THE

LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE

AMERICAN FORCES, DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY, AND

FIRST PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES. 

COMPILED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF

THE HONOURABLE BUSHROD WASHINGTON, FROM

_ORIGINAL PAPERS_

BEQUEATHED TO HIM BY HIS DECEASED RELATIVE, AND NOW IN POSSESSION OFTHE AUTHOR. 

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN INTRODUCTION, CONTAINING A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE COLONIES PLANTED BY THE ENGLISHON THE

CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA, FROM THEIR SETTLEMENT TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THAT WAR WHICH TERMINATEDIN THEIR

INDEPENDENCE. 

BY JOHN MARSHALL. 

VOL. II. 

THE CITIZENS' GUILDOF WASHINGTON'S BOYHOOD HOMEFREDERICKSBURG, VA. 

1926

Printed in the U. S. A. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. 

Birth of Mr. Washington.... His mission to the French on the Ohio.... Appointed Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment of regular troops.... Surprises Monsieur Jumonville.... Capitulation of fort Necessity.... Is appointed aid-de-camp to General Braddock.... Defeat and death ofthat general.... Is appointed to the command of a regiment.... Extremedistress of the frontiers, and exertions of Colonel Washington toaugment the regular forces of the colony.... Expedition against fortDu Quesne.... Defeat of Major Grant.... Fort Du Quesne evacuated bythe French, and taken possession of by the English.... Resignation ofColonel Washington.... His marriage. 

CHAPTER II. 

Colonel Washington appointed commander-in-chief of the Americanforces.... Arrives at Cambridge.... Strength and disposition of thetwo armies.... Deficiency of the Americans in arms and ammunitions.... Falmouth burnt.... Success of the American cruisers.... Distress ofthe British from the want of fresh provisions.... Measures to form acontinental army.... Difficulty of re-enlisting the troops.... Planfor attacking Boston.... General Lee detached to New York.... Possession taken of the heights of Dorchester.... Boston evacuated.... Correspondence respecting prisoners. 

CHAPTER III. 

Invasion of Canada meditated.... Siege of St. John's.... Capture offort Chamblée.... Carleton defeated at Longueisle.... St. John'scapitulated.... Montreal surrenders.... Arnold's expedition.... Hearrives before Quebec.... Retires to Point Aux Trembles.... Montgomerylays siege to Quebec.... Unsuccessful attack on that place.... Deathof Montgomery.... Blockade of Quebec.... General Thomas takes commandof the army.... The blockade raised.... General Sullivan takes thecommand.... Battle of the Three Rivers.... Canada evacuated.... General Carleton constructs a fleet.... Enters lake Champlain.... Defeats the American flotilla.... Takes possession of Crown Point.... Retires into winter quarters. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Transaction in Virginia.... Action at Great Bridge.... Norfolkevacuated.... Burnt.... Transactions in North Carolina.... Action atMoore's Creek Bridge.... Invasion of South Carolina.... British fleetrepulsed at Fort Moultrie.... Transactions in New York.... Measuresleading to Independence.... Independence declared. 

CHAPTER V. 

Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York.... Circular letterof Lord Howe.... State of the American Army.... The British land inforce on Long Island.... Battle of Brooklyn.... Evacuation of LongIsland.... Fruitless negotiations.... New York evacuated.... Skirmishon the heights of Haerlem.... Letter on the state of the army. 

CHAPTER VI. 

The British land at Frog's Neck.... The American army evacuates YorkIsland, except fort Washington.... Both armies move towards the WhitePlains.... Battle of the White Plains.... The British army returns toKingsbridge.... General Washington crosses the North river.... Thelines of fort Washington carried by the British, and the garrison madeprisoners.... Evacuation of fort Lee.... Weakness of the Americanarmy.... Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia.... GeneralWashington retreats through Jersey.... General Washington crosses theDelaware.... Danger of Philadelphia.... Capture of General Lee.... TheBritish go into winter quarters.... Battle of Trenton.... OfPrinceton.... Firmness of congress. 

CHAPTER VII. 

American army inoculated.... General Heath moves to Kingsbridge.... Returns to Peekskill.... Skirmishes.... State of the army.... Destruction of stores at Peekskill.... At Danbury.... Expedition toSagg Harbour.... Camp formed at Middlebrook.... Sir William Howe movesout to Somerset Court House.... Returns to Amboy.... Attempts to cutoff the retreat of the American army to Middlebrook.... LordCornwallis skirmishes with Lord Stirling.... General Prescottsurprised and taken.... The British army embarks. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

General Washington commences his march to the Delaware.... Takesmeasures for checking Burgoyne.... British army land at Elk River.... General Washington advances to Brandywine.... Retreat of Maxwell.... Defeat at Brandywine.... Slight skirmish near the White Horse, andretreat to French Creek.... General Wayne surprised.... General Howetakes possession of Philadelphia.... Removal of Congress to Lancaster. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Measures to cut off the communication between the British army andfleet.... Battle of Germantown.... Measures to intercept supplies toPhiladelphia.... Attack on fort Mifflin.... On Red Bank.... TheAugusta blows up.... Fort Mifflin evacuated.... Fort Mercerevacuated.... The British open the communication with their fleet.... Washington urged to attack Philadelphia.... General Howe marches outto Chestnut Hill.... Returns to Philadelphia.... General Washingtongoes into winter quarters. 

CHAPTER X. 

Inquiry into the conduct of General Schuyler.... Burgoyne appearsbefore Ticonderoga.... Evacuation of that place, ... OfSkeensborough.... Colonel Warner defeated.... Evacuation of fortAnne.... Proclamation of Burgoyne.... Counter-proclamation ofSchuyler.... Burgoyne approaches fort Edward.... Schuyler retires toSaratoga, ... To Stillwater.... St. Leger invests fort Schuyler.... Herkimer defeated.... Colonel Baum detached to Bennington.... Isdefeated.... Brechman defeated.... St. Leger abandons the siege offort Schuyler.... Murder of Miss M'Crea.... General Gates takescommand.... Burgoyne encamps on the heights of Saratoga.... Battle ofStillwater.... Burgoyne retreats to Saratoga.... Capitulates.... TheBritish take forts Montgomery and Clinton.... The forts Independenceand Constitution evacuated by the Americans.... Ticonderoga evacuatedby the British. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Defects in the Commissary departments.... Distress of the army atValley Forge.... The army subsisted by impressments.... Combination incongress against General Washington.... Correspondence between him andGeneral Gates.... Distress of the army for clothes.... Washington'sexertions to augment the army.... Congress sends a committee tocamp.... Attempt to surprise Captain Lee.... Congress determines on asecond expedition to Canada.... Abandons it.... General Conwayresigns.... The Baron Steuben appointed Inspector General.... Congressforbids the embarkation of Burgoyne's army.... Plan of reconciliationagreed to in Parliament.... Communicated to congress and rejected.... Information of treaties between France and the United States.... Complaints of the treatment of prisoners.... A partial exchange agreedto. 

THE LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON

CHAPTER I. 

 Birth of Mr. Washington.... His mission to the French on the Ohio.... Appointed Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment of regular troops.... Surprises Monsieur Jumonville.... Capitulation of fort Necessity.... Is appointed aid-de-camp to General Braddock.... Defeat and death of that general.... Is appointed to the command of a regiment.... Extreme distress of the frontiers, and exertions of Colonel Washington to augment the regular forces of the colony.... Expedition against fort Du Quesne.... Defeat of Major Grant.... Fort Du Quesne evacuated by the French, and taken possession of by the English.... Resignation of Colonel Washington.... His marriage. 

{1732}

[Sidenote: Birth of Mr. Washington. ]

George Washington, the third son of Augustine Washington, was born onthe 22d of February, 1732, near the banks of the Potowmac, in thecounty of Westmoreland, in Virginia. His father first married MissButler, who died in 1728; leaving two sons, Lawrence and Augustine. In1730, he intermarried with Miss Mary Ball, by whom he had four sons, George, John, Samuel and Charles; and one daughter, Betty, whointermarried with Colonel Fielding Lewis, of Fredericksburg. 

His great grandfather, John Washington, a gentleman of a respectablefamily, had emigrated from the north of England about the year 1657, and settled on the place where Mr. Washington was born. 

At the age of ten years he lost his father. Deprived of one parent, hebecame an object of more assiduous attention to the other; whocontinued to impress those principles of religion and virtue on histender mind, which constituted the solid basis of a character that wasmaintained through all the trying vicissitudes of an eventful life. But his education was limited to those subjects, in which alone thesons of gentlemen, of moderate fortune, were, at that time, generallyinstructed. It was confined to acquisitions strictly useful, not evenextending to foreign languages. 

In 1743, his eldest brother intermarried with the daughter of theHonourable George William Fairfax, then a member of the council; andthis connexion introduced Mr. Washington to Lord Fairfax, theproprietor of the Northern Neck of Virginia, who offered him, when inhis eighteenth year, an appointment as surveyor, in the western partof that territory. His patrimonial estate being inconsiderable, thisappointment was readily accepted; and in the performance of itsduties, he acquired that information respecting vacant lands, andformed those opinions concerning their future value, which afterwardscontributed greatly to the increase of his private fortune. 

{1750}

Those powerful attractions which the profession of arms presents toyoung and ardent minds, possessed their full influence over Mr. Washington. Stimulated by the enthusiasm of military genius, to takepart in the war in which Great Britain was then engaged, he hadpressed so earnestly to enter into the navy, that, at the age offifteen, a midshipman's warrant was obtained for him. The interferenceof a timid and affectionate mother deferred the commencement, andchanged the direction of his military career. Four years afterwards, at a time when the militia were to be trained for actual service, hewas appointed one of the Adjutants General of Virginia, with the rankof Major. The duties annexed to this office soon yielded to others ofa more interesting character. 

France was beginning to develop the vast plan of connecting herextensive dominions in America, by uniting Canada with Louisiana. Thetroops of that nation had taken possession of a tract of countryclaimed by Virginia, and had commenced a line of posts, to be extendedfrom the Lakes to the Ohio. The attention of Mr. Dinwiddie, LieutenantGovernor of that Province, was attracted to these supposedencroachments; and he deemed it his duty to demand, in the name of theKing his master, that they should be suspended. 

{1753}

This mission was toilsome and hazardous. The Envoy would be under thenecessity of passing through an extensive and almost unexploredwilderness, intersected with rugged mountains and considerable rivers, and inhabited by fierce savages, who were either hostile to theEnglish, or of doubtful attachment. While the dangers and fatigues ofthis service deterred others from undertaking it, they seem to havepossessed attractions for Mr. Washington, and he engaged in it withalacrity. 

{October 31. }

[Sidenote: His mission to the French on the Ohio. ]

On receiving his commission, he left Williamsburg and arrived, on the14th of November, at Wills' creek, then the extreme frontiersettlement of the English, where guides were engaged to conduct himover the Alleghany mountains. After surmounting the impedimentsoccasioned by the snow and high waters, he reached the mouth of Turtlecreek, where he was informed that the French General was dead, andthat the greater part of the army had retired into winter quarters. Pursuing his route, he examined the country through which he passedwith a military eye, and selected the confluence of the Monongahelaand Alleghany rivers, the place where fort Du Quesne was afterwardserected by the French, as an advantageous position, which it would beadviseable to seize and to fortify immediately. 

{1754}

{January 16}

After employing a few days among the Indians in that neighbourhood, and procuring some of their chiefs to accompany him, whose fidelity hetook the most judicious means to secure, he ascended the Alleghanyriver. Passing one fort at the mouth of French creek, he proceeded upthe stream to a second, where he was received by Monsieur Le Gardeurde St. Pierre, the commanding officer on the Ohio, to whom hedelivered the letter of Mr. Dinwiddie, and from whom he received ananswer with which he returned to Williamsburg. The exertions made byMr. Washington on this occasion, the perseverance with which hesurmounted the difficulties of the journey, and the judgment displayedin his conduct towards the Indians, raised him in the public opinion, as well as in that of the Lieutenant Governor. His journal, [1] drawnup for the inspection of Mr. Dinwiddie, was published, and impressedhis countrymen with very favourable sentiments of his understandingand fortitude. 

 [Footnote 1: See note No. I. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: Appointed lieutenant colonel of a regiment of regulartroops. ]

[Sidenote: Surprises Monsieur Jumonville. ]

As the answer from the commandant of the French forces on the Ohioindicated no disposition to withdraw from that country, it was deemednecessary to make some preparations to maintain the right assertedover it by the British crown; and the assembly of Virginia authorizedthe executive to raise a regiment for that purpose, to consist ofthree hundred men. The command of this regiment was given to Mr. Fry, [2] and Major Washington was appointed Lieutenant Colonel. Anxiousto be engaged in active service, he obtained permission, about thebeginning of April, to advance with two companies to the Great Meadowsin the Alleghany mountains. By this movement he hoped to cover thatfrontier, to make himself more perfectly acquainted with the country, to gain some information respecting the situation and designs of theFrench, and to preserve the friendship of the savages. Soon after hisarrival at that place, he was visited by some friendly Indians, whoinformed him that the French, having dispersed a party of workmenemployed by the Ohio company to erect a fort on the south-easternbranch of the Ohio, were themselves engaged in completing afortification at the confluence of the Alleghany and Monongahelarivers: a detachment from which place was then on its march towardshis camp. Open hostilities had not yet commenced; but the country wasconsidered as invaded: and several circumstances were related, confirming the opinion that this party was approaching with hostileviews. Among others, it had withdrawn itself some distance from thepath, and had encamped for the night in a bottom, as if to ensureconcealment. Entertaining no doubt of the unfriendly designs withwhich these troops were advancing, Lieutenant Colonel Washingtonresolved to anticipate them. Availing himself of the offer made by theIndians to serve him as guides, he proceeded through a dark and rainynight to the French encampment, which he completely surrounded. Atday-break, his troops fired and rushed upon the party, whichimmediately surrendered. One man only escaped capture, and M. Jumonville alone, the commanding officer, was killed. 

 [Footnote 2: With an unaffected modesty which the accumulated honours of his after life could never impair, Major Washington, though the most distinguished military man then in Virginia, declined being a candidate for the command of this regiment. The following letter written on the occasion to Colonel Richard Corbin, a member of the council, with whom his family was connected by the ties of friendship and of affinity, was placed in the hands of the author by Mr. Francis Corbin, a son of that gentleman. 

 "DEAR SIR, --In a conversation at Green Spring you gave me some room to hope for a commission above that of a Major, and to be ranked among the chief officers of this expedition. The command of the whole forces is what I neither look for, expect, or desire; for I must be impartial enough to confess, it is a charge too great for my youth and inexperience to be intrusted with. Knowing this, I have too sincere a love for my country, to undertake that which may tend to the prejudice of it. But if I could entertain hopes that you thought me worthy of the post of Lieutenant-colonel, and would favour me so far as to mention it at the appointment of officers, I could not but entertain a true sense of the kindness. 

 "I flatter myself that under a skilful commander, or man of sense, (which I most sincerely wish to serve under, ) with my own application and diligent study of my duty, I shall be able to conduct my steps without censure, and in time, render myself worthy of the promotion that I shall be favoured with now. "

 The commission he solicited was transmitted to him by Mr. Corbin, in the following laconic letter:

 "DEAR GEORGE, --I inclose you your commission. God prosper you with it. 

 "Your friend, RICHARD CORBIN. "]

While the regiment was on its march to join the detachment advanced infront, the command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Washington by thedeath of Colonel Fry. Soon after its arrival, it was reinforced by twoindependent companies of regulars. After erecting a small stockade atthe Great Meadows, Colonel Washington commenced his march towards fortDu Quesne, with the intention of dislodging the French from thatplace. He had proceeded about thirteen miles, when he was met by somefriendly Indians, who informed him that the French and their savageallies, "as numerous as the pigeons in the woods, " were advancingrapidly to meet him. Among those who brought this information was atrusty chief, only two days from the fort on the Ohio, who hadobserved the arrival of a considerable reinforcement at that place, and had heard their intention of marching immediately to attack theEnglish, with a corps composed of eight hundred French and fourhundred Indians. This intelligence was corroborated by informationpreviously received from deserters, who had reported that areinforcement was expected. 

The troops commanded by Colonel Washington were almost destitute ofprovisions; and the ground he occupied was not adapted to militarypurposes. A road at some distance, leading through other defiles inthe mountains, would enable the French to pass into his rear, intercept his supplies, and starve him into a surrender, or fight himwith a superiority of three to one. 

{June 23. }

In this hazardous situation, a council of war unanimously advised aretreat to the fort at the Great Meadows, now termed fort Necessity;where the two roads united, and where the face of the country was suchas not to permit an enemy to pass unperceived. At that place, it wasintended to remain, until reinforcements of men, and supplies ofprovisions, should arrive. 

{July 2. }

{Third. }

[Sidenote: Capitulation of fort Necessity. ]

{Fourth. }

In pursuance of this advice, Colonel Washington returned to fortNecessity, and began a ditch around the stockade. Before it wascompleted, the French, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, commanded by Monsieur de Villier, appeared before the fort, andimmediately commenced a furious attack upon it. They were receivedwith great intrepidity by the Americans, who fought partly within thestockade, and partly in the surrounding ditch, which was nearly filledwith mud and water. Colonel Washington continued the whole day on theoutside of the fort, encouraging the soldiers by his countenance andexample. The assailants fought under cover of the trees and highgrass, with which the country abounds. The engagement was continuedwith great resolution from ten in the morning until dark; whenMonsieur de Villier demanded a parley, and offered terms ofcapitulation. The proposals first made were rejected; but, in thecourse of the night, articles were signed, by which the fort wassurrendered, on condition that its garrison should be allowed thehonours of war--should be permitted to retain their arms and baggage, and be suffered to march without molestation into the inhabited partsof Virginia. The capitulation being in French--a language notunderstood by any person in the garrison, and being drawn up hastilyin the night, contains an expression which was inaccurately translatedat the time, and of which advantage has been since taken, by theenemies of Mr. Washington, to imply an admission on his part, thatMonsieur Jumonville was assassinated. An account of the transactionwas published by Monsieur de Villier, which drew from ColonelWashington a letter to a friend, completely disproving the calumny. Though entirely discredited at the time, it was revived at asubsequent period, when circumstances, well understood at the date ofthe transaction, were supposed to be forgotten. [3]

 [Footnote 3: See note No. II. At the end of the volume. ]

The loss of the Americans in this affair is not ascertained. From areturn made on the 9th of July, at Wills' Creek, it appears that thekilled and wounded, of the Virginia regiment, amounted to fifty-eight;but the loss sustained by the two independent companies is not stated. That of the assailants was supposed to be more considerable. 

Great credit was given to Colonel Washington by his countrymen, forthe courage displayed on this occasion. The legislature evinced itssatisfaction with the conduct of the whole party, by passing a vote ofthanks[4] to him, and the officers under his command; and by givingthree hundred pistoles, to be distributed among the soldiers engagedin the action. 

 [Footnote 4: To the vote of thanks, the officers made the following reply:

 "We, the officers of the Virginia regiment, are highly sensible of the particular mark of distinction with which you have honoured us, in returning your thanks for our behaviour in the late action; and can not help testifying our grateful acknowledgments, for your '_high sense_' of what we shall always esteem a duty to our country and the best of kings. 

 "Favoured with your regard, we shall zealously endeavour to deserve your applause, and, by our future actions, strive to convince the worshipful house of burgesses, how much we esteem their approbation, and, as it ought to be, regard it as the voice of our country. 

 "Signed for the whole corps, "GEO: WASHINGTON. "]

The regiment returned to Winchester, to be recruited; soon after whichit was joined by a few companies from North Carolina and Maryland. Onthe arrival of this reinforcement, the Lieutenant Governor, with theadvice of council, regardless of the condition or number of theforces, ordered them immediately to march over the Alleghanymountains, and to expel the French from fort Du Quesne, or to buildone in its vicinity. 

{August. }

{September. }

The little army in Virginia, which was placed under the command ofColonel Innes, from North Carolina, did not, as now reinforced, exceedhalf the number of the enemy, and was neither provided with the meansof moving, nor with supplies for a winter campaign. With as littleconsideration, directions had been given for the immediate completionof the regiment, without furnishing a single shilling for therecruiting service. Although a long peace may account for many errorsat the commencement of war, some surprise will be felt at suchill-considered and ill-judged measures. Colonel Washingtonremonstrated strongly against these orders, but prepared to executethem. The assembly, however, having risen without making any provisionfor the farther prosecution of the war, this wild expedition was laidaside, and the Virginia regiment was reduced to independent companies. 

In the course of the winter, orders were received "for settling therank of the officers of his majesty's forces when serving with theprovincials in North America. " These orders directed "that allofficers commissioned by the King, or by his General in North America, should take rank of all officers commissioned by the Governors of therespective provinces; and farther, that the general and field officersof the provincial troops should have no rank when serving with thegeneral and field officers commissioned by the crown; but that allcaptains, and other inferior officers of the royal troops, should takerank over provincial officers of the same grade, having seniorcommissions. "

Strong as was his attachment to a military life, Colonel Washingtonpossessed in too eminent a degree the proud and punctilious feelingsof a soldier, to submit to a degradation so humiliating as wasproduced by his loss of rank. Professing his unabated inclination tocontinue in the service, if permitted to do so without a sacrifice toogreat to be made, he retired indignantly from the station assignedhim, and answered the various letters which he received, pressing himstill to hold his commission, with assurances that he would serve withpleasure, when he should be enabled to do so without dishonour. 

His eldest brother had lately died, and left him a considerable estateon the Potowmac. This gentleman had served in the expedition againstCarthagena; and, in compliment to the admiral who commanded the fleetengaged in that enterprise, had named his seat _Mount Vernon_! To thisdelightful spot Colonel Washington withdrew, resolving to devote hisfuture attention to the avocations of private life. This resolutionwas not long maintained. 

{1755}

{March. }

General Braddock, being informed of his merit, his knowledge of thecountry which was to be the theatre of action, and his motives forretiring from the service, gratified his desire to make one campaignunder a person supposed to possess some knowledge of war, by invitinghim to enter his family as a volunteer aid-de-camp. 

[Sidenote: Is appointed aid-de-camp to General Braddock. ]

{April. }

{June. }

Having determined to accept this invitation, he joined thecommander-in-chief, immediately after his departure from Alexandria, and proceeded with him to Wills' Creek. The army, consisting of twoEuropean regiments and a few corps of provincials, was detained atthat place until the 12th of June, by the difficulty of procuringwagons, horses, and provisions. Colonel Washington, impatient underthese delays, suggested the propriety of using pack-horses instead ofwagons, for conveying the baggage. The commander-in-chief, althoughsolicitous to hasten the expedition, was so attached to the usages ofregular war, that this salutary advice was at first rejected; but, soon after the commencement of the march, its propriety became tooobvious to be longer neglected. 

{Fifteenth. }

On the third day after the army had moved from its ground, ColonelWashington was seized with a violent fever, which disabled him fromriding on horseback, and was conveyed in a covered wagon. GeneralBraddock, who found the difficulties of the march greater than hadbeen expected, continuing to consult him privately, he strenuouslyurged that officer to leave his heavy artillery and baggage with therear division of the army; and with a chosen body of troops and somepieces of light artillery, to press forward with the utmost expeditionto fort Du Quesne. In support of this advice, he stated that theFrench were then weak on the Ohio, but hourly expected reinforcements. During the excessive drought which prevailed at that time, these couldnot arrive; because the river Le Boeuf, on which their supplies mustbe brought to Venango, did not then afford a sufficient quantity ofwater for the purpose. A rapid movement therefore might enable him tocarry the fort, before the arrival of the expected aid; but if thismeasure should not be adopted, such were the delays attendant on themarch of the whole army, that rains sufficient to raise the watersmight reasonably be expected, and the whole force of the French wouldprobably be collected for their reception; a circumstance which wouldrender the success of the expedition doubtful. 

This advice according well with the temper of the commander-in-chief, it was determined in a council of war, held at the Little Meadows, that twelve hundred select men, to be commanded by General Braddock inperson, should advance with the utmost expedition against fort DuQuesne. Colonel Dunbar was to remain with the residue of the tworegiments, and all the heavy baggage. 

{June 19. }

Although this select corps commenced its march with only thirtycarriages, including ammunition wagons, the hopes which had beenentertained of the celerity of its movements were not fulfilled. "Ifound, " said Colonel Washington, in a letter to his brother, writtenduring the march, "that instead of pushing on with vigour, withoutregarding a little rough road, they were halting to level everymole-hill, and to erect bridges over every brook. " By these means theyemployed four days in reaching the great crossings of the Yohiogany, only nineteen miles from the Little Meadows. 

Colonel Washington was obliged to stop at that place;--the physicianhaving declared that his life would be endangered by continuing withthe army. He obeyed, with reluctance, the positive orders of thegeneral to remain at this camp, under the protection of a small guard, until the arrival of Colonel Dunbar; having first received a promisethat means should be used to bring him up with the army before itreached fort Du Quesne. 

{July 8. }

The day before the action of the Monongahela he rejoined the generalin a covered wagon; and, though weak, entered on the duties of hisstation. 

In a short time after the action had commenced, Colonel Washington wasthe only aid remaining alive, and unwounded. The whole duty ofcarrying the orders of the commander-in-chief, in an engagement withmarksmen who selected officers, and especially those on horseback, fortheir objects, devolved on him alone. Under these difficultcircumstances, he manifested that coolness, that self-possession, thatfearlessness of danger which ever distinguished him, and which are sonecessary to the character of a consummate soldier. Two horses werekilled under him, and four balls passed through his coat; but, to theastonishment of all, he escaped unhurt, --while every other officer onhorseback was either killed or wounded. "I expected every moment, "says an eye-witness, [5] "to see him fall. His duty and situationexposed him to every danger. Nothing but the superintending care ofProvidence could have saved him from the fate of all around him. "

 [Footnote 5: Dr. Craik. ]

[Sidenote: Defeat and death of that general. ]

{August. }

At length, after an action of nearly three hours, General Braddock, under whom three horses had been killed, received a mortal wound; andhis troops fled in great disorder. Every effort to rally them wasineffectual until they had crossed the Monongahela, when, being nolonger pursued, they were again formed. The general was brought off ina small tumbril by Colonel Washington, Captain Stewart of the guards, and his servant. The defeated detachment retreated with the utmostprecipitation to the rear division of the army; soon after which, Braddock expired. In the first moments of alarm, all the stores weredestroyed, except those necessary for immediate use; and not longafterwards, Colonel Dunbar marched the remaining European troops toPhiladelphia, in order to place them in, what he termed, winterquarters. 

Colonel Washington was greatly disappointed and disgusted by theconduct of the regular troops in this action. In his letter toLieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, giving an account of it, he said, "Theywere struck with such an inconceivable panic, that nothing butconfusion and disobedience of orders prevailed among them. Theofficers in general behaved with incomparable bravery, for which theygreatly suffered; there being upwards of sixty killed and wounded--alarge proportion out of what we had. 

"The Virginia companies behaved like men, and died like soldiers; for, I believe, out of three companies on the ground that day, scarcethirty men were left alive. Captain Peronny, and all his officers downto a corporal, were killed. Captain Poulson had almost as hard a fate, for only one of his escaped. In short, the dastardly behaviour of theregular troops (so called, ) exposed those who were inclined to dotheir duty, to almost certain death; and, at length, in spite of everyeffort to the contrary, they broke, and ran as sheep before hounds;leaving the artillery, ammunition, provisions, baggage, and in shortevery thing, a prey to the enemy; and when we endeavoured to rallythem, in hopes of regaining the ground, and what we had left upon it, it was with as little success as if we had attempted to have stoppedthe wild bears of the mountains, or the rivulets with our feet: forthey would break by, in spite of every effort to prevent it. "[6]

 [Footnote 6: In another letter, he says, "We have been beaten, shamefully beaten--shamefully beaten by a handful of men, who only intended to molest and disturb our march! Victory was their smallest expectation! But see the wondrous works of Providence, the uncertainty of human things! We, but a few moments before, believed our numbers almost equal to the force of Canada; they only expected to annoy us. Yet, contrary to all expectation and human probability, and even to the common course of things, we were totally defeated, and have sustained the loss of every thing. "]

[Illustration: Wakefield--the Birthplace of George Washington

_This is from an etching made in idealization of the original house, situated on the banks of the Potomac, 38 miles from Fredericksburg, inWestmoreland County, Virginia, where our First President was born, February 22, 1732. The original house, which was built by Washington'sfather, Augustine, was destroyed by fire more than 150 years ago, before the Declaration of Independence was signed. _]

{August. }

[Sidenote: Is appointed to the command of a regiment. ]

Colonel Washington had long been the favourite soldier of Virginia;and his reputation grew with every occasion for exertion. His conductin this battle had been universally extolled;[7] and the commonopinion of his countrymen was, that, had his advice been pursued, thedisaster had been avoided. The assembly was in session, whenintelligence was received of this defeat, and of the abandonment ofthe colony by Colonel Dunbar. The legislature, perceiving thenecessity of levying troops for the defence of the province, determined to raise a regiment, to consist of sixteen companies, thecommand of which was offered to Colonel Washington; who was alsodesignated, in his commission, as the Commander-in-chief of all theforces raised and to be raised in the colony of Virginia. The uncommonprivilege of naming his Field Officers was added to this honourablemanifestation of the public confidence. 

 [Footnote 7: In a sermon preached not long after the defeat of General Braddock, the Rev. Mr. Davies, speaking of that disaster, and of the preservation of Colonel Washington, said: "I can not but hope that Providence has preserved that youth to be the saviour of this country. " These words were afterwards considered as prophetic; and were applied by his countrymen to an event very opposite to that which was contemplated by the person who uttered them. ]

Retaining still his prepossessions in favour of a military life, hecheerfully embraced this opportunity of re-entering the army. Aftermaking the necessary arrangements for the recruiting service, andvisiting the posts on the frontiers, which he placed in the best stateof defence of which they were susceptible; he set out for the seat ofgovernment, where objects of the first importance required hisattention; but was overtaken below Fredericksburg by an express, carrying the intelligence, that a large number of French and Indians, divided into several parties, had broken up the frontier settlements;were murdering and capturing men, women, and children; burning theirhouses, and destroying their crops. The troops stationed among themfor their protection, were unequal to that duty; and, instead of beingable to afford aid to the inhabitants, were themselves blocked up intheir forts. 

[Sidenote: Extreme distress of the frontiers and exertions of ColonelWashington to augment the regular forces of the colony. ]

Colonel Washington hastened back to Winchester, where the utmostconfusion and alarm prevailed. His efforts to raise the militia wereunavailing. Attentive only to individual security, and regardless ofthe common danger, they could not be drawn from their families. Instead of assembling in arms, and obtaining safety by meeting theirinvaders, the inhabitants fled into the lower country, and increasedthe general terror. In this state of things, he endeavoured to collectand arm the men who had abandoned their houses, and to remove theirwives and children to a distance from this scene of desolation andcarnage. Pressing orders were at the same time despatched to the newlyappointed officers, to forward their recruits; and to the countylieutenants, east of the Blue Ridge, to hasten their militia toWinchester: but before these orders could be executed, the party whichhad done so much mischief, and excited such alarm, had recrossed theAlleghany mountains. 

{1756}

{April. }

Early in the following spring, the enemy made another irruption intothe inhabited country, and did great mischief. The number of troops onthe regular establishment was totally insufficient for the protectionof the frontier, and effective service from the militia was found tobe unattainable. The Indians, who were divided into small parties, concealed themselves with so much dexterity, as seldom to be perceiveduntil the blow was struck. Their murders were frequently committed inthe very neighbourhood of the forts; and the detachments from thegarrisons, employed in scouring the country, were generally eluded, orattacked to advantage. In one of these skirmishes, the Americans wererouted, and Captain Mercer was killed. The people either abandoned thecountry, or attempted to secure themselves in small stockade forts, where they were in great distress for provisions, arms, andammunition; were often surrounded, and sometimes cut off. ColonelWashington was deeply affected by this state of things. "I see theirsituation, " said he, in a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, "I knowtheir danger, and participate their sufferings, without having it inmy power to give them farther relief than uncertain promises. Inshort, I see inevitable destruction in so clear a light, that unlessvigorous measures are taken by the assembly, and speedy assistancesent from below, the poor inhabitants now in forts must unavoidablyfall, while the remainder are flying before the barbarous foe. Infine, the melancholy situation of the people; the little prospect ofassistance; the gross and scandalous abuses cast upon the officers ingeneral, which is reflecting upon me in particular for sufferingmisconduct of such extraordinary kind; and the distant prospect, ifany, of gaining reputation in the service, cause me to lament the hourthat gave me a commission, and would induce me, at any other time thanthis of imminent danger, to resign, without one hesitating moment, acommand from which I never expect to reap either honour or benefit;but, on the contrary, have almost an absolute certainty of incurringdispleasure below, while the murder of helpless families may be laidto my account here. "

Colonel Washington had been prevented from taking post at fortCumberland by an unfortunate and extraordinary difficulty, growing outof an obscurity in the royal orders, respecting the relative rank ofofficers commissioned by the king, and those commissioned by thegovernor. A Captain Dagworthy, who was at that place, and of theformer description, insisted on taking the command, although it hadbeen committed to Lieutenant Colonel Stevens; and, on the sameprinciple, he contested the rank of Colonel Washington also. Thiscircumstance had retained that officer at Winchester, where publicstores to a considerable amount were deposited, with only about fiftymen to guard them. In the deep distress of the moment, a council ofwar was called, to determine whether he should march this small bodyto some of the nearest forts, and, uniting with their petty garrisons, risk an action; or wait until the militia could be raised. The councilunanimously advised a continuance at Winchester. Lord Fairfax, whocommanded the militia of that and the adjacent counties, had orderedthem to his assistance; but they were slow in assembling. Theunremitting exertion of three days, in the county of Frederick, couldproduce only twenty men. 

The incompetency of the military force to the defence of the countryhaving become obvious, the assembly determined to augment the regimentto fifteen hundred men. In a letter addressed to the house ofburgesses, Colonel Washington urged the necessity of increasing itstill farther, to two thousand men; a less number than which could notpossibly, in his opinion, be sufficient to cover the extensivefrontier of Virginia, should the defensive system be continued. Insupport of this demand, he stated, in detail, the forts which must begarrisoned; and observed, that, with the exception of a fewinhabitants in forts on the south branch of the Potowmac, the northmountain near Winchester had become the frontier; and that, withouteffectual aid, the inhabitants would even pass the Blue Ridge. Hefarther observed that the woods seemed "alive with French andIndians;" and again described so feelingly the situation of theinhabitants, that the assembly requested the governor to order halfthe militia of the adjoining counties to their relief; and theattorney general, Mr. Peyton Randolph, formed a company of one hundredgentlemen, who engaged to make the campaign, as volunteers. Ten welltrained woodsmen, or Indians, would have rendered more service. 

The distress of the country increased. As had been foreseen, Winchester became almost the only settlement west of the Blue Ridge, on the northern frontier; and fears were entertained that the enemywould soon pass even that barrier, and ravage the country below. Express after express was sent to hasten the militia, but sent invain. At length, about the last of April, the French and their savageallies, laden with plunder, prisoners, and scalps, returned to fort DuQuesne. 

Some short time after their retreat, the militia appeared. Thistemporary increase of strength was employed in searching the countryfor small parties of Indians, who lingered behind the main body, andin making dispositions to repel another invasion. A fort was commencedat Winchester, which, in honour of the general who had been appointedto the command of the British troops in America, was called fortLoudoun; and the perpetual remonstrances of Colonel Washington atlength effected some improvement in the laws for the government of thetroops. 

Instead of adopting, in the first instance, that military code whichexperience had matured, the assembly passed occasional acts to remedyparticular evils as they occurred; in consequence of which, a state ofinsubordination was protracted, and the difficulties of the commandingofficer increased. Slight penalties were at first annexed to seriousmilitary offences; and when an act was obtained to punish mutiny anddesertion with death, such crimes as cowardice in action, and sleepingon a post, were pretermitted. It was left impossible to hold a generalcourt martial, without an order from the governor; and the commandingofficer was not at liberty to make those arrangements in otherrespects which his own observation suggested, but shackled by thecontrol of others, who could neither judge so correctly, nor be sowell informed, as himself. 

These errors of a government unused to war, though continuallyremarked by the officer commanding the troops, were slowly perceivedby those in power, and were never entirely corrected. 

Successive incursions continued to be made into the country by smallpredatory parties of French and Indians, who kept up a perpetualalarm, and murdered the defenceless, wherever found. In Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were driven as far as Carlisle; and in Maryland, Fredericktown, on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, became afrontier. With the Virginia regiment, which did not yet amount to onethousand men, aided occasionally by militia, Colonel Washington was todefend a frontier of near four hundred miles in extent, and tocomplete a chain of forts. He repeatedly urged the necessity andpropriety of abandoning fort Cumberland, which was too far in advanceof the settlements, and too far north, to be useful, while it requiredfor its defence a larger portion of his force than could be sparedwith a proper regard to the safety of other and more advantageouspositions. The governor, however, thought the abandonment of itimproper, since it was a "_king's fort_;" and Lord Loudoun, on beingconsulted, gave the same opinion. 

Among the subjects of extreme chagrin to the commander of the Virginiatroops, was the practice of desertion. The prevalence of this crimewas ascribed, in a considerable degree, to the ill-judged parsimony ofthe assembly. The daily pay of a soldier was only eight pence, out ofwhich two pence were stopped for his clothes. This pay was inferior towhat was received in every other part of the continent; and, as oughtto have been foreseen, great discontents were excited by a distinctionso invidious. The remonstrances of the commanding officer, in somedegree, corrected this mischief; and a full suit of regimentals wasallowed to each soldier, without deducting its price from his pay. 

This campaign furnishes no event which can interest the reader; yetthe duties of the officer, though minute, were arduous; and thesufferings of the people, beyond measure afflicting. It adds one tothe many proofs which have been afforded, of the miseries to beexpected by those who defer preparing the means of defence, until themoment when they ought to be used; and then, rely almost entirely, ona force neither adequate to the danger, nor of equal continuance. 

It is an interesting fact to those who know the present situation ofVirginia, that, so late as the year 1756, the Blue Ridge was thenorthwestern frontier; and that she found immense difficulty incompleting a single regiment to protect the inhabitants from thehorrors of the scalping knife, and the still greater horrors of beingled into captivity by savages who added terrors to death by the mannerof inflicting it. 

As soon as the main body of the enemy had withdrawn from thesettlements, a tour was made by Colonel Washington to thesouth-western frontier. There, as well as to the north, continuedincursions had been made; and there too, the principal defence of thecountry was entrusted to an ill-regulated militia. The fatalconsequences of this system are thus stated by him, in a letter to thelieutenant governor: "The inhabitants are so sensible of their danger, if left to the protection of these people, that not a man will stay athis place. This I have from their own mouths, and the principalinhabitants of Augusta county. The militia are under such bad orderand discipline, that they will come and go, when and where theyplease, without regarding time, their officers, or the safety of theinhabitants, but consulting solely their own inclinations. Thereshould be, according to your honour's orders, one-third of the militiaof these parts on duty at a time; instead of that, scarceone-thirtieth is out. They are to be relieved every month, and theyare a great part of that time marching to and from their stations; andthey will not wait one day longer than the limited time, whetherrelieved or not, however urgent the necessity for their continuancemay be. " Some instances of this, and of gross misbehaviour, were thenenumerated; after which, he pressed the necessity of increasing thenumber of regulars to two thousand men. 

After returning from this tour, to Winchester, he gave the LieutenantGovernor, in curious detail, a statement of the situation in which hefound the country, urging, but urging in vain, arguments which willalways be suggested by experience, against relying chiefly on militiafor defence. 

Sensible of the impracticability of defending such an extensivefrontier, Colonel Washington continued to press the policy of enablinghim to act on the offensive. The people of Virginia, he thought, couldbe protected only by entering the country of the enemy; giving himemployment at home, and removing the source of all their calamities bytaking possession of fort Du Quesne. 

"As defensive measures, " he observed in a letter to the LieutenantGovernor, "are evidently insufficient for the security and safety ofthe country, I hope no arguments are necessary to evince the necessityof altering them to a vigorous offensive war, in order to remove thecause. " But in the event, that the assembly should still indulge theirfavourite scheme of protecting the inhabitants by forts along thefrontiers, he presented a plan, which, in its execution, would requiretwo thousand men--these were to be distributed in twenty-two forts, extending from the river Mayo to the Potowmac, in a line of threehundred and sixty miles. In a letter written about the same time tothe speaker of the assembly, he said, "The certainty of advantage, byan offensive scheme of action, renders it, beyond any doubt, preferable to our defensive measures. Our scattered force, soseparated and dispersed in weak parties, avails little to stop thesecret incursions of the savages. We can only perhaps put them toflight, or frighten them to some other part of the country, whichanswers not the end proposed. Whereas, had we strength enough toinvade their lands, we should restrain them from coming abroad, andleaving their families exposed. We should then remove the principalcause, and have stronger probability of success; we should be freefrom the many alarms, mischiefs, and murders, that now attend us; weshould inspirit the hearts of our few Indian friends, and gain moreesteem with them. In short, could Pennsylvania and Maryland be inducedto join us in an expedition of this nature, and to petition hisExcellency Lord Loudoun for a small train of artillery, with someengineers, we should then be able, in all human probability, to subduethe terror of fort Du Quesne; retrieve our character with the Indians;and restore peace to our unhappy frontiers. "

His total inability to act offensively, or even to afford protectionto the frontiers of Virginia, was not the only distressing andvexatious circumstance to which he was exposed. The LieutenantGovernor, to whose commands he was subjected in every minuteparticular, and who seems to have been unequal to the difficulties ofhis station, frequently deranged his system by orders which could notbe executed without considerable hazard and inconvenience. ColonelWashington could not always restrain his chagrin on such occasions;and, on one of them, observed in a letter to an intimate friend, whopossessed great influence in the country, "whence it arises, or why, Iam truly ignorant, but my strongest representations of mattersrelative to the peace of the frontiers are disregarded, as idle andfrivolous; my propositions and measures, as partial and selfish; andall my sincerest endeavours for the service of my country, pervertedto the worst purposes. My orders are dark, doubtful, and uncertain:to-day approved, tomorrow condemned; left to act and proceed athazard; accountable for the consequences, and blamed without thebenefit of defence. If you can think my situation capable of excitingthe smallest degree of envy, or of affording the least satisfaction, the truth is yet hid from you, and you entertain notions verydifferent from the reality of the case. However, I am determined tobear up under all these embarrassments some time longer, in the hopeof better regulations under Lord Loudoun, to whom I look for thefuture fate of Virginia. "

Not long after this letter was written, Lord Loudoun, in whose personthe offices of Governor and Commander-in-chief were united, arrived inVirginia. A comprehensive statement of the situation of the colony, ina military point of view, and of the regiment in particular, was drawnup and submitted to him by Colonel Washington. In this he enumeratedthe errors which had prevented the completion of his regiment, showedthe insufficiency of the militia for any military purpose, anddemonstrated the superiority of an offensive system over that whichhad been pursued. 

{1757}

This statement was probably presented by Colonel Washington in person, who was permitted, during the winter, to visit Lord Loudoun inPhiladelphia, where that nobleman met the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, and the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, in order to consult with them on the measures to be taken, in theirrespective Provinces, for the ensuing campaign. He was, however, disappointed in his favourite hope of being able to act offensivelyagainst the French on the Ohio. Lord Loudoun had determined to directall his efforts against Canada, and to leave only twelve hundred menin the middle and southern colonies. Instead of receiving assistance, Virginia was required to send four hundred men to South Carolina. Notdiscouraged by these disappointments, Colonel Washington continuedindefatigable in his endeavours to impress on Mr. Dinwiddie, and onthe assembly, the importance of reviving, and properly modifying theirmilitary code, which had now expired, of making a more effectivemilitia law, and of increasing their number of regular troops. 

{May. }

So far from succeeding on the last subject, he had the mortificationto witness a measure which crushed his hopes of an adequate regularforce. Being unable to complete the regiment by voluntary enlistment, the assembly changed its organization, and reduced it to tencompanies; each to consist of one hundred men. Yet his anxious wishescontinued to be directed towards fort Du Quesne. In a letter writtenabout this time to Colonel Stanwix, who commanded in the middlecolonies, he said, "You will excuse me, sir, for saying, that I thinkthere never was, and perhaps never again will be, so favourable anopportunity as the present for reducing fort Du Quesne. Severalprisoners have made their escape from the Ohio this spring, and agreein their accounts, that there are but three hundred men left in thegarrison; and I do not conceive that the French are so strong inCanada, as to reinforce this place, and defend themselves at home thiscampaign: surely then this is too precious an opportunity to be lost. "

But Mr. Pitt did not yet direct the councils of Britain; and a spiritof enterprise and heroism did not yet animate her generals. Thecampaign to the north was inglorious; and to the west, nothing waseven attempted, which might relieve the middle colonies. 

{October 8. }

Large bodies of savages, in the service of France, once more spreaddesolation and murder over the whole country, west of the Blue Ridge. The regular troops were inadequate to the protection of theinhabitants; and the incompetency of the defensive system to theirsecurity became every day more apparent. "I exert every means, " saidColonel Washington, in a letter to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, "toprotect a much distressed country; but it is a task too arduous. Tothink of defending a frontier of more than three hundred and fiftymiles extent, as ours is, with only seven hundred men, is vain andidle; especially when that frontier lies more contiguous to the enemythan any other. 

"I am, and for a long time have been, fully convinced, that if wecontinue to pursue a defensive plan, the country must be inevitablylost. "

{October 24. }

In another letter he said, "The raising a company of rangers, oraugmenting our strength in some other manner, is so far necessary, that, without it, the remaining inhabitants of this once fertile andpopulous valley will scarcely be detained at their dwellings until thespring. And if there is no expedition to the westward then, nor aforce more considerable than Virginia can support, posted on ourfrontiers; if we still adhere, for the next campaign, to ourdestructive defensive schemes, there will not, I dare affirm, be onesoul living on this side the Blue Ridge the ensuing autumn, if weexcept the troops in garrison, and a few inhabitants of this town, whomay shelter themselves under the protection of this fort. This I knowto be the immoveable determination of all the settlers of thiscountry. " To the Speaker of the assembly he gave the same opinion; andadded, "I do not know on whom these miserable undone people are torely for protection. If the assembly are to give it to them, it istime that measures were at least concerting, and not when they oughtto be going into execution, as has always been the case. If they areto seek it from the Commander-in-chief, it is time their condition wasmade known to him. For I can not forbear repeating again, that, whilewe pursue defensive measures, we pursue inevitable ruin. "

{August 27. }

It was impossible for Colonel Washington, zealous in the service ofhis country, and ambitious of military fame, to observe the errorscommitted in the conduct of the war, without censuring them. Theseerrors were not confined to the military affairs of the colony. TheCherokee and Catawba Indians had hitherto remained faithful to theEnglish, and it was very desirable to engage the warriors of thosetribes heartily in their service; but so miserably was the intercoursewith them conducted, that, though a considerable expense was incurred, not much assistance was obtained, and great disgust was excited amongthem. The freedom with which the Commander-in-chief of the Virginiaforces censured public measures, gave offence to the LieutenantGovernor, who considered these censures as manifesting a want ofrespect for himself. Sometimes he coarsely termed them _impertinent_;and at other times, charged him with looseness in his information, andinattention to his duty. On one of these occasions, Colonel Washingtonthus concluded a letter of detail, "Nothing remarkable has happened, and therefore I have nothing to add. I must beg leave, however, beforeI conclude, to observe, in justification of my own conduct, that it iswith pleasure I receive reproof when reproof is due, because no personcan be readier to accuse me, than I am to acknowledge an error, when Ihave committed it; nor more desirous of atoning for a crime, when I amsensible of being guilty of one. But, on the other hand, it is withconcern I remark, that my best endeavours lose their reward; and thatmy conduct, although I have uniformly studied to make it asunexceptionable as I could, does not appear to you in a favourablepoint of light. Otherwise, your honour would not have accused me of_loose_ behaviour, and _remissness_ of duty, in matters where, Ithink, I have rather exceeded than fallen short of it. This, I think, is evidently the case in speaking of Indian affairs at all, afterbeing instructed in very express terms, '_Not to have any concernwith, or management of Indian affairs_. ' This has induced me toforbear mentioning the Indians in my letters to your honour of late, and to leave the misunderstanding, which you speak of, between Mr. Aikin and them, to be related by him. "

Not long after this, he received a letter informing him of some coarsecalumny, reflecting on his veracity and honour, which had beenreported to the Lieutenant Governor. He enclosed a copy of this letterto Mr. Dinwiddie, and thus addressed him, --"I should take itinfinitely kind if your honour would please to inform me whether areport of this nature was ever made to you; and, in that case, who wasthe author of it. 

"It is evident from a variety of circumstances, and especially fromthe change in your honour's conduct towards me, that some person, aswell inclined to detract, but better skilled in the art of detractionthan the author of the above stupid scandal, has made free with mycharacter. For I can not suppose, that malice so absurd, so barefaced, so diametrically opposite to truth, to common policy, and, in short, to everything but villany, as the above is, could impress you with soill an opinion of my honour and honesty. 

"If it be possible that ----, for my belief is staggered, not beingconscious of having given the least cause to any one, much less tothat gentleman, to reflect so grossly; I say, if it be possible that---- could descend so low as to be the propagator of this story, hemust either be vastly ignorant of the state of affairs in this country_at that time_, or else, he must suppose that the whole body of theinhabitants had combined with me in executing the deceitful fraud. Orwhy did they, almost to a man, forsake their dwellings in the greatestterror and confusion; and while one half of them sought shelter inpaltry forts, (of their own building, ) the other should flee to theadjacent counties for refuge; numbers of them even to Carolina, fromwhence they have never returned?

"These are facts well known; but not better known than that thesewretched people, while they lay pent up in forts, destitute of thecommon supports of life, (having in their precipitate flightforgotten, or rather, been unable to secure any kind of necessaries, )did despatch messengers of their own, (thinking I had not representedtheir miseries in the piteous manner they deserved, ) with addresses toyour honour and the assembly, praying relief. And did I ever send anyalarming account, without sending also the original papers (or thecopies) which gave rise to it?

"That I have foibles, and perhaps many of them, I shall not deny. Ishould esteem myself, as the world also would, vain and empty, were Ito arrogate perfection. 

"Knowledge in military matters is to be acquired only by practice andexperience; and if I have erred, great allowance should be made forwant of them; unless my errors should appear to be wilful; and then, Iconceive, it would be more generous to charge me with my faults, andto let me stand or fall according to evidence, than to stigmatize mebehind my back. 

"It is uncertain in what light my services may have appeared to yourHonour: but this I know, and it is the highest consolation I amcapable of feeling, that no man that ever was employed in a publiccapacity, has endeavoured to discharge the trust reposed in him withgreater honesty, and more zeal for the country's interest than I havedone; and if there is any person living, who can say with justice thatI have offered any intentional wrong to the public, I will cheerfullysubmit to the most ignominious punishment that an injured people oughtto inflict. On the other hand, it is hard to have my characterarraigned, and my actions condemned, without a hearing. 

"I must therefore again beg in _more plain_, and in very _earnest_terms, to know if ---- has taken the liberty of representing my conductto your Honour with such ungentlemanly freedom as the letter implies. Your condescension herein will be acknowledged a singular favour. "

In a letter, some short time after this, to the Lieutenant Governor, he said, "I do not know that I ever gave your Honour cause to suspectme of ingratitude; a crime I detest, and would most carefully avoid. If an open, disinterested behaviour carries offence, I may haveoffended; for I have all along laid it down as a maxim, to representfacts freely and impartially, but not more so to others than to you, sir. If instances of my ungrateful behaviour had been particularized, I would have answered them. But I have been long convinced that myactions and their motives have been maliciously aggravated. " A requestthat he might be permitted to come to Williamsburg for the settlementof some accounts, which he was desirous of adjusting under theinspection of the Lieutenant Governor, who proposed to leave theprovince in the following November, was refused in abrupt anddisobliging terms. In answer to the letter containing the refusal, Colonel Washington, after stating the immoveable disposition of theinhabitants to leave the country unless more sufficiently protected, added, "To give a more succinct account of their affairs than I couldin writing, was the principal, among many other reasons, that inducedme to ask leave to come down. It was not to enjoy a party of pleasurethat I asked leave of absence. I have indulged with few of those, winter or summer. "

Mr. Dinwiddie soon afterwards took leave of Virginia, and thegovernment devolved on Mr. Blair, the President of the Council. Between him and the commander of the colonial troops the utmostcordiality existed. 

[Sidenote: General Forbes undertakes the expedition against Fort DuQuesne. ]

After the close of this campaign, Lord Loudoun returned to England, and General Abercrombie succeeded to the command of the army. Thedepartment of the middle and southern provinces was committed toGeneral Forbes, who, to the inexpressible gratification of ColonelWashington, determined to undertake an expedition against fort DuQuesne. 

{1758}

He urged an early campaign, but he urged it ineffectually; and, beforethe troops were assembled, a large body of French and Indians brokeinto the country, and renewed the horrors of the tomahawk andscalping-knife. The county of Augusta was ravaged and about sixtypersons were murdered. The attempts made to intercept these savageswere unsuccessful; and they recrossed the Alleghany, with theirplunder, prisoners, and scalps. 

{May 24. }

At length, orders were given to assemble the regiment at Winchester, and be in readiness to march in fifteen days. On receiving them, Colonel Washington called in his recruiting parties; but soinattentive had the government been to his representations that, previous to marching his regiment, he was under the necessity ofrepairing to Williamsburg, personally to enforce his solicitations forarms, ammunition, money, and clothing. That these preparations for anexpedition vitally interesting to Virginia, should remain to be madeafter the season for action had commenced, does not furnish strongerevidence of the difficulties encountered by the chief of the militarydepartment, than is given by another circumstance of about the samedate. He was under the necessity of pointing out and urging thepropriety of allowing to his regiment, which had performed much severeservice, the same pay which had been granted to a second regiment, voted the preceding session of Assembly, to serve for a single year. 

Among other motives for an early campaign, Colonel Washington hadurged the impracticability of detaining the Indians. His fears werewell founded. Before a junction of the troops had been made, thesesavages became impatient to return to their homes; and, finding thatthe expedition would yet be delayed a considerable time, they left thearmy, with promises to rejoin it at the proper season. 

{June 24. }

In pursuance of the orders which had been received, the Virginiatroops moved in detachments from Winchester to fort Cumberland, wherethey assembled early in July: after which, they were employed inopening a road to Raystown, where Colonel Bouquet was stationed. Asthe English were continually harassed by small parties of French andIndians, the general had contemplated advancing a strong detachmentover the Alleghany mountains, for the purpose of giving thememployment at home. By the advice of Colonel Washington this plan wasrelinquished. In support of his opinion, he stated the probabilitythat a large force was collected at fort Du Quesne, and theimpracticability of moving a strong detachment, without such aquantity of provisions, as would expose it to the danger of beingdiscovered and cut to pieces. He advised to harass them with smallparties, principally of Indians; and this advice was pursued. 

{July. }

Colonel Washington had expected that the army would march byBraddock's road: but, late in July, he had the mortification toreceive a letter from Colonel Bouquet, asking an interview with him, in order to consult on opening a new road from Raystown, andrequesting his opinion on that route. "I shall, " says he, in answer tothis letter, "most cheerfully work on any road, pursue any route, orenter upon any service, that the general or yourself may think meusefully employed in, or qualified for; and shall never have a will ofmy own, when a duty is required of me. But since you desire me tospeak my sentiments freely, permit me to observe, that, after havingconversed with all the guides, and having been informed by othersacquainted with the country, I am convinced that a road, to becompared with General Braddock's, or indeed that will be fit fortransportation even by pack-horses, can not be made. I own I have nopredilection for the route you have in contemplation for me. "

A few days after writing this letter, he had an interview with ColonelBouquet, whom he found decided in favour of opening the new road. After their separation, Colonel Washington, with his permission, addressed to him a letter to be laid before General Forbes, thenindisposed at Carlisle, in which he stated his reasons against thismeasure. He concluded his arguments against the new road: argumentswhich appear to be unanswerable, by declaring his fears that, shouldthe attempt be made, they would be able to do nothing more thanfortify some post on the other side of the Alleghany, and prepare foranother campaign. This he prayed Heaven to avert. 

He was equally opposed to a scheme which had been suggested ofmarching by the two different routes, and recommended an order ofmarch by Braddock's road, which would bring the whole army before fortDu Quesne in thirty-four days, with a supply of provisions foreighty-six days. 

{August 2. }

In a letter of the same date addressed to Major Halket, aid of GeneralForbes, Colonel Washington thus expressed his forebodings of themischiefs to be apprehended from the adoption of the proposed route. "I am just returned from a conference held with Colonel Bouquet. Ifind him fixed--I think I may say unalterably fixed--to lead you a newway to the Ohio, through a road, every inch of which is to be cut atthis advanced season, when we have scarcely time left to tread thebeaten track, universally confessed to be the best passage through themountains. 

"If Colonel Bouquet succeeds in this point with the general, all islost! all is lost indeed! our enterprise is ruined! and we shall bestopped at the Laurel hill this winter; but not to gather laurels, except of the kind which cover the mountains. The southern Indianswill turn against us, and these colonies will be desolated by such anaccession to the enemy's strength. These must be the consequences of amiscarriage; and a miscarriage, the almost necessary consequence of anattempt to march the army by this route. "

Colonel Washington's remonstrances and arguments were unavailing; andthe new route was adopted. His extreme chagrin at this measure, and atthe delays resulting from it, was expressed in anxious letters to Mr. Fauquier, then governor of Virginia, and to the speaker of the houseof burgesses. 

{September 2. }

In a letter to the speaker, written while at fort Cumberland, he said:"We are still encamped here; very sickly, and dispirited at theprospect before us. That appearance of glory which we once had inview--that hope--that laudable ambition of serving our country, andmeriting its applause, are now no more: all is dwindled into ease, sloth, and fatal inactivity. In a word, all is lost, if the ways ofmen in power, like certain ways of Providence, are not inscrutable. But we who view the actions of great men at a distance can only formconjectures agreeably to a limited perception; and, being ignorant ofthe comprehensive schemes which may be in contemplation, might mistakeegregiously in judging of things from appearances, or by the lump. Yetevery f--l will have his notions--will prattle and talk away; and whymay not I? We seem then, in my opinion, to act under the guidance ofan evil genius. The conduct of our leaders, if not actuated bysuperior orders, is tempered with something--I do not care to give aname to. Nothing now but a miracle can bring this campaign to a happyissue. " He then recapitulated the arguments he had urged againstattempting a new road, and added, "But I spoke unavailingly. The roadwas immediately begun; and since then, from one to two thousand menhave constantly wrought on it. By the last accounts I have received, they had cut it to the foot of the Laurel hill, about thirty-fivemiles; and I suppose, by this time, fifteen hundred men have takenpost about ten miles further, at a placed called Loyal Hanna, whereour next fort is to be constructed. 

"We have certain intelligence that the French strength at fort DuQuesne did not exceed eight hundred men, the thirteenth ultimo;including about three or four hundred Indians. See how our time hasbeen misspent--behold how the golden opportunity is lost--perhaps, never to be regained! How is it to be accounted for? Can GeneralForbes have orders for this?--Impossible. Will then our injuredcountry pass by such abuses? I hope not. Rather let a fullrepresentation of the matter go to his majesty; let him know howgrossly his glory and interests, and the public money have beenprostituted. "

{September 22. }

[Sidenote: Defeat of Major Grant. ]

Colonel Washington was soon afterwards ordered to Raystown. MajorGrant had been previously detached from the advanced post at LoyalHanna, with a select corps of eight hundred men, to reconnoitre thecountry about fort Du Quesne. In the night he reached a hill near thefort, and sent forward a party for the purpose of discovery. Theyburnt a log house, and returned. Next morning, Major Grant detachedMajor Lewis, of Colonel Washington's regiment, with a baggage guard, two miles into his rear; and sent an engineer, with a covering party, within full view of the fort, to take a plan of the works. In the meantime he ordered the _reveillée_ to be beaten in different places. Anaction soon commenced, on which Major Lewis, leaving Captain Bullett, with about fifty Virginians to guard the baggage, advanced with theutmost celerity to support Major Grant. The English were defeated withconsiderable loss; and both Major Grant and Major Lewis were takenprisoners. In this action, the Virginians evidenced the spirit withwhich they had been trained. Out of eight officers, five were killed, a sixth wounded, and a seventh taken prisoner. Captain Bullett, whodefended the baggage with great resolution, and contributed to savethe remnant of the detachment, was the only officer who escapedunhurt. Of one hundred and sixty-two men, sixty-two were killed on thespot, and two wounded. This conduct reflected high honour on thecommanding officer of the regiment as well as on the troops; and hereceived, on the occasion, the compliments of the general. The totalloss was two hundred and seventy-three killed, and forty-two wounded. 

{October 8. }

It was at length determined that the main body of the army should movefrom Raystown; and the general called on the colonels of regiments, tosubmit severally to his consideration, a plan for his march. Thatproposed by Colonel Washington has been preserved, and appears to havebeen judiciously formed. 

They reached the camp at Loyal Hanna, through a road indescribablybad, about the fifth of November; where, as had been predicted, acouncil of war determined that it was unadviseable to proceed fartherthis campaign. It would have been almost impossible to winter an armyin that position. They must have retreated from the cold inhospitablewilderness into which they had penetrated, or have suffered immensely;perhaps have perished. Fortunately, some prisoners were taken, whoinformed them of the extreme distress of the fort. Deriving no supportfrom Canada, the garrison was weak; in great want of provisions; andhad been deserted by the Indians. These encouraging circumstanceschanged the resolution which had been taken, and determined thegeneral to prosecute the expedition. 

[Sidenote: Fort Du Quesne evacuated by the French, and takenpossession of by the English. ]

{November 25. }

Colonel Washington was advanced in front; and, with immense labour, opened a way for the main body of the army. The troops moved forwardwith slow and painful steps until they reached fort Du Quesne, ofwhich they took peaceable possession; the garrison having on thepreceding night, after evacuating and setting it on fire, proceededdown the Ohio in boats. 

To other causes than the vigour of the officer who conducted thisenterprise, the capture of this important place is to be ascribed. Thenaval armaments of Britain had intercepted the reinforcements designedby France for her colonies; and the pressure on Canada was such as todisable the governor of that province from detaching troops to fort DuQuesne. Without the aid of these causes, the extraordinary andunaccountable delays of the campaign must have defeated its object. 

The works were repaired, and the new fort received the name of thegreat minister, who, with unparalleled vigour and talents, thengoverned the nation. 

After furnishing two hundred men from his regiment as a garrison forfort Pitt, Colonel Washington marched back to Winchester; whence hesoon afterwards proceeded to Williamsburg, to take his seat in theGeneral Assembly, of which he had been elected a member by the countyof Frederick, while at fort Cumberland. 

A cessation of Indian hostility being the consequence of expelling theFrench from the Ohio, Virginia was relieved from the dangers withwhich she had been threatened; and the object for which alone he hadcontinued in the service, after perceiving that he should not beplaced on the permanent establishment, was accomplished. His healthwas much impaired, and his domestic affairs required his attention. 

[Sidenote: Resignation and marriage of Colonel Washington. ]

Impelled by these and other motives of a private nature, he determinedto withdraw from a service, which he might now quit without dishonour;and, about the close of the year, resigned his commission, as colonelof the first Virginia regiment, and commander-in-chief of all thetroops raised in the colony. 

[Illustration: The Washington Family Burial Ground

_Wakefield, Westmoreland County, Virginia_

_Here rest the mortal remains of George Washington'sgreat-grandfather, Colonel John Washington, who came to Virginia in1658 and was buried here in 1677; of his grandfather, LawrenceWashington, buried in 1697; of his grandmother, Jane (Butler), in1729; of his father, Augustine Washington, in 1743; and other membersof the Washington family. _]

The officers whom he had commanded were greatly attached to him. Theymanifested their esteem and their regret at parting, by a veryaffectionate address, [8] expressive of the high opinion theyentertained both of his military and private character. 

 [Footnote 8: See note No. III. At the end of the volume. ]

This opinion was not confined to the officers of his regiment. It wascommon to Virginia; and had been adopted by the British officers withwhom he served. The duties he performed, though not splendid, werearduous; and were executed with zeal, and with judgment. The exactdiscipline he established in his regiment, when the temper of Virginiawas extremely hostile to discipline, does credit to his militarycharacter, and the gallantry the troops displayed, whenever calledinto action, manifests the spirit infused into them by theircommander. 

The difficulties of his situation, while unable to cover the frontierfrom the French and Indians, who were spreading death and desolationin every quarter, were incalculably great; and no better evidence ofhis exertions, under these distressing circumstances, can be given, than the undiminished confidence still placed in him, by those whom hewas unable to protect. 

The efforts to which he incessantly stimulated his country for thepurpose of obtaining possession of the Ohio; the system for theconduct of the war which he continually recommended; the vigorous andactive measures always urged upon those by whom he was commanded;manifest an ardent and enterprising mind, tempered by judgment, andquickly improved by experience. 

Not long after his resignation, he was married to Mrs. Custis; a younglady to whom he had been for some time attached; and who, to a largefortune and fine person, added those amiable accomplishments whichensure domestic happiness, and fill, with silent but unceasingfelicity, the quiet scenes of private life. 

CHAPTER II. 

 Colonel Washington appointed commander-in-chief of the American forces.... Arrives at Cambridge.... Strength and disposition of the two armies.... Deficiency of the Americans in arms and ammunition.... Distress of the British from the want of fresh provisions.... Falmouth burnt.... Success of the American cruisers.... Measures to form a continental army.... Difficulty of re-enlisting the troops.... Plan for attacking Boston.... General Lee detached to New York.... Possession taken of the heights of Dorchester.... Boston evacuated.... Correspondence respecting prisoners. 

{1775}

The attention of Colonel Washington, for several years after hismarriage, was principally directed to the management of his estate. Hecontinued a most respectable member of the legislature of his country, in which he took an early and a decided part against the claims ofsupremacy asserted by the British Parliament. As hostilitiesapproached, he was chosen by the independent companies, formed throughthe northern parts of Virginia, to command them; and was elected amember of the first congress which met at Philadelphia. Theillustrious patriots who composed it, soon distinguished him as thesoldier of America, and placed him on all those committees whose dutyit was to make arrangements for defence. When it became necessary toappoint a commander-in-chief, his military character, the solidity ofhis judgment, the steady firmness of his temper, the dignity of hisperson and deportment, the confidence inspired by his patriotism andintegrity, and the independence of his fortune, combined to designatehim, in the opinion of all, for that important station. Local jealousywas suppressed, not only by the enthusiasm of the moment, but by thatpolicy which induced the sagacious delegation from New England, toprefer a commander-in-chief from the south. 

[Sidenote: Colonel Washington appointed Commander-in-chief of theAmerican forces. ]

On the 14th of June, he was unanimously chosen "General, andCommander-in-chief of the armies of the United Colonies, and all theforces now raised, or to be raised by them. "[9]

 [Footnote 9: See note No. IV. At the end of the volume. ]

{June 15. }

On the succeeding day, when the President communicated thisappointment to him, he expressed his high sense of the honourconferred upon him, and his firm determination to exert every power hepossessed in the service of his country and of her "glorious cause. "At the same time he acknowledged the distress he felt from aconsciousness that his abilities and military experience might not beequal to the extensive and important trust. 

He declined all compensation for his services; and avowed an intentionto keep an exact account of his expenses, which he should rely onCongress to discharge. 

A special commission was directed, and a resolution unanimouslypassed, declaring that "Congress would maintain, assist, and adhere tohim, as the General and Commander-in-chief of the forces raised, or tobe raised, for the maintenance and preservation of American liberty, with their lives and fortunes. "

He prepared, without delay, to enter upon the arduous duties of hisoffice; and, remaining only a few days in New York, where severalimportant arrangements were to be made, proceeded to the head quartersof the American army. 

[Sidenote: Arrives at Cambridge. ]

As all orders of men concurred in approving his appointment, allconcurred in expressing their satisfaction at that event, and theirdetermination to afford him entire support. A committee of theCongress of Massachusetts waited to receive him at Springfield, on theconfines of the colony, and to escort him to the army. On his arrival, an address was presented to him by the House of Representatives, breathing the most cordial affection, and testifying the most exaltedrespect. His answer[10] was well calculated to keep up impressionsessential to the success of that arduous contest into which the UnitedColonies had entered. 

 [Footnote 10: It is in the following terms:

 "Gentlemen, --Your kind congratulations on my appointment and arrival, demand my warmest acknowledgments, and will be ever retained in grateful remembrance. In exchanging the enjoyments of domestic life for the duties of my present honourable but arduous situation, I only emulate the virtue and public spirit of the whole Province of Massachusetts, which, with a firmness and patriotism without example, has sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in support of the rights of mankind, and the welfare of our common country. My highest ambition is to be the happy instrument of vindicating these rights, and to see this devoted Province again restored to peace, liberty, and safety. 

 "GEO: WASHINGTON. "]

{July 3. }

[Sidenote: Strength and disposition of the two armies. ]

The first moments after his arrival in camp were employed inreconnoitring the enemy, and examining the strength and situation ofthe American troops. 

The main body of the British army, under the immediate command ofGeneral Howe, was entrenching itself strongly on Bunker's hill. Threefloating batteries lay in Mystic river, near the camp, and a twentygun ship below the ferry, between Boston and Charlestown. A strongbattery on the Boston side of the water, on Cop's or Cope's hill, served to cover and strengthen the post on Bunker's hill. Anotherdivision was deeply entrenched on Roxbury neck. The light horse, andan inconsiderable body of infantry, were stationed in Boston. 

The American army lay on both sides of Charles river. The rightoccupied the high grounds about Roxbury; whence it extended towardsDorchester; and the left was covered by Mystic or Medford river, aspace of at least twelve miles. These extensive lines could not becontracted without opening to the British general a communication withthe country. 

For the purpose of a more distinct arrangement, the army was throwninto three grand divisions. That part of it which lay about Roxburyconstituted the right wing, and was commanded by Major General Ward;the troops near Mystic or Medford river formed the left, which wasplaced under Major General Lee. The centre, including the reserve, wasunder the immediate command of General Washington, whose head quarterswere at Cambridge. 

The army consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men; but severalcircumstances combined to render this force less effective than itsnumbers would indicate. 

[Sidenote: Deficiency of the Americans in arms and ammunition. ]

So long had the hope of avoiding open hostilities been indulged, thatthe time for making preparations to meet them had passed awayunemployed, and the neglect could not be remedied. On GeneralWashington's arrival in camp, he had ordered a return of theammunition to be made; and the report stated three hundred and threebarrels of powder to be in store. A few days after this return, thealarming discovery was made, that the actual quantity was not morethan sufficient to furnish each man with nine cartridges. This mistakehad been produced by a misapprehension of the committee of supplies, (for the magazines were not yet in possession of military officers, )who, instead of returning the existing quantity, reported the wholewhich had been originally furnished by the Province. Though the utmostexertions were made, this critical state of things continued about afortnight, when a small supply of powder was received fromElizabethtown, in New Jersey. [11] The utmost address was used toconceal from the enemy this alarming deficiency; but when it isrecollected, in how many various directions, and to what variousbodies, application for assistance was unavoidably made, it willappear scarcely possible that those efforts at concealment could havebeen completely successful. It is more probable that thecommunications which must have been made to the British general werediscredited; and that he could not permit himself to believe, that anarmy without bayonets would be hardy enough to maintain the positionoccupied by the Provincials, if destitute of ammunition. 

 [Footnote 11: A circumstance attending this transaction, will furnish some idea of the difficulties encountered by those who then conducted the affairs of America. All-important to the general safety as was the speedy replenishment of the magazines of that army which lay encamped in front of the enemy, the committee of Elizabethtown was under the necessity of transmitting this powder secretly, lest the people of the neighbourhood should seize and detain it for their own security. ]

The troops were also in such need of tents, as to be placed inbarracks, instead of being encamped in the open field; and were almostdestitute of clothing. They had, too, been raised by the colonialgovernments; each of which organized its quota on differentprinciples. From this cause resulted not only a want of uniformity, but other defects which were much more important. In Massachusetts, the soldiers had chosen their platoon officers, and generally livedwith them as equals. This unmilitary practice was the certain index ofthat general insubordination which pervaded every department. Thedifficulty of establishing principles of order and obedience, alwaysconsiderable among raw troops, was increased by the short terms forwhich enlistments had been made. The quotas of some of the colonieswould be entitled to a discharge in November; and none were engaged tocontinue in service longer than the last of December. The early ordersevidence a state of things still more loose and unmilitary than was tobe inferred from the circumstances under which the war had beencommenced. 

An additional inconvenience, derived from this mixed agency of localgovernments with that of the Union, was thus stated by GeneralWashington in a letter addressed to congress:--"I should be extremelydeficient in gratitude as well as justice, if I did not take the firstopportunity to acknowledge the readiness and attention which thecongress and different committees have shown to make every thing asconvenient and agreeable as possible; but there is a vital andinherent principle of delay, incompatible with military service, intransacting business through such various and different channels. [12]I esteem it my duty, therefore, to represent the inconvenience thatmust unavoidably ensue from a dependence on a number of persons forsupplies; and submit it to the consideration of congress, whether thepublic service will not be best promoted by appointing a CommissaryGeneral for the purpose. "[13]

 [Footnote 12: The General was under the necessity of carrying on a direct correspondence, not only with the several colonial governments, but with the committees of all the important towns and some inferior places. ]

 [Footnote 13: It is strange that an army should have been formed without such an officer. ]

Every military operation was also seriously affected by the total wantof engineers, and the deficiency of working tools. 

To increase difficulties already so considerable, the appointment ofgeneral officers, made by congress, gave extensive dissatisfaction, and determined several of those who thought themselves injured, toretire from the service. 

These disadvantages deducted essentially from the capacity of theAmerican force: but under them all, the General observed with pleasure"the materials for a good army. " These were "a great number of men, able bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionablecourage. " Possessed of these materials, he employed himselfindefatigably in their organization. The army was arranged intodivisions and brigades; and congress was urged to the appointment of aPaymaster, Quarter-master General, and such other general staff as areindispensable in the structure of a regular military establishment. 

The two armies continued to work on their respective fortifications, without seriously molesting each other. Slight skirmishes occasionallytook place, in which little execution was done; and, although theAmericans made some advances, no attempt was made to dislodge them. 

{September. }

The Commander-in-chief submitted with reluctance to this state ofapparent inactivity. He felt the importance of destroying the army inBoston, before it should be strengthened by reinforcements in theensuing spring; and with a view to this object, frequentlyreconnoitred its situation, and was assiduous in collecting everyinformation respecting its strength. The result of his observationsand inquiries seems to have been, a strong inclination to the opinion, that to carry the works by storm, though hazardous, was notimpracticable. A council of general officers being unanimously ofopinion, that for the present at least, the attempt ought not to bemade, it was laid aside. 

[Sidenote: Distress of the British from the want of fresh provisions. ]

A rigorous blockade being maintained, the British army began to sufferconsiderably for fresh meat and vegetables. The small parties whichsailed from Boston, in quest of these articles, were frequentlydisappointed by the vigilance of the minute men. But the continuanceof active exertion, which this service required on the part of theinhabitants of the sea coast, soon became burdensome; and thegovernors of the several colonies pressed for detachments from themain army. Although it was impossible to spare the troops required, without hazarding the cause of the colonies, great irritation wasexcited by the refusal to comply with these demands of particularprotection. They at length became so importunate, and the unavoidablerefusal to comply with them was so ill received, that congress wasinduced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Bostonwas designed only to oppose the enemy at that place, and ought not tobe weakened by detachments for the security of other parts of thecountry. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought to securethe place, by entering into a compromise with Captain Wallace, whocommanded the ships of war on that station, stipulating that he shouldbe furnished with provisions on condition of his sparing the town, andcommitting no depredations on the country. This compromise contravenedso essentially the general plan of distressing the British forces, that General Washington deemed it necessary to interpose, andrepresent to the Governor of that province, the mischief to beapprehended from so dangerous a practice. 

While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, otherevents of considerable importance took place elsewhere. 

In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates torepresent her in congress: after which, the style of "The thirteenUnited Colonies" was assumed; and by that title, the EnglishProvinces, confederated and in arms, were thenceforward designated. 

{September 5. }

After a recess of one month, congress again assembled at Philadelphia. The state of the colonies, and the letters of the Commander-in-chiefbeing immediately taken into consideration, the scarcity of arms andammunition engaged their most serious attention. Great exertions[14]had been made, by importation and by domestic manufacture, toextricate the country from this perilous situation; but the supplieswere unequal to the necessities of the army; and the danger resultingfrom the want of articles, so vitally essential in war, stillcontinued to be great. 

 [Footnote 14: The agents of congress had the address to purchase all the powder on the coast of Africa, and that within the British forts, without attracting notice; and to seize the magazine in the island of Bermuda. Great exertions were also made in the interior to obtain saltpetre and sulphur, for the manufacture of that important article. ]

The importance of a maritime force to the military operations of acountry possessing an immense extent of sea coast must always besensibly felt; and, in an early stage of the contest, the particularattention of the United Colonies was directed more immediately to thisinteresting object, by an event not very unusual in war, but which, atthis time, excited no ordinary degree of resentment. 

Orders had been issued to the commanders of the British ships of warto proceed, as in the case of actual rebellion, against those seaporttowns which were accessible, and in which any troops should be raised, or military works erected. 

{October. }

[Sidenote: Falmouth burnt. ]

Falmouth, a flourishing village on the sea coast of Massachusetts, having given some particular offence, a small naval force, commandedby Captain Mowat, was, under colour of these orders, detached for itsdestruction. After making an ineffectual effort to induce theinhabitants to deliver up their arms and ammunition, and four of theprincipal citizens as hostages, he commenced a furious cannonade andbombardment, by which the town was reduced to ashes. An attempt wasthen made to penetrate into the country; but the militia and minutemen, rather irritated than intimidated by this wanton act ofunavailing devastation, drove the party, which had landed, back totheir ships. 

This measure was loudly reprobated throughout America, andcontributed, not a little, to turn the attention of the UnitedColonies to their marine. It was one immediate motive with theconvention of Massachusetts, for granting letters of marque andreprisal; and was assigned by congress, in addition to the capture ofAmerican merchantmen on the high seas, as an inducement for fittingout some ships of war; to man which they directed two battalions ofmarines to be recruited. 

[Sidenote: Success of the American cruisers. ]

Though congress deferred granting general letters of reprisal, theyadopted a measure of equal efficacy, but less hostile in appearance. Their ships of war were authorized to capture all vessels employed ingiving assistance to the enemy; the terms used in their resolutionwere such as comprehended every possible capture. A few small cruisershad already been fitted out by the directions of General Washington;and the coasts soon swarmed with the privateers of New England. Thesenaval exertions were attended with valuable consequences. Manycaptures were made; and important supplies of ammunition were thusobtained. 

Although the British army had manifested no intention to evacuateBoston, fears were continually entertained for New York. Mr. Tryon, who was popular in that province, had been lately recalled from NorthCarolina, and appointed its governor. His utmost influence wasemployed in detaching that colony from the union; and his exertionswere seconded by the Asia man of war, whose guns commanded the town. The consequence of these intrigues and of this terror was, that evenin the convention, disaffection to the American cause began openly toshow itself; and a determination to join the king's standard is saidto have been expressed with impunity. These threatening appearanceswere rendered the more serious by some confidential communicationsfrom England, stating the intention of administration to send a fleetinto the Hudson, and to occupy both New York and Albany. Under thealarm thus excited, an effort was made in congress to obtain aresolution for seizing the governor. He had, however, been artfulenough to make impressions in his favour; and he was defended by apart of the delegation from New York with so much earnestness that, for a time, the advocates of the proposition forbore to press it. Afterwards, when the increasing defection in that province inducedCongress to resume the subject, the resolution was expressed ingeneral terms; and assumed the form of a recommendation, to those whoexercised the legislative and executive functions in the severalprovinces, "to arrest and secure every person in the respectivecolonies, whose going at large might, in their opinion, endanger thesafety of the colony, or the liberties of America. " Intelligence ofthis resolution is supposed to have been received by the governor, who, after some correspondence with the mayor of the city respectinghis personal safety, retired for security on board the Halifax packet, and continued to carry on his intrigues with nearly as much advantageas while on shore. 

But the subject which, next to the supply of arms and ammunition, mostinterested the American government, was the re-enlistment of the army. 

[Illustration: The Historic Washington Elm at Cambridge, Massachusetts

_"Under this tree, " as the granite tablet states, "Washington firsttook command of the American army, July 3d, 1775. " This picture isfrom a photograph taken about the year 1900. In spite of the mostdetermined efforts to preserve this historic relic, the tree fell inNovember, 1923. _

© U & U]

[Sidenote: Measures to form a continental army. ]

On the 29th of September, at the earnest solicitation of GeneralWashington, a committee had been appointed by congress, withdirections to repair to the camp at Cambridge; there to consult withthe Commander-in-chief, and with the chief magistrates of NewHampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and the council ofMassachusetts, "on the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army. " On the return of thiscommittee, congress determined that the new army should consist oftwenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two men, including officers;to be raised as far as practicable from the troops already in service. Unfortunately, in constituting this first military establishment ofthe union, an essential error was committed; the consequences of whichceased only with the war. The soldiers, instead of being engaged foran unlimited time, were enlisted for the term of only one year, if notsooner discharged by congress. It is not easy to account entirely forthis fatal error. With their jealousy of a permanent army, wereprobably intermingled hopes that the war would not be of longduration, and fears that much difficulty would be encountered inprevailing on men to enter into engagements of unlimited extent. Perhaps the habits of the northern colonies, where it had been usualto raise men for a single campaign, may have contributed to thismeasure. Whatever may have been its motives, its consequences were ofthe most serious nature; and it brought the American cause, more thanonce, into real hazard. 

Other resolutions accompanied that for raising and establishing thenew army, which exhibit the perilous condition of the country, and itswant of those means, which were indispensable to the support of thearduous conflict in which it was engaged. 

One resolution ordered the detention, at a valuation, of the arms ofthose soldiers who should refuse to re-enlist, although they wereprivate property, and but ill adapted to military purposes; another, offered two dollars to every recruit who would supply himself with ablanket; a third, ordered the purchase of any cloths which could beprocured, without regard to colour, to be delivered to the soldiers, after deducting the price from their pay; and a fourth, required thesoldiers to furnish their own arms, or to pay for the use of thosewhich might be supplied by the government. 

{October 22. }

Before the arrangements made by the committee were confirmed bycongress, General Washington proceeded to take the preparatory stepsfor carrying them into execution. 

It being understood that the engagements of the officers, as well asof the soldiers, would expire with the year; the whole army was to beformed anew. The officers therefore were required to signify inwriting to their respective colonels, their determination to leave, orto continue in the service; that it might be communicated to congressthrough the officer commanding brigades. 

[Sidenote: Difficulty of re-enlisting the army. ]

The urgency of the case could not produce a compliance with theseorders. Many disregarded them; and others annexed conditions to theirremaining in the service. Repetitions of them became necessary; and anunconditional declaration was required. [15] But that high spirit andenthusiastic ardour, which had brought such numbers into the fieldafter the battle of Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate; andthat alacrity for the service, which had been expected, was notdisplayed. The orders of the day contain the most animatingexhortations to the army, and the strongest appeals to its patriotism;but there was an ominous hesitation in forming new engagements. 

 [Footnote 15: In this state of things, several officers, supposing that commissions and rank might depend on recruiting men, began, without permission, to recruit soldiers, to serve particularly under the officer enlisting them. Every military principle required that this practice should be arrested; and it was peremptorily forbidden in general orders. ]

{November 12. }

At length, with much labour, the officers were arranged, upon which, recruiting orders were issued. But the sufferings of the army forfuel, clothes, and even provisions, had been great; and to this causemay be attributed the tardiness with which the soldiers in campenrolled themselves. One officer from each company was employed torecruit in the country; but their progress was not such as the crisisdemanded; and the army was dissolving by the expiration of the timefor which it had been enlisted. The impatience of the soldiers torevisit their friends, overcame all their solicitude for maintainingthe blockade of Boston; and it was with great difficulty that thoseentitled to a discharge were detained in camp even for ten days; atthe end of which time a body of militia was expected to supply theirplaces. This fact, however, did not convince the governments of theUnited Colonies, that it was possible to rely too much on individualpatriotism; and that the American cause, if defended entirely bytemporary armies, must be often exposed to imminent hazard. 

{November 30. }

Perceiving the difficulty of recruiting the army, the Generalearnestly recommended to congress, to try the effect of a bounty. Thisproposition was not adopted until late in January; and, on the lastday of December, when all the old troops, not engaged on the newestablishment, were disbanded, only nine thousand six hundred andfifty men had been enlisted for the army of 1776; many of whom wereunavoidably permitted to be absent on furlough. Their numbers, however, were considerably augmented during the winter; and, in themean time, the militia cheerfully complied with the requisitions madeon them. 

{December. }

Notwithstanding these complicated difficulties and embarrassments, theGeneral viewed with deep mortification the semblance of inactivity towhich his situation compelled him to submit. In the commencement ofthe contest, while the minds of many were undetermined, it was of vastimportance to secure the public confidence, and it was necessary topay some attention even to the public caprice. The real difficultiesunder which he laboured were not generally known. His numbers wereexaggerated, and his means of carrying on offensive operations weremagnified. The expulsion of the British army from Boston had been longsince anticipated by many; and those were not wanting, who endeavouredto spread discontent by insinuating that the Commander-in-chief wasdesirous of prolonging the war, in order to continue his ownimportance. To these symptoms of impatience, and to the consequencesthey might produce, he could not be insensible; but it was not in hispower to silence such complaints, by disclosing to the world his realsituation. His views still continued to be directed towards Boston;and, congress having manifested a disposition favourable to an attackon that place, the general officers had been again assembled, and hadagain advised unanimously against the measure. Supposing that fearsfor the safety of the town might embarrass the proceedings of thearmy, congress resolved, "that if General Washington and his councilof war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made onthe troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might thinkexpedient, notwithstanding the town and property in it might bethereby destroyed. "

[Sidenote: Plans for attacking Boston. ]

Whilst waiting for a favourable opportunity to execute this bold plan, the American general availed himself of the occasional aids receivedfrom the militia, to make advances on the besieged, and to seizepositions which would favour ulterior operations. Ploughed Hill, Cobble Hill, and Lechmere's Point, were successively occupied andfortified. His approaches were carried within half a mile of the workson Bunker's Hill; and his guns drove their floating batteries fromtheir stations, and protected others constructed under his orders. 

Hitherto, the object of the war had been a redress of grievances. Thelanguage, that it was a war against a corrupt administration, had beencarefully observed; and allegiance to the British crown wasuniversally avowed. The progress, however, of the public mind towardsindependence, though slow, was certain; and measures were necessarilytaken, which apparently tended to that object. Among these, was theact of establishing temporary governments in place of thatrevolutionary system which followed the suspension of the ancientinstitutions. 

The first application on this subject was made by Massachusetts;[16]and her example was soon followed by other colonies. Theseapplications could not fail to draw forth the sentiments of members onthe very interesting question of separation from the mother country. They who wished to lead public opinion to independence, were desirousof establishing a regular government in each province, entirelycompetent to the administration of its affairs; while they who werehostile to that event, opposed every measure which might eitherincline the colonies towards it, or strengthen the opinion in GreatBritain, that it was the real object of all who had resisted thelegislative supremacy of parliament. A resolution was with difficultyobtained in the case of New Hampshire, which formed a precedent forothers of the same nature, recommending to the provincial conventionto call a full and free representation of the people, who shouldestablish such form of government as would best promote the generalhappiness, and most effectually secure peace and good order in thecolony, during the continuance of the present dispute with GreatBritain. Without this last clause, which still maintained theappearance of preserving the ancient connexion with the parent state, the recommendation would not have been made. About the same time, congress also resolved that it would be extremely dangerous to theliberties and welfare of America, for any colony separately topetition the king or either house of parliament. 

 [Footnote 16: On this application congress recommended that an assembly and council should be chosen in the usual way, who should exercise the powers of government until a Governor of his Majesty's appointment should consent to govern the colony according to its charter. ]

Having taken into consideration a proclamation, declaring certainpersons in the colonies to have forgotten their allegiance, and to bein a state of open rebellion, and threatening with punishment thosewho should be found carrying on correspondence with them;--congressdeclared, "in the name of the people of these United Colonies, and bythe authority according to the purest maxims of representation derivedfrom them, that whatever punishment shall be inflicted upon anypersons in the power of their enemies, for favouring, aiding, orabetting the cause of American liberty, shall be retaliated in thesame kind, and in the same degree, upon those in their power, who havefavoured, aided, or abetted, or shall favour, aid, or abet the systemof ministerial oppression. "

The British army, the command of which, on the recall of General Gage, had devolved upon General Howe, still remained inactive in Boston; andwas still closely blocked up on the land side. The history of thiswinter campaign, is a history of successive struggles on the part ofthe American general, with the difficulties imposed by the want ofarms, ammunition, and permanent troops, on a person extremelysolicitous, by some grand and useful achievement, to prove himselfworthy of the high station to which the voice of his country hadcalled him. 

{1776}

{January. }

Considering the resolution relative to the attack on Boston asindicating the desire of congress on that subject, he assured thepresident that an attempt would be made to put it in execution thefirst moment he should perceive a probability of success. If thisshould not occur, as soon as might be expected or wished, he prayedthat his situation might be recollected, and that congress would dohim the justice to believe, that circumstances, not inclination on hispart, occasioned the delay. "It is not, " said he, "in the pages ofhistory to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musketshot of the enemy for six months together, without _ammunition_; andat the same time, to disband one army and recruit another, within thatdistance of twenty-odd British regiments, is more than, probably, everwas attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter, as we havehitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate eventof my whole life. "

In the month of January a council of war, at which Mr. John Adams, amember of congress, and Mr. Warren, president of the provincialcongress of Massachusetts, assisted: Resolved, "that a vigorousattempt ought to be made on the ministerial troops in Boston, beforethey can be reinforced in the spring, if the means can be provided, and a favourable opportunity should offer. " It was farther advised, "that thirteen regiments of militia should be asked for fromMassachusetts and the neighbouring colonies, in order to put the armyin a condition to make the attempt. The militia to assemble on thefirst of February, and to continue in service, if necessary, until thefirst of March. " The colonies readily complied with theserequisitions; but so mild had the season hitherto been, that thewaters about Boston continued open. "Congress would discover in mylast, " said the general, on the nineteenth of January, "my motives forstrengthening these lines with militia. But whether, as the weatherturns out exceedingly mild, (insomuch as to promise nothing favourablefrom ice, ) and there is no appearance of powder, I shall be able toattempt any thing decisive, time only can determine. No man upon earthwishes to destroy the nest in Boston more than I do; no person wouldbe willing to go greater lengths than I shall to accomplish it, if itshall be thought adviseable; but if we have no powder to bombard with, nor ice to pass on, we shall be in no better situation than we havebeen all the year: we shall be in a worse, as their works arestronger. "

[Sidenote: General Lee detached to New York. ]

Early in January, the Commander-in-chief received unquestionableintelligence that an armament was equipping in Boston, to sail underGeneral Clinton on a secret expedition. Many considerations inducedhim to believe that New York was its destination. He thought thepossession of the Hudson of great importance to the British: and thatthe numerous adherents to the royal cause in New York, furnished anadditional reason for transferring the seat of war to that colony. Whilst deliberating on this subject, he received a letter from GeneralLee, requesting to be detached to Connecticut, for the purpose ofassembling a body of volunteers, who should march into New York, andbe employed both for the security of that place, and the expulsion orsuppression of a band of tories collecting on Long Island. Thoughinclined to the adoption of this measure, delicacy towards those whoexercised the powers of civil government in the colony, suspended hisdecision on it. Mr. John Adams, who possessed great and well meritedinfluence, was then at Watertown, attending the provincial convention;and with him, the general held some communications respecting hispowers. That gentleman being decidedly of opinion that they extendedto the case, General Lee was detached, with instructions to raise abody of volunteers in Connecticut, to reinforce the battalions of NewJersey and New York, which were placed under his command. His orderswere to proceed to New York; to examine the fortifications of thecity, and up the river; to put them in the best possible state ofdefence; to disarm all persons whose conduct rendered them justlysuspected of designs unfriendly to the government, especially those onLong Island; and to collect the arms and ammunition in theirpossession, for the use of the army. 

No difficulty was found in raising the volunteers required fromConnecticut. The people of that province were zealous andenterprising, and Governor Trumbull having sanctioned the measure, troops were immediately embodied, and Lee commenced his march for NewYork at the head of twelve hundred men. 

The inhabitants of that place were much alarmed at his approach. Captain Parker of the Asia man of war had threatened that he woulddestroy the town in the event of its being entered by any considerablebody of provincials; and it was believed that these threats would beexecuted. 

A committee of safety, which had been appointed to exercise the powersof government during the recess of the provincial congress, addresseda letter to General Lee, expressing astonishment at the report that hewas about to enter the town without previously intimating his design, and pressing him earnestly not to pass the confines of Connecticut, until they could have further explanations with him. 

Holding in utter contempt the threats of Captain Parker, Lee continuedhis march; and, in a letter[17] to congress, represented in suchstrong terms the impolicy of leaving the military arrangements for NewYork under the control of the local government, that congressappointed three of their own body, to consult with him and the councilof safety, respecting the defence of the place; and instructed him toobey the directions of that committee. 

 [Footnote 17: See note No. V. At the end of the volume. ]

Lee soon acquired that ascendancy which is the prerogative of asuperior mind, over those who were sent for his government, and theydirected him to execute whatever he suggested. A plan recommended byhim, for fortifying the city and preserving its connexion with LongIsland, was adopted, and prosecuted with vigour. 

General Clinton arrived almost at the same instant with General Lee, but without troops. He said openly, that none were coming; that nohostilities were contemplated against New York; and that he was, himself, merely on a visit to his friend Tryon. "If it be really so, "added General Lee, in his letter containing this communication, "it isthe most whimsical piece of civility I ever heard of. " General Clintondid not affect to conceal that his real object was to proceed to NorthCarolina, where he expected that five regiments from Europe would jointhe small force he should carry with him. 

About the middle of February, the cold was intense, and the ice becamesufficiently firm to bear the troops. General Washington was nowdisposed to execute the bold plan he had formed, of attacking GeneralHowe in Boston; but a council of war being almost unanimous againstthe measure, it was abandoned. The want of ammunition for theartillery was a principal inducement to this opinion. 

The attempt, probably, would not have succeeded, and must certainlyhave been attended with considerable loss. But the advice of thecouncil seems to have been adopted with regret. In communicating theiropinion to congress, the general observed, "Perhaps the irksomeness ofmy situation may have given different ideas to me, from those whichinfluence the gentlemen I consulted; and might have inclined me to putmore to the hazard than was consistent with prudence. If it had thiseffect, I am not sensible of it, as I endeavoured to give the subjectall the consideration a matter of such importance required. True itis, and I can not help acknowledging, that I have many disagreeablesensations on account of my situation; for, to have the eyes of thewhole continent fixed on me, with anxious expectation of hearing somegreat event, and to be restrained in every military operation for wantof the necessary means to carry it on, is not very pleasing;especially as the means used to conceal my weakness from the enemy, conceal it also from our friends, and add to their wonder. "

Late in February, various appearances among the British troopsindicated an intention to evacuate Boston; but as these appearancesmight be deceptive, and he had now received a small supply of powder, General Washington determined to prosecute vigorously a plan he hadformed, to force General Howe either to come to an action, or toabandon the town. 

Since the allowance of a bounty, recruiting had been more successful;and the regular force had been augmented to rather more than fourteenthousand men. In addition to these troops, the Commander-in-chief hadcalled to his aid about six thousand of the militia of Massachusetts. Thus reinforced, he determined to take possession of the heights ofDorchester, and to fortify them. As the possession of this post wouldenable him to annoy the ships in the harbour and the soldiers in thetown, he was persuaded that a general action would ensue. But if thishope should be disappointed, his purpose was to make the works on theheights of Dorchester only preparatory to seizing and fortifyingNook's Hill, and the points opposite the south end of Boston, whichcommanded the harbour, a great part of the town, and the beach fromwhich an embarkation must take place in the event of a retreat. 

{March. }

[Sidenote: Possession taken of the heights of Dorchester. ]

To facilitate the execution of this plan, a heavy bombardment andcannonade were commenced on the town and on the British lines, whichwere repeated the two succeeding nights. On the last of them, immediately after the firing had begun, a strong detachment, under thecommand of General Thomas, took possession of the heights withoutopposition. Such was their activity and industry through the nightthat, although the ground was almost impenetrable, the works weresufficiently advanced by the morning, nearly to cover them. Whenday-light disclosed their operations to the British, a considerabledegree of embarrassment appeared, and an ineffectual fire wascommenced on the party in possession of the heights, who in turnopened a battery on the besieged; and continued with unremittinglabour to strengthen their position. 

{March 5. }

It was necessary to dislodge the Americans from the heights, or toevacuate the town; and General Howe, as had been foreseen, determinedto embrace the former part of the alternative. Three thousand chosenmen, to be commanded by Lord Percy, were ordered on this service. These troops were embarked, and fell down to the castle, in order toproceed up the river to the intended scene of action; but werescattered by a furious storm, which disabled them from immediatelyprosecuting the enterprise. Before they could again be in readinessfor the attack, the works were made so strong, that the attempt tostorm them was thought unadviseable, and the evacuation of the townbecame inevitable. 

In the expectation that the flower of the British troops would beemployed against the heights of Dorchester, General Washington hadconcerted a plan for availing himself of that occasion, to attackBoston itself. The storm which defeated the proposed attack on theheights defeated this enterprise also. 

[Sidenote: Boston evacuated. ]

{March 17. }

The determination to evacuate Boston was soon communicated. A papersigned by some of the select men of the town, and brought out with aflag, stated the fact. This paper was accompanied by propositions saidto be made on the part of General Howe, but not signed by him, relative to the security of the town, and the peaceable embarkation ofhis army. As these propositions were not addressed to theCommander-in-chief, and were not authenticated by the signature ofGeneral Howe, nor by any act obligatory on him, General Washingtonthought it improper directly to notice them; and ordered the officerto whom they were delivered to return an answer stating the reasonswhy they were not treated with more attention. The determination, however, to continue his advances and to secure Nook's Hill, waschanged; and considerable detachments were moved towards New York, before the actual evacuation of Boston. This event took place on the17th of March; and, in a few days, the whole fleet sailed out ofNantasket road, directing its course eastward. 

The recovery of this important town gave great joy to the UnitedColonies. Congress passed a vote of thanks to the General and hisarmy, "for their wise and spirited conduct in the siege andacquisition of Boston;" and directed a medal of gold to be struck incommemoration of the event. 

As soon as the British fleet had put to sea, the American armyproceeded by divisions to New York, where it arrived on the 14th ofApril. 

During the siege of Boston, an altercation concerning prisoners tookplace between the commanders of the respective armies, which wasviewed with great interest throughout America. The character of thewar--a war between a sovereign and those who professed to be hissubjects, led to a course of conduct on the part of the BritishGeneral, which the actual state of things did not justify. 

General Gage, as Governor of Massachusetts, had received all theirritations of which his mind was susceptible--irritations whichseemed to have had no inconsiderable influence over his conduct asCommander-in-chief. He regarded the Americans nearly as rebels; andtreated them as if the great national resistance they were making onprinciple, was to be viewed as the act of a few daring and turbulentindividuals, rising against laws of unquestionable obligation, whowould soon be quelled, and punished for their disobedience oflegitimate authority. In this spirit, he threw some distinguishedgentlemen of Boston, and the American officers and soldiers who fellinto his hands, into the common jail of felons; and treated them, without respect to military rank or condition, not as prisoners ofwar, but as state criminals. 

[Sidenote: Correspondence respecting prisoners. ]

General Washington remonstrated very seriously against thisunjustifiable measure. Considering political opinion entirely out ofthe question, and "conceiving the obligations of humanity, and theclaims of rank, to be universally binding, except in the case ofretaliation;" he expressed the hope he had entertained, "that theywould have induced, on the part of the British General, a conduct moreconformable to the rights they gave. " While he claimed the benefits ofthese rights, he declared his determination "to be regulated entirely, in his conduct towards the prisoners who should fall into his hands, by the treatment which those in the power of the British Generalshould receive. "

To this letter, a haughty and intemperate answer was returned, retorting the complaints concerning the treatment of prisoners, andaffecting to consider it as an instance of clemency, that the cord wasnot applied to those whose imprisonment was complained of. To thisanswer, General Washington gave a manly and dignified reply, whichwas, he said, "to close their correspondence perhaps forever;" andwhich concluded with saying, "If your officers, our prisoners, receivefrom me a treatment different from what I wished to show them, theyand you will remember the occasion of it. "

The result of this correspondence was communicated to the council ofMassachusetts, [18] who were requested to order the British officersthen on parole to be confined in close jail, and the soldiers to besent to such place of security as the general court should direct. 

 [Footnote 18: In the early part of the war, congress had appointed no commissary of prisoners; nor had the government taken upon itself the custody of them. They were entrusted for safe keeping to the respective legislatures and committees, to whom it was necessary to apply for the execution of every order respecting them. ]

On the recall of General Gage, the command devolved on General Howe, whose conduct was less exceptionable; and this rigorous treatment ofprisoners was relaxed. 

Not long after this correspondence with General Gage, while Montgomerywas employed in the siege of St. John's, Colonel Ethan Allen wascaptured in a bold and rash attempt on Montreal. Under the pretext ofhis having acted without authority, he was put in irons, and sent toEngland as a traitor. 

While he was yet in Canada, congress requested the Commander-in-chiefto inquire into the fact. He addressed a letter to Sir William Howe, requiring explanations on it, and assuring him that General Prescot, who had been taken in Canada, and was understood to have contributedto the severities inflicted on Colonel Allen, should receive exactlythe fate of that officer. 

General Howe, not holding any authority in Canada, or not choosing toenter fully into this subject, General Schuyler was directed to makeparticular inquiries into the conduct of Prescot; and congress, onbeing informed of the inefficacy of the application to General Howe, ordered that officer into close jail. 

CHAPTER III. 

 Invasion of Canada meditated.... Siege of St. John's.... Capture of fort Chamblée.... Carleton defeated at Longueisle.... St. John's capitulated.... Montreal surrenders.... Arnold's expedition.... He arrives before Quebec.... Retires to Point Aux Trembles.... Montgomery lays siege to Quebec.... Unsuccessful attack on that place.... Death of Montgomery.... Blockade of Quebec.... General Thomas takes command of the army.... The blockade raised.... General Sullivan takes the command.... Battle of the Three Rivers.... Canada evacuated.... General Carleton constructs a fleet.... Enters lake Champlain.... Defeats the American flotilla.... Takes possession of Crown Point.... Retires into winter quarters. 

{1775}

During these transactions, events of great interest were passing stillfurther north. 

Serious dissatisfaction prevailed in Canada. The measures ofadministration had disquieted the British settlers, withoutconciliating the ancient inhabitants. At the same time, the regulartroops had been chiefly ordered to Boston, and the province leftalmost entirely undefended. These facts were known in the UnitedColonies. It was also known that military stores to an immense amounthad been deposited in Quebec, and that preparations were making toinvade the colonies from that quarter. The possession of that countrywas believed to be all important; and its present temper countenancedthe opinion, that its weight would be thrown into the scale of thatparty, which should first show a force in it sufficient for theprotection of its inhabitants. The facility with which Crown Point andTiconderoga had been taken, and the command of the lakes George andChamplain acquired, added to the motives already stated, inspiringcongress with the daring design of anticipating the plans meditated inCanada, by taking possession of that province. 

[Sidenote: Invasion of Canada meditated. ]

In June, 1775, a resolution passed that body, directing GeneralSchuyler to repair to Ticonderoga, and take the proper measures forsecuring that post and Crown Point, and for retaining the command ofthe lakes. He was, at the same time authorized, if he should find themeasure not disagreeable to the Canadians, to take possession of St. John's and Montreal, and to pursue any other steps which might have atendency to promote the peace and security of the United Colonies. 

Near three thousand men from New England and New York were designedfor this service. A number of batteaux were directed to be built atTiconderoga and Crown Point, to convey them along lake Champlain, andfifty thousand dollars in specie were voted for the expenses of thearmy in Canada. 

General Schuyler, who was at New York when this important command wasconfided to him, hastened to Ticonderoga, in order to make thenecessary arrangements for the enterprise. 

The troops of that department, belonging to different colonies, stationed at different places, and acknowledging no one commandingofficer, were found in a state of entire disorganization. The storeswere misapplied, or wasted; no subordination nor camp discipline wasobserved; and had the enemy been in a condition to attempt a _coup demain_, Ticonderoga and Crown Point would have been lost, with as muchfacility as they had been acquired. 

{September. }

Schuyler immediately commenced the task of preparing vessels for thetransportation of the troops; a task the more laborious and tedious, as the timber for the batteaux was then to be procured from the woods. Before the preparations were complete, or the soldiers destined forthe expedition were assembled, the impatience expressed by thediscontented in Canada rendered an immediate movement adviseable. Orders were therefore given to General Montgomery to embark with thetroops then in readiness; and General Schuyler having directed theexpected reinforcements to rendezvous at the Isle Aux Noix, followedand joined him before he reached that place. 

[Sidenote: The Americans enter that Province. ]

Circular letters to the Canadians, exhorting them to rouse and asserttheir liberties, and declaring, that the Americans entered theircountry, not as enemies, but as friends and protectors, wereimmediately dispersed among them; and to improve the favourableimpression which had been made, it was determined to advance directlyto St. John's. On the sixth of September, the American army, amountingto about one thousand men, entirely destitute of artillery, embarkedon the Sorel, and proceeding down that river, landed within a mile anda half of the fort. The intelligence received during the evening, determined them to return to the Isle Aux Noix, and wait for theirremaining troops and artillery. 

The Isle Aux Noix lies at the junction of the Sorel with lakeChamplain; and to prevent the armed vessels at St. John's fromentering the latter, a boom was drawn across the narrow channel, atthe point of union between those waters. 

While at that place, General Schuyler became so ill as to be confinedto his bed; and the command devolved on Montgomery. 

{September 25. }

[Sidenote: Siege of St. Johns. ]

{October. }

[Sidenote: Capture of Fort Chamblée. ]

Late in September the artillery was brought up; and reinforcementsarrived, which augmented the army to nearly two thousand men;--uponwhich Montgomery again proceeded to the investment of St. John's. Thisplace was garrisoned by five or six hundred regulars, with about twohundred Canadian militia, and was well provided with artillery andmilitary stores. The army of Canada, as well as the other armies ofthe United Colonies, was almost entirely without powder; and, ofconsequence, the siege advanced slowly. Its necessities in thisrespect were fortunately relieved by the capture of fort Chamblée, which being supposed to be covered by St. John's, was not in adefensible condition. In this place, about one hundred and twentybarrels of gunpowder were taken, after which the siege of St. John'swas prosecuted with vigour; but the garrison made a resolute defence, and for some time indulged the hope of being relieved. [19]

 [Footnote 19: Annual Register. ]

[Sidenote: Carleton defeated at Longueisle. ]

Colonel M'Clean, a veteran officer, with his regiment of royalhighland emigrants, and a few hundred Canadians, was posted near thejunction of the Sorel with the St. Lawrence. General Carleton was atMontreal, where he had collected about a thousand men, chieflyCanadians. At the head of these troops, he hoped to effect a junctionwith M'Clean, after which he designed to march with his whole forceagainst Montgomery, and endeavour to raise the siege; but, onattempting to cross over from Montreal, he was encountered andentirely defeated at Longueisle by a detachment of the American troopsunder Colonel Warner. Another party advanced on M'Clean. Beingentirely abandoned by his Canadians so soon as they were informed ofthe defeat of the governor, and having also received information thatArnold was approaching Point Levi, M'Clean retreated to Quebec. TheAmericans occupied the post he had abandoned, and erected batteries ona point of land at the junction of the Sorel with the St. Lawrence;where they also constructed several armed rafts and floatingbatteries, in order to prevent Carleton with the vessels at Montrealfrom escaping down the river. 

[Sidenote: St. Johns capitulates. ]

{November 3. }

Montgomery was pressing the siege of St. John's with great vigour, andhad advanced his works near the fort, when the account of the successat Longueisle reached him. On receiving this intelligence, he sent aflag by one of the prisoners, with a letter to Major Preston, thecommanding officer, demanding a surrender of the place. All hopes ofrelief having now vanished, the garrison capitulated, on being allowedthe honours of war. 

Scarcely was this first success obtained, when the consequences ofshort enlistments began to be felt. The time of service for which thetroops had engaged being about to expire, great difficulty wasexperienced in prevailing on them to proceed farther; and before theGeneral could induce them to march against Montreal, he was under thenecessity of stipulating explicitly, that all who wished it should bedischarged at that place. Having effected this compromise, heproceeded against Montreal; while his floating batteries, underColonel Easton, advanced up the St. Lawrence, and not only preventedthe armed vessels of the enemy from escaping to Quebec, but drove themstill higher up the river. 

[Sidenote: Montreal surrenders. ]

{November 13. }

Montreal was not in a condition to be defended. After engaging toallow the Canadians in their own laws, the free exercise of theirreligion, and the privilege of governing themselves, Montgomery tookpeaceable possession of the town; and Governor Carleton retired to hisflotilla. While preparations were making to attack these vessels, theGovernor was conveyed in a boat with muffled oars down the river, in adark night, and made his escape to Quebec. The fleet soon afterwardssurrendered, and the General prepared, with the utmost expedition, toproceed with the few troops who were willing to follow him, to thecapital of Canada. 

Diminished as his army was by the discharge of those who claimed theperformance of his engagements made at St. John's, it was necessary toleave a part of it at Montreal, St. John's, and Chamblée to garrisonthose places--keep open the communication between Quebec and theUnited Colonies--preserve the dependence of the Canadians--overawe theIndians, and hold in check the garrisons above him at Detroit andNiagara. These essential objects, though provided for with the utmostpossible economy of men, formed such deductions from his force, as toleave little more than three hundred soldiers to follow their Generalin the enterprise against Quebec. 

{August. }

Foreseeing that the whole force of Canada would be concentrated aboutMontreal, General Washington had planned an expedition against Quebec, to be carried on by a detachment from his camp before Boston, whichwas to march by the way of Kennebec river; and, passing through thedreary wilderness lying between the settled parts of Maine and the St. Lawrence, to enter Canada about ninety miles below Montreal. 

The object of this hardy enterprise was to compel Carleton, either todraw his troops from the upper country and leave the passage open tothe army invading the province by the way of the river Sorel, or, ifhe should maintain that position, to take possession of Quebec. Allhis accounts assured him that this place was unable to hold outagainst the force which would appear before it; and, if attacked by anAmerican army before the return of Carleton, would surrender withoutfiring a shot. 

This arduous enterprise was committed to Colonel Arnold. About athousand men, consisting of New England infantry, some volunteers, [20]a company of artillery under Captain Lamb, and three companies ofriflemen, were selected for the service. 

 [Footnote 20: Colonel Burr, since Vice President of the United States, was of this number. ]

[Sidenote: Arnold's expedition by the way of the Kennebec. ]

Such delays in expediting this detachment were occasioned by thederangements of the army, that Arnold could not commence his marchuntil the middle of September. 

The success of the expedition depending in a great measure on thefriendly temper of the province against which it was directed, theinstructions given to Arnold earnestly inculcated the cultivation of agood understanding with the Canadians; and even enjoined anabandonment of the enterprise, should this sudden invasion of theircountry threaten to irritate them, and induce them to take up armsagainst the United Colonies. He was furnished with about one thousandpounds in specie to defray contingent expenses, and with a cargo ofmanifestoes to be dispersed through Canada. 

The opinion which had been formed of the favourable disposition of theCanadians was not disproved by the event. They gave essential aid tothe Americans, and cheerfully facilitated their march through thatprovince. But the previous difficulties to be surmounted were muchgreater than had been apprehended. The intermediate country, which hadnever been well explored, opposed obstacles to the march, which onlyperseverance like that of Arnold and of his brave and hardy followers, could have conquered. Colonel Enos, who commanded the rear division, consisting of one third of the detachment, returned from the DeadRiver, a branch of the Kennebec. At first, his appearance excited theutmost indignation in the army; yet, on being arrested, he wasacquitted by a court martial, on the principle that it was absolutelyimpracticable to obtain provisions on the route to preserve the troopsfrom perishing with famine. 

Arnold, who at the head of the first two divisions, still prosecutedhis march, was thirty-two days traversing a hideous wilderness, without seeing a house, or any thing human. Notwithstanding thezealous and wonderfully persevering exertions of his men, theobstacles he encountered so protracted his march, that he did notreach the first settlements on the Chaudière, which empties itselfinto the St. Lawrence, near Quebec, until the 3d of November. 

On the high grounds which separate the waters of the Kennebec fromthose of the St. Lawrence, the scanty remnant of provisions wasdivided among the companies; each of which was directed, withoutattempting to preserve any connexion with the other, to march with theutmost possible celerity into the inhabited country. Whilst those whogained the front were yet thirty miles from the first poor andscattered habitations which composed that frontier of Canada, theirlast morsel of food was consumed. But, preceded by Arnold, who wentforward for the purpose of procuring for them something which mightsatisfy the demands of nature, the troops persevered in their labourswith a vigour unimpaired by the hardships they had encountered, untilthey once more found themselves in regions frequented by human beings. 

After a march of such unexampled fatigue, no more time was allowed forrepose than was barely sufficient to collect the rear, and to refreshthe men. During this short respite from toil, the address signed byGeneral Washington was published, and every assurance given to thepeople, that they came to protect, and not to plunder them. The lineof march was resumed; and, on the 9th of November, this gallant corpsreached Point Levi, opposite Quebec. 

[Sidenote: He arrives before Quebec. ]

The town was almost entirely without a garrison, and nothing couldexceed the astonishment of its inhabitants. Could Arnold haveimmediately crossed the St. Lawrence, and have availed himself of thefirst consternation, it is believed that he might have entered theplace without opposition; but a high wind, and the want of boats, rendered the passage of the river impossible. 

One of his Indian messengers, despatched with letters to GeneralSchuyler, had either betrayed him or been intercepted; and thusintelligence of his approach was communicated to Colonel M'Clean whowas then at the mouth of the Sorel. Trembling for the capital of theprovince, that gallant veteran determined to throw himself into it, and endeavour to defend it. In the mean time, the winds continued sohigh for several nights as to render the passage of the river in thecanoes which had been collected, too hazardous to be attempted; and itwas only in the night that the Americans could hope to cross, becausefour ships of war were distributed at different stations in the river, and armed boats were employed to ply around them. Whilst the Americanswere thus unavoidably detained on the south side of the St. Lawrence, Colonel M'Clean, with his corps of emigrants, entered the city. 

{November 12. }

At length the wind moderated; and Arnold determined to attempt theriver. Eluding the armed vessels, and conquering a rapid current, he, with great difficulty and danger, crossed over in the night, andlanded his little army about a mile and a half above the place whichis rendered memorable by the disembarkation of Wolfe. The passage ofthe rugged cliffs which continue on the northern bank of the St. Lawrence for some distance above Quebec, being impracticable at thisplace, he marched down on the shore to Wolfe's Cove, and ascendingwith his band of hardy followers the same precipice which had opposedsuch obstacles to the British hero; he, too, formed his small corps onthe heights near the plains of Abraham. 

The dangerous and difficult operations of crossing the river incanoes, whilst the passage was vigilantly guarded by ships of war, andof gaining the almost perpendicular heights of the opposite shore, were completed, soon after midnight, by the advance party, consistingof the rifle companies. While waiting for the residue of thedetachment, a council of all the officers was held for the purpose ofdetermining on their future measures. Although destitute of everyimplement required for an assault, Arnold proposed to marchimmediately against Quebec. He counted on surprising the place, andfinding the gates open; but this opinion, which was not earnestlypressed, was overruled. 

Though disappointed in the expectation of surprising Quebec, Arnolddid not immediately relinquish the hope of obtaining possession ofthat important place. Not superior to the garrison in point ofnumbers, and without a single piece of artillery, he was obviouslyincapable of acting offensively; but he flattered himself that adefection in the town might yet put it in his hands. With this view, he paraded on the adjacent heights for some days, and sent two flagsto demand a surrender. But the presence of Colonel M'Clean restrainedthose measures which the fears of the inhabitants dictated. Deemingany communication with the assailants dangerous, he refused to receivethe flag, and fired on the officer who bore it. Intelligence was soonobtained, that the first alarm was visibly wearing off, and givingplace to other sentiments unfavourable to the hope of gaining Quebec. Fears for the vast property contained in the town had united thedisaffected; who were, at their own request, embodied and armed. Thesailors too were landed, and placed at the batteries; and, by thesemeans, the garrison had become more numerous than the American army. 

[Sidenote: And retires to Point Aux Trembles. ]

{November 19. }

After collecting those who had been left on the south side of the St. Lawrence, Arnold could not parade more than seven hundred men, andthey were in no condition to risk an action. In their laborious marchthrough the wilderness, nearly one third of their muskets had beenrendered useless; and their ammunition had sustained such damage thatthe riflemen had not more than ten, nor the other troops more than sixrounds for each man. Under these circumstances, it was thought mostadviseable to retire to Point Aux Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec, and there await the arrival of Montgomery. On their march, they sawthe vessel which conveyed General Carleton; and afterwards found hehad been on shore at Point Aux Trembles, a few hours before theyreached that place. [21]

 [Footnote 21: In the account of this expedition much use has been made of a journal kept by Colonel Heth who served in it as a Lieutenant in Morgan's company of riflemen. ]

In war, the success of the most judicious plans often depends onaccidents not to be foreseen nor controlled. Seldom has the truth ofthis proposition been more clearly demonstrated, than in the issue ofthe expedition conducted by Colonel Arnold. The situation of Canadaconformed exactly to the expectations of the American general. Notsuspecting that so bold and difficult an enterprise could bemeditated, its Governor had left Quebec entirely defenceless, and haddrawn the strength of the province towards the lakes. Could Arnoldhave reached that place a few days sooner--could he even have crossedthe river on his first arrival at Point Levi--or had Colonel Enos beenable to follow the main body with his division of thedetachment--every probability favours the opinion, that this hardy andwell conceived expedition would have been crowned with the mostbrilliant success. Nay, more--had Arnold been careful to relieve theinhabitants of the town from all fears respecting their property, there is reason to believe, they would have refused to defend it. Butalthough this bold enterprise was planned with judgment, and executedwith vigour; although the means employed were adequate to the object;yet the concurrence of several minute and unfavourable incidentsentirely defeated it, and deprived it of that éclat to which it wasjustly entitled. 

{December 5. }

Having clothed his almost naked troops at Montreal, GeneralMontgomery, at the head of about three hundred men, proceeded with hisusual expedition to join Colonel Arnold at Point Aux Trembles, wherehe supplied the troops of that officer with clothes provided atMontreal; and afterwards marched with their united forces directly toQuebec. But, before his arrival, Governor Carleton, who had enteredthe town, was making every preparation for a vigorous defence. Thegarrison now consisted of about fifteen hundred men, of whom eighthundred were militia, and between four and five hundred were seamen. Montgomery's effective force was stated, by himself, at only eighthundred. His situation would have filled with despair a mind lessvigorous, less sanguine, and less brave. His numbers were notsufficient to render success probable, according to any commonprinciple of calculation; and the prospect of their being diminishedmight be rationally entertained. But, relying on their courage, onhimself and his fortune, and on the fears of the garrison; stimulated, too, by the high expectations formed throughout America of hissuccess, and by the dread of disappointing those expectations, hedetermined to lay immediate siege to the town. 

[Sidenote: Montgomery lays siege to Quebec. ]

In a few days he opened a six gun battery within seven hundred yardsof the walls; but his artillery was too light to make a breach, and hedid not calculate on any effect from it. His object was to amuse thegarrison, and conceal his real design. 

Although the troops supported the excessive hardships to which theywere exposed, with constancy and firmness, Montgomery feared that suchcontinued sufferings would overcome them; and, as he would soon haveno legal authority to retain a part of them, he apprehended that heshould be abandoned by that part. Impressed with the real necessity oftaking decisive steps, and impelled by his native courage, thisgallant officer determined to risk an assault. 

Of such materials was his little army composed, that the mostdesperate hardihood could not hope to succeed in the purposed attempt, unless it should receive the approbation of all his troops. It wastherefore necessary, not only to consult the officers individually onthis delicate subject, but to obtain also the cheerful assent of thesoldiers to the meditated enterprise. The proposition was at firstreceived coldly by a part of Arnold's corps, who were, by some means, disgusted with their commanding officer; but the influence of Morgan, who was particularly zealous for an assault, and who held up as apowerful inducement, the rights conferred by the usages of war onthose who storm a fortified town, at length prevailed; and the measurewas almost unanimously approved. 

Whilst the general was preparing for the assault, the garrisonreceived intelligence of his design from a deserter. This circumstanceinduced him to change the plan, which had originally been to attackboth the upper and lower towns at the same time. That finally adopted, was to divide the army into four parts; and while two of them, consisting of Canadians under Major Livingston, and a small partyunder Major Brown, were to distract the garrison by making two feintsagainst the upper town at St. John's and Cape Diamond; the other two, led, the one by Montgomery in person, and the other by Arnold, were tomake real attacks on opposite sides of the lower town. After gainingthat, it would yet be extremely difficult to conquer the obstacles tobe surmounted in forcing their way to the upper town; but, as all thewealth of the city would then be in their power, it was confidentlyexpected that the inhabitants, to secure their property, would compelthe governor to capitulate. 

{December 31. }

[Sidenote: Unsuccessful attack on that place. ]

Between four and five in the morning, the signal was given; and theseveral divisions moved to the assault under a violent storm of snow. The plan was so well concerted, that from the side of the river St. Lawrence, along the fortified front round to the basin, every partseemed equally threatened. [22] Montgomery advanced at the head of theNew York troops, along the St. Lawrence, by the way of Aunce de Mere, under Cape Diamond. The first barrier on this side, at the Pot Ash, was defended by a battery, in which a few pieces of artillery weremounted; about two hundred paces in front of which was a block-houseand picket. The guard placed at the block-house being chieflyCanadians, after giving a random and harmless fire, threw away theirarms, and fled in confusion to the barrier. Their terrors werecommunicated to those who defended this important pass; and from theintelligence afterwards received by the American prisoners in Quebec, it appears that the battery was for a time deserted. 

 [Footnote 22: Letter of Governor Carleton. ]

[Sidenote: Death of Montgomery. ]

Unfortunately, the difficulties of the route rendered it impossiblefor Montgomery to avail himself instantly of this first impression. Cape Diamond, around which he was to make his way, presents aprecipice, the foot of which is washed by the river, where suchenormous and rugged masses of ice had been piled on each other, as torender the way almost impassable. [23] Along the scanty path leadingunder the projecting rocks of the precipice, the Americans pressedforward in a narrow file, until they reached the block-house andpicket. Montgomery, who was himself in front, assisted with his ownhand to cut down or pull up the pickets, and open a passage for histroops: but the roughness and difficulty of the way had so lengthenedhis line of march, that he found it absolutely necessary to halt a fewminutes. Having re-assembled about two hundred men, he advanced boldlyand rapidly at their head, to force the barrier. One or two personshad now ventured to return to the battery, and seizing a slow-match, discharged a gun, when the American front was within forty paces ofit. This single and accidental fire proved fatal to the enterprise. The general, with Captains M'Pherson and Cheeseman, the first of whomwas his aid, together with his orderly sergeant and a private, werekilled upon the spot. The loss of their general, in whom theirconfidence had been so justly placed, discouraged the troops; andColonel Campbell, on whom the command devolved, made no attempt toreanimate them. This whole division retired precipitately from theaction, and left the garrison at leisure to direct its undivided forceagainst Arnold. 

 [Footnote 23: Annual Register. ]

At the common signal for the attack, the division commanded by thisofficer moved in files along the street of St. Roques towards the Sautde Matelots, where the first barrier had been constructed, and abattery of two twelve pounders erected. In imitation of Montgomery, hetoo led the forlorn hope in person, and was followed by Captain Lambwith his company of artillery, and a field piece mounted on a sled. Close in the rear of the artillery was the main body, in front ofwhich was Morgan's company of riflemen, commanded by himself. The pathalong which the troops were to march was so narrow, that the twopieces of artillery in the battery were capable of raking with grapeshot every inch of the ground; whilst the whole right flank wasexposed to an incessant fire of musketry from the walls, and from thepickets of the garrison. 

In this order Arnold advanced along the St. Charles with the utmostintrepidity. The alarm was immediately given, and the fire on hisflank commenced. As he approached the barrier, he received a musketball in the leg which shattered the bone, and was carried off thefield. Morgan rushed forward to the battery at the head of hiscompany, and received from one of the pieces, almost at its mouth, adischarge of grape shot, which killed only one man. The barricade wasinstantly mounted, on which the battery was deserted without adischarge from another gun. The captain of the guard, with the greaternumber of his men, were made prisoners. 

Morgan formed his troops in the streets within the barrier, and tookinto custody several English and Canadian burghers; but his situationsoon became extremely critical. He was not followed by the main bodyof the division--he had no guide--and was, himself, totally ignorantof the situation of the town. It was yet dark--and he had not theslightest knowledge of the course to be pursued, or of the defences tobe encountered. Under these circumstances, it was thought unadviseableto advance farther. They were soon joined by Lieutenant Colonel Green, and Majors Bigelow and Meigs, with several fragments of companies, soas to constitute altogether about two hundred men. 

As the light of day began to appear, this gallant party was againformed, with Morgan's company in front; and, with one voice, loudlycalled on him to lead them against the second barrier, which was nowknown to be less than forty paces from them, though concealed by anangle of the street from their immediate view. Seizing the few laddersbrought with them, they again rushed forward; and under an incessantfire from the battery, and from the windows overlooking it, appliedtheir ladders to the barricade; and maintained for some time a fierce, and, on their part, a bloody contest. Exposed thus, in a narrowstreet, to a galling fire, and finding themselves unable to force thebarrier, or to discharge more than one in ten of their fire arms--theviolence of the storm having unfitted them for service; many of theassailants threw themselves into the stone houses on each side, whichafforded them a shelter both from the storm and from the enemy. Aftercontinuing some time in this situation, Morgan proposed to cut theirway back to the American camp. They were prevented from adopting thisdaring resolution, only by the suggestion that the attack led byMontgomery, of whose fate they were ignorant, might possibly besuccessful; and that, in the event of his having entered the oppositepart of the town, their co-operation might be useful to him. On thisaccount, they determined still to maintain their situation. But theforce of the enemy increasing considerably, they soon perceived thatthey were no longer masters of their own destinies, and surrenderedthemselves prisoners of war. [24]

 [Footnote 24: In this account of the attempt to storm Quebec, free use is made of Colonel Heth's journal. ]

In this bold attack on Quebec, the loss on the part of the garrisonwas inconsiderable. That of the Americans was about four hundred men, three hundred and forty of whom were prisoners. It fell chiefly onArnold's division. Captain Hendricks of the Pennsylvania riflemen, Lieutenant Humphries of Morgan's company, and Lieutenant Cooper ofConnecticut, were among the slain. Captains Lamb and Hubbard, andLieutenants Steele and Tisdale, were among the wounded. Every officerat the second barrier received several balls through his clothes, andsome of them were severely scorched by the powder from the muzzles ofthe muskets discharged at them. But the loss most deplored, and mostfatal to the hopes of the American army, was that of their general. 

Richard Montgomery was a native of Ireland, and had served withreputation in the late war. After its conclusion he settled in NewYork, where he married an American lady, and took a decided part withthe colonies in their contest with Great Britain. His militaryreputation was high throughout America. In the history of hisachievements, while commanding in Canada, we perceive the bold, skilful, and active partisan; and, so far as a judgment can be formedof a capacity for conducting the movements of a large army fromjudicious management of a small one, we can not hesitate to allow himthe talents of an able general. At the head of a small body ofundisciplined troops, drawn from different colonies, unwilling to becommanded by a stranger, jealous of him in the extreme, often disposedto disobedience, and anxious for their homes, he conquereddifficulties which not many would have ventured to meet; and, untilhis last fatal moment, was uniformly successful. In little more thantwo months, he made himself master of Canada, from the lakes toQuebec: and, as if determined to triumph over the climate itself, laidsiege, in the depth of winter, to that important fortress. Hismeasures seem to have been taken with judgment, and were certainlyexecuted with great courage and unremitting exertion. When he appearsto have risked much, and to have exposed his troops to excessivehardships, this line of conduct was not inconsiderately chosen. Thestate of his affairs left him only the alternative between attemptingto storm Quebec, or abandoning the great object of the expedition. Norwas his attempt so hopeless a measure as the strength of the place, and the event might, at first view, induce us to suppose. The designwas worthy of the lofty spirit which formed it; though hazardous, itwas not desperate; and if great courage was required to crown it withsuccess, great courage was employed in its execution. He counted, andwith reason, on the fears of the garrison, and on the immense extentof ground to be guarded. Had he not fallen himself, or been desertedby his troops, it is even yet believed the enterprise would havesucceeded. The progress made by Arnold's division gives greatcountenance to this opinion. 

To manifest the high sense entertained of his services, congressdirected a monument, expressing the circumstances of his death and thegratitude of his country, to be erected to his memory. 

The Americans, being no longer in a condition to continue the siege, retired about three miles from the city; where, though inferior innumbers to the garrison, they maintained the blockade. By preservingthis bold countenance, they retained the confidence of the Canadians;which saved their affairs, for a time, from total ruin. 

Governor Carleton was content to preserve Quebec, until thereinforcements he expected in the spring should enable him to act onthe offensive. He therefore determined not to hazard an attack, with agarrison on which it was unsafe to rely; and Arnold, on whom thecommand had devolved, remained undisturbed. Although badly wounded, heretained his courage and activity; and, though deserted by those whoseterms of service had expired, so as to be reduced at one time to aboutfive hundred effective men, he discovered no disposition to sink underthe weight of adverse fortune. 

While the affairs of the colonies wore this gloomy aspect in Canada, congress was indulging sanguine hopes of annexing that province to theunion. Nine regiments, including one to be raised in that colony, werevoted for its defence during the ensuing campaign; and GeneralSchuyler was directed to construct a number of batteaux atTiconderoga, for the purpose of transporting the troops to the sceneof action. 

{1776}

{January 17. }

Whilst adopting these measures, congress received the melancholyintelligence of the disaster of the 31st December. Far from beingdispirited by this reverse of fortune, that body redoubled itsexertions to hasten reinforcements to the army in Canada, and urgedthe several conventions to collect for its use all the specie theycould obtain. These measures were, in some degree, accelerated byhaving been anticipated by the Commander-in-chief. [25]

 [Footnote 25: On the first intelligence received in the camp at Boston of the fate of Montgomery, General Washington, though extremely delicate respecting the assumption of power, without waiting for the orders of congress, had immediately requested the New England governments to raise several regiments to reinforce that army. This proceeding was approved by congress. ]

The service in Canada being deemed of too much importance to beentrusted to Colonel, now Brigadier General Arnold, or to GeneralWooster; and the health of General Schuyler not admitting of hisproceeding to Quebec; General Thomas, an officer who had acquiredreputation at Roxbury, was ordered to take command of the army in thatprovince. 

In the hope of exciting throughout Canada the sentiments whichprevailed in the United Colonies, and of forming with it a perfectunion, three commissioners, Mr. Franklin, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Carroll, [26] were deputed with full powers on this subject, and withinstructions to establish a free press. These commissioners weredirected to assure the people that they would be permitted to adoptsuch form of government as should be agreeable to themselves; toexercise freely all the rights of conscience; and to be considered asa sister colony, governed by the same general system of mild and equallaws which prevailed in the other colonies, with only such localdifferences as each might deem conducive to its own happiness. Theywere also instructed to inquire into the conduct of the American army, and to correct any irregularities which might be offensive to thepeople. 

 [Footnote 26: They were accompanied by Mr. Carroll, a bishop of the Roman Catholic church. ]

Congress seems to have entertained the opinion expressed by GeneralWashington in a letter to General Schuyler, "that the Province couldbe secured only by laying hold of the affections of the people, andengaging them heartily in the common cause. " In pursuance of thisopinion, they adopted the magnanimous policy of compensating thoseindividuals who had suffered for their adherence to the Americans. 

[Sidenote: Blockade of Quebec continued. ]

In the mean time Arnold maintained the blockade of Quebec. Butreinforcements were slow in arriving, notwithstanding every exertionto hasten them, and from the first of January to the first of March, the effective force before that place had never exceeded seven hundredmen, and had often been as low as five hundred. In March, reinforcements arrived in greater numbers, and the army was increasedto seventeen hundred; but this number was soon reduced by thesmall-pox, which had made its way into camp, where, in contempt oforders, it was propagated by inoculation. 

To render the blockade in any degree effectual, this small army, whichoccupied the island of Orleans and both sides of the St. Lawrence, wasspread over a circuit of twenty-six miles, and divided by threeferries. The establishment of discipline had been impracticable, ifattempted; and the Canadians were often injured and irritated. Thereis reason to believe that even General Arnold was disposed to thinkhimself in the country of an enemy; and that, in repressing disorders, he did not exert that energy which he had always displayedconspicuously in the field. 

{March 4. }

Many causes combined to diminish the attachment originally manifestedby the Canadians to the United Colonies. The necessities of hissituation compelled General Arnold to issue a proclamation makingpaper money current, under the promise of redeeming it in four months, and denouncing those as enemies, who should refuse to receive it. TheCanadians were unwilling to exchange their property or labour, for anarticle of such uncertain value; and the discontents excited by theattempt to force it on them were very considerable. 

Another circumstance, which had great influence with reflecting men, was the obvious incompetence of the American force to its object. TheCanadians had expected a powerful army--sufficient for the protectionof the country; and their disappointment in this respect, produced agreat change in their opinions and conduct. 

The dissatisfaction arising from these causes was augmented by thepriests. They, as a body, were never cordial in the American interest;and having been, since the death of Montgomery, very injudiciouslyneglected, had become almost universally hostile to the views of theUnited Colonies. 

General Carleton was no stranger to the revolution which was takingplace in the minds of the Canadians, and entertained the hope ofraising the siege by their assistance. A detachment of about sixtymen, from the garrison of Quebec, landed twelve leagues below the townon the south side of the river, and were joined by about two hundredand fifty Canadians, who were rapidly increasing in numbers, when theywere suddenly attacked by a detachment sent by Arnold, which surprisedtheir advance guard, killed a few, took some prisoners, and dispersedthe residue. 

{April 2. }

As the season of the year approached when reinforcements from Englandmight be expected, Arnold deemed it necessary to recommence activeoperations, and to resume the siege. His batteries were again erected, and were opened on the 2d of April, but without much effect. He hadnot weight of metal to make a breach in the wall, nor an engineercapable of directing a siege, nor artillerists who understood themanagement of the pieces. 

On the 1st of April, Wooster had arrived, and, on the succeeding day, Arnold's horse fell with him, and so bruised one of his legs as toconfine him to his bed for some time. Believing himself to beneglected, he obtained leave of absence as soon as he was able tomove, and took the command at Montreal. 

{April 15. }

A considerable part of the army having become entitled to a discharge, no inducement could prevail on them to continue longer in so severe aservice. This deduction from Wooster's force was the more sensiblyfelt, because the present situation of the roads, the lakes, and theSt. Lawrence, suspended the arrival of the reinforcements destined forhis aid. 

[Sidenote: General Thomas takes command of the army. ]

Among the first who reached camp after this state of things tookplace, was General Thomas. He arrived on the 1st of May, and found anarmy consisting of nineteen hundred men; of whom, less than onethousand, including officers, were effective. Among these were threehundred entitled to discharge, who refused to do duty, and insistedimportunately on being immediately dismissed. This small force wasstill more enfeebled by being so divided that it was impracticable tounite more than three hundred men at any one point. All the magazinescontained but one hundred and fifty barrels of powder, and six daysprovisions; nor could adequate supplies from the country people beobtained, as the Canadians no longer manifested any disposition toserve them. 

The river began to open below, and it was certain, that the Britishwould seize the first moment of its being practicable, to relieve thisimportant place. Amidst these unpromising circumstances, the hopes oftaking Quebec appeared to General Thomas to be chimerical, and alonger continuance before the town both useless and dangerous. It wasapparent that the first reinforcements which should arrive woulddeprive him entirely of the use of the river, and consequently wouldembarrass the removal of his sick, and military stores. No objectremained to justify this hazard. 

[Sidenote: The blockade of Quebec is raised. ]

{May 6. }

Under these impressions, he called a council of war, which unanimouslydetermined, that the army was not in a condition to risk anassault--that the sick should be removed to the Three Rivers, and theartillery and other stores embarked in their boats, in order to moveto a more defensible position. On the evening of the same day, intelligence was received that a British fleet was below; and, thenext morning, five ships, which had, with much labour and danger, madetheir way up the river through the ice, appeared in sight. They soonentered the harbour, and landed some men whilst the Americans wereassiduously employed in the embarkation of their sick and stores--anoperation carried on the more slowly, because the first appearance ofthe ships deprived them of the aid expected from the teams andcarriages of the Canadians. 

About noon, Carleton made a sortie at the head of one thousand men, formed in two divisions, and supported by six field pieces. TheAmericans had thrown up no intrenchments, and could not bring intoaction more than three hundred men. Under these circumstances, victorywas scarcely possible, and could have produced no important effect. General Thomas, therefore, with the advice of the field officers abouthim, determined not to risk an action, and ordered his troops toretreat up the river. This was done with much precipitation, and manyof the sick, with all the military stores, fell into the hands of theenemy. The army continued its retreat to the Sorel, where GeneralThomas was seized with the small=pox, of which he died. [27]

 [Footnote 27: Whilst the troops of the United Colonies were flying from the vicinity of Quebec, an unexpected calamity befel them in a different quarter of that province. 

 Colonel Bedel, with three hundred and ninety continental troops and two field pieces, had been stationed at the Cedars, a point of land about forty miles above Montreal, which projected far into the St. Lawrence, and could be approached only on one side. Early in the spring, General Carleton had planned an expedition against this post, the execution of which was committed to Captain Forster, who commanded at an English station on Oswegachie. At the head of a company of regulars and a body of Indians, amounting in the whole to six hundred men, he appeared before the American works early in May. Two days previous to his appearance, Colonel Bedel had received intelligence of his approach; and, leaving the fort to be commanded by Major Butterfield, had proceeded himself to Montreal, to solicit assistance. Arnold, who then commanded at that place, immediately detached Major Sherburne to the Cedars with one hundred men; and prepared to follow, in person, at the head of a much larger force. 

 Although the place could have been easily defended, the besiegers having no artillery--Major Butterfield, intimidated by the threat, that should any Indians be killed during the siege, it would be out of the power of Captain Forster to restrain the savages from massacreing every individual of the garrison, consented to a capitulation, by which the whole party became prisoners of war. The next day, Major Sherburne approached without having received any information that Butterfield had surrendered. Within about four miles of the Cedars, he was attacked by a considerable body of Indians; and, after a sharp conflict, surrendered at discretion. 

 On being informed of these untoward events, Arnold, at the head of seven hundred men, marched against the enemy then at Vaudreuil, in the hope of recovering the American prisoners. When preparing for an engagement, he received a flag, accompanied by Major Sherburne, giving him the most positive assurances that if he persisted in his design, it would be entirely out of the power of Captain Forster to prevent his savages from pursuing their horrid customs, and disencumbering themselves of their prisoners by putting every man to death. This massacre was already threatened; and Major Sherburne confirmed the information. Under the influence of this threat, Arnold desisted from his purpose, and consented to a cartel, by which the prisoners were delivered up to him; he agreeing, among other things, not only to deliver as many British soldiers in exchange for them, but also, that they should immediately return to their homes. ]

The Americans were much dissatisfied with the conduct of thisgentleman. To him they, in some degree, attributed the disasters whichruined their affairs in Canada. But this censure was unjust. He tookcommand of the army when it was too weak to maintain its ground, andwhen the time for saving the sick and the military stores had passedaway. 

The siege of Quebec, instead of being continued longer, ought to havebeen abandoned at an earlier period. This was the real fault of thosewho commanded in Canada. It is to be ascribed to the reluctance alwaysfelt by inexperienced officers to disappoint the public expectation, by relinquishing an enterprise concerning which sanguine hopes havebeen entertained; and to encounter the obloquy of giving up a post, although it can no longer with prudence be defended. In theperseverance with which the siege of Quebec was maintained, thesemotives operated with all their force, and they received an addition, from the unwillingness felt by the Americans, to abandon those oftheir friends who had taken so decisive a part in their favour, as tobe incapable of remaining in safety behind them. 

{June 4. }

[Sidenote: General Sullivan takes the command. ]

After the death of General Thomas, reinforcements assembled at themouth of the Sorel, which increased the army to four or five thousandmen, who were commanded by General Sullivan. The friendly Canadianswho had supposed themselves abandoned, manifested great joy at thearrival of a force which appeared to them very considerable; andoffered every assistance in their power. Sullivan calculated on theirjoining him in great numbers, and entertained sanguine hopes ofrecovering and maintaining the post of De Chambeau. As a previousmeasure, it was necessary to dislodge the enemy at the Three Rivers. 

Carleton was not immediately in a situation to follow up the blowgiven the Americans at Quebec, and to drive them entirely out of theprovince; but the respite allowed them was not of long duration. 

Towards the end of May large reinforcements arrived, which augmentedthe British army in Canada to about thirteen thousand men. The generalrendezvous appointed for these troops was at the Three Rivers. Thearmy was greatly divided. A considerable corps, commanded by GeneralFrazer, had reached the Three Rivers, and the main body was on its wayfrom Quebec. The distance from the Sorel was about fifty miles, andseveral armed vessels and transports, full of troops, lay about fivemiles higher up than the Three Rivers, full in the way. [28]

 [Footnote 28: Annual Register. ]

General Thompson, who commanded the army after the illness of GeneralThomas, understanding the party at the Three Rivers to consist ofabout eight hundred men, partly Canadians, had detached Colonel St. Clair with between six and seven hundred men, to attack it, if thereshould be any probability of doing so with advantage. Colonel St. Clair advanced to Nicolet, where, believing himself not strong enoughfor the service on which he had been ordered, he waited for furtherreinforcements, or additional instructions. At this time GeneralSullivan arrived; and, understanding the enemy to be weak at the ThreeRivers, orders General Thompson to join Colonel St. Clair at Nicolet, with a reinforcement of nearly fourteen hundred men, to take commandof the whole detachment, and to attack the troops lying at the ThreeRivers, provided there was a favourable prospect of success. 

{June 8. }

General Thompson joined Colonel St. Clair at Nicolet, and, believinghimself strong enough to perform the service consigned to him, felldown the river by night, and passed to the other side, with theintention of surprising Frazer. The plan was to attack the village alittle before day-break, at the same instant, at each end; whilst twosmaller corps were drawn up to cover and support the attack. 

[Sidenote: Battle of the Three Rivers. ]

The troops passed the armed vessels without being perceived, butarrived at Three Rivers about an hour later than had been intended; inconsequence of which they were discovered, and the alarm was given attheir landing. To avoid the fire of some ships in the river, theyattempted to pass through what appeared to be a point of woods, butwas in reality a deep morass three miles in extent. The delaysoccasioned by their detention in this morass, gave General Frazer fulltime to land some field pieces, and prepare for their reception; whileGeneral Nesbit fell into their rear, and cut off their return to theboats. They advanced to the charge, but were soon repulsed; andfinding it impracticable to return the way they came, were driven somemiles through a deep swamp, which they traversed with inconceivabletoil, and every degree of distress. The British at length gave overthe pursuit. 

In this unfortunate enterprise, General Thompson and Colonel Irwin, with about two hundred men, were made prisoners; and from twenty tothirty were killed. The loss of the British was inconsiderable. 

{June 14. }

The whole American force in Canada now amounted to about eightthousand men, not one half of whom were fit for duty. About twothousand five hundred effectives were with General Sullivan at theSorel. The whole were in a state of total insubordination--muchharassed with fatigue--and dispirited by their late losses, by thevisible superiority of the enemy, and by the apprehension that theirretreat would be entirely cut off. Under all these discouragingcircumstances, General Sullivan formed the rash determination ofdefending the post at Sorel; and was induced only by the unanimousopinion of his officers, and a conviction that the troops would notsupport him, to abandon it a few hours before the British tookpossession of it. The same causes drew him reluctantly from Chambléeand St. John's; but he resolved to remain at the Isle Aux Noix, untilhe should receive orders to retreat. He had been joined at St. John'sby General Arnold, who had crossed over at Longueisle just in time tosave the garrison of Montreal. 

The Isle Aux Noix is a low unhealthy place, badly supplied with water;where the troops were so universally seized with fevers, as to compelGeneral Sullivan to retire to the Isle Lamotte. At that place hereceived the orders of General Schuyler to embark on the lakes forCrown Point. 

The armed vessels on the Sorel and St. Lawrence were destroyed, andthe fortifications of Chamblée and St. John's set on fire. All thebaggage of the army, and nearly all the military stores were saved. 

The British army, during this whole retreat, followed close in therear, and took possession of the different posts which the Americanshad occupied, immediately after they were evacuated. 

On the Sorel the pursuit stopped. The Americans had the command of thelake, and the British general deemed it prudent to wrest it from thembefore he advanced farther. To effect this, it was necessary toconstruct a number of vessels, which required time and labour. Meanwhile, General Gates was ordered to take command of the northernarmy, which was directed to be reinforced with six thousand militia. 

[Sidenote: Canada evacuated. ]

Thus terminated the enterprise against Canada. It was a bold, and, atone period, promised to be a successful effort to annex that extensiveprovince to the United Colonies. The dispositions of the Canadiansfavoured the measure; and had Quebec fallen, there is reason tobelieve the colony would have entered cordially into the union. Had afew incidents turned out fortunately; had Arnold been able to reachQuebec a few days sooner, or to cross the St. Lawrence on his firstarrival--or had the gallant Montgomery not fallen in the assault ofthe 31st December, it is probable the expedition would have beencrowned with complete success. But the radical causes of failure, putting fortune out of the question, were to be found in the latenessof the season when the troops were assembled, in a defect of thepreparations necessary for such a service, and still more in theshortness of the time for which the men were enlisted. Had theexpedition been successful, the practicability of maintaining thecountry is much to be doubted. Whilst General Montgomery lay beforeQuebec, and expected to obtain possession of the place, he extendedhis views to its preservation. His plan required a permanent army often thousand men; strong fortifications at Jacques Cartier, and therapids of Richelieu; and armed vessels in the river, above the lastplace. With this army and these precautions, he thought the countrymight be defended; but not with an inferior force. 

It seems, therefore, to have been an enterprise requiring means beyondthe ability of congress; and the strength exhausted on it would havebeen more judiciously employed in securing the command of the lakesGeorge and Champlain, and the fortified towns upon them. 

While General Carleton was making preparations to enter the lakes, General Schuyler was using his utmost exertions to retain the commandof them. But, so great was the difficulty of procuring workmen andmaterials, that he found it impossible to equip a fleet which would beequal to the exigency. It consisted of only fifteen small vessels; thelargest of which was a schooner mounting twelve guns, carrying six andfour pound balls. The command of this squadron, at the instance ofGeneral Washington, was given to General Arnold. 

[Sidenote: General Carleton constructs a fleet. ]

[Sidenote: Enters Lake Champlain. ]

With almost incredible exertions, the British general constructed apowerful fleet; and, afterwards, dragged up the rapids of St. Thereseand St. John's, a vast number of long boats and other vessels, amongwhich was a gondola weighing thirty tons. This immense work wascompleted in little more than three months; and, as if by magic, General Arnold saw on Lake Champlain, early in October, a fleetconsisting of near thirty vessels; the largest of which, theInflexible, carried eighteen twelve-pounders. This formidable fleet, having on board General Carleton himself, and navigated by sevenhundred prime seamen under the command of Captain Pringle, proceededimmediately in quest of Arnold, who was advantageously posted betweenthe island of Valicour and the western main. 

Notwithstanding the disparity of force, a warm action ensued. A wind, unfavourable to the British, kept the Inflexible and some other largevessels at too great a distance to render any service. Thiscircumstance enabled Arnold to keep up the engagement until night, when Captain Pringle discontinued it, and anchored his whole fleet ina line, as near the vessels of his adversary as was practicable. Inthis engagement, the best schooner belonging to the American flotillawas burnt, and a gondola was sunk. 

[Sidenote: Defeats the American flotilla. ]

In the night, Arnold attempted to escape to Ticonderoga; and, the nextmorning, was out of sight; but, being immediately pursued, wasovertaken about noon, and brought to action a few leagues short ofCrown Point. He kept up a warm engagement for about two hours, duringwhich the vessels that were most ahead escaped to Ticonderoga. Twogallies and five gondolas, which remained, made a desperateresistance. At length one of them struck; after which Arnold ran theremaining vessels on shore, and blew them up; having first saved hismen, though great efforts were made to take them. 

On the approach of the British army, a small detachment, which hadoccupied Crown Point as an out-post, evacuated the place, and retiredto Ticonderoga, which Schuyler determined to defend to the lastextremity. 

[Sidenote: Takes possession of Crown Point. ]

[Sidenote: Retires into winter quarters. ]

General Carleton took possession of Crown Point, and advanced a partof his fleet into Lake George, within view of Ticonderoga. His armyalso approached that place, as if designing to invest it; but, afterreconnoitring the works, and observing the steady countenance of thegarrison, he thought it too late to lay siege to the fortress. Re-embarking his army, he returned to Canada, where he placed it inwinter quarters; making the Isle Aux Noix his most advanced post. 

CHAPTER IV. 

 Transactions in Virginia.... Action at Great Bridge.... Norfolk evacuated.... Burnt.... Transactions in North Carolina.... Action at Moore's Creek Bridge.... Invasion of South Carolina.... British fleet repulsed at Fort Moultrie.... Transactions in New York.... Measures leading to Independence.... Independence declared. 

{1775}

{July. }

[Sidenote: Transactions in Virginia. ]

Whilst the war was carried on thus vigorously in the north, thesouthern colonies were not entirely unemployed. The convention ofVirginia determined to raise two regiments of regular troops for oneyear, and to enlist a part of the militia as minute-men. 

{October. }

Lord Dunmore, the Governor of the colony, who was joined by the mostactive of the disaffected, and by a number of slaves whom he hadencouraged to run away from their masters, was collecting a navalforce, which threatened to be extremely troublesome in a country sointersected with large navigable rivers as the colony of Virginia. With this force he carried on a slight predatory war, and, at length, attempted to burn the town of Hampton. The inhabitants, havingreceived intimation of his design, gave notice of it to the commandingofficer at Williamsburg, where some regulars and minute-men werestationed. Two companies were despatched to their assistance, whoarrived just before the assault was made, and obliged the assailantsto retreat, with some loss, to their vessels. 

{November 7. }

In consequence of this repulse, his Lordship proclaimed martial law;summoned all persons capable of bearing arms to repair to the royalstandard, or be considered as traitors; and offered freedom to allindented servants and slaves who should join him. [29]

 [Footnote 29: Gazette-Remembrancer. ]

This proclamation made some impression about Norfolk, where theGovernor collected such a force of the disaffected and negroes, asgave him an entire ascendancy in that part of the colony. 

Intelligence of these transactions being received at Williamsburg, aregiment of regulars and about two hundred minute-men, were ordereddown under the command of Colonel Woodford, [30] for the defence of theinhabitants. Hearing of their approach, Lord Dunmore took a wellchosen position on the north side of Elizabeth river, at the GreatBridge, where it was necessary for the provincials to cross in orderto reach Norfolk; at which place he had established himself in someforce. Here he erected a small fort on a piece of firm groundsurrounded by a marsh, which was accessible, on either side, only by along causeway. Colonel Woodford encamped within cannon-shot of thispost, in a small village at the south end of the causeway; acrosswhich, just at its termination, he constructed a breast-work; but, being without artillery, was unable to make any attempt on the fort. 

 [Footnote 30: The author was in this expedition, and relates the circumstances attending it chiefly from his own observation. ]

{December. }

[Sidenote: Action at the Great Bridge. ]

In this position both parties continued for a few days, when LordDunmore ordered Captain Fordyce, the commanding officer at the GreatBridge, though inferior in numbers, to storm the works of theprovincials. Between day-break and sunrise, this officer, at the headof about sixty grenadiers of the 14th regiment, who led the column, advanced along the causeway with fixed bayonets, against thebreast-work. The alarm was immediately given; and, as is the practicewith raw troops, the bravest rushed to the works, where, regardless oforder, they kept up a heavy fire on the front of the British column. Captain Fordyce, though received so warmly in front, and taken inflank by a party posted on a small eminence on his right, marched upwith great intrepidity, until he fell dead within a few steps of thebreast-work. The column immediately broke and retreated; but beingcovered by the artillery of the fort, was not pursued. 

In this ill-judged attack, every grenadier is said to have been killedor wounded; while the Americans did not lose a single man. 

[Sidenote: Norfolk evacuated. ]

The following night, the fort was evacuated. The provincial troopsproceeded to Norfolk, under the command of Colonel Howe of NorthCarolina, and Lord Dunmore took refuge on board his vessels. 

{1776}

{January. }

[Sidenote: And burnt. ]

After taking possession of the town, the American soldiers frequentlyamused themselves by firing into the vessels in the harbour, from thebuildings near the water. Irritated by this, Lord Dunmore determinedto destroy the houses immediately on the shore; and, on the night ofthe first of January, under cover of a heavy cannonade, landed a bodyof troops, and set fire to a number of houses near the river. Theprovincials, who entertained strong prejudices against this station, saw the flames spread from house to house without making any attemptto extinguish them. After the fire had continued several weeks, inwhich time it had consumed about four-fifths of the town, ColonelHowe, who had waited on the convention to urge the necessity ofdestroying the place, returned with orders to burn the remaininghouses; which were carried into immediate execution. 

{February. }

Thus was destroyed the most populous and flourishing town in Virginia. Its destruction was one of those ill-judged measures, of which theconsequences are felt long after the motives are forgotten. 

After Norfolk was laid in ashes, Lord Dunmore continued a predatorywar on the rivers--burning houses, and robbing plantations--whichserved only to distress a few individuals, and to increase thedetestation in which he was held through the country. At length, hiswretched followers, wearied with their miserable condition, were sentto Florida. [31]

 [Footnote 31: Virginia Gazette. ]

As the war became more serious, the convention deemed it necessary toincrease the number of regular regiments from two to nine, which wereafterwards taken into the continental service. 

[Sidenote: Transactions in North Carolina. ]

In North Carolina, Governor Martin, though obliged to take refuge onboard a ship of war, in Cape Fear river, indulged the hope of beingable to reduce that colony. 

A body of ignorant and disorderly men on the western frontier, stylingthemselves regulators, had attempted by arms, some time before theexisting war, to control and stop the administration of justice. Afterfailing in this attempt, they became as hostile to the colonial, asthey had been to the royal government. 

The province also contained many families who had lately emigratedfrom the highlands of Scotland; and who, retaining their attachment tothe place of their nativity, transferred it to the government underwhich they had been bred. From the union of these parties, GovernorMartin entertained sanguine hopes of making a successful struggle forNorth Carolina. His confidence was increased by the assurances he hadreceived, that a considerable land and naval armament was destined forthe southern colonies. 

To prepare for co-operating with this force, should it arrive; or, inany event, to make an effort to give the ascendancy in North Carolinato the royal cause, he sent several commissions to the leaders of thehighlanders, for raising and commanding regiments; and granted one toa Mr. M'Donald, their chief, to act as their general. He also sentthem a proclamation, to be used on a proper occasion, commanding allpersons, on their allegiance, to repair to the royal standard. Thiswas erected by General M'Donald at Cross Creek, about the middle ofFebruary, and nearly fifteen hundred men arranged themselves under it. 

{Fifteenth. }

{Twentieth. }

Upon the first advice that the loyalists were assembling, BrigadierGeneral Moore marched at the head of a provincial regiment, with suchmilitia as he could suddenly collect, and some pieces of cannon, andtook a strong position within a few miles of them. General M'Donaldsoon approached, and sent a letter to Moore, enclosing the Governor'sproclamation, and recommending to him and his party to join the King'sstandard by a given hour the next day. The negotiation was protractedby Moore, in the hope that the numerous bodies of militia who wereadvancing to join him, would soon enable him to surround hisadversary. M'Donald, at length, perceived his danger, and, suddenlydecamping, endeavoured by forced marches to extricate himself from it, and join Governor Martin and Lord William Campbell, who wereencouraged to commence active operations by the arrival of GeneralClinton in the colony. 

[Sidenote: Action at Moore's Creek Bridge. ]

The provincial parties, however, were so alert in every part of thecountry, that he found himself under the necessity of engagingColonels Caswell and Lillington, who, with about one thousandminute-men and militia, had entrenched themselves directly in hisfront, at a place called Moore's Creek Bridge. The royalists weregreatly superior in number, but were under the disadvantage of beingcompelled to cross the bridge, the planks of which were partly takenup, in the face of the intrenchments occupied by the provincials. Theycommenced the attack, however, with great spirit; but Colonel M'Leodwho commanded them, in consequence of the indisposition of M'Donald, and several others of their bravest officers and men, having fallen inthe first onset, their courage deserted them, and they fled in greatdisorder, leaving behind them their general and several others oftheir leaders, who fell into the hands of the provincials. [32]

 [Footnote 32: Annual Register--Gordon--Ramsay--Gazette. ]

This victory was of eminent service to the American cause in NorthCarolina. It broke the spirits of a great body of men, who would haveconstituted a formidable reinforcement to an invading army; increasedthe confidence of the provincials in themselves, and attached to themthe timid and wavering, who form a large portion of every community. 

General Clinton, who was to command in the south, had left Boston witha force too inconsiderable to attempt any thing until he should bereinforced by the troops expected from Europe. After parting withGovernor Tryon in New York, he had proceeded to Virginia, where hepassed a few days with Lord Dunmore; but finding himself too weak toeffect any thing in that province, he repaired to North Carolina, andremained with Governor Martin until the arrival of Sir Peter Parker. Fortunately for the province, the unsuccessful insurrection ofM'Donald had previously broken the strength and spirits of theloyalists, and deprived them of their most active chiefs; inconsequence of which, the operations which had been meditated againstNorth Carolina were deferred. Clinton continued in Cape Fear untilnear the end of May, when, hearing nothing certain from General Howe, he determined to make an attempt on the capital of South Carolina. 

{May. }

Early in the month of April, a letter from the secretary of state toMr. Eden, the royal governor of Maryland, disclosing the designs ofadministration against the southern colonies, was intercepted in theChesapeake; and thus, South Carolina became apprized of the dangerwhich threatened its metropolis. Mr. Rutledge, a gentleman of vigourand talents, who had been chosen president of that province on thedissolution of the regal government, adopted the most energetic meansfor placing it in a posture of defence. 

{June. }

[Sidenote: Invasion of South Carolina. ]

In the beginning of June, the British fleet came to anchor off theharbour of Charleston. The bar was crossed with some difficulty; afterwhich, it was determined to commence operations by silencing a fort onSullivan's island. 

During the interval between passing the bar and attacking the fort, the continental troops of Virginia and North Carolina arrived inCharleston; and the American force amounted to between five and sixthousand men, of whom two thousand five hundred were regulars. Thisarmy was commanded by General Lee, whose fortune it had been to meetGeneral Clinton at New York, in Virginia, and in North Carolina. Viewing with a military eye the situation of the post entrusted to hiscare, Lee was disinclined to hazard his army by engaging it deeply inthe defence of the town; but the solicitude of the South Caroliniansto preserve their capital, aided by his confidence in his ownvigilance, prevailed over a caution which was thought extreme, anddetermined him to attempt to maintain the place. 

Two regular regiments of South Carolina, commanded by Colonels Gadsdenand Moultrie, garrisoned fort Johnson and fort Moultrie. About fivehundred regulars, and three hundred militia under Colonel Thompson, were stationed in some works which had been thrown up on thenorth-eastern extremity of Sullivan's island; and the remaining troopswere arranged on Hadrell's Point, and along the bay in front of thetown. General Lee remained in person with the troops at Hadrell'sPoint, in the rear of Sullivan's island. His position was chosen insuch a manner as to enable him to observe and support the operationsin every quarter, and especially to watch and oppose any attempt ofthe enemy to pass from Long Island to the continent; a movement ofwhich he seems to have been particularly apprehensive. 

{June 28. }

[Sidenote: British fleet repulsed at Fort Moultrie. ]

The British ships, after taking their stations, commenced an incessantand heavy cannonade on the American works. Its effect, however, on thefort, was not such as had been expected. This was attributable to itsform, and to its materials. It was very low, with merlons of greatthickness; and was constructed of earth, and a species of soft woodcommon in that country, called the palmetto, which, on being struckwith a ball, does not splinter, but closes upon it. 

The fire from the fort was deliberate; and, being directed with skill, did vast execution. The garrison united the cool determined courage ofveterans, with the enthusiastic ardour of youth. General Lee crossedover in a boat, to determine whether he should withdraw them; and wasenraptured with the ardour they displayed. They assured him they wouldlose the fort only with their lives; and the mortally wounded breathedtheir last, exhorting their fellow soldiers to the most heroic defenceof the place. 

{July 15. }

The engagement continued until night. By that time, the ships were insuch a condition, as to be unfit to renew the action on the ensuingday. The Bristol lost one hundred and eleven men, and the Experimentseventy-nine. Captain Scott, of the one, lost his arm; and CaptainMorris, of the other, was mortally wounded. Lord Campbell, lateGovernor of the province, who served as a volunteer on board one ofthese vessels, was also mortally wounded; and both ships were soshattered, as to inspire hopes that they would be unable to repass thebar. About nine, they slipped their cables and moved off. A few daysafterwards, the troops were re-embarked, and all farther designsagainst the southern colonies being for the present relinquished, thesquadron sailed for New York. [33]

 [Footnote 33: Annual Register--Gordon--Ramsay--Letters of General Lee. ]

The attack on fort Moultrie was supported by the British seamen withtheir accustomed bravery; and the slaughter on board the ships wasuncommonly great. The loss of the Americans, in killed and wounded, was only thirty-five men. 

Great and well merited praise was bestowed on Colonel Moultrie, whocommanded the fort, and on the garrison, for the resolution displayedin defending it. Nor was the glory acquired on this occasion confinedto them. All the troops that had been stationed on the island partookof it: and the thanks of the United Colonies were voted by congress toGeneral Lee, Colonel Moultrie, Colonel Thompson, and the officers andmen under their command. 

This fortunate event, for such it may well be termed, though not ofmuch magnitude in itself, was, like many other successes attending theAmerican arms in the commencement of the war, of great importance inits consequences. By impressing on the colonists a conviction of theirability to maintain the contest, it increased the number of those whoresolved to resist British authority, and assisted in paving the wayto a declaration of independence. 

{April. }

[Sidenote: Transactions in New York. ]

Even before the evacuation of Boston, it had been foreseen that NewYork must become the seat of war; and that most important militaryoperations would be carried on in that colony. The fortificationswhich had been commenced for the defence of its capital wereindefatigably prosecuted; and, after the arrival of GeneralWashington, these works, combined with those to be erected in thepasses through the highlands up the Hudson, were the objects of hisunremitting attention. 

The difficulty which had been experienced in expelling the Britishfrom Boston, had demonstrated the importance of preventing theirestablishment in New York; and had contributed to the determination ofcontesting with them, very seriously, the possession of that importantplace. The execution of this determination, however, was difficult anddangerous. The defence of New York, against an enemy commanding thesea, requires an army capable of meeting him in the open field, and ofacting offensively both on Long and York Islands. Congress had notadopted measures which might raise such an army. TheCommander-in-chief, in his letters to that body, had long andearnestly urged the policy of bringing the whole strength of thecountry into regular operation. The government was not inattentive tohis remonstrances; but many circumstances combined to prevent such amilitary establishment as the exigency required. 

The congress which assembled in 1775 had adjourned with strong hopesthat the differences between the Mother Country and the Colonies wouldsoon be adjusted to their mutual satisfaction. When the tempermanifested both by the king and his parliament had dissipated thesehopes, and the immense preparations of Great Britain for war, evincedthe necessity of preparations equally vigorous on the part of America, the resolution to make them was finally taken. But, unaccustomed tothe great duties of conducting a war of vast extent, they could notestimate rightly the value of the means employed, nor calculate theeffects which certain causes would produce. Opinions of the mostpernicious tendency prevailed; from which they receded slowly, andfrom which they could be ultimately forced only by melancholyexperience. 

The most fatal among these was the theory, that an army could becreated every campaign for the purposes of that campaign; and thatsuch temporary means would be adequate to the defence of the country. They relied confidently on being able on any emergency, to call out aforce suited to the occasion:--they relied too much on the competenceof such a force to the purposes of war, and they depended too long onthe spirit of patriotism, which was believed to animate the mass ofthe people. 

Under these impressions, the determination to form a permanent armywas too long delayed; and the measures necessary to raise such an armywere deferred, till their efficacy became doubtful. It was not untilJune, 1776, that the representations of the Commander-in-chief couldobtain a resolution, directing soldiers to be enlisted for threeyears, and offering a bounty of ten dollars to each recruit. The timewhen this resolution could certainly have been executed, had passedaway. That zeal for the service, which was manifested in the firstmoments of the war, had long since begun to abate; and though thedetermination to resist had become more general, that enthusiasm whichprompts individuals to expose themselves to more than an equal shareof danger and hardship, was visibly declining. The progress of thesesentiments seems to have been unexpected; and the causes producingsuch effects appear not to have been perceived. The regiments voted bycongress were incomplete; and that bounty, which, if offered in time, would have effected its object, came too late to fill them. 

It was not in numbers only that the weakness of the American armyconsisted. In arms, ammunition, tents, and clothes, its deficiency wassuch as to render it unfit for the great purposes of war, andinferior, in all these respects, to the enemy which it was destined toencounter. 

But, however inadequate to the object the regular force might be, boththe government and the Commander-in-chief were determined to defendNew York; and congress passed a resolution to reinforce the army withthirteen thousand eight hundred militia. For the defence of the middlecolonies, and for the purpose of repelling any attempt to land on theJersey shore, it was resolved to form a flying camp, to be composed often thousand men, to be furnished by Pennsylvania, Delaware, andMaryland. The militia, both of the flying camp and of the army at NewYork, were to be engaged to serve until the first of December; and theCommander-in-chief was empowered to call on the neighbouring coloniesfor such additional temporary aids of militia, as the exigencies ofhis army might render necessary. 

Great and embarrassing as were the difficulties already noticed, theywere augmented by the disaffection of the city of New York, and of theadjacent islands. Although Governor Tryon had found it necessary totake refuge on board some ships lying in the harbour, he had beenpermitted to continue an open intercourse with the inhabitants, whichenabled him to communicate freely with the royalists; and to concertplans of future co-operation. This intercourse was broken off by thearrival of the Commander-in-chief;--yet a plot was formed, through theagency of the mayor, to rise in favour of the British on theirlanding; and, as was understood, to seize and deliver up GeneralWashington himself. This plot had extended to the American army, andeven to the general's guards. It was fortunately discovered in time tobe defeated; and some of the persons concerned were executed. Aboutthe same time a similar plot was discovered in the neighbourhood ofAlbany; and there too, executions were found necessary. 

Hitherto, the sole avowed object of the war had been a redress ofgrievances. The utmost horror had been expressed at the idea ofattempting independence; and the most anxious desire ofre-establishing the union which had so long subsisted between the twocountries on its ancient principles, was openly and generallydeclared. But however sincere these declarations might have been atthe commencement of the conflict, the operation of hostilities wasinfallible. To profess allegiance and respect for a monarch with whomthey were at open war, was an absurdity too great to be longcontinued. The human mind, when it receives a strong impulse, doesnot, like projectiles, stop at the point to which the force originallyapplied may have been calculated to carry it. Various causes act uponit in its course. When the appeal was made to arms, a great majorityof those who guided the councils and led the forces of America, wishedonly for a repeal of the acts of parliament which had occasioned theirresistance to the authority of the crown; and would have been trulyunwilling to venture upon the unexplored field of self-government. Forsome time, prayers were offered for the king, in the performance ofdivine service; and, in the proclamation of a fast by congress, inJune, 1775, one of the motives for recommending it, was, to beseechthe Almighty "to bless our rightful sovereign King George III. Andinspire him with wisdom. "

[Illustration: Independence Hall, Philadelphia

_In this unpretentious brick building, erected in 1729-34, andintimately associated with the birth of the nation, the ContinentalCongress met, Washington was made Commander-in-Chief of the Americanarmy in 1775, and the Declaration of Independence was adopted on July4, 1776, and read to the people assembled in the street. It is now amuseum of Revolutionary and historical relics. _]

[Sidenote: Measures leading to independence. ]

The prejudices in favour of a connexion with England, and of theEnglish constitution, gradually, but rapidly yielded to republicanprinciples, and a desire for independence. New strength was every dayadded to the opinions, that a cordial reconciliation with GreatBritain had become impossible; that mutual confidence could never berestored; that reciprocal jealousy, suspicion, and hate, would takethe place of that affection, which could alone render such a connexionhappy and beneficial; that even the commercial dependence of Americaupon Britain, was greatly injurious to the former, and thatincalculable benefits must be derived from opening to themselves themarkets of the world; that to be governed by a distant nation orsovereign, unacquainted with, and unmindful of their interests, would, even if reinstated in their former situation, be an evil too great tobe voluntarily borne. But victory alone could restore them to thatsituation--and victory would give them independence. The hazard wasthe same; and since the risk of every thing was unavoidable, the mostvaluable object ought, in common justice, and common prudence, to bethe reward of success. With such horror, too, did they view thepresent war, as to suppose it could not possibly receive the supportof a free people. The alacrity therefore with which the English nationentered into it, was ascribed to a secret and dangerous influence, which was, with rapid progress, undermining the liberties and themorals of the Mother Country; and which, it was feared, would crossthe Atlantic, and infect the principles of the colonists likewise, should the ancient connexion be restored. The intercourse of Americawith the world, and her own experience, had not then been sufficientto teach her the important truth, that the many, as often as the few, can abuse power, and trample on the weak, without perceiving that theyare tyrants; that they too, not unfrequently, close their eyes againstthe light; and shut their ears against the plainest evidence, and themost conclusive reasoning. 

It was also urged, with great effect, that the possibility ofobtaining foreign aid would be much increased by holding out thedismemberment of the British empire, to the rivals of that nation, asan inducement to engage in the contest. 

American independence became the general theme of conversation; andmore and more the general wish. The measures of congress took theircomplexion from the temper of the people. Their proceedings againstthe disaffected became more and more vigorous; their languagerespecting the British government was less the language of subjects, and better calculated to turn the public attention towards congressand the provincial assemblies, as the sole and ultimate rulers of thecountry. General letters of marque and reprisal were granted; and theAmerican ports were opened to all nations and people, not subject tothe British crown. 

{May 6. }

At length, a measure was adopted, which was considered by congress andby America in general, as deciding the question of independence. Hitherto, it had been recommended to particular colonies, to establishtemporary institutions for the conduct of their affairs during theexistence of the contest; but now, a resolution was offered, recommending generally to such colonies as had not already establishedthem, the adoption of governments adequate to the exigency. Mr. JohnAdams, Mr. Rutledge, and Mr. Richard Henry Lee, all zealous advocatesfor independence, were appointed a committee, to prepare a properpreamble to the resolution. The report of these gentlemen wasaccepted, and the resolution passed. [34]

 [Footnote 34: Before the vote on the question of independence was taken, congress passed resolutions, declaring that all persons residing within, or passing through any one of the United Colonies, owed allegiance to the government thereof; and that any such person who should levy war against any of the United Colonies, or adhere to the king of Great Britain, or other enemies of the said colonies, or any of them, should be guilty of treason: and recommending it to the several legislatures to pass laws for their punishment. ]

{May 15. }

The provincial assemblies and conventions acted on thisrecommendation; and governments were generally established. InConnecticut and Rhode Island, it was deemed unnecessary to make anychange in their actual situation, because, in those colonies, theexecutive, as well as the whole legislature, had always been electedby themselves. In Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York, somehesitation was at first discovered; and the assemblies appearedunwilling to take this decisive step. The public opinion, however, wasin favour of it, and finally prevailed. 

The several colonies, now contemplating themselves as sovereignstates, and mingling with the arduous duty of providing means to repela powerful enemy, the important and interesting labour of framinggovernments for themselves and their posterity, exhibited the novelspectacle of matured and enlightened societies, uninfluenced byexternal or internal force, devising, according to their ownjudgments, political systems for their own government. 

With the exceptions already stated, of Connecticut and Rhode Island, whose systems had ever been in a high degree democratic, the hithertountried principle was adopted, of limiting the departments ofgovernments by a written constitution, prescribing bounds not to betranscended by the legislature itself. 

The solid foundations of a popular government were already laid in allthe colonies. The institutions received from England were admirablycalculated to prepare the way for temperate and rational republics. Nohereditary powers had ever existed; and every authority had beenderived either from the people or the king. The crown being no longeracknowledged, the people remained the only source of legitimate power. The materials in their possession, as well as their habits ofthinking, were adapted only to governments in all respectsrepresentative; and such governments were universally adopted. 

The provincial assemblies, under the influence of congress, took upthe question of independence; and, in some instances, authorized theirrepresentatives in the great national council, to enter into foreignalliances. Many declared themselves in favour of a total and immediateseparation from Great Britain; and gave instructions to theirrepresentatives conforming to this sentiment. 

{June 7. }

Thus supported by public opinion, congress determined to take thisdecisive step; and on the 7th of June, a resolution to that effect wasmoved by Richard Henry Lee, and seconded by John Adams. The resolutionwas referred to a committee, who reported it in the following terms. "Resolved, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to befree and independent states; and that all political connexion betweenthem and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totallydissolved. "

{June 28. }

{July 2. }

This resolution was referred to a committee of the whole, in which itwas debated on Saturday the 8th, and Monday the 10th of June. Itappearing that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina were not yet matured for the measure, but were fastadvancing to that state, the debate was adjourned to the first ofJuly, when it was resumed. In the mean time, a committee[35] wasappointed to prepare the declaration of independence, which wasreported on the 28th of June, and laid on the table. On the first ofJuly the debate on the original resolution was resumed. The questionwas put in the evening of that day, and carried in the affirmative bythe votes of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, againstPennsylvania and South Carolina. Delaware was divided; and thedelegates from New York, having declared their approbation of theresolution, and their conviction that it was approved by theirconstituents also, but that their instructions, which had been drawnnear twelve months before, enjoined them to do nothing which mightimpede reconciliation with the mother country, were permitted towithdraw from the question. The report of the committee was put offtill the next day at the request of Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina, who expressed the opinion that his colleagues would then concur in theresolution for the sake of unanimity. The next day South Carolina didconcur in it. The votes of Pennsylvania and Delaware were also changedby the arrival of other members. Congress then proceeded to considerthe declaration of independence. After some amendments[36] it wasapproved, and signed by every member present except Mr. Dickenson. [37]

 [Footnote 35: Mr. Jefferson, Mr. John Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. R. R. Livingston. Mr. R. H. Lee, the mover of the resolution, had been compelled by the illness of Mrs. Lee to leave congress the day on which the committee was appointed. ]

 [Footnote 36: See note No. VI. At the end of the volume. ]

 [Footnote 37: Mr. Jefferson's Correspondence. ]

[Sidenote: Independence declared. ]

{July 4. }

This declaration was immediately communicated to the armies, whoreceived it with enthusiasm. It was also proclaimed throughout theUnited States, and was generally approved by those who had engaged inthe opposition to the claims of the British Parliament. Some fewindividuals, who had been zealous supporters of all measures which hadfor their object only a redress of grievances, and in whose bosoms thehope of accommodation still lingered, --either too timid to meet thearduous conflict which this measure rendered inevitable, or, sincerelybelieving that the happiness of America would be best consulted bypreserving their political connexion with Great Britain, viewed thedissolution of that connexion with regret. Others, who afterwardsdeserted the American cause, attributed their defection to thismeasure. It was also an unfortunate truth, that in the whole countrybetween New England and the Potowmac, which was now become the greattheatre of action, although the majority was in favour ofindependence, a formidable minority existed, who not only refused toact with their countrymen, but were ready to give to the enemy everyaid in their power. 

It can not, however, be questioned, that the declaration ofindependence was wise, and well-timed. The soundest policy requiredthat the war should no longer be a contest between subjects and theiracknowledged sovereign. 

CHAPTER V. 

 Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York.... Circular letter of Lord Howe.... State of the American Army.... The British land in force on Long Island.... Battle of Brooklyn.... Evacuation of Long Island.... Fruitless negotiations.... New York evacuated.... Skirmish on the heights of Haerlem.... Letter on the state of the army. 

{1776}

While congress was deliberating in Philadelphia on the great questionof independence, the British fleet appeared before New York. 

[Sidenote: Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York. ]

On evacuating Boston, General Howe had retired to Halifax; where hepurposed to remain till reinforcements should arrive from England. Butthe situation of his army in that place was so uncomfortable, and thedelays in the arrival of the troops from Europe were so great, that heat length resolved to sail for New York, with the forces already underhis command. 

{June 10. }

{July 3 & 4. }

In the latter end of June, he arrived off Sandy Hook, in the GreyHound; and, on the 29th of that month, the first division of the fleetfrom Halifax reached that place. The rear division soon followed; andthe troops were landed on Staten Island, on the third and fourth ofJuly. They were received with great demonstrations of joy by theinhabitants, who took the oaths of allegiance to the British crown, and embodied themselves under the authority of the late GovernorTryon, for the defence of the island. Strong assurances were alsoreceived from Long Island, and the neighbouring parts of New Jersey, of the favourable dispositions of a great proportion of the people tothe royal cause. 

It was foreseen that the provisions remaining on the small islandsabout New York, must fall into the possession of the invading army, and General Washington had intended to remove them to a place ofsafety; but, the existing state of public opinion requiring theco-operation of the several committees, this measure of wiseprecaution could not be completely executed; and General Howe, on hisarrival, obtained ample supplies for his army. 

The command of the fleet destined for the American service wasintrusted to Lord Howe, the brother of the general; and they were bothconstituted commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies, andgranting pardons, with such exceptions as they should think proper tomake. He arrived at Staten Island on the twelfth of July. 

{July 12. }

The difficulty of closing the Hudson against an enemy possessing apowerful fleet was soon demonstrated. Two frigates passed thebatteries without injury, and took a station which enabled them to cutoff the communication by water, between the army at New York, and thatat Ticonderoga. An attempt to set these frigates on fire failed in itsexecution, and only a tender was burnt;--soon after which thesevessels returned to the fleet. 

[Sidenote: Circular letter of Lord Howe. ]

{July 14. }

Lord Howe was not deterred by the declaration of Independence fromtrying the influence of his powers for pacification. He sent on shore, by a flag, a circular letter, dated off the coast of Massachusetts, addressed severally to the late governors under the crown, enclosing adeclaration, which he requested them to make public. This declarationannounced his authority to grant pardons to any number or descriptionof persons, who, during the tumult and disorders of the times, mighthave deviated from their just allegiance, and who might be willing, bya speedy return to their duty, to reap the benefits of the royalfavour; and to declare any colony, town, port, or place, in the peaceand under the protection of the crown, and excepted from the penalprovisions of the act of parliament prohibiting all trade andintercourse with the colonies. Assurances were also given that themeritorious services of all persons who should aid and assist inrestoring public tranquillity in the colonies, or in any partsthereof, would be duly considered. 

{July 19. }

These papers were immediately transmitted by the Commander-in-chief tocongress, who resolved that they should "be published in the severalgazettes, that the good people of the United States might be informedof what nature were the commissioners, and what the terms, with theexpectation of which, the insidious court of Britain had sought toamuse and disarm them; and that the few who still remained suspendedby a hope, founded either in the justice or moderation of their lateking, might now, at length, be convinced, that the valour alone oftheir country is to save its liberties. "

About the same time, Lord Howe sent, with a flag, a letter addressedto "George Washington, esquire, " which the General refused to receive, as "it did not acknowledge the public character with which he wasinvested by congress, and in no other character could he have anyintercourse with his lordship. " In a resolution approving thisproceeding, congress directed, "that no letter or message be receivedon any occasion whatever from the enemy, by the Commander-in-chief, orothers, the commanders of the American army, but such as shall bedirected to them in the characters they respectively sustain. "

{July 20. }

The commissioners felt some difficulty in recognizing either the civilor military character conferred on individuals by the existing powersin America; and yet it was desirable, either for the purpose ofeffecting a pacification, or, if that should be impracticable, ofincreasing the divisions already existing, to open negotiations, andhold out the semblance of restoring peace. They cast about for meansto evade this preliminary obstacle to any discussion of the terms theywere authorized to propose; and, at length, Colonel Patterson, adjutant general of the British army, was sent on shore by GeneralHowe, with a letter directed to George Washington, &c. &c. &c. He wasintroduced to the general, whom he addressed by the title of"Excellency;" and, after the usual compliments, opened the subject ofhis mission, by saying, that General Howe much regretted thedifficulties which had arisen respecting the address of the letters;that the mode adopted was deemed consistent with propriety, and wasfounded on precedent, in cases of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, where disputes or difficulties had arisen about rank; that GeneralWashington might recollect he had, last summer, addressed a letter to"the honourable William Howe;" that Lord, and General Howe, did notmean to derogate from his rank, or the respect due to him, and thatthey held his person and character in the highest esteem;--but thatthe direction, with the addition of &c. &c. &c. Implied every thingwhich ought to follow. Colonel Patterson then produced a letter whichhe said was the same that had been sent, and which he laid on thetable. 

The General declined receiving it, and said, that a letter directed toa person in a public character, should have some description orindication of that character; otherwise it would be considered as amere private letter. It was true the _etceteras_ implied every thing, and they also implied any thing; that the letter to General Howe, alluded to, was an answer to one received from him under a likeaddress; which, having been taken by the officer on duty, he did notthink proper to return, and therefore answered in the same mode ofaddress; and that he should absolutely decline any letter relating tohis public station, directed to him as a private person. 

Colonel Patterson then said, that General Howe would not urge hisdelicacy farther, and repeated his assertions that no failure ofrespect was intended. 

After some conversation relative to the treatment of prisoners, Colonel Patterson said, that the goodness and benevolence of the kinghad induced him to appoint Lord Howe, and General Howe, hiscommissioners to accommodate the unhappy dispute at presentsubsisting: that they had great powers, and would derive much pleasurefrom effecting the accommodation; and that he wished this visit to beconsidered as the first advance towards so desirable an object. 

General Washington replied, that he was not vested with any powers onthis subject; but he would observe that, so far as he could judge fromwhat had yet transpired, Lord Howe and General Howe were onlyempowered to grant pardons; that those who had committed no fault, wanted no pardon; and that the Americans were only defending what theydeemed their indubitable rights. This, Colonel Patterson said, wouldopen a very wide field for argument: and, after expressing his fearsthat an adherence to forms might obstruct business of the greatestmoment and concern, he took his leave. 

The substance of this conversation was communicated to congress, whodirected its publication. 

{August. }

The reinforcements to the British army, of whom about four hundred andfifty had been captured by the American cruisers, were now arrivingdaily from Europe; and General Howe had also been joined by the troopsfrom Charleston. His strength was estimated at twenty-four thousandmen. 

[Sidenote: State of the American army. ]

To this army, alike formidable for its numbers, its discipline, andits equipments, --aided in its operations by a numerous fleet, andconducted by commanders of skill and experience, was opposed a force, unstable in its nature, --incapable, from its structure, of receivingdiscipline, --and inferior to its enemy, in numbers, in arms, and inevery military equipment. It consisted, when General Howe landed onStaten Island, of ten thousand men, who were much enfeebled bysickness. The diseases which always afflict new troops, were increasedby exposure to the rain and night air, without tents. At the instanceof the General, some regiments, stationed in the different states, were ordered to join him; and, in addition to the requisitions of mento serve until December--requisitions not yet complied with--theneighbouring militia were called into service for the exigency of themoment. Yet, in a letter written to congress on the 8th of August, hestated that "for the several posts on New York, Long, and Governor'sIsland, and Paulus Hook, the army consisted of only seventeen thousandtwo hundred and twenty-five men, of whom three thousand six hundredand sixty-eight were sick; and that, to repel an immediate attack, hecould count certainly on no other addition to his numbers, than abattalion from Maryland under the command of Colonel Smallwood. " Thisforce was rendered the more inadequate to its objects by beingnecessarily divided for the defence of posts, some of which werefifteen miles distant from others, with navigable waters between them. 

"These things, " continued the letter, "are melancholy, but they arenevertheless true. I hope for better. Under every disadvantage, myutmost exertions shall be employed to bring about the great end wehave in view; and, so far as I can judge from the professions andapparent dispositions of my troops, I shall have their support. Thesuperiority of the enemy, and the expected attack, do not seem to havedepressed their spirits. These considerations lead me to think thatthough the appeal may not terminate so happily as I could wish, yetthe enemy will not succeed in their views without considerable loss. Any advantage they may gain, I trust will cost them dear. "

Soon after this letter, the army was reinforced by Smallwood'sregiment, and by two regiments from Pennsylvania, with a body of NewEngland and New York militia, which increased it to twenty-seventhousand men, of whom one fourth were sick. 

A part of the army was stationed on Long Island, under the command ofMajor General Sullivan. The residue occupied different stations onYork Island, except two small detachments, one on Governor's Island, and the other at Paulus Hook; and except a part of the New Yorkmilitia under General Clinton, who were stationed on the Sound, towards New Rochelle, and about East and West Chester, in order tooppose any sudden attempt which might be made to land aboveKingsbridge, and cut off the communication with the country. 

{July 2. }

Expecting daily to be attacked, and believing that the influence ofthe first battle would be considerable, the Commander-in-chiefemployed every expedient which might act upon that enthusiastic loveof liberty, that indignation against the invaders of their country, and that native courage, which were believed to animate the bosoms ofhis soldiers; and which were relied on as substitutes for disciplineand experience. "The time, " say his orders issued soon after thearrival of General Howe, "is now near at hand, which must determinewhether Americans are to be freemen or slaves; whether they are tohave any property they can call their own; whether their houses andfarms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and themselves consigned to astate of wretchedness from which no human efforts will deliver them. The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courageand conduct of this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves usonly the choice of a brave resistance, or the most abject submission. We have therefore to resolve to conquer or to die. Our own, ourcountry's honour, call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion; andif we now shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the wholeworld. Let us then rely on the goodness of our cause, and the aid ofthe Supreme Being, in whose hands victory is, to animate and encourageus to great and noble actions. The eyes of all our countrymen are nowupon us, and we shall have their blessings and praises, if happily weare the instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated againstthem. Let us therefore animate and encourage each other, and show thewhole world that a freeman contending for liberty, on his own ground, is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth. "

To the officers, he recommended coolness in time of action; and to thesoldiers, strict attention and obedience, with a becoming firmness andspirit. 

He assured them that any officer, soldier, or corps, distinguished byany acts of extraordinary bravery, should most certainly meet withnotice and rewards; whilst, on the other hand, those who should failin the performance of their duty, would as certainly be exposed andpunished. 

{July 21. }

Whilst preparations were making for the expected engagement, intelligence was received of the repulse of the British squadron whichhad attacked fort Moultrie. The Commander-in-chief availed himself ofthe occasion of communicating this success to his army, to add aspirit of emulation to the other motives which should impel them tomanly exertions. "This glorious example of our troops, " he said, "under the like circumstances with ourselves, the General hopes, willanimate every officer and soldier to imitate, and even to out-do them, when the enemy shall make the same attempt on us. With such a brightexample before us of what can be done by brave men fighting in defenceof their country, we shall be loaded with a double share of shame andinfamy, if we do not acquit ourselves with courage, and manifest adetermined resolution to conquer or die. "

As the crisis approached, his anxiety increased. Endeavouring tobreathe into his army his own spirit, and to give them his ownfeeling, he thus addressed them. "The enemy's whole reinforcement isnow arrived; so that an attack must, and will soon be made. TheGeneral, therefore, again repeats his earnest request that everyofficer and soldier will have his arms and ammunition in good order;keep within his quarters and encampments as far as possible; be readyfor action at a moment's call; and when called to it, remember, thatliberty, property, life, and honour, are all at stake; that upon theircourage and conduct rest the hopes of their bleeding and insultedcountry; that their wives, children, and parents, expect safety fromthem only; and that we have every reason to believe, that heaven willcrown with success so just a cause. 

"The enemy will endeavour to intimidate by show and appearance; butremember, they have been repulsed on various occasions by a few braveAmericans; their cause is bad; and if opposed with firmness andcoolness on their first onset, with our advantage of works, andknowledge of the ground, the victory is most assuredly ours. Everygood soldier will be silent and attentive, wait for orders, andreserve his fire until he is sure of doing execution; of this theofficers are to be particularly careful. "

He directed explicitly that any soldier who should attempt to concealhimself, or retreat without orders, should instantly be shot down; andsolemnly promised to notice and reward those who should distinguishthemselves. Thus did he, by infusing those sentiments which wouldstimulate to the greatest individual exertion, into every bosom, endeavour to compensate for the want of arms, of discipline, and ofnumbers. 

As the defence of Long Island was intimately connected with that ofNew York, a brigade had been stationed at Brooklyn, a post capable ofbeing maintained for a considerable time. An extensive camp had beenmarked out and fortified at the same place. Brooklyn is a village on asmall peninsula made by East river, the Bay, and Gowan's Cove. Theencampment fronted the main land of the island, and the worksstretched quite across the peninsula, from Whaaleboght Bay in the Eastriver on the left, to a deep marsh on a creek emptying into Gowan'sCove, on the right. The rear was covered and defended against anattack from the ships, by strong batteries on Red Hook and onGovernor's Island, which in a great measure commanded that part of thebay, and by other batteries on East river, which kept open thecommunication with York Island. In front of the camp was a range ofhills covered with thick woods, which extended from east to westnearly the length of the island, and across which were three differentroads leading to Brooklyn ferry. These hills, though steep, are everywhere passable by infantry. 

[Sidenote: The British land in force on Long Island. ]

The movements of General Howe indicating an intention to make hisfirst attack on Long Island, General Sullivan was strongly reinforced. Early in the morning of the twenty-second, the principal part of theBritish army, under the command of General Clinton, landed under coverof the guns of the fleet, and extended from the ferry at the Narrows, through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village of Flatland. [38]

 [Footnote 38: General Howe's letter. ]

{July 23. }

Confident that an engagement must soon take place, General Washingtonmade still another effort to inspire his troops with the mostdetermined courage. "The enemy, " said he, in addressing them, "havenow landed on Long Island, and the hour is fast approaching, on whichthe honour and success of this army, and the safety of our bleedingcountry depend. Remember, officers and soldiers, that you are freemen, fighting for the blessings of liberty--that slavery will be yourportion and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit yourselveslike men. " He repeated his instructions respecting their conduct inaction, and concluded with the most animating and encouragingexhortations. 

{July 25. }

Major General Putnam was now directed to take command at Brooklyn, with a reinforcement of six regiments; and he was charged mostearnestly by the Commander-in-chief, to be in constant readiness foran attack, and to guard the woods between the two camps with his besttroops. 

General Washington had passed the day at Brooklyn, making arrangementsfor the approaching action; and, at night, had returned to New York. 

The Hessians under General De Heister composed the centre of theBritish army at Flatbush; Major General Grant commanded the left wingwhich extended to the coast, and the greater part of the Britishforces under General Clinton. Earl Percy and Lord Cornwallis turnedshort to the right, and approached the opposite coast of Flatland. [39]

 [Footnote 39: General Howe's letter. ]

The two armies were now separated from each other by the range ofhills already mentioned. The British centre at Flatbush was scarcelyfour miles distant from the American lines at Brooklyn; and a directroad led across the heights from the one to the other. Another road, rather more circuitous than the first, led from Flatbush by the way ofBedford, a small village on the Brooklyn side of the hills. The rightand left wings of the British army were nearly equi-distant from theAmerican works, and about five or six miles from them. The roadleading from the Narrows along the coast, and by the way of Gowan'sCove, afforded the most direct route to their left; and their rightmight either return by the way of Flatbush and unite with the centre, or take a more circuitous course, and enter a road leading fromJamaica to Bedford. These several roads unite between Bedford andBrooklyn, a small distance in front of the American lines. 

The direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn was defended by a fort whichthe Americans had constructed in the hills; and the coast and Bedfordroads were guarded by detachments posted on the hills within view ofthe British camp. Light parties of volunteers were directed to patrolon the road leading from Jamaica to Bedford; about two miles fromwhich, near Flatbush, Colonel Miles of Pennsylvania was stationed witha regiment of riflemen. The convention of New York had ordered GeneralWoodhull, with the militia of Long Island, to take post on the highgrounds, as near the enemy as possible; but he remained at Jamaica, and seemed scarcely to suppose himself under the control of theregular officer commanding on the island. 

{July 27. }

About nine at night, General Clinton silently drew off the van of theBritish army across the country, in order to seize a pass in theheights, about three miles east of Bedford, on the Jamaica road. Inthe morning, about two hours before day-break, within half a mile ofthe pass, his patrols fell in with and captured one of the Americanparties, which had been stationed on this road. Learning from hisprisoners that the pass was unoccupied, General Clinton immediatelyseized it; and, on the appearance of day, the whole column passed theheights, and advanced into the level country between them andBrooklyn. [40]

 [Footnote 40: General Howe's letter. ]

Before Clinton had secured the passes on the road from Jamaica, General Grant advanced along the coast at the head of the left wing, with ten pieces of cannon. As his first object was to draw theattention of the Americans from their left, he moved slowly, skirmishing as he advanced with the light parties stationed on thatroad. [41]

 [Footnote 41: General Howe's letter. ]

This movement was soon communicated to General Putnam, who reinforcedthe parties which had been advanced in front; and, as General Grantcontinued to gain ground, still stronger detachments were employed inthis service. About three in the morning, Brigadier General LordStirling was directed to meet the enemy, with the two nearestregiments, on the road leading from the Narrows. Major GeneralSullivan, who commanded all the troops without the lines, advanced atthe head of a strong detachment on the road leading directly toFlatbush; while another detachment occupied the heights between thatplace and Bedford. 

About the break of day, Lord Stirling reached the summit of the hills, where he was joined by the troops which had been already engaged, andwere retiring slowly before the enemy, who almost immediately appearedin sight. A warm cannonade was commenced on both sides, whichcontinued for several hours; and some sharp, but not very closeskirmishing took place between the infantry. Lord Stirling, beinganxious only to defend the pass he guarded, could not descend in forcefrom the heights; and General Grant did not wish to drive him fromthem until that part of the plan, which had been entrusted to SirHenry Clinton, should be executed. 

[Sidenote: Battle of Brooklyn and evacuation of Long Island. ]

In the centre, General De Heister, soon after day-light, began tocannonade the troops under General Sullivan; but did not move from hisground at Flatbush, until the British right had approached the leftand rear of the American line. In the mean time, in order the moreeffectually to draw their attention from the point where the grandattack was intended, the fleet was put in motion, and a heavycannonade was commenced on the battery at Red Hook. 

About half past eight, the British right having then reached Bedford, in the rear of Sullivan's left, General De Heister ordered ColonelDonop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill; following, himself, with the centre of the army. The approach of Clinton was nowdiscovered by the American left, which immediately endeavoured toregain the camp at Brooklyn. While retiring from the woods byregiments, they encountered the front of the British. About the sametime, the Hessians advanced from Flatbush, against that part of thedetachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn. [42] Here, General Sullivan commanded in person; but he found it difficult tokeep his troops together long enough to sustain the first attack. Thefiring heard towards Bedford had disclosed the alarming fact that theBritish had turned their left flank, and were getting completely intotheir rear. Perceiving at once the full danger of their situation, they sought to escape it by regaining the camp with the utmostpossible celerity. The sudden rout of this party enabled De Heister todetach a part of his force against those who were engaged nearBedford. In that quarter, too, the Americans were broken, and drivenback into the woods; and the front of the column led by GeneralClinton, continuing to move forward, intercepted and engaged those whowere retreating along the direct road from Flatbush. Thus attackedboth in front and rear, and alternately driven by the British on theHessians, and by the Hessians back again on the British, a successionof skirmishes took place in the woods, in the course of which, someparts of corps forced their way through the enemy, and regained thelines of Brooklyn, and several individuals saved themselves undercover of the woods; but a great proportion of the detachment waskilled or taken. The fugitives were pursued up to the American works;and such is represented to have been the ardour of the Britishsoldiers, that it required the authority of their cautious commanderto prevent an immediate assault. 

 [Footnote 42: General Howe's letter. ]

The fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the Americanright, that the enemy had gained their rear. Lord Stirling perceivedthe danger, and that he could only escape it by retreating instantlyacross the creek. This movement was immediately directed; and, tosecure it, his lordship determined to attack, in person, a Britishcorps under Lord Cornwallis, stationed at a house rather above theplace at which he intended to cross the creek. About four hundred menof Smallwood's regiment were drawn out for this purpose, and theattack was made with great spirit. This small corps was brought upseveral times to the charge; and Lord Stirling stated that he was onthe point of dislodging Lord Cornwallis from his post; but the forcein his front increasing, and General Grant also advancing on his rear, the brave men he commanded were no longer able to oppose the superiornumbers which assailed them on every quarter; and those who survivedwere, with their General, made prisoners of war. This attempt, thoughunsuccessful, gave an opportunity to a large part of the detachment tosave themselves by crossing the creek. 

The loss sustained by the American army in this battle could not beaccurately ascertained by either party. Numbers were supposed to havebeen drowned in the creek, or suffocated in the marsh, whose bodieswere never found; and exact accounts from the militia are seldom to beobtained, as the list of the missing is always swelled by those whoreturn to their homes. General Washington did not admit it to exceed athousand men; but in this estimate he must have included only theregular troops. In the letter written by General Howe, the amount ofprisoners is stated at one thousand and ninety-seven; among whom wereMajor General Sullivan, and Brigadiers Lord Stirling and Woodhull, byhim named Udell. He computes the loss of the Americans at threethousand three hundred men; but his computation is probably excessive. He supposes, too, that the troops engaged on the heights, amounted toten thousand; but they could not have much exceeded half that number. His own loss is stated at twenty-one officers, and three hundred andforty-six privates; killed, wounded, and taken. 

As the action became warm, General Washington passed over to the campat Brooklyn, where he saw, with inexpressible anguish, the destructionin which his best troops were involved, and from which it wasimpossible to extricate them. Should he attempt any thing in theirfavour with the men remaining within the lines, it was probable thecamp itself would be lost, and that whole division of his armydestroyed. Should he bring over the remaining battalions from NewYork, he would still be inferior in point of numbers; and his wholearmy, perhaps the fate of his country, might be staked on the issue ofa single battle thus inauspiciously commenced. Compelled to behold thecarnage of his troops, without being able to assist them, his effortswere directed to the preservation of those which remained. 

{July 28. }

Believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were in reality, and unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, General Howe made noimmediate attempt to force their lines. He encamped in front of them;and, on the twenty-eighth at night, broke ground in form, within sixhundred yards of a redoubt on the left. 

{July 29. }

In this critical state of things, General Washington determined towithdraw from Long Island. This difficult movement was effected on thenight of the twenty-eighth, with such silence, that all the troops andmilitary stores, with the greater part of the provisions, and all theartillery, except such heavy pieces as could not be drawn through theroads, rendered almost impassable by the rains which had fallen, werecarried over in safety. Early next morning, the British out-postsperceived the rear guard crossing the East river, out of reach oftheir fire. 

From the commencement of the action on the morning of thetwenty-seventh, until the American troops had crossed the East riveron the morning of the twenty-ninth, the exertions and fatigues of theCommander-in-chief were incessant. Throughout that time, he neverclosed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback. 

The manner in which this critical operation was executed, and thecircumstances under which it was performed, added greatly to thereputation of the American general, in the opinion of all militarymen. To withdraw, without loss, a defeated, dispirited, andundisciplined army from the view of an experienced and able officer, and to transport them in safety across a large river, while watched bya numerous and vigilant fleet, require talents of no ordinary kind;and the retreat from Long Island may justly be ranked among thoseskilful manoeuvres which distinguish a master in the art of war. 

The attempt to defend Long Island was so perilous in itself, and sodisastrous in its issue, that it was condemned by many at the time, and is yet represented as a great error of the Commander-in-chief. But, in deciding on the wisdom of measures, the event will not alwayslead to a correct judgment. Before a just opinion can be formed, it isnecessary to consider the previous state of things--to weigh themotives which induced the decision--and to compare the value of theobject, and the probability of securing it, with the hazards attendingthe attempt. 

It was very desirable to preserve New York, if practicable; or, ifthat could not be done, to consume the campaign in the struggle forthat place. The abandonment of Long Island, besides giving the enemysecure and immediate possession of an extensive and fertile country, would certainly facilitate the success of his attempt upon New York. It was therefore to be avoided, if possible. 

The impossibility of avoiding it was not evident until the battle wasfought. It is true, that the American force on the island could nothave been rendered equal, even in point of numbers, to that of theBritish; but, with the advantage of the defencible country throughwhich the assailants were to pass, and of a fortified camp which couldbe attacked only on one side, hopes might be entertained, without theimputation of being oversanguine, of maintaining the position for aconsiderable time; and, ultimately, of selling it at a high price. This opinion is supported by the subsequent movements of General Howe, who, even after the victory of the twenty-seventh, was unwilling tohazard an assault on the American works, without the co-operation ofthe fleet; but chose rather to carry them by regular approaches. Norwould the situation of the troops on Long Island have been desperate, even in the event of a conjoint attack by land and water, before theirstrength and spirits were broken by the action of the twenty-seventh. The East river was guarded by strong batteries on both sides, and theentrance into it from the bay was defended by Governor's Island, whichwas fortified, and in which two regiments were stationed. The shipscould not lie in that river, without first silencing thosebatteries--a work not easily accomplished. The aid of the fleet, therefore, could be given only at the point of time when a storm ofthe works should be intended; and when that should appear practicable, the troops might be withdrawn from the island. 

There was then considerable hazard in maintaining Long Island; but notso much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post ofsuch great importance, without a struggle. 

With more appearance of reason, the General has been condemned for nothaving guarded the road which leads over the hills from Jamaica toBedford. 

The written instructions given to the officer commanding on LongIsland, two days previous to the action, directed that the woodsshould be well guarded, and the approach of the enemy through themrendered as difficult as possible. But his numbers were not sufficientto furnish detachments for all the defiles through the mountains; andif a corps, capable of making an effectual resistance, had been postedon this road, and a feint had been made on it, while the principalattack was by the direct road from Flatbush, or by that along thecoast, the events of the day would probably have been not lessdisastrous. The columns marching directly from Flatbush must, on everyreasonable calculation, have been in possession of the plain in therear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica, so as tointercept its retreat to the camp. So great is the advantage of thosewho attack, in being able to choose the point against which to directtheir grand effort. 

The most adviseable plan, then, appears to have been, to watch themotions of the enemy so as to be master of his designs; to oppose witha competent force every attempt to seize the heights; and to guard allthe passes in such a manner as to receive notice of his approachthrough any one of them, in sufficient time to recall the troopsmaintaining the others. 

This plan was adopted--and the heavy disasters of the day areattributable, principally, to the failure of those charged with theexecution of that very important part of it which related to theJamaica road. The letter of General Howe states that an Americanpatrolling party was taken on this road; and General Washington, in aprivate and confidential communication to a friend, says, "Thismisfortune happened, in a great measure, by two detachments of ourpeople who were posted in two roads leading through a wood, tointercept the enemy in their march, suffering a surprise, and making aprecipitate retreat. "

The events of this day, too, exhibited a practical demonstration of aradical defect in the structure of the army. It did not contain asingle corps of cavalry. That miscalculating economy which refuses themeans essential to the end, was not sufficiently relaxed to admit ofso expensive an establishment. Had the General been furnished with afew troops of light-horse, to serve merely as videts, it is probablethat the movement so decisive of the fate of the day could not havebeen made unnoticed. The troops on the lines do not appear to haveobserved the column which was withdrawn, on the evening of thetwenty-sixth, from Flatbush to Flatland. Had this important manoeuvrebeen communicated, it would, most probably, have turned the attentionof General Putnam, more particularly, to the Jamaica road. It is tothe want of videts, that a failure to obtain this importantintelligence is to be ascribed. The necessity of changing the officeroriginally intrusted with the command, was also an unfortunatecircumstance, which probably contributed to the event which happened. 

Whatever causes might have led to this defeat, it gave a gloomy aspectto the affairs of America. Heretofore, her arms had been frequentlysuccessful, and her soldiers had always manifested a great degree ofintrepidity. A confidence in themselves, a persuasion of superiorityover the enemy, arising from the goodness of their cause, and theirearly and habitual use of fire arms, had been carefully encouraged. This sentiment had been nourished by all their experience precedingthis event. When they found themselves, by a course of evolutions inwhich they imagined they perceived a great superiority of militaryskill, encircled with unexpected dangers, from which no exertionscould extricate them, their confidence in themselves and in theirleaders was greatly diminished, and the approach of the enemy inspiredthe apprehension that some stratagem was concealed, from whichimmediate flight alone could preserve them. 

{September 2. }

In a letter from General Washington to congress, the state of the armyafter this event was thus feelingly described: "Our situation is trulydistressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled theirminds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of callingforth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in orderto repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient toreturn. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almostby whole regiments; in many, by half ones and by companies, at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by awell appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when it is added, that theirexample has infected another part of the army; that their want ofdiscipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint andgovernment, have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole;and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordinationnecessary for the well doing of an army, and which had been beforeinculcated as well as the nature of our military establishment wouldadmit of; our condition is still more alarming, and with the deepestconcern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in thegenerality of the troops. 

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I, more than once, in my letters, took the liberty ofmentioning to congress, that no dependence could be placed in amilitia, or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longerperiod than our regulations have hitherto prescribed. I am persuaded, and am as fully convinced as of any one fact that has happened, thatour liberties must, of necessity, be greatly hazarded, if not entirelylost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent army. "

[Sidenote: Fruitless negotiations. ]

The first use made by Lord Howe of the victory of the 27th of August, was to avail himself of the impression it had probably made oncongress, by opening a negotiation in conformity with his powers as acommissioner. For this purpose, General Sullivan was sent on parole toPhiladelphia, with a verbal message, the import of which was, "thatthough he could not at present treat with congress as a politicalbody, yet he was very desirous of having a conference with some of itsmembers, whom he would consider, for the present, only as privategentlemen, and meet them as such at any place they would appoint. 

"That, in conjunction with General Howe, he had full powers tocompromise the dispute between Great Britain and America, on termsadvantageous to both; the obtaining of which detained him near twomonths in England, and prevented his arrival in New York before thedeclaration of independence took place. 

"That he wished a compact might be settled at this time, when nodecisive blow was struck, and neither party could allege beingcompelled to enter into such agreement. 

"That in case congress were disposed to treat, many things which theyhad not as yet asked, might, and ought to be granted them; and thatif, upon the conference, they found any probable ground of anaccommodation, the authority of congress must be afterwardsacknowledged--otherwise the compact would not be complete. "

This proposition was not without its embarrassments. Its rejectionwould give some countenance to the opinion, that, if independence werewaved, a restoration of the ancient connexion between the twocountries, on principles formerly deemed constitutional, was stillpracticable; an opinion which would have an unfavourable effect on thepublic sentiment. On the other hand, to enter into a negotiation undersuch circumstances, might excite a suspicion, that their determinationto maintain the independence they had declared, was not immoveable;and that things were in such a situation, as to admit of somerelaxation in the measures necessary for the defence of the country. 

The answer given to Lord Howe, through General Sullivan, was, "thatcongress, being the representatives of the free and independent Statesof America, can not, with propriety, send any of its members to conferwith his Lordship in their private characters; but that, ever desirousof establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committeeof their body to know whether he has any authority to treat withpersons authorized by congress for that purpose, on behalf of America;and what that authority is;--and to hear such propositions as he shallthink proper to make, respecting the same. "

The President was, at the same time, directed to communicate toGeneral Washington the opinion of congress, that no propositions formaking peace "ought to be received or attended to, unless the same bemade in writing, and addressed to the representatives of the UnitedStates in congress, or persons authorized by them: And if applicationson that subject be made to him by any of the commanders of the Britishforces, that he inform them, that these United States, who enteredinto the war only for the defence of their lives and liberties, willcheerfully agree to peace on reasonable terms, whenever such shall beproposed to them in manner aforesaid. "

It is worthy of remark, that, in these resolutions, congress preservesthe appearance of insisting on the independence of the United States, without declaring it to be the indispensable condition of peace. 

Mr. Franklin, Mr. John Adams, and Mr. Edward Rutledge, all zealoussupporters of independence, were appointed "to receive thecommunications of Lord Howe. "

They waited on his Lordship; and, on their return, reported, that hehad received them on the 11th of September, on Staten Island, oppositeto Amboy, with great politeness. 

He opened the conversation by acquainting them, that though he couldnot treat with them as a committee of congress, yet, as his powersenabled him to confer and consult with any private gentlemen ofinfluence in the colonies, on the means of restoring peace between thetwo countries, he was glad of this opportunity of conferring with themon that subject; if they thought themselves at liberty to enter into aconference with him in that character. The committee observed to hisLordship, that, as their business was to hear, he might consider themin what light he pleased, and communicate to them any propositions hemight be authorized to make for the purpose mentioned; but that theycould consider themselves in no other character than that in whichthey were placed by order of congress. His Lordship then proceeded toopen his views at some length. He offered peace only on the conditionthat the colonies should return to their allegiance and obedience tothe British crown. He made no explicit propositions as inducements tothis measure, but gave assurances that there was a good disposition inthe king and his ministers to make the government easy to them, withintimations that, in case of submission, the offensive acts ofparliament would be revised, and the instructions to the Governorsreconsidered; so that, if any just causes of complaint were found inthe acts, or any errors in government were found to have crept intothe instructions, they might be amended or withdrawn. 

The committee gave it as their opinion to his Lordship, that a returnto the domination of Great Britain was not now to be expected. Theymentioned the repeated humble petitions of the colonies to the kingand parliament, which had been treated with contempt, and answeredonly by additional injuries; the unexampled patience which had beenshown under their tyrannical government; and that it was not until thelate act of parliament, which denounced war against them, and put themout of the king's protection, that they declared their independence;that this declaration had been called for by the people of thecolonies in general, and that every colony had approved it whenmade, --and all now considered themselves as independent states, andwere settling, or had settled, their governments accordingly; so thatit was not in the power of congress to agree for them that they shouldreturn to their former dependent state; that there was no doubt oftheir inclination for peace, and their willingness to enter into atreaty with Britain, that might be advantageous to both countries;that though his Lordship had, at present, no power to treat with themas independent states, he might, if there was the same gooddisposition in Britain, much sooner obtain fresh powers from hisgovernment, for that purpose, than powers could be obtained bycongress, from the several colonies, to consent to a submission. 

His Lordship then expressed his regret that no accommodation was liketo take place, and put an end to the conference. 

These fruitless negotiations produced no suspension of hostilities. 

The British army, now in full possession of Long Island, was postedfrom Bedford to Hurlgate; and thus fronted and threatened York Islandfrom its extreme southern point, to the part opposite the northernboundary of Long Island, a small distance below the heights ofHaerlem; comprehending a space of about nine miles. 

The two armies were divided only by the East river, which is generallyless than a mile wide. 

{September 4. }

Immediately after the victory at Brooklyn, dispositions were made bythe enemy to attack New York, and a part of the fleet sailed roundLong Island, and appeared in the Sound. Two frigates passed up theEast river, without receiving any injury from the batteries, andanchored behind a small island which protected them from the Americanartillery. At the same time, the main body of the fleet lay at anchorclose in with Governor's Island, from which the American troops hadbeen withdrawn, ready to pass up either the North or East river, orboth, and act against any part of York Island. 

These movements indicated a disposition, not to make an attackdirectly on New York, as had been expected, but to land nearKingsbridge, and take a position which would cut off the communicationof the American army with the country. 

Aware of the danger of his situation, General Washington began toremove such stores as were not immediately necessary; and called acouncil of general officers for the purpose of deciding, whether NewYork should be evacuated without delay, or longer defended. 

In his letter communicating to congress the result of this council, which was against an immediate evacuation, he manifested a convictionof the necessity of that measure, though he yielded to that necessitywith reluctance. Speaking of the enemy, he observed, "It is nowextremely obvious from their movements, from our intelligence, andfrom every other circumstance, that, having their whole army upon LongIsland, except about four thousand men who remain on Staten Island, they mean to enclose us in this island, by taking post in our rear, while their ships effectually secure the front; and thus, by cuttingoff our communication with the country, oblige us to fight them ontheir own terms, or surrender at discretion; or, if that shall bedeemed more adviseable, by a brilliant stroke endeavour to cut thisarmy to pieces, and secure the possession of arms and stores, whichthey well know our inability to replace. 

"Having their system unfolded to us, it becomes an importantconsideration how it could be most successfully opposed. On every sidethere is a choice of difficulties, and experience teaches us, thatevery measure on our part (however painful the reflection) must betaken with some apprehension, that all our troops will not do theirduty. 

"In deliberating upon this great question, " he added, "it wasimpossible to forget that history, our own experience, the advice ofour ablest friends in Europe, the fears of the enemy, and even thedeclarations of congress, demonstrate that, on our side, the warshould be defensive;--(it has ever been called a war of posts;)--thatwe should, on all occasions, avoid a general action, nor put any thingto the risk, unless compelled by necessity, into which we ought neverto be drawn. "

After communicating the decision which had been made by the council ofofficers, he stated the opinion of those who were in favour of animmediate evacuation with such force, as to confirm the belief that itremained his own. 

The majority, who overruled this opinion, did not expect to be able todefend the city, permanently, but to defer the time of losing it, inthe hope of wasting so much of the campaign, before General Howe couldobtain possession of it, as to prevent his undertaking any thingfarther until the following year. They therefore advised a middlecourse between abandoning the town absolutely, and concentrating theirwhole strength for its defence. This was, to form the army into threedivisions; one of which should remain in New York; the second bestationed at Kingsbridge, and the third occupy the intermediate space, so as to support either extreme. The sick were to be immediatelyremoved to Orange Town. A belief that congress was inclined tomaintain New York at every hazard, and a dread of the unfavourableimpression which its evacuation might make on the people, seem to havehad great influence in producing the determination to defend the placeyet a short time longer. 

{September 10. }

This opinion was soon changed. The movements of the British generalindicated clearly an intention either to break their line ofcommunication, or to enclose the whole army in York Island. Hisdispositions were alike calculated to favour the one or the other ofthose objects. The general, who had continued to employ himselfassiduously in the removal of the military stores to a place ofsafety, [43] called a second council to deliberate on the fartherdefence of the city, which determined, by a large majority, that ithad become not only prudent, but absolutely necessary to withdraw thearmy from New York. 

 [Footnote 43: He had, on the first appearance of the enemy in force before New York urged the removal of the women and children, with their most valuable effects, to a place of safety. ]

{September 12. }

In consequence of this determination, Brigadier General Mercer, whocommanded the flying camp on the Jersey shore, was directed to move upthe North river, to the post opposite fort Washington; and everyeffort was used to expedite the removal of the stores. 

On the morning of the fifteenth, three ships of war proceeded up theNorth river as high as Bloomingdale; a movement which entirely stoppedthe farther removal of stores by water. About eleven on the same day, Sir Henry Clinton, with a division of four thousand men who hadembarked at the head of New Town bay, where they had lain concealedfrom the view of the troops posted on York Island, proceeded throughthat bay into the East river, which he crossed; and, under cover ofthe fire of five men of war, landed at a place called Kipp's bay, about three miles above New York. 

[Sidenote: New York evacuated. ]

The works thrown up to oppose a landing at this place, were ofconsiderable strength, and capable of being defended for some time;but the troops stationed in them abandoned them without waiting to beattacked, and fled with precipitation. On the commencement of thecannonade, General Washington ordered the brigades of Parsons andFellowes to the support of the troops posted in the lines, and rodehimself towards the scene of action. The panic of those who had fledfrom the works was communicated to the troops ordered to sustain them;and the Commander-in-chief had the extreme mortification to meet thewhole party retreating in the utmost disorder, totally regardless ofthe great efforts made by their generals to stop their disgracefulflight. Whilst General Washington was exerting himself to rally them, a small corps of the enemy appeared; and they again broke and fled inconfusion. The only part to be taken was immediately to withdraw thefew remaining troops from New York, and to secure the posts on theheights. For this latter purpose, the lines were instantly manned; butno attempt was made to force them. The retreat from New York waseffected with an inconsiderable loss of men, sustained in a skirmishat Bloomingdale; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion ofthe baggage, provisions, and military stores, much of which might havebeen saved had the post at Kipp's bay been properly defended, wereunavoidably abandoned. In this shameful day, one colonel, one captain, three subalterns, and ten privates were killed: one lieutenantcolonel, one captain, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates weremissing. 

The unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was notattributable to a want of personal courage, but to other causes. Theapprehensions excited by the defeat on Long Island had not yetsubsided; nor had the American troops recovered their confidenceeither in themselves or in their commanders. Their situation appearedto themselves to be perilous; and they had not yet acquired thattemper which teaches the veteran to do his duty wherever he may beplaced; to assure himself that others will do their duty likewise; andto rely that those, who take into view the situation of the whole, will not expose him to useless hazard; or neglect those precautionswhich the safety and advantage of the whole may require. 

Unfortunately, there existed in a great part of the army, severalcauses, in addition to the shortness of enlistments and reliance onmilitia, which were but too operative in obstructing the progress ofthese military sentiments. In New England, whence the supplies of menhad been principally drawn, the zeal excited by the revolution hadtaken such a direction, as in a great degree to abolish thosedistinctions between the platoon officers and the soldiers, which areindispensable to the formation of an army suited to all the purposesof war. It has been already said that these officers, who constitutean important part of every army, were, in many companies, elected bythe privates. Of consequence, a disposition to associate with them onthe footing of equality, was a recommendation of more weight, andfrequently conduced more to the choice, than individual merit. Gentlemen of high rank have stated that, in some instances, men wereelected, who agreed to put their pay in a common stock with that ofthe soldiers, and divide equally with them. It is not cause of wonder, that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitarypractices should frequently prevail; and that the privates should notrespect them sufficiently, to acquire habits of obedience andsubordination. This vital defect had been in some degree remedied, innew modelling the army before Boston; but it still existed to a fatalextent. 

{September 15. }

Having taken possession of New York, General Howe stationed a fewtroops in the town; and, with the main body of his army, encamped onthe island near the American lines. His right was at Horen's Hook onthe East river, and his left reached the North river nearBloomingdale; so that his encampment extended quite across the island, which is, in this place, scarcely two miles wide; and both his flankswere covered by his ships. 

The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge, bothsides of which had been carefully fortified. M'Gowan's Pass, andMorris's Heights were also occupied in considerable force, andrendered capable of being defended against superior numbers. A strongdetachment was posted in an intrenched camp on the heights of Haerlem, within about a mile and a half of the British lines. 

The present position of the armies favoured the views of the AmericanGeneral. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a series ofsuccessful skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field; and hepersuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a strong intrenchedcamp to be immediately in their rear, would engage withoutapprehension, would soon display their native courage, and wouldspeedily regain the confidence they had lost. 

Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded. The day after the retreat from New York, the British appeared inconsiderable force in the plains between the two camps; and theGeneral immediately rode to his advanced posts, in order to make inperson such arrangements as this movement might require. Soon afterhis arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who, at thehead of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party, camein, and stated their numbers on conjecture at about three hundred men;the main body being concealed in a wood. 

The General ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and MajorLeitch with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which hadjoined the army only the preceding day, to gain their rear, while heamused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack theirfront. 

[Sidenote: Skirmish on the heights of Haerlem. ]

This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill, in order topossess themselves of some fences and bushes, which presented anadvantageous position against the party expected in front; and afiring commenced--but at too great a distance to do any execution. Inthe mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not being precisely acquainted withtheir new position, made his attack rather on their flank than rear;and a warm action ensued. 

In a short time, Major Leitch, who had led the detachment with greatintrepidity, was brought off the ground mortally wounded, havingreceived three balls through his body; and soon afterwards the gallantColonel Knowlton also fell. Not discouraged by the loss of their fieldofficers, the captains maintained their ground, and continued theaction with great animation. The British were reinforced; and GeneralWashington ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of NewEngland and Maryland, to the support of the Americans. Thusreinforced, they made a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of thewood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther, when theGeneral, content with the present advantage, called back his troops totheir intrenchments. [44]

 [Footnote 44: The author received the account of this skirmish from the Colonel of the third Virginia Regiment, and from the Captains commanding the companies that were engaged. ]

In this sharp conflict, the loss of the Americans, in killed andwounded, did not exceed fifty men. The British lost more than doublethat number. But the real importance of the affair was derived fromits operation on the spirits of the whole army. It was the firstsuccess they had obtained during this campaign; and its influence wasvery discernible. To give it the more effect, the parole the next daywas Leitch; and the General, in his orders, publicly thanked thetroops under the command of that officer, who had first advanced onthe enemy, and the others who had so resolutely supported them. Hecontrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the daybefore; and the result, he said, evidenced what might be done whereofficers and soldiers would exert themselves. Once more, therefore, hecalled upon them so to act, as not to disgrace the noble cause inwhich they were engaged. He appointed a successor to "the gallant andbrave Colonel Knowlton, who would, " he said, "have been an honour toany country, and who had fallen gloriously, fighting at his post. "

In this active part of the campaign, when the utmost stretch of everyfaculty was required, to watch and counteract the plans of a skilfuland powerful enemy, the effects of the original errors committed bythe government, in its military establishment, were beginning to be soseriously felt, as to compel the Commander-in-chief to devote aportion of his time and attention to the complete removal of thecauses which produced them. 

The situation of America was becoming extremely critical. The almostentire dissolution of the existing army, by the expiration of the timefor which the greater number of the troops had been engaged, was fastapproaching. No steps had been taken to recruit the new regimentswhich congress had resolved to raise for the ensuing campaign; andthere was much reason to apprehend, that in the actual state ofthings, the terms offered would not hold forth sufficient inducementsto fill them. 

{September 24. }

[Sidenote: Letter on the state of the army. ]

With so unpromising a prospect before him, the General found himselfpressed by an army, permanent in its establishment, supplied withevery requisite of war, formidable for its discipline and theexperience of its leaders, and superior to him in numbers. Thesecircumstances, and the impressions they created, will be bestexhibited by an extract from a letter written at the time to congress. It is in these words: "From the hours allotted to sleep, I will borrowa few moments to convey my thoughts, on sundry important matters, tocongress. I shall offer them with that sincerity which ought tocharacterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be usedin giving useful information, without incurring the imputation ofpresumption. 

"We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of ourarmy. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon thatoccasion last year; the consequences which might have followed thechange, if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy; added to aknowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops; reflectbut a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, andsatisfy me, beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedyand effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will belost. 

"It is in vain to expect that any, or more than a trifling part ofthis army, will engage again in the service, on the encouragementoffered by congress. When men find that their townsmen and companionsare receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars, for a few monthsservice, (which is truly the case, ) this can not be expected, withoutusing compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer novaluable purpose. When men are irritated, and their passions inflamed, they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms; but after the first emotionsare over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of an army, that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest, is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen; thecongress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it. 

"A soldier, reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engagedin, and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you withpatience, and acknowledges the truth of your observations; but adds, that it is of no more consequence to him than to others. The officermakes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay willnot support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve hiscountry, when every member of the community is equally benefited andinterested by his labours. The few, therefore, who act upon principlesof disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a dropin the ocean. It becomes evidently clear, then, that as this contestis not likely to become the work of a day; as the war must be carriedon systematically; and to do it, you must have good officers; thereis, in my judgment, no other possible means to obtain them, but byestablishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving yourofficers good pay. This will induce gentlemen, and men of character, to engage; and, until the bulk of your officers are composed of suchpersons as are actuated by principles of honour and a spirit ofenterprise, you have little to expect from them. They ought to havesuch allowances as will enable them to live like, and support thecharacter of gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to thelow and dirty arts which many of them practise, to filch the public ofmore than the difference of pay would amount to, upon an ampleallowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life inyour hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domesticenjoyments. Why a captain in the continental service should receive nomore than five shillings currency per day, for performing the sameduties that an officer of the same rank in the British servicereceives ten shillings sterling for, I never could conceive;especially, when the latter is provided with every necessary herequires, upon the best terms, and the former can scarcely procurethem at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence, andrenders him fit for command, like a support that renders himindependent of every body but the state he serves. 

"With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain themupon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than thecontinuance of the war ought they to be engaged; as factsincontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistmentsincrease with time. When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I ampersuaded the men might have been got, without a bounty, for the war:after that, they began to see that the contest was not likely to endso speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence, byremarking, that to get their militia, in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evilsresulting from this, and the destructive consequences which wouldunavoidably follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a longletter, (date not now recollected, as my letter book is not here, ) torecommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning suchreasons for it, as experience has since convinced me, were wellfounded. At that time, twenty dollars would, I am persuaded, haveengaged the men for this term: but it will not do to look back--and ifthe present opportunity is slipped, I am persuaded that twelve monthsmore will increase our difficulties four fold. I shall therefore takethe liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a good bounty beimmediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least a hundred, or ahundred and fifty acres of land, and a suit of clothes, and a blanket, to each non-commissioned officer and soldier, as I have good authorityfor saying, that however high the men's pay may appear, it is barelysufficient, in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds ofgoods, to keep them in clothes, much less to afford support to theirfamilies. If this encouragement, then, is given to the men, and suchpay allowed to the officers, as will induce gentlemen of liberalcharacter and liberal sentiments to engage; and proper care andcaution be used in the nomination, (having more regard to thecharacters of persons than the number of men they can enlist, ) weshould, in a little time, have an army able to cope with any that canbe opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of:but whilst the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raisemen; whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal, and in thecharacter of an officer, regard him no more than a broomstick, beingmixed together as one common herd; no order nor discipline canprevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which isessentially necessary to due subordination. 

"To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting upon abroken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domesticlife; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with everykind of military skill, which, being followed by a want of confidencein themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed--superior in knowledge, and superior in arms--makes themtimid, and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the suddenchange in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such anunconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that itnot only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit into others. Again, men accustomed tounbounded freedom and no control, can not brook the restraint which isindispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army;without which, licentiousness, and every kind of disorder, triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination, is not the work of a day, a month, or a year; and unhappily for us, and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have beenlabouring to establish in the army under my immediate command, is in amanner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have beencalled together within these few months. "

The frequent remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief; the opinions ofall military men; and the severe, but correcting hand of experience, had at length produced some effect on the government of theunion;--and soon after the defeat on Long Island, congress haddirected the committee composing the board of war, to prepare a planof operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report proposeda permanent army, to be enlisted for the war, and to be raised by theseveral states, in proportion to their ability. A bounty of twentydollars was offered to each recruit; and small portions of land toevery officer and soldier. 

{October 4. }

The resolutions adopting this report were received by theCommander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoingletter. Believing the inducements they held forth for the completionof the army to be still insufficient, he, in his letter acknowledgingthe receipt of them, urged in the most serious terms, the necessity ofraising the pay of the officers, and the bounty offered to recruits. "Give me leave to say, sir, " he observed, "I say it with due deferenceand respect, (and my knowledge of the facts, added to the importanceof the cause, and the stake I hold it in, must justify the freedom, )that your affairs are in a more unpromising way than you seem toapprehend. 

"Your army, as mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of politicaldissolution. True it is, you have voted a larger one in lieu of it;but the season is late, and there is a material difference betweenvoting battalions, and raising men. In the latter, there are moredifficulties than Congress seem aware of; which makes it my duty (as Ihave been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army) toinform them, that unless the pay of the officers (especially that ofthe field officers) is raised, the chief part of those that are worthretaining will leave the service at the expiration of the presentterm; as the soldiers will also, if some greater encouragement is notoffered them, than twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land. "

After urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberalcompensation to the army, and stating that the British were actuallyraising a regiment with a bounty of ten pounds sterling for eachrecruit, he added, "when the pay and establishment of an officer oncebecome objects of interested attention, the sloth, negligence, andeven disobedience of orders, which at this time but too generallyprevail, will be purged off;--but while the service is viewed withindifference; while the officer conceives that he is rather conferringthan receiving an obligation: there will be a total relaxation of allorder and discipline; and every thing will move heavily on, to thegreat detriment of the service, and inexpressible trouble and vexationof the general. 

"The critical situation of our affairs at this time will justify mysaying, that no time is to be lost in making fruitless experiments. Anunavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon the terms proposed, may render it impracticable to do it at all, and prove fatal to ourcause; as I am not sure whether any rubs in the way of ourenlistments, or unfavourable turn in our affairs, may not prove themeans of the enemy's recruiting men faster than we do. "

After stating at large the confusion and delay, inseparable from thecircumstance that the appointments for the new army were to be made bythe states, the letter proceeds, "upon the present plan, I plainlyforesee an intervention of time between the old and new army, whichmust be filled with militia, if to be had, with whom no man, who hasany regard for his own reputation, can undertake to be answerable forconsequences. I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do notlose the most valuable officers in this army, under the present modeof appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it willbe composed of materials not only entirely raw, but, if uncommon painsare not taken, entirely unfit: and I see such a distrust and jealousyof military power, that the Commander-in-chief has not an opportunity, even by recommendation, to give the least assurance of reward for themost essential services. 

"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears beforeme, without one flattering hope, that I am thoroughly convinced, unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediatelyadopted to remedy these evils, the certain and absolute loss of ourliberties will be the inevitable consequence: as one unhappy strokewill throw a powerful weight into the scale against us, and enableGeneral Howe to recruit his army, as fast as we shall ours; numbersbeing disposed, and many actually doing so already. Some of the mostprobable remedies, and such as experience has brought to my moreintimate knowledge, I have taken the liberty to point out; the rest Ibeg leave to submit to the consideration of congress. 

"I ask pardon for taking up so much of their time with my opinions, but I should betray that trust which they and my country have reposedin me, were I to be silent upon matters so extremely interesting. "

On receiving this very serious letter, congress passed resolutionsconforming to many of its suggestions. The pay of the officers wasraised, and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each soldier: Thelegislatures of the states having troops in the continental service, either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New Jersey, were requested todepute committees to those places in order to officer the regiments onthe new establishment: and it was recommended to the committees toconsult the General on the subject of appointments. 

[Illustration: Washington's Headquarters at White Plains

_Here, twenty-two miles northeast of New York City, Washington madehis headquarters in October, 1776, and directed the Battle of WhitePlains or Chatterton Hill. Opposed to the American forces was aBritish army, greatly superior in numbers, under General Howe, whosedelay in attaching the Americans enabled Washington to take up anunassailable position at North Castle, preparatory to his subsequentmasterly retreat across New Jersey. _]

CHAPTER VI. 

 The British land at Frog's Neck.... The American army evacuates York Island, except fort Washington.... Both armies move towards the White Plains.... Battle of the White Plains.... The British army returns to Kingsbridge.... General Washington crosses the North river.... The lines of fort Washington carried by the British, and the garrison made prisoners.... Evacuation of fort Lee.... Weakness of the American army.... Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia.... General Washington retreats through Jersey.... General Washington crosses the Delaware.... Danger of Philadelphia.... Capture of General Lee.... The British go into winter quarters.... Battle of Trenton.... Of Princeton.... Firmness of congress. 

{1776}

{October 9. }

The armies did not long retain their position on York Island. GeneralHowe was sensible of the strength of the American camp, and was notdisposed to force it. His plan was to compel General Washington toabandon it, or to give battle in a situation in which a defeat must beattended with the total destruction of his army. With this view, afterthrowing up entrenchments on M'Gowan's hill for the protection of NewYork, he determined to gain the rear of the American camp, by the NewEngland road, and also to possess himself of the North river aboveKingsbridge. To assure himself of the practicability of acquiring thecommand of the river, three frigates passed up it under the fire fromfort Washington, and from the opposite post on the Jersey shore, afterwards called fort Lee, without sustaining any injury from thebatteries, or being impeded by the chevaux-de-frise which had beensunk in the channel between those forts. 

{Twelfth. }

[Sidenote: The enemy land at Frog's Neck. ]

This point being ascertained, he embarked a great part of his army onboard flat bottomed boats, and, passing through Hurl Gate into theSound, landed at Frog's Neck, about nine miles from the camp on theheights of Haerlem. 

In consequence of this movement, Washington strengthened the post atKingsbridge, and detached some regiments to West Chester for thepurpose of skirmishing with the enemy, so soon as he should march fromthe ground he occupied. The road from Frog's Point to Kingsbridgeleads through a strong country, intersected by numerous stone fences, so as to render it difficult to move artillery, or even infantry, incompact columns, except along the main road, which had been broken upin several places. The General, therefore, entertained sanguine hopesof the event, should a direct attack be made on his camp. 

General Howe continued some days waiting for his artillery, militarystores, and reinforcements from Staten Island, which were detained byunfavourable winds. 

{October 16. }

[Sidenote: The American army evacuates York island except FortWashington. ]

In the mean time, as the habits of thinking in America required thatevery important measure should be the result of consultation, andshould receive the approbation of a majority, the propriety ofremoving the American army from its present situation was submitted toa council of the general officers. After much investigation, it wasdeclared to be impracticable, without a change of position, to keep uptheir communication with the country, and avoid being compelled tofight under great disadvantages, or to surrender themselves prisonersof war. General Lee, who had just arrived from the south, and whoseexperience as well as late success gave great weight to his opinions, urged the necessity of this movement with much earnestness. It was, atthe same time, determined to hold fort Washington, and to defend it aslong as possible. A resolution of congress of the 11th of October, desiring General Washington, by every art and expense, to obstruct, ifpossible, the navigation of the river, contributed, notinconsiderably, to this determination. 

In pursuance of this opinion of the military council, measures weretaken for moving the army up the North River, so as to extend itsfront, or left, towards the White Plains, beyond the British right, and thus keep open its communication with the country. The right, orrear division, remained a few days longer about Kingsbridge under thecommand of General Lee, for the security of the heavy baggage andmilitary stores, which, in consequence of the difficulty of obtainingwagons, could be but slowly removed. 

{October 18. }

General Howe, after uniting his forces at Pell's Point, moved forwardhis whole army, except four brigades destined for the defence of NewYork, through Pelham's manor, towards New Rochelle. Some skirmishestook place on the march with a part of Glover's brigade, in which theconduct of the Americans was mentioned with satisfaction by theCommander-in-chief; and, as General Howe took post at New Rochelle, avillage on the Sound, General Washington occupied the heights betweenthat place and the North River. 

{October 21. }

[Sidenote: Both armies move towards the White Plains. ]

At New Rochelle, the British army was joined by the second division ofGermans, under the command of General Knyphausen, and by an incompleteregiment of cavalry from Ireland; some of whom had been captured ontheir passage. Both armies now moved towards the White Plains, astrong piece of ground already occupied by a detachment of militia. The main body of the American troops formed a long line of entrenchedcamps, extending from twelve to thirteen miles, on the differentheights from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge, to the White Plains, fronting the British line of march, and the Brunx, which divided thetwo armies. The motions of General Howe were anxiously watched, notonly for the purposes of security, and of avoiding a general action, but in order to seize any occasion which might present itself ofengaging his out-posts with advantage. While the British army lay atNew Rochelle, the position of a corps of American loyalists commandedby Major Rogers was supposed to furnish such an occasion. He wasadvanced, farther eastward, to Mamaraneck, on the Sound, where he wasbelieved to be covered by the other troops. An attempt was made tosurprise him in the night, by a detachment which should pass betweenhim and the main body of the British army, and, by a coup de main, bear off his whole corps. Major Rogers was surprised, and about sixtyof his regiment killed and taken. The loss of the Americans was onlytwo killed, and eight or ten wounded; among the latter was Major Greenof Virginia, a brave officer, who led the detachment, and who receiveda ball through his body. 

Not long afterwards, a regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen, underColonel Hand, engaged an equal number of Hessian chasseurs, with someadvantage. 

The caution of the English general was increased by these evidences ofenterprise in his adversary. His object seems to have been to avoidskirmishes, and to bring on a general action, if that could beeffected under favourable circumstances; if not, he calculated onnearly all the advantages of a victory from the approachingdissolution of the American army. He proceeded therefore slowly. Hismarch was in close order, his encampments compact, and well guardedwith artillery; and the utmost circumspection was used to leave novulnerable point. 

{October 25. }

As the sick and baggage reached a place of safety, General Washingtongradually drew in his out-posts, and took possession of the heights onthe east side of the Brunx, fronting the head of the British columns, at the distance of seven or eight miles from them. The next day, hewas joined by General Lee, who, after securing the sick and thebaggage, had, with considerable address, brought up the rear divisionof the army; an operation the more difficult as the deficiency ofteams was such that a large portion of the labour usually performed byhorses or oxen, devolved on men. 

General Washington was encamped on high broken ground, with his rightflank on the Brunx. This stream meandered so as also to cover thefront of his right wing, which extended along the road leading towardsNew Rochelle, as far as the brow of the hill where his centre wasposted. His left, which formed almost a right angle with his centre, and was nearly parallel to his right, extended along the hillsnorthward, so as to keep possession of the commanding ground, andsecure a retreat, should it be necessary, to a still stronger positionin his rear. 

On the right of the army, and on the west side of the Brunx, about onemile from camp, on a road leading from the North River, was a hill, ofwhich General M'Dougal was ordered to take possession, for the purposeof covering the right flank. His detachment consisted of about sixteenhundred men, principally militia; and his communication with the mainarmy was open, that part of the Brunx being passable withoutdifficulty. 

Intrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the lines. 

General Howe, having made arrangements to attack Washington in hiscamp, advanced early in the morning in two columns, the rightcommanded by Sir Henry Clinton, and the left by General Knyphausen;and, about ten, his van appeared in full view, on which a cannonadecommenced without much execution on either side. 

{October 28. }

[Sidenote: Battle of the White Plains. ]

The British right formed behind a rising ground, about a mile in frontof the American camp, and extending from the road leading fromMamaraneck towards the Brunx, stood opposed to the American centre. 

On viewing Washington's situation, Howe, who accompanied Knyphausen, determined to carry the hill occupied by M'Dougal, as preliminary toan attack on the centre and right of the American camp. He thereforedirected Colonel Rawle, with a brigade of Hessians, to cross the Brunxand make a circuit so as to turn M'Dougal's right flank, whileBrigadier General Leslie, with a strong corps of British and Hessiantroops should attack him in front. When Rawle had gained his position, the detachment commanded by Leslie also crossed the Brunx, andcommenced a vigorous attack. [45] The militia in the front lineimmediately fled; but the regulars maintained their ground with greatgallantry. Colonel Smallwood's regiment of Maryland, and ColonelReitzimer's of New York, advanced boldly towards the foot of the hillto meet Leslie, but, after a sharp encounter, were overpowered bynumbers, and compelled to retreat. General Leslie then attacked theremaining part of M'Dougal's forces, who were soon driven from thehill, but kept up for some time an irregular fire from the stone wallsabout the scene of action. General Putnam, with Real's brigade, wasordered to support them; but not having arrived till the hill waslost, the attempt to regain it was deemed unadviseable, and the troopsretreated to the main army. 

 [Footnote 45: General Howe's letter. ]

In this animated engagement, the loss was supposed to be nearly equal. That of the Americans was between three and four hundred in killed, wounded, and taken. Colonel Smallwood was among the wounded. 

General Washington continued in his lines expecting an assault. But aconsiderable part of the day having been exhausted in gaining the hillwhich had been occupied by M'Dougal, the meditated attempt on hisintrenchments was postponed until the next morning; and the Britisharmy lay on their arms the following night, in order of battle, on theground taken during the day. 

{October 30. }

This interval was employed by General Washington in strengthening hisworks, removing his sick and baggage, and preparing for the expectedattack by adopting the arrangement of his troops to the existing stateof things. His left maintained its position; but his right was drawnback to stronger ground. Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leaveany thing to hazard, Howe resolved to postpone farther offensiveoperations, until Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions fromNew York, and two from Mamaraneck. This reinforcement was received onthe evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were then made to forcethe American intrenchments the next morning. In the night, and duringthe early part of the succeeding day, a violent rain still fartherpostponed the assault. 

Having now removed his provisions and heavy baggage to much strongerground, and apprehending that the British general, whose left wingextended along the height, taken from M'Dougal, to his rear, mightturn his camp, and occupy the strong ground to which he designed toretreat, should an attempt on his lines prove successful, GeneralWashington changed his position in the night, and withdrew to theheights of North Castle, about five miles from the White Plains. 

{November 1. }

Deeming this position too strong to be attempted with prudence, General Howe determined to change his plan of operations, and to givea new direction to his efforts. [46]

 [Footnote 46: General Howe's letter. ]

While forts Washington and Lee were held by the Americans, hismovements were checked, and York Island insecure. With a view to theacquisition of these posts, he directed General Knyphausen to takepossession of Kingsbridge, which was defended by a small party ofAmericans placed in fort Independence. On his approach, this partyretreated to fort Washington; and Knyphausen encamped between thatplace and Kingsbridge. 

{November 5. }

[Sidenote: The British army returns to Kingsbridge. ]

In the mean time, General Howe retired slowly down the North River. His designs were immediately penetrated by the American general, whoperceived the necessity of passing a part of his army into Jersey, butwas restrained from immediately leaving the strong ground he occupiedby the apprehension that his adversary might, in that event, returnsuddenly and gain his rear. A council of war was called, whichdetermined unanimously, that, should General Howe continue his marchtowards New York, all the troops raised on the west side of the Hudsonshould cross that river, to be afterwards followed by those raised inthe eastern part of the continent, leaving three thousand men for thedefence of the Highlands about the North river. 

In a letter to congress communicating this movement of the Britisharmy, and this determination of the council, the general said, "I cannot indulge the idea that General Howe, supposing him to be going toNew York, means to close the campaign, and to sit down withoutattempting something more. I think it highly probable, and almostcertain, that he will make a descent with part of his troops into theJerseys; and, as soon as I am satisfied that the present manoeuvre isreal, and not a feint, I shall use all the means in my power toforward a part of our force to counteract his designs. 

"I expect the enemy will bend their force against fort Washington, andinvest it immediately. From some advices, it is an object that willattract their earliest attention. "

He also addressed a letter to the governor of New Jersey, expressing adecided opinion that General Howe would not content himself withinvesting fort Washington, but would invade the Jerseys; and urginghim to put the militia in the best possible condition to reinforce thearmy, and to take the place of the new levies, who could not, hesuggested, be depended on to continue in service one day longer thanthe first of December, the time for which they were engaged. 

Immediate intelligence of this movement was likewise given to GeneralGreene, who commanded in the Jerseys; and his attention wasparticularly pointed to fort Washington. 

As the British army approached Kingsbridge, three ships of war passedup the North River, notwithstanding the fire from forts Washington andLee, and notwithstanding the additional obstructions which had beenplaced in the channel. 

{November 8. }

On being informed of this, another letter was addressed to GeneralGreene, stating that this fact was so plain a proof of the inefficacyof all the obstructions thrown in the river, as to justify a change inthe dispositions which had been made. "If, " continued the letter, "wecan not prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessedof the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer toattempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit can not bederived? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent tohazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on thespot, I leave it to you to give such orders respecting the evacuationof the place, as you may think most adviseable; and so far revoke theorders given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last. "

Measures were now taken to cross the North River with the troops whichhad been raised on its western side, and General Washington determinedto accompany that division of the army. The eastern regiments remainedon the eastern side of the river, under the command of General Lee, with orders to join the Commander-in-chief, should the British armycross the Hudson. 

[Sidenote: And General Washington with a part of his army crosses theNorth River. ]

After visiting the posts about Peekskill, and making all thearrangements in his power for their defence, General Washington passedthe North River in the rear of the troops designed to act in theJerseys, and proceeded to the quarters of General Greene, near fortLee. 

From too great a confidence[47] in the strength of fort Washington, and a conviction of its importance, General Greene had not withdrawnits garrison under the discretionary orders he had received, but stillindulged a hope that the post might be maintained, or, should itssituation become desperate, that means might be found to transport thetroops across the river to the Jersey shore, which was defended byfort Lee. 

 [Footnote 47: Extract of a letter from General Greene, dated September 11th, 1778. 

 "Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of fort Washington had; there were men enough to have defended themselves against all the army had they not been struck with a panic; but, being most of them irregular troops, they lost their confidence when the danger began to grow pressing, and so fell a prey to their own fears. "--_Life of Greene_, v. 1, p. 121. ]

Mount Washington is a high piece of rocky ground, near the NorthRiver, very difficult of ascent, especially towards the north, orKingsbridge. The fort was capable of containing about one thousandmen; but the lines and out-works, which were chiefly on the southernside, towards New York, were drawn quite across the island. The groundwas naturally strong, the approaches difficult, and thefortifications, though not sufficient to resist heavy artillery, werebelieved to be in a condition to resist any attempt to carry them bystorm. The garrison consisted of troops, some of whom were among thebest in the American army; and the command had been given to ColonelMagaw, a brave and intelligent officer, in whom great confidence wasplaced. 

{November 13. }

{Fifteenth. }

General Howe, after retiring from the White Plains, encamped at asmall distance from Kingsbridge, on the heights of Fordham; and, having made the necessary preparations for an assault, summoned thegarrison to surrender, on pain of being put to the sword. ColonelMagaw replied, that he should defend the place to the last extremity, and communicated the summons to General Greene at fort Lee, whotransmitted it to the Commander-in-chief, then at Hackensack. Heimmediately rode to fort Lee, and, though it was late in the night, was proceeding to fort Washington, where he expected to find GeneralsPutnam and Greene, when, in crossing the river, he met those officersreturning from a visit to that fort. They reported that the garrisonwas in high spirits, and would make a good defence; on which hereturned with them to fort Lee. 

{November 16. }

Early next morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops, partly on acommanding hill north of the fort, partly in the outermost of thelines drawn across the island on the south of the fort, and partlybetween those lines, on the woody and rocky heights fronting HaerlemRiver, where the ground being extremely difficult of ascent, the workswere not closed. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, commanded on the hilltowards Kingsbridge; Colonel Cadwallader, of Pennsylvania, in thelines, and Colonel Magaw himself continued in the fort. 

The strength of the place had not deterred the British general fromresolving to carry it by storm; and, on receiving the answer ofColonel Magaw, arrangements were made for a vigorous attack next day. About ten, the assailants appeared before the works, and moved to theassault in four different quarters. Their first division consisting ofHessians and Waldeckers, amounting to about five thousand men, underthe command of General Knyphausen, advanced on the north side of thefort, against the hill occupied by Colonel Rawlings, who received themwith great gallantry. The second, on the east, consisting of theBritish light infantry and guards, was led by Brigadier GeneralMatthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the grenadiersand the thirty-third regiment. These troops crossed Haerlem River inboats, under cover of the artillery planted in the works, which hadbeen erected on the opposite side of the river, and landed within thethird line of defence which crossed the island. The third division wasconducted by Lieutenant Colonel Stirling, who passed the river higherup; and the fourth by Lord Percy, accompanied by General Howe inperson. This division was to attack the lines in front, on the southside. [48]

 [Footnote 48: General Howe's letter. ]

The attacks on the north and south by General Knyphausen and LordPercy, were made about the same instant, on Colonels Rawlings andCadwallader, who maintained their ground for a considerable time; but, while Colonel Cadwallader was engaged in the first line against LordPercy, the second and third divisions which had crossed Haerlem Rivermade good their landing, and dispersed the troops fronting that river, as well as a detachment sent by Colonel Cadwallader to support them. Thus being overpowered, and the British advancing between the fort andthe lines, it became necessary to abandon them. In retreating to thefort, some of the men were intercepted by the division under ColonelStirling, and made prisoners. 

The resistance on the north was of longer duration. Rawlingsmaintained his ground with firmness, and his riflemen did vastexecution. A three gun battery also played on Knyphausen with greateffect. At length, the Hessian columns gained the summit of the hill;after which, Colonel Rawlings, who perceived the danger whichthreatened his rear, retreated under the guns of the fort. 

[Sidenote: The lines of Fort Washington carried by the enemy, and thegarrison made prisoners. ]

Having carried the lines, and all the strong ground adjoining them, the British general again summoned Colonel Magaw to surrender. Whilethe capitulation was in a course of arrangement, General Washingtonsent him a billet, requesting him to hold out until the evening, whenmeans should be attempted to bring off the garrison. But Magaw hadproceeded too far to retreat; and it is probable the place could nothave resisted an assault from so formidable a force as threatened it. The greatest difficulties had been overcome; the fort was too small tocontain all the men; and their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Underthese circumstances the garrison became prisoners of war. 

The loss on this occasion was the greatest the Americans had eversustained. The garrison was stated by General Washington at about twothousand men. Yet, in a report published as from General Howe, thenumber of prisoners is said to be two thousand and six hundred, exclusive of officers. Either General Howe must have included in hisreport persons who were not soldiers, or General Washington must havecomprehended the regulars only in his letter. The last conjecture ismost probably correct. The loss of the assailants, according to Mr. Stedman, amounted to eight hundred men. This loss fell heaviest on theGermans. 

[Sidenote: Evacuation of Fort Lee. ]

{November 18. }

On the surrender of fort Washington, it was determined to evacuatefort Lee; and a removal of the stores was immediately commenced. Before this operation could be completed, a detachment commanded byLord Cornwallis, amounting to about six thousand men, crossed theNorth River below Dobb's ferry, and endeavoured, by a rapid march, toenclose the garrison between the North and Hackensack Rivers. Animmediate retreat from that narrow neck of land had becomeindispensable, and was with difficulty effected. All the heavy cannonat fort Lee, except two twelve-pounders, with a considerable quantityof provisions and military stores, including three hundred tents, werelost. After crossing the Hackensack, General Washington posted histroops along the western bank of that river, but was unable to disputeits passage at the head of about three thousand effectives, exposed, without tents, in an inclement season; he was in a level country, without a single intrenching tool, among people far from being zealousin the American cause. In other respects this situation was dangerous. The Passaic, in his rear, after running several miles nearly parallelto the Hackensack, unites with that river below the ground occupied bythe Americans, who were consequently still exposed to the hazard ofbeing inclosed between two rivers. 

{November 21. }

[Sidenote: Weakness of the American army. ]

This gloomy state of things was not brightened by the prospect beforehim. In casting his eyes around, no cheering object presented itself. No confidence could be placed on receiving reinforcements from anyquarter. But, in no situation could Washington despond. His exertionsto collect an army, and to impede the progress of his enemy, wereperseveringly continued. Understanding that Sir Guy Carleton no longerthreatened Ticonderoga, he directed General Schuyler to hasten thetroops of Pennsylvania and Jersey to his assistance, and ordered[49]General Lee to cross the North River, and be in readiness to join him, should the enemy continue the campaign. But, under the influence ofthe same fatal cause which had acted elsewhere, these armies too weremelting away, and would soon be almost totally dissolved. GeneralMercer, who commanded a part of the flying camp stationed aboutBergen, was also called in; but these troops had engaged to serve onlytill the 1st of December, and, like the other six months men, hadalready abandoned the army in great numbers. No hope existed ofretaining the remnant after they should possess a legal right to bedischarged; and there was not much probability of supplying theirplaces with other militia. To New England he looked with anxious hope;and his requisitions on those states received prompt attention. Sixthousand militia from Massachusetts, and a considerable body fromConnecticut, were ordered to his assistance; but some delay inassembling them was unavoidable, and their march was arrested by theappearance of the enemy in their immediate neighbourhood. 

 [Footnote 49: See note No. VII. At the end of the volume. ]

Three thousand men, conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, who were embarkedon board a fleet commanded by Sir Peter Parker, sailed late inNovember from New York, and, without much opposition, took possessionof Newport. This invasion excited serious alarm in Massachusetts andConnecticut, and these states retained for their own defence, themilitia who had been embodied at the instance of theCommander-in-chief. 

Not intending to maintain his present position, General Washington hadplaced some regiments along the Hackensack to afford the semblance ofdefending its passage until his stores could be removed; and, with theresidue of the troops, crossed the Passaic, and took post at Newark. Soon after he had marched, Major General Vaughan appeared before thenew bridge over Hackensack. The American detachment which had beenleft in the rear, being unable to defend it, broke it down, andretired before him over the Passaic. 

[Sidenote: Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia. ]

Having entered the open country, General Washington determined to halta few days on the south side of this river, make some show ofresistance, and endeavour to collect such a force as would keep up thesemblance of an army. His letters, not having produced such exertionsas the public exigencies required, he deputed General Mifflin to thegovernment of Pennsylvania, and Colonel Reid, his Adjutant General, tothe government of New Jersey, with orders to represent the realsituation of the army, and the certainty that, without greatreinforcements, Philadelphia must fall into the hands of the enemy, and the state of Jersey be overrun. 

While thus endeavouring to strengthen himself with militia, he pressedGeneral Lee to hasten his march, and cautioned him to keep high enoughup the country to avoid the enemy, who, having got possession of themail containing one of his late letters, would certainly endeavour toprevent the junction of the two armies. 

This perilous state of things was rendered still more critical byindications of an insurrection in the county of Monmouth, in Jersey, where great numbers favoured the royal cause. In other places, too, ahostile temper was displayed, and an indisposition to fartherresistance began to be manifested throughout that state. Theseappearances obliged him to make detachments from the militia of hisarmy, to overawe the disaffected of Monmouth, who were on the point ofassembling in force. 

[Sidenote: General Washington retreats through Jersey. ]

{November 23. }

As the British army crossed the Passaic, General Washington abandonedhis position behind that river; and the day Lord Cornwallis enteredNewark, he retreated to Brunswick, a small village on the Raritan. 

{December 1. }

At this place, the levies drawn from Maryland and Jersey to composethe flying camp, became entitled to their discharge. No remonstrancescould detain them; and he sustained the mortification of seeing hisfeeble army still more enfeebled by being entirely abandoned by thesetroops, in the face of an advancing enemy. The Pennsylvania militiabelonging to the flying camp were engaged to serve till the 1st ofJanuary. So many of them deserted, that it was deemed necessary toplace guards on the roads, and ferries over the Delaware, to apprehendand send them back to camp. The Governor of New Jersey was againpressed for assistance, but it was not in his power to furnish the aidrequired. The well affected part of the lower country was overawed bythe British army; and the militia of Morris and Sussex came out slowlyand reluctantly. 

While at Brunswick, attempts were made to retard the advance of theBritish army by movements indicating an intention to act on theoffensive; but this feint was unavailing. Lord Cornwallis continued topress forward; and, as his advanced guards showed themselves on theopposite side of the bridge, General Washington evacuated the town, and marched through Princeton to Trenton. Directions had already beengiven to collect all the boats on the Delaware, from Philadelphiaupwards for seventy miles, in the hope that the progress of the enemymight be stopped at this river; and that, in the mean time, reinforcements might arrive which would enable him to dispute itspassage. 

{December 2. }

Having, with great labour, transported the few remaining militarystores and baggage over the Delaware, he determined to remain as longas possible on the northern banks of that river. 

The army which was thus pressed slowly through the Jerseys, was aidedby no other cavalry than a small corps of badly mounted Connecticutmilitia, commanded by Major Shelden; and was almost equally destituteof artillery. Its numbers, at no time during the retreat, exceededfour thousand men, and on reaching the Delaware, was reduced to lessthan three thousand; of whom, not quite one thousand were militia ofNew Jersey. Even among the continental troops there were many whoseterm of service was about to expire. 

Its defectiveness of numbers did not constitute its only weakness. Theregulars were badly armed, worse clad, and almost destitute of tents, blankets, or utensils for dressing their food. They were composedchiefly of the garrison of fort Lee, and had been obliged to evacuatethat place with too much precipitation to bring with them even thosefew articles of comfort and accommodation with which they had beenfurnished. The Commander-in-chief found himself at the head of thissmall band of soldiers, dispirited by their losses and fatigues, retreating almost naked and bare-footed, in the cold of November andDecember, before a numerous, well appointed, and victorious army, through a desponding country, much more disposed to obtain safety bysubmission, than to seek it by a manly resistance. 

In this crisis of American affairs, a proclamation was issued by Lordand General Howe, as commissioners appointed on the part of the crownfor restoring peace to America, commanding all persons assembled inarms against his majesty's government, to disband and return to theirhomes; and all civil officers to desist from their treasonablepractices, and relinquish their usurped authority. A full pardon wasoffered to every person who would, within sixty days, appear beforecertain civil or military officers of the crown, claim the benefit ofthat proclamation, and testify his obedience to the laws bysubscribing a declaration of his submission to the royal authority. Copies of it were dispersed through the country, after which numbersflocked in daily, to make their peace and obtain protection. Thecontrast between the splendid appearance of the pursuing army, andthat of the ragged Americans who were flying before them, could notfail to nourish the general opinion that the contest was approachingits termination. 

Among the many valuable traits in the character of Washington, wasthat unyielding firmness of mind which resisted these accumulatedcircumstances of depression, and supported him under them. Undismayedby the dangers which surrounded him, he did not for an instant relaxhis exertions, nor omit any thing which could obstruct the progress ofthe enemy, or improve his own condition. He did not appear to despairof the public safety, but struggled against adverse fortune with thehope of yet vanquishing the difficulties which surrounded him; andconstantly showed himself to his harassed and enfeebled army, with aserene, unembarrassed countenance, betraying no fears in himself, andinvigorating and inspiring with confidence the bosoms of others. Tothis unconquerable firmness, to this perfect self-possession under themost desperate circumstances, is America, in a great degree, indebtedfor her independence. 

{December 5. }

After removing his baggage and stores over the Delaware, and sendinghis sick to Philadelphia, the American General, finding that LordCornwallis still continued in Brunswick, detached twelve hundred mento Princeton in the hope that this appearance of advancing on theBritish might not only retard their progress, but cover a part of thecountry, and reanimate the people of Jersey. 

Some portion of this short respite from laborious service was devotedto the predominant wish of his heart, --preparations for the nextcampaign, --by impressing on congress a conviction of the real causesof the present calamitous state of things. However the human mind mayresist the clearest theoretic reasoning, it is scarcely possible notto discern obvious and radical errors, while smarting under theirdestructive consequences. The abandonment of the army by wholeregiments of the flying camp, in the face of an advancing and superiorenemy; the impracticability of calling out the militia of Jersey andPennsylvania in sufficient force to prevent Lord Cornwallis fromoverrunning the first state, or restrain him from entering the last, had it not been saved by other causes, were practical lessons on thesubjects of enlistments for a short time, and a reliance on militia, which no prejudice could disregard, and which could not fail to addgreat weight to the remonstrances formerly made by theCommander-in-chief, which were now repeated. 

{December 6. }

{Seventh. }

The exertions of General Mifflin to raise the militia of Pennsylvania, though unavailing in the country, were successful in Philadelphia. Alarge proportion of the inhabitants of that city capable of bearingarms, had associated for the general defence; and, on this occasion, fifteen hundred of them marched to Trenton; to which place a Germanbattalion was also ordered by congress. On the arrival of thesetroops, General Washington commenced his march to Princeton, but wasstopped by the intelligence that Lord Cornwallis, having receivedlarge reinforcements, was advancing rapidly from Brunswick bydifferent routes, and endeavouring to gain his rear. 

{Eighth. }

[Sidenote: General Washington crosses the Delaware. ]

[Sidenote: Danger of Philadelphia. ]

On receiving this intelligence, he crossed the Delaware, and postedhis army in such a manner as to guard the fords. As his rear passedthe river, the van of the British army appeared in sight. The mainbody took post at Trenton, and detachments were placed both above andbelow, while small parties, without interruption from the people ofthe country, reconnoitred the Delaware for a considerable distance. From Bordentown below Trenton the course of the river turns westward, and forms an acute angle with its course from Philadelphia to thatplace; so that Lord Cornwallis might cross a considerable distanceabove, and be not much, if any, farther from that city than theAmerican army. 

The British general made some unsuccessful attempts to seize a numberof boats guarded by Lord Stirling, about Coryell's Ferry; and, inorder to facilitate his movements down the river, on the Jersey shore, repaired the bridges below Trenton, which had been broken down byorder of General Washington. He then advanced a strong detachment toBordentown, giving indications of an intention to cross the Delawareat the same time above and below; and either to march in two columnsto Philadelphia, or completely to envelop the American army in theangle of the river. To counteract this plan, the American Generalstationed a few gallies to watch the movements of his enemy below, andaid in repelling any effort to pass over to the Pennsylvania shore;and made such a disposition of his little army as to guard against anyattempt to force a passage above, which he believed to be the realdesign. 

Having made his arrangements, he waited anxiously for reinforcements;and, in the meantime, sent daily parties over the river to harass theenemy, and to observe his situation. 

The utmost exertions were made by government to raise the militia. Inthe hope that a respectable body of continental troops would aid theseexertions, General Washington had directed General Gates, with theregulars of the northern army, and General Heath, with those atPeekskill, to march to his assistance. 

[Sidenote: Capture of General Lee. ]

Although General Lee had been repeatedly urged to join theCommander-in-chief, he proceeded slowly in the execution of theseorders, manifesting a strong disposition to retain his separatecommand, and rather to hang on, and threaten the rear of the Britisharmy, than to strengthen that in its front. With this view he proposedestablishing himself at Morristown. On receiving a letter from GeneralWashington disapproving this proposition, and urging him to hasten hismarch, Lee still avowed a preference for his own plan, and proceededreluctantly towards the Delaware. While passing through Morris county, at the distance of twenty miles from the British encampment, he, veryincautiously, quartered under a slight guard, in a house about threemiles from his army. Information of this circumstance was given by acountryman to Colonel Harcourt, at that time detached with a body ofcavalry to watch his movements, who immediately formed and executedthe design of seizing him. Early in the morning of the 12th ofDecember, this officer reached Lee's quarters, who received nointimation of his danger until the house was surrounded, and he foundhimself a prisoner. He was carried off in triumph to the British army, where he was, for some time, treated as a deserter from the Britishservice. 

This misfortune made a serious impression on all America. Theconfidence originally placed in General Lee had been increased by hissuccess in the southern department, and by a belief that his opinions, during the military operations in New York, had contributed to theadoption of those judicious movements which had, in some measure, defeated the plans of General Howe in that quarter. It was alsobelieved that he had dissented from the resolution of the council ofwar for maintaining forts Washington and Lee. No officer, except theCommander-in-chief, possessed, at that time, in so eminent a degree, the confidence of the army, or of the country; and his loss was, almost universally, bewailed as one of the greatest calamities whichhad befallen the American arms. It was regretted by no person morethan by General Washington himself. He respected the merit of thateccentric veteran, and sincerely lamented his captivity. 

General Sullivan, on whom the command of that division devolved afterthe capture of Lee, promptly obeyed the orders which had been directedto that officer; and, crossing the Delaware at Philipsburg, joined theCommander-in-chief. On the same day General Gates arrived with a fewnorthern troops. By these and other reinforcements, the army wasaugmented to about seven thousand effective men. 

[Sidenote: The British go into winter quarters. ]

The attempts of the British general to get possession of boats for thetransportation of his army over the Delaware having failed, he gaveindications of an intention to close the campaign, and to retire intowinter quarters. About four thousand men were cantoned on the Delawareat Trenton, Bordentown, the White Horse, and Mount Holly; and theremaining part of the army of Jersey was distributed from that riverto the Hackensack. Strong corps were posted at Princeton, Brunswick, and Elizabethtown. 

To intimidate the people, and thereby impede the recruiting service, was believed to be no inconsiderable inducement with General Howe, forcovering so large a portion of Jersey. To counteract these views, General Washington ordered three of the regiments from Peekskill tohalt at Morristown, and to unite with about eight hundred militiaassembled at that place under Colonel Ford. General Maxwell was sentto take command of these troops, with orders to watch the motions ofthe enemy, to harass him in his marches, to give intelligence of allhis movements, to keep up the spirits of the militia, and to preventthe inhabitants from going within the British lines, and takingprotection. 

{December 20. }

The short interval between this cantonment of the British troops, andthe recommencement of active operations, was employed by GeneralWashington in repeating the representations he had so often made tocongress, respecting preparations for the ensuing campaign. Thedangers resulting from a reliance on temporary armies had been fullyexemplified; and his remonstrances on that subject were supported bythat severe experience which corrects while it chastises. In thecourse of the campaign, he had suffered greatly from the want ofcavalry, of artillery, and of engineers. His ideas on these importantsubjects had been already stated to congress, and were now reurged. With respect to the additional expense to be incurred by the measuresrecommended, he observed, "that our funds were not the only object nowto be taken into consideration. The enemy, it was found, were dailygathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball by rolling, would increase, unless some means should be devisedto check effectually the progress of their arms. Militia mightpossibly do it for a little while; but in a little while also, themilitia of those states which were frequently called upon would notturn out at all, or would turn out with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! WitnessPennsylvania! Could any thing but the river Delaware have savedPhiladelphia?

"Could any thing, " he asked, "be more destructive of the recruitingbusiness than giving ten dollars bounty for six weeks service in themilitia, who come in, you can not tell how; go, you can not tell when;and act, you can not tell where; who consume your provisions, exhaustyour stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment. 

"These, sir, " he added, "are the men I am to depend upon ten dayshence. This is the basis upon which your cause will rest, and must forever depend, until you get a large standing army sufficient of itselfto oppose the enemy. "

[Illustration: Washington Crossing the Delaware

_From the painting by Emanuel Leutze, in the Metropolitan Museum ofArt, New York City. _

_On December 8, 1776, following his retreat across New Jersey, withthe British army under Cornwallis pressing him closely, Washingtontransported his army of 6, 000 men across the Delaware intoPennsylvania and to safety. He had seized all the boats within seventymiles, leaving Cornwallis to wait until the river froze over before hecould follow. _

_In recrossing the Delaware (as here depicted) to strike the Britishat Trenton, Washington executed the most brilliant military maneuverof his career. _

_In his sesquicentennial address delivered at Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3, 1925, President Coolidge related this incidentwhich gives us Cornwallis's estimate of the importance of the Trentonvictory:_

 "It is recorded that a few evenings after the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown a banquet was given by Washington and his staff to the British commander and his staff. One likes to contemplate the sportsmanship of that function. Amiabilities and good wishes were duly exchanged, and finally Lord Cornwallis rose to present his compliments to Washington. There had been much talk of past campaigning experiences, and Cornwallis, turning to Washington, expressed the judgment that when history's verdict was made up 'the brightest garlands for your Excellency will be gathered, not from the shores of the Chesapeake, but from the banks of the Delaware. '"]

He also hinted the idea, extremely delicate in itself, of enlarginghis powers so as to enable him to act, without constant applicationsto congress for their sanction of measures, the immediate adoption ofwhich was essential to the public interests. "This might, " he said, "be termed an application for powers too dangerous to be trusted. " Hecould only answer, "that desperate diseases required desperateremedies. He could with truth declare that he felt no lust for power, but wished with as much fervency as any man upon this wide extendedcontinent, for an opportunity of turning the sword into a ploughshare;but his feelings as an officer and a man had been such as to force himto say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties tocontend with than himself. "

After recapitulating the measures he had adopted, which were notwithin his power, and urging many other necessary arrangements, headded, "it may be thought I am going a good deal out of the line of myduty to adopt these measures, or to advise thus freely. A character tolose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable blessing of liberty atstake; and a life devoted, must be my excuse. "

The present aspect of American affairs was gloomy in the extreme. Theexisting army, except a few regiments, affording an effective force ofabout fifteen hundred men, would dissolve in a few days. New Jerseyhad, in a great measure, submitted; and the militia of Pennsylvaniahad not displayed the alacrity expected from them. General Howe would, most probably, avail himself of the ice which would soon form, and ofthe dissolution of the American army, to pass the Delaware and seizePhiladelphia. This event was dreaded, not only on account of itsintrinsic importance, but of its peculiar effect at this time, when anarmy was to be recruited on which the future hopes of America were torest. It was feared, and with reason, that it would make such animpression on the public mind as to deter the American youth fromengaging in a contest becoming desperate. 

Impelled by these considerations, General Washington meditated a blowon the British army, while dispersed in its cantonments, which mightretrieve the affairs of America in the opinion of the public, andrecover the ground that had been lost. 

He formed the daring plan of attacking all the British posts on theDelaware at the same instant. If successful in all, or any of theseattacks, he hoped not only to wipe off the impression made by hislosses, and by his retreat, but also to relieve Philadelphia fromimmediate danger, and to compel his adversary to compress himself insuch a manner as no longer to cover the Jerseys. 

The positions taken to guard the river were equally well adapted tooffensive operations. 

The regulars were posted above Trenton from Yardley's up to Coryell'sFerry. The Pennsylvania flying camp, and Jersey militia, under thecommand of General Irvine, extended from Yardley's to the ferryopposite Bordentown; and General Cadwallader with the Pennsylvaniamilitia lay still lower down the river. 

In the plan of attack which had been digested, it was proposed tocross in the night at M'Konkey's Ferry, about nine miles aboveTrenton; to march down in two divisions, the one taking the riverroad, and the other the Pennington road, both which lead into thetown; the first, towards that part of the western side whichapproaches the river, and the last towards the north. This part of theplan was to be executed by the General in person, at the head of abouttwo thousand four hundred continental troops. It was thoughtpracticable to pass them over the river by twelve, and to reach thepoint of destination by five in the morning of the next day, when theattack was to be made. General Irvine was directed to cross at theTrenton Ferry, and to secure the bridge below the town, in order toprevent the escape of the enemy by that road. General Cadwallader wasto pass over at Dunk's Ferry, and carry the post at Mount Holly. Ithad been in contemplation to unite the troops employed in fortifyingPhiladelphia, to those at Bristol, and to place the whole underGeneral Putnam; but such indications were given in that city of aninsurrection of the royal cause, that this part of the plan wasabandoned. The cold on the night of the 25th was very severe. Snow, mingled with hail and rain, fell in great quantities, and so much icewas made in the river that, with every possible exertion, the divisionconducted by the General in person could not effect its passage untilthree, nor commence its march down the river till near four. As thedistance to Trenton by either road is nearly the same, orders weregiven to attack at the instant of arrival, and, after driving in theout-guards, to press rapidly after them into the town, and prevent themain body from forming. 

[Sidenote: Battle of Trenton. ]

{December 26. }

General Washington accompanied the upper column, and arriving at theout-post on that road, precisely at eight, drove it in, and, in threeminutes, heard the fire from the column which had taken the riverroad. The picket guard attempted to keep up a fire while retreating, but was pursued with such ardour as to be unable to make a stand. Colonel Rawle, who commanded in the town, paraded his men, and met theassailants. In the commencement of the action, he was mortallywounded, upon which the troops, in apparent confusion, attempted togain the road to Princeton. General Washington threw a detachment intotheir front, while he advanced rapidly on them in person. Findingthemselves surrounded, and their artillery already seized, they laiddown their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Abouttwenty of the enemy were killed, and about one thousand madeprisoners. Six field pieces, and a thousand stand of small arms werealso taken. On the part of the Americans, two privates were killed;two frozen to death; and one officer, Lieutenant Monroe, [50] of thethird Virginia regiment, and three or four privates wounded. 

 [Footnote 50: Since President of the United States. ]

Unfortunately, the ice rendered it impracticable for General Irvine toexecute that part of the plan which was allotted to him. With hisutmost efforts, he was unable to cross the river; and the road towardsBordentown remained open. About five hundred men, among whom was atroop of cavalry, stationed in the lower end of Trenton, availedthemselves of this circumstance, and crossing the bridge in thecommencement of the action, escaped down the river. The same causeprevented General Cadwallader from attacking the post at Mount Holly. With great difficulty a part of his infantry passed the river, butreturned on its being found absolutely impracticable to cross with theartillery. 

Although this plan failed in so many of its parts, the successattending that which was conducted by General Washington in person wasfollowed by the happiest effects. 

Had it been practicable for the divisions under Generals Irvine andCadwallader to cross the river, it was intended to proceed fromTrenton to the posts at and about Bordentown, to sweep the Britishfrom the banks of the Delaware, [51] and to maintain a position in theJerseys. But finding that those parts of the plan had failed, andsupposing the British to remain in force below, while a strong corpswas posted at Princeton, General Washington thought it unadviseable tohazard the loss of the very important advantage already gained, byattempting to increase it, and recrossed the river with his prisonersand military stores. Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, his aid-de-camp, whocarried the intelligence of this success to congress, was presentedwith a horse completely caparisoned for service, and recommended tothe command of a regiment of cavalry. 

 [Footnote 51: A fact has been stated to the author which shows to what an extent the plan might have been executed had it been possible to cross the river. Colonel Reed, who was with the division of Cadwallader, passed the ferry with the van of the infantry, and immediately despatched some trusty persons to examine the situation of the troops at Mount Holly. The report made by his messengers was, that they had looked into several houses in which the soldiers were quartered, and had found them generally fast asleep, under the influence, as was supposed, of the spirituous liquors they had drunk the preceding day, which was Christmas-day. That there appeared to be no apprehension of danger, nor precaution against it. ]

Nothing could surpass the astonishment of the British commander atthis unexpected display of vigour on the part of the American General. His condition, and that of his country, had been thought desperate. Hehad been deserted by all the troops having a legal right to leave him;and, to render his situation completely ruinous, nearly two-thirds ofthe continental soldiers still remaining with him, would be entitledto their discharge on the first day of January. There appeared to beno probability of prevailing on them to continue longer in theservice, and the recruiting business was absolutely at an end. Thespirits of a large proportion of the people were sunk to the lowestpoint of depression. New Jersey appeared to be completely subdued; andsome of the best judges of the public sentiment were of opinion thatimmense numbers in Pennsylvania, also, were determined not to permitthe sixty days allowed in the proclamation of Lord and Sir WilliamHowe, to elapse, without availing themselves of the pardon itproffered. Instead of offensive operations, the total dispersion ofthe small remnant of the American army was to be expected, since itwould be rendered too feeble by the discharge of those engaged onlyuntil the last day of December, to attempt, any longer, the defence ofthe Delaware, which would by that time, in all probability, bepassable on the ice. While every appearance supported these opinions, and the British General, without being sanguine, might well considerthe war as approaching its termination, this bold and fortunateenterprise announced to him, that he was contending with an adversarywho could never cease to be formidable while the possibility ofresistance remained. Finding the conquest of America more distant thanhad been supposed, he determined, in the depth of winter to recommenceactive operations; and Lord Cornwallis, who had retired to New Yorkwith the intention of embarking for Europe, suspended his departure, and returned to the Jerseys in great force, for the purpose ofregaining the ground which had been lost. 

Meanwhile, Count Donop, who commanded the troops below Trenton, onhearing the disaster which had befallen Colonel Rawle, retreated bythe road leading to Amboy, and joined General Leslie at Princeton. Thenext day, General Cadwallader crossed the Delaware, with orders toharass the enemy, but to put nothing to hazard until he should bejoined by the continental battalions, who were allowed a day or two ofrepose, after the fatigues of the enterprise against Trenton. GeneralMifflin joined General Irvine with about fifteen hundred Pennsylvaniamilitia, and those troops also crossed the river. 

Finding himself once more at the head of a force with which it seemedpracticable to act offensively, the General determined to employ thewinter in endeavouring to recover Jersey. 

{December 30. }

With this view, he ordered General Heath to leave a small detachmentat Peekskill, and with the main body of the New England militia, toenter Jersey, and approach the British cantonments on that side. General Maxwell was ordered, with all the militia he could collect, toharass their flank and rear, and to attack their out-posts on everyfavourable occasion, while the continental troops, led by himself, recrossed the Delaware, and took post at Trenton. On the last day ofDecember, the regulars of New England were entitled to a discharge. With great difficulty, and a bounty of ten dollars, many of them wereinduced to renew their engagements for six weeks. 

{1777}

{January 1. }

The British were now collected in force at Princeton under LordCornwallis; and appearances confirmed the intelligence, secretly[52]obtained, that he intended to attack the American army. 

 [Footnote 52: In this critical moment, when correct intelligence was so all important, Mr. Robert Morris raised on his private credit in Philadelphia, five hundred pounds in specie, which he transmitted to the Commander-in-chief, who employed it in procuring information not otherwise to have been obtained. ]

Generals Mifflin and Cadwallader, who lay at Bordentown and Crosswix, with three thousand six hundred militia, were therefore ordered tojoin the Commander-in-chief, whose whole effective force, with thisaddition, did not exceed five thousand men. 

{January 2. }

Lord Cornwallis advanced upon him the next morning; and about four inthe afternoon, the van of the British army reached Trenton. On itsapproach, General Washington retired across the Assumpinck, a creekwhich runs through the town. The British attempted to cross the creekat several places, but finding all the fords guarded, they desistedfrom the attempt, and kindled their fires. The Americans kindled theirfires likewise; and a cannonade was kept up on both sides till dark. 

The situation of General Washington was again extremely critical. Should he maintain his position, he would certainly be attacked nextmorning, by a force so very superior, as to render the destruction ofhis little army inevitable. Should he attempt to retreat over theDelaware, the passage of that river had been rendered so difficult bya few mild and foggy days which had softened the ice, that a totaldefeat would be hazarded. In any event, the Jerseys would, once more, be entirely in possession of the enemy; the public mind again bedepressed; recruiting discouraged; and Philadelphia, a second time, inthe grasp of General Howe. 

In this embarrassing state of things, he formed the bold design ofabandoning the Delaware, and marching, by a circuitous route, alongthe left flank of the British army, into its rear, at Princeton, whereits strength could not be great; and, after beating the troops at thatplace, to move rapidly to Brunswick, where the baggage and principalmagazines of the army lay under a weak guard. He indulged the hopethat this manoeuvre would call the attention of the British general tohis own defence. Should Lord Cornwallis, contrary to every reasonablecalculation, proceed to Philadelphia, nothing worse could happen inthat quarter, than must happen should the American army be drivenbefore him; and some compensation for that calamity would be obtainedby expelling the enemy completely from Jersey, and cutting up, indetail, all his parties in that state. 

{January 3. }

[Sidenote: Of Princeton. ]

This plan being approved by a council of war, preparations were madefor its immediate execution. As soon as it was dark, the baggage wasremoved silently to Burlington; and, about one in the morning, afterrenewing their fires, and leaving their guards to go the rounds asusual; the army decamped with perfect silence, and took a circuitousroute along the Quaker road to Princeton, where three Britishregiments had encamped the preceding night, two of which commencedtheir march early in the morning to join the rear of their army atMaidenhead. At sunrise, when they had proceeded about two miles, theysaw the Americans on their left, advancing in a direction which wouldenter the road in their rear. They immediately faced about, and, repassing Stony Brook, moved under cover of a copse of wood towardsthe American van, which was conducted by General Mercer. A sharpaction ensued, which, however, was not of long duration. The militia, of which the advanced party was principally composed, soon gave way;and the few regulars attached to them were not strong enough tomaintain their ground. While exerting himself gallantly to rally hisbroken troops, General Mercer was mortally wounded, and the van wasentirely routed. But the fortune of the day was soon changed. The mainbody, led by General Washington in person, followed close in the rear, and attacked the British with great spirit. Persuaded that defeatwould irretrievably ruin the affairs of America, he advanced in thevery front of danger, and exposed himself to the hottest fire of theenemy. He was so well supported by the same troops who, a few daysbefore, had saved their country at Trenton, that the British, in turn, were compelled to give way. Their line was broken, and the tworegiments separated from each other. Colonel Mawhood, who commandedthat in front, and was, consequently, nearest the rear division of thearmy, under Lord Cornwallis, retired to the main road, and continuedhis march to Maidenhead. The fifty-fifth regiment, which was on theleft, being hard pressed, fled in confusion across the fields into aback road, leading between Hillsborough and Kingston towardsBrunswick. The vicinity of the British forces at Maidenhead securedColonel Mawhood, and General Washington pressed forward to Princeton. The regiment remaining in that place took post in the college, andmade a show of resistance; but some pieces of artillery being broughtup to play upon that building, it was abandoned, and the greater partof them became prisoners. A few saved themselves by a precipitateflight to Brunswick. 

In this engagement, rather more than one hundred British were killedin the field, and near three hundred were taken prisoners. The loss ofthe Americans, in killed, was somewhat less, but in their number wasincluded General Mercer, a valuable officer, who had served with theCommander-in-chief during his early campaigns in Virginia, and wasgreatly esteemed by him. Colonels Haslet and Potter, Captain Neal ofthe artillery, Captain Fleming, and five other valuable officers, werealso among the slain. 

On the return of day-light, Lord Cornwallis discovered that theAmerican army had decamped in the night; and immediately conceived thewhole plan. Alarmed at the danger which threatened Brunswick, hemarched with the utmost expedition for that place, and was close inthe rear of the American army before it could leave Princeton. 

The situation of General Washington was again perilous in the extreme. His small army was exhausted with fatigue. His troops had been withoutsleep, all of them one night, and some of them, two. They were withoutblankets, many of them were bare-footed and otherwise thinly clad, andwere eighteen miles from his place of destination. He was closelypursued by a superior enemy who must necessarily come up with himbefore he could accomplish his designs on Brunswick. Under thesecircumstances he abandoned the remaining part of his original plan, and took the road leading up the country to Pluckemin, where histroops were permitted to refresh themselves. Lord Cornwallis continuedhis march to Brunswick, which he reached in the course of that night. 

The sufferings of the American soldiers had been so great from theseverity of the season, and the very active service in which they hadbeen engaged; their complaints, especially on the part of the militia, were so loud; their numbers were reducing so fast by returning home, and by sickness; that General Washington found it impracticable tocontinue offensive operations. He retired to Morristown, in order toput his men under cover, and to give them some repose. 

The bold, judicious, and unexpected attacks made at Trenton andPrinceton, had a much more extensive influence than would be supposedfrom a mere estimate of the killed and taken. They saved Philadelphiafor the winter; recovered the state of Jersey; and, which was of stillmore importance, revived the drooping spirits of the people, and gavea perceptible impulse to the recruiting service throughout the UnitedStates. 

The problem, that a nation can be defended against a permanent force, by temporary armies, by occasional calls of the husbandman from hisplough to the field, was completely disproved; and, in demonstratingits fallacy, the independence of America had nearly perished in itscradle. The utmost efforts were now directed to the creation of anarmy for the ensuing campaign, as the only solid basis on which thehopes of the patriot could rest. During the retreat through theJerseys, and while the expectation prevailed that no effectualresistance could be made to the British armies, some spirited menindeed were animated to greater and more determined exertions; butthis state of things produced a very different effect on the greatmass, which can alone furnish the solid force of armies. In the middlestates especially, the panic of distrust was perceived. Doubtsconcerning the issue of the contest became extensive; and therecruiting service proceeded so heavily and slowly as to excite themost anxious solicitude for the future. 

The affairs of Trenton and Princeton were magnified into greatvictories; and were believed by the body of the people to evidence thesuperiority of their army and of their general. The opinion that theywere engaged in hopeless contest, yielded to a confidence that properexertions would ensure ultimate success. 

This change of opinion was accompanied with an essential change ofconduct; and, although the regiments required by congress were notcompleted, they were made much stronger than was believed to bepossible before this happy revolution in the aspect of public affairs. 

[Sidenote: Firmness of Congress. ]

The firmness of congress throughout the gloomy and trying period whichintervened between the loss of fort Washington and the battle ofPrinceton, gives the members of that time a just claim to theadmiration of the world, and to the gratitude of their fellowcitizens. Undismayed by impending dangers, they did not, for aninstant, admit the idea of surrendering the independence they haddeclared, and purchasing peace by returning to their colonialsituation. As the British army advanced through Jersey, and theconsequent insecurity of Philadelphia rendered an adjournment fromthat place a necessary measure of precaution, their exertions seemedto increase with their difficulties. They sought to remove thedespondence which was seizing and paralyzing the public mind, by anaddress to the states, in which every argument was suggested whichcould rouse them to vigorous action. They made the most strenuousefforts to animate the militia, and impel them to the field, by theagency of those whose popular eloquence best fitted them for such aservice. 

{1776}

{December 20. }

When reassembled at Baltimore, the place to which they had adjourned, their resolutions exhibited no evidence of confusion or dismay; andthe most judicious efforts were made to repair the mischief producedby past errors. 

{December 27. }

Declaring that, in the present state of things, the very existence ofcivil liberty depended on the right execution of military powers, to avigorous direction of which, distant, numerous, and deliberativebodies were unequal, they authorized General Washington to raisesixteen additional regiments, and conferred upon him, for six months, almost unlimited powers for the conduct of the war. 

Towards the close of 1776, while the tide of fortune was runningstrongest against them, some few members, distrusting their ability tomake a successful resistance, proposed to authorize theircommissioners at the court of Versailles to transfer to France thesame monopoly of their trade which Great Britain had possessed. [53]This proposition is stated to have been relinquished, because it wasbelieved that concessions of this kind would impair many argumentswhich had been used in favour of independence, and disunite thepeople. It was next proposed to offer a monopoly of certain enumeratedarticles; but the unequal operation of this measure gave to theproposition a speedy negative. Some proposed offering to France anoffensive and defensive league; but this also was rejected. The moreenlightened members argued that, though the friendship of small statesmight be purchased, that of France could not. They alleged that, ifshe would risk a war with Great Britain by openly espousing theircause, she would not be induced to that measure by the prospect ofdirect advantages, so much as by a desire to lessen the overgrownpower of a dangerous rival. [54] It was therefore urged that the mostcertain means of influencing France to interfere, was an assurancethat the United States were determined to persevere in refusing toresume their former allegiance. Under the influence of this betteropinion, resolutions were again entered into, directing theircommissioners in Europe to give explicit assurances of theirdetermination at all events to maintain their independence. Copies ofthese resolutions were sent to the principal courts of Europe; andagents were appointed to solicit their friendship to the new formedstates. [55] These despatches fell into the hands of the British, andwere published by them; a circumstance which promoted the views ofcongress, who were persuaded that an apprehension of their coming toan accommodation with Great Britain constituted a material objectionto the interference of foreign courts, in what was represented asmerely a domestic quarrel. A resolution adopted in the deepestdistress, to listen to no terms of reunion with their parent state, would, it was believed, convince those who wished for thedismemberment of the British empire, that sound policy required theirinterference so far as to prevent the conquest of the United States. 

 [Footnote 53: Ramsay. ]

 [Footnote 54: Ramsay. ]

 [Footnote 55: Secret Journals of Congress, vol. Ii. P. 38, and post. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

 American army inoculated.... General Heath moves to Kingsbridge.... Returns to Peekskill.... Destruction of stores at Peekskill.... At Danbury.... Expedition to Sagg Harbour.... Camp formed at Middlebrook.... Sir William Howe moves out to Somerset Court House.... Returns to Amboy.... Attempts to cut off the retreat of the American army to Middlebrook.... Lord Cornwallis skirmishes with Lord Stirling.... General Prescot surprised and taken.... The British army embarks. 

{1777}

The effect of the proclamation published by Lord and General Howe ontaking possession of New Jersey, was, in a great degree, counteractedby the conduct of the invading army. Fortunately for the UnitedStates, the hope that security was attainable by submission, was soondissipated. Whatever may have been the exertions of their General torestrain his soldiers, they still considered and treated theinhabitants rather as conquered rebels than returning friends. Indulging in every species of licentiousness, the plunder anddestruction of property were among the least offensive of the injuriesthey inflicted. The persons, not only of the men, but of that sexthrough which indignities least to be forgiven, and longest to beremembered, are received, were exposed to the most irritating outrage. Nor were these excesses confined to those who had been active in theAmerican cause. The lukewarm, and even the loyalists, were the victimsof this indiscriminating spirit of rapine and violence. 

The effect of such proceedings on a people whose country had neverbefore been the seat of war, and whose non-resistance had beenoccasioned solely by the expectation of that security which had beenpromised as the reward of submission to the royal authority, could notfail to equal the most sanguine hopes of the friends of therevolution. A sense of personal wrongs produced a temper whichnational considerations had proved too weak to excite; and, when thebattles of Trenton and Princeton relieved the inhabitants from fearsinspired by the presence of their invaders, the great body of thepeople flew to arms; and numbers who could not be brought into thefield to check the advancing enemy, and prevent the ravages whichuniformly afflict a country that becomes the seat of war, were promptin avenging those ravages. Small bodies of militia scoured thecountry, seized on stragglers, behaved unexceptionably well in severalslight skirmishes, and were collecting in such numbers as to threatenthe weaker British posts with the fate which had befallen Trenton andPrinceton. 

To guard against that spirit of enterprise which his adversary haddisplayed to such advantage, General Howe determined to strengthen hisposts by contracting them. The position taken for the purpose ofcovering the country were abandoned; and the British force in NewJersey was collected at New Brunswick, on the Raritan, and at Amboy, asmall town at the mouth of that river. 

Feeble as was the American army, this movement was not effectedwithout some loss. On the evacuation of Elizabeth town, GeneralMaxwell attacked the British rear, and captured about seventy men witha part of their baggage. 

The American troops had been so diminished by the extreme severity ofthe service, that it was with much difficulty the appearance of anarmy could be maintained. Fresh militia and volunteers arrived incamp, whose numbers were exaggerated by report. These additions to hissmall remaining regular force enabled the General to take differentpositions near the lines of the enemy, to harass him perpetually, restrain his foraging parties, and produce considerable distress inhis camp. 

{January 12. }

While, with little more than an imaginary army, General Washingtonthus harassed and confined his adversary, he came to the hazardousresolution of freeing himself and his troops from the fear of acalamity which he found it impossible to elude, and which had provedmore fatal in his camp than the sword of the enemy. 

[Sidenote: American army inoculated. ]

Inoculation having been rarely practised in the western world, theAmerican youth remained liable to the small pox. Notwithstanding theefforts to guard against this disease, it had found its way into boththe northern and middle army, and had impaired the strength of both toan alarming degree. To avoid the return of the same evil, the Generaldetermined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. Withthe utmost secrecy, preparations were made to give the infection incamp; and the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered tocarry all the southern troops, as they should arrive, through thedisease. Similar orders were also given to the physicians at otherplaces; and thus an army exempt from the fear of a calamity which had, at all times, endangered the most important operations, was preparedfor the ensuing campaign. This example was followed through thecountry; and this alarming disease was no longer the terror ofAmerica. 

As the main body of the British army was cantoned in Jersey, and astrong detachment occupied Rhode Island, General Washington believedthat New York could not be perfectly secure. His intelligencestrengthened this opinion; and, as an army, respectable in point ofnumbers, had been assembled about Peekskill, he ordered General Heathto approach New York for the purpose of foraging, and, shouldappearances favour the attempt, of attacking the forts which guardedthe entrance into the island. The hope was entertained that GeneralHowe, alarmed for New York, might either withdraw his troops fromJersey, or so weaken his posts in that state as to endanger them. Should this hope be disappointed, it was believed that somethinghandsome might be done, either on York or Long Island. 

[Sidenote: General Heath moves down to Kingsbridge, but returns toPeekskill without effecting anything. ]

In pursuance of this plan, General Heath marched down to West Chester, and summoned fort Independence to surrender; but, the garrisondetermining to hold the place, a council of war deemed it unadviseableto risk an assault. An embarkation of troops which took place, aboutthat time, at Rhode Island, alarmed General Heath for his rear, andinduced him to resume his ground in the Highlands. 

Though this attempt entirely failed, the Commander-in-chief stillmeditated important operations during the winter. All the intelligencefrom Europe demonstrated the necessity of these operations, and thefallacy of the hope, still extensively cherished, that the war wouldbe abandoned by Great Britain. The administration was still supportedby great majorities in parliament; and the nation seemed well disposedto employ all its means to reannex to the empire, what were stilldenominated, revolted colonies. It was not to be doubted that largereinforcements would arrive in the spring; and the safety of thenation would be in hazard should General Howe remain in full forcetill they should be received. The utmost efforts were made by theCommander-in-chief to collect a sufficient number of troops to enablehim to give a decisive blow to some one of the positions of his enemy. The state sovereignties, where the real energies of governmentresided, were incessantly urged to fill their regiments, and to bringtheir quotas into the field; and congress, at his instance, passedresolutions authorizing him to draw the troops from Peekskill, and tocall out the militia of the neighbouring states. "It being, " theseresolutions proceed to say, "the earnest desire of congress, to makethe army under the immediate command of General Washingtonsufficiently strong, not only to curb and confine the enemy withintheir present quarters, and prevent their drawing support of any kindfrom the country, but, by the divine blessing, totally to subdue thembefore they can be reinforced. "

These resolves were communicated to the general, in a letter, manifesting the confident expectation of congress that the desireexpressed in them would soon be realized. But the energy displayed intheir passage could not be maintained in their execution. 

Many causes concurred to prevent the collection of a force competentto those vigorous operations which the enterprising genius of theCommander-in-chief had provisionally planned, and the sanguine temperof congress had anticipated. Some of the state assemblies did not evencomplete the appointment of officers till the spring; and then, bittercontests concerning rank remained to be adjusted when the troopsshould join the army. After these arrangements were made, thedifficulty of enlisting men was unexpectedly great. The immensehardships to which the naked soldiers had been exposed, during awinter campaign, in the face of a superior enemy; the mortalityresulting from those hardships, and probably from an injudiciousarrangement of the hospital department which was found to be the tombof the sick; had excited a general disgust to the service; and aconsequent unwillingness to engage in it. 

From these causes the army continued so feeble that the general, instead of being able to execute the great designs he had meditated, entertained serious fears that Sir William Howe would take the fieldduring the winter, force his positions, cross the Delaware on the ice, and proceed to Philadelphia. In the apprehension of this attempt, andto avoid that confusion which would result from the removal of storesin the crisis of military operations, he had taken the precaution, assoon as the armies were in winter quarters, to convey those which weremost valuable, to a distance from the route which it was supposed theBritish army would pursue. 

{March 4. }

The real condition of the army is exhibited in a letter from theCommander-in-chief to congress, in answer to that which enclosed theresolutions already mentioned, and which expressed the brilliantschemes of victory formed by the government. "Could I, " said thegeneral, "accomplish the important objects so eagerly wished bycongress; confining the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their getting supplies from the country, and totallysubduing them before they are reinforced, I should be happy indeed. But what prospect or hope can there be of my effecting so desirable awork at this time? The enclosed return, [56] to which I solicit themost serious attention of congress, comprehends the whole force I havein Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion on the scaleof numbers to that of the enemy. Added to this, the major part is madeup of militia. The most sanguine in speculation can not deem it morethan adequate to the least valuable purposes of war. "

 [Footnote 56: See note No. VIII. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: Skirmishes. ]

Though unable to act with the vigour he wished, the American generalkept up a war of skirmishes through the winter. In the course of it, the British loss was believed to be considerable; and hopes wereentertained that, from the scarcity of forage, neither their cavalrynor draft horses would be in a condition to take the field when thecampaign should open. Their foraging parties were often attacked toadvantage. Frequent small successes, the details of which filled thepapers throughout the United States, not only increased the confidenceof the American soldiers, but served greatly to animate the people. 

[Sidenote: State of the army. ]

The hope of collecting a sufficient force during the winter to makeany valuable impression on the British army being disappointed, theviews of the General were directed to the next campaign. 

As the new army was to be raised by the authority of the stategovernments, he urged on them the necessity of bringing a respectableforce into the field early in the spring, with all the earnestnesswhich was suggested by his situation, and zeal for the service. 

In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the country was laid off intodistricts, each of which was required, by a given day, to furnish asoldier enlisted for three years, or during the war; in default ofwhich, one person, from those capable of bearing arms, was to bedrafted to serve until the first of the ensuing January. TheCommander-in-chief, though still deprecating the introduction of meninto the army whose terms of service would be of short duration, feltthe necessity of submitting to this expedient, as the most eligiblewhich could now be adopted. 

In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended enlistments, it wasproposed by the executive to fill the regiments with volunteers, whoshould engage to serve for six months. This plan was submitted toGeneral Washington by Governor Henry, and his opinion asked upon it. "I am under the necessity of observing, " said the General in reply, "that the volunteer plan which you mention will never answer anyvaluable purpose, and that I can not but disapprove the measure. Tothe short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribedalmost every misfortune that we have experienced. "

In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, enforcing earnestly thenecessity of bringing a sufficient army into the field, thoughcoercive measures should be adopted, some alternatives were suggested, which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of variousexperiments to furnish the quota of troops required from that state. 

As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties, growing out of the organization of the American system, unfoldedthemselves. As every state was exposed to invasion, and the command ofthe ocean enabled the British general to transfer the war, atpleasure, to any part of the Union, the attention of each was directedexclusively to its particular situation. Each state in theneighbourhood of the great theatre of action, contemplating its owndanger, claimed the protection which is due from the whole to itsparts. Although the object of the confederation was the same with thatpursued by each of its members, the spirit incident to every leaguecould not be controlled in an empire where, notwithstanding theexistence of a head, the essentials of government resided in themembers. It was displayed in repeated efforts to give to the energiesof the army such various directions, as would leave it unable toeffect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy mightform. The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampledconfidence placed by all the state governments in theCommander-in-chief, prevented the mischiefs this spirit is so wellcalculated to generate. His representations made their properimpression; and the intention of retaining continental troops forlocal defence was abandoned, though with some reluctance. The burden, however, of calling militia from their domestic avocations, at everythreat of invasion, to watch every military post in each state, becameso intolerable, that the people cast about for other expedients torelieve themselves from its weight. The plan of raising regular corps, to be exclusively under state authority, and thus be a perpetualsubstitute for the yeomanry of the country, presented itself as themost effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts frominsult. 

During the winter, General Howe kept his troops in their quarters, attending to their comfort. As the season for more active operationsapproached, his first attention was directed to the destruction of thescanty supplies prepared by the Americans for the ensuing campaign. Asmall place on the Hudson called Peekskill, about fifty miles aboveNew York, was generally the residence of the officer commanding in theHighlands, and was used for the reception of stores, to be distributedinto the neighbouring posts as occasion might require. Its strength, like that of all others depending for defence on militia, was subjectto great fluctuation. As soon as the ice was out of the river, GeneralHowe took advantage of its occasional weakness, to carry on anexpedition against it, for the purpose of destroying the stores theredeposited, or of bringing them away. 

{March 23. }

[Sidenote: Destruction of stores at Peekskill. ]

Colonel Bird was detached up the river on this service, with aboutfive hundred men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels. General M'Dougal, whose numbers did not at that time exceed twohundred and fifty men, received timely notice of his approach, andexerted himself for the removal of the stores into the strong countryin his rear. Before this could be effected, Colonel Bird appeared; andM'Dougal, after setting fire to the remaining stores and barracks, retired into the strong grounds in the rear of Peekskill. The Britishdetachment completed the conflagration, and returned to New York. During their short stay, a piquet guard was attacked by ColonelWillet, and driven in with the loss of a few men; a circumstance, believed by General M'Dougal, to have hastened the re-embarkation ofthe detachment. 

[Sidenote: At Danbury. ]

{April. }

Military stores to a considerable amount had likewise been depositedat Danbury, on the western frontier of Connecticut. Although thisplace is not more than twenty miles from the Sound, yet the roughnessof the intervening country, the frequent passage of troops from theeastward through the town, and the well known zeal of the neighbouringmilitia, were believed sufficient to secure the magazines collected atit. Against Danbury an expedition was projected; and two thousand menunder the command of Governor Tryon, major general of the provincialsin the British service, assisted by Brigadiers Agnew and Sir WilliamErskine, were employed in it. 

{April 28. }

On the 25th of April the fleet appeared off the coast of Connecticut;and in the evening the troops were landed without opposition betweenFairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then casually in that part ofthe country, immediately despatched expresses to assemble the militia. In the mean time Tryon proceeded to Danbury, which he reached abouttwo the next day. On his approach, Colonel Huntingdon, who hadoccupied the town with about one hundred and fifty men, retired to aneighbouring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, wasconsumed by fire. General Arnold, who was also in the statesuperintending the recruiting service, joined General Silliman atReading, where that officer had collected about five hundred militia. General Wooster, who had resigned his commission in the continentalservice, and been appointed major general of the militia, fell in withthem at the same place, and they proceeded in the night through aheavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury. Having heardnext morning that Tryon, after destroying the town and magazines, wasreturning, they divided their troops; and General Wooster, with aboutthree hundred men, fell in his rear, while Arnold, with about fivehundred, crossing the country, took post in his front at Ridgefield. Wooster came up with his rear about eleven in the morning, attacked itwith great gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which he wasmortally wounded, [57] and his troops were repulsed. Tryon thenproceeded to Ridgefield, where he found Arnold already intrenched on astrong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his passage. A warmskirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour. Arnold was at lengthdriven from the field; after which he retreated to Paugatuck, aboutthree miles east of Norwalk. At break of day next morning, aftersetting Ridgefield on fire, the British resumed their march. Abouteleven in the forenoon, they were again met by Arnold, whose numbersincreased during the day to rather more than one thousand men; amongwhom were some continental troops. A continued skirmishing was kept upuntil five in the afternoon, when the British formed on a hill neartheir ships. The Americans attacked them with intrepidity, but wererepulsed and broken. Tryon, availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops, and returned to New York. 

 [Footnote 57: Congress voted a monument to his memory. ]

The loss of the British amounted to about one hundred and seventy men. That of the Americans, was represented by Tryon, as being much moreconsiderable. By themselves, it was not admitted to exceed onehundred. In this number, however, were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant Colonel Gould, and another field officer, killed; andColonel Lamb wounded. Several other officers and volunteers werekilled. Military and hospital stores to a considerable amount, whichwere greatly needed by the army, were destroyed in the magazines atDanbury; but the loss most severely felt was rather more than onethousand tents, which had been provided for the campaign about toopen. 

Not long afterwards this enterprise was successfully retaliated. ABritish detachment had been for some time employed in collectingforage and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposedthis part of the country to be so completely secured by the armedvessels which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided theprotection of the stores, deposited at a small port called SaggHarbour, to a schooner with twelve guns, and a company of infantry. 

[Sidenote: Expedition of Colonel Meigs to Sagg Harbour. ]

{May. }

{May 24. }

General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinkingit practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design ofsurprising this party, and other adjacent posts, the execution ofwhich was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer, who had accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. Heembarked with about two hundred and thirty men, on board thirteenwhale boats, and proceeded along the coast to Guilford, where he wasto cross the Sound. With about one hundred and seventy of hisdetachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded across theSound to the north division of the island near South Hold, in theneighbourhood of which a small foraging party, against which theexpedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie; but they hadmarched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed acrossthe land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which deeplyintersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troopsre-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in the morning, about four miles from Sagg Harbour, which place they completelysurprised, and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time, adivision of the detachment secured the armed schooner, and the vesselsladen with forage, which were set on fire, and entirely consumed. Sixof the enemy were killed, and ninety taken prisoners. A very fewescaped under cover of the night. 

The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man, Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having, " aswas stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommoncelerity, as to have transported his men, by land and water, ninetymiles in twenty-five hours. " Congress directed a sword to be presentedto him, and passed a resolution expressing the high sense entertainedof his merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valour, displayed byhimself and his party. 

The exertions made by the Commander-in-chief through the winter toraise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign, had not beensuccessful. The hopes respecting its strength which the flatteringreports made from every quarter had authorized him to form, werecruelly disappointed; and he found himself not only unable to carryinto effect the offensive operations he had meditated, but unequaleven to defensive war. That steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported himself and the American cause through the gloomyscenes of the preceding year, did not forsake him; and that soundjudgment which applies to the best advantage those means which areattainable, however inadequate they may be, still remained. His planof operations was adapted to that which he believed his enemy hadformed. He was persuaded either that General Burgoyne would endeavourto take Ticonderoga, and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which eventGeneral Howe would co-operate with him by moving up that river, andattempting to possess himself of the forts and high grounds commandingits passage; or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New York bysea; after which the combined armies would proceed againstPhiladelphia. 

To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, todefend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York, and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him, in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make suchan arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally toaid each other, without neglecting objects of great, and almost equalmagnitude which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effectthese purposes, the troops of New England and New York were dividedbetween Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to NorthCarolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formedin Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that weak quarter ofthe union for its protection. 

[Sidenote: Camp formed at Middlebrook. ]

These arrangements being made, and the recruits collected, the camp atMorristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the armyassembled at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of strong andcommanding heights, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, andabout ten miles from Brunswick. 

This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, wasrendered still more defensible by intrenchments. The heights in frontcommanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road toPhiladelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part ofthe country between that place and Amboy; so as to afford a full viewof the most interesting movements of the enemy. 

The force brought into the field by America required all the aid whichcould be derived from strong positions, and unremitting vigilance. Onthe 20th of May, the total of the army in Jersey, excluding cavalryand artillery, amounted to only eight thousand three hundred andseventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. Theeffective rank and file were only five thousand seven hundred andthirty-eight. 

Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, itsinferiority, in point of numbers, must have limited its operations todefensive war; and have rendered it incompetent to the protection ofany place, whose defence would require a battle in the open field. Butmore than half the troops[58] were unacquainted with the firstrudiments of military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face. As an additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of thesoldiers, especially from the middle states, were foreigners, many ofthem servants, in whose attachment to the American cause fullconfidence could not be placed. 

 [Footnote 58: The extreme severity of the service, aided perhaps by the state of the hospitals, had carried to the grave more than two-thirds of the soldiers who had served the preceding campaign, and been engaged for more than one year. ]

General Washington, anticipating a movement by land towardsPhiladelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders for assemblingon the western bank of the Delaware, an army of militia, strengthenedby a few continental troops, the command of which was given to GeneralArnold, who was then in Philadelphia, employed in the settlement ofhis accounts. 

The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of GeneralHowe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to marchthrough Jersey; and, after securing the submission of that state, tocross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter forthe purpose, and proceed by land to that city. If, in the execution ofthis plan, the Americans could be brought to a general action on equalground, the advantages of the royal army must insure a victory. Butshould Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over theDelaware, the object would be as certainly obtained. 

Had Sir William Howe taken the field before the continental troopswere assembled, this plan might probably have been executed withoutany serious obstruction; but the tents and camp equipage expected fromEurope did not arrive until General Washington had collected hisforces, and taken possession of the strong post on the heights ofMiddlebrook. It would be dangerous to attack him on such advantageousground; for, although his camp might be forced, victory would probablybe attended with such loss, as to disable the victor from reaping itsfruits. 

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp atMiddlebrook, an attempt to cross the Delaware, in the face of an armycollected on its western bank, while that under General Washingtonremained unbroken in his rear, was an experiment of equal danger. Itcomported with the cautious temper of Sir William Howe to devise someother plan of operation to which he might resort, should he be unableto seduce the American general from his advantageous position. 

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested thealternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manoeuvreGeneral Washington out of his present encampment. 

{June. }

{June 12. }

The plan of the campaign being settled, and some small reinforcementswith the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, GeneralHowe, leaving a garrison in New York, and a guard in Amboy, assembledhis army at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention topenetrate through the country to the Delaware, and reach Philadelphiaby land. 

Believing this to be his real design, Washington placed a select corpsof riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, an officer who haddistinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, andin whom those peculiar qualities which fit a man for the command of apartisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy, were eminently united. 

He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's Bridge on the Raritan, just above its confluence with the Millstone River, to watch the leftflank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it. 

[Sidenote: Sir William Howe moves out to Somerset Court House in greatforce. ]

Early in the morning of the 14th, Sir William Howe, leaving twothousand men under the command of General Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware. The front of the first, under Lord Cornwallis, reached Somerset Court House, nine miles fromBrunswick, by the appearance of day; and the second, commanded byGeneral de Heister, reached Middlebush about the same time. 

This movement was made with the view of inducing General Washington toquit his fortified camp, and approach the Delaware, [59] in whichevent, the British general expected to bring on an engagement onground less disadvantageous than that now occupied by the Americanarmy. But that officer understood the importance of his position toowell to abandon it. On the first intelligence that the enemy was inmotion, he drew out his whole army, and formed it, to great advantage, on the heights in front of his camp. This position was constantlymaintained. The troops remained in order of battle during the day;and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended. In the meantime the Jersey militia, with an alacrity theretofore unexampled inthat state, took the field in great numbers. They principally joinedGeneral Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton, behind the Sourlandhills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability wasforming, which could readily co-operate with that under the immediateinspection of the Commander-in-chief. 

 [Footnote 59: General Howe's letter. ]

The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend his camp, butnot to hazard a general action on other ground. He had thereforedetermined not to advance from the heights he occupied, into the opencountry, either towards the enemy, or the Delaware. 

The object of General Howe seems to have been, by acting on hisanxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from the strong ground aboutMiddlebrook, and tempt him to approach the Delaware, in the hope ofdefending its passage. Should he succeed in this, he had little doubtof being able to bring on an engagement, in which he counted withcertainty on victory. The considerations which restrained General Howefrom attempting to march through Jersey, leaving the American army infull force in his rear, had determined Washington to allow him toproceed to the Delaware, if such should be his intention. In thatevent, he had determined to throw those impediments only in the way ofthe hostile army which might harass and retard its march; and, maintaining the high and secure grounds north of the road to be takenby the enemy, to watch for an opportunity of striking some importantblow with manifest advantage. 

He was not long in penetrating the designs of his adversary. "Theviews of the enemy, " he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the17th, "must be to destroy this army, and get possession ofPhiladelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will notmove that way until they have endeavoured to give a severe blow tothis army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river, when they must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front, andwould have such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly besuccessful, but the probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keepclose upon their heels, and will do every thing in my power to makethe project fatal to them. 

"But, besides the argument in favour of their intending, in the firstplace, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure, every appearance contributes to confirm the opinion. Had their designbeen for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably havemade a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awakenour attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead of that they have only advanced to a position necessary tofacilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are mostexposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as lightas possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, andbridges, at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the idea of theirintending to push for the Delaware. "

[Sidenote: Returns to Amboy. ]

Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position, General Howe determined to waste no more time in threateningPhiladelphia by land, but to withdraw from Jersey, and to embark hisarmy as expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the night of the 19th he returned to Brunswick, and on the 22d toAmboy, from which place, the heavy baggage and a few of his troopspassed into Staten Island, on the bridge which had been designed forthe Delaware. 

General Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick, and hadmade arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene wasdetached with three brigades to annoy the British rear; and Sullivanand Maxwell were ordered to co-operate with him. In the mean time thearmy paraded on the heights of Middlebrook, ready to act ascircumstances might require. 

About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a piquet guard, soon afterwhich that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharpskirmishing took place between this party and Morgan's regiment, butthe hope of gaining any important advantage was entirely disappointed;and the retreat to Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss. 

{June 24. }

In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the Britishflank and rear, General Washington advanced six or seven miles, toQuibbletown on the road to Amboy; and Lord Stirling's division waspushed still farther, to the neighbourhood of the Metucking MeetingHouse, for the purpose of co-operating with the light parties, shouldthe retreat to Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at therear. 

[Sidenote: Endeavors to cut off the retreat of the American army toMiddlebrook, but is disappointed. ]

Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement, and probablyhoping to turn the left of the American army, and gain the heights inits rear, General Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troopsfrom Staten Island; and, early next morning, made a rapid movement, intwo columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of LordCornwallis, took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch Plains; and theleft, led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by Metucking MeetingHouse, to fall into the rear of the right column. It was intended thatthe left should take a separate road, soon after this junction, andattack the left flank of the American army at Quibbletown; while LordCornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp atMiddlebrook. Four battalions with six pieces of cannon were detachedto Bonhamtown. [60]

 [Footnote 60: General Howe's letter. ]

[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis skirmishes near the Scotch Plains with LordStirling. ]

{June 30. }

About Woodbridge, the right column fell in with one of the Americanparties of observation which gave notice of this movement. GeneralWashington discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly inmotion, and regained the camp at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell inwith Lord Stirling, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which theAmericans were driven from their ground with the loss of three fieldpieces, and a few men. They retreated to the hills about the ScotchPlains, and were pursued as far as Westfield. Perceiving the passes inthe mountains on the left of the American camp to be guarded, and theobject of this skilful manoeuvre to be, consequently, unattainable, his lordship returned through Rahway to Amboy; and the whole armycrossed over to Staten Island. 

{July 2. }

General Washington was now again left to his conjectures respectingthe plan of the campaign. Before Sir William Howe had, in any degreedisclosed his views, intelligence was received of the appearance ofBurgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. Thisintelligence strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must beto seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the commandof that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet hecould not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, asto make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His army therefore maintained its station at Middlebrook; butarrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts whichdefended the Hudson. 

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troopshaving relieved the American general from his apprehensions of asudden march to Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division toPompton Plains, on the way to Peekskill; and proceeded with the mainbody of his army, to Morristown;--thus approaching the highlands ofNew York, without removing so far from Middlebrook as to be unable toregain that camp should General Howe indicate an intention to seizeit. 

Meanwhile, the British General prosecuted, diligently, his plan ofembarkation, which was, necessarily, attended with circumstancesindicating a much longer voyage than that up the North River. Thesecircumstances were immediately communicated to the eastern states, andcongress was earnestly pressed to strengthen the fortifications on theDelaware, and to increase the obstructions in that river. 

{July 16. }

In the midst of these appearances, certain intelligence was receivedthat Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancingagainst Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that themain object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on theNorth River. Under this impression, General Washington orderedSullivan to Peekskill, and advanced, himself, first to Pompton Plains, and afterwards to the Clove, where he determined to remain until theviews of the enemy should be disclosed. 

While the General thus anxiously watched the movements of hisadversary, an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence wasreceived from New England. The command of the British troops in RhodeIsland had devolved on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectlysecure in an island, the water surrounding which was believed to beentirely guarded by his cruisers, and at the head of an army greatlysuperior to any force then collected in that department, he indulgedhimself in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp; and wasremiss with respect to the guards about his person. Information ofthis negligence was communicated to the main, and a plan was formed tosurprise him. This spirited enterprise was executed, with equalcourage and address, by Lieutenant Colonel Barton of the Rhode Islandmilitia. 

[Sidenote: General Prescot surprised and taken. ]

On the night of the 10th, he embarked on board four whale boats, atWarwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty persons, including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other officers. After proceeding about ten miles by water, unobserved by the Britishguard-boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter, helanded on the west of the island, about midway between Newport andBristol ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot, dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. Thegeneral himself was taken out of bed, and conveyed to a place ofsafety. 

The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joythroughout America, because it was supposed to secure the liberationof General Lee, by enabling General Washington to offer an officer ofequal rank in exchange for him. 

Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of ColonelBarton, and his party; and presented him with a sword as a mark ofapprobation. 

As the fleet fell down towards Sandy Hook, General Washington withdrewslowly from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions, so as to march to any point which might be attacked. 

[Sidenote: The British army embarks. ]

At length, the embarkation was completed, and the fleet put to sea. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

 General Washington commences his march to the Delaware.... Takes measures for checking Burgoyne.... British army lands at Elk River.... General Washington advances to Brandywine.... Retreat of Maxwell.... Defeat at Brandywine.... Slight skirmish near the White Horse, and retreat to French Creek.... General Wayne surprised.... General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia.... Removal of Congress to Lancaster. 

{1777}

{July. }

[Sidenote: General Washington commences his march to the Delaware. ]

On receiving intelligence that the British fleet had sailed from NewYork, the American army commenced its march to the Delaware. About thetime of its departure, a letter from Sir William Howe, directed toGeneral Burgoyne at Quebec, was delivered to General Putnam by theperson who had received it, as was said, for the purpose of carryingit to Quebec, and was transmitted by Putnam to the Commander-in-chief. In this letter, General Howe said that "he was exhibiting theappearance of moving to the southward, while his real intent wasagainst Boston, from whence he would co-operate with the army ofCanada. " This stratagem entirely failed. General Washington, at once, perceived that the letter was written with a design that it shouldfall into his hands, and mislead him with respect to the views of thewriter. 

[Sidenote: He takes measures for checking Burgoyne. ]

While the utmost vigilance and judgment were required to conduct theoperations of the army under the immediate command of GeneralWashington, the transactions in the north were too vitally interestingnot to engage a large share of his attention. He not only hastened themarch of those generals who were designed to act in that department, and pressed the governors of the eastern states to reinforce theretreating army with all their militia, but made large detachments ofchoice troops from his own;--thus weakening himself in order tostrengthen other generals whose strength would be more useful. Thefame of being himself the leader of the victorious army did not, withfalse glare, dazzle his judgment, or conceal the superior publicadvantage to be derived from defeating the plans of Burgoyne. 

On the 30th of July, all doubts respecting the destination of theBritish fleet were supposed to be removed by its appearance off thecapes of Delaware; and orders were immediately given for assemblingthe detached parts of the army in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia. Scarcely were these orders given, when the aspect of affairs waschanged, and they were countermanded. An express from Cape May broughtthe information that the fleet had sailed out of the bay of Delaware, and was proceeding eastward. From this time, no intelligencerespecting it was received until about the 7th of August, when itappeared a few leagues south of the capes of Delaware, after which itdisappeared, and was not again seen until late in that month. The factwas, that on entering the capes of Delaware, the difficultiesattending an attempt to carry his fleet up that bay and river, determined General Howe to relinquish his original design, and totransport his army to the Chesapeake. Contrary winds prevented hisgaining the mouth of that bay until the 16th of August. 

The several divisions of the army were immediately ordered[61] tounite in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, and the militia ofPennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and the northern counties ofVirginia, were directed to take the field. 

 [Footnote 61: These orders were received by General Sullivan, who had been encamped about Hanover, in Jersey, on his return from an expedition to Staten Island. The British force on that island amounted to between two and three thousand men, of whom nearly one thousand were provincials, who were distributed along the coast, opposite the Jersey shore. The Europeans occupied a fortified camp near the watering place; and General Sullivan thought it practicable to surprise the provincials, and bring them off before they could be supported by the Europeans. Only six boats had been procured for the conveyance of his troops; yet they crossed over into the island before day undiscovered, and completely surprised two of the provincial parties, commanded by Colonels Lawrence and Barton, both of whom, with several officers and men were taken. The alarm being given, Sullivan attempted to withdraw from the island. The number of boats not being sufficient for the embarkation of all his troops at the same time, some confusion obtained among them. General Campbell advanced in force on the rear guard while waiting for the return of the boats, which was captured after making a gallant resistance. 

 This enterprise was well planned, and in its commencement, happily executed; but ought not to have been undertaken without a number of boats sufficient to secure the retreat. 

 The loss of the British in prisoners amounted to eleven officers, and one hundred and thirty privates. That of the Americans, is stated by Sullivan, at one major, one captain, one lieutenant, and ten privates killed, and fifteen wounded, and nine officers, and one hundred and twenty-seven privates prisoners. General Campbell, in his account of the action says, that he made two hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, among whom were one lieutenant colonel, three majors, two captains, and fifteen inferior officers. ]

[Sidenote: British fleet comes up the Chesapeake and lands an armyunder Sir William Howe at Elk River. ]

The British fleet, after entering the Chesapeake, sailed up it withfavourable winds, and entered Elk River, up which the admiralproceeded as high as it was safely navigable; and on the 25th ofAugust the troops were landed at the ferry. 

The British army, at its disembarkation, has been generally computedat eighteen thousand men. They were in good health and spirits, admirably supplied with all the implements of war, and led by anexperienced general, of unquestionable military talents. 

[Sidenote: General Washington advances to Brandywine. ]

The day before Sir William Howe landed, the American army marchedthrough Philadelphia, and proceeded to the Brandywine. The divisionsof Greene and Stephen were advanced nearer to the Head of Elk, andencamped behind White Clay creek. 

Congress had directed General Smallwood and Colonel Girt to takecommand of the militia of Maryland, who had been ordered by GeneralWashington to assemble near the head of the bay. The militia of thelower counties of Delaware, commanded by General Rodney, were directedalso to assemble in the British rear, and to co-operate with those ofMaryland. Colonel Richardson's continental regiment, which had beenstationed on the Eastern shore, was ordered to join this corps. 

The militia of Pennsylvania, commanded by Major General Armstrong, were united with the main body of the army. Great exertions were usedto bring them promptly into the field, and they came forward generallywith some degree of alacrity. Although the numbers required bycongress did not assemble, more appeared than could be armed. 

The real strength of the American army can not be accurately stated. It was estimated by Sir William Howe at fifteen thousand, includingmilitia; and this estimate did not far exceed their real total, asexhibited by the returns. But it is a fact, attributable in somedegree to the badness of their clothing, and scarcity of tents, and insome degree to the neglect of the commissary department, to providethose articles of food which contribute to the preservation of health, that the effective force was always far below the total number. Theeffectives, including militia, did not exceed eleven thousand. 

Morgan's regiment of riflemen having been detached to the northernarmy, a corps of light infantry was formed for the occasion, thecommand of which was given to General Maxwell. This corps was advancedto Iron Hill, about three miles in front of White Clay creek. Thecavalry, consisting of four regiments, amounting to about nine hundredmen, including persons of every description, were employed principallyon the lines. 

[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis attacks Maxwell's corps, and compels themto retreat. ]

One division of the British army, commanded by Sir William Howe inperson, had taken post at Elkton, with its van advanced to Gray'sHill. General Knyphausen, with a second division, had crossed theferry and encamped at Cecil Court House. He was directed to march upon the eastern side of the river, and to join Sir William Howe sevenor eight miles south of Christiana. The intention to make thismovement being disclosed by the preparatory arrangements, GeneralWashington advised Maxwell to post a choice body of men in the nighton an advantageous part of the road, in order to annoy him on hismarch. In the morning of the third of September, the two divisionsunder Lord Cornwallis and General Knyphausen, moved forward and formeda junction at Pencader, or Atkins' tavern, where they encamped. Intheir way, the column led by Lord Cornwallis fell in with and attackedMaxwell, who retreated over White Clay creek, with the loss of aboutforty killed and wounded. 

{September 5. }

The whole American army, except the light infantry, took a positionbehind Red Clay creek, on the road leading from the camp of SirWilliam Howe to Philadelphia. On this ground, the General thought itprobable that the fate of Philadelphia, and of the campaign, might bedecided; and he resorted to all the means in his power to encouragehis troops, and stimulate them to the greatest exertions. 

{September 8. }

On the 8th of September, the British army was again put in motion. Themain body advanced by Newark, upon the right of the Americans, andencamped within four miles of that place, extending its left stillfarther up the country. Meanwhile, a strong column made a show ofattacking in front, and, after manoeuvring some time, halted atMilton, within two miles of the centre. 

{September 9. }

General Washington was soon convinced that the column in front wasdesigned only to amuse, while the left should effect the principal andreal object. Believing that object to be to turn his right, and cutoff his communication with Philadelphia, he changed his ground, and, crossing the Brandywine early in the night, took post behind thatriver, at Chadd's Ford. General Maxwell was advanced in front, andplaced, advantageously, on the hills south of the river, on the roadleading over the ford. The militia, under General Armstrong, wereposted at a ford two miles below Chadd's; and the right extended somemiles above, with a view to other passes deemed less practicable. Inthis position, General Washington attended the movements of theadverse army. 

In the evening, Howe marched forward in two columns, which united, early the next morning, at Kennet's Square; after which he advancedparties on the roads leading to Lancaster, to Chadd's Ford, and toWilmington. 

The armies were now within seven miles of each other, with only theBrandywine between them, which opposed no obstacle to a generalengagement. This was sought by Howe, and not avoided by Washington. Itwas impossible to protect Philadelphia without a victory, and thisobject was deemed throughout America, and especially by congress, ofsuch magnitude as to require that an action should be hazarded for itsattainment. 

In the morning of the 11th, soon after day, information was receivedthat the whole British army was in motion, advancing on the directroad leading over Chadd's Ford. The Americans were immediately underarms, and placed in order of battle, for the purpose of contesting thepassage of the river. Skirmishing soon commenced between the advancedparties; and, by ten, Maxwell's corps, with little loss on eitherside, was driven over the Brandywine below the ford. Knyphausen, whocommanded this column, paraded on the heights, reconnoitred theAmerican army, and appeared to be making dispositions to force thepassage of the river. A skirt of woods, with the river, divided himfrom Maxwell's corps, small parties of whom occasionally crossed over, and kept up a scattering fire, by which not much execution was done. At length one of these parties, led by Captains Waggoner andPorterfield, engaged the British flank guard very closely, killed acaptain with ten or fifteen privates, drove them out of the wood, andwere on the point of taking a field piece. The sharpness of theskirmish soon drew a large body of the British to that quarter, andthe Americans were again driven over the Brandywine. [62]

 [Footnote 62: The author was an eye-witness of this skirmish. ]

About eleven in the morning, information reached General Washingtonthat a large column with many field pieces, had taken a road leadingfrom Kennet's Square, directly up the country, and had entered thegreat valley road, down which they were marching to the upper fords ofthe Brandywine. This information was given by Colonel Ross ofPennsylvania, who was in their rear, and estimated their numbers atfive thousand men. 

On receiving this information, Washington is said to have determinedto detach Sullivan and Lord Stirling to engage the left division ofthe British army, and with the residue of his troops, to cross Chadd'sFord in person, and attack Knyphausen. Before this plan could beexecuted, counter intelligence was received inducing an opinion thatthe movement of the British on their left was a feint, and that thecolumn under Lord Cornwallis, after making demonstrations of crossingthe Brandywine above its forks, had marched down the southern side ofthat river to reunite itself with Knyphausen. 

Not long after the first communication was made by Colonel Ross, information was received from Colonel Bland of the cavalry, whichproduced some doubt respecting the strength of this column. He sawonly two brigades; but the dust appeared to rise in their rear for aconsiderable distance. A major of the militia came in, who allegedthat he left the forks of the Brandywine so late in the day that itwas supposed Lord Cornwallis must have passed them by that time, hadhe continued his march in that direction, and who asserted that noenemy had appeared in that quarter. Some light horsemen who had beensent to reconnoitre the road, returned with the same information. 

The uncertainty produced by this contradictory intelligence was atlength removed; and about two in the afternoon, it was ascertainedthat the column led by Lord Cornwallis, after making a circuit ofabout seventeen miles, had crossed the river above its forks, and wasadvancing in great force. 

A change of disposition was immediately made. The divisions commandedby Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen, took new ground, advanced fartherup the Brandywine, and fronted the British column marching down thatriver. The division commanded by Wayne remained at Chadd's Ford, tokeep Knyphausen in check; in which service Maxwell was to co-operate. Greene's division, accompanied by General Washington in person, formeda reserve, and took a central position between the right and leftwings. 

The divisions detached against Lord Cornwallis formed hastily on anadvantageous piece of ground, above Birmingham Meeting House, withtheir left near the Brandywine, and having both flanks covered by athick wood. The artillery was judiciously posted, and the dispositionof the whole was well made. Unfortunately, Sullivan's division, intaking its ground, made too large a circuit, and was scarcely formedwhen the attack commenced. 

[Sidenote: The American army defeated at Brandywine, and retreat toChester. ]

On perceiving the Americans, the British army was formed in order ofbattle; and, about half past four, the action began. It was kept upwarmly for some time. The American right first gave way, and by itsflight exposed the flank of the remaining divisions to a galling fire. The line continued to break from the right, and, in a short time, wascompletely routed. The right wing made some attempts to rally, but, being briskly charged, again broke, and the flight became general. 

On the commencement of the action on the right, General Washingtonpressed forward with Greene, to the support of that wing; but, beforehis arrival, its rout was complete, and he could only check thepursuit. For this purpose, the 10th Virginia regiment commanded byColonel Stevens, and a regiment of Pennsylvania commanded by ColonelStewart, neither of which had been in action, were postedadvantageously on the road taken by the defeated army. The impressionmade by the fire of these regiments, and the approach of night, induced Sir William Howe, after dispersing them, to give over thepursuit. 

When the American right was found to be fully engaged with LordCornwallis, Knyphausen made real dispositions for crossing the river. Chadd's Ford was defended by an intrenchment and battery, with threefield pieces, and a howitzer. After some resistance, the work wasforced; and, the defeat of the right being known, the left wing alsowithdrew from its ground. The whole army retreated that night toChester, and the next day to Philadelphia. 

The loss sustained by the Americans in this action has been estimatedat three hundred killed, and six hundred wounded. Between three andfour hundred, principally the wounded, were made prisoners. 

As must ever be the case in new raised armies, unused to danger, andfrom which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conductwas not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served thepreceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness andintrepidity of veterans, while others gave way as soon as they werepressed. The authors of a very correct history of the war, [63]speaking of this action, say, "a part of their troops, among whom wereparticularly numbered some Virginia[64] regiments, and the whole corpsof artillery, behaved exceedingly well in some of the actions of thisday, exhibiting a degree of order, firmness, and resolution, andpreserving such a countenance in extremely sharp service, as would nothave discredited veterans. Some other bodies of their troops behavedvery badly. "[65]

 [Footnote 63: Annual Register. ]

 [Footnote 64: The third Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Marshall, which had performed extremely severe duty in the campaign of 1776, was placed in a wood on the right, and in front of Woodford's brigade, and Stephen's division. Though attacked by much superior numbers, it maintained its position without losing an inch of ground, until both its flanks were turned, its ammunition nearly expended, and more than half the officers, and one third of the soldiers were killed and wounded. Colonel Marshall, whose horse had received two balls, then retired in good order to resume his position on the right of his division; but it had already retreated. ]

 [Footnote 65: Deboore's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his conduct being directed, he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between him and Sullivan, on whose right he was stationed. ]

The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather lessthan one hundred killed, and four hundred wounded. As the Americanssustained very little injury in the retreat, this inequality of losscan be ascribed only to the inferiority of their arms. Many of theirmuskets were scarcely fit for service; and, being of unequal calibre, their cartridges could not be so well fitted, and, consequently, theirfire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy. This radicaldefect was felt in all the operations of the army. 

From the ardour with which the Commander-in-chief had inspired histroops before this action, it is probable that the conflict would havebeen more severe, had the intelligence respecting the movement on theleft of the British army been less contradictory. Raw troops, changingtheir ground in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation ofmoving, are easily thrown into confusion. This was the criticalsituation of a part of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of theright's breaking before Greene could be brought up to support it;after which, it was impossible to retrieve the fortune of the day. 

But had the best disposition of the troops been made at the time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action could not haveterminated in favour of the Americans. Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms, was too great to leave them a probableprospect of victory. A battle, however, was not to be avoided. Theopinion of the public, and of congress, demanded it. The loss ofPhiladelphia, without an attempt to preserve it, would have exciteddiscontents which, in the United States, might be productive ofserious mischief; and action, though attended with defeat, providedthe loss be not too great, must improve an army in which, not only themilitary talents, but even the courage, of officers, some of them ofhigh rank, remained to be ascertained. 

Among the wounded was the Marquis de la Fayette, and Brigadier GeneralWoodford. 

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by congress, the General, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that theBritish had gained only the ground; and that their loss was still moreconsiderable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congressappeared determined to risk another battle for the metropolis ofAmerica. Far from discovering any intention to change their place ofsession, they passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed General Washington to give the necessary orders forcompleting the defences of the Delaware. 

{September 12. }

From Chester, the army marched through Darby, over the Schuylkillbridge, to its former ground, near the falls of that river. GeneralGreene's division, which, having been less in action, was more entirethan any other, covered the rear; and the corps of Maxwell remained atChester until the next day, as a rallying point for the small parties, and straggling soldiers, who might yet be in the neighbourhood. 

Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, GeneralWashington recrossed the Schuylkill, and proceeded on the Lancasterroad, with the intention of risking another engagement. 

Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle. On the succeeding day, he detached Major General Grant with twobrigades to Concord meeting-house; and on the 13th, Lord Cornwallisjoined General Grant, and marched towards Chester. Another detachmenttook possession of Wilmington; to which place the sick and woundedwere conveyed. 

To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road, thebridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its moorings, and GeneralArmstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia to guard thepasses over that river. 

On the 15th, the American army, intending to gain the left of theBritish, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received, earlynext morning, that Howe was approaching in two columns. It being toolate to reach the ground he had intended to occupy, Washingtonresolved to meet and engage him in front. 

{September 16. }

Both armies prepared, with great alacrity, for battle. The advancedparties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they wereseparated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent, rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity. The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminentperil as on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes hadbeen so inartificially constructed, as not to protect their ammunitionfrom the tempest. Their cartridges were soon damaged; and thismischief was the more serious, because very many of the soldiers werewithout bayonets. 

[Sidenote: After a slight skirmish compelled again to retire, crossthe Schuylkill, and proceed to French Creek. ]

The army being thus rendered unfit for action, the design of givingbattle was reluctantly abandoned, and a retreat commenced. It wascontinued all the day, and great part of the night, through a cold andmost distressing rain, and very deep roads. A few hours before day, the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where their arms andammunition were examined, and the alarming fact was disclosed, thatscarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged, and scarcely onecartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things suggested theprecaution of moving to a still greater distance, in order to refittheir arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive thespirits of the army. The General therefore retired to Warwick furnace, on the south branch of French Creek, where ammunition and a fewmuskets might be obtained in time to dispute the passage of theSchuylkill, and make yet another effort to save Philadelphia. 

The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the Britisharmy. During two days, General Howe made no other movement than tounite his columns. 

From French Creek, General Wayne was detached with his division, intothe rear of the British, with orders to join General Smallwood; and, carefully concealing himself and his movements, to seize everyoccasion which this march might offer, of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile, General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker'sferry, and encamped on both sides of Perkyomy Creek. 

{September 19. }

[Sidenote: General Wayne surprised, and after a sharp action compelledto retreat. ]

General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road fromDarby into that leading to Lancaster, about three miles in the rear ofthe left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where hebelieved himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was soextensively disaffected that Sir William Howe received accurateaccounts of his position and of his force. Major General Gray wasdetached to surprise him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About eleven, in the night of the 20th, his pickets, driven in withcharged bayonets, gave the first intimation of Gray's approach. Wayneinstantly formed his division; and while his right sustained a fierceassault, directed a retreat by the left, under cover of a fewregiments who, for a short time, withstood the violence of the shock. In his letter to the Commander-in-chief, he says that they gave theassailants some well-directed fires which must have done considerableexecution; and that, after retreating from the ground on which theengagement commenced, they formed again, at a small distance from thescene of action; but that both parties drew off without renewing theconflict. He states his loss at about one hundred and fifty[66] killedand wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of onlyseven. 

 [Footnote 66: The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much more considerable. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men. ]

When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march tojoin Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, waswithin less than a mile of him; and, had he commanded regulars, mighthave given a very different turn to the night. But his militia thoughtonly of their own safety; and, having fallen in with a party returningfrom the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion with the loss of only oneman. 

Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having been madein the army, General Wayne demanded a court martial, which, afterinvestigating his conduct, was unanimously of opinion, "that he haddone every thing to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilantofficer;" and acquitted him with honour. 

{September 21. }

Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a greaterdistance, Sir William Howe marched along the valley road to theSchuylkill, and encamped on the bank of that river, from the Fatlandford up to French Creek, along the front of the American army. Tosecure his right from being turned, General Washington again changedhis position, and encamped with his left near, but above the Britishright. 

[Sidenote: Washington marches to Pottsgrove. ]

{September 22. }

General Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington toanother battle; and, thinking it adviseable, perhaps, to transfer theseat of war to the neighbourhood of his ships, determined to cross theSchuylkill, and take possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon, heordered one detachment to cross at Fatland ford which was on hisright, and another to cross at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to takepossession of the heights commanding them. These orders were executedwithout much difficulty, and the American troops placed to defendthese fords were easily dispersed. 

This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right, about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceededa considerable distance towards Philadelphia, and encamped, with itsleft near Sweed's ford, and its right on the Manatawny road, havingStony run in its front. 

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could savePhiladelphia from the grasp of the British general, whose situationgave him the option of either taking possession of that place, orendeavouring to bring on another engagement. If, therefore, a battlemust certainly be risked to save the capital, it would be necessary toattack the enemy. 

Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty inresisting, and the opinion of congress required a battle; but, on atemperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wisedecision of avoiding one for the present. 

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood hadnot yet joined the army. The continental troops ordered fromPeekskill, who had been detained for a time by an incursion from NewYork, were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, underGeneral Dickenson, was also expected. 

To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, otherconsiderations of great weight were added, founded on the condition ofhis soldiers. An army, manoeuvring in an open country, in the face ofa very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue, and extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increasedby the privations under which the American troops suffered. While inalmost continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering everyvicissitude of the seasons, they were without tents, nearly withoutshoes, or winter clothes, and often without food. 

A council of war concurred in the opinion the Commander-in-chief hadformed, not to march against the enemy, but to allow his harassedtroops a few days for repose, and to remain on his present grounduntil the expected reinforcements should arrive. 

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situationof the army had been represented to congress, who had recommended itto the executive of Pennsylvania to seize the cloths and othermilitary stores in the ware houses of Philadelphia, and, aftergranting certificates expressing their value, to convey them to aplace of safety. The executive, being unwilling to encounter the odiumof this strong measure, advised that the extraordinary powers of theCommander-in-chief should be used on the occasion. Lieutenant ColonelHamilton, one of the General's aids, a young gentleman already in highestimation for his talents and zeal, was employed on this delicatebusiness. "Your own prudence, " said the General, in a letter to himwhile in Philadelphia, "will point out the least exceptionable meansto be pursued; but remember, delicacy and a strict adherence to theordinary mode of application must give place to our necessities. Wemust, if possible, accommodate the soldiers with such articles as theystand in need of, or we shall have just reason to apprehend the mostinjurious and alarming consequences from the approaching season. "

All the efforts, however, of this very active officer could not obtaina supply, in any degree, adequate to the pressing and increasing wantsof the army. 

[Sidenote: General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia. ]

[Sidenote: Congress removes to Lancaster. ]

Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores whichhad been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, andthe vessels which were lying at the wharves, to be removed up theDelaware. This duty was executed with so much vigilance, that verylittle public property fell, with the city, into the hands of theBritish general, who entered it on the 26th of September. The membersof congress separated on the eighteenth, in the evening, andreassembled at Lancaster on the twenty-seventh of the same month. 

From the 25th of August, when the British army landed at the Head ofElk, until the 26th of September when it entered Philadelphia, thecampaign had been active, and the duties of the American generaluncommonly arduous. The best English writers bestow high encomiums onSir William Howe for his military skill, and masterly movements duringthis period. At Brandywine especially, Washington is supposed to havebeen "outgeneraled, more outgeneraled than in any action during thewar. " If all the operations of this trying period be examined, and themeans in possession of both be considered, the American chief willappear, in no respect, inferior to his adversary, or unworthy of thehigh place assigned to him in the opinions of his countrymen. With anarmy decidedly inferior, not only in numbers, but in every militaryrequisite except courage, in an open country, he employed his enemynear thirty days in advancing about sixty miles. In this time hefought one general action; and, though defeated, was able toreassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost unfed army;and, the fifth day afterwards, again to offer battle. When the armieswere separated by a storm which involved him in the most distressingcircumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still maintained arespectable and imposing countenance. 

The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle ofBrandywine; and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertaintyof the intelligence received. A general must be governed by hisintelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It ishis duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuabletraits of a military character, is the skill to select those meanswhich will obtain it. Yet the best selected means are not alwayssuccessful; and, in a new army, where military talent has not beenwell tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarlyexposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments. In acountry, too, which is covered with wood, precise information of thenumbers composing different columns is to be gained with difficulty. 

It has been said "that the Americans do not appear to have made allthe use that might be expected of the advantages which the countryafforded for harassing and impeding the British army. "

In estimating this objection, it ought to be recollected that GeneralSmallwood was directed, with the militia of Maryland and Delaware, supported by a regiment of continental troops, to hang on and harassthe rear of the enemy: that General Maxwell, with a select corpsconsisting of a thousand men, was ordered to seize every occasion toannoy him on his march: that General Wayne, with his division, wasafterwards detached to unite with Smallwood, and command the wholeforce collected in the rear, which would have been very respectable. 

If the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected, or effect theservice allotted to them, their failure is not attributable to GeneralWashington. His calls on them had been early and energetic; and thestate of his army did not admit of his making larger detachments fromit to supply the place they had been designed to fill. 

Loud complaints had been made against General Maxwell by the officersof his corps; and a court was ordered to inquire into his conduct, bywhom he was acquitted. Whether that officer omitted to seize theproper occasions to annoy the enemy, or the cautious and compactmovements of Sir William Howe afforded none, can not be easilyascertained. General Washington felt the loss of Morgan, and wrotepressingly to Gates, after his success against Burgoyne, to restorehim that officer, with his regiment, as soon as possible. 

CHAPTER IX. 

 Measures to cut off the communication between the British army and fleet.... Battle of Germantown.... Measures to intercept supplies to Philadelphia.... Attack on fort Mifflin.... On Red Bank.... The Augusta blows up.... Fort Mifflin evacuated.... Fort Mercer evacuated.... The British open the communication with their fleet.... Washington urged to attack Philadelphia.... General Howe marches out to Chestnut Hill.... Returns to Philadelphia.... General Washington goes into winter quarters. 

{1777}

{September. }

[Sidenote: Measures taken to prevent a communication between theBritish army in Philadelphia and their fleet. ]

Philadelphia being lost, General Washington sought to make itsoccupation inconvenient and insecure, by rendering it inaccessible tothe British fleet. With this design, works had been erected on a lowmarshy island in the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from the nature of its soil, was called Mud Island. On theopposite shore of Jersey, at a place called Red Bank, a fort had alsobeen constructed which was defended with heavy artillery. In the deepchannel between, or under cover of these batteries, several ranges offrames had been sunk, to which, from their resemblance to thatmachine, the name of chevaux-de-frise had been given. These frameswere so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship which mightstrike against them, and were sunk in such a depth of water asrendered it equally difficult to weigh them or cut them through; noattempt to raise them, or to open the channel in any manner could besuccessful until the command of the shores on both sides should beobtained. 

Other ranges of these machines had been sunk about three miles lowerdown the river; and some considerable works were in progress atBillingsport on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as tobe provided with artillery. These works and machines were farthersupported by several galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with twofloating batteries, a number of armed vessels, and some fire ships. 

The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisiveimportance to these works. Cutting off the communication of GeneralHowe with his fleet, they prevented his receiving supplies by water, while the American vessels in the river above fort Mifflin, the namegiven to the fort on Mud Island, rendered it difficult to forage inJersey, General Washington hoped to render his supplies on the side ofPennsylvania so precarious, as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia. 

The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by thecapture of the Delaware frigate. 

{September 27. }

The day after Lord Cornwallis entered Philadelphia, three batterieswere commenced for the purpose of acting against any American shipswhich might appear before the town. While yet incomplete, they wereattacked by two frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas. The Delaware, being left by the tide while engaged with the battery, grounded and was captured; soon after which, the smaller frigate, andthe other vessels, retired under the guns of the fort. Thiscircumstance was the more interesting, as it gave the British Generalthe command of the ferry, and, consequently, free access to Jersey, and enabled him to intercept the communication between the fortsbelow, and Trenton, from which place the garrisons were to have drawntheir military stores. 

{September 28. }

{September 30. }

{September 29. }

{October 3. }

All the expected reinforcements, except the state regiment and militiafrom Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being calledin, the effective strength of the army amounted to eight thousandcontinental troops, and three thousand militia. With this force, General Washington determined to approach the enemy, and seize thefirst favourable moment to attack him. In pursuance of thisdetermination, the army took a position on the Skippack road, abouttwenty miles from Philadelphia, and sixteen from Germantown, --a longvillage stretching on both sides the great road leading northward fromPhiladelphia, which forms one continued street nearly two miles inlength. The British line of encampment crossed this village at rightangles near the centre, and Lord Cornwallis, with four regiments ofgrenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. The immediate object of GeneralHowe being the removal of the obstructions in the river, ColonelStirling, with two regiments, had been detached to take possession ofthe fort at Billingsport, which he accomplished without opposition. This service being effected, and the works facing the water destroyed, Colonel Stirling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions fromChester to Philadelphia. Some apprehensions being entertained for thesafety of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown, with directions to join Colonel Stirling. [67]

 [Footnote 67: Annual Register. --Stedman. ]

This division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish afair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage. Determining to avail himself of it, he formed a plan for surprisingthe camp at Germantown, and attacking both wings, in front and rear, at the same instant. 

The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway's brigade, wereto march down the main road, and, entering the town by the way ofChesnut Hill, to attack the left wing; while General Armstrong, withthe Pennsylvania militia, was to move down the Manatawny road[68] byVanduring's mill, and turning the left flank to attack in the rear. The Commander-in-chief accompanied this column. 

 [Footnote 68: Better known as the Ridge road. ]

The divisions of Greene and Stephen, flanked by M'Dougal's brigade, were to take a circuit by the Lime Kiln road, and, entering the townat the market house, to attack the right wing. 

The militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood andForman, were to march down the old York road, and turning the right tofall upon its rear. 

The division of Lord Stirling, and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell, were to form a corps de reserve. 

Parties of cavalry were silently to scour the roads to preventobservation, and to keep up the communication between the heads of theseveral columns. 

{October 4. }

[Sidenote: Royal army attacked at Germantown. ]

The necessary arrangements being made, the army moved from its groundat seven in the afternoon. Before sunrise the next morning, theadvance of the column led by Sullivan, encountered and drove in apicket placed at Mount Airy, the house of Mr. Allen. [69] The main bodyfollowed close in the rear, and engaging the light infantry and the40th regiment, posted at the head of the village, soon forced them togive way, leaving their baggage behind them. Though closely pursued, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave threw himself with five companies of the40th regiment into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, whichstood directly in the way of Wayne's division, and poured on theAmericans an incessant and galling fire of musketry from its doors andwindows. After making some unsuccessful, and bloody attempts to carrythis house by storm, and then battering it for a few minutes withfield artillery, which was found too light to make any impression onits walls, a regiment was left to observe the party within it, whilethe troops who had been checked by Colonel Musgrave again movedforward, passing to the left of the house. 

 [Footnote 69: Since Robinson's. ]

In rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been engaged, theleft wing, having formed the line, came also into action; and, attacking the light infantry posted in front of the British rightwing, soon drove it from its ground. While rapidly pursuing the flyingenemy, Woodford's brigade, [70] which was on the right of this wing, was arrested by a heavy fire from Chew's house, directed against itsright flank. The inefficiency of musketry against troops thussheltered being instantly perceived, the brigade was drawn off to theleft by its commanding officer, and the field-pieces attached to itwere ordered up to play on the house, but were too light to be ofservice. Some time was consumed in this operation, and the advance ofthe brigade was, of course, retarded. This part of the line wasconsequently broken, and the two brigades composing the division ofStephen were not only separated from each other, but from the otherdivision which was led by General Greene in person. That division, consisting of the brigades of Muhlenberg and Scott, pressing forwardwith eagerness, encountered and broke a part of the British rightwing, entered the village, and made a considerable number ofprisoners. 

 [Footnote 70: The author was in this brigade, and describes this part of the action from his own observation. ]

Thus far the prospect was flattering. The attack had been made withgreat spirit; several brigades had entered the town; and such animpression had been made on the British army as to justify theexpectation that its wings might be separated from each other, and acomplete victory be obtained. Had the American troops possessed theadvantages given by experience; had every division of the armyperformed with precision the part allotted to it, there is yet reasonto believe that the hopes inspired by this favourable commencementwould not have been disappointed. But the face of the country, and thedarkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density, co-operating with the want of discipline in the army, and thederangements of the corps from the incidents at Chew's house, blastedtheir flattering appearances, and defeated the enterprise. 

The grounds over which the British were pursued abounded with smalland strong enclosures, which frequently broke the line of theadvancing army. The two divisions of the right wing had been separatedat Chew's house; and immediately after their passing it, the right ofthe left wing was stopped at the same place, so as to cause a divisionof that wing also. The darkness of the morning rendered it difficultto distinguish objects even at an inconsiderable distance; and it wasimpossible for the Commander-in-chief to learn the situation of thewhole, or to correct the confusion which was commencing. The divisionsand brigades separated at Chew's house could not be reunited; and, even among those parts which remained entire, a considerable degree ofdisorder was soon introduced by the impediments to their advance. Someregiments pursuing with more vivacity than others, they were separatedfrom each other, their weight lessened, and their effect impaired. Thedarkness which obstructed the reunion of the broken parts of theAmerican army, also prevented their discerning the real situation ofthe enemy, so as to improve the first impression; and, in someinstances, some corps being in advance of others, produced uncertaintywhether the troops, seen indistinctly, were friends or foes. 

The attacks on the flanks and rear, which formed a part of theoriginal plan, do not appear ever to have been made. The Pennsylvaniamilitia came in view of the chasseurs who flanked the left of theBritish line, but did not engage them closely. The Maryland and Jerseymilitia just showed themselves on the right flank, about the timeGreene was commencing a retreat. 

[Sidenote: The Americans repulsed. ]

These embarrassments gave the British time to recover from theconsternation into which they had been thrown. General Knyphausen, whocommanded their left, detached two brigades to meet the right ofSullivan which had penetrated far into the village, before his left, which had been detained at Chew's house, could rejoin him; and theaction became warm in this quarter. The British right also recoveredfrom its surprise, and advanced on that part of Greene's divisionwhich had entered the town. After a sharp engagement these twobrigades began to retreat, and those which were most in advance weresurrounded and compelled to surrender. About the same time the rightwing also began to retreat. It is understood that they had expendedtheir ammunition. 

Every effort to stop this retrograde movement proved ineffectual. Thedivision of Wayne fell back on that of Stephen, and was for an instantmistaken for the enemy. General confusion prevailed, and theconfidence felt in the beginning of the action was lost. With infinitechagrin General Washington was compelled to relinquish his hopes ofvictory, and turn his attention to the security of his army. The enemynot being sufficiently recovered to endanger his rear, the retreat wasmade without loss, under cover of the division of Stephen, which hadscarcely been in the engagement. 

In this battle, about two hundred Americans were killed, near threetimes that number wounded, and about four hundred were made prisoners. Among the killed was General Nash of North Carolina; and among theprisoners was Colonel Matthews of Virginia, whose regiment hadpenetrated into the centre of the town. 

The loss of the British, as stated in the official return of GeneralHowe, did not much exceed five hundred in killed and wounded, of whomless than one hundred were killed; among the latter were BrigadierGeneral Agnew and Colonel Bird. 

The American army retreated the same day, about twenty miles, toPerkyomy Creek, where a small reinforcement, consisting of fifteenhundred militia and a state regiment, was received from Virginia;after which it again advanced towards Philadelphia, and encamped oncemore on Skippack Creek. 

The plan of the battle of Germantown must be admitted to have beenjudiciously formed; and, in its commencement, to have been happilyconducted. But a strict adherence to it by those who were entrustedwith the execution of its several parts, was indispensable to itssuccess. 

Major General Stephen, who commanded the right division of the leftwing, was cashiered for misconduct on the retreat, and forintoxication. 

Congress expressed, in decided terms, their approbation both of theplan of this enterprise, and of the courage with which it wasexecuted; for which their thanks were given to the general and thearmy. [71]

 [Footnote 71: On hearing that General Howe had landed at the head of the Chesapeake, Sir Henry Clinton, for the purpose of averting those aids which Washington might draw from the north of the Delaware, entered Jersey at the head of three thousand men. On the approach of General M'Dougal with a body of continental troops from Peekskill, and on hearing that the militia were assembling under General Dickinson, he returned to New York and Staten Island with the cattle he had collected, having lost in the expedition only eight men killed and twice as many wounded. 

 M'Dougal continued his march towards the Delaware; and the utmost exertions were made both by Governor Livingston and General Dickinson to collect the militia for the purpose of aiding the army in Pennsylvania. The success of their exertions did not equal their wishes. The militia being of opinion that there was danger of a second invasion from New York, and that their services were more necessary at home than in Pennsylvania, assembled slowly and reluctantly. Five or six hundred crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia, about the time Sir William Howe crossed the Schuylkill, and were employed in the removal of stores. On the approach of the British army, they were directed to avoid it by moving up the Frankford road; but the commanding officer, having separated himself from his corps, was taken by a party of British horse employed in scouring the country; on which the regiment dispersed, and returned by different roads to Jersey. With much labour General Dickinson assembled two other corps amounting to about nine hundred men, with whom he was about to cross the Delaware when intelligence was received of the arrival at New York of a reinforcement from Europe. He was detained in Jersey for the defence of the state, and the militia designed to serve in Pennsylvania were placed under General Forman. About six hundred of them reached the army a few days before the battle of Germantown, immediately after which they were permitted to return. ]

The attention of both armies was most principally directed to theforts below Philadelphia. 

The loss of the Delaware frigate, and of Billingsport, greatlydiscouraged the seamen by whom the galleys and floating batteries weremanned. Believing the fate of America to be decided, an opinionstrengthened by the intelligence received from their connexions inPhiladelphia, they manifested the most alarming defection, and severalofficers as well as sailors deserted to the enemy. This despondingtemper was checked by the battle of Germantown, and by throwing agarrison of continental troops into the fort at Red Bank, called fortMercer, the defence of which had been entrusted to militia. This fortcommanded the channel between the Jersey shore and Mud Island; and theAmerican vessels were secure under its guns. The militia of Jerseywere relied on to reinforce its garrison, and also to form a corps ofobservation which might harass the rear of any detachment investingthe place. 

[Sidenote: Measures taken by General Washington for cutting offsupplies from Philadelphia. ]

To increase the inconvenience of General Howe's situation byintercepting his supplies, six hundred militia, commanded by GeneralPotter, crossed the Schuylkill, with orders to scour the countrybetween that river and Chester; and the militia on the Delaware, abovePhiladelphia, were directed to watch the roads in that vicinity. 

The more effectually to stop those who were seduced by the hope ofgold and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time, congresspassed a resolution subjecting to martial law and to death, all whoshould furnish them with provisions, or certain other enumeratedarticles, who should be taken within thirty miles of any city, town orplace, in Jersey, Pennsylvania, or Delaware, occupied by Britishtroops. 

These arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the country, General Washington reoccupied the ground from which he had marched tofight the battle of Germantown. 

[Sidenote: Attack upon Fort Mifflin. ]

Meanwhile, General Howe was actively preparing to attack fort Mifflinfrom the Pennsylvania shore. He erected some batteries at the mouth ofthe Schuylkill, in order to command Webb's ferry, which were attackedby Commodore Hazlewood, and silenced; but, the following night, adetachment crossed over Webb's ferry into Province Island, andconstructed a slight work opposite fort Mifflin, within two musketshots of the block-house, from which they were enabled to throw shotand shells into the barracks. When day-light discovered this work, three galleys and a floating battery were ordered to attack it, andthe garrison surrendered. While the boats were bringing off theprisoners, a large column of British troops were seen marching intothe fortress, upon which the attack on it was renewed, but withoutsuccess; and two attempts made by Lieutenant Colonel Smith to stormit, failed. In a few nights, works were completed on the high groundof Province Island which enfiladed the principal battery of fortMifflin, and rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on theplatform to protect the men who worked the guns. 

The aids expected from the Jersey militia were not received. "Assureyourself, " said Lieutenant Colonel Smith, in a letter pressingearnestly for a reinforcement of continental troops, "that nodependence is to be put on the militia; whatever men your excellencydetermines on sending, no time is to be lost. " The garrison of fortMifflin was now reduced to one hundred and fifty-six effectives, andthat of Red Bank did not much exceed two hundred. 

In consequence of these representations, Colonel Angel, of RhodeIsland, with his regiment, was ordered to Red Bank, and LieutenantColonel John Greene, of Virginia, with about two hundred men, to fortMifflin. 

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, Admiral Howe sailed forthe Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet andco-operate with the army in and about Philadelphia. But the winds wereso unfavourable, and the navigation of the bay of Delaware sodifficult, that his van did not get into the river until the 4th ofOctober. The ships of war and transports which followed, came up fromthe sixth to the eighth, and anchored from New Castle to Reedy Island. 

The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded in theirendeavours to effect a passage through the lower double row ofchevaux-de-frise. Though no longer protected by the fort atBillingsport, they were defended by the water force above, and thework was found more difficult than had been expected. It was not untilthe middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as toafford a narrow and intricate passage through them. In the mean time, the fire from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effectexpected from it; and it was perceived that greater exertions would benecessary for the reduction of the works than could safely be made inthe present relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe, soon after the return of the American army to its formercamp on the Skippack, withdrew his troops from Germantown intoPhiladelphia, as preparatory to a combined attack by land and water onforts Mercer and Mifflin. 

After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river atBillingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered bythe ships of war. Several rows of chevaux-de-frise had been sunk abouthalf a mile below Mud Island, which were protected by the guns of theforts, as well as by the moveable water force. To silence these works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of theseobstructions in the channel. 

{October. }

[Sidenote: Attack upon Red Bank. ]

[Sidenote: Colonel Donop killed and his party repulsed withconsiderable loss. ]

On the 21st of October, a detachment of Hessians, amounting to twelvehundred men, commanded by Colonel Count Donop, crossed the Delaware atPhiladelphia, with orders to storm the fort at Red Bank. Thefortifications consisted of extensive outer works, within which was anintrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in theevening of the twenty-second. Count Donop appeared before the fort, and attacked it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equalresolution. The outer works being too extensive to be manned by thetroops in the fort, were used only to gall the assailants whileadvancing. On their near approach, the garrison retired within theinner intrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy anddestructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound; andLieutenant Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about thesame time. Lieutenant Colonel Minsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his troops, and returned next day to Philadelphia. The lossof the assailants was estimated by the Americans at four hundred men. The garrison was reinforced from fort Mifflin, and aided by thegalleys which flanked the Hessians in their advance and retreat. TheAmerican loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to only thirty-two men. 

[Sidenote: The Augusta frigate blows up. ]

The ships having been ordered to co-operate with Count Donop, theAugusta, with four smaller vessels, passed the lower line ofchevaux-de-frise, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above it, waitinguntil the assault should be made on the fort. The flood tide settingin about the time the attack commenced, they moved with it up theriver. The obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degreechanged its channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and theMerlin grounded, a considerable distance below the second line ofchevaux-de-frise and a strong wind from the north so checked therising of the tide, that these vessels could not be floated by theflood. Their situation, however, was not discerned that evening, asthe frigates which were able to approach the fort, and the batteriesfrom the Pennsylvania shore, kept up an incessant fire on thegarrison, till night put an end to the cannonade. Early next morningit was recommenced, in the hope that, under its cover, the Augusta andthe Merlin might be got off. The Americans, on discovering theirsituation, sent four fire ships against them, but without effect. Meanwhile, a warm cannonade took place on both sides, in the course ofwhich the Augusta took fire, and it was found impracticable toextinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out, the frigateswithdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire; after which the Augusta blewup, and a few of the crew were lost in her. 

This repulse inspired congress with flattering hopes for the permanentdefence of the posts on the Delaware. That body expressed its highsense of the merits of Colonel Greene of Rhode Island, who hadcommanded in fort Mercer; of Lieutenant Colonel Smith of Maryland, whohad commanded in fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, whocommanded the galleys; and presented a sword to each of theseofficers, as a mark of estimation in which their services were held. 

The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidenceof their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been unskilfullyconstructed, and required at least eight hundred men fully to man thelines. The island is about half a mile long. Fort Mifflin was placedat the lower end, having its principal fortifications in front for thepurpose of repelling ships coming up the river. The defences in therear consisted only of a ditch and palisade, protected by twoblock-houses, the upper story of one of which had been destroyed inthe late cannonade. Above the fort were two batteries opposing thoseconstructed by the British on Province and Carpenter's Islands, whichwere separated from Mud Island only by a narrow passage between fourand five hundred yards wide. 

The vessels of war, engaged in the defence of the Delaware, werepartly in the service of the continent, and partly in that of thestate of Pennsylvania, under a Commodore who received his commissionfrom the state. A misunderstanding took place between him andLieutenant Colonel Smith, and also between him and the officers of thecontinental navy; and it required all the authority of theCommander-in-chief to prevent these differences from essentiallyinjuring the service. 

The garrison of fort Mifflin consisted of only three hundredcontinental troops, who were worn down with fatigue, and constantwatching, under the constant apprehension of being attacked fromProvince Island, from Philadelphia, and from the ships below. 

{October 29. }

Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of Jersey to theDelaware, General Washington determined to strengthen the garrison byfarther drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia weredetached, to be divided between the two forts; and, a few daysafterwards, General Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take aposition about Woodbury, near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforcethe garrisons of both forts as far as his strength would permit. Thehope was entertained that the appearance of so respectable acontinental force might encourage the militia to assemble in greaternumbers. 

Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British armywhile separated from the fleet, General Washington had been uniformlydetermined to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after thebattle of Germantown, continued to watch assiduously for anopportunity to attack his enemy once more to advantage. Thecircumspect caution of General Howe afforded none. After the repulseat Red Bank, his measures were slow but certain; and were calculatedto insure the possession of the forts without exposing his troops tothe hazard of an assault. 

In this state of things, intelligence was received of the successfultermination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which greatpart of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might bedrawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But it was feared that, before these reinforcements could arrive, Sir William Howe would gainpossession of the forts, and remove the obstructions to the navigationof the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive forvigorous attempts to relieve fort Mifflin. But the relative force ofthe armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia, and, above all, the reflection that a defeat might disable him frommeeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troopsexpected from the north, determined General Washington not to hazard asecond attack under existing circumstances. 

To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Colonel Hamiltonwas despatched to General Gates with directions to represent to himthe condition of the armies in Pennsylvania; and to urge him, if hecontemplated no other service of more importance, immediately to sendthe regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army ofthe middle department. These orders were not peremptory, because itwas possible that some other object (as the capture of New York) stillmore interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from Philadelphia, might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to interferewith the accomplishment of such object. 

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerablepart of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates haddetained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be madein the winter against Ticonderoga. 

Having made such arrangements with Putnam as he supposed would securethe immediate march of a large body of continental troops from thatstation, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany for the purpose ofremonstrating to General Gates against retaining so large and valuablea part of the army unemployed at a time when the most imminent dangerthreatened the vitals of the country. Gates was by no means disposedto part with his troops. He could not believe that an expedition thenpreparing at New York, was designed to reinforce General Howe; andinsisted that, should the troops then embarked at that place, insteadof proceeding to the Delaware, make a sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should Albany be left defenceless, todestroy the valuable arsenal which had been there erected, and themilitary stores captured with Burgoyne, which had been chieflydeposited in that town. 

Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directingthree brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam, andfound the troops which had been ordered to join General Washington, still at Peekskill. The detachment from New York had suggested toPutnam the possibility of taking that place; and he does not appear tohave made very great exertions to divest himself of a force he deemednecessary for an object, the accomplishment of which would give somuch splendour to his military character. In addition to thiscircumstance, an opinion had gained ground among the soldiers thattheir share of service for the campaign had been performed, and thatit was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great discontents tooprevailed concerning their pay, which the government had permitted tobe more than six months in arrear; and in Poor's brigade, a mutinybroke out, in the course of which a soldier who was run through thebody by his captain, before he expired, shot the captain dead who gavethe wound. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money from thegovernor of New York, to put the troops in motion; and they proceededby brigades to the Delaware. But these several delays retarded theirarrival until the contest for the forts on that river was terminated. 

{November. }

The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large batteryon Province Island of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders, and twohowitzers of eight inches each, opened, early in the morning of the10th of November, upon fort Mifflin, at the distance of five hundredyards, and kept up an incessant fire for several successive days. Theblock-houses were reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades werebeaten down; and most of the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered in every part, so that the troops could notremain in them. They were under the necessity of working and watchingthe whole night to repair the damages of the day, and to guard againsta storm, of which they were in perpetual apprehension. If in the day, a few moments were allowed for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in consequence of heavy rains, had become a soft mud. Thegarrison was relieved by General Varnum every forty-eight hours; buthis brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty. 

Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum concurredwith him, that the garrison could not repel an assault, and ought tobe withdrawn; but General Washington still cherished the hope that theplace might be maintained until he should be reinforced from thenorthern army. Believing that an assault would not be attempted untilthe works were battered down, he recommended that the whole nightshould be employed in making repairs. His orders were that the placeshould be defended to the last extremity; and never were orders morefaithfully executed. 

{November 11. }

{Fourteenth. }

Several of the garrison were killed, and among them Captain Treat, agallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received acontusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up thecommand, and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer ofdistinguished merit, who served as engineer, reported to theCommander-in-chief that, although the block-houses were beaten down, all the guns in them, except two, disabled, and several breaches madein the walls, the place was still defensible; but the garrison was sounequal to the numbers required by the extent of the lines, and was sodispirited by watching, fatigue, and constant exposure to the coldrains which were almost incessant, that he dreaded the event of anattempt to carry the place by storm. Fresh troops were ordered totheir relief from Varnum's brigade, and the command was taken, firstby Colonel Russell, and afterwards by Major Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well served. The besiegerswere several times thrown into confusion, and a floating battery whichopened on the morning of the 14th, was silenced in the course of theday. 

{Fifteenth. }

The defence being unexpectedly obstinate, the assailants brought uptheir ships as far as the obstructions in the river permitted, andadded their fire to that of the batteries, which was the more fatal asthe cover for the troops had been greatly impaired. The bravegarrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshakenfirmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and asloop of war were brought up the inner channel, between Mud andProvince Islands, which had, unobserved by the besieged, been deepenedby the current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel;and, taking a station within one hundred yards of the works, not onlykept up a destructive cannonade, but threw hand grenades into them;while the musketeers from the round top of the Vigilant killed everyman that appeared on the platform. 

Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels, and heordered six galleys on the service; but, after reconnoitring theirsituation, the galleys returned without attempting any thing. Theirreport was that these ships were so covered by the batteries onProvince Island as to be unassailable. 

[Sidenote: Fort Mifflin evacuated and possession taken by theBritish. ]

{November 16. }

It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended. The works were in ruins. The position of the Vigilant rendered anyfarther continuance on the island a prodigal and useless waste ofhuman life; and on the 16th, about 11 at night, the garrison waswithdrawn. [72]

 [Footnote 72: In stating the defence of Mud Island, the author has availed himself of the journal of Major Fleury. ]

A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stationswith a determination, should it succeed, to repossess the island; butthe galleys effected nothing; and a detachment from Province Islandsoon occupied the ground which had been abandoned. 

{November 17. }

The day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of fortMifflin, General Washington deputed Generals De Kalb, and Knox, toconfer with General Varnum and the officers at fort Mercer on thepracticability of continuing to defend the obstructions in thechannel, to report thereon, and to state the force which would benecessary for that purpose. Their report was in favour of continuingthe defence. A council of the navy officers had already been called bythe Commodore in pursuance of a request of the Commander-in-chief madebefore the evacuation had taken place, who were unanimously of opinionthat it would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of theisland, to maintain its station, or to assist in preventing thechevaux-de-frise from being weighed by the ships of the enemy. 

General Howe had now completed a line of defence from the Schuylkillto the Delaware; and a reinforcement from New York had arrived atChester. These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in theJerseys sufficient for the reduction of fort Mercer, without weakeninghimself so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. Stilldeeming it of the utmost importance to open the navigation of theDelaware completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis about one in themorning of the 17th, with a strong body of troops to Chester. Fromthat place, his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where he wasjoined by the reinforcement from New York. 

{November 17. }

General Washington received immediate intelligence of the march ofthis detachment, which he communicated to General Varnum with ordersthat fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity. With a viewto military operations in that quarter, he ordered one division of thearmy to cross the river at Burlington, and despatched expresses to thenorthern troops who were marching on by brigades, directing them tomove down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receivefarther orders. 

[Sidenote: Fort Mercer evacuated. ]

Major General Greene, an officer who had been distinguished early inthe war by the Commander-in-chief for the solidity of his judgment andhis military talents, was selected for this expedition. A hope wasentertained that he would be able, not only to protect fort Mercer, but to obtain some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis; as thesituation of the fort, which his lordship could not invest withoutplacing himself between Timber and Manto Creeks, would expose theassailants to great peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before Greene could cross the Delaware, Lord Cornwallis approachedwith an army rendered more powerful than had been expected by thejunction of the reinforcement from New York; and fort Mercer wasevacuated. 

A few of the smaller galleys escaped up the river, and the others wereburnt by their crews. 

Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. Avictory would restore the Jersey shore, and this object was deemed soimportant, that General Greene's instructions indicated theexpectation that he would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis. 

That judicious officer feared the reproach of avoiding an action lessthan the just censure of sacrificing the real interests of his countryby engaging the enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of theBritish exceeded his, even counting his militia as regulars; and hedetermined to wait for Glover's brigade, which was marching from thenorth. Before its arrival, Lord Cornwallis took post on GloucesterPoint, a point of land making deep into the Delaware, which wasentirely under cover of the guns of the ships, from which place he wasembarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected forPhiladelphia. [73]

 [Footnote 73: While Lord Cornwallis lay on Gloucester Point, about one hundred and fifty men of Morgan's rifle corps under Lieutenant Colonel Butler, and an equal number of militia, the whole under the Marquis de la Fayette, who still served as a volunteer, attacked a picket consisting of about three hundred men, and drove them with the loss of twenty or thirty killed, and a greater number wounded, quite into their camp; after which the Americans retired without being pursued. ]

Believing that Lord Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazineshe had collected, and that the purpose of Sir William Howe was, withhis united forces, to attack the American army while divided, GeneralWashington ordered Greene to recross the Delaware, and join the army. 

[Sidenote: The enemy succeeds in opening a free communication with hisfleet. ]

Thus after one continued struggle of more than six weeks, in which thecontinental troops displayed great military virtues, the army inPhiladelphia secured itself in the possession of that city, by openinga free communication with the fleet. [74]

 [Footnote 74: While these transactions were passing on the Delaware, General Dickinson projected another expedition against the post on Staten Island. He collected about two thousand men, and requested General Putnam to make a diversion on the side of Kingsbridge, in order to prevent a reinforcement from New York. 

 Knowing that success depended on secrecy, he had concealed his object even from his field-officers, until eight of the night in which it was to be executed. Yet by three next morning, information of his design was given to General Skinner, who, being on his guard, saved himself and his brigade, by taking refuge, on the first alarm, in some works too strong to be carried by assault. A few prisoners were made and a few men killed, after which General Dickinson brought off his party with the loss of only three killed and ten slightly wounded. ]

[Sidenote: Washington urged to attack Philadelphia. ]

While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene on theDelaware above him, the reinforcements from the north being received, an attack on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officershigh in rank; and was in some measure urged by that torrent of publicopinion, which, if not resisted by a very firm mind, overwhelms thejudgment, and by controlling measures not well comprehended, mayfrequently produce, especially in military transactions, the mostdisastrous effects. 

It was stated to the Commander-in-chief, that his army was now ingreater force than he could expect it to be at any future time; thatbeing joined by the troops who had conquered Burgoyne, his ownreputation, the reputation of his army, the opinion of congress, andof the nation, required some decisive blow on his part. That the rapiddepreciation of the paper currency, by which the resources forcarrying on the war were dried up, rendered indispensable some grandeffort to bring it to a speedy termination. 

The plan proposed was, that General Greene should embark two thousandmen at Dunks' ferry, and descending the Delaware in the night, land inthe town just before day, attack the enemy in the rear, and takepossession of the bridge over the Schuylkill. That a strong corpsshould march down on the west side of that river, occupy the heightsenfilading the works of the enemy, and open a brisk cannonade uponthem, while a detachment from it should march down to the bridge, andattack in front at the same instant, that the party descending theriver should commence its assault on the rear. 

Not only the Commander-in-chief, but some of his best officers, thosewho could not be impelled by the clamours of the ill-informed to ruinthe public interests, were opposed to this mad enterprise. 

The two armies, they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the detachment under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to haveso weakened Sir William Howe as to compensate for the advantages ofhis position. His right was covered by the Delaware, his left by theSchuylkill, his rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well asby the city of Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubtsextending from river to river, and connected by an abattis, and bycircular works. It would be indispensably necessary to carry all theseredoubts; since to leave a part of them to play on the rear of thecolumns, while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia, wouldbe extremely hazardous. 

Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven into thetown, yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of storminga town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superiorto that of the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brickhouses would be lined with musketeers, whose first must thin the ranksof the assailants. 

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the wholedepended, was, that the British rear should be surprised by the corpsdescending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of toomany favourable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposedthat Sir William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probablethat not even his embarkation would be made unnoticed; but it waspresuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed, tosuppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movements should be observed, the whole plan would becomprehended, since it would never be conjectured that General Greenewas to attack singly. 

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, thetotal loss of the two thousand men in the rear must follow; andGeneral Howe would maintain his superiority through the winter. 

The situation of America did not require these desperate measures. TheBritish general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms, orto manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army. Thedepreciation of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immenseemissions without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected. 

Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the falsebrilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of stormingPhiladelphia, in order to throw lustre round his own fame, and that ofhis army; and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and realpatriotism, to be diverted from a purpose believed to be right, by theclamours of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding theimportunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations ofenemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed; he persevered inhis resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He saved his army, and was able to keep the field in the face of his enemy; while theclamour of the moment wasted in air, and is forgotten. 

The opinion that Sir William Howe meditated an attack on the Americancamp, was not ill founded. Scarcely had Lord Cornwallis returned toPhiladelphia, and Greene to the American army, when unquestionableintelligence was received that the British general was preparing tomarch out in full strength, with the avowed object of forcingWashington from his position, and driving him beyond the mountains. 

[Sidenote: General Howe marches out to Chestnut Hill. ]

On the 4th of December, Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer on thelines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp atWhite Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information tothe Commander-in-chief. In the evening of the same day, General Howemarched out of Philadelphia with his whole force; and, about eleven atnight, M'Lane, who had been detached with one hundred chosen men, attacked the British van at the Three Mile Run, on the Germantownroad, and compelled their front division to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army, galling themseverely until three next morning, when the British encamped onChestnut Hill, in front of the American right, and distant from itabout three miles. A slight skirmish had also taken place between thePennsylvania militia under General Irvine, and the advanced lightparties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded, and themilitia, without much other loss, were dispersed. 

The range of hills on which the British were posted, approached nearerto those occupied by the Americans, as they stretched northward. 

Having passed the day in reconnoitring the right, Sir William Howechanged his ground in the course of the night, and moving along thehills to his right, took an advantageous position, about a mile infront of the American left. The next day he inclined still farther tohis right, and, in doing so, approached still nearer to the left wingof the American army. Supposing a general engagement to beapproaching, Washington detached Gist with some Maryland militia, andMorgan with his rifle corps, to attack the flanking and advancedparties of the enemy. A sharp action ensued, in which Major Morris, ofJersey, a brave officer in Morgan's regiment, was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and wounded. A small loss wasalso sustained in the militia. The parties first attacked were drivenin; but the enemy reinforcing in numbers, and Washington, unwilling tomove from the heights, and engage on the ground which was the scene ofthe skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat. 

[Sidenote: Returns to Philadelphia. ]

Sir William Howe continued to manoeuvre towards the flank, and infront of the left wing of the American army. Expecting to be attackedin that quarter in full force, Washington made such changes in thedisposition of his troops as the occasion required; and the day wasconsumed in these movements. In the course of it, the American chiefrode through every brigade of his army, delivering, in person, hisorders, respecting the manner of receiving the enemy, exhorting histroops to rely principally on the bayonet, and encouraging them by thesteady firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words, to avigorous performance of their duty. [75] The dispositions of theevening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning; butin the afternoon of the eighth, the British suddenly filed off fromtheir right, which extended beyond the American left, and retreated toPhiladelphia. The parties detached to harass their rear could notovertake it. 

 [Footnote 75: The author states this on his own observation. ]

The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the officialletter of General Howe, rather exceeded one hundred in killed, wounded, and missing; and was sustained principally in the skirmish ofthe 7th, in which Major Morris fell. 

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, withsuperior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force ofthe British was then stated at twelve thousand men. It has been sincedeclared by an author[76] who then belonged to it, but who, though acandid writer, appears to have imbibed prejudices against Sir WilliamHowe, to have amounted to fourteen thousand. The American armyconsisted of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-onecontinental troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-onemilitia. This equality in point of numbers, rendered it a prudentprecaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armiesoccupied heights fronting each other, neither could attack withoutgiving to its adversary some advantage in the ground; and this was anadvantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish. 

 [Footnote 76: Stedman. ]

The return of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on anaction, after marching out with the avowed intention of fighting, isthe best testimony of the respect which he felt for the talents of hisadversary, and the courage of the troops he was to encounter. 

The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for anarmy neither well clothed, nor sufficiently supplied with blankets, longer to keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to placethe troops in winter quarters; but in the existing state of things thechoice of winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It wasimpossible to place them in villages without uncovering the country, or exposing them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment. 

To avoid these calamities, it was determined to take a strong positionin the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from theDelaware above and below that city; and there to construct huts, inthe form of a regular encampment, which might cover the army duringthe winter. A strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west sideof the Schuylkill, between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was selected for that purpose; and some time before day on the morningof the 11th of December, the army marched to take possession of it. Byan accidental concurrence of circumstances, Lord Cornwallis had beendetached the same morning at the head of a strong corps, on a foragingparty on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had fallen in with abrigade of Pennsylvania militia commanded by General Potter, which hesoon dispersed; and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heightsopposite Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridgefor the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops tocommand the defile called the Gulph, just as the front division of theAmerican army reached the bank of the river. This movement had beenmade without any knowledge of the intention of General Washington tochange his position, or any design of contesting the passage of theSchuylkill; but the troops had been posted in the manner alreadymentioned for the sole purpose of covering the foraging party. 

Washington apprehended, from his first intelligence, that General Howehad taken the field in full force. He therefore recalled the troopsalready on the west side, and moved rather higher up the river, forthe purpose of understanding the real situation, force, and designs ofthe enemy. The next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia; and, in the course of the night, the American army crossed the river. 

[Sidenote: General Washington goes into winter quarters. ]

Here the Commander-in-chief communicated to his army, in generalorders, the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during thewinter. He expressed, in strong terms, his approbation of theirconduct, presented them with an encouraging state of the futureprospects of their country, exhorted them to bear with continuingfortitude the hardships inseparable from the position they were aboutto take, and endeavoured to convince their judgments that thosehardships were not imposed on them by unfeeling caprice, but werenecessary for the good of their country. 

The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of thearmy were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings wereconsiderably diminished by the erection of logged huts, filled up withmortar, which, after being dried, formed comfortable habitations, andgave content to men long unused to the conveniences of life. The orderof a regular encampment was observed; and the only appearance ofwinter quarters, was the substitution of huts for tents. 

CHAPTER X. 

 Inquiry into the conduct of General Schuyler.... Burgoyne appears before Ticonderoga.... Evacuation of that place, ... Of Skeensborough.... Colonel Warner defeated.... Evacuation of fort Anne.... Proclamation of Burgoyne.... Counter-proclamation of Schuyler.... Burgoyne approaches fort Edward.... Schuyler retires to Saratoga, ... To Stillwater.... St. Leger invests fort Schuyler.... Herkimer defeated.... Colonel Baum detached to Bennington.... Is defeated.... Breckman defeated.... St. Leger abandons the siege of fort Schuyler.... Murder of Miss M'Crea.... General Gates takes command.... Burgoyne encamps on the heights of Saratoga.... Battle of Stillwater.... Burgoyne retreats to Saratoga.... Capitulates.... The British take forts Montgomery and Clinton.... The forts Independence and Constitution evacuated by the Americans.... Ticonderoga evacuated by the British. 

{1777}

While, with inferior numbers, General Washington maintained a stubborncontest in the middle states, events of great variety and importancewere passing in the north. 

After Sir Guy Carleton had distributed his army, for winter quarters, in the several villages from the Isle Aux Noix and Montreal to Quebec, General Burgoyne, who had served under him, embarked for England, inorder to communicate a full statement of affairs in the northerndepartment; and to assist in making arrangements for the ensuingcampaign. The American army, having been formed for only one year, dissolved of itself at the expiration of that term, and could scarcelyfurnish even the appearance of garrisons in their forts. 

The defence of this frontier was assigned to the regiments directed tobe raised in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the northwestern partsof New York; but the recruiting service advanced so slowly, and somuch difficulty was found in clothing and arming those who wereenlisted, that it became indispensable to call in the aid of themilitia; and the plan of the campaign on the part of the British wasinvolved in so much obscurity that General Washington deemed itadviseable to direct eight of the regiments of Massachusetts torendezvous at Peekskill. 

[Sidenote: An inquiry into the conduct of General Schuyler, whichterminates to his honour. ]

{May 22. }

The service of General Schuyler in the northern department had beenmore solid than brilliant. Dissatisfied with his situation, anddisgusted with the injustice[77] he supposed himself to experience, hehad for some time meditated a resignation, and had been retained inthe service only by the deep interest he felt in the struggle of hiscountry for independence. So soon as his fears for Ticonderoga wereremoved by the partial opening of Lake Champlain, he waited in personon congress for the purpose of adjusting his accounts, obtaining aninquiry into his conduct, and supporting those necessary measures ofdefence in the north, which were suggested by his perfect knowledge ofthe country. At his request, a committee, consisting of a member fromeach state, was appointed to inquire into his conduct during the timehe had held a command in the army. The arduous services performed bythis meritorious officer, when investigated, were found so far toexceed any estimate which had been made of them, that congress deemedit essential to the public interest to prevail on him to retain hiscommission. The resolution which fixed his head quarters at Albany wasrepealed, and he was directed to proceed forthwith to the northerndepartment, and to take the command of it. 

 [Footnote 77: When the command of the operating army was given to General Thomas in March 1776, the head quarters of General Schuyler had been fixed by congress at Albany, and that resolution remained in force. General Gates was now directed to repair to Ticonderoga and take command of the army; and Major General St. Clair was ordered to the same place to serve under him. ]

On his arrival, he found the army of the north not only too weak forthe objects entrusted to it, but badly supplied with arms, clothes, and provisions. From a spy who had been seized near Onion River, heobtained information that General Burgoyne was at Quebec, and was tocommand the British forces in that department so soon as they shouldmarch out of Canada. That while Ticonderoga should be attacked by themain army, Sir John Johnson, with a strong body of British, Canadians, and Indians, was to penetrate to the Mohawk by Oswego, and placehimself between fort Stanwix and fort Edward. 

[Sidenote: Burgoyne appears before Ticonderoga. ]

General Schuyler was sensible of the danger which threatened him, andmade every exertion to meet it. After completing his arrangements atTiconderoga for sustaining a siege, he had proceeded to Albany, forthe purpose of attending to his supplies, and of expediting the marchof reinforcements, when he received intelligence from General St. Clair, who was entrusted with the defence of Ticonderoga, thatBurgoyne had appeared before that place. 

In the course of the preceding winter, a plan for penetrating to theHudson, from Canada, by the way of the lakes, had been digested in thecabinet of London. General Burgoyne, who assisted in forming it, wasentrusted with its execution, and was to lead a formidable armyagainst Ticonderoga as soon as the season would permit. At the sametime a smaller party under Colonel St. Leger, composed of Canadians, newly raised Americans, and a few Europeans, aided by a powerful bodyof Indians, was to march from Oswego, to enter the country by the wayof the Mohawk, and to join the grand army on the Hudson. 

{January 22. }

Burgoyne reached Quebec as soon as it was practicable to sail up theSt. Lawrence, and appeared in full force on the river Bouquet, on thewestern banks of lake Champlain, much earlier than the Americangeneral had supposed to be possible. At this place he met the Indiansin a grand council, after which he gave them a war feast. Much of thecruelty afterwards perpetrated by the savages has been attributed tothis unfortunate officer; but justice requires the admission that hisspeech was calculated rather to diminish than increase their habitualferocity. He endeavoured to impress on them the distinction betweenenemies in the field, and the unarmed inhabitants, many of whom werefriends; and, addressing himself to their avarice, promised rewardsfor prisoners, but none for scalps. It was perhaps fortunate forAmerica, that, in some instances, peculiarly calculated to excite andinterest the human feelings, these feeble restraints were disregarded. 

After publishing a manifesto at Putnam River, designed to act on thehopes and fears of the people of the country through which he was topass, he halted a few days at Crown Point, to make the necessarydispositions for investing Ticonderoga. 

{June 30. }

{July 1. }

From Crown Point, the royal army advanced on both sides the lake, keeping up a communication between its divisions, by means of thefleet; and on the 1st of July encamped within four miles of theAmerican works. A strong party was pushed forward to Three Mile Point;and the fleet anchored just beyond the range of the guns of the fort. The next day they took possession, without opposition, of theimportant post at Mount Hope, which commanded, in part, the lines onthe northern side, and entirely cut off the communication with lakeGeorge. 

The weakness of his garrison induced General St. Clair to give up thispost without a struggle. Believing it to be impracticable to supportit without hazarding a general action, he determined to concentratehis force about Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. 

After taking possession of Mount Hope, the British lines were extendedon the western side of Champlain, from the mountain quite to the lake, so as completely to inclose the garrison on that side. The Germandivision under Major General Reidisel, which occupied the easternshore of the lake, was encamped at Three Mile Point, and had pushedforward a detachment near the rivulet, which runs east of MountIndependence. 

{July. }

The besiegers laboured assiduously to bring up their artillery andcomplete their works. Sugar Hill, a rugged mountain standing at theconfluence of the waters that unite at Ticonderoga, which overlooksthe fortress and had been thought inaccessible, was examined; and thereport being that the ascent, though extremely difficult, waspracticable, the work was immediately commenced, and was pressed withso much vigour that the batteries might have opened next day. Thegarrison was not in a condition to check these operations. 

The situation of St. Clair was now at its crisis. Only the groundbetween the Eastern run and the South River remained open; and this hewas informed would be occupied the next day, so that the investmentwould be complete. The place must be immediately evacuated, ormaintained at the hazard of losing the garrison when it should be nolonger tenable. 

Between these cruel alternations, General St. Clair did not hesitateto choose the first; but deeming it prudent to take the advice of acouncil of war, he convened the general officers, who unanimouslyadvised the immediate evacuation of the fort. 

[Sidenote: Evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. ]

{July 5. }

Preparations for the retreat were instantly commenced. The invalids, the hospital, and such stores as could be moved in the course of thenight, were put on board the batteaux, which proceeded under the guardof Colonel Long, up the South River to Skeensborough; and, before dayon the morning of the 6th of July, the main body of the army directedits march to the same place. 

In the hope of making considerable progress before his retreat shouldbe discovered, General St. Clair had ordered the troops to observe themost profound silence, and, particularly, to set nothing on fire. These judicious orders were disobeyed; and, before the rear guard wasin motion, the house which had been occupied by General De Fermoy wasin flames. This served as a signal to the besiegers, who immediatelyentered the works. The main body of the retreating army was rapidlypursued by Generals Frazer and Reidisel, while General Burgoyne, inperson, followed the detachment under Colonel Long. 

{July 6. }

The bridge, the boom, and those other works, the construction of whichhad employed the labour of ten months, were cut through by nine in themorning, so as to afford a passage for the Royal George and Inflexiblefrigates, as well as for the gun boats, which engaged the Americangalleys, about three in the afternoon, near the falls ofSkeensborough. 

[Sidenote: The American army evacuate Skeensborough and retire to fortAnne. ]

In the mean time, three regiments had disembarked at some distancefrom the fort, with the intention of attacking it by land, and cuttingoff the retreat of the garrison, as well as that of the detachment inthe boats and galleys. This manoeuvre being discovered, the works andbatteaux were set on fire, and the troops retired to fort Anne. Onthis occasion, the baggage of the army, and a great quantity ofmilitary stores, were either destroyed by the Americans, or taken bythe British. 

Knowing that he could save his army only by the rapidity of his march, General St. Clair reached Castletown, thirty miles from Ticonderoga, on the night succeeding the evacuation of the fort. The rear guardunder Colonel Warner halted six miles short of that place. Having beenaugmented by those who from excessive fatigue had fallen out of theline of march, it amounted to rather more than one thousand men. 

{July 7. }

[Sidenote: Colonel Warner attacked by General Frazer and obliged toretreat. ]

The next morning at five, they were overtaken and attacked by GeneralFrazer with eight hundred and fifty men. The action was warm and wellcontested. In its commencement, two regiments of militia, which laywithin two miles of Colonel Warner, were ordered to his assistance. Instead of obeying these orders, they consulted their own safety, andhastened to Castletown. Had these orders been executed, the corpswhich attacked Warner would probably have been cut to pieces. Whilethe action was maintained with equal spirit on both sides, GeneralReidisel arrived with his division of Germans, and the Americans wererouted. 

In this action, Colonel Francis, several other officers, and upwardsof two hundred men were left dead on the field; and one colonel, sevencaptains, ten subalterns, and two hundred and ten privates were madeprisoners. Near six hundred are supposed to have been wounded, many ofwhom must have perished in attempting to escape through the woodstowards the inhabited country. The British state their own loss atthirty-five killed, among whom was one field officer, and one hundredand forty-four wounded, including two majors, and five inferiorofficers. It is scarcely credible, notwithstanding the difference inarms, that in a well contested action, the disparity in the killedcould have been so considerable. It is the less probable, as thepursuit was not of long continuance. 

To avoid that division of the British army which had proceeded up theNorth River, St. Clair changed his route; and directed his march toRutland, to which place he ordered Warner also to retire. At Rutlandhe fell in with several soldiers who had been separated from theircorps, and, two days afterwards, at Manchester, was joined by Warnerwith about ninety men. From this place he proceeded to fort Edward, where he met General Schuyler. 

After taking possession of Skeensborough, Burgoyne had found itnecessary to suspend the pursuit, and to give his army refreshment. The troops were in some disorder; distinct corps were intermingled, and his detachments were far apart from each other. He determinedtherefore to halt a few days at that place, in order to reassemble andarrange his army. 

{July 7. }

[Sidenote: Colonel Long evacuates Fort Anne and retires to FortEdward. ]

Colonel Long having been directed to defend fort Anne, the ninthregiment of British, under Lieutenant Colonel Hill, had been detachedagainst that place. It being understood that the Americans were insome force, two other regiments, under Brigadier Powell, were orderedto support the first party. Before the arrival of this reinforcement, Colonel Long attacked the ninth regiment, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the British kept their ground, and the advantage was claimedby both parties. Hearing that a reinforcement was approaching, Longset fire to the works at fort Anne, and retired to fort Edward. 

{July 7. }

At Stillwater, on his way to Ticonderoga, General Schuyler wasinformed of the evacuation of that place; and, on the same day, atSaratoga, of the loss of the stores at Skeensborough. He had heardnothing from General St. Clair; and was seriously apprehensive forthat officer and his army, which, after the junction of Colonel Long, consisted of about fifteen hundred continental troops, and the samenumber of militia. They were dispirited by defeat, without tents, badly armed, and had lost great part of their stores and baggage. Thecountry was generally much alarmed; and even the well affecteddiscovered more inclination to take care of themselves than to jointhe army. In this gloomy state of things, no officer could haveexerted more diligence and skill than were displayed by Schuyler. Having fixed his head quarters at fort Edward, he employed to theutmost advantage the short respite from action which Burgoyneunavoidably gave. The country between Skeensborough and fort Edwardwas almost entirely unsettled, was covered with thick woods, and of asurface extremely rough, and much intersected with creeks andmorasses. Wood creek was navigable with batteaux as far as fort Anne;and military stores of every description might be transported up it. He obstructed its navigation by sinking numerous impediments in itscourse, broke up the bridges, and rendered the roads impassable. Hewas also indefatigable in driving the live stock out of the way, andin bringing from fort George to fort Edward, the ammunition and othermilitary stores which had been deposited at that place. Still fartherto delay the movements of the British, he posted Colonel Warner ontheir left flank, with instructions to raise the militia in thatquarter. The hope was entertained, that the appearance of arespectable force, threatening the flank and rear of the invadingarmy, would not only retard its advance, but would induce GeneralBurgoyne to weaken it, in order to strengthen the garrison ofTiconderoga. 

While thus endeavoring to obstruct the march of the enemy, Schuylerwas not less attentive to the best means of strengthening his ownarmy. Reinforcements of regular troops were earnestly solicited; themilitia of New England and New York were required to take the field, and all his influence in the surrounding country was exerted toreanimate the people, and to prevent their defection from the Americancause. 

[Sidenote: Proclamation of Burgoyne and counter-proclamation ofSchuyler. ]

While at Skeensborough General Burgoyne issued a secondproclamation[78] summoning the people of the adjacent country to sendten deputies from each township to meet Colonel Skeene at Castletown, in order to deliberate on such measures as might still be adopted tosave those who had not yet conformed to his first, and submitted tothe royal authority. General Schuyler apprehending some effect fromthis paper, issued a counter proclamation, stating the insidiousdesigns of the enemy. Warning the inhabitants, by the example ofJersey, of the danger to which their yielding to this seductiveproposition would expose them, and giving them the most solemnassurances that all who should send deputies to this meeting, or inany manner aid the enemy, would be considered traitors, and shouldsuffer the utmost rigour of the law. 

 [Footnote 78: Remem. ]

The evacuation of Ticonderoga was a shock for which no part of theUnited States was prepared. Neither the strength of the invading army, nor of the garrison had been understood. When therefore intelligencewas received that a place, on the fortifications of which much moneyand labour had been expended, which was considered as the key to thewhole northwestern country, and supposed to contain a garrison nearlyequal to the invading army, had been abandoned without a siege; thatan immense train of artillery, and all the military stores, had eitherfallen into the hands of the enemy, or been destroyed; that the army, on its retreat, had been attacked, defeated, and dispersed;astonishment pervaded all ranks of men; and the conduct of theofficers was universally condemned. Congress recalled all the generalsof the department, and directed an inquiry into their conduct. Throughout New England especially, the most bitter aspersions werecast on them and General Schuyler, who, from some unknown cause, hadnever been viewed with favour in that part of the continent, wasinvolved in the common charge of treachery, to which this accumulationof unlooked-for calamity was generally attributed by the mass of thepeople. 

On the representations of General Washington, the recall of theofficers was suspended, until he should be of opinion that the servicewould not suffer by the measure; and, on a full inquiry afterwardsmade into their conduct, they were acquitted of all blame. 

In a letter of St. Clair to the Commander-in-chief, stating hismotives for evacuating Ticonderoga, he represented the strength of hisgarrison, including nine hundred militia, who would consent to staybut a few days, at only three thousand effective rank and file, manyof whom were without bayonets. The lines required ten thousand to manthem properly. He also affirmed, that his supply of provisions wassufficient for only twenty days, and that the works on the Ticonderogaside were incomplete, with their flanks undefended. He justified hishaving failed to call in a larger reinforcement of militia, by thescarcity of provisions, the supply on hand not having been procureduntil General Schuyler had resumed the command in the department; andattributed his not having evacuated the place in time to preserve hisarmy and stores, to the prevalent opinion that there was not asufficient force in Canada to attempt so hardy an enterprise, and tohis not being at liberty to adopt that measure but in the lastnecessity. 

A court of inquiry justified his conduct, and he retained theconfidence of the Commander-in-chief. 

On learning the distressed state of the remnant of the army, GeneralWashington made great exertions to repair its losses, and to reinforceit. The utmost industry was used to procure a supply of tents;artillery and ammunition were forwarded from Massachusetts; theremaining troops of that state were ordered to that department; andGeneral Lincoln, who possessed, in a high degree, the confidence ofthe New England militia, was directed to raise and command them. General Arnold, so often distinguished for his gallantry in the field, was ordered to the northern army, in the hope that his presence andreputation might reanimate the troops; and Colonel Morgan, with hiscorps of riflemen, was detached on the same service. Through thepresent dark gloom, Washington discerned a ray of light, and alreadycherished the hope that much good might result from present evil. "Theevacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, " said he in a letterof the 15th of July, to General Schuyler, "is an event of chagrin andsurprise, not apprehended, nor within the compass of my reasoning. This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much. But, notwithstanding, things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, Ihope a spirited opposition will check the progress of GeneralBurgoyne's arms, and that the confidence derived from success willhurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, befavourable to us. We should never despair. Our situation has beforebeen unpromising, and has changed for the better. So, I trust, it willagain. If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth newexertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times. "

On receiving a letter from General Schuyler of the seventeenth, stating the divided situation of the British army, he seemed toanticipate the event which afterwards occurred, and to suggest themeasure in which originated that torrent of misfortune with whichBurgoyne was overwhelmed. "Though our affairs, " he said in reply tothis information, "have for some days past worn a dark and gloomyaspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trustGeneral Burgoyne's army will meet, sooner or later, an effectualcheck; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has met withwill precipitate his ruin. From your accounts, he appears to bepursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is most favourableto us. I mean acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly giveroom for enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to greathazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though itshould not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspiritthe people, and do away much of their present anxiety. In such anevent, they would lose sight of past misfortunes; and, urged at thesame time by a regard for their own security, would fly to arms, andafford every aid in their power. "

After allowing a short repose to his army, General Burgoyne proceededwith ardour to the remaining objects of the campaign. The toils anddelays which must be encountered in reaching the Hudson were soonperceived. He found it necessary to open Wood creek, and to repair theroads and bridges which Schuyler had broken up. Such was theunavoidable delay of this difficult operation, that the army did notarrive on the Hudson, in the neighbourhood of fort Edward, till thefourteenth of July. At this place it was necessary again to halt, inorder to bring artillery, provisions, batteaux, and other articlesfrom fort George. 

[Sidenote: Burgoyne approaches Fort Edward and Schuyler retires toSaratoga. ]

[Sidenote: From thence to Stillwater. ]

The time afforded by this delay had been employed by Schuyler to theutmost advantage. Some reinforcements of continental troops hadarrived from Peekskill, and the militia had been assembled; but hisstrength did not yet afford a reasonable prospect of success in acontest with the enemy opposed to him. On this account, as Burgoyneapproached fort Edward, Schuyler retired over the Hudson to Saratoga, and soon afterwards to Stillwater, not far from the mouth of theMohawk. At this place, General Lincoln, who had been detached to takecommand of the militia assembling at Manchester, was ordered to rejoinhim, and he fortified his camp in the hope of being strong enough todefend it. 

{August 15}

At Stillwater, information was obtained that Burgoyne had evacuatedCastletown; so that the only communication with Ticonderoga, whencenearly all his supplies were drawn, was through Lake George; and thatthe garrison of that important place had been reduced to three hundredmen. In consequence of this intelligence, the orders to GeneralLincoln were countermanded, and he was directed with the militia ofMassachusetts, New Hampshire, and of the Grants, making, as wasunderstood, a total of between two and three thousand men, to placehimself in the rear of the British army, and cut off its communicationwith the lakes. Here too he was informed that Colonel St. Leger, witha large body of Indians, in addition to his regulars, had penetratedfrom Oswego, by the way of the Oneida lake and Wood creek, to theMohawk, where he had laid siege to fort Schuyler, and had totallydefeated General Herkimer, who had raised the militia of Tryon county, in order to relieve the fort. The importance of protecting theinhabitants from the savages, and of preventing a junction between St. Leger and Burgoyne, and the consequent loss of the country on theMohawk, determined Schuyler, weak as he was, to detach Major GeneralArnold with three continental regiments to raise the siege. The armywas so enfeebled by this measure, that its removal to a place ofgreater security became necessary, and it was withdrawn to someislands in the confluence of the Hudson and the Mohawk, where the campwas deemed more defensible. Burgoyne had now marched down the eastside of the Hudson, and his advanced parties had crossed the river, and occupied the ground at Saratoga. 

[Sidenote: St. Leger invests Fort Schuyler. ]

On the 3d of August, after a message vaunting of his strength, anddemanding a surrender, which was answered by a declaration that thefort would be defended to the last extremity, St. Leger invested fortSchuyler. The garrison amounted to six hundred men, all continentaltroops, who were commanded by Colonel Gansevoort. The besieging armyrather exceeded fifteen hundred, of whom from six to nine hundred wereIndians. 

On the approach of the enemy, General Herkimer, who commanded themilitia of Tryon county, assembled them in considerable numbers, andgave information to the garrison, about eleven in the morning of thesixth, of his intention to force a passage that day through thebesieging army. Gansevoort determined to favour the execution of thisdesign by a vigorous sortie; and upwards of two hundred men, to becommanded by Lieutenant Colonel Willet, were drawn out for thatpurpose. 

[Sidenote: Herkimer, advancing to the relief of the fort, falls intoan ambuscade, and is defeated with loss. ]

Unfortunately St. Leger received information the preceding day ofHerkimer's approach, and, early in the morning, placed a strong party, composed of regulars and Indians, in ambuscade on the road along whichhe was to march. His first notice of it was given by a heavy dischargeof small arms, which was followed by a furious attack from the Indianswith their tomahawks. He defended himself with resolution; but wasdefeated with great slaughter. The general and several of the fieldofficers were wounded; and many others, among whom were severalpersons of distinction, were killed or taken prisoners. The loss wasestimated at four hundred men. The destruction was prevented frombeing still more complete, by the very timely sortie made byLieutenant Colonel Willet, which checked the pursuit, and recalledthose engaged in it to the defence of their own camp. 

As soon as Gansevoort understood that Herkimer was advancing, thesortie which he had planned was made. Lieutenant Colonel Willet fellon the camp of the besiegers, and routed them at the first onset. After driving them, some into the woods, and others over the river, hereturned to the fort without the loss of a man. 

Burgoyne had received early intimation of the arrival of St. Legerbefore fort Schuyler; and was aware of the advantage to be derivedfrom an immediate and rapid movement down the Hudson. But theobstacles to his progress multiplied daily, and each step produced newembarrassments. Not more than one-third of the horses expected fromCanada had arrived; and Schuyler had been active in removing the draftcattle of the country. With unremitting exertion, he had been able totransport from fort George to the Hudson, a distance of eighteenmiles, only twelve batteaux, and provisions for four days in advance. The defectiveness of his means to feed his army until it should reachthe abundant country below him, presented an impediment to his fartherprogress, not readily to be surmounted. The difficulty of drawingsupplies from fort George would increase every day with the increasingdistance; and the communications, already endangered by a considerablebody of militia assembling at White Creek, could be secured only bylarger detachments from his army than he was in a condition to make. These were strong inducements to attempt some other mode of supply. 

[Sidenote: Colonel Baum is detached to seize the magazines atBennington. ]

It was well known that large magazines of provisions for the use ofthe American army were collected at Bennington, which place wasgenerally guarded by militia, whose numbers varied from day to day. The possession of these magazines would enable him to prosecute hisulterior plans without relying for supplies from Lake George; and hedetermined to seize them. 

To try the affections of the country, to complete a corps ofloyalists, and to mount Reidisel's dragoons, were subordinate objectsof the expedition. [79] Lieutenant Colonel Baum with five hundredEuropeans, and a body of American loyalists, was detached on thisservice. 

 [Footnote 79: Letter of Burgoyne. ]

To facilitate the enterprise, and be ready to take advantage of itssuccess, Burgoyne moved down the east side of the Hudson, and threw abridge of rafts over that river for the passage of his van, which tookpost at Saratoga. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Brechman, withhis corps, was advanced to Batten Hill, in order, if necessary, tosupport Colonel Baum. [80]

 [Footnote 80: Letter of Burgoyne. ]

On approaching Bennington, Baum discovered that he should have toencounter a much more considerable force than had been suspected. TheNew Hampshire militia, commanded by General Starke, had reached thatplace on their way to camp; and, uniting with Colonel Warner, made inthe whole about two thousand men. 

Perceiving his danger, Baum halted about four miles from Bennington, and despatched an express for a reinforcement. In the mean time, hestrengthened his position by intrenchments. 

Lieutenant Colonel Brechman was immediately ordered to his assistance;but, such was the state of the roads that, though the distance wasonly twenty-four miles, and his march was pressed unremittingly fromeight in the morning of the 15th, he did not reach the ground on whichBaum had encamped, until four in the afternoon of the next day. [81]

 [Footnote 81: Ibid. ]

[Sidenote: Is attacked in his intrenchments by General Starke, andentirely routed. ]

In the mean time, General Starke determined to attack him in hisintrenchments. So confident were the provincials belonging to thisparty, of the attachment of the country to the royal cause, that theAmerican troops, while making their dispositions for the attack, weremistaken for armed friends coming to join them. On discovering hiserror, Baum prepared for the contest, and made a gallant defence. Hisworks however were carried by storm, and great part of his detachmentkilled, or taken prisoners. A few escaped into the woods, and savedthemselves by flight. 

[Sidenote: Brechman advances to Baum's aid, is attacked by ColonelWarner, and defeated. ]

Brechman arrived during the pursuit, and obtained from the fugitives, the first intelligence of the disaster which had befallen them. Heimmediately attacked the parties of militia who were engaged in thepursuit, and gained some advantage over them. Fortunately for theAmericans, Colonel Warner[82] came up at this critical juncture withhis continental regiment, and restored, and continued the action, until the main body of the militia re-assembled, and came to supporthim. Brechman in turn was compelled to retire; but he maintained theengagement until dark, when, abandoning his artillery and baggage, hesaved his party under cover of the night. 

 [Footnote 82: Gordon. ]

One thousand stand of arms, and nine hundred swords were taken in thisbattle. General Burgoyne represented his loss in men at about fourhundred; but thirty-two officers, and five hundred and sixty-fourprivates, including Canadians and loyalists, were made prisoners. Thenumber of the dead was not ascertained, because the action withBrechman had been fought in the woods, and been continued for severalmiles. 

The British general therefore must have included in his estimate ofloss, only his European troops. 

This important success was soon followed by another of equal influenceon the fate of the campaign. 

Fort Schuyler had been fortified with more skill, and was defendedwith more courage, than St. Leger had expected. His artillery made noimpression on its walls; and his Indians, who were much better pleasedwith obtaining plunder and scalps, than besieging fortresses, becameintractable, and manifested great disgust with the service. In thistemper, they understood that Arnold was advancing with a large body ofcontinental troops; and, soon afterwards were told that Burgoyne andhis army had been totally defeated; a report probably founded on theaffair at Bennington. Unwilling to share the misfortune of theirfriends, they manifested a determination not to await the arrival ofArnold. The efforts of St. Leger to detain them being ineffectual, many of them decamped immediately, and the rest threatened to follow. 

[Sidenote: St. Leger abandons the siege of Fort Schuyler, and retreatsto Ticonderoga. ]

The time for deliberation was past. The camp was broken up withindications of excessive alarm. The tents were left standing; and theartillery, with great part of the baggage, ammunition, and provisions, fell into the hands of the Americans. The retreating army was pursuedby a detachment from the garrison; and it was stated by deserters, that the Indians plundered the remaining baggage of the officers, andmassacred such soldiers as could not keep up with the line of march. St. Leger returned to Montreal, whence he proceeded to Ticonderoga, with the intention of joining General Burgoyne by that route. 

The decisive victory at Bennington, and the retreat of St. Leger fromfort Schuyler, however important in themselves, were still more so intheir consequences. An army, which had spread terror and dismay inevery direction, which had, previously, experienced no reverse offortune, was considered as already beaten; and the opinion becamecommon, that the appearance of the great body of the people in arms, would secure the emancipation of their country. It was too anadvantage of no inconsiderable importance resulting from this changeof public opinion, that the disaffected became timid, and the waveringwho, had the torrent of success continued, would have made a merit ofcontributing their aid to the victor, were no longer disposed to putthemselves and their fortunes in hazard, to support an army whose fatewas so uncertain. 

The barbarities which had been perpetrated by the Indians belonging tothe invading armies, excited still more resentment than terror. As theprospect of revenge began to open, their effect became the moreapparent; and their influence on the royal cause was the more sensiblyfelt because they had been indiscriminate. 

[Sidenote: The murder of Miss M'Crea. ]

The murder of Miss M'Crea passed through all the papers of thecontinent: and the story, being retouched by the hand of more than onemaster, excited a peculiar degree of sensibility. [83] But there wereother causes of still greater influence in producing the events whichafterwards took place. The last reinforcements of continental troopsarrived in camp about this time, and added both courage and strengthto the army. The harvest, which had detained the northern militia upontheir farms, was over; and General Schuyler, whose continued andeminent services had not exempted him from the imputation of being atraitor, was succeeded by General Gates, who possessed a large shareof the public confidence. 

 [Footnote 83: See note No. IX. At the end of the volume. ]

[Sidenote: General Gates takes command of the Northern Army. ]

When Schuyler was directed by congress to resume the command of thenorthern department, Gates withdrew himself from it. When theresolution passed recalling the general officers who had served inthat department, General Washington was requested to name a successorto Schuyler. On his expressing a wish to decline this nomination, andrepresenting the inconvenience of removing all the general officers, Gates was again directed to repair thither and take the command, andtheir resolution to recall the brigadiers was suspended until theCommander-in-chief should be of opinion that it might be carried intoeffect with safety. 

Schuyler retained the command until the arrival of Gates, which was onthe 19th of August, and continued his exertions to restore the affairsof the department, though he felt acutely the disgrace of beingrecalled in this critical and interesting state of the campaign. "Itis, " said he, in a letter to the Commander-in-chief, "matter ofextreme chagrin to me to be deprived of the command at a time when, soon if ever, we shall probably be enabled to face the enemy; when weare on the point of taking ground[84] where they must attack to adisadvantage, should our force be inadequate to facing them in thefield; when an opportunity will, in all probability, occur, in which Imight evince that I am not what congress have too plainly insinuatedby taking the command from me. "

 [Footnote 84: The islands in the mouth of the Mohawk. ]

If error be attributable to the evacuation of Ticonderoga, no portionof it was committed by Schuyler. His removal from the command wasprobably severe and unjust as respected himself; but perhaps wise asrespected America. The frontier towards the lakes was to be defendedby the troops of New England; and, however unfounded their prejudicesagainst him might be, it was prudent to consult them. 

Notwithstanding the difficulties which multiplied around him, Burgoyneremained steady to his purpose. The disasters at Bennington and on theMohawk produced no disposition to abandon the enterprise and save hisarmy. 

{September 14. }

[Sidenote: Burgoyne encamps on the heights of Saratoga. ]

It had now become necessary to recur to the slow and toilsome mode ofobtaining supplies from fort George. Having, with persevering labour, collected provision for thirty days in advance, he crossed the Hudsonon the 13th and 14th of September, and encamped on the heights andplains of Saratoga, with a determination to decide the fate of theexpedition in a general engagement. 

General Gates, having been joined by all the continental troopsdestined for the northern department, and reinforced by large bodiesof militia, had moved from his camp in the islands, and advanced tothe neighbourhood of Stillwater. 

[Sidenote: He attacks Gates at Stillwater. ]

{September 19. }

The bridges between the two armies having been broken down, the roadsbeing excessively bad, and the country covered with wood, the progressof the British army down the river was slow. On the night of the 17th, Burgoyne encamped within four miles of the American army, and the nextday was employed in repairing the bridges between the two camps. [85]In the morning of the 19th he advanced in full force towards theAmerican left. Morgan was immediately detached with his corps toobserve the enemy, and to harass his front and flanks. He fell in witha picket in front of the right wing, which he attacked with vivacity, and drove in upon the main body. Pursuing with too much ardour, he wasmet in considerable force, and, after a severe encounter, wascompelled, in turn, to retire in some disorder. Two regiments beingadvanced to his assistance, his corps was rallied, and the actionbecame more general. The Americans were formed in a wood, with an openfield in front, and invariably repulsed the British corps whichattacked them; but when they pursued those corps to the main body, they were in turn driven back to their first ground. Reinforcementswere continually brought up, and about four in the afternoon, upwardsof three thousand American troops[86] were closely engaged with thewhole right wing of the British army commanded by General Burgoyne inperson. The conflict was extremely severe, and only terminated withthe day. At dark, the Americans retired to their camp, and theBritish, who had found great difficulty in maintaining their ground, lay all night on their arms near the field of battle. 

 [Footnote 85: Letter of Burgoyne. ]

 [Footnote 86: The accounts of the day stated that the Americans were commanded by General Arnold, but General Wilkinson says that no general officer was in the field. ]

In this action the killed and wounded on the part of the Americanswere between three and four hundred. Among the former were ColonelsCoburn and Adams, and several other valuable officers. The Britishloss has been estimated at rather more than five hundred men. 

Each army claimed the victory; and each believed itself to have beatennear the whole of the hostile army with only a part of its own force. The advantage, however, taking all circumstances into consideration, was decidedly with the Americans. In a conflict which nearly consumedthe day, they found themselves at least equal to their antagonists. Inevery quarter they had acted on the offensive; and, after an encounterfor several hours, had not lost an inch of ground. They had not beendriven from the field, but had retired from it at the close of day, tothe camp from which they had marched to battle. Their object, whichwas to check the advancing enemy, had been obtained; while that of theBritish general had failed. In the actual state of things, to fightwithout being beaten was, on their part, victory; while, on the partof the British, to fight without a decisive victory, was defeat. TheIndians, who found themselves beaten in the woods by Morgan, andrestrained from scalping and plundering the unarmed by Burgoyne, whosaw before them the prospect of hard fighting without profit, grewtired of the service, and deserted in great numbers. The Canadians andProvincials were not much more faithful; and Burgoyne soon perceivedthat his hopes must rest almost entirely on his European troops. 

With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout theUnited States as a victory, and considered as the precursor of thetotal ruin of the invading army. The utmost exultation was displayed, and the militia were stimulated to fly to arms, and complete the workso happily begun. 

General Lincoln, in conformity with directions which have been stated, had assembled a considerable body of New England militia in the rearof Burgoyne, from which he drew three parties of about five hundredmen each. One of these was detached under the command of ColonelBrown, to the north end of Lake George, principally to relieve anumber of prisoners who were confined there, but with orders to pushhis success, should he be fortunate, as far as prudence would admit. Colonel Johnson, at the head of another party, marched towards MountIndependence, and Colonel Woodbury, with a third, was detached toSkeensborough to cover the retreat of both the others. With theresidue, Lincoln proceeded to the camp of Gates. 

Colonel Brown, after marching all night, arrived, at the break of day, on the north end of the lake, where he found a small post which hecarried without opposition. The surprise was complete; and he tookpossession of Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the landing place, and abouttwo hundred batteaux. With the loss of only three killed and fivewounded, he liberated one hundred American prisoners, and captured twohundred and ninety-three of the enemy. This success was joyfullyproclaimed through the northern states. It was believed confidentlythat Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were recovered; and themilitia were exhorted, by joining their brethren in the army, toinsure that event if it had not already happened. 

The attempt on those places however failed. The garrison repulsed theassailants; who, after a few days, abandoned the siege. On theirreturn through Lake George in the vessels they had captured, themilitia made an attack on Diamond Island, the depot of all the storescollected at the north end of the lake. Being again repulsed, theydestroyed the vessels they had taken, and returned to their formerstation. [87]

 [Footnote 87: Remem. ]

{September 21. }

The day after the battle of Stillwater, General Burgoyne took aposition almost within cannon shot of the American camp, fortified hisright, and extended his left to the river. Directly after taking thisground he received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, informing him thathe should attack fort Montgomery about the 20th of September. Themessenger returned with information that Burgoyne was in extremedifficulty, and would endeavour to wait for aid until the 12th ofOctober. [88]

 [Footnote 88: Letter of Burgoyne. ]

Both armies retained their position until the 7th of October. Burgoyne, in the hope of being relieved by Sir Henry Clinton; andGates, in the confidence of growing stronger every day. 

{October 7. }

Having received no farther intelligence from Sir Henry, and beingreduced to the necessity of diminishing the ration issued to hissoldiers, the British general determined to make one more trial ofstrength with his adversary. In execution of this determination, hedrew out on his right fifteen hundred choice troops, whom he commandedin person, assisted by Generals Philips, Reidisel, and Frazer. 

The right wing was formed within three-quarters of a mile of the leftof the American camp; and a corps of rangers, Indians, andprovincials, was pushed on through secret paths, to show themselves inits rear, and excite alarm in that quarter. [89]

 [Footnote 89: Remem. ]

These movements were perceived by General Gates, who determined toattack their left, and, at the same time, to fall on their rightflank. Poor's brigade, and some regiments from New Hampshire, wereordered to meet them in front; while Morgan with his rifle corps madea circuit unperceived, and seized a very advantageous height coveredwith wood on their right. As soon as it was supposed that Morgan hadgained the ground he intended to occupy, the attack was made in frontand on the left, in great force. At this critical moment Morgan pouredin a deadly and incessant fire on the front and right flank. 

While the British right wing was thus closely pressed in front, and onits flank, a distinct division of the American troops was ordered tointercept its retreat to camp, and to separate it from the residue ofthe army. Burgoyne perceived the danger of his situation, and orderedthe light infantry under General Frazer, with part of the 24thregiment, to form a second line, in order to cover the light infantryof the right, and secure a retreat. While this movement was inprogress, the left of the British right was forced from its ground, and the light infantry was ordered to its aid. In the attempt toexecute this order, they were attacked by the rifle corps, with greateffect; and Frazer was mortally wounded. Overpowered by numbers, andpressed on all sides by a superior weight of fire, Burgoyne, withgreat difficulty, and with the loss of his field pieces, and greatpart of his artillery corps, regained his camp. The Americans followedclose in his rear; and assaulted his works throughout their wholeextent. Towards the close of day, the intrenchments were forced ontheir right; and General Arnold, with a few men, actually enteredtheir works; but his horse being killed under him, and himselfwounded, the troops were forced out of them; and it being nearly dark, they desisted from the assault. The left of Arnold's division wasstill more successful. Jackson's regiment of Massachusetts, then ledby Lieutenant Colonel Brooks, turned the right of the encampment, andstormed the works occupied by the German reserve. Lieutenant ColonelBrechman who commanded in them was killed, and the works were carried. The orders given by Burgoyne to recover them were not executed; andBrooks maintained the ground he had gained. 

Darkness put an end to the action; and the Americans lay all nightwith their arms in their hands, about half a mile from the Britishlines, ready to renew the assault with the return of day. Theadvantage they had gained was decisive. They had taken several piecesof artillery, killed a great number of men, made upwards of twohundred prisoners, among whom were several officers of distinction, and had penetrated the lines in a part which exposed the whole toconsiderable danger. 

Unwilling to risk the events of the next day on the same ground, Burgoyne changed his position in the course of the night, and drew hiswhole army into a strong camp on the river heights, extending hisright up the river. This movement extricated him from the danger ofbeing attacked the ensuing morning by an enemy already in possessionof part of his works. 

{October 8. }

General Gates perceived the strength of this position, and was notdisposed to hazard an assault. Aware of the critical situation of hisadversary, he detached a party higher up the Hudson for the purpose ofintercepting the British army on its retreat, while strong corps wereposted on the other side of the river to guard its passage. 

[Sidenote: Retreats to Saratoga. ]

This movement compelled Burgoyne again to change his position, and toretire to Saratoga. About nine at night the retreat was commenced, andwas effected with the loss of his hospital, containing about threehundred sick, and of several batteaux laden with provision andbaggage. On reaching the ground to be occupied, he found a strongcorps already intrenched on the opposite side of the river, preparedto dispute its passage. 

{October 10. }

From Saratoga, Burgoyne detached a company of artificers, under astrong escort, to repair the roads and bridges towards fort Edward. Scarcely had this detachment moved, when the Americans appeared inforce on the heights south of Saratoga creek, and made dispositionswhich excited the apprehension of a design to cross it and attack hiscamp. The Europeans escorting the artificers were recalled, and aprovincial corps, employed in the same service, being attacked by asmall party, ran away and left the workmen to shift for themselves. 

No hope of repairing the roads remaining, it became impossible to movethe baggage and artillery. 

The British army was now almost completely environed by a superiorforce. No means remained of extricating itself from difficulties anddangers which were continually increasing, but fording a river, on theopposite bank of which a formidable body of troops was already posted;and then escaping to fort George, through roads impassable byartillery or wagons, while its rear was closely pressed by avictorious enemy. [90]

 [Footnote 90: Mr. Gordon, in his history of the war, states himself to have received from General Glover an anecdote, showing, that all these advantages were on the point of being exposed to imminent hazard. "On the morning of the eleventh, Gates called the general officers together, and informed them of his having received certain intelligence, which might be depended upon, that the main body of Burgoyne's army was marched off for fort Edward with what they could take; and that the rear guard only was left in the camp, who, after awhile, were to push off as fast as possible, leaving the heavy baggage behind. On this it was concluded to advance and attack the camp in half an hour. The officers repaired immediately to their respective commands. General Nixon's being the eldest brigade, crossed the Saratoga creek first. Unknown to the Americans, Burgoyne had a line formed behind a parcel of brush-wood, to support the park of artillery where the attack was to be made. General Glover was upon the point of following Nixon. Just as he entered the water, he saw a British soldier making across, whom he called and examined. " This soldier was a deserter, and communicated the very important fact that the whole British army were in their encampment. Nixon was immediately stopped: and the intelligence conveyed to Gates, who countermanded his orders for the assault, and called back his troops, not without sustaining some loss from the British artillery. 

 Gordon is confirmed by General Wilkinson, who was adjutant general in the American army. The narrative of the general varies from that of Gordon only in minor circumstances. ]

A council of general officers called to deliberate on their situation, took the bold resolution to abandon every thing but their arms andsuch provisions as the soldiers could carry; and, by a forced march inthe night up the river, to extricate themselves from the Americanarmy; and crossing at fort Edward, or at a ford above it, to press onto fort George. 

Gates had foreseen this movement, and had prepared for it. In additionto placing strong guards at the fords of the Hudson, he had formed anintrenched camp on the high grounds between fort Edward and fortGeorge. The scouts sent to examine the route returned with thisinformation, and the plan was abandoned as impracticable. 

Nothing could be more hopeless than the condition of the British army, or more desperate than that of their general, as described by himself. In his letter to Lord George Germain, secretary of state for Americanaffairs, he says, "A series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubbornaction, until disabled in the collateral branches of the army by thetotal defection of the Indians; the desertion, or timidity of theCanadians and provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed inthe last hope of any co-operation from other armies; the regulartroops reduced by losses from the best parts, to three thousand fivehundred fighting men, not two thousand of which were British; onlythree days provisions, upon short allowance, in store; invested by anarmy of sixteen thousand men; and no appearance of retreat remaining;I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captainscommanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I wasinduced to open a treaty with Major General Gates. "

A treaty was opened with a general proposition, stating thewillingness of the British general to spare the further effusion ofblood, provided a negotiation could be effected on honourable terms. 

[Sidenote: Surrender of the army under Burgoyne. ]

{October 17. }

This proposition was answered by a demand that the whole army shouldground their arms in their encampment, and surrender themselvesprisoners of war. This demand was instantly rejected, with adeclaration that if General Gates designed to insist on it, thenegotiation must immediately break off, and hostilities recommence. Onreceiving this decided answer, Gates receded from the rigorous termsat first proposed; and a convention was signed, in which it was agreedthat the British army, after marching out of their encampment with allthe honours of war, should lay down their arms, and not serve againstthe United States till exchanged. They were not to be detained incaptivity, but to be permitted to embark for England. 

The situation of the armies considered, [91] these terms were highlyhonourable to the British general, and favourable to his nation. Theywere probably more advantageous than would have been granted byGeneral Gates, had he entertained no apprehension from Sir HenryClinton, who was, at length, making the promised diversion on theNorth River, up which he had penetrated as far as Æsopus. 

 [Footnote 91: The American army consisted of nine thousand and ninety-three continental troops. The number of the militia fluctuated; but amounted, at the signature of the convention, to four thousand one hundred and twenty-nine. The sick exceeded two thousand five hundred men. ]

The drafts made from Peekskill for both armies had left that post in asituation to require the aid of militia for its security. Therequisitions of General Putnam were complied with; but the attack uponthem being delayed, the militia, who were anxious to seed their farms, became impatient; many deserted; and General Putnam was induced todischarge the residue. 

Governor Clinton immediately ordered out half the militia of New York, with assurances that they should be relieved in one month by the otherhalf. This order was executed so slowly that the forts were carriedbefore the militia were in the field. 

Great pains had been taken, and much labour employed, to render thisposition, which is naturally strong, still more secure. The principaldefences were forts Montgomery and Clinton. They had been constructedon the western bank of the Hudson, on very high ground, extremelydifficult of access, and were separated from each other by a smallcreek which runs from the mountains into the river. These forts weretoo much elevated to be battered from the water, and the hills onwhich they stood were too steep to be ascended by troops landing atthe foot of them. The mountains, which commence five or six milesbelow them, are so high and rugged, the defiles, through which theroads leading to them pass, so narrow, and so commanded by the heightson both sides, that the approaches to them are extremely difficult anddangerous. 

To prevent ships from passing the forts, chevaux-de-frise had beensunk in the river, and a boom extended from bank to bank, which wascovered with immense chains stretched at some distance in its front. These works were defended by the guns of the forts, and by a frigateand galleys stationed above them, capable of opposing with an equalfire in front any force which might attack them by water from below. 

Fort Independence is four or five miles below forts Montgomery andClinton, and on the opposite side of the river, on a high point ofland; and fort Constitution is rather more than six miles above them, on an island near the eastern shore. Peekskill, the general headquarters of the officer commanding at the station, is just below fortIndependence, and on the same side of the river. The garrisons hadbeen reduced to about six hundred men; and the whole force underGeneral Putnam did not much exceed two thousand. Yet this force, though far inferior to that which General Washington had ordered to beretained at the station, was, if properly applied, more than competentto the defence of the forts against any numbers which could be sparedfrom New York. To insure success to the enterprise, it was necessaryto draw the attention of Putnam from the real object, and to storm theworks before the garrisons could be aided by his army. This Sir HenryClinton accomplished. 

{October 6. }

Between three and four thousand men embarked at New York, and landedon the 5th of October at Verplank's Point, on the east side of theHudson, a short distance below Peekskill, upon which General Putnamretired to the heights in his rear. On the evening of the same day, apart of these troops re-embarked, and the fleet moved up the river toPeekskill Neck, in order to mask King's ferry, which was below them. The next morning, at break of day, the troops destined for theenterprise, landed on the west side of Stony Point, and commencedtheir march through the mountains, into the rear of forts Clinton andMontgomery. [92] This disembarkation was observed; but the morning wasso foggy that the numbers could not be distinguished; and a largefire, which was afterwards perceived at the landing place, suggestedthe idea that the sole object of the party on shore was the burning ofsome store houses. In the mean time, the manoeuvres of the vessels, and the appearance of a small detachment left at Verplank's Point, persuaded General Putnam that the meditated attack was on fortIndependence. 

 [Footnote 92: Letter of Sir Henry Clinton. ]

[Sidenote: Forts Montgomery and Clinton taken by the British. ]

His whole attention was directed to this object; and the real designsof the enemy were not suspected, until a heavy firing from the otherside of the river announced the assault on forts Clinton andMontgomery. Five hundred men were instantly detached to reinforce thegarrisons of those places; but before this detachment could cross theriver the forts were in possession of the British. 

Having left a battalion at the pass of Thunderhill, to keep up acommunication, Sir Henry Clinton had formed his army into twodivisions; one of which consisting of nine hundred men, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Campbell, made a circuit by the forest of Deane, inorder to fall on the back of fort Montgomery; while the other, consisting of twelve hundred men, commanded by General Vaughan, andaccompanied by Sir Henry Clinton in person, advanced slowly againstfort Clinton. [93]

 [Footnote 93: Letter of Sir Henry Clinton. ]

Both posts were assaulted about five in the afternoon. The works weredefended with resolution, and were maintained until dark, when, thelines being too extensive to be completely manned, the assailantsentered them in different places. The defence being no longerpossible, some of the garrison were made prisoners, while their betterknowledge of the country enabled others to escape. Governor Clintonpassed the river in a boat, and General James Clinton, though woundedin the thigh by a bayonet, also made his escape. Lieutenant ColonelsLivingston and Bruyn, and Majors Hamilton and Logan were among theprisoners. The loss sustained by the garrisons was about two hundredand fifty men. That of the assailants, was stated by Sir H. Clinton, at less than two hundred. Among the killed were Lieutenant ColonelCampbell, and two other field officers. 

[Sidenote: Peekskill, together with Forts Independence andConstitution evacuated by the Americans. ]

As the boom and chains drawn across the river could no longer bedefended, the continental frigates and galleys lying above them wereburnt, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. FortIndependence and fort Constitution were evacuated the next day, andPutnam retreated to Fishkill. General Vaughan, after burningContinental village, where stores to a considerable amount had beendeposited, proceeded, at the head of a strong detachment, up the riverto Æsopus, which he also destroyed. [94]

 [Footnote 94: Intelligence of the success of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River was received by General Burgoyne, in the night after the convention at Saratoga had been agreed upon, but before the articles had been signed and executed. The British general had serious thoughts of breaking off the treaty. ]

{October 8. }

General Putnam, whose army had been augmented by reinforcements ofmilitia to six thousand men, detached General Parsons with twothousand, to repossess himself of Peekskill, and of the passes in thehighlands; while, with the residue, he watched the progress of theenemy up the river. The want of heavy artillery prevented his annoyingtheir ships in the Hudson. 

On the capitulation of Burgoyne, near five thousand men had beendetached by Gates to his aid. Before their arrival, General Vaughanhad returned to New York, whence a reinforcement to General Howe wasthen about to sail. 

Great as was the injury sustained by the United States from thisenterprise, Great Britain derived from it no solid advantage. It wasundertaken at too late a period to save Burgoyne; and though thepasses in the highlands were acquired, they could not be retained. TheBritish had reduced to ashes every village, and almost every housewithin their power; but this wanton and useless destruction served toirritate, without tending to subdue. A keenness was given to theresentment of the injured, which outlasted the contest between the twonations. 

The army which surrendered at Saratoga exceeded five thousand men. Onmarching from Ticonderoga, it was estimated at nine thousand. Inaddition to this great military force, the British lost, and theAmericans acquired, a fine train of artillery, seven thousand stand ofexcellent arms, clothing for seven thousand recruits, with tents, andother military stores, to a considerable amount. 

The thanks of congress were voted to General Gates and his army; and amedal of gold, in commemoration of this great event, was ordered to bestruck, and presented to him by the President, in the name of theUnited States. Colonel Wilkinson, his Adjutant General, whom hestrongly recommended, was appointed Brigadier General by brevet. 

[Illustration: The Saratoga Battle Monument

_Schuylerville, New York_

_"Nothing bespeaks more strongly the consummate tragedy of BenedictArnold's career than the Battle Monument which rises on the banks ofthe Hudson to commemorate the victory of Saratoga. In the square shaftare four high Gothic arches, and in these are placed heroic statues ofthe generals who won the victory. Horatio Gates, unworthy though hewas, stands there in bronze. The gallant Schuyler, the intrepidMorgan, honor the other two. But where is he whose valor turned backthe advancing Saint-Leger? whose prompt decision saved the Continentalposition at Bemis Heights? whose military genius truly gained the day?A vacant niche--empty as England's rewards, void as his ownlife--speaks more eloquently than words, more strongly thancondemnation, more pitifully than tears, of a mighty career blightedby treason and hurled into the bottomless pit of despair. This isAmerica's way of honoring Arnold in his dishonor. "_

--From The Real America in Romance. ]

In the opinion that the British would not immediately abandon thepasses in the highlands, congress ordered Putnam to join GeneralWashington with a reinforcement not exceeding two thousand fivehundred men, and directed Gates to take command of the army on theHudson, with unlimited powers to call for aids of militia from the NewEngland States, as well as from New York and New Jersey. 

A proposition to authorize the Commander-in-chief, after consultingwith General Gates and Governor Clinton, to increase the detachmentdesigned to strengthen his army, if he should then be of opinion thatit might be done without endangering the objects to be accomplished byGates, was seriously opposed. An attempt was made to amend thisproposition so as to make the increase of the reinforcement to dependon the assent of Gates and Clinton; but this amendment was lost by aconsiderable majority, and the original resolution was carried. Theseproceedings were attended with no other consequences than to excitesome degree of attention to the state of parties. 

[Sidenote: Ticonderoga and Mount Independence evacuated by the enemy. ]

Soon after the capitulation of Burgoyne, Ticonderoga and MountIndependence were evacuated, and the garrison retired to Isle AuxNoix, and St. Johns. 

The effect produced by this event on the British cabinet and nationwas great and immediate. It seemed to remove the delusive hopes ofconquest with which they had been flattered, and suddenly to displaythe mass of resistance which must yet be encountered. Previous to thereception of this disastrous intelligence, the employment of savagesin the war had been the subject of severe animadversion. Parliamentwas assembled on the 20th of November; and, as usual, addresses wereproposed in answer to the speech from the throne, entirely approvingthe conduct of the administration. In the House of Lords, the Earl ofChatham moved to amend the address by introducing a clauserecommending to his Majesty, an immediate cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of a treaty of conciliation, "to restore peaceand liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, securityand permanent prosperity to both countries. " In the course of the veryanimated observations made by this extraordinary man in support of hismotion, he said, [95] "But, my Lords, who is the man that, in additionto the disgraces and mischiefs of war, has dared to authorize andassociate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping-knife of the savage?to call into civilized alliance the wild and inhuman inhabitant of thewoods? to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputedrights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against ourbrethren? My Lords, these enormities cry aloud for redress andpunishment. Unless thoroughly done away they will be a stain on thenational character. It is not the least of our national misfortunesthat the strength and character of our army are thus impaired. Familiarized to the horrid scenes of savage cruelty, it can no longerboast of the noble and generous principles which dignify a soldier. Nolonger sympathize with the dignity of the royal banner, nor feel thepride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war that makes ambitionvirtue. What makes ambition virtue? the sense of honour. But is thissense of honour consistent with the spirit of plunder, or the practiceof murder? Can it flow from mercenary motives? or can it prompt tocruel deeds?"[96]

 [Footnote 95: Life of Chatham. --Belsham. ]

 [Footnote 96: See note No. X. At the end of the volume. ]

The conduct of administration, however, received the full approbationof large majorities; but the triumph these victories in Parliamentafforded them was of short duration. The disastrous issue of anexpedition from which the most sanguine expectations had been formed, was soon known, and the mortification it produced was extreme. Areluctant confession of the calamity was made by the minister, and adesire to restore peace on any terms consistent with the integrity ofthe empire found its way into the cabinet. 

CHAPTER XI. 

 Defects in the Commissary department.... Distress of the army at Valley Forge.... The army subsisted by impressments.... Combination in congress against General Washington.... Correspondence between him and General Gates.... Distress of the army for clothes.... Washington's exertions to augment the army.... Congress sends a committee to camp.... Attempt to surprise Captain Lee.... Congress determines on a second expedition to Canada.... Abandons it.... General Conway resigns.... The Baron Steuben appointed Inspector General.... Congress forbids the embarkation of Burgoyne's army.... Plan of reconciliation agreed to in Parliament.... Communicated to congress and rejected.... Information of treaties between France and the United States.... Great Britain declares war against France.... The treaties with France ratified by congress.... Complaints of the treatment of prisoners.... A partial exchange agreed to. 

{1777}

The army under the immediate command of General Washington was engagedthrough the winter in endeavouring to stop the intercourse betweenPhiladelphia and the country. To effect this object General Smallwoodwas detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel Morgan wasplaced on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill; and GeneralArmstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the oldcamp at White Marsh. Major Jameson, with two troops of cavalry, andM'Lane's infantry, was directed to guard the east, and Captain Leewith his troop, the west side of that river. General Count Pulaski, aPolish nobleman who commanded the horse, led the residue of thecavalry to Trenton, where he trained them for the ensuing campaign. 

{December 22. }

One of the first operations meditated by General Washington aftercrossing the Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quantity of haywhich remained in the islands above the mouth of Derby Creek, withinthe power of the British. Early in the morning after his orders forthis purpose had been given, Sir William Howe marched out in fullforce, and encamped between Derby and the middle party, so ascompletely to cover the islands; while a foraging party removed thehay. Washington, with the intention of disturbing this operation, gaveorders for putting his army in motion, when the alarming fact wasdisclosed, that the commissary's stores were exhausted, and that thelast ration had been delivered and consumed. 

Accustomed as were the continental troops to privations of every sort, it would have been hazarding too much to move them, under thesecircumstances, against a powerful enemy. In a desert, or in a garrisonwhere food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits ofdiscipline, enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinarysituations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a countryabounding with provisions, requires something more than fortitude; norcan soldiers readily submit, while in such a country, to thedeprivation of food. It is not therefore surprising that, among a fewof the troops, some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much moreastonishing that the great body of the army bore a circumstance soirritating, and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur. 

On receiving intelligence of the fact, General Washington ordered thecountry to be scoured, and provisions, for supplying the pressingwants of the moment, to be seized wherever found. In the mean time, light parties were detached to harass the enemy about Derby, where SirWilliam Howe, with his accustomed circumspection, kept his army socompact, and his soldiers so within the lines, that an opportunity toannoy him was seldom afforded even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee. After completing his forage, he returned, with inconsiderable loss, toPhiladelphia. 

That the American army, while the value still retained by paper billsplaced ample funds in the hands of government, should be destitute offood, in the midst of a state so abounding with provisions asPennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which can not failto excite attention. 

[Sidenote: Defects in the Commissary Department. ]

Early in the war, the office of commissary general had been confirmedon Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman fitted by histalents, activity and zeal, for that important station. Yet, from thedifficulty of arranging so complicated a department in itscommencement, without the advantages of experience, complaints wererepeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies. 

The subject was taken up by congress; but the remedy administered, aswell from the time of its application, as from the ingredients ofwhich it was composed, served only to increase the disease. The systemwas not completed until near midsummer; and then its arrangements weresuch that Colonel Trumbull refused to accept the office assigned tohim; and new men were to be called into service at a time when thestrongest necessity required the exertions of those who understood theplan of supplies for the campaign in all its modifications. Inaddition to the commissary of purchases, and a commissary general ofissues, each to be appointed by congress, the new plan contemplatedfour deputies in each department, also to be appointed by that body, who were not accountable to, nor removeable by the head of thedepartment, but might be suspended, and accused before congress whoshould examine the charge, and either remove the accused from hisoffice, or reinstate him in it. 

[Sidenote: Distress of the American army at Valley Forge forprovisions. ]

This _imperium in imperio_, erected in direct opposition to theopinion of the Commander-in-chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from thearmy. Congress, however, persisted in the system; and the effects ofderanging so important a department as that which feeds the troops, inthe midst of a campaign, were not long in unfolding themselves. Inevery military division of the continent, loud complaints were made ofthe deficiency of supplies. The success of Gates appears to have beenmore endangered by this cause, than by the movement of Sir HenryClinton up the Hudson. The army of General Washington was oftengreatly embarrassed, and his movements not unfrequently suspended, bythe want of provisions. The present total failure of all supply waspreceded, for a few days, by the issuing of meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject were made to the Commander-in-chief, who, on the morning that Sir William Howe moved out to Derby, andbefore intelligence of that movement had been received, communicatedthem to congress. 

[Sidenote: The army subsisted in a great measure by impressments. ]

That body had authorized the Commander-in-chief to seize provisionsfor the use of his army within seventy miles of head quarters; andeither to pay for them in money, or in certificates, for theredemption of which the faith of the United States was pledged. Theodium of this measure was increased by the failure of the governmentto provide funds to take up these certificates when presented. 

At the same time, the provisions carried into Philadelphia were paidfor in specie at a good price. The inhabitants of that part ofPennsylvania were not zealous in support of the war, and thedifference between prompt payment in gold or silver, and acertificate, the value of which was often diminished by depreciationbefore its payment, was too great not to influence their wishes andtheir conduct. Such was the dexterity they employed that, notwithstanding the rigour of the laws, and the vigilance of thetroops stationed on the lines, they often succeeded in concealingtheir provisions from those who were authorized to impress for thearmy, and in conveying them privately into Philadelphia. 

{December 10. }

General Washington exercised the powers confided to him with caution, but he did exercise them; and by doing so, acquired considerablesupplies. Congress appeared as much dissatisfied with the lenity ofthe Commander-in-chief, as the people were with his rigour, inconsequence of which the subject was taken into consideration, hisforbearance disapproved, and instructions given for the rigorousexertions in future of the powers with which he was invested. In replyto the letter communicating these resolves, the General stated theconduct he had observed, insisted that provisions had been taken veryextensively, and repeated his opinion, that such measures would bemuch more readily submitted to if executed by the civil authority. 

In obedience, however, to the will of congress, he issued aproclamation, requiring the farmers within seventy miles of headquarters, to thrash out one half of their grain by the first ofFebruary, and the residue by the first of March, under the penalty ofhaving the whole seized as straw. 

The success of this experiment did not correspond with the wishes ofcongress. It was attended with the pernicious consequences which hadbeen foreseen by the General, to avoid which he had considered thissystem as a dernier ressort, of which he was to avail himself only inextreme cases. In answer to a letter on this subject from the board ofwar, he said, "I shall use every exertion that may be expedient andpracticable for subsisting the army, and keeping it together; but Imust observe, that this never can be done by coercive means. Suppliesof provisions and clothing must be had in another way, or it can notexist. The small seizures that were made of the former some time ago, in consequence of the most pressing and urgent necessity--when thealternative was to do that or dissolve--excited the greatest alarm anduneasiness imaginable, even among some of our best and warmestfriends. Such procedures may relieve for an instant, but eventuallywill prove of the most pernicious consequence. Besides spreadingdisaffection and jealousy among the people, they never fail, even inthe most veteran armies, to raise in the soldiery a disposition tolicentiousness, plunder, and robbery, which it has ever been foundexceeding difficult to suppress; and which has not only proved ruinousto the inhabitants, but, in many instances, to the armies themselves. "In a subsequent letter to congress, he added, "I regret the occasionwhich compelled us to the measure the other day, and shall consider itas among the greatest of our misfortunes to be under the necessity ofpractising it again. I am now obliged to keep several parties from thearmy thrashing grain, that our supplies may not fail; but this willnot do. "

[Sidenote: Combination formed in Congress against General Washington. ]

About this time, a strong combination was forming against theCommander-in-chief, into which several members of congress, and a veryfew officers of the army are believed to have entered. 

[Sidenote: General Gates supposed to be concerned in it. ]

[Sidenote: Correspondence on this subject between the two generals. ]

The splendour with which the capture of a British army had surroundedthe military reputation of General Gates, acquired some advocates forthe opinion that the arms of America would be more fortunate, shouldthat gentleman be elevated to the supreme command. He could not besupposed hostile himself to the prevalence of this opinion; and someparts of his conduct would seem to warrant a belief that, if it didnot originate with him, he was not among the last to adopt it. Afterthe victory of the seventh of October had opened to him the prospectof subduing the arms of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicatehis success to General Washington, but carried on a correspondencewith General Conway, in which that officer expressed great contemptfor the Commander-in-chief. When the purport of this correspondencewas disclosed to General Washington, Gates demanded the name of theinformer in a letter far from being conciliatory in its terms, whichwas accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of beingpassed through congress. [97] The state of Pennsylvania too, chagrinedat the loss of its capital, and forgetful of its own backwardness instrengthening the army, which had twice fought superior numbers in itsdefence, furnished many discontented individuals. They imputed it toGeneral Washington as a fault that, with forces inferior to his enemyin numbers, and in every equipment, he had not effected the sameresult which had been produced in the north, by a continental army, initself, much stronger than its adversary, and so reinforced by militiaas to treble his numbers. On the report that General Washington wasmoving into winter quarters, the legislature of that state addressed aremonstrance to congress on the subject, manifesting, in veryintelligible terms, their dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-chief. About the same time, a new board of war was created, of which GeneralGates was appointed the President; and General Mifflin, who wassupposed to be of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of itsmembers. General Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in thearmy that had joined this faction, was appointed inspector general, and was promoted, above senior brigadiers, to the rank of majorgeneral. These were evidences that, if the hold which theCommander-in-chief had taken of the affections and confidence of thearmy and of the nation could be loosened, the party in congressdisposed to change their general, was far from being contemptible inpoint of numbers. But to loosen this hold was impossible. Theindignation with which the idea of such a change was received even bythe victorious troops who had conquered under Gates, forms the mostconclusive proof of its strength. Even the northern army clung toWashington as the saviour of his country. 

 [Footnote 97: See note No. XI. At the end of the volume. ]

These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of theCommander-in-chief, could not escape his notice. They made, however, no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of hismeasures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism, ofapprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. His desireto remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the convictionthat his retaining that station would be useful to his country, ratherthan from the gratification his high rank might furnish to ambition. When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings andsentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr. Laurens, thepresident of congress, and his private friend, who, in an unofficialletter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to him aspresident, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-chief, hesaid, "I can not sufficiently express the obligation I feel towardsyou for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I amdeeply interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction hadbeen for some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I amof having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposesof the trusts reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on apersonal account; but my chief concern arises from an apprehension ofthe dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce tothe common cause. 

"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and amunambitious of honours not founded in the approbation of my country, Iwould not desire, in the least degree, to suppress a free spirit ofinquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deemreprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many seriouscharges, and it is my wish that it may be submitted to congress. ThisI am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment maypossibly involve you in embarrassment hereafter, since it is uncertainhow many, or who, may be privy to the contents. 

"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacyof my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defenceI might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know Ican not combat their insinuations, however injurious, withoutdisclosing secrets it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But whyshould I expect to be free from censure, the unfailing lot of anelevated station? Merit and talents which I can not pretend to rival, have ever been subject to it. My heart tells me it has been myunremitted aim to do the best which circumstances would permit. Yet Imay have been very often mistaken in my judgment of the means, and mayin many instances deserve the imputation of error. "[98]

 [Footnote 98: See note No. XII. At the end of the volume. ]

Fortunately for America, these combinations only excited resentmentagainst those who were believed to be engaged in them. 

{December. }

{December 23. }

Soon after being informed of the unfavourable disposition of somemembers of congress towards him, and receiving the memorial of thelegislature of Pennsylvania against his going into winter quarters, the General also discovered the failure already mentioned in thecommissary department. On this occasion, he addressed congress interms of energy and plainness which he had used on no former occasion. In his letter to that body he said, "Full as I was in myrepresentation of the matters in the commissary's departmentyesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons oblige me to add that I amnow convinced beyond a doubt that, unless some great and capitalchange suddenly takes place in that line, this army must inevitably bereduced to one or other of these three things--to starve, dissolve, ordisperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that thisis not an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason tosuppose what I say. 

"Saturday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force, had left the city, and were advancing towards Derby with apparentdesign to forage, and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give everyopposition in my power; when, to my great mortification, I was notonly informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir onaccount of a want of provisions; and that a dangerous mutiny, begunthe night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by thespirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehendedfrom the want of this article. 

"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in thiscamp, and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had nota single hoof of any kind to slaughter, and not more than twenty-fivebarrels of flour! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when Iadd that he could not tell when to expect any. 

[Sidenote: Distress of the American army for clothes. ]

"All I could do under these circumstances, was to send out a few lightparties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties wereinstantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as muchprovision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiers;but will this answer? No, sir. Three or four days of bad weather wouldprove our destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter?And if we are now as often without provisions as with them, what is tobecome of us in the spring, when our force will be collected, with theaid perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early campaign beforethe enemy can be reinforced? These are considerations of greatmagnitude, meriting the closest attention, and will, when my ownreputation is so intimately connected with, and to be affected by theevent, justify my saying, that the present commissaries are by nomeans equal to the execution of the office, or that the disaffectionof the people surpasses all belief. The misfortune, however, does, inmy opinion, proceed from both causes; and, though I have been tenderheretofore of giving any opinion, or of lodging complaints, as thechange in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and theconsequences thereof were predicted; yet, finding that the inactivityof the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or otheressentials, is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar, but by those in power; it is time to speak plain in exculpation ofmyself. With truth, then, I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department ofthe army. Since the month of July, we have had no assistance from thequartermaster general; and to want of assistance from this department, the commissary general charges great part of his deficiency. To this Iam to add that, notwithstanding it is a standing order (oftenrepeated) that the troops shall always have two days provisions bythem, that they may be ready at any sudden call; yet, scarcely anyopportunity has ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy, thathas not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded, on thisaccount; and this, the great and crying evil is not all. Soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by congress, we see none of, norhave we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. Thefirst, indeed, we have little occasion for; few men having more thanone shirt, many, only the moiety of one, and some, none at all. Inaddition to which, as a proof of the little benefit from a clothiergeneral, and at the same time, as a farther proof of the inability ofan army under the circumstances of this to perform the common dutiesof soldiers, we have, by a field return this day made, besides anumber of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others infarmers' houses on the same account, no less than two thousand eighthundred and ninety-eight men, now in camp, unfit for duty, becausethey are bare-foot, and otherwise naked. By the same return, itappears that our whole strength in continental troops, including theeastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of GeneralBurgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amountsto no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty;notwithstanding which, and that since the fourth instant, our numberfit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near twothousand men, we find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army wasreally going into winter quarters or not, (for I am sure no resolutionof mine would warrant the remonstrance), reprobating the measure asmuch as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if theyconceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under thedisadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no meansexaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well appointedand provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the states of Pennsylvania, Jersey, &c. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in myeye is, that these very gentlemen, who were well apprised of thenakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought theirown soldiers worse clad than others, and advised me, near a month ago, to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, inconsequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strongassurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days, agreeably to a decree of the state; (not one article of which by theby is yet to come to hand, ) should think a winter's campaign, and thecovering of their states from the invasion of an enemy, so easy andpracticable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is amuch easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in acomfortable room, by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold bleakhill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked anddistressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soulpity those miseries which it is not in my power either to relieve orto prevent. "

The representations made in this letter were not exaggerated. Thedistresses of the army, however, so far as respected clothing, did notarise from the inattention of congress. Measures for the importationof clothes had been adopted early in the war, but had not produced theeffect expected from them. Vigorous but ineffectual means had alsobeen taken to obtain supplies from the interior. The unfortunatenon-importation agreements which preceded the commencement ofhostilities, had reduced the quantity of goods in the country belowthe ordinary amount, and the war had almost annihilated foreigncommerce. The progress of manufactures did not equal the consumption;and such was the real scarcity, that exactions from individualsproduced great distress, without relieving the wants of the army. Awarm blanket was a luxury in which not many participated, either inthe camp or in the country. 

In the northern states, where the sea coast was too extensive, and theports too numerous to be completely guarded, and where the people weremore inclined to maritime enterprise, supplies both of arms andclothes were attainable in a more considerable degree than in thosefarther south; but the large sums of money expended in that part ofthe union for the support of the army, had lessened the value of thecurrency there more rapidly than elsewhere, and a consequent highnominal price was demanded for imported articles. Congress deemed theterms on which some large contracts had been made by the clothiergeneral in Massachusetts, so exorbitant, as to forbid their execution;and at the same time, addressed a letter to the state government, requesting that the goods should be seized for the use of the army, atprices to be fixed by the legislature, in pursuance of a resolution ofthe 22d of November. 

These recommendations from congress, so far as they exhorted thestates to supply the wants of the soldiers, were strongly supported bythe General. In his letters to the several governors, he representedthe very existence of the army, and the continuance of the contest, asdepending on their exertions in this respect. 

{1778}

[Sidenote: General Washington's exertions to increase his force, andto place it on a respectable footing before the ensuing campaign. ]

To recruit the army for the ensuing campaign became again an object ofvital importance; and the Commander-in-chief again pressed itsnecessity on congress, and on the states. To obtain a respectablenumber of men by voluntary enlistment had, obviously, becomeimpossible. Coercion could be employed only by the state governments;and it required all the influence of General Washington to induce theadoption of a measure so odious in itself, but so indispensable to theacquirement of means to meet the crisis of the war, which, in hisjudgment, had not yet passed away. He enclosed to each state a returnof its troops on continental establishment, thereby exhibiting to eachits own deficiency. To those who had not resorted to coercive means, he stated the success with which they had been used by others; and heurged all, by every motive which could operate on the human mind, toemploy those means early enough to enable him to anticipate the enemyin taking the field. 

To the causes which had long threatened the destruction of the army, the depreciation of paper money was now to be added. It had become soconsiderable that the pay of an officer would not procure even thoseabsolute necessaries which might protect his person from the extremesof heat and cold. The few who possessed small patrimonial estatesfound them melting away; and others were unable to appear asgentlemen. Such circumstances could not fail to excite disgust withthe service, and a disposition to leave it. Among those who offeredtheir commissions to the Commander-in-chief, were many who, possessinga larger portion of military pride, and therefore feeling withpeculiar sensibility the degradation connected with poverty and rags, afforded the fairest hopes of becoming the ornaments of the army. Thisgeneral indifference about holding a commission; this general opinionthat an obligation was conferred, not received by continuing in theservice, could not fail to be unfavourable, not only to that spirit ofemulation which stimulates to bolder deeds than are required, but to acomplete execution of orders, and to a rigid observance of duty. 

An officer whose pride was in any degree wounded, whose caprice wasnot indulged, who apprehended censure for a fault which hiscarelessness about remaining in the army had probably seduced him tocommit, was ready to throw up a commission which, instead of beingvaluable, was a burden almost too heavy to be borne. With extremeanxiety the Commander-in-chief watched the progress of a temper which, though just commencing, would increase, he feared, with the cause thatproduced it. He was, therefore, early and earnest in pressing theconsideration of this important subject on the attention of congress. 

{January 10. }

[Sidenote: Congress send a committee of their own body to the army. ]

The weak and broken condition of the continental regiments, the strongremonstrances of the General, the numerous complaints received fromevery quarter, determined congress to depute a committee to reside incamp during the winter, for the purpose of investigating the state ofthe army, and reporting such reforms as the public good might require. 

This committee repaired to head quarters in the month of January. TheCommander-in-chief laid before them a general statement, taking acomprehensive view of the condition of the army, and detailing theremedies necessary for the correction of existing abuses, as well asthose regulations which he deemed essential to its future prosperity. 

This paper, exhibiting the actual state of the army, discloses defectsof real magnitude in the existing arrangements. In perusing it, thereader is struck with the numerous difficulties, in addition to thoseresulting from inferiority of numbers, with which the American generalwas under the necessity of contending. The memorial is too long to beinserted, but there are parts which ought not to be entirelyoverlooked. The neglect of the very serious representation itcontained respecting a future permanent provision for the officers, threatened, at an after period, to be productive of such perniciouseffects, that their insertion in this place will not, it is presumed, be unacceptable. 

He recommended as the basis of every salutary reform, a comfortableprovision for the officers, which should render their commissionsvaluable; to effect which the future, as well as the present, ought tobe contemplated. 

"A long and continual sacrifice of individual interest for the generalgood, ought not, " he said, "to be expected or required. The nature ofman must be changed, before institutions built on the presumptivetruth of such a principle can succeed. 

"This position, " he added, "is supported by the conduct of theofficers of the American army, as well as by that of all other men. Atthe commencement of the dispute, in the first effusions of zeal, whenit was believed the service would be temporary, they entered into itwithout regard to pecuniary considerations. But finding its durationmuch longer than had been at first expected, and that, instead ofderiving advantage from the hardships and dangers to which they areexposed, they were, on the contrary, losers by their patriotism, andfell far short of even a competency for their wants, they havegradually abated in their ardour; and, with many, an entiredisinclination to the service, under present circumstances, has takenplace. To this, in an eminent degree, must be ascribed the frequentresignations daily happening, and the more frequent importunities forpermission to resign, from some officers of the greatest merit. 

"To this also may be ascribed the apathy, inattention, and neglect ofduty, which pervade all ranks; and which will necessarily continue andincrease, while an officer, instead of gaining any thing, isimpoverished by his commission, and conceives he is conferring, notreceiving a favour, in holding it. There can be no sufficient tie onmen possessing such sentiments. Nor can any method be adopted tocompel those to a punctual discharge of duty, who are indifferentabout their continuance in the service, and are often seeking apretext to disengage themselves from it. Punishment, in this case, would be unavailing. But when an officer's commission is made valuableto him, and he fears to lose it, you may exact obedience from him. 

"It is not indeed consistent with reason or justice that one set ofmen should make a sacrifice of property, domestic ease, and happiness;encounter the rigours of the field, the perils and vicissitudes ofwar, without some adequate compensation, to obtain those blessingswhich every citizen will enjoy in common with them. It must also be acomfortless reflection to any man, that, after he may have contributedto secure the rights of his country, at the risk of his life, and theruin of his fortune, there will be no provision made to preventhimself and his family, from sinking into indigence and wretchedness. "With these and other arguments, General Washington recommended, inaddition to present compensation, a half pay and pensionaryestablishment for the army. 

"I urge my sentiments, " said he, "with the greater freedom, because Ican not, and shall not, receive the smallest benefit from theestablishment; and can have no other inducement for proposing it, thana full conviction of its utility and propriety. "

The wants and distresses of the army, when actually seen by thecommittee of congress, made a much deeper impression than could havebeen received from any statement whatever. They endeavoured tocommunicate to congress the sentiments felt by themselves, and tocorrect the errors which had been committed. But a numerous body, ifit deliberate at all, proceeds slowly in the conduct of executivebusiness; and will seldom afford a prompt corrective to existingmischiefs, especially to those growing out of its own measures. 

{February 5. }

Much of the sufferings of the army was attributed to mismanagement inthe quartermaster's department, which, notwithstanding the repeatedremonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, had long remained without ahead. This subject was taken up early by the committee, and properrepresentations made respecting it. But congress still remained underthe influence of those opinions which had already produced suchmischievous effects, and were still disposed to retain the subordinateofficers of the department in a state of immediate dependence on theirown body. In this temper, they proposed a plan which, not beingapproved in camp, was never carried into execution. 

While congress was deliberating on the reforms proposed, thedistresses of the army approached their acme, and its dissolution wasthreatened. Early in February, the commissaries gave notice that thecountry, to a great distance, was actually exhausted; and that itwould be impracticable to obtain supplies for the army longer than tothe end of that month. Already the threatened scarcity began to befelt, and the rations issued were often bad in quality, andinsufficient in quantity. General Washington found it necessary againto interpose his personal exertions to procure provisions from adistance. 

In the apprehension that the resources of the commissary departmentwould fail before the distant supplies he had taken measures to obtaincould reach him, and that the enemy designed to make another incursioninto the country around Philadelphia, for the purpose of gleaning whatyet remained in possession of the inhabitants, he detached GeneralWayne, with orders to seize every article proper for the use of anarmy within fifteen miles of the Delaware, and to destroy the forageon the islands between Philadelphia and Chester. 

To defeat the object of this foraging party, the inhabitants concealedtheir provisions and teams, and gave to the country every appearanceof having been entirely pillaged. Before any sufficient aid could beobtained by these means, the bread, as well as the meat, wasexhausted, and famine prevailed in camp. 

In an emergency so pressing, the Commander-in-chief used every effortto feed his hungry army. Parties were sent out to glean the country;officers of influence were deputed to Jersey, Delaware and Maryland;and circular letters were addressed to the governors of states by thecommittee of congress in camp and by the Commander-in-chief, describing the wants of the army, and urging the greatest exertionsfor its immediate relief. 

Fortunately for America, there were features in the character ofWashington which, notwithstanding the discordant materials of whichhis army was composed, attached his officers and soldiers so stronglyto his person, that no distress could weaken their affection, norimpair the respect and veneration in which they held him. To thissentiment is to be attributed, in a great measure, the preservation ofa respectable military force, under circumstances but too wellcalculated for its dissolution. 

Through this severe experiment on their fortitude, the nativeAmericans persevered steadily in the performance of their duty; butthe conduct of the Europeans, who constituted a large part of thearmy, was, to a considerable extent, less laudable; and at no periodof the war was desertion so frequent as during this winter. Aided bythe disaffected, deserters eluded the vigilance of the parties whowatched the roads, and great numbers escaped into Philadelphia withtheir arms. 

In a few days, the army was rescued from the famine with which it hadbeen threatened, and considerable supplies of provisions were laid upin camp. It was perceived that the difficulties which had producedsuch melancholy effects, were created more by the want of due exertionin the commissary department, and by the efforts of the people to savetheir stock for a better market, than by any real deficiency of foodin the country. 

This severe demonstration seems to have convinced congress that theirfavourite system was radically vicious, and the subject was taken upwith the serious intention of remodeling the commissary department onprinciples recommended by experience. But such were the delaysinherent in the organization of that body, that the new system was notadopted until late in April. 

At no period of the war had the situation of the American army beenmore perilous than at Valley Forge. Even when the troops were notentirely destitute of food, their stock of provisions was so scantythat a quantity sufficient for one week was seldom in store. Consequently, had General Howe moved out in force, the American armycould not have remained in camp; and their want of clothes disabledthem from keeping the field in the winter. The returns of the first ofFebruary exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundredand eighty-nine men in camp, unfit for duty for want of clothes. Scarcely one man of these had a pair of shoes. Even among thosereturned capable of doing duty, many were so badly clad, that exposureto the cold of the season must have destroyed them. Although the totalof the army exceeded seventeen thousand men, the present effectiverank and file amounted to only five thousand and twelve. 

While the sufferings of the soldiers filled the hospitals, a dreadfulmortality continued to prevail in those miserable receptacles of thesick. A violent putrid fever swept off much greater numbers than allthe diseases of the camp. 

If then during the deep snow which covered the earth for a great partof the winter, the British general had taken the field, his own armywould indeed have suffered greatly, but the American loss is not to becalculated. 

[Illustration: Washington's Headquarters at Valley Forge

_Here on December 17, 1777, after the Battles of Brandywine andGermantown and the occupation of Philadelphia by the British, Washington established his headquarters for what may be paradoxicallytermed the darkest winter of the Revolutionary War. The AmericanCommander-in-Chief chose this place partly for its defensibility andpartly to protect Congress, then in session at York, Pennsylvania, from a sudden British attack. It was here that Washington and BaronSteuben planned the reorganization of the American army, and it washere, May 1, 1778, that news reached Washington of the consummation ofthe French alliance. _]

[Sidenote: Attempt to surprise Captain Lee's corps, and the gallantresistance made by him. ]

{March 28. }

Happily, the real condition of Washington was not well understood bySir William Howe; and the characteristic attention of that officer tothe lives and comfort of his troops, saved the American army. Fortunately, he confined his operations to those small excursions thatwere calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own soldiers, who, notwithstanding the favourable dispositions of the neighbouringcountry, were much distressed for fuel, and often in great want offorage and fresh provisions. The vigilance of the parties on thelines, especially on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted alarge portion of the supplies intended for the Philadelphia market;and corporal punishment was frequently inflicted on those who weredetected in attempting this infraction of the laws. As Captain Lee wasparticularly active, a plan was formed, late in January, to surpriseand capture him in his quarters. An extensive circuit was made by alarge body of cavalry, who seized four of his patrols withoutcommunicating an alarm. About break of day the British horse appeared;upon which Captain Lee placed his troopers that were in the house, atthe doors and windows, who behaved so gallantly as to repulse theassailants without losing a horse or man. Only Lieutenant Lindsay andone private were wounded. The whole number in the house did not exceedten. [99] That of the assailants was said to amount to two hundred. They lost a sergeant and three men with several horses, killed; and anofficer and three men wounded. 

 [Footnote 99: Major Jameson was accidentally present, and engaged in this skirmish. ]

The result of this skirmish gave great pleasure to theCommander-in-chief, who had formed a high opinion of Lee's talents asa partisan. He mentioned the affair in his orders with strong marks ofapprobation; and, in a private letter to the captain, testified thesatisfaction he felt. For his merit through the preceding campaign, congress promoted him to the rank of major, and gave him anindependent partisan corps to consist of three troops of horse. 

[Sidenote: Congress determine upon a second expedition againstCanada. ]

While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from thealarming depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself in allthe military departments, a plan was matured in congress, and in theboard of war, without consulting the Commander-in-chief, for a secondirruption into Canada. It was proposed to place the Marquis deLafayette at the head of this expedition, and to employ GeneralsConway and Starke, as the second and third in command. 

This young nobleman, possessing an excellent heart, and all themilitary enthusiasm of his country, had left France early in 1777, inopposition to the will of his sovereign, to engage in the service ofthe United States. His high rank, and supposed influence at the courtof Versailles, secured him the unlimited respect of his countrymen inAmerica; and, added to his frankness of manners and zeal in theircause, recommended him strongly to congress. While the claims ofothers of the same country to rank were too exorbitant to begratified, he demanded no station in the army; would consent toreceive no compensation, and offered to serve as a volunteer. He hadstipulated with Mr. Deane for the rank of major general withoutemolument; and, on his arrival in America, that rank was conferred onhim, but without any immediate command. In that capacity, he soughtfor danger, and was wounded at the battle of Brandywine. He attachedhimself with the ardour of youth to the Commander-in-chief, whosmoothed the way to his receiving a command in the army equal to hisrank. 

The first intimation to General Washington that the expedition wascontemplated, was given in a letter from the president of the board ofwar of the 24th of January, inclosing one of the same date to theMarquis, requiring the attendance of that nobleman on congress toreceive his instructions. The Commander-in-chief was requested tofurnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly composed of Canadians, forthe expedition; and in the same letter, his advice and opinion wereasked respecting it. The northern states were to furnish the necessarytroops. 

Without noticing the manner in which this business had been conducted, and the marked want of confidence it betrayed, General Washingtonordered Hazen's regiment to march towards Albany; and the Marquisproceeded immediately to the seat of congress. At his request, he wasto be considered as an officer detached from the army of Washington, to remain under his orders, and Major General the Baron de Kalb wasadded to the expedition; after which the Marquis repaired in person toAlbany to take charge of the troops who were to assemble at that placein order to cross the lakes on the ice, and attack Montreal. 

[Sidenote: Before its execution, it is abandoned. ]

On arriving at Albany, he found no preparations made for theexpedition. Nothing which had been promised being in readiness, heabandoned the enterprise as impracticable. Some time afterward, congress also determined to relinquish it; and General Washington wasauthorized to recall both the Marquis de Lafayette, and the Baron deKalb. 

{February 27. }

While the army lay at Valley Forge, the Baron Steuben arrived in camp. This gentleman was a Prussian officer, who came to the United Stateswith ample recommendations. He was said to have served many years inthe armies of the great Frederick; to have been one of the aids decamp of that consummate commander; and to have held the rank oflieutenant general. He was, unquestionably, versed in the system offield exercise which the king of Prussia had introduced, and was wellqualified to teach it to raw troops. He claimed no rank, and offeredto render his services as a volunteer. After holding a conference withcongress, he proceeded to Valley Forge. 

[Sidenote: General Conway resigns. Duel between him and GeneralCadwallader. ]

[Sidenote: The Baron Steuben appointed inspector general. ]

Although the office of inspector general had been bestowed on Conway, he had never entered on its duties; and his promotion to the rank ofmajor general had given much umbrage to the brigadiers, who had beenhis seniors. That circumstance, in addition to the knowledge of hisbeing in a faction hostile to the Commander-in-chief, rendered hissituation in the army so uncomfortable, that he withdrew to York, inPennsylvania, which was then the seat of congress. When the expeditionto Canada was abandoned, he was not directed, with Lafayette and DeKalb, to rejoin the army. Entertaining no hope of being permitted toexercise the functions of his new office, he resigned his commissionabout the last of April, and, some time afterwards, returned toFrance. [100] On his resignation, the Baron Steuben, who had, as avolunteer, performed the duties of inspector general, much to thesatisfaction of the Commander-in-chief, and of the army, was, on therecommendation of General Washington, appointed to that office withthe rank of major general, without exciting the slightest murmur. 

 [Footnote 100: General Conway, after his resignation, frequently indulged in expressions of extreme hostility to the Commander-in-chief. These indiscretions were offensive to the gentlemen of the army. In consequence of them, he was engaged in an altercation with General Cadwallader, which produced a duel, in which Conway received a wound, supposed for some time to be mortal. While his recovery was despaired of, he addressed the following letter to General Washington. 

 _Philadelphia, July 23d, 1778. _

 Sir, --I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done, written, or said any thing disagreeable to your excellency. My career will soon be over, therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these states, whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues. 

 I am with the greatest respect, sir, Your excellency's most obedient humble servant, PHS. CONWAY. ]

This gentleman was of real service to the American troops. Heestablished one uniform system of field exercise; and, by his skilland persevering industry, effected important improvements through allranks of the army during its continuance at Valley Forge. 

{1777}

While it was encamped at that place, several matters of great interestengaged the attention of congress. Among them, was the stipulation inthe convention of Saratoga for the return of the British army toEngland. Boston was named as the place of embarkation. At the time ofthe capitulation, the difficulty of making that port early in thewinter was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as some timemust elapse before a sufficient number of vessels for thetransportation of his army could be collected, its embarkation mightbe delayed until the ensuing spring. 

{November 25. }

On receiving this unwelcome intelligence, he applied to GeneralWashington to change the port of embarkation, and to substituteNewport, in Rhode Island, or some place on the Sound, for Boston. Ifany considerations not foreseen should make this proposalobjectionable, he then solicited this indulgence for himself and hissuite. This request was communicated to congress, in terms favourableto that part of the application which respected General Burgoyne andhis suite; but the objections to any change in the convention whichmight expedite the transportation of the army, were too weighty to bedisregarded; and the General pressed them earnestly on congress. Thisprecaution was unnecessary. The facility with which the conventionmight be violated by the British, and the captured army be united tothat under General Howe, seems to have suggested itself to theAmerican government, as soon as the first rejoicings were over; andsuch was its then existing temper, that the faith and honour ofBritish officers were believed to be no securities against theirappearing again in the field. Under this impression, a resolution hadpassed early in November, directing General Heath to transmit to theboard of war a descriptive list of all persons comprehended in theconvention, "in order that, if any officer, soldier, or other personof the said army should hereafter be found in arms against thesestates in North America, during the present contest, he might beconvicted of the offence, and suffer the punishment in such caseinflicted by the law of nations. "

No other notice was taken of the application made by General Burgoyneto congress through the Commander-in-chief, than to pass a resolution"that General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne thatcongress will not receive, nor consider, any proposition forindulgence, nor for altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately directed to their own body. "

{December. }

Contrary to expectation, a fleet of transports for the reception ofthe troops reached Rhode Island, on its way to Boston, in the month ofDecember. But, before its arrival, the preconceived suspicions ofcongress had ripened into conviction several circumstances combined toproduce this result. General Burgoyne, dissatisfied with theaccommodations prepared for his officers in Boston, had, after afruitless correspondence with General Heath, addressed a letter toGeneral Gates, in which he complained of the inconvenient quartersassigned his officers, as a breach of the articles of the convention. This complaint was considered by congress as being made for thepurpose of letting in the principle, that the breach of one article ofa treaty discharges the injured party from its obligations. 

This suspicion was strengthened by the indiscreet hesitation ofGeneral Burgoyne to permit the resolution requiring a descriptive listof his troops to be executed. His subsequent relinquishment of theobjection did not remove the impression it had made. 

It was also alleged, that the number of transports was not sufficientto convey the troops to Europe; nor was it believed possible that SirWilliam Howe could have laid in, so expeditiously, a sufficient stockof provisions for the voyage. 

These objections to the embarkation of Burgoyne's troops werestrengthened by some trivial infractions of the convention, which, itwas contended, gave congress a strict right to detain them. It wasstipulated that "the arms" should be delivered up; and it appearedthat several cartouch boxes and other military accoutrements, supposedto be comprehended in the technical term _arms_, had been detained. This was deemed an infraction of the letter of the compact, which, onrigid principle, justified the measures afterwards adopted bycongress. 

[Sidenote: Congress forbid the embarkation of the British troops takenat Saratoga. ]

The whole subject was referred to a committee who reported all thecircumstances of the case, whereupon congress came to severalresolutions, enumerating the facts already mentioned, the last ofwhich was in these words: "Resolved, therefore, that the embarkationof Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and the troops under his command, besuspended, until a distinct and explicit ratification of theconvention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court ofGreat Britain to congress. "

These resolutions, together with the report on which they werefounded, were transmitted to the several states, and to GeneralWashington. Two copies of them were sent to General Heath, withdirections to deliver one of them to General Burgoyne, and withfarther directions, "to order the vessels which may have arrived, orwhich shall arrive, for the transportation of the army underLieutenant General Burgoyne, to quit, without delay, the port ofBoston. "

[Sidenote: Burgoyne permitted to depart. ]

On receiving these resolutions, General Burgoyne addressed a letter tocongress, containing papers, on which he founded a defence of hisconduct, and insisted on the embarkation of his army, as stipulated inthe convention; but the committee, to whom these papers were referred, reported their opinion, after the most attentive consideration ofthem, to be, "that nothing therein contained was sufficient to inducecongress to recede from their resolves of the 8th of January last, respecting the convention of Saratoga. " This application wasaccompanied by another letter from General Burgoyne, to be deliveredif the army should still be detained, in which, in consideration ofthe state of his health, he solicited permission to return to England. This request was readily granted. 

The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation ofBurgoyne, notwithstanding the persevering temper of the king, atlength made its way into the cabinet, and produced resolutions infavour of pacific measures. 

{1778}

{February. }

After the rejection of repeated motions made by the opposition memberstending to the abandonment of the American war, Lord North gavenotice, in the House of Commons, that he had digested a plan ofreconciliation which he designed shortly to lay before the house. 

[Sidenote: Plan of reconciliation with America agreed to inParliament. ]

In conformity with this notice, he moved for leave to bring in, "first, A bill for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerningtaxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies andplantations of North America. 

"Second. A bill to enable his Majesty to appoint commissioners withsufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon the means ofquieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies ofNorth America. "

The first contained a declaration that Parliament will impose no taxor duty whatever payable within any of the colonies of North America, except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for thepurposes of commerce, the net produce of which should always be paidand applied to and for the use of the colonies in which the same shallbe respectively levied, in like manner as other duties collected underthe authority of their respective legislatures are ordinarily paid andapplied. 

The second authorized the appointment of commissioners by the crown, with power to treat either with the existing governments, or withindividuals, in America; provided that no stipulations which might beentered into should have any effect until approved in Parliament, other than is afterward mentioned. 

It is then enacted, that the commissioners may have power "to proclaima cessation of hostilities in any of the colonies, to suspend theoperation of the non-intercourse law; and farther, to suspend, duringthe continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts ofParliament which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, asrelates to the colonies. 

"To grant pardon to any number or description of persons, and toappoint a governor in any colony in which his majesty had heretoforeexercised the power of making such appointments. "

These bills passed both houses of Parliament with inconsiderableopposition. 

Intelligence of the treaty between the United States and France havingbeen received by the minister about the time of their beingintroduced, copies of them, before they had gone through the requisiteforms, were hurried to America, to be laid before congress and thepublic, in the hope and expectation that they might counteract theeffects which it was feared the treaty with France would produce. 

{April. }

General Washington received early information of their arrival, andentertained serious fears of their operation. He was apprehensive thatthe publication of a proposition for the restoration of peace on theterms originally required by America, would greatly increase thenumbers of the disaffected; and immediately forwarded the bills tocongress in a letter suggesting the policy of preventing theirpernicious influence on the public mind by all possible means, andespecially through the medium of the press. 

[Sidenote: Communicated to, and rejected by Congress. ]

{April 22. }

This letter was referred to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Morris, Drayton, and Dana, by whom a report was made, investigating the billswith great acuteness as well as asperity. This report, and theresolutions upon it, were ordered to be published. Other resolutionswere passed the succeeding day, recommending it to the states topardon under such limitations as they might think proper to make, suchof their misguided fellow-citizens as had levied war against theUnited States. 

This resolution was accompanied by an order directing it to be printedin English and in German, and requesting General Washington to takesuch measures as he should deem most effectual for circulating thecopies among the American recruits in the enemy's army. [101]

 [Footnote 101: This request afforded the Commander-in-chief a fair retort on Major General Tryon. That officer had addressed a letter to him enclosing the bills brought into Parliament, and containing, to use the language of General Washington himself, "the more extraordinary and impertinent request" that their contents should be communicated through him to the army. General Washington now acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and, in return, enclosed to Governor Tryon copies of the resolution just mentioned, with a request that he would be instrumental in making them known to the persons on whom they were to operate. ]

During these transactions, the frigate _La Sensible_ arrived with theimportant intelligence that treaties of alliance and of commerce, hadbeen formed between the United States of America and France. Thetreaties themselves were brought by Mr. Simeon Deane, the brother ofthe American Minister in Paris. 

This event had long been anxiously expected, and the delay attendingit had been such as to excite serious apprehension that it would nevertake place. 

France was still extremely sore under the wounds inflicted during thewar which terminated in 1763. It was impossible to reflect on a treatywhich had wrested from her so fair a part of North America, withoutfeeling resentments which would seek the first occasion ofgratification. 

The growing discontents between Great Britain and her colonies were, consequently, viewed at a distance with secret satisfaction; butrather as a circumstance which might have some tendency to weaken andembarrass a rival, and which was to be encouraged from motives ofgeneral policy, than as one from which any definite advantage was tobe derived. France appears, at that time, to have required, and wishedfor, repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war hadso deranged her finances, that the wish to preserve peace seems tohave predominated in her cabinet. The young monarch, who had justascended the throne, possessed a pacific unambitious temper, and thecouncils of the nation were governed by men alike indisposed todisturb the general tranquillity. The advice they gave the monarchwas, to aid and encourage the colonies secretly, in order to prevent areconciliation with the mother country, and to prepare privately forhostilities, by improving his finances, and strengthening his marine;but to avoid every thing which might give occasion for open war. Thesystem which for a time regulated the cabinet of Versailles, conformedto this advice. While the utmost attention was paid to the Minister ofBritain, and every measure to satisfy him was openly taken, intimationwas privately given to those of the United States, that these measureswere necessary for the present, but they might be assured of the goodwill of the French government. 

During the public demonstration of dispositions favourable to England, means were taken to furnish aids of ammunition and arms, and tofacilitate the negotiation of loans to the United States; and theowners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes, or to procure their condemnation, found means to dispose of themprivately. 

Meanwhile, another party was formed in the cabinet, to whose politicalsystem subsequent events gave the ascendency. Its avowed object was toseize the present moment to revenge past injuries, humble the haughtyrival of France, and dismember her empire. 

Matters remained in a fluctuating state until December, 1777. Privately encouraged, but discountenanced publicly, the prospects ofthe American Ministers varied according to the complexion of Americanaffairs. 

Intelligence of the convention of Saratoga reached France early inDecember, 1777. The American deputies took that opportunity to pressthe treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelvemonths; and to urge the importance, at this juncture, when Britainwould, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation, [102] ofcommunicating to congress, precisely, what was to be expected fromFrance and Spain. 

 [Footnote 102: Congress, in their first instructions to their commissioners, directed them to press the immediate declaration of France in favour of the United States, by suggesting that a reunion with Great Britain might be the consequence of delay. --_Secret Journals of Congress_, v. Ii. P. 30. ]

They were informed by M. Girard, one of the secretaries of the king'scouncil of state, that it was determined to acknowledge theindependence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them. That his Most Christian Majesty was resolved not only to acknowledge, but to support their independence. That in doing this, he mightprobably soon be engaged in a war; yet he should not expect anycompensation from the United States on that account; nor was itpretended that he acted wholly for their sakes; since, besides hisreal good will to them, it was manifestly the interest of France thatthe power of England should be diminished by the separation of hercolonies. The only condition he should require would be that theUnited States, in no peace to be made, should give up theirindependence, and return to their obedience to the British government. 

On determining to take this decisive course, the cabinet of Versailleshad despatched a courier to his Catholic majesty with information ofthe line of conduct about to be pursued by France. On his return, thenegotiation was taken up in earnest, and a treaty of friendship andcommerce was soon concluded. This was accompanied by a treaty ofalliance eventual and defensive between the two nations, in which itwas declared, that if war should break out between France and Englandduring the existence of that with the United States, it should be madea common cause; and that neither of the contracting parties shouldconclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formalconsent of the other, first obtained; and they mutually engaged "notto lay down their arms until the independence of the United Statesshall have been formally, or tacitly assured by the treaty, ortreaties that shall terminate the war. "

It was the wish of the ministers of the United States to engage Franceimmediately in the war; and to make the alliance, not eventual, butpositive. This proposition, however, was rejected. 

In a few weeks after the conclusion of these negotiations, the Marquisde Noailles announced officially to the court of London, the treaty offriendship and commerce France had formed with the United States. TheBritish government, considering this notification as a declaration ofwar, published a memorial for the purpose of justifying to all Europethe hostilities it had determined to commence. 

Soon after their commencement, the Count de Vergennes received privateintelligence that it was contemplated in the cabinet of London tooffer to the United States an acknowledgment of their independence asthe condition of a separate peace. He immediately communicated thisintelligence to the American ministers, requesting them to lose notime in stating to congress that, though war was not declared in form, it had commenced in fact; and that he considered the obligations ofthe treaty of alliance as in full force; consequently that neitherparty was now at liberty to make a separate peace. Instructions of asimilar import were given to the minister of France in the UnitedStates. 

[Sidenote: Information received of treaties of alliance and commercebeing entered into between France and the United States. ]

The despatches containing these treaties were received by thepresident on Saturday the second of May, after congress had adjourned. That body was immediately convened, the despatches were opened, andtheir joyful contents communicated. 

In the exultation of the moment, the treaty of alliance, as well asthat of commerce and friendship was published; a circumstance which, not without reason, gave umbrage to the cabinet of Versailles; becausethat treaty, being only eventual, ought not to have been communicatedto the public but by mutual consent. 

From this event, which was the source of universal exultation to thefriends of the revolution, the attention must be directed to one whichwas productive of very different sensations. 

Among the various improvements which struggling humanity has graduallyengrafted on the belligerent code, none have contributed more todiminish the calamities of war, than those which meliorate thecondition of prisoners. No obligations will be more respected by thegenerous and the brave; nor are there any, the violation of whichcould wound the national character more deeply, or expose it to morelasting or better merited reproach. 

In wars between nations nearly equal in power, and possessing rightsacknowledged to be equal, a departure from modern usage in thisrespect is almost unknown; and the voice of the civilized world wouldbe raised against the potentate who could adopt a system calculated tore-establish the rigours and misery of exploded barbarism. But incontests between different parts of the same empire, those practiceswhich mitigate the horrors of war yield, too frequently, to thecalculations of a blind and erring resentment. The party whichsupports the ancient state of things, often treats resistance asrebellion, and captives as traitors. The opposite party, supportingalso by the sword principles believed to be right, will admit of nodeparture from established usage, to its prejudice; and may beexpected, if possessing the power, to endeavour, by retaliatinginjuries, to compel the observance of a more just and humane system. But they participate in the fault imputable to their adversaries, bymanifesting a disposition to punish those whom they deem traitors, with the same severity of which they so loudly and justly complain, when they are themselves its victims. 

General Gage, as Commander-in-chief of the British army, in theharshness of spirit which had been excited while governor ofMassachusetts, not only threw all his prisoners into a common jail, but rejected every proposition for an exchange of them. When thecommand devolved on Sir William Howe, this absurd system wasabandoned, and an exchange[103] took place to a considerable extent. But the Americans had not made a sufficient number of prisoners torelieve all their citizens, and many of them still remained inconfinement. Representations were continually received from theseunfortunate men, describing in strong terms, the severity of theirtreatment. They complained of suffering almost the extremity offamine, that even the supply of provisions allowed them was unsound, and that they were crowded into prison-ships, where they became thevictims of disease. 

 [Footnote 103: In the execution of this agreement, the inconveniences arising from having committed the custody of prisoners to the several states, was severely felt. In addition to the delay inseparable from the necessity of inquiring for them, and collecting them from different places, they were often sent in without the knowledge of General Washington; and, in some instances, they passed unobserved, with permits from a state government, through his camp, into that of the enemy. These irregularities, and the remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, at length, induced congress to appoint a commissary of prisoners. ]

When charged with conduct so unworthy of his character and station, Sir William Howe positively denied its truth. 

It would be unjust to ascribe this excess of inhumanity to an officerwho, though perhaps severe in his temper, did not mingle cruelties inhis general system, which would excite universal indignation in otherwars. It must be admitted that his supplies of provisions were neithergood nor abundant; and that the American soldiers, in their own camp, were unhealthy. But the excessive mortality prevailing among theprisoners can be accounted for on no ordinary principles; and thecandid, who were least inclined to criminate without cause, have everbeen persuaded that, if his orders did not produce the distress whichexisted, his authority was not interposed with sufficient energy, tocorrect the abuses which prevailed. 

The capture of General Lee furnished an additional ground ofcontroversy on the subject of prisoners. As he had been an officer inthe British service, whose resignation had not, perhaps, been receivedwhen he entered into that of America, a disposition was, at first, manifested to consider him as a deserter, and he was closely confined. On receiving information of this circumstance, congress directedGeneral Howe to be assured that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and fiveHessian field-officers, should be detained, and should experienceprecisely the fate of General Lee. These officers were taken intoclose custody, and informed that the resolution announced to GeneralHowe should be strictly enforced. 

The sentiments of the Commander-in-chief on the subject ofretaliation, seem to have been less severe than those of congress. Sogreat was his abhorrence of the cruelties such a practice mustgenerate, that he was unwilling to adopt it in any case not ofabsolute and apparent necessity. Not believing that of General Lee tobe such a case, he remonstrated strongly against these resolutions. But congress remained inflexible; and the officers designated as theobjects of retaliation, were kept in rigorous confinement untilGeneral Lee was declared to be a prisoner of war. [104]

 [Footnote 104: See note No. XIII. At the end of the volume. ]

The resolutions of congress respecting the prisoners taken at theCedars, were also the source of much embarrassment and chagrin to theCommander-in-chief. Alleging that the capitulation had been violatedon the part of the enemy, and that the savages had been permitted tomurder some of the prisoners, and to plunder others, they withheldtheir sanction from the agreement entered into by General Arnold withCaptain Forster, and refused to allow other prisoners to be returnedin exchange for those liberated under that agreement, until themurderers should be given up, and compensation made for the baggagesaid to have been plundered. As the fact alleged was not clearlyestablished, Sir William Howe continued to press General Washington onthis subject. Reminding him of the importance of a punctiliousobservance of faith, plighted in engagements like that made by GeneralArnold, he persisted to hold the Commander-in-chief personally boundfor an honourable compliance with military stipulations entered intoby an officer under his authority. 

General Washington, feeling the keenness of the reproach, pressedcongress to change their resolution on this subject; but hisremonstrances were, for a long time, unavailing. 

After the sufferings of the prisoners in New York had been extreme, and great numbers had perished in confinement, the survivors wereliberated for the purpose of being exchanged; but so miserable wastheir condition, that many of them died on their way home. For thedead as well as the living, General Howe claimed a return ofprisoners, while General Washington contended that reasonabledeductions should be made for those who were actually dead, ofdiseases under which they laboured when permitted to leave the Britishprisons. 

Until this claim should be admitted, General Howe rejected any partialexchange. General Washington was immoveable in his determination torepel it; and thus all hope of being relieved in the ordinary modeappeared to be taken from those whom the fortune of war had placed inthe power of the enemy. 

[Sidenote: Complaints made by General Washington of the treatment ofAmerican prisoners in possession of the enemy. ]

In the mean time, the sufferings of the American prisoners increasedwith the increasing severity of the season. Information continued tobe received, that they suffered almost the extremity of famine. Repeated remonstrances, made on this subject to the British general, were answered by a denial of the fact. He continued to aver that thesame food, both in quantity and quality, was issued to the prisoners, as to British troops when in transports, or elsewhere, not on actualduty; and that every tenderness was extended to them, which wascompatible with the situation of his army. He yielded to the requestmade by General Washington to permit a commissary to visit the jails, and demanded passports for an agent to administer to the wants ofBritish prisoners. 

When Mr. Boudinot, the American commissary of prisoners, who wasappointed by General Washington to visit the jails in Philadelphia, met Mr. Ferguson, the British commissary, he was informed that GeneralHowe thought it unnecessary for him to come into the city, as he wouldhimself inspect the situation and treatment of the prisoners. There isreason to believe that their causes of complaint, so far as respectedprovisions, did not exist afterwards in the same degree as formerly;and that the strong measures subsequently taken by congress, werefounded on facts of an earlier date. 

But clothes and blankets were also necessary, and the difficulty offurnishing them was considerable. General Howe would not permit thepurchase of those articles in Philadelphia; and they were notattainable elsewhere. 

[Sidenote: Proceedings of congress on this subject. ]

To compel him to abandon this distressing restriction, and to permitthe use of paper money within the British lines, congress resolved, that no prisoner should be exchanged until all the expenditures madein paper for the supplies they received from the United States, shouldbe repaid in specie, at the rate of four shillings and sixpence foreach dollar. They afterwards determined, that from the 1st day ofFebruary, no British commissary should be permitted to purchase anyprovisions for the use of prisoners west of New Jersey, but that allsupplies for persons of that description should be furnished fromBritish stores. 

Sir William Howe remonstrated against the last resolution with greatstrength and justice, as a decree which doomed a considerable numberof prisoners, far removed into the country, to a slow and painfuldeath by famine; since it was impracticable to supply them immediatelyfrom Philadelphia. The severity of this order was in some degreemitigated by a resolution that each British commissary of prisonersshould receive provisions from the American commissary of purchases, to be paid for in specie, according to the resolution of the 19th ofDecember, 1777. 

About the same time, an order was hastily given by the board of war, which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment; and exposedthe Commander-in-chief to strictures not less severe than those he hadapplied to the British general. 

General Washington had consented that a quartermaster, with a smallescort, should come out of Philadelphia, with clothes and othercomforts for the prisoners who were in possession of the UnitedStates. He had expressly stipulated for their security, and had giventhem a passport. 

{January 26. }

While they were travelling through the country, information was givento the board of war that General Howe had refused to permit provisionsto be sent in to the American prisoners in Philadelphia by water. Thisinformation was not correct. General Howe had only requested thatflags should not be sent up or down the river without previouspermission obtained from himself. On this information, however, theboard ordered Lieutenant Colonel Smith immediately to seize theofficers, though protected by the passport of General Washington, their horses, carriages, and the provisions destined for the relief ofthe British prisoners; and to secure them until farther orders, eitherfrom the board or from the Commander-in-chief. 

General Washington, on hearing this circumstance, despatched one ofhis aids with orders for the immediate release of the persons andproperty which had been confined; but the officers refused to proceedon their journey, and returned to Philadelphia. [105]

 [Footnote 105: They alleged that their horses had been disabled, and the clothing embezzled. ]

This untoward event was much regretted by the Commander-in-chief. In aletter received some time afterwards, General Howe, after expressinghis willingness that the American prisoners should be visited bydeputy commissaries, who should inspect their situation, and supplytheir wants required, as the condition on which this indulgence shouldbe granted, "that a similar permit should be allowed to personsappointed by him, which should be accompanied with the assurance ofGeneral Washington, that his authority will have sufficient weight toprevent any interruption to their progress, and any insult to theirpersons. " This demand was ascribed to the treatment to which officersunder the protection of his passport had already been exposed. 

General Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange ofprisoners, which had hitherto appeared to be insuperable; and maderepeated, but ineffectual efforts to remove it. General Howe haduniformly refused to proceed with any cartel, unless his right toclaim for all the diseased and infirm, whom he had liberated, shouldbe previously admitted. 

At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from that highground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished it of his ownaccord, and acceded completely to the proposition of GeneralWashington for the meeting of commissioners, in order to settleequitably the number to which he should be entitled for those he haddischarged in the preceding winter. This point being adjusted, commissaries were mutually appointed, who were to meet on the 10th ofMarch, in Germantown, to arrange the details of a general cartel. 

{March 4. }

The Commander-in-chief had entertained no doubt of his authority toenter into this agreement. On the fourth of March, however, he had themortification to perceive in a newspaper, a resolution of congresscalling on the several states for the amounts of supplies furnishedthe prisoners, that they might be adjusted according to the rule ofthe 10th of December, before the exchange should take place. 

On seeing this embarrassing resolution, General Washington addressed aletter to Sir William Howe, informing him that particularcircumstances had rendered it inconvenient for the Americancommissioners to attend at the time appointed, and requesting thattheir meeting should be deferred from the 10th to the 21st of March. The interval was successfully employed in obtaining a repeal of theresolution. 

It would seem probable that the dispositions of congress on thesubject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of GeneralWashington. From the fundamental principle of the militaryestablishment of the United States at its commencement, an exchange ofprisoners would necessarily strengthen the British, much more than theAmerican army. The war having been carried on by troops raised forshort times, aided by militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged, returned to their homes as citizens, while those of the enemy againtook the field. 

General Washington, who was governed by a policy more just, and morepermanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to congress, urging, as well the injury done the public faith, and his own personalhonour, by this infraction of a solemn engagement, as the cruelty andimpolicy of a system which must cut off for ever all hopes of anexchange, and render imprisonment as lasting as the war. Herepresented in strong terms the effect such a measure must have on thetroops on whom they should thereafter be compelled chiefly to rely, and its impression on the friends of those already in captivity. Theseremonstrances produced the desired effect, and the resolutions wererepealed. The commissioners met according to the second appointment;but, on examining their powers, it appeared that those given byGeneral Washington were expressed to be in virtue of the authorityvested in him; while those given by Sir William Howe contained no suchdeclaration. 

This omission produced an objection on the part of the United States;but General Howe refused to change the language, alleging that hedesigned the treaty to be of a personal nature, founded on the mutualconfidence and honour of the contracting generals; and had nointention either to bind his government, or to extend the cartelbeyond the limits and duration of his own command. 

This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners, and General Howe persisting in his refusal to make the requiredalteration in his powers, the negotiation was broken off, and thisfair prospect of terminating the distresses of numerous unfortunatepersons passed away, without effecting the good it had promised. 

Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general cartel, Sir William Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchangeableshould be sent in to the nearest posts, and returns made of officerfor officer of equal rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numberswould admit; and that if a surplus of officers, should remain, theyshould be exchanged for an equivalent in privates. 

[Sidenote: A partial exchange agreed to. ]

On the representations of General Washington, congress acceded to thisproposition, so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer, and soldier for soldier; but rejected the part which admitted anequivalent in privates for a surplus of officers, because the officerscaptured with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of GeneralHowe. Under this agreement, an exchange took place to a considerableextent; but as the Americans had lost more prisoners than they hadtaken, unless the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation, many of their troops were still detained in captivity. 

NOTES. 

NOTE--No. I. _See Page 5. _

It will not be unacceptable to the reader to peruse this first reportof a young gentleman who afterwards performed so distinguished a partin the revolution of his country, it is therefore inserted at large. 

I was commissioned and appointed by the Hon. Robert Dinwiddie, Esq. Governor &c. Of Virginia, to visit and deliver a letter to thecommandant of the French forces on the Ohio, and set out on theintended journey on the same day: the next, I arrived atFredericksburg, and engaged Mr. Jacob Vanbraam to be my Frenchinterpreter, and proceeded with him to Alexandria, where we providednecessaries. From thence we went to Winchester, and got baggage, horses, &c. And from thence we pursued the new road to Wills' Creek, where we arrived the 14th November. 

Here I engaged Mr. Gist to pilot us out, and also hired four others asservitors, Barnaby Currin, and John M'Quire, Indian traders, HenrySteward, and William Jenkins; and in company with those persons leftthe inhabitants the next day. 

The excessive rains and vast quantity of snow which had fallen, prevented our reaching Mr. Frazier's, an Indian trader, at the mouthof Turtle creek, on Monongahela river, until Thursday the 22d. We wereinformed here, that expresses had been sent a few days before to thetraders down the river, to acquaint them with the French general'sdeath, and the return of the major part of the French army into winterquarters. 

The waters were quite impassable without swimming our horses, whichobliged us to get the loan of a canoe from Frazier, and to sendBarnaby Currin and Henry Steward down the Monongahela, with ourbaggage, to meet us at the forks of Ohio, about ten miles; there, tocross the Alleghany. 

As I got down before the canoe, I spent some time in viewing therivers, and the land in the fork, which I think extremely wellsituated for a fort, as it has the absolute command of both rivers. The land at the point is twenty, or twenty-five feet above the commonsurface of the water; and a considerable bottom of flat, well timberedland all around it very convenient for building. The rivers are each aquarter of a mile or more across, and run here very nearly at rightangles; Alleghany, bearing northeast; and Monongahela, southeast. Theformer of these two is a very rapid and swift running water, the otherdeep and still, without any perceptible fall. 

About two miles from this, on the southeast side of the river, at theplace where the Ohio company intended to erect a fort, lives Shingiss, king of the Delawares. We called upon him, to invite him to council atthe Loggstown. 

As I had taken a good deal of notice yesterday of the situation at thefork, my curiosity led me to examine this more particularly, and Ithink it greatly inferior, either for defence or advantages;especially the latter. For a fort at the fork would be equally wellsituated on the Ohio, and have the entire command of the Monongahela, which runs up our settlement, and is extremely well designed for watercarriage, as it is of a deep, still nature. Besides, a fort at thefork might be built at much less expense than at the other places. 

Nature has well contrived this lower place for water defence; but thehill whereon it must stand being about a quarter of a mile in length, and then descending gradually on the land side, will render itdifficult and very expensive to make a sufficient fortification there. The whole flat upon the hill must be taken in, the side next thedescent made extremely high, or else the hill itself cut away:otherwise, the enemy may raise batteries within that distance withoutbeing exposed to a single shot from the fort. 

Shingiss attended us to the Loggstown, where we arrived betweensun-setting and dark, the twenty-fifth day after I left Williamsburg. We travelled over some extremely good and bad land to get to thisplace. 

As soon as I came into town, I went to Monakatoocha (as the half kingwas out at his hunting cabin on Little Beaver creek, about fifteenmiles off) and informed him by John Davidson, my Indian interpreter, that I was sent a messenger to the French general; and was ordered tocall upon the sachems of the Six Nations to acquaint them with it. Igave him a string of wampum and a twist of tobacco, and desired him tosend for the half king, which he promised to do by a runner in themorning, and for other sachems. I invited him and the other great menpresent, to my tent, where they stayed about an hour and returned. 

According to the best observations I could make, Mr. Gift's newsettlement (which we passed by) bears about west northwest seventymiles from Wills' creek; Shanapins, or the forks, north by west, ornorth northwest about fifty miles from that; and from thence to theLoggstown, the course is nearly west about eighteen or twenty miles:so that the whole distance, as we went and computed it, is, at least, one hundred and thirty-five or one hundred and forty miles from ourback inhabitants. 

25th. Came to town, four of ten Frenchmen, who had deserted from acompany at the Kuskuskas, which lies at the mouth of this river. I gotthe following account from them. They were sent from New Orleans witha hundred men, and eight canoe loads of provisions, to this place, where they expected to have met the same number of men, from the fortson this side of lake Erie, to convoy them and the stores up, who werenot arrived when they ran off. 

I inquired into the situation of the French on the Mississippi, theirnumbers, and what forts they had built. They informed me, that therewere four small forts between New Orleans and the Black Islands, garrisoned with about thirty or forty men, and a few small pieces ineach. That at New Orleans, which is near the mouth of the Mississippi, there are thirty-five companies of forty men each, with a prettystrong fort mounting eight carriage guns; and at the Black Islandsthere are several companies and a fort with six guns. The BlackIslands are about a hundred and thirty leagues above the mouth of theOhio, which is about three hundred and fifty above New Orleans. Theyalso acquainted me, that there was a small pallisadoed fort on theOhio, at the mouth of the Obaish, about sixty leagues from theMississippi. The Obaish heads near the west end of lake Erie, andaffords the communication between the French on the Mississippi andthose on the lakes. These deserters came up from the lower Shannoahtown with one Brown, an Indian trader, and were going to Philadelphia. 

About three o'clock this evening the half king came to town. I went upand invited him with Davidson, privately, to my tent; and desired himto relate some of the particulars of his journey to the Frenchcommandant, and of his reception there; also, to give me an account ofthe ways and distance. He told me, that the nearest and levelest waywas now impassable, by reason of many large miry savannas; that wemust be obliged to go by Venango, and should not get to the near fortin less than five or six nights sleep, good travelling. When he wentto the fort, he said he was received in a very stern manner by thelate commander, who asked him very abruptly, what he had come about, and to declare his business: which he said he did in the followingspeech:

"Fathers, I am come to tell you your own speeches; what your ownmouths have declared. Fathers, you, in former days, set a silver basinbefore us, wherein there was the leg of a beaver, and desired all thenations to come and eat of it, to eat in peace and plenty, and not tobe churlish to one another: and that if any such person should befound to be a disturber, I here lay down by the edge of the dish arod, which you must scourge them with; and if your father should getfoolish, in my old days, I desire you may use it upon me as well asothers. 

"Now, fathers, it is you who are the disturbers in this land, bycoming and building your towns; and taking it away unknown to us, andby force. 

"Fathers, we kindled a fire a long time ago, at a place calledMontreal, where we desired you to stay, and not to come and intrudeupon our land. I now desire you may despatch to that place; for be itknown to you, fathers, that this is our land and not yours. 

"Fathers, I desire you may hear me in civilness; if not, we musthandle that rod which was laid down for the use of the obstreperous. If you had come in a peaceable manner, like our brothers the English, we would not have been against your trading with us, as they do; butto come, fathers, and build houses upon our land, and to take it byforce, is what we can not submit to. 

"Fathers, both you and the English are white, we live in a countrybetween; therefore, the land belongs to neither one nor the other. Butthe great Being above allowed it to be a place of residence for us;so, fathers, I desire you to withdraw, as I have done our brothers theEnglish; for I will keep you at arm's length. I lay this down as atrial for both, to see which will have the greatest regard to it, andthat side we will stand by, and make equal sharers with us. Ourbrothers, the English, have heard this, and I come now to tell it toyou; for I am not afraid to discharge you off this land. " This he saidwas the substance of what he spoke to the general, who made thisreply. 

"Now, my child, I have heard your speech: you spoke first, but it ismy time to speak now. Where is my wampum that you took away, with themarks of towns in it? This wampum I do not know, which you havedischarged me off the land with: but you need not put yourself to thetrouble of speaking, for I will not hear you. I am not afraid of fliesor musquitoes, for Indians are such as those: I tell you down thatriver I will go, and build upon it, according to my command. If theriver was blocked up, I have forces sufficient to burst it open, andtread under my feet all that stand in opposition, together with theiralliances; for my force is as the sand upon the sea shore: thereforehere is your wampum; I sling it at you. Child, you talk foolish; yousay this land belongs to you, but there is not the black of my nailyours. I saw that land sooner than you did, before the Shannoahs andyou were at war; Lead was the man who went down and took possession ofthat river. It is my land, and I will have it, let who will stand upfor, or say against it. I will buy and sell with the English(mockingly). If people will be ruled by me, they may expect kindness, but not else. "

The half king told me he had inquired of the general after twoEnglishmen, who were made prisoners, and received this answer:

"Child, you think it a very great hardship that I made prisoners ofthose two people at Venango. Don't you concern yourself with it: wetook and carried them to Canada, to get intelligence of what theEnglish were doing in Virginia. "

He informed me that they had built two forts, one on lake Erie, andanother on French creek, near a small lake, about fifteen milesasunder, and a large wagon road between. They are both built after thesame model, but different in size: that on the lake the largest. Hegave me a plan of them of his own drawing. 

The Indians inquired very particularly after their brothers inCarolina gaol. 

They also asked what sort of a boy it was who was taken from the southbranch; for they were told by some Indians, that a party of FrenchIndians had carried a white boy by Kuskuska town, towards the lakes. 

26th. We met in council at the long house about nine o'clock, when Ispoke to them as follows:

"Brothers, I have called you together in council, by order of yourbrother the governor of Virginia, to acquaint you, that I am sent withall possible despatch, to visit and deliver a letter to the Frenchcommandant, of very great importance to your brothers the English; andI dare say to you, their friends and allies. 

"I was desired, brothers, by your brother the governor to call uponyou, the sachems of the nations, to inform you of it, and to ask youradvice and assistance to proceed the nearest and best road to theFrench. You see, brothers, I have gotten thus far on my journey. 

"His honour likewise desired me to apply to you for some of your youngmen to conduct and provide provisions for us on our way; and be asafeguard against those French Indians who have taken up the hatchetagainst us. I have spoken thus particularly to you, brothers, becausehis honour our governor treats you as good friends and allies, andholds you in great esteem. To confirm what I have said, I give youthis string of wampum. "

After they had considered for some time on the above discourse, thehalf king got up and spoke. 

"Now, my brother, in regard to what my brother the governor haddesired of me, I return you this answer. 

"I rely upon you as a brother ought to do, as you say we are brothers, and one people. We shall put heart in hand and speak to our fathers, the French, concerning the speech they made to me; and you may dependthat we will endeavour to be your guard. 

"Brother, as you have asked my advice, I hope you will be ruled by it, and stay until I can provide a company to go with you. The Frenchspeech belt is not here; I have it to go for to my hunting cabin. Likewise, the people whom I have ordered in are not yet come, and cannot until the third night from this; until which time, brother, I mustbeg you to stay. 

"I intend to send the guard of Mingos, Shannoahs, and Delawares, thatour brothers may see the love and loyalty we bear them. "

As I had orders to make all possible despatch, and waiting here wasvery contrary to my inclination, I thanked him in the most suitablemanner I could; and told him that my business required the greatestexpedition, and would not admit of that delay. He was not well pleasedthat I should offer to go before the time he had appointed, and toldme, that he could not consent to our going without a guard, for fearsome accident should befall us, and draw a reflection upon him. Besides, said he, this is a matter of no small moment, and must not beentered into without due consideration; for I intend to deliver up theFrench speech belt, and make the Shannoahs and Delawares do the same. And accordingly he gave orders to king Shingiss, who was present, toattend on Wednesday night with the wampum; and two men of their nationto be in readiness to set out with us next morning. As I found it wasimpossible to get off without affronting them in the most egregiousmanner, I consented to stay. 

I gave them back a string of wampum which I met with at Mr. Frazier's, and which they sent with a speech to his honour the governor, toinform him, that three nations of French Indians, viz. Chippoways, Ottoways, and Orundaks, had taken up the hatchet against the English;and desired them to repeat it over again. But this they postponeddoing until they met in full council with the Shannoah and Delawarechiefs. 

27th. Runners were despatched very early for the Shannoah chiefs. Thehalf king set out himself to fetch the French speech belt from hishunting cabin. 

28th. He returned this evening, and came with Monakatoocha, and twoother sachems to my tent; and begged (as they had complied with hishonour the governor's request, in providing men, &c. ) to know on whatbusiness we were going to the French? This was a question I had allalong expected, and had provided as satisfactory answers to as Icould; which allayed their curiosity a little. 

Monakatoocha informed me, that an Indian from Venango brought news, afew days ago, that the French had called all the Mingos, Delawares, &c. Together at that place; and told them that they intended to havebeen down the river this fall, but the waters were growing cold, andthe winter advancing, which obliged them to go into quarters; but thatthey might assuredly expect them in the spring, with a far greaternumber; and desired that they might be quite passive, and notintermeddle unless they had a mind to draw all their force upon them:for that they expected to fight the English three years (as theysupposed there would be some attempts made to stop them) in which timethey should conquer. But that if they should prove equally strong, they and the English would join to cut them all off, and divide theland between them: that though they had lost their general, and somefew of their soldiers, yet there were men enough to reinforce them, and make them masters of the Ohio. 

This speech, he said, was delivered to them by one Captain Joncaire, their interpreter in chief, living at Venango, and a man of note inthe army. 

29th. The half king and Monakatoocha, came very early and begged me tostay one day more: for notwithstanding they had used all the diligencein their power, the Shannoah chiefs had not brought the wampum theyordered, but would certainly be in to night; if not, they would delayme no longer, but would send it after us as soon as they arrived. WhenI found them so pressing in their request, and knew that returning ofwampum was the abolishing of agreements; and giving this up wasshaking off all dependence upon the French, I consented to stay, as Ibelieved an offence offered at this crisis, might be attended withgreater ill consequence, than another day's delay. They also informedme, that Shingiss could not get in his men; and was prevented fromcoming himself by his wife's sickness; (I believe, by fear of theFrench) but that the wampum of that nation was lodged with Kustalogo, one of their chiefs, at Venango. 

In the evening, late, they came again, and acquainted me that theShannoahs were not yet arrived, but that it should not retard theprosecution of our journey. He delivered in my hearing the speech thatwas to be made to the French by Jeskakake, one of their old chiefs, which was giving up the belt the late commandant had asked for, andrepeating nearly the same speech he himself had done before. 

He also delivered a string of wampum to this chief, which was sent byking Shingiss, to be given to Kustalogo, with orders to repair to theFrench, and deliver up the wampum. 

He likewise gave a very large string of black and white wampum, whichwas to be sent up immediately to the Six Nations, if the Frenchrefused to quit the land at this warning; which was the third and lasttime, and was the right of this Jeskakake to deliver. 

30th. Last night, the great men assembled at their council house, toconsult further about this journey, and who were to go: the result ofwhich was, that only three of their chiefs, with one of their besthunters, should be our convoy. The reason they gave for not sendingmore, after what had been proposed at council the 26th, was, that agreater number might give the French suspicions of some bad design, and cause them to be treated rudely: but I rather think they could notget their hunters in. 

We set out about nine o'clock with the half king, Jeskakake, WhiteThunder, and the Hunter; and travelled on the road to Venango, wherewe arrived the fourth of December, without any thing remarkablehappening but a continued series of bad weather. 

This is an old Indian town, situated at the mouth of French creek, onOhio; and lies near north about sixty miles from the Loggstown, butmore than seventy the way we were obliged to go. 

We found the French colours hoisted at a house from which they haddriven Mr. John Frazier, an English subject. I immediately repaired toit, to know where the commander resided. There were three officers, one of whom, Captain Joncaire, informed me that he had the command ofthe Ohio; but that there was a general officer at the near fort, wherehe advised me to apply for an answer. He invited us to sup with them, and treated us with the greatest complaisance. 

The wine, as they dosed themselves pretty plentifully with it, soonbanished the restraint which at first appeared in their conversation, and gave a license to their tongues to reveal their sentiments morefreely. 

They told me, that it was their absolute design to take possession ofthe Ohio, and by G-d they would do it: for that, although they weresensible the English could raise two men for their one, yet they knewtheir motions were too slow and dilatory to prevent any undertaking oftheirs. They pretend to have an undoubted right to the river from adiscovery made by one La Salle, sixty years ago: and the rise of thisexpedition is, to prevent our settling on the river or waters of it, as they heard of some families moving out in order thereto. From thebest intelligence I could get, there have been fifteen hundred men onthis side Ontario lake. But upon the death of the general, all wererecalled to about six or seven hundred, who were left to garrison fourforts, one hundred and fifty or thereabout in each. The first of themis on French creek, near a small lake, about sixty miles from Venango, near north northwest: the next lies on lake Erie, where the greaterpart of their stores are kept, about fifteen miles from the other:from this it is one hundred and twenty miles to the carrying place, atthe falls of Lake Erie, where there is a small fort, at which theylodge their goods in bringing them from Montreal, the place fromwhence all their stores are brought. The next fort lies about twentymiles from this, on Ontario lake. Between this fort and Montreal, there are three others, the first of which is nearly opposite to theEnglish fort Oswego. From the fort on lake Erie to Montreal is aboutsix hundred miles, which, they say, requires no more (if goodweather, ) than four weeks voyage, if they go in barks or largevessels, so that they may cross the lake: but if they come in canoes, it will require five or six weeks, for they are obliged to keep underthe shore. 

5th. Rained excessively all day, which prevented our travelling. Captain Joncaire sent for the half king, as he had but just heard thathe came with me. He affected to be much concerned that I did not makefree to bring them in before. I excused it in the best manner of whichI was capable, and told him, I did not think their company agreeable, as I had heard him say a good deal in dispraise of Indians in general:but another motive prevented me from bringing them into his company: Iknew that he was an interpreter, and a person of very great influenceamong the Indians, and had lately used all possible means to draw themover to his interest; therefore, I was desirous of giving him noopportunity that could be avoided. 

When they came in, there was great pleasure expressed at seeing them. He wondered how they could be so near without coming to visit him, made several trifling presents, and applied liquor so fast, that theywere soon rendered incapable of the business they came about, notwithstanding the caution which was given. 

6th. The half king came to my tent, quite sober, and insisted verymuch that I should stay and hear what he had to say to the French. Ifain would have prevented him from speaking any thing until he came tothe commandant, but could not prevail. He told me, that at this placea council fire was kindled, where all their business with these peoplewas to be transacted, and that the management of the Indian affairswas left solely to Monsieur Joncaire. As I was desirous of knowing theissue of this, I agreed to stay; but sent our horses a little way upFrench creek, to raft over and encamp; which I knew would make it nearnight. 

About ten o'clock, they met in council. The king spoke much the sameas he had before done to the general; and offered the French speechbelt which had before been demanded, with the marks of four towns onit, which Monsieur Joncaire refused to receive, but desired him tocarry it to the fort to the commander. 

7th. Monsieur La Force, Commissary of the French stores, and threeother soldiers, came over to accompany us up. We found it extremelydifficult to get the Indians off to-day, as every stratagem had beenused to prevent their going up with me. I had last night left JohnDavidson (the Indian interpreter) whom I brought with me from town, and strictly charged him not to be out of their company, as I couldnot get them over to my tent; for they had some business withKustologa, chiefly to know why he did not deliver up the French speechbelt which he had in keeping: but I was obliged to send Mr. Gist overto-day to fetch them, which he did with great persuasion. 

At twelve o'clock, we set out for the fort, and were prevented fromarriving there until the eleventh by excessive rains, snows, and badtravelling through many mires and swamps; these we were obliged topass to avoid crossing the creek, which was impossible, either byfording or rafting, the water was so high and rapid. 

We passed over much good land since we left Venango, and throughseveral extensive and very rich meadows, one of which, I believe, wasnearly four miles in length, and considerably wide in some places. 

12th. I prepared early to wait upon the commander, and was received, and conducted to him by the second officer in command. I acquaintedhim with my business, and offered my commission and letter: both ofwhich he desired me to keep until the arrival of Monsieur Reparti, captain at the next fort, who was sent for and expected every hour. 

This commander is a knight of the military order of St. Louis, andnamed Legardeur de St. Pierre. He is an elderly gentleman, and hasmuch the air of a soldier. He was sent over to take the command, immediately upon the death of the late general, and arrived here aboutseven days before me. 

At two o'clock, the gentleman who was sent for arrived, when I offeredthe letter, &c. Again, which they received, and adjourned into aprivate apartment for the captain to translate, who understood alittle English. After he had done it, the commander desired I wouldwalk in and bring my interpreter to peruse and correct it; which Idid. 

13th. The chief officers retired to hold a council of war, which gaveme an opportunity of taking the dimensions of the fort, and makingwhat observations I could. 

It is situated on the south, or west fork of French creek, near thewater; and is almost surrounded by the creek, and a small branch of itwhich forms a kind of island. Four houses compose the sides. Thebastions are made of piles driven into the ground, standing more thantwelve feet above it, and sharp at top; with port holes cut forcannon, and loop holes for the small arms to fire through. There areeight six pound pieces mounted in each bastion, and one piece of fourpound before the gate. In the bastions are a guard house, chapel, doctor's lodging, and the commander's private store: round which arelaid platforms for the cannon and men to stand on. There are severalbarracks without the fort, for the soldiers' dwelling, covered, somewith bark, and some with boards, made chiefly of logs. There are alsoseveral other houses, such as stables, smith's shop, &c. 

I could get no certain account of the number of men here; butaccording to the best judgment I could form, there are an hundred, exclusive of officers, of which there are many. I also gave orders tothe people who were with me, to take an exact account of the canoeswhich were hauled up to convey their forces down in the spring. Thisthey did, and told fifty of birch bark, and an hundred and seventy ofpine; besides many others which were blocked out, in readiness forbeing made. 

14th. As the snow increased very fast, and our horses daily becameweaker, I sent them off unloaded, under the care of Barnaby Currin andtwo others, to make all convenient despatch to Venango, and there towait our arrival, if there was a prospect of the river's freezing: ifnot, then to continue down to Shanapin's town, at the forks of Ohio, and there to wait until we came to cross the Alleghany; intendingmyself to go down by water, as I had the offer of a canoe or two. 

As I found many plots concerted to retard the Indians' business, andprevent their returning with me, I endeavoured all that lay in mypower to frustrate their schemes, and hurried them on to execute theirintended design. They accordingly pressed for admittance this evening, which at length was granted them, privately, to the commander and oneor two other officers. The half king told me that he offered thewampum to the commander, who evaded taking it, and made many fairpromises of love and friendship; said he wanted to live in peace andtrade amicably with them, as a proof of which, he would send somegoods immediately down to the Loggstown for them. But I rather thinkthe design of that is to bring away all our straggling traders theymeet with, as I privately understood they intended to carry anofficer, &c. With them. And what rather confirms this opinion, I wasinquiring of the commander by what authority he had made prisoners ofseveral of our English subjects. He told me that the country belongedto them; that no Englishman had a right to trade upon those waters;and that he had orders to make every person prisoner who attempted iton the Ohio, or the waters of it. 

I inquired of Captain Reparti about the boy that was carried by thisplace, as it was done while the command devolved on him, between thedeath of the late general, and the arrival of the present. Heacknowledged that a boy had been carried past: and that the Indianshad two or three white men's scalps, (I was told by some of theIndians at Venango, eight) but pretended to have forgotten the name ofthe place where the boy came from, and all the particular facts, though he had questioned him for some hours, as they were carryingpast. I likewise inquired what they had done with John Trotter andJames M'Clocklan, two Pennsylvania traders, whom they had taken withall their goods. They told me that they had been sent to Canada, butwere now returned home. 

This evening, I received an answer to his honour the governor'sletter, from the commandant. 

15th. The commandant ordered a plentiful store of liquor, provision, &c. To be put on board our canoes, and appeared to be extremelycomplaisant, though he was exerting every artifice which he couldinvent to set our Indians at variance with us, to prevent their goinguntil after our departure: presents, rewards, and every thing whichcould be suggested by him or his officers. I can not say that ever inmy life I suffered so much anxiety as I did in this affair. I saw thatevery stratagem, which the most fruitful brain could invent, waspractised to win the half king to their interest; and that leaving himthere was giving them the opportunity they aimed at. I went to thehalf king and pressed him in the strongest terms to go; he told methat the commandant would not discharge him until the morning. I thenwent to the commandant, and desired him to do their business, andcomplained of ill treatment; for keeping them, as they were part of mycompany, was detaining me. This he promised not to do, but to forwardmy journey as much as he could. He protested he did not keep them, butwas ignorant of the cause of their stay; though I soon found it out. He had promised them a present of guns, &c. If they would wait untilthe morning. As I was very much pressed by the Indians to wait thisday for them, I consented, on a promise that nothing should hinderthem in the morning. 

16th. The French were not slack in their inventions to keep theIndians this day also. But as they were obliged, according to promise, to give the present, they then endeavoured to try the power of liquor, which I doubt not would have prevailed at any other time than this:but I urged and insisted with the king so closely upon his word, thathe refrained, and set off with us as he had engaged. 

We had a tedious and very fatiguing passage down the creek. Severaltimes we had like to have been staved against rocks; and many timeswere obliged all hands to get out and remain in the water half an houror more, getting over the shoals. At one place, the ice had lodged, and made it impassable by water; we were, therefore, obliged to carryour canoe across the neck of land, a quarter of a mile over. We didnot reach Venango until the 22d, where we met with our horses. 

This creek is extremely crooked. I dare say the distance between thefort and Venango, can not be less than one hundred and thirty miles tofollow the meanders. 

23d. When I got things ready to set off, I sent for the half king, toknow whether he intended to go with us, or by water. He told me thatWhite Thunder had hurt himself much, and was sick, and unable to walk;therefore he was obliged to carry him down in a canoe. As I found heintended to stay here a day or two, and knew that Monsieur Joncairewould employ every scheme to set him against the English, as he hadbefore done, I told him, I hoped he would guard against his flattery, and let no fine speeches influence him in their favour. He desired Imight not be concerned, for he knew the French too well, for any thingto engage him in their favour; and that though he could not go downwith us, he yet would endeavour to meet at the forks with JosephCampbell, to deliver a speech for me to carry to his honour thegovernor. He told me he would order the Young Hunter to attend us, andget provisions, &c. If wanted. 

Our horses were now so weak and feeble, and the baggage so heavy, (aswe were obliged to provide all the necessaries which the journey wouldrequire) that we doubted much their performing it. Therefore, myselfand others, except the drivers, who were obliged to ride, gave up ourhorses for packs, to assist along with the baggage. I put myself in anIndian walking dress, and continued with them three days, until Ifound there was no probability of their getting home in any reasonabletime. The horses became less able to travel every day; the coldincreased very fast; and the roads were becoming much worse by a deepsnow, continually freezing: therefore, as I was uneasy to get back, tomake report of my proceedings to his honour the governor, I determinedto prosecute my journey, the nearest way through the woods, on foot. 

Accordingly, I left Mr. Vanbraam in charge of our baggage, with moneyand directions to provide necessaries from place to place forthemselves and horses, and to make the most convenient despatch intravelling. 

I took my necessary papers, pulled off my clothes, and tied myself upin a watch coat. Then, with gun in hand, and pack on my back, in whichwere my papers and provisions, I set out with Mr. Gist, fitted in thesame manner, on Wednesday the 26th. The day following, just after wehad passed a place called Murdering town, (where we intended to quitthe path and steer across the country for Shanapin's town) we fell inwith a party of French Indians, who had laid in wait for us. One ofthem fired at Mr. Gist or me, not fifteen steps off, but fortunatelymissed. We took this fellow into custody, and kept him until aboutnine o'clock at night, then let him go, and walked all the remainingpart of the night without making any stop, that we might get thestart, so far, as to be out of the reach of their pursuit the nextday, since we were well assured they would follow our track as soon asit was light. The next day we continued travelling until quite dark, and got to the river about two miles above Shanapin's. We expected tohave found the river frozen, but it was not, only about fifty yardsfrom each shore. The ice, I suppose, had broken up above, for it wasdriving in vast quantities. 

There was no way for getting over but on a raft, which we set about, with but one poor hatchet, and finished just after sun setting. Thiswas a whole day's work: we next got it launched, then went on board ofit, and set off; but before we were half way over, we were jammed inthe ice, in such a manner, that we expected every moment our raft tosink, and ourselves to perish. I put out my setting pole to try tostop the raft, that the ice might pass by, when the rapidity of thestream threw it with so much violence against the pole, that it jerkedme out into ten feet water; but I fortunately saved myself by catchinghold of one of the raft logs. Notwithstanding all our efforts, wecould not get to either shore, but were obliged, as we were near anisland, to quit our raft and make to it. 

The cold was so extremely severe, that Mr. Gist had all his fingers, and some of his toes frozen, and the water was shut up so hard, thatwe found no difficulty in getting off the island on the ice in themorning, and went to Mr. Frazier's. We met here with twenty warriors, who were going to the southward to war; but coming to a place on thehead of the great Kanawa, where they found seven people killed andscalped, (all but one woman with very light hair) they turned aboutand ran back, for fear the inhabitants should rise and take them asthe authors of the murder. They report that the bodies were lyingabout the house, and some of them much torn and eaten by the hogs. Bythe marks which were left, they say they were French Indians of theOttoway nation, &c. Who did it. 

As we intended to take horses here, and it required some time to findthem, I went up about three miles to the mouth of Yohogany, to visitqueen Alliquippa, who had expressed great concern that we passed herin going to the fort. I made her a present of a watch coat and abottle of rum, which latter was thought much the best present of thetwo. 

Tuesday, the first of January, we left Mr. Frazier's house, andarrived at Mr. Gist's, at Monongahela, the second, where I bought ahorse, saddle, &c. The sixth, we met seventeen horses loaded withmaterials and stores for a fort at the forks of Ohio, and the dayafter, some families going out to settle. This day, we arrived atWills' creek, after as fatiguing a journey as it is possible toconceive, rendered so by excessive bad weather. From the first day ofDecember to the fifteenth, there was but one day on which it did notrain or snow incessantly; and throughout the whole journey, we metwith nothing but one continued series of cold, wet weather, whichoccasioned very uncomfortable lodgings, especially after we hadquitted our tent, which was some screen from the inclemency of it. 

On the 11th, I got to Belvoir, where I stopped one day to takenecessary rest; and then set out and arrived in Williamsburg the 16th, when I waited upon his honour the governor, with the letter I hadbrought from the French commandant, and to give an account of thesuccess of my proceedings. This I beg leave to do by offering theforegoing narrative, as it contains the most remarkable occurrenceswhich happened in my journey. 

I hope what has been said will be sufficient to make your honoursatisfied with my conduct; for that was my aim in undertaking thejourney, and chief study throughout the prosecution of it. 

 * * * * *

NOTE--No. II. _See Page 10. _

_The author is indebted, for the letter alluded to, to the Editor ofthe Lancaster Journal. _

SIR, --I am really sorry that I have it not in my power to answer yourrequest, in a more satisfactory manner. If you had favoured me withthe journal a few days sooner, I would have examined it carefully, andendeavoured to point out such errors as might conduce to your use, myadvantage, and the public satisfaction; but now it is out of my power. 

I had no time to make any remarks upon that piece which is called myjournal. The enclosed are observations on the French notes. They areof no use to me separated, nor will they, I believe, be of any to you;yet I send them unconnected and incoherent as they were taken, for Ihave no opportunity to correct them. 

In regard to the journal, I can only observe in general, that I keptno regular one during that expedition: rough minutes of occurrences Icertainly took, and find them as certainly and strangelymetamorphosed--some parts left out which I remember were entered, andmany things added that never were thought of; the names of men andthings egregiously miscalled; and the whole of what I saw Englished, is very incorrect and nonsensical:--yet, I will not pretend to saythat the little body who brought it to me, has not made a literaltranslation, and a good one. 

Short as my time is, I can not help remarking on Villiers' account ofthe battle of, and transactions at the Meadows, as it is veryextraordinary, and not less erroneous than inconsistent. He says theFrench received the first fire. It is well known that we received itat six hundred paces distance. He also says, our fears obliged us toretreat in the most disorderly manner after the capitulation. How isthis consistent with his other account? He acknowledges that wesustained the attack, warmly, from ten in the morning until dark, andthat he called first to parley, which strongly indicates that we werenot totally absorbed in fear. If the gentleman in his account hadadhered to the truth, he must have confessed, that we looked upon hisoffer to parley as an artifice to get into and examine our trenches, and refused on this account, until they desired an officer might besent to them, and gave their parole for his safe return. He mightalso, if he had been as great a lover of the truth as he was of vainglory, have said, that we absolutely refused their first and secondproposals, and would consent to capitulate on no other terms than suchas we obtained. That we were wilfully, or ignorantly deceived by ourinterpreter in regard to the word _assassination_, I do aver, and willto my dying moment; so will every officer that was present. Theinterpreter was a Dutchman, little acquainted with the English tongue, therefore might not advert to the tone and meaning of the word inEnglish; but, whatever his motives were for so doing, certain it is, he called it the _death_, or the _loss_ of the Sieur Jumonville. So wereceived and so we understood it, until to our great surprise andmortification, we found it otherwise in a literal translation. That weleft our baggage and horses at the Meadows is certain; that there wasnot even a possibility to bring them away is equally certain, as wehad every horse belonging to the camp killed or taken away during theaction; so that it was impracticable to bring any thing off that ourshoulders were not able to bear, and to wait there was impossible, forwe had scarce three days provisions, and were seventy miles from asupply; yet, to say we came off precipitately is absolutely false;notwithstanding they did, contrary to articles, suffer their Indiansto pillage our baggage, and commit all kinds of irregularity, we werewith them until ten o'clock the next day; we destroyed our powder andother stores, nay, even our private baggage, to prevent its fallinginto their hands, as we could not bring it off. When we had got abouta mile from the place of action, we missed two or three of thewounded, and sent a party back to bring them up-this is the party hespeaks of. We brought them all safe off, and encamped within threemiles of the Meadows. These are circumstances, I think, that make itevidently clear, that we were not very apprehensive of danger. Thecolours he speaks of to be left, was a large flag of immense size andweight; our regimental colours were brought off and are now in mypossession. Their gasconades, and boasted clemency, must appear in themost ludicrous light to every considerate person who reads Villiers'journal;--such preparations for an attack, such vigour and intrepidityas he pretends to have conducted his march with, such revenge, as byhis own account, appeared in his attack, considered, it will hardly bethought that compassion was his motive for calling a parley. But tosum up the whole, Mr. Villiers pays himself no great compliment, insaying, we were struck with a panic when matters were adjusted. Wesurely could not be afraid without cause, and if we had cause aftercapitulation, it was a reflection upon himself. 

I do not doubt, but your good nature will excuse the badness of mypaper, and the incoherence of my writing--think you see me in a publichouse in a crowd, surrounded with noise, and you hit my case. You dome particular honour in offering your friendship: I wish I may be sohappy as always to merit it, and deserve your correspondence, which Ishould be glad to cultivate. 

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NOTE--No. III. _See Page 51. _

SIR, -We your most obedient and affectionate officers, beg leave toexpress our great concern, at the disagreeable news we have receivedof your determination to resign the command of that corps, in which wehave under you long served. 

The happiness we have enjoyed, and the honour we have acquiredtogether, with the mutual regard that has always subsisted between youand your officers, have implanted so sensible an affection in theminds of us all, that we can not be silent on this critical occasion. 

In our earliest infancy you took us under your tuition, trained us upin the practice of that discipline, which alone can constitute goodtroops, from the punctual observance of which you never suffered theleast deviation. 

Your steady adherence to impartial justice, your quick discernment, and invariable regard to merit, wisely intended to inculcate thosegenuine sentiments of true honour and passion for glory, from whichthe greatest military achievements have been derived, first heightenedour natural emulation and our desire to excel. How much we improved bythose regulations and your own example, with what alacrity we havehitherto discharged our duty, with what cheerfulness we haveencountered the severest toils, especially while under your particulardirections, we submit to yourself, and natter ourselves that we havein a great measure answered your expectations. 

Judge, then, how sensibly we must be affected with the loss of such anexcellent commander, such a sincere friend, and so affable acompanion. How rare is it to find those amiable qualifications blendedtogether in one man! How great the loss of such a man! Adieu to thatsuperiority, which the enemy have granted us over other troops, andwhich even the regulars and provincials have done us the honourpublicly to acknowledge! Adieu to that strict discipline and order, which you have always maintained! Adieu to that happy union andharmony, which have been our principal cement!

It gives us additional sorrow, when we reflect, to find our unhappycountry will receive a loss no less irreparable than our own. Wherewill it meet a man so experienced in military affairs--one so renownedfor patriotism, conduct, and courage? Who has so great a knowledge ofthe enemy we have to deal with?--who so well acquainted with theirsituation and strength?--who so much respected by the soldiery?--who, in short, so able to support the military character of Virginia?

Your approved love to your king and country, and your uncommonperseverance in promoting the honour and true interest of the service, convince us that the most cogent reasons only could induce you to quitit; yet we, with the greatest deference, presume to intreat you tosuspend those thoughts for another year, and to lead us on to assistin the glorious work of extirpating our enemies, towards which, soconsiderable advances have been already made. In you, we place themost implicit confidence. Your presence only will cause a steadyfirmness and vigour to actuate in every breast, despising the greatestdangers, and thinking light of toils and hardships, while led on bythe man we know and love. 

But if we must be so unhappy as to part, if the exigencies of youraffairs force you to abandon us, we beg it as our last request, thatyou will recommend some person most capable to command, whose militaryknowledge, whose honour, whose conduct, and whose disinterestedprinciples, we may depend on. 

Frankness, sincerity, and a certain openness of soul, are the truecharacteristics of an officer, and we flatter ourselves that you donot think us capable of saying any thing contrary to the purestdictates of our minds. Fully persuaded of this, we beg leave to assureyou, that, as you have hitherto been the actuating soul of our wholecorps, we shall at all times pay the most invariable regard to yourwill and pleasure, and will always be happy to demonstrate by ouractions with how much respect and esteem we are, &c. 

 * * * * *

NOTE--No. IV. _See Page 54. _

The delegates of the United Colonies of New Hampshire, MassachusettsBay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the counties of Newcastle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina:

To George Washington, esquire. 

We, reposing special trust and confidence in your patriotism, valour, conduct, and fidelity, do, by these presents constitute and appointyou to be general and commander-in-chief of the army of the UnitedColonies, and of all the forces now raised, or to be raised by them, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service, and jointhe said army for the defence of American liberty, and for repellingevery hostile invasion thereof: and you are hereby invested with fullpower and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfareof the service. 

And we do hereby strictly charge and require all officers and soldiersunder your command, to be obedient to your orders, and diligent in theexercise of their several duties. 

And we also enjoin and require you to be careful in executing thegreat trust reposed in you, by causing strict discipline and order tobe observed in the army, and that the soldiers be duly exercised andprovided with all convenient necessaries. 

And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by the rules anddiscipline of war, (as herewith given you) and punctually to observeand follow such orders and directions from time to time as you shallreceive from this or a future congress of these United Colonies, orcommittee of congress. 

This commission to continue in force, until revoked by us, or a futurecongress. 

 * * * * *

NOTE--No. V. _See Page 78. _

_This letter is so truly characteristic of the writer, and treats in amanner so peculiar to himself, the measures of congress on thissubject, that, although it may not be immediately connected with theLife of General Washington, the reader will not be displeased with itsinsertion. _

Stamford, January 22, 1779. 

SIR, --As General Washington has informed the congress of his motivesfor detaching me, it is needless to trouble you upon the subject. I amtherefore only to inform you that I have collected a body of abouttwelve hundred men from the colony of Connecticut, whose zeal andardour demonstrated on this occasion can not be sufficiently praised. With this body I am marching directly to New York to execute thedifferent purposes for which I am detached. I am sensible, sir, thatnothing can carry the air of greater presumption than a servantintruding his opinion unasked upon his master, but at the same timethere are certain seasons when the real danger of the master may notonly excuse, but render laudable, the servant's officiousness. Itherefore flatter myself that the congress will receive withindulgence and lenity the opinion I shall offer. The scheme of simplydisarming the tories seems to me totally ineffectual; it will onlyembitter their minds and add virus to their venom. They can, and will, always be supplied with fresh arms by the enemy. That of seizing themost dangerous will, I apprehend, from the vagueness of theinstruction, be attended with some bad consequences, and can answer nogood one. It opens so wide a door for partiality and prejudice to thedifferent congresses and committees on the continent, that muchdiscord and animosity will probably ensue; it being next to impossibleto distinguish who are, and who are not the most dangerous. The planof explaining to these deluded people the justice and merits of theAmerican cause is certainly generous and humane, but I am afraid, willbe fruitless. They are so riveted in their opinions, that I ampersuaded should an angel descend from heaven with his golden trumpet, and ring in their ears that their conduct was criminal, he would bedisregarded. I had lately myself an instance of their infatuationwhich, if it is not impertinent, I will relate. At Newport I took theliberty, without any authority but the conviction of necessity, toadminister a very strong oath to some of the leading tories, for whichliberty I humbly ask pardon of the congress. One article of this oathwas to take arms in defence of their country, if called upon by thevoice of the congress. To this Colonel Wanton and others flatlyrefused their assent; to take arms against their sovereign, they said, was too monstrous an impiety. I asked them if they had lived at thetime of the revolution whether they would have beenrevolutionists--their answers were at first evasive, circuitous, andunintelligible, but, by fixing them down precisely to the question, Iat length drew from them a positive confession that no violence, noprovocation on the part of the court, could prevail upon them to actwith the continent. Such, I am afraid, is the creed and principles ofthe whole party great and small. --Sense, reason, argument, andeloquence, have been expended in vain; and in vain you may still argueand reason to the end of time. Even the common feelings andresentments of humanity have not aroused them, but rather with amalignant pleasure they have beheld the destruction of theirfellow-citizens and relations. But I am running into declamation, perhaps impertinent and presuming, when I ought to confine myself tothe scheme I submit to your consideration. It is, sir, in the firstplace, to disarm all the manifestly disaffected, as well of the loweras the higher class, not on the principle of putting them in a stateof impotence (for this I observed before will not be the case) but tosupply our troops with arms of which they stand in too great need. Secondly, to appraise their estates and oblige them to deposite atleast the value of one half of their respective property in the handsof the continental congress as a security for their good behaviour. And lastly, to administer the strongest oath that can be devised toact offensively and defensively in support of the common rights. Iconfess that men so eaten up with bigotry, as the bulk of them appearto be, will not consider themselves as bound by this oath;particularly as it is in some measure forced, they will argue that itis by no means obligatory; but if I mistake not, it will be a sort ofcriterion by which you will be able to distinguish the desperatefanatics from those who are reclaimable. The former must of course besecured and carried to some interior parts of the continent where theycan not be dangerous. This mode of proceeding I conceive (if any can)will be effectual--but whether it meets with the approbation ordisapprobation of the congress, I most humbly conjure them not toattribute the proposal to arrogance, or self-conceit, or pragmaticalofficiousness, but, at worst, to an intemperate zeal for the publicservice. 

Notwithstanding the apparent slimness of the authority, as I am myselfconvinced that it is substantial, I think it my duty to communicate acircumstance to congress. I have with me here, sir, a deserter fromCaptain Wallace's ship before Newport. It is necessary to inform youthat this Captain Wallace has the reputation of being the mostimprudent and rash of all mortals--particularly when he is heated withwine, which, as reported, is a daily incident: that in these momentshe blabs his most secret instructions even to the common men. Thisdeserter, then, informs us that the captain a few days ago assembledthe sailors and marines on the quarter-deck, and assured them, by wayof encouragement, that they were to proceed very soon to New York, where they were to be joined by his majesty's most loyal subjects ofWhite Plains, Poughkeepsie, and Long Island, and at the same timebestowed abundantly his curses on the admiral and general for theirdilatoriness and scandalous conduct in not availing themselves soonerof the invitation they had received from the worthy gentlemen. Thecongress will make what comments they please on this information, which I must repeat I thought it my duty to communicate. Upon thewhole, sir, you may be assured that it is the intention of theministerialists to take possession, and immediately, of New York. Theintercepted letters, the unguarded expressions of their officers, intheir interviews with ours on the lines, but above all the manifestadvantages resulting to their cause from this measure, put theirintention beyond dispute. With submission therefore to the wisdom ofthe congress, it behooves them, I should think, not to lose a momentin securing this important post, which, if in the hands of the enemy, must cut the continent in twain, and render it almost impossible forthe northern and southern colonies to support each other. This crisis, when every thing is at stake, is not a time to be over complacent tothe timidity of the inhabitants of any particular spot. I have nowunder my command a respectable force adequate to the purpose ofsecuring the place, and purging all its environs of traitors, on whichsubject I shall expect with impatience the determination of thecongress. Their orders I hope to receive before or immediately on myarrival. 

This instant, the enclosed, express from the provincial congress ofNew York, was delivered into my hands, but as these gentlemen probablyare not fully apprised of the danger hanging over their heads, as Ihave received intelligence from the camp that the fleet is sailed, andthat it is necessary to urge my march, I shall proceed with onedivision of the forces under my command to that city. A moment's delaymay be fatal. The force I shall carry with me is not strong enough toact offensively, but just sufficient to secure the city against anyimmediate designs of the enemy. If this is to give umbrage, if thegovernor and captain of the man of war are pleased to construe thisstep as an act of positive hostility, if they are to prescribe whatnumber of your troops are and what number are not to enter the city, all I can say is that New York must be considered as the minister'splace, and not the continent. I must now, sir, beg pardon for thelength of this letter, and more so, for the presumption in offering sofreely my thoughts to the congress, from whom it is my duty simply toreceive my orders, and as a servant and soldier strictly to obey;which none can do with greater ardour and affection than, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant, CHARLES LEE. 

To the honourable John Hancock, esquire, president of the continentalcongress. 

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NOTE--No. VI. _See Page 153. _

THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS WHO SUBSCRIBED THE DECLARATION OFINDEPENDENCE WERE AS FOLLOWS, VIZ:

_New Hampshire. _

Josiah Bartlett, William Whipple, Matthew Thornton. 

_Massachusetts Bay. _

Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry. 

_Rhode Island, &c. _

Stephen Hopkins, William Ellery. 

_Connecticut. _

Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, William Williams, Oliver Wolcott. 

_New York. _

William Floyd, Philip Livingston, Francis Lewis, Lewis Morris. 

_New Jersey. _

Richard Stockton, John Witherspoon, Francis Hopkinson, John Hart, Abram Clark. 

_Pennsylvania. _

Robert Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, John Morton, George Clymer, James Smith, George Taylor, James Wilson, George Ross. 

_Delaware. _

Cesar Rodney, George Reed. 

_Maryland. _

Samuel Chase, William Paca, Thomas Stone, Charles Carroll, _of Carrollton_. 

_Virginia. _

George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Nelson, jun. Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton. 

_North Carolina. _

William Hooper, Joseph Hughes, John Penn. 

_South Carolina. _

Edward Rutledge, Thomas Heyward, jun. Thomas Lynch, jun. Arthur Middleton. 

_Georgia. _

Button Gwinn, George Walton, Lyman Hall. 

The people of the United States have taken such universal interest inthe composition of this celebrated instrument as to excuse a moreminute attention to it than has been bestowed on the othercotemporaneous state papers. 

Mr. Jefferson has preserved a copy of the original draft as reportedby the committee, with the amendments made to it in congress, whichhas been published in his correspondence. The following is extractedfrom that work. 

_Mr. Jefferson's draft as _As amended by congress. _reported by the committee. _

A declaration by the A declaration by therepresentatives of the representatives of theUnited States of America United States of Americain _general_ congress in congress assembled. Assembled. 

When in the course ofhuman events it becomesnecessary for one people todissolve the political bondswhich have connected themwith another, and to assumeamong the powers of theearth the separate and equal Not altered. Station to which the laws ofnature and of nature's Godentitle them, a decent respectfor the opinions of mankindrequires that they shoulddeclare the causes which impelthem to the separation. 

We hold these truths to be We hold these truths to beself-evident, that all men are self-evident, that all men arecreated equal; that they are created equal; that they areendowed by their creator with endowed by their creator with_inherent and_ inalienable _certain_ inalienable rights;rights; that among these are that among these are life, life, liberty, and the pursuit liberty, and the pursuit ofof happiness; that to secure happiness; that to securethese rights, governments are these rights, governments areinstituted among men, deriving instituted among men, derivingtheir just powers from their just powers fromthe consent of the governed; the consent of the governed;that whenever any form of that whenever any form ofgovernment becomes destructive government becomes destructiveof these ends, it is the of these ends, it is theright of the people to alter or right of the people to alter orto abolish it, and to institute to abolish it, and to institutenew government, laying its new government, laying itsfoundation on such principles, foundation on such principles, and organising its powers in and organising its powers insuch form, as to them shall such form, as to them shallseem most likely to effect their seem most likely to effect theirsafety and happiness. Prudence safety and happiness. Prudenceindeed will dictate that indeed will dictate thatgovernments long established governments long establishedshould not be changed for should not be changed forlight and transient causes; light and transient causes;and accordingly all experience and accordingly all experiencehath shown that mankind are hath shown that mankind aremore disposed to suffer while more disposed to suffer whileevils are sufferable, than to evils are sufferable, than toright themselves by abolishing right themselves by abolishingthe forms to which they the forms to which theyare accustomed. But when a are accustomed. But when along train of abuses and long train of abuses andusurpations _begun at a usurpations pursuingdistinguished period and_ invariably the same object, pursuing invariably the same evinces a design to reduceobject, evinces a design to them under absolute despotism, reduce them under absolute it is their right, it isdespotism, it is their right, their duty to throw off suchit is their duty to throw off government, and to providesuch government, and to provide new guards for their futurenew guards for their security. Such has been thefuture security. Such has patient sufferance of thesebeen the patient sufferings of colonies, and such is now thethese colonies; and such is necessity which constrainsnow the necessity which constrains them to _alter_ their formerthem to _expunge_ their systems of government. Theformer systems of government. History of the present king ofThe history of the Great Britain is a history ofpresent king of Great Britain _repeated_ injuries andis a history of _unremitting_ usurpations, _all having_injuries and usurpations in direct object_among which appears no the establishment of ansolitary fact to contradict the absolute tyranny over theseuniform tenor of the rest, but states. To prove this let factsall have_ in direct object the be submitted to a candidestablishment of an absolute world. Tyranny over these states. Toprove this let facts be submittedto a candid world, _forthe truth of which we pledgea faith yet unsullied byfalsehood_. 

He has refused his assentto laws the most wholesome Not altered. And necessary for the publicgood. 

He has forbidden hisgovernors to pass laws ofimmediate and pressingimportance, unless suspended Not altered. In their operation till hisassent should be obtained;and when so suspended hehas utterly neglected toattend to them. 

He has refused to passother laws for the accommodationof large districts ofpeople, unless those peoplewould relinquish the right of Not altered. Representation in thelegislature, a right inestimableto them, and formidable totyrants only. 

He has called togetherlegislative bodies at placesunusual, uncomfortable, anddistant from the depositary of Not altered. Their public records, for thesole purpose of fatiguingthem into compliance with hismeasures. 

He has dissolved representative He has dissolved representativehouses repeatedly _and houses repeatedly forcontinually_, for opposing with opposing with manly firmnessmanly firmness his invasions his invasions on the rights ofon the rights of the people. The people. 

He has refused for a longtime after such dissolutions tocause others to be elected, whereby the legislativepowers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people Not altered. At large for their exercise, the state remaining, in themean time, exposed to thedangers of invasion fromwithout and convulsionswithin. 

He has endeavoured toprevent the population ofthese states; for that purposeobstructing the laws for thenaturalization of foreigners, Not altered. Refusing to pass others toencourage their migrationshither, and raising theconditions of new appropriationsof lands. 

He has _suffered_ the He has _obstructed_ theadministration of justice administration of justice_totally to cease in some _by_ refusing his assentof these states_, refusing his to laws for establishingassent to laws for establishing judiciary powers. Judiciary powers. 

He has made _our_ judges He has made judges dependentdependent on his will alone on his will alone for thefor the tenure of their offices, tenure of their offices, and theand the amount and payment amount and payment of theirof their salaries. Salaries. 

He has erected a multitude He has erected a multitudeof new offices, _by a of new offices, and sent hitherself-assumed power_, and swarms of new officers tosent hither swarms of new harass our people and eat outofficers to harass our people their substance. And eat out their substance. 

He has kept among us in He has kept among us intimes of peace standing armies times of peace standing armies_and ships of war_ without without the consent of ourthe consent of our legislatures. Legislatures. 

He has affected to renderthe military independence of Not altered. And superior to the civilpower. 

He has combined with He has combined withothers to subject us to a others to subject us to ajurisdiction foreign to our jurisdiction foreign to ourconstitutions and constitutions andunacknowledged unacknowledgedby our laws, giving his assent by our laws, giving his assentto their acts of pretended to their acts of pretendedlegislation for quartering legislation for quarteringlarge bodies of armed troops large bodies of armed troopsamong us; for protecting by among us; for protecting bya mock trial from punishment a mock trial from punishmentfor any murders which they for any murders which theyshould commit on the inhabitants should commit on the inhabitantsof these states; for cutting of these states; for cuttingoff our trade with all off our trade with allparts of the world; for imposing parts of the world; for imposingtaxes on us without taxes on us withoutour consent; for depriving us our consent; for depriving usof the benefits of trial by _in many cases_ of thejury; for transporting us beyond benefits of trial by jury;seas to be tried for pretended for transporting us beyondoffences; for abolishing seas to be tried for pretendedthe free system of English offences; for abolishing thelaws in a neighbouring province, free system of English lawsestablishing therein an in a neighbouring province, arbitrary government, and establishing therein anenlarging its boundaries, so arbitrary government, andas to render it at once an enlarging its boundaries, soexample and fit instrument for as to render it at once anintroducing the same absolute example and fit instrument forrule into these _states_; for introducing the same absolutetaking away our charters, rule into these _colonies_;abolishing our most valuable for taking away our charters, laws, and altering fundamentally abolishing our most valuablethe forms of our governments; laws, and altering fundamentallyfor suspending our the forms of our governments;own legislatures, and declaring for suspending our ownthemselves invested with legislatures, and declaringpower to legislate for us in themselves invested withall cases whatsoever. Power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. 

He has abdicated government He has abdicated governmenthere, _withdrawing his here _by declaring us outgovernors and declaring us of his protection and wagingout of his allegiance and war against us_. Protection_. 

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our Not altered. Towns and destroyed the livesof our people. 

He is at this time transporting He is at this time transportinglarge armies of foreign large armies of foreignmercenaries to complete the mercenaries to complete theworks of death, desolation works of death, destructionand tyranny already begun and tyranny already begunwith circumstances of cruelty with circumstances of crueltyand perfidy unworthy the and perfidy _scarcelyhead of a civilized nation. Paralleled in the most barbarous ages and totally_ unworthy the head of a civilized nation. 

He has constrained ourfellow-citizens taken captiveon the high seas to bear armsagainst their country, to Not altered. Become the executioners oftheir friends and brethren, orto fall themselves by theirhands. 

He has endeavoured to He has _excited domesticbring on the inhabitants of insurrections among us and has_the frontiers the merciless endeavoured to bring on theIndian savages whose known inhabitants of the frontiersrule of warfare is an the merciless Indian savagesundistinguished destruction of whose known rule of warfareall ages, sexes and conditions is an undistinguished destruction_of existence_. Of all ages, sexes, and conditions. 

He has excited treasonableinsurrections of ourfellow-citizens, with the Struck out. Allurements of forfeiture andconfiscation of our property. 

He has waged cruel waragainst human nature itself, violating its most sacredrights of life and liberty inthe persons of a distant peoplewho never offended him, captivating and carrying theminto slavery in anotherhemisphere, or to incurmiserable death in theirtransportation thither. This piratical warfare, theopprobrium of INFIDEL powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIANking of Great Britain. Determined to keep open amarket where MEN should bebought and sold, he hasprostituted his negative for Struck out. Suppressing every legislativeattempt to prohibit or torestrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblageof horrors might want no fact ofdistinguished die, he is nowexciting those very people torise in arms among us, and topurchase that liberty of whichhe has deprived them, bymurdering the people on whom healso obtruded them; thus payingoff former crimes committedagainst the LIBERTIES of onepeople with crimes which heurges them to commit againstthe LIVES of another. 

In every stage of theseoppressions we have petitionedfor redress in the most Not altered. Humble terms; our repeatedpetitions have been answeredonly by repeated injuries. 

A prince whose character is A prince whose character isthus marked by every act thus marked by every actwhich may define a tyrant is which may define a tyrant isunfit to be the ruler of a unfit to be the ruler of apeople _who mean to be free. _free_ people. Future ages will scarcelybelieve that the hardiness of oneman adventured, within theshort compass of twelve yearsonly, to lay a foundation sobroad and so undisguised fortyranny over a people fosteredand fixed in principles offreedom. _

Nor have we been wanting Nor have we been wantingin attention to our British in attention to our Britishbrethren. We have warned brethren. We have warnedthem from time to time of them from time to time ofattempts by their legislature to attempts by their legislature toextend _a_ jurisdiction over extend _an unwarrantable__these our states_. We have jurisdiction over _us_. We havereminded them of the reminded them of thecircumstances of our emigration circumstances of our emigrationand settlement here; _no one of and settlement here; we _have_which could warrant so appealed to their native justicestrange a pretension; these and magnanimity, _and wewere effected at the expense have conjured them by_ theof our own blood and treasure, ties of our common kindredunassisted by the wealth or to disavow these usurpationsthe strength of Great Britain; which _would inevitably_that in constituting indeed interrupt our connexion andour several forms of government, correspondence. They too havewe had adopted one been deaf to the voice ofcommon king; thereby laying justice and of consanguinity. A foundation for perpetual _We must therefore_ acquiesceleague and amity with them; in the necessity which denouncesbut that submission to their our separation, _and hold them_parliament was no part of our as we hold the rest of mankind, constitution, nor ever in idea enemies in war, in peaceif history may be credited; friends. And_ we appealed to theirnative justice and magnanimity, _as well as to_ the ties of ourcommon kindred, to disavowthese usurpations which _werelikely to_ interrupt ourconnexion and correspondence. They too have been deaf tothe voice of justice and ofconsanguinity, _and whenoccasions have been given themby the regular course of theirlaws, of removing from theircouncils the disturbers of ourharmony, they have by theirfree election re-establishedthem in power. At this verytime too, they are permittingtheir chief magistrate to sendover not only soldiers of ourcommon blood, but Scotch andforeign mercenaries to invadeand destroy us. These factshave given the last stab toagonizing affection, andmanly spirit bids us to renouncefor ever these unfeelingbrethren. We must endeavourto forget our formerlove for them, and hold themas we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, inpeace friends. We might havebeen a free and a great peopletogether; but a communicationof grandeur and offreedom, it seems, is belowtheir dignity. Be it so, sincethey will have it. The roadto happiness and to glory isopen to us too. We will treadit apart from them, and_acquiesce in the necessitywhich denounces our _eternal_separation. 

We, therefore, the We, therefore, therepresentatives of the United representatives of the UnitedStates of America in general States of America in generalcongress assembled, do, in the congress assembled, _appealingname and by the authority of to the supreme judge of thethe good people of these world for the rectitude of our_states, reject and renounce all intentions_, do in the name, allegiance and subjection to and by the good people ofthe kings of Great Britain, these _colonies, solemnlyand all others who may hereafter publish and declare that theseclaim by, through or united colonies are and ofunder them; we utterly dissolve right ought to be free andall political connexion which independent states; that theymay heretofore have are absolved from allsubsisted between us and the allegiance to the British crown, people or parliament of Great and that all politicalBritain; and finally we do connexion between them and theassert and declare these colonies state of Great Britain is, andto be free and independent ought to be, totally dissolved_;states_, and that as free and and that as free and independentindependent states, they have states they have fullfull power to levy war, power to levy war, concludeconclude peace, contract alliances, peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do establish commerce, and to doall other acts and things all other acts and thingswhich independent states may which independent states mayof right do. Of right do. 

And for the support of this And for the support of thisdeclaration, we mutually declaration, _with a firmpledge to each other our lives, reliance on the protection ofour fortunes, and our sacred divine providence_, we mutuallyhonour. Pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour. 

The words expunged from the original draft are distinguished byitalics, as are the words that were introduced by congress. 

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NOTE--No. VII. _See Page 229. _

"My reasons for this measure, " said the Commander-in-chief in hisletter to General Lee, ordering him to cross the Hudson, "and which Ithink must have weight with you, are, that the enemy are evidentlychanging the seat of war to this side of the North river; that thiscountry, therefore, will expect the continental army to give whatsupport they can; and, if disappointed in this, will cease to dependupon, or support a force by which no protection is given to them. Itis, therefore, of the utmost importance that at least an appearance offorce should be made, to keep this state in connexion with the others. If that should not continue, it is much to be feared that itsinfluence on Pennsylvania would be very considerable; and the publicinterests would be more and more endangered. Unless, therefore, somenew event should occur, or some more cogent reason present itself, Iwould have you move over by the easiest and best passage. I amsensible your numbers will not be large, and that the movement may notperhaps be agreeable to your troops. As to the first, report willexaggerate them, and there will be preserved the appearance of anarmy, which will, at least, have the effect of encouraging thedesponding here; and, as to the other, you will doubtless represent tothem, that in duty and gratitude, their service is due wherever theenemy may make the greatest impression, or seem to intend to do so. "

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NOTE--No. VIII. _See Page 268. _

In a postscript, it is stated, that an accurate return could not beobtained, but that from the best estimate he could form, the wholeforce in Jersey fit for duty was under three thousand; all of whom, except nine hundred and eighty-one, were militia, who stood engagedonly until the last of that month. The continental troops underinoculation, including their attendants, amounted to about onethousand. 

In a letter of the sixth of March to Governor Trumbull, calling on thestate of Connecticut for two thousand militia to be marched toPeekskill, after complaining of the militia he had called from thesouthern states, who came and went as their own caprice might direct, he says, "I am persuaded, from the readiness with which you have evercomplied with all my demands, that you will exert yourself inforwarding the aforementioned number of men, upon my bare request. ButI hope you will be convinced of the necessity of the demand, when Itell you, in confidence, that after the 15th of this month, when thetime of General Lincoln's militia expires, I shall be left with theremains of five Virginia regiments, not amounting to more than as manyhundred men, and parts of two or three other continental battalions, all very weak. The remainder of the army will be composed of smallparties of militia from this state and Pennsylvania, on whom littledependence can be put, as they come and go when they please. I haveissued peremptory orders to every colonel in the regular service, tosend in what men he has recruited, even if they amount to but onehundred to a regiment: if they would do this, it would make aconsiderable force upon the whole. The enemy must be ignorant of ournumbers and situation, or they would never suffer us to remainunmolested; and I almost tax myself with imprudence in committing thesecret to paper; not that I distrust you, of whose inviolableattachment I have had so many proofs; but for fear the letter shouldby any accident fall into other hands than those for which it isintended. "

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NOTE--No. IX. _See Page 382. _

Justice to the unfortunate demands that an extract from thecorrespondence between Generals Burgoyne and Gates on this subjectshould be inserted. 

The British general had complained of the harsh treatment experiencedby the provincial prisoners taken at Bennington, and requested that asurgeon from his army should be permitted to visit the wounded; andthat he might be allowed to furnish them with necessaries andattendants. "Duty and principle, " he added, "make me a public enemy tothe Americans, who have taken up arms; but I seek to be a generousone; nor have I the shadow of resentment against any individual, whodoes not induce it by acts derogatory to those maxims, upon which allmen of honour think alike. " In answer to this letter, General Gates, who had just taken command of the American army, said, "that thesavages of America should, in their warfare, mangle and scalp theunhappy prisoners who fall into their hands is neither new norextraordinary, but that the famous Lieutenant General Burgoyne, inwhom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and the scholar, should hire the savages of America to scalp Europeans, and thedescendants of Europeans; nay more, that he should pay a price foreach scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed inEurope, until authenticated facts shall, in every gazette, confirm thetruth of the horrid tale. 

"Miss M'Crea, a young lady, lovely to the sight, of virtuouscharacter, and amiable disposition, engaged to an officer of yourarmy, was, with other women and children, taken out of a house nearfort Edward, carried into the woods, and there scalped and mangled ina most shocking manner. Two parents with their six children, were alltreated with the same inhumanity, while quietly resting in their oncehappy and peaceful dwelling. The miserable fate of Miss M'Crea wasparticularly aggravated, by being dressed to receive her promisedhusband; but met her murderer employed by you. Upwards of one hundredmen, women and children, have perished by the hands of the ruffians towhom, it is asserted, you have paid the price of blood. "

To this part of his letter, General Burgoyne replied, "I havehesitated, sir, upon answering the other paragraphs of your letter. Idisdain to justify myself against the rhapsodies of fiction andcalumny, which from the first of this contest, it has been an unvariedAmerican policy to propagate, but which no longer imposes on theworld. I am induced to deviate from this general rule, in the presentinstance, lest my silence should be construed an acknowledgment of thetruth of your allegations, and a pretence be thence taken forexercising future barbarities by the American troops. 

"By this motive, and upon this only, I condescend to inform you, thatI would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to me, forthe whole continent of America, though the wealth of worlds was in itsbowels, and a paradise upon its surface. 

"It has happened, that all my transactions with the Indian nations, last year and this, have been clearly heard, distinctly understood, accurately minuted, by very numerous, and in many parts, veryunprejudiced persons. So immediately opposite to the truth is yourassertion that I have paid a price for scalps, that one of the firstregulations established by me at the great council in May, andrepeated and enforced, and invariably adhered to since, was, that theIndians should receive compensation for prisoners, because it wouldprevent cruelty; and that not only such compensation should bewithheld, but a strict account demanded for scalps. These pledges ofconquest, for such you well know they will ever esteem them, weresolemnly and peremptorily prohibited to be taken from the wounded, andeven the dying, and the persons of aged men, women, children, andprisoners, were pronounced sacred, even in an assault. 

"In regard to Miss M'Crea, her fall wanted not the tragic display youhave laboured to give it, to make it as sincerely abhorred andlamented by me, as it can be by the tenderest of her friends. The factwas no premeditated barbarity. On the contrary, two chiefs who hadbrought her off for the purpose of security, not of violence to herperson, disputed which should be her guard, and in a fit of savagepassion in one, from whose hands she was snatched, the unhappy womanbecame the victim. Upon the first intelligence of this event, Iobliged the Indians to deliver the murderer into my hands, and thoughto have punished him by our laws, or principles of justice, would havebeen perhaps unprecedented, he certainly should have suffered anignominious death, had I not been convinced from my circumstances andobservation, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that a pardon underthe terms which I presented, and they accepted, would be moreefficacious than an execution, to prevent similar mischiefs. 

"The above instance excepted, your intelligence respecting the crueltyof the Indians is false. 

"You seem to threaten me with European publications, which affect meas little as any other threats you could make; but in regard toAmerican publications, whether your charge against me, which I acquityou of believing, was penned _from_ a gazette, or _for_ a gazette, Idesire and demand of you, as a man of honour, that should it appear inprint at all this answer may follow it. "

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NOTE--No. X. _See Page 405. _

Lord Suffolk, secretary of state, contended for the employment ofIndians, in the war. "Besides its policy and necessity, " his lordshipsaid, "that the measure was also allowable on principle, for that itwas perfectly justifiable to use all the means that God and nature hadput into our hands. "

This moving the indignation of Lord Chatham, he suddenly rose, andgave full vent to his feelings in one of the most extraordinary burstsof eloquence that the pen of history has recorded: "I am astonished, "exclaimed his lordship, "shocked to hear such principles confessed; tohear them avowed in this house or even this country. My lords, I didnot intend to have encroached again on your attention, but I can notrepress my indignation. I feel myself impelled to speak. My lords, weare called upon as members of this house, as men, as christians, toprotest against such horrible barbarity. That God and nature had putinto our hands! what ideas of God and nature that noble lord mayentertain I know not, but I know that such detestable principles areequally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What, to attribute thesacred sanction of God and nature to the massacres of the Indianscalping knife! to the cannibal savage, torturing, murdering, devouring, drinking the blood of his mangled victims! such notionsshock every precept of morality, every feeling of humanity, everysentiment of honour. These abominable principles and this moreabominable avowal of them, demand the most decisive indignation. Icall upon that right reverend and this most learned bench to vindicatethe religion of their God, to support the justice of their country. Icall upon the bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of theirlawn, upon the judges to interpose the purity of their ermine, to saveus from this pollution. I call upon the honour of your lordships, toreverence the dignity of your ancestors, and to maintain your own. Icall upon the spirit and humanity of my country, to vindicate thenational character. I invoke the genius of the constitution. From thetapestry that adorns these walls, the immortal ancestor of this noblelord, frowns with indignation at the disgrace of his country. In vaindid he defend the liberty, and establish the religion of Britainagainst the tyranny of Rome, if these worse than popish cruelties andinquisitorial practices are endured among us. To send forth themerciless cannibal thirsting for blood!--against whom?--Yourprotestant brethren--to lay waste their country, to desolate theirdwellings, and extirpate their race and name, by the aid andinstrumentality of these horrible hell-hounds of war! Spain can nolonger boast preeminence of barbarity. She armed herself withblood-hounds to extirpate the wretched natives of Mexico, but we moreruthless, loose these dogs of war against our countrymen in America, endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity. My lords, Isolemnly call upon your lordships, and upon every order of men in thestate, to stamp upon this infamous procedure the indelible stigma ofthe public abhorrence. More particularly I call upon the holy prelatesof our religion to do away this iniquity; let them perform alustration to purify their country from this deep and deadly sin. Mylords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more, but myfeelings and indignation were too strong to have said less. I couldnot have slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head upon mypillow, without giving this vent to my eternal abhorrence of suchenormous and preposterous principles. "

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NOTE--No. XI. _See Page 414. _

_The following are the letters which passed between the two generalson this subject:_

Albany, December 18, 1777. 

SIR, --I shall not attempt to describe what, as a private gentleman, Ican not help feeling, on representing to my mind the disagreeablesituation which confidential letters, when exposed to publicinspection, may place an unsuspecting correspondent in; but, as apublic officer, I conjure your excellency, to give me all theassistance you can, in tracing out the author of the infidelity, whichput extracts from General Conway's letters to me into your hands. Those letters have been stealingly copied; but, which of them, when, or by whom, is to me, as yet, an unfathomable secret. 

There is not one officer in my suite, or amongst those who have a freeaccess to me, upon whom I could, with the least justification tomyself, fix the suspicion; and yet, my uneasiness may deprive me ofthe usefulness of the worthiest men. It is, I believe, in yourexcellency's power to do me, and the United States, a very importantservice, by detecting a wretch who may betray me, and capitally injurethe very operations under your immediate direction. For this reason, sir, I beg your excellency will favour me with the proofs you canprocure to that effect. But, the crime being, eventually so important, that the least loss of time may be attended with the worstconsequences; and, it being unknown to me whether the letter came toyou from a member of congress, or from an officer, I shall have thehonour of transmitting a copy of this to the president, that congressmay, in concert with your excellency, obtain, as soon as possible, adiscovery which so deeply affects the safety of the states. Crimes ofthat magnitude ought not to remain unpunished. 

I have the honour to be, Sir, With the greatest respect, Your excellency's most humble and most obedient servant, HORATIO GATES. 

His excellency General Washington. 

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Valley Forge, January 4, 1778. 

SIR, --Your letter of the 18th ultimo, came to my hands a few days ago, and to my great surprise informed me, that a copy of it had been sentto congress, for what reason, I find myself unable to account; but, assome end doubtless was intended to be answered by it, I am laid underthe disagreeable necessity of returning my answer through the samechannel, lest any member of that honourable body should harbour anunfavourable suspicion of my having practised some indiscreet means tocome at the contents of the confidential letters between you andGeneral Conway. 

I am to inform you then, that ----, on his way to congress in themonth of October last, fell in with Lord Stirling at Reading: and, notin confidence that I ever understood, informed his aid-de-camp, MajorM'Williams, that General Conway had written thus to you, "heaven hasbeen determined to save your country, or a weak general and badcounsellors[106] would have ruined it. " Lord Stirling, from motives offriendship, transmitted the account with this remark. "The enclosedwas communicated by ---- to Major M'Williams; such wicked duplicity ofconduct I shall always think it my duty to detect. "

 [Footnote 106: One of whom, by the by, he was. ]

In consequence of this information, and without having any thing morein view, than merely to show that gentleman that I was not unapprisedof his intriguing disposition, I wrote him a letter in these words. 

"Sir, a letter which I received last night contained the followingparagraph. 

"In a letter from General Conway to General Gates, he says, heaven hasbeen determined to save your country, or a weak general and badcounsellors would have ruined it. I am, sir, &c. "

Neither the letter, nor the information which occasioned it, was ever, directly, or indirectly, communicated by me to a single officer inthis army (out of my own family) excepting the Marquis de Lafayette, who having been spoken to on the subject, by General Conway, appliedfor, and saw, under injunctions of secrecy, the letter which containedthis information; so desirous was I of concealing every matter thatcould, in its consequences, give the smallest interruption to thetranquillity of this army, or afford a gleam of hope to the enemy bydissensions therein. 

Thus, sir, with an openness and candour, which I hope will evercharacterize and mark my conduct, have I complied with your request. The only concern I feel upon the occasion, finding how matters stand, is, that in doing this, I have necessarily been obliged to name agentleman, who, I am persuaded, (although I never exchanged a wordwith him upon the subject) thought he was rather doing an act ofjustice, than committing an act of infidelity; and sure I am, that, until Lord Stirling's letter came to my hands, I never knew thatGeneral Conway, (whom I viewed in the light of a stranger to you) wasa correspondent of yours, much less did I suspect that I was thesubject of your confidential letters. Pardon me then for adding, that, so far from conceiving that the safety of the states can be affected, or in the smallest degree injured, by a discovery of this kind, orthat I should be called upon in such solemn terms to point out theauthor, that I considered the information as coming from yourself, andgiven with a friendly view to forewarn, and consequently forearm me, against a secret enemy, or in other words, a dangerous incendiary, inwhich character sooner or later, this country will know GeneralConway. But, in this, as well as other matters of late, I have foundmyself mistaken. I am, sir, Your most obedient servant, GEO: WASHINGTON. 

To Major General Gates. 

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NOTE--No. XII. _See Page 417. _

_During the existence of this faction, an attempt appears to have beenmade to alienate the affections of the leading political personages inthe states from the commander-in-chief. The following letters exhibita very unsuccessful effort of this sort, which was made on GovernorHenry, of Virginia, by a gentleman not supposed to be a member ofcongress from that state. _

Williamsburgh, February 20, 1778. 

DEAR SIR, --You will no doubt be surprised at seeing the enclosedletter, in which the encomiums bestowed on me are as undeserved, asthe censures aimed at you are unjust. I am sorry there should be oneman who counts himself my friend, who is not yours. 

Perhaps I give you needless trouble in handing you this paper. Thewriter of it may be too insignificant to deserve any notice. If I knewthis to be the case, I should not have intruded on your time, which isso precious. But there may possibly be some scheme or party forming toyour prejudice. The enclosed leads to such a suspicion. Believe me, sir, I have too high a sense of the obligations America has to you, toabet or countenance so unworthy a proceeding. The most exalted merithath ever been found to attract envy. But I please myself with thehope, that the same fortitude and greatness of mind which havehitherto braved all the difficulties and dangers inseparable from yourstation, will rise superior to every attempt of the envious partisan. 

I really can not tell who is the writer of this letter, which not alittle perplexes me. The hand writing is altogether strange to me. 

To give you the trouble of this, gives me pain. It would suit myinclination better, to give you some assistance in the great businessof the war. But I will not conceal any thing from you, by which youmay be affected, for I really think your personal welfare and thehappiness of America are intimately connected. I beg you will beassured of that high regard and esteem with which I ever am, Dear sir, Your affectionate friend and very humble servant, P. HENRY. 

His excellency General Washington. 

(_Letter enclosed in the preceding. _)

Yorktown, January 12, 1778. 

DEAR SIR, --The common danger of our country first brought you and metogether. I recollect with pleasure the influence of your conversationand eloquence upon the opinions of this country in the beginning ofthe present controversy. You first taught us to shake off ouridolatrous attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments uponour liberties with our very lives. By these means you saved us fromruin. The independence of America is the offspring of that liberalspirit of thinking, and acting, which followed the destruction of thesceptres of kings and the mighty power of Great Britain. 

But, sir, we have only passed the Red Sea. A dreary wilderness isstill before us, and unless a Moses or a Joshua are raised up in ourbehalf, we must perish before we reach the promised land. We havenothing to fear from our enemies on the way. General Howe, it is true, has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed his prison. Hisdominions are bounded on all sides by his outsentries. America canonly be undone by herself. She looks up to her councils and arms forprotection; but alas! what are they? her representation in congressdwindled to only twenty-one members--her Adams--her Wilson--her Henry, are no more among them. Her councils weak--and partial remediesapplied constantly for universal diseases. Her army--what is it? amajor general belonging to it called it a few days ago in my hearing a_mob_. Discipline unknown or _wholly_ neglected. The quartermaster andcommissary's departments filled with idleness, ignorance andpeculation--our hospitals crowded with six thousand sick, but halfprovided with necessaries or accommodations, and more dying in them inone month, than perished in the field during the whole of the lastcampaign. 

The money depreciating without any effectual measures being taken toraise it--the country distracted with the Don Quixote attempts toregulate the prices of provisions, an _artificial_ famine created byit, and a _real_ one dreaded from it. The spirit of the people failingthrough a more intimate acquaintance with the causes of ourmisfortunes--many submitting daily to General Howe, and more wishingto do it, only to avoid the calamities which threaten our country. Butis our case desperate? by no means. We have wisdom, virtue, andstrength _eno'_ to save us if they could be called into action. Thenorthern army has shown us what Americans are capable of doing with AGENERAL at their head. The spirit of the southern army is no waysinferior to the spirit of the northern. A Gates--a Lee, or a Conwaywould, in a few weeks, render them an irresistible body of men. Thelast of the above officers has accepted of the new office of inspectorgeneral of our army, in order to reform abuses--but the remedy is onlya palliative one. In one of his letters to a friend he says, "a greatand good God hath decreed America to be free--or the ---- and weakcounsellors would have ruined her long ago"--you may rest assured of_each_ of the facts related in this letter. The author of it is one ofyour Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by thehand writing, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Eventhe letter _must_ be thrown in the fire. But some of its contentsought to be made public in order to awaken, enlighten, and alarm ourcountry. I rely upon your prudence, and am, dear sir, with my usualattachment to _you_, and to our beloved independence, Yours, sincerely. 

His excellency P. Henry. 

 * * * * *

Williamsburgh, March 5, 1778. 

DEAR SIR, --By an express which Colonel Finnie sent to camp, I enclosedyou an anonymous letter, which I hope got safe to hand. I am anxiousto hear something that will serve to explain the strange affair, whichI am now informed is taken up, respecting you. Mr. Custis has justpaid us a visit, and by him I learn sundry particulars concerningGeneral Mifflin, that much surprise me. It is very hard to trace theschemes and windings of the enemies to America. I really thought thatman its friend: however, I am too far from him to judge of his presenttemper. 

While you face the armed enemies of our liberty in the field, and, bythe favour of God, have been kept unhurt, I trust your country willnever harbour in her bosom the miscreant who would ruin her bestsupporter. I wish not to flatter; but when arts unworthy honest menare used to defame and traduce you, I think it not amiss, but a duty, to assure you of that estimation in which the public hold you. Notthat I think any testimony I can bear, is necessary for your support, or private satisfaction, for a bare recollection of what is past mustgive you sufficient pleasure in every circumstance of life. But I cannot help assuring you, on this occasion, of the high sense ofgratitude which all ranks of men, in this your native country, bear toyou. It will give me sincere pleasure to manifest my regards, andrender my best services to you or yours. I do not like to make aparade of these things, and I know you are not fond of it; however, Ihope the occasion will plead my excuse. 

The assembly have at length empowered the executive here to providethe Virginia troops serving with you, with clothes, &c. I am makingprovision accordingly, and hope to do something towards it. Everypossible assistance from government is afforded the commissary ofprovisions, whose department has not been attended to. It was taken upby me too late to do much. Indeed the load of business devolved on meis too great to be managed well. A French ship, mounting thirty guns, that has been long chased by the English cruisers, has got intoCarolina, as I hear last night. 

Wishing you all possible felicity, I am, my dear sir, Your ever affectionate friend, and very humble servant, P. HENRY. 

His excellency General Washington. 

 * * * * *

Valley Forge, March 27, 1778. 

DEAR SIR, --About eight days past, I was honoured with your favour ofthe 20th ultimo. 

Your friendship, sir, in transmitting me the anonymous letter you hadreceived, lays me under the most grateful obligations; and, if anything could give a still further claim to my acknowledgments, it isthe very polite and delicate terms in which you have been pleased tomake the communication. 

I have ever been happy in supposing that I held a place in youresteem, and the proof of it you have afforded on this occasion makesme peculiarly so. The favourable light in which you hold me is trulyflattering, but I should feel much regret if I thought the happinessof America so intimately connected with my personal welfare, as you soobligingly seem to consider it. All I can say, is, that she has everhad, and, I trust, she ever will have, my honest exertions to promoteher interest. I can not hope that my services have been the best; butmy heart tells me that they have been the best that I could render. 

That I may have erred in using the means in my power for accomplishingthe objects of the arduous, exalted station with which I am honoured, I can not doubt; nor do I wish my conduct to be exempted from thereprehension it may deserve. Error is the portion of humanity, and tocensure it, whether committed by this or that public character, is theprerogative of freemen.... 

This is not the only secret insidious attempt that has been made towound my reputation. There have been others equally base, cruel, andungenerous; because conducted with as little frankness and proceedingfrom views perhaps as personally interested. 

I am, dear sir, &c. 

GEO: WASHINGTON. 

To his excellency Patrick Henry, esquire, Governor of Virginia. 

 * * * * *

Camp, March 28, 1778. 

DEAR SIR, --Just as I was about to close my letter of yesterday, yourfavour of the fifth instant came to hand. 

I can only thank you again, in the language of the most undissembledgratitude, for your friendship: and assure you, the indulgentdisposition which Virginia in particular, and the states in generalentertain towards me, gives me the most sensible pleasure. Theapprobation of my country is what I wish; and, as far as my abilitiesand opportunity will permit, I hope I shall endeavour to deserve it. It is the highest reward to a feeling mind; and happy are they who soconduct themselves as to merit it. 

The anonymous letter with which you were pleased to favour me, waswritten by ----, so far as I can judge from a similitude of hands.... 

My caution to avoid any thing that could injure the service, preventedme from communicating, except to a very few of my friends, theintrigues of a faction which I know was formed against me, since itmight serve to publish our internal dissensions; but their ownrestless zeal to advance their views has too clearly betrayed them, and made concealment on my part fruitless. I can not precisely markthe extent of their views, but it appeared in general, that GeneralGates was to be exalted on the ruin of my reputation and influence. This I am authorized to say from undeniable facts in my ownpossession, from publications the evident scope of which could not bemistaken, and from private detractions industriously circulated. ----, it is commonly supposed, bore the second part in the cabal; andGeneral Conway, I know, was a very active and malignant partisan; butI have good reason to believe that their machinations have recoiledmost sensibly upon themselves. I am, dear sir, &c. 

GEO: WASHINGTON. 

His excellency Patrick Henry, esquire, Gov. Of Virginia. 

_The following extract is taken from a letter written about the sametime to a gentleman in New England, who had expressed some anxiousapprehensions occasioned by a report that the commander-in-chief haddetermined to resign his station in the army:_

"I can assure you that no person ever heard me drop an expression thathad a tendency to resignation. The same principles that led me toembark in the opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain, operate with additional force at this day; nor is it my desire towithdraw my services while they are considered of importance in thepresent contest; but to report a design of this kind, is among thearts, which those who are endeavouring to effect a change arepractising to bring it to pass. I have said, and I still do say, thatthere is not an officer in the service of the United States, thatwould return to the sweets of domestic life with more heartfelt joythan I should. But I would have this declaration accompanied by thesesentiments, that while the public are satisfied with my endeavours, Imean not to shrink from the cause: but the moment her voice, not thatof faction, calls upon me to resign, I shall do it with as muchpleasure as ever the wearied traveller retired to rest. "

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NOTE--No. XIII. _See Page 456. _

_The following is an extract of a letter addressed on this occasion byGeneral Washington to congress:_

"Though I sincerely commiserate the misfortune of General Lee, andfeel much for his present unhappy situation; yet, with all possibledeference to the opinion of congress, I fear that their resolutionswill not have the desired effect, are founded in impolicy, and will, if adhered to, produce consequences of an extensive and melancholynature. 

"Retaliation is certainly just, and sometimes necessary, even whereattended with the severest penalties: but when the evils which may, and must result from it, exceed those intended to be redressed, prudence and policy require that it should be avoided. 

"Having premised thus much, I beg leave to examine the justice andexpediency of it in the instance before us. From the best informationI have been able to obtain, General Lee's usage has not been sodisgraceful and dishonourable, as to authorize the treatment decreedto these gentlemen, was it not prohibited by many other importantconsiderations. His confinement, I believe, has been more rigorousthan has been generally experienced by the rest of our officers, orthose of the enemy who have been in our possession; but if the reportsreceived on that head be true, he has been provided with a decentapartment, and with most things necessary to render him comfortable. This is not the case with one of the officers comprehended in theresolves, if his letter, of which a copy is transmitted, deserves yourcredit. Here retaliation seems to have been prematurely begun, or tospeak with more propriety, severities have been, and are exercisedtowards Colonel Campbell, not justified by any that General Lee hasyet received. 

"In point of policy, and under the present situation of our affairs, most surely the doctrine can not be supported. The balance ofprisoners is greatly against us, and a general regard to the happinessof the whole should mark our conduct. Can we imagine that our enemieswill not mete the same punishments, the same indignities, the samecruelties, to those belonging to us in their possession, that weimpose on theirs? why should we suppose them to have more humanitythan we possess ourselves? or why should an ineffectual attempt torelieve the distresses of one brave man, involve many more in misery?At this time, however disagreeable the fact may be, the enemy have intheir power, and subject to their call, near three hundred officersbelonging to the army of the United States. In this number there aresome of high rank, and the most of them are men of bravery and ofmerit. The quota of theirs in our hands bears no proportion, not beingmore than fifty. Under these circumstances, we certainly should do noact to draw upon the gentlemen belonging to us, and who have alreadysuffered a long captivity, greater punishments than they nowexperience. If we should, what will be their feelings, and those oftheir numerous and extensive connexions? Suppose the treatmentprescribed for the Hessian officers should be pursued, will it notestablish what the enemy have been aiming to effect by every artifice, and the grossest misrepresentations? I mean, an opinion of our enmitytowards them, and of the cruel conduct they experience when they fallinto our hands; a prejudice which we, on our part, have heretoforethought it politic to suppress, and to root out by every act ofkindness and of lenity. It certainly will. The Hessians will hear ofthe punishments with all the circumstances of heightened exaggeration, and would feel the injury without investigating the cause, orreasoning upon the justice of it. The mischiefs which may, and mustinevitably flow from the execution of the resolves, appear to beendless and innumerable. "

END OF VOLUME II.