1806, experience had demonstrated, what hadbeen abundantly clear to foresight, that a naval lieutenant or captaincould not safely be intrusted with a function so delicate as decidingthe nationality of a likely English-speaking topman, whom, if British, he had the power to impress. 

The United States did not refuse to recognize, distinctly if notfully, the embarrassment under which Great Britain labored by losingthe services of her seamen at a moment of such national exigency; andit was prepared to offer many concessions in municipal regulations, inorder to exclude British subjects from American vessels. Variouspropositions were advanced looking to the return of deserters and tothe prevention of enlistments; coupled always with a renunciation ofthe British claim to take persons from under the American flag. Therehad been much negotiation by individual ministers of the United Statesin the ordinary course of their duties; beginning as far back as 1787, when John Adams had to remonstrate vigorously with the Cabinet"against this practice, which has been too common, of impressingAmerican citizens, and especially with the aggravating circumstancesof going on board American vessels, which ought to be protected by theflag of their sovereign. "[138] Again, in 1790, on hostilitiesthreatening with Spain, a number of American seamen were impressed inBritish ports. The arrests, being within British waters, were not aninfringement of American jurisdiction, and the only question thenraised was that of proving nationality. Gouverneur Morris, whoafterwards so violently advocated the British claim to impress theirown subjects in American vessels on the seas, [139] was at this time inLondon on a special semi-official errand, committed to him byPresident Washington. There being then no American resident minister, he took upon himself to mention to the Foreign Secretary "the conductof their pressgangs, who had taken many American seamen, and hadentered American vessels with as little ceremony as those belonging toBritain;" adding, with a caustic humor characteristic of him, "Ibelieve, my Lord, this is the only instance in which we are nottreated as aliens. " He suggested certificates of citizenship, to beissued by the Admiralty Courts of the United States. This wasapproved by the Secretary and by Pitt; the latter, however, remarkingthat the plan was "very liable to abuse, notwithstanding everyprecaution. "[140] Various expedients for attaching to the individualdocumentary evidence of birth were from time to time tried; but theheedless and inconsequent character and habits of the sailor of thatday, and the facility with which the papers, once issued, could betransferred or bought, made any such resource futile. The UnitedStates was thus driven to the position enunciated in 1792 byJefferson, then Secretary of State: "The simplest rule will be thatthe vessel being American shall be evidence that the seamen on boardof her are such. "[141] If this demand comprehended, as it apparentlydid, cases of arrest in British harbors, it was clearly extravagant, resembling the idea proceeding from the same source that the GulfStream should mark the neutral line of United States waters; but forthe open sea it formulated the doctrine on which the country finallyand firmly took its stand. 

 [Illustration: THOMAS JEFFERSON From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. ]

The history of the practice of impressment, and of the consequentnegotiations, from the time of Jefferson's first proposition down tothe mission of Monroe and Pinkney, had shown conclusively that noother basis of settlement than that of the flag vouching for the crewcould adequately meet and remove the evil of which the United Statescomplained; an evil which was not only an injury to the individualsaffected, but a dishonor to the nation which should continue tosubmit. The subject early engaged the care of Rufus King, who becameMinister to Great Britain in 1796. In 1797, Lord Grenville and he hada correspondence, [142] which served merely to develop the difficultieson both sides, and things drifted from bad to worse. Not only wasthere the oppression of the individual, but the safety of ships wasendangered by the ruthless manner in which they were robbed of theircrews; an evil from which British merchant vessels oftensuffered. [143] On October 7, 1799, King again presented Grenville apaper, [144] summarizing forcibly both the abuses undergone byAmericans, and the inconsistency of the British principle ofinalienable allegiance with other British practices, which not onlyconferred citizenship upon aliens serving for a certain time in theirmerchant ships, but even attributed it compulsorily to seamen settledor married in the land. [145] No satisfactory action followed upon thisremonstrance. In March, 1801, Grenville having resigned with Pitt, King brought the question before their successors, referring to theletter of October, 1799, as "a full explanation, requiring no furtherdevelopment on the present occasion. "[146] At the same time, byauthority from his Government, he made a definite proposal, "thatneither party shall upon the high seas impress seamen out of thevessels of the other. " The instructions for this action were givenunder the presidency of John Adams, John Marshall being then Secretaryof State. On the high seas the vessels of the country were not underBritish jurisdiction for any purpose. The only concession ofinternational law was that the ship itself could be arrested, if foundby a belligerent cruiser under circumstances apparently in violationof belligerent rights, be brought within belligerent jurisdiction, andthe facts there determined by due process of law. But in the practiceof impressment the whole procedure, from arrest to trial and sentence, was transferred to the open sea; therefore to allow it extendedthither a British jurisdiction, which possessed none of the guaranteesfor the sifting of evidence, the application of law, or theimpartiality of the judge, which may be presumed in regular tribunals. 

Yet, while holding clearly the absolute justice of the Americancontention, demonstrated both by the faulty character of the methodand the outrageous injustice in results, let us not be blind to theactuality of the loss Great Britain was undergoing, nor to herestimate of the compensation offered for the relinquishment of thepractice. The New England States, which furnished a large proportionof the maritime population, affirmed continually by their constitutedauthorities that very few of their seamen were known to be impressed. Governor Strong of Massachusetts, in a message to the Legislature, said, "The number of our native seamen impressed by British ships hasbeen grossly exaggerated, and the number of British seamen employed byus has at all times been far greater than those of all nations whohave been impressed from our vessels. If we are contending for thesupport of a claim to exempt British seamen from their allegiance totheir own country, is it not time to inquire whether our claim isjust?"[147] It seems singular now that the fewness of the citizenshopelessly consigned to indefinite involuntary servitude should havematerially affected opinion as to the degree of the outrage; but, after making allowance for the spirit of faction then prevalent, itcan be readily understood that such conditions, being believed by theBritish, must color their judgment as to the real extent of theinjustice by which they profited. At New York, in 1805, Consul-GeneralBarclay, [148] who had then been resident for six years, in replying toa letter from the Mayor, said, "It is a fact, too notorious to haveescaped your knowledge, that many of his Majesty's subjects arefurnished with American protection, to which they have no title. " Thisbeing brought to Madison's attention produced a complaint to theBritish Minister. In justifying his statements, Barclay wrote therewere "innumerable instances where British subjects within a monthafter their arrival in these states obtain certificates ofcitizenship. " "The documents I have already furnished you prove theindiscriminate use of those certificates. "[149] Representative Gastonof North Carolina, whose utterances on another aspect of the questionhave been before quoted, [150] said in this relation, "In the battle, Ithink of the President and the Little Belt, a neighbor of mine, now anindustrious farmer, noticed in the number of the slain one of his ownname. He exclaimed, 'There goes one of my protections. ' On being askedfor an explanation, he remarked that in his wild days, when hefollowed the sea, it was an ordinary mode of procuring a littlespending money to get a protection from a notary for a dollar, andsell it to the first foreigner whom it at all fitted for fifteen ortwenty. " But, while believing that the number of impressed Americans"had been exaggerated infinitely beyond the truth, " Gaston added, withthe clear perceptions of patriotism, "Be they more or less, the rightto the protection of their country is sacred and must beregarded. "[151]

The logic was unimpeachable which, to every argument based uponnumbers, replied that the question was not of few or many, but of asystem, under which American seamen--one or more--were continuallyliable to be seized by an irresponsible authority, without protectionor hearing of law, and sent to the uttermost part of the earth, beyondpower of legal redress, or of even making known their situation. Yetit can be understood that the British Government, painfully consciousof the deterioration of its fighting force by the absence of itssubjects, and convinced of its right, concerning which no hesitationwas ever by it expressed, should have resolved to maintain it, distrustful of offers to exclude British seamen from the Americanmerchant service, the efficacy of which must have been more thandoubtful to all familiar with shipping procedures in maritime ports. The protections issued to seamen as American citizens fell under thesuspicion which in later days not infrequently attached tonaturalization papers; and, if questioned by some of our own people, it is not to be wondered that they seemed more than doubtful to acontrary interest. 

In presenting the proposition, "that neither party should impress fromthe ships of the other, " King had characterized it as a temporarymeasure, "until more comprehensive and precise regulations can bedevised to secure the respective rights of the two countries. "Nevertheless, the United States would doubtless have been content torest in this, duly carried out, and even to waive concession of theprinciple, should it be thus voided in practice. As King from thefirst foresaw, [152] acceptance by the British Cabinet would dependupon the new head of the Admiralty, Lord St. Vincent, a veteranadmiral, whose reputation, and experience of over fifty years, wouldoutweigh the opinions of his colleagues. In reply to a private letterfrom one of St. Vincent's political friends, sent at King's request, the admiral wrote: "Mr. King is probably not aware of the abuses whichare committed by American Consuls in France, Spain, and Portugal, fromthe generality of whom every Englishman, knowing him to be such, maybe made an American for a dollar. I have known more than one Americanmaster carry off soldiers, in their regimentals, arms, andaccoutrements, from the garrison at Gibraltar; and there cannot be adoubt but the American trade is navigated by a majority of Britishsubjects; and a very considerable one too. " However inspired byprejudice, these words in their way echo Gaston's statements justquoted; while Madison in 1806 admitted that the number of Britishseamen in American merchant ships was "considerable, though probablyless than supposed. "

Entertaining these impressions, the concurrence of St. Vincent seemeddoubtful; and in fact, through the period of nominal peace which soonensued, and continued to May, 1803, the matter dragged. When therenewal of the war was seen to be inevitable, King again urged asettlement, and the Foreign Secretary promised to sign any agreementwhich the admiral would approve. After conference, King thought he hadgained this desired consent, for a term of five years, to the Americanproposition. He drew up articles embodying it, together with thenecessary equivalents to be stipulated by the United States; but, before these could be submitted, he received a letter from St. Vincent, saying that he was of the opinion that the narrow seas shouldbe expressly excepted from the operation of the clause, "as they hadbeen immemorially considered to be within the dominions of GreatBritain. " Since this would give the consent of the United States tothe extension of British jurisdiction far beyond the customary threemiles from the shore, conceded by international law, King properlywould not accept the solution, tempting as was the opportunity tosecure immunity for Americans in other quarters from the renewedoutrages that could be foreseen. He soon after returned to the UnitedStates, where his decision was of course approved; for though the GulfStream appeared to Jefferson the natural limit for the neutraljurisdiction of America, the claim of Great Britain to the narrow seaswas evidently a grave encroachment upon the rights of others. 

In later years Lord Castlereagh, in an interview with the Americanchargé d'affaires, Jonathan Russell, assured him that Mr. King hadmisapprehended St. Vincent's meaning; reading, from a mass of recordsthen before him, a letter of the admiral to Sir William Scott, Judgeof the High Court of Admiralty, "asking for counsel and advice, andconfessing his own perplexity and total incompetency to discover anypractical project for the safe discontinuance of the practice. " "Yousee, " proceeded Lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King onthis point was entirely unfounded. "[153]

Wherever the misunderstanding lay, matters had not advanced in theleast towards a solution when Monroe reached England, in 1803, asKing's successor. Up to that time, no tabular statement seems to havebeen prepared, showing the total number of seamen impressed fromAmerican vessels during the first war, 1793-1801; nor does the presentwriter think it material to ascertain, from the fragmentary data athand, the exact extent of an injury to which the question of more orless was secondary. The official agent of the American Government, forthe protection of seamen, upon quitting his post in London in 1802, wrote that he had transferred to his successor "A list of 597 seamen, where answers have been returned to me, stating that, having nodocuments to prove their citizenship, the Lords Commissioners of theAdmiralty could not consent to their discharge. " Only seven cases thenremained without replies, which shows at the least a decent attentionto the formalities of intercourse; and King, in his letter of October7, 1799, had acknowledged that the Secretary to the Admiralty had"given great attention to the numerous applications, and that adisposition has existed to comply with our demands, when the samecould be done consistently with the maxims and practice adopted andadhered to by Great Britain. " The Admiralty, however, maintained that"the admission of the principle, that a man declaring himself tobelong to a foreign state should, upon that assertion merely, andwithout direct or very strong circumstantial proof, be suffered toleave the service, would be productive of the most dangerousconsequences to his Majesty's Navy. " The agent himself had written tothe Secretary of the Admiralty, "I freely confess that I believe manyof them are British subjects; but I presume that all of them wereimpressed from American vessels, and by far the greater proportion areAmerican citizens, who, from various causes, have been deprived oftheir certificates, and who, from their peculiar situation, have beenunable to obtain proofs from America. "[154]

When Mr. Monroe arrived in England in 1803, after the conclusion ofthe Louisiana purchase from France, war had just re-begun. Instructions were sent him, in an elaborate series of articles framedby Madison, for negotiating a convention to regulate those matters ofdifference which experience had shown were sure to arise between thetwo countries in the progress of the hostilities. Among them, impressment was given the first place; but up to 1806, when Pinkneywas sent as his associate, nothing had been effected, nor does urgencyseem to have been felt. So long as in practice things ran smoothly, divergences of opinion were easily tolerable. Soon after the receiptof the instructions, in March, 1804, [155] the comparatively friendlyadministration of Addington gave way to that of Pitt; and upon thishad followed Monroe's nine-months absence in Spain. Before departure, however, he had written, "The negotiation has not failed in its greatobjects, . .. Nor was there ever less cause of complaint furnished byimpressment. "[156] The outburst of seizure upon the plea of aconstructively direct trade, already mentioned, had followed, and, with the retaliatory non-importation law of the United States, madethe situation acute and menacing. Further cause for exasperation wasindicated in a report from the Secretary of State, March 5, 1806, giving, in reply to a resolution of the House, a tabulated statement, by name, of 913 persons, who "appear to have been impressed fromAmerican vessels;" to which was added that "the aggregate number ofimpressments into the British service since the commencement of thepresent war in Europe (May, 1803) is found to be 2, 273. "[157]

Confronted by this situation of wrongs endured, by commerce and byseamen, the mission of Monroe and Pinkney was to negotiate acomprehensive treaty of "amity, commerce, and navigation, " the firstattempted between the two countries since Jay's in 1794. When Pinkneylanded, Fox was already in the grip of the sickness from which he diedin the following September. This circumstance introduced an element ofdelay, aggravated by the inevitable hesitations of the new ministry, solicitous on the one hand to accommodate, but yet more anxious not toincense British opinion. The Prime Minister, in room of Mr. Fox, received the envoys on August 5, and, when the American demand wasexplained to him, defined at once the delicacy of the question ofimpressment. "On the subject of the impressment of our seamen, hesuggested doubts of the practicability of devising the means ofdiscrimination between the seamen of the two countries, within (as weunderstood him) their respective jurisdictions; and he spoke of theimportance to the safety of Great Britain, in the present state of thepower of her enemy, of preserving in their utmost strength the rightand capacity of Government to avail itself in war of the services ofits seamen. These observations were connected with frequentprofessions of an earnest wish that some liberal and equitable planshould be adopted, for _reconciling the exercise_ of this essentialright with the just claims of the United States, and for removing fromit all cause of complaint and irritation. "[158]

In consequence of Mr. Fox's continued illness two negotiators, one ofwhom, Lord Holland, was a near relative of his, were appointed toconfer with the American envoys, and to frame an agreement, ifattainable. The first formal meeting was on August 27, the second onSeptember 1. [159] As the satisfactory arrangement of the impressmentdifficulty was a _sine quâ non_ to the ratification of any treaty, andto the repeal of the Non-Importation Act, this American requirementwas necessarily at once submitted. The reply was significant, particularly because made by men apparently chosen for their generalattitude towards the United States, by a ministry certainly desirousto conciliate, and to retain the full British advantage from theUnited States market, if compatible with the preservation of aninterest deemed greater still. "It was soon apparent that they feltthe strongest repugnance to a formal renunciation, or the abandonment, of their claim to take from our vessels on the high seas such seamenas should appear to be their own subjects, and they pressed upon uswith much zeal a provision" for documentary protection to individuals;"but that, subject to such protections, the ships of war of GreatBritain should continue to visit and impress on the main ocean asheretofore. "

In the preliminary discussions the British negotiators presented theaspect of the case as it appeared to them and to their public. They"observed that they supposed the object of our plan to be to preventthe impressment at sea of American seamen, and not to withdrawBritish seamen from the naval service of their country in times ofgreat national peril, for the purpose of employing them ourselves;that the first of these purposes would be effectually accomplished bya system which should introduce and establish a clear and conclusivedistinction between the seamen of the two countries, which on alloccasions would be implicitly respected; that if they should consentto make our commercial navy a floating asylum for all the Britishseamen who, tempted by higher wages, should quit their service forours, the effect of such a concession upon their maritime strength, onwhich Great Britain depended, not only for her prosperity but for hersafety, might be fatal; that on the most alarming emergency they mightbe deprived, to an extent impossible to calculate, of their only meansof security; that our vessels might become receptacles for desertersto any amount, and when once at sea might set at defiance the justclaims of the service to which such deserters belonged; that, evenwithin the United States, it could not be expected that any plan forrecovering British deserters could be efficacious; and that, moreover, the plan we proposed was inadequate in its range and object, inasmuchas it was merely prospective, confined wholly to deserters, and in norespect provided for the case of the vast body of British seamen _now_employed in our trade to every part of the world. "

To these representations, which had a strong basis in fact and reason, if once the British principle was conceded, the American negotiatorsreplied in detail as best they could. In such detail, the weight ofargument and of probability appears to the writer to rest with theBritish case; but there is no adequate reply to the final Americanassertion, which sums up the whole controversy, "that impressment uponthe high seas by those to whom that service is necessarily confidedmust under any conceivable guards be frequently abused;" such abusebeing the imprisonment without trial of American citizens, as "apressed man, " for an indefinite period. Lord Cochrane, a British navalofficer of rare distinction, stated in the House of Commons a fewyears later that "the duration of the term of service in his Majesty'sNavy is absolutely without limitation. "[160]

The American envoys were prevented by their instructions fromconceding this point, and from signing a treaty without somesatisfactory arrangement. Meantime, impressed by the conciliatorinessof the British representatives, and doubtless in measure by theevident seriousness of the difficulty experienced by the BritishGovernment, they wrote home advising that the date for theNon-Importation Act going into operation, now close at hand, should bepostponed; and, in accordance with a recommendation from thePresident, the measure was suspended by Congress, with a provision forfurther prolongation in the discretion of the Executive. On September13 Fox died, an event which introduced further delays, esteemed notunreasonable by Monroe and Pinkney. Their next letter home, however, November 11, [161] while reporting the resumption of the negotiation, announced also its failure by a deadlock on this principal subject ofimpressment: "We have said everything that we could in support of ourclaim, that the flag should protect the crew, which we have contendedwas founded in unquestionable right. .. . This right was denied by theBritish commissioners, who asserted that of their Government to seizeits subjects on board neutral vessels on the high seas, and also urgedthat the relinquishment of it at this time would go far to theoverthrow of their naval power, on which the safety of the stateessentially depended. " In support of the abstract right was quoted thereport from a law officer of the Crown, which "justified thepretension by stating that the King had a right, by his prerogative, to require the services of all his seafaring subjects against theenemy, and to seize them by force wherever found, not being within theterritorial limits of another Power; that as the high seas wereextra-territorial, the merchant vessels of other Powers navigating onthem were not admitted to possess such a jurisdiction as to protectBritish subjects from the exercise of the King's prerogative overthem. "

This was a final and absolute rejection of Madison's doctrine, thatmerchant vessels on the high seas were under the jurisdiction only oftheir own country. Asserted right was arrayed directly andunequivocally against asserted right. Negotiation on that subject wasclosed, and to diplomacy was left no further resort, save arms, orsubmission to continued injury and insult. The British commissionersdid indeed submit a project, [162] in place of that of the UnitedStates, rejected by their Government. By this it was provided thatthereafter the captain of a cruiser who should impress an Americancitizen should be liable to heavy penalties, to be enacted by law; butas the preamble to this proposition read, "Whereas it is not lawfulfor a belligerent to impress or carry off, from on board a neutral, seafaring persons _who are not the subjects of the belligerent_, "there was admitted implicitly the right to impress those who were suchsubjects, the precise point at issue. The Americans thereforepronounced it wholly inadmissible, and repeated that no project couldbe adopted "which did not allow our ships to protect their crews. "

The provision made indispensable by the United States having thusfailed of adoption, the question arose whether the negotiation shouldcease. The British expressed an earnest desire that it should not, andas a means thereto communicated the most positive assurances fromtheir Government that "instructions have been given, and will berepeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution inthe impressing of British seamen; that the strictest care shall betaken to preserve the citizens of the United States from molestationor injury; and that prompt redress shall be afforded upon anyrepresentation of injury. "[163] To this assurance the Americancommissioners attached more value as a safeguard for the future thanpast experience warranted; but in London they were able to feel, moreaccurately than an official in Washington, the extent and complexityof the British problem, both in actual fact and in public feeling. They knew, too, the anxious wish of the President for an accommodationon other matters; so they decided to proceed with their discussions, having first explicitly stated that they were acting on their ownjudgment. [164] Consequently, whatever instrument might result fromtheir joint labors would be liable to rejection at home, because ofthe failure of the impressment demand. 

The discussions thus renewed terminated in a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, signed by the four negotiators, December 31, 1806. Into the details of this instrument it is unnecessary to go, asit never became operative. Jefferson persisted in refusing approval toany formal convention which did not provide the required stipulationagainst impressment. He was dissatisfied also with particular detailsconnected with the other arrangements. All these matters were setforth at great length in a letter[165] of May 20, 1807, from Mr. Madison to the American commissioners; in which they were instructedto reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty submitted, endeavoring to effect the changes specified. The danger to GreatBritain from American commercial restriction was fully expounded, asan argument to compel compliance with the demands; the wholeconcluding with the characteristic remark that, "as long asnegotiation can be honorably protracted, it is a resource to bepreferred, under existing circumstances, to the peremptory alternativeof improper concessions or inevitable collisions. " In other words, theUnited States Government did not mean to fight, and that was all GreatBritain needed to know. That she would suffer from the closure of theAmerican market was indisputable; but, being assured of transatlanticpeace, there were other circumstances of high import, political aswell as commercial, which rendered yielding more inexpedient to herthan a commercial war. 

At the end of March, 1807, within three months of the signature atLondon, the British Ministry fell, and the disciples of Pitt returnedto power. Mr. Canning became Foreign Secretary. Circumstances werethen changing rapidly on the continent of Europe, and by the timeMadison's letter reached England a very serious event had modifiedalso the relations of the United States to Great Britain. This was theattack upon the United States frigate "Chesapeake" by a British shipof war, upon the high seas, and the removal of four of her crew, claimed as deserters from the British Navy. Unofficial information ofthis transaction reached England July 25, just one day after Monroeand Pinkney had addressed to Canning a letter communicating theirinstructions to reopen negotiations, and stating the changes deemeddesirable in the treaty submitted. The intervention of the"Chesapeake" affair, to a contingent adjustment of which all othermatters had been postponed, delayed to October 22 the reply of theBritish Minister. [166] In this, after a preamble of "distinct protestagainst a practice, altogether unusual in the political transactionsof states, by which the American Government assumes to itself theprivilege of revising and altering agreements concluded and signed onits behalf by its agents duly authorized for that purpose, " Canningthus announced the decision of the Cabinet: "The proposal of thePresident of the United States for proceeding to negotiate anew, uponthe basis of a treaty already solemnly concluded and signed, is aproposal wholly inadmissible. And his Majesty has therefore no option, under the present circumstances of this transaction, but to acquiescein the refusal of the President of the United States to ratify thetreaty signed on December 31, 1806. " The settlement of the"Chesapeake" business having already been transferred to Washington, by the appointment of a special British envoy, this rejection offurther consideration of the treaty closed all matters pending betweenthe two governments, except those appertaining to the usual duties ofa legation, and Monroe's mission ended. A fortnight later he sailedfor the United States. His place as regularly accredited Minister tothe British Court was taken by Pinkney, through whom were conductedthe subsequent important discussions, which arose from the markedextension given immediately afterwards by France and Great Britain totheir several policies for the forcible restriction of neutral trade. 

Those who have followed the course of the successive events traced inthis chapter, and marked their accelerating momentum, will be preparedfor the more extreme and startling occurrences which soon after ensuedas a matter of inevitable development. They will be able also tounderstand how naturally the phrase, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, "grew out of these various transactions, as the expression of thedemands and grievances which finally drove the United States intohostilities; and will comprehend in what sense these terms were used, and what the wrongs against which they severally protested. "FreeTrade" had no relation of opposition to a system of protection to homeindustries, an idea hardly as yet formulated to consciousness, exceptby a few advanced economists. It meant the trade of a nation carriedon according to its own free will, relieved from fetters forciblyimposed by a foreign yoke, in which, under the circumstances of thetime, the resurrection of colonial bondage was fairly to be discerned. "Sailors' Rights" expressed not only the right of the American seamanto personal liberty of action, --in theory not contested, but inpractice continually violated by the British, --but the right of allseamen under the American flag to its protection in the voluntaryengagements which they were then fulfilling. It voiced the sufferingsof the individual; the personal side of an injury, the reverse ofwhich was the disgrace of the nation responsible for his security. 

It was afterwards charged against the administrations of Jefferson andMadison, under which these events ran their course to theirculmination in war, that impressment was not a cause of the breakbetween the two countries, but was adduced subsequently to swell thearray of injuries, in which the later Orders in Council were the realdeterminative factor. The drift of this argument was, that the Repealof the Orders, made almost simultaneously with the AmericanDeclaration of War, and known in the United States two months later, should have terminated hostilities. The British Government, in anelaborate vindication of its general course, published in January, 1813, stated that, "in a manifesto, accompanying their declaration ofhostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the Ordersin Council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; but none ofthem such as were ever before alleged by the American Government to begrounds for war. " In America itself similar allegations were made bythe party in opposition. The Maryland House of Delegates, in January, 1814, adopted a memorial, in which it was said that "The claim ofimpressment, which has been so much exaggerated, but which was neverdeemed of itself a substantive cause of war, has been heretoforeconsidered susceptible of satisfactory arrangement in the judgment ofboth the commissioners, who were selected by the President then inoffice to conduct the negotiation with the English ministry in theyear 1806. "[167] The words of the commissioners in their officialletters of November 11, 1806, [168] and April 22, 1807, [169] certainlysustain this statement as to their opinion, which was againdeliberately affirmed by Monroe in a justificatory review of theircourse, addressed to Madison in February, 1808, [170] after his return. Gaston, speaking in the House in February, 1814, said: "Sir, thequestion of seamen was not a cause of this war. More than five yearshad passed over since an arrangement on this question, perfectlysatisfactory to our ministers, [Monroe and Pinkney] had been made withGreat Britain; but it pleased not the President, and was rejected. Yet, during the whole period that afterwards elapsed until thedeclaration of war, no second effort was made to adjust this cause ofcontroversy. "[171]

Gaston here is slightly in error as to fact, for the attack upon the"Chesapeake" was made by the Government the occasion for againdemanding an abandonment of the practice of impressment from Americanmerchant ships; but, accepting the statements otherwise, nothing morecould be required of the Administration, so far as words went, thanits insistence upon this relinquishment as a _sine quâ non_ to anytreaty. Its instructions to its ministers in 1806 had placed thisdemand first, not only in order, but in importance, coupling with itas indispensable only one other condition, the freedom of trade; thelater and more extreme infringements of which were constituted by theOrders in Council of 1807. After protracted discussion, the Americanrequirement as to impressment had been refused by Great Britain, deliberately, distinctly, and in the most positive manner; nor does itseem possible to concur with the opinion of our envoys that thestipulations offered by her representatives, while not sacrificing theBritish principle, did substantially and in practice secure theAmerican demands. These could be satisfactorily covered only by theterms laid down by the Administration. Thereafter, any renewal of thesubject must come from the other side; it was inconsistent withself-respect for the United States again to ask it, unless with armsin her hands. To make further advances in words would have been, notto negotiate, but to entreat. This, in substance, was the reply of theGovernment to its accusers at home, and it is irrefutable. 

It is less easy--rather, it is impossible--to justify theAdministration for refraining from adequate deeds, when the impotenceof words had been fully and finally proved. In part, this was due tomiscalculation, in itself difficult to pardon, from the somewhatsordid grounds and estimates of national feeling upon which itproceeded. The two successive presidents, and the party behind them, were satisfied that Great Britain, though standing avowedly andevidently upon grounds considered by her essential to national honorand national safety, could be compelled to yield by the menace ofcommercial embarrassment. That there was lacking in them the elevatedinstinct, which could recognize that they were in collision withsomething greater than a question of pecuniary profits, is in itself acondemnation; and their statesmanship was at fault in not appreciatingthat the enslaved conditions of the European continent had justlyaroused in Great Britain an exaltation of spirit, which was preparedto undergo every extreme, in resistance to a like subjection, tillexhaustion itself should cause her weapons to drop from her hands. 

The resentment of the United States Government for the injuries doneits people was righteous and proper. It was open to it to bear themunder adequate protest, sympathizing with the evident embarrassmentsof the old cradle of the race; or, on the other hand, to do as she wasdoing, strain every nerve to compel the cessation of outrage. TheAdministration preferred to persist in its military and navaleconomies, putting forth but one-half of its power, by measures ofmere commercial restriction. These impoverished its own people, anddivided national sentiment, but proved incapable within reasonabletime to reduce the resolution of the opponent. That that finally gaveway when war was clearly imminent proves, not that commercialrestriction alone was sufficient, but that coupled with militaryreadiness it would have attained its end more surely, and sooner;consequently with less of national suffering, and no nationalignominy. 

Entire conviction of the justice and urgency of the Americancontentions, especially in the matter of impressment, and only to aless degree in that of the regulation of trade by foreign force, asimpeaching national independence, is not enough to induce admirationfor the course of American statesmanship at this time. The acutenessand technical accuracy of Madison's voluminous arguments make but moreimpressive the narrowness of outlook, which saw only the Americanpoint of view, and recognized only the force of legal precedent, at atime when the foundations of the civilized world were heaving. American interests doubtless were his sole concern; but what waspracticable and necessary to support those interests depended upon awide consideration and just appreciation of external conditions. Thatlaws are silent amid the clash of arms, seems in his apprehensiontransformed to the conviction that at no time are they more noisy andcompulsive. Upon this political obtuseness there fell a kind ofpoetical retribution, which gradually worked the Administration roundto the position of substantially supporting Napoleon, when puttingforth all his power to oppress the liberties of Spain, and ofembarrassing Great Britain at the time when a people in insurrectionagainst perfidy and outrage found in her their sole support. Duringthese eventful five years, the history of which we are yet to trace, the bearing of successive British ministries towards the United Stateswas usually uncompromising, often arrogant, sometimes insolent, hardeven now to read with composure; but in the imminent danger of theircountry, during a period of complicated emergencies, they held, withcool heads, and with steady hands on the helm, a course taken in fullunderstanding of world conditions, and with a substantially justforecast of the future. Among their presuppositions, in the periodnext to be treated, was that America might argue and threaten, butwould not fight. There was here no miscalculation, for she did notfight till too late, and she fought wholly unprepared. 

FOOTNOTES:

[108] Wheaton's International Law, p. 753. 

[109] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 476. 

[110] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. Pp. 472-474. 

[111] Ibid. , p. 503. 

[112] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. P. 522. 

[113] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. P. 491. 

[114] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 263. 

[115] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 265. 

[116] Ibid. , p. 266. 

[117] Ibid. , p. 175. 

[118] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 98. 

[119] History of the United States, by Henry Adams, vol. Ii. P. 423. 

[120] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. P. 491. 

[121] Ibid. , vol. Iii. P. 145. 

[122] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 114. 

[123] Monroe to Madison, April 28, 1806. American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 117. 

[124] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 111. 

[125] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 109, 107. 

[126] Ibid. , p. 118. 

[127] For the text of this measure, see American State Papers, ForeignRelations, vol. Iii. P. 267. 

[128] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 443. 

[129] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 446. 

[130] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 195. Author's italics. 

[131] Ibid. , p. 371. 

[132] See, particularly, Foster to Monroe, July 3, 1811. AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 436. 

[133] Ibid. , pp. 428, 439. 

[134] The Instructions to Monroe and Pinkney are found in AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 120. 

[135] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 200, 201. 

[136] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. P. 148. 

[137] Correspondence of Thomas Barclay, edited by George L. Rives, NewYork, 1894. For instances, see Index, Impressment. 

[138] Works of John Adams, vol. Viii. P. 456. 

[139] Ante, p. 6. 

[140] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. I. Pp. 123-124. 

[141] Jefferson's Works, Letter to T. Pinckney, Minister to GreatBritain, June 11, 1792. 

[142] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. Pp. 145-150. 

[143] See, for example, Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxvi. Pp. 215-221, 306-309. 

[144] Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, vol. Iii. P. 115. 

[145] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. P. 150. 

[146] Ibid. , p. 493. 

[147] Niles' Register, vol. V. P. 343. 

[148] Correspondence, p. 210. 

[149] Correspondence, p. 219. 

[150] Ante, p. 7. 

[151] Niles' Register, vol. V. Supplement, p. 105. 

[152] King to Thomas Erskine. Life of King, vol. Iii. P. 401. 

[153] Russell to the Secretary of State, Sept. 17, 1812. AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 593. 

[154] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. Pp. 427, 473. 

[155] Ibid. , vol. Iii. P. 90. 

[156] Ibid. , p. 98. 

[157] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. Pp. 776-798. 

[158] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 131. Author's italics. 

[159] For the American report of these interviews, see Ibid. , pp. 133-135. 

[160] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. Xxvi. P. 1103. 

[161] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 137-140. 

[162] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 140. 

[163] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 140. 

[164] Ibid. , p. 139. 

[165] Ibid. , pp. 166-173. 

[166] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 198. 

[167] Niles' Register, vol. V. P. 377. 

[168] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 139. 

[169] Ibid. , p. 161. 

[170] Ibid. , p. 173. 

[171] Niles' Register, vol. V. Supplement, p. 102. 

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL TO WAR

1807-1812

When the treaty of December 31, 1806, was about to be signed, theBritish negotiators delivered to the Americans a paper, of the generalcharacter of which they had been forewarned, but which in preciseterms then first came before them. Its origin was due to apronouncement of the French Emperor, historically known as the Decreeof Berlin, which was dated November 21, while the negotiations were inprogress, but had become fully known only when they had reached a veryadvanced stage. The pretensions and policy set forth in the Decreewere considered by the British Government to violate the rights ofneutrals, with a specific and far-reaching purpose of thereby injuringGreat Britain. It was claimed that acquiescence in such violations bythe neutral, or submission to them, would be a concurrence in thehostile object of the enemy; in which case Great Britain might feelcompelled to adopt measures retaliatory against France, through thesame medium of neutral navigation. In such steps she might befettered, should the present treaty take effect. In finalratification, therefore, the British Government would be guided by theaction of the United States upon the Berlin Decree. Unless the Emperorabandoned his policy, or "the United States by its conduct orassurances will have given security to his Majesty that it will notsubmit to such innovations on the established system of maritime law, . .. His Majesty will not consider himself bound by the presentsignature of his commissioners to ratify the treaty, or precluded fromadopting such measures as may seem necessary for counteracting thedesigns of his enemy. "[172] The American representatives transmittedthis paper to Washington, with the simple observation that "we do notconsider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any theslightest degree our sanction. "[173]

The Berlin Decree was remarkable not only in scope and spirit, but inform. "It had excited in us apprehensions, " wrote Madison to theUnited States minister in Paris, "which were repressed only by theinarticulate import of its articles, and the presumption that it wouldbe executed in a sense not inconsistent with the respect due to thetreaty between France and the United States. " It bore, in fact, theimpress of its author's mind, which, however replete with knowledgeconcerning conventional international law, defined in accordance withthe momentary and often hasty impulses of his own will, andconsequently often also with the obscurity attendant upon ill-digestedideas. The preamble recited various practices of Great Britain assubversive of international right; most of which were not so, but inaccordance with long-standing usage and general prescription. Themethods of blockade instituted by her were more exceptionable, andwere given prominence, with evident reference to the Order of May 16, declaring the blockade of a long coast-line. It being evident, so ranthe Emperor's reasoning, that the object of this abuse of blockade wasto interrupt neutral commerce in favor of British, it followed that"whoever deals on the Continent in English merchandise favors thatdesign, and becomes an accomplice. " He therefore decreed, as a measureof just retaliation, "that the British Islands were thenceforward ina state of blockade; that all correspondence and commerce with themwas prohibited; that trade in English merchandise was forbidden; andthat all merchandise belonging to England, or" (even if neutralproperty) "proceeding from its manufactories and colonies, is lawfulprize. " No vessel coming directly from British dominions should bereceived in any port to which the Decree was applicable. The scope ofits intended application was shown in the concluding command, that itshould be communicated "to the Kings of Spain, of Naples, of Holland, of Etruria, and to our allies, whose subjects, like ours, are thevictims of the injustice and barbarism of the English maritimelaws. "[174]

The phrasing of the edict was ambiguous, as Madison indicated. Notably, while neutral vessels having on board merchandise neutral inproperty, but British in origin, were to be seized when voluntarilyentering a French port, it was not clear whether they were for thesame reason to be arrested when found on the high seas; and there wasequal failure to specify whether the proclaimed blockade authorizedthe capture of neutrals merely because bound to the British Isles, aswas lawful if destined to a seaport effectively blockaded. Again, someof the proposed measures, such as refusal of admission to vessels ormerchandise coming to French ports from British, were matters ofpurely local concern and municipal regulation; whereas the seizure ofneutral property, because of English manufacture, was at least ofdoubtful right, if exercised within municipal limits, and certainlyunlawful, if effected on the high seas. Whether such application wasintended could not certainly be inferred from the text. The genius ofthe measure, as a whole, its inspiring motive and purpose, wasrevealed in the closing words of the preamble: "This decree shall beconsidered as the fundamental law of the Empire, until England hasacknowledged that the rights of war are the same an land and on sea;that it [war] cannot be extended to any private property whatever; norto persons who are not military; and until the right of blockade berestrained to fortified places, actually invested by competentforces. " These words struck directly at measures of war resting uponlong-standing usage, in which the strength of a maritime state such asGreat Britain was vitally implicated. 

The claim for private property possesses particular interest; for itinvolves a play upon words to the confusion of ideas, which from thattime to this has vitiated the arguments upon which have been based aprominent feature of American policy. Private property at a standstillis one thing. It is the unproductive money in a stocking, hid in acloset. Property belonging to private individuals, but embarked inthat process of transportation and exchange which we call commerce, islike money in circulation. It is the life-blood of nationalprosperity, upon which war depends; and as such is national in itsemployment, and only in ownership private. To stop such circulation isto sap national prosperity; and to sap prosperity, upon which wardepends for its energy, is a measure as truly military as is killingthe men whose arms maintain war in the field. Prohibition of commerceis enforced at will where an enemy's army holds a territory; ifpermitted, it is because it inures to the benefit of the conqueror, orat least from its restricted scope does not injure him. It will not bedoubted that, should a prohibition on shore be disregarded, theoffending property would be seized in punishment. The sea is the greatscene of commerce. The property transported back and forth, circulating from state to state in exchanges, is one of the greatestfactors in national wealth. The maritime nations have been, and are, the wealthy nations. To prohibit such commerce to an enemy is, andhistorically has been, a tremendous blow to his fighting power; nevermore conspicuously so than in the Napoleonic wars. But prohibition isa vain show, in war as it is in civil government, if not enforced bypenalties; and the natural penalty against offending property is fine, extending even to confiscation in extreme cases. The seizure ofenemy's merchant ships and goods, for violating the prohibitionagainst their engaging in commerce, is what is commonly called theseizure of private property. Under the methods of the last twocenturies, it has been in administration a process as regular, legally, as is libelling a ship for an action in damages; nor does itdiffer from it in principle. The point at issue really is not, "Is theproperty private?" but, "Is the method conducive to the purposes ofwar?" Property strictly private, on board ship, but not in process ofcommercial exchange, is for this reason never touched; and to do so isconsidered as disgraceful as a common theft. 

Napoleon, as a ruler, was always poverty-stricken. For that reason helevied heavy contributions on conquered states, which it is needlessto say were paid by private taxpayers; and for the same reason, bycalling French ships and French goods "private property, " he wouldcompel for them the freedom of the sea, which the maritimepreponderance of Great Britain denied them. He needed the revenue thatcommerce would bring in. So as to blockades. In denying the right tocapture under a nominal blockade, unsupported by an effective force, he took the ground which the common-sense of nations had long beforeembodied in the common consent called international law. But he wentfarther. Blockade is very inconvenient to the blockaded, which was therôle played by France. Along with the claim for "private property, " heformulated the proposition that the right of blockade is restrainedto fortified places; to which was afterwards added the corollary thatthe place must be invested by land as well as by sea. It is to benoticed that here also American policy showed a disposition to goastray, by denying the legitimacy of a purely commercial blockade; atendency natural enough at that passing moment, when, as a weaknation, it was desired to restrict the rights of belligerents, butwhich in its results on the subsequent history of the country wouldhave been ruinous. John Marshall, one of the greatest names inAmerican jurisprudence, when Secretary of State in 1800, wrote to theminister in London:

 On principle it might well be questioned whether this rule [of blockade] can be applied to a place not completely invested, by land as well as by sea. If we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns invested by sea only is an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals. But it is not of this departure from principle (a departure which has received some sanction from practice) that we mean to complain. [175]

In 1810, the then Secretary of State enclosed to the American ministerin London the letter from which this extract is taken, among otherproofs of the positions maintained by the United States on the subjectof blockade. The particular claim cited was not directly indorsed; butas its mention was unnecessary to the matter immediately in hand, wemay safely regard its retention as indicative of the ideal of theSecretary, and of the President, Mr. Madison. In consequence, we findthe minister, William Pinkney, in his letter of January 14, 1811, adducing Marshall's view to the British Foreign Secretary:

 It is by no means clear that it may not fairly be contended, on principle and early usage, that a maritime blockade is incomplete, with regard to States at peace, [176] unless the place which it would affect is invested by land, as well as by sea. The United States, however, have called for the recognition of no such rule. They appear to have contented themselves, etc. [177]

The error into which both these eminent statesmen fell is military incharacter, and proceeds from the same source as the agitation in favorof exempting so-called private property from capture. Both spring fromthe failure to recognize a function of the sea, vital to themaintenance of war by states which depend upon maritime commerce. Toforbid the free use of the seas to enemy's merchant ships and materialof commerce, differs in no wise in principle from shutting his portsto neutral vessels, as well as to his own, by blockade. Both are aimedat the enemy's sources of supply, at his communications; and thepenalty inflicted by the laws of war in both cases is thesame, --forfeiture of the offending property. With clear recognition ofthis military principle involved, and of the importance of sustainingit by Great Britain, British high officials repeatedly declared thatthe Berlin Decree was to be regarded, not chiefly in its methods, butin its object, or principle, which was to deprive Great Britain of herprincipal weapon. This purpose stood avowed in the words, "this decreeshall be considered the fundamental law of the Empire until Englandhas acknowledged, " etc. British statesmen correctly paraphrased this, "has renounced the established foundations, admitted by all civilizednations, of her maritime rights and interests, upon which depend themost valuable rights and interests of the nation. "[178] The Britishauthorities understood that, by relinquishing these rights, they wouldabandon in great measure the control of the sea, so far as useful towar. The United States have received their lesson in history. If theprinciple contended for by their representatives, Marshall andPinkney, had been established as international law before 1861, therecould have been no blockade of the Southern coast in the Civil War. The cotton of the Confederacy, innocent "private property, " could havegone freely; the returns from it would have entered unimpeded;commerce, the source of national wealth, would have flourished in fullvigor; supplies, except contraband, would have flowed unmolested; andall this at the price merely of killing some hundred thousands moremen, with proportionate expenditure of money, in the effort tomaintain the Union, which would probably have failed, to theimmeasurable loss of both sections. 

The British Government took some time to analyze the "inarticulateimport" of the Berlin Decree. Hence, in the paper presented to Monroeand Pinkney, stress was laid upon the methods only, ignoring theobject of compelling Great Britain to surrender her maritime rights. In the methods, however, instinct divined the true character of theplotted evil. There was to be formed, under military pressure, a vastpolitical combination of states pledged to exclude British commercefrom the markets of the Continent; a design which in executionreceived the name of the Continental System. The Decree being issuedafter the battle of Jena, upon the eve of the evident completesubjugation of Prussia, following that of Austria the year before, there was room to fear that the predominance of Napoleon on theContinent would compel in Europe universal compliance with thesemeasures of exclusion. It so proved, in fact, in the course of 1807, leading to a commercial warfare of extraordinary rigor, the effects ofwhich upon Europe have been discussed by the author in a previouswork. [179] Its influence upon the United States is now to beconsidered; for it was a prominent factor in the causes of the War of1812. 

Although in a military sense weak to debility, and politically notwelded as yet into a nation, strong in a common spirit and acceptedtraditions, the United States was already in two respects a force tobe considered. She possessed an extensive shipping, second in tonnageonly to that of the British Islands, to which it was a dangerous rivalin maintaining the commercial intercourse of Europe; while herpopulation and purchasing power were so increased as to constitute hera very valuable market, manufacturing for which was chiefly in thehands of Great Britain. It became, therefore, an object with Napoleon, in prosecution of the design of the Berlin Decree, to draw the UnitedStates into co-operation with the European continental system, byshutting her ports to Great Britain; while the latter, confronted bythis double danger, sought to impose upon neutral navigation--almostwholly American--such curtailment as should punish the Emperor and histributaries for their measures of exclusion, and also neutralize theeffect of these by forcing the British Islands into the chain ofcommunication by which Europe in general was supplied. To retaliatethe Berlin Decree upon the enemy, and by the same means to nourish thetrade of Great Britain, was the avowed twofold object. The shipping ofthe United States found itself between hammer and anvil, crushed bythese opposing policies. Napoleon banned it from continental harbors, if coming from England or freighted with English goods; Great Britainforbade it going to a continental port, unless it had first touched atone of hers; and both inflicted penalties of confiscation, when ableto lay hands on a vessel which had violated their respective commands. 

The lack of precision in the terms of the Berlin Decree exposed itfrom the first to much latitude of interpretation; and the Emperorremaining absent from France for eight months after its promulgation, preoccupied with an arduous warfare in Eastern Europe, theconstruction of the edict by the authorities in Paris made littlealteration in existing conditions. Nevertheless, the impulse toretaliate prevailed; and the British ministry with which Monroe andPinkney had negotiated, though comparatively liberal in politicalcomplexion, would not wait for more precise knowledge. The occasionwas seized with a precipitancy which lent color to Napoleon'sassertion, that the leading aim was to favor their own trade bydepressing that of others. This had already been acknowledged as themotive for interrupting American traffic in West India produce. Nowagain, one week only after stating to Monroe and Pinkney that they"could not believe that the enemy will ever seriously attempt toenforce such a system, " and without waiting to ascertain whetherneutral nations, the United States in particular, would, "contrary toall expectations, acquiesce in such usurpations, "[180] the Governmenton January 7, 1807, with no information as to the practical effectgiven to the Decree in operation, issued an Order in Council, whichstruck Americans directly and chiefly. Neutrals were forbidden to sailfrom one port to another, both of which were so far under the controlof France or her allies that British vessels might not freely tradethereat. This was aimed immediately at trade along the coast ofEurope, but it included, of course, the voyages from a hostile colonyto a hostile European port already interdicted by British rulings, ofwhich the new Order was simply an extension. It fell with particularseverity on Americans, accustomed to go from port to port, notcarrying on local coasting, but seeking markets for their outwardcargoes, or making up a homeward lading. It is true that the Cabinetby which the Order was issued did not intend to forbid this particularprocedure; but the wording naturally implied such prohibition, and wasso construed by Madison, [181] who communicated his understanding tothe British minister at Washington. Before this letter could reachLondon, the ministry changed, and the new Government refrained fromcorrecting the misapprehension. For this it was taken to task inParliament, by Lords Holland and Grenville. [182]

Monroe had once written to the British Foreign Secretary that "itcannot well be conceived how it should be lawful to carry on commercefrom one port to another of the parent country, and not from itscolonies to the mother country. "[183] This well meant argument, infavor of opening the colonial trade, gave to the new step of theBritish Cabinet a somewhat gratuitous indorsement of logicalconsistency. A consciousness of this may have underlain the remarkableterms in which this grievous restriction was imparted to the UnitedStates Government, as evincing the singular indulgence of GreatBritain. Her minister in Washington, in conveying the Order to theState Department, wrote: "His Majesty, with that forbearance andmoderation which have at all times distinguished his conduct, hasdetermined for the present to confine himself to exercising hisdecided naval superiority in such a manner only as is authorized bythe acknowledged principles of the laws of nations, and has issued anOrder for preventing all commerce from port to port of his enemies;comprehending in this Order not only the ports of France, but those ofother nations, as, either in alliance with France, or subject to herdominion, have, by measures of active offence or by the exclusion ofBritish ships, taken part in the present war. "[184] These wordscharacterized the measure as strictly retaliatory. They implied thatthe extra-legal action of the enemy would warrant extra-legal actionby Great Britain, but asserted expressly that the present step wassanctioned by existing law, --"in such a manner only as is authorizedby the acknowledged principles of the law of nations. " The prohibitionof coasting trade could be brought under the law of nations only byinvoking the Rule of 1756, forbidding neutrals to undertake for astate at war employment denied to them in peace. Of this, coasting wasa precise instance; but to call the Rule an acknowledged principle ofthe law of nations was an assumption peculiarly calculated to irritateMadison, who had expended reams in refutation. He penned two carefulreplies, logical, incisive, and showing the profound knowledge of thesubject which distinguished him; but in a time of political convulsionhe contended in vain against men who wore swords and thought theircountry's existence imperilled. 

The United States authorities argued by text and precedent. To the endthey persisted in shutting their eyes to the important fact, recognized intuitively by Great Britain, that the Berlin Decree was noisolated measure, to be discussed on its separate merits, but anincident in an unprecedented political combination, alreadysufficiently defined in tendency, which overturned the traditionalsystem of Europe. It destroyed the checks inherent in the balance ofpower, concentrating the whole in the hands of Napoleon, to whom thereremained on the Continent only one valid counterweight, the Emperor ofRussia, whom he soon after contrived to lead into his scheme ofpolicy. The balance of power was thus reduced to the opposing scalesof Great Britain and France, and for five years so remained. TheContinental System, embracing all the rest of Europe, was arrayedagainst Great Britain, and might well look to destroy her, if it couldcommand the support of the United States. Founded upon armed power, itproposed by continuous exertion of the same means to undermine thebases of British prosperity, and so to subvert the British Empire. Theenterprise was distinctly military, and could be met only by measuresof a similar character, to which existing international law wasunequal. The corner-stone was the military power of Napoleon, which, by nullifying the independence of the continental states, compelledthem to adopt the methods of the Berlin Decree contrary to their will, and contrary to the wishes, the interests, and the bare well-being oftheir populations. "You will see, " wrote an observant Americanrepresentative abroad, "that Napoleon stalks at a gigantic strideamong the pygmy monarchs of Europe, and bends them to his policy. Itis even an equal chance if Russia, after all her blustering, does notaccede to his demands without striking a blow. "[185] To meet thedanger Great Britain opposed a maritime dominion, equally exclusive, equally founded on force, and exercised in equally arbitrary fashionover the populations of the sea. 

At the end of March, 1807, the British Cabinet with which Monroe andPinkney had negotiated went out of office. Their successors came inprepared for extreme action in consequence of the Berlin Decree; buttheir hand was for the moment stayed, because its enforcement remainedin abeyance, owing to the Emperor's continued absence in the field. Towards the claims of the United States their attitude was likely tobe uncompromising; and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Canning, towhom fell the expression of the Government's views and purposes, possessed an adroitness in fastening upon minor weaknesses in a case, and postponing to such the consideration of the important point atissue, which, coupled with a peremptoriness of tone often bordering oninsolence, effected nothing towards conciliating a people believed tobe both unready and unwilling to fight. The American envoys, at theirfirst interview, in April, met him with the proposition of theirGovernment to reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty ofDecember 31. Learning from them that the treaty would not be ratifiedwithout a satisfactory arrangement concerning impressment, Canningasked what relations would then obtain between the two nations. Thereply was that the United States Government wished them placedinformally on the most friendly footing; that is, that anunderstanding should be reached as to practical action to be expectedon either side, without concessions of principle. [186] As finalinstructions from Washington were yet to come, it was agreed that thematter should be postponed. When they arrived, on July 16, the envoysdrew up a letter, submitting the various changes desired; butconveying also the fixed determination of the President "to declineany arrangement, formal or informal, which does not comprise aprovision against impressments from American vessels on the high seas, and which would, notwithstanding, be a bar to legislative measures byCongress for controlling that species of aggression. "[187]

This letter was dated July 24, but by the time it could be deliverednews arrived which threw into the background all matters ofnegotiation and illustrated with what respect British naval officersregarded "the instructions, repeated and enforced, for the observanceof the greatest caution in impressing British seamen. "[188] It isprobable, indeed, that the change of ministry, and the well-understoodtone of the new-comers, had modified the influence of theserestraining orders; and Canning evidently felt that such an inferencewas natural, for Monroe reported his noticeable desire "to satisfy methat no new orders had been issued by the present ministry to thecommandant of the British squadron at Halifax, " who was primarilyresponsible for the lamentable occurrence which here traversed thecourse of negotiation. It had been believed, and doubtless correctly, that some deserters from British ships of war had found their way intothe naval service of the United States. In June, 1807, the Americanfrigate "Chesapeake, " bearing the broad pendant of Commodore JamesBarron, had been fitting for sea in Hampton Roads. At this time twoFrench ships of war were lying off Annapolis, a hundred miles upChesapeake Bay; and, to prevent their getting to sea, a small Britishsquadron had been assembled at Lynnhaven Bay, just within Cape Henry, a dozen miles below the "Chesapeake's" anchorage. They were thus, asJefferson said, enjoying the hospitality of the United States. On June22 the American frigate got under way for sea, and as she stood down, one of the British, the "Leopard" of fifty guns, also made sail, goingout ahead of her. Shortly after noon the "Chesapeake" passed theCapes. When about ten miles outside, a little after three o'clock, the"Leopard" approached, and hailed that she had a despatch for CommodoreBarron. This was brought on board by a lieutenant, and proved to be aletter from the captain of the "Leopard, " enclosing an order fromVice-Admiral Berkeley, in charge of the Halifax station, "requiringand directing the captains and commanders of his Majesty's vesselsunder my command, in case of meeting the American frigate, the'Chesapeake, ' at sea, without the limits of the United States, to showher captain this order, and to require to search his ship fordeserters from certain British ships, " specified by name. UponBarron's refusal, the "Leopard" fired into the "Chesapeake, " killed orwounded twenty-one men, and reduced her to submission. The order forsearch was then enforced. Four of the American crew, considered to beBritish deserters, were taken away. Of these, one was hanged; onedied; and the other two, after prolonged disputation, were returnedfive years later to the deck of the "Chesapeake, " in formalreparation. 

Word of this transaction reached the British Government before it didMonroe, who was still sole American minister for all matters exceptthe special mission. Canning at once wrote him a letter of regret, andspontaneously promised "prompt and effectual reparation, " if uponreceipt of full information British officers should prove culpable. Four days later, July 29, Monroe and Canning met in pursuance of aprevious appointment, the object of which had been to discusscomplaints against the conduct of British ships of war on the coast ofthe United States. The "Chesapeake" business naturally nowovershadowed all others. Monroe maintained that, on principle, a shipof war could not be entered to search for deserters, or for anypurpose, without violating the sovereignty of her nation. Canning wasvery guarded; no admission of principle could then be obtained fromhim; but he gave Monroe to understand that, in whatever light theaction of the British officer should be viewed by his Government, thepoint whether the men seized were British subjects or Americancitizens would be of consideration, in the question of restoringthem, now that they were in British hands. Monroe, in accordance withthe position of his Government on the subject of impressment, repliedthat the determining consideration was not the nationality of the men, but of the ship, the flag of which had been insulted. 

The conference ended with an understanding that Monroe would send in anote embodying his position and claims. This he did the same day;[189]but his statements were grounded upon newspaper accounts, as theBritish Government had not yet published Berkeley's official report. He would not await the positive information that must soon be givenout, but applied strong language to acts not yet preciselyascertained; and he mingled with the "Chesapeake" affair other veryreal, but different and minor, subjects of complaint, seemingly with aview to cumulative effect. He thus made the mistake of encumberingwith extraneous or needless details a subject which required separate, undivided, and lucid insistence; while Canning found an opportunity, particularly congenial to his temperament, to escape under a cloud ofdignified words from the simple admission of wrong, and promise ofreparation, which otherwise he would have had to face. He could assumea tone of haughty rebuke, where only that of apology should have beenleft open. His reply ran thus:

 I have the honor to acknowledge your official note of the 29th ultimo, which I have lost no time in laying before the King. 

 As _the statement_ of the transaction to which this note refers is not brought forward either by the authority of the Government of the United States, _or with any precise knowledge of the facts on which it is founded_, it might have been sufficient for me to express to you his Majesty's readiness to take the whole of the circumstances of the case, _when fully disclosed_, into his consideration, and to make reparation for any _alleged injury_ to the sovereignty of the United States, whenever it should be _clearly shown_ that such injury has been _actually sustained_, and that such reparation is _really due_. 

 Of the existence of such a disposition on the part of the British Government, you, Sir, cannot be ignorant; I have already assured you of it, though in an unofficial form, by the letter which I addressed you on the first receipt of the intelligence of this unfortunate transaction; and I may, perhaps, be permitted to express my surprise, after such an assurance, at the tone of that representation which I have just had the honor to receive from you. 

 But the earnest desire of his Majesty to evince, in the most satisfactory manner, the principles of justice and moderation by which he is uniformly actuated, has not permitted him to hesitate in commanding me to assure you, that his Majesty neither does, nor has at any time maintained the pretension of a right to search ships of war, in the national service of any State, for deserters. 

 _If_, therefore, _the statement in your note should prove to be correct_, and to contain all the circumstances of the case, upon which the complaint is intended to be made, and it shall appear that the action of his Majesty's officers rested on no other grounds than the simple and unqualified assertion of the pretension above referred to, his Majesty has no difficulty in disavowing the act, and will have no difficulty in manifesting his displeasure at the conduct of his officers. 

 With respect to the other causes of complaint, (whatever they may be, ) which are hinted at in your note, I perfectly agree with you, in the sentiment which you express, as to the propriety of not involving them in a question, which of itself is of sufficient importance to claim a separate and most serious consideration. 

 _I have only to lament that the same sentiment did not induce you to abstain from alluding to these subjects_, on an occasion which you were yourself of opinion was not favorable for pursuing the discussion of them. [190]

 I have the honor to be, with great consideration, your most obedient, humble servant

 GEORGE CANNING. 

JAMES MONROE, ESQ. &C. 

While the right of the occasion was wholly with the American nation, the honors of the discussion, the weight of the first broadside, rested so far with the British Secretary; the more so that Monroe, byhis manner of adducing his "other causes of complaint, " admitted theirirrelevancy and yet characterized them irritatingly to hiscorrespondent. "I might state other examples of great indignity andoutrage, many of which are of recent date, to which the United Stateshave been exposed off their own coast, and even within several oftheir harbors, from the British squadron; but it is improper to minglethem with the present more serious causes of complaint. " This invitedCanning's retort, --You do mingle them, in the same sentence in whichyou admit the impropriety. And why, he shrewdly insinuated, precipitate action ahead of knowledge, when the facts must soon beknown? The unspoken reason is evident. Because a government, which byits own fault is weak, will try with big words to atone to the publicopinion of its people for that which it cannot, or will not, effect indeeds. Bluster, whether measured or intemperate in terms, is blusterstill, as long as it means only talk, not act. 

Monroe comforted himself that, though Canning's note was "harsh, " hehad obtained the "concession of the point desired. "[191] he had infact obtained less than would probably have resulted from a policy ofwhich the premises were assured, and the demands rigorously limited tothe particular offence. Canning's note set the key for the subsequentBritish correspondence, and dictated the methods by which hepersistently evaded an amends spontaneously promised under the firstemotions produced by an odious aggression. He continued to offer it;but under conditions impossible of acceptance, and as discreditable tothe party at fault as they were humiliating to the one offended. Inthemselves, the first notes exchanged between Monroe and Canning aretrivial, a revelation chiefly of individual characteristics. Theirinterest lies in the exemplification of the general course of theAmerican administration, imposed by its years of temporizing, ofmoney-getting, and of military parsimony. President Jefferson inAmerica met the occasion precisely as did Monroe in London, with thesame result of a sharp correspondence, abounding in strong language, but affording Canning further opportunity to confuse issues and escapefrom reparations, which, however just and wise, were distasteful. Itwas a Pyrrhic victory for the British minister, destroying the lastchance of conciliating American acquiescence in a line of actionforced upon Great Britain by Napoleon; but as a mere question ofdialectics he had scored a success. 

When the news of the "Chesapeake" outrage was received in Washington, Jefferson issued a proclamation, dated July 2, 1807, suited chieflyfor home consumption, as the phrase goes. He began with a recitationof the various wrongs and irritations, undeniable and extreme, whichhis long-suffering Administration had endured from British cruisers, and to which Monroe alluded in his note to Canning. Upon this followedan account of the "Chesapeake" incident, thus inextricably entangledwith other circumstances differing from it in essential feature. Then, taking occasion by a transaction which, however reprehensible, waswholly external to the territory of the United States, --unlessconstrued to extend to the Gulf Stream, according to one ofJefferson's day-dreams, --action was based upon the necessity ofproviding for the internal peace of the nation and the safety of itscitizens, and consequently of refusing admission to British ships ofwar, as inconsistent with these objects. Therefore, "all armedvessels, bearing commissions under the Government of Great Britain, now within the harbors of the United States, are required immediatelyand without any delay to depart from the same; and entrance of all thesaid harbors and waters is interdicted to the said armed vessels, andto all others bearing commissions under the authority of the BritishGovernment. " Vessels carrying despatches were excepted. 

This procedure had the appearance of energy which momentarilysatisfies a public demand that something shall be done. It alsoafforded Canning the peg on which to hang a grievance, and dexterouslyto prolong discussion until the matter became stale in publicinterest. By the irrelevancy of the punishment to the crime, and bythe intrusion of secondary matters into the complaint, the"Chesapeake" issue, essentially clear, sharp, and impressive, becamehopelessly confused with other considerations. Upon the proclamationfollowed a despatch from Madison to Monroe, July 6, which opened withthe just words, "This enormity is not a subject for discussion, " andthen proceeded to discuss at length. Demand was to be made, mostproperly, for a formal disavowal, and for the restoration of theseamen to the ship. This could have been formulated in six lines, andhad it stood alone could scarcely have been refused; but to it wasattached indissolubly an extraneous requirement. "As a security forthe future, an entire abolition of impressment from vessels[192] underthe flag of the United States, if not already arranged, is also tomake an _indispensable part of the satisfaction_. "[193]

This made accommodation hopeless. Practically, it was an ultimatum;for recent notorious discussion had demonstrated that this the BritishGovernment would not yield, and as it differed essentially from thepoint at issue in the "Chesapeake" affair, there was no reason toexpect a change of attitude in consequence of that. Great as was thewrong to a merchant vessel, it has not the status of a ship of war, which carries even into foreign ports a territorial immunityresembling that of an ambassador, representing peculiarly thesovereignty of its nation. Further, the men taken from the"Chesapeake" were not seized as liable to impressment, but arrested asdeserters; the case was distinct. Finally, Great Britain's power tomaintain her position on impressment had certainly not waned under the"Chesapeake" humiliation, and was not likely to succumb to peremptorylanguage from Madison. No such demand should have been advanced, insuch connection, by a self-respecting government, unless prepared tofight instantly upon refusal. The despatch indeed contains cautionsand expressions indicating a sense of treading on dangerous ground; anapprehension of exciting hostile action, though no thought of takingit. The exclusion of armed vessels was justified "by the vexations anddangers to our peace, experienced from these visits. " The reason, ifcorrect, was adequate as a matter of policy under normal conditions;but it became inconsistent with self-respect when the national flagwas insulted in the attack on the "Chesapeake. " Entire composure, andforbearance from demonstrations bearing a trace of temper, alonecomport with such a situation. To distinguish against British ships ofwar at such a moment, by refusing them only, and for the first time, admission into American harbors, was either a humiliating confessionof impotence to maintain order within the national borders, or itjustified Canning's contention that it was in retaliation for the"Leopard's" action. His further plea, that it must therefore be takeninto the account in determining the reparation due, was pettifogging, reducing a question of insult and amends to one of debit and creditbookkeeping; but the American claim that the step was necessary tointernal quiet was puerile, and its precipitancy carried theappearance of petulance. 

Monroe received Madison's despatch August 30, and on September 3 hadan interview with Canning. In it he specified the redress indicated byMadison. With this was coupled an intimation that a special mission tothe United States ought to be constituted, to impart to the act ofreparation "a solemnity which the extraordinary nature of theaggression particularly required. " This assertion of the extraordinarynature of the occasion separated the incident from the impressmentgrievance, with which Madison sought to join it; but what is moreinstructively noticeable is the contrast between this extremeformality, represented as requisite, and the wholly informal, and asit proved unreal, withdrawal by Napoleon of his Decrees, which theAdministration of Madison at a later day maintained to be sufficientfor the satisfaction of Great Britain. 

In this interview[194] Canning made full use of the advantages givenhim by his adversaries' method of presentation and action. "He saidthat by the President's proclamation, and the seizure and detention ofsome men who had landed on the coast to procure water, the Governmentseemed to have taken redress into its own hands. " To Monroe'sstatement that "the suppression of the practice of impressment frommerchant vessels had been made indispensable by the late aggression, for reasons which were sufficiently known to him, " he retorted, "thatthe late aggression was an act different in all respects to theformer practice; and ought not to be connected with it, as it showed adisposition to make a particular incident, in which Great Britain wasin the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in a case in which hisGovernment held a different doctrine. " The remark went to the root ofthe matter. This was what the Administration was trying to do. AsMadison afterwards put it to Rose, the President was desirous "ofconverting a particular incident into an occasion for removing anotherand more extensive source of danger to the harmony of the twocountries. " This plausible rendering was not likely to recommend to aresolute nation such a method of obtaining surrender of a claimedright. The exclusion proclamation Monroe represented to be "a meremeasure of police indispensable for the preservation of order withinthe United States. " Canning declined to be shaken from his stand thatit was an exhibition of partiality against Great Britain, the vesselsof which alone were excluded, because of an outrage committed by oneof them outside of American waters. The time at which the proclamationissued, and the incorporation in it of the "Chesapeake" incident, madethis view at least colorable. 

This interview also was followed by an exchange of notes. Monroe's ofSeptember 7, 1807, developed the American case and demand as alreadygiven. That of Canning, September 23, stated as follows the dilemmaraised by the President's proclamation: Either it was an act ofpartiality between England and France, the warships of the latterbeing still admitted, or it was an act of retaliation for the"Chesapeake" outrage, and so of the nature of redress, self-obtained, it is true, but to be taken into account in estimating the reparationwhich the British Government "acknowledged to have been originallydue. "[195] To the request for explanation Monroe replied lamely, witha statement which can scarcely be taken as other than admitting thepunitive character of the proclamation. "There certainly existed nodesire of giving a preference;" but, --"_Before, this aggression_ it iswell known that His Britannic Majesty's ships of war lay within thewaters of the Chesapeake, and enjoyed all the advantages of the mostfavored nation; it cannot therefore be doubted that my Government willbe ready _to restore them to the same situation as soon as it can bedone consistently with the honor and rights of the UnitedStates_. "[196]

In closing his letter of September 23, Canning asked Monroe whether hecould not, consistently with his instructions, separate the questionof impressment from that of the "Chesapeake. " If not, as it was thefixed intention of his Government not to treat the two as connected, the negotiation would be transferred to Washington, and a specialenvoy sent. "But in order to avoid the inconvenience which has arisenfrom the mixed nature of your instructions, he will not be empoweredto entertain, as connected with this subject, any propositionrespecting the search of merchant vessels. "[197] Monroe replied thathis "instructions were explicit to consider the whole of this class ofinjuries as an entire subject. "[198] To his inquiry as to the natureof the special mission, in particulars, Canning replied that it wouldbe limited in the first instance to the question of the "Chesapeake. "Whether it would have any further scope, he could not say. [199]

Mr. George Henry Rose was nominated for this mission, and sailed fromEngland in November. Before his departure, the British Government tooka further step, which in view of the existing circumstances, and ofall that had preceded, emphasized beyond the possibility ofwithdrawal the firmness of its decision not to surrender the claim toimpress British subjects from foreign merchant vessels. On October 16, 1807, a Royal Proclamation was issued, recalling all seafaring personswho had entered foreign services, whether naval or merchant, directingthem to withdraw at once from such service and return home, or else toship on board any accessible British ship of war. Commanders of navalvessels were ordered to seize all such persons whenever found by themon board foreign merchantmen. In the case of British-born subjects, known to be serving on board foreign men-of-war, --which was the caseof the "Chesapeake, "--the repetition of the outrage was implicitlyforbidden, by prescribing the procedure to be observed. Requisitionfor the discharge of such persons was to be made on the foreigncaptain, and, in case of refusal, the particulars of the case were tobe transmitted to the British minister to the nation concerned, or tothe British home authorities; "in order that the necessary steps maybe taken for obtaining redress . .. For the injury done to us by theunwarranted detention of our natural-born subjects in the service of aforeign state. " The proclamation closed by denying the efficacy ofletters of naturalization to discharge native British from theirallegiance of birth. 

Rose's mission proved abortive. Like Monroe's, his instructions werepositive to connect with his negotiation a matter which, if not soirrelevant as impressment, was at least of a character that a politicforeign minister might well have disregarded, in favor of theadvantage to be gained by that most conciliatory of actions, a fulland cordial apology. Rose was directed not to open his business untilthe President had withdrawn the proclamation excluding British shipsof war. Having here no more option than Monroe as to impressment, thenegotiation became iron-bound. The United States Government went tothe utmost limit of concession to conclude the matter. Receding fromits first attitude, it agreed to sever the question of impressmentfrom that of the "Chesapeake;" but, with regard to the recalling ofthe President's proclamation, it demanded that Rose should show hiscards, should state what was the nature and extent of the reparationhe was empowered to offer, and whether it was conditioned orunconditioned. If this first outcome were such as to meet the justexpectations of the Administration, revocation of the proclamationshould bear the same date as the British act of reparation. Certainly, more could not be offered. The Government could not play a blind game, yielding point after point in reliance upon the unknown contents ofRose's budget. This, however, was what it was required to do, according to the British envoy's reading of his orders, and the matterterminated in a fruitless exchange of argumentation. [200] In April, 1808, Rose quitted the country, and redress for the "Chesapeake"injury remained in abeyance for three years longer. Interest in it hadwaned under more engrossing events which had already taken place, andit was relegated by both Governments to the background of diplomacy. Admiral Berkeley had been recalled, as a mark of his Majesty'sdisapproval. He arrived in England in the beginning of 1808, some sixmonths after the outrage, accompanied by the "Leopard. " Her captainwas not again given a ship; but before the end of the year the chiefoffender, the admiral, had been assigned to the important command atLisbon. To Pinkney's observation upon this dissatisfying proceeding, Canning replied that it was impossible for the Admiralty to resist hisclaim to be employed (no other objection existing against him) aftersuch a lapse of time since his return from Halifax, without bringinghim to a court-martial. [201] In the final settlement, furtherpunishment of Berkeley was persistently refused. 

Although standing completely apart from the continuous stream ofconnected events which constituted contemporaneous history, --perhapsbecause of that very separateness, --the "Chesapeake" affair marksconspicuously the turning-point in the relations of the two countries. In point of time, its aptness as a sign-post is notable; for itoccurred just at the moment when the British ministry, under thegeneral exigencies of the situation, and the particular menace of theTilsit compacts between Napoleon and the Czar, were meditating the newand extraordinary maritime system by which alone they might hope tocounteract the Continental system that now threatened to become trulycoextensive with Europe. But to the writer the significance of the"Chesapeake" business is more negative than positive; it suggestsrather what might have been under different treatment by the Portlandministry. The danger to Great Britain was imminent and stupendous, andher measures of counteraction needed to correspond. These wereconfessedly illegal in the form they took, and were justified by theirauthors only on the ground of retaliation. Towards neutrals, amongwhom the United States were by far the chief, they were mostoppressive. Yet for over four years not only did the AmericanGovernment endure them, but its mercantile community conformed to thepolicy of Great Britain, found profit in so doing, and deprecatedresort to war. At a later day Jefferson asserted bitterly that underBritish influence one fourth of the nation had compelled the otherthree fourths to abandon the embargo. Whether this be quite a fairstatement may be doubted; but there was in it so much of truth as tosuggest the possibility, if not of acquiescence in the Orders inCouncil, at least of such abstention from active resentment as wouldhave been practically equivalent. 

The acquiescence, if possible even the co-operation, of America was atthis time momentous to Great Britain as well as to Napoleon. Tocomplete his scheme for ruining his enemy, by closing against hercommerce all the ports of Europe, the Emperor needed to deprive heralso of access to the markets of the United States; while the graveloss to which Great Britain was exposed in the one quarter made itespecially necessary to retain the large and increasing body ofconsumers across the Atlantic. In the United States there was adivision of public opinion and feeling, which offered a fair chance ofinclining national action in one direction or the other. Although theTreaty of Commerce and Navigation of December 31, 1806, had beenrejected by the Administration, and disapproved by the stricterfollowers of Jefferson and Madison, it was regarded with favor in manyquarters. Its negotiators had represented the two leading partieswhich divided the nation. Monroe was a republican, traditionallyallied to Jefferson; Pinkney was a federalist. Although in it theprinciples of the United States had not been successfully asserted, asregarded either impressment or the transport of colonial produce, theterms of compromise had commanded their signatures, because they heldthat in effect the national objects were obtained; that impressmentwould practically cease, and the carrying trade, under therestrictions they had accepted, would not only nourish, but be asremunerative as before. Monroe, who had a large personal following inhis state and party, maintained this view in strong and measuredlanguage after his return home; and it found supporters in bothpolitical camps, as well as upon the floor of the two houses ofCongress. Then, and afterwards, it was made a reproach to theAdministration that it had refused a working arrangement which wassatisfactory in its substantial results and left the principles of thecountry untouched for future assertion. Whatever may be thought, froman American standpoint, of the justice or dignity of this position, itshowed grave divergences of sentiment, from which it is the skill ofan opposing diplomatist to draw profit. It is impossible to estimatethe effect upon the subsequent course of America, if the Britishministry, with a certain big-heartedness, had seized the opportunityof the "Chesapeake" affair; if they had disclaimed the act of theirofficers with frankness and cordiality, offering ungrudging regret, and reparation proportionate to the shame inflicted upon a communitytoo weak in military power to avenge its wrongs. As it was, at amoment when the hostilities she had provoked would have been mostembarrassing, Great Britain escaped only by the unreadiness of theAmerican Government. 

Left unatoned, the attack on the "Chesapeake" remained in Americanconsciousness where Jefferson and Madison had sought to place it, --anexample of the outrages of impressment. The incidental violence, whicharoused attention and wrath, differed in nothing but circumstance fromthe procedure when an unresisting merchant vessel was deprived of men. In both cases there was the forcible exaction of a disputed claim. Canning, indeed, was at pains to explain that originally the Britishright extended to vessels of every kind; but "for nearly a century theCrown had forborne to instruct the commanders of its ships of war tosearch foreign ships of war for deserters, . .. Because to attack anational ship of war is an act of hostility. The very essence of thecharge against Admiral Berkeley, as you represent it, is the havingtaken upon himself to commit an act of hostility without the previousauthority of his Government. " Under this construction, the incidentonly served to emphasize the fundamental opposition of principle, andto exasperate the war party in the United States. To deprive a foreignmerchant vessel of men was not considered a hostile act; and thedifference in the case of ships of war was only because the Crownchose so to construe. The argument was, that to retain seamen ofBritish birth, when recalled by proclamation, was itself hostile, because every such seaman disobeying this call was a deserter. It wasto be presumed that a foreign Power would not countenance theirdetention, and on this presumption no search of its commissioned shipswas ordered. "But with respect to merchant vessels there is no suchpresumption. "[202]

While the "Chesapeake" affair was still in its earlier stages ofdiscussion, the passage of events in Europe was leading rapidly to theformulation of the extreme British measures of retaliation for theBerlin Decree. On June 14 Napoleon defeated the Russians at the battleof Friedland; and on June 22, the day the "Leopard" attacked the"Chesapeake, " an armistice was signed between the contending parties. Upon this followed the Conventions of Tilsit, July 8, 1807, by whichthe Czar undertook to support the Continental system, and to close hisports to Great Britain. The deadly purpose of the commercial warfarethus reinforced was apparent; and upon the Emperor's return to Paris, soon afterwards, the Berlin Decree received an execution moreconsonant to its wording than was the construction hitherto given itby French officials. In May, an American ship, the "Horizon, " boundfrom England to Peru, had been wrecked upon the coast of France. Hercargo consisted in part of goods of British origin. Up to that time, no decisions contrary to American neutral rights had been based uponthe Decree by French courts; but final action in the case of the"Horizon" was not taken till some time after the Emperor's return. Meanwhile, on August 9, General Armstrong, the American minister, hadasked that Spain, which had formally adopted the Berlin Decree asgoverning its own course, should be informed of the rulings of theFrench authorities; "for a letter from the _chargé des affaires_ ofthe United States at Madrid shows that the fate of sundry Americanvessels, captured by Spanish cruisers, will depend, not on theconstruction which might be given to the Spanish decree by Spanishtribunals, but on the practice which shall have been established inFrance. "[203] This letter was referred in due course--August 21--tothe Minister of Marine, and a reply promised when his answer should bereceived. Under Napoleon's eye, doubts not entertained in his absenceseem to have occurred to the ministers concerned, and on September 24Armstrong learned that the Emperor had been consulted, and had saidthat, as he had expressed no exceptions to the operation of hisDecree, French armed vessels were authorized to seize goods of Englishorigin on board neutral vessels. This decision, having the force oflaw, was communicated to the tribunals, and under it so much of the"Horizon's" cargo as answered to this description was condemned. Therest was liberated. [204]

When this decision became known, it was evident that within the rangeof Napoleon's power there would henceforth be no refuge for Britishmanufactures, or the produce of British colonies; that neutralownership or jurisdiction would be no protection against force. Eventhe pity commonly extended to the shipwrecked failed, if his propertyhad been bought in England. Recognition of the increased danger wasshown in the doubling and trebling of insurance. The geographicalsweep intended to be given to the edict was manifested by the actionof state after state whither arms had extended Napoleon's influence;or, as Armstrong phrased it, "having settled the business ofbelligerents, with the exception of England, very much to his ownliking, he was now on the point of settling that of neutrals in thesame way. " In July, Denmark and Portugal, as yet at peace, had beennotified that they must choose between France and England, and hadbeen compelled to exclude English commerce. August 29, a Frenchdivision entered Leghorn, belonging to the nominally independentKingdom of Etruria, took possession of the harbor and forts, orderedthe surrender of all British goods in the hands of the inhabitants, and laid a general embargo upon the shipping, among which were manyAmericans. In Lower Italy, the Papal States and Naples underwent thesame restrictions. Prussia yielded under obvious constraint, andAustria acceded from motives of policy, distinguishable in form onlyfrom direct compulsion. Russia, as already said, had joinedimmediately after decisive defeat in the field. The co-operation ofthe United States, the second maritime nation in the world, was vitalto the general plan. Could it be secured? Already, at an audiencegiven to the diplomatic corps on August 2, the Danish minister hadtaken Armstrong aside and asked him whether any application had beenmade to him with regard to the projected _union of all commercialstates against Great Britain_. Being answered in the negative, hesaid, "You are much favored, but it will not last. "[205] Armstrongcharacterized this incident as not important; but in truth the wordsitalicized defined exactly the menacing scheme already matured in theEmperor's mind, for the execution of which, as events already showed, and continued to prove, he relied upon the force of arms. To this theUnited States was not accessible; but to coerce or cajole her by othermeans became a prominent feature of French policy, which waspowerfully abetted by the tone of Great Britain speaking throughCanning. 

To appreciate duly the impending measures of the British ministry, attention should fasten upon the single decisive fact that this vastcombination was not the free act of the parties concerned, but asubmission imposed by an external military power, which at the moment, and for five succeeding years, they were unable to resist. It is onething to deny the right of any number of independent communities tojoin in a Customs Union; it is another to maintain the obligationsupon third parties of such a convention, when extorted by externalcompulsion. Either action may be resisted, but means not permissiblein the one case may be justified in the other. In the Europeansituation the subjected states, by reason of their subjection, disappeared as factors in diplomatic consideration. There remainedonly their master Napoleon, with his momentary lieutenant the Czar, and opposed to them Great Britain. "It is obvious, " said the FrenchMinister of Foreign Affairs, Champagny, to Armstrong, "that hisMajesty _cannot permit_ to his allies a commerce which he denies tohimself. This would be at once to defeat his system and oppress hissubjects. "[206] A few days later he wrote formally, "His Majestyconsidered himself bound to _order_ reprisals on American vessels_not only in his territory, but likewise in the countries which areunder his influence_, --Holland, Spain, Italy, Naples. "[207] TheEmperor by strength of arms oppressed to their grievous injury thosewho could not escape him; what should be the course of those whom hecould not reach, to whom was left the choice between actual resistanceand virtual co-operation? The two really independent states were GreatBritain and the United States. In the universal convulsion ofcivilization, the case of the several nations recalls the law ofSolon, that in civil tumults the man who took neither side should bedisfranchised. 

The United States chose neutrality, and expected that it would bepermitted her. She chose to overlook the interposition of Napoleon, and to regard the exclusion laws, forced by him upon other states, asinstances of municipal regulation, incontestable when freelyexercised. Not only would she not go behind the superficial form, buton technical grounds of international law she denied the right ofanother to do so. Great Britain had no choice. She was compelled toresistance; the question was as to methods. Direct military action wasimpossible. The weapon used against her was commercial prohibition, which meant eventual ruin, unless adequately parried by her ownaction. From Europe no help was to be expected. If the United Statesalso decided so far to support Napoleon as to prosecute her tradesubject to his measures, accepting as legal regulations extorted byhim from other European countries, the trade of Europe would betransferred from Great Britain to America, and the revenues of Francewould expand in every way, while those of Great Britain shrank, --aresult militarily fatal. In this the British Government would notacquiesce. It chose instead war with the United States, under theforms of peace. 

That the tendency of the course pursued by the United States was todestroy British commerce, and that this tendency was successfullycounteracted by the means framed by the British Government, --theOrders in Council, --admits of little doubt. When the American policyhad worked out to its logical conclusion, in open trade with France, and complete interdict of importation from Great Britain, Joel Barlow, American Minister to France in 1811-12, and an intimate of Jeffersonand Madison, wrote thus to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Inadopting the late arrangements with France the United States could notcontemplate the deprivation of revenue. They really expected to drawfrom this country and from the rest of continental Europe the samespecies of manufactures, and to as great an amount as they wereaccustomed to do from England. They calculated with the moreconfidence on such a result as they saw how intimately it was combinedwith the great and essential interests of the Imperial Government. They perceived that _it would promote in an unexpected degree theContinental system_, which the Emperor has so much at heart. .. . TheEmperor now commands nearly all the ports of continental Europe. Thewhole interior of the Continent must be supplied with Americanproducts. These must pass through French territory, French commercialhouses, canals, and wagons. They must pay" toll to France in variousways, "and thus render these territories as tributary to France as ifthey were part of her own dominions. "[208] But Napoleon replied thathis system, as it stood, had greatly crippled British commerce, andthat if he should admit American shipping freely to the Continent, trade could not be carried on, because the English under the Orders inCouncil would take it all, going or coming. [209]

"The peril of the moment is truly supposed to be great beyond allformer example, " wrote Pinkney, now American minister in London, whencommunicating to his Government the further Orders in Council adoptedby Great Britain, in response to the attempted "union of all thecommercial states" against her. As defined by Canning to Pinkney, [210]"the principle upon which the whole of this measure has been framed isthat of refusing to the enemy those advantages of commerce which hehas forbidden to this country. The simplest method of enforcing thissystem of retaliation would have been to follow the example of theenemy, by prohibiting altogether all commercial intercourse betweenhim and other states. " America then would not be allowed to trade withthe countries under his Decrees. It was considered, however, moreindulgent to neutrals--to the second parties in commercial intercoursewith the enemy--to allow this intercourse subject to duties in transitto be paid in Great Britain. This would raise the cost to thecontinental consumer and pay revenue to Great Britain. 

The Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, therefore forbade allentrance to ports of the countries which had embraced the Continentalsystem. It was not pretended that they would be blockaded effectively. "All ports from which the British flag is excluded shall fromhenceforth be subject to the same restrictions, in point of trade andnavigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, _as if the samewere actually blockaded_ in the most strict and rigorous manner by hisMajesty's naval forces. " The exception was merely that a vesselcalling first at a British port would be allowed to proceed to one ofthose prohibited, after paying certain duties upon her cargo andobtaining a fresh clearance. This measure was instituted by theExecutive, in pursuance of the custom of regulating trade withAmerica by Orders in Council, prevalent since 1783; but it receivedlegislative sanction by an Act of Parliament, March 28, 1808, whichfixed the duties to be paid on the foreign goods thus passing throughBritish custom-houses. Cotton, for instance, was to pay nine pence apound, an amount intended to be prohibitory; tobacco, three halfpence. These were the two leading exports of United States domestic produce. In the United States this Act of Parliament was resented moreviolently, if possible, than the Order in Council itself. In thecolonial period there had been less jealousy of the royal authoritythan of that of Parliament, and the feeling reappears in thediscussion of the present measures. "This, " said a Virginiasenator, [211] "is the Act regulating our commerce, of which Icomplain. An export duty, which could not be laid in Charlestonbecause forbidden by our Constitution, is laid in London, or inBritish ports. " It was literally, and in no metaphorical sense, thereimposition of colonial regulation, to increase the revenues of GreatBritain by reconstituting her the _entrepôt_ of commerce betweenAmerica and Europe. "The Orders in Council, " wrote John Quincy Adamsin a public letter, "if submitted to, would have degraded us to thecondition of colonists. "[212]

This just appreciation preponderated over other feelings throughoutthe middle and southern states. Adams, a senator from Massachusetts, had separated himself in action and opinion from the mass of thepeople in New England, where, although the Orders were condemned, hatred of Napoleon and his methods overbore the sense of injuryreceived from Great Britain. The indignation of the supporters of theAdministration was intensified by the apparent purpose of the BritishGovernment to keep back information of the measure. Rose had sailedthe day after its adoption, Monroe two days later, but neitherbrought any official intimation of its issuance, although that wasannounced in the papers of the day. "The Orders in Council, " wroteAdams, "were not merely without official authenticity. Rumors had beenfor several weeks in circulation, derived from English prints and fromprivate correspondence, that such Orders were to issue, [213] and noinconsiderable pains were taken to discredit the facts. Suspicionswere lulled by declarations equivalent as nearly as possible topositive denial, and these opiates were continued for weeks after theembargo was laid, until Mr. Erskine received orders to make officialcommunication of the Orders themselves, in proper form, to ourGovernment. "[214] This remissness, culpable as it certainly was in amatter of such importance, was freely attributed to the most sinistermotives. "These Orders in Council were designedly concealed from Mr. Rose, although they had long been deliberated upon, and almostmatured, before he left London. They were the besom which was intendedto sweep, and would have swept, our commerce from the ocean. GreatBritain in the most insidious manner had issued orders for the entiredestruction of our commerce. "[215]

The wrath was becoming, but in this particular the inference wasexaggerated. The Orders, modelled on the general plan of blockades, provided for the warning of a vessel which had sailed before receivingnotification; and not till after a first notice by a British cruiserwas she liable to capture. Mention of such cases occurs in thejournals of the day. [216] Some captains persisted, and, if successfulin reaching a port under Napoleon's control, found themselves arrestedunder a new Decree, --that of Milan, --for having submitted to a visitthey could not resist. Such were sequestered, subject to the decisionof the United States to take active measures against Great Britain. "Arrived at New York, March 23, [1808], ship 'Eliza, ' Captain Skiddy, 29 days from Bordeaux. All American vessels in France which had beenboarded by British cruisers were under seizure. The opinion was, theywould so remain till it was known whether the United States hadadjusted its difficulties with Great Britain, in which case they wouldbe immediately condemned. A letter from the Minister of Marine waspublished that the Decree of Milan must be executed severely, strictly, and literally. "[217] Independent of a perpetual need toraise money, by methods more consonant to the Middle Ages than to thecurrent period, Napoleon thus secured hostages for the action of theUnited States in its present dilemma. 

The Orders in Council of November 11, having been announced in Englishpapers of the 10th, 11th, and 12th, appeared in the Washington"National Intelligencer" of December 18. [218] The general facts weretherefore known to the Executive and to the Legislature; and, thoughnot officially adduced, could not but affect consideration, when thePresident, on December 18, 1807, sent a message to Congressrecommending "an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from theports of the United States. " With his customary exaggerated expressionof attendance upon instructions from Congress, he made no furtherdefinition of wishes which were completely understood by the partyleaders. "The wisdom of Congress will also see the necessity of makingevery preparation for whatever events may grow out of the presentcrisis. " Accompanying the message, as documents justificatory of theaction to be taken, were four official papers. One was the formalcommunication to the French Council of Prizes of Napoleon's decisionthat goods of English origin were lawful prize on board neutralvessels; the second was the British proclamation directing theimpressment of British seamen found on board neutral ships. These twowere made public. Secrecy was imposed concerning the others, whichwere a letter of September 24, from Armstrong to the French Ministerof Exterior Relations, and the reply, dated October 7. In this theminister, M. Champagny, affirmed the Emperor's decision, and added asentence which, while susceptible of double meaning, certainlycovertly suggested that the United States should join in supportingthe Berlin Decree. "The decree of blockade has now been issued elevenmonths. The principal Powers of Europe, far from protesting againstits provisions, have adopted them. They have perceived that itsexecution must be complete to render it more effectual, and it hasseemed easy to reconcile these measures with the observance oftreaties, especially at a time when the infractions by England of therights of _all maritime_ Powers render their interests common, andtend to _unite them in support of the same cause_. "[219] Thisdoubtless might be construed as applicable only to the EuropeanPowers; but as a foremost contention of Madison and Armstrong had beenthat the Berlin Decree contravened the treaty between France and theUnited States, the sentence lent itself readily to the interpretation, placed upon it by the Federalists, that the United States was invitedto enforce in her own waters the continental system of exclusion, andso to help bring England to reason. 

This the United States immediately proceeded to do. Though the motivediffered somewhat, the action was precisely that suggested. On thesame day that Jefferson's message was received, the Senate passed anEmbargo Bill. This was sent at once to the House, returned withamendments, amendments concurred in, and bill passed and approvedDecember 22. This rapidity of action--Sunday intervened--shows apurpose already decided in general principle; while the enactment ofthree supplementary measures, before the adjournment of Congress inApril, indicates a precipitancy incompatible with proper weighing ofdetails, and an avoidance of discussion, commendable only on theground that no otherwise than by the promptest interception couldAmerican ships or merchandise be successfully jailed in port. The billprovided for the instant stoppage of all vessels in the ports of theUnited States, whether cleared or not cleared, if bound to any foreignport. Exception was made only in favor of foreign ships, which ofcourse could not be held. They might depart with cargo already onboard, or in ballast. Vessels cleared coastwise were to be deterredfrom turning foreign by bonds exacted in double the value of ship andcargo. American export and foreign navigation were thus completelystopped; and as the Non-Importation Act at last went into operation onDecember 14, [220] there was practical exclusion of all Britishvessels, for none could be expected to enter a port where she couldneither land her cargo nor depart. 

In communicating the embargo to Pinkney, for the information of theBritish Government, [221] Madison was careful to explain, as he had tothe British minister at Washington, that it was a measure ofprecaution only; not to be considered as hostile in character. Thiswas scarcely candid; coercion of Great Britain, to compel thewithdrawal of her various maritime measures objectionable to theUnited States, was at least a silent partner in the scheme, asformulated to the consciousness of Jefferson and his followers. [222]The motive transpired, as such motives necessarily do; but, even hadit not, the operation of the Act, under the conditions of the Europeanwar, was so plainly partial between the two belligerents, as toamount virtually to co-operation with Napoleon by the preponderance ofinjury done to Great Britain. It deprived her of cotton for rawmaterial; of tobacco, which, imported in payment for Britishmanufactures, formed a large element in her commerce with theContinent; of wheat and flour, which to some extent contributed to thesupport of her people, though in a much less degree than manysupposed. It closed to her the American market at the moment thatNapoleon and Alexander were actively closing the European; and it shutoff from the West Indies American supplies known to be of the greatestimportance, and fondly, but mistakenly, believed to be indispensable. 

All this was well enough, if national policy required. Great Britainthen was scarcely in a position to object seriously to retaliation bya nation thinking itself injured; but to define such a measure as nothostile was an insult to her common-sense. It was certainly hostile innature, it was believed to be hostile in motive, and it intensifiedfeelings already none too friendly. In France, although included inthe embargo, and although her action was one of the reasons allegedfor its institution, Napoleon expressed approval. It was injurious toEngland, and added little to the pressure upon France exerted by theOrders in Council through the British control of the ocean. SenatorSmith of Maryland, a large shipping merchant, bore testimony to this. "It has been truly said by an eminent merchant of Salem, that not morethan one vessel in eight that sailed for Europe within a short timebefore the embargo reached its destination. My own experience hastaught me the truth of this; and as further proof I have in my hand alist of fifteen vessels which sailed for Europe between September 1and December 23, 1807. Three arrived; two were captured by French andSpaniards; one was seized in Hamburg; and nine carried into England. But for the embargo, ships that would have sailed would have fared asill, or worse. Not one in twenty would have arrived. " Granting thetruth of this anticipation, Great Britain might have claimed that, sofar as evident danger was concerned, her blockades over longcoast-lines were effective. 

The question speedily arose, --If the object of embargo be precautiononly, to save our vessels from condemnation under the sweeping edictsof France and Great Britain, and seamen from impressment on Americandecks, why object to exporting native produce in foreign bottoms, andto commerce across the Canada frontier? If, by keeping our vessels athome, we are to lose the profits upon sixty million dollars' worth ofcolonial produce which they have heretofore been carrying, withadvantage to the national revenue, why also forbid the export of theforty to fifty million dollars' worth of domestic produce whichforeign ship-owners would gladly take and safely carry? for suchforeigners would be chiefly British, and would sail under Britishconvoy, subject to small proportionate risk. [223] Why, also, to saveseamen from impressment, deprive them of their living, and force themin search of occupation to fly our ports to British, where lower wagesand more exposure to the pressgang await them? On the ground ofprecaution, there was no reply to these questions; unless, perhaps, that with open export of domestic produce the popular suffering wouldbe too unequally distributed, falling almost wholly on New Englandshipping industries. Logically, however, if the precaution werenecessary, the suffering must be accepted; its incidence was a detailonly. The embargo was distinctly a hostile measure; and more and more, as people talked, in and out of Congress, was admitted to be simplyan alternative for open war. 

As such it failed. It entailed most of the miseries of war, withoutany of its compensations. It could not arouse the popular enthusiasmwhich elevates, nor command the popular support that strengthens. Hated and despised, it bred elusion, sneaking and demoralizing, and sodebased public sentiment with reference to national objects, andindividual self-sacrifice to national ends, that the conduct of themany who now evaded it was reproduced, during the War of 1812, indealings with the enemy which even now may make an American's headhang for shame. Born of the Jeffersonian horror of war, its evilcommunication corrupted morals among those whose standards wereconventional only; for public opinion failed to condemn breaches ofembargo, and by a natural declension equally failed soon after tocondemn aid to the enemy in an unpopular war. Was it wonderful that anAdministration which bade the seamen and the ship-owners of the day tostarve, that a foreign state might be injured, and at the same timerefused to build national ships to protect them, fell into contempt?that men, so far as they might, simply refused to obey, and whollydeparted from respect? "I have believed, and still do believe, " wroteMr. Adams, "that our internal resources are competent to establish andmaintain a naval force, if not fully adequate to the protection anddefence of our commerce, at least sufficient to induce a retreat fromthese hostilities, and to deter from the renewal of them by either ofthe harrying parties;" in short, to compel peace, the first object ofmilitary preparation. "I believed that a system to that effect mightbe formed, ultimately far more economical, and certainly moreenergetic than a three years' embargo. I did submit such a propositionto the Senate, and similar attempts had been made in the House ofRepresentatives, but equally discountenanced. "[224] This wasprecisely the effect of Jefferson's teaching, which then dominated hisparty, and controlled both houses. At this critical moment he wrote, "Believing, myself, that gunboats are the only water defence which canbe useful to us, and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, I ampleased with everything which promises to improve them. "[225]

Not thus was a nation to be united, nor foreign governments impressed. The panacea recommended was to abandon the sea; to yield practicalsubmission to the Orders in Council, which forbade American ships tovisit the Continent, and to the Decrees of Napoleon, which forbadethem entrance to any dominion of Great Britain. By a curious mentalprocess this was actually believed to be resistance. The Americannation was to take as its model the farmer who lives on his ownproduce, sternly independent of his neighbor; whose sons delved, andwife span, all that the family needed. This programme, half sentiment, half philosophy, and not at all practical, or practicable, was thegroundwork of Jefferson's thought. To it co-operated a dislikeapproaching detestation for the carrying trade; the very opposite, certainly, of the other ideal. American shipping was then handlingsixty million dollars' worth of foreign produce, and rolling up thewealth which for some reason follows the trader more largely than theagriculturist, who observed with ill-concealed envy. "I trust, " wroteJefferson, "that the good sense of our country will see that itsgreatest prosperity depends on a due balance between agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and not on this protuberant navigation, which has kept us in hot water from the commencement of ourgovernment. This drawback system enriches a few individuals, butlessens the stock of native productions, by withdrawing all the hands[seamen] thus employed. It is essentially necessary for us to haveshipping and seamen enough to carry our surplus products to market, but beyond that I do not think we are bound to give it encouragementby drawbacks or other premiums. " This meant that it was unjust to therest of the community to allow the merchant to land his cargo, andsend it abroad, without paying as much duty as if actually consumed inthe country. "This exuberant commerce brings us into collision withother Powers in every sea, and will force us into every war withEuropean Powers. " "It is now engaging us in war. "[226]

Whether for merchant ships or navies the sea was odious to Jefferson'sconception of things. As a convenient medium for sending to marketsurplus cotton and tobacco, it might be tolerated; but for that ampleuse of it which had made the greatness of Holland and England, he hadonly aversion. This prepossession characterized the whole body of men, who willingly stripped the seaman and his employers of all theirliving, after refusing to provide them with an armed protection towhich the resources of the state were equal. Up to the outbreak of thewar not a ship was added to the navy. With this feeling, GreatBritain, whose very being was maritime, not unnaturally became theobject of a dislike so profound as unconsciously to affect action. Napoleon decreed, and embargoed, and sequestered, with little effectupon national sentiment outside of New England. "Certainly all thedifficulties and the troubles of the Government during our timeproceeded from England, " wrote Jefferson soon after quittingoffice, [227] to Dearborn, his Secretary of War. "At least all otherswere trifling in comparison. " Yet not to speak of the Berlin Decree, by which ships were captured for the mere offence of sailing forEngland, [228] Bonaparte, by the Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808, nearlya year before Jefferson left office, pronounced the confiscation ofall American vessels entering ports under his control, on the groundthat under the existing embargo they could not lawfully have lefttheir own country; a matter which was none of his business. Within ayear were condemned one hundred and thirty-four ships and cargoes, worth $10, 000, 000. [229]

That Jefferson consciously leaned to France from any regard toNapoleon is incredible; the character and procedures of the FrenchEmperor were repugnant to his deepest convictions; but that there wasa still stronger bias against the English form of government, and thepursuit of the sea for which England especially stood, is equallyclear. Opposition to England was to him a kind of mission. His bestwish for her had been that she might be republicanized by a successfulFrench invasion. [230] "I came into office, " he wrote to a politicaldisciple, "under circumstances calculated to generate peculiaracrimony. I found all the offices in the possession of a politicalsect, who wished to transform it ultimately into the shape of theirdarling model, the English government; and in the meantime tofamiliarize the public mind to the change, by administering it onEnglish principles, and in English forms. The elective interpositionof the people had blown all their designs, and they found themselvesand their fortresses of power and profit put in a moment in the handof other trustees. "[231]

These words, written in the third of the fifteen embargo months, reveal an acrimony not wholly one-sided. It was perceived by theparties hardest hit by this essentially Jeffersonian scheme; by thepeople of New England and of Great Britain. In the old country itintensified bitterness. In the following summer, at a dinner given torepresentatives of the Spanish revolt against Napoleon, the toast tothe President of the United States was received with hisses, [232] "andthe marks of disapprobation continued till a new subject drew off theattention of the company. " The embargo was not so much a definitecause of complaint, for at worst it was merely a retaliatory measurelike the Orders in Council. Enmity was recognized, alike in thecouncil boards and in the social gatherings of the two peoples; thespirit that leads to war was aroused. Nor could this hostiledemonstration proceed from sympathy with the Spanish insurgents; for, except so far as might be inferred from the previous general course ofthe American Administration, there was no reason to believe that theywould regard unfavorably the Spanish struggle for liberty. Yet theysoon did, and could not but do so. 

It is a coincidence too singular to go unnoticed, that the firststrong measure of the American Government against GreatBritain--Embargo--was followed by Napoleon's reverses in Spain, which, by opening much of that country and of her colonies to trade, at oncein large measure relieved Great Britain from the pressure of theContinental system and the embargo; while the second, the last resortof nations, War, was declared shortly before the great Russiancatastrophe, which, by rapidly contracting the sphere of the Emperor'scontrol, both widened the area of British commerce and deprived theUnited States of a diversion of British effort, upon which calculationhad rightly been based. It was impossible for the American Governmentnot to wish well to Napoleon, when for it so much depended upon hissuccess; and to wish him well was of course to wish ill to hisopponents, even if fighting for freedom. 

Congress adjourned April 25, having completed embargo legislation, asfar as could then be seen necessary. On May 2 occurred the rising inMadrid, consequent upon Napoleon's removal of the Spanish RoyalFamily; and on July 21 followed the surrender of Dupont's corps atBaylen. Already, on July 4, the British Government had stopped allhostilities against Spain, and withdrawn the blockade of all Spanishports, except such as might still be in French control. On August 30, by the Convention of Cintra, Portugal was evacuated by the French, andfrom that time forward the Peninsula kingdoms, though scourged by war, were in alliance with Great Britain; their ports and those of theircolonies open to her trade. 

This of itself was a severe blow to the embargo, which for coercivesuccess depended upon the co-operation of the Continental system. Itwas further thwarted and weakened by extensive popular repudiation inthe United States. The political conviction of the expediency, orprobable efficacy, of the measure was largely sectional; and it is noserious imputation upon the honesty of its supporters to say thatthey mustered most strongly where interests were least immediatelyaffected. Tobacco and cotton suffered less in keeping than flour andsalt fish; and the deterioration of these was by no means so instantas the stoppage of a ship's sailing or loading. The farmer ideal isrealizable on a farm; but it was not so for the men whose soleoccupation was transporting that which the agriculturist did not needto markets now closed by law. Wherever employment depended uponcommerce, distress was immediate. The seamen, improvident by habit, first felt the blow. "I cannot conceive, " said Representative[afterwards Justice] Story, "why gentlemen should wish to paralyze thestrength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, andparticularly now, when many of our native seamen (and I am sorry tosay from my own knowledge I speak it) are starving in our ports. "[233]The Commandant of the New York Navy Yard undertook to employ, forrations only, not wages, three hundred of those adrift in the streets;the corporation of the city undertaking to pay for the foodissued. [234] They moved off, as they could get opportunity, towardsthe British Provinces; and thus many got into the British service, byenlistment or impressment. "Had your frigate arrived here instead ofthe Chesapeake, " wrote the British Consul General at New York, asearly as February 15, 1808, "I have no doubt two or three hundred ableBritish seamen would have entered on board her for his Majesty'sservice; and even now, was your station removed to this city, I feelconfident, _provided the embargo continues_, you would more thancomplete your complement. "[235] Six months later, "Is it not notoriousthat not a seaport in the United States can produce seamen enough toman three merchant ships?"[236] In moving the estimates for onehundred and thirty thousand seamen a year later (February, 1809), theSecretary of the Admiralty observed that Parliament would learn withsatisfaction that the number of seamen now serving in the navycovered, if it did not exceed, the number here voted. [237] It had notbeen so once. Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain during tenyears of this period, wrote in 1805, "I dread the discharge of ourcrew; for I do not think the miserable wretches with which the shipslately fitted out were manned are equal to fight their ships in themanner they are expected to do. "[238] The high wages, which theprofits of the American merchant service enabled it to pay, outbadeall competition by the British navy. "Dollars for shillings, " as theexpression ran. The embargo stopped all this, and equivalentconditions did not return before the war. The American Minister toFrance in 1811 wrote: "We complain with justice of the Englishpractice of pressing our seamen into their service. But the fact is, and there is no harm in saying it, there are at present more Americanseamen who seek that service than are forced into it. "[239]

After the seamen followed the associated employments; those whosedaily labor was expended in occupations connected with transportation, or who produced objects which men could not eat, or with which theycould dispense. Before the end of the year testimony came from everyquarter of the increase of suffering among the deserving poor; and notthey only, but those somewhat above them as gainers of a comfortableliving. They were for the most part helpless, except as helped bytheir richer neighbors. Work for them there was not, and they couldnot rebel. Not so with the seafarers, or the dwellers upon thefrontiers. On the great scale, of course, a sure enforcement of theembargo was possible; the bulk of the shipping, especially the bigger, was corralled and idle. In the port of New York, February 17, 1808, lay 161 ships, 121 brigs, and 98 smaller sea-going vessels; in all 380unoccupied, of which only 11 were foreign. In the much smaller port ofSavannah, at this early period there were 50. In Philadelphia, a yearlater, 293, mostly of large tonnage for the period. "What is that hugeforest of dry trees that spreads itself before the town?" asked aBoston journal. "You behold the masts of ships thrown out ofemployment by the embargo. "[240] "Our dismantled, ark-roofed vesselsare indeed decaying in safety at our wharves, forming a suitablemonument to the memory of our departed commerce. But where are yourseamen? Gone, sir! Driven into foreign exile in search ofsubsistence. "[241] Yet not all; for illicit employment, for evadingthe Acts, enough remained to disconcert the Government, alike by theirnumbers and the boldness of their movements. 

"This Embargo law, " wrote Jefferson to Gallatin, August 11, 1808, "iscertainly the most embarrassing we ever had to execute. I did notexpect a crop of so sudden and rank growth of fraud, and openopposition by force, could have grown up within the UnitedStates. "[242] Apostle of pure democracy as he was, he had forgotten toreckon with the people, and had mistaken the convictions of himself anda coterie for national sentiment. From all parts of the country menbegan silently and covertly to undermine the working of the system. Passamaquoddy Bay on the borders of New Brunswick, and St. Mary's onthe confines of Florida, remote from ordinary commerce, becamesuddenly crowded with vessels. [243] Coasters, not from recalcitrant NewEngland only, but from the Chesapeake and Southern waters, found itimpossible to reach their ports of destination. Furious gales of winddrove them from their course; spars smitten with decay went overboard;butts of planking started, causing dangerous leaks. Safety could befound only by bearing up for some friendly foreign port, in Nova Scotiaor the West Indies, where cargoes of flour and fish had to be sold forneeded repairs, to enable the homeward voyage to be made. Notinfrequently the vessel's name had been washed off the stern by theviolence of the waves, and the captain could remember neither it norhis own. The New York and Vermont frontiers became the scene ofwidespread illegal trade, the shameful effects of which upon thepatriotism of the inhabitants were conspicuous in the following war. Agentleman returning from Canada in January, 1809, reported that he hadcounted seven hundred sleighs, going and returning between Montreal andVermont. [244] This on one line only. A letter received in New Yorkstated that, during the embargo year, 1808, thirty thousand barrels ofpotash had been brought into Quebec. [245] "While our gunboats andcutters are watching the harbors and sounds of the Atlantic, " said asenator from his place, "a strange inversion of business ensues, and bya retrograde motion of all the interior machinery of the country, potash and lumber are launched upon the lakes, and Ontario andChamplain feel the bustle of illicit traffic. .. . Violators of the lawsare making fortunes, while the conscientious observers of them aresuffering sad privations. "[246] Not the conscientious only, but theunlucky. Unlike New York, North Carolina had not a friendly foreignboundary nigh to her naval stores. 

Under these circumstances the blow glanced from the British dominions. At the first announcement of the embargo, prices of provisions andlumber rose heavily in the West Indies; but reaction set in, as theleaks in the dam became manifest and copious. The British Governmentfostered the rebellious evasions of American citizens by aproclamation, issued April 11, directing commanders of cruisers not tointerrupt any neutral vessel laden with provisions or lumber, going tothe West Indies; no matter to whom the property belonged, nor whetherthe vessel had any clearance, or papers of any kind. A principalmethod of eluding the embargo, Gallatin informed Jefferson, was byloading secretly and going off without clearing. "Evasions are chieflyeffected by vessels going coastwise. "[247] The two methods were notincompatible. Besides the sea-going vessels already mentioned as lyingin New York alone, there were there over four hundred coasters. It wasimpossible to watch so many. The ridiculous gunboats, identified withthis Administration, derisively nicknamed "Jeffs"[248] by theunbelieving, were called into service to arrest the evil; but neithertheir numbers nor their qualities fitted them to cope with theubiquity and speed of their nimble opponents. "The larger part of ourgunboats, " wrote Commodore Shaw[249] from New Orleans, "are well knownto be dull sailers. " "For enforcing the embargo, " said SecretaryGallatin, "gunboats are better calculated as a stationary force, andfor the purpose of stopping vessels in certain places, than forpursuit. "[250] A double bond was a mockery, when in West Indian portsthe cargo was worth from four to eight times what it was at the placeof loading. These were the palmier days of the embargo breakers; theease and frequency with which they escaped soon brought prices down. Randolph, in the House, asserted that in the first four months ofembargo one hundred thousand barrels of flour had been shipped fromBaltimore alone; and the West India planters, besides opening newsources of supply, devoted part of their ground to raising food. Theythus turned farmer, after the Jefferson ideal, supporting themselvesoff their own grounds; an economical error, for sugar was their bettercrop, but unavoidable in the circumstances. With all this, thedifficulty in the way of exportation so cheapened articles in theUnited States as to maintain a considerable disproportion in pricesthere and abroad, which kept alive the spirit of speculation, andmaintained the opportunity of large profits, [251] at the same timethat it distressed the American grower. 

Upon the whole, after making allowance for the boasts which succeededthe first fright in the West Indies, the indications seem to be thatthey escaped much better than had been expected, either by themselvesor by the American Government. Just before adjourning, Congress hadpassed a supplementary measure, which, besides drawing restrictionstighter, authorized the President to license vessels to go abroad inballast, in order to bring home property belonging to Americancitizens. These dispersed in various directions, and in very largenumbers. [252] Many doubtless remained away; but those which returnedbrought constant confirmation of the numerous American shipping inthe various ports of the West Indies, and the general abundance ofAmerican produce. A letter from Havana, September 12, said: "We havenearly one hundred American vessels in port. Three weeks ago therewere but four or five. If the property, for which these vessels wereostensibly despatched, had been really here, why have they been solong delayed? The truth is, the property is not here. A host of peoplehave been let loose, who could not possibly have had any other motivethan procuring freight and passengers from merchants of this country, or from the French, who are supposed to be going off with theirproperty [in consequence of the Spanish outbreak]. The vast number ofevasions and smugglers which the embargo has created is surprising. For some days after the last influx of American vessels, the quays andcustom-house were every morning covered with all kinds of provisions, which had been landed during the preceding night. "[253]

To Quebec and Halifax the embargo was a positive boon, from thediversion upon them of smuggling enterprise, by the lakes and by land, or by coasters too small to make the direct voyage to the West Indies. In consequence of the embargo, these towns became an _entrepôt_ ofcommerce, such as the Orders in Council were designed to make theBritish Islands. There was, of course, a return trade, through them, of British manufactures smuggled into the United States. These importsseem to have exceeded the exports by the same route. A New Bedfordtown meeting, in August, affirmed that gold was already at a premium, from the facility with which it was transported through the country, and across the frontier, in payment of purchases. [254] At the end ofthe summer one hundred and fifty vessels were despatched from Quebecwith full cargoes, and it may be believed they had not arrived empty. "From a Canada price current now before us, it will be seen that sincethe embargo was laid the single port of Quebec has done more foreignbusiness than the whole United States. In less than eleven monthsthere cleared thence three hundred and thirty-four vessels. "[255] AnAmerican merchant visiting Halifax wrote home: "Our embargo is anexcellent thing for this place. Every inhabitant of Nova Scotia isexceedingly desirous of its continuance, as it will be the making oftheir fortunes. "[256] Independent of the _entrepôt_ profit, theBritish provinces themselves produced several of the articles whichfigured largely among the exports of the middle and eastern states;not to the extent imagined by Sheffield, sufficient to supply the WestIndies, but, in the artificial scarcity caused by the embargo, theenhanced prices redounded directly to their advantage. Sir GeorgePrevost, governor of Nova Scotia, summed up the experience of the yearby saying that "the embargo has totally failed. New sources have beenresorted to with success to supply deficiencies produced by so suddenan interruption of commerce, and the vast increase of export andimport of this province proves that the embargo is a measure welladapted to promote the true interests of his Majesty's Americancolonies. "[257]

Upon the British Islands themselves the injury was more appreciableand conspicuous. It was, moreover, in the direction expected byJefferson and his supporters. The supply of cotton nearly ceased. Mr. Baring, March 6, 1809, said in the House of Commons that raw materialhad become so scarce and so high, that in many places it could not beprocured. "In Manchester during the greatest part of the past year, only nine cotton mills were in full employment; about thirty-one athalf work, and forty-four without any at all. "[258] Flaxseed, essential to the Irish linen manufactures, and of which three fourthscame from America, had risen from £2-½ to £23 the quarter. [259] Theexports for the year 1808 had fallen fifteen per cent; the imports thesame amount, involving a total diminution in trade of £14, 000, 000. Anincrease of distress was manifested in the poor rates. In Manchesterthey had risen from £24, 000 to £49, 000. On the other hand, the harvestfor the year, contrary to first anticipation, had been very good; and, in part compensation for intercourse with the United States, there wasthe opening of Spain, Portugal, and their extensive colonies, theeffect of which was scarcely yet fully felt. 

There was, besides, the relief of American competition in the carryingtrade. This was a singularly noteworthy effect of the embargo; forthis industry was particularly adverse to United States navigation, and particularly benefited by the locking up of American shipping. OnApril 28, 1808, there was not in Liverpool a vessel from Boston or NewYork. [260] The year before, four hundred and eighty-nine had entered, paying a tonnage duty of £36, 960. [261] In Bristol at the same timethere were only ten Americans. In consequence of the loss of so muchtonnage, "those who have anything to do with vessels for freight orcharter are absolutely insolent in their demands. For a ship of 330tons from this to St. Petersburg and back £3, 300 have been paid;£2, 000 for a ship of 199 tons to Lisbon and back. "[262] At the end ofAugust, in Liverpool, the value of British shipping had increasedrapidly, and vessels which had long been laid up found profitableemployment at enormous freights. [263]

Thus, while the effect of the embargo doubtless was to raise prices ofAmerican goods in England, it stopped American competition with theBritish carrying trade, especially in West India produce. Thisoccurred also at the time when the revolt of Spain opened to Britishnavigation the colonies from which Americans hitherto had been thechief carriers. The same event had further relieved British shippingby the almost total destruction of French privateering, thenceforthbanished from its former ports of support in the Caribbean. From allthese causes, the appreciation quoted from a London letter ofSeptember 5 seems probably accurate. "The continuance of the embargois not as yet felt in any degree adequate to make a deep impression onthe public mind. .. . Except with those directly interested [merchantsin the American trade], the dispute with the United States seemsalmost forgotten, or remembered only to draw forth ironical gratitude, that the kind embargo leaves the golden harvest to be reaped byBritish enterprise alone. "[264]

Upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrenceof the Spanish revolution, the United States by cutting its own throatunderwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. Besides thewidespread individual suffering, [265] already mentioned, the nationalrevenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports. Despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargopassed, and the permits issued to bring in American property abroad, the income from this source sank from over $16, 000, 000 to$8, 400, 000. [266] "However dissimilar in some respects, " wrote Gallatinin a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect uponnational wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materiallydifferent. In case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; butif embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises fromcommerce will entirely disappear. "[267] Jefferson nevertheless clungto the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction thatdefied demonstration. The fundamental error of conception, of course, was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. Thedifference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was thatembargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yetspared the opponent that which war might do to him. For the UnitedStates, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, andlittle more. To Great Britain it would have meant all that theAmerican embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, andactual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritimecommerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes, singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation. War and embargo, combined, with Napoleon in the plenitude of hispower, as he was in 1808, would sorely have tried the enemy; even whenit came, amid the Emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe. But Jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his disliketo the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reducedit, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as ameasure of coercion. To this contributed also his conviction of theexposure of Canada to offensive operations, which was just, thoughfatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, ormilitia summoned from their farms. Neither was there among hisadvisers any to correct his views; rather they had imbibed their ownfrom him, and their utterances in debate betray radicalmisapprehension of military considerations. 

Among the incidents attendant upon the embargo was the continuanceabroad of a number of American vessels, which were there at thepassage of the Act. They remained, willing exiles, to share theconstant employment and large freights which the sudden withdrawal oftheir compatriots had opened to British navigation. They weredoubtless joined by many of those which received permission to sail inquest of American property. One flagrant instance of such abuse ofprivilege turned up at Leghorn, with a load of tropical produce;[268]and the comments above quoted from an Havana letter doubtless dependedupon that current acquaintance with facts which men in the midst ofaffairs pick up. It was against this class of traders specificallythat Napoleon launched the Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808. Beingabroad contrary to the law of the United States, he argued, was aclear indication that they were not American, but British indisguise. This they were not; but they were carrying on trade underthe Orders in Council, and often under British convoy. [269] The factwas noteworthy, as bearing upon the contention of the United StatesGovernment soon after, that the Non-Intercourse Law was adequatesecurity for the action of American merchant vessels; a grotesqueabsurdity, in view of the embargo experiences. That it is notconsonant with national self-esteem to accept foreign assistance tocarry out national laws is undeniable; but it is a step further toexpect another nation to accept, as assured, the efficiency of anauthority notoriously and continually violated by its own subjects. 

Under the general conditions named, the year 1808 wore on to itsclose. Both the British Orders in Council and the Decrees of theFrench Emperor continued in force and received execution;[270] but sofar as the United States was concerned their effect was much limited, the embargo retaining at home the greater part of the nation'sshipping. The vessels which had remained abroad, and still more thosewhich escaped by violation of the law, or abuse of the permission tosail unloaded to bring back American property, for the most partpurchased immunity by acquiescence in the British Orders. Theyaccepted British licenses, and British convoy also, where expedient. It was stated in Congress that, of those which went to sea underpermission, comparatively few were interrupted by Britishcruisers. [271] Napoleon's condemnations went on apace, and in thematter of loss, --waiving questions of principle, --were at this momenta more serious grievance than the British Orders. Nor could it be saidthat the grounds upon which he based his action were less arbitrary orunjust. The Orders in Council condemned a vessel for sailing for anenemy's port, because constructively blockaded--a matter as to whichat least choice was free; the Milan Decree condemned because visitedby a British cruiser, to avoid which a merchant ship was powerless. The American brig "Vengeance" sailed from Norfolk before the embargowas laid, for Bilboa, then a port in alliance with France. On thepassage the British frigate "Iris" boarded her, and indorsed on herpapers that, in accordance with the orders of November 11, she mustnot proceed. That night the "Vengeance" gave the cruiser the slip, andpursued her course. She was captured off Bilboa by a French vessel, sent in as a prize, and condemned because of the frigate's visit. [272]This case is notable because of the pure application of a singleprinciple, not obscured by other incidental circumstances, as oftenhappens. The brig "George", equally bound to Bilboa, after visitationby a British vessel had been to Falmouth, and there received a Britishlicense to go to her destination. She was condemned for threeoffenses: the visit, the entrance to Falmouth, and the license. [272a]These cases were far from isolated, and quite as flagrant as anythingdone by Great Britain; but, while not overlooked, nor unresented, bythe supporters of the embargo, there was not evident in the debates ofCongress any such depth of feeling as was aroused by the Britishmeasures. As was said by Mr. Bayard, an Opposition Senator, "It may befrom the habit of enduring, but we do not feel an aggression fromFrance with the same quickness and sensibility that we do fromEngland. "[273]

Throughout the year 1808, the embargo was maintained by theAdministration with as much vigor as was possible to the nature of theadministrator, profoundly interested in the success of a favoritemeasure. Congress had supplemented the brief original Act by aprohibition of all intercourse with foreign territories by land, aswell as by sea. This was levelled at the Florida and Canada frontiers. Authority had been given also for the absolute detention of allvessels bound coastwise, if with cargoes exciting suspicion ofintention to evade the laws. Part of the small navy was sent tocruise off the coast, and the gunboats were distributed among themaritime districts, to intercept and to enforce submission. Steps weretaken to build vessels on Lakes Ontario and Champlain; for, in theundeveloped condition of the road systems, these sheets of water wereprincipal means of transportation, after snow left the ground. To theembargo the Navy owed the brig "Oneida", the most formidable vessel onOntario when war came. All this restrictive service was of courseextremely unpopular with the inhabitants; or at least with thatactive, assertive element, which is foremost in pushing localadvantages, and directs popular sentiment. Nor did feeling in allcases refrain from action. April 19, the President had to issue aproclamation against combinations to defy the law in the country aboutChamplain. The collector at Passamaquoddy wrote that, with upwards ofa hundred vessels in port, he was powerless; and the mob threatened toburn his house. [274] A Kennebec paper doubted whether civil societycould hang together much longer. There were few places in the regionwhere it was safe for civil officers to execute the laws. [274a] Troopsand revenue vessels were despatched to the chief centres ofdisturbance; but, while occasional rencounters occurred, attended attimes with bloodshed, and some captures of smuggled goods wereeffected, the weak arm of the Government was practically powerlessagainst universal connivance in the disaffected districts. Smugglingstill continued to a large extent, and was very profitable; while thedetermination of the smugglers assumed the character commonly styleddesperate. 

Such conditions, with a falling revenue, and an Opposition strong insectional support, confronted the supporters of the Administrationwhen Congress again met in November. Confident that embargo was anefficient coercive weapon, if relentlessly wielded, the Presidentwished more searching enactments, and power for more extensive andvigorous enforcement. This Congress proceeded to grant. Additionalrevenue cutters were authorized; and after long debate was passed anAct for the Enforcement of the Embargo, approved January 9, 1809. [275]The details of this law were derived from a letter[276] addressed to aCommittee of Congress by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, uponwhom the administration of the embargo system chiefly fell. The twoprincipal difficulties so far encountered were the evasions of vesselsbound coastwise, and departure without clearance. "The infractionsthus practised threaten to prostrate the law and the Governmentitself. " Even to take cargo on board should not be permitted, withoutauthorization from the collector of the district. "The great number ofvessels now laden and in a state of readiness to depart shows thenecessity of this provision. "

It was therefore enacted that no vessel, coasting or registered, should load, without first having obtained permission from thecustom-house, and given bond, in six times the value of the cargo, that she would not depart without a clearance, nor after clearing goto any foreign port, or transfer her lading to any other vessel. Theloading was to be under the inspection of revenue officers. Shipsalready loaded, when notice of the Act was received, must unload orgive bonds. Further to insure compliance, vessels bound coastwisemust, within two months after sailing, deposit with the collector atthe port of clearance a certificate from the collector at the port ofdestination, that they had arrived there. If going to New Orleans fromthe Atlantic coast, four months were allowed for this formality. Failing this, proof of total loss at sea would alone relieve thebond. "Neither capture, distress, nor any other accident, shall bepleaded or given in evidence. " Collectors were empowered to take intocustody specie and goods, whether on vessels or land vehicles, whenthere was reason to believe them intended for exportation; andauthority was given to employ the army and navy, and the militia, forcarrying out this and the other embargo legislation. A furtherprovision of thirty armed vessels, to stop trade, was made by thisCongress; which otherwise, like its predecessors and successors, wasperfectly faithful to the party tradition not to protect trade, orseek peace, by providing a navy. 

All this was sitting on the safety valve. However unflattering tonational self-esteem it might be to see national legislationuniversally disregarded, the leakage of steam by evasion had made thetension bearable. The Act also opened to a number of subalternexecutive officers, of uncertain discretion, an opportunity forarbitrary and capricious action, to which the people of the UnitedStates were unaccustomed. Already a justice of a circuit court haddecided in opposition to instructions issued by the President himself. The new legislation was followed by an explosion of popular wrath andstreet demonstrations. These were most marked in the Eastern states, where the opposition party and the shipping interest were strongest. Feeling was the more bitter, because the revolt of Spain, and thedeliverance of Portugal, had exempted those nations and theirextensive colonies from the operation of the British Orders inCouncil, had paralyzed in many of their ports the edicts of Napoleon, and so had extended widely the field safe for neutral commerce. It wasevident also that, while the peninsula everywhere was the scene ofwar, it could not feed itself; nor could supplies for the population, or for the British armies there, come from England, often narrowlypressed herself for grain. Cadiz was open on August 26; all neutralsadmitted, and the British blockade raised. Through that portal andLisbon might flow a golden tide for American farmers and shipmen. Thetown meetings of New England again displayed the power for promptpolitical agitation which so impressed the imagination of Jefferson. The Governor of Connecticut refused, on constitutional grounds, tocomply with the President's request to detail officers of militia, towhom collectors could apply when needing assistance to enforce thelaws. The attitude of the Eastern people generally was that of mutiny;and it became evident that it could only be repressed by violence, andwith danger to the Union. 

Congress was not prepared to run this risk. On February 8, less than amonth after the Enforcement Act became law, its principal supporter inthe Senate[277] introduced a resolution for the partial repeal of theEmbargo Act. "This is not of my choice, " he said, "nor is the step oneby which I could wish that my responsibility should be tested. It isthe offspring of conciliation, and of great concession on my part. Onone point we are agreed, --resistance to foreign aggressions. Thepoints of difficulty to be adjusted, --and compromised, --relate to theextent of that resistance and the mode of its application. In myjudgment, if public sentiment could be brought to support them, wisdomwould dictate the combined measures of embargo, non-intercourse, andwar. Sir, when the love of peace degenerates into fear of war, itbecomes of all passions the most despicable. " It was not the firsttime the word "War" had been spoken, but the occasion made it doublysignificant and ominous; for it was the requiem of the measure uponwhich the dominant party had staked all to avoid war, and theelections had already declared that power should remain in the samehands for at least two years to come. Within four weeks Madison wasto succeed his leader, Jefferson; with a Congressional majority, reduced indeed, but still adequate. 

The debate over the new measure, known as the Non-Intercourse Act, wasprolonged and heated, abounding in recriminations, ranging over thewhole gamut of foreign injuries and domestic misdoings, whether byGovernment policy or rebellious action; but clearer and clearer thedemand for war was heard, through and above the din. "When the lateintelligence from the northeast reached us, " said an emotionalfollower of the Administration, [278] "it bore a character mostdistressful to every man who valued the integrity of the Government. Choosing not to enforce the law with the bayonet, I thought proper toacknowledge to the House that I was ready to abandon the embargo. .. . The excitement in the East renders it necessary that we should enforceit by the bayonet, or repeal. I will repeal, and could weep over itmore than over a lost child. " There was, he said, nothing now but war. "The very men who now set your laws at defiance, " cried another, "willbe against you if you go to war;" but he added, "I will never let gothe embargo, unless on the very same day on which we let it go, wedraw the sword. "[279]

Josiah Quincy, an extremist on the other side, gave a definition ofthe position of Massachusetts, which from his ability, and his knownprevious course on national questions, is particularly valuable. Inthe light of the past, and of what was then future, it may beconsidered to embody the most accurate summary of the views prevailingin New England, from the time of the "Chesapeake" affair to the war. He "wished a negotiation to be opened, unshackled with the impedimentawhich now exist. As long as they remained, people in the part of thecountry whence he came would not deem an unsuccessful attempt atnegotiation cause for war. If they were removed, and an earnestattempt at negotiation made, unimpeded by these restrictions, andshould not meet with success, they would join heartily in a war. Theywould not, however, go to war to contest the right of Great Britain tosearch American vessels for British seamen; for it was the generalopinion with them that, if American seamen were encouraged, therewould be no need for the employment of foreign seamen. "[280] Quincytherefore condemned the retaliatory temper of the Administration, asshown in the "Chesapeake" incident by the proclamation excludingBritish ships of war, and in the embargo as a reply to the Orders inCouncil. The oppression of American trade, culminating in the Orders, was a just cause of war; but war was not expedient before a furtherattempt at negotiation, favored by a withdrawal of all retaliatoryacts. He was willing to concede the exercise of British authority onboard American merchantmen on the high seas. 

In the main these were the coincident opinions of Monroe, although aVirginian and identified with the opposite party. At this time hewrote to Jefferson privately, urging a special mission, for which heoffered his services. "Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and thenext step to be taken, without an unexpected change, seems likely tobe the commencement of war with both France and Great Britain, unlesssome expedient consistent with the honor of the Government and Countryis adopted to prevent it. " To Jefferson's rejection of the propositionhe replied: "I have not the hope you seem still to entertain that ourdifferences with either Power will be accommodated under existingarrangements. The embargo was not likely to accomplish the desiredeffect, if it did not produce it under the first impression. .. . Without evidence of firm and strong union at home, nothing favorableto us can be expected abroad, and from the symptoms in the Easternstates there is much cause to fear that tranquillity cannot be securedat present by adherence only to the measures which have heretoforebeen pursued. "[281] Monroe had already[282] expressed the opinion--notto Jefferson, who had refused to ratify, but to a commonintimate--that had the treaty of December 31, 1806, signed by himselfand Pinkney, been accepted by the Administration, none of thesubsequent troubles with France and Great Britain would have ensued;that not till the failure of accommodation with Great Britain becameknown abroad was there placed upon the Berlin Decree that stricterinterpretation which elicited the Orders in Council, whence in duesequence the embargo, the Eastern commotions, and the present alarmingoutlook. In principle, Quincy and Monroe differed on the impressmentquestion, but in practical adjustment there was no serious divergence. In other points they stood substantially together. 

Under the combined influences indicated by the expressions quoted, Congress receded rapidly from the extreme measures of domesticregulation embodied in the various Embargo Acts and culminating in thatof January 9. The substitute adopted was pronouncedly of the characterof foreign policy, and assumed distinctly and unequivocally the hostileform of retaliation upon the two countries under the decrees of whichAmerican commerce was suffering. It foreshadowed the general line ofaction followed by the approaching new Administration, with whoseviews and purposes it doubtless coincided. Passed in the House onFebruary 27, 1809, it was to go into effect May 20, after which datethe ports of the United States were forbidden to the ships of war ofboth France and Great Britain, except in cases of distress, or ofvessels bearing despatches. Merchant vessels of the two countries weresimilarly excluded, with a provision for seizure, if entering. Importation from any part of the dominions of those states wasprohibited, as also that of any merchandise therein produced. Underthese conditions, and with these exceptions, the embargo was to standrepealed from March 15 following; but American and other merchantvessels, sailing after the Act went into operation, were to be underbonds not to proceed to any port of Great Britain or France, nor duringabsence to engage in any trade, direct or indirect, with such port. From the general character of these interdictions, stopping bothnavigation and commerce between the United States and the countriesproscribed, this measure was commonly called the Non-Intercourse Act. Its stormy passage through the House was marked by a number ofamendments and proposed substitutes, noticeable principally asindicative of the growth of warlike temper among Southern members. There were embodied with the bill the administrative and police clausesnecessary for its enforcement. Finally, as a weapon of negotiation inthe hands of the Government, there was a provision, corresponding toone in the original Embargo Act, that in case either France or GreatBritain should so modify its measures as to cease to violate theneutral commerce of the United States, the President was authorized toproclaim the fact, after which trade with that country might berenewed. In this shape the bill was returned to the Senate, whichconcurred February 28. Next day it became law, by the President'ssignature. 

The Enforcement Act and the Non-Intercourse Act, taken together and intheir rapid sequence, symbolize the death struggle between Jefferson'sideal of peaceful commercial restriction, unmitigated and protracted, in the power of which he had absolute faith, and the views of those towhom it was simply a means of diplomatic pressure, temporary, andantecedent to war. Napoleon himself was not more ruthless thanJefferson in his desired application of commercial prohibition. Not sohis party, in its entirety. The leading provisions of theNon-Intercourse Act, by partially opening the door and so facilitatingabundant evasion, traversed Jefferson's plan. It was antecedentlynotorious that their effect, as regarded Great Britain, would be torenew trade with her by means of intermediary ports. Yet that theywere features in the policy of the men about to become prominent underthe coming Administration was known to Canning some time before theresolution was introduced by Giles; before the Enforcement Act evencould reach England. Though hastened by the outburst in New England, the policy of the Non-Intercourse Act was conceived before thecollapse of Jefferson's own measure was seen to be imminent. 

On January 18 and 22 Canning, in informal conversations with Pinkney, had expressed his satisfaction at proceedings in Congress, recentlybecome known, looking to the exclusion of French ships equally withBritish, and to the extension of non-importation legislation to Franceas well as Great Britain. [283] He thought that such measures mightopen the way to a withdrawal of the Orders in Council, by enabling theBritish Government to entertain the overture, made by Pinkney August23, under instructions, that the President would suspend the embargo, if the British Government would repeal its orders. This he conceivedcould not be done, consistently with self-respect, so long as therewas inequality of treatment. In these anticipations he was encouragedby representations concerning the attitude of Madison and someintended members of his Cabinet, made to him by Erskine, the BritishMinister in Washington, who throughout seems to have cherished anardent desire to reconcile differences which interfered with his justappreciation even of written words, --much more of spoken. 

In the interview of the 22d Pinkney confined himself to sayingeverything "which I thought consistent with candor and discretion toconfirm him in his dispositions. " He suggested that the whole matterought to be settled at Washington, and "that it would be well (in casea special mission did not meet their approbation) that the necessarypowers should be sent to Mr. Erskine. "[284] He added, "I offered myintervention for the purpose of guarding them against deficiencies inthese powers. "[285] The remark is noteworthy, for it shows Pinkney'ssense that Erskine's mere letter of credence as Minister Resident, notsupplemented by full powers for the special transaction, wasinadequate to a binding settlement of such important matters. In thesequel the American Administration did not demand of Erskine theproduction either of special powers or of the text of hisinstructions; a routine formality which would have forestalled themortifying error into which it was betrayed by precipitancy, and whichbecame the occasion of a breach with Erskine's successor. 

The day after his interview with Pinkney, Canning sent Erskineinstructions, [286] the starting-point of which was that the Orders inCouncil must be maintained, unless their object could be otherwiseaccomplished. Assuming, as an indispensable preliminary to anynegotiation, that equality of treatment between British and Frenchships and merchandise would have been established, he said heunderstood further from Erskine's reports of conversations that theleading men in the new Administration would be prepared to agree tothree conditions: 1. That, contemporaneously with the withdrawal ofthe Orders of January 7 and November 11, there would be a removal ofthe restrictions upon British ships and merchandise, leaving in forcethose against French. 2. The claim, to carry on with enemies' coloniesa trade not permitted in peace, would be abandoned for this war. 3. Great Britain should be at liberty to secure the operation of theNon-Intercourse measures, still in effect against France, by theaction of the British Navy, which should be authorized to captureAmerican vessels seeking to enter ports forbidden them by theNon-Intercourse Act. Canning justly remarked that otherwiseNon-Intercourse would be nugatory; there would be nothing to preventAmericans from clearing for England or Spain and going to Holland orFrance. This was perfectly true. Not only had a year's experience ofthe embargo so demonstrated, but a twelvemonth later[287] Gallatin hadto admit that "the summary of destinations of these exports, beinggrounded on clearances, cannot be relied on under existingcircumstances. Thus, all the vessels actually destined for thedominions of Great Britain, which left the United States between April19 and June 10, 1809, cleared for other ports; principally, it isbelieved, for Sweden. " Nevertheless, the proposition that a foreignstate should enforce national laws, because the United States herselfcould not, was saved from being an insult only by the belief, extracted by Canning from Erskine's report of conversations, thatMadison, or his associates, had committed themselves to such anarrangement. He added that Pinkney "recently (but for the first time)"had expressed an opinion to the same effect. 

The British Government would consent to withdraw the Orders in Councilon the conditions cited; and for the purpose of obtaining a distinctand official recognition of them, Canning authorized Erskine to readhis letter _in extenso_ to the American Government. Had this beendone, as the three concessions were a _sine quâ non_, themisunderstanding on which the despatch was based would have been atonce exposed; and while its assumptions and tone could scarcely havefailed to give offence, there would have been saved the successiveemotions of satisfaction and disappointment which swept over theUnited States, leaving bitterness worse than before. Instead ofcommunicating Canning's letter, Erskine, after ascertaining that theconditions would not be accepted, sent in a paraphrase of his own, dated April 18, [288] in which he made no mention of the threestipulations, but announced that, in consequence of the impartialattitude resulting from the Non-Intercourse Act, his Majesty wouldsend a special envoy to conclude a treaty on all points of therelations between the two countries, and meanwhile would be willing towithdraw the Orders of January 7 and November 11, so far as affectingthe United States, in the persuasion that the President would issuethe proclamation restoring intercourse. This advance was welcomed, theassurance of revocation given, and the next day Erskine wrote that hewas "authorized to declare that the Orders will have been withdrawn asrespects the United States on the 10th day of June next. " The sameday, by apparent preconcertment, in accordance with Canning'srequirement that the two acts should be coincident, Madison issuedhis proclamation, announcing the fact of the future withdrawal, andthat trade between the United States and Great Britain might berenewed on June 10. 

Erskine's proceeding was disavowed instantly by the BritishGovernment, and himself recalled. A series of unpleasant explanationsfollowed between him and the members of the American Government, [289]astonished by the interpretation placed upon their words, as shown inCanning's despatch. Canning also had to admit that he had strainedErskine's words, in reaching his conclusions as to the willingness ofMadison and his advisers to allow the enforcement of theNon-Intercourse Act by British cruisers;[290] while Pinkney entirelydisclaimed intending any such opinion as Canning imagined him to haveexpressed. [291] The British Secretary was further irritated by thetone of the American replies to Erskine's notes; but he "forbore totrouble"[292] Pinkney with any comment upon them. That would be madethrough Erskine's successor; an unhappy decision, as it proved. Noexplanation of the disavowal was given; but the instructions sent wereread to Pinkney by Canning, and a letter followed saying thatErskine's action had been in direct contradiction to them. Things thusreturned to the momentarily interrupted condition of AmericanNon-Intercourse and British Orders in Council; the British Governmentissuing a temporary order for the protection of American vessels whichmight have started for the ports of Holland in reliance upon Erskine'sassurances. From America there had been numerous clearances forEngland; and it may be believed that there would have been many moreif the transient nature of the opportunity had been foreseen. August9, Madison issued another proclamation, annulling the former. 

While Erskine was conducting his side negotiation, the BritishGovernment had largely modified the scope of the restrictions laidupon neutral trade. In consequence of the various events which hadaltered its relations with European states and their dependencies, theOrders of November, 1807, were revoked; and for them was substituted anew one, dated April 26, 1809, [293] similar in principle but muchcurtailed in extent. Only the coasts of France itself, of Holland toits boundary, the River Ems, and those of Italy falling underNapoleon's own dominion, from Orbitello to Pesaro, were thenceforth tobe subject to "the same restrictions as if actually blockaded. "Further, no permission was given, as in the former Orders, tocommunicate with the forbidden ports by first entering one of GreatBritain, paying a transit duty, and obtaining a permit to proceed. Interms, prohibition was now unqualified; and although it was known thatlicenses for intercourse with interdicted harbors were freely issued, the overt offence of prescribing British channels to neutralnavigation was avoided. Within the area of restriction, "No trade savethrough England" was thus converted, in form, to no trade at all. Thisnarrowing of the constructive blockade system, combined with therelaxations effected by the Non-Intercourse Act, and with the foodrequirements of the Spanish peninsula, did much to revive Americancommerce; which, however, did not again before the war regain the fairproportions of the years preceding the embargo. The discrepancy wasmost marked in the re-exportation of foreign tropical produce, sugarand coffee, a trade dependent wholly upon war conditions, andaffecting chiefly the shipping interest engaged in carrying it. Forthis falling off there were several causes. After 1809 the Continentalsystem was more than ever remorselessly enforced, and it was to theContinent almost wholly that Americans had carried these articles. The Spanish colonies were now open to British as well as Americancustomers; and the last of the French West Indies having passed intoBritish possession, trade with them was denied to foreigners by theNavigation Act. In 1807 the value of the colonial produce re-exportedfrom the United States was $59, 643, 558; in 1811, $16, 022, 790. Theexports of domestic productions in the same years were: 1807, $48, 699, 592; in 1811, $45, 294, 043. In connection with these figures, as significant of political conditions, it is interesting to note thatof the latter sum $18, 266, 466 went to Spain and Portugal, chiefly tosupply demands created by war. So with tropical produce; out of thetotal of $16, 022, 790, $5, 772, 572 went to the Peninsula, and an equalamount to the Baltic, that having become the centre of accumulation, from which subsequent distribution was made to the Continent inelusion of the Continental System. The increasing poverty of theContinent, also, under Napoleon's merciless suppression of foreigncommerce, greatly lessened the purchasing power of the inhabitants. The great colonial trade had wasted under the combined action ofBritish Orders and French Decrees, supplemented by changes inpolitical relations. The remote extremities of the Baltic lands andthe Spanish peninsula now alone sustained its drooping life. 

Coincident with Erskine's recall had been the appointment of hissuccessor, Mr. Francis J. Jackson, who took with him not only theusual credentials, but also full powers for concluding a treaty orconvention. [294] He departed for his post under the impulse of theemotions and comments excited by the manner and terms in whichErskine's advances had been met, with which Canning had forborne totrouble Pinkney. Upon his arrival in Washington, disappointment wasexpressed that he had no authority to give any explanations of thereasons why his Government had disavowed arrangements, entered into byErskine, concerning not only the withdrawal of the Orders inCouncil, --as touching the United States, --but also the reparation forthe "Chesapeake" business. This Erskine had offered and concluded, coincidently with the revocation of the Orders, though not inconnection with it; but in both instances his action was disapprovedby his Government. After two verbal conferences, held within a week ofJackson's arrival, the Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Smith, notifiedhim on October 9 that it was thought expedient, for the presentoccasion, that further communication on this matter should be inwriting. There followed an exchange of letters, which in suchcircumstances passed necessarily under the eyes of President Madison, who for the eight preceding years had held Smith's present office. 

This correspondence[295] presents an interesting exhibition ofdiplomatic fencing; but beyond the discussion, pro and con, of thematters in original and continuous dispute between the two countries, the issue turned upon the question whether the United States hadreceived the explanation due to it, --in right and courtesy, --of thereasons for disavowing Erskine's agreements. Smith maintained it hadnot. Jackson rejoined that sufficient explanation had been given bythe terms of Canning's letter of May 27 to Pinkney, announcing thatErskine had been recalled because he had acted in direct contradictionto his instructions; an allegation sustained by reading to theAmerican minister the instructions themselves. In advancing thisargument, Jackson stated also that Canning's three conditions had beenmade known by Erskine to the American Government, which, in decliningto admit them, had suggested substitutes finally accepted by Erskine;so that the United States understood that the arrangement was reachedon another basis than that laid down by Canning. This assertion hedrew from the expressions of Erskine in a letter to Canning, after thedisavowal. Smith replied that Erskine, while not showing the despatch, had stated the three stipulations; that they had been rejected; andthat the subsequent arrangement had been understood to be with aminister fully competent to recede from his first demand and to acceptother conditions. Distinctly he affirmed, that the United StatesGovernment did not know, at any time during the discussion precedingthe agreement, that Erskine's powers were limited by the conditions inthe text of his instructions, afterwards published. That he had noothers, "is now for the first time made known to this Government, " byJackson's declaration. 

 [Illustration: JAMES MADISON From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me. ]

Jackson had come prepared to maintain, not only the Britishcontention, but the note set by Canning for British diplomaticcorrespondence. He was conscious too of opposing material force toargument, and had but recently been amid the scenes at Copenhagen, which had illustrated Nelson's maxim that a fleet of ships of the linewere the best negotiators in Europe. The position has its advantages, but also its dangers, when the field of warfare is that of words, notdeeds; and in Madison, who superintended the American case, he wasunequally matched with an adversary whose natural dialectical abilityhad been tempered and sharpened in many campaigns. There isnoticeable, too, on the American side, a labored effort at acutenessof discrimination, an adroitness to exaggerate shades of differencepractically imperceptible, and an aptitude to give and take offence, not so evident under the preceding Administration. These suggestirresistibly the absence, over Madison the President, of a moderatinghand, which had been held over Madison the Secretary of State. It maybe due also to the fact that both the President and his Cabinet weresomewhat less indisposed to war than his predecessor had been. 

In his answer to Smith Jackson reiterated, what Smith had admitted, that Erskine had made known the three conditions. He added, "Nostronger illustration of the deviation from them which occurred can begiven than by a reference to the terms of the agreement. " As anincidental comment, supporting the contention that Erskine's departurefrom his sole authority was so decisive as to be a sufficientexplanation for the disavowal of his procedure, the words wereadmissible; so much so as to invite the suspicion that the opponent, who had complained of the want of such explanation, felt the touch ofthe foil, and somewhat lost temper. Whatever impression of aninsinuation the phrase may have conveyed should have been whollyremoved by the further expression, in close sequence, "You are alreadyacquainted with the instruction given; and _I have had_[296] the honorof informing you it was the only one. " Smith's knowledge thatErskine's powers were limited to the one document is here attributedexplicitly to Jackson. The Secretary (or President) saw fit not torecognize this, but took occasion to administer a severe rebuke, whichdoubtless the general tone of Jackson's letter tended to provoke. "Iabstain, sir, from making any particular animadversions on severalirrelevant and improper allusions in your letter. .. . But it would beimproper to conclude the few observations to which I purposely limitmyself, without adverting to your repetition of a language implying aknowledge, on the part of this Government, that the instructions ofyour predecessor did not authorize the arrangement formed by him. After the explicit and peremptory asseveration that this Governmenthad no such knowledge, and that with such a knowledge no sucharrangement would have been entered into, the view which you haveagain presented of the subject makes it my duty to apprise you thatsuch insinuations are inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreignminister with a Government that understands what it owes to itself. "

Whatever may be thought of the construction placed upon Jackson'swords by his opponent, this thrust should have made him look to hisfooting; but arrogance and temper carried the day, and laid him opento the fatal return which he received. By drawing attention to thequalifying phrase, he could have shown that he had been misunderstood, but he practically accepted the interpretation; for, instead ofrepelling it, he replied: "In my correspondence with you I havecarefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily followfrom the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think ofuttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact. Tofacts, such as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulouslyadhered, and in so doing I must continue, whenever the good faith ofhis Majesty's Government is called in question, " etc. To this outburstthe reply was: "You have used language which cannot but be understoodas reiterating, and even aggravating, the same gross insinuation. Itonly remains, in order to preclude opportunities which are thusabused, to inform you that no further communications will be receivedfrom you, and that the necessity for this determination will, withoutdelay, be made known to your Government. " Jackson thereupon quittedWashington for New York, leaving a _chargé d'affaires_ for transactingcurrent business. 

Before leaving the city, however, Jackson, through the channel of the_chargé_, made a statement to the Secretary of State. In this healleged that the facts which he considered it his duty to state, andto the assertion of which, as facts, exception was taken, and hisdismissal attributed, were two. One was, that the three conditions hadbeen submitted by Mr. Erskine to the Secretary of State. This theSecretary had admitted. "The other, namely: that that instruction isthe only one, in which the conditions were prescribed to Mr. Erskine, for the conclusion of an arrangement on the matter to which itrelated, is known to Mr. Jackson by the instructions which he hashimself received. " This he had said in his second letter; if somewhatobscurely, still not so much so but that careful reading, andindisposition to take offence, could have detected his meaning, andafforded him the opportunity to be as explicit as in this final paper. If Madison, who is understood to have given special supervision tothis correspondence, [297] meant the severe rebuke conveyed by hisreply as a feint, to lead the British minister incautiously to exposehimself to a punishment which his general bearing and that of hisGovernment deserved, he assuredly succeeded; yet it may be questionedwho really came best out of the encounter. Jackson had blundered inwords; the American Administration had needlessly intensifiedinternational bitterness. 

Prepossession in reading, and proneness to angry misconception, mustbe inferred in the conduct of the American side of this discussion;for another notable and even graver instance occurs in thedespatch[298] communicating Jackson's dismissal to Pinkney, beyondwhose notice it probably was not allowed to go. Canning, in his thirdrejected condition, had written:

 Great Britain, for the purpose of securing _the operation of_ the embargo, and _of_ the bonâ fide intention of America to prevent her citizens from trading with France, and the Powers adopting and acting under the French decrees, is to be considered as being at liberty to capture all such American vessels as shall be found attempting to trade with the ports of such Powers;[299]

and he explained that, unless such permission was granted, "theraising of the embargo nominally as to Great Britain, would raise it, in fact, with respect to all the world, " owing to the evidentinability of the United States to enforce its orders beyond its ownports. 

In the passage quoted, both the explanatory comment and the syntaxshow that the object of this proposed concession was to secure _theoperation_, the effectual working, of the _bonâ fide_ intentionexpressly conceded to the American Government. The repetition of thepreposition "of, " before _bonâ fide_, secures this meaning beyondperadventure. Nevertheless Smith, in labored arraignment of the wholeBritish course, wrote to Pinkney as follows:

 In urging this concession, Mr. Canning has taken a ground forbidden by those principles of decorum which regulate and mark the proceedings of Governments towards each other. In his despatch the condition is stated to be for the purpose of _securing the bonâ fide intention_ of America, to prevent her citizens from trading with France and certain other Powers; in other words to secure a pledge to that effect against the _malâ fide_ intention of the United States. And this despatch too was authorized to be communicated _in extenso_ to the Government, of which such language was used. [300]

Being addressed only to Pinkney, a man altogether too careful andshrewd not to detect the mistake, no occasion arose for this gravemisstatement doing harm, or receiving correction. But, conjoined withthe failure to note that Jackson in his second letter had attributedto his own communication the American Government's knowledge thatErskine had no alternative instructions, the conclusion isirresistible that the President acted, perhaps unconsciously, underimpulses foreign to the deliberate care which should precede andaccompany so momentous an act as the refusal to communicate with anaccredited foreign minister. It will be remembered that this actionwas taken on grounds avowedly independent of the reasonableness orjustice of the British demands. It rested purely on the conduct of theminister himself. 

This incident powerfully furthered the alienation of the two nations, for the British Government not only refused to disapprove Jackson'sconduct, but for nearly two years neglected to send a successor, thusestablishing strained diplomatic relations. Before finally leavingthis unlucky business, it is due to a complete appreciation to mentionthat, in its very outset, at the beginning of Erskine's well-meant butblundering attempt, the United States Government had overpassed thelimits of diplomatic civility. Canning was a master of insolence; hecould go to the utmost verge of insult and innuendo, withoutabsolutely crossing the line which separates them from formalobservance of propriety; but it cannot be said that the Americancorrespondence in this instance was equally adroit. In replying toErskine's formal offer of reparation for the "Chesapeake" affair, certain points essential to safeguarding the position of the UnitedStates were carefully and properly pointed out; then the reparation, as tended, was accepted. There the matter might have dropped;acceptance is acceptance; or, if necessary, failure of fullsatisfaction on the part of the United States might have been candidlystated, as due to itself. But the Secretary[301] proceeded towords--and mere words--reflecting on the British Sovereign andGovernment. "I have it in express charge from the President to state, that, while he forbears to insist upon the further punishment of theoffending officer, he is not the less sensible of the justice andutility of such an example, nor the less persuaded that it would bestcomport with what is due from his Britannic Majesty to his own honor. "

To the writer nothing quite as bad as this occurs in Jackson'sletters, objectionable as they were in tone. With the opinion heagrees; the further employment of Berkeley was indecent, nor was he aman for whom it could be claimed that he was indispensable; but it isone thing to hold an opinion, and another to utter it to the personconcerned. Had Madison meant war, he might have spoken as he did, andfought; but to accept, and then to speak words barren of everythingbut useless insult, is intolerable. Jackson very probably believedthat the American Government was lying when it said it did not knowthe facts as to Erskine's instructions. [302] It would be quite incharacter that he should; but he did not say so. There was put intohis mouth a construction of his words which he heedlessly accepted. 

Jackson's dismissal was notified to the British Government throughPinkney, on January 2, 1810. [303] Some time before, a disagreementwithin the British Cabinet had led to a duel between Castlereagh andCanning, in which the latter was severely wounded. He did not returnto the Foreign Office, but was succeeded by the Marquis Wellesley, brother of the future Duke of Wellington. After presenting the view ofthe correspondence taken by his Government, Pinkney seems to betray aslight uneasiness as to the accuracy of the interpretation placed onJackson's words. "I willingly leave your Lordship to judge whether Mr. Jackson's correspondence will bear any other construction than that itin fact received; and whether, supposing it to have been erroneouslyconstrued, his letter of the 4th of November should not have correctedthe mistake, instead of confirming and establishing it. "

Wellesley, with a certain indolent nonchalance, characteristic of hiscorrespondence with Pinkney, delayed to answer for two months, andthen gave a reply as indifferent in manner as it was brief in terms. Jackson had written, "There appears to have prevailed, throughout thewhole of this transaction [Erskine's], a fundamental mistake, whichwould suggest that his Majesty had proposed to propitiate theGovernment of the United States, to consent to the renewal ofcommercial intercourse; . .. As if, in any arrangement, his Majestywould condescend to barter objects of national policy and dignity forpermission to trade with another country. " The phrase was Canning's, and summarized precisely the jealous attitude towards its own prestigecharacteristic of the British policy of the day. It also definedexactly the theory upon which the foreign policy of the United Stateshad been directed for eight years by the party still in power. Madisonand Jefferson had both placed just this construction upon Erskine'stender. "The British Cabinet must have changed its course under a fullconviction that an adjustment with this country had becomeessential. "[304] "Gallatin had a conversation with Turreau at hisresidence near Baltimore. He professes to be confident that hisGovernment will consider England broken down, by the examples she hasgiven in repealing her Orders. "[305] "By our unyielding adherence toprinciple Great Britain has been forced into revocation. "[306] Canningand his associates intuitively divined this inference, which after allwas obvious enough. The feeling increased their discontent withErskine, who had placed his country in the false light of recedingunder commercial pressure from America, and probably enoughprepossessed them with the conviction that the American Governmentcould not but have realized that Erskine was acting beyond his powers. 

Wellesley, after his manner, --which was not Canning's, --assertedequally the superiority of the British Government to concession forthe sake of such advantage. His Majesty regretted the Jackson episode, the more so that no opportunity had been given for him to interpose, which "was the usual course in such cases. " Mr. Jackson had writtenpositive assurances that it was not his purpose to give offence; towhich the reply was apt, that in such matters it is not enough tointend, but to succeed in avoiding offence. [307] "His Majesty has notmarked, with any expression of his displeasure, the conduct of Mr. Jackson, who does not appear, on this occasion, to have committed anyintentional offence against the Government of the United States. " A_chargé_ would be appointed to carry on the ordinary intercourse, butno intention was expressed of sending another minister. Persistence inthis neglect soon became a further ground of bad feeling. 

By its own limitations the Non-Intercourse Act was to expire at theend of the approaching spring session of the new Congress, but it wasrenewed by that body to the end of the winter session. During therecess the Jackson episode occurred, and was the first subject toengage attention on reassembling, November 27, 1809. After prolongeddiscussion in the lower house, [308] a joint resolution was passedapproving the action of the Executive, and pledging to him the supportof the nation. Despite a lucid exposition by Josiah Quincy, that theoffence particularly attributed to the British minister was disprovedby a reasonable attention to the construction of his sentences, themajority persisted in sustaining the party chief. That disposed of, the question of commercial restriction was again taken up. 

It was conceded on all sides that Non-Intercourse had failed, andprecisely in the manner predicted. On the south, Amelia Island, --atthe mouth of the St. Mary's River, just outside the Floridaboundary, --and on the north Halifax, and Canada in general, had becomeports of deposit for American products, whence they were conveyed inBritish ships to Great Britain and her dependencies, to which the Actforbade American vessels to go. The effect was to give the carrying ofAmerican products to British shipping, in precise conformity with theastute provisions of the Navigation Acts. British markets were reachedby a broken voyage, the long leg of which, from Amelia and Halifax toEurope and elsewhere, was taken by British navigation. It was statedthat there were at a given moment one hundred British vessels atAmelia, [309] the shores of which were encumbered with American goodsawaiting such transportation. The freight from the American ports toAmelia averaged a cent a pound, from Amelia to England eightcents;[310] the latter amount going to British pockets, the former toAmericans who were debarred from full transatlantic freight by theprohibitions of the Non-Intercourse Act. The absence of competitionnecessarily raised the prices obtainable by the British shipper, andthis, together with the additional cost of transshipment and delays, attendant upon a broken voyage, fell upon the American agriculturist, whose goods commanded just so much less at their place of origin. Themeasure was even ingeniously malaprop, considered from the point ofview of its purpose towards Great Britain, whether retaliatory orcoercive. Upon France its effect was trivial, in any aspect. There wasno French navigation, and the Orders in Council left little chance forAmerican vessels to reach French ports. 

All agreed that the Non-Intercourse Act must go; the difficulty was tofind a substitute which should not confessedly abandon the wholesystem of commercial restrictions, idealized by the party in power, but from which it was being driven foot by foot. A first measureproposed was to institute a Navigation Act, borrowed in broad outlinefrom that of Great Britain, but in operation applied only to thatnation and France, in retaliation for their injurious edicts. [311]Open intercourse with the whole world should be restored; but Britishand French merchant ships, as well as vessels of war, should beexcluded from American harbors. British and French products could beimported only in vessels owned wholly by American citizens; and afterApril 15, 1810, could be introduced only by direct voyage from theplace of origin. This was designed to prevent the continuance of tradeby way of Amelia or Halifax. It was pointed out in debate, however, that French shipping practically did not exist, and that in the daysof open trade, before the embargo, only about eight thousand tons ofBritish shipping yearly entered American ports, whereas from threehundred thousand to four hundred thousand American tons visited GreatBritain. [312] Should she, by a strict retaliation, resent this clumsyattempt at injuring her, the weight of the blow would fall onAmericans. American ships would be excluded from British ports; thecarrying trade to Amelia and Halifax would be resumed, to thedetriment of American vessels by a competition which otherwise wouldnot exist, and British manufactures would be introduced by smuggling, to the grievous loss of the revenue, as had been notoriously andabundantly the case under the Non-Intercourse Act. In truth, a purelycommercial war with Great Britain was as injurious as a military war, and more hopeless. 

The bill consequently failed in the Senate, though passed by theHouse. In its stead was adopted an Act which repealed that ofNon-Intercourse, but prescribed that in case either Great Britain orFrance, before March 3, 1811, should so revoke or modify its edicts asthat they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the UnitedStates, the President should declare the fact by proclamation; and ifthe other nation should not, within three months from the date of suchproclamation, in like manner so modify or revoke its edicts, thereshould revive against it those sections of the Non-Intercourse Actwhich excluded its vessels from American ports, and forbade toAmerican vessels importation from its ports, or of its goods from anypart of the world whatsoever. The determination of the fact ofrevocation by either state was left to the sole judgment of thePresident, by whose approval the Act became law May 1, 1810. [313]

As Great Britain and France, by the Orders in Council and the Berlinand Milan Decrees, were then engaged in a commercial warfare, in whichthe object of each was to exhaust its rival, the effect of this Actwas to tender the co-operation of the United States to whichever ofthem should embrace the offer. In terms, it was strictly impartialbetween the two. In fact, forasmuch as France could not preventAmerican intercourse with Great Britain, whereas Great Britain, infurtherance of her purposes, could and did prevent American trade withFrance, the latter had much more to gain; and particularly, if sheshould so word her revocation as to save her face, by not appearingthe first to recede, --to show weakening, --as Great Britain had beenmade for the moment to seem by Erskine's arrangement. Should thisingenious diplomacy prove satisfactory to the President, yet fail soto convince Great Britain as to draw from her the recall of the Ordersin Council, the United States, by the simple operation of the lawitself, would become a party to the Emperor's Continental system, inits specific aim of reducing his opponent's strength. 

At this very moment Napoleon was putting into effect against theUnited States one of those perverse and shameless interpretations ofinternational relations, or actions, by which he not infrequentlycontrived to fill his pockets. The Non-Intercourse Act, passed March3, 1809, had decreed forfeiture of any French or British ship, orgoods, which should enter American waters after May 20, of the sameyear. The measure was duly communicated to the French Government, andno remonstrance had been made against a municipal regulation, whichgave ample antecedent warning. There the matter rested until March 23, 1810, when the Emperor, on the ground of the Act, imposing theseconfiscations and forbidding American vessels to visit France, signeda retroactive decree that all vessels under the flag of the UnitedStates, which, since May 20, 1809, had entered ports of his empire, colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should be seizedand sold. Commissioners were sent to Holland to enforce there thisedict, known as the Decree of Rambouillet, which was not actuallypublished till May 14. [314] It took effect upon vessels which, duringa twelvemonth previous, unwarned, had gone to France, or the othercountries indicated. Immediately before it was signed, the Americanminister, Armstrong, had written to Champagny, Duke of Cadore, theFrench Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Your Excellency knows that thereare not less than one hundred American ships within his Majesty'spossession, or that of his allies;" and he added that, from severalsources of information, he felt warranted in believing that not asingle French vessel had violated the Non-Intercourse law, andtherefore none could have been seized. [315]

The law of May 1 was duly communicated to the two states concerned, bythe United States ministers there resident. Great Britain was informedthat not only the Orders in Council, but the blockade of May, 1806, [316] were included among the edicts affecting American commerce, the repeal of which was expected, as injurious to that commerce. France was told that this demand would be made upon her rival;[317]but that it was also the purpose of the President not to give the laweffect favorable to herself, by publishing a proclamation, if the lateseizures of the property of citizens of the United States had beenfollowed by absolute confiscation, and restoration were finallyrefused. [318] This referred not to the Rambouillet Decree, as yetunknown in America, but to the previous seizures upon variouspretexts, mentioned above by Armstrong. Ultimately this purpose wasnot adhered to; but the Emperor was attentive to the President'sintimation that "by putting in force, agreeably to the terms of thisstatute, the non-intercourse against Great Britain, the very speciesof resistance would be made which France has constantly beenrepresenting as most efficacious. "[319] Thus, the co-operation ofAmerica to the Continental System was no longer asked, but offered. 

The Emperor did not wait even for information by the usual officialchannels. By some unexplained delay, Armstrong's first knowledge wasthrough a copy of the Gazette of the United States containing the Act, which he at once transmitted to Champagny, who replied August 5, 1810. [320] His Majesty wished that the acts of the United StatesGovernment could be more promptly communicated; not till very latelyhad he heard of the Non-Intercourse, --a statement which Armstrongpromptly denied, referring Champagny to the archives of his owndepartment. [321] In view of the Act of May 1, the Emperor's decisionwas announced in a paragraph of the same letter, in the followingwords:

 In this new state of things I am authorized to declare to you, Sir, that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the first of November they will cease to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the Act which you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English. 

Definition is proverbially difficult; and over this superficiallysimple definition of circumstances and conditions, under which theDecrees of Berlin and Milan stood revoked, arose a discussionconcerning construction and meaning which resembled the wrangling ofscholars over a corrupt text in an obscure classical author. Clear-headed men became hopelessly involved, as they wrestled witheach others' interpretations; and the most got no farther thansticking to their first opinions, probably reached in the majority ofcases by sheer prepossession. The American ministers to France andGreat Britain both accepted the words as a distinct, indisputable, revocation; and Madison followed suit. These hasty conclusions are notvery surprising; for there was personal triumph, dear to diplomatistsas to other men, in seeing the repeal of the Decrees, or of theOrders, result from their efforts. It has been seen how much thisfactor entered into the feelings of Madison and Jefferson in theErskine business, and to Armstrong the present turn was especiallygrateful, as he was about quitting his mission after several yearsbuffeting against wind and tide. His sun seemed after all about to setin glory. He wrote to Pinkney, "I have the honor to inform you thathis Majesty, the Emperor and King, has been pleased to revoke hisDecrees of Berlin and Milan. "[322] Pinkney, to whom the recall of theBritish Orders offered the like laurels, was equally emphatic in hiscommunication to Wellesley; adding, "I take for granted that therevocation of the British Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, April, 1809, and all other orders dependent upon, or analogous, or in execution of them, will follow of course. "[323] The BritishGovernment demurred to the interpretation; but Madison accepted it, and on November 2 proclaimed it as a fact. In consequence, by theterms of the Act, non-intercourse would revive against Great Britainon February 2, 1811. 

When Congress met, distrust on one side and assertion on the othergave rise to prolonged and acute discussion. Napoleon had surprisedpeople so often, that no wonder need be felt at those who thought hiswords might bear a double meaning. The late President, who did notlack sagacity, had once written to his successor, "Bonaparte's policyis so crooked that it eludes conjecture. I fear his first object nowis to dry up the sources of British prosperity, by excluding hermanufactures from the Continent. He may fear that opening the ports ofEurope to our vessels will open them to an inundation of Britishwares. "[324] This was exactly Bonaparte's dilemma, and suggested thepoint of view from which his every action ought to be scrutinized. Then there was the recent deception with Erskine, which, if itincreased the doubts of some concerning the soundness of Madison'sjudgment, made it the more incumbent on others to show that on thisoccasion at least he had not been precipitate. Certainly, as regardsthe competency of the foreign official in either case, there was nocomparison. A simple Minister Resident should produce particularpowers or definite instructions, to guarantee his authority forconcluding so important a modification of national policy as wasaccepted from Erskine; but by common usage the Minister of ForeignAffairs, at a national capital, is understood to speak for the ChiefExecutive. The statement of Champagny, at Paris, that he was"authorized" to make a specific declaration, could be accepted as thevoice of Napoleon himself. The only question was, what did the voicesignify?

In truth, explicit as Champagny's words sound, Napoleon'smemoranda, [325] on which they were based, show a deliberate purpose toavoid a formal revocation, for reasons analogous to those suggested byJefferson. Throughout he used "_rapporter_" instead of "_révoquer_. "In the particular connection, the words are nearly synonymous; yet tothe latter attaches a natural fitness and emphasis, the avoidance ofwhich betrays the bias, perhaps unconscious, towards seeking escapefrom self-committal on the matter in hand. His phrases are moredefinite. July 31 he wrote, "After much reflection upon Americanaffairs, I have decided that to withdraw (_rapporter_) my decrees ofBerlin and Milan would conduce to nothing (_n'aurait aucun effet_);that it is better you should address a note to Mr. Armstrong, in whichyou will acquaint him that you have placed before me the detailscontained in the American gazette, . .. And since he assures us it maybe regarded as official, he may depend (_compter_) that my decrees ofBerlin and Milan will not receive execution (_n'auront aucun effet_)dating from November 1; and that he should consider them as withdrawn(_rapportés_) in consequence of the Act of the American Congress;provided, " etc. "This, " he concludes, "seems to me more suitable thana decree, which would cause disturbance and would not fulfil my aim. This method seems to me more conformable to my dignity and to theserious character of the business. " The Decrees, as touching theUnited States alone, were to be quietly withdrawn from action, but notformally revoked. They were to be dormant, yet potential. Asconvenience might dictate, it would be open to say that they wererevoked [in effect], or not revoked [in form]. The one might, and did, satisfy the United States; the other might not, and did not, contentGreat Britain, against whom exclusion from the continent remained inforce. The two English-speaking peoples were set by the ears. August 2the Emperor made a draft of the note to be sent to Armstrong. ThisChampagny copied almost verbatim in the declaration quoted;substituting, however, "_révoquer_" for "_rapporter_. "

It would be intolerable to attempt to drag readers through the mazesof analysis, and of comparison with other papers, by which the partiesto the discussion, ignorant of the above memoranda, sought toestablish their respective views. One thing, however, should have beenpatent to all, --that, with a man so subtle and adroit as Napoleon, anystep in apparent reversal of a decided and cherished policy shouldhave been complete and unequivocal, both in form and in terms. TheBerlin Decree was put forth with the utmost formality with whichmajesty and power could invest it; the asserted revocation, ifapparently explicit, was simply a paragraph in ordinary diplomaticcorrespondence, stating that revocation had taken place. If so, wherewas it? An act which undoes another, particularly if an injury, mustcorrespond fully in form to that which it claims to undo. A privateinsult may receive private apology; but no private expression canatone for public insult or public wrong. In the appreciation of Mr. Madison, in 1807, so grave an outrage as that of the "Chesapeake"called for a special envoy, to give adequate dignity to the profferedreparation. Yet his followers now would have form to be indifferent tosubstantial effect. Champagny's letter, it is true, was published inthe official paper; but, besides being in form merely a diplomaticletter, it bore the signature of Champagny, whereas the decree borethat of Napoleon. The Decree of Rambouillet, then less than six monthsold, was clothed with the like sanction. Even Pinkney, usually soclear-headed, and in utterance incisive, suffered himself here to bemisled. Does England find inadequate the "manner" of the FrenchRevocation? he asked. "It is precisely that in which the orders of itsown Government, establishing, modifying, or removing blockades, areusually proclaimed. " But the Decree of Berlin was no mere proclamationof a blockade. It had been proclaimed, in the Emperor's own name, afundamental law of the Empire, until England had abandoned certainlines of action. This was policy against policy, to which the blockadewas incidental as a method. English blockades were announced andwithdrawn under identical forms of circular letter; but when an Orderin Council, as that of November, 1807, was modified, as in April, 1809, it was done by an Order in Council, not by a diplomatic letter. In short, Champagny's utterance was the declaration of a fact; butwhere was the fact itself?

Great Britain therefore refused to recognize the letter as arevocation, and could not be persuaded that it was by the opinion ofthe American authorities. Nor was the form alone inadequate; the termswere ambiguous, and lent themselves to a construction which woulddeprive her of all benefit from the alleged revocation. She had tolook to her own battle, which reached its utmost intensity in thisyear 1810. Except the helpless Spanish and Portuguese insurgents, shehad not an open friend in Europe; while Napoleon, freed from allopponents by the overthrow of Austria in 1809, had organized againstGreat Britain and her feeble allies the most gigantic display of forcemade in the peninsula since his own personal departure thence, nearlytwo years before. The United States had plain sailing; so far as theletter went, the Decrees were revoked, conditional on her executingthe law of May 1. But Great Britain must renounce the "new" principlesof blockade. What were these principles, pronounced new by the Decree?They were, that unfortified ports, commercial harbors, might beblockaded, as the United States a half century later strangled theSouthern Confederacy. Such blockades were lawful then and long before. To yield this position would be to abandon rights upon which dependedthe political value of Great Britain's maritime supremacy; yet unlessshe did so the Berlin Decree remained in force against her. TheDecree was universal in application, not limited to the United Statescommerce, towards which Champagny's letter undertook to relax it; andBritish commerce would remain excluded from neutral continental portsunless Great Britain not only withdrew the Orders in Council, butrelinquished prescriptive rights upon which, in war, depended herposition in the world. 

In declining to repeal, Great Britain referred to her past record inproof of consistency. In the first communication of the Orders inCouncil, February 23, 1808, [326] Erskine had written, "I am commandedby his Majesty especially to represent to the Government of the UnitedStates the earnest desire of his Majesty to see the commerce _of theworld_ restored once more to that freedom which is necessary for itsprosperity, and his readiness to abandon the system which has beenforced upon him, _whenever the enemy shall retract the principles_which have rendered it necessary. " The British envoy in thesesentences reproduced _verbatim_ the instructions he had received, [327]and the words italicized bar expressly the subsequent contention ofthe United States, that revocation by one party as to one nation, irrespective of the rest _of the world_, and that in practice only, not in principle, entitled the nation so favored to revocation by theother party. They exclude therefore, by all the formality of writtenwords at a momentous instant, the singular assertion of the AmericanGovernment, in 1811, that Great Britain had pledged herself to proceed"_pari passu_"[328] with France in the revocation of their respectiveacts. As far as can be ascertained, the origin of this confidentassumption is to be found in letters of February 18 and 19, 1808, [329]from Madison, then Secretary of State, to Armstrong and Pinkney. Inthese he says that Erskine, in communicating the Orders, [330]expressed his Majesty's regrets, and "assurances that his Majestywould readily follow the example, in case the Berlin Decree should berescinded, or would proceed _pari passu_ with France in relaxing therigor of their measures. " By whichever of the colloquists theexpression was used, the contrast between this report of an interviewand the official letter quoted sufficiently shows the snare latent inconversations, and the superior necessity of relying upon writtencommunications, to which informal talk only smooths the way. On thevery day of Madison's writing to Armstrong, February 18, the AdvocateGeneral, who may be presumed to have understood the purposes of theGovernment, was repudiating such a construction in the House ofCommons. "Even let it be granted that there had been a publicassurance to America that she alone was to be excepted from theinfluence of the Berlin Decree, would that have been a sufficientground for us not to look further to our own interest? What! BecauseFrance chooses to exempt America from her injurious decrees, are we toconsent to their continuance?"[331] Where such a contradictionexists, to assert a pledge from a Government, and that two years afterErskine's singular performance of 1809, which led to his recall, is acurious example of the capacity of the American Administration, underMadison's guidance, for putting words into an opponent's mouth. In thepresent juncture, Wellesley replied[332] to Pinkney's claim for therevocation of the Orders in Council by quoting, and repeating, theassurance of Erskine's letter of February 23, 1808, given above. 

Yet, unless the Orders in Council were repealed, Napoleon'sconcessions would not go far to relieve the United States. The vesselshe would admit would be but the gleanings, after British cruisers hadreaped the ocean field. Pinkney, therefore, had to be importunate inpresenting the demands of his Government. Wellesley persisted in hismethod of procrastination. At last, on December 4, he wrote briefly tosay that after careful inquiry he could find no authentic intelligenceof the repeal, nor of the restoration of the commerce of neutralnations to its previous conditions. He invited, however, a freshstatement from Pinkney, who then, in a letter dated December 10, [333]argued the case at length, under the three heads of the manner, orform, the terms, and the practical effect of the alleged repeal. Having completed the argument, he took incidental occasion to presentthe views of the United States concerning the whole system of theOrders in Council; animadverting severely, and emphasizing withliberal italics. The Orders went far beyond any intelligible standardof _retaliation_; but it soon appeared that neutrals might bepermitted to traffic, if they would submit with a dependence _trulycolonial_ to carry on their trade through British ports, to pay suchduties as the British Government might impose, and such charges asBritish agents might make. The modification of April 26, 1809, was oneof appearance only. True, neutrals were no longer compelled to enterBritish ports; their prohibition from interdicted ports was nominallyabsolute; but it was known that by coming to Great Britain they couldobtain a license to enter them, so that the effect was the same; andby forged papers this license system was so extended "that thecommerce of _England_ could advantageously find its way to thoseports. "[334]

Wellesley delayed reply till December 29. [335] He regretted theintrusion of these closing remarks, which might tend to interfere witha conciliatory spirit, but without further comment on them addressedhimself to the main question. His Government did not find the"notification" of the repeal of the French Decrees such as wouldjustify it in recalling the Orders in Council. The United Stateshaving demanded the formal revocation of the blockade of May, 1806, aswell as of the Orders in Council, he "must conclude, combining yourrequisition with that of the French Minister, that America demands therevocation of that order of blockade, as a practical instance of ourrenunciation of those principles of blockade which are condemned bythe French Government. " This inference seems overstrained; butcertainly much greater substantial concession was required of GreatBritain than of France. Wellesley intimated that this concert ofaction was partial--not neutral--between the two belligerents. "Itrust that the justice of the American Government will not considerthat France, by the repeal of her obnoxious decrees, _under such acondition_, [336] has placed the question in that state which canwarrant America in enforcing the Non-Intercourse Act against GreatBritain, and not against France. " He reminded Pinkney of the situationin which the commerce of neutral nations had been placed by manyrecent acts of the French Government; and said that its system ofviolence and injustice required some precautions of defence on thepart of Great Britain. In conclusion, his Majesty stood ready torepeal, when the French Decrees should be repealed without conditionsinjurious to the maritime rights and honor of the United Kingdom. 

Unhappily for Pinkney's argument on the actuality of Napoleon'srepeal, on the very day of his own writing, December 10, the American_chargé_[337] in Paris, Jonathan Russell, was sending Champagny aremonstrance[338] upon the seizure of an American vessel at Bordeaux, under the decrees of Berlin and Milan, on December 1, --a month aftertheir asserted repeal. That the Director of Customs at a principalseaport should understand them to be in force, nearly four monthsafter the publication of Champagny's letter in the "Moniteur, " wouldcertainly seem to imply some defect in customary form;[339] and theensuing measures of the Government would indicate also somethingmisleading in the terms. Russell told Champagny that, since November1, the alleged day of repeal, this was the first case to which theBerlin and Milan Decrees could apply; and lo! to it they were applied. Yet, "to execute the Act of Congress against the English requires theprevious revocation of the decrees. " It was, indeed, ingeniouslyargued in Congress, by an able advocate of the Administration, thatall the law required was the revocation in terms of the Decrees; theirsubsequent enforcement in act was immaterial. [340] Such a solution, however, would scarcely content the American people. The FrenchGovernment now took a step which clearly showed that the Decrees werestill in force, technically, however honest its purpose to hold to therevocation, if the United States complied with the conditions. Instructions to the Council of Prizes, [341] from the proper minister, directed that the vessel, and any others falling under the samecategory of entry after November 1, should "remain suspended" untilafter February 2, the period at which the United States should havefulfilled its obligation. Then they should be restored. 

The general trend of argument, pro and con, with the subsequentevents, probably shook the confidence of the Administration, and ofits supporters in Congress, in the certainty of the revocation, whichthe President had authenticated by his proclamation. Were the factunimpeachable, the law was clear; non-intercourse with Great Britainwould go into effect February 2, without further action. But thedoubts started were so plausible that it was certain any condemnationor enforcement under the law would be carried up to the highest court, to test whether the fact of revocation, upon which the operativenessof the statute turned, was legally established. Even should the courtdecline to review the act of the Executive, and accept theproclamation as sufficient evidence for its own decision, such feebleindorsement would be mortifying. A supplementary Act was thereforeframed, doing away with the original, and then reviving it, as a newmeasure, against Great Britain alone. In presenting this, the membercharged with its introduction said: "The Committee thought proper thatin this case the legislature should step forward and decide; that itwas not consistent with the responsibility they owed the community toturn over to judicial tribunals the decision of the question, whetherthe Non-Intercourse was in force or not. "[342] The matter was thustaken from the purview of the courts, and decided by a party vote. After an exhausting discussion, this bill passed at 4 A. M. , February28, 1811. It was approved by the President, March 2. 

For the settlement of American litigation this course was adequate;not so for the vindication of international procedure. The UnitedStates at this time had abundant justification for war with bothFrance and Great Britain, and it was within the righteous decision ofher own policy whether she should declare against either or both; butit is a serious impeachment of a Government's capacity and manfulnesswhen, with such questions as Impressment, the Orders in Council, Napoleon's Decrees, and his arbitrary sequestrations, war comes notfrom a bold grappling with difficulties, but from a series ofhuckstering attempts to buy off one antagonist or the other, with theresult of being fairly overreached. The outcome, summarily stated, hadbeen that a finesse of the French Government had attached the UnitedStates to Napoleon's Continental System. She was henceforth, ineffect, allied with the leading feature of French policy hostile toGreat Britain. It was perfectly competent and proper for her so toattach herself, if she saw fit. The Orders in Council were a nationalwrong to her, justifying retaliation and war; still more so wasImpressment. But it is humiliating to see one's country finallycommitted to such a step through being outwitted in a paltry bargain, and the justification of her course rested, not upon a firm assertionof right, but upon the refusal of another nation to accept amanifestly unequal proposition. The course of Great Britain washigh-handed, unjust, and not always straightforward; but it was candoritself alongside of Napoleon's. 

There remained but one step to complete the formal breach; and that, if the writer's analysis has been correct, resulted as directly as didthe final Non-Intercourse Act from action erroneously taken by Mr. Madison's Administration. Jackson's place, vacated in November, 1809, by the refusal to communicate further with him, remained stillunfilled. This delay was thought deliberate by the United StatesGovernment, which on May 22 wrote to Pinkney that it seemed tomanifest indifference to the character of the diplomatic intercoursebetween the two countries, arising from dissatisfaction at the stepnecessarily taken with regard to Mr. Jackson. Should this inferencefrom Wellesley's inaction prove correct, Pinkney was directed toreturn to the United States, leaving the office with a _chargéd'affaires_, for whom a blank appointment was sent. He was, however, to exercise his own judgment as to the time and manner. In consequenceof his interview with Wellesley, and in reply to a formal note ofinquiry, he received a private letter, July 22, 1810, saying it wasdifficult to enter upon the subject in an official form, but that itwas the Secretary's intention immediately to recommend a successor toJackson. Still the matter dragged, and at the end of the year noappointment had been made. 

In other ways, too, there was unexplained delay. In April Pinkney hadreceived powers to resume the frustrated negotiations committed firstto him and Monroe. Wellesley had welcomed the advance, and hadaccepted an order of discussion which gave priority to satisfactionfor the "Chesapeake" affair. After that an arrangement for therevocation of the Orders in Council should be attempted. On June 13Pinkney wrote home that a verbal agreement conformable to hisinstructions had been reached concerning the "Chesapeake, " and that hewas daily expecting a written overture embodying the terms. August 14this had not been received, --to his great surprise, for Wellesley'smanner had shown every disposition to accommodate. Upon this situationsupervened Cadore's declaration of the revocation of the FrenchDecrees, Pinkney's acceptance of the fact as indisputable, and hisurgency to obtain from the British Government a corresponding measurein the repeal of the Orders. Through all ran the same procrastination, issuing in entire inaction. 

Pinkney's correspondence shows a man diplomatically self-controlledand patient, though keenly sensible to the indignity of unwarrantabledelays. The rough speaking of his mind concerning the Orders inCouncil, in his letter of December 10, suggests no loss of temper, buta deliberate letting himself go. There appeared to him now nonecessity for further endurance. To Wellesley's rejoinder of December29 he sent an answer on January 14, 1811, "written, " he said, "underthe pressure of indisposition, and the influence of more indignationthan could well be suppressed. "[343] The questions at issue were againtrenchantly discussed, but therewith he brought to an end hisfunctions as minister of the United States. Under the same date, butby separate letter, he wrote that as no steps had been taken toreplace Jackson by an envoy of equal rank, his instructions imposed onhim the duty of informing his lordship that the Government of theUnited States could not continue to be represented in England by aminister plenipotentiary. Owing to the insanity of the King, and thedelays incident to the institution of a regency, his audience of leavewas delayed to February 28; and it is a noticeable coincidence thatthe day of this formal diplomatic act was also that upon which theNon-Intercourse Bill against Great Britain passed the House ofRepresentatives. In the course of the spring Pinkney embarked in thefrigate "Essex" for the United States. He had no successor until afterthe War of 1812, and the Non-Intercourse Act remained in vigor to theday of hostilities. 

On February 15, a month after Pinkney's notification of his intendeddeparture, Wellesley wrote him that the Prince Regent, whose authorityas such dated only from February 5, had appointed Mr. Augustus J. Foster minister at Washington. The delay had been caused in the firstinstance, "as I stated to you repeatedly, " by the wish to make anappointment satisfactory to the United States, and afterwards by thestate of his Majesty's Government; the regal function having been inabeyance until the King's incapacity was remedied by the institutionof the Regent. Wellesley suggested the possibility of Pinkneyreconsidering his decision, the ground for which was thus removed; butthe minister demurred. He replied that he inferred, from Wellesley'sletter, that the British Government by this appointment signified itsintention of conceding the demands of the United States; that theOrders in Council and blockade of May, 1806, would be annulled;without this a beneficial effect was not to be expected. Wellesleyreplied that no change of system was intended unless France revokedher Decrees. The effect of this correspondence, therefore, was simplyto place Pinkney's departure upon the same ground as the newNon-Intercourse Act against Great Britain. 

Mr. Augustus John Foster was still a very young man, just thirty-one. He had but recently returned from the position of minister to Sweden, the duties of which he had discharged[344] during a year very criticalfor the fortunes of that country, and in the event for Napoleon andEurope. Upon his new mission Wellesley gave him a long letter ofinstructions, [345] in which he dealt elaborately with the whole courseof events connected with the Orders in Council and Bonaparte's Decree, especially as connected with America. In this occurs a concise andlucid summary of the British policy, which is worth quoting. "Fromthis view of the origin of the Orders in Council, you will perceivethat the object of our system was not to crush the trade of thecontinent, but to counteract an attempt to crush British trade; thatwe have endeavored to permit the continent to receive as large aportion of commerce as might be practicable through Great Britain, andthat all our subsequent regulations, and every modification of thesystem, by new orders, or modes of granting or withholding licenses, have been calculated for _the purpose of encouraging the trade ofneutrals through Great Britain_, [346] whenever such encouragementmight appear advantageous to the general interests of commerce andconsistent with the public safety of the nation, --the preservation ofwhich is the primary object of all national councils, and theparamount duty of the Executive power. "

In brief, the plea was that Bonaparte by armed constraint had forcedthe continent into a league to destroy Great Britain through hertrade; that there was cause to fear these measures would succeed, ifnot counteracted; that retaliation by similar measures was thereforedemanded by the safety of the state; and that the method adopted wasretaliation, so modified as to produce the least possible evil toothers concerned. It was admitted and deplored that prohibition ofdirect trade with the ports of the league injuriously affected theUnited States. That this was illegal, judged by the law of nations, was also admitted; but it was justified by the natural right ofretaliation. Wellesley scouted the view, pertinaciously urged by theAmerican Government, that the exclusion of British commerce fromneutral continental ports by the Continental System was a meremunicipal regulation, which the United States could not resist. Municipal regulation was merely the cloak, beneath which Franceconcealed her military coercion of states helpless against her policy. "The pretext of municipal right, under which the violence of the enemyis now exercised against neutral commerce in every part of thecontinent, will not be admitted by Great Britain; nor can we ever deemthe repeal of the French Decrees to be effectual, until neutralcommerce shall be restored to the conditions in which it stood, previously to the commencement of the French system of commercialwarfare, as promulgated in the Decrees. "

Foster's mission was to urge these arguments, and to induce the repealof the Non-Intercourse law against Great Britain, as partial betweenthe two belligerents; who, if offenders against accepted law, were inthat offenders equally. The United States was urged not thus to joinNapoleon's league against Great Britain, from which indeed, if sosupported, the direst distress must arise. It is needless to pursuethe correspondence which ensued with Monroe, now Secretary of State. By Madison's proclamation, and the passage of the Non-Intercourse Actof March 2, 1811, the American Government was irretrievably committedto the contention that France had so revoked her Decrees as toconstitute an obligation upon Great Britain and upon the UnitedStates. To admit mistake, even to one's self, in so important a step, probably passes diplomatic candor, and especially after the blunder inErskine's case. Yet, even admitting the adequacy of Champagny'sletter, the Decrees were not revoked; seizures were still made underthem. In November, 1811, Monroe had to write to Barlow, now Americanminister to France, "It is not sufficient that it should appear thatthe French Decrees are repealed, in the _final decision_ of a causebrought _before a French tribunal_. An active prohibitory policyshould be adopted _to prevent seizures_ on the principle. "[347] Thiswas in the midst of his correspondence with Foster. The two disputantsthreshed over and over again the particulars of the controversy, butnothing new was adduced by either. [348] Conditions were hopeless, andwar assured, even when Foster arrived in Washington, in June, 1811. 

One thing, however, was finally settled. In behalf of his Government, in reparation for the "Chesapeake" affair, Foster repeated theprevious disavowal of Berkeley's action, and his consequent recall;and offered to restore to the ship herself the survivors of the mentaken from her. Pecuniary provision for those who had suffered in theaction, or for their families, was also tendered. The propositionswere accepted, while denying the adequacy of Berkeley's removal fromone command to another. The men were brought to Boston harbor, andthere formally given up to the "Chesapeake. "

Tardy and insufficient as was this atonement, it was further delayed, at the very moment of tendering, by an incident which may be said tohave derived directly from the original injury. In June, 1810, asquadron of frigates and sloops had been constituted under CommodoreJohn Rodgers, to patrol the coast from the Capes of the Chesapeakenorthward to the eastern limit of the United States. Its orders, generally, were to defend from molestation by a foreign armed ship allvessels of the United States within the marine league, seaward, towhich neutral jurisdiction was conceded by international law. Forcewas to be used, if necessary, and, if the offender were a privateer, or piratical, she was to be sent in. So weak and unready was thenominal naval force of the United States, that piracy near her veryshores was apprehended; and concern was expressed in Congressregarding vessels from Santo Domingo, thus converted into a kind oflocal Barbary power. To these general instructions the Secretary ofthe Navy attached a special reminder. Recalling the "Chesapeake"affair, as a merely exaggerated instance of the contumely everywhereheaped upon the American flag by both belligerents, he wrote: "Whathas been perpetrated may be again attempted. It is therefore our dutyto be prepared and determined at every hazard to vindicate the injuredhonor of our navy, and revive the drooping spirit of the nation. It isexpected that, while you conduct the force under your commandconsistently with the principles of a strict and upright neutrality, you are to maintain and support at every risk and cost the dignity ofour flag; and that, offering yourself no unjust aggression, you are tosubmit to none, not even a menace or threat from a force notmaterially your superior. "

Under such reminiscences and such words, the ships' guns were like togo off of themselves. It requires small imagination to picture thefeelings of naval officers in the years after the "Chesapeake's"dishonor. In transmitting the orders to his captains, Rodgers added, "Every man, woman, and child, in our country, will be active inconsigning our names to disgrace, and even the very vessels composingour little navy to the ravages of the worms, or the detestabletransmigration to merchantmen, should we not fulfil theirexpectations. I should consider the firing of a shot by a vessel ofwar, of either nation, and particularly England, at one of our publicvessels, whilst the colors of her nation are flying on board of her, as a menace of the grossest order, and in amount an insult which itwould be disgraceful not to resent by the return of two shot at least;while should the shot strike, it ought to be considered an act ofhostility meriting chastisement to the utmost extent of all yourforce. "[349] The Secretary indorsed approval upon the copy of thisorder forwarded to him. Rodgers' apprehension for the fate of the navyreflected accurately the hostile views of leaders in the dominantpolitical party. Demoralized by the gunboat system, and disorganizedand browbeaten by the loud-mouthed disfavor of representativeCongressmen, the extinction of the service was not unnaturallyexpected. Bainbridge, a captain of standing and merit, applied at thistime for a furlough to make a commercial voyage to China, owing tostraitened means. "I have hitherto refused such offers, on thepresumption that my country would require my services. Thatpresumption is removed, and even doubts entertained of the permanencyof our naval establishment. "[350]

The following year, 1811, Rodgers' squadron and orders were continued. The British admirals of adjacent stations, acting doubtless underorders from home, enjoined great caution upon their ships of war inapproaching the American coast. [351] While set not to relax the Ordersin Council, the ministry did not wish war by gratuitous offence. Cruising, however, continued, though charged with possibilities ofexplosion. Under these circumstances Rodgers' ship, the "President"frigate, and a British sloop of war, the "Little Belt, " sighted eachother on May 16, 1811, fifty miles east of Cape Henry. Independent ofthe general disposition of ships of war in troublous times to overhauland ascertain the business of any doubtful sail, Rodgers' ordersprescribed the capture of vessels of certain character, even outsidethe three-mile limit; and, the "Little Belt" making sail from him, hepursued. About 8 P. M. , it being then full dark, the character andforce of the chase were still uncertain, and the vessels within range. The two accounts of what followed differ diametrically; but theBritish official version[352] is less exhaustive in matter and mannerthan the American, which rests upon the sworn testimony of numerouscompetent witnesses before a formal Court of Inquiry. [353] By this itwas found proved that the "Little Belt" fired the first gun, which byRodgers' statement cut away a backstay and went into the mainmast. Thebatteries of both ships opened, and an engagement followed, lastingtwelve or fifteen minutes, during which the "Little Belt, " hopelesslyinferior in force, was badly cut up, losing nine killed andtwenty-three wounded. Deplorable as was this result, and whateverunreconciled doubts may be entertained by others than Americans as tothe blame, there can be no question that the affair was an accident, unpremeditated. It was clearly in evidence that Rodgers had cautionedhis officers against any firing prior to orders. There was nothing ofthe deliberate purpose characterizing the "Chesapeake" affair; yet Mr. Foster, with the chariness which from first to last marked the Britishhandling of that business, withheld the reparation authorized by hisinstructions until he had received a copy of the proceedings of thecourt. 

On July 24, 1811, the President summoned Congress to meet November 4, a month before the usual time, in consequence of the state of foreignaffairs. His message spoke of ominous indications; of the inflexiblehostility evidenced by Great Britain in trampling upon rights which noindependent nation can relinquish; and recommended legislation forincreasing the military force. As regarded the navy, his words wereindefinite and vague, beyond suggesting the expediency of purchasingmaterials for ship-building. The debates and action of Congressreflected the tone of the Executive. War was anticipated as a matterof course, and mentioned freely in speeches. That the regular armyshould be enlarged, and dispositions made for more effective use ofthe militia, was granted; the only dispute being about the amount ofdevelopment. In this the legislature exceeded the President's wishes, which were understood, though not expressed in the message. PreviousCongresses had authorized an army of ten thousand, of which not morethan five thousand were then in the ranks. It was voted to completethis; to add twenty-five thousand more regulars, and to provide forfifty thousand volunteers. Doubts, based upon past experience, andwhich proved well founded, were expressed as to the possibility ofraising so many regular troops, pledged for five years to submit tothe restrictions of military life. It was urged that, in theeconomical conditions of the country, the class did not exist fromwhich such a force could be recruited. 

This consideration did not apply to the navy. Seamen could be hadabundantly from the merchant shipping, the activities of which mustnecessarily be much curtailed by war with a great naval power. Nevertheless, the dominance of Jefferson, though in this particularalready shaken, remained upon the mass of his party. The new Secretaryof the Navy was from South Carolina, not reckoned among the commercialstates; but, however influenced, he ventured to intimate doubts as tothe gunboat system. Of one thing there was no doubt. On a gunboat agun cost twelve thousand dollars a year; the same on a frigate costbut four thousand. [354] In the House of Representatives, the strongestsupport to the development of the navy as a permanent force came fromthe Secretary's state, backed by Henry Clay from Kentucky, and by thecommercial states; the leading representative of which, Josiah Quincy, expressed, however, a certain diffidence, because in the embitteredpolitics of the day the mere fact of Federalist support tended ratherto damage the cause. 

So much of the President's message as related to the navy--threelines, wholly non-committal--was referred to a special committee. Thereport[355] was made by Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, whose clearand cogent exposition of the capabilities of the country and thepossibility of providing a force efficient against Great Britain, under her existing embarrassments, was supported powerfully andperspicuously by William Lowndes of the same state. The text for theirremarks was supplied by a sentence in the committee's report: "Theimportant engine of national strength and national security, which isformed by a naval force, has hitherto been treated with a neglecthighly impolitic, or supported by a spirit so languid, as, while ithas preserved the existence of the establishment, has had the effectof loading it with the imputations of wasteful expense, andcomparative inefficiency. .. . Such a course is impolitic under anycircumstances. " This was the condemnation of the party's past. Clayfound his delight in dealing with some of the oratory, which on thepresent occasion still sustained--and for the moment successfullysustained--the prepossessions of Jefferson. Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, were republics with free institutions and great navies;Carthage, Rome, Venice, and Genoa had lost their liberties, and theirnational existence. Clearly navies, besides being very costly, werefatal to constitutional freedom. Not in reply to such _non sequitur_, but quickened by an insight which was to receive earlier vindicationthan he could have anticipated, Quincy prophesied that, amid thediverse and contrary interests of the several states, which the lackof a common object of affection left still imperfectly unified insentiment, a glorious navy, identified with the whole country becauseof its external action, yet local to no part, would supply a commoncentre for the enthusiasm not yet inspired by the central government, too closely associated for years back with a particular school ofextreme political thought, narrowly territorial and clannish in itsorigin and manifestation. Within a twelvemonth, the "Constitution, "most happily apt of all names ever given to a ship, became theembodiment of this verified prediction. 

The report of the committee was modest in its scope. "To the defenceof your ports and harbors, and the protection of your coasting trade, should be confined the present objects and operations of any navywhich the United States can, or ought, to have. " To this office it wasestimated that twelve ships of the line and twenty frigates wouldsuffice. Cheves and Lowndes were satisfied that such a fleet waswithin the resources of the country; and to insure the fifteenthousand seamen necessary to man it, they would be willing to limitthe number of privateers, --a most wholesome and necessary provision. By a careful historical examination of Great Britain's past andpresent exigencies, it was shown that such a force would most probablykeep clear the approaches to all American ports, the most criticalzone for shipping, whether inward or outward bound; because, tocounteract it, the enemy would have to employ numbers so largelysuperior that they could not be spared from her European conflict. Theargument was sound; but unhappily Cheves, Lowndes, Clay, and Quincydid not represent the spirit of the men who for ten years had ruledthe country and evolved the gunboat system. These, in their day ofpower, not yet fully past, had neither maintained the fleet noraccumulated material, and there was no seasoned timber to build with. The Administration which expired in 1801 had left timber for six74-gun ships, of which now remained only enough for four. The rest hadbeen wasted in gunboats, or otherwise. The committee therefore limitedits recommendations to building the frigates, for which it wasbelieved materials could be procured. 

Even in this reduced form it proved impossible to overcome theopposition to a navy as economically expensive and politicallydangerous. The question was amply debated; but as, on the one hand, little doubt was felt about the rapid conquest of Canada by militiaand volunteers, so, on the other, the same disposition to trust toextemporized irregular forces encouraged reliance simply uponprivateering. Private enterprise in such a cause undoubtedly has fromtime to time attained marked results; but in general effect the methodis a wasteful expenditure of national resources, and, historically, saps the strength of the regular navy. In the manning of inefficientprivateers--and the majority were inefficient and ineffective--werethrown away resources of seamen which, in an adequate naval force, organized and directed as it would have been by the admirable officersof that period, could have accomplished vastly more in the annoyanceof British trade, --the one offensive naval undertaking left open tothe nation. Even with the assistance of the Federalists the provisionfor the frigates could not be carried, though the majority wasnarrow--62 to 59. The same fate befell the proposition to provide adockyard. All that could be had was an appropriation of six hundredthousand dollars, distributed over three successive years, for buyingtimber. These votes were taken January 27, 1812, in full expectationof war, and only five months before it was declared. 

Early in April, Congress, in secret session, passed an Act of Embargofor ninety days, which became law on the fourth by the President'ssignature. The motive was twofold: to retain at home the ships andseamen of the nation, in anticipation of war, to keep them fromfalling into the hands of the enemy; and also to prevent the carriageof supplies indispensably necessary to the British armies in Spain. Both objects were defeated by the action of Quincy, in conjunctionwith Senator Lloyd of Massachusetts and Representative Emott of NewYork. Learning that the President intended to recommend the embargo, these gentlemen, as stated by Quincy on the floor of the House, despatched at once to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, expresseswhich left Washington March 31, the day before Madison's letter wasdated. Four or five days' respite was thus secured, and the wholemercantile community set zealously to work to counteract the effectsof the measure. "Niles' Register, " published in Baltimore, said:"Drays were working night and day, from Tuesday night, March 31, andcontinued their toil till Sunday morning, incessantly. In thishurly-burly to palsy the arm of the Government all parties united. OnSunday perhaps not twenty seamen, able to do duty, could be found inall Baltimore. " A New York paper is quoted as saying, "The propertycould not have been moved off with greater expedition had the citybeen enveloped in flames. " From that port forty-eight vessels cleared;from Baltimore thirty-one; Philadelphia and Alexandria in likeproportions. It was estimated that not less than two hundred thousandbarrels of flour, besides grain in other shapes, and provisions of allkinds, to a total value of fifteen million dollars, were rushed out ofthe country in those five days, when labor-saving appliances werenearly unknown. [356]

Jonathan Russell, who was now _chargé d'affaires_ at London, havingbeen transferred from Paris upon the arrival of Armstrong's successor, Joel Barlow, wrote home, "The great shipments of provisions, whichwere hurried from America in expectation of the embargo, have giventhe Peninsula a supply for about two months; and at the expiration ofthat period the harvest in that region will furnish a stock for aboutthree months more. .. . The avidity discovered by our countrymen toescape from the embargo, and the disregard of its policy, haveencouraged this Government to hope that supplies will still continueto be received from the United States. The ship 'Lady Madison, ' whichleft Liverpool in March, has returned thither with a cargo taken inoff Sandy Hook without entering an American port. There are severalvessels now about leaving this country with the intention not only ofprocuring a cargo in the same way, but of getting rid, illicitly, ofone they carry out. "[357]

It was, indeed, a conspicuous instance of mercantile avidity, whollydisregardful of patriotic considerations, such as is to be found inall times and in all countries; strictly analogous to the constantsmuggling between France and Great Britain at this very time. Itssignificance in the present case, however, is as marking thewidespread lack of a national patriotism, as distinct from purelylocal advantage and personal interests, which unhappily characterizedAmericans at this period. Of this Great Britain stood ready to availherself, by extending to the United States the system of licenses, bywhich, combined with the Orders in Council, she was combating with alarge degree of success Napoleon's Continental System. She hoped, andthe sequel showed not unreasonably, that even during open hostilitiesshe could in the same manner thwart the United States in its effortsto keep its own produce from her markets. Less than a fortnight afterthe American Declaration of War was received, Russell, who had not yetleft England, wrote to the Secretary of State that the Board of Tradehad given notice that licenses would be granted for American vesselsto carry provisions from the United States to Cadiz and Lisbon, forthe term of eight months; and that a policy had been issued at Lloydsto a New York firm, insuring flour from that port to the peninsula, warranted free from British capture, and from capture or detention bythe Government of the United States. [358]

The British armies were thus nourished and dependent, both in Spainand in Canada. The supplying of the latter scarcely fell short oftreason, and decisively affected the maintenance of the war in thatquarter. It is difficult to demonstrate a moral distinction betweenwhat was done there, disregardful of national success, in shamefulsupport of the enemy, and the supplying of the peninsula; but anintuitive sympathy extends to the latter a tolerance which the motivesof the individual agents probably do not deserve, and for which calmreason cannot give a perfectly satisfactory account. But it was themisfortune of American policy, as shaped by the Administration, thatit was committed to support Napoleon in his iniquitous attack upon theliberties of Spain; that it saw in his success the probable fulfilmentof its designs upon the Floridas;[359] and that its chosen ground forproceeding against Great Britain, rather than France, was her refusalto conform her action to a statement of the Emperor's, the illusoryand deceptive character of which became continually more apparent. 

To declare war because of the Orders in Council was a simple, straightforward, and wholly justifiable course; but the flying monthsmade more and more evident, to the Government and its agents abroad, that it was vain to expect revocation on the ground of Napoleon'srecall of his edicts, for they were not recalled. Having entered uponthis course, however, it seemed impossible to recede, or toacknowledge a mistake, the pinch of which was nevertheless felt. Writing to Russell, whose service in Paris, from October, 1810, toOctober, 1811, and transfer thence to London, made him unusuallyfamiliar, on both sides of the Channel, with the controversy overChampagny's letter of August 5, 1810, Madison speaks "of the delicacyof our situation, having in view, on the one hand, the importance ofobtaining from the French Government confirmation of the repeal of theDecrees, and on the other that of not weakening the ground on whichthe British repeal was urged. "[360] That is, it would be awkward tohave the British ministry find out that we were pressing France for aconfirmation of that very revocation which we were confidentlyasserting to them to be indisputable, and to require in good faith thewithdrawal of their Orders. Respecting action taken under theso-called repeal, Russell had written on March 15, 1811, over threemonths after it was said to take effect, "By forbearing to condemn, orto acquit, distinctly and loyally, [the vessels seized since November1], this Government encourages us to persevere in our non-importationagainst England, and England to persist in her orders against us. Thisstate of things appears calculated to produce mutual complaint andirritation, and cannot probably be long continued without leading to amore serious contest, . .. Which is perhaps an essential object of thiscountry's policy. "[361] July 15, he expressed regret to the Duke ofBassano, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the proceedingsconcerning captured American vessels "had been so partial, andconfined to cases which from their peculiar circumstances provednothing conclusively in relation to the revocation of the FrenchEdicts. "[362]

Russell might have found some light as to the causes of these delays, could he have seen a note addressed by the Emperor to theAdministration of Commerce, April 29. In this, renewing the reasoningof the Bayonne Decree, he argued that every American vessel whichtouched at an English port was liable to confiscation in the UnitedStates; consequently, could be seized by an American cruiser on theopen sea; therefore, was equally open to seizure there by a Frenchcruiser--the demand advanced by Canning[363] which gave such justoffence; and if by a French cruiser at sea, likewise in a French portby the French Government. She was in fact no longer American, not evena denationalized American, but an English vessel. Under thissupposition, Napoleon luminously inferred, "It could be said: TheDecrees of Berlin and Milan are recalled as to the United States, but, as every ship which has stopped in England, or is destined thither, isa ship unacknowledged (_sans aveu_), which American laws punish andconfiscate, she may be confiscated in France. " The Emperor concludedthat should this theory not be capable of substantiation, the mattermight for the present be left obscure. [364] On September 13 the shipsin question had not been liberated. 

Coincidently with his note to Bassano, Russell wrote to Monroe, "It ismy conviction that the great object of their policy is to entangle usin a war with England. They therefore abstain from doing any act whichwould furnish clear and unequivocal testimony of the revocation oftheir decrees, lest it should induce the extinction of the BritishOrders, and thereby appease our irritation against their enemy. Hence, of all the captured vessels since November 1, the three which wereliberated were precisely those which had not violated theDecrees. "[365] Yet, such were the exigencies of the debate withEngland, those three cases were transmitted by him at the same time tothe American _chargé_ in London as evidence of the revocation. [366] Tothe French Minister he wrote again, August 8, "After the declarationsof M. De Champagny and yourself, I cannot permit myself to doubt therevocation; . .. But I may be allowed to lament that no fact has yetcome to my knowledge of a character unequivocally and incontrovertiblyto confirm that revocation. " "That none of the captured vessels havebeen condemned, instead of proving the extinction of the edicts, appears rather to be evidence, at best, of a commutation of thepenalty from prompt confiscation to perpetual detention. "[367] Thematter was further complicated by an announcement of Napoleon to theChamber of Commerce, in April of the same year, that the Berlin andMilan Decrees were the fundamental law of the Empire concerningneutral commerce, and that American ships would be repelled fromFrench ports, unless the United States conformed to those decrees, byexcluding British ships and merchandise. [368] Under such conditions, argument with a sceptical British ministry was attended withdifficulties. The position to which the Government had become reduced, by endeavoring to play off France and Great Britain against eachother, in order to avoid a war with either, was as perplexing ashumiliating. "Great anxiety, "[369] to which little sympathy can beextended, was felt in Washington as to the evidence for the actualityof the repeals. 

The situation was finally cleared up by a clever move of the BritishCabinet, forcing Napoleon's hand at a moment when the Orders inCouncil could with difficulty be maintained longer against populardiscontent. On March 10, 1812, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a report to the Senate, reiterated the demands of the Decrees, andasserted again that, until those demands were conceded by England, theDecrees must be enforced against Powers which permitted their flags tobe denationalized. The position thus reaffirmed was emphasized by arequirement for a large increase of the army for this object. "It isnecessary that all the disposable forces of France be available forsending everywhere where the English flag, and other flags, denationalized or convoyed by English ships of war, may seek toenter. "[370] No exceptions in favor of the United States beingstated, the British ministry construed the omission as conclusiveproof of the unqualified continuance of the Decrees;[371] and theoccasion was taken to issue an Order in Council, defining theGovernment's position, both in the past and for the future. Quotingthe French minister's Report, as removing all doubts of Napoleon'spersistence in the maintenance of a system, "as inconsistent withneutral rights and independence as it was hostile to the maritimerights and commercial interests of Great Britain, " the Prince Regentdeclared that, "if at any time thereafter the Berlin and Milan Decreesshould be absolutely and unconditionally repealed, by some authenticact of the French Government, publicly promulgated, then the Orders inCouncil of January, 1807, and April, 1809, shall without any furtherorder be, and the same are hereby declared from thenceforth to be, wholly and absolutely revoked. "[372] No exception could be taken tothe phrasing or form of this Order. The wording was precise andexplicit; the time fixed was definite, --the date of the French Repeal;the manner of revocation was the same as that of promulgation, anOrder in Council observant of all usual formalities. 

In substance, this well-timed State Paper challenged Champagny'sletter of August 5, 1810, and the American Non-Importation Act basedupon it. Both these asserted the revocation of the French Decrees. TheBritish Cabinet, seizing a happy opportunity, asked of the world theproduction of the revocation, or else the justification of its owncourse. The demand went far to silence the growing discontents athome, and to embarrass the American Government in the grounds uponwhich it had chosen to base its action. It was well calculated alsoto disconcert the Emperor, for, unless he did something more definite, dissension would increase in the United States, where, as Barlowwrote, "It is well known to the world, for our public documents arefull of it, that great doubts exist, even among our best informedmerchants, and in the halls of Congress itself, whether the Berlin andMilan Decrees are to this day repealed, or even modified, in regard tothe United States. " The sentence is taken from a letter[373] which headdressed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 1, 1812, whenhe had received the recent British Order. He pointed out how astutelythis step was calculated to undo the effect of Champagny's letter, andto weaken the American Administration at the critical moment when itwas known to be preparing for war. He urged that the French Governmentshould now make and publish an authentic Act, declaring the Berlin andMilan Decrees, as relative to the United States, to have ceased inNovember, 1810. "Such an act is absolutely necessary to the AmericanGovernment; and, though solicited as an accommodation, it may bedemanded as a right. If it was the duty of France to cease to applythose Decrees to the United States, it is equally her duty topromulgate it to the world in as formal a manner as we havepromulgated our law for the exclusion of British merchandise. Sheought to declare and publish the non-application of these Decrees inthe same forms in which she enacted the Decrees. The President hasinstructed me to propose and press this object. "

At last the demand was made which should have been enforced eighteenmonths before. After sending the letter, Barlow had "a pretty sharpconversation" with Bassano, in which he perceived a singularreluctance to answer his letter. At last the Duke placed before him aDecree, drawn up in due and customary form, dated a yearbefore, --April 28, 1811, --declaring that "the Decrees of Berlin andMilan are definitively, and to date from the first day of Novemberlast, [1810], considered as not having existed in regard to Americanvessels. "[374] This Decree, Bassano said, had been communicated toRussell, and also sent to Serrurier, the French minister atWashington, with orders to convey it to the American Government. BothRussell and Serrurier denied ever having received the paper. [375]

Barlow made no comment upon the strange manner in which this documentwas produced to him, and confined himself to inquiring if it had beenpublished. The reply could only be, No; a singular admission withregard to a formal paper a year old, and of such importance to allconcerned. He then asked that a copy might be sent him. Upon receipt, he at once hastened it to Russell in London, by the sloop of war"Wasp, " then lying in a French port. He wrote, "You will doubtlessrender an essential service to both Great Britain and the UnitedStates by communicating it without loss of time to the ForeignSecretary. If by this the cause of war should be removed, there is anobvious reason for keeping the secret, if possible, so long as thatthe "Wasp" may not bring the news to this country in any other mannerbut in your despatch. This Government, as you must long haveperceived, wishes not to see that effect produced; and I should notprobably have obtained the letter and documents from the Minister, ifthe Prince Regent's Declaration had not convinced this Government thatthe war was now become inevitable. "[376]

Russell transmitted the Decree to the British Foreign Secretary May20, 1812. The Government was at the moment in confusion, through theassassination, May 11, of Mr. Perceval, the Prime Minister; who, though not esteemed of the first order of statesmanship by hiscontemporaries and colleagues, had been found in recent negotiationsthe only available man about whom a cabinet could unite. A period ofsuspense followed, in which the difficulty of forming a newgovernment, owing to personal antagonisms, was complicated by radicaldifferences as to public policy, especially in the cardinal point ofpursuing or relinquishing the war in the peninsula. Not till near themiddle of June was an arrangement reached. The same ministry, substantially, remained in power, with Lord Liverpool as premier;Castlereagh continuing as Foreign Secretary. This retained in officethe party identified with the Orders in Council, and favoring armedsupport to the Spanish revolt. 

The delay in settling the government afforded an excuse for postponingaction upon the newly discovered French Decree. It permitted also timefor reflection. Just before Perceval's death, Russell had noted a firmdetermination to maintain the Orders in Council, conditioned only bythe late Declaration of April 21; but at the same time there wasevident apprehension of the consequences of war with the UnitedStates. [377] This, he carefully explained, was due to no apprehensionof American military power. Even Lord Grenville, one of the chiefleaders of the Opposition, was satisfied that the United States couldnot conquer Canada. "We are, indeed, most miserably underrated inEurope. " "It is not believed here, notwithstanding the spirited reportof the Committee on Foreign Relations, that we shall resort to anydefinitive measures. We have indeed a reputation in Europe for sayingso much and doing so little that we shall not be believed in earnestuntil we act in a manner not to be mistaken. " "I am persuaded thisGovernment has presumed much on our weakness and divisions, and thatit continues to believe that we have not energy and union enough tomake effective war. Nor is this confined to the ministry, but extendsto the leaders of the Opposition. " "Mr. Perceval is well known tocalculate with confidence that even in case of war we shall be obligedto resort to a license trade for a supply of British manufactures. ""He considers us incapable even of bearing the privations of a stateof hostility with England, and much more incapable of becoming aformidable enemy. " On March 3 Perceval in a debate in the House hadindicated the most positive intentions of maintaining the Orders, andasserted that, in consequence of Napoleon's Decrees, Great Britain wasno longer restrained by the law of nations in the extent or form ofretaliation to which she may resort upon the enemy. "I cannot perceivethe slightest indication of apprehension of a rupture with the UnitedStates, or any measure of preparation to meet such an event. Such isthe conviction of our total inability to make war that the five or sixthousand troops now in Canada are considered to be amply sufficient toprotect that province against our mightiest efforts. "[378] Arevolution of sentiment was to be noted even in the minds of formeradvocates. Castlereagh, at a levee on March 12, said to Russell thatthe movements in the United States appeared to him to be nothing butparty evolutions. 

There was, however, another side to the question which occasioned moreconcern to the British ministry. "It is the increasing want of ourintercourse, " wrote Russell May 9, "rather than the apprehension ofour arms which leads to a conciliatory spirit" which he had recentlynoticed. "They will endeavor to avoid the calamity of war with theUnited States by every means which can save their pride and theirconsistency. The scarcity of bread in this country, the distress ofthe manufacturing towns, and the absolute dependency of the alliedtroops in the Peninsula on our supplies, form a check on their conductwhich they can scarcely have the hardihood to disregard. "[379] Twodays after these words were written, the murder of Perceval addedpolitical anarchy to the embarrassments of the Government. The crisisthen impending was indeed momentous. War between France and Russia wascertain. Upon its outcome depended the fall of the Continental System, or its prevalence over all Europe in an extent and with a rigor neveryet reached. "Some of the Powers of Europe, " said the Emperor, "havenot fulfilled their promise with respect to the Continental System. Imust force them to it. " In carrying this message to the Senate, theMinister of Foreign Affairs said: "In whatever port of Europe aBritish ship can enter there must be a French garrison to preventit;"[380] an interesting commentary upon the neutral regulations towhich the United States professed that neither she nor Great Britainhad any claim to object, because municipal. Great Britain had alreadytouched ruin too nearly to think lightly of the conditions. By herOrders in Council she had so retorted Napoleon's Decrees as to inducehim, in order still further to enforce them, into the Peninsular War, and now into that with Russia. To uphold the latter, her busynegotiators, profiting by his high-handedness, had obtained for theCzar peace with Sweden and Turkey. More completely to sustain him, itwas essential to support in fullest effect the powerful diversionwhich retained three hundred thousand French troops in Spain. To dothis, the assistance of American food supplies was imperative. 

If peace with the United States could be maintained, the triumph ofBritish diplomacy would be unqualified. The announcement of thealleged Decree of April 28, 1811, came therefore most opportunely tosave their pride and self-consistency. On June 23 Castlereaghtransmitted to Russell an Order in Council published that day, revoking as to the United States the celebrated Orders of January 7, 1807, and April 26, 1809. "I am to request you, " ran his letter, "thatyou will acquaint your Government that the Prince Regent's ministershave taken _the earliest opportunity, after the resumption of theGovernment_, to advise his Royal Highness to the adoption of a measuregrounded upon the document communicated by you to this office on the20th ultimo;"[381] that is upon the Decree of April 28. No oneaffected to believe that this had been framed at the date it bore. "There was something so very much like fraud on the face of it, " wroteRussell, "that in several conversations which I have since had withLord Castlereagh, particularly at a dinner at the Lord Mayor's, when Iwas placed next his lordship, I have taken care not to commit thehonor of my Government by attempting its vindication. When hislordship called it a strange proceeding, a new specimen of Frenchdiplomacy, a trick unworthy of a civilized government, I have merelyreplied that the motives or good faith of the Government which issuedit, or the real time when it was issued, were of little importance asto the effect which it ought to have here; that it was sufficient thatit contained a most precise and formal declaration that the Berlin andMilan Decrees were revoked, in relation to America, from November 1, 1810. "[382]

This was true; but the contention of the British Government had beenthat the system of the Decrees was one whole; that its effect uponAmerica could not be dissociated from that upon continental neutralstates, where it was enforced under the guise of municipalregulations; and that it must be revoked as a whole, in order toimpose the repeal of the Orders in Council. This position had beenreaffirmed in the recent Order of April 21. Opinion will thereforediffer as to the ministry's success in escaping, under the cover ofthe new Decree, from the dilemma in which they were placed by theirresistible agitation against the Orders in Council spreading throughthe nation, and the necessity of avoiding war with the United States, if possible, because of the affairs of the Peninsula. They made thebest of it by alleging, as it were, the spirit of the Order of April21; the disposition "to take such measures as may tend to re-establishthe intercourse between neutral and belligerent nations upon itsaccustomed principles. " For this reason, while avowing explicitly thatthe tenor of the Decree did not meet the requirements of the lateOrder, the Orders in Council were revoked from August 1 nextfollowing; and vessels captured after May 20, the date of Russell'scommunicating the Decree, would be released. The ministry thus recededgracefully under compulsion; and for their own people at least savedtheir face. 

Superficially the British diplomatic triumph for the moment seemedcomplete. They had withdrawn their head from the noose just as itbegan to tighten; and they had done so not on any ground of stringentrequirement, but with expressions of desire to go even farther thantheir just claims, in order to promote conciliation. Russell naturallyfelt a moment of bitter discomfiture. "In yielding, the ministersappear to have been extremely perplexed in seeking for a subterfugefor their credit. All their feelings and all their prejudices revoltedat the idea of publicly bending to the Opposition, or truckling to theUnited States, and they were compelled to seize on the French Decreeof April 28, 1811, as the only means of saving themselves from thedegradation of acknowledging that they were vanquished. Without thisdecree they would have been obliged to yield, and I almost regret thatit existed to furnish a salvo, miserable as it is, for their pride. Our victory, however, is still complete, and I trust that those whohave refused to support our Government in the contest will at least bewilling to allow it the honors of a triumph. "[383]

Russell wrote under the mistaken impression that the repeal of theOrders had come in time to save war; in which event the yielding ofthe British ministry, identified as it was with the Orders in Council, might be construed as a triumph for the system of peaceable coercion, by commercial restrictions, which formed the whole policy of Jeffersonand Madison. The triumph claimed by him must be qualified, however, bythe reflection that it was obtained at the expense of becoming thedupe of a French deception, on its face so obvious as to deprivemistake of the excuse of plausibility. The eagerness of theGovernment, and of its representatives abroad, for a diplomatictriumph, had precipitated them into a step for which, on the groundstaken, no justification existed; and they had since then been draggedat the wheels of Napoleon's chariot, in a constant dust ofmystification, until he had finally achieved the end of his schemingand landed them in a war for which they were utterly unprepared, andwhich it had been the chief object of commercial reprisals to avoid. Thus considered, the triumph was barren. 

On June 1, 1812, President Madison sent to Congress a message, [384]reciting the long list of international wrongs endured at the hands ofGreat Britain, and recommending to the deliberations of Congress thequestion of peace or war. On June 4 the House of Representatives, by avote of seventy-nine yeas to forty-nine nays, declared that a state ofwar existed between the United States and Great Britain. The bill thenwent to the Senate, where it was discussed, amended, and passed onJune 17, by nineteen yeas to thirteen nays. The next day the Houseconcurred in the Senate's amendments, and the bill thus passedreceived the President's signature immediately. The war thus began, formally, on June 18, 1812, five days before the repeal of the BritishOrders in Council. 

While the Declaration of War was still under debate, the Secretary ofWar, Eustis, on June 8 reported to the Senate that of the ten thousandmen authorized as a peace establishment, there were in service sixthousand seven hundred and forty-four. He was unable to state whatnumber had been enlisted of the twenty-five thousand regulars providedby the legislation of the current session; a singular exhibition ofthe efficiency of the Department. He had no hesitation, however, inexpressing an unofficial opinion that there were five thousand ofthese recruits. It is scarce necessary to surmise what the conditionof the army was likely to be, with James Wilkinson as the seniorgeneral officer of consecutive service, and with Dearborn, a man ofsixty, and in civil life ever since the War of Independence, as thefirst major-general appointed under the new legislation. The navy hada noble and competent body of officers, in the prime of life, a largeproportion of whom had seen instructive service in the Barbaryconflict; but, as has been seen, Congress had no faith in a navy, andrefused it any increase. In this distrust the Administration shared. 

Mr. Monroe, indeed, probably through his residence abroad, hadattained a juster view of the influence of a navy on foreignrelations. He has already been quoted in this connection, [385] but ina letter to a friend, two years before 1812, he developed his opinionswith some precision. "I gave my opinion that our naval force ought tobe increased. In advising this, I urged that the naval force of theUnited States ought not to be regulated by reference to the navies ofthe Great Powers, but to the strength of the squadrons which theyusually stationed in time of war on our coasts, at the mouths of greatrivers, and in our harbors. I thought that such a force, incorporatedpermanently with our system, would give weight at all times to ournegotiations, and by means thereof prevent wars and save money. "[386]Monroe at this time was not in the Administration. Such a policy wasdiametrically opposed to that of Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin; andwhen war came, ships had not been provided. Under the circumstancesthe disposition of the Government was to put the ships they had undera glass case. 

"At the commencement of the war, " wrote Monroe to Jefferson, "I wasdecidedly of your opinion, that the best disposition which could bemade of our little navy would be to keep it in a body in a safe port, from which it might sally, only on some important occasion, to renderessential service. Its safety, in itself, appeared an importantobject; as, while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in alloperations along our coast, and increased proportionately hisexpense, in the force to be kept up, as well to annoy our commerce asto protect his own. The reasoning against this, in which all navalofficers have agreed, is that, if stationed together in a port, --NewYork, for example, --the British would immediately block up this, by aforce rather superior, and then harass our coast and commerce, withoutrestraint, and with any force, however small. In that case a singlefrigate might, by cruising along the coast, and menacing continuallydifferent parts, keep in motion great bodies of militia; that, whileour frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be met togetherwill compel the British to keep in a body, whenever they institute ablockade or cruise, a force equal at least to our own whole force;that they, [the American vessels] being the best sailors, hazardlittle by cruising separately, or together occasionally, as they mightbring on an action, or avoid one, as they saw fit; that in thatmeasure they would annoy the enemy's commerce wherever they went, excite alarm in the West Indies and elsewhere, and even giveprotection to our own trade by drawing the enemy's squadron from ourown coast. .. . The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equalthat it is hard to say which is best. "[387] It is to be hoped that thesequel will show which was best, although little can be hoped whenmeans, military and naval, have been allowed to waste as they hadunder the essentially unmilitary Administrations since 1801. 

On November 25, 1811, seven months before the war began, the Secretaryof the Treasury, Gallatin, communicated to the Senate a report on theState of the Finances, [388] in which he showed that since 1801, byeconomies which totally crippled the war power of the nation, thepublic debt had been diminished from $80, 000, 000 to $34, 000, 000, --asaving of $46, 000, 000, which lessened the annual interest on the debtby $2, 000, 000. A good financial showing, doubtless; but, had therebeen on hand the troops and the ships, which the saved moneyrepresented, the War of 1812 might have had an issue more satisfactoryto national retrospect. Gallatin also showed, in this paper, that bythe restrictive system, enforced against Great Britain in consequenceof the Administration's decision that Napoleon's revocation of hisDecrees was real, the revenue had dropped from $12, 000, 000 to$6, 000, 000; leaving the nation with a probable deficiency of$2, 000, 000, on the estimate of a year of peace for 1812. 

FOOTNOTES:

[172] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 152. 

[173] Ibid. , p. 147. 

[174] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 290. 

[175] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Ii. P. 488. 

[176] That is, as restrictive of neutral shipping. 

[177] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 410. 

[178] Wellesley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Pinkney, Dec. 29, 1810; also, Feb. 11, 1811. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 409, 412. See also Sir Wm. Scott, in the Court ofAdmiralty, Ibid. , p. 421. 

[179] Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, chaps. Xvii. , xviii. 

[180] Declaration of the King's reservations, Dec. 31, 1806. AmericanState Papers, vol. Iii. P. 152. 

[181] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 159. 

[182] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. X. P. 1274. 

[183] Aug. 12, 1805. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 104. 

[184] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 158. 

[185] Jonathan Russell to the Secretary of State, Nov. 15, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[186] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 154, 160. 

[187] Ibid. , p. 166. 

[188] The British Commissioners to Monroe and Pinkney, Nov. 8, 1806. Ibid. , p. 140. 

[189] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 187. 

[190] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 188. Author's italics. 

[191] Monroe to Madison, Aug. 4, 1807. American State Papers, ForeignRelations, vol. Iii. P. 186. 

[192] That is, all vessels, including merchantmen. 

[193] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 183-185. Author's italics. 

[194] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 191-193. 

[195] American State Papers, vol. Iii. Pp. 199, 200. 

[196] American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 202. Author's italics. 

[197] Ibid. , Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 201. 

[198] Ibid. , p. 202. 

[199] Ibid. , p. 203. 

[200] The principal part of the correspondence between Rose andMadison will be found in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 213-220. Rose's instructions from Canning were firstpublished by Mr. Henry Adams, History of the United States, vol. Iv. Pp. 178-182. They were of a character that completely justify thecaution of the American Government in refusing to go further withoutknowing their contents, concerning which, indeed, Madison wrote that aglimpse had been obtained in the informal interviews, which showedtheir inadmissibility. Madison to Pinkney, Feb. 19, 1808, U. S. StateDepartment MSS. 

[201] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 300. 

[202] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 200. 

[203] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 243. 

[204] Ibid. , pp. 244-245. 

[205] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 243. 

[206] Armstrong to Smith, U. S. Secretary of State, Jan. 28, 1810. Ibid. , p. 380. Author's italics. 

[207] American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 380. Author's italics. 

[208] Barlow to Bassano, Nov. 10, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. Author's italics. 

[209] Barlow to Monroe, Dec. 19, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[210] Feb. 22, 1808. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 206. 

[211] Giles, Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 123-125. 

[212] N. Y. Evening Post, May 12, 1808. 

[213] Jefferson, under date of Nov. 15, 1807, alludes to such areport. (Jefferson's Works, vol. V. P. 211. ) Already, indeed, on Aug. 19, 1807, an Order in Council, addressed to vessels bearing theneutral flags of Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Papenburg, or Kniphausen, hadbeen issued, which, though brief, imposed precisely the samerestrictions as the later celebrated ones here under discussion. (Annual Register, 1807, State Papers, p. 730; Naval Chronicle, vol. Xviii. P. 151. ) The fact is interesting, as indicative of the date offormulating a project, for the execution of which the "Horizon"decision probably afforded the occasion. 

[214] Erskine's communication was dated Feb. 23, 1808. (American StatePapers, vol. Iii. P. 209. ) Pinkney, however, had forwarded a copy ofthe Orders on November 17. (Ibid. , p. 203. ) Canning's letter, of whichErskine's was a transcript, was dated Dec. 1, 1807. (British ForeignOffice Archives. )

[215] Senator Giles of Virginia. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 218. 

[216] The following are instances: Philadelphia, February 23. The ship"Venus, " King, hence to the Isle of France, has returned to port. January 17, Lat. 25° N. , Long. 34° W. , fell in with an Englishmerchant fleet of thirty-six sail, under convoy of four ships of war. Was boarded by the sloop of war "Wanderer, " which endorsed on all herpapers, forbidding to enter any port belonging to France or herallies, they all being declared in a state of blockade. Captain Kingtherefore put back. (N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 24, 1808. ) Salem, Mass. , February 23. Arrived bark "Active, " Richardson. Sailed hence forMalaga, December 12. January 2, Lat. 37° N. , Long. 17° W. , boarded bya British cruiser, and papers endorsed against entering any but aBritish port. The voyage being thus frustrated, Captain Richardsonreturned. Marblehead, February 29. Schooner "Minerva" returned, havingbeen captured under the Orders in Council, released, and come home. Ship "George, " from Amsterdam, arrived at New York, March 6, viaYarmouth. Was taken by an English cruiser into Yarmouth and therecleared. (Evening Post, March 6. )

[217] N. Y. Evening Post, March 24, 1808. 

[218] Letter of John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis. 

[219] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 245. Author's italics. 

[220] Correspondence of Thomas Barclay, p. 272. 

[221] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 206. 

[222] "We expected, too, some effect from coercion of interest. "(Jefferson to Armstrong, March 5, 1809. Works, vol. V. P. 433. ) "Theembargo is the last card we have to play short of war. " (Jefferson toMadison, March 11, 1808. Ibid. , p. 258. ) "The coercive experiment wehave made. " (Monroe to John Taylor. Works, vol. V. P. 89. ) "I placeimmense value on the experiment being fully made how far an Embargomay be an _effectual weapon_ in future, as well as on this occasion. "(Jefferson. Works, vol. V. P. 289. ) "Bonaparte ought to beparticularly satisfied with us, by whose unyielding adherence toprinciple England has been forced into the revocation of her Orders. "(Jefferson to Madison, April 27, 1809. Works, vol. V. P. 442. ) Thisrevocation was not actual, but a mistake of the British minister atWashington. "I have always understood that there were two objectscontemplated by the Embargo Laws. The first, precautionary; thesecond, coercive, operating upon the aggressive belligerents, byaddressing strong appeals to the interests of both. " (Giles ofVirginia, in Senate, Nov. 24, 1808. ) "The embargo is not designed toaffect our own citizens, but to make an impression in Europe. "(Williams of South Carolina, in House of Representatives, April 14, 1808. )

[223] The writer, in a previous work (Sea Power in the FrenchRevolution), believes himself to have shown that the losses by captureof British traders did not exceed two and one half per cent. 

[224] Letter to Otis. 

[225] To Thomas Paine, concerning an improved gunboat devised by him. Sept. 6, 1807. (Jefferson's Works, vol. V. P. 189. )

[226] Jefferson's Works, vol. V. Pp. 417, 426. 

[227] June 14, 1809. Works, vol. V. P. 455. 

[228] An American ship putting into England, leaky, reported that onDec. 18, 1807, she had been boarded by a French privateer, whichallowed her to proceed because bound to Holland. The French captainsaid he had captured four Americans, all sent into Passage, in Spain;and that his orders were to bring in all Americans bound to Englishports. (N. Y. Evening Post, March 1, 1808. ) This was under the BerlinDecree, as that of Milan issued only December 17. The Berlin Decreeproclaimed the British Islands under blockade, but Napoleon for a timereserved decision as to the mere act of sailing for them being aninfringement. Mr. James Stephen, in Parliament, stated that in 1807several ships, not less than twenty-one, he thought, were taken forthe mere fact of sailing between America and England; in consequence, insurance on American vessels rose 50 per cent, from 2-½ to 3-¾. (Parliamentary Debates, vol. Xiii. P. Xxxix. App. ) In the Evening Postof March 3, 1808, will be found, quoted from a French journal, casesof four vessels carried into France, apparently only because bound toEngland. 

[229] Henry Adams's History of the United States, vol. V. P. 242. 

[230] "Nothing can establish firmly the republican principles of ourgovernment but an establishment of them in England. France will be theapostle for this. " (Jefferson's Works, vol. Iv. P. 192. ) "Thesubjugation of England would be a general calamity. Happily it isimpossible. Should invasion end in her being only republicanized, Iknow not on what principles a true republican of our country couldlament it. " (Ibid. , p. 217; Feb. 23, 1798. )

[231] Jefferson to Richard M. Johnson, March 10, 1808. Works, vol. V. P. 257. 

[232] London Times of August 6, quoted in N. Y. Evening Post of Oct. 10, 1808. 

[233] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 1032. 

[234] Captains' Letters, U. S. Navy Department MSS. Jan. 11, 1808. 

[235] Thomas Barclay's Correspondence, p. 274. Author's italics. 

[236] N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 1, 1808. 

[237] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. Xii. P. 326. 

[238] Life of Sir William Parker, vol. I. P. 304. 

[239] Barlow to Bassano, Nov. 10, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[240] N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 18, June 30, 1808; Feb. 24, 1809. 

[241] Senator White of Delaware. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 52. 

[242] Works, vol. V. P. 336. 

[243] "Trinidad, July 1, 1808. We have just received 15, 000 barrels offlour from Passamaquoddy, and not a week passes but some drops in fromPhiladelphia, Norfolk, etc. Cargo of 1, 000 barrels would not nowcommand more than twelve dollars; a year ago, eighteen. " (N. Y. EveningPost, July 25. )

[244] N. Y. Evening Post, Jan. 17, 1809. 

[245] Ibid. , February 6. 

[246] Mitchill of N. Y. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 86, 92. 

[247] Jefferson's Works, vol. V. Pp. 298, 318. 

[248] N. Y. Evening Post, Aug. 31, 1808. 

[249] Feb. 17, 1812. Captains' Letters, U. S. Navy Department MSS. 

[250] American State Papers, Finance, vol. Ii. P. 306. 

[251] With flour varying at short intervals from $30 to $18, and $12, a barrel, it is evident that speculation must be rife, and also thatonly general statements can be made as to conditions over any lengthof time. 

[252] Orchard Cook, of Massachusetts, said in the House ofRepresentatives that 590 vessels sailed thus by permission. Annals ofCongress, 1808-09, p. 1250. 

[253] N. Y. Evening Post, Oct. 3, 1808. 

[254] Ibid. , Sept. 2, 1808. 

[255] N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 28, 1809. 

[256] Ibid. , Sept. 21, 1808. 

[257] Ibid. , Dec. 8, 1808. 

[258] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. Xii. P. 1194. 

[259] Lord Grenville in House of Lords. Ibid. , p. 780. 

[260] N. Y. Evening Post, June 28, 1808. 

[261] Ibid. , April 8. 

[262] Ibid. , June 28. 

[263] Ibid. , October 27. The same effect, though on a much smallerscale, was seen in France. Deprived, through the joint operation ofthe embargo and the Orders in Council, of colonial produce brought byAmericans, a number of vessels were fitted out, and armed as lettersof marque, to carry on this trade. These adventures were verysuccessful, though they by no means filled the void caused by theabsence of American carriers. See Evening Post of Dec. 29, 1808, andMarch 22 and 28, 1809. One of these, acting on her commission as aletter of marque, captured an American brig, returning from India, which was carried into Cayenne and there condemned under the MilanDecree. Ibid. , Dec. 6, 1808. 

[264] N. Y. Evening Post, Nov. 23, 1808. 

[265] For some instances see: Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 428;N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 5, 8, 12; May 13; Aug. 26; Sept. 27, 1808. Gallatin, in a report dated Dec. 10, 1808, said, "At no time has therebeen so much specie, so much redundant unemployed capital in thecountry;" scarcely a token of prosperity in so new a country. (American State Papers, Finance, vol. Ii. P. 309. )

[266] American State Papers, Finance, vol. Ii. Pp. 307, 373, 442. Thesecond figure is an average of the two years, 1808, 1809, within whichfell the fifteen months of embargo. 

[267] Ibid. , p. 309 (Dec. 10, 1808). 

[268] "The schooner 'John, ' Clayton, from La Guayra, with two hundredthousand pounds of coffee, has been seized at Leghorn, and it wasexpected would be condemned under the Bayonne Decree. The 'John'sailed from Baltimore for La Guayra, by permission, under the fourthsupplementary Embargo Act. By some means or other she found her way toLeghorn, where it was vainly hoped she might safely dispose of hercargo. " (N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 20, 1808. ) "The frigate 'Chesapeake, 'Captain Decatur, cruising in support of the embargo, captured offBlock Island the brig 'Mount Vernon' and the ship 'John' loaded withprovisions. Of these the former, at least, is expressly stated to havecleared 'in ballast, ' by permission. " (Ibid. , Aug. 15, 1808. )

[269] Two or three quotations are sufficient to illustrate a conditionnotorious at the time. "Jamaica. Nine Americans came with the Junefleet, (from England) with full cargoes. At first it was thought thesevessels would not be allowed to take cargoes, (because contrary toNavigation Act); but a little reflection taught the Government better. Rum is the surplus crop of Jamaica, and to keep on hand that whichthey do not want is too much our way (_i. E. _ embargo). The Britishadmiral granted these vessels convoy without hesitation, which savedthem from five to seven and one half percent in insurance. " (N. Y. Evening Post, Aug. 2, 1808. ) "Gibraltar. A large number of Americanvessels are in these seas, sailing under license from Great Britain, to and from ports of Spain, without interruption. Our informant sailedin company with eight or ten, laden with wine and fruit for England. "(Ibid. , June 30. ) Senator Hillhouse, of Connecticut: "Many of ourvessels which were out when the embargo was laid have remained out. They have been navigating under the American flag, and have beenconstantly employed, at vast profit. " (Annals of Congress, 1808, p. 172. )

[270] "At Gibraltar, between January 1 and April 15, eight vesselswere sent in for breach of the Orders, of which seven were condemned. "(N. Y. Evening Post, May 25, 1808. ) "Baltimore, Sept. 30. 1808. Arrivedbrig. 'Sophia' from Rotterdam, July 28, _via_ Harwich, England. Boarded by British brig 'Phosphorus', and ordered to England. Afterarrival, cargo (of gin) gauged, and a duty exacted of eight pencesterling per gallon. Allowed to proceed, with a license, after payingduty. In company with the 'Sophia', and sent in with her, were threevessels bound for New York, with similar cargoes. " (Ibid. , Oct. 3. )"American ship 'Othello, ' from New York for Nantes, with assortedcargo. Ship, with thirty hogsheads of sugar condemned on ground ofviolating blockade;" _i. E. _ Orders in Council. (Naval Chronicle, vol. Xx. P. 62. ) Besides the 'Othello' there are two other cases, turningon the Orders, by compliance or evasion. From France came numerousletters announcing condemnations of vessels, because boarded byBritish cruisers. (N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 10, Oct. 5, Oct. 27, Dec. 6, Dec. 10, 1808; March 17, 1809. ) Proceedings were sometimes evenmore peremptory. More than one American vessel, though neutral, wasburned or sunk at sea, as amenable under Napoleon's decrees. (Ibid. , Nov. 3 and Nov. 5, Dec. 10, 1808. ) See also affidavits in the case ofthe "Brutus", burned, and of the "Bristol Packet", scuttled. (Ibid. , April 5 and April 7, 1808. )

[271] Hillhouse in the Senate (Annals of Congress, 1808, p. 172), andCook, of Massachusetts, in the House. "Of about five hundred andninety which sailed, only eight or ten have been captured. " (Ibid. , 1808-09, p. 1250. ) Yet many went to Guadaloupe and other forbiddenFrench islands. At Saint Pierre, Martinique, in the middle ofSeptember, were nearly ninety American vessels. "Flour, which had beenup to fifty dollars per barrel, fell to thirty dollars, in consequenceof the number of arrivals from America. " (N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 20, 1808. ) This shows how the permission to sail "in ballast" was abused. 

[272] N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 7, 1808. 

[273] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 406. 

[274] N. Y. Evening Post, May 4 and 13, 1808. 

[275] For the text of the Act see Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 1798-1803. 

[276] Ibid. , p. 233. 

[277] Giles of Virginia. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 353-381. 

[278] Williams of South Carolina. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 1236. 

[279] Nelson of Maryland. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 1258. 

[280] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 1438-1439. 

[281] Monroe to Jefferson, Jan. 18 and Feb. 2, 1809. Monroe's Works, vol. V. Pp. 91, 93-95. 

[282] To John Taylor, January 9. Ibid. , p. 89. 

[283] Pinkney, in connection with these, speaks of the "expected" Actof Congress. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 299. 

[284] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 299. 

[285] This sentence was omitted in the papers when submitted toCongress. 

[286] State Papers, p. 300. 

[287] February 7, 1810. American State Papers, Commerce andNavigation, vol. I. P. 812. 

[288] The correspondence between Erskine and the Secretary of State onthis occasion is in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 295-297. 

[289] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 304-308. 

[290] Ibid. , p. 303. 

[291] Ibid. 

[292] Ibid. , p. 301. 

[293] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 241. 

[294] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 318. 

[295] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 308-319. 

[296] Author's italics. 

[297] See Madison's Works, vol. Ii. P. 499. 

[298] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. 319-322. 

[299] The italics in this quotation (American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 300) are introduced by the author, to draw attention to the wordsdecisive to be noted. 

[300] The italics are Smith's. They serve exactly, however, toillustrate just wherein consists the perverseness of omission (thewords "operation of"), and the misstatement of this remarkablepassage. 

[301] Secretary Smith subsequently stated that this sentence was addedby express interposition of the President. (Smith's Address to theAmerican people. )

[302] Canning in his instructions to Jackson (No. 1, July 1, 1809, Foreign Office MSS. ) wrote: "The United States cannot have _believed_that such an arrangement as Mr. Erskine consented to accept wasconformable to his instructions. _If_ Mr. Erskine availed himself ofthe liberty allowed to him of communicating those instructions in theaffair of the Orders in Council, they must have _known_ that it wasnot so. " My italics. 

[303] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 352. 

[304] Writings of James Madison. Published by Order of Congress, 1865. Vol. Ii. P. 439. 

[305] Ibid. , p. 440. Turreau was the French minister. 

[306] Works of Jefferson, vol. V. Pp. 442-445. 

[307] "When Lord Wellesley's answer speaks of the offence imputed toJackson, it does not say he gave no such cause of offence, but simplyrelied on his repeated asseverations that he did not mean to offend. "Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 13, 1810. Wheaton's Life of Pinkney, p. 446. 

[308] Annals of Congress, 1809-10. 

[309] Ibid. , January 8, 1810, pp. 1164, 1234. 

[310] Ibid. , p. 1234. 

[311] Annals of Congress, 1809-10, pp. 754, 755. 

[312] Ibid. , pp. 606, 607. 

[313] Annals of Congress, 1810, p. 2582. 

[314] For Armstrong's letter and the text of the Decree, see AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 384. 

[315] Armstrong to Champagny, March 10, 1810. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 382. 

[316] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 362. 

[317] Ibid. , p. 385. 

[318] Ibid. 

[319] The Secretary of State to Armstrong, June 5, 1810. AmericanState Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 385. 

[320] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 386. 

[321] Ibid. , p. 387. 

[322] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 364. 

[323] Ibid. , p. 365. 

[324] Jefferson to Madison, April 27, 1809. Works, vol. V. P. 442. 

[325] Correspondance de Napoléon. Napoleon to Champagny, July 31, andAugust 2, 1810, vol. Xx. P. 644, and vol. Xxi. P. 1. 

[326] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 209. Author's italics. 

[327] Canning to Erskine, Dec. 1, 1807, transmitting the Orders inCouncil of November 11. British Foreign Office MSS. 

[328] Monroe to Foster, Oct. 1, 1811. American State Papers, ForeignRelations, vol. Iii. P. 445. See also, more particularly, ibid. , pp. 440, 441. 

[329] U. S. State Department MSS. , and State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 250. 

[330] That is, verbally, before his formal letter of February 23. 

[331] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. X. P. 669. A searchthrough the correspondence of Canning and Erskine, as well as throughthe debates of Parliament upon the Orders in Council, January-April, 1808, reveals nothing confirmatory of the _pari passu_ claim, putforth in Madison's letters quoted, and afterwards used by Monroe inhis arguments with Foster. But in Canning's instructions to Jackson, July 1, 1809 (No. 3), appears a sentence which may throw some light onthe apparent misunderstanding. "As to the willingness or ability ofneutral nations to resist the Decrees of France, his Majesty hasalways professed . .. _a disposition to relax or modify his measures ofretaliation and self-defence in proportion as those of neutral, nations_ should come in aid of them and take their place. " This wouldbe action _pari passu_ with a neutral; and if the same were expressedto Erskine, it is far from incredible, in view of his remarkableaction of 1809, that he may have extended it verbally withoutauthority to cover an act of France. My italics. 

[332] Wellesley to Pinkney, Aug. 31, 1810. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 366. 

[333] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 376. 

[334] The American flag was used in this way to cover Britishshipping. For instances see American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 342. 

[335] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 408. 

[336] Author's italics. 

[337] Armstrong had sailed for the United States two months before. 

[338] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 391. 

[339] Russell on November 17 wrote that he had reason to believe thatthe revocation of the Decrees had not been notified to the ministerscharged with the execution of them. On December 4 he said that, as theordinary practice in seizing a vessel was to hold her sequestered tillthe papers were examined in Paris, this might explain why the localCustom-House was not notified of the repeal. Russell to the Secretaryof State, U. S. State Department MSS. 

[340] Langdon Cheves of South Carolina. Annals of Congress, 1810-11, pp. 885-887. 

[341] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 393. 

[342] Annals of Congress, 1810-11, p. 990. 

[343] Pinkney to the Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1811. American StatePapers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 408. 

[344] Foster had succeeded as _chargé d'affaires_ in May, 1809, by thedeparture of Merry, formerly minister to the United States. He wasafterwards appointed minister; but in June, 1810, under pressure fromBonaparte, Sweden requested him to leave the country. 

[345] Pearce, Life and Correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley, vol. Iii. P. 193. 

[346] Author's italics. 

[347] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 514. Author's italics. 

[348] Ibid. , p. 435. 

[349] Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 4, 1810. Captains'Letters. 

[350] Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, May 3, 1810. Captains'Letters. The case was not singular. 

[351] Orders of Admiral Sawyer to the Captain of the "Little Belt. "American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 475. 

[352] American State Papers, vol. Iii. P. 473. In the absence of theBritish admiral, the senior officer at Halifax assembled a board ofcaptains which collected what his letter styles the depositions of the"Little Belt's" officers. Depositions would imply that the witnesseswere sworn, but it is not so said in the report of the Board, wherethey simply "state. " In the case of honorable gentlemen history maygive equal credit in either case; but the indication would be thatinquiry was less particular. The Board reports no question by itself;the "statements" are in the first person, apparently in reply to therequest "tell all you know, " and are uninterrupted by comment. 

[353] The proceedings of this court are printed in American StatePapers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. Pp. 477-497. 

[354] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 890. 

[355] Dec. 17, 1811. American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. I. P. 247. 

[356] Niles' Register, vol. Ii. Pp. 101-104. 

[357] Russell to Monroe, May 30, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[358] Russell to Monroe, August 15 and 21, 1812. U. S. State DepartmentMSS. 

[359] See Jefferson's Works, vol. V. Pp. 335, 337, 338, 339, 419, 442-445. 

[360] Madison to Russell, Nov. 15, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[361] Russell to Robert Smith, March 15, 1811. U. S. State DepartmentMSS. 

[362] Russell to the Secretary of State, July 15, 1811. Ibid. 

[363] Ante, p. 217. 

[364] Note dictée en conseil d'Administration du Commerce, April 29, 1811. Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. Xxii. P. 144. 

[365] Russell to Monroe, July 13, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[366] Russell to J. S. Smith, July 14, 1811. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 447. 

[367] Russell to Bassano, Aug. 8, 1811. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[368] Russell to Robert Smith, April, 1811. Ibid. 

[369] Monroe to Russell, June 8, 1811. Ibid. 

[370] Reports of the Ministers of Foreign Relations and of War, March10, 1812. Moniteur, March 16. 

[371] Russell to Monroe, April 19, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[372] The copy of this Order in Council which the author is here usingis in the Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxvii. P. 466. 

[373] This letter, which is given in a very mutilated form in theAmerican State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 602, has beenpublished in full by the Bureau of Historical Research, CarnegieInstitution, Washington. Report on the Diplomatic Archives of theDepartment of State, 1904, p. 64. 

[374] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 603. 

[375] Barlow's interview with Bassano, and the letters exchanged, willbe found in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 602-603. Russell's denial is on p. 614. Serrurier's is mentioned in aReport made to the House by Monroe, Secretary of State, ibid. , p. 609. 

[376] Barlow to Russell, May 10, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[377] Russell to Monroe, May 9, 1812. Ibid. 

[378] The passages cited above are from Russell's correspondence withthe State Department, under the dates of January 10, February 3 and19, March 4 and 20, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[379] Russell to Monroe, May 9, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[380] Barlow to Monroe, March 15, 1812. Ibid. Published by Bureau ofHistorical Research, Carnegie Institution, 1904, p. 63. 

[381] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 433. Author's italics. 

[382] Russell to Monroe, June 30, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[383] Russell to Monroe, June 30, 1812. U. S. State Department MSS. 

[384] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 405. 

[385] Ante, p. 106. 

[386] To John Taylor, Sept. 10, 1810. Works of James Monroe, vol. Vi. P. 128. 

[387] Monroe to Jefferson, Monroe's Works, vol. V. P. 268. 

[388] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 2046. 

 [Illustration: THEATRE OF LAND AND COAST WARFARE]

CHAPTER V

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

War being now immediately at hand, it is advisable, for the betterappreciation of the course of events, the more accurate estimate oftheir historical and military value, to consider the relativeconditions of the two opponents, the probable seats of warlikeoperations, and the methods which it was open to either to pursue. 

Invasion of the British Islands, or of any transmarine possession ofGreat Britain--save Canada--was denied to the United States by theimmeasurable inferiority of her navy. To cross the sea in force wasimpossible, even for short distances. For this reason, land operationswere limited to the North American Continent. This fact, conjoinedwith the strong traditional desire, received from the old French warsand cherished in the War of Independence, to incorporate the Canadiancolonies with the Union, determined an aggressive policy by the UnitedStates on the northern frontier. This was indeed the onlydistinctively offensive operation available to her upon the land;consequently it was imposed by reasons of both political and militaryexpediency. On the other hand, the sea was open to American armedships, though under certain very obvious restrictions; that is to say, subject to the primary difficulty of evading blockades of the coast, and of escaping subsequent capture by the very great number ofBritish cruisers, which watched all seas where British commerce wentand came, and most of the ports whence hostile ships might issue toprey upon it. The principal trammel which now rests upon the movementsof vessels destined to cripple an enemy's commerce--the necessity torenew the motive power, coal, at frequent brief intervals--did notthen exist. The wind, upon which motion depended, might at particularmoments favor one of two antagonists relatively to the other; but inthe long run it was substantially the same for all. In this respectall were on an equal footing; and the supply, if fickle at times, waspractically inexhaustible. Barring accidents, vessels were able tokeep the sea as long as their provisions and water lasted. This periodmay be reckoned as generally three months, while by watchfuladministration it might at times be protracted to six. 

It is desirable to explain here what was, and is, the particularspecific utility of operations directed toward the destruction of anenemy's commerce; what its bearing upon the issues of war; and how, also, it affects the relative interests of antagonists, unequallypaired in the matter of sea power. Without attempting to determineprecisely the relative importance of internal and external commerce, which varies with each country, and admitting that the length oftransportation entails a distinct element of increased cost upon thearticles transported, it is nevertheless safe to say that, to nationshaving free access to the sea, the export and import trade is a verylarge factor in national prosperity and comfort. At the very least, itincreases by so much the aggregate of commercial transactions, whilethe ease and copiousness of water carriage go far to compensate forthe increase of distance. Furthermore, the public revenue of maritimestates is largely derived from duties on imports. Hence arises, therefore, a large source of wealth, of money; and money--ready moneyor substantial credit--is proverbially the sinews of war, as the Warof 1812 was amply to demonstrate. Inconvertible assets, as businessmen know, are a very inefficacious form of wealth in tight times; andwar is always a tight time for a country, a time in which its positivewealth, in the shape of every kind of produce, is of little use, unless by freedom of exchange it can be converted into cash forgovernmental expenses. To this sea-commerce greatly contributes, andthe extreme embarrassment under which the United States as a nationlabored in 1814 was mainly due to commercial exclusion from the sea. To attack the commerce of the enemy is therefore to cripple him, inthe measure of success achieved, in the particular factor which isvital to the maintenance of war. Moreover, in the complicatedconditions of mercantile activity no one branch can be seriouslyinjured without involving others. 

This may be called the financial and political effect of "commercedestroying, " as the modern phrase runs. In military effect, it isstrictly analogous to the impairing of an enemy's communications, ofthe line of supplies connecting an army with its base of operations, upon the maintenance of which the life of the army depends. Money, credit, is the life of war; lessen it, and vigor flags; destroy it, and resistance dies. No resource then remains except to "make warsupport war;" that is, to make the vanquished pay the bills for themaintenance of the army which has crushed him, or which is proceedingto crush whatever opposition is left alive. This, by the extraction ofprivate money, and of supplies for the use of his troops, from thecountry in which he was fighting, was the method of Napoleon, thanwhom no man held more delicate views concerning the gross improprietyof capturing private property at sea, whither his power did notextend. Yet this, in effect, is simply another method of forcing theenemy to surrender a large part of his means, so weakening him, whiletransferring it to the victor for the better propagation ofhostilities. The exaction of a pecuniary indemnity from the worstedparty at the conclusion of a war, as is frequently done, differs fromthe seizure of property in transit afloat only in method, and as peacediffers from war. In either case, money or money's worth is exacted;but when peace supervenes, the method of collection is left to theGovernment of the country, in pursuance of its powers of taxation, todistribute the burden among the people; whereas in war, the primaryobject being immediate injury to the enemy's fighting power, it is notonly legitimate in principle, but particularly effective, to seek thedisorganization of his financial system by a crushing attack upon oneof its important factors, because effort thus is concentrated on areadily accessible, fundamental element of his general prosperity. That the loss falls directly on individuals, or a class, instead ofupon the whole community, is but an incident of war, just as some menare killed and others not. Indirectly, but none the less surely, thewhole community, and, what is more important, the organizedgovernment, are crippled; offensive powers impaired. 

But while this is the absolute tendency of war against commerce, common to all cases, the relative value varies greatly with thecountries having recourse to it. It is a species of hostilities easilyextemporized by a great maritime nation; it therefore favors one whosepolicy is not to maintain a large naval establishment. It opens afield for a sea militia force, requiring little antecedent militarytraining. Again, it is a logical military reply to commercialblockade, which is the most systematic, regularized, and extensiveform of commerce-destruction known to war. Commercial blockade is notto be confounded with the military measure of confining a body ofhostile ships of war to their harbor, by stationing before it acompetent force. It is directed against merchant vessels, and is nota military operation in the narrowest sense, in that it does notnecessarily involve fighting, nor propose the capture of the blockadedharbor. It is not usually directed against military ports, unlessthese happen to be also centres of commerce. Its object, which was theparamount function of the United States Navy during the Civil War, dealing probably the most decisive blow inflicted upon theConfederacy, is the destruction of commerce by closing the ports ofegress and ingress. Incidental to that, all ships, neutrals included, attempting to enter or depart, after public notification throughcustomary channels, are captured and confiscated as remorselessly ascould be done by the most greedy privateer. Thus constituted, theoperation receives far wider scope than commerce-destruction on thehigh seas; for this is confined to merchantmen of belligerents, whilecommercial blockade, by universal consent, subjects to captureneutrals who attempt to infringe it, because, by attempting to defeatthe efforts of one belligerent, they make themselves parties to thewar. 

In fact, commercial blockade, though most effective as a militarymeasure in broad results, is so distinctly commerce-destructive inessence, that those who censure the one form must logically proceed todenounce the other. This, as has been seen, [389] Napoleon did;alleging in his Berlin Decree, in 1806, that war cannot be extended toany private property whatever, and that the right of blockade isrestricted to _fortified_ places, actually invested by competentforces. This he had the face to assert, at the very moment when he wascompelling every vanquished state to extract, from the private meansof its subjects, coin running up to hundreds of millions to replenishhis military chest for further extension of hostilities. Had thisdictum been accepted international law in 1861, the United Statescould not have closed the ports of the Confederacy, the commerce ofwhich would have proceeded unmolested; and hostile measures beingconsequently directed against men's persons instead of their trade, victory, if accomplished at all, would have cost three lives for everytwo actually lost. It is apparent, immediately on statement, thatagainst commerce-destruction by blockade, the recourse of the weakermaritime belligerent is commerce-destruction by cruisers on the highsea. Granting equal efficiency in the use of either measure, it isfurther plain that the latter is intrinsically far less efficacious. To cut off access to a city is much more certainly accomplished byholding the gates than by scouring the country in search of personsseeking to enter. Still, one can but do what one can. In 1861 to 1865, the Southern Confederacy, unable to shake off the death grip fastenedon its throat, attempted counteraction by means of the "Alabama, ""Sumter, " and their less famous consorts, with what disastrousinfluence upon the navigation--the shipping--of the Union it isneedless to insist. But while the shipping of the opposite belligerentwas in this way not only crippled, but indirectly was swept from theseas, the Confederate cruisers, not being able to establish ablockade, could not prevent neutral vessels from carrying on thecommerce of the Union. This consequently suffered no seriousinterruption; whereas the produce of the South, its inconvertiblewealth--cotton chiefly--was practically useless to sustain thefinancial system and credit of the people. So, in 1812 and the twoyears following, the United States flooded the seas with privateers, producing an effect upon British commerce which, though inconclusivesingly, doubtless co-operated powerfully with other motives to disposethe enemy to liberal terms of peace. It was the reply, and the onlypossible reply, to the commercial blockade, the grinding efficacy ofwhich it will be a principal object of these pages to depict. Theissue to us has been accurately characterized by Mr. Henry Adams, inthe single word "Exhaustion. "[390]

Both parties to the War of 1812 being conspicuously maritime indisposition and occupation, while separated by three thousand miles ofocean, the sea and its navigable approaches became necessarily themost extensive scene of operations. There being between them greatinequality of organized naval strength and of pecuniary resources, they inevitably resorted, according to their respective force, to oneor the other form of maritime hostilities against commerce which havebeen indicated. To this procedure combats on the high seas were merelyincidental. Tradition, professional pride, and the combative spiritinherent in both peoples, compelled fighting when armed vessels ofnearly equal strength met; but such contests, though wholly laudablefrom the naval standpoint, which under ordinary circumstances cannotafford to encourage retreat from an equal foe, were indecisive ofgeneral results, however meritorious in particular execution. They hadno effect upon the issue, except so far as they inspired moralenthusiasm and confidence. Still more, in the sequel they have had adistinctly injurious effect upon national opinion in the UnitedStates. In the brilliant exhibition of enterprise, professional skill, and usual success, by its naval officers and seamen, the country hasforgotten the precedent neglect of several administrations toconstitute the navy as strong in proportion to the means of thecountry as it was excellent through the spirit and acquirements of itsofficers. Sight also has been lost of the actual conditions ofrepression, confinement, and isolation, enforced upon the maritimefrontier during the greater part of the war, with the misery andmortification thence ensuing. It has been widely inferred that themaritime conditions in general were highly flattering to nationalpride, and that a future emergency could be confronted with the samesupposed facility, and as little preparation, as the odds of 1812 arebelieved to have been encountered and overcome. This mentalimpression, this picture, is false throughout, alike in its groupingof incidents, in its disregard of proportion, and in its ignoring offacts. The truth of this assertion will appear in due course of thisnarrative, and it will be seen that, although relieved by manybrilliant incidents, indicative of the real spirit and capacity of thenation, the record upon the whole is one of gloom, disaster, andgovernmental incompetence, resulting from lack of nationalpreparation, due to the obstinate and blind prepossessions of theGovernment, and, in part, of the people. 

This was so even upon the water, despite the great names--for greatthey were in measure of their opportunities--of Decatur, Hull, Perry, Macdonough, Morris, and a dozen others. On shore things were farworse; for while upon the water the country had as leaders men stillin the young prime of life, who were both seamen and officers, --noneof those just named were then over forty, --the army at the beginninghad only elderly men, who, if they ever had been soldiers in any truersense than young fighting men, --soldiers by training andunderstanding, --had long since disacquired whatever knowledge andhabit of the profession they had gained in the War of Independence, then more than thirty years past. "As far as American movements areconcerned, " said one of Wellington's trusted officers, sent to reportupon the subject of Canadian defence, "the campaign of 1812 is almostbeneath criticism. "[391] Instructed American opinion must sorrowfullyadmit the truth of the comment. That of 1813 was not much better, although some younger men--Brown, Scott, Gaines, Macomb, Ripley--werebeginning to show their mettle, and there had by then been placed atthe head of the War Department a secretary who at least possessed areasoned understanding of the principles of warfare. With everymaterial military advantage, save the vital one of adequatepreparation, it was found too late to prepare when war was already athand; and after the old inefficients had been given a chance todemonstrate their incapacity, it was too late to utilize the youngmen. 

Jefferson, with curious insanity of optimism, had once written, "Webegin to broach the idea that we consider the whole Gulf Stream as ofour waters, within which hostilities and cruising are to be frowned onfor the present, and prohibited as soon as either consent or forcewill permit;"[392] while at the same time, under an unbrokensuccession of maritime humiliations, he of purpose neglected all navalpreparation save that of two hundred gunboats, which could not ventureout of sight of land without putting their guns in the hold. With likeblindness to the conditions to which his administration had reducedthe nation, he now wrote: "The acquisition of Canada this year [1812], as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter ofmarching. "[393] This would scarcely have been a misappreciation, hadhis care for the army and that of his successor given the country in1812 an effective force of fifteen thousand regulars. Great Britainhad but forty-five hundred in all Canada, [394] from Quebec to St. Joseph's, near Mackinac; and the American resources in militia were tohers as ten to one. But Jefferson and Madison, with their Secretary ofthe Treasury, had reduced the national debt between 1801 and 1812 from$80, 000, 000 to $45, 000, 000, concerning which a Virginia Senatorremarked: "This difference has never been felt by society. It hasproduced no effect upon the common intercourse among men. For my part, I should never have known of the reduction but for the annual TreasuryReport. "[395] Something was learned about it, however, in the firstyear of the war, and the interest upon the savings was received atDetroit, on the Niagara frontier, in the Chesapeake and the Delaware. 

The War of 1812 was very unpopular in certain sections of the UnitedStates and with certain parts of the community. By these, particularfault was found with the invasion of Canada. "You have declared war, itwas said, for two principal alleged reasons: one, the general policy ofthe British Government, formulated in the successive Orders in Council, to the unjustifiable injury and violation of American commerce; theother, the impressment of seamen from American merchant ships. Whathave Canada and the Canadians to do with either? If war you must, carryon your war upon the ocean, the scene of your avowed wrongs, and theseat of your adversary's prosperity, and do not embroil these innocentregions and people in the common ruin which, without adequate cause, you are bringing upon your own countrymen, and upon the only nationthat now upholds the freedom of mankind against that oppressor of ourrace, that incarnation of all despotism--Napoleon. " So, not withoutsome alloy of self-interest, the question presented itself to NewEngland, and so New England presented it to the Government and theSouthern part of the Union; partly as a matter of honest conviction, partly as an incident of the factiousness inherent in all politicalopposition, which makes a point wherever it can. 

Logically, there may at first appear some reason in these arguments. We are bound to believe so, for we cannot entirely impeach the candorof our ancestors, who doubtless advanced them with some degree ofconviction. The answer, of course, is, that when two nations go towar, all the citizens of one become internationally the enemies of theother. This is the accepted principle of International Law, a residuumof the concentrated wisdom of many generations of internationallegists. When war takes the place of peace, it annihilates all naturaland conventional rights, all treaties and compacts, except those whichappertain to the state of war itself. The warfare of moderncivilization assures many rights to an enemy, by custom, by precedent, by compact; many treaties bear express stipulations that, should wararise between the parties, such and such methods of warfare arebarred; but all these are merely guaranteed exceptions to the generalrule that every individual of each nation is the enemy of those of theopposing belligerent. 

Canada and the Canadians, being British subjects, became therefore, however involuntarily, the enemies of the United States, when thelatter decided that the injuries received from Great Britain compelledrecourse to the sword. Moreover, war, once determined, must be wagedon the principles of war; and whatever greed of annexation may haveentered into the motives of the Administration of the day, there canbe no question that politically and militarily, as a war measure, theinvasion of Canada was not only justifiable but imperative. "In caseof war, " wrote the United States Secretary of State, Monroe, a veryfew days[396] before the declaration, "it might be necessary to invadeCanada; not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to asatisfactory conclusion. " War now is never waged for the sake of merefighting, simply to see who is the better at killing people. Thewarfare of civilized nations is for the purpose of accomplishing anobject, obtaining a concession of alleged right from an enemy who hasproved implacable to argument. He is to be made to yield to force whathe has refused to reason; and to do that, hold is laid upon what ishis, either by taking actual possession, or by preventing hisutilizing what he still may retain. An attachment is issued, so tosay, or an injunction laid, according to circumstances; as men in lawdo to enforce payment of a debt, or abatement of an injury. If, in theattempt to do this, the other nation resists, as it probably will, then fighting ensues; but that fighting is only an incident of war. War, in substance, though not perhaps in form, began when the onenation resorted to force, quite irrespective of the resistance of theother. 

Canada, conquered by the United States, would therefore have been apiece of British property attached; either in compensation for claims, or as an asset in the bargaining which precedes a treaty of peace. Itsretention even, as a permanent possession, would have been justifiedby the law of war, if the military situation supported that course. This is a political consideration; militarily, the reasons were evenstronger. To Americans the War of 1812 has worn the appearance of amaritime contest. This is both natural and just; for, as a matter offact, not only were the maritime operations more pleasing toretrospect, but they also were as a whole, and on both sides, far moreefficient, far more virile, than those on land. Under the relativeconditions of the parties, however, it ought to have been a land war, because of the vastly superior advantages on shore possessed by theparty declaring war; and such it would have been, doubtless, but forthe amazing incompetency of most of the army leaders on both sides, after the fall of the British general, Brock, almost at the opening ofhostilities. This incompetency, on the part of the United States, isdirectly attributable to the policy of Jefferson and Madison; for hadproper attention and development been given to the army between 1801and 1812, it could scarcely have failed that some indication of men'sfitness or unfitness would have preceded and obviated the lamentableexperience of the first two years, when every opportunity wasfavorable, only to be thrown away from lack of leadership. That eventhe defects of preparation, extreme and culpable as these were, couldhave been overcome, is evidenced by the history of the Lakes. TheGovernor General, Prevost, reported to the home government in July andAugust, 1812, that the British still had the naval superiority on Erieand Ontario;[397] but this condition was reversed by the energy andcapacity of the American commanders, Chauncey, Perry, and Macdonough, utilizing the undeniable superiority in available resources--mechanicsand transportation--which their territory had over the Canadian, notfor naval warfare only, but for land as well. 

The general considerations that have been advanced are sufficient toindicate what should have been the general plan of the war on the partof the United States. Every war must be aggressive, or, to use thetechnical term, offensive, in military character; for unless youinjure the enemy, if you confine yourself, as some of the grumblers ofthat day would have it, to simple defence against his efforts, obviously he has no inducement to yield your contention. Incidentally, however, vital interests must be defended, otherwise the power ofoffence falls with them. Every war, therefore, has both a defensiveand an offensive side, and in an effective plan of campaign each mustreceive due attention. Now, in 1812, so far as general naturalconditions went, the United States was relatively weak on the seafrontier, and strong on the side of Canada. The seaboard might, indeed, in the preceding ten years, have been given a development offorce, by the creation of an adequate navy, which would haveprevented war, by the obvious danger to British interests involved inhostilities. But this had not been done; and Jefferson, by his gunboatpolicy, building some two hundred of those vessels, worthless unlessunder cover of the land, proclaimed by act as by voice his adherenceto a bare defensive. The sea frontier, therefore, became mainly a lineof defence, the utility of which primarily was, or should have been, to maintain communication with the outside world; to support commerce, which in turn should sustain the financial potency that determines theissues of war. 

The truth of this observation is shown by one single fact, which willreceive recurrent mention from time to time in the narrative. Owingpartly to the necessities of the British Government, and partly as amatter of favor extended to the New England States, on account oftheir antagonism to the war, the commercial blockade of the coast wasfor a long time--until April 25, 1814--limited to the part betweenNarragansett Bay and the boundary of Florida, then a Spanish colony. During this period, which Madison angrily called one of "invidiousdiscrimination between different parts of the United States, " NewEngland was left open to neutral commerce, which the British, tosupply their own wants, further encouraged by a system of licenses, exempting from capture the vessels engaged, even though American. Owing largely to this, though partly to the local development ofmanufactures caused by the previous policy of restriction upon foreigntrade, which had diverted New England from maritime commerce tomanufactures, that section became the distributing centre of theUnion. In consequence, the remainder of the country was practicallydrained of specie, which set to the northward and eastward, thesurplusage above strictly local needs finding its way to Canada, toease the very severe necessities of the British military authoritiesthere; for Great Britain, maintaining her own armies in the Spanishpeninsula, and supporting in part the alliance against Napoleon on theContinent, could spare no coin to Canada. It could not go far south, because the coasting trade was destroyed by the enemy's fleets, andthe South could not send forward its produce by land to obtain moneyin return. The deposits in Massachusetts banks increased from$2, 671, 619, in 1810, to $8, 875, 589, in 1814; while in the same yearsthe specie held was respectively $1, 561, 034 and $6, 393, 718. [398]

It was a day of small things, relatively to present giganticcommercial enterprises; but an accumulation of cash in one quarter, coinciding with penury in another, proves defect in circulationconsequent upon embarrassed communications. That flour in Boston soldfor $12. 00 the barrel, while at Baltimore and Richmond it stood at$6. 50 and $4. 50, tells the same tale of congestion and deficiency, dueto interruption of water communication; the whole proving that, underthe conditions of 1812, as the United States Government had allowedthem to become, through failure to foster a navy by which alone coastdefence in the true sense can be effected, the coast frontier wasessentially the weak point. There Great Britain could put forth herenormous naval strength with the most sensible and widespread injuryto American national power, as represented in the financial stabilitywhich constitutes the sinews of war. Men enough could be had; therewere one hundred thousand registered seamen belonging to the country;but in the preceding ten years the frigate force had decreased fromthirteen of that nominal rate to nine, while the only additions to theservice, except gunboats, were two sloops of war, two brigs, and fourschooners. The construction of ships of the line, for six of whichprovision had been made under the administration which expired in1801, was abandoned immediately by its successor. There was no navyfor defence. 

Small vessels, under which denomination most frigates should beincluded, have their appropriate uses in a naval establishment, but inthemselves are inadequate to the defence of a coast-line, in the truesense of the word "defence. " It is one of the first elements ofintelligent warfare that true defence consists in imposing upon theenemy a wholesome fear of yourself. "The best protection against theenemy's fire, " said Farragut, "is a rapid fire from our own guns. " "Noscheme of defence, " said Napoleon, "can be considered efficient thatdoes not provide the means of attacking the enemy at an opportunemoment. In the defence of a river, for instance, " he continues, "youmust not only be able to withstand its passage by the enemy, but mustkeep in your own hands means of crossing, so as to attack him, whenoccasion either offers, or can be contrived. " In short, you mustcommand either a bridge or a ford, and have a disposable force readyto utilize it by attack. The fact of such preparation fetters everymovement of the enemy. 

At its very outbreak the War of 1812 gave an illustration of theworking of this principle. Tiny as was the United States Navy, theopening of hostilities found it concentrated in a body of severalfrigates, with one or two sloops of war, which put to sea together. The energies of Great Britain being then concentrated upon the navy ofNapoleon, her available force at Halifax and Bermuda was small, andthe frigates, of which it was almost wholly composed, were compelledto keep together; for, if they attempted to scatter, in order to watchseveral commercial ports, they were exposed to capture singly by thisrelatively numerous body of American cruisers. The narrow escape ofthe frigate "Constitution" from the British squadron at this moment, on her way from the Chesapeake to New York, which port she was unableto gain, exemplifies precisely the risk of dispersion that the Britishfrigates did not dare to face while their enemy was believed to be athand in concentrated force. They being compelled thus to remaintogether, the ports were left open; and the American merchant ships, of which a great number were then abroad, returned with comparativeimpunity, though certainly not entirely without losses. 

This actual experience illustrates exactly the principle of coastdefence by the power having relatively the weaker navy. It cannot, indeed, drive away a body numerically much stronger; but, if itselfrespectable in force, it can compel the enemy to keep united. Therebyis minimized the injury caused to a coast-line by the dispersion of theenemy's force along it in security, such as was subsequently acquiredby the British in 1813-14, and by the United States Navy during theCivil War. The enemy's fears defend the coast, and protect the nation, by securing the principal benefit of the coast-line--coastwise andmaritime trade, and the revenue thence proceeding. In order, however, to maintain this imposing attitude, the defending state must hold readya concentrated force, of such size that the enemy cannot safely dividehis own--a force, for instance, such as that estimated by GouverneurMorris, twenty years before 1812. [399] The defendant fleet, further, must be able to put to sea at a moment inconvenient to the enemy; musthave the bridge or ford Napoleon required for his army. Such the UnitedStates had in her seaports, which with moderate protection could keepan enemy at a distance, and from which escape was possible underconditions exceedingly dangerous for the detached hostile divisions;but although possessing these bridge heads leading to the scene ofocean war, no force to issue from them existed. In those elevenprecious years during which Great Britain by American official returnshad captured 917 American ships, [400] a large proportion of them indefiance of International Law, as was claimed, and had impressed fromAmerican vessels 6, 257 seamen, [401] asserted to be mostly Americancitizens, the United States had built two sloops of 18 guns, and twobrigs of 16; and out of twelve frigates had permitted three to rot attheir moorings. To build ships of the line had not even been attempted. Consequently, except when weather drove them off, puny divisions ofBritish ships gripped each commercial port by the throat with perfectsafety; and those weather occasions, which constitute the opportunityof the defendant sea power, could not be improved by military action. 

Such in general was the condition of the sea frontier, throwninevitably upon the defensive. With the passing comment that, had itbeen defended as suggested, Great Britain would never have forced thewar, let us now consider conditions on the Canadian line, wherecircumstances eminently favored the offensive by the United States;for this war should not be regarded simply as a land war or a navalwar, nor yet as a war of offence and again one of defence, but asbeing continuously and at all times both offensive and defensive, bothland and sea, in reciprocal influence. 

Disregarding as militarily unimportant the artificial boundarydividing Canada from New York, Vermont, and the eastern parts of theUnion, the frontier separating the land positions of the twobelligerents was the Great Lakes and the river St. Lawrence. Thispresented certain characteristic and unusual features. That it was awater line was a condition not uncommon; but it was exceptionallymarked by those broad expanses which constitute inland seas of greatsize and depth, navigable by vessels of the largest sea-goingdimensions. This water system, being continuous and in continualprogress, is best conceived by applying to the whole, from LakeSuperior to the ocean, the name of the great river, the St. Lawrence, which on the one hand unites it to the sea, and on the other dividesthe inner waters from the outer by a barrier of rapids, impassable toships that otherwise could navigate freely both lakes and ocean. 

The importance of the lakes to military operations must always begreat, but it was much enhanced in 1812 by the undeveloped conditionof land communications. With the roads in the state they then were, the movement of men, and still more of supplies, was vastly more rapidby water than by land. Except in winter, when iron-bound snow coveredthe ground, the routes of Upper Canada were well-nigh impassable; inspring and in autumn rains, wholly so to heavy vehicles. The mail fromMontreal to York, --now Toronto, --three hundred miles, took a month intransit. [402] In October, 1814, when the war was virtually over, theBritish General at Niagara lamented to the Commander-in-Chief that, owing to the refusal of the navy to carry troops, an importantdetachment was left "to struggle through the dreadful roads fromKingston to York. "[403] "Should reinforcements and provisions notarrive, the naval commander would, " in his opinion, "have much toanswer for. "[404] The Commander-in-Chief himself wrote: "The commandof the lakes enables the enemy to perform in two days what it takesthe troops from Kingston sixteen to twenty days of severe marching. Their men arrive fresh; ours fatigued, and with exhausted equipment. The distance from Kingston to the Niagara frontier exceeds two hundredand fifty miles, and part of the way is impracticable forsupplies. "[405] On the United States side, road conditions weresimilar but much less disadvantageous. The water route by Ontario wasgreatly preferred as a means of transportation, and in parts and atcertain seasons was indispensable. Stores for Sackett's Harbor, forinstance, had in early summer to be brought to Oswego, and thencecoasted along to their destination, in security or in peril, accordingto the momentary predominance of one party or the other on the lake. In like manner, it was more convenient to move between the Niagarafrontier and the east end of the lake by water; but in case ofnecessity, men could march. An English traveller in 1818 says: "Iaccomplished the journey from Albany to Buffalo in October in six dayswith ease and comfort, whereas in May it took ten of great difficultyand distress. "[406] In the farther West the American armies, thoughmuch impeded, advanced securely through Ohio and Indiana to the shoresof Lake Erie, and there maintained themselves in supplies sentover-country; whereas the British at the western end of the lake, opposite Detroit, depended wholly upon the water, although no hostileforce threatened the land line between them and Ontario. The battle ofLake Erie, so disastrous to their cause, was forced upon them purelyby failure of food, owing to the appearance of Perry's squadron. 

From Lake Superior to the head of the first rapid of the St. Lawrence, therefore, the control of the water was the decisive factor in thegeneral military situation. Both on the upper lakes, where watercommunication from Sault Sainte Marie to Niagara was unbroken, and onOntario, separated from the others by the falls of Niagara, theBritish had at the outset a slight superiority, but not beyond thepower of the United States to overtake and outpass. Throughout therapids, to Montreal, military conditions resembled those whichconfront a general charged with the passage of any great river. Ifundertaken at all, such an enterprise requires the deceiving of theopponent as to the place and time when the attempt will be made, thecareful provision of means and disposition of men for instantexecution, and finally the prompt and decisive seizure of opportunity, to transfer and secure on the opposite shore a small body, capable ofmaintaining itself until the bulk of the army can cross to itssupport. Nothing of the sort was attempted here, or needed to beundertaken in this war. Naval superiority determined the ability tocross above the rapids, and there was no occasion to consider thequestion of crossing between them. Immediately below the last layMontreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean. To thatpoint, therefore, the sea power of Great Britain reached, and there itended. 

The United States Government was conscious of its great potentialsuperiority over Canada, in men and in available resources. Soevident, indeed, was the disparity, that the prevalent feeling was notone of reasonable self-reliance, but of vainglorious self-confidence;of dependence upon mere bulk and weight to crush an opponent, quiteirrespective of preparation or skill, and disregardful of the factorof military efficiency. Jefferson's words have already been quoted. Calhoun, then a youthful member of Congress, and a foremost advocateof the war, said in March, 1812: "So far from being unprepared, Sir, Ibelieve that in four weeks from the time a declaration of war isheard, on our frontier, the whole of Upper Canada"--halfway down theSt. Lawrence--"and a part of Lower Canada will be in our power. " Thistone was general in Congress; Henry Clay spoke to the same effect. Granting due preparation, such might indeed readily have been theresult of a well-designed, active, offensive campaign. Little hope ofany other result was held by the British local officials, and whatlittle they had was based upon the known want of military efficiencyin the United States. Brock, by far the ablest among them, in Februarydeclared his "full conviction that unless Detroit and Michilimackinacbe both in our possession at the commencement of hostilities, not onlyAmherstburg"--on the Detroit River, a little below Detroit--"but mostprobably the whole country, must be evacuated as far asKingston. "[407] This place is at the foot of Ontario, close to theentrance to the St. Lawrence. Having a good and defensible harbor, ithad been selected for the naval station of the lake. If successful inholding it, there would be a base of operations for attemptingrecovery of the water, and ultimately of the upper country. Failingthere, of course the British must fall back upon the sea, touch withwhich they would regain at Montreal, resting there upon the navy oftheir nation; just as Wellington, by the same dependence, hadmaintained himself at Lisbon unshaken by the whole power of Napoleon. 

There was, however, no certainty that the Lisbon of Canada would befound at Montreal. Though secure on the water side, there were thereno lines of Torres Vedras; and it was well within the fears of thegovernors of Canada that under energetic attack their forces would notbe able to make a stand short of Quebec, against the overwhelmingnumbers which might be brought against them. In December, 1807, Governor General Craig, a soldier of tried experience and reputation, had written: "Defective as it is, Quebec is the only post that can beconsidered tenable for a moment. If the Americans should turn theirattention to Lower Canada, which is most probable, I have no hopesthat the forces here can accomplish more than to check them for ashort time. They will eventually be compelled to take refuge inQuebec, and operations must terminate in a siege. "[408] Consequentupon this report of a most competent officer, much had been done tostrengthen the works; but pressed by the drain of the Peninsular War, heaviest in the years 1809 to 1812, when France elsewhere was atpeace, little in the way of troops had been sent. As late as November16, 1812, the Secretary for War, in London, notified Governor GeneralPrevost that as yet he could give no hopes of reinforcements. [409]Napoleon had begun his retreat from Moscow three weeks before, but thefull effects of the impending disaster were not yet forecast. Anotherthree weeks, and the Secretary wrote that a moderate detachment wouldbe sent to Bermuda, to await there the opening of the St. Lawrence inthe spring. [410] But already the United States had lost Mackinac andDetroit, and Canada had gained time to breathe. 

Brock's remark, expanded as has here been done, defines the decisivemilitary points upon the long frontier from Lake Superior to Montreal. Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, Montreal--these four places, togetherwith adequate development of naval strength on the lakes--constitutedthe essential elements of the military situation at the opening ofhostilities. Why? Mackinac and Detroit because, being situated uponextremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication, their possession controlled decisively all transit. Held in force, they commanded the one great and feasible access to the northwesterncountry. Upon them turned, therefore, the movement of what was thenits chief industry, the fur trade; but more important still, thetenure of those points so affected the interests of the Indians ofthat region as to throw them necessarily on the side of the party inpossession. It is difficult for us to realize how heavily thisconsideration weighed at that day with both nations, but especiallywith the British; because, besides being locally the weaker, they knewthat under existing conditions in Europe--Napoleon still in the heightof his power, never yet vanquished, and about to undertake theinvasion of Russia--they had nothing to hope from the mother country. Yet the leaders, largely professional soldiers, faced the situationwith soldierly instinct. "If we could destroy the American posts atDetroit and Michilimackinac, " wrote Lieutenant-Governor Gore of UpperCanada, to Craig, in 1808, "many Indians would declare for us;" and heagrees with Craig that, "if not for us, they will surely be againstus. "[411]

It was Gore's successor, Brock, that wrested from the Americans atonce the two places named, with the effect upon the Indians which hadbeen anticipated. The dependence of these upon this water-linecommunication was greatly increased by various punitive expeditions bythe United States troops in the Northwest, under General Harrison, inthe autumn and winter of 1812-13. To secure further the safety of thewhites in the outer settlements, the villages and corn of the hostilenatives were laid waste for a considerable surrounding distance. [412]They were thus forced to remove, and to seek shelter in the Northwest. This increase of population in that quarter, relatively to a store offood never too abundant, made it the more urgent for them to remainfriends of those with whom it rested to permit the water traffic, bywhich supplies could come forward and the exchange of commodities goon. The fall of Michilimackinac, therefore, determined their side, towhich the existing British naval command of the upper lakes alsocontributed; and these causes were alleged by Hull in justification ofhis surrender at Detroit, which completed and secured the enemy's gripthroughout the Northwestern frontier. This accession of strength tothe British was not without very serious drawbacks. Shortly before thebattle of Lake Erie the British commissaries were feeding fourteenthousand Indians--men, women, and children. What proportion of thesewere warriors it is hard to say, and harder still how many could becounted on to take the field when wanted; but it is probable that theexhaustion of supplies due to this cause more than compensated for anyservice received from them in war. When Barclay sailed to fight Perry, there remained in store but one day's flour, and the crews of hisships had been for some days on half allowance of many articles. 

The opinion of competent soldiers on the spot, such as Craig andBrock, in full possession of all the contemporary facts, may beaccepted explicitly as confirming the inferences which in any eventmight have been drawn from the natural features of the situation. UponMackinac and Detroit depended the control and quiet of theNorthwestern country, because they commanded vital points on its lineof communication. Upon Kingston and Montreal, by their position andintrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada, alongand above the St. Lawrence, with the sea power of Great Britain, whence alone could be drawn the constant support without whichultimate defeat should have been inevitable. Naval power, sustainedupon the Great Lakes, controlled the great line of communicationbetween the East and West, and also conferred upon the partypossessing it the strategic advantage of interior lines; that is, ofshorter distances, both in length and time, to move from point topoint of the lake shores, close to which lay the scenes ofoperations. It followed that Detroit and Michilimackinac, being at thebeginning in the possession of the United States, should have beenfortified, garrisoned, provisioned, in readiness for siege, and placedin close communication with home, as soon as war was seen to beimminent, which it was in December, 1811, at latest. Having in thatquarter everything to lose, and comparatively little to gain, thecountry was thrown on the defensive. On the east the possession ofMontreal or Kingston would cut off all Canada above from support bythe sea, which would be equivalent to insuring its fall. "I shallcontinue to exert myself to the utmost to overcome every difficulty, "wrote Brock, who gave such emphatic proof of energetic and sagaciousexertion in his subsequent course. "Should, however, the communicationbetween Montreal and Kingston be cut off, the fate of the troops inthis part of the province will be decided. "[413] "The Montrealfrontier, " said the officer selected by the Duke of Wellington toreport on the defences of Canada, "is the most important, and atpresent [1826] confessedly most vulnerable and accessible part ofCanada. "[414] There, then, was the direction for offensive operationsby the United States; preferably against Montreal, for, if successful, a much larger region would be isolated and reduced. Montreal gone, Kingston could receive no help from without; and, even if capable oftemporary resistance, its surrender would be but a question of time. Coincidently with this military advance, naval development for thecontrol of the lakes should have proceeded, as a discreet precaution;although, after the fall of Kingston and Montreal, there could havebeen little use of an inland navy, for the British local resourceswould then have been inadequate to maintain an opposing force. 

Considered apart from the question of military readiness, in whichthe United States was so lamentably deficient, the natural advantagesin her possession for the invasion of Canada were very great. TheHudson River, Lake George, and Lake Champlain furnished a line ofwater communication, for men and supplies, from the very heart of theresources of the country, centring about New York. This was not indeedcontinuous; but it was consecutive, and well developed. Almost thewhole of it lay within United States territory; and when the boundaryline on Champlain was reached, Montreal was but forty miles distant. Towards Kingston, also, there was a similar line, by way of the MohawkRiver and Lake Oneida to Oswego, whence a short voyage on Ontarioreached the American naval station at Sackett's Harbor, thirty milesfrom Kingston. As had been pointed out six months before the warbegan, by General Armstrong, who became the United States Secretary ofWar in January, 1813, when the most favorable conditions forinitiative had already been lost, these two lines were identical asfar as Albany. "This should be the place of rendezvous; because, besides other recommendations, it is here that all the roads leadingfrom the central portion of the United States to the Canadasdiverge--a circumstance which, while it keeps up your enemy's doubtsas to your real point of attack, cannot fail to keep his means ofdefence in a state of division. "[415] The perplexity of an army, thusuncertain upon which extreme of a line one hundred and fifty mileslong a blow will fall, is most distressing; and trebly so when, as inthis case, the means of communication from end to end are both scantyand slow. "The conquest of Lower Canada, " Sir James Craig had written, "must still be effected by way of Lake Champlain;" but while this wastrue, and dictated to the officer charged with the defence thenecessity of keeping the greater part of his force in that quarter, it would be impossible wholly to neglect the exposure of the uppersection. This requirement was reflected in the disposition of theBritish forces when war began; two thirds being below Montreal, chiefly at Quebec, the remainder dispersed through Upper Canada. Toadd to these advantages of the United States, trivial as was the navalforce of either party on Champlain, the preponderance at this moment, and throughout the first year, was in her hands. She was also bettersituated to enlarge her squadrons on all the lakes, because nearer theheart of her power. 

Circumstances thus had determined that, in general plan, the seaboardrepresented the defensive scene of campaign for the United States, while the land frontier should be that of offensive action. It will beseen, with particular reference to the latter, that the character ofthe front of operations prescribed the offensive in great andconcentrated force toward the St. Lawrence, with preparations anddemonstrations framed to keep the enemy doubtful to the last possiblemoment as to where the blow should fall; while on the westernfrontier, from Michilimackinac to Niagara, the defensive should havebeen maintained, qualifying this term, however, by the already quotedmaxim of Napoleon, that no offensive disposition is complete whichdoes not keep in view, and provide for, offensive action, ifopportunity offer. Such readiness, if it leads to no more, at leastcompels the opponent to retain near by a degree of force that weakensby so much his resistance in the other quarter, against which the realoffensive campaign is directed. 

Similarly, the seaboard, defensive in general relation to the nationalplan as a whole, must have its own particular sphere of offensiveaction, without which its defensive function is enfeebled, if notparalyzed. Having failed to create before the war a competent navy, capable of seizing opportunity, when offered, to act against hostiledivisions throughout the world, it was not possible afterwards toretrieve this mistake. Under the circumstances existing in 1812, theprevious decade having been allowed by the country to pass in absolutenaval indifference, offensive measures were necessarily confined tothe injury of the enemy's commerce. Had a proper force existed, abundant opportunity for more military action was sure to occur. Thecharacteristics of parts of the American coast prevented closeblockade, especially in winter; and the same violent winds whichforced an enemy's ships off, facilitated egress under circumstancesfavoring evasion. Escape to the illimitable ocean then depended atworst upon speed. This was the case at Boston, which CommodoreBainbridge before the war predicted could not be effectuallyblockaded; also at Narragansett, recommended for the same reason byCommodore John Rodgers; and in measure at New York, though there themore difficult and shoaler bar involved danger and delay to thepassage of heavy frigates. In this respect the British encounteredconditions contrary to those they had know before the French Atlanticports, where the wind which drove the blockaders off prevented theblockaded from leaving. Once out and away, a squadron of respectableforce would be at liberty to seek and strike one of the minordivisions of the enemy, imposing caution as to how he dispersed hisships in face of such a chance. To the south, both the Delaware andChesapeake could be sealed almost hermetically by a navy so superioras was that of Great Britain; for the sheltered anchorage withinenabled a fleet to lie with perfect safety across the path of allvessels attempting to go out or in. South of this again, Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, though useful commercial harbors, had notthe facilities, natural or acquired, for sustaining a military navy. They were not maritime centres; the commerce of the South, even ofBaltimore with its famous schooners, being in peace carried on chieflyby shipping which belonged elsewhere--New England or foreign. Thenecessities of a number of armed ships could not there be supplied;and furthermore, the comparatively moderate weather made the coast atonce more easy and less dangerous for an enemy to approach. Theseports, therefore, were entered only occasionally, and then by thesmaller American cruisers. 

For these reasons the northern portion of the coast, with its ruggedshores and tempestuous weather, was the base of such offensiveoperations as the diminutive numbers of the United States Navypermitted. To it the national ships sought to return, for they couldenter with greater security, and had better prospects of getting outagain when they wished. In the Delaware, the Chesapeake, and on theSouthern coast, the efforts of the United States were limited toaction strictly, and even narrowly, defensive in scope. Occasionally, a very small enemy's cruiser might be attacked; but for the most partpeople were content merely to resist aggression, if attempted. Theharrying of the Chesapeake, and to a less extent of the Delaware, arefamiliar stories; the total destruction of the coasting trade and theconsequent widespread distress are less known, or less remembered. What is not at all appreciated is the deterrent effect upon theperfect liberty enjoyed by the enemy to do as they pleased, whichwould have been exercised by a respectable fighting navy; by a forcein the Northern ports, equal to the offensive, and ready for it, atthe time that Great Britain was so grievously preoccupied by thenumerous fleet which Napoleon had succeeded in equipping, from Antwerpround to Venice. Of course, after his abdication in 1814, and therelease of the British navy and army, there was nothing for thecountry to do, in the then military strength of the two nations, saveto make peace on the best terms attainable. Having allowed to passaway, unresented and unimproved, years of insult, injury, andopportunity, during which the gigantic power of Napoleon would havebeen a substantial, if inert, support to its own efforts at redress, it was the mishap of the United States Government to take up arms atthe very moment when the great burden which her enemy had been bearingfor years was about to fall from his shoulders forever. 

FOOTNOTES:

[389] Ante, p. 144. 

[390] Adams, History of the United States, vol. Viii. Chap. Viii. 

[391] Sir J. Carmichael Smyth, Précis of Wars in Canada, p. 116. 

[392] To Monroe, May 4, 1806. Jefferson's Writings, Collected andEdited by P. L. Ford, vol. Viii. P. 450. 

[393] Ibid. , vol. Vi. P. 75. 

[394] Kingsford's History of Canada, vol. Viii. P. 183. The author isindebted to Major General Sir F. Maurice, and Major G. Le M. Gretton, of the British Army, for extracts from the official records, fromwhich it appears that, excluding provincial corps, not to be accountedregulars, the British troops in Canada numbered in January, 1812, 3, 952; in July, 5, 004. 

[395] Giles, Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 51. 

[396] June 13, 1812. Works of James Monroe, vol. V. P. 207. 

[397] Prevost to Liverpool, July 15, 1812. Canadian Archives, Q. 118. 

[398] Niles' Register, vol. Vii. P. 195. 

[399] Ante, p. 71. 

[400] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 584. 

[401] Niles' Register, vol. Ii. P. 119. "Official Returns in theDepartment of State" are alleged as authority for the statement. Monroe to Foster, May 30, 1812, mentions "a list in this office ofseveral thousand American seamen who have been impressed into theBritish service. " American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. Iii. P. 454. 

[402] Kingsford's History of Canada, vol. Viii. P. 111. 

[403] Drummond to Prevost, Oct. 20, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Upper Canada, p. 9. 

[404] Ibid. , Oct. 15. 

[405] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 14, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, p. 36. 

[406] Travels, J. M. Duncan, vol. Ii. P. 27. 

[407] Life of Sir Isaac Brock, p. 127. 

[408] Report on Canadian Archives, 1893, Lower Canada, p. 1. 

[409] Ibid. , p. 75. 

[410] Ibid. 

[411] Report on Canadian Archives, 1893, Lower Canada, p. 3. 

[412] Brackenridge, War of 1812, pp. 57, 63, 65, 66. 

[413] Life of Brock, p. 193. 

[414] Smyth, Précis of the Wars in Canada, p. 167. 

[415] Armstrong to Eustis, Jan. 2, 1812. Armstrong's Notices of theWar of 1812, vol. I, p. 238. 

CHAPTER VI

EARLY CRUISES AND ENGAGEMENTS: THE "CONSTITUTION" AND"GUERRIÈRE. " HULL'S OPERATIONS AND SURRENDER

War was declared on June 18. On the 21st there was lying in the lowerharbor of New York a division of five United States vessels under thecommand of Commodore John Rodgers. It consisted of three frigates, the"President" and "United States, " rated of 44 guns, the "Congress" of38, the ship-rigged sloop of war "Hornet" of 18, and the brig "Argus"of 16. This division, as it stood, was composed of two squadrons; thatof Rodgers himself, and that of Commodore Stephen Decatur, the latterhaving assigned to him immediately the "United States, " the"Congress, " and the "Argus. " There belonged also to Rodgers'particular squadron the "Essex, " a frigate rated at 32 guns. CaptainDavid Porter, one of the most distinguished names in American navalannals, commanded her then, and until her capture by a much superiorforce, nearly two years later; but at this moment she was undergoingrepairs, a circumstance which prevented her from accompanying theother vessels, and materially affected her subsequent history. 

It may be mentioned, as an indication of naval policy, that althoughRodgers and Decatur each had more than one vessel under his control, neither was given the further privilege and distinction, frequent insuch cases, of having a captain to command the particular ship onwhich he himself sailed. This, when done, introduces a verysubstantial change in the position of the officer affected. He isremoved from being only first among several equals, and is advanced toa superiority of grade, in which he stands alone, with consequentenhancement of authority. Rodgers was captain of the "President" aswell as commodore of the small body of vessels assigned to him;Decatur held the same relation to the frigate "United States, " and toher consorts. Though apparently trivial, the circumstance is notinsignificant; for it indicates clearly that, so far as the NavyDepartment then had any mind, it had not yet made it up as to whetherit would send out its vessels as single cruisers, or combine them intodivisions, for the one operation open to the United States Navy, namely, the destruction of the enemy's commerce. With divisionspermanently constituted as such, propriety and effective action wouldhave required the additional dignity for the officer in generalcharge, and they themselves doubtless would have asked for it; but forships temporarily associated, and liable at any moment to bescattered, not only was the simple seniority of naval rank sufficient, but more would have been inexpedient. The commodores, now such only bycourtesy and temporary circumstance, would suffer no derogation ifdeprived of ships other than their own; whereas the more extensivefunction, similarly curtailed, would become a mere empty show, ahumiliation which no office, civil or military, can undergo withoutharm. 

This indecision of the Department reflected the varying opinions ofthe higher officers of the service, which in turn but reproduceddifferent schools of thought throughout all navies. Historically, as amilitary operation, for the injury of an enemy's commerce and theprotection of one's own, it may be considered fairly demonstrated thatvessels grouped do more effective work than the same number scattered. This is, of course, but to repeat the general military teaching ofoperations of all kinds. It is not the keeping of the several vesselsside by side that constitutes the virtue of this disposition; it isthe placing them under a single head, thereby insuring co-operation, however widely dispersed by their common chief under the emergency ofsuccessive moments. Like a fan that opens and shuts, vessels thusorganically bound together possess the power of wide sweep, whichinsures exertion over a great field of ocean, and at the same timethat of mutual support, because dependent upon and controlled from acommon centre. Such is concentration, reasonably understood; nothuddled together like a drove of cattle, but distributed with a regardto a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of asingle will. 

There is, however, in the human mind an inveterate tendency todispersion of effort, due apparently to the wish to do at once as manythings as may be; a disposition also to take as many chances aspossible in an apparent lottery, with the more hope that some one ofthem will come up successful. Not an aggregate big result, and oneonly, whether hit or miss, but a division of resources and powerswhich shall insure possible compensation in one direction for what isnot gained, or may even be lost, in another. The Navy Department, whenhostilities were imminent, addressed inquiries to several prominentofficers as to the best means of employing the very small total forceavailable. The question involved the direction of effort, as well asthe method; but as regards the former of these, the general routesfollowed by British commerce, and the modes of protecting it, were sofar understood as to leave not much room for differences of opinion. 

Rodgers may have been unconsciously swayed by the natural bias of anofficer whose seniority would insure him a division, if thesingle-cruiser policy did not prevail. Of the replies given, however, his certainly was the one most consonant with sound militaryviews. [416] Send a small squadron, of two or three frigates and asloop, to cruise on the coast of the British Islands, and send thelight cruisers to the West Indies; for, though he did not express it, in the gentle breezes and smooth seas of the tropics small cruisershave a much better chance to avoid capture by big ships than in theheavy gales of the North Atlantic. This much may be termed thedistinctly offensive part of Rodgers' project. For the defensive, employ the remainder of the frigates, singly or in squadron, to guardour own seaboard; either directly, by remaining off the coast, or bytaking position in the track of the trade between Great Britain andthe St. Lawrence. Irrespective of direct captures there made, thiscourse would contribute to protect the access to home ports, bydrawing away the enemy's ships of war to cover their own threatenedcommerce. Alike in the size of his foreign squadron, and in the touchof uncertainty as to our own coasts, "singly or in squadron, " Rodgersreflected the embarrassment of a man whose means are utterlyinadequate to the work he wishes to do. One does not need to be asoldier or a seaman to comprehend the difficulty of making ends meetwhen there is not enough to go round. 

Decatur and Bainbridge, whose written opinions are preserved, heldviews greatly modified from those of Rodgers, or even distinctlyopposed to them. "The plan which appears to me best calculated for ourlittle navy to annoy the trade of Great Britain, " wrote Decatur, [417]"would be to send them out distant from our own coast, singly, or notmore than two frigates in company, without specific instructions;relying upon the enterprise of their officers. Two frigates cruisingtogether would not be so easily traced by an enemy as a greaternumber; their movements would be infinitely more rapid; they would besufficiently strong in most instances to attack a convoy, and theprobability is they would not meet with a superior cruising force. If, however, they should meet a superior, and cannot avoid it, we wouldnot have to regret the whole of our marine crushed at one blow. "Bainbridge is yet more absolute. "I am anxious to see us all dispersedabout various seas. If we are kept together in squadron, or lying inport, the whole are scarcely of more advantage than one ship. I wishall our public vessels here [Boston] were dispersed in various ports, for I apprehend it will draw speedily a numerous force of the enemy toblockade or attack. "[418] At the moment of writing this, Rodgers'squadron was in Boston, having returned from a cruise, and the"Constitution" also, immediately after her engagement with the"Guerrière. "

It will be observed that, in spirit even more than in letter, Rodgers'leading conception is that of co-operation, combined action. First, hewould have a Department general plan, embracing in a comprehensivescheme the entire navy and the ocean at large, in the British seas, West Indies, and North Atlantic; each contributing, by its particularaction and impression, to forward the work of the others, and so ofthe whole. Secondly, he intimates, not obscurely, though cautiously, in each separate field the concerted action of several ships is betterthan their disconnected efforts. Decatur and Bainbridge, on thecontrary, implicitly, and indeed explicitly, favor individualmovement. They would reject even combination by the Department--"nospecific instructions, rely upon the enterprise of the officers. " Norwill they have a local supervision or control in any particular; twofrigates at the most are to act together, singly even is preferable, and they shall roam the seas at will. 

There can be little doubt as to which scheme is sounder in generalprinciple. All military experience concurs in the general rule ofco-operative action; and this means concentration, under the liberaldefinition before given--unity of purpose and subordination to acentral control. General rules, however, must be intelligently appliedto particular circumstances; and it will be found by considering thespecial circumstances of British commerce, under the war conditions of1812, that Rodgers' plan was particularly suited to injure it. It isdoubtless true that if merchant vessels were so dispersed over theglobe, that rarely more than one would be visible at a time, one shipof war could take that one as well as a half-dozen could. But this wasnot the condition. British merchant ships were not permitted so toact. They were compelled to gather at certain centres, and thence, when enough had assembled, were despatched in large convoys, guardedby ships of war, in force proportioned to that disposable at themoment by the local admiral, and to the anticipated danger. Consequently, while isolated merchant ships were to be met, they werebut the crumbs that fell from the table, except in the near vicinityof the British Islands themselves. 

Such were the conditions while Great Britain had been at war withFrance alone; but the declaration of the United States led at once toincreased stringency. All licenses to cross the Atlantic withoutconvoy were at once revoked, and every colonial and naval commanderlay under heavy responsibility to enforce the law of convoy. Insurancewas forfeited by breach of its requirements; and in case of partingconvoy, capture would at least hazard, if not invalidate, the policy. Under all this compulsion, concentrated merchant fleets and heavyguards became as far as possible the rule of action. With suchconditions it was at once more difficult for a single ship of war tofind, and when found to deal effectually with, a body of vessels whichon the one hand was large, and yet occupied but a small spacerelatively to the great expanse of ocean over which the pursuer mightroam fruitlessly, missing continually the one moving spot he sought. For such a purpose a well-handled squadron, scattering withinsignal-distance from each other, or to meet at a rendezvous, was morelikely to find, and, having found, could by concerted action bestovercome the guard and destroy the fleet. 

On June 22, 1812, the Navy Department issued orders for Rodgers, [419]which are interesting as showing its ideas of operations. The twosquadrons then assembled under him were to go to sea, and thereseparate. He himself, with the frigates "President, " "Essex, " and"John Adams, " sloop "Hornet, " and the small brig "Nautilus, " was to goto the Capes of the Chesapeake, and thence cruise eastwardly, off andon. Decatur's two frigates, with the "Argus, " would cruise southwardlyfrom New York. It was expected that the two would meet from time totime; and, should combined action be advisable, Rodgers had authorityto unite them under his broad pendant for that purpose. The object ofthis movement was to protect the commerce of the country, which atthis time was expected to be returning in great numbers from theSpanish peninsula; whither had been hurried every available ship, andevery barrel of flour in store, as soon as the news of the approachingembargo of April 4 became public. "The great bulk of our returningcommerce, " wrote the secretary, "will make for the ports between theChesapeake and our eastern extremities; and, in the protection to beafforded, such ports claim particular attention. "

The obvious comment on this disposition is that protection to theincoming ships would be most completely afforded, not by the localpresence of either of these squadrons, but by the absence of theenemy. This absence was best insured by beating him, if met; and inthe then size of the British Halifax fleet it was possible that adetachment sent from it might be successfully engaged by the jointdivision, though not by either squadron singly. The other adequatealternative was to force the enemy to keep concentrated, and so tocover as small a part as might be of the homeward path of thescattered American trade. This also was best effected by uniting ourown ships. Without exaggerating the danger to the American squadrons, needlessly exposed in detail by the Department's plan, the object inview would have been attained as surely, and at less risk, by keepingall the vessels together, even though they were retained betweenBoston Bay and the Capes of the Chesapeake for the local defence ofcommerce. In short, as was to be expected from the antecedents of theGovernment, the scheme was purely and narrowly defensive; there wasnot in it a trace of any comprehension of the principle that offenceis the surest defence. The opening words of its letter defined thefull measure of its understanding. "It has been judged expedient so toemploy our public armed vessels, as to afford to our returningcommerce all possible protection. " It may be added, that to station onthe very spot where the merchant vessels were flocking in return, divisions inferior to that which could be concentrated against them, was very bad strategy; drawing the enemy by a double motive to theplace whence his absence was particularly desirable. 

The better way was to influence British naval action by a distinctoffensive step; by a movement of the combined divisions sufficientlyobvious to inspire caution, but yet too vague to admit of precision ofdirection or definite pursuit. In accordance with the general ideasformulated in his letter, before quoted, Rodgers had already fixedupon a plan, which, if successful, would inflict a startling blow toBritish commerce and prestige, and at the same time would compel theenemy to concentrate, thus diminishing his menace to Americanshipping. It was known to him that a large convoy had sailed fromJamaica for England about May 20. The invariable course of such bodieswas first to the north-northeast, parallel in a general sense to theGulf Stream and American coast, until they had cleared the northeasttrades and the belt of light and variable winds above them. Uponapproaching forty degrees north latitude, they met in full force therude west winds, as the Spanish navigators styled them, and beforethem bore away to the English Channel. That a month after theirstarting Rodgers should still have hoped to overtake them, gives alively impression of the lumbering slowness of trade movement underconvoy; but he counted also upon the far swifter joint speed of hisfew and well-found ships. To the effective fulfilment of his doubleobject, defensive and offensive, however, he required more ships thanhis own squadron, and he held his course dependent upon Decaturjoining him. [420]

 [Illustration: THE CHASE OF THE _Belvidera_ From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman. ]

On June 21 Decatur did join, and later in the same day arrived aDepartment order of June 18 with the Declaration of War. Within anhour the division of five ships was under way for sea. In consequenceof this instant movement Rodgers did not receive the subsequent orderof the Department, June 22, the purport of which has been explainedand discussed. Standing off southeasterly from Sandy Hook, at 3 A. M. Of June 23 was spoken an American brig, which four days before hadseen the convoy steering east in latitude 36°, longitude 67°, or aboutthree hundred miles from where the squadron then was. Canvas wascrowded in pursuit, but three hours later was sighted in the northeasta large sail heading toward the squadron. The course of all thevessels was changed for her; but she, proving to be British, --the"Belvidera, " rated 32, and smaller than any one of the Americanfrigates, --speedily turned and took flight. Pursuit was continued allthat day and until half an hour before midnight, the "President"leading as the fastest ship; but the British vessel, fighting for herlife, and with the friendly port of Halifax under her lee, couldresort to measures impossible to one whose plan of distant cruisingrequired complete equipment, and full stores of provisions and water. Boats and spare spars and anchors were thrown overboard, and fourteentons of drinking water pumped out. Thus lightened, after being withinrange of the "President's" guns for a couple of hours, the "Belvidera"drew gradually away, and succeeded in escaping, having received andinflicted considerable damage. In explanation of such a result betweentwo antagonists of very unequal size, it must be remembered that achasing ship of those days could not fire straight ahead; while inturning her side to bring the guns to bear, as the "President" severaltimes did, she lost ground. The chased ship, on the other hand, fromthe form of the stern, could use four guns without deviating from hercourse. 

After some little delay in repairing, the squadron resumed pursuit ofthe convoy. On June 29, and again on July 9, vessels were spoken whichreported encountering it; the latter the evening before. Traces of itscourse also were thought to be found in quantities of cocoanut shelland orange peel, passed on one occasion; but, though the chase wascontinued to within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, theconvoy itself was never seen. To this disappointing result atmosphericconditions very largely contributed. From June 29, on the western edgeof the Great Banks, until July 13, when the pursuit was abandoned, theweather was so thick that "at least six days out of seven" nothing wasvisible over five miles away, and for long periods the vessels couldnot even see one another at a distance of two hundred yards. The samesurrounding lasted to the neighborhood of Madeira, for which thecourse was next shaped. After passing that island on June 21 returnwas made toward the United States by way of the Azores, which weresighted, and thence again to the Banks of Newfoundland and Cape Sable, reaching Boston August 31, after an absence of seventy days. 

Although Rodgers's plan had completely failed in what may properly becalled its purpose of offence, and he could report the capture of"only seven merchant vessels, and those not valuable, " hecongratulated himself with justice upon success on the defensiveside. [421] The full effect was produced, which he had anticipated fromthe mere fact of a strong American division being at large, but seenso near its own shores that nothing certain could be inferred as toits movements or intentions. The "Belvidera, " having lost sight of itat midnight, could, upon her arrival in Halifax, give only the generalinformation that it was at sea; and Captain Byron, who commanded her, thought with reason that the "President's" action warranted theconclusion that the anticipated hostilities had been begun. Hetherefore seized and brought in two or three American merchantmen; butthe British admiral, Sawyer, thinking there might possibly be somemistake, like that of the meeting between the "President" and "LittleBelt" a year before, directed their release. 

A very few days later, definite intelligence of the declaration of warby the United States was received at Halifax. At that period, theAmerican seas from the equator to Labrador were for administrativepurposes divided by the British Admiralty into four commands: two inthe West Indies, centring respectively at Jamaica and Barbados; oneat Newfoundland; while the fourth, with its two chief naval bases ofHalifax and Bermuda, lay over against the United States, and embracedthe Atlantic coast-line in its field of operations. Admiral Sawyer nowpromptly despatched a squadron, consisting of one small ship of theline and three frigates, the "Shannon", 38, "Belvidera", 36, and"Æolus", 32, which sailed July 5. Four days later, off Nantucket, itwas joined by the "Guerrière", 38, and July 14 arrived off Sandy Hook. There Captain Broke, of the "Shannon", who by seniority of rankcommanded the whole force, "received the first intelligence ofRodgers' squadron having put to sea. "[422] As an American division ofsome character had been known to be out since the "Belvidera" met it, and as Rodgers on this particular day was within two days' sail of theEnglish Channel, the entire ignorance of the enemy as to hiswhereabouts could not be more emphatically stated. The components ofthe British force were such that no two of them could justifiablyventure to encounter his united command. Consequently, to remaintogether was imposed as a military necessity, and it so continued forsome weeks. In fact, the first separation, that of the "Guerrière", though apparently necessary and safe, was followed immediately by adisaster. 

Rodgers was therefore justified in his claim concerning his cruise. "It is truly unpleasant to be obliged to make a communication thusbarren of benefit to our country. The only consolation I, individually, feel on the occasion is derived from knowing that ourbeing at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portionof his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing anincalculable amount of American property that would otherwise havefallen a sacrifice. " "My calculations were, " he wrote on anotheroccasion, "even if I did not succeed in destroying the convoy, thatleaving the coast as we did would tend to distract the enemy, obligehim to concentrate a considerable portion of his active navy, and atthe same time prevent his single cruisers from lying before any of ourprincipal ports, from their not knowing to which, or at what moment, we might return. "[423] This was not only a perfectly sound militaryconception, gaining additional credit from the contrasted views ofDecatur and Bainbridge, but it was applied successfully at the mostcritical moment of all wars, namely, when commerce is flocking homefor safety, and under conditions particularly hazardous to the UnitedStates, owing to the unusually large number of vessels then out. "Wehave been so completely occupied in looking out for Commodore Rodgers'squadron, " wrote an officer of the "Guerrière", "that we have takenvery few prizes. "[424] President Madison in his annual message[425]said: "Our trade, with little exception, has reached our ports, havingbeen much favored in it by the course pursued by a squadron of ourfrigates under the command of Commodore Rodgers. "

 [Illustration: THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE OCEAN ACTIONS OF THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SQUADRONS IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1812]

Nor was it only the offensive action of the enemy against the UnitedStates' ports and commerce that was thus hampered. Unwonted defensivemeasures were forced upon him. Uncertainty as to Rodgers' position andintentions led Captain Broke, on July 29, to join a homeward-boundJamaica fleet, under convoy of the frigate "Thalia", some two or threehundred miles to the southward and eastward of Halifax, and toaccompany it with his division five hundred miles on its voyage. Theplace of this meeting shows that it was pre-arranged, and its distancefrom the American coast, five hundred miles away from New York, together with the length of the journey through which the additionalguard was thought necessary, emphasize the effect of Rodgers' unknownsituation upon the enemy's movements. The protection of their owntrade carried this British division a thousand miles away from thecoast it was to threaten. It is in such study of reciprocal actionbetween enemies that the lessons of war are learned, and itsprinciples established, in a manner to which the study of combatsbetween single ships, however brilliant, affords no equivalent. Theconvoy that Broke thus accompanied has been curiously confused withthe one of which Rodgers believed himself in pursuit;[426] and theBritish naval historian James chuckles obviously over the blunder ofthe Yankee commodore, who returned to Boston "just six days after the'Thalia', having brought home her charge in safety, had anchored inthe Downs. " Rodgers may have been wholly misinformed as to there beingany Jamaica convoy on the way when he started; but as on July 29 hehad passed Madeira on his way home, it is obvious that the convoywhich Broke then joined south of Halifax could not be the one theAmerican squadron believed itself to be pursuing across the Atlantic amonth earlier. 

Broke accompanied the merchant ships to the limits of the Halifaxstation. Then, on August 6, receiving intelligence of Rodgers havingbeen seen on their homeward path, he directed the ship of the line, "Africa", to go with them as far as 45° W. , and for them thence tofollow latitude 52° N. , instead of the usual more southerlyroute. [427] After completing this duty the "Africa" was to return toHalifax, whither the "Guerrière", which needed repairs, was ordered atonce. The remainder of the squadron returned off New York, where itwas again reported on September 10. The movement of the convoy, andthe "Guerrière's" need of refit, were linked events that broughtabout the first single-ship action of the war; to account for whichfully the antecedent movements of her opponent must also be traced. Atthe time Rodgers sailed, the United States frigate "Constitution", 44, was lying at Annapolis, enlisting a crew. Fearing to be blockaded inChesapeake Bay, a position almost hopeless, her captain, Hull, hurriedto sea on July 12. July 17, the ship being then off Egg Harbor, NewJersey, some ten or fifteen miles from shore, bound to New York, Broke's vessels, which had then arrived from Halifax for the firsttime in the war, were sighted from the masthead, to the northward andinshore of the "Constitution". Captain Hull at first believed thatthis might be the squadron of Rodgers, of whose actual movements hehad no knowledge, waiting for him to join in order to carry outcommands of the Department. Two hours later, another sail wasdiscovered to the northeast, off shore. The perils of an isolatedship, in the presence of a superior force of possible enemies, imposedcaution, so Hull steered warily toward the single unknown. Attemptingto exchange signals, he soon found that he neither could understandnor be understood. To persist on his course might surround him withfoes, and accordingly, about 11 P. M. , the ship was headed to thesoutheast and so continued during the night. 

 [Illustration: THE FORECASTLE OF THE _Constitution_ DURING THE CHASE From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl. ]

The next morning left no doubt as to the character of the strangers, among whom was the "Guerrière"; and there ensued a chase which, lasting from daylight of July 18th to near noon of the 20th, hasbecome historical in the United States Navy, from the attendantdifficulties and the imminent peril of the favorite ship endangered. Much of the pursuit being in calm, and on soundings, resort was had totowing by boats, and to dragging the ship ahead by means of lightanchors dropped on the bottom. In a contest of this kind, the abilityof a squadron to concentrate numbers on one or two ships, which canfirst approach and cripple the enemy, thus holding him till theirconsorts come up, gives an evident advantage over the single opponent. On the other hand, the towing boats of the pursuer, being toward thestern guns of the pursued, are the first objects on either side tocome under fire, and are vulnerable to a much greater degree than theships themselves. Under such conditions, accurate appreciation ofadvantages, and unremitting use of small opportunities, are apt toprove decisive. It was by such diligent and skilful exertion that the"Constitution" effected her escape from a position which for a timeseemed desperate; but it should not escape attention that thus earlyin the war, before Great Britain had been able to re-enforce herAmerican fleet, one of our frigates was unable to enter our principalseaport. "Finding the ship so far to the southward and eastward, "reported Hull, "and the enemy's squadron stationed off New York, whichwould make it impossible to get in there, I determined to make forBoston, to receive your further orders. "

On July 28 he writes from Boston that there were as yet no Britishcruisers in the Bay, nor off the New England coast; that great numbersof merchant vessels were daily arriving from Europe; and that he waswarning them off the southern ports, advising that they should enterBoston. He reasoned that the enemy would now disperse, and probablysend two frigates off the port. In this he under-estimated thedeterrent effect of Rodgers' invisible command, but the apprehensionhastened his own departure, and on August 2 he sailed again with thefirst fair wind. Running along the Maine coast to the Bay of Fundy, hethence went off Halifax; and meeting nothing there, in a three or fourdays' stay, moved to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to intercept the tradeof Canada and Nova Scotia. Here in the neighborhood of Cape Race someimportant captures were made, and on August 15 an American brigretaken, which gave information that Broke's squadron was not faraway. This was probably a fairly correct report, as its returningcourse should have carried it near by a very few days before. Hulltherefore determined to go to the southward, passing close to Bermuda, to cruise on the southern coast of the United States. In pursuance ofthis decision the "Constitution" had run some three hundred miles, when at 2 P. M. Of August 19, being then nearly midway of the routeover which Broke three weeks before had accompanied the convoy, a sailwas sighted to the eastward, standing west. This proved to be the"Guerrière, " on her return to Halifax, whither she was moving veryleisurely, having traversed only two hundred miles in twelve days. 

As the "Constitution, " standing south-southwest for her destination, was crossing the "Guerrière's" bows, her course was changed, in orderto learn the character of the stranger. By half-past three she wasrecognized to be a large frigate, under easy sail on the starboardtack; which, the wind being northwesterly, gives her heading fromwest-southwest to southwest. The "Constitution" was to windward. At3. 45 the "Guerrière, " without changing her course, backed hermaintopsail, the effect of which was to lessen her forward movement, leaving just way enough to keep command with her helm (G 1). To bethus nearly motionless assured the steadiest platform for aiming theguns, during the period most critical for the "Constitution, " when, toget near, she must steer nearly head on, toward her opponent. Thedisadvantage of this approach is that the enemy's shot, if they hit, pass from end to end of the ship, a distance, in those days, nearlyfourfold that of from side to side; and besides, the line from bow tostern was that on which the guns and the men who work them wereranged. The risks of grave injury were therefore greatly increased byexposure to this, which by soldiers is called enfilading, but at sea araking fire; and to avoid such mischance was one of the principalconcerns of a captain in a naval duel. 

 [Illustration: CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the painting by Gilbert Stuart. ]

Seeing his enemy thus challenge him to come on, Hull, who had beencarrying sail in order to close, now reduced his canvas to topsails, and put two reefs into them, bringing by the wind for that object (C1). All other usual preparations were made at the same time; the"Constitution" during them lying side to wind, out of gunshot, practically motionless, like her antagonist. When all was ready, theship kept away again, heading toward the starboard quarter of theBritish vessel; that is, she was on her right-hand side, steeringtoward her stern (C 2). As this, if continued, would permit her topass close under the stern, and rake, Captain Dacres waited until hethought her within gunshot, when he fired the guns on the right-handside of the vessel--the starboard broadside--and immediately woreship; that is, turned the "Guerrière" round, making a half circle, andbringing her other side toward the "Constitution, " to fire the other, or port, battery (G 2). It will be seen that, as both ships weremoving in the same general direction, away from the wind, the Americancoming straight on, while the British retired by a succession ofsemicircles, each time this manoeuvre was repeated the ships would benearer together. This was what both captains purposed, but neitherproposed to be raked in the operation. Hence, although the"Constitution" did not wear, she "yawed" several times; that is, turned her head from side to side, so that a shot striking would nothave full raking effect, but angling across the decks would doproportionately less damage. Such methods were common to all actionsbetween single ships. 

These proceedings had lasted about three quarters of an hour, whenDacres, considering he now could safely afford to let his enemy close, settled his ship on a course nearly before the wind, having it alittle on her left side (G 3). The American frigate was thus behindher, receiving the shot of her stern guns, to which the bow fire ofthose days could make little effective reply. To relieve thisdisadvantage, by shortening its duration, a big additional sail--themain topgallantsail--was set upon the "Constitution, " which, gatheringfresh speed, drew up on the left-hand side of the "Guerrière, " withinpistol-shot, at 6 P. M. , when the battle proper fairly began (3). Forthe moment manoeuvring ceased, and a square set-to at the gunsfollowed, the ships running side by side. In twenty minutes the"Guerrière's" mizzen-mast[428] was shot away, falling overboard on thestarboard side; while at nearly the same moment, so Hull reported, hermain-yard went in the slings. [429] This double accident reduced herspeed; but in addition the mast with all its hamper, dragging in thewater on one side, both slowed the vessel and acted as a rudder toturn her head to starboard, --from the "Constitution. " The sail-powerof the latter being unimpaired would have quickly carried her so farahead that her guns would no longer bear, if she continued the samecourse. Hull, therefore, as soon as he saw the spars of his antagonistgo overboard, put the helm to port, in order to "oblige him to do thesame, or suffer himself to be raked by our getting across hisbows. "[430] The fall of the "Guerrière's" mast effected what wasdesired by Hull, who continues: "On our helm being put to port theship came to, and gave us an opportunity of pouring in upon hislarboard bow several broadsides. " The disabled state of the Britishfrigate, and the promptness of the American captain, thus enabled thelatter to take a raking position upon the port (larboard) bow of theenemy; that is, ahead, but on the left side (4). 

 [Illustration: PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION AND GUERRIÈRE]

The "Constitution" ranged on very slowly across the "Guerrière's"bows, from left to right; her sails shaking in the wind, because theyards could not be braced, the braces having been shot away. From thiscommanding position she gave two raking broadsides, to which heropponent could reply only feebly from a few forward guns; then, thevessels being close together, and the British forging slowly ahead, threatening to cross the American's stern, the helm of the latter wasput up. As the "Constitution" turned away, the bowsprit of the"Guerrière" lunged over her quarter-deck, and became entangled by herport mizzen-rigging; the result being that the two fell into the sameline, the "Guerrière" astern and fastened to her antagonist asdescribed. (5) In her crippled condition for manoeuvring, it waspossible that the British captain might seek to retrieve the fortunesof the day by boarding, for which the present situation seemed tooffer some opportunity; and from the reports of the respectiveofficers it is clear that the same thought occurred to both parties, prompting in each the movement to repel boarders rather than to board. A number of men clustered on either side at the point of contact, andhere, by musketry fire, occurred some of the severest losses. Thefirst lieutenant and sailing-master of the "Constitution" fellwounded, and the senior officer of marines dead, shot through thehead. All these were specially concerned where boarding was at issue. This period was brief; for at 6. 30 the fore and main-masts of theBritish frigate gave way together, carrying with them all the headbooms, and she lay a helpless hulk in the trough of a heavy sea, rolling the muzzles of her guns under. A sturdy attempt to get herunder control with the spritsail[431] was made; but this resource, abare possibility to a dismasted ship in a fleet action, with friendsaround, was only the assertion of a sound never-give-up tradition, against hopeless odds, in a naval duel with a full-sparred antagonist. The "Constitution" hauled off for half an hour to repair damages, andupon returning received the "Guerrière's" surrender. It was then dark, and the night was passed in transferring the prisoners. When daybroke, the prize was found so shattered that it would be impossible tobring her into port. She was consequently set on fire at 3 P. M. , andsoon after blew up. 

 [Illustration: THE BURNING OF THE _Guerrière_ From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl. ]

In this fight the American frigate was much superior in force to herantagonist. The customary, and upon the whole justest, mode ofestimating relative power, was by aggregate weight of shot dischargedin one broadside; and when, as in this case, the range is so closethat every gun comes into play, it is perhaps a useless refinement toinsist on qualifying considerations. The broadside of the"Constitution" weighed 736 pounds, that of the "Guerrière" 570. Thedifference therefore in favor of the American vessel was thirty percent, and the disparity in numbers of the crews was even greater. Itis not possible, therefore, to insist upon any singular credit, in themere fact that under such odds victory falls to the heavier vessel. What can be said, after a careful comparison of the several reports, is that the American ship was fought warily and boldly, that hergunnery was excellent, that the instant advantage taken of the enemy'smizzen-mast falling showed high seamanlike qualities, both inpromptness and accuracy of execution; in short, that, considering thecapacity of the American captain as evidenced by his action, and theodds in his favor, nothing could be more misplaced than CaptainDacres' vaunt before the Court: "I am so well aware that the successof my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish to beonce more opposed to the 'Constitution, ' with the same officers andcrew under my command, in a frigate of similar force to the'Guerrière. '"[432] In view of the difference of broadside weight, thisamounts to saying that the capacity and courage of the captain andship's company of the "Guerrière, " being over thirty per cent greaterthan those of the "Constitution, " would more than compensate for thelatter's bare thirty per cent superiority of force. It may safely besaid that one will look in vain through the accounts of thetransaction for any ground for such assumption. A ready acquiescencein this opinion was elicited, indeed, from two witnesses, the masterand a master's mate, based upon a supposed superiority of fire, whichthe latter estimated to be in point of rapidity as four broadsides toevery three of the "Constitution. "[433] But rapidity is not the onlyelement of superiority; and Dacres' satisfaction on this score, repeatedly expressed, might have been tempered by one of the facts healleged in defence of his surrender--that "on the larboard side of the'Guerrière' there were about thirty shot which had taken effect aboutfive sheets of copper down, "--far below the water-line. 

Captain Hull with the "Constitution" reached Boston August 30, justfour weeks after his departure; and the following day CommodoreRodgers with his squadron entered the harbor. It was a meeting betweendisappointment and exultation; for so profound was the impressionprevailing in the United States, and not least in New England, concerning the irreversible superiority of Great Britain on the sea, that no word less strong than "exultation" can do justice to thefeeling aroused by Hull's victory. Sight was lost of the disparity offorce, and the pride of the country fixed, not upon those points whichthe attentive seaman can recognize as giving warrant for confidence, but upon the supposed demonstration of superiority in equal combat. 

Consolation was needed; for since Rodgers' sailing much had occurredto dishearten and little to encourage. The nation had cherished fewexpectations from its tiny, navy; but concerning its arms on land theadvocates of war had entertained the unreasoning confidence of thosewho expect to reap without taking the trouble to sow. In the firstyear of President Jefferson's administration, 1801, the "peaceestablishment" of the regular army, in pursuance of the policy of thePresident and party in power, was reduced to three thousand men. In1808, under the excitement of the outrage upon the "Chesapeake" and ofthe Orders in Council, an "additional military force" was authorized, raising the total to ten thousand. The latter measure seems for sometime to have been considered temporary in character; for in a returnto Congress in January, 1810, the numbers actually in service arereported separately, as 2, 765 and 4, 189; total, 6, 954, exclusive ofstaff officers. 

General Scott, who was one of the captains appointed under the Act of1808, has recorded that the condition of both soldiers and officerswas in great part most inefficient. [434] Speaking of the latercommissions, he said, "Such were the results of Mr. Jefferson's lowestimate of, or rather contempt for, the military character, theconsequence of the old hostility between him and the principalofficers who achieved our independence. "[435] In January, 1812, whenwar had in effect been determined upon in the party councils, a billwas passed raising the army to thirty-five thousand; but in theeconomical and social condition of the period the service was under apopular disfavor, to which the attitude of recent administrationsdoubtless contributed greatly, and recruiting went on very slowly. There was substantially no military tradition in the country. Thirtyyears of peace had seen the disappearance of the officers whom the Warof Independence had left in their prime; and the Government fell intothat most facile of mistakes, the choice of old men, because whenyouths they had worn an epaulette, without regarding the experiencethey had had under it, or since it was laid aside. 

Among the men thus selected were Henry Dearborn, for senior majorgeneral, to command the northern division of the country, from Niagarato Boston Bay and New York; and William Hull, a brigadier, for theNorthwestern frontier, centring round Detroit. The latter, who wasuncle to Captain Hull of the "Constitution, " seems to have been chosenbecause already civil Governor of Michigan Territory. PresidentMadison thus reversed the practice of Great Britain, which commonlywas to choose a military man for civil governor of exposed provinces. Hull accepted with reluctance, and under pressure. He set out for hisnew duties, expecting that he would receive in his distant andperilous charge that measure of support which results from activeoperations at some other point of the enemy's line, presumably atNiagara. In this he was disappointed. Dearborn was now sixty-one, Hullfifty-nine. Both had served with credit during the War ofIndependence, but in subordinate positions; and Dearborn had beenSecretary of War throughout Jefferson's two terms. 

Opposed to these was the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, IsaacBrock, a major-general in the British army. A soldier from boyhood, hehad commanded a regiment in active campaign at twenty-eight. He wasnow forty-two, and for the last ten years had served in North America;first with his regiment, and later as a general officer in command ofthe troops. In October, 1811, he was appointed to the civil governmentof the province. He was thoroughly familiar with the political andmilitary conditions surrounding him, and his mind had long beenactively engaged in considering probable contingencies, in case war, threatening since 1807, should become actual. In formulated purposeand resolve, he was perfectly prepared for immediate action, as isshown by his letters, foreshadowing his course, to his superior, SirGeorge Prevost, Governor General of Canada. He predicted that thepressure of the Indians upon the western frontier of the United Stateswould compel that country to keep there a considerable force, thepresence of which would naturally tend to more than mere defensivemeasures. With the numerical inferiority of the British, theco-operation of the Indians was essential. To preserve Upper Canada, therefore, Michilimackinac and Detroit must be reduced. Otherwise thesavages could not be convinced that Great Britain would not sacrificethem at a peace, as they believed her to have done in 1794, by Jay'sTreaty. In this he agreed with Hull, who faced the situation far moreefficiently than his superiors, and at the same moment was writingofficially, "The British cannot hold Upper Canada without theassistance of the Indians, and that they cannot obtain if we have anadequate force at Detroit. "[436] Brock deemed it vital thatAmherstburg, nearly opposite Detroit, should be held in force; both toresist the first hostile attack, and as a base whence to proceed tooffensive operations. He apprehended, and correctly, as the eventproved, that Niagara would be chosen by the Americans as the line fortheir main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. This was hisdefensive frontier; the western, the offensive wing of his campaign. These leading ideas dictated his preparations, imperfect from paucityof means, but sufficient to meet the limping, flaccid measures of theUnited States authorities. 

To this well-considered view the War Department of the United Statesopposed no ordered plan of any kind, no mind prepared with even thecommon precautions of every-day life. This unreadiness, plainlymanifested by its actions, was the more culpable because theunfortunate Hull, in his letter of March 6, 1812, just quoted, a monthbefore his unwilling acceptance of his general's commission, had laidclearly before it the leading features of the military and politicalsituation, recognized by him during his four years of office asGovernor of the Territory. In this cogent paper, amid numerousilluminative details, he laid unmistakable emphasis on the decisiveinfluence of Detroit upon the whole Northwest, especially indetermining the attitude of the Indians. He dwelt also upon thecritical weakness of the communications on which the tenure of itdepended, and upon the necessity of naval superiority to secure them. This expression of his opinion was in the hands of the Government overthree months before the declaration of war. As early as January, however, Secretary Eustis had been warned by Armstrong, whosubsequently succeeded him in the War Department, that Detroit, otherwise advantageous in position, "would be positively bad, unlessyour naval means have an ascendency on Lake Erie. "[437]

Unfortunately for himself and for the country, Hull, upon visiting thecapital in the spring, did not adhere firmly to his views as to thenecessity for a lake navy. After the capitulation, President Madisonwrote to his friend, John Nicholas, "The failure of our calculationswith respect to the expedition under Hull needs no comment. The worstof it was that we were misled by a reliance, authorized by himself, onits [the expedition] securing to us the command of the lakes. "[438]General Peter B. Porter, of the New York militia, a member also ofthe House of Representatives, who served well on the Niagara frontier, and was in no wise implicated by Hull's surrender, testified beforethe Court Martial, "I was twice at the President's with General Hull, when the subject of a navy was talked over. At first it was agreed tohave one; but afterwards it was agreed to abandon it, doubtless asinexpedient. "[439] The indications from Hull's earlier correspondenceare that for the time he was influenced by the war spirit, anddeveloped a hopefulness of achievement which affected his former andbetter judgment. 

On May 25, three weeks before the declaration of war, Hull tookcommand of the militia assembled at Dayton, Ohio. On June 10, he wasat Urbana, where a regiment of regular infantry joined. June 30, hereached the Maumee River, and thence reported that his force was overtwo thousand, rank and file. [440] He had not yet received officialintelligence of war having been actually declared, but allindications, including his own mission itself, pointed to it asimminent. Nevertheless, he here loaded a schooner with militarystores, and sent her down the river for Detroit, knowing that, twentymiles before reaching there, she must pass near the British FortMalden, on the Detroit River covering Amherstburg; and this while theBritish had local naval superiority. In taking this risk, the veryimprudence of which testifies the importance of water transportationto Detroit, Hull directed his aids to forward his baggage by the sameconveyance; and with it, contrary to his intention, were despatchedalso his official papers. The vessel, being promptly seized by theboats of the British armed brig "Hunter, " was taken into Malden, whence Colonel St. George, commanding the district, sent the capturedcorrespondence to Brock. "Till I received these letters, " remarkedthe latter, "I had no idea General Hull was advancing with so large aforce. "[441]

When Brock thus wrote, July 20, he was at Fort George, on the shore ofOntario, near Niagara River, watching the frontier where he expectedthe main attack. He had already struck his first blow. Immediatelyupon being assured of the declaration of war, on June 28, he haddespatched a letter to St. Joseph's, directing all preparations to bemade for proceeding against Mackinac; the final determination as tooffensive or defensive action being very properly left to the officerthere in command. The latter, thus aware of his superior's wishes, started July 16, with some six hundred men, --of whom four hundred wereIndians, --under convoy of the armed brig "Caledonia, " belonging to theNorthwestern Fur Company. The next day he appeared before the Americanpost, where the existence of war was yet unknown. The garrisonnumbered fifty-seven, including three officers; being about one thirdthe force reported necessary for the peace establishment by Mr. Jefferson's Secretary of War, in 1801. The place was immediatelysurrendered. Under all the conditions stated there is an entertainingingenuousness in the reference made to this disaster by PresidentMadison: "We have but just learned that the important post ofMichilimackinac has fallen into the hands of the enemy, but from whatcause remains to be known. "[442]

Brock received this news at Toronto, July 29; but not till August 3 didit reach Hull, by the arrival of the paroled prisoners. He was then onthe Canada side, at Sandwich, opposite Detroit; having crossed withfrom fourteen to sixteen hundred men on July 12. This step was taken onthe strength of a discretionary order from the Secretary of War, thatif "the force under your command be equal to the enterprise, consistentwith the safety of your own post, you will take possession of Malden, and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify. " It must beadded, however, in justice to the Administration, that the same letter, received July 9, three days before the crossing, contained the warning, "It is also proper to inform you that an adequate force cannot soon berelied on for the reduction of the enemy's posts below you. "[443] Thisbears on the question of Hull's expectation of support by diversion onthe Niagara frontier, and shows that he had fair notice on that score. That over-confidence still possessed him seems apparent from a letterto the secretary dated July 7, in which he said, "In your letter ofJune 18, you direct me to adopt measures for the security of thecountry, and to await further orders. I regret that I have not largerlatitude. "[444] Now he received it, and his invasion of Canada was theresult. It is vain to deny his liberty of action, under suchinstructions, but it is equally vain to deny the responsibility of asuperior who thus authorizes action, and not obscurely intimates awish, under general military conditions perfectly well known, such asexisted with reference to Hull's communications. Hull's attempt tojustify his movement on the ground of pressure from subordinates, moraleffect upon his troops, is admissible only if his decision wereconsistently followed by the one course that gave a chance of success. As a military enterprise the attempt was hopeless, unless by a rapidadvance upon Malden he could carry the works by instant storm. In thatevent the enemy's army and navy, losing their local base of operations, would have to seek one new and distant, one hundred and fifty miles tothe eastward, at Long Point; whence attempts against the Americanpositions could be only by water, with transportation inadequate tocarrying large bodies of men. The American general thus might feelsecure against attacks on his communications with Ohio, the criticalcondition of which constituted the great danger of the situation, whether at Detroit or Sandwich. Hull himself, ten days after crossing, wrote, "It is in the power of this army to take Malden by storm, but itwould be attended, in my opinion, with too great a sacrifice under thepresent circumstances. "[445]

Instead of prompt action, two days were allowed to pass. Then, July14, a council of war decided that immediate attack was inexpedient, and delay advisable. This conclusion, if correct, condemned theinvasion, and should have been reached before it was attempted. Themilitary situation was this: Hull's line of supplies andre-enforcements was reasonably secure from hostile interferencebetween southern Ohio and the Maumee; at which river properfortification would permit the establishment of an advanced depot. Thence to Detroit was seventy-two miles, through much of which theroad passed near the lake shore. It was consequently liable to attackfrom the water, so long as that was controlled by the enemy; while byits greater distance from the centre of American population in theWest, it was also more exposed to Indian hostilities than the portionbehind the Maumee. Under these circumstances, Detroit itself was indanger of an interruption of supplies and re-enforcements, amountingpossibly to isolation. It was open to the enemy to land in its rear, secure of his own communications by water, and with a fair chance, incase of failure, to retire by the way he came; for retreat could bemade safely in very small vessels or boats, so long as Malden was heldin force. 

The reduction of Malden might therefore secure Detroit, by deprivingthe enemy of a base suitable for using his lake power against itscommunications. Unless this was accomplished, any advance beyondDetroit with the force then at hand merely weakened that place, byjust the amount of men and means expended, and was increasinglyhazardous when it entailed crossing water. A sudden blow may snatchsafety under such conditions; but to attempt the slow and graduatedmovements of a siege, with uncertain communications supporting it, isto court disaster. The holding of Detroit being imperative, effortsexternal to it should have been chiefly exerted on its rear, and uponits front only to prevent the easy passage of the enemy. In short, when Detroit was reached, barring the chance of a _coup de main_ uponMalden, Hull's position needed to be made more solid, not moreextensive. As it was, the army remained at Sandwich, making abortivemovements toward the river Canard, which covered the approach toMalden, and pushing small foraging parties up the valley of theThames. The greatest industry was used, Hull reported, in makingpreparations to besiege, but it was not till August 7, nearly fourweeks after crossing, that the siege guns were ready; and then theartillery officers reported that it would be extremely difficult, ifnot impossible, to take them to Malden by land, and by water stillmore so, because the ship of war "Queen Charlotte, " carrying eighteen24-pounders, lay off the mouth of the Canard, commanding the stream. 

The first impression produced by the advance into Canada had beenpropitious to Hull. He himself in his defence admitted that theenemy's force had diminished, great part of their militia had leftthem, and many of their Indians. [446] This information of the Americancamp corresponded with the facts. Lieut. Colonel St. George, commanding Fort Malden, reported the demoralized condition of hismilitia. Three days after Hull crossed he had left but four hundredand seventy-one, in such a state as to be absolutely inefficient. [447]Colonel Procter, who soon afterwards relieved him, could on July 18muster only two hundred and seventy Indians by the utmost exertion, and by the 26th these had rather decreased. [448] Professing to see noimmediate danger, he still asked for five hundred more regulars. At notime before Hull recrossed did he have two hundred and fifty. [449]Under Hull's delay these favorable conditions disappeared. Britishre-enforcements, small but veteran, arrived; the local militiarecovered; and the Indians, with the facile changefulness of savages, passed from an outwardly friendly bearing over to what began to seemthe winning side. Colonel Procter then initiated the policy ofthreatening Hull's communications from the lake side. A body ofIndians sent across by him on August 4 defeated an American detachmentmarching to protect a convoy from the Maumee. This incident, comingupon accumulating adverse indications, and coinciding with the badnews received from Mackinac, aroused Hull to the essential danger ofhis situation. August 8 he recrossed to Detroit. August 9 anothervigorous effort was made by the enemy to destroy a detachment sent outto establish communications with the rear. Although the British weredefeated, the Americans were unable to proceed, and returned to thetown without supplies. In the first of these affairs some more ofHull's correspondence was captured, which revealed his apprehensions, and the general moral condition of his command, to an opponent capableof appreciating their military significance. 

Brock had remained near Niagara, detained partly by the politicalnecessity of meeting the provincial legislature, partly to watch overwhat he considered the more exposed portion of his military charge;for a disaster to it, being nearer the source of British power, wouldhave upon the fortunes of the West an effect even more vital than areverse there would exert upon the East. Being soon satisfied that thepreparations of the United States threatened no immediate action, andfinding that Hull's troops were foraging to a considerable distanceeast of Sandwich, along the Thames, he had decided to send againstthem a small body of local troops with a number of Indians, while hehimself gathered some militia and went direct by water to Malden. Tohis dismay, the Indians declined to assist, alleging their intentionto remain neutral; upon which the militia also refused, saying theywere afraid to leave their homes unguarded, till it was certain whichside the savages would take. On July 25 Brock wrote that his planswere thus ruined; but July 29 it became known that Mackinac hadfallen, and on that day the militia about York [Toronto], where hethen was, volunteered for service in any part of the province. August8 he embarked with three hundred of them, and a few regulars, at LongPoint, on the north shore of Lake Erie; whence he coasted to Malden, arriving on the 13th. 

Meanwhile batteries had been erected opposite Detroit, which opened onthe evening of August 15, the fort replying; but slight harm was doneon either side. Next day Brock crossed the greater part of his force, landing three miles below Detroit. His little column of assaultconsisted of 330 regulars, 400 militia, and 600 Indians, the latter inthe woods covering the left flank. [450] The effective Americanspresent were by that morning's report 1, 060;[451] while their fieldartillery, additional to that mounted in the works, was much superiorto that of the enemy, was advantageously posted, and loaded withgrape. Moreover, they had the fort, on which to retire. 

Brock's movements were audacious. Some said nothing could be moredesperate; "but I answer, that the state of Upper Canada admitted ofnothing but desperate remedies. "[452] The British general had servedunder Nelson at Copenhagen, and quoted him here. He knew also, throughthe captured correspondence, that his opponent was a prey to adesperation very different in temper from his own, and had lost theconfidence of his men. He had hoped, by the threatening positionassumed between the town and its home base, to force Hull to come outand attack; but learning now that the garrison was weakened by adetachment of three hundred and fifty, despatched two days beforeunder Colonel McArthur to open intercourse with the Maumee by acircuitous road, avoiding the lake shore, he decided to assault atonce. When the British column had approached within a mile, Hullwithdrew within the works all his force, including the artillery, andimmediately afterward capitulated. The detachment under McArthur, withanother from the state of Ohio on its way to join the army, wereembraced in the terms; Brock estimating the whole number surrenderedat not less than twenty-five hundred. A more important capture, underthe conditions, was an American brig, the "Adams, " not yet armed, butcapable of use as a ship of war, for which purpose she had alreadybeen transferred from the War Department to the Navy. 

In his defence before the Court Martial, which in March, 1814, triedhim for his conduct of the campaign, Hull addressed himself to threeparticulars, which he considered to be the principal features in thevoluminous charges and specifications drawn against him. These were, "the delay at Sandwich, the retreat from Canada, and the surrender atDetroit. "[453] Concerning these, as a matter of military criticism, itmay be said with much certainty that if conditions imposed the delayat Sandwich, they condemned the advance to it, and would havewarranted an earlier retreat. The capitulation he justified on theground that resistance could not change the result, though it mightprotract the issue. Because ultimate surrender could not be averted, he characterized life lost in postponing it as blood shed uselessly. The conclusion does not follow from the premise; nor could anymilitary code accept the maxim that a position is to be yielded assoon as it appears that it cannot be held indefinitely. Delay, so longas sustained, not only keeps open the chapter of accidents for theparticular post, but supports related operations throughout theremainder of the field of war. Tenacious endurance, if it effected nomore, would at least have held Brock away from Niagara, whither hehastened within a week after the capitulation, taking with him a forcewhich now could be well spared from the westward. No one militarycharge can be considered as disconnected; therefore no commander has aright to abandon defence while it is possible to maintain it, unlesshe also knows that it cannot affect results elsewhere; and thispractically can never be certain. The burden of anxieties, of dangersand difficulties, actual and possible, weighing upon Brock, were fullas great as those upon Hull, for on his shoulders rested both Niagaraand Malden. His own resolution and promptitude triumphed because ofthe combined inefficiency of Hull and Dearborn. He scarcely could haveavoided disaster at one end or the other of the line, had eitheropponent been thoroughly competent. 

There was yet another reason which weighed forcibly with Hull, andprobably put all purely military considerations out of court. Thiswas the dread of Indian outrage and massacre. The general trend of thetestimony, and Hull's own defence, go to show a mind overpowered bythe agony of this imagination. After receiving word of the desertionof two companies, he said, "I now became impatient to put the placeunder the protection of the British; I knew that there were thousandsof savages around us. " These thousands were not at hand. Not tillafter September 1 did as many as a hundred arrive from the north--fromMackinac. [454] In short, unless what Cass styled the philanthropicreason can be accepted, --and in the opinion of the present writer itcannot, --Hull wrote the condemnation of his action in his own defence. "I shall now state what force the enemy brought, or might bring, against me. I say, gentlemen, _might bring_, because it was thatconsideration which induced the surrender, and not the force which wasactually landed on the American shore on the morning of the 16th. Itis possible I might have met and repelled that force; and if I had nofurther to look than the event of a contest at that time, I shouldhave trusted to the issue of a battle. .. . The force brought against meI am very confident was not less than one thousand whites, and as manysavage warriors. "[455]

The reproach of this mortifying incident cannot be lifted from offHull's memory; but for this very reason, in weighing thecircumstances, it is far less than justice to forget his years, verging on old age, his long dissociation from military life, hispersonal courage frequently shown during the War of Independence, northe fact that, though a soldier on occasion, he probably never had theopportunity to form correct soldierly standards. To the credit accountshould also be carried the timely and really capable presentation ofthe conditions of the field of operations already quoted, submitted byhim to the Government, which should not have needed suchdemonstration. The mortification of the country fastened on his name;but had the measures urged by him been taken, had his expeditionreceived due support by energetic operations elsewhere, events neednot have reached the crisis to which he proved unequal. The trueauthors of the national disaster and its accompanying humiliation areto be sought in the national administrations and legislatures of thepreceding ten or twelve years, upon whom rests the responsibility forthe miserably unprepared condition in which the country was plungedinto war. Madison, too tardily repentant, wrote, "The command of theLakes by a superior force on the water ought to have been afundamental part in the national policy from the moment the peace [of1783] took place. What is now doing for the command proves what may bedone. "[456]

FOOTNOTES:

[416] Captains' Letters, June 3, 1812. Navy Department MSS. 

[417] Ibid. , June 8, 1812. 

[418] Captains' Letters, Sept. 2, 1812. Navy Department MSS. 

[419] Navy Department MSS. 

[420] Captains' Letters, J. Rodgers, Sept. 1, 1812. Navy DepartmentMSS. 

[421] Letter of Sept. 1, 1812. Navy Department MSS. 

[422] James, Naval History (edition 1824), vol. V. P. 283. 

[423] Captains' Letters, Sept. 14, 1812. Navy Department MSS. 

[424] Naval Chronicle (British), vol. Xxviii. P. 426. 

[425] Nov. 4, 1812. 

[426] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 159; James, vol. V. P. 274. 

[427] Sir J. B. Warren to Admiralty, Aug 24, 1812. Canadian ArchivesMSS. M. 389. 1, p. 147. 

[428] Of the three masts of a "ship, " the mizzen-mast is the onenearest the stern. 

[429] The middle, where the yard is hung. 

[430] Hull's report, Aug. 28, 1812. Captains' Letters, Navy DepartmentMSS. 

[431] The spritsail was set on a yard which in ships of that daycrossed the bowsprit at its outer end, much as other yards crossed thethree upright lower masts. Under some circumstances ships would forgeslowly ahead under its impulse. It was a survival from days which knewnot jibs. 

[432] Dacres' Defence before the Court Martial. Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 422. 

[433] "Guerrière" Court Martial. MS. British Records Office. 

[434] Memoirs of Gen. Winfield Scott, vol. I p. 31. 

[435] Ibid. , p. 35. 

[436] Hull to the War Department, March 6, 1812. Report of Hull'sTrial, taken by Lieut. Col. Forbes, 42d U. S. Infantry. Hull's Defence, p. 31. 

[437] Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. I. P. 237. 

[438] The Writings of Madison (ed. 1865), vol. Ii. P. 563. See alsohis letter to Dearborn, Oct. 7, 1812. Ibid. , p. 547. 

[439] Hull's Trial, p. 127. Porter was a witness for the defence. 

[440] Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 4. 

[441] Life of Brock, p. 192. 

[442] Writings of James Madison (Lippincott, 1865), vol. Ii. P. 543. 

[443] Eustis to Hull, June 24, 1812. From MS. Copy in the Records ofthe War Department. This letter was acknowledged by Hull, July 9. 

[444] Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 9. 

[445] Hull to Eustis, July 22, 1812. Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 10. 

[446] Hull's Trial, Defence, p. 45. 

[447] Canadian Archives MSS. C. 676, p. 177. 

[448] Ibid. , p. 242. 

[449] Hull's Trial. Evidence of Lieutenant Gooding, p. 101, and ofSergeant Forbush, p. 147 (prisoners in Malden). 

[450] Life of Brock, p. 250. 

[451] Letter of Colonel Cass to U. S. Secretary of War, Sept. 10, 1812. Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 27. 

[452] Life of Brock, p. 267. 

[453] Hull's Trial. Defence, p. 20. 

[454] Hull's Trial. Testimony of Captain Eastman, p. 100, and ofDalliby, Ordnance Officer, p. 84. 

[455] Ibid. Hull's Defence, pp. 59-60. 

[456] Madison to Dearborn, Oct. 7, 1812. Writings, vol. Ii, p. 547. 

CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AFTER HULL'S SURRENDER. EUROPEAN EVENTS BEARING ON THE WAR

By August 25, nine days after the capitulation of Detroit, Brock wasagain writing from Fort George, by Niagara. About the time of hisdeparture for Malden, Prevost had received from Foster, late Britishminister to Washington, and now in Nova Scotia, letters foreshadowingthe repeal of the Orders in Council. In consequence he had sent hisadjutant-general, Colonel Baynes, to Dearborn to negotiate asuspension of hostilities. Like all intelligent flags of truce, Bayneskept his eyes wide open to indications in the enemy's lines. Themilitia, he reported, were not uniformed; they were distinguished fromother people of the country only by a cockade. The regulars weremostly recruits. The war was unpopular, the great majority impatientto return to their homes; a condition Brock observed also in theCanadians. They avowed a fixed determination not to pass the frontier. Recruiting for the regular service went on very slowly, though pay andbounty were liberal. Dearborn appeared over sixty, strong and healthy, but did not seem to possess the energy of mind or activity of bodyrequisite to his post. In short, from the actual state of the Americanforces assembled on Lake Champlain, Baynes did not think there was anyintention of invasion. From its total want of discipline and order, the militia could not be considered formidable when opposed towell-disciplined British regulars. [457] Of this prognostic the war wasto furnish sufficient saddening proof. The militia contained excellentmaterial for soldiers, but soldiers they were not. 

Dearborn declined to enter into a formal armistice, as beyond hispowers; but he consented to a cessation of hostilities pending areference to Washington, agreeing to direct all commanders of postswithin his district to abstain from offensive operations till furtherorders. This suspension of arms included the Niagara line, from actionupon which Hull had expected to receive support. In his defence Hullclaimed that this arrangement, in which his army was not included, hadfreed a number of troops to proceed against him; but the comparison ofdates shows that every man present at Detroit in the British force hadgone forward before the agreement could be known. The letter engagingto remain on the defensive only was signed by Dearborn at Greenbush, near Albany, August 8. The same day Brock was three hundred and fiftymiles to the westward, embarking at Long Point for Malden; and amonghis papers occurs the statement that the strong American force on theNiagara frontier compelled him to take to Detroit only one half of themilitia that volunteered. [458] His military judgment and vigor, unaided, had enabled him to abandon one line, and that the mostimportant, concentrate all available men at another point, effectthere a decisive success, and return betimes to his natural centre ofoperations. He owed nothing to outside military diplomacy. On thecontrary, he deeply deplored the measure which now tied his hands at amoment when the Americans, though restrained from fighting, were notprevented from bringing up re-enforcements to the positionsconfronting him. 

Dearborn's action was not approved by the Administration, and thearmistice was ended September 4, by notification. Meantime, tostrengthen the British Niagara frontier, all the men and ordnance thatcould now be spared from Amherstburg had been brought back by Brock toFort Erie, which was on the lake of that name, at the upper end of theNiagara River. Although still far from secure, owing to the muchgreater local material resources of the United States, and thepreoccupation of Great Britain with the Peninsular War, whichprevented her succoring Canada, Brock's general position was immenselyimproved since the beginning of hostilities. His successes in theWest, besides rallying the Indians by thousands to his support, hadfor the time so assured that frontier as to enable him to concentratehis efforts on the East; while the existing British naval superiorityon both lakes, Erie and Ontario, covered his flanks, and facilitatedtransportation--communications--from Kingston to Niagara, and thenceto Malden, Detroit, Mackinac, and the Great West. To illustrate thesweep of this influence, it may be mentioned here--for there will beno occasion to repeat--that an expedition from Mackinac at a laterperiod captured the isolated United States post at Prairie du Chien, on the Mississippi, on the western border of what is now the state ofWisconsin. Already, at the most critical period, the use of the waterhad enabled Brock, by simultaneous movements, to send cannon from FortGeorge by way of Fort Erie to Fort Malden; while at the same timereplacing those thus despatched by others brought from Toronto andKingston. In short, control of the lakes conferred upon him therecognized advantage of a central position--the Niagarapeninsula--having rapid communication by interior lines with theflanks, or extremities; to Malden and Detroit in one direction, toToronto and Kingston in the other. 

It was just here, also, that the first mischance befell him; and itcannot but be a subject of professional pride to a naval officer totrace the prompt and sustained action of his professional ancestors, who reversed conditions, not merely by a single brilliant blow, uponwhich popular reminiscence fastens, but by efficient initiative andsustained sagacious exertion through a long period of time. OnSeptember 3, Captain Isaac Chauncey had been ordered from the New Yorknavy yard to command on Lakes Erie and Ontario. Upon the latter therewas already serving Lieutenant Melancthon T. Woolsey, in command of arespectable vessel, the brig "Oneida, " of eighteen 24-poundercarronades. On Erie there was as yet no naval organization nor vessel. Chauncey consequently, on September 7, ordered thither LieutenantJesse D. Elliott to select a site for equipping vessels, and tocontract for two to be built of three hundred tons each. Elliott, whoarrived at Buffalo on the 14th, was still engaged in this preliminarywork, and was fitting some purchased schooners behind Squaw Island, three miles below, when, on October 8, there arrived from Malden, andanchored off Fort Erie, two British armed brigs, the "Detroit"--latelythe American "Adams, " surrendered with Hull--and the "Caledonia, "which co-operated so decisively in the fall of Mackinac. The same dayhe learned the near approach of a body of ninety seamen, despatched byChauncey from New York on September 22. [459] He sent to hasten them, and they arrived at noon. The afternoon was spent in preparations, weapons having to be obtained from the army, which also supplied acontingent of fifty soldiers. 

The seamen needed refreshment, having come on foot five hundredmiles, but Elliott would not trifle with opportunity. At 1 A. M. OfOctober 9 he shoved off with a hundred men in two boats, and at 3 wasalongside the brigs. From Buffalo to Fort Erie is about two miles; butthis distance was materially increased by the strong downward currenttoward the falls, and by the necessity of pulling far up stream inorder to approach the vessels from ahead, which lessened the chance ofpremature discovery, and materially shortened the interval betweenbeing seen and getting alongside. The enemy, taken by surprise, werequickly overpowered, and in ten minutes both prizes were under sailfor the American shore. The "Caledonia" was beached at Black Rock, where was Elliott's temporary navy yard, just above Squaw Island; butthe wind did not enable the "Detroit, " in which he himself was, tostem the downward drift of the river. After being swept some time, shehad to anchor under the fire of batteries at four hundred yards range, to which reply was made till the powder on board was expended. Then, the berth proving too hot, the cable was cut, sail again made, and thebrig run ashore on Squaw Island within range of both British andAmerican guns. Here Elliott abandoned her, she having already severallarge shot through her hull, with rigging and sails cut to pieces, andshe was boarded in turn by a body of the enemy. Under the conditions, however, neither side could remain to get her off, and she was finallyset on fire by the Americans. [460] Besides the vessel herself, hercargo of ordnance was lost to the British. American seamen afterwardrecovered from the wreck by night four 12-pounders, and a quantity ofshot, which were used with effect. 

The conduct of this affair was of a character frequent in the navalannals of that day. Elliott's quick discernment of the opportunity toreverse the naval conditions which constituted so much of the Britishadvantage, and the promptness of his action, are qualities morenoticeable than the mere courage displayed. "A strong inducement, " hewrote, "was that with these two vessels, and those I have purchased, Ishould be able to meet the remainder of the British force on the UpperLakes. " The mishap of the "Detroit" partly disappointed thisexpectation, and the British aggregate remained still superior; butthe units lost their perfect freedom of movement, the facility oftransportation was greatly diminished, and the American success heldin it the germ of future development to the superiority which Perryachieved a year later. None realized the extent of the calamity morekeenly than Brock. "This event is particularly unfortunate, " he wroteto the Governor General, "and may reduce us to incalculable distress. The enemy is making every exertion to gain a naval superiority on bothlakes; which, if they accomplish, I do not see how we can retain thecountry. More vessels are fitting for war on the other side of SquawIsland, which I should have attempted to destroy but for yourExcellency's repeated instructions to forbear. Now such a force iscollected for their protection as will render every operation againstthem very hazardous. "[461] To his subordinate, Procter, at Detroit, heexposed the other side of the calamity. [462] "This will reduce us togreat distress. You will have the goodness to state the expedients youpossess to enable us to replace, as far as possible, the heavy loss wehave sustained in the 'Detroit'. .. . A quantity of provisions was readyto be shipped; but as I am sending you the flank companies of theNewfoundland Regiment by the 'Lady Prevost, ' she cannot take theprovisions. " Trivial details these may seem; but in war, as in othermatters, trivialities sometimes decide great issues, as the touchingof a button may blow up a reef. The battle of Lake Erie, as beforesaid, was precipitated by need of food. 

Brock did not survive to witness the consequences which heapprehended, and which, had he lived, he possibly might have donesomething to avert. The increasing strength he had observed gatheringabout Elliott's collection of purchased vessels corresponded to agradual accumulation of American land force along the Niagara line;the divisions of which above and below the Falls were under twocommanders, between whom co-operation was doubtful. General VanRensselaer of the New York militia, who had the lower division, determined upon an effort to seize the heights of Queenston, at thehead of navigation from Lake Ontario. The attempt was made on October13, before daybreak. Brock, whose headquarters were at Fort George, was quickly on the ground; so quickly, that he narrowly escapedcapture by the advance guard of Americans as they reached the summit. Collecting a few men, he endeavored to regain the position before theenemy could establish himself in force, and in the charge wasinstantly killed at the head of his troops. 

In historical value, the death of Brock was the one notable incidentof the day, which otherwise was unproductive of results beyond anadditional mortification to the United States. The Americans graduallyaccumulated on the height to the number of some six hundred, and, hadthey been properly re-enforced, could probably have held their ground, affording an opening for further advance. It was found impossible toinduce the raw, unseasoned men on the other side to cross to theirsupport, and after many fruitless appeals the American general wascompelled to witness the shameful sight of a gallant division drivendown the cliffs to the river, and there obliged to surrender, becausetheir comrades refused to go betimes to their relief. 

Van Rensselaer retired from service, and was succeeded by GeneralSmyth, who now held command of the whole line, thirty miles, fromBuffalo to Fort Niagara, opposite Fort George, where the river entersLake Ontario. A crossing in force, in the upper part of the river, opposite Black Rock, was planned by him for November 28. Inpreparation for it an attack was to be made shortly before daylight bytwo advance parties, proceeding separately. One was to carry thebatteries and spike the guns near the point selected for landing; theother, to destroy abridge five miles below, by which re-enforcementsmight arrive to the enemy. 

To the first of these was attached a party of seventy seamen, whocarried out their instructions, spiking and dismounting the guns. Thefighting was unusually severe, eight out of the twelve naval officersconcerned being wounded, two mortally, and half of the seamen eitherkilled or wounded. Although the bridge was not destroyed, favorableconditions for the crossing of the main body had been established;but, upon viewing the numbers at his disposal, Smyth called a councilof war, and after advising with it decided not to proceed. This wascertainly a case of useless bloodshed. General Porter of the New Yorkmilitia, who served with distinguished gallantry on the Niagarafrontier to the end of the war, was present in this business, andcriticised Smyth's conduct so severely as to cause a duel betweenthem. "If bravery be a virtue, " wrote Porter, "if the gratitude of acountry be due to those who gallantly and desperately assert itsrights, the government will make ample and honorable provision for theheirs of the brave tars who fell on this occasion, as well as forthose that survive. "[463] Another abortive movement toward crossingwas made a few days later, and with it land operations on the Niagarafrontier ended for the year 1812. Smyth was soon afterward droppedfrom the rolls of the army. 

In the eastern part of Dearborn's military division, where hecommanded in person, toward Albany and Champlain, less was attemptedthan at Detroit or Niagara. To accomplish less would be impossible;but as nothing was seriously undertaken, nothing also disastrouslyfailed. The Commander-in-Chief gave sufficient disproof of militarycapacity by gravely proposing to "operate with effect at the samemoment against Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. "[464] Such divergenceof effort and dissemination of means, scanty at the best, upon pointsone hundred and fifty to two hundred miles apart, contravened allsound principle; to remedy which no compensating vigor wasdiscoverable in his conduct. In all these quarters, as at Detroit, theenemy were perceptibly stronger in the autumn than when the war began;and the feebleness of American action had destroyed the principalbasis upon which expectation of success had rested--the disaffectionof the inhabitants of Canada and their readiness to side with theinvaders. That this disposition existed to a formidable extent waswell known. It constituted a large element in the anxieties of theBritish generals, especially of Brock; for in his district there weremore American settlers than in Lower Canada. [465] On the Niagarapeninsula, especially, climatic conditions, favorable to farming, hadinduced a large immigration. But local disloyalty is a poor reed foran assailant to rest upon, and to sustain it in vigorous actioncommonly requires the presence of a force which will render itsassistance needless. Whatever inclination to rebel there might havebeen was effectually quelled by the energy of Brock, the weakness ofHull, and the impotence of Dearborn and his subordinates. 

In the general situation the one change favorable to the UnitedStates was in a quarter the importance of which the Administration hadbeen slow to recognize, and probably scarcely appreciated even now. The anticipated military laurels had vanished like a dream, and thedisinclination of the American people to military life in general, andto this war in particular, had shown itself in enlistments for thearmy, which, the President wrote, "fall short of the most moderatecalculation. " The attempt to supplement "regulars" by "volunteers, "who, unlike the militia, should be under the General Governmentinstead of that of the States--a favorite resource always with theLegislature of the United States--was "extremely unproductive;" whilethe militia in service were not under obligation to leave their state, and might, if they chose, abandon their fellow-countrymen outside itslimits to slaughter and capture, as they did at Niagara, withoutincurring military punishment. The governors of the New EnglandStates, being opposed to the war, refused to go a step beyondprotecting their own territory from hostilities, which they declaredwere forced upon them by the Administration rather than by theBritish. For this attitude there was a semblance of excuse in theutter military inefficiency to which the policy of Jefferson andMadison had reduced the national government. It was powerless to givethe several states the protection to which it was pledged by theConstitution. The citizens of New York had to fortify and defend theirown harbor. The reproaches of New England on this score were secondedsomewhat later by the outcries of Maryland; and if Virginia was silentunder suffering, it was not because she lacked cause for complaint. Itis to be remembered that in the matter of military and navalunpreparedness the great culprits were Virginians. South of Virginiathe nature of the shore line minimized the local harrying, from whichthe northern part of the community suffered. Nevertheless, there alsothe coasting trade was nearly destroyed, and even the internalnavigation seriously harassed. 

Only on the Great Lakes had the case of the United States improved, when winter put an end to most operations on the northern frontier. Asin the Civil War a half century later, so in 1812, the power of thewater over the issues of the land not only was not comprehended by theaverage official, but was incomprehensible to him. Armstrong inJanuary, and Hull in March, had insisted upon a condition that shouldhave been obvious; but not till September 3, when Hull's disaster haddriven home Hull's reasoning, did Captain Chauncey receive orders "toassume command of the naval force on lakes Erie and Ontario, and to useevery exertion to obtain control of them this fall. " All preparationshad still to be made, and were thrown, most wisely, on the man who wasto do the work. He was "to use all the means which he might judgeessential to accomplish the wishes of the government. "[466] It is onlyjust to give these quotations, which indicate how entirely everythingto be done was left to the energy and discretion of the officer incharge, who had to plan and build up, almost from the foundation, thenaval force on both lakes. Champlain, apparently by an oversight, wasnot included in his charge. Near the end of the war he was directed toconvene a court-martial on some occurrences there, and then repliedthat it had never been placed under his command. [467]

Chauncey, who was just turned forty, entered on his duties with awill. Having been for four years in charge of the navy yard at NewYork, he was intimately acquainted with the resources of the principaldepot from which he must draw his supplies. On September 26, afterthree weeks of busy collecting and shipping, he started for hisstation by the very occasional steamboat of those days, which requiredfrom eighteen to twenty hours for the trip to Albany. On the eve ofdeparture, he wrote the Government that he had despatched "one hundredand forty ship-carpenters, seven hundred seamen and marines, more thanone hundred pieces of cannon, the greater part of large caliber, withmuskets, shot, carriages, etc. The carriages have nearly all beenmade, and the shot cast, in that time. Nay, I may say that nearlyevery article that has been sent forward has been made. "[468] Thewords convey forcibly the lack of preparation which characterized thegeneral state of the country; and they suggest also the difference inenergy and efficiency between a man of forty, in continuous practiceof his profession, and generals of sixty, whose knowledge of theirbusiness derived over a disuse of more than thirty years, and fromexperience limited to positions necessarily very subordinate. From themeagreness of steamer traffic, all this provision of men and materialhad to go by sail vessel to Albany; and Chauncey wrote that hispersonal delay in New York was no injury, but a benefit, for as it washe should arrive well before the needed equipment. 

On October 6 he reached Sackett's Harbor, "in company with hisExcellency the Governor of New York, through the worst roads I eversaw, especially near this place, in consequence of which I haveordered the stores intended for this place to Oswego, from which placethey will come by water. " Elliott had reported from Buffalo that "theroads are good, except for thirteen miles, which is intolerably bad;so bad that ordnance cannot be brought in wagons; it must come whensnow is on the ground, and then in sleds. " All expectation ofcontesting Lake Erie was therefore abandoned for that year, andeffort concentrated on Ontario. There the misfortune of the Americanposition was that the only harbor on their side of the lake, Sackett's, close to the entrance of the St. Lawrence, was remote fromthe highways of United States internal traffic. The roads described byChauncey cut it off from communications by land, except in winter andthe height of summer; while the historic water route by the MohawkRiver, Lake Oneida, and the outlet of the latter through the OswegoRiver, debouched upon Ontario at a point utterly insecure againstweather or hostilities. It was necessary, therefore, to acceptSackett's Harbor as the only possible navy yard and station, under thedisadvantage that the maintenance of it--and through it, of the navalcommand of Ontario--depended upon this water transport of forty milesof open lake from the Oswego River. The danger, when superiority offorce lapsed, as at times it did, was lessened by the existence ofseveral creeks or small rivers, within which coasting craft could takerefuge and find protection from attack under the muskets of thesoldiery. Sackett's Harbor itself, though of small area, was a safeport, and under proper precautions defensible; but in neither point ofview was it comparable with Kingston. 

While in New York, Chauncey's preparations had not been limited towhat could be done there. By communication with Elliott and Woolsey, he had informed himself well as to conditions, and had initiated thepurchase and equipment of lake craft, chiefly schooners of from fortyto eighty tons, which were fitted to carry one or two heavy guns; theweight of battery being determined partly by their capacity to bearit, and partly by the guns on hand. Elliott's report concerning LakeErie led to his being diverted, at his own suggestion, to the mouth ofthe Genesee and to Oswego, to equip four schooners lying there; forarming which cannon before destined to Buffalo were likewise turnedaside to those points. When Chauncey reached Sackett's, he found therealso five schooners belonging mainly to the St. Lawrence trade, whichhad been bought under his directions by Woolsey. There was thusalready a very fair beginning of a naval force; the only remainingapprehension being that, "from the badness of the roads and thelowness of the water in the Mohawk, the guns and stores will notarrive in time for us to do anything decisive against the enemy thisfall. "[469] Should they arrive soon enough, he hoped to seek theBritish in their own waters by November. Besides these extemporizedexpedients, two ships of twenty-four guns were under construction atSackett's, and two brigs of twenty, with three gunboats, were orderedon Lake Erie--all to be ready for service in the spring, theirbatteries to be sent on when the snow made it feasible. 

After some disappointing detention, the waters of the inlet and outletof Lake Oneida rose sufficiently to enable guns to reach Oswego, whence they were safely conveyed to Sackett's. On November 2 thereport of a hostile cruiser in the neighborhood, and fears of herinterfering with parts of the armaments still in transit, led Chaunceyto go out with the "Oneida, " the only vessel yet ready, to cut off thereturn of the stranger to Kingston. On this occasion he saw three ofthe enemy's squadron, which, though superior in force, took no noticeof him. This slackness to improve an evident opportunity mayreasonably be ascribed to the fact that as yet the British vessels onthe lakes were not in charge of officers of the Royal Navy, but of aforce purely provincial and irregular. Returning to Sackett's, Chauncey again sailed, on the evening of November 6, with the "Oneida"and six armed schooners. On the 8th he fell in with a single Britishvessel, the "Royal George, " of twenty-one guns, which retreated thatnight into Kingston. The Americans followed some distance into theharbor on the 9th, and engaged both the ship and the works; but thebreeze blowing straight in, and becoming heavy, made it imprudentlonger to expose the squadron to the loss of spars, under the fire ofshore guns, when retreat had to be effected against the wind. Beatingout, a British armed schooner was sighted coming in from the westward;but after some exchange of shots, she also, though closely pressed, escaped by her better local knowledge, and gained the protection ofthe port. The squadron returned to Sackett's, taking with it two lakevessels as prizes, and having destroyed a third--all three possibleresources for the enemy. [470]

Nothing decisive resulted from this outing, but it fairly opened thecampaign for the control of the lakes, and served to temper officersand men for the kind of task before them. It gave also some experienceas to the strength of the works at Kingston, which exceeded Chauncey'santicipations, and seems afterward to have exerted influence upon hisviews of the situation; but at present he announced his intention, ifsupported by a military force, to attack the enemy's vessels at theiranchorage. Although several shot had been seen to strike, Chaunceyhimself entertained no doubt that all their damages could readily berepaired, and that they would put out again, if only to join theirforce to that already in Toronto. Still, on November 13, he reportedhis certainty that he controlled the water, an assurance renewed onthe 17th; adding that he had taken on board military stores, withwhich he would sail on the first fair wind for Niagara River, and thathe was prepared to effect transportation to any part of the lake, regardless of the enemy, but not of the weather. The last reservationwas timely, for, sailing two days later, the vessels were driven back, one schooner being dismasted. As navigation on Erie opened usuallymuch later than that upon Ontario, there was reasonable certainty thatstores could reach the upper lake before they were needed in thespring, and the attempt was postponed till then. Meantime, however, four of the schooners were kept cruising off Kingston, to preventintercourse between it and the other ports. [471]

On December 1 Chauncey wrote that it was no longer safe to navigatethe lake, and that he would soon lay up the vessels. He ascertainedsubsequently that the recent action of the squadron had compelledtroops for Toronto to march by land, from Kingston, and had preventedthe transport of needed supplies to Fort George, thus justifying hisconviction of control established over the water communications. A fewdays before he had had the satisfaction of announcing the launch, onNovember 26, of the "Madison, " a new ship of the corvette type, of 590tons, one third larger than the ocean cruisers "Wasp" and "Hornet, " ofthe same class, and with proportionately heavy armament; she carryingtwenty-four 32-pounder carronades, and they sixteen to eighteen of thelike weight. "She was built, " added Chauncey, "in the short time offorty-five days; and nine weeks ago the timber that she is composed ofwas growing in the forest. "[472] It seems scarcely necessary to pointthe moral, which he naturally did not draw for the edification of hissuperiors in the Administration, that a like energy displayed on LakeErie, when war was contemplated, would have placed Hull's enterpriseon the same level of security that was obtained for his successor byPerry's victory a year later, and at much less cost. 

With the laying up of the fleet on the lakes operations on thenorthern frontier closed, except in the far West, where GeneralHarrison succeeded to the command after Hull's capitulation. The lossof Detroit had thrown the American front of operations back upon theMaumee; nor would that, perhaps, have been tenable, had conditions inUpper Canada permitted Brock to remain with the most of his forcethrough August and September. As it was, just apprehension for theNiagara line compelled his return thither; and the same considerationsthat decided the place of the Commander-in-Chief, dictated also thatof the mass of his troops. The command at Detroit and Malden was leftto Colonel Procter, whose position was defensively secured by navalmeans; the ship "Queen Charlotte" and brig "Hunter" maintaining localcontrol of the water. He was, however, forbidden to attempt operationsdistinctively offensive. "It must be explicitly understood, " wroteBrock to him, "that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for thepurposes of conquest. Your operations are to be confined to measuresof defence and security. "[473] Among these, however, Brock included, by direct mention, undertakings intended to destroy betimesthreatening gatherings of men or of stores; but such action was merelyto secure the British positions, on the principle, already noted, thatoffence is the best defence. How far these restrictions representBrock's own wishes, or reflect simply the known views of Sir GeorgePrevost, the Governor General, is difficult to say. Brock's lastletter to Procter, written within a week of his death, directed thatthe enemy should be kept in a state of constant ferment. It seemsprobable, however, that Procter's force was not such as to warrantmovement with a view to permanent occupation beyond Detroit, the moreso as the roads were usually very bad; but any effort on the part ofthe Americans to establish posts on the Maumee, or along the lake, must be promptly checked, if possible, lest these should form baseswhence to march in force upon Detroit or Malden, when winter hadhardened the face of the ground. [474]

The purpose of the Americans being to recover Detroit, and then torenew Hull's invasion, their immediate aim was to establish their lineas far to the front as it could for the moment be successfullymaintained. The Maumee was such a line, and the one naturallyindicated as the advanced base of supplies upon which any forwardmovement by land must rest. The obstacle to its tenure, when summerwas past and autumn rains had begun, was a great swamp, known locallyas the Black Swamp, some forty miles wide, stretching from theSandusky River on the east to the Indiana line on the west, andtherefore impeding the direct approach from the south to the Maumee. Through this Hull had forced his way in June, building a road as hewent; but by the time troops had assembled in the autumn progress hereproved wholly impossible. 

On account of the difficulties of transportation, Harrison divided hisforce into three columns, the supplies of each of which in a newcountry could be more readily sustained than those of the whole body, if united; in fact, the exigencies of supply in the case of largearmies, even in well-settled countries, enforce "dissemination inorder to live, " as Napoleon expressed it. It is of the essence of suchdissemination that the several divisions shall be near enough tosupport each other if there be danger of attack; but in the case ofHarrison, although his dispositions have been severely censured onthis score, south of the Maumee no such danger existed to a degreewhich could not be safely disregarded. The centre column, therefore, was to advance over the road opened by Hull; the right by the east ofthe Sandusky River to its mouth on Lake Erie, east of the swamp, whence it could move to the Maumee; while the left, and the one mostexposed, from its nearness to the Indian country, was to proceed bythe Auglaize River, a tributary of the Maumee navigable for boats oflight draught, to Fort Defiance, at the junction of the two streams. Had this plan been carried out, the army would have held a line fromFort Defiance to the Rapids of the Maumee, a distance of about fortymiles, on which fortified depots could be established prior to furtheroperations; and there would have been to it three chains of supply, corresponding to the roads used by the divisions in their march. FortDefiance, with a work at the Rapids, afterward built and called FortMeigs, would sustain the line proper; while a subsidiary post, subsequently known as Fort Stephenson, on the Lower Sandusky, wasessential to the defence of that road as it approached the lake, andthence westward, where it skirted the lake shore, and was in measureopen to raids from the water. The western line of supplies, beingliable to attack from the neighboring Indians, was furtherstrengthened by works adequate to repel savages. 

Fort Defiance on the left was occupied by October 22, and toward themiddle of December some fifteen hundred men had assembled on theright, on the Sandusky, Upper and Lower; but the centre column couldnot get through, and the attempt to push on supplies by that routeseems to have been persisted in beyond the limits of reasonableperseverance. Under these conditions, Harrison established hisheadquarters at Upper Sandusky about December 20, sending word toGeneral Winchester, commanding at Defiance, to descend the Maumee tothe Rapids, and there to prepare sleds for a dash against Maldenacross the lake, when frozen. This was the substitution, under theconstraint of circumstances, of a sudden blow in place of regulatedadvance; for it abandoned, momentarily at least, the plan ofestablishing a permanent line. Winchester moved as directed, reachingthe Rapids January 10, 1813, and fixing himself in position withthirteen hundred men on the north bank, opposite Hull's road. Early inthe month the swamp froze over, and quantities of supplies werehurried forward. The total disposable force now under Harrison'scommand is given as sixty-three hundred. 

Preparations and concentration had progressed thus far, when animpulsive outburst of sympathy evoked a singularly inconsiderate andrash movement on the part of the division on the Maumee, the commanderof which seems to have been rather under the influence of his troopsthan in control of them. Word was brought to the camp that theAmerican settlement of Frenchtown, beyond the River Raisin, thirtymiles away toward Detroit, and now within British control, wasthreatened with burning by Indians. A council of war decided thatrelief should be attempted, and six hundred and sixty men started onthe morning of January 17. They dispossessed the enemy and establishedthemselves in the town, though with severe losses. Learning theirsuccess, Winchester himself went to the place on the 19th, followedclosely by a re-enforcement of two-hundred and fifty. More than halfhis command was now thirty miles away from the position assigned it, without other base of retreat or support than the remnant left at theRapids. In this situation a superior force of British and Indiansunder Procter crossed the lake on the ice and attacked the party thusrashly advanced to Frenchtown, which was compelled to surrender by 8A. M. Of January 22. 

 [Illustration: MAP OF LAKE FRONTIER TO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812-1814]

Winchester had notified Harrison of his proposed action, but not insuch time as to permit it to be countermanded. Receiving the news onthe morning of January 19, Harrison at once recognized the hazardousnature of the step, and ordered forward troops from Upper and LowerSandusky; proceeding himself to the latter place, and thence to theRapids, which he reached early on the 20th, ahead of there-enforcements. There was nothing to do but await developments untilthe men from Sandusky arrived. At noon of the 22d he receivedintelligence of the surrender, and saw that, through the imprudence ofhis subordinate, his project of crossing the ice to attack the enemyhad been crushed by Procter, who had practically annihilated one ofhis principal divisions, beating it in detail. 

The loss of so large a part of the force upon which he had counted, and the spread of sickness among the remainder, arrested Harrison'sprojects of offensive action. The Maumee even was abandoned for a fewdays, the army falling back to Portage River, toward the Sandusky. Itsoon, however, returned to the Rapids, and there Fort Meigs was built, which in the sequel proved sufficient to hold the position againstProcter's attack. The army of the Northwest from that time remainedpurely on the defensive until the following September, when Perry'svictory, assuring the control of the lake, enabled it to march secureof its communications. 

Whatever chance of success may attend such a dash as that againstMalden, planned by Harrison in December, or open to Hull in August, the undertaking is essentially outside the ordinary rules of warfare, and to be justified only by the special circumstances of the case, together with the possibility of securing the results obtained. Frenchtown, as a particular enterprise, illustrates in some measurethe case of Malden. It was victoriously possessed, but underconditions which made its tenure more than doubtful, and the loss ofthe expeditionary corps more than probable. Furthermore, if held, itconferred no advantage. The position was less defensible than theMaumee, more exposed because nearer the enemy, more difficult tomaintain because the communications were thirty miles longer, and, finally, it controlled nothing. The name of occupation, applied to it, was a mere misnomer, disguising a sham. Malden, on the contrary, ifeffectually held, would confer a great benefit; for in the hands of anenemy it menaced the communications of Detroit, and if coupled withcommand of the water, as was the case, it controlled them, as Hullfound to his ruin. To gain it, therefore, justified a good deal ofrisk; yet if seized, unless control of the water were also soonestablished, it would, as compared with Detroit, entail upon theAmericans the additional disadvantage that Frenchtown incurred overthe Maumee, --an increase of exposure, because of longer and moreexposed lines of communication. Though Malden was valuable to theBritish as a local base, with all the benefits of nearness, it was notthe only one they possessed on the lakes. The loss of it, therefore, so long as they possessed decided superiority in armed shipping, though a great inconvenience, would not be a positive disability. Withthe small tonnage they had on the lake, however, it would have becomeextremely difficult, if not impossible, to transport and maintain aforce sufficient seriously to interrupt the road from the Maumee, uponwhich Detroit depended. 

In short, in all ordinary warfare, and in most that is extraordinaryand seems outside the rules, one principle is sure to enforce itselfwith startling emphasis, if momentarily lost to sight or forgotten, and that is the need of secured communications. A military body, landor sea, may abandon its communications for a brief period, strictlylimited, expecting soon to restore them at the same or some otherpoint, just as a caravan can start across the desert with food andwater which will last until another base is reached. There is nosurrender of certainty in such a case; but a body of troops throwninto a position where it has no security of receiving supplies, incursa risk that needs justification, and can receive it only from specialcircumstances. No position within striking distance of the lake shorewas permanently secure unless supported by naval power; because allthat is implied by the term "communications"--facility fortransporting troops, supplies, and ammunition, rapidity of movementfrom point to point, central position and interior lines--all dependedupon the control of the water, from Mackinac to the rapids of the St. Lawrence. 

This truth, announced before the war by Hull and Armstrong, as well asby Harrison somewhat later, and sufficiently obvious to any thoughtfulman, was recognized in act by Harrison and the Government after theFrenchtown disaster. The general was not responsible for the blunderof his subordinate, nor am I able to see that his general plans for aland campaign, considered independent of the water, lacked eitherinsight, judgment, or energy. He unquestionably made very rashcalculations, and indulged in wildly sanguine assurances of success;but this was probably inevitable in the atmosphere in which he had towork. The obstacles to be overcome were so enormous, the people andthe Government, militarily, so ignorant and incapable, that it wasscarcely possible to move efficiently without adopting, or seeming toadopt, the popular spirit and conviction. Facts had now assertedthemselves through the unpleasant medium of experience, and henceforthit was tacitly accepted that nothing could be done except to stand onthe defensive, until the navy of Lake Erie, as yet unbuilt, couldexert its power. Until that day came, even the defensive positionstaken were rudely shaken by Procter, a far from efficient officer, but possessed still of the power of the lakes, and following, thoughover-feebly, the spirit of Brock's instructions, to attack the enemy'sposts and keep things in a ferment. 

With the Frenchtown affair hostilities on the Canada frontier ceaseduntil the following April; but the winter months were not thereforepassed in inactivity. Chauncey, after laying up his ships at Sackett'sHarbor, and representing to the Government the danger to them and tothe navy yard, now that frost had extended over the waters thesolidity of the ground, enabling the enemy to cross at will, departedto visit his hitherto neglected command on Lake Erie. He had alreadyseen cause to be dissatisfied with Elliott's choice of a navy yard, known usually by the name Black Rock, a quarter of a mile above SquawIsland. The hostile shores were here so close together that evenmusketry could be exchanged; and Elliott, when reporting his decision, said "the river is so narrow that the soldiers are shooting at eachother across. " There was the further difficulty that, to reach theopen lake, the vessels would have to go three miles against a currentthat ran four knots an hour, and much of the way within point-blankrange of the enemy. Nevertheless, after examining all situations onLake Erie, Elliott had reported that none other would answer thepurpose; "those that have shelters have not sufficient water, andthose with water cannot be defended from the enemy and the violence ofthe weather. "[475] Here he had collected materials and gathered sixtiny vessels; the largest a brig of ninety tons, the others schoonersof from forty to eighty. These he began to equip and alter about themiddle of October, upon the arrival of the carpenters sent byChauncey; but the British kept up such a fire of shot and shell thatthe carpenters quitted their work and returned to New York, leavingthe vessels with their decks and sides torn up. [476]

They were still in this condition when Chauncey came, toward the endof December; and although then hauled into a creek behind SquawIsland, out of range, there were no workmen to complete them. Hepassed on to Presqu'Isle, now Erie, on the Pennsylvania shore, andfound it in every way eligible as a port, except that there were butfour or five feet of water on the bar. Vessels of war within couldreach the lake only by being lightened of their guns and stores, acondition impracticable in the presence of a hostile squadron; but thelocal advantages were much superior to those at Black Rock, and whileit could be hoped that a lucky opportunity might insure the absence ofthe enemy's vessels, the enemy's guns on the Niagara shore werefixtures, unless the American army took possession of them. Betweenthese various considerations Chauncey decided to shift the naval basefrom Black Rock to Erie; and he there assembled the materials for thetwo brigs, of three hundred tons each, which formed the backbone ofPerry's squadron nine months later. [477] For supplies Erie dependedupon Philadelphia and Pittsburg, there being from the latter placewater communication by the Alleghany River, and its tributary theFrench River, to within fifteen miles, whence the transportation wasby good road. Except timber, which grew upon the spot, thematerials--iron, cordage, provisions, and guns--came mainly by thisroute from Pennsylvania; a number of guns, however, being sent fromWashington. By these arrangements the resources of New York, relievedof Lake Erie, were concentrated upon Lakes Ontario and Champlain. 

Chauncey further provided for the defence of Black Rock by its ownresources against sudden attack; the army, except a local force ofthree hundred men, having gone into winter quarters ten miles backfrom the Niagara. He then returned to Sackett's Harbor January 19, where he found preparations for protection even less satisfactory thanupon Lake Erie, [478] although the stake was far greater; for it maysafely be said that the fall of either Kingston or Sackett's wouldhave decided the fate of Lake Ontario and of Upper Canada, at once anddefinitively. It had now become evident that, in order to decidesuperiority on the water, there was to be between these neighboringand hostile stations the race of ship-building, which became andcontinued the most marked feature of the war on this lake. Chaunceyfelt the increasing necessity thus entailed for his presence on thescene. He was proportionately relieved by receiving at this time anapplication from Commander Oliver H. Perry to serve under him on thelakes, and immediately, on January 21, applied for his orders, statingthat he could "be employed to great advantage, particularly on LakeErie, where I shall not be able to go so early as I expected, owing tothe increasing force of the enemy on this lake. " This marks theofficial beginning of Perry's entrance upon the duty in which he won adistinction that his less fortunate superior failed to achieve. Atthis time, however, Chauncey hoped to attain such superiority by theopening of spring, and to receive such support from the army, as tocapture Kingston by a joint operation, the plan for which he submittedto the Department. That accomplished, he would be able to transfer toLake Erie the force of men needed to destroy the enemy's fleetthere. [479] This expectation was not fulfilled, and Perry remained inpractically independent command upon the upper lakes. 

The season of 1812 may be said, therefore, to have closed with theAmerican squadron upon Lake Ontario concentrated in Sackett's Harbor, where also two new and relatively powerful ships were building. UponLake Erie the force was divided between Black Rock, where Elliott'sflotilla lay, and Erie, where the two brigs were laid down, and fourother gunboats building. The concentration of these two bodies could beeffected only by first taking possession of the British side of theNiagara River. This done, and the Black Rock vessels thus released, there still remained the bar at Erie to pass. The British force onOntario was likewise divided, between Toronto and Kingston, the vesselsafloat being at the latter. Neither place, however, was under suchfetters as Black Rock, and the two divisions might very possibly beassembled despite the hostile fleet. On the upper lake their navy was atAmherstburg, where also was building a ship, inferior in force, despiteher rig, to either of the brigs ordered by Chauncey at Erie. Thedifficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seamen, in that thenremote region, imposed great hindrances upon the general Britishpreparations. There nevertheless remained in their hands, at the openingof the campaign, the great advantages over the Americans--first, of theseparation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the British holdingthe bank of the Niagara; and secondly, of the almost insuperabledifficulty of crossing the Erie bar unarmed, if the enemy's fleet keptin position near it. That the British failed to sustain these originaladvantages condemns their management, and is far more a matter ofmilitary criticism than the relative power of the two squadrons in thebattle of September 10. The principal business of each commander was tobe stronger than the enemy when they met. That the American accomplishedthis, despite serious obstacles, first by concentrating his force, andsecond by crossing the bar unimpeded, so that when he encountered hisopponent he was in decisively superior force, is as distinctly to hiscredit as it would have been distinctly to his discredit had the oddsbeen reversed by any fault of his. Perry by diligent efficiency overcamehis difficulties, combined his divisions, gained the lake, and, bycommanding it, so cut off his enemy's supplies that he compelled him tocome out, and fight, and be destroyed. To compare the force of the twomay be a matter of curious interest; but for the purpose of makingcomparisons of desert between them it is a mere waste of ink, importantonly to those who conceive the chief end of war to be fighting, and notvictory. 

 * * * * *

The disaster at Frenchtown, with the consequent abandonment of allproject of forward movement by the Army of the Northwest, may beregarded as the definite termination of the land campaign of 1812. Before resuming the account of the ocean operations of the sameperiod, it is expedient here to give a summary of European conditionsat the same time, for these markedly affected the policy of theBritish Government towards the United States, even after war had beenformally declared. 

The British Orders in Council of 1807, modified in 1809 in scope, though not in principle, had been for a long while the grievancechiefly insisted upon by the United States. Against them mainly wasdirected, by Jefferson and Madison, the system of commercialrestrictions which it was believed would compel their repeal. Consequently, when the British Government had abolished the obnoxiousOrders, on June 23, 1812, with reservations probably admissible bythe United States, it was unwilling to believe that war could stillnot be avoided; nor that, even if begun in ignorance of the repeal, itcould not be stopped without further concession. Till near the end ofthe year 1812 its measures were governed by this expectation, powerfully re-enforced by momentous considerations of European events, the effect of which upon the United States requires that they bestated. 

In June, 1812, European politics were reaching a crisis, the issue ofwhich could not then be forecast. War had begun between Napoleon andRussia; and on June 24 the Emperor, crossing the Niemen, invaded thedominion of the Czar. Great Britain, already nine years at war withFrance, had just succeeded in detaching Russia from her enemy, andranging her on her own side. The accession of Sweden to this allianceconferred complete control of the Baltic, thus releasing a hugeBritish fleet hitherto maintained there, and opening an importanttrade, debarred to Great Britain in great measure for four years past. But on the other hand, Napoleon still, as during all this recentperiod, controlled the Continent from the Pyrenees to the Vistula, carrying its hosts forward against Russia, and closing its ports toBritish commerce to the depressing injury of British finance. A youngCanadian, then in England, in close contact with London business life, wrote to his home at this period: "There is a general stagnation ofcommerce, all entrance to Europe being completely shut up. There wasnever a time known to compare with the present, nearly all foreigntraders becoming bankrupt, or reduced to one tenth of their formertrade. Merchants, who once kept ten or fifteen clerks, have now buttwo or three; thousands of half-starved discharged clerks are skulkingabout the streets. Customhouse duties are reduced upwards of one half. Of such dread power are Bonaparte's decrees, which have of late beenenforced in the strictest manner all over the Continent, that it hasalmost ruined the commerce of England. "[480]

A month before the United States declared war the perplexities of theBritish Government were depicted by the same writer, in terms whichpalpably and graphically reflect the contemporary talk of thecounting-house and the dinner-table: "If the Orders in Council arerepealed, the trade of the United States will flourish beyond allformer periods. They will then have the whole commerce of theContinent in their hands, and the British, though blockading withpowerful armaments the hostile ports of Europe, will behold fleets ofAmerican merchantmen enter in safety the harbors of the enemy, andcarry on a brisk and lucrative trade, whilst Englishmen, who commandthe ocean and are sole masters of the deep, must quietly suffer twothirds of their shipping to be dismantled and lie useless in littlerivers or before empty warehouses. Their seamen, to earn a little saltjunk and flinty biscuits, must spread themselves like vagabonds overthe face of the earth, and enter the service of any nation. If, on thecontrary, the Government continue to enforce the Orders, trade willstill remain in its present deplorable state; an American war willfollow, and poor Canada will bear the brunt. " Cannot one see the fineold fellows of the period shaking their heads over their wine, andhear the words which the lively young provincial takes down almostfrom their lips? They portray truly, however, the anxious dilemma inwhich the Government was living, and explain concisely the conflictingconsiderations which brought on the war with the United States. Fromthis embarrassing situation the current year brought a double relief. The chance of American competition was removed by the declaration ofwar, and exclusion from the Continent by Napoleon's reverses. 

While matters were thus in northern and central Europe, in the farsouthwest the Spanish peninsula had for the same four dreary yearsbeen the scene of desolating strife, in which from the beginning GreatBritain had taken a most active part, supporting the insurgent peoplewith armies and money against the French legions. The weakening effectof this conflict upon the Emperor, and the tremendous additionalstrain upon his resources now occasioned by the break with Russia, were well understood, and hopes rose high; but heavy in the otherscale were his unbroken record of success, and the fact that the Warin the Peninsula, the sustenance of which was now doubly imperative inorder to maintain the fatal dissemination of his forces between thetwo extremities of Europe, depended upon intercourse with the UnitedStates. The corn of America fed the British and their allies in thePeninsula, and so abundantly, that flour was cheaper in Lisbon than inLiverpool. In 1811, 802 American vessels entered the Tagus to 860British; and from all the rest of the outside world there came only75. The Peninsula itself, Spain and Portugal together, sent but452. [481] The merchants of Baltimore, petitioning against theNon-Intercourse Act, said that $100, 000, 000 were owing by Britishmerchants to Americans, which could only be repaid by importationsfrom England; and that this debt was chiefly for shipments to Spainand Portugal. [482] The yearly export thither, mainly for the armies, was 700, 000 barrels of flour, besides grain in other forms. [483] Themaintenance of this supply would be endangered by war. 

Upon the continuance of peace depended also the enjoyment of therelatively tranquil conditions which Great Britain, after years ofvexation, had succeeded at last in establishing in the western basinof the Atlantic, and especially in the Caribbean Sea. In 1808 therevolt of the Spanish people turned the Spanish West Indies once moreto her side; and in 1809 and 1810 the conquest of the last of theFrench islands gave her control of the whole region, depriving Frenchprivateers of every base for local operations against Britishcommerce. In 1812, by returns to September 1, the Royal Navy had atsea one hundred and twenty ships of the line and one hundred andforty-five frigates, besides four hundred and twenty-one othercruisers, sixteen of which were larger and the rest smaller than thefrigate class--a total of six hundred and eighty-six. [484] Of thesethere were on the North American and West India stations only three ofthe line, fifteen frigates, and sixty-one smaller--a total ofseventy-nine. [485] The huge remainder of over six hundred ships of warwere detained elsewhere by the exigencies of the contest, the navalrange of which stretched from the Levant to the shores of Denmark andNorway, then one kingdom under Napoleon's control; and in the farEastern seas extended to the Straits of Sunda, and beyond. FromAntwerp to Venice, in various ports, when the Empire fell, Napoleonhad over a hundred ships of the line and half a hundred frigates. Tohold these in check was in itself a heavy task for the British seapower, even though most of the colonial ports which might serve asbases for their external action had been wrested from France. Ahostile America would open to the French navy a number of harborswhich it now needed; and at the will of the Emperor the United Statesmight receive a division of ships of a class she lacked entirely, butcould both officer and man. One of Napoleon's great wants was seamen, and it was perfectly understood by intelligent naval officers, and byappreciative statesmen like John Adams and Gouverneur Morris, that afleet of ships of the line, based upon American resources, wouldconstitute for Great Britain a more difficult problem than a vastlylarger number in Europe. The probability was contemplated by both theBritish Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty, and was doubtless achief reason for the comparatively large number of ships of theline--eleven--assigned on the outbreak of hostilities to a stationwhere otherwise there was no similar force to encounter. [486] To bringthe French ships and this coast-line together was a combinationcorrect in conception, and not impracticable. It was spoken of at thetime--rumored as a design; and had not the attention and the means ofthe Emperor been otherwise preoccupied, probably would have beenattempted, and not impossibly effected. 

To avert such a conjuncture by the restoration of peace wasnecessarily an object of British policy. More than that, however, wasat stake. The Orders in Council had served their turn. In conjunctionwith Napoleon's Continental System, by the misery inflicted upon allthe countries under his control, they had brought about thedesperation of Russia and the resistance of the Czar, who at first hadengaged in the Emperor's policy. Russia and France were at war, and itwas imperative at once to redouble the pressure in the Peninsula, andto recuperate the financial strength of Great Britain, by openingevery possible avenue of supply and of market to British trade, inorder to bring the whole national power, economical and military, tobear effectively upon what promised to be a death struggle. The repealof the Orders, with the consequent admission of American merchantships to every hostile port, except such, few as might be effectivelyblockaded in accordance with the accepted principles of InternationalLaw, was the price offered for the preservation of peace, and forreadmission to the American market, closed to British manufacturersand merchants by the Non-Importation Acts. This extension of Britishcommerce, now loudly demanded by the British people, was an object tobe accomplished by the same means that should prevent the Americanpeople from constituting themselves virtually the allies of Napoleonby going to war. Should this dreaded alternative, however, come topass, not only would British trade again miss the market, the loss ofwhich had already caused widespread suffering, but, in common with it, British navigation, British shipping, the chief handmaid of commerce, would be exposed in a remote quarter, most difficult to guard, to theprivateering activity of a people whose aptitude for such occupationhad been demonstrated in the fight for independence and the old Frenchwars. Half a century before, in the years 1756-58, there had beenfitted out in the single port of New York, for war against the French, forty-eight privateers, carrying six hundred and ninety-five guns andmanned by over five thousand men. [487]

The conditions enumerated constituted the principal important militarypossibilities of the sea frontier of the United States, regarded as anelement in the general international situation when the year 1812opened. Its importance to France was simply that of an additionalweight thrown into the scale against Great Britain. France, beingexcluded from the sea, could not be aided or injured by the UnitedStates directly, but only indirectly, through their common enemy; andthe same was substantially true of the Continent at large. But toGreat Britain a hostile seaboard in America meant the possibility ofall that has been stated; and therefore, slowly and unwillingly, butsurely, the apprehension of war with its added burden forced theGovernment to a concession which years of intermittent commercialrestrictions by the United States, and of Opposition denunciation athome, had not been able to extort. The sudden death of SpencerPerceval, the prime minister identified with the Orders in Council, possibly facilitated the issue, but it had become inevitable by sheerpressure of circumstances as they developed. It came to pass, by aconjuncture most fortunate for Great Britain, and most unfavorable tothe United States, that the moment of war, vainly sought to be avoidedby both parties, coincided with the first rude jar to Napoleon'sempire and its speedy final collapse; leaving the Union, weakened byinternal dissension, exposed single-handed to the full force of theBritish power. At the beginning, however, and till toward the end of1812, it seemed possible that for an indefinite period the efforts ofthe Americans would receive the support derived from the inevitablepreoccupation of their enemy with European affairs; nor did many doubtNapoleon's success against Russia, or that it would be followed byGreat Britain's abandoning the European struggle as hopeless. 

For such maritime and political contingencies the British Admiraltyhad to prepare, when the near prospect of war with America threatenedto add to the extensive responsibilities entailed by the long strifewith Napoleon. Its measures reflected the double purpose of theGovernment: to secure peace, if possible, yet not to surrenderpolicies considered imperative. On May 9, 1812, identical instructionswere issued to each of the admirals commanding the four transatlanticstations, --Newfoundland, Halifax, Jamaica, and Barbados, --warning themof the imminent probability of hostilities, in the event of which, byaggressive action or formal declaration on the part of the UnitedStates, they were authorized to resort at once to all customaryprocedures of war; "to attack, take or sink, burn or destroy, allships or vessels belonging to the United States or to the citizensthereof. " At the same time, however, special stress was laid upon theurgent wish of the Government to avoid occasions which might induce acollision. "You are to direct the commanders of his Majesty's ships toexercise, except in the events hereinbefore specified, all possibleforbearance toward the United States, and to contribute, as far as maydepend upon them, to that good understanding which it is his RoyalHighness's[488] most earnest wish to maintain. "[489] The spirit ofthese orders, together with caution not to be attacked unawares, accounts for the absence of British ships of war from the neighborhoodof the American coast noted by Rodgers' cruising squadron in thespring of 1812. Decatur, indeed, was informed by a British naval agentthat the admiral at Bermuda did not permit more than two vessels tocruise at a time, and these were instructed not to approach theAmerican coast. [490] The temper of the controlling element in theAdministration, and the disposition of American naval officers sincethe "Chesapeake" affair, were but too likely to afford causes ofmisunderstanding in case of a meeting. 

FOOTNOTES:

[457] Baynes to Prevost. Canadian Archives, C. 377, pp. 27-37. 

[458] Life of Brock, p. 258. Brock first heard of the suspensionAugust 23, at Fort Erie, on his return toward Niagara. Life, p. 274. See also a letter from Brock to the American General Van Rensselaer, in the Defence of General Dearborn, by H. A. S. Dearborn, p. 8. 

[459] Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 26, 1812. Captains'Letters, Navy Department MSS. 

[460] Elliott's report of this affair will be found in the Captains'Letters, Navy Department MSS. , forwarded by Chauncey Oct. 16, 1812. 

[461] Life of Brock, p. 315. 

[462] Ibid. , p. 316. 

[463] Porter's Address to the Public. Niles' Register, vol. Iii. P. 284. 

[464] See Eustis's Letter to Dearborn, Aug. 15, 1812. Hall's Memoirsof the Northwestern Campaign, p. 87. 

[465] Life of Brock, pp. 106, 130, 181. 

[466] Chauncey to Secretary, Sept. 26, 1812. Captains' Letters, NavyDepartment MSS. 

[467] Chauncey to Secretary, Feb. 24, 1815. Ibid. 

[468] The details of Chauncey's actions are appended to his letter ofSept. 26, 1812. 

[469] Chauncey to Secretary of the Nary, Oct. 8, 12, 21, 1812. Captains' Letters. 

[470] Chauncey to Secretary, October 27, November 4, 6, 13. Captains'Letters. Those for November 6 and 13 can be found in Niles, vol. Iii, pp. 205, 206. 

[471] Chauncey to Secretary, November 17. Captains' Letters. 

[472] Chauncey to Secretary, Nov. 26, 1812. Ibid. 

[473] Life of Brock, p. 293. 

[474] In the Canadian Archives frequent mention is made of expeditionsby Procter's forces about the American lines, as of the Britishshipping on the Lake front during the autumn of 1812. 

[475] Elliott to Chauncey, Sept. 14, 1812. Captains' Letters, NavyDepartment. 

[476] Chauncey to the Secretary, Oct. 22, 1812. Captains' Letters, Navy Department. 

[477] Chauncey to the Secretary, Dec. 25, 1812; Jan. 1 and 8, and Feb. 16, 1813. Captains' Letters. 

[478] See Chauncey's letters of Dec. 1, 1812, and Jan. 20, 1813. Captains' Letters. 

[479] Chauncey to the Secretary, Jan. 21, Feb. 22, 1813. Captains'Letters. 

[480] Ridout, "Ten Years in Upper Canada, " pp. 52, 58, 115. 

[481] Niles' Register, vol ii. P. 42. 

[482] Ibid. , p. 119. 

[483] Ibid. , p. 303. 

[484] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 248. 

[485] Quoted from Steele's List (British) by Niles' Register, vol. Ii. P. 356. 

[486] Croker to Warren, Nov. 18, 1812, and March 20, 1813. BritishAdmiralty MSS. Out-Letters. 

[487] Niles' Register, vol. Iii. P. 111. Quoted from a publication of1759. 

[488] The Prince Regent. George III. Was incapacitated at this time. 

[489] Admiralty Out-Letters, British Records Office. 

[490] Rodgers to the Secretary, April 29, 1812. Decatur, June 16, 1812. Captains' Letters. 

CHAPTER VIII

OCEAN WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE--PRIVATEERING--BRITISHLICENSES--NAVAL ACTIONS: "WASP" AND "FROLIC"; "UNITED STATES"AND "MACEDONIAN"

In anticipation of war the British Admiralty took the military measureof consolidating their transatlantic stations, with the exception ofNewfoundland. The Jamaica, Leeward Islands, and Halifax squadrons, while retaining their present local organizations, were subordinatedto a single chief; for which position was designated Admiral Sir JohnBorlase Warren, an officer of good fighting record, but from hisprevious career esteemed less a seaman than a gallant man. This wasapparently his first extensive command, although he was nowapproaching sixty; but it was foreseen that the British minister mighthave left Washington in consequence of a rupture of relations, andthat there might thus devolve upon the naval commander-in-chiefcertain diplomatic overtures, which the Government had determined tomake before definitely accepting war as an irreversible issue. Warren, a man of courtly manners, had some slight diplomatic antecedents, having represented Great Britain at St. Petersburg on one occasion. There were also other negotiations anticipated, dependent uponpolitical conditions within the Union; where bitter oppositions ofopinion, sectional in character, were known to exist concerning thecourse of the Administration in resorting to hostilities. Warren wasinstructed on these several points. 

It was not until July 25, 1812, that a despatch vessel from Halifaxbrought word to England of the attack upon the "Belvidera" by Rodgers'squadron on June 24. By the same mail Admiral Sawyer wrote that he hadsent a flag of truce to New York to ask an explanation, and besideshad directed all his cruisers to assemble at Halifax. [491] TheGovernment recognized the gravity of the news, but expressed theopinion that there was no evidence that war had been decided upon, andthat the action of the American commodore had been in conformity withprevious orders not to permit foreign cruisers within the waters ofthe United States. Some color was lent to this view by thecircumstance that the "Belvidera" was reported to have been off SandyHook, though not in sight of land. [492] In short, the British Cabinetofficially assumed that facts were as they wished them to continue;the course best adapted to insure the maintenance of peace, ifperchance not yet broken. 

On July 29, however, definite information was received that the UnitedStates Government had declared that war existed between the twocountries. On the 31st the Cabinet took its first measures inconsequence. [493] One order was issued forbidding British merchantvessels to sail without convoy for any part of North America or theWest Indies; while another laid an embargo on all American merchantships in British ports, and directed the capture of any met at sea, unless sailing under British licenses, as many then did to Continentalports. No other hostile steps, such as general reprisals or commercialblockade, were at this time authorized; it was decided to await theeffect in the United States of the repeal of the obnoxious Orders inCouncil. This having taken place only on June 23, intelligence of itsreception and results could not well reach England before the middleof September. When Parliament was prorogued on July 30, the speechfrom the throne expressed a willingness still "to hope that theaccustomed relations of peace and amity between the two countries mayyet be restored. "

It is a coincidence, accidental, yet noteworthy for its significance, that the date of the first hostile action against the United States, July 31, was also that of the official promulgation of treaties ofpeace between Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden. [494] Accompanied asthese were with clauses embodying what was virtually a defensivealliance of the three Powers against Napoleon, they marked that turnof the tide in European affairs which overthrew one of the mostimportant factors in the political and military anticipations of theUnited States Administration. "Can it be doubted, " wrote Madison onSeptember 6, "that if, under the pressure added by our war to thatpreviously felt by Great Britain, her Government declines anaccommodation, it will be owing to calculations drawn from ourinternal divisions?"[495] Of the approaching change, however, no signyet appeared. The reverses of the French were still in the far future. Not until September 14 did they enter Moscow, and news of this eventwas received in the United States only at the end of November. Acontemporary weekly, under date of December 5, remarked: "Peace beforethis time has been dictated by Bonaparte, as ought to have beencalculated upon by the dealers (_sic_) at St. Petersburg, before they, influenced by the British, prevailed upon Alexander to embark in theWar. .. . All Europe, the British Islands excepted, will soon be at thefeet of Bonaparte. "[496] This expectation, generally shared during thesummer of 1812, is an element in the American situation not to beoverlooked. As late as December 4, Henry Clay, addressing the House ofRepresentatives, of which he then was Speaker, said: "The Britishtrade shut out from the Baltic--excluded from the Continent ofEurope--possibly expelled the Black Sea--perishing in South America;its illicit avenue to the United States, through Canada, closed--wasthis the period for throwing open our own market by abandoning ourrestrictive system? Perhaps at this moment the fate of the north ofEurope is decided, and the French Emperor may be dictating the lawfrom Moscow. "[497] The following night Napoleon finally abandoned hisrouted army and started on his return to Paris. 

War having been foreseen, the British Government took its first stepwithout hesitation. On August 6 the Foreign Office issued Warren'ssecret instructions, which were substantially the repetition of thosealready addressed on July 8 to its representative in Washington. Itbeing probable that before they could be received he would havedeparted in consequence of the rupture, Warren was to submit theproposition contained in them, that the United States Government, inview of the revocation of the Orders in Council, so long demanded byit, should recall the hostile measures taken. In case of acceptance, he was authorized to stop at once all hostilities within his command, and to give assurance of similar action by his Government in everypart of the world. If this advance proved fruitless, as it did, noorders instituting a state of war were needed, for it already existed;but for that contingency Warren received further instructions as tothe course he was to pursue, in case "a desire should manifest itselfin any considerable portion of the American Union, more especially inthose States bordering upon his Majesty's North American dominions, toreturn to their relations of peace and amity with this country. " Theadmiral was to encourage such dispositions, and should they take shapein formal act, making overtures to him for a cessation of hostilitiesfor that part of the country, he was directed to grant it, and toenter into negotiations for commercial intercourse between the sectionthus acting and the British dominions. In short, if the GeneralGovernment proved irreconcilable, Great Britain was to profit by anysentiment of disunion found to exist. [498]

Warren sailed from Portsmouth August 14, arriving in Halifax September26. On the 30th, he despatched to the United States Government theproposal for the cessation of hostilities. Monroe, the Secretary ofState, replied on October 27. The President, he said, was at all timesanxious to restore peace, and at the very moment of declaring war hadinstructed the _chargé_ in London to make propositions to that effectto the British Ministry. An indispensable condition, however, was theabandonment of the practice of impressment from American vessels. ThePresident recognized the embarrassment under which Great Britain lay, because of her felt necessity to control the services of her nativeseamen, and was willing to undertake that hereafter they should bewholly excluded from the naval and merchant ships of the UnitedStates. This should be done under regulations to be negotiated betweenthe two countries, in order to obviate the injury alleged by GreatBritain; but, meanwhile, impressing from under the American flag mustbe discontinued during any armistice arranged. "It cannot be presumed, while the parties are engaged in a negotiation to adjust amicably thisimportant difference, that the United States would admit the right, or acquiesce in the practice of the opposite party, or that GreatBritain would be unwilling to restrain her cruisers from a practicewhich would have the strongest tendency to defeat the negotiation. "The Orders in Council having been revoked, impressment remained theonly outstanding question upon which the United States was absolute inits demand. That conceded, upon the terms indicated, all otherdifferences might be referred to negotiation. Upon this point Warrenhad no powers, for his Government was determined not to yield. Themaritime war therefore went on unabated; but it may be mentioned herethat the President's undertaking to exclude British-born seamen fromAmerican ships took effect in an Act of Congress, approved by himMarch 3, 1813. He had thenceforth in hand a pledge which he considereda full guarantee against whatever Great Britain feared to lose byceasing to take seamen from under the American flag. It was not soregarded in England, and no formal agreement on this interestingsubject was ever reached. 

The conditions existing upon his arrival, and the occurrences of thepast three months, as then first fully known to Warren, deeplyimpressed him with the largeness of his task in protecting thecommerce of Great Britain. He found himself at once in the midst ofits most evident perils, which in the beginning were concentratedabout Halifax, owing to special circumstances. Although long seeminglyimminent, hostilities when they actually came had found the mercantilecommunity of the United States, for the most part, unbelieving andunprepared. The cry of "Wolf!" had been raised so often that they didnot credit its coming, even when at the doors. This was especially thecase in New England, where the popular feeling against war increasedthe indisposition to think it near. On May 14, Captain Bainbridge, commanding the Boston navy yard, wrote: "I am sorry to say that thepeople here do not believe we are going to war, and are too muchdisposed to treat our national councils with contempt, and to considertheir preparations as electioneering. "[499] The presidential electionwas due in the following November. A Baltimore newspaper of the day, criticising the universal rush to evade the embargo of April 4, instituted in order to keep both seamen and property at home inavoidance of capture, added that in justice it must be said that mostpeople believed that the embargo, as on former occasions, did not meanwar. [500]

Under the general sense of unpreparedness, it seemed to manyinconceivable that the Administration would venture to expose thecoasts to British reprisals. John Randolph, repeating in the House ofRepresentatives in secret session a conversation between the Committeeon Foreign Relations and the Secretary of State, said: "He was askedwhether any essential changes would be made in the sixty days (of theproposed embargo) in the defence of our maritime frontier andseaports. He replied, pretty considerable preparations would be made. He said New York was in a pretty respectable state, but not such as toresist a formidable fleet; but that it was not to be expected thatthat kind of war would be carried on. " The obvious reply was, "We mustexpect what commonly happens in wars. " "As to the prepared state ofthe country, the President, in case of a declaration, would not feelbound to take more than his share of the responsibility. Theunprepared state of the country was the only reason why ulteriormeasures should be deferred. "[501] Randolph's recollections of thisinterview were challenged by members of the Committee in otherpoints, but not in these. The Administration had then been in officethree years, and the causes of war had been accumulating for at leastseven; but so notorious was the unreadiness that a great part of thecommunity even now saw only bluster. 

For these reasons the first rush to privateering, although feverishlyenergetic, was of a somewhat extemporized character. In consequence ofthe attempt to elude the embargo, by a precipitate and extensiveexport movement, a very large part of the merchant ships and seamenwere now abroad. Hence, in the haste to seize upon enemy's shipping, anything that could be sent to sea at quick notice was utilized. Vessels thus equipped were rarely best fitted for a distant voyage, inwhich dependence must rest upon their own resources, and upon crewsboth numerous and capable. They were therefore necessarily directedupon commercial highways near at hand, which, though not intrinsicallyrichest, nor followed by the cargoes that would pay best in the UnitedStates, could nevertheless adequately reward enterprise. In the nearvicinity of Halifax the routes from the British West Indies to NewBrunswick, Nova Scotia, and the St. Lawrence, met and crossed theequally important lines of travel from the British Islands to the samepoints. This circumstance contributed to the importance of that placeas a naval and commercial centre, and also focussed about it by farthe larger part of the effort and excitement of the first privateeringoutburst from the United States. As Rodgers' bold sortie, anddisappearance into the unknown with a strong squadron had forcedconcentration upon the principal British vessels, the cruisersremaining for dispersion in search of privateers were numericallyinadequate to suppress the many and scattered Americans. BeforeWarren's arrival the prizes reported in the United States were onehundred and ninety, and they probably exceeded two hundred. Ananalysis of the somewhat imperfect data which accompany these returnsindicates that about three fourths were seized in the Bay of Fundy andin the off-lying waters from thence round to Newfoundland. Of theremainder, half, probably, were taken in the West Indies; and the restout in the deep sea, beyond the Gulf Stream, upon the first part ofthe track followed by the sugar and coffee traders from the WestIndies to England. [502] There had not yet been time to hear of prizestaken in Europe, to which comparatively few privateers as yet went. 

One of the most intelligent and enterprising of the early privateerswas Commodore Joshua Barney, a veteran of the American Navy of theRevolution. He commissioned a Baltimore schooner, the "Rossie, " at theoutbreak of the war; partly, apparently, in order to show a goodexample of patriotic energy, but doubtless also through the promptingsof a love of adventure, not extinguished by advancing years. Thedouble motive kept him an active, useful, and distinguished publicservant throughout the war. His cruise on this occasion, as far as canbe gathered from the reports, [503] conformed in direction to thequarters in which the enemy's merchant ships might most surely beexpected. Sailing from the Chesapeake July 15, he seems to have stoodat once outside the Gulf Stream for the eastern edge of the Banks ofNewfoundland. In the ensuing two weeks he was twice chased by anenemy's frigate, and not till July 31 did he take his first prize. From that day, to and including August 9, he captured ten othervessels--eleven in all. Unfortunately, the precise locality of eachseizure is not given, but it is inferable from the general tenor ofthe accounts that they were made between the eastern edge of theGreat Banks and the immediate neighborhood of Halifax; in thelocality, in fact, to which Hull during those same ten days wasdirecting the "Constitution, " partly in pursuit of prizes, equally insearch of the enemy's ships of war, which were naturally to be soughtat those centres of movement where their national traders accumulated. 

On August 30 the "Rossie, " having run down the Nova Scotia coast andpassed by George's Bank and Nantucket, went into Newport, RhodeIsland. It is noticeable that before and after those ten days ofsuccess, although she saw no English vessels, except ships of warcruising on the outer approaches of their commerce, she wascontinually meeting and speaking American vessels returning home. These facts illustrate the considerations governing privateering, andrefute the plausible opinion often advanced, that it was a mere matterof gambling adventure. Thus Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of theTreasury, in a communication to Congress, said: "The occupation ofprivateers is precisely of the same species as the lottery, withrespect to hazard and to the chance of rich prizes. "[504] Gallatinapproached the subject from the standpoint of the financier and withthe abstract ideas of the political economist. His temporarysuccessor, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Jones, had been a merchantin active business life, and he viewed privateering as a practicalbusiness undertaking. "The analogy between privateering and lotteriesdoes not appear to me to be so strict as the Secretary seems toconsider it. The adventure of a privateer is of the nature of acommercial project or speculation, conducted by commercial men uponprinciples of mercantile calculation and profit. The vessel and herequipment is a matter of great expense, which is expected to beremunerated by the probable chances of profit, after calculating theoutfit, insurance, etc. , as in a regular mercantile voyage. "[505] Mr. Jones would doubtless have admitted what Gallatin alleged, that thebusiness was liable to be overdone, as is the case with all promisingoccupations; and that many would engage in it without adequateunderstanding or forethought. 

The elements of risk which enter into privateering are doubtless verygreat, and to some extent baffle calculation. In this it only sharesthe lot common to all warlike enterprise, in which, as the ablestmasters of the art repeatedly affirm, something must be allowed forchance. But it does not follow that a reasonable measure of successmay not fairly be expected, where sagacious appreciation of well-knownfacts controls the direction of effort, and preparation isproportioned to the difficulties to be encountered. Heedlessness ofconditions, or recklessness of dangers, defeat effort everywhere, aswell as in privateering; nor is even the chapter of unforeseenaccident confined to military affairs. In 1812 the courses followed bythe enemy's trade were well understood, as were also thecharacteristics of their ships of war, in sailing, distribution, andmanagement. [506] Regard being had to these conditions, the pecuniaryventure, which privateering essentially is, was sure of fairreturns--barring accidents--if the vessels were thoroughly well found, with superior speed and nautical qualities, and if directed upon thecentres of ocean travel, such as the approaches to the EnglishChannel, or, as before noted, to where great highways cross, inducingan accumulation of vessels from several quarters. So pursued, privateering can be made pecuniarily successful, as was shown by theincreasing number and value of prizes as the war went on. It has alsoa distinct effect as a minor offensive operation, harassing andweakening the enemy; but its merits are more contestable when regardedas by itself alone decisive of great issues. Despite the efficiencyand numbers of American privateers, it was not British commerce, butAmerican, that was destroyed by the war. 

From Newport the "Rossie" took a turn through another lucrative fieldof privateering enterprise, the Caribbean Sea. Passing by Bermuda, which brought her in the track of vessels from the West Indies toHalifax, she entered the Caribbean at its northeastern corner, by theAnegada Passage, near St. Thomas, thence ran along the south shore ofPorto Rico, coming out by the Mona Passage, between Porto Rico andSanto Domingo, and so home by the Gulf Stream. In this second voyageshe made but two prizes; and it is noted in her log book that she heremet the privateer schooner "Rapid" from Charleston, fifty-two daysout, without taking anything. The cause of these small results doesnot certainly appear; but it may be presumed that with the height ofthe hurricane season at hand, most of the West India traders hadalready sailed for Europe. Despite all drawbacks, when the "Rossie"returned to Baltimore toward the end of October, she had captured ordestroyed property roughly reckoned at a million and a half, which isprobably an exaggerated estimate. Two hundred and seventeen prisonershad been taken. 

While the "Rossie" was on her way to the West Indies, there sailedfrom Salem a large privateer called the "America, " the equipment andoperations of which illustrated precisely the business conceptionwhich attached to these enterprises in the minds of competent businessmen. This ship-rigged vessel of four hundred and seventy-three tons, built of course for a merchantman, was about eight years old when thewar broke out, and had just returned from a voyage. Seeing thatordinary commerce was likely to be a very precarious undertaking, herowners spent the months of July and August in preparing herdeliberately for her new occupation. Her upper deck was removed, andsides filled in solid. She was given larger yards and loftier sparsthan before; the greatly increased number of men carried by aprivateer, for fighting and for manning prizes, enabling canvas to behandled with greater rapidity and certainty. She received a battery ofvery respectable force for those days, so that she could repel thesmaller classes of ships of war, which formed a large proportion ofthe enemy's cruisers. Thus fitted to fight or run, and having verysuperior speed, she was often chased, but never caught. During the twoand a half years of war she made four cruises of four months each;taking in all forty-one prizes, twenty-seven of which reached port andrealized $1, 100, 000, after deducting expenses and government charges. As half of this went to the ship's company, the owners netted $550, 000for sixteen months' active use of the ship. Her invariable cruisingground was from the English Channel south, to the latitude of theCanary Islands. [507]

The United States having declared war, the Americans enjoyed theadvantage of the first blow at the enemy's trade. The reduced numbersof vessels on the British transatlantic stations, and the perplexityinduced by Rodgers' movement, combined to restrict the injury toAmerican shipping. A number of prizes were made, doubtless; but asnearly as can be ascertained not over seventy American merchant shipswere taken in the first three months of the war. Of these, thirty-eight are reported as brought under the jurisdiction of theVice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, and twenty-four as captured on theJamaica station. News of the war not being received by the Britishsquadrons in Europe until early in August, only one capture thereappears before October 1, except from the Mediterranean. There CaptainUsher on September 6 wrote from Gibraltar that all the Americans ontheir way down the Sea--that is, out of the Straits--had beentaken. [508] In like manner, though with somewhat better fortune, thirty or forty American ships from the Baltic were driven to takerefuge in the neutral Swedish port of Gottenburg, and remainedwar-bound. [509] That the British cruisers were not inactive inprotecting the threatened shores and waters of Nova Scotia and the St. Lawrence is proved by the seizure of twenty-four American privateers, between July 1 and August 25;[510] a result to which the inadequateequipment of these vessels probably contributed. But Americanshipping, upon the whole, at first escaped pretty well in the matterof actual capture. 

It was not in this way, but by the almost total suppression ofcommerce, both coasting and foreign, both neutral and American, thatthe maritime pressure of war was brought home to the United States. This also did not happen until a comparatively late period. Nocommercial blockade was instituted by the enemy before February, 1813. Up to that time neutrals, not carrying contraband, had free admissionto all American ports; and the British for their own purposesencouraged a licensed trade, wholly illegitimate as far as UnitedStates ships were concerned, but in which American citizens andAmerican vessels were largely engaged, though frequently under flagsof other nations. A significant indication of the nature of thistraffic is found in the export returns of the year ending September30, 1813. The total value of home produce exported was $25, 008, 152, chiefly flour, grain, and other provisions. Of this, $20, 536, 328 wentto Spain and Portugal with their colonies; $15, 500, 000 to thePeninsula itself. [511] It was not till October, 1813, when the Britisharmies entered France, that this demand fell. At the same time Halifaxand Canada were being supplied with flour from New England; and thecommon saying that the British forces in Canada could not keep thefield but for supplies sent from the United States was strictly true, and has been attested by British commissaries. An American in Halifaxin November, 1812, wrote home that within a fortnight twenty thousandbarrels of flour had arrived in vessels under Spanish and Swedishflags, chiefly from Boston. This sort of unfaithfulness to a nationalcause is incidental to most wars, but rarely amounts to as grievous amilitary evil as in 1812 and 1813, when both the Peninsula and Canadawere substantially at our mercy in this respect. With the fall ofNapoleon, and the opening of Continental resources, such controldeparted from American hands. In the succeeding twelvemonth there wassent to the Peninsula less than $5, 000, 000 worth. 

Warren's impressions of the serious nature of the opening conflictcaused a correspondence between him and the Admiralty somewhatcontroversial in tone. Ten days after his arrival he represented thereduced state of the squadron: "The war assumes a new, as well as moreactive and inveterate aspect than heretofore. " Alarming reports werebeing received as to the number of ships of twenty-two to thirty-twoguns fitting out in American ports, and he mentions as significantthat the commission of a privateer officer, taken in a recapturedvessel, bore the number 318. At Halifax he was in an atmosphere ofrumors and excitement, fed by frequent communication with easternports, as well as by continual experience of captures about theneighboring shores; the enemies' crews even landing at times. When hewent to Bermuda two months later, so many privateers were met on theline of traffic between the West Indies and the St. Lawrence as toconvince him of the number and destructiveness of these vessels, and"of the impossibility of our trade navigating these seas unless a veryextensive squadron is employed to scour the vicinity. " He was crippledfor attempting this by the size of the American frigates, whichforbade his dispersing his cruisers. The capture of the "Guerrière"had now been followed by that of the "Macedonian;" and in view of theresults, and of Rodgers being again out, he felt compelled toconstitute squadrons of two frigates and a sloop. Under theseconditions, and with so many convoys to furnish, "it is impracticableto cut off the enemy's resources, or to repress the disorder andpillage which actually exist to a very alarming degree, both on thecoast of British America and in the West Indies, as will be seen bythe copies of letters enclosed, " from colonial and naval officials. Hegoes on to speak, in terms not carefully weighed, of swarms ofprivateers and letters-of-marque, their numbers now amounting to sixhundred; the crews of which had landed in many points of his Majesty'sdominions, and even taken vessels from their anchors in Britishports. [512]

The Admiralty, while evidently seeing exaggeration in this language, bear witness in their reply to the harassment caused by the Americansquadrons and private armed ships. They remind the admiral that thereare two principal ways of protecting the trade: one by furnishing itwith convoys, the other by preventing egress from the enemy's ports, through adequate force placed before them. To disperse vessels overthe open sea, along the tracks of commerce, though necessary, is buta subsidiary measure. His true course is to concentrate a strongdivision before each chief American port, and they intimatedissatisfaction that this apparently had not yet been done. As amatter of fact, up to the spring of 1813, American ships of war hadlittle difficulty in getting to sea. Rodgers had sailed again with hisown squadron and Decatur's on October 8, the two separating on the11th, though this was unknown to the British; and Bainbridge followedwith the "Constitution" and "Hornet" on the 26th. Once away, power toarrest their depredations was almost wholly lost, through ignorance oftheir intentions. With regard to commerce, they were on the offensive, the British on the defensive, with the perplexity attaching to thelatter rôle. 

Under the circumstances, the Admiralty betrays some impatience withWarren's clamor for small vessels to be scattered in defence of thetrade and coasts. They remind him that he has under his flag elevensail of the line, thirty-four frigates, thirty-eight sloops, besidesother vessels, making a total of ninety-seven; and yet first Rodgers, and then Bainbridge, had got away. True, Boston cannot be effectivelyblockaded from November to March, but these two squadrons had sailedin October. Even "in the month of December, though it was not possibleperhaps to have maintained a permanent watch on that port, yet having, as you state in your letter of November 5, precise information thatCommodore Bainbridge was to sail at a given time, their Lordshipsregret that it was not deemed practicable to proceed off that port ata reasonable and safe distance from the land, and to have taken thechance at least of intercepting the enemy. " "The necessity for sendingheavy convoys arises from the facility and safety with which theAmerican navy has hitherto found it possible to put to sea. Theuncertainty in which you have left their Lordships, in regard to themovements of the enemy and the disposition of your own force, hasobliged them to employ six or seven sail of the line and as manyfrigates and sloops, independent of your command, in guarding againstthe possible attempts of the enemy. Captain Prowse, with two sail ofthe line, two frigates, and a sloop, has been sent to St. Helena. Rear-Admiral Beauclerk, with two of the line, two frigates, and twosloops, is stationed in the neighborhood of Madeira and the Azores, lest Commodore Bainbridge should have come into that quarter to takethe place of Commodore Rodgers, who was retiring from it about thetime you state Commodore Bainbridge was expected to sail. CommodoreOwen, who had preceded Admiral Beauclerk in this station, with a shipof the line and three other vessels, is not yet returned from thecruise on which the appearance of the enemy near the Azores hadobliged their Lordships to send this force; while the 'Colossus' andthe 'Elephant' [ships of the line], with the 'Rhin' and the 'Armide, 'are but just returned from similar services. Thus it is obvious that, large as the force under your orders was, and is, it is not all thathas been opposed to the Americans, and that these services becamenecessary only because the chief weight of the enemy's force has beenemployed at a distance from your station. "[513]

The final words here quoted characterize exactly the conditions of thefirst eight or ten months of the war, until the spring of 1813. Theyalso define the purpose of the British Government to close the coastof the United States in such manner as to minimize the evils of widelydispersed commerce-destroying, by confining the American vessels asfar as possible within their harbors. The American squadrons andheavy frigates, which menaced not commerce only but scattered ships ofwar as well, were to be rigorously shut up by an overwhelming divisionbefore each port in which they harbored; and the Admiralty intimatedits wish that a ship of the line should always form one of suchdivision. This course of policy, initiated when the winter of 1812-13was over, was thenceforth maintained with ever increasing rigor;especially after the general peace in Europe, in May, 1814, hadreleased the entire British navy. It had two principal results. TheAmerican frigates were, in the main, successfully excluded from theocean. Their three successful battles were all fought before January1, 1813. Commodore John Rodgers, indeed, by observing his own preceptof clinging to the eastern ports of Newport and Boston, did succeedafter this in making two cruises with the "President;" but enteringNew York with her on the last of these, in February, 1814, she wasobliged, in endeavoring to get to sea when transferred to Decatur, todo so under circumstances so difficult as to cause her to ground, andby consequent loss of speed to be overtaken and captured by theblockading squadron. Captain Stewart reported the "Constitution"nearly ready for sea, at Boston, September 26, 1813. Three monthsafter, he wrote the weather had not yet enabled him to escape. OnDecember 30, however, she sailed; but returning on April 4, theblockaders drove her into Salem, whence she could not reach Bostonuntil April 17, 1814, and there remained until the 17th of thefollowing December. Her last successful battle, under his command, wason February 20, 1815, more than two years after she captured the"Java. " When the war ended the only United States vessels on the oceanwere the "Constitution, " three sloops--the "Wasp, " "Hornet, " and"Peacock "--and the brig "Tom Bowline. " The smaller vessels of thenavy, and the privateers, owing to their much lighter draft, got outmore readily; but neither singly nor collectively did they constitutea serious menace to convoys, nor to the scattered cruisers of theenemy. These, therefore, were perfectly free to pursue theiroperations without fear of surprise. 

On the other hand, because of this concentration along the shores ofthe United States, the vessels that did escape went prepared more andmore for long absences and distant operations. On the sea "the weightof the enemy's force, " to use again the words of the Admiralty, "wasemployed at a distance from the North American station. " Whereas, atthe first, most captures by Americans were made near the UnitedStates, after the spring of 1813 there is an increasing indication oftheir being most successfully sought abroad; and during the last ninemonths of the war, when peace prevailed throughout the world exceptbetween the United States and Great Britain, when the Chesapeake wasBritish waters, when Washington was being burned and Baltimorethreatened, when the American invasion of Canada had given place tothe British invasion of New York, when New Orleans and Mobile wereboth being attacked, --it was the coasts of Europe, and the narrow seasover which England had claimed immemorial sovereignty, that witnessedthe most audacious and successful ventures of American cruisers. Theprizes taken in these quarters were to those on the hither side of theAtlantic as two to one. To this contributed also the commercialblockade, after its extension over the entire seaboard of the UnitedStates, in April, 1814. The practically absolute exclusion of Americancommerce from the ocean is testified by the exports of 1814, whichamounted to not quite $7, 000, 000;[514] whereas in 1807, the last fullyear of unrestricted trade, they had been $108, 000, 000. [515] Deprivedof all their usual employments, shipping and seamen were driven toprivateering to earn any returns at all. 

From these special circumstances, the period from June, 1812, when thewar began, to the end of April, 1813, when the departure of winterconditions permitted the renewal of local activity on sea and land, had a character of its own, favoring the United States on the ocean, which did not recur. Some specific account of particular transactionsduring these months will serve to illustrate the general conditionsmentioned. 

When Warren reached Halifax, there were still in Boston the"Constitution" and the ships that had returned with Rodgers on August31. From these the Navy Department now constituted three squadrons. The "Hornet, " Captain James Lawrence, detached from Rodgers' command, was attached to the "Constitution, " in which Captain WilliamBainbridge had succeeded Hull. Bainbridge's squadron was to becomposed of these two vessels and the smaller 32-gun frigate "Essex, "Captain David Porter, then lying in the Delaware. Rodgers retained hisown ship, the "President, " with the frigate "Congress;" while toDecatur was continued the "United States" and the brig "Argus. " Thesedetachments were to act separately under their several commodores; butas Decatur's preparations were only a few days behind those ofRodgers, the latter decided to wait for him, and on October 8 the twosailed in company, for mutual support until outside the lines ofenemies, in case of meeting with a force superior to either singly. 

In announcing his departure, Rodgers wrote the Department that heexpected the British would be distributed in divisions, off the portsof the coast, and that if reliable information reached him of any suchexposed detachment, it would be his duty to seek it. "I feel aconfidence that, with prudent policy, we shall, barring unforeseenaccidents, not only annoy their commerce, but embarrass and perplexthe commanders of their public ships, equally to the advantage of ourcommerce and the disadvantage of theirs. " Warren and the Admiraltyalike have borne witness to the accuracy of this judgment. Rodgers wasless happy in another forecast, in which he reflected that of hiscountrymen generally. As regards the reported size of Britishre-enforcements to America, "I do not feel confidence in them, as Icannot convince myself that their resources, situated as England is atpresent, are equal to the maintenance of such a force on this side ofthe Atlantic; and at any rate, if such an one do appear, it will beonly with a view to bullying us into such a peace as may suit theirinterests. "[516] The Commodore's words reflected often an animosity, personal as well as national, aroused by the liberal abuse bestowed onhim by British writers. 

 [Illustration: THE CRUISES OF THE THREE AMERICAN SQUADRONS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1812]

On October 11 Decatur's division parted company, the "President" and"Congress" continuing together and steering to the eastward. On the15th the two ships captured a British packet, the "Swallow, " fromJamaica to Falmouth, having $150, 000 to $200, 000 specie on board; andon the 31st, in longitude 32° west, latitude 33° north, two hundredand forty miles south of the Azores, a Pacific whaler on her homewardvoyage was taken. These two incidents indicate the general directionof the course held, which was continued to longitude 22° west, latitude 17° north, the neighborhood of the Cape Verde group. Thisconfirms the information of the British Admiralty that Rodgers wascruising between the Azores and Madeira; and it will be seen thatBainbridge, as they feared, followed in Rodgers' wake, though with adifferent ulterior destination. The ground indeed was well chosen tointercept homeward trade from the East Indies and South America. Returning, the two frigates ran west in latitude 17°, with the tradewind, as far as longitude 50°, whence they steered north, passing onehundred and twenty miles east of Bermuda. In his report to the NavyDepartment Rodgers said that he had sailed almost eleven thousandmiles, making the circuit of nearly the whole western Atlantic. Inthis extensive sweep he had seen only five enemy's merchant vessels, two of which were captured. The last four weeks, practically theentire month of December, had been spent upon the line between Halifaxand Bermuda, without meeting a single enemy's ship. From this heconcluded that "their trade is at present infinitely more limited thanpeople imagine. "[517] In fact, however, the experience indicated thatthe British officials were rigorously enforcing the Convoy Law, according to the "positive directions, " and warnings of penalties, issued by the Government. A convoy is doubtless a much larger objectthan a single ship; but vessels thus concentrated in place and in timeare more apt to pass wholly unseen than the same number sailingindependently, and so scattered over wide expanses of sea. 

Shortly before his return Rodgers arrested and sent in an Americanvessel, from Baltimore to Lisbon, with flour, sailing under aprotection from the British admiral at Halifax. This was a frequentincident with United States cruisers, national or private, at thistime; Decatur, for example, the day after leaving Rodgers, reportedmeeting an American ship having on board a number of licenses from theBritish Government to American citizens, granting them protection intransporting grain to Spain and Portugal. The license was issued by aBritish consular officer, and ran thus:[518]

 "To the commanders of His Majesty's ships of war, or of private armed ships belonging to subjects of His Majesty. 

 "Whereas, from the consideration of the great importance of continuing a regular supply of flour and other dried provisions, to the allied armies in Spain and Portugal, it has been deemed expedient by His Majesty's Government that, notwithstanding the hostilities now existing between Great Britain and the United States, every degree of encouragement and protection should be given to American vessels laden with flour and other dry provisions, and _bonâ fide_ bound to Spain or Portugal, and whereas, in furtherance of the views of His Majesty's Government, Herbert Sawyer, Esq. , Vice Admiral and commander-in-chief on the Halifax station, has addressed to me a letter under the date of the 5th of August, 1812 (a copy whereof is hereunto annexed) wherein I am instructed to furnish a copy of his letter certified under my consular seal to every American vessel so laden and bound, destined to serve as a perfect safeguard and protection of such vessel in the prosecution of her voyage: Now, therefore, in obedience to these instructions, I have granted to the American ship ----, ----, Master, " etc. 

To this was appended the following letter of instructions from AdmiralSawyer:

 "Whereas Mr. Andrew Allen, His Majesty's Consul at Boston, has recommended to me Mr. Robert Elwell, a merchant of that place, and well inclined toward the British Interest, who is desirous of sending provisions to Spain and Portugal for the use of the allied armies in the Peninsula, and whereas I think it fit and necessary that encouragement and protection should be afforded him in so doing, "These are therefore to require and direct all captains and commanders of His Majesty's ships and vessels of war which may fall in with any American or other vessel bearing a neutral flag, laden with flour, bread, corn, and pease, or any other species of dry provisions, bound from America to Spain or Portugal, and having this protection on board, to suffer her to proceed without unnecessary obstruction or detention in her voyage, provided she shall appear to be steering a due course for those countries, and it being understood this is only to be in force for one voyage and within six months from the date hereof. 

 "Given under my hand and seal on board His Majesty's Ship 'Centurion, ' at Halifax this fourth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and twelve. 

 "(Sig. ) H. SAWYER, Vice Admiral. "

This practice soon became perfectly known to the American Government, copies being found not only on board vessels stopped for carryingthem, but in seaports. Nevertheless, it went on, apparently tolerated, or at least winked at; although, to say the least, the seamen thusemployed in sustaining the enemies' armies were needed by thestate. [519] When the commercial blockade of the Chesapeake wasenforced in February, 1813, and Admiral Warren announced that licenseswould no longer enable vessels to pass, flour in Baltimore fell twodollars a barrel. The blockade being then limited to the Chesapeakeand Delaware, the immediate effect was to transfer this lucrativetraffic further north, favoring that portion of the country which wasconsidered, in the common parlance of the British official of thatday, "well inclined towards British interests. "

On October 13, two days after Rodgers and Decatur parted at sea, theUnited States sloop of war "Wasp, " Captain Jacob Jones, left theCapes of the Delaware on a cruise, steering to the eastward. On the16th, in a heavy gale of wind, she lost her jib-boom. At half-pasteleven in the night of the 17th, being then in latitude 37° north, longitude 65° west, between four and five hundred miles east of theChesapeake, in the track of vessels bound to Europe from the Gulf ofMexico, half a dozen large sail were seen passing. These were part ofa convoy which had left the Bay of Honduras September 12, on their wayto England, under guard of the British brig of war "Frolic, " CaptainWhinyates. Jones, unable in the dark to distinguish their force, tooka position some miles to windward, whence he could still see andfollow their motions. In the morning each saw the other, andWhinyates, properly concerned for his charges chiefly, directed themto proceed under all sail on their easterly course, while he allowedthe "Frolic" to drop astern, at the same time hoisting Spanish colorsto deceive the stranger; a ruse prompted by his having a few daysbefore passed a Spanish fleet convoyed by a brig resembling his own. 

It still blowing strong from the westward, with a heavy sea, CaptainJones, being to windward, and so having the choice of attacking, firstput his ship under close-reefed topsails, and then stood down for the"Frolic, " which hauled to the wind on the port tack--that is, with thewind on the left side--to await the enemy. The British brig was underthe disadvantage of having lost her main-yard in the same gale thatcost the American her jib-boom; she was therefore unable to set anysquare sail on the rearmost of her two masts. The sail called the boommainsail in part remedied this, so far as enabling the brig to keepside to wind; but, being a low sail, it did not steady her as well asa square topsail would have done in the heavy sea running, a conditionwhich makes accurate aim more difficult. 

The action did not begin until the "Wasp" was within sixty yards ofthe "Frolic. " Then the latter opened fire, which the American quicklyreturned; the two running side by side and gradually closing. TheBritish crew fired much the more rapidly, a circumstance which theircaptain described as "superior fire;" in this reproducing the illusionunder which Captain Dacres labored during the first part of his fightwith the "Constitution. " "The superior fire of our guns gave everyreason to expect a speedy termination in our favor, " wrote Whinyatesin his official report. Dacres before his Court Martial asked of twowitnesses, "Did you understand it was not my intention to board whilstthe masts stood, in consequence of our superior fire and their greatnumber of men?" That superior here meant quicker is established by thereply of one of these witnesses: "Our fire was a great deal quickerthan the enemy's. " Superiority of fire, however, consists not only inrapidity, but in hitting; and while with very big ships it may bepossible to realize Nelson's maxim, that by getting close missingbecomes impossible, it is not the same with smaller vessels inturbulent motion. It was thought on board the "Wasp" that the enemyfired thrice to her twice, but the direction of their shot was seen inits effects; the American losing within ten minutes her maintopmastwith its yard, the mizzen-topgallant-mast, and spanker gaff. Withintwenty minutes most of the running rigging was also shot away, so asto leave the ship largely unmanageable; but she had only five killedand five wounded. In other words, the enemy's shot flew high; and, while it did the damage mentioned, it inflicted no vital injury. The"Wasp, " on the contrary, as evidently fired low; for the loss of theboom mainsail was the only serious harm received by the "Frolic's"motive power during the engagement, and when her masts fell, immediately after it, they went close to the deck. Her loss in men, fifteen killed and forty-three wounded, tells the same story of aiminglow. 

The "Frolic" having gone into action without a main-yard, the loss ofthe boom mainsail left her unmanageable and decided the action. The"Wasp, " though still under control, was but little better off; for shewas unable to handle her head yards, the maintopmast having fallenacross the head braces. There is little reason therefore to credit acontemporary statement of her wearing twice before boarding. Neithercaptain mentions further manoeuvring, and Jones' words, "We graduallylessened the space till we laid her on board, " probably express theexact sequence. As they thus closed, the "Wasp's" greater remainingsail and a movement of her helm would effect what followed: theBritish vessel's bowsprit coming between the main and the mizzenrigging of her opponent, who thus grappled her in a position favorablefor raking. A broadside or two, preparatory for boarding, followed, and ended the battle; for when the Americans leaped on board there wasno resistance. In view of the vigorous previous contest, this shows aship's company decisively beaten. [520]

Under the conditions of wind and weather, this engagement may fairlybe described as an artillery duel between two vessels of substantiallyequal force. James' contention of inferior numbers in the "Frolic" istrue in the letter; but the greater rapidity of her firing shows itirrelevant to the issue. The want of the mainyard, which means thelack of the maintopsail, was a more substantial disadvantage. So longas the boom mainsail held, however, it was fairly offset by the fallof the "Wasp's" maintopmast and its consequences. Both vessels carriedsixteen 32-pounder carronades, which gave a broadside of two hundredand fifty-six pounds. The "Wasp" had, besides, two 12-pounder longguns. The British naval historian James states that the "Frolic" hadin addition to her main battery only two long sixes; but Captain Jonesgives her six 12-pounders, claiming that she was therefore superior tothe "Wasp" by four 12-pounders. As we are not excusing a defeat, itmay be sufficient to say that the fight was as nearly equal as it isgiven to such affairs to be. The action lasted forty-three minutes;the "Frolic" hauling down her colors shortly after noon. Almostimmediately afterward the British seventy-four "Poietiers" came insight, and in the disabled condition of the two combatants overhauledthem easily. Two hours later she took possession of both "Wasp" and"Frolic, " and carried them into Bermuda. The "Wasp" was added to theBritish navy under the name of "Loup Cervier" (Lynx). 

When Rodgers and Decatur separated, on October 11, the former steeredrather easterly, while the latter diverged to the southward as well aseast, accompanied by the "Argus. " These two did not remain longtogether. It is perhaps worth noticing by the way, that Rodgersadhered to his idea of co-operation between ships, keeping his two incompany throughout; whereas Decatur, when in control, illustrated inpractice his preference for separate action. The brig proceeded toCape St. Roque, the easternmost point of Brazil, and thence along thenorth coast of South America, as far as Surinam. From there she passedto the eastward of the West India Islands and so toward home;remaining out as long as her stores justified, cruising in the watersbetween Halifax, Bermuda, and the Continent. These courses, as thoseof the other divisions, are given as part of the maritime action, conducive to understanding the general character of effort put forthby national and other cruisers. Of these four ships that sailedtogether, the "Argus" alone encountered any considerable force of theenemy; falling in with a squadron of six British vessels, two of themof the line, soon after parting with the "United States. " She escapedby her better sailing. Her entire absence from the country wasninety-six days. 

Decatur with the "United States" kept away to the southeast untilOctober 25. At daybreak of that day the frigate was in latitude 29°north, longitude 29° 30' west, steering southwest on the port tack, with the wind at south-southeast. Soon after daylight there wassighted a large sail bearing about south-southwest; or, as seamen say, two points on the weather bow. She was already heading as nearly asthe wind permitted in the direction of the stranger; but the latter, which proved to be the British frigate "Macedonian, " Captain John S. Carden, having the wind free, changed her course for the "UnitedStates, " taking care withal to preserve the windward position, cherished by the seamen of that day. In this respect conditionsdiffered from those of the "Constitution" and "Guerrière, " for therethe American was to windward. Contrary also to the case of the "Wasp"and "Frolic, " the interest of the approaching contest turns largely onthe manoeuvres of the antagonists; for, the "United States" beingfully fifty per cent stronger than the "Macedonian" in artillerypower, it was only by utilizing the advantage of her windwardposition, by judicious choice of the method of attack, that theBritish ship could hope for success. She had in her favor also adecided superiority of speed; and, being just from England after aperiod of refit, was in excellent sailing trim. 

When first visible to each other from the mastheads, the vessels weresome twelve miles apart. They continued to approach until 8. 30, whenthe "United States, " being then about three miles distant, wore--turned round--standing on the other tack. Her colors, previously concealed by her sails, were by this manoeuvre shown to theBritish frigate, which was thus also placed in the position ofsteering for the quarter of her opponent; the latter heading nearerthe wind, and inclining gradually to cross the "Macedonian's" bows(1). When this occurred, a conversation was going on between CaptainCarden, his first lieutenant, and the master;[521] the latter beingthe officer who usually worked the ship in battle, under directionsfrom the captain. These officers had been in company with the "UnitedStates" the year before in Chesapeake Bay; and, whether they nowrecognized her or not, they knew the weight of battery carried by theheavy American frigates. The question under discussion by them, beforethe "United States" wore, was whether it was best to steer direct uponthe approaching enemy, or to keep farther away for a time, in order tomaintain the windward position. By the first lieutenant's testimonybefore the Court, this was in his opinion the decisive moment, victoryor defeat hinging upon the resolution taken. He favored attempting tocross the enemy's bows, which was possible if the "United States"should continue to stand as she at the moment was--on the port tack;but in any event to close with the least delay possible. The masterappears to have preferred to close by going under the enemy's stern, and hauling up to leeward; but Captain Carden, impressed both with theadvantage of the weather gage and the danger of approaching exposed toa raking fire, thought better to haul nearer the wind, on the tack hewas already on, the starboard, but without bracing the yards, whichwere not sharp. His aim was to pass the "United States" at a distance, wear--turn round from the wind, toward her--when clear of herbroadside, and so come up from astern without being raked. Theinterested reader may compare this method with that pursued by Hull, who steered down by zigzag courses. The Court Martial censuredCarden's decision, which was clearly wrong, for the power of heavyguns over lighter, of the American 24's over the British 18's, wasgreatest at a distance; therefore, to close rapidly, taking thechances of being raked--if not avoidable by yawing--was the smallerrisk. Moreover, wearing behind the "United States, " and then pursuing, gave her the opportunity which she used, to fire and keep away again, prolonging still farther the period of slow approach which Cardenfirst chose. 

 [Illustration: PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MACEDONIAN]

The "United States" wearing, while this conversation was in progress, precipitated Carden's action. He interpreted the manoeuvre asindicating a wish to get to windward, which the "Macedonian's" thencourse, far off the wind, would favor. He therefore hurriedly gave theorder to haul up (2), cutting adrift the topmast studdingsail; acircumstance which to seamen will explain exactly the relativesituations. That he had rightly interpreted Decatur's purpose seemsprobable, for in fifteen or twenty minutes the "United States" againwore (_a_), resuming her original course, by the wind on the porttack, the "Macedonian" continuing on the starboard; the two nowrunning on lines nearly parallel, in opposite directions (_b b_). Asthey passed, at the distance of almost a mile, the American frigatedischarged her main-deck battery, her spar-deck carronades not rangingso far. The British ship did not reply, but shortly afterward wore(_c_), and, heading now in the same general direction as the "UnitedStates, " steered to come up on her port side. She thus reached aposition not directly behind her antagonist, but well to the left, apparently about half a mile away. So situated, if steering the samecourse, each ship could train its batteries on the opponent; but theincreased advantage at a distance was with the heavier guns, and whenthe "Macedonian, " to get near, headed more toward the "United States, "most of hers ceased to bear, while those of her enemy continued theirfire. A detailed description of the "United States's" manoeuvres byher own officers has not been transmitted; but in the searchinginvestigation made by Carden's Court Martial we have them probablywell preserved. The master of the British ship stated that when the"Macedonian" wore in chase, the "United States" first kept off beforethe wind, and then almost immediately came back to it as before (_c_), bringing it abeam, and immediately began firing. By thus increasingher lateral distance from the line of the enemy's approach, she wasable more certainly to train her guns on him. After about fifteenminutes of this, the "Macedonian" suffering severely, her foresail wasset to close (_e_), upon which the "United States, " hauling out thespanker and letting fly the jib-sheet, came up to the wind and backedher mizzen-topsail, in order not to move too fast from theadvantageous position she had, yet to keep way enough to command theship (_e_). 

Under these unhappy conditions the "Macedonian" reached within halfmusket-shot, which was scarcely the ideal close action of the day; butby that time she had lost her mizzen-topmast, mainyard, andmaintopsail, most of her standing rigging was shot away, the lowermasts badly wounded, and almost all her carronade battery, theprincipal reliance for close action, was disabled. She had also manykilled and wounded; while the only visible damage on board the "UnitedStates" was the loss of the mizzen-topgallant-mast, a circumstance ofabsolutely no moment at the time. In short, although she continued tofight manfully for a half-hour more, the "Macedonian, " when she gotalongside the "United States, " was already beaten beyond hope. At theend of the half-hour her fore and main topmasts fell, upon which the"United States" filled her mizzen-topsail and shot ahead, crossing thebows of the "Macedonian, "[522] and thus ending the fight. Surprise wasfelt on board the British vessel that a raking broadside was not atthis moment poured in, and it was even believed by some that theAmerican was now abandoning the contest. She was so, in the sense thatthe contest was over; a ship with all her spars standing, "in perfectcondition, " to use the expression of the enemy's first lieutenant, would be little less than brutal to use her power upon one reduced tolower masts, unless submission was refused. Upon her return an hourlater, the "Macedonian's" mizzenmast had gone overboard, and hercolors were hauled down as the "United States" drew near. 

 [Illustration: CAPTAIN STEPHEN DECATUR From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. ]

This action was fought by the "United States" with singular wariness, not to say caution. Her change to the starboard tack, when still somethree miles distant, seems to indicate a desire to get the weathergage, as the "Macedonian" was then steering free. It was sointerpreted on board the British vessel; but as Carden also at oncehauled up, it became apparent that he would not yield the advantage ofthe wind which he had, and which it was in his choice to keep, for the"United States" was a lumbering sailer. Decatur, unable to obtain theposition for attacking, at once wore again, and thenceforth played thegame of the defensive with a skill which his enemy's mistake seconded. By the movements of his ship the "Macedonian's" closing wasprotracted, and she was kept at the distance and bearing mostfavorable to the American guns. But when her foresail was set, the"United States, " by luffing rapidly to the wind--flowing the jib-sheetand hauling out the spanker to hasten this movement--and at the sametime backing the mizzen-topsail to steady her motions and position, was constituted a moving platform of guns, disposed in the very bestmanner to annihilate an opponent obliged to approach at a pretty broadangle. 

This account, summarized from the sworn testimony before the Britishcourt, is not irreconcilable with Decatur's remark, that the enemybeing to windward engaged at his own distance, to the greatness ofwhich was to be ascribed the unusual length of the action. Imbued withthe traditions of their navy, the actions of the "United States"puzzled the British extremely. Her first wearing was interpreted asrunning away, and her shooting ahead when the "Macedonian's" topmastsfell, crossing her bows without pouring a murderous broadside into abeaten ship, coupled with the previous impression of wariness, ledthem to think that the American was using the bad luck by which alonethey could have been beaten, in order to get away. Three cheers weregiven, as though victorious in repelling an attack. They had expected, so the testimony ran, to have her in an hour. [523] Judged by thisevidence, the handling of the "United States" was thoroughly skilful. Though he probably knew himself superior in force, Decatur's objectnecessarily should be to take his opponent at the least possibleinjury to his own ship. She was "on a cruise"; hence haste was noobject, while serious damage might cripple her further operations. Theresult was, by his official statement, that "the damage sustained wasnot such as to render return to port necessary; and I should havecontinued her cruise, had I not deemed it important that we should seeour prize in. "[524]

In general principle, the great French Admiral Tourville correctlysaid that the best victories are those which cost least in blood, timber, and iron; but, in the particular instance before us, Decatur'sconduct may rest its absolute professional justification on thetestimony of the master of the British ship and two of her threelieutenants. To the question whether closing more rapidly by the"Macedonian" would have changed the result, the first lieutenantreplied he thought there was a chance of success. The others differedfrom him in this, but agreed that their position would have been morefavorable, and the enemy have suffered more. [525] Carden himself hadno hesitation as to the need of getting near, but only as to themethod. To avoid this was therefore not only fitting, but the boundenduty of the American captain. His business was not merely to make abrilliant display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmostinjury to the opponent at the least harm to his ship and men. It wasthe more notable to find this trait in Decatur; for not, only had heshown headlong valor before, but when offered the new American"Guerrière" a year later, he declined, saying that she was overmatchedby a seventy-four, while no frigate could lie alongside of her. "Therewas no reputation to be made in this. "[526]

The "United States" and her prize, after repairing damages sufficientlyfor a winter arrival upon the American coast, started thither; the"United States" reaching New London December 4, the "Macedonian, " fromweather conditions, putting into Newport. Both soon afterward went toNew York by Long Island Sound. It is somewhat remarkable that no one ofWarren's rapidly increasing fleet should have been sighted by either. There was as yet no commercial blockade, and this, coupled with thenumbers of American vessels protected by licenses, and the fewness ofthe American ships of war, may have indisposed the admiral and hisofficers to watch very closely an inhospitable shore, at a seasonunpropitious to active operations. Besides, as appears from lettersalready quoted, the commander-in-chief's personal predilection was morefor the defensive than the offensive; to protect British trade bycruisers patrolling its routes, rather than by preventing egress fromthe hostile ports. 

FOOTNOTES:

[491] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 73. 

[492] Ibid. 

[493] Ibid. , pp. 138, 139. 

[494] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 139. 

[495] Writings of Madison (ed. 1865), vol. Ii. P. 545. 

[496] Niles' Register, vol. Iii. P. 220. 

[497] Annals of Congress, 1812-13, p. 301. 

[498] Castlereagh to the Admiralty, Aug. 6 and 12, 1812. BritishRecord Office MSS. Warren's Letter to the United States Government andMonroe's reply are in American State Papers, vol. Iii. Pp. 595, 596. 

[499] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS. 

[500] Niles' Register, vol. Ii. P. 101. 

[501] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 1593. 

[502] These data are summarized from Niles' Register, which throughoutthe war collected, and periodically published, lists of prizes. 

[503] A synopsis of the "Rossie's" log is given in Niles' Register, vol. Iii p. 158. 

[504] Gallatin, Dec. 8, 1812. American State Papers, Finance, vol. Ii. P. 594. 

[505] Jones, July 21, 1813. American State Papers, Finance, vol. Ii. P. 645. 

[506] In the memoir of Commodore Barney (p. 252), published by hisdaughter, it is said that, successful though the "Rossie's" cruise wasin its issue, he was dissatisfied with the course laid down for him byhis owners, who did not understand the usual tracks of Britishcommerce. 

[507] Account of the Private Armed Ship "America, " by B. B. Crowninshield. Essex Institute Historical Collections, vol. Xxxvii. 

[508] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 431. 

[509] Niles' Register, vol. Iii. P. 320. 

[510] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxviii. P. 257. 

[511] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. I. P. 992. 

[512] Warren to Croker, Dec. 28 and 29, 1812. Records Office MSS. 

[513] Croker to Warren, Jan. 9, Feb. 10, and March 20, 1813. RecordsOffice MSS. 

[514] American State Papers. Commerce and Navigation, vol. I. P. 1021. 

[515] American State Papers. Commerce and Navigation, vol. I. P. 718. 

[516] Captains' Letters. Navy Department, Oct. 3, 1812. 

[517] Captains' Letters, Navy Department, Dee. 31, 1812, and Jan. 2, 1813. 

[518] From the file of Captains' Letters, Jan. 1, 1813. Found in theAmerican licensed brig "Julia, " captured by United States frigate"Chesapeake, " Captain Samuel Evans. The vessel was condemned in theUnited States Courts. 

[519] Besides the obvious impropriety, the practice was expresslyforbidden by law. It was reprobated in strong terms by Justice JosephStory, of Massachusetts, of the Supreme Court of the United States, affirming the condemnation of the "Julia. " His judgment is given infull in Niles' Register, vol. Iv. Pp. 393-397. 

[520] Captain Jones' Report of this action can be found in Niles'Register, vol. Iii. P. 217; that of Captain Whinyates in NavalChronicle, vol. Xxix. P. 76. 

[521] Macedonian Court Martial. British Records Office MSS. 

[522] James states that this was in order to fill fresh cartridges, which is likely enough; but it is most improbable that the movementwas deferred till the last cartridge ready was exhausted--that thebattery could not have been fired when crossing the bows. 

[523] "Macedonian" Court Martial. 

[524] Decatur's Report. Niles' Register, vol. Iii. P. 253. 

[525] "Macedonian" Court Martial. 

[526] Captains' Letters, April 9, 1814. Navy Department MSS. 

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