MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman

VOLUME II

Part 4

CHAPTER XXI. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH. 

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 

On the 12th of November the railroad and telegraph communicationswith the rear were broken, and the army stood detached from allfriends, dependent on its own resources and supplies. No time wasto be lost; all the detachments were ordered to march rapidly forAtlanta, breaking up the railroad en route, and generally to sodamage the country as to make it untenable to the enemy. By the14th all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and were, according to orders, grouped into two wings, the right and left, commanded respectively by Major-Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum, both comparatively young men, but educated and experiencedofficers, fully competent to their command. 

The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Major-GeneralP. J. Osterhaus commanding, and the Seventeenth Corps, Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding. 

The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-GeneralJefferson C. Davis commanding, and the Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding. 

The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Gorse. 

The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded byMajor-General J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals M. D. Leggettand Giles A. Smith. 

The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A. Baird. 

The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals N. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and W. T. Ward. 

The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my own orders. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and wascomposed of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, ofKentucky, and Smith D. Atkins, of Illinois. 

The strength of the army, as officially reported, is given in thefollowing tables, and shows an aggregate of fifty-five thousandthree hundred and twenty-nine infantry, five thousand andsixty-three cavalry, and eighteen hundred and twelve artillery inall, sixty-two thousand two hundred and four officers and men. 

The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army ofnon-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was tobe no place of safety save with the army itself; our wagons wereloaded with ammunition, provisions, and forage, and we could illafford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on thisexhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experiencedsoldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as humanforesight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, andvigorous action. 

The two general orders made for this march appear to me, even atthis late day, so clear, emphatic, and well-digested, that noaccount of that historic event is perfect without them, and I givethem entire, even at the seeming appearance of repetition; and, though they called for great sacrifice and labor on the part of theofficers and men, I insist that these orders were obeyed as well asany similar orders ever were, by an army operating wholly in anenemy's country, and dispersed, as we necessarily were, during thesubsequent period of nearly six months. 

[Special Field Orders, No. 119. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 8, 1864

The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform theofficers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, andTwentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for aspecial purpose, well known to the War Department and to GeneralGrant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves adeparture from our present base, and a long and difficult march toa new one. All the chances of war have been considered andprovided for, as far as human sagacity can. All he asks of you isto maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which havecharacterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strikea blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producingwhat we all so much desire, his complete overthrow. Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers orforagers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It isalso of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loadedwith any thing but provisions and ammunition. All surplusservants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At somefuture time we will be able to provide for the poor whites andblacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are nowsuffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you toachievements equal in importance to those of the past. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

[Special Field Orders, No. 120. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 9, 1864

1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is dividedinto two wings viz. :

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed ofthe Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-GeneralH. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and TwentiethCorps. 

2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, byfour roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging atpoints hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive specialorders from the commander-in-chief. 

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps willhave its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributedhabitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagonand one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a dueproportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order ofmarch, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered bywheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a. M. , andmake about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders. 

4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good andsufficient foraging party, under the command of one or morediscreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, cornor forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, orwhatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep inthe wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and threedays' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of theinhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and othervegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. Toregular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering ofprovisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled. 

6. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroymills, houses, cotton-gins, etc. ; and for them this generalprinciple is laid down:

In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, nodestruction of each property should be permitted; but shouldguerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should theinhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifestlocal hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce adevastation more or less relentless, according to the measure ofsuch hostility. 

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc. , belonging to theinhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely andwithout limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who areusually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral orfriendly. Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, toreplace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve aspack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, ofwhatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive orthreatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinksproper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts;and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonableportion for their maintenance, 7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to theseveral columns may be taken along; but each army commander willbear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms. 

8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for eacharmy corps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads anddouble them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayedafter reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practisethe habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marchingtheir troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assistwagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams. 

9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing ofthe army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and thecommanders thereof will see to their being properly protected atall times. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

The greatest possible attention had been given to the artillery andwagon trains. The number of guns had been reduced to sixty-five, or about one gun to each thousand men, and these were generally inbatteries of four guns each. 

Each gun, caisson, and forges was drawn by four teams of horses. We had in all about twenty-five hundred wagons, with teams of sixmules to each, and six hundred ambulances, with two horses to each. The loads were made comparatively light, about twenty-five hundredpounds net; each wagon carrying in addition the forage needed byits own team: Each soldier carried on his person forty rounds ofammunition, and in the wagons were enough cartridges to make upabout two hundred rounds per man, and in like manner two hundredrounds of assorted ammunition were carried for each gun. 

The wagon-trains were divided equally between the four corps, sothat each had about eight hundred wagons, and these usually on themarch occupied five miles or more of road. Each corps commandermanaged his own train; and habitually the artillery and wagons hadthe road, while the men, with the exception of the advance and rearguards, pursued paths improvised by the aide of the wagons, unlessthey were forced to use a bridge or causeway in common. 

I reached Atlanta during the afternoon of the 14th, and found thatall preparations had been made-Colonel Beckwith, chief commissary, reporting one million two hundred thousand rations in possession ofthe troops, which was about twenty days' supply, and he had on handa good supply of beef-cattle to be driven along on the hoof. Offorage, the supply was limited, being of oats and corn enough forfive days, but I knew that within that time we would reach acountry well stocked with corn, which had been gathered and storedin cribs, seemingly for our use, by Governor Brown's militia. 

Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, of my staff, had been busy inhis special task of destruction. He had a large force at work, hadleveled the great depot, round house, and the machine-shops of theGeorgia Railroad, and had applied fire to the wreck. One of thesemachine-shops had been used by the rebels as an arsenal, and in itwere stored piles of shot and shell, some of which proved to beloaded, and that night was made hideous by the bursting of shells, whose fragments came uncomfortably, near Judge Lyon's house, inwhich I was quartered. The fire also reached the block of storesnear the depot, and the heart of the city was in flames all night, but the fire did not reach the parts of Atlanta where thecourt-house was, or the great mass of dwelling houses. 

The march from Atlanta began on the morning of November 15th, theright wing and cavalry following the railroad southeast towardJonesboro', and General Slocum with the Twentieth Corps leading offto the east by Decatur and Stone Mountain, toward Madison. Thesewere divergent lines, designed to threaten both Mason and Augustaat the same time, so as to prevent a concentration at our intendeddestination, or "objective, " Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, distant southeast about one hundred miles. The time allowed eachcolumn for reaching Milledgeville was seven days. I remained inAtlanta during the 15th with the Fourteenth Corps, and therear-guard of the right wing, to complete the loading of the trains, and the destruction of the buildings of Atlanta which could beconverted to hostile uses, and on the morning of the 16th startedwith my personal staff, a company of Alabama cavalry, commanded byLieutenant Snelling, and an infantry company, commanded by LieutenantMcCrory, which guarded our small train of wagons. 

My staff was then composed of Major L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp andacting adjutant-general, Major J. C. McCoy, and Major J. C. Audenried, aides. Major Ward Nichols had joined some weeks beforeat Gaylesville, Alabama, and was attached as an actingaide-de-camp. Also Major Henry Hitchcock had joined at the sametime as judge-advocate. Colonel Charles Ewing wasinspector-general, and Surgeon John Moore medical director. Theseconstituted our mess. We had no tents, only the flies, with whichwe nightly made bivouacs with the assistance of the abundantpine-boughs, which made excellent shelter, as well as beds. 

Colonel L. C. Easton was chief-quartermaster; Colonel AmosBeckwith, chief-commissary; Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer; andColonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance. These invariably rodewith us during the day, but they had a separate camp and mess atnight. 

General William F. Barry had been chief of artillery in theprevious campaign, but at Kingston his face was so swollen witherysipelas that he was reluctantly compelled to leave us for therear; and he could not, on recovering, rejoin us till we hadreached Savannah. 

About 7 a. M. Of November 16th we rode out of Atlanta by the Decaturroad, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the FourteenthCorps; and reaching the hill, just outside of the old rebel works, we naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our pastbattles. We stood upon the very ground whereon was fought thebloody battle of July 22d, and could see the copse of wood whereMcPherson fell. Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like a pall overthe ruined city. Away off in the distance, on the McDonough road, was the rear of Howard's column, the gun-barrels glistening in thesun, the white-topped wagons stretching away to the south; andright before us the Fourteenth Corps, marching steadily andrapidly, with a cheery look and swinging pace, that made light ofthe thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond. Some band, byaccident, struck up the anthem of "John Brown's soul goes marchingon;" the men caught up the strain, and never before or since have Iheard the chorus of "Glory, glory, hallelujah!" done with morespirit, or in better harmony of time and place. 

Then we turned our horses' heads to the east; Atlanta was soon lostbehind the screen of trees, and became a thing of the past. Aroundit clings many a thought of desperate battle, of hope and fear, that now seem like the memory of a dream; and I have never seen theplace since. The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight, withbracing air, and an unusual feeling of exhilaration seemed topervade all minds--a feeling of something to come, vague andundefined, still full of venture and intense interest. Even thecommon soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called outto me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant iswaiting for us at Richmond!" Indeed, the general sentiment wasthat we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should endthe war, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did theymeasure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother theirbrains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food requiredfor man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way. There was a"devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men, that made mefeel the full load of responsibility, for success would be acceptedas a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" wouldbe adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool. I had no purposeto march direct for Richmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, butalways designed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or PortRoyal, South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative ofPensacola. 

The first night out we camped by the road-side near Lithonia. Stone Mountain, a mass of granite, was in plain view, cut out inclear outline against the blue sky; the whole horizon was luridwith the bonfires of rail-ties, and groups of men all night werecarrying the heated rails to the nearest trees, and bending themaround the trunks. Colonel Poe had provided tools for ripping upthe rails and twisting them when hot; but the best and easiest wayis the one I have described, of heating the middle of theiron-rails on bonfires made of the cross-ties, and then windingthem around a telegraph-pole or the trunk of some convenientsapling. I attached much importance to this destruction of therailroad, gave it my own personal attention, and made reiteratedorders to others on the subject. 

The next day we passed through the handsome town of Covington, thesoldiers closing up their ranks, the color-bearers unfurling theirflags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs. The white peoplecame out of their houses to behold the sight, spite of their deephatred of the invaders, and the negroes were simply frantic withjoy. Whenever they heard my name, they clustered about my horse, shouted and prayed in their peculiar style, which had a naturaleloquence that would have moved a stone. I have witnessedhundreds, if not thousands, of such scenes; and can now see a poorgirl, in the very ecstasy of the Methodist "shout, " hugging thebanner of one of the regiments, and jumping up to the "feet ofJesus. "

I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, toavoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that some onebrought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson, who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached meafter we had passed the main part of the town. I asked to beexcused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at thecrossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the eastof the town. Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to aplantation-house close by, where were assembled many negroes, amongthem an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw. Iasked him if he understood about the war and its progress. He saidhe did; that he had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" eversince he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting forthe Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that oursuccess was to be his freedom. I asked him if all the negro slavescomprehended this fact, and he said they surely did. I thenexplained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where theywere, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eatup the food needed for our fighting men; that our success was theirassured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, heartymen as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old andyoung, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down andcripple us in our great task. I think Major Henry Hitchcock waswith me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, andI believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which wascarried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, andthat it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred ofswelling our numbers so that famine would have attended ourprogress. It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed mewith a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-molasses under his arm, and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating, and, catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to acomrade, "Forage liberally on the country, " quoting from my generalorders. On this occasion, as on many others that fell under mypersonal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foragingmust be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and thatall provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regularcommissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept theirranks. 

From Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with which I wastraveling, turned to the right for Milledgeville, via Shady Dale. General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps, having torn up the railroad as far as that place, and thence hadsent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn the bridges acrossthat stream, when this corps turned south by Eatonton, forMilledgeville, the common "objective" for the first stage of the"march. " We found abundance of corn, molasses, meal, bacon, andsweet-potatoes. We also took a good many cows and oxen, and alarge number of mules. In all these the country was quite rich, never before having been visited by a hostile army; the recent crophad been excellent, had been just gathered and laid by for thewinter. As a rule, we destroyed none, but kept our wagons full, and fed our teams bountifully. 

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one ofthe features of this march. Each brigade commander had authorityto detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with oneor two commissioned officers selected for their boldness andenterprise. This party would be dispatched before daylight with aknowledge of the intended day's march and camp; would proceed onfoot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade, and then visit every plantation and farm within range. They wouldusually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon, corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and every thing that could beused as food or forage, and would then regain the main road, usually in advance of their train. When this came up, they woulddeliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by theway. Often would I pass these foraging-parties at the roadside, waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amused at theirstrange collections--mules, horses, even cattle, packed with oldsaddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of cornmeal, and poultryof every character and description. Although this foraging wasattended with great danger and hard work, there seemed to be acharm about it that attracted the soldiers, and it was a privilegeto be detailed on such a party. Daily they returned mounted on allsorts of beasts, which were at once taken from them andappropriated to the general use; but the next day they would startout again on foot, only to repeat the experience of the day before. No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, werecommitted by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;"for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunderof articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts wereexceptional and incidental. I never heard of any cases of murderor rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food andforage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in someshape was necessary. The country was sparsely settled, with nomagistrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisitions, as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system offoraging was simply indispensable to our success. By it our menwere well supplied with all the essentials of life and health, while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, andour animals were well fed. Indeed, when we reached Savannah, thetrains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh andappearance ever seen with any army. 

Habitually each corps followed some main road, and the foragers, being kept out on the exposed flank, served all the military usesof flankers. The main columns gathered, by the roads traveled, much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, and sweet-potatoes, andit was the duty of each division and brigade quartermaster to fillhis wagons as fast as the contents were issued to the troops. Thewagon-trains had the right to the road always, but each wagon wasrequired to keep closed up, so as to leave no gaps in the column. If for any purpose any wagon or group of wagons dropped out ofplace, they had to wait for the rear. And this was always dreaded, for each brigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soonafter reaching it with his men as possible. 

I have seen much skill and industry displayed by thesequarter-masters on the march, in trying to load their wagons withcorn and fodder by the way without losing their place in column. They would, while marching, shift the loads of wagons, so as to havesix or ten of them empty. Then, riding well ahead, they would securepossession of certain stacks of fodder near the road, or cribs ofcorn, leave some men in charge, then open fences and a road back fora couple of miles, return to their trains, divert the empty wagonsout of column, and conduct them rapidly to their forage, load up andregain their place in column without losing distance. On one occasionI remember to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with cornfrom two or three full cribs, almost without halting. These cribswere built of logs, and roofed. The train-guard, by a lever, hadraised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; the wagons droveclose alongside, and the men in the cribs, lying on their backs, kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I have taken to describeit. 

In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these things might bedeemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of theseyounger officers accomplished many things far better than I couldhave ordered, and the marches were thus made, and the distanceswere accomplished, in the most admirable way. Habitually westarted from camp at the earliest break of dawn, and usuallyreached camp soon after noon. The marches varied from ten tofifteen miles a day, though sometimes on extreme flanks it wasnecessary to make as much as twenty, but the rate of travel wasregulated by the wagons; and, considering the nature of the roads, fifteen miles per day was deemed the limit. 

The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in about equalproportions to the four corps, giving each a section of about ninehundred feet. The pontoons were of the skeleton pattern, withcotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks andcheeses, constituting a load for one wagon. By uniting two suchsections together, we could make a bridge of eighteen hundred feet, enough for any river we had to traverse; but habitually the leadingbrigade would, out of the abundant timber, improvise a bridgebefore the pontoon-train could come up, unless in the cases ofrivers of considerable magnitude, such as the Ocmulgee, Oconee, Ogeechee, Savannah, etc. 

On the 20th of November I was still with the Fourteenth Corps, nearEatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and onthe 21st we camped near the house of a man named Mann; the nextday, about 4 p. M. , General Davis had halted his head of column on awooded ridge, overlooking an extensive slope of cultivated country, about ten miles short of Milledgeville, and was deploying histroops for camp when I got up. There was a high, raw wind blowing, and I asked him why he had chosen so cold and bleak a position. Heexplained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day, and had there an abundance of wood and water. He explained furtherthat his advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, askinghim to let his rear division, as it came up, move some distanceahead into the depression or valley beyond. Riding on somedistance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the mainroad into a cluster of wild-plum bushes, that broke the force ofthe cold November wind, dismounted, and instructed the staff topick out the place for our camp. 

The afternoon was unusually raw and cold. My orderly was at handwith his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a change ofunder-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch of cigars. Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a row ofnegro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or two warmingthemselves by a wood-fire. I took their place by the fire, intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, and a camp madefor the night. I was talking to the old negro woman, when some onecame and explained to me that, if I would come farther down theroad, I could find a better place. So I started on foot, and foundon the main road a good double-hewed-log house, in one room ofwhich Colonel Poe, Dr. Moore, and others, had started a fire. Isent back orders to the "plum-bushes" to bring our horses andsaddles up to this house, and an orderly to conduct our headquarterwagons to the same place. In looking around the room, I saw asmall box, like a candle-box, marked "Howell Cobb, " and, oninquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation ofGeneral Howell Cobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of theSouth, then a general in the Southern army, and who had beenSecretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time. Ofcourse, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn, beans, pea-nuts, and sorghum-molasses. Extensive fields were allround the house; I sent word back to General David to explain whoseplantation it was, and instructed him to spare nothing. That nighthuge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, andthe teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off animmense quantity of corn and provisions of all sorts. 

In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we got supper. After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back to a good fire, musing, and became conscious that an old negro, with atallow-candle in his hand, was scanning my face closely. I inquired, "What do you want, old man!" He answered, "Dey say you is MassaSherman. " I answered that such was the case, and inquired what hewanted. He only wanted to look at me, and kept muttering, "Disnigger can't sleep dis night. " I asked him why he trembled so, andhe said that he wanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees, "for on a former occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-blueovercoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroes weredeceived thereby, himself among the number had shown them sympathy, and had in consequence been unmercifully beaten therefor. Thistime he wanted to be certain before committing himself; so I toldhim to go out on the porch, from which he could see the wholehorizon lit up with camp-fires, and he could then judge whether hehad ever seen any thing like it before. The old man becameconvinced that the "Yankees" had come at last, about whom he hadbeen dreaming all his life; and some of the staff officers gave hima strong drink of whiskey, which set his tongue going. LieutenantSpelling, who commanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognizedin this old negro a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided aboutsix miles off; but the old slave did not at first recognize hisyoung master in our uniform. One of my staff-officers asked himwhat had become of his young master, George. He did not know, onlythat he had gone off to the war, and he supposed him killed, as amatter of course. His attention was then drawn to Spelling's face, when he fell on his knees and thanked God that he had found hisyoung master alive and along with the Yankees. Spelling inquiredall about his uncle and the family, asked my permission to go andpay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of course, and the nextmorning he described to me his visit. The uncle was not cordial, by any means, to find his nephew in the ranks of the host that wasdesolating the land, and Spelling came back, having exchanged histired horse for a fresher one out of his uncle's stables, explaining that surely some of the "bummers" would have got thehorse had he not. 

The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledgeville, thecapital of the State, whither the Twentieth Corps had preceded us;and during that day the left wing was all united, in and aroundMilledgeville. From the inhabitants we learned that some ofKilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us by a couple of days, and thatall of the right wing was at and near Gordon, twelve miles off, viz. , the place where the branch railroad came to Milledgevillefrom the Mason & Savannah road. The first stage of the journeywas, therefore, complete, and absolutely successful. 

General Howard soon reported by letter the operations of his rightwing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substantially followed the tworoads toward Mason, by Jonesboro' and McDonough, and reached theOcmulgee at Planters' Factory, which they crossed, by the aid ofthe pontoon-train, during the 18th and 19th of November. Thence, with the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) he (General Howard)had marched via Monticello toward Gordon, having dispatchedKilpatrick's cavalry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps(Osterhaus's), to feign on Mason. Kilpatrick met the enemy'scavalry about four miles out of Mason, and drove them rapidly backinto the bridge-defenses held by infantry. Kilpatrick chargedthese, got inside the parapet, but could not hold it, and retiredto his infantry supports, near Griswold Station. The FifteenthCorps tore up the railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leavingCharles R. Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade ofwhich was intrenched across the road, with some of Kilpatrick'scavalry on the flanks. On the 22d of November General G. W. Smith, with a division of troops, came out of Mason, attacked this brigade(Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely repulsed and drivenback into Mason. This brigade was in part armed with Spencerrepeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid that General Smithinsists to this day that he encountered a whole division; but he ismistaken; he was beaten by one brigade (Walcutt's), and made nofurther effort to molest our operations from that direction. General Walcutt was wounded in the leg, and had to ride the rest ofthe distance to Savannah in a carriage. 

Therefore, by the 23d, I was in Milledgeville with the left wing, and was in full communication with the right wing at Gordon. Thepeople of Milledgeville remained at home, except the Governor(Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, who had ignominiouslyfled, in the utmost disorder and confusion; standing not on theorder of their going, but going at once--some by rail, some bycarriages, and many on foot. Some of the citizens who remainedbehind described this flight of the "brave and patriotic" GovernorBrown. He had occupied a public building known as the "Governor'sMansion, " and had hastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, andfurniture of all sorts, which were removed to a train offreight-cars, which carried away these things--even the cabbages andvegetables from his kitchen and cellar--leaving behind muskets, ammunition, and the public archives. On arrival at Milledgeville Ioccupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmed withappeals for protection. General Slocum had previously arrived withthe Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quarters at the MilledgevilleHotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order wasmaintained. The most frantic appeals had been made by the Governorand Legislature for help from every quarter, and the people of theState had been called out en masse to resist and destroy the invadersof their homes and firesides. Even the prisoners and convicts of thepenitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers, andthe cadets were taken from their military college for the samepurpose. These constituted a small battalion, under General HarryWayne, a former officer of the United States Army, and son of thethen Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court. But these hastily retreatedeast across the Oconee River, leaving us a good bridge, which wepromptly secured. 

At Milledgeville we found newspapers from all the South, andlearned the consternation which had filled the Southern mind at ourtemerity; many charging that we were actually fleeing for our livesand seeking safety at the hands of our fleet on the sea-coast. Alldemanded that we should be assailed, "front, flank, and rear;" thatprovisions should be destroyed in advance, so that we would starve;that bridges should be burned, roads obstructed, and no mercy shownus. Judging from the tone of the Southern press of that day, theoutside world must have supposed us ruined and lost. I give a fewof these appeals as samples, which to-day must sound strange to theparties who made them:

Corinth, Mississippi, November 18, 1884. 

To the People of Georgia:

Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally around yourpatriotic Governor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy allthe roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army willsoon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in anoverruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts. Ihasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD. 

RICHMOND, November 18, 1884. 

To the People of Georgia:

You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy theenemy. Put every thing at the disposal of our generals; remove allprovisions from the path of the, invader, and put all obstructionsin his path. 

Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe, can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy byretarding his march. 

Georgians, be firm! Act promptly, and fear not!

B. H. Hill, Senator. 

I most cordially approve the above. James A. SEDDON, Secretary of War. 

Richmond, November 19, 1864. 

To the People of Georgia:

We have had a special conference with President Davis and theSecretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have doneand are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency thatpresses upon you. Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn whatyou cannot carry. Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in hisroute. Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night andby day. Let him have no rest. 

JULIAN HARTRIDGEMARK BLANDFORD, J. H. ECHOLSGEO. N. LESTERJOHN T. SHUEMAKERJAS. M. SMITH, Members of Congress. 

Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these threats, andmade light of the feeble opposition offered to our progress. Someof the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gathered together inthe vacant hall of Representatives, elected a Speaker, andconstituted themselves the Legislature of the State of Georgia! Aproposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, whichwas well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote! I wasnot present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, andenjoyed the joke. 

Meantime orders were made for the total destruction of the arsenaland its contents, and of such public buildings as could be easilyconverted to hostile uses. But little or no damage was done toprivate property, and General Slocum, with my approval, sparedseveral mills, and many thousands of bales of cotton, taking whathe knew to be worthless bonds, that the cotton should not be usedfor the Confederacy. Meantime the right wing continued itsmovement along the railroad toward Savannah, tearing up the trackand destroying its iron. At the Oconee was met a feeble resistancefrom Harry Wayne's troops, but soon the pontoon-bridge was laid, and that wing crossed over. Gilpatrick's cavalry was brought intoMilledgeville, and crossed the Oconee by the bridge near the town;and on the 23d I made the general orders for the next stage of themarch as far as Millen. These were, substantially, for the rightwing to follow the Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; theleft wing was to move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' andLouisville, while the cavalry was ordered by a circuit to thenorth, and to march rapidly for Millen, to rescue our prisoners ofwar confined there. The distance was about a hundred miles. 

General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had succeededin getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta, andGeneral P. J. Hardee had been dispatched by General Beauregard fromHood's army to oppose our progress directly in front. He had, however, brought with him no troops, but relied on his influencewith the Georgians (of whose State he was a native) to arouse thepeople, and with them to annihilate Sherman's army!

On the 24th we renewed the march, and I accompanied the TwentiethCorps, which took the direct road to Sandersville, which we reachedsimultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps, on the 26th. A brigadeof rebel cavalry was deployed before the town, and was driven inand through it by our skirmish-line. I myself saw the rebel cavalryapply fire to stacks of fodder standing in the fields atSandersville, and gave orders to burn some unoccupied dwellingsclose by. On entering the town, I told certain citizens (who wouldbe sure to spread the report) that, if the enemy attempted to carryout their threat to burn their food, corn, and fodder, in ourroute, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the generalorders of devastation made at the outset of the campaign. Withthis exception, and one or two minor cases near Savannah, thepeople did not destroy food, for they saw clearly that it would beruin to themselves. 

At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that the rightwing was abreast of us on the railroad. During the evening a negrowas brought to me, who had that day been to the station (Tenille), about six miles south of the town. I inquired of him if there wereany Yankees there, and he answered, "Yes. " He described in his ownway what he had seen. 

"First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned thedepot; then come along some infantry-men, and they tore up thetrack, and burned it;" and just before he left they had "sot fireto the well. "

The next morning, viz. , the 27th, I rode down to the station, andfound General Corse's division (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged indestroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informanthad seen "burnt. " It was a square pit about twenty-five feet deep, boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was afine copper pump, to lift the water to a tank above. The soldiershad broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and setfire to the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, whichcorroborated the negro's description. 

From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up the work ofdestroying the railroad, the Fifteenth Corps following another roadleading eastward, farther to the south of the railroad. While theleft wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad, General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidlytoward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen toAugusta. He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, andhad considerable skirmishing with it; but, learning that ourprisoners had been removed two days before from Millen, he returnedto Louisville on the 29th, where he found the left wing. Here heremained a couple of days to rest his horses, and, receiving ordersfrom me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted, he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantrydivision of General Baird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2dof December, the remainder of the left wing continuing its march ontoward Millers. Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered, and driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, toward Augusta, thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving towardAugusta. General Kilpatrick's fighting and movements aboutWaynesboro' and Brier Creek were spirited, and produced a goodeffect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of allmolestation during their march on Millen. Having thus covered thatflank, he turned south and followed the movement of the FourteenthCorps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it. 

On the 3d of December I entered Millen with the Seventeenth Corps(General Frank P. Blair), and there paused one day, to communicatewith all parts of the army. General Howard was south of theOgeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps, opposite Scarboro'. General Slocum was at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen, with the Twentieth Corps. The Fourteenth (General Davis) was atLumpkin's Station, on the Augusta road, about ten miles north ofMillen, and the cavalry division was within easy support of thiswing. Thus the whole army was in good position and in goodcondition. We had largely subsisted on the country; our wagonswere full of forage and provisions; but, as we approached thesea-coast, the country became more sandy and barren, and foodbecame more scarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveledtwo-thirds of our distance, and I concluded to push on forSavannah. At Millen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta, and that General Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Richmond, to organize a large cavalry force with which to resist ourprogress. 

General Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, with McLaw'sdivision, and other irregular troops, that could not, I feltassured, exceed ten thousand men. I caused the fine depot atMillen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then resumed themarch directly on Savannah, by the four main roads. The SeventeenthCorps (General Blair) followed substantially the railroad, and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reached OgeecheeChurch, about fifty miles from Savannah, and found there freshearthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw's division; but hemust have seen that both his flanks were being turned, andprudently retreated to Savannah without a fight. All the columnsthen pursued leisurely their march toward Savannah, corn and foragebecoming more and more scarce, but rice-fields beginning to occuralong the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, which proved a goodsubstitute, both as food and forage. The weather was fine, theroads good, and every thing seemed to favor us. Never do I recalla more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by night, lit up by the fires of fragrant pine-knots. The trains were all ingood order, and the men seemed to march their fifteen miles a dayas though it were nothing. No enemy opposed us, and we could onlyoccasionally hear the faint reverberation of a gun to our leftrear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing withWheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him. But theinfantry columns had met with no opposition whatsoever. McLaw'sdivision was falling back before us, and we occasionally picked upa few of his men as prisoners, who insisted that we would meet withstrong opposition at Savannah. 

On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of themain road, marching through the fields. Close by, in the corner ofa fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome youngofficer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo plantedin the road. He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, andtold me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade-staffof the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horsehad exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all theflesh from one of his legs. I saw the terrible wound, and madefull inquiry into the facts. There had been no resistance at thatpoint, nothing to give warning of danger, and the rebels hadplanted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction-matches toexplode them by being trodden on. This was not war, but murder, and it made me very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of rebelprisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picksand spades, and made them march in close order along the road, soas to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up. They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly helplaughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it wassupposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but theyfound no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister. That night wereached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah, and during thenext two days, December 9th and 10th, the several corps reached thedefenses of Savannah--the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touchingthe river; the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and theFifteenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city. Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by theLouisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress, leftthe horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a place wherethere was a side-track, and a cut about four feet deep. From thatpoint the railroad was straight, leading into Savannah, and abouteight hundred yards off were a rebel parapet and battery. I couldsee the cannoneers preparing to fire, and cautioned the officersnear me to scatter, as we would likely attract a shot. Very soon Isaw the white puff of smoke, and, watching close, caught sight ofthe ball as it rose in its flight, and, finding it coming prettystraight, I stepped a short distance to one side, but noticed anegro very near me in the act of crossing the track at rightangles. Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poorfellow understood his danger, the ball (a thirty-two-pound roundshot) struck the ground, and rose in its first ricochet, caught thenegro under the right jaw, and literally carried away his head, scattering blood and brains about. A soldier close by spread anovercoat over the body, and we all concluded to get out of thatrailroad-cut. Meantime, General Mower's division of the SeventeenthCorps had crossed the canal to the right of the Louisvilleroad, and had found the line of parapet continuous; so at Savannahwe had again run up against the old familiar parapet, with its deepditches, canals, and bayous, full of water; and it looked as thoughanother siege was inevitable. I accordingly made a camp or bivouacnear the Louisville road, about five miles from Savannah, andproceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forwardreconnoissances at every available point. 

As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well fortified, with a good garrison, commanded by General William J. Hardee, acompetent soldier, I saw that the first step was to opencommunication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting for us withsupplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound. 

General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of his bestscouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to drift pastFort McAllister, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge of ourapproach. General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been transferredto the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to opencommunication with the fleet. Leaving orders with General Slocumto press the siege, I instructed General Howard to send a divisionwith all his engineers to Grog's Bridge, fourteen and a half milessouthwest from Savannah, to rebuild it. On the evening of the 12thI rode over myself, and spent the night at Mr. King's house, whereI found General Howard, with General Hazen's division of theFifteenth Corps. His engineers were hard at work on the bridge, which they finished that night, and at sunrise Hazen's divisionpassed over. I gave General Hazen, in person, his orders to marchrapidly down the right bank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitationto assault and carry Fort McAllister by storm. I knew it to bestrong in heavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, butbelieved it open and weak to the rear. I explained to GeneralHazen, fully, that on his action depended the safety of the wholearmy, and the success of the campaign. Kilpatrick had already feltthe fort, and had gone farther down the coast to Kilkenny Bluff, orSt. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he had communicationwith a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet; but, at the time, I was not aware of this fact, and trusted entirely to General Hazenand his division of infantry, the Second of the Fifteenth Corps, the same old division which I had commanded at Shiloh andVicksburg, in which I felt a special pride and confidence. 

Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by GeneralHoward, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee, ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Cheevea, where GeneralHoward had established a signal-station to overlook the lowerriver, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron, which the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightlysent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeecheeas near to Fort McAllister as it was safe. 

On reaching the rice-mill at Cheevea's, I found a guard and acouple of twenty-pound Parrott gone, of De Gres's battery, whichfired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly seen overthe salt-marsh, about three miles distant. Fort McAllister had therebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back acrossthe marsh to where we were, but otherwise every thing about theplace looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath. 

The signal-officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole ofthe rice-mill. Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw, we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom Icould communicate with the signal-officer above, and at the sametime look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee Riverat Fort McAllister. About 2 p. M. We observed signs of commotionin the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and somemusket-skirmishing in the woods close by. 

This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had beenanxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal-officerdiscovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag, withwhich he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, whowas preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I werethere. On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fortto be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance ofGeneral Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soonattempt the assault. The sun was rapidly declining, and I wasdreadfully impatient. At that very moment some one discovered afaint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along thehorizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little bylittle grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of asteamer coming up the river. "It must be one of our squadron!"Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and ourattention was divided between this approaching steamer and theexpected assault. When the sun was about an hour high, anothersignal-message came from General Hazen that he was all ready, and Ireplied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching frombelow. Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of thisvessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you!" The answer went backpromptly, "General Sherman. " Then followed the question, "Is FortMcAllister taken?" "Not yet, but it will be in a minute!" Almostat that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the darkfringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as onparade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steadypace. Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belchingforth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaultinglines. One color went down, but was up in a moment. On the linesadvanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was apause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and theparapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in theair, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that wedid. Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantlysent by the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approachinggunboat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister fromtheir view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must haveheard the cannonading. 

During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves'smill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on theparapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro atCobb's plantation, "This nigger will have no sleep this night!"

I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, whichhappened to be a beautiful moonlight one. At the wharf belongingto Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our menin fishing or in gathering oysters. I was there in a minute, called for a volunteer crew, when several young officers, Nicholsand Merritt among the number; said they were good oarsmen, andvolunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister. GeneralHoward asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of theboat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will. The tidewas setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though thedistance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was socrooked that the actual distance was fully six miles. On the waydown we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk someyears before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister. 

Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach. I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was. Heanswered that the general was at the house of the overseer of theplantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it. Weaccordingly landed, tied our boat to a driftlog, and followed ourguide through bushes to a frame-house, standing in a grove oflive-oaks, near a row of negro quarters. 

General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of gettingsupper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, forwe were really very hungry. Of course, I congratulated Hazen mostheartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution veryhighly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail theexact results. The fort was an inclosed work, and its land-frontwas in the nature of a bastion and curtains, with good parapet, ditch, fraise, and chevaux-de-frise, made out of the large branchesof live-oaks. Luckily, the rebels had left the larger and unwieldytrunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for theskirmish-line, which crept behind these logs, and from them keptthe artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately. 

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one from below, one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along thecapital. All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis andline of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailantsthan the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark. Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two. Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and thegarrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty ofthem killed or wounded), were in his power. The commandingofficer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, andGeneral Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did. 

Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was inthe river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a pointof timber, and I was determined to board her that night, atwhatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going onin the outer world. Accordingly, after supper, we all walked downto the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been, entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, andthe sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outsidethe fort was full of torpedoes. Indeed, while we were there, atorpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was huntingfor a dead comrade. Inside the fort lay the dead as they hadfallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their livingcomrades, sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight. Inthe river, close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, butthe tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to thebank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, mannedthe boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, Ientered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings allabout the torpedoes. 

The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find the gunboatwithin a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully threemiles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to think she had turnedand gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends ofthe river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light, and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor. Pulling alongside, we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth andenthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among themCaptain Williamson, United States Navy. She proved to be theDandelion, a tender of the regular gunboat Flag, posted at themouth of the Ogeechee. All sorts of questions were made andanswered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached thesquadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and theyhad been expecting us for some days. They explained that AdmiralDahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was thenengaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was onhis flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; thatGeneral J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South, with his headquarters at Hilton Head; and that several ships loadedwith stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in PortRoyal Sound. From these officers I also learned that General Grantwas still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters andthings generally remained pretty much the same as when we had leftAtlanta. All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia, cut off from all communication with our friends; and the rebelpapers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, andfleeing for safety to the coast. I then asked for pen and paper, and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren, General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general termsthe actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of FortMcAllister, and of my desire that means should be taken toestablish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeecheeto the rear of the army. As a sample, I give one of these notes, addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication torelieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:

ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, December 13, 1864--11. 50 p. M. 

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

To-day, at 6 p. M. , General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corpscarried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrisonand stores. This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down tothis gunboat to communicate with the fleet. Before openingcommunication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leadinginto Savannah, and invested the city. The left of the army is onthe Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on theOgeechee, at King's Bridge. The army is in splendid order, andequal to any thing. The weather has been fine, and supplies wereabundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at allmolested by guerrillas. 

We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister, could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can goahead. 

We have already captured two boats on the Savannah river andprevented their gunboats from coming down. 

I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, andthe garrison at fifteen thousand. General Hardee commands. 

We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a largesupply of negroes, mules, horses, etc. , and our teams are in farbetter condition than when we started. 

My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses. We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles ofrails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential toLee's and Hood's armies. 

The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communicationwith our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies, dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve thearmy. 

I regard Savannah as already gained. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide was runningebb-strong; so I asked. Captain Williamson to tow us up as nearFort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which thenavy-officers had a wholesome dread. The Dandelion steamed up somethree or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could beseen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat. General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, wherewe found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of oneof the rooms. Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, butshortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiringfor me among the sleepers. Calling out, I was told that an officerof General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchoredbelow McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see meon important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-Warwound, and could not possibly come to me. I was extremely wearyfrom the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up, and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found aboat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river, to the steamer W. W. Coit (I think), on board of which we foundGeneral Foster. He had just come from Port Royal, expecting tofind Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the captureof Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me. He described fullythe condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina. He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on therailroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo, but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though hehad a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near BroadRiver, within cannon-range of the railroad. He explained, moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of breadand provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use. Westill had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but weneeded bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that aroute of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose theassistance of the navy were indispensable. We accordinglysteamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meetAdmiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by theinland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon, and Admiral Dahlgren. I was not personally acquainted with him atthe time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was atonce attracted to him. There was nothing in his power, he said, which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutelysuccessful. He undertook at once to find vessels of light draughtto carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or toGrog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to ourseveral camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, tosuperintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of allthe details of this most difficult work. General Foster thenconcluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundredthousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, andammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city ofSavannah, from the positions already secured. Admiral Dahlgrenthen returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister. Thisconsumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had againreached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on toGeneral Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on theplank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah. I reached thisplace about noon, and immediately sent orders to my ownhead-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over tothe plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave writtennotice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, andordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them inposition to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault. The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected withinnumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunatelythe weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should thewinter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed. Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare awharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto werecorduroyed in advance. The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out foruse; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, werecollected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on theOgeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps. 

Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, andHoward's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down theLittle Ogeechee. The enemy occupied not only the city itself, withits long line of outer works, but the many forts which had beenbuilt to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu, Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff, Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc. , etc. I knew that General Hardee couldnot have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I wastherefore anxious to break his lines before he could receivereenforcements from Virginia or Augusta. General Slocum hadalready captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down theSavannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men onArgyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted totransfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as theenemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem itprudent, because the same result could be better accomplished fromGeneral Fosters position at Broad River. 

Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening ofDecember 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up ashigh as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant haddispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated sinceour departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland. These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers ofthe army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for twomonths, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had anexcellent effect, making us feel that home was near. By thisvessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the followingletter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next dayColonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the letterof December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's ownhandwriting, and are given entire:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 3, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern pressindicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed yourmails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by ColonelMarkland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sentas far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded toyou as soon as heard from on the coast. 

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain fromcongratulating you and those under your command, until bottom hasbeen struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result. 

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented fromdetaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragghas gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of hisabsence to get possession of that place. Owing to somepreparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blowup Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believea particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. Ihope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg willnot have started back by that time. 

In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing likedirections for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on thesea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the onlytwo through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy beforethe fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holdingSavannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east ofSavannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from therecan cooperate with you. 

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood closeupon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this fallingback was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. Itdid not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas faroutnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage inmorale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled, if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papersbetter than I can give it. 

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that thereis likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will rundown the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi

GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands ofLieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operationtoward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and hisarmy. 

You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it willprobably take them three months without interruption to reestablisha through line from east to west. In that time I think the job herewill be effectually completed. 

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortifyand leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantryto protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior thatthe militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With thebalance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want inperson. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation. 

Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to forcehim to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the orderwithout any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow. The result will probably be known in New York before ColonelBabcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock willgive you full information of all operations now in progress. Very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I hadset my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to bepracticable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by seawas so complete a change from what I had supposed would be thecourse of events that I was very much concerned. I supposed, as amatter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, readyto convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orderscontemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind, I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, andsent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitrethe ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp largeenough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that wouldthus be left behind. And as some time might be required to collectthe necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than ahundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to pushoperations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before thenecessary fleet could be available. All these ideas are given inmy answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in thereport of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in thatcopy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now needno longer be withheld:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands ofLieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at thehands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previouslymade you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in OgeecheeRiver, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast, destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investingclosely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with thefleet. 

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred withGeneral Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangementswhich were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah toour possession. But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I haveinitiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fiftyor Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah, if time will allow. 

At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely, with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly awareof its importance; but, since passing down the river with GeneralFoster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirablyadapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an armyoperating against Savannah. Seagoing vessels can easily come toKing's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half milesdue west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to allour camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favoredwith weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavydetails are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes, so that I have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, byliberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantlysupplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrivalexcept bread. Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight totwenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had oneday's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they didnot want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well ascorn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We startedwith about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over tenthousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep, hogs, and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses, we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many ofwhich were drawn by mules which had not recovered from theChattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mulesshot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have nodoubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteenthousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected allhis remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along ourcolumns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, andeach regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes andfoot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom was foreach brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men, on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagonsloaded with poultry, potatoes, etc. , and as the army is composed ofabout forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number ofhorses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my order, because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having toomany idlers mounted. General Euston is now engaged in collectingstatistics on this subject, but I know the Government will neverreceive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed atwas fully attained, viz. , to deprive our enemy of them. All theseanimals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind FortMcAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations, or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematicallyaccounted for. While General Easton is collecting transportationfor my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island allour means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near FortMcAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to beerected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is nowreconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I havebegun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely, the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacksand feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I willplace some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from GeneralFoster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city, and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed, or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard thecity, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across thenarrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it. 

If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications, would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenuesof supply. 

The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above tothe city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whoseleft flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the firstboat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats andcapturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and acrew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Islandand the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on theSouth Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one ofhis corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of planmade necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things instatu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and outof the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops yourequire at James River, which I will accompany and command inperson. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (sayfive thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of theFifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must seeGeneral Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over abovethe Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to theOgeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he canbetter threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction ofPort Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from myregular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even preferthat other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Fosterfrom some other quarter. My four corps, full of experience andfull of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousandfighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard. Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducingSavannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence toRaleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, itmay be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, bysea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before themiddle of January. 

I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things inTennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomasassured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him ofthe 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promisedme that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's armyin Tennessee. 

Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking anddiscomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do notapprove of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumedthe offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction ofWaynesburg. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidencein him. I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood. 

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, hasgood artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia. In allour marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thingbut a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erectedfortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats. InSavannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swampsand overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the SavannahRiver about three miles above the city, around by a branch of theLittle Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshesand boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or commoncorduroy-roads. 

There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, andchildren, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feedthem beyond a few days I cannot imagine. I know that hisrequisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, andwe are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which couldalone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can drawnothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in thesoutheast, and that by a disused wagon-road. I could easily getpossession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making adetachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the mainarmy. Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and theweather is splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personaldislike to turning northward. I will keep Lieutenant Dunn hereuntil I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah, but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution ofyour order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time itwill require to obtain transportation by sea. 

I am, with respect, etc. , your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army. 

Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from myheadquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum'sheadquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag oftruce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing, inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place. Thefollowing letters give the result. General Hardee refused tosurrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break hisline of defense at several places, trusting that some one wouldsucceed. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864. 

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces inSavannah. 

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedewthat sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up theOgeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of allkinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for thereduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can castheavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which thepeople and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am thereforejustified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, andits dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for youranswer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertainthe proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to theinhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort toassault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shallthen feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, andshall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge thenational wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large citieswhich have been so prominent in dragging our country into civilwar. I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for thesurrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it isworth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDASAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces nearSavannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication fromyou of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannahand its dependent forts, " on the ground that you "have receivedguns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of thecity, " and for the further reason that you "have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrisoncan be supplied. " You add that, should you be "forced to resort toassault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you willthen feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and willmake little effort to restrain your army, " etc. , etc. The positionof your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for theland-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least fourmiles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line areboth intact. 

Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlledevery avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, isincorrect. I am in free and constant communication with mydepartment. 

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent fortsis refused. 

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs ofyour letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is notcomplied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted themilitary operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordancewith the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret theadoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate fromthem in future. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yourobedient servant, W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p. M. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16thinstant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made ademand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both lettersare herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my linesare within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but GeneralHardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But Imyself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and GeorgiaCentral Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yardsbeyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no picketsoutside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a milewithin the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R. Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was aprisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from theExchange, which is but two squares back from the river. Byto-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts inposition, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not. From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, thespires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely woodedwith pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothingfrom any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feelsconfident that he can make a successful assault at one or twopoints in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All ofGeneral Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the LittleOgeecbee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face ofan enemy. Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get asufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperativedemonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like verymuch indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wroteto you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark forthe James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to PortRoyal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximatenumber of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force. I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, foralready the movement of our transports and the gunboats hasrequired more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs;there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, andthere are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to havethe channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We findonly six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about tenfeet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. Allthese points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridgeacross Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to FortMcAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutelynecessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc. , en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remarkthat General Hardee refers to his still being in communication withhis department. This language he thought would deceive me; but Iam confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (theUnion Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feedhis army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures methat he has his force on that very road, near the head of BroadRiver, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah. We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed itfrom the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles). In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing thedestruction of their railroads, and at this moment have twodivisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroadfrom the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not takeSavannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope thatevents will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have toassault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it, the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon thebatteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faintbelief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delayoperations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannahin our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punishSouth Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people inGeorgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the wholeUnited States, North and South, would rejoice to have this armyturned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in themanner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst andimmediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia. 

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army. 

As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had openedcommunication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what hadtranspired in Tennessee since our departure. We received ourletters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts ofall the events there up to about the 1st of December. As beforedescribed, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D. Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--withForrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate aboutforty-five thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee, quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat brokenforces at his disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command ofMajor-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front ofFlorence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, andCapron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely forHood's initiative. 

This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was thereforeinferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, incase the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly towardNashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomasin person. Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of myadvance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marchedfrom Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield'sposition at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to therear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. GeneralHood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofieldat Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, andCheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whitherGeneral Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of hisdivisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the nightof November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with histrains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide ofHarpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to GeneralCheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while inmotion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundredyards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. GeneralSchofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, andposted his army in front of the town, where somerifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had thetwo corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), withWilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind theHarpeth. 

General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted hisposition with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and woundingGeneral Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool anddetermined, and fought magnificently. The rebel officers led theirmen in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing thebattle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten anddiscomfited. 

Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; amongthem Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders. Hood's losson that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospitalat Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and twoprisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundredand fifty-two. General Schofields lose, reported officially, wasone hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-threewounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six. The next dayGeneral Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fellback to the defenses of Nashville. 

Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of theQuartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by thechief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in thefortifications of Nashville, under the general direction ofMajor-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers. Hehad also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and hehad drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions ofSteedman and of R. S. Granger. These, with General Schofields armyand about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson, constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville, but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained insideof Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed uponhim and had entrenched his position. 

General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leadingfrom Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at itsprincipal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro' thedivision of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to abouteight thousand men. 

At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground wascovered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested onthe defensive. Those matters stood at Nashville, while we wereclosing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; andthe country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seemingpassive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one timeconsidered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going toNashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be atCity Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily forthe latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, andthus escaped so terrible a fate. 

On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road, eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letterdeclining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. Theground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved sobloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surroundSavannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and, in case of success, to capture the whole of his army. We hadalready completely invested the place on the north, west, andsouth, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of theold dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew thatHardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. On examiningmy maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging toGeneral Fosters command, might be moved from its then position atBroad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reachthis plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course, because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fallon this detachment with his whole army. I did not want to make amistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, takingone or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge, leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make allpossible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or threedays' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whenceAdmiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) toHilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, andhe promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it. Duringthe night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong, Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run intoTybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the OgeecheeRiver by the Romney Marshes. We were caught by a low tide andstuck in the mud. After laboring some time, the admiral orderedout his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallowchannel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, comingtoward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to theQuarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearingletters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting thatthe city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning ofDecember 21st, and was then in our possession. General Hardee hadcrossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his menand light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, butleaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars, steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property. Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of hisblockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and Itransferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River toGrog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I therelearned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishershad detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his linessimultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum), especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to havebeen the first to reach the heart of the city. 

Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once intothe city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside. Onthe morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters, and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof ofwhich we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and thevast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side. The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, werestill smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough. Turning back, we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone, and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to bea clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired aboutthe capacity of his hotel for headquarters. He was very anxious tohave us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had afull mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit ofpaying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for ouruse, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodationof officers and gentlemen in the remainder. I then dispatched anofficer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodateour horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr. Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completelyfurnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters. He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, theday before, that I would want his house for headquarters. At firstI felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling, lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, andso expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city, and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yardand stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house duringour stay in Savannah. He only reserved for himself the use of acouple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and amost excellent house it was in all respects. 

I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but onthe whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruitsof victory. The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed bytorpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below thecity, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerlypaved the streets. Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visitedme repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watchedCharleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners thatinfested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed byEnglishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as asort of entrepot. One of these small blockade-runners came intoSavannah after we were in full possession, and the master did notdiscover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house. Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy. A heavy force wasat once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in themain channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannahbecame the great depot of supply for the troops operating in thatquarter. 

Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in frontof Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so noblyfulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fullygiven in his own official reports, long-since published. Rumors ofthese great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but hisofficial report came on the 24th of December, with a letter fromGeneral Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th, and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, toGeneral Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms. Hisbrilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah tomake a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended byMr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter ofDecember 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is alsoclaimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8, 1865, here given:

(Special Field Order No. 6. )

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864. 

The general commanding announces to the troops composing theMilitary Division of the Mississippi that he has received from thePresident of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant, letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaignjust closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat ofHood's army in Tennessee. 

In order that all may understand the importance of events, it isproper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. Weheld Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to theenemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in theSouth, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regainthe place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measureswhich he thought would be effectual. That army, by a rapid march, gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton. We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtakeit, and General Hood led his army successfully far over towardMississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were notthus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and controlevents ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding thedepartments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared todecoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to completethe original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyedAtlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry onwar against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured hiscommercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from thesea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment ofour victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expectednews that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly andwell their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and thenturned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all hisartillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing thefragments down in Alabama. So complete success in militaryoperations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement thatentitles it to a place in the military history of the world. Thearmies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the localgarrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro', are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment mayinscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or"Nashville. " The general commanding embraces, in the same generalsuccess, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, andparalyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safetyof East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we haveat all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completelythwarted the designs of the enemies of our country. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

Here terminated the "March to the Sea, " and I only add a fewletters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling ofrejoicing throughout the country at the time. I only regarded themarch from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base, " as thetransfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finishedits then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, fromwhich it could achieve other important results. I considered thismarch as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war. Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded assomething extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of theusual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved fromAtlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, amovement that had to be met and defeated, or the war wasnecessarily at an end. 

Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of themarch to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I wouldplace the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum. 

I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of thelosses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured. Theproperty captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand, and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large, but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming thatsixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about fortydays, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period, so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition. I alsoadd a few of the more important letters that passed betweenGenerals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinionsat that stage of the war:

STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THEFIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA. 

 Killed Wounded Missing CapturedOfficers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men 10 93 24 404 1 277 77 1, 261

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 16, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head). 

GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his lastdispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry toRichmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entireforce, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as maybe given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate fromsuch base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster willobey such instructions as may be given by you. 

Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that bytransferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may bemade a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if capturedand not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort wouldserve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their mostvaluable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be themost important point at which to strike in order to sever allconnection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad. 

General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter ofyour future actions should be entirely left to your discretion. 

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries offield-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, assoon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported thatThomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have noparticulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication beinginterrupted by a heavy storm. 

Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing hisapproach to Savannah. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 18, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head). 

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is justreceived. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shallvery soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--thecapture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as thegreat one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for anotherwide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will notanticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and willprobably write you his own views. 

I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that youare in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, Ihad prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty offoraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending anyunless you actually need them. The hay-crop this year is short, and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty inprocuring a supply for our animals. 

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hopedthat he will completely, crush his army. Breckenridge, at lastaccounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, asThomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or bedefeated. 

General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowingPrice with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millionsof property. 

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments havingthree months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah. Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained byGeneral Thomas. 

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident theplace may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown uponits site, it may prevent the growth of future crops ofnullification and secession. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 18, 1864. 

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell youwith how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck. Icongratulate you and the brave officers and men under your commandon the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. Inever had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for yoursafety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the armyyou had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but youwould strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feelthe same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expeditionto any other living commander. 

It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gavehim the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself, before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since hestarted. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-ninepieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerablesmall-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive ofthe enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen generalofficers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lostfive thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last threedays' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making forMurfreesboro'. 

I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wipedout John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol. I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part ofyour army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to betaking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may notaccomplish more toward that result where you are than if broughthere, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city, that it would take about two months to get you here with all theother calls there are for ocean transportation. 

I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what canbe done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainlywill compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly thewhole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out ofVirginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmondto be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may bewell to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands. 

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results ofyour campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, Isubscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst. , brought byMajor Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand. As themajor starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simplyacknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with all itsimmense stores, must tell upon the people of the South. All wellhere. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPISAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feelvery much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you paymy army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and menthe substance of your note. 

I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for Ifeared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb theunity and morale of my army, now so perfect. 

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part ofyour instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebelforts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavyordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where theycan be more easily guarded than if left in the city. 

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and withslight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. Ifeel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought themover so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. Ileft Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be indoubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide hisforces. I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by anycurved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in ourcourse as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston andAugusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing therelong enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for theCharleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee andCape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleetunder Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favoran attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler willfail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a meredesolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take tostarve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically andpolitically, much importance is attached to the place, and it maybe that, apart from its military importance, both you and theAdministration may prefer I should give it more attention; and itwould be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point oflittle importance, after all its railroads leading into theinterior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on thehypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I wouldthen favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up withLee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; inwhich case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now thatHood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter toan issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can breakup the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the timespring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whipLee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that Ican handle him in the open country. 

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believeHardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty ofprovisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be madeimpregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siegeoperations. 

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas canspare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc. , belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I donot want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations asall-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down intoAlabama, trusting to the country for supplies. 

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review thewhole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has aconfidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish youcould run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show toboth armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather isnow cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your truefriend, W. T. SHERMAN Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864. 

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flatteredby the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, whichis now complete by the occupation of Savannah. 

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind aboutembarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make thebroad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; andstill more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, becauseit fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to disposeof Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River. So, Ithink, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis'sdisappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscowdisaster. "

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and haveexplained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from theOgeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made bythe enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring theheavy ordnance, etc. , to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and inremodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans andpurposes. I have also laid down the programme for a campaign whichI can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on theRoanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster thecity of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross theSavannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a largepart of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, andthen rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charlestonto Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, Iwould turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to theimportance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroadcommunications are broken. I take it for granted that the presentmovement on Wilmington will fail. If I should determine to takeCharleston, I would turn across the country (which I have huntedover many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wingon the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper. Afteraccomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-linefor Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out ofRichmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by theuse of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me andGrant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would notalarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and Iworld force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under thesupposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worstcome to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, orNewbern. 

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldestmoves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution thanmore timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, forinstance, my recent campaign. 

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent, for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can bebrought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that anyone general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle. 

I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step Itake from this point northward, is as much a direct attack uponLee's army as though we were operating within the sound of hisartillery. 

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to thevery utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country whichare rich in corn and meat. 

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy'scountry, because this war differs from European wars in thisparticular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostilepeople, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hardhand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that thisrecent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effectin this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lyingnewspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time nowrealize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of thesame experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people underpretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken inGeorgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will notbe quite so tempestuous. 

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think"salt" will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will beon the right of the right wing, and their position will naturallybring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched thehistory of that corps, you will have remarked that they generallydo their work pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burningwith an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all thatseems in store for her. 

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go toSouth Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for thatState, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make thosepeople feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you foryour desolation of Georgia. "

I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt ifwe shall spare the public buildings there as we did atMilledgeville. 

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my officialreport, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinatereports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearlynot only the reasons for every step, but the amount of executiondone, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; forwe marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, ofcourse, I could only be present with one, and generally that oneengaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction wasperformed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment, provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Suchbars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroadline can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new roadfrom Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) toMadison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can bedone, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, whichis a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed atHardee's escape, but really am not to blame. I moved as quickly aspossible to close up the "Union Causeway, " but interveningobstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road, Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were inSavannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgiatroops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in SouthCarolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and Ihave reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone toWilmington; in other words, they are scattered. I have reason tobelieve that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of itsevacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston, making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step. 

Please say to the President that I have received his kind message(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want ofzeal or love to the cause. 

From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for thefuture, which may enable me to correct errors before it is toolate. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friendsno chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage. 

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, yourfriend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[General Order No. 3. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICEWASHINGTON, January 14, 1865. 

The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representativesis published to the army:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4. ]

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congressto Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiersof his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliantmovement through Georgia. 

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of theUnited States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks ofthe people and of the Congress of the United States are due and arehereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and throughhim to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantryand good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga toAtlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia toSavannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to beengrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman. 

Approved, January 10, 1865. 

By order of the Secretary of War, W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 

DECEMBER, 1884, AND JANUARY, 1885. 

The city of Savannah was an old place, and usually accounted ahandsome one. Its houses were of brick or frame, with large yards, ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; its streets perfectlyregular, crossing each other at right angles; and at many of theintersections were small inclosures in the nature of parks. Thesestreets and parks were lined with the handsomest shade-trees ofwhich I have knowledge, viz. , the Willow-leaf live-oak, evergreensof exquisite beauty; and these certainly entitled Savannah to itsreputation as a handsome town more than the houses, which, thoughcomfortable, would hardly make a display on Fifth Avenue or theBoulevard Haussmann of Paris. The city was built on a plateau ofsand about forty feet above the level of the sea, abutting againstthe river, leaving room along its margin for a street of stores andwarehouses. The customhouse, court-house, post-office, etc. , wereon the plateau above. In rear of Savannah was a large park, with afountain, and between it and the court-house was a handsomemonument, erected to the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779in the assault made on the city at the time it was held by theEnglish during the Revolutionary War. Outside of Savannah therewas very little to interest a stranger, except the cemetery ofBonaventura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way ofThunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majesticlive-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which weretruly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' campingunder them:

Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green's house, Mr. A. G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agentfor the Department of the South, made his appearance to claimpossession, in the name of the Treasury Department, of all capturedcotton, rice, buildings, etc. Having use for these articlesourselves, and having fairly earned them, I did not feel inclinedto surrender possession, and explained to him that thequartermaster and commissary could manage them more to my likingthan he; but I agreed, after the proper inventories had beenprepared, if there remained any thing for which we had no specialuse, I would turn it over to him. It was then known that in thewarehouses were stored at least twenty-five thousand bales ofcotton, and in the forts one hundred and fifty large, heavysea-coast guns: although afterward, on a more careful count, thereproved to be more than two hundred and fifty sea-coast or siegeguns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton. At that interviewMr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee, told me that a vesselwas on the point of starting for Old Point Comfort, and, if she hadgood weather off Cape Hatteras, would reach Fortress Monroe byChristmas-day, and he suggested that I might make it the occasionof sending a welcome Christmas gift to the President, Mr. Lincoln, who peculiarly enjoyed such pleasantry. I accordingly sat down andwrote on a slip of paper, to be left at the telegraph-office atFortress Monroe for transmission, the following:

SAVANNAH GEORGIA, December 22, 1884. To His Excellency President Lincoln, Washington, D. C. :

I beg to present you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, withone hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, alsoabout twenty five thousand bales of cotton. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

This message actually reached him on Christmas-eve, was extensivelypublished in the newspapers, and made many a household unusuallyhappy on that festive day; and it was in the answer to thisdispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letter of December 28th, already given, beginning with the words, "many, many thanks, " etc. , which he sent at the hands of General John A. Logan, who happenedto be in Washington, and was coming to Savannah, to rejoin hiscommand. 

On the 23d of December were made the following general orders forthe disposition of the troops in and about Savannah:

[Special Field Order No. 139. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 23, 1864. 

Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially clearedout, and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions, will at once be made a grand depot for future operations:

1. The chief-quartermaster, General Euston, will, after giving thenecessary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River andOasabaw Sound, come in person to Savannah, and take possession ofall public buildings, vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc. , that maybe now or hereafter needed for any department of the army. Norents will be paid by the Government of the United States duringthe war, and all buildings must be distributed according to theaccustomed rates of the Quartermaster's Department, as though theywere public property. 

2. The chief commissary of subsistence, Colonel A. Beckwith, willtransfer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah, secure possession of the needful buildings and offices, and givethe necessary orders, to the end that the army may be suppliedabundantly and well. 

S. The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which ofthe enemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and whichdismantled and destroyed. The chief ordnance-officer, CaptainBaylor, will in like manner take possession of all propertypertaining to his department captured from the enemy, and cause thesame to be collected and conveyed to points of security; all theheavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to Fort Pulaski. 

4. The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city ofSavannah, looking to convenience of camps; General Slocum takingfrom the Savannah River around to the seven-mile post on the Canal, and General Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will holdKing's Bridge until Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troopswithdrawn from the south side of the Ogeechee, when he will takepost about Anderson's plantation, on the plank-road, and picket allthe roads leading from the north and west. 

5. General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale, Beaulieu, Wimberley, Thunderbolt, and Bonaventura, and he willcause that shore and Skidaway Island to be examined very closely, with a view to finding many and convenient points for theembarkation of troops and wagons on seagoing vessels. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

[Special Field Order No. 143. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 26, 1864. 

The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as amilitary post, and adapted to future military uses, but, as itcontains a population of some twenty thousand people, who must beprovided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to laydown certain general principles, that all within its militaryjurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations. 

1. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and, where interests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there isno conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposedand peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Familiesshould be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, andtradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc. ;churches, schools, and all places of amusement and recreation, should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe topersons in their pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within theline of outer pickets, but if any person shall abuse theseprivileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act ofhostility to the Government of the United States, he or she will bepunished with the utmost rigor of the law. Commerce with the outerworld will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants ofthe citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of theTreasury Department. 

2. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may givesuitable employment to the people, white and black, or transportthem to such points as they may choose where employment can be had;and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacanthouses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can helpthemselves. They will select first the buildings for the necessaryuses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores, to be turnedover to the Treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacantstore-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absentrebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States, until such time as their titles can be settled by the courts of theUnited States. 

8. The Mayor and City Council of Savannah will continue toexercise their functions, and will, in concert with the commandingofficer of the post and the chief-quartermaster, see that thefire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned andlighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens andsoldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissaryof subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthyfamilies that need assistance and support. The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choosetheir course, viz. , remain within our lines, and conduct themselvesas good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the namesof all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names andresidence to the chief-quartermaster, that measures may be taken totransport them beyond our lines. 

4. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah;their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictestaccountability, and will be punished severely, in person andproperty, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whateverupon the acts of the constituted authorities; they will be heldaccountable for such articles, even though copied from otherpapers. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand inhabitantsin Savannah, all of whom had participated more or less in the war, and had no special claims to our favor, but I regarded the war asrapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a politicalquestion as to what was to be done with the people of the South, both white and black, when the war was actually over. I concludedto give them the option to remain or to join their friends inCharleston or Augusta, and so announced in general orders. Themayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated, " and, afterconsulting with him, I authorized him to assemble his City Councilto take charge generally of the interests of the people; but warnedall who remained that they must be strictly subordinate to themilitary law, and to the interests of the General Government. About two hundred persona, mostly the families of men in theConfederate army, prepared to follow the fortunes of their husbandsand fathers, and these were sent in a steamboat under a flag oftruce, in charge of my aide Captain Audenried, to Charlestonharbor, and there delivered to an officer of the Confederate army. But the great bulk of the inhabitants chose to remain in Savannah, generally behaved with propriety, and good social relations at oncearose between them and the army. Shortly after our occupation ofSavannah, a lady was announced at my headquarters by the orderly orsentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, andproved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I had knownabout 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point. She was a nativeof New London, Connecticut, and very handsome. She began herinterview by presenting me a letter from her husband, who thencommanded a division of the Georgia militia in the rebel army, which had just quitted Savannah, which letter began, "DEAR SHERMAN:The fortunes of war, etc-. , compel me to leave my wife in Savannah, and I beg for her your courteous protection, " etc. , etc. Iinquired where she lived, and if anybody was troubling her. Shesaid she was boarding with a lady whose husband had, in like mannerwith her own, gone off with Hardee's army; that a part of the househad been taken for the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; thather landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous atthe noise which the younger staff-officers made at night; etc. Iexplained to her that I could give but little personal attention tosuch matters, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troopsoccupied the city. I afterward visited her house, and saw, personally, that she had no reason to complain. Shortly afterwardMr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presented aletter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, allegingthat his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, and askedof me protection for his family, his cotton, etc. To him I gavethe general assurance that no harm was designed to any of thepeople of Savannah who would remain quiet and peaceable, but that Icould give him no guarantee as to his cotton, for over it I had noabsolute control; and yet still later I received a note from thewife of General A. P. Stewart (who commanded a corps in Hood'sarmy), asking me to come to see her. This I did, and found her tobe a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wanting protection, and who wasnaturally anxious about the fate of her husband, known to be withGeneral Hood, in Tennessee, retreating before General Thomas. Iremember that I was able to assure her that he had not been killedor captured, up to that date, and think that I advised her, insteadof attempting to go in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati, to her uncle, Judge Storer, there await the issue of events. 

Before I had reached Savannah, and during our stay there, the rebelofficers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of ourarmy as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex;that we burned every thing we came across--barns, stables, cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the womenand killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on theinhabitants. Therefore it struck me as strange that GeneralsHardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, andeven bespeak our personal care and attention. These officers knewwell that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yettacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the droopingenergies of the people of the South. 

As the division of Major-General John W. Geary, of the TwentiethCorps, was the first to enter Savannah, that officer was appointedto command the place, or to act as a sort of governor. He verysoon established a good police, maintained admirable order, and Idoubt if Savannah, either before or since, has had a bettergovernment than during our stay. The guard-mountings and parades, as well as the greater reviews, became the daily resorts of theladies, to hear the music of our excellent bands; schools wereopened, and the churches every Sunday were well filled with mostdevout and respectful congregations; stores were reopened, andmarkets for provisions, meat, wood, etc. , were established, so thateach family, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procureall the necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they hadmoney. Of course, many families were actually destitute of this, and to these were issued stores from our own stock of supplies. Iremember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, an order for thecontents of a large warehouse of rice, which he confided to acommittee of gentlemen, who went North (to Boston), and soonreturned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams, sugar, coffee, etc. , for gratuitous distribution, which relieved the most pressingwants until the revival of trade and business enabled the people toprovide for themselves. 

A lady, whom I had known in former years as Miss Josephine Goodwin, told me that, with a barrel of flour and some sugar which she hadreceived gratuitously from the commissary, she had baked cakes andpies, in the sale of which she realized a profit of fifty-sixdollars. 

Meantime Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off new lines ofparapet, which would enable a comparatively small garrison to holdthe place, and a heavy detail of soldiers was put to work thereon;Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot ofsupplies; and, though vessels arrived almost daily with mails andprovisions, we were hardly ready to initiate a new and hazardouscampaign. I had not yet received from General Grant or GeneralHalleck any modification of the orders of December 6, 1864, toembark my command for Virginia by sea; but on the 2d of January, 1865, General J. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arriveddirect from General Grant's headquarters, bearing the followingletter, in the general's own handwriting, which, with my answer, ishere given:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the nextcampaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written fromWashington. Your confidence in being able to march up and jointhis army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect ofsuch a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent theorganization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood isnow retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss inmen has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besidesdeserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collectedtogether and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can, weshould act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving asproposed, will do it. 

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenchedcamp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah andCharleston. Your movement toward Branchville will probably enableFoster to reach this with his own force. This will give us aposition in the South from which we can threaten the interiorwithout marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, aswe have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp beestablished about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for presentharm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteenthousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and moveout with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee toretain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandonthem entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only dangerto the easy success of your expedition. In the event you shouldmeet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find thesea-coast. Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I canhelp it, and will not let it go without following to the best of myability. 

Without waiting further directions, than, you may make yourpreparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join thearmies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leaveout all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing thatyour information, gained daily in the course of events, will bebetter than any that can be obtained now. 

It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coastports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could takeshipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you couldmarch the whole distance. 

From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty insupplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there hereis but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south ofthe river to bring you through. I shall establish communicationwith you there, by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wantscan be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, andto hear your plan, and about the time of starting. 

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah, and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens orTreasury agents, without orders of the War Department. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 2, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point. 

GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, yournote of 26th and letter of 27th December. 

I herewith inclose to you a copy of a projet which I have thismorning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediatecommanders. 

I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain. I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton, quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forwardthem to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary stepsmay be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time. 

I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add. Everything here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in ourwagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet(January 15th). But, until those supplies are in hand, I can donothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with greatrapidity. 

I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear. It has turned out as youwill remember I expected. 

I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from theSecretary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here, and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York. 

I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal, by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster(without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make alodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo. 

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this bya staff-officer, who can return on one of the vessels of thesupply-fleet. I suppose that, now that General Butler has gotthrough with them, you can spare them to us. 

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sentyou in a day or two, as soon as some farther subordinate reportscome in. 

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[Entirely confidential]

PROJET FOR JANUARY. 

1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head ofBroad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and massthe wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo. 

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway towardHardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corpsabout Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secureSister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville. 

In the mean time, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc. , to be movedto a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got readyfor another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the headof Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, bythe 15th January. 

2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leadingin the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance offorage and provisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15thJanuary, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at ornear Coosawhatchie about the same date. General Fosters troops tooccupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon asHoward gets Pocotaligo. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

Therefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to march with myentire army north by land, and concluded at once to secure afoothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side, selectingPocotaligo and Hardeeville as the points of rendezvous for the twowings; but I still remained in doubt as to the wishes of theAdministration, whether I should take Charleston en route, orconfine my whole attention to the incidental advantages of breakingup the railways of South and North Carolina, and the greater objectof uniting my army with that of General Grant before Richmond. 

General Barnard remained with me several days, and was regardedthen, as now, one of the first engineers of the age, perfectlycompetent to advise me on the strategy and objects of the newcampaign. He expressed himself delighted with the high spirit ofthe army, the steps already taken, by which we had capturedSavannah, and he personally inspected some of the forts, such asThunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which the enemy had so longheld at bay the whole of our navy, and had defeated the previousattempts made in April, 1862, by the army of General Gillmore, which had bombarded and captured Fort Pulaski, but had failed toreach the city of Savannah. I think General Barnard expected me toinvite him to accompany us northward in his official capacity; butColonel Poe, of my staff, had done so well, and was so perfectlycompetent, that I thought it unjust to supersede him by a senior inhis own corps. I therefore said nothing of this to GeneralBarnard, and soon after he returned to his post with General Grant, at City Point, bearing letters and full personal messages of oursituation and wants. 

We were very much in want of light-draught steamers for navigatingthe shallow waters of the coast, so that it took the SeventeenthCorps more than a week to transfer from Thunderbolt to Beaufort, South Carolina. Admiral Dahlgren had supplied the Harvest Moon andthe Pontiac, and General Foster gave us a couple of hired steamers;I was really amused at the effect this short sea-voyage had on ourmen, most of whom had never before looked upon the ocean. Ofcourse, they were fit subjects for sea-sickness, and afterward theybegged me never again to send them to sea, saying they would rathermarch a thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than tospend a single night on the ocean. By the 10th General Howard hadcollected the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) onBeaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-fivemiles inland. They crossed the channel between the island andmain-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pontoon-bridge, and marched out to Garden's Corners, where there was somelight skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they continued on toPocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned, andaccordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lost only twoofficers and eight men. 

About the same time General Slocum crossed two divisions of theTwentieth Corps over the Savannah River, above the city, occupiedHardeeville by one division and Purysburg by another. Thus, by themiddle of January, we had effected a lodgment in South Carolina, and were ready to resume the march northward; but we had not yetaccumulated enough provisions and forage to fill the wagons, andother causes of delay occurred, of which I will make mention in dueorder. 

On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, United StatesNavy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah, bringingthe first news of General Butler's failure at Fort Fisher, and thatthe general had returned to James River with his land-forces, leaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in thattempestuous season. Captain Breese brought me a letter from theadmiral, dated December 29th, asking me to send him from Savannahone of my old divisions, with which he said he would make shortwork of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced itsguns, and that General Butler had failed because he was afraid toattack, or even give the order to attack, after (as Porterinsisted) the guns of Fort Fisher had been actually silenced by thenavy. 

I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that I proposed tomarch north inland, and that I would prefer to leave the rebelgarrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging and piling them up inmy front as we progressed. From the chances, as I then understoodthem, I supposed that Fort Fisher was garrisoned by a comparativelysmall force, while the whole division of General Hoke remainedabout the city of Wilmington; and that, if Fort Fisher werecaptured, it would leave General Hoke free to join the larger forcethat would naturally be collected to oppose my progress northward. I accordingly answered Admiral Porter to this effect, declining toloan him the use of one of my divisions. It subsequentlytranspired, however, that, as soon as General Butler reached CityPoint, General Grant was unwilling to rest under a sense offailure, and accordingly dispatched back the same troops, reenforced and commanded by General A. H. Terry, who, on the 15thday of January, successfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher, with its entire garrison. After the war was over, about the 20thof May, when I was giving my testimony before the CongressionalCommittee on the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee, Senator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had beensummoned before that committee during the previous January, and hadjust finished his demonstration to their entire satisfaction thatFort Fisher could not be carried by assault, when they heard thenewsboy in the hall crying out an "extra" Calling him in, theyinquired the news, and he answered, "Fort Fisher done took!" Ofcourse, they all laughed, and none more heartily than GeneralButler himself. 

On the 11th of January there arrived at Savannah a revenue-cutter, having on board Simeon Draper, Esq. , of New York City, the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartermaster-General Meigs, Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of civilians, who had comedown from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah.... 

I was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer to Mr. Draper thecustom house, post-office, and such other public buildings as thesecivilians needed in the execution of their office, and to cause tobe delivered into their custody the captured cotton. This wasaccomplished by--

[Special Field Orders, No. 10. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 12, 1865. 

1. Brevet Brigadier-General Euston, chief-quartermaster, will turnover to Simeon Draper, Esq. , agent of the United States TreasuryDepartment, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war, taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it tothe quartermaster-general. He will also afford Mr. Draper all thefacilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc. , to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition. 

2. General Euston will also turn over to Mr. Draper thecustom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah ashe may need in the execution of his office. 

By order of General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, withorders to General Euston to ship it by the return-vessels to NewYork, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court, accompaniedwith invoices and all evidence of title to ownership. Marks, numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales, so that the court might know the history of each bale. But Mr. Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, andordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friendor foe, could trace his identical cotton. I thought it strange atthe time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims, real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identicalcotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and thatreclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than theactual quantity captured, viz. , thirty-one thousand bales. 

Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curiousabout matters and things in general. I walked with him through thecity, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments thatoccupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased atthe ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts. Four of the "dog-tents, " or tentes d'abri, buttoned together, served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or roughboards brought from demolished houses or fences. I remember hismarked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his doorout of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frameserving for his door. 

He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves, and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating theirsimple character and faith in our arms and progress. He inquiredparticularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was aDemocrat, and hostile to the negro. I assured him that GeneralDavis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had anyhostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers, and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed alarge force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who hadrendered admirable service. He then showed me a newspaper accountof General Davis taking up his pontoon-bridge across EbenezerCreek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on theother side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry. I had heardsuch a rumor, and advised Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced, to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and GeneralDavis explained the matter to his entire satisfaction. The truthwas, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves, old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place ofsafety. It so happened that General Davis's route into Savannahfollowed what was known as the "River-road, " and he had to makeconstant use of his pontoon-train--the head of his column reachingsome deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly overanother. He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day andnight. On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up fromEbenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers remained asleep onthe farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry. Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over, and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but thiswas a mere supposition. At all events, the same thing might haveresulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humanecommanders who filled the army. General Jeff. C. Davis wasstrictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons andcolumns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all feltsympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr. Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics. Thenegro question was beginning to loom up among the politicaleventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would theslaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes. I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, assuch, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaveswould be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters, equal to all others, politically and socially. Mr. Stanton seemeddesirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer withthem, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him. Iaccordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of thenegroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to myrooms to meet the Secretary of War. Twenty responded, and werereceived in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr. Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation inthe form of questions and answers. Each of the twenty gave hisname and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier astheir spokesman:

First Question. State what your understanding is in regard to theacts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching thecolored people in the rebel States?

Answer. So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation tothe rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms andsubmit to the laws of the United States, before the 1st of January, 1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slavesin the Southern States should be free, henceforth and forever. That is what I understood. 

Second Question. State what you understand by slavery, and thefreedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?

Answer. Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work ofanother man, and not by his consent. The freedom, as I understandit, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yokeof bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our ownlabor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government inmaintaining our freedom. 

Fourth Question. State in what manner you would rather live--whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer. I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is aprejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over;but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren. 

(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed withFrazier, but he thought they ought to live together, along with thewhites. )

Eighth Question. If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, whatwould be its effect?

Answer. I think they would fight as long as they were before the"bayonet, " and just as soon as they could get away they woulddesert, in my opinion. 

Tenth Question. Do you understand the mode of enlistment ofcolored persons in the rebel States by State agents, under the actof Congress; if yea, what is your understanding?

Answer. My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted byState agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to theState and do not swell the army, because every black man enlistedby a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that largerbounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are givenby the United States. The great object should be to push throughthis rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be somethingwanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthenthe army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted. 

Eleventh Question. State what, in your opinion, is the best way toenlist colored men as soldiers?

Answer. I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be puta stop to. The ministers would talk to them, and the young menwould enlist. It is my opinion that it world be far better for theState agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for theUnited States under the direction of General Sherman. 

Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's intimatingthat he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, andthen he put the twelfth and last question

Twelfth Question. State what is the feeling of the colored peopletoward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentimentsand actions as friendly to their rights and interests, orotherwise. 

Answer. We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as aman, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplishthis work, and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him, looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithfulperformance of his duty. Some of us called upon him immediatelyupon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretarywith more courtesy than he did us. His conduct and deportmenttoward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman. We haveconfidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could notbe in better hands. This is our opinion now, from the shortacquaintance and intercourse we have had. 

It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary shouldhave catechized negroes concerning the character of a general whohad commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured citiesconducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundredmiles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousandsof freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loadeddown my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I wasconstrued by others as hostile to the black race. I had receivedfrom General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that therewere certain influential parties near the President who weretorturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negropolicy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though acivilian, knew better, and appreciated my motives and character. Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by meas confidential, I now insert it here at length:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C. , December 30, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah. 

MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, inthis private and friendly way, to a matter which may possiblyhereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may nowanticipate. 

While almost every one is praising your great march throughGeorgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain classhaving now great influence with the President, and very probablyanticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedlydisposed to make a point against you. I mean in regard to"inevitable Sambo. " They say that you have manifested an almostcriminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing tocarry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, butrepulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with youto Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia ofthat number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many morecould have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this, you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you bycutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre oflarge numbers by Wheeler's cavalry. 

To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as theidle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes fromfollowing you because you had not the means of supporting them, andfeared they might seriously embarrass your march. But there areothers, and among them some in high authority, who think or pretendto think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a pointagainst you. 

I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of menby doing any thing which you do not deem right and proper, and forthe interest of the Government and the country; but simply to callyour attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhatdifferently than from your stand-point. I will explain as brieflyas possible:

Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in theSouth, and the probability that a part, at least, of theable-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of therebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by whichthese slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the routeyou have passed over should be made the route of escape, andSavannah the great place of refuge. These, I know, are the viewsof some of the leading men in the Administration, and they nowexpress dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in yourgreat raid. 

Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be nofurther fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you toreopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interferingwith your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves findat least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields aboutSavannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

I merely throw out these suggestions. I know that such a coursewould be approved by the Government, and I believe that amanifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves withinour lines will do much to silence your opponents. You willappreciate my motives in writing this private letter. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK. 

There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah, shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes themselves convincedhim that he was in error, and that they understood their owninterests far better than did the men in Washington, who tried tomake political capital out of this negro question. The idea thatsuch men should have been permitted to hang around Mr. Lincoln, totorture his life by suspicions of the officers who were toilingwith the single purpose to bring the war to a successful end, andthereby to liberate all slaves, is a fair illustration of theinfluences that poison a political capital. 

My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, tofollow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dreadus. "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. " I did not wantthem to cast in our teeth what General Hood had once done inAtlanta, that we had to call on their slaves to help us to subduethem. But, as regards kindness to the race, encouraging them topatience and forbearance, procuring them food and clothing, andproviding them with land whereon to labor, I assert that no armyever did more for that race than the one I commanded in Savannah. When we reached Savannah, we were beset by ravenous State agentsfrom Hilton Head, who enticed and carried away our servants, andthe corps of pioneers which we had organized, and which had donesuch excellent service. On one occasion, my own aide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up ina house and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthilyto Hilton Head. They appealed to him for protection, alleging thatthey had been told that they must be soldiers, that "Massa Lincoln"wanted them, etc. I never denied the slaves a full opportunity forvoluntary enlistment, but I did prohibit force to be used, for Iknew that the State agents were more influenced by the profit theyderived from the large bounties then being paid than by any love ofcountry or of the colored race. In the language of Mr. Frazier, the enlistment of every black man "did not strengthen the army, buttook away one white man from the ranks. "

During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed this negroquestion very fully; he asked me to draft an order on the subject, in accordance with my own views, that would meet the pressingnecessities of the case, and I did so. We went over this order, No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully. The secretary madesome verbal modifications, when it was approved by him in all itsdetails, I published it, and it went into operation at once. Itprovided fully for the enlistment of colored troops, and gave thefreedmen certain possessory rights to land, which afterward becamematters of judicial inquiry and decision. Of course, the militaryauthorities at that day, when war prevailed, had a perfect right togrant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extendmilitary protection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simpletitle; and all that was designed by these special field orders wasto make temporary provisions for the freedmen and their familiesduring the rest of the war, or until Congress should take action inthe premises. All that I now propose to assert is, that Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough, andapproved every paragraph thereof, before they were made public:

[Special Field Orders, No. 15. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 16, 1865. 

1. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fieldsalong the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and thecountry bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved andset apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by theacts of war and the proclamation of the President of the UnitedStates. 

2. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen oraccustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlementshereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unlessmilitary officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permittedto reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will beleft to the freed people themselves, subject only to the UnitedStates military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the lawsof war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negrois free, and must be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected toconscription, or forced military service, save by the writtenorders of the highest military authority of the department, undersuch regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe. Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics, will be free to select their own work and residence, but the youngand able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiery inthe service of the United States, to contribute their share towardmaintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights ascitizens of the United States. 

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments, under the orders of the United States militaryauthorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed; according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of therecruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuringagricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and otherarticles necessary for their livelihood. 

8. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shalldesire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purposean island or a locality clearly defined within the limits abovedesignated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations willhimself, or, by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, givethem a license to settle such island or district, and afford themsuch assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceableagricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdividethe land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves, and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that eachfamily shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillableground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not morethan eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of whichland the military authorities will afford them protection untilsuch time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shallregulate their title. The quartermaster may, on the requisition ofthe Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposalof the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to plybetween the settlements and one or more of the commercial pointsheretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunityto supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of theirland and labor. 

4. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of theUnited States, be may locate his family in any one of thesettlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all otherrights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person. In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage onboard the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of theinland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantagesderived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler asabove defined, or unless absent on Government service, will beentitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlementby virtue of these orders. 

5. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a generalofficer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements andPlantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, toregulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnishpersonally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of thePresident of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and whoshall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether aspossessory. The same general officer will also be charged with theenlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protectingtheir interests while absent from their settlements; and will begoverned by the rules and regulations prescribed by the WarDepartment for such purposes. 

6. Brigadier-General R. Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector ofSettlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on theperformance of his duties. No change is intended or desired in thesettlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to propertyheretofore acquired be affected thereby. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the time of hisvisit to Savannah. He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter withSimeon Draper, Esq. , which cutter lay at a wharf in the river, buthe came very often to my quarters at Mr. Green's house. Thoughappearing robust and strong, he complained a good deal of internalpains, which he said threatened his life, and would compel him soonto quit public office. He professed to have come from Washingtonpurposely for rest and recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of thebickerings and jealousies at the national capital; of theinterminable quarrels of the State Governors about their quotas, and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened thevery existence of the Government itself. He said that the price ofevery thing had so risen in comparison with the depreciated money, that there was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed tome, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to bringthe war to a close. 

He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and promised togo North without delay, so as to hurry back to me the supplies Ihad called for, as indispensable for the prosecution of the nextstage of the campaign. I was quite impatient to get off myself, for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxiousto get into the pine-woods again, free from the importunities ofrebel women asking for protection, and of the civilians from theNorth who were coming to Savannah for cotton and all sorts ofprofit. 

On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered to turn over thecity of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, commanding the Departmentof the South, who proposed to retain his own headquarters at HiltonHead, and to occupy Savannah by General Grovers division of theNineteenth Corps, just arrived from James River; and on the nextday, viz. , January 19th, I made the first general orders for themove. 

These were substantially to group the right wing of the army atPocotaligo, already held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the leftwing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Carolina. Thearmy remained substantially the same as during the march fromAtlanta, with the exception of a few changes in the commanders ofbrigades and divisions, the addition of some men who had joinedfrom furlough, and the loss of others from the expiration of theirterm of service. My own personal staff remained the same, with theexception that General W. F. Barry had rejoined us at Savannah, perfectly recovered from his attack of erysipelas, and continuedwith us to the end of the war. Generals Easton and Beckwithremained at Savannah, in charge of their respective depots, withorders to follow and meet us by sea with supplies when we shouldreach the coast at Wilmington or Newbern, North Carolina. 

Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among therebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta; but I had longbefore made up my mind to waste no time on either, further than toplay off on their fears, thus to retain for their protection aforce of the enemy which would otherwise concentrate in our front, and make the passage of some of the great rivers that crossed ourroute more difficult and bloody. 

Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st ofJanuary, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies, etc. , with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beaufort, South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see General Foster. The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Beaufort safely onthe 23d, and found some of General Blair's troops there. The pinkof his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up on the railroad aboutPocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to which their supplieswere carried from Hilton Head by steamboats. General Hatch'sdivision (of General Foster's command) was still at Coosawhatchieor Tullafinny, where the Charleston & Savannah Railroad crosses theriver of that name. All the country between Beaufort andPocotaligo was low alluvial land, cut up by an infinite number ofsalt-water sloughs and freshwater creeks, easily susceptible ofdefense by a small force; and why the enemy had allowed us to makea lodgment at Pocotaligo so easily I did not understand, unless itresulted from fear or ignorance. It seemed to me then that theterrible energy they had displayed in the earlier stages of the warwas beginning to yield to the slower but more certain industry anddiscipline of our Northern men. It was to me manifest that thesoldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear of ourWestern men, and, like children, they had invented such ghostlikestories of our prowess in Georgia, that they were scared by theirown inventions. Still, this was a power, and I intended to utilizeit. Somehow, our men had got the idea that South Carolina was thecause of all our troubles; her people were the first to fire onFort Sumter, had been in a great hurry to precipitate the countryinto civil war; and therefore on them should fall the scourge ofwar in its worst form. Taunting messages had also come to us, whenin Georgia, to the effect that, when we should reach SouthCarolina, we would find a people less passive, who would fight usto the bitter end, daring us to come over, etc. ; so that I saw andfelt that we would not be able longer to restrain our men as we haddone in Georgia. 

Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom I would gladlyhave extended protection and mercy, but they were beyond mypersonal reach, and I would not restrain the army lest its vigorand energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expectbold and strong resistance at the many broad and deep rivers thatlay across our path. 

General Foster's Department of the South had been enlarged toembrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troops servingthere, under the command of General Innis N. Palmer, at Newbern, became subject to my command. General A. H. Terry held FortFisher, and a rumor came that he had taken the city of Wilmington;but this was premature. He had about eight thousand men. GeneralSchofield was also known to be en route from Nashville for NorthCarolina, with the entire Twenty-third Corps, so that I had everyreason to be satisfied that I would receive additional strength aswe progressed northward, and before I should need it. 

General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forces inCharleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of defense. It was also known that General Beauregard had come from thedirection of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of allthe troops designed to resist our progress. 

The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, rendered theroads execrable, and the Savannah River became so swollen that itfilled its many channels, overflowing the vast extent ofrice-fields that lay on the east bank. This flood delayed ourdeparture two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridge atSavannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's division of theFifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons that were enroute from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway. 

General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisions across theriver, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above Savannah, wasselected for the passage of the rest of his wing and ofKilpatrick's cavalry. The troops were in motion for that pointbefore I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, United StatesNavy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) and a coupleof transports, which I requested him to use in protecting Sister'sFerry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facilitate thepassage of the troops all he could. The utmost activity prevailedat all points, but it was manifest we could not get off much beforethe 1st day of February; so I determined to go in person toPocotaligo, and there act as though we were bound for Charleston. On the 24th of January I started from Beaufort with a part of mystaff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure, rode across theisland to a pontoon-bridge that spanned the channel between it andthe main-land, and thence rode by Garden's Corners to a plantationnot far from Pocotaligo, occupied by General Blair. There we founda house, with a majestic avenue of live-oaks, whose limbs had beencut away by the troops for firewood, and desolation marked one ofthose splendid South Carolina estates where the proprietorsformerly had dispensed a hospitality that distinguished the oldregime of that proud State. I slept on the floor of the house, butthe night was so bitter cold that I got up by the fire severaltimes, and when it burned low I rekindled it with an oldmantel-clock and the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner ofthe room--the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myselfpersonally during the war. 

The next morning I rode to Pocotaligo, and thence reconnoitred ourentire line down to Coosawhatchie. Pocotaligo Fort was on low, alluvial ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land whichconnected with the firm ground extending inland, constituting thechief reason for its capture at the very first stage of thecampaign. Hatch's division was ordered to that point fromCoosawhatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing was broughtnear by, ready to start by the 1st of February. I alsoreconnoitred the point of the Salkiehatchie River, where theCharleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected by arebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few men aboutit; but the stream itself was absolutely impassable, for the wholebottom was overflowed by its swollen waters to the breadth of afull mile. Nevertheless, Force's and Mower's divisions of theSeventeenth Corps were kept active, seemingly with the intention tocross over in the direction of Charleston, and thus to keep up thedelusion that that city was our immediate "objective. " Meantime, Ihad reports from General Slocum of the terrible difficulties he hadencountered about Sister's Ferry, where the Savannah River wasreported nearly three miles wide, and it seemed for a time almostimpossible for him to span it at all with his frail pontoons. About this time (January 25th), the weather cleared away bright andcold, and I inferred that the river would soon run down, and enableSlocum to pass the river before February 1st. One of the divisionsof the Fifteenth Corps (Corse's) had also been cut off by the lossof the pontoon-bridge at Savannah, so that General Slocum had withhim, not only his own two corps, but Corse's division andKilpatrick's cavalry, without which it was not prudent for me toinaugurate the campaign. We therefore rested quietly aboutPocotaligo, collecting stores and making final preparations, untilthe 1st of February, when I learned that the cavalry and twodivisions of the Twentieth Corps were fairly across the river, andthen gave the necessary orders for the march northward. 

Before closing this chapter, I will add a few original letters thatbear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON, D. C. January 21, 1866. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received atCity Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you onall points of recommendation. As I arrived here at 1 p. M. , andmust leave at 6 p. M. , having in the mean time spent over threehours with the secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into theheart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboardby the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroadtransportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbersover twenty-one thousand men. 

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go toSelma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, toknow whether he could go, and, if so, by which of several routes hewould select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered toset offensively from the seacoast to the interior, towardMontgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north atan early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Withoutfurther reenforcement Canby will have a moving column of twentythousand men. 

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a forcethere of eight thousand effective. At Newbern about half thenumber. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also hasfallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th weknew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, andthat on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington. 

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, hewill be sent to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus forcesat the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', incooperation with your movements. From either point, railroadcommunications can be run out, there being here abundance ofrolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. 

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's armysouth. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, ifWilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisherhaving overtaken about two thousand. 

All other troops are subject to your orders as you come incommunication with them. They will be so instructed. From aboutRichmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, orattempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should yoube brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirtythousand effective men to your support, from the troops aboutRichmond. 

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from theGulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with youfrom Newbern or Wilmington, or both. You can call forreenforcements. 

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who willreturn with any message you may have for me. If there is any thingI can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at anypoint on the seacoast, ready for you, let me know it. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with yourletter of January 21st, which I have read with interest. 

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on mycampaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of itsintrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point ofsecurity on the seaboard. I hope General Terry will follow it upby the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, fromAdmiral Porter's dispatch to me. I rejoice that Terry was not aWest-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had thesame troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt. 

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reenforced by some more ironclads, wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but Iwithhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of allSullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the captureof James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at thistime. Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for therailroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior. Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto, and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the commonroad which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When I getto Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', viaFayetteville. By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate theland; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, willfollow my movement, taking any thing the enemy lets go, or sooccupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces againstme. I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston, andbeing at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to MoreheadCity and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems thatLee must come out. If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should bepushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and may be Goldsboro' (or, rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro'). Itis not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distantregion, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forcedto draw supplies from its north, it, will be eating up the samestores on which Lee depends for his command. 

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta. Canby andThomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keepemployed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplishthe same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanoogaforward to the Etowah, viz. , Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, therebythreatening Georgia. I know that the Georgia troops aredisaffected. At Savannah I met delegates from several counties ofthe southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to theConfederate cause. I nursed the feeling as far as possible, andinstructed Grower to keep it up. 

My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the SavannahRiver to the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsvilleto-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all readyto start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway. 

We find the enemy on the east aide of the Salkiehatchie, andcavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seemto be merely watching us. If we start on Tuesday, in one week weshall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road fromthe Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles. I will be surethat every rail is twisted. Should we encounter too muchopposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect thatbranch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangleformed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee), breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads. Up to thatpoint I feel full confidence, but from there may have to manoeuvresome, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies. 

You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridiantrip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that Februaryis usually a fine month. Before the March storms come we should bewithin striking distance of the coast. The months of April and Maywill be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and theRoanoke. You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well inhand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay sodearly that you will have less to do. I know that this trip isnecessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and inthe right position for it. My army is large enough for thepurpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmostactivity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentrationagainst me may not be universal. 

I suspect that Jeff. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me, for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heartof South Carolina. 

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in thedirection of Athena. 

I think the "poor white trash" of the South are falling out oftheir ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; butthere is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight tothe last. The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, andthe disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens for us; we mustnot relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts: Iworld, ere this, have been off, but we had terrific rains, whichcaught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in therice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which hadbeen carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout merelakes of slimy mud. The weather is now good, and I have the armyon terra firma. Supplies, too, came for a long time by dailydriblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hopeto start on Tuesday. 

I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on thereenforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield comes, you hadbetter relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs anoperation on his leg. Let Schofield take command, with hisheadquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secureGoldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort andWilmington). If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up. 

I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied asbefore, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirtydays. I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs, cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Colombia districts. Evenhere we have found some forage. Of course, the enemy will carryoff and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where thepeople burn their forage, and they will get tired of it. 

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heelsif he comes south. I observe that the enemy has some respect formy name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when theyheard that the attacking force belonged to my army. I will try andkeep up that feeling, which is a real power. With respect, yourfriend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general commanding. 

P. S. --I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind tofollow coastwise. W. T. S. 

[Dispatch No. 6. ]

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIASAVANNAH RIVER, January 4, 1865. 

HON. GIDEON WELLS, Secretary of the Navy. 

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army ofGeneral Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st ofDecember. 

The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escapedby crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward therailroad. 

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that itstranquillity is undisturbed. The Union soldiers who are stationedwithin its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York orBoston.... One effect of the march of General Sherman throughGeorgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity hasbeen imposed upon by the lying assertions of the rebel Government, affirming the inability of the United States Government towithstand the armies of rebeldom. They have seen the old flag ofthe United States carried by its victorious legions through theirState, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city withouta blow. 

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupiedin making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for themarch that he meditates. My attention has been directed to suchmeasures of cooperation as the number and quality of my forcepermit. 

On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated inmy dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence ofinformation from the senior officer there that the rebelscontemplated issuing from the harbor, and his request for mypresence. Having placed a force there of seven monitors, sufficient to meet each an emergency, and not perceiving any signof the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep incommunication with General Sherman and be ready to render anyassistance that might be desired. General Sherman has fullyinformed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, theyshall not lack assistance by water. 

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was began, andthe only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sentto Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation. This took placeabout 3 p. M. , and was witnessed by General Sherman and GeneralBernard (United States Engineers) and myself. The Pontiac isordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed thefirst move by the Harvest Moon. 

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed inthe large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as theygathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels. The notesof a solitary bugle alone came from their midst. 

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works(Cansten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course--the bestapproach of the kind to Savannah. 

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department thepowerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches. General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace. But will contract the line very much. 

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny. Withhis concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the menbelonging to it have returned to their vessels. The excellentservice performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes, and exemplified the efficiency of the organization--infantry andlight artillery handled as skirmishers. The howitzers were alwayslanded as quickly as the men, and were brought into action beforethe light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore. 

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vesselsprevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization. With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I couldfrequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, whenthe attention of the rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman. 

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets ofwhich were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since, when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back. Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as tosweep the ground in the direction of the causeway. 

The transfer of the right-wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufortwill so imperil the rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cutoff or dispersed, if not moved in season. 

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any wantthat may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will beready to act from Broad River. 

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exactdirection must be decided more or less by circumstances which itmay not be possible to foresee.... 

My cooperation will be confined to assistance in attackingCharleston, or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in casethe army pushes on without attacking Charleston, and time alonewill show which of these will eventuate. 

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground inspring, would permit little advantage to be derived from thepresence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May. So thatGeneral Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose suchobjects as he prefers, and take as much time as their attainmentmay demand. The Department will learn the objects in view ofGeneral Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him toGeneral Halleck, which he read to me a few days since. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. A. DAHLGREN, Rear-Admiral, commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885. 

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South. 

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant, stating that Schofield's corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-onethousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sentto Beaufort, North Carolina. That is well; I want that force tosecure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to buildthe railroad out to that point. If Goldsboro' be too strong tocarry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south ofGoldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston, should be held and fortified strong. The movement should be maskedby the troops already at Newbern. Please notify General Palmerthat these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them. Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirablyadapted for the work. If it is possible, I want him to secureGoldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington. As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meetsome one of your staff, to explain in full the details of thesituation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chiefcommand of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If hefinds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need notfollow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secureGoldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before Ihave passed the Santee. Send him all detachments of men that havecome to join my army. They can be so organized and officered as tobe efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have beendetached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee, you can betteruse these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc. 

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, totake his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on theroad out. I do not know that he can use them on any road here. Idid instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina, to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry;but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do. If you move thepontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, andmark it with sign-boards--obstructing the old road, so that, shouldI send back any detachments, they would not be misled. 

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened untilI am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation ofaffairs about Charleston. If you can break the railroad betweenthis and Charleston, then this force could be reduced. 

I am, with respect, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 18, 1865. 

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the mapwhich General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route bywhich his division entered the city of Savannah, being the firsttroops to occupy that city. I now send it to you. 

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of allmy official orders touching trade and intercourse with the peopleof Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negrosettlements. 

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I amsatisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shownto their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis'sdominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth thatslavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions thatremain are what disposition shall be made of the negroesthemselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solutionfor these questions, and prefer to leave it to the sloweroperations of time. We have given the initiative, and can affordto await the working of the experiment. 

As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep theSouthern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce towhich they have hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is nowhere, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously, and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in largequantities. But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety onthat score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a poweragainst us. We should assume, a tone of perfect contempt forcotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object ofthe war--the restoration of the Union, with all its rights andpower. It the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simplyplay into our hands by taking away the only product of value theyhave to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions. Bysuch a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class ofsmall farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton toexchange for food and clothing for their families. I hope theGovernment will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton inlarge quantities, and especially that the President will notindorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities ofcotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousandbales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not insuch a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitatetheir execution. 

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated andabandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can onlysay that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbingelements to a military government, and it is almost impossible forus to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully theirpowers and duties. I rather think the Quartermaster's Departmentof the army could better fulfill all their duties and accomplishall that is aimed at by the law. Yet on this subject I will leaveGenerals Foster and Grover to do the best they can. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 2, 1865. 

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy ofthat part of your telegram to him of December 26th relating tocotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to GeneralEaston, chief-quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it. 

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half thepeople of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariableanswer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale ofit with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chiefcauses of this war, it should help to pay its expenses; that allcotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act ofhostility was committed against the United States some time inDecember, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that datecould convey title. 

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department, United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, amere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of thebales' marks, etc. , the cotton then to be turned over to the agentof the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered GeneralEaston to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at NewYork, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think theTreasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes orcaptures of war. 

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me withreference to cotton claimed by English subjects. He seemed amazedwhen I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favorthan one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I wasunwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openlyengaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conductmy army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explainedto him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the GeneralGovernment of the United States, but that my opinion, so franklyexpressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him toheed. It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line ofinvestment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and forwhich he expected me to give some certificate entitling him toindemnification, which I declined emphatically. 

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property--severe butjust--founded upon the laws of nations and the practice ofcivilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we shouldclaim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that thepeople may realize the truth that war is no child's play. 

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, inanswer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair, his personal friend, as follows:

Major-General F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps. 

GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, isreceived, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries. 

1. No one can practise law as an attorney in the United Stateswithout acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am notin error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as theclerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have acourt to administer law which denied the supremacy of thegovernment itself. 

2. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or, rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of theGovernment without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy. 

3. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary usebe necessary for the military authorities of the city. The titleto property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicatedby the courts of the United States. 

4. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 148, itis a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of theUnited States, " and all his property becomes forfeited to theUnited States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed tocarry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, hisfamily, and servants, and will be trans ported within the enemy'slines, but not by way of Port Royal. 

These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exceptionwill be made. 

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, andcovers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders areexecuted, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, GeneralFoster, their wisdom and propriety. 

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet yourapprobation, and that the President will not refund to partiesclaiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidenceof loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unlesssome other positive end is to be gained. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 

FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1865. 

On the 1st day of February, as before explained, the army designedfor the active campaign from Savannah northward was composed of twowings, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum, and was substantially the same that had marched from Atlanta toSavannah. The same general orders were in force, and this campaignmay properly be classed as a continuance of the former. 

The right wing, less Corse's division, Fifteenth Corps, was groupedat or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagons filled withfood, ammunition, and forage, all ready to start, and only waitingfor the left wing, which was detained by the flood in the SavannahRiver. It was composed as follows:

Fifteenth Corps, Major-General JOHN A. LOGAN. 

First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods;Second Division, Major-General W. B. Hazen;Third Division, Brigadier-General John E. Smith;Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse. Artillery brigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ross, First Michigan Artillery. 

Seventeenth. Corps, Major-General FRANK P. BLAIR, JR. 

First Division, Major-General Joseph A. Mower;Second Division, Brigadier-General M. F. Force;Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith. Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A. C. Waterhouse, FirstIllinois Artillery. 

The left wing, with Corse's division and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was at and near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above the city ofSavannah, engaged in crossing the river, then much swollen. It was composed as follows:

Fourteenth Corps, Major-General JEFF. C. DAVIS. 

First Division, Brigadier-General W. P. Carlin;Second Division, Brigadier-General John D. Morgan;Third Division, Brigadier-General A. Baird. Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major Charles Houghtaling, FirstIllinois Artillery. 

Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. WILLIAMS. 

First Division, Brigadier-General N. I. Jackson;Second Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Geary;Third Division, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward. Artillery brigade, Sixteen gnus, Major J. A. Reynolds, First NewYork Artillery. 

Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General JUDSON KILPATRICK. 

First Brigade, Colonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry;Second Brigade, Colonel S. D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Vol. ;Third Brigade, Colonel George E. Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry. One battery of four guns. 

The actual strength of the army, as given in the following officialtabular statements, was at the time sixty thousand and seventy-ninemen, and sixty-eight guns. The trains were made up of abouttwenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to each wagon, and aboutsix hundred ambulances, with two horses each. The contents of thewagons embraced an ample supply of ammunition for a great battle;forage for about seven days, and provisions for twenty days, mostlyof bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, depending largely for fresh meaton beeves driven on the hoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, aswe expected to gather along our line of march. 

RECAPITULATION-CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 

 February 1. March 1. April 1. April 10Pers: 60, 079 57, 676 81, 150 88, 948

The enemy occupied the cities of Charleston and Augusta, withgarrisons capable of making a respectable if not successfuldefense, but utterly unable to meet our veteran columns in the openfield. To resist or delay our progress north, General Wheeler hadhis division of cavalry (reduced to the size of a brigade by hishard and persistent fighting ever since the beginning of theAtlanta campaign), and General Wade Hampton had been dispatchedfrom the Army of Virginia to his native State of South Carolina, with a great flourish of trumpets, and extraordinary powers toraise men, money, and horses, with which "to stay the progress ofthe invader, " and "to punish us for our insolent attempt to invadethe glorious State of South Carolina!" He was supposed at the timeto have, at and near Columbia, two small divisions of cavalrycommanded by himself and General Butler. 

Of course, I had a species of contempt for these scattered andinconsiderable forces, knew that they could hardly delay us anhour; and the only serious question that occurred to me was, wouldGeneral Lee sit down in Richmond (besieged by General Grant), andpermit us, almost unopposed, to pass through the States of Southand North Carolina, cutting off and consuming the very supplies onwhich he depended to feed his army in Virginia, or would he make aneffort to escape from General Grant, and endeavor to catch usinland somewhere between Columbia and Raleigh? I knew full well atthe time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which hadescaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia, by Augusta, to make junction in my front; estimating them at themaximum twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, andHampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand; which, if handled with spirit and energy, would constitute a formidableforce, and might make the passage of such rivers as the Santee andCape Fear a difficult undertaking. Therefore, I took all possibleprecautions, and arranged with Admiral Dahlgren and General Fosterto watch our progress inland by all the means possible, and toprovide for us points of security along the coast; as, at Bull'sBay, Georgetown, and the mouth of Cape Fear River. Still, it wasextremely desirable in one march to reach Goldsboro' in the Stateof North Carolina (distant four hundred and twenty-five miles), apoint of great convenience for ulterior operations, by reason ofthe two railroads which meet there, coming from the seacoast atWilmington and Newbern. Before leaving Savannah I had sent toNewbern Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Engineers, with orders to lookto these railroads, to collect rolling-stock, and to have the roadsrepaired out as far as possible in six weeks--the time estimated asnecessary for us to march that distance. 

The question of supplies remained still the one of vitalimportance, and I reasoned that we might safely rely on the countryfor a considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, ifthe worst came to the worst, we could live several months on themules and horses of our trains. Nevertheless, time was equallymaterial, and the moment I heard that General Slocum had finishedhis pontoon-bridge at Sister's Ferry, and that Kilpatrick's cavalrywas over the river, I gave the general orders to march, andinstructed all the columns to aim for the South Carolina Railroadto the west of Branchville, about Blackville and Midway. 

The right wing moved up the Salkiehatchie, the Seventeenth Corps onthe right, with orders on reaching Rivers's Bridge to cross over, and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill to Beaufort's Bridge. Kilpatrick was instructed to march by way of Barnwell; Corse'sdivision and the Twentieth Corps to take such roads as would bringthem into communication with the Fifteenth Corps about Beaufort'sBridge. All these columns started promptly on the 1st of February. We encountered Wheeler's cavalry, which had obstructed the road byfelling trees, but our men picked these up and threw them aside, sothat this obstruction hardly delayed us an hour. In person Iaccompanied the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan) by McPhersonvilleand Hickory Hill, and kept couriers going to and fro to GeneralSlocum with instructions to hurry as much as possible, so as tomake a junction of the whole army on the South Carolina Railroadabout Blackville. 

I spent the night of February 1st at Hickory Hill Post-Office, andthat of the 2d at Duck Branch Post-Office, thirty-one miles outfrom Pocotaligo. On the 3d the Seventeenth Corps was oppositeRivers's Bridge, and the Fifteenth approached Beaufort's Bridge. The Salkiehatchie was still over its banks, and presented a mostformidable obstacle. The enemy appeared in some force on theopposite bank, had cut away all the bridges which spanned the manydeep channels of the swollen river, and the only available passageseemed to be along the narrow causeways which constituted thecommon roads. At Rivers's Bridge Generals Mower and Giles A. Smith led, their heads of column through this swamp, the water upto their shoulders, crossed over to the pine-land, turned upon therebel brigade which defended the passage, and routed it in utterdisorder. It was in this attack that General Wager Swayne lost hisleg, and he had to be conveyed back to Pocotaligo. Still, the lossof life was very small, in proportion to the advantages gained, forthe enemy at once abandoned the whole line of the Salkiehatchie, and the Fifteenth Corps passed over at Beaufort's Bridge, withoutopposition. 

On the 5th of February I was at Beaufort's Bridge, by which timeGeneral A. S. Williams had got up with five brigades' of theTwentieth Corps; I also heard of General Kilpatrick's being abreastof us, at Barnwell, and then gave orders for the march straight forthe railroad at Midway. I still remained with the Fifteenth Corps, which, on the 6th of February, was five miles from Bamberg. As amatter of course, I expected severe resistance at this railroad, for its loss would sever all the communications of the enemy inCharleston with those in Augusta. 

Early on the 7th, in the midst of a rain-storm, we reached therailroad; almost unopposed, striking it at several points. GeneralHoward told me a good story concerning this, which will bearrepeating: He was with the Seventeenth Corps, marching straight forMidway, and when about five miles distant he began to deploy theleading division, so as to be ready for battle. Sitting on hishorse by the road-side, while the deployment was making, he saw aman coming down the road, riding as hard as he could, and as heapproached he recognized him as one of his own "foragers, " mountedon a white horse, with a rope bridle and a blanket for saddle. Ashe came near he called out, "Hurry up, general; we have got therailroad!" So, while we, the generals, were proceedingdeliberately to prepare for a serious battle, a parcel of ourforagers, in search of plunder, had got ahead and actually capturedthe South Carolina Railroad, a line of vital importance to therebel Government. 

As soon as we struck the railroad, details of men were set to workto tear up the rails, to burn the ties and twist the bars. Thiswas a most important railroad, and I proposed to destroy itcompletely for fifty miles, partly to prevent a possibility of itsrestoration and partly to utilize the time necessary for GeneralSlocum to get up. 

The country thereabouts was very poor, but the inhabitants mostlyremained at home. Indeed, they knew not where to go. The enemy'scavalry had retreated before us, but his infantry was reported insome strength at Branchville, on the farther side of the Edisto;yet on the appearance of a mere squad of our men they burned theirown bridges the very thing I wanted, for we had no use for them, and they had. 

We all remained strung along this railroad till the 9th ofFebruary--the Seventeenth Corps on the right, then the Fifteenth, Twentieth, and cavalry, at Blackville. General Slocum reachedBlackville that day, with Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, and reported the Fourteenth Corps (General Jeff. C. Davis's) to befollowing by way of Barnwell. On the 10th I rode up to Blackville, where I conferred with Generals Slocum and Kilpatrick, becamesatisfied that the whole army would be ready within a day, andaccordingly made orders for the next movement north to Columbia, the right wing to strike Orangeburg en route. Kilpatrick wasordered to demonstrate strongly toward Aiken, to keep up thedelusion that we might turn to Augusta; but he was notified thatColumbia was the next objective, and that he should cover the leftflank against Wheeler, who hung around it. I wanted to reachColumbia before any part of Hood's army could possibly get there. Some of them were reported as having reached Augusta, under thecommand of General Dick Taylor. 

Having sufficiently damaged the railroad, and effected the junctionof the entire army, the general march was resumed on the 11th, eachcorps crossing the South Edisto by separate bridges, with orders topause on the road leading from Orangeberg to Augusta, till it wascertain that the Seventeenth Corps had got possession ofOrangeburg. This place was simply important as its occupationwould sever the communications between Charleston and Columbia. All the heads of column reached this road, known as the Edgefieldroad, during the 12th, and the Seventeenth Corps turned to theright, against Orangeburg. When I reached the head of columnopposite Orangeburg, I found Giles A. Smith's division halted, witha battery unlimbered, exchanging shots with a party on the oppositeside of the Edisto. He reported that the bridge was gone, and thatthe river was deep and impassable. I then directed General Blairto send a strong division below the town, some four or five miles, to effect a crossing there. He laid his pontoon-bridge, but thebottom on the other side was overflowed, and the men had to wadethrough it, in places as deep as their waists. I was with thisdivision at the time, on foot, trying to pick my way across theoverflowed bottom; but, as soon as the head of column reached thesand-hills, I knew that the enemy would not long remain inOrangeburg, and accordingly returned to my horse, on the west bank, and rode rapidly up to where I had left Giles A. Smith. I foundhim in possession of the broken bridge, abreast of the town, whichhe was repairing, and I was among the first to cross over and enterthe town. By and before the time either Force's or Giles A. Smith's skirmishers entered the place, several stores were on fire, and I am sure that some of the towns-people told me that a Jewmerchant had set fire to his own cotton and store, and from thisthe fire had spread. This, however, was soon put out, and theSeventeenth Corps (General Blair) occupied the place during thatnight. I remember to have visited a large hospital, on the hillnear the railroad depot, which was occupied by the orphan childrenwho had been removed from the asylum in Charleston. We gave themprotection, and, I think, some provisions. The railroad and depotwere destroyed by order, and no doubt a good deal of cotton wasburned, for we all regarded cotton as hostile property, a thing tobe destroyed. General Blair was ordered to break up this railroad, forward to the point where it crossed the Santee, and then to turnfor Columbia. On the morning of the 13th I again joined theFifteenth Corps, which crossed the North Edisto by Snilling'sBridge, and moved straight for Columbia, around the head of Caw-CawSwamp. Orders were sent to all the columns to turn for Columbia, where it was supposed the enemy had concentrated all the men theycould from Charleston, Augusta, and even from Virginia. That nightI was with the Fifteenth Corps, twenty-one miles from Columbia, where my aide, Colonel Audenried, picked up a rebel officer on theroad, who, supposing him to be of the same service with himself, answered all his questions frankly, and revealed the truth thatthere was nothing in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. The factwas, that General Hardee, in Charleston, took it for granted thatwe were after Charleston; the rebel troops in Augusta supposed theywere "our objective;" so they abandoned poor Columbia to the careof Hampton's cavalry, which was confused by the rumors that pouredin on it, so that both Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were inColumbia, seem to have lost their heads. 

On the 14th the head of the Fifteenth Corps, Charles R. Woods'sdivision, approached the Little Congaree, a broad, deep stream, tributary to the Main Congaree; six or eight miles below Columbia. On the opposite side of this stream was a newly-constructed fort, and on our side--a wide extent of old cotton-fields, which, had beenoverflowed, and was covered with a deep slime. General Woods haddeployed his leading brigade, which was skirmishing forward, but hereported that the bridge was gone, and that a considerable force ofthe enemy was on the other side. I directed General Howard orLogan to send a brigade by a circuit to the left, to see if thisstream could not be crossed higher up, but at the same time knewthat General Slocum's route world bring him to Colombia behind thisstream, and that his approach would uncover it. Therefore, therewas no need of exposing much life. The brigade, however, foundmeans to cross the Little Congaree, and thus uncovered the passageby the main road, so that General Woods's skirmishers at oncepassed over, and a party was set to work to repair the bridge, which occupied less than an hour, when I passed over with my wholestaff. I found the new fort unfinished and unoccupied, but fromits parapet could see over some old fields bounded to the north andwest by hills skirted with timber. There was a plantation to ourleft, about half a mile, and on the edge of the timber was drawn upa force of rebel cavalry of about a regiment, which advanced, andcharged upon some, of our foragers, who were plundering theplantation; my aide, Colonel Audenried, who had ridden forward, came back somewhat hurt and bruised, for, observing this charge ofcavalry, he had turned for us, and his horse fell with him inattempting to leap a ditch. General Woods's skirmish-line met thischarge of cavalry, and drove it back into the woods and beyond. Weremained on that ground during the night of the 15th, and I campedon the nearest dry ground behind the Little Congaree, where on thenext morning were made the written' orders for the government ofthe troops while occupying Columbia. These are dated February 16, 1865, in these words:

General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near theirmouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will sparelibraries, asylums, and private dwellings. He will then move toWinnsboro', destroying en route utterly that section of therailroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time toaccomplish consistent with proper celerity. 

These instructions were embraced in General Order No. 26, whichprescribed the routes of march for the several columns as far asFayetteville, North Carolina, and is conclusive that I thenregarded Columbia as simply one point on our general route ofmarch, and not as an important conquest. 

During the 16th of February the Fifteenth Corps reached the pointopposite Columbia, and pushed on for the Saluda Factory three milesabove, crossed that stream, and the head of column reached BroadRiver just in time to find its bridge in flames, Butler's cavalryhaving just passed over into Columbia. The head of Slocum's columnalso reached the point opposite Columbia the same morning, but thebulk of his army was back at Lexington. I reached this place earlyin the morning of the 16th, met General Slocum there; and explainedto him the purport of General Order No. 26, which contemplated thepassage of his army across Broad River at Alston, fifteen milesabove Columbia. Riding down to the river-bank, I saw the wreck ofthe large bridge which had been burned by the enemy, with its manystone piers still standing, but the superstructure gone. Acrossthe Congaree River lay the city of Columbia, in plain, easy view. I could see the unfinished State-House, a handsome granitestructure, and the ruins of the railroad depot, which were stillsmouldering. Occasionally a few citizens or cavalry could be seenrunning across the streets, and quite a number of negroes wereseemingly busy in carrying off bags of grain or meal, which werepiled up near the burned depot. 

Captain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrott gunsunlimbered, firing into the town. I asked him what he was firingfor; he said he could see some rebel cavalry occasionally at theintersections of the streets, and he had an idea that there was alarge force of infantry concealed on the opposite bank, lying low, in case we should attempt to cross over directly into the town. Iinstructed him not to fire any more into the town, but consented tohis bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroeswho were appropriating the bags of corn and meal which we wanted, also to fire three shots at the unoccupied State-House. I stood byand saw these fired, and then all firing ceased. Although thismatter of firing into Columbia has been the subject of much abuseand investigation, I have yet to hear of any single person havingbeen killed in Columbia by our cannon. On the other hand, thenight before, when Woods's division was in camp in the open fieldsat Little Congaree, it was shelled all night by a rebel batteryfrom the other aide of the river. This provoked me much at thetime, for it was wanton mischief, as Generals Beauregard andHampton must have been convinced that they could not prevent ourentrance into Columbia. I have always contended that I would havebeen justified in retaliating for this unnecessary act of war, butdid not, though I always characterized it as it deserved. 

The night of the 16th I camped near an old prison bivouac oppositeColumbia, known to our prisoners of war as "Camp Sorghum, " whereremained the mud-hovels and holes in the ground which our prisonershad made to shelter themselves from the winter's cold and thesummer's heat. The Fifteenth Corps was then ahead, reaching toBroad River, about four miles above Columbia; the Seventeenth Corpswas behind, on the river-bank opposite Columbia; and the left wingand cavalry had turned north toward Alston. 

The next morning, viz. , February 17th, I rode to the head ofGeneral Howard's column, and found that during the night he hadferried Stone's brigade of Woods's division of the FifteenthCorps across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigade wasthen deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construction of apontoon-bridge nearly finished. 

I sat with General Howard on a log, watching the men lay thisbridge; and about 9 or 10 A. M. A messenger came from Colonel Stoneon the other aide, saying that the Mayor of Columbia had come outof the city to surrender the place, and asking for orders. Isimply remarked to General Howard that he had his orders, to letColonel Stone go on into the city, and that we would follow as soonas the bridge was ready. By this same messenger I received a notein pencil from the Lady Superioress of a convent or school inColumbia, in which she claimed to have been a teacher in a conventin Brown County, Ohio, at the time my daughter Minnie was a pupilthere, and therefore asking special protection. My recollectionis, that I gave the note to my brother-in-law, Colonel Ewing, theninspector-general on my staff, with instructions to see this lady, and assure her that we contemplated no destruction of any privateproperty in Columbia at all. 

As soon as the bridge was done, I led my horse over it, followed bymy whole staff. General Howard accompanied me with his, andGeneral Logan was next in order, followed by General C. R. Woods, and the whole of the Fifteenth Corps. Ascending the hill, we soonemerged into a broad road leading into Columbia, between old fieldsof corn and cotton, and, entering the city, we found seemingly allits population, white and black, in the streets. A high andboisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of cottonwere flying about in the air and lodging in the limbs of the trees, reminding us of a Northern snow-storm. Near the market-square wefound Stone's brigade halted, with arms stacked, and a large detailof his men, along with some citizens, engaged with an oldfire-engine, trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burningcotton-bales, which I was told had been fired by the rebel cavalryon withdrawing from the city that morning. I know that, to avoidthis row of burning cotton-bales, I had to ride my horse on thesidewalk. In the market-square had collected a large crowd ofwhites and blacks, among whom was the mayor of the city, Dr. Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who was extremelyanxious to protect the interests of the citizens. He was on foot, and I on horseback, and it is probable I told him then not to beuneasy, that we did not intend to stay long, and had no purpose toinjure the private citizens or private property. About this time Inoticed several men trying to get through the crowd to speak withme, and called to some black people to make room for them; whenthey reached me, they explained that they were officers of ourarmy, who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison andguard, and were of course overjoyed to find themselves safe withus. I told them that, as soon as things settled down, they shouldreport to General Howard, who would provide for their safety, andenable them to travel with us. One of them handed me a paper, asking me to read it at my leisure; I put it in my breast-pocketand rode on. General Howard was still with me, and, riding downthe street which led by the right to the Charleston depot, we foundit and a large storehouse burned to the ground, but there were, onthe platform and ground near by, piles of cotton bags filled withcorn and corn-meal, partially burned. 

A detachment of Stone's brigade was guarding this, and separatingthe good from the bad. We rode along the railroad-track, somethree or four hundred yards, to a large foundery, when some manrode up and said the rebel cavalry were close by, and he warned usthat we might get shot. We accordingly turned back to themarket-square, and en route noticed that, several of the men wereevidently in liquor, when I called General Howard's attention toit. He left me and rode toward General Woods's head of column, which was defiling through the town. On reaching themarket-square, I again met Dr. Goodwin, and inquired where heproposed to quarter me, and he said that he had selected the houseof Blanton Duncan, Esq. , a citizen of Louisville, Kentucky, then aresident there, who had the contract for manufacturing theConfederate money, and had fled with Hampton's cavalry. We allrode some six or eight squares back from the new State-House, andfound a very good modern house, completely furnished, with stablingand a large yard, took it as our headquarters, and occupied itduring our stay. I considered General Howard as in command of theplace, and referred the many applicants for guards and protectionto him. Before our headquarters-wagons had got up, I strolledthrough the streets of Columbia, found sentinels posted at theprincipal intersections, and generally good order prevailing, butdid not again return to the main street, because it was filled witha crowd of citizens watching the soldiers marching by. 

During the afternoon of that day, February 17th, the whole of theFifteenth Corps passed through the town and out on the Camden andWinnsboro' roads. The Seventeenth Corps did not enter the city atall, but crossed directly over to the Winnsboro' road from thepontoon bridge at Broad River, which was about four miles above thecity. 

After we had got, as it were, settled in Blanton Duncan's house, say about 2 p. M. , I overhauled my pocket according to custom, toread more carefully the various notes and memoranda received duringthe day, and found the paper which had been given me, as described, by one of our escaped prisoners. It proved to be the song of"Sherman's March to the Sea, " which had been composed by AdjutantS. H. M. Byers, of the Fifth Iowa Infantry, when a prisoner in theasylum at Columbia, which had been beautifully written off by afellow-prisoner, and handed to me in person. This appeared to meso good that I at once sent for Byers, attached him to my staff, provided him with horse and equipment, and took him as far asFayetteville, North Carolina, whence he was sent to Washington asbearer of dispatches. He is now United States consul at Zurich, Switzerland, where I have since been his guest. I insert the songhere for convenient reference and preservation. Byers said thatthere was an excellent glee-club among the prisoners in Columbia, who used to sing it well, with an audience often of rebel ladies:

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 

Composed by Adjutant Byers, Fifth Iowa Infantry. Arranged and sungby the Prisoners in Columbia Prison. 

I

Our camp-fires shone bright on the mountainThat frowned on the river below, As we stood by our guns in the morning, And eagerly watched for the foe;When a rider came out of the darknessThat hung over mountain and tree, And shouted, "Boys, up and be ready!For Sherman will march to the sea!"

CHORUS:

Then sang we a song of our chieftain, That echoed over river and lea;And the stars of our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman marched down to the sea!

II

Then cheer upon cheer for bold ShermanWent up from each valley and glen, And the bugles reechoed the musicThat came from the lips of the men;For we knew that the stars in our bannerMore bright in their splendor would be, And that blessings from Northland world greet us, When Sherman marched down to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

III

Then forward, boys! forward to battle!We marched on our wearisome way, We stormed the wild hills of ResacarGod bless those who fell on that day!Then Kenesaw frowned in its glory, Frowned down on the flag of the free;But the East and the West bore our standard, And Sherman marched on to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

IV

Still onward we pressed, till our bannersSwept out from Atlanta's grim walls, And the blood of the patriot dampenedThe soil where the traitor-flag falls;But we paused not to weep for the fallen, Who slept by each river and tree, Yet we twined them a wreath of the laurel, As Sherman marched down to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

V

Oh, proud was our army that morning, That stood where the pine darkly towers, When Sherman said, "Boys, you are weary, But to-day fair Savannah is ours!"Then sang we the song of our chieftain, That echoed over river and lea, And the stars in our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman camped down by the sea!

Toward evening of February 17th, the mayor, Dr. Goodwin, came to myquarters at Duncan's house, and remarked that there was a lady inColumbia who professed to be a special friend of mine. On hisgiving her name, I could not recall it, but inquired as to hermaiden or family name. He answered Poyas. It so happened that, when I was a lieutenant at Fort Moultrie, in 1842-'46, I used veryoften to visit a family of that name on the east branch of CooperRiver, about forty miles from Fort Moultrie, and to hunt with theson, Mr. James Poyas, an elegant young fellow and a fine sportsman. His father, mother, and several sisters, composed the family, andwere extremely hospitable. One of the ladies was very fond ofpainting in water-colors, which was one of my weaknesses, and onone occasion I had presented her with a volume treating ofwater-colors. Of course, I was glad to renew the acquaintance, andproposed to Dr. Goodwin that we should walk to her house and visitthis lady, which we did. The house stood beyond the Charlottedepot, in a large lot, was of frame, with a high porch, which wasreached by a set of steps outside. Entering this yard, I noticedducks and chickens, and a general air of peace and comfort that wasreally pleasant to behold at that time of universal desolation; thelady in question met us at the head of the steps and invited usinto a parlor which was perfectly neat and well furnished. Afterinquiring about her father, mother, sisters, and especially herbrother James, my special friend, I could not help saying that Iwas pleased to notice that our men had not handled her house andpremises as roughly as was their wont. "I owe it to you, general, "she answered. "Not at all. I did not know you were here till afew minutes ago. " She reiterated that she was indebted to me forthe perfect safety of her house and property, and added, "Youremember, when you were at our house on Cooper River in 1845, yougave me a book;" and she handed me the book in question, on the flyleaf of which was written: "To Miss Poyas, with the compliments ofW. T. Sherman, First-lieutenant Third Artillery. " She thenexplained that, as our army approached Columbia, there was a doubtin her mind whether the terrible Sherman who was devastating theland were W. T. Sherman or T. W. Sherman, both known to be generalsin the Northern army; but, on the supposition that he was her oldacquaintance, when Wade Hampton's cavalry drew out of the city, calling out that the Yankees were coming, she armed herself withthis book, and awaited the crisis. Soon the shouts about themarkethouse announced that the Yankees had come; very soon men wereseen running up and down the streets; a parcel of them poured overthe fence, began to chase the chickens and ducks, and to enter herhouse. She observed one large man, with full beard, who exercisedsome authority, and to him she appealed in the name of "hisgeneral. " "What do you know of Uncle Billy?" "Why, " she said, "when he was a young man he used to be our friend in Charleston, and here is a book he gave me. " The officer or soldier took thebook, looked at the inscription, and, turning to his fellows, said:"Boys, that's so; that's Uncle Billy's writing, for I have seen itoften before. " He at once commanded the party to stop pillaging, and left a man in charge of the house, to protect her until theregular provost-guard should be established. I then asked her ifthe regular guard or sentinel had been as good to her. She assuredme that he was a very nice young man; that he had been telling herall about his family in Iowa; and that at that very instant of timehe was in another room minding her baby. Now, this lady had goodsense and tact, and had thus turned aside a party who, in fiveminutes more, would have rifled her premises of all that was goodto eat or wear. I made her a long social visit, and, beforeleaving Columbia, gave her a half-tierce of rice and about onehundred pounds of ham from our own mess-stores. 

In like manner, that same evening I found in Mrs. Simons anotheracquaintance--the wife of the brother of Hon. James Simons, ofCharleston, who had been Miss Wragg. When Columbia was on firethat night, and her house in danger, I had her family and effectscarried to my own headquarters, gave them my own room and bed, and, on leaving Columbia the next day, supplied her with a half-barrelof hams and a half-tierce of rice. I mention these specific factsto show that, personally, I had no malice or desire to destroy thatcity or its inhabitants, as is generally believed at the South. 

Having walked over much of the suburbs of Columbia in theafternoon, and being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan'shouse to rest. Soon after dark I became conscious that a brightlight was shining on the walls; and, calling some one of my staff(Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause, he said there seemedto be a house on fire down about the market-house. The same highwind still prevailed, and, fearing the consequences, I bade him goin person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty. He soonreturned, and reported that the block of buildings directlyopposite the burning cotton of that morning was on fire, and thatit was spreading; but he had found General Woods on the ground, with plenty of men trying to put the fire out, or, at least, toprevent its extension. The fire continued to increase, and thewhole heavens became lurid. I dispatched messenger after messengerto Generals Howard, Logan, and Woods, and received from themrepeated assurances that all was being done that could be done, butthat the high wind was spreading the flames beyond all control. These general officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen'sdivision had been brought into the city to assist Woods's division, already there. About eleven o'clock at night I went down-townmyself, Colonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Simons's house, from which I could see the flames rising high in the air, and couldhear the roaring of the fire. I advised the ladies to move to myheadquarters, had our own headquarter-wagons hitched up, and theireffects carried there, as a place of greater safety. The whole airwas full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc. , some of which were carried four or five blocks, and started newfires. The men seemed generally under good control, and certainlylabored hard to girdle the fire, to prevent its spreading; but, solong as the high wind prevailed, it was simply beyond humanpossibility. Fortunately, about 3 or 4 a. M. , the wind moderated, and gradually the fire was got under control; but it had burned outthe very heart of the city, embracing several churches, the oldState-House, and the school or asylum of that very Sister ofCharity who had appealed for my personal protection. Nickerson'sHotel, in which several of my staff were quartered, was burneddown, but the houses occupied by myself, Generals Howard and Logan, were not burned at all. Many of the people thought that this firewas deliberately planned and executed. This is not true. It wasaccidental, and in my judgment began with the cotton which GeneralHampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city (whether by hisorders or not is not material), which fire was partially subduedearly in the day by our men; but, when night came, the high windfanned it again into full blaze, carried it against theframe-houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond ourcontrol. 

This whole subject has since been thoroughly and judiciallyinvestigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission onAmerican and British claims, under the Treaty of Washington, whichcommission failed to award a verdict in favor of the Englishclaimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destruction ofproperty in Columbia, during that night, did not result from theacts of the General Government of the United States--that is tosay, from my army. In my official report of this conflagration, Idistinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did sopointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was inmy opinion boastful, and professed to be the special champion ofSouth Carolina. 

The morning sun of February 18th rose bright and clear over aruined city. About half of it was in ashes and in smoulderingheaps. Many of the people were houseless, and gathered in groupsin the suburbs, or in the open parks and spaces, around theirscanty piles of furniture. General Howard, in concert with themayor, did all that was possible to provide other houses for them;and by my authority he turned over to the Sisters of Charity theMethodist College, and to the mayor five hundred beef-cattle; tohelp feed the people; I also gave the mayor (Dr. Goodwin) onehundred muskets, with which to arm a guard to maintain order afterwe should leave the neighborhood. During the 18th and 19th weremained in Columbia, General Howard's troops engaged in tearing upand destroying the railroad, back toward the Wateree, while astrong detail, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, United States Engineers, destroyed the State Arsenal, whichwas found to be well supplied with shot, shell, and ammunition. These were hauled in wagons to the Saluda River, under thesupervision of Colonel Baylor, chief of ordnance, and emptied intodeep water, causing a very serious accident by the bursting of apercussion-shell, as it struck another on the margin of the water. The flame followed back a train of powder which had sifted out, reached the wagons, still partially loaded, and exploded them, killing sixteen men and destroying several wagons and teams ofmules. We also destroyed several valuable founderies and thefactory of Confederate money. The dies had been carried away, butabout sixty handpresses remained. There was also found an immensequantity of money, in various stages of manufacture, which our menspent and gambled with in the most lavish manner. 

Having utterly ruined Columbia, the right wing began its marchnorthward, toward Winnsboro', on the 20th, which we reached on the21st, and found General Slocum, with the left wing, who had come bythe way of Alston. Thence the right wing was turned eastward, toward Cheraw, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, to cross theCatawba River at Peay's Ferry. The cavalry was ordered to followthe railroad north as far as Chester, and then to turn east toRocky Mount, the point indicated for the passage of the left wing. In person I reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, with the TwentiethCorps, which laid its pontoon-bridge and crossed over during the23d. Kilpatrick arrived the next day, in the midst of heavy rain, and was instructed to cross the Catawba at once, by night, and tomove up to Lancaster, to make believe we were bound for Charlotte, to which point I heard that Beauregard had directed all hisdetachments, including a corps of Hood's old army, which had beenmarching parallel with us, but had failed to make junction with, the forces immediately opposing us. Of course, I had no purpose ofgoing to Charlotte, for the right wing was already moving rapidlytoward Fayetteville, North Carolina. The rain was so heavy andpersistent that the Catawba, River rose fast, and soon after I hadcrossed the pontoon bridge at Rocky Mount it was carried away, leaving General Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, on the west bank. The roads were infamous, so I halted the Twentieth Corps at HangingRock for some days, to allow time for the Fourteenth to get over. 

General Davis had infinite difficulty in reconstructing his bridge, and was compelled to use the fifth chains of his wagons foranchor-chains, so that we were delayed nearly a week in thatneighborhood. While in camp at Hanging Rock two prisoners werebrought to me--one a chaplain, the other a boy, son of Richard Bacot, of Charleston, whom I had known as a cadet at West Point. They werejust from Charleston, and had been sent away by General Hardee inadvance, because he was, they said, evacuating Charleston. Rumors tothe same effect had reached me through the negroes, and it was, moreover, reported that Wilmington, North Carolina, was in possessionof the Yankee troops; so that I had every reason to be satisfied thatour march was fully reaping all the fruits we could possibly ask for. Charleston was, in fact, evacuated by General Hardee on the 18th ofFebruary, and was taken possession of by a brigade of General Fosterstroops, commanded by General Schimmelpfennig, the same day. Hardeehad availed himself of his only remaining railroad, by Florence toCheraw; had sent there much of his ammunition and stores, and reachedit with the effective part of the garrison in time to escape acrossthe Pedee River before our arrival. Wilmington was captured byGeneral Terry on the 22d of February; but of this important event weonly knew by the vague rumors which reached us through rebel sources. 

General Jeff. C. Davis got across the Catawba during the 27th, andthe general march was resumed on Cheraw. Kilpatrick remained nearLancaster, skirmishing with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry, keeping up the delusion that we proposed to move on Charlotte andSalisbury, but with orders to watch the progress of the FourteenthCorps, and to act in concert with it, on its left rear. On the 1stof March I was at Finlay's Bridge across Lynch's Creek, the roadsso bad that we had to corduroy nearly every foot of the way; but Iwas in communication with all parts of the army, which had met noserious opposition from the enemy. On the 2d of March we enteredthe village of Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's cavalry, which gave ground rapidly. There I received a message from GeneralHoward, who, reported that he was already in Cheraw with theSeventeenth Corps, and that the Fifteenth was near at hand. 

General Hardee had retreated eastward across the Pedee, burning thebridge. I therefore directed the left wing to march forSneedsboro', about ten miles above Cheraw, to cross the Pedeethere, while I in person proposed to cross over and join the rightwing in Cheraw. Early in the morning of the 3d of March I rode outof Chesterfield along with the Twentieth Corps, which filled theroad, forded Thompson's Creek, and, at the top of the hill beyond, found a road branching off to the right, which corresponded withthe one, on my map leading to Cheraw. Seeing a negro standing bythe roadside, looking at the troops passing, I inquired of him whatroad that was. "Him lead to Cheraw, master!" "Is it a good road, and how far?" "A very good road, and eight or ten miles. " "Anyguerrillas?"

"Oh! no, master, dey is gone two days ago; you could have playedcards on der coat-tails, dey was in sich a hurry!" I was on myLexington horse, who was very handsome and restive, so I madesignal to my staff to follow, as I proposed to go without escort. I turned my horse down the road, and the rest of the stafffollowed. General Barry took up the questions about the road, andasked the same negro what he was doing there. He answered, "Deysay Massa Sherman will be along soon!" "Why, " said General Barry, "that was General Sherman you were talking to. " The poor negro, almost in the attitude of prayer, exclaimed: "De great God! justlook at his horse!" He ran up and trotted by my side for a mile orso, and gave me all the information he possessed, but he seemed toadmire the horse more than the rider. 

We reached Cheraw in a couple of hours in a drizzling rain, and, while waiting for our wagons to come up, I staid with General Blairin a large house, the property of a blockade-runner, whose familyremained. General Howard occupied another house farther down-town. He had already ordered his pontoon-bridge to be laid across thePedee, there a large, deep, navigable stream, and Mower's divisionwas already across, skirmishing with the enemy about two miles out. Cheraw was found to be full of stores which had been sent up fromCharleston prior to its evacuation, and which could not be removed. I was satisfied, from inquiries, that General Hardee had with himonly the Charleston garrison, that the enemy had not divined ourmovements, and that consequently they were still scattered fromCharlotte around to Florence, then behind us. Having thus securedthe passage of the Pedee, I felt no uneasiness about the future, because there remained no further great impediment between us andCape Fear River, which I felt assured was by that time inpossession of our friends. The day was so wet that we all keptin-doors; and about noon General Blair invited us to take lunchwith him. We passed down into the basement dining-room, where theregular family table was spread with an excellent meal; and duringits progress I was asked to take some wine, which stood upon thetable in venerable bottles. It was so very good that I inquiredwhere it came from. General Blair simply asked, "Do you like it?"but I insisted upon knowing where he had got it; he only replied byasking if I liked it, and wanted some. He afterward sent to mybivouac a case containing a dozen bottles of the finest madeira Iever tasted; and I learned that he had captured, in Cheraw, thewine of some of the old aristocratic families of Charleston, whohad sent it up to Cheraw for safety, and heard afterward that Blairhad found about eight wagon-loads of this wine, which hedistributed to the army generally, in very fair proportions. 

After finishing our lunch, as we passed out of the dining room, General Blair asked me, if I did not want some saddle-blankets, ora rug for my tent, and, leading me into the hall to a space underthe stairway, he pointed out a pile of carpets which had also beensent up from Charleston for safety. After our headquarter-wagonsgot up, and our bivouac was established in a field near by, I sentmy orderly (Walter) over to General Blair, and he came backstaggering under a load of carpets, out of which the officers andescort made excellent tent-rugs, saddle-cloths, and blankets. There was an immense amount of stores in Cheraw, which were used ordestroyed; among them twenty-four guns, two thousand muskets, andthirty-six hundred barrels of gunpowder. By the carelessness of asoldier, an immense pile of this powder was exploded, which shookthe town badly; and killed and maimed several of our men. 

We remained in or near Cheraw till the 6th of March, by which timethe army was mostly across the Pedee River, and was prepared toresume the march on Fayetteville. In a house where General Hardeehad been, I found a late New York Tribune, of fully a month laterdate than any I had seen. It contained a mass of news of greatinterest to us, and one short paragraph which I thought extremelymischievous. I think it was an editorial, to the effect that atlast the editor had the satisfaction to inform his readers thatGeneral Sherman would next be heard from about Goldsboro', becausehis supply-vessels from Savannah were known to be rendezvousing atMorehead City:--Now, I knew that General Hardee had read that samepaper, and that he would be perfectly able to draw his owninferences. Up to, that moment I had endeavored so to feign to ourleft that we had completely, misled our antagonists; but this wasno longer possible, and I concluded that we must be ready, for theconcentration in our front of all the force subject to General Jos. Johnston's orders, for I was there also informed that he had beenrestored to the full command of the Confederate forces in South andNorth Carolina. 

On the 6th of March I crossed the Pedee, and all the army marchedfor Fayetteville: the Seventeenth Corps kept well to the right, tomake room; the Fifteenth Corps marched by a direct road; theFourteenth Corps also followed a direct road from Sneedsboro', where it had crossed the Pedee; and the Twentieth Corps, which hadcome into. Cheraw for the convenience of the pontoon-bridge, diverged to the left, so as to enter Fayetteville next after theFourteenth Corps, which was appointed to lead into Fayetteville. Kilpatrick held his cavalry still farther to the left rear on theroads from Lancaster, by way of Wadesboro' and New Gilead, so as tocover our trains from Hampton's and Wheeler's cavalry, who hadfirst retreated toward the north. I traveled with the FifteenthCorps, and on the 8th of March reached Laurel Hill, North Carolina. Satisfied that our troops must be at Wilmington, I determined tosend a message there; I called for my man, Corporal Pike, whom Ihad rescued as before described, at Columbia, who was thentraveling with our escort, and instructed him in disguise to workhis way to the Cape Fear River, secure a boat, and float down toWilmington to convey a letter, and to report our approach. I alsocalled on General Howard for another volunteer, and he brought me avery clever young sergeant, who is now a commissioned officer inthe regular army. Each of these got off during the night byseparate routes, bearing the following message, reduced to the samecipher we used in telegraphic messages:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, LAUREL HILL, Wednesday, March 8, 1865. 

Commanding Officer, Wilmington, North Carolina:

We are marching for Fayetteville, will be there Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, and will then march for Goldsboro'. 

If possible, send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyedto General Schofield that I expect to meet him about Goldsboro'. We are all well and have done finely. The rains make our roadsdifficult, and may delay us about Fayetteville, in which case Iwould like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee. We haveabundance of all else. I expect to reach Goldsboro' by the 20thinstant. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

On the 9th I was with the Fifteenth Corps, and toward eveningreached a little church called Bethel, in the woods, in which wetook refuge in a terrible storm of rain, which poured all night, making the roads awful. All the men were at work corduroying theroads, using fence-rails and split saplings, and every foot of theway had thus to be corduroyed to enable the artillery and wagons topass. On the 10th we made some little progress; on the 11th Ireached Fayetteville, and found that General Hardee, followed byWade Hampton's cavalry, had barely escaped across Cape Fear River, burning the bridge which I had hoped to save. On reachingFayetteville I found General Slocum already in possession with theFourteenth Corps, and all the rest of the army was near at hand. Aday or two before, General Kilpatrick, to our left rear, haddivided his force into two parts, occupying roads behind theTwentieth Corps, interposing between our infantry columns and WadeHampton's cavalry. The latter, doubtless to make junction withGeneral Hardee, in Fayetteville, broke across this line, capturedthe house in which General Kilpatrick and the brigade-commander, General Spencer, were, and for a time held possession of the campand artillery of the brigade. However, General Kilpatrick and mostof his men escaped into a swamp with their arms, reorganized andreturned, catching Hampton's men--in turn, scattered and drove themaway, recovering most of his camp and artillery; but Hampton gotoff with Kilpatrick's private horses and a couple hundredprisoners, of which he boasted much in passing throughFayetteville. 

It was also reported that, in the morning after Hardee's army wasall across the bridge at Cape Fear River, Hampton, with a smallbodyguard, had remained in town, ready to retreat and burn thebridge as soon as our forces made their appearance. He was gettingbreakfast at the hotel when the alarm was given, when he and hisescort took saddle, but soon realized that the alarm came from aset of our foragers, who, as usual, were extremely bold and rash. On these he turned, scattered them, killing some and making othersprisoners; among them General Howard's favorite scout, CaptainDuncan. Hampton then crossed the bridge and burned it. 

I took up my quarters at the old United States Arsenal, which wasin fine order, and had been much enlarged by the Confederateauthorities, who never dreamed that an invading army would reach itfrom the west; and I also found in Fayetteville the widow anddaughter of my first captain (General Childs), of the ThirdArtillery, learned that her son Fred had been the ordnance-officerin charge of the arsenal, and had of course fled with Hardee'sarmy. 

During the 11th. The whole army closed down upon Fayetteville, andimmediate preparations were made to lay two pontoon bridges, onenear the burned bridge, and another about four miles lower down. 

Sunday, March 12th, was a day of Sabbath stillness in Fayetteville. The people generally attended their churches, for they were a verypious people, descended in a large measure from the old ScotchCovenanters, and our men too were resting from the toils and laborsof six weeks of as hard marching as ever fell to the lot ofsoldiers. Shortly after noon was heard in the distance the shrillwhistle of a steamboat, which came nearer and nearer, and soon ashout, long and continuous, was raised down by the river, whichspread farther and farther, and we all felt that it meant amessenger from home. The effect was electric, and no one canrealize the feeling unless, like us, he has been for months cut offfrom all communication with friends, and compelled to listen to thecroakings and prognostications of open enemies. But in a very fewminutes came up through the town to the arsenal on the plateaubehind a group of officers, among whom was a large, floridseafaring man, named Ainsworth, bearing a small mail-bag fromGeneral Terry, at Wilmington, having left at 2 p. M. The daybefore. Our couriers had got through safe from Laurel Hill, andthis was the prompt reply. 

As in the case of our former march from Atlanta, intense anxietyhad been felt for our safety, and General Terry had been prompt toopen communication. After a few minutes' conference with CaptainAinsworth about the capacity of his boat, and the state of factsalong the river, I instructed him to be ready to start back at 6p. M. , and ordered Captain Byers to get ready to carry dispatches toWashington. I also authorized General Howard to send back by thisopportunity some of the fugitives who had traveled with his armyall the way from Columbia, among whom were Mrs. Feaster and her twobeautiful daughters. 

I immediately prepared letters for Secretary Stanton, GeneralsHalleck and Grant, and Generals Schofield, Foster, Easton, andBeckwith, all of which have been published, but I include here onlythose to the Secretary of War, and Generals Grant and Terry, assamples of the whole:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army hasreached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M. 

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which hewill doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell youwhat I know will give you pleasure--that I have done all that Iproposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington, are incidents, while theutter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and theutter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, andFayetteville, are the principals of the movement. These pointswere regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in theConfederacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold onto Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what useis Richmond. He must come out and fight us on open ground, and forthat we must ever be ready. Let him stick behind his parapets, andhe will perish. 

I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the rightroad, though a long one. My army is as united and cheerful asever, and as full of confidence in itself and its leaders. It isutterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but Iinclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial. At Columbiaand Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridgeswhich the Confederacy had in this part of the country. Thisarsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged. I cannotleave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it upwith gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls. I take itfor granted the United States will never again trust North Carolinawith an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure. 

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army. I remain yourservant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Army, City Point, Virginia. 

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Hardee, asusual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; butour pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay aspossible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro'. 

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off fromhere, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied with allelse, having in a measure lived off the country. 

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though wehave had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel toalmost any other body of men I ever heard of. 

Our march, was substantially what I designed--straight on Columbia, feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We destroyed, in passing, therailroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburgto the Congaree; again, from Colombia down to Kingsville on theWateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thencewe turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville. At Colombia wedestroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among whichwore forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery andmaterial of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-fiveguns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we findabout twenty guns and a magnificent United States' arsenal. 

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall thereforedestroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use;and the United States should never again confide such valuableproperty to a people who have betrayed a trust. 

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of thevast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us. Some I willsend down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land, under small escort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River. 

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits ofthis march will be appreciated. It had to be made not only todestroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents inthe necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If Ican now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in aposition to aid you materially in the spring campaign. 

Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofieldabout Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentratehis scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him assoon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded. 

Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' orCharlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be mostimportant. 

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to theenemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of thered-clay hills which are impassable to wheels in wet weather. 

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Major-General TERRY, commanding United States Forces, Wilmington, North Carolina. 

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which leftWilmington at 2 p. M. Yesterday, which arrived here withouttrouble. The scout who brought me your cipher-message started backlast night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact ofyour opening the river. 

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy'ssteamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure twoothers known to be above, and we will load them with refugees(white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded ourmovements, and consumed our food. 

We have swept the, country well from Savannah to here, and the menand animals are in fine condition. Had it not been for the foulweather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but atColumbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, anddestroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property, of inestimablevalue to our enemy. At all points he has fled from us, "standingnot on the order of his going. "

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, willnow call on Lee to feed them. 

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats orcorn: Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at anyrisk. We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate atGoldsboro'. We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but heshall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with hisrailroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the samefrom Wilmington. If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro'by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth amillion of dollars. I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does notcatch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the armymarches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form. 

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand uselessmouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest togo in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington. 

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you. I am, truly your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

In quick succession I received other messages from General Terry, of older date, and therefore superseded by that brought by the tugDavidson, viz. , by two naval officers, who had come up partly bycanoes and partly by land; General Terry had also sent theThirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry to search for us, under ColonelKerwin, who had dispatched Major Berks with fifty men, who reachedus at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in fullcommunication with General Terry and the outside world. Still, Iwas anxious to reach Goldsboro', there to make junction withGeneral Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stage ofthe war. I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos. E. Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that he would not bemisled by feints and false reports, and would somehow compel me toexercise more caution than I had hitherto done. I thenover-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousand infantry, supposed to be made up of S. D. Lee's corps, four thousand;Cheatham's, five thousand; Hoke's, eight thousand; Hardee's, tenthousand; and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton's, Wheeler's, and Butler's cavalry, about eight thousand. Of these, only Hardee and the cavalry were immediately in our front, whilethe bulk of Johnston's army was supposed to be collecting at ornear Raleigh. I was determined, however, to give him as littletime for organization as possible, and accordingly crossed CapeFear River, with all the army, during the 13th and 14th, leavingone division as a rearguard, until the arsenal could be completelydestroyed. This was deliberately and completely leveled on the14th, when fire was applied to the wreck. Little other damage wasdone at Fayetteville. 

On the 14th the tug Davidson again arrived from Wilmington, withGeneral Dodge, quartermaster, on board, reporting that there was noclothing to be had at Wilmington; but he brought up some sugar andcoffee, which were most welcome, and some oats. He was followed bya couple of gunboats, under command of Captain Young, United StatesNavy, who reached Fayetteville after I had left, and undertook topatrol the river as long as the stage of water would permit; andGeneral Dodge also promised to use the captured steamboats for alike purpose. Meantime, also, I had sent orders to GeneralSchofield, at Newbern, and to General Terry, at Wilmington, to movewith their effective forces straight for Goldsboro', where Iexpected to meet them by the 20th of March. 

On the 15th of March the whole army was across Cape Fear River, andat once began its march for Goldsboro'; the Seventeenth Corps stillon the right, the Fifteenth next in order, then the Fourteenth andTwentieth on the extreme left; the cavalry, acting in close concertwith the left flank. With almost a certainty of being attacked onthis flank, I had instructed General Slocum to send hiscorps-trains under strong escort by an interior road, holding fourdivisions ready for immediate battle. General Howard was in likemanner ordered to keep his trains well to his right, and to havefour divisions unencumbered, about six miles ahead of GeneralSlocum, within easy support. 

In the mean time, I had dispatched by land to Wilmington a train ofrefugees who had followed the army all the way from Columbia, SouthCarolina, under an escort of two hundred men, commanded by MajorJohn A. Winson (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois Infantry), sothat we were disencumbered, and prepared for instant battle on ourleft and exposed flank. 

In person I accompanied General Slocum, and during the night ofMarch 15th was thirteen miles out on the Raleigh road. This flankfollowed substantially a road along Cape Fear River north, encountered pretty stubborn resistance by Hardee's infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and the ground favored our enemy; for thedeep river, Cape Fear, was on his right, and North River on hisleft, forcing us to attack him square in front. I proposed todrive Hardee well beyond Averysboro', and then to turn to the rightby Bentonville for Goldsboro'. During the day it rained veryhard, and I had taken refuge in an old cooper-shop, where aprisoner of war was brought to me (sent back from the skirmish-lineby General Kilpatrick), who proved to be Colonel Albert Rhett, former commander of Fort Sumter. He was a tall, slender, andhandsome young man, dressed in the most approved rebel uniform, with high jackboots beautifully stitched, and was dreadfullymortified to find himself a prisoner in our hands. General FrankBlair happened to be with me at the moment, and we were much amusedat Rhett's outspoken disgust at having been captured without afight. He said he was a brigade commander, and that his brigadethat day was Hardee's rear-guard; that his command was composedmostly of the recent garrisons of the batteries of CharlestonHarbor, and had little experience in woodcraft; that he was givingground to us as fast as Hardee's army to his rear moved back, andduring this operation he was with a single aide in the woods, andwas captured by two men of Kilpatrick's skirmish-line that wasfollowing up his retrograde movement. These men called on him tosurrender, and ordered him, in language more forcible than polite, to turn and ride back. He first supposed these men to be ofHampton's cavalry, and threatened to report them to General Hamptonfor disrespectful language; but he was soon undeceived, and wasconducted to Kilpatrick, who sent him back to General Slocum'sguard. 

The rain was falling heavily, and, our wagons coming up, we wentinto camp there, and had Rhett and General Blair to take supperwith us, and our conversation was full and quite interesting. Indue time, however, Rhett was passed over by General Slocum to hisprovost-guard, with orders to be treated with due respect, --and wasfurnished with a horse to ride. 

The next day (the 16th) the opposition continued stubborn, and nearAverysboro' Hardee had taken up a strong position, before whichGeneral Slocum deployed Jackson's division (of the TwentiethCorps), with part of Ward's. Kilpatrick was on his right front. Coming up, I advised that a brigade should make a wide circuit bythe left, and, if possible, catch this line in flank. The movementwas completely successful, the first line of the enemy was sweptaway, and we captured the larger part of Rhett's brigade, twohundred and seventeen men, including Captain Macbeth's battery ofthree guns, and buried one hundred and eight dead. 

The deployed lines (Ward's and Jackson's) pressed on, and foundHardee again intrenched; but the next morning he was gone, in fullretreat toward Smithfield. In this action, called the battle ofAverysboro', we lost twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, andfour hundred and seventy-seven men wounded; a serious loss, becauseevery wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance. The rebelwounded (sixty-eight) were carried to a house near by, all surgicaloperations necessary were performed by our surgeons, and then thesewounded men were left in care of an officer and four men of therebel prisoners, with a scanty supply of food, which was the bestwe could do for them. In person I visited this house while thesurgeons were at work, with arms and legs lying around loose, inthe yard and on the porch; and in a room on a bed lay a pale, handsome young fellow, whose left arm had just been cut off nearthe shoulder. Some one used my name, when he asked, in a feeblevoice, if I were General Sherman. He then announced himself asCaptain Macbeth, whose battery had just been captured; and saidthat he remembered me when I used to visit his father's house, inCharleston. I inquired about his family, and enabled him to writea note to his mother, which was sent her afterward from Goldsboro'. I have seen that same young gentleman since in St. Louis, where hewas a clerk in an insurance-office. 

While the battle of Averysboro' was in progress, and I was sittingon my horse, I was approached by a man on foot, without shoes orcoat, and his head bandaged by a handkerchief. He announcedhimself as the Captain Duncan who had been captured by Wade Hamptonin Fayetteville, but had escaped; and, on my inquiring how hehappened to be in that plight, he explained that when he was aprisoner Wade Hampton's men had made him "get out of his coat, hat, and shoes, " which they appropriated to themselves. He said WadeHampton had seen them do it, and he had appealed to him personallyfor protection, as an officer, but Hampton answered him with acurse. I sent Duncan to General Kilpatrick, and heard afterwardthat Kilpatrick had applied to General Slocum for his prisoner, Colonel Rhett, whom he made march on foot the rest of the way toGoldsboro', in retaliation. There was a story afloat thatKilpatrick made him get out of those fine boots, but restored thembecause none of his own officers had feet delicate enough to wearthem. Of course, I know nothing of this personally, and have neverseen Rhett since that night by the cooper-shop; and suppose that heis the editor who recently fought a duel in New Orleans. 

From Averysboro' the left wing turned east, toward Goldsboro', theFourteenth Corps leading. I remained with this wing until thenight of the 18th, when we were within twenty-seven miles ofGoldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and, supposing that alldanger was over, I crossed over to join Howard's column, to theright, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, known tobe approaching Goldsboro'. I overtook General Howard atFalling-Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reasonof the bad roads. I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum'shead of column, and supposed it to indicate about the same measure ofopposition by Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry beforeexperienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, and notifiedme that near Bentonsville General Slocum had run up againstJohnston's whole army. I sent back orders for him to fightdefensively to save time, and that I would come up withreenforcements from the direction of Cog's Bridge, by the road whichwe had reached near Falling-Creek Church. The country was veryobscure, and the maps extremely defective. 

By this movement I hoped General Slocum would hold Johnston's armyfacing west, while I would come on his rear from the east. TheFifteenth Corps, less one division (Hazen's), still well to therear, was turned at once toward Bentonsville; Hazen's division wasordered to Slocum's flank, and orders were also sent for GeneralBlair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to come to the same destination. Meantime the sound of cannon came from the direction ofBentonsville. 

The night of the 19th caught us near Falling-Creek Church; butearly the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R. Woods'sdivision leading, closed down on Bentonsville, near which it wasbrought up by encountering a line of fresh parapet, crossing theroad and extending north, toward Mill Creek. 

After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with duecaution, using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction withGeneral Slocum, on his left. These deployments occupied all day, during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps also got up. At that time General Johnston's army occupied the form of a V, theangle reaching the road leading from Averysboro' to Goldsboro', andthe flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing the villageof Bentonsville. 

General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and General Howard'sthe other; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength, I did not feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had beenout from Savannah since the latter part of January, and ourwagon-trains contained but little food. I had also received messagesduring the day from General Schofield, at Kinston, and GeneralTerry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro', both expecting toreach it by March 21st. During the 20th we simply held our groundand started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which wouldbe needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle atBentonsville. The next day (21st) it began to rain again, and weremained quiet till about noon, when General Mower, ever rash, broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and waspushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek. I ordered him back to connect with his own corps; and, lest theenemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to beengaged with a strong skirmish-fire. 

I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followedMower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would havebrought on a general battle, and it could not have resultedotherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superiornumbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred tomake junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engagingJohnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown. Thenext day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, theroads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro'. The heaviestfighting at Bentonsville was on the first day, viz. , the 19th, whenJohnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns, knocking backCarlin's division; but, as soon as General Slocum had brought upthe rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward theTwentieth on its left, he received and repulsed all attacks, andheld his ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the rightwing. His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundred andforty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and twohundred and twenty-six missing. He reported having buried of therebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, and captured three hundredand thirty-eight prisoners. 

The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-five menkilled, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine menwounded, and seventy missing. General Howard reported that he hadburied one hundred of the rebel dead, and had captured twelvehundred and eighty-seven prisoners. 

Our total loss, therefore, at Bentonsville was: 1, 604

General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (p. 392), asserts that hisentire force at Bentonsville, omitting Wheeler's and Butler'scavalry, only amounted to fourteen thousand one hundred infantryand artillery; and (p. 393) states his losses as: 2, 343

Wide discrepancies exist in these figures: for instance, GeneralSlocum accounts for three hundred and thirty-eight prisonerscaptured, and General Howard for twelve hundred and eighty-seven, making sixteen hundred and twenty-five in all, to Johnston's sixhundred and fifty three--a difference of eight hundred andseventy-two. I have always accorded to General Johnston due creditfor boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville, but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at thetime he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collectedfrom Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc. After the first attack onCarlin's division, I doubt if the fighting was as desperate asdescribed by him, p. 385, et seq. I was close up with theFifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st, considered the fighting asmere skirmishing, and know that my orders were to avoid a generalbattle, till we could be sure of Goldsboro', and of opening up anew base of supply. With the knowledge now possessed of his smallforce, of course I committed an error in not overwhelmingJohnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865. But I was content thento let him go, and on the 22d of March rode to Cog's Bridge, whereI met General Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Corps; andthe next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found GeneralSchofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfectjunction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated. During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro';General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison's Depot to thesouth, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at Mount Olive Station, near him, and there we all rested, while I directed my specialattention to replenishing the army for the next and last stage ofthe campaign. Colonel W. W. Wright had been so indefatigable, thatthe Newbern Railroad was done, and a locomotive arrived inGoldsboro' on the 25th of March. 

Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marchesever made by an organized army in a civilized country. Thedistance from Savannah to Goldsboro' is four hundred andtwenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five largenavigable rivers, viz. , the Edisto, Broad, Catawba, Pedee, and CapeFear, at either of which a comparatively small force, well-handled, should have made the passage most difficult, if not impossible. The country generally was in a state of nature, with innumerableswamps, with simply mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to becorduroyed. In our route we had captured Columbia, Cheraw, andFayetteville, important cities and depots of supplies, hadcompelled the evacuation of Charleston City and Harbor, had utterlybroken up all the railroads of South Carolina, and had consumed avast amount of food and forage, essential to the enemy for thesupport of his own armies. We had in mid-winter accomplished thewhole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days, averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reachedGoldsboro' with the army in superb order, and the trains almost asfresh as when we had started from Atlanta. 

It was manifest to me that we could resume our march, and comewithin the theatre of General Grant's field of operations in allApril, and that there was no force in existence that could delayour progress, unless General Lee should succeed in eluding GeneralGrant at Petersburg, make junction with General Johnston, and thusunited meet me alone; and now that we had effected a junction withGenerals Terry and Schofield, I had no fear even of that event. Onreaching Goldsboro, I learned from General Schofield all thedetails of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of thefight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg. I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaitingme, with the general's letter of February 7th, coveringinstructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter ofMarch 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville. 

These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the eventsof the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself, to fill out the picture. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi

GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to beof any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions toSchofield and Thomas. I had informed Schofield by telegraph of thedeparture of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front. These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparentlywent without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have notreturned. I was absent from here when they left. Just returnedyesterday morning from Cape Fear River. I went there to determinewhere Schofield's corps had better go to operate against Wilmingtonand Goldsboro'. The instructions with this will inform you of theconclusion arrived at. 

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement againstWilmington fully determined before we started back; hence theabsence of more detailed instructions to him. He will land onedivision at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of theriver, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with hispontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if hecan. With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this movewill drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of thecity, either back to their line or away altogether. There will bea large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to followup and invest the garrison, if they should go inside. 

The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-halfinches. Gauge. I have sent large parties of railroad-men there tobuild them up, and have ordered stock to run them. We haveabundance of it idle from the non-use of the Virginia roads. Ihave taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you whereveryou may turn up. I did this before when you left Atlanta, andregret that they did not reach you promptly when you reachedsalt-water.... 

Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now atmy headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feelingwithin the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate usto greater activity. 

I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you woulddecline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one world be morepleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed inmy position, and I put subordinate, it would not change ourpersonal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions tosupport you that you have ever done to support me, and would do allin my power to make our cause win. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865. 

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland. 

GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. Atthe time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of thedepletion of your command by my orders. It will, be impossible atpresent for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force ofinfantry indicated. General Slocum is advised before this of thechanges made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under GeneralStoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thusvisiting a portion of the State which will not be reached bySherman's forces. He might also be able to return to EastTennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing homeour prisoners of war in rebel hands. 

Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have tobe the judge, making up his mind from information obtained whileexecuting the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movementswill attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this. 

Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. Thisprobably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, withouttaking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, thereorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, whichStoneman had in his very successful raid into SouthwesternVirginia. 

It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to theforce now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, toenable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, andthe mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson. 

You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copyof this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparationswithout loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with youas to these preparations. 

As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but toavoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing likeequal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should goas light as possible. Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teachhim in this matter better than he can be directed. 

Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, andkeep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedientservant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865. 

Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio. 

GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes, North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placedin command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Ofcourse, you will receive orders from me direct until such time asGeneral Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. Thisobviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informedyou would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred toshould not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, youwill read these instructions as your authority to assume command ofall the troops in North Carolina, dating all officialcommunications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio. " Your headquarterswill be in the field, and with the portion of the army where youfeel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to CapeFear River. 

Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movementthrough the States of South and North Carolina. The first point tobe obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be yourobjective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting thatplace with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building theroad behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: thefirst is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in hismarch north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on theline of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine whichof the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use forthrowing supplies from to the interior, you will commence theaccumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousandmen and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many asyou can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you maybe able to occupy. 

I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructionsdirectly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing suppliesfor his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and begoverned in your requisitions accordingly. A supply ofordnance-stores will also be necessary. 

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respectivedepartments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate withme by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at anytime, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point youcan communicate by telegraph. 

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive ofthose required by your own command. 

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it yourimperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for theinterior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your ownjudgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying outthese instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to theimportance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in theneighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th ofFebruary. This limits your time very materially. 

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, itcan be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men hasalready been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to FortFisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you bytelegraph. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. Is justreceived. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but Ihave felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing. Iknew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere. 

To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington ofthe greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us. But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I donot know but the first failure has been as valuable a success forthe country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see itin that light. 

Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I havebeen attempting to get something done in the West, both tocooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weaknessthere--to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to beslow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so thathe might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I havesaid, he has not moved at last advices. Canby was sending acavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg towardSelma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward thesame point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of Februaryas possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date. He has not yet started, or had not at last advices. I ordered himto send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He wouldeither have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would havesucceeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material, which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers werefull of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts ofmovements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it wasStoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned thatStoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops inNorth Carolina were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman mightget off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men wouldbe sufficient for him to take. In the mean time I had directedSheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in themountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on anddestroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place aspossible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soonas possible. 

Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far asheard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since aboutthe 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibitedfrom publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our ownresources, therefore, for information. You will see from thepapers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bearsthis will tell you all. 

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn ofnone going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but Ithink no division or brigade. The determination seems to be tohold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient toleave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), andmove out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads areentirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myselfwith watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attemptsto evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over--think I will--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are thelast avenues left to the enemy. 

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has nowabout as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I havestopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, exceptthose from Illinois. 

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, andafterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I haveordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and tofortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. Hehas accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and hasbeen ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of theVirginia Hue. I told him to get ready for a campaign towardLynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there orelsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else totake his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may benecessary. I do not believe either will. 

When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your backupon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against anything the enemy can do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannotget there with force enough to touch you. His army is nowdemoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if wedid not follow. 

Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now ontheir way to join you. If more reenforcements are necessary, Iwill send them. My notion is, that you should get Raleigh as soonas possible, and hold the railroad from there back. This may takemore force than you now have. 

From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to theenemy, without keeping up communications with the rear. 

Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces fromWilmington and Newborn, I remain, very respectfully, your obedientservant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, NEUSE RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA, March 22, 1865

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday, the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', towhich point I had also ordered General Schofield, from Newborn, andGeneral Terry, from Wilmington. I knew that General Jos. Johnstonwas supreme in command against me, and that he would have time toconcentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of thismarch. Accordingly, General Slocum was ordered to send his mainsupply-train, under escort of two divisions, straight forBentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions, disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march towardRaleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'. General Howard, in like manner, sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well tothe right, and, with the four divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposedleft flank. We started on the 16th, but again the rains set in, and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible. 

On Tuesday, the 16th, General Slocum found Hardee's army, fromCharleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in positionacross the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers, where the road branches off to Goldsboro'. There a pretty severefight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomelythe advanced line, held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by aColonel Butler. Its Commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumternotoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before beencaptured, by Kilpatrick's scouts, from his very skirmish-line. Thenext morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through andbeyond Averysboro'. General Slocum buried one hundred and eightdead rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns. Some eightywounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing theirwounds, we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officerand four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled forthe purpose. 

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'. I was with the left winguntil I supposed all danger had passed; but, when General Slocum'shead of column was within four miles of Bentonsville, afterskirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there wasinfantry in his front. He deployed a couple of brigades, which, onadvancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied, when heformed a line of the two leading divisions (Morgan's and Carlin's)of Jeff. C. Davis's corps. The enemy attacked these with violence, but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the TwentiethCorps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrickmassed his cavalry on the left. 

General Jos. Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole army(Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he haddrawn from every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crashone of our corps, and then defeat us in detail. He attackedGeneral Slocum in position from 3 P. M. On the 19th till dark; butwas everywhere repulsed, and lost heavily. At the time, I was withthe Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the right; but, onhearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps towardCox's Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps over, and on the20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear. We struck himabout noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify. Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, theright division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken into within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at thebridge across Mill Creek. Last night he retreated, leaving us inpossession of the field, dead, and wounded. We have over twothousand prisoners from this affair and the one at Averysboro', andI am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handledyesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have nowbeen out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of ourforagers, our men dirty, ragged, and saucy, and we must rest andfix up a little. Our entire losses thus far (killed, wounded, andprisoners) will be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part ofwhich are, as usual, slight wounds. The enemy has lost more thandouble as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand. 

I limited the pursuit, this morning, to Mill Creek, and willforthwith march the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, reclothe, and get some rations. 

Our combinations were such that General Schofield enteredGoldsboro' from Newborn; General Terry got Cox's Bridge, withpontoons laid, and a brigade across Neuse River intrenched; and wewhipped Jos. Johnston--all on the same day. 

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville, and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place(Cox's Bridge) to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride intoGoldsboro. 

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall post General Terryabout Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partlyto protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage asthe country affords, until the railroads are repaired leading intoGoldsboro'. 

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected;but I will soon have them both going. I shall proceed at once toorganize three armies of twenty-five thousand men each, and willtry and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we maydetermine, by or before April 10th. 

I inclose you a copy of my orders of to-day. I would like to bemore specific, but have not the data. We have lost no generalofficers nor any organization. General Slocum took three guns atAverysboro', and lost three others at the first dash on him atBentonsville. We have all our wagons and trains in good order. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 23, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the UnitedStates, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found LieutenantDunn awaiting me with your letter of March 18th and dispatch of the17th. I wrote you fully from Cox's Bridge yesterday, and sincereaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctuallyto Newborn, whence it will be dispatched to you. 

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good servicebetween Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ballmoving, I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy anddiscourage him much. 

General Slocum's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are nowcoming in. I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between theWeldon road and Little River. General Howard to-day is marchingsouth of the Nenae, and to-morrow will come in and occupy groundnorth of Goldsboro', extending from the Weldon Railroad to thatleading to Kinston. 

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troopsbelonging to the regular corps, to be broken up, and the men tojoin their proper regiments and organizations; and have orderedGeneral Schofield to guard the railroads back to Newborn andWilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-fivethousand men, with which to take the field. His army will be thecentre, as on the Atlanta campaign. I do not think I want any moretroops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the presentregiments, and I can make up an army of eighty thousand men byApril 10th. I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Stationon the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest. 

We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the properstaff-officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions. As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but, the momentwe stop, trouble begins. 

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done. I donot like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries;but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made ere this, and the road properly stocked. I can only hear of one locomotive(besides the four old ones) on the Newbern road, and two damagedlocomotives (found by General Terry) on the Wilmington road. Ileft Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements inanticipation of my arrival, and have heard from neither, though Isuppose them both to be at Morehead City. 

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, andif we can maintain them, will, in a short time, be in a position tomarch against Raleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you maydetermine. 

If I get the troops all well planed, and the supplies working well, I may run up to see you for a day or two before diving again intothe bowels of the country. 

I will make, in a very short time, accurate reports of ouroperations for the past two months. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 24, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I mightreport farther. All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which Ihave posted at Mount Olive Station, south of the Nenae) and GeneralTerry's command (which--to-morrow will move from Cog's Ferry toFaison's Depot, also on the Wilmington road). I send you a copy ofmy orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to MoreheadCity, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston inboats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from theretwenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead Cityand Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip thearmy, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. Ifeel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have gotJohnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity andcaution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits itsoperations to our stragglers and foraging-parties. My marchingcolumns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walkright through it. 

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we cancheckmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defenseof Richmond, or to abandon the cause. I feel certain, if he leavesRichmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy. I will study my maps alittle more before giving my positive views. I want all possibleinformation of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and withwhat draught. 

We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn andforage than I had expected. The families remain, but I willgradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington. We will needevery house in the town. Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of manythings of which I need not write. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. ===

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865

Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of theCumberland. 

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate mycommand--it is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you inthe way of orders or men; nor do I think you need either. GeneralCruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will atonce be broken up and the men sent to their proper regiments, asthat of Meagher was on my arrival here. 

You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocumshould have command of the two corps that properly belong to you, viz. , the Fourteenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he wasbut a corps commander, and could not legally make orders ofdischarge, transfer, etc. , which was imperatively necessary. Itherefore asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command"an army in the field, " called the Army of Georgia, composed of theFourteenth and Twentieth Corps. The order is not yet made by thePresident, though I have recognized it because both, General Grantand the President have sanctioned it, and promised to have theorder made. 

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided intothree parts, of two corps each--much as our old Atlanta army was. 

I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains inRichmond) to pass the Roanoke, and open communication with theChowan and Norfolk. This will bring me in direct communicationwith General Grant. 

This is an admirable point--country open, and the two railroads ingood order back to Wilmington and Beaufort. We have alreadybrought up stores enough to fill our wagons, and only await somefew articles, and the arrival of some men who are marching up fromthe coast, to be off. 

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course, are all right. You can make reports direct to Washington or toGeneral Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the generalstate of affairs, that I may know what is happening. I must givemy undivided attention to matters here. You will hear from athousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march. Yourstruly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[LETTER FROM ADMIRAL DAHLGREN]

SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRONFLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA, CHARLESTON, April 20, 1865

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies of the Tennessee, Georgia, and Mississippi. 

Mr DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of yourhandwriting, which has just reached me from Goldsboro'; it was verysuggestive of a past to me, when these regions were the scene ofyour operations. 

As you progressed through South Carolina, there was nomanifestation of weakness or of an intention to abandon Charleston, until within a few hours of the fact. On the 11th of February Iwas at Stono, and a spirited demonstration was made by GeneralSchimmel-pfennig and the vessels. He drove the rebels from theirrifle-pits in front of the lines, extending from Fort Pringle, andpushed them vigorously. The next day I was at Bull's Bay, with adozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron. GeneralPotter had twelve to fifteen hundred men, the object being to carryout your views. We made as much fuss as possible, and with bettersuccess than I anticipated, for it seems that the rebs conceivedStono to be a feint, and the real object at Bull's Bay, supposing, from the number of steamers and boats, that we had several thousandmen. Now came an aide from General Gillmore, at Port Royal, withyour cipher-dispatch from Midway, so I steamed down to Port Royalto see him. Next day was spent in vain efforts to decipher-finallyit was accomplished. You thought that the state of the roads mightforce you to turn upon Charleston; so I went there on the 15th, butthere was no sign yet of flinching. Then I went to Bull's Bay nextday (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owing tothe difficulties of shoal water. One of the gunboats had contrivedto get up to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailorswere working hard. On the evening of the 18th I steamed down toStono to see how matters were going there. Passing Charleston, Inoticed two large fires, well inside--probably preparing to leave. On the 17th, in Stono, rumors were flying about loose ofevacuation. In course of the morning, General Schimmelpfennigtelegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symptoms ofleaving; that he would again make a push at Stono, and asked formonitors. General Schimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, andwe met in the Folly Branch, near Secessionville. He was sore thatthe rebs would be off that night, so he was to assault them infront, while a monitor and gunboats stung their flanks both sides. I also sent an aide to order my battery of five eleven-inch guns, at Cumming's Point, to fire steadily all night on Sullivan'sIsland, and two monitors to close up to the island for the sameobject. Next morning (18th) the rascals were found to be off, andwe broke in from all directions, by land and water. The mainbodies had left at eight or nine in the evening, leavingdetachments to keep up a fire from the batteries. I steamed roundquickly, and soon got into the city, threading the streets with alarge group of naval captains who had joined me. All was silent asthe grave. No one to be seen but a few firemen. 

No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking thetrack you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was naturalto desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any onespot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston. 

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete inexecution; and now it is yours to secure the last army whichrebeldom possesses. I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, andhope that the result may be all that you wish. 

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shockedevery mind. Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratumof American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of a madman. Who have prompted him?

I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him isever nearest to my heart. Generous, brave, and noble, as I everknew him to be, that he should close his young life so early, evenunder the accepted conditions of a soldier's life, as a son of theUnion, would have been grief sufficient for me to bear; but thathis precious remains should have been so treated by the brutes intowhose hands they fell, adds even to the bitterness of death. I amnow awaiting the hour when I can pay my last duties to his memory. 

With my best and sincere wishes, my dear general, for your successand happiness, I am, most truly, your friend, J. A. DAHLGREN. 

[General Order No. 50. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICEWASHINGTON, March 27, 1865

Ordered--1. That at the hour of noon, on the 14th day of April, 1885, Brevet Major-General Anderson will raise and plant upon theruins of Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, the same United Statesflag which floated over the battlements of that fort during therebel assault, and which was lowered and saluted by him and thesmall force of his command when the works were evacuated on the14th day of April, 1861. 

2. That the flag, when raised, be saluted by one hundred guns fromFort Sumter, and by a national salute from every fort and rebelbattery that fired upon Fort Sumter. 

3. That suitable ceremonies be had upon the occasion, under thedirection of Major-General William T. Sherman, whose militaryoperations compelled the rebels to evacuate Charleston, or, in hisabsence, under the charge of Major-General Q. A. Gilmore, commanding the department. Among the ceremonies will be thedelivery of a public address by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. 

4. That the naval forces at Charleston, and their commander onthat station, be invited to participate in the ceremonies of theoccasion. 

By order of the President of the United States, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

[General Order No. 41. ]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTHHILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA, April 10, 1865

Friday next, the 14th inst. , will be the fourth anniversary of thecapture of Fort Sumter by the rebels. A befitting celebration onthat day, in honor of its reoccupation by the national forces, hasbeen ordered by the President, in pursuance of which Brevet Major-General Robert Anderson, United States Army, will restore to itsoriginal place on the fort the identical flag which, after anhonorable and gallant defense, he was compelled to lower to theinsurgents in South Carolina, in April, 1861. 

The ceremonies for the occasion will commence with prayer, atthirty minutes past eleven o'clock a. M. 

At noon precisely, the flag will be raised and saluted with onehundred guns from Fort Sumter, and with a national salute from FortMoultrie and Battery Bee on Sullivan's Island, Fort Putnam onMorris Island, and Fort Johnson on James's Island; it beingeminently appropriate that the places which were so conspicuous inthe inauguration of the rebellion should take a part not lessprominent in this national rejoicing over the restoration of thenational authority. 

After the salutes, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher will deliver anaddress. 

The ceremonies will close with prayer and a benediction. 

Colonel Stewart L. Woodford, chief of staff, under such verbalinstructions as he may receive, is hereby charged with the detailsof the celebration, comprising all the arrangements that it may benecessary to make for the accommodation of the orator of the day, and the comfort and safety of the invited guests from the army andnavy, and from civil life. 

By command of Major-General Q. A. Gillmore, W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Copy of Major ANDERSON's Dispatch, announcing the Surrender of FortSumter, April 14, 1861. 

STEAMSHIP BALTIC, OFF SANDY HOOKApril 10, 1861, 10. 30 a. M. Via New York

Honorable S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington

Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until thequarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge-walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded byflames, and its door closed from the effect of heat, four barrelsand three cartridges of powder only being available, and noprovisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuationoffered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the11th inst. , prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marchedout of the fort, Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst. , with colorsflying and drums beating, bringing away company and privateproperty, and saluting my flag with fifty guns. 

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major First Artillery, commanding. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

END OF THE WAR--FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALEIGH AND WASHINGTON. 

APRIL AND MAY, 1865. 

As before described, the armies commanded respectively by GeneralsJ. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and myself, effected a junction inand about Goldsboro', North Carolina, during the 22d and 23d ofMarch, 1865, but it required a few days for all the troops andtrains of wagons to reach their respective camps. In person Ireached Goldsboro' on the 23d, and met General Schofield, whodescribed fully his operations in North Carolina up to that date;and I also found Lieutenant Dunn, aide-de-camp to General Grant, with a letter from him of March 16th, giving a general descriptionof the state of facts about City Point. The next day I receivedanother letter, more full, dated the 22d, which I give herewith. 

Nevertheless, I deemed it of great importance that I should have apersonal interview with the general, and determined to go in personto City Point as soon as the repairs of the railroad, then inprogress under the personal direction of Colonel W. W. Wright, would permit:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 22, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the fact, yet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro'on the 19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may beregarded as the successful termination of the third campaign sinceleaving the Tennessee River, less than one year ago. 

Since Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemyare left dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for alltheir supplies. These I hope to cut next week. Sheridan is atWhite House, "shoeing up" and resting his cavalry. I expect him tofinish by Friday night and to start the following morning, raidLong Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred, and the extreme left ofthe army around Petersburg. He will make no halt with the armiesoperating here, but will be joined by a division of cavalry, fivethousand five hundred strong, from the Army of the Potomac, andwill proceed directly to the Southside and Danville roads. Hisinstructions will be to strike the Southside road as nearPetersburg as he can, and destroy it so that it cannot be repairedfor three or four days, and push on to the Danville road, as nearto the Appomattox as he can get. Then I want him to destroy theroad toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push on to theSouthside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually. From that point I shall probably leave it to his discretion eitherto return to this army, crossing the Danville road south ofBurkesville, or go and join you, passing between Danville andGreensboro'. When this movement commences I shall move out by myleft, with all the force I can, holding present intrenched lines. I shall start with no distinct view, further than holding Lee'sforces from following Sheridan. But I shall be along myself, andwill take advantage of any thing that turns up. If Lee detaches, Iwill attack; or if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor torepulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage. 

It is most difficult to understand what the rebels intend to do; sofar but few troops have been detached from Lee's army. Muchmachinery has been removed, and material has been sent toLynchburg, showing a disposition to go there. Points, too, havebeen fortified on the Danville road. 

Lee's army is much demoralized, and great numbers are deserting. Probably, from returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can bepicked up, his numbers may be kept up. I estimate his force now atabout sixty-five thousand men. 

Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, fromEastport. Stoneman started on the same day, from East Tennessee, toward Lynchburg. Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interiorof Alabama. 

I ordered Gilmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, tohold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send toWilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also directed to forwardto Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you. Iunderstand this will give you about five thousand men, besidesthose brought east by Meagher. 

I have been telegraphing General Meigs to hasten up locomotives andcars for you. General McCallum, he informs me, is attending to it. I fear they are not going forward as fast as I world like. 

Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The railroad was repaired to Goldsboro' by the evening of March25th, when, leaving General Schofield in chief command, with acouple of staff-officers I started for City Point, Virginia, in alocomotive, in company with Colonel Wright, the constructingengineer. We reached Newbern that evening, which was passed in thecompany of General Palmer and his accomplished lady, and early thenext morning we continued on to Morehead City, where General Eastonhad provided for us the small captured steamer Russia, CaptainSmith. We put to sea at once and steamed up the coast, reachingFortress Monroe on the morning of the 27th, where I landed andtelegraphed to my brother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, invitinghim to come down and return with me to Goldsboro. We proceeded onup James River to City Point, which we reached the same afternoon. I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occupying apretty group of huts on the bank of James River, overlooking theharbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war andmerchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale. Thegeneral received me most heartily, and we talked over matters veryfully. After I had been with him an hour or so, he remarked thatthe President, Mr. Lincoln, was then on board the steamer RiverQueen, lying at the wharf, and he proposed that we should call andsee him. We walked down to the wharf, went on board, and found Mr. Lincoln alone, in the after-cabin. He remembered me perfectly, andat once engaged in a most interesting conversation. He was full ofcuriosity about the many incidents of our great march, which hadreached him officially and through the newspapers, and seemed toenjoy very much the more ludicrous parts-about the "bummers, " andtheir devices to collect food and forage when the outside worldsupposed us to be starving; but at the same time he expressed agood deal of anxiety lest some accident might happen to the army inNorth Carolina during my absence. I explained to him that thatarmy was snug and comfortable, in good camps, at Goldsboro'; thatit would require some days to collect forage and food for anothermarch; and that General Schofield was fully competent to command itin my absence. Having made a good, long, social visit, we took ourleave and returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs, Granthad provided tea. While at the table, Mrs. Grant inquired if wehad seen Mrs. Lincoln. "No, " said the general, "I did not ask forher;" and I added that I did not even know that she was on board. Mrs. Grant then exclaimed, "Well, you are a pretty pair!" and addedthat our neglect was unpardonable; when the general said we wouldcall again the next day, and make amends for the unintended slight. 

Early the next day, March 28th, all the principal officers of thearmy and navy called to see me, Generals Meade, Ord, Ingalls, etc. , and Admiral Porter. At this time the River Queen was at anchor outin the river, abreast of the wharf, and we again started to visitMr. And Mrs. Lincoln. Admiral Porter accompanied us. We took asmall, tug at the wharf, which conveyed us on board, where we wereagain received most courteously by the President, who conducted usto the after-cabin. After the general compliments, General Grantinquired after Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state-room, returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well. We then again entered upon a general conversation, during whichGeneral Grant explained to the President that at that very instantof time General Sheridan was crossing James River from the north, by a pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he had a large, well-appointed force of cavalry, with which he proposed to strikethe Southside and Danville Railroads, by which alone General Lee, in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in his judgment, matterswere drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that GeneralLee would not wait long enough. I also explained that my army atGoldsboro' was strong enough to fight Lee's army and Johnston'scombined, provided that General Grant could come up within a day orso; that if Lee would only remain in Richmond another fortnight, Icould march up to Burkesville, when Lee would have to starve insideof his lines, or come out from his intrenchments and fight us onequal terms. 

Both General Grant and myself supposed that one or the other of uswould have to fight one more bloody battle, and that it would bethe last. Mr. Lincoln exclaimed, more than once, that there hadbeen blood enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not beavoided. I remember well to have said that we could not controlthat event; that this necessarily rested with our enemy; and Iinferred that both Jeff. Davis and General Lee would be forced tofight one more desperate and bloody battle. I rather supposed itwould fall on me, somewhere near Raleigh; and General Grant addedthat, if Lee would only wait a few more days, he would have hisarmy so disposed that if the enemy should abandon Richmond, andattempt to make junction with General Jos. Johnston in NorthCarolina, he (General Grant) would be on his heels. Mr. Lincolnmore than once expressed uneasiness that I was not with my army atGoldsboro', when I again assured him that General Schofield wasfully competent to command in my absence; that I was going to startback that very day, and that Admiral Porter had kindly provided forme the steamer Bat, which he said was much swifter than my ownvessel, the Russia. During this interview I inquired of thePresident if he was all ready for the end of the war. What was tobe done with the rebel armies when defeated? And what should bedone with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc. ? Shouldwe allow them to escape, etc. ? He said he was all ready; all hewanted of us was to defeat the opposing armies, and to get the mencomposing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work ontheir farms and in their shops. As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardlyat liberty to speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought toclear out, "escape the country, " only it would not do for him tosay so openly. As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:

A man once had taken the total-abstinence pledge. When visiting afriend, he was invited to take a drink, but declined, on the scoreof his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade, which wasaccepted. In preparing the lemonade, the friend pointed to thebrandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would be more palatable if hewere to pour in a little brandy; when his guest said, if he coulddo so "unbeknown" to him, he would "not object. " From whichillustration I inferred that Mr. Lincoln wanted Davis to escape, "unbeknown" to him. 

I made no notes of this conversation at the time, but AdmiralPorter, who was present, did, and in 1866 he furnished me anaccount thereof, which I insert below, but the admiral describesthe first visit, of the 27th, whereas my memory puts AdmiralPorter's presence on the following day. Still he may be right, andhe may have been with us the day before, as I write this chieflyfrom memory. There were two distinct interviews; the first waslate in the afternoon of March 27th, and the other about noon ofthe 28th, both in the after-cabin of the steamer River Queen; onboth occasions Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civilreorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over;and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and thepeople of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laiddown their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would atonce be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a commoncountry; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then inexistence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized byhim as the government de facto till Congress could provide others. 

I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever impressed by hiskindly nature, his deep and earnest sympathy with the afflictionsof the whole people, resulting from the war, and by the march ofhostile armies through the South; and that his earnest desireseemed to be to end the war speedily, without more bloodshed ordevastation, and to restore all the men of both sections to theirhomes. In the language of his second inaugural address, he seemedto have "charity for all, malice toward none, " and, above all, anabsolute faith in the courage, manliness, and integrity of thearmies in the field. When at rest or listening, his legs and armsseemed to hang almost lifeless, and his face was care-worn andhaggard; but, the moment he began to talk, his face lightened up, his tall form, as it were, unfolded, and he was the veryimpersonation of good-humor and fellowship. The last words Irecall as addressed to me were that he would feel better when I wasback at Goldsboro'. We parted at the gangway of the River Queen, about noon of March 28th, and I never saw him again. Of all themen I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements ofgreatness, combined with goodness, than any other. 

ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITHMr. LINCOLN. 

The day of General Sherman's arrival at City Point (I think the27th of March, 1866), I accompanied him and General Grant on boardthe President's flagship, the Queen, where the President receivedus in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present. 

The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted tomeet General Sherman, whom he cordially greeted. 

It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, toremember him, since the beginning of the war, and did not rememberwhen he had seen him before, until the general reminded him of thecircumstances of their first meeting. 

This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, Ithink, remarkable for remembering people, having that kinglyquality in an eminent degree. Indeed, such was the power of hismemory, that he seemed never to forget the most minutecircumstance. 

The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaignthrough the South, with every movement of which the Presidentseemed familiar. 

He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers, "and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking mannerthe ideas he wanted to convey. For example, he would often expresshis wishes by telling an apt story, which was quite a habit withhim, and one that I think he adopted to prevent his committinghimself seriously. 

The interview between the two generals and the President lastedabout an hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotteddown what I remembered of the conversation, as I have made apractice of doing during the rebellion, when any thing interestingoccurred. 

I don't regret having done so, as circumstances afterward occurred(Stanton's ill conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odiumon General Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to Jos. Johnston. 

Could the conversation that occurred on board the Queen, betweenthe President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman wouldnot, and could not, have been censored. Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, would have acquitted the general of any blame, for he was onlycarrying out the President's wishes. 

My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with themost liberal views toward the rebels. He felt confident that wewould be successful, and was willing that the enemy shouldcapitulate on the most favorable terms. 

I don't know what the President would have done had he been left tohimself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was thanwrought up to a high state of excitement. He wanted peace onalmost any terms, and there is no knowing what proposals he mighthave been willing to listen to. His heart was tendernessthroughout, and, as long as the rebels laid down their arms, he didnot care how it was done. I do not know how far he was influencedby General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferences, thatthey must have understood each other perfectly, and that the termsgiven to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln. Iknow that the latter was delighted when he heard that they had beengiven, and exclaimed, a dozen times, "Good!" "All right!""Exactly the thing!" and other similar expressions. Indeed, thePresident more than once told me what he supposed the terms wouldbe: if Lee and Johnston surrendered, he considered the war ended, and that all the other rebel forces world lay down their arms atonce. 

In this he proved to be right. Grant and Sherman were both of thesame opinion, and so was everyone else who knew anything about thematter. 

What signified the terms to them, so long as we obtained the actualsurrender of people who only wanted a good opportunity to give upgracefully? The rebels had fought "to the last ditch, " and allthat they had left them was the hope of being handed down inhistory as having received honorable terms. 

After hearing General Sherman's account of his own position, andthat of Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears thatthe rebel general would escape south again by the railroads, andthat General Sherman would have to chase him anew, over the sameground; but the general pronounced this to be impracticable. Heremarked: "I have him where he cannot move without breaking up hisarmy, which, once disbanded, can never again be got together; and Ihave destroyed the Southern railroads, so that they cannot be usedagain for a long time. " General Grant remarked, "What is toprevent their laying the rails again?" "Why, " said GeneralSherman, "my bummers don't do things by halves. Every rail, afterhaving been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked asa ram's-horn, and they never can be used again. "

This was the only remark made by General Grant during theinterview, as he sat smoking a short distance from the President, intent, no doubt, on his own plans, which were being brought to asuccessful termination. 

The conversation between the President and General Sherman, aboutthe terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued. Sherman energetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and that Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but thePresident was very decided about the matter, and insisted that thesurrender of Johnston's army most be obtained on any terms. 

General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for, although he did not join in the conversation to any extent, yet hemade no objections, and I presume had made up his mind to allow thebest terms himself. 

He was also anxious that Johnston should not be driven intoRichmond, to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind theirstrong intrenchments, would have given us incalculable trouble. 

Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those ofthe President, and the terms of capitulation between himself andJohnston were exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes. Hecould not have done any thing which would have pleased thePresident better. 

Mr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal termsoffered General Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been GeneralSherman's private views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishesof the President in every respect. It was Mr. Lincoln's policythat was carried out, and, had he lived long enough, he would havebeen but too glad to have acknowledged it. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, Secretary Stanton would have issued no false telegraphicdispatches, in the hope of killing off another general in theregular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the wayof his own succession. 

The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that thepens and ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted. 

It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that General Sherman had givenup all that we had been fighting for, had conceded every thing toJos. Johnston, and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into thefire;" but sober reflection soon overruled these harsh expressions, and, with those who knew General Sherman, and appreciated him, hewas still the great soldier, patriot, and gentleman. In futuretimes this matter will be looked at more calmly anddispassionately. The bitter animosities that have been engenderedduring the rebellion will have died out for want of food on whichto live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and others pursued, ingranting liberal terms to the defeated rebels, will be applauded. The fact is, they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches hadbroken from under him: they let him have only the broken crutchesto get home with!

I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in thesteamer Bat. 

While he was absent from his command he was losing no time, for bewas getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and, when he returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready toswallow up Jos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins. 

Johnston was cornered, could not move without leaving every thingbehind him, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on afamine in that destitute city. 

I was with Mr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and untilbe left for Washington. He was more than delighted with thesurrender of Lee, and with the terms Grant gave the rebel general;and would have given Jos. Johnston twice as much, had the latterasked for it, and could he have been certain that the rebel worldhave surrendered without a fight. I again repeat that, had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered all the responsibility. 

One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got intoRichmond, and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than wehad, General Sherman would have been blamed. Then why not give himthe full credit of capturing on the best terms the enemy's lastimportant army and its best general, and putting an end to therebellion

It was a finale worthy of Sherman's great march through the swampsand deserts of the South, a march not excelled by any thing we readof in modern military history. 

D. D. PORTER, Vice-Admiral. 

(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States Naval Academyat Annapolis, Md. , and mailed to General Sherman at St. Louis, Mo. )

As soon as possible, I arranged with General Grant for certainchanges in the organization of my army; and the general alsoundertook to send to North Carolina some tug-boat and barges tocarry stores from Newbern up as far as Kinston, whence they couldbe hauled in wagons to our camps, thus relieving our railroads tothat extent. I undertook to be ready to march north by April 10th, and then embarked on the steamer Bat, Captain Barnes, for NorthCarolina. We steamed down James River, and at Old Point Comforttook on board my brother, Senator Sherman, and Mr. Edwin Stanton, son of the Secretary of War, and proceeded at once to ourdestination. On our way down the river, Captain Barnes expressedhimself extremely obliged to me for taking his vessel, as it hadrelieved him of a most painful dilemma. He explained that he hadbeen detailed by Admiral Porter to escort the President's unarmedboat, the River Queen, in which capacity it became his special dutyto look after Mrs. Lincoln. The day before my arrival at CityPoint, there had been a grand review of a part of the Army of theJames, then commanded by General Ord. The President rode out fromCity Point with General Grant on horseback, accompanied by anumerous staff, including Captain Barnes and Mrs. Ord; but Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had followed in a carriage. 

The cavalcade reached the review-ground some five or six miles outfrom City Point, found the troops all ready, drawn up in line, andafter the usual presentation of arms, the President and party, followed by Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes on horseback, rode thelines, and returned to the reviewing stand, which meantime had beenreached by Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant in their carriage, which hadbeen delayed by the driver taking a wrong road. Mrs. Lincoln, seeing Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes riding with the retinue, andsupposing that Mrs. Ord had personated her, turned on CaptainBarnes and gave him a fearful scolding; and even indulged in somepretty sharp upbraidings to Mrs. Ord. 

This made Barne's position very unpleasant, so that he felt muchrelieved when he was sent with me to North Carolina. The Bat wasvery fast, and on the morning of the 29th we were near CapeHatteras; Captain Barnes, noticing a propeller coming out ofHatteras Inlet, made her turn back and pilot us in. We enteredsafely, steamed up Pamlico Sound into Neuse River, and the nextmorning, --by reason of some derangement of machinery, we anchoredabout seven miles below Newbern, whence we went up in CaptainBarnes's barge. As soon as we arrived at Newbern, I telegraphed upto General Schofield at Goldsboro' the fact of my return, and thatI had arranged with General Grant for the changes made necessary inthe reorganization of the army, and for the boats necessary tocarry up the provisions and stores we needed, prior to the renewalof our march northward. 

These changes amounted to constituting the left wing a distinctarmy, under the title of "the Army of Georgia, " under command ofGeneral Slocum, with his two corps commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis and General Joseph A. Mower; the Tenth and Twenty-third Corpsalready constituted another army, "of the Ohio, " under the commandof Major-General Schofield, and his two corps were commanded byGenerals J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. These changes were necessary, because army commanders only could order courts-martial, grantdischarges, and perform many other matters of discipline andadministration which were indispensable; but my chief purpose wasto prepare the whole army for what seemed among the probabilitiesof the time--to fight both Lee's and Johnston's armies combined, incase their junction could be formed before General Grant couldpossibly follow Lee to North Carolina. 

General George H. Thomas, who still remained at Nashville, was notpleased with these changes, for the two corps with General Slocum, viz. , the Fourteenth and Twentieth, up to that time, had remainedtechnically a part of his "Army of the Cumberland;" but he was sofar away, that I had to act to the best advantage with the troopsand general officers actually present. I had specially asked forGeneral Mower to command the Twentieth Corps, because I regardedhim as one of the boldest and best fighting generals in the wholearmy. His predecessor, General A. S. Williams, the senior divisioncommander present, had commanded the corps well from Atlanta toGoldsboro', and it may have seemed unjust to replace him at thatprecise moment; but I was resolved to be prepared for a mostdesperate and, as then expected, a final battle, should it fall onme. 

I returned to Goldsboro' from Newbern by rail the evening of March30th, and at once addressed myself to the task of reorganizationand replenishment of stores, so as to be ready to march by April10th, the day agreed on with General Grant. 

The army was divided into the usual three parts, right and leftwings, and centre. The tabular statements herewith will give theexact composition of these separate armies, which by the 10th ofApril gave the following effective strength:

 Infantry ................... 80, 968 Artillery .................. 2, 448 Cavalry .................... 5, 587

 Aggregate ............ 88, 948 Total number of guns, 91

The railroads to our rear had also been repaired, so that storeswere arriving very fast, both from Morehead City and Wilmington. The country was so level that a single locomotive could haultwenty-five and thirty cars to a train, instead of only ten, as wasthe case in Tennessee and Upper Georgia. 

By the 5th of April such progress had been made, that I issued thefollowing Special Field Orders, No. 48, prescribing the time andmanner of the next march

[Special Field Orders, No. 48. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865. 

Confidential to Army Commanders, Corps Commanders, and Chiefs ofStaff Departments:

The next grand objective is to place this army (with its fullequipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base forsupplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, aboutPetersburg; and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible enroute:

1. To accomplish this result the following general plan will befollowed, or modified only by written orders from theseheadquarters, should events require a change:

(1. ) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed tobe complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in, orgiven directions to meet on the next march. All preparations willalso be complete to place the railroad-stock back of Kinston on theone road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other. 

(2. ) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their linesof march, say, about seven miles, and close up. 

(3. ) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be keptup at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according tothe amount of resistance. All the columns will dress to the left(which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always tofind roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general leftwheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on thedirect route of march. Foraging and other details may continue asheretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed; andforagers should not go in advance of the advance-guard, but lookmore to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal. 

2. The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aimstraight for the railroad-bridge near Smithfield; thence along upthe Neuse River to the railroad-bridge over Neuse River, northeastof Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point ofconcentration. 

The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move toWhitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is pastSmithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River toabout Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of theleft; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton. 

The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by thecavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swingacross to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with theother armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of NeuseRiver, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious oppositionon the left, will work up toward Earpsboro', Andrews, B----, andWarrenton. 

The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving itsencumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight forWeldon, until the enemy is across Tar River, and that bridgeburned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up communication with general headquarters. 

3. As soon as the army starts, the chief-quartermaster andcommissary will prepare a resupply of stores at some point onPamlico or Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston orWinton and Murfreesboro', according to developments. As soon asthey have satisfactory information that the army is north of theRoanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Winton, with asub-depot at Murfreesboro'. Major-General Schofield will hold, asheretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across Northern Branch asan outpost), Newborn (and Kinston as its outpost), and will beprepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the timearrives for that move. The navy has instructions from AdmiralPorter to cooperate, and any commanding officer is authorized tocall on the navy for assistance and cooperation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons, of which necessarily the navalcommander must be the judge. 

4. The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, butmay in person shift to either flank where his presence may beneeded, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports. He requires, absolutely, a report of each army or grand detachment each night, whether any thing material has occurred or not, for often theabsence of an enemy is a very important fact in militaryprognostication. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

But the whole problem became suddenly changed by the news of thefall of Richmond and Petersburg, which reached as at Goldsboro', onthe 6th of April. The Confederate Government, with Lee's army, hadhastily abandoned Richmond, fled in great disorder toward Danville, and General Grant's whole army was in close pursuit. Of course, Iinferred that General Lee would succeed in making junction withGeneral Johnston, with at least a fraction of his army, somewhereto my front. I at once altered the foregoing orders, and preparedon the day appointed, viz. , April 10th, to move straight onRaleigh, against the army of General Johnston, known to be atSmithfield, and supposed to have about thirty-five thousand men. Wade Hampton's cavalry was on his left front and Wheeler's on hisright front, simply watching us and awaiting our initiative. Meantime the details of the great victories in Virginia came thickand fast, and on the 8th I received from General Grant thiscommunication, in the form of a cipher-dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Goldsboro', North Carolina:

All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danvillewith the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him lastnight, reports all that is left with him--horse, foot, anddragoons--at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reducethis number one-half. I will push on to Burkesville, and, if astand is made at Danville, will, in a very few days, go there. Ifyou can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us seeif we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' ornearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when youreceive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points tostrike at. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I answered immediately that we would move on the 10th, prepared tofollow Johnston wherever he might go. Promptly on Monday morning, April 10th, the army moved straight on Smithfield; the right wingmaking a circuit by the right, and the left wing, supported by thecentre, moving on the two direct roads toward Raleigh, distantfifty miles. General Terry's and General Kilpatrick's troops movedfrom their positions on the south or west bank of the Neuse Riverin the same general direction, by Cox's Bridge. On the 11th wereached Smithfield, and found it abandoned by Johnston's army, which had retreated hastily on Raleigh, burning the bridges. Torestore these consumed the remainder of the day, and during thatnight I received a message from General Grant, at Appomattox, thatGeneral Lee had surrendered to him his whole army, which I at onceannounced to the troops in orders:

[Special Field Orders, No. 54]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, SMITHFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA, April 12, 1865. 

The general commanding announces to the army that he has officialnotice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him hisentire army, on the 9th inst. , at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia. 

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades inarms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great raceis won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four longyears of war. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Of course, this created a perfect furore, of rejoicing, and we allregarded the war as over, for I knew well that General Johnston hadno army with which to oppose mine. So that the only questions thatremained were, would he surrender at Raleigh? or would he allowhis army to disperse into guerrilla bands, to "die in the lastditch, " and entail on his country an indefinite and prolongedmilitary occupation, and of consequent desolation? I knew wellthat Johnston's army could not be caught; the country was too open;and, without wagons, the men could escape us, disperse, andassemble again at some place agreed on, and thus the war might beprolonged indefinitely. 

I then remembered Mr. Lincoln's repeated expression that he wantedthe rebel soldiers not only defeated, but "back at their homes, engaged in their civil pursuits. " On the evening of the 12th I waswith the head of Slocum's column, at Gulley's, and GeneralKilpatrick's cavalry was still ahead, fighting Wade Hampton'srear-guard, with orders to push it through Raleigh, while I wouldgive a more southerly course to the infantry columns, so as, ifpossible, to prevent a retreat southward. On the 13th, early, Ientered Raleigh, and ordered the several heads of column towardAshville in the direction of Salisbury or Charlotte. Beforereaching Raleigh, a locomotive came down the road to meet me, passing through both Wade Hampton's and Kilpatrick's cavalry, bringing four gentlemen, with a letter from Governor Vance to me, asking protection for the citizens of Raleigh. These gentlemenwere, of course, dreadfully excited at the dangers through whichthey had passed. Among them were ex-Senator Graham, Mr. Swain, president of Chapel Hill University, and a Surgeon Warren, of theConfederate army. They had come with a flag of truce, to whichthey were not entitled; still, in the interest of peace, Irespected it, and permitted them to return to Raleigh with theirlocomotive, to assure the Governor and the people that the war wassubstantially over, and that I wanted the civil authorities toremain in the execution of their office till the pleasure of thePresident could be ascertained. On reaching Raleigh I found thesesame gentlemen, with Messrs. Badger, Bragg, Holden, and others, butGovernor Vance had fled, and could not be prevailed on to return, because he feared an arrest and imprisonment. From the Raleighnewspapers of the 10th I learned that General Stoneman, with hisdivision of cavalry, had come across the mountains from EastTennessee, had destroyed the railroad at Salisbury, and was thensupposed to be approaching Greensboro'. I also learned thatGeneral Wilson's cavalry corps was "smashing things" down aboutSelma and Montgomery, Alabama, and was pushing for Columbus andMacon, Georgia; and I also had reason to expect that GeneralSheridan would come down from Appomattox to join us at Raleigh withhis superb cavalry corps. I needed more cavalry to checkJohnston's retreat, so that I could come up to him with myinfantry, and therefore had good reason to delay. I ordered therailroad to be finished up to Raleigh, so that I could operate fromit as a base, and then made:

[Special Field Orders, No. 55]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865. 

The next movement will be on Ashboro', to turn the position of theenemy at the "Company's Shops" in rear of Haw River Bridge, and atGreensboro', and to cut off his only available line of retreat bySalisbury and Charlotte:

1. General Kilpatrick will keep up a show of pursuit in thedirection of Hillsboro' and Graham, but be ready to cross Haw Riveron General Howard's bridge, near Pittsboro', and thence willoperate toward Greensboro', on the right front of the right wing. 

2. The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, will move outon the Chapel Hill road, and send a light division up in thedirection of Chapel Hill University to act in connection with thecavalry; but the main columns and trains will move via Hackney'sCross-Roads, and Trader's Hill, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence, etc. , tobe followed by the cavalry and light division, as soon as thebridge is laid over Haw River. 

8. The centre, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move viaHolly Springs, New Hill, Haywood, and Moffitt's Mills. 

4. The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will moverapidly by the Aven's Ferry road, Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox'sMills. 

5. All the troops will draw well out on the roads designatedduring today and to-morrow, and on the following day will move withall possible rapidity for Ashboro'. No further destruction ofrailroads, mills, cotton, and produce, will be made without thespecific orders of an army commander, and the inhabitants will bedealt with kindly, looking to an early reconciliation. The troopswill be permitted, however, to gather forage and provisions asheretofore; only more care should be taken not to strip the poorerclasses too closely. 

By order of General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Thus matters stood, when on the morning of the 14th GeneralKilpatrick reported from Durham's Station, twenty-six miles up therailroad toward Hillsboro', that a flag of truce had come in fromthe enemy with a package from General Johnston addressed to me. Taking it for granted that this was preliminary to a surrender, Iordered the message to be sent me at Raleigh, and on the 14threceived from General Johnston a letter dated April 13, 1865, inthese words:

The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed therelative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, to stopthe further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you arewilling to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and tocommunicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies ofthe United States, the request that he will take like action inregard to other armies, the object being to permit the civilauthorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate theexisting war. 

To which I replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865. 

General J. E. JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army. 

GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of thisdate. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for thesuspension of farther hostilities between the armies commanded byyou and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to conferwith you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the university, andexpect that you will also maintain the present position of yourforces until each has notice of a failure to agree. 

That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the sameterms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee atAppomattox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our twoarmies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order tosuspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend anydevastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that Ireally desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage theywould sustain by the march of this army through the central orwestern parts of the State. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

I sent my aide-de-camp, Colonel McCoy, up to Durham's Station withthis letter, with instructions to receive the answer, to telegraphits contents back to me at Raleigh, and to arrange for aninterview. On the 16th I received a reply from General Johnston, agreeing to meet me the next day at a point midway between ouradvance at Durham and his rear at Hillsboro'. I ordered a car andlocomotive to be prepared to convey me up to Durham's at eighto'clock of the morning of April 17th. Just as we were entering thecar, the telegraph-operator, whose office was up-stairs in thedepot-building, ran down to me and said that he was at that instantof time receiving a most important dispatch in cipher from MoreheadCity, which I ought to see. I held the train for nearly half anhour, when he returned with the message translated and written out. It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the attempt on the life of Mr. Seward and son, and asuspicion that a like fate was designed for General Grant and allthe principal officers of the Government. Dreading the effect ofsuch a message at that critical instant of time, I asked theoperator if any one besides himself had seen it; he answered No!I then bade him not to reveal the contents by word or look till Icame back, which I proposed to do the same afternoon. The trainthen started, and, as we passed Morris's Station, General Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, came into my car, and I told him Iwanted to see him on my return, as I had something very importantto communicate. He knew I was going to meet General Johnston, andvolunteered to say that he hoped I would succeed in obtaining hissurrender, as the whole army dreaded the long march to Charlotte(one hundred and seventy-five miles), already begun, but which hadbeen interrupted by the receipt of General Johnston's letter of the13th. We reached Durham's, twenty-six miles, about 10 a. M. , whereGeneral Kilpatrick had a squadron of cavalry drawn up to receiveme. We passed into the house in which he had his headquarters, andsoon after mounted some led horses, which he had prepared formyself and staff. General Kilpatrick sent a man ahead with a whiteflag, followed by a small platoon, behind which we rode, and werefollowed by the rest of the escort. We rode up the Hillsboro' roadfor about five miles, when our flag bearer discovered anothercoming to meet him: They met, and word was passed back to us thatGeneral Johnston was near at hand, when we rode forward and metGeneral Johnston on horseback, riding side by side with GeneralWade Hampton. We shook hands, and introduced our respectiveattendants. I asked if there was a place convenient where we couldbe private, and General Johnston said he had passed a smallfarmhouse a short distance back, when we rode back to it togetherside by side, our staff-officers and escorts following. We hadnever met before, though we had been in the regular army togetherfor thirteen years; but it so happened that we had never beforecometogether. He was some twelve or more years my senior; but we knewenough of each other to be well acquainted at once. We soonreached the house of a Mr. Bennett, dismounted, and left our horseswith orderlies in the road. Our officers, on foot, passed into theyard, and General Johnston and I entered the small frame-house. Weasked the farmer if we could have the use of his house for a fewminutes, and he and his wife withdrew into a smaller log-house, which stood close by. 

As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dispatchannouncing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched him closely. The perspiration came out in large drops on his forehead, and hedid not attempt to conceal his distress. He denounced the act as adisgrace to the age, and hoped I did not charge it to theConfederate Government. I told him I could not believe that he orGeneral Lee, or the officers of the Confederate army, couldpossibly be privy to acts of assassination; but I would not say asmuch for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders, and men of that stripe. Wetalked about the effect of this act on the country at large and onthe armies, and he realized that it made my situation extremelydelicate. I explained to him that I had not yet revealed the newsto my own personal staff or to the army, and that I dreaded theeffect when made known in Raleigh. Mr. Lincoln was peculiarlyendeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman orman in Raleigh might say something or do something that wouldmadden our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia wouldbefall the place. 

I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could notoppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could dothe same with honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedlyadmitted this, and added that any further fighting would be"murder;" but he thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, we might arrange terms that would embrace all the Confederatearmies. I asked him if he could control other armies than his own;he said, not then, but intimated that he could procure authorityfrom Mr. Davis. I then told him that I had recently had aninterview with General Grant and President Lincoln, and that I waspossessed of their views; that with them and the people North thereseemed to be no vindictive feeling against the Confederate armies, but there was against Davis and his political adherents; and thatthe terms that General Grant had given to General Lee's army werecertainly most generous and liberal. All this he admitted, butalways recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing hisown army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia. General Johnston'saccount of our interview in his "Narrative" (page 402, et seq. ) isquite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming thecapitulation of Loeben, to which he refers. Our conversation wasvery general and extremely cordial, satisfying me that it couldhave but one result, and that which we all desired, viz. , to endthe war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return toRaleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could bedivulged, on General Johnston's saying that he thought that, duringthe night, he could procure authority to act in the name of all theConfederate armies in existence we agreed to meet again the nextday at noon at the same place, and parted, he for Hillsboro' and Ifor Raleigh. 

We rode back to Durham's Station in the order we had come, and thenI showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death. I cautionedthe officers to watch the soldiers closely, to prevent any violentretaliation by them, leaving that to the Government at Washington;and on our way back to Raleigh in the cars I showed the samedispatch to General Logan and to several of the officers of theFifteenth Corps that were posted at Morrisville and Jones'sStation, all of whom were deeply impressed by it; but all gavetheir opinion that this sad news should not change our generalcourse of action. 

As soon as I reached Raleigh I published the following orders tothe army, announcing the assassination of the President, and Idoubt if, in the whole land, there were more sincere mourners overhis sad fate than were then in and about Raleigh. I watched theeffect closely, and was gratified that there was no single act ofretaliation; though I saw and felt that one single word by me wouldhave laid the city in ashes, and turned its whole populationhouseless upon the country, if not worse:

[Special Field Orders, No. 56. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 17, 1865. 

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on theevening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in Washington city, hisExcellency the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, wasassassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia. Atthe same time, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while sufferingfrom a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his ownhouse, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposedfatally. It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that otherhigh officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it seemsthat our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare, begins to resort to the assassin's tools. 

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, forhe knows that the great mass of the Confederate army world scorn tosanction each acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequenceof rebellion against rightful authority. 

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now beprepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins andguerrillas; but woe onto the people who seek to expend their wildpassions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

During the evening of the 17th and morning of the 18th I saw nearlyall the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slocum, Howard, Logan, Blair), and we talked over the matter of the conference atBennett's house of the day before, and, without exception, alladvised me to agree to some terms, for they all dreaded the longand harassing march in pursuit of a dissolving and fleeing army--a march that might carry us back again over the thousand miles thatwe had just accomplished. We all knew that if we could bringJohnston's army to bay, we could destroy it in an hour, but thatwas simply impossible in the country in which we found ourselves. We discussed all the probabilities, among which was, whether, ifJohnston made a point of it, I should assent to the escape from thecountry of Jeff. Davis and his fugitive cabinet; and some one of mygeneral officers, either Logan or Blair, insisted that, if askedfor, we should even provide a vessel to carry them to Nassau fromCharleston. 

The next morning I again started in the cars to Durham's Station, accompanied by most of my personal staff, and by Generals Blair, Barry, Howard, etc. , and, reaching General Kilpatrick'sheadquarters at Durham's, we again mounted, and rode, with the sameescort of the day, before, to Bennett's house, reaching therepunctually at noon. General Johnston had not yet arrived, but acourier shortly came, and reported him as on the way. It must havebeen nearly 2 p. M. When he arrived, as before, with General WadeHampton. He had halted his escort out of sight, and we againentered Bennett's house, and I closed the door. General Johnstonthen assured me that he had authority over all the Confederatearmies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the sameterms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply thisdesirable result, I ought to give his men and officers someassurance of their political rights after their surrender. Iexplained to him that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, ofDecember 8, 1863, still in force; enabled every Confederate soldierand officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolutepardon, by simply laying down his arms, and taking the common oathof allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrenderof General Lee's army, had extended the same principle to all theofficers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, wouldrestore to them all their rights of citizenship. But he insistedthat the officers and men of the Confederate army wereunnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear. Hethen said that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thoughtthat it would be well for him to be present. I objected, on thescore that he was then in Davis's cabinet, and our negotiationsshould be confined strictly to belligerents. He then saidBreckenridge was a major-general in the Confederate army, and mightsink his character of Secretary of War. I consented, and he sentone of his staff-officers back, who soon returned withBreckenridge, and he entered the room. General Johnston and I thenagain went over the whole ground, and Breckenridge confirmed whathe had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers andsoldiers about their political rights in case of surrender. Whilewe were in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers, which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General. He and Breckenridge looked over them, and, after some side conversation, he handed one of the papers to me. It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long preamble andterms, so general and verbose, that I said they were inadmissible. Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, Isat down at the table, and wrote off the terms, which I thoughtconcisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I waswilling to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until thetruce therein declared should expire. I had full faith thatGeneral Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did;and that I would be the gainer, for in the few days it would taketo send the papers to Washington, and receive an answer, I couldfinish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for along chase. 

Neither Mr. Breckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one word ofthat paper. I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best Icould do, and they readily assented. 

While copies of this paper were being made for signature, theofficers of our staffs commingled in the yard at Bennett's house, and were all presented to Generals Johnston and Breckenridge. Allwithout exception were rejoiced that the war was over, and that ina very few days we could turn our faces toward home. I remembertelling Breckenridge that he had better get away, as the feeling ofour people was utterly hostile to the political element of theSouth, and to him especially, because he was the Vice-President ofthe United States, who had as such announced Mr. Lincoln, ofIllinois, duly and properly elected the President of the UnitedStates, and yet that he had afterward openly rebelled and taken uparms against the Government. He answered me that he surely wouldgive us no more trouble, and intimated that he would speedily leavethe country forever. I may have also advised him that Mr. Davistoo should get abroad as soon as possible. 

The papers were duly signed; we parted about dark, and my partyreturned to Raleigh. Early the next morning, April 19th, Idispatched by telegraph to Morehead City to prepare a fleet-steamerto carry a messenger to Washington, and sent Major Henry Hitchcockdown by rail, bearing the following letters, and agreement withGeneral Johnston, with instructions to be very careful to letnothing escape him to the greedy newspaper correspondents, but tosubmit his papers to General Halleck, General Grant, or theSecretary of War, and to bring me back with all expedition theirorders and instructions. 

On their face they recited that I had no authority to make finalterms involving civil or political questions, but that I submittedthem to the proper quarter in Washington for their action; and theletters fully explained that the military situation was such thatthe delay was an advantage to us. I cared little whether they wereapproved, modified, or disapproved in toto; only I wantedinstructions. Many of my general officers, among whom, I am almostpositive, were Generals Logan and Blair, urged me to accept the"terms, " without reference at all to Washington, but I preferredthe latter course:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1886. 

General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I received your dispatch describing the man Clark, detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry, or hewill be too late. 

The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect onour troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses; but nowit has softened down, and can easily be guided. None evinced morefeeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act wascalculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contendedthat the loss was most serious to the South, who had begun torealize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had. 

I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolicalplot, but think it the emanation of a set of young men of theSouth, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South thecare of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to theirindustrial classes as to us. 

Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would havedispersed, and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me thatGeneral Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now at Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me. 

General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was atColumbia, Georgia, and he wanted me to arrest his progress. I leavethat to you. 

Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, ourinterest is to cease all destruction. 

Please give all orders necessary according to the views theExecutive may take, and influence him, if possible, not to vary theterms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that, the Confederate armies once dispersed, we can adjust all elsefairly and well. I am, yours, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, or Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this daybetween General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approvedby the President of the United States, will produce peace from thePotomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckenridge was present at ourconference, in the capacity of major-general, and satisfied me ofthe ability of General Johnston to carry out to their full extentthe terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President tosimply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. 

You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy tothe lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armiesabsolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in sucha manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands. Onthe other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of repressing guerrillas, which wecould not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms. 

Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery wasdead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. I know that allthe men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do notbelieve they will resort to war again during this century. I haveno doubt that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate tothe laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matteris approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders toleave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and to marchmyself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, andTwenty-third Corps via Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick orHagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out. 

The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier andofficer not needed should be got home at work. I would like to beable to begin the march north by May 1st. 

I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it isimportant to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well asour own. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Memorandum, or Basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, byand between General Joseph E. JOHNSTON, commanding the ConfederateArmy, and Major-General William T. SHERMAN, commanding the army ofthe United States in North Carolina, both present:

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the statuquo until notice is given by the commanding general of any one toits opponent, and reasonable time--say, forty-eight hours--allowed. 

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded andconducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit theirarms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer andman to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, andto abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The numberof arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief ofOrdnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of theCongress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be neededsolely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the Statesrespectively. 

3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of theseveral State governments, on their officers and Legislaturestaking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the UnitedStates, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted fromthe war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the SupremeCourt of the United States. 

4. The reestablishment of all the Federal Courts in the severalStates, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the UnitedStates and of the States respectively. 

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person sad property, as defined by theConstitution of the United States and of the States respectively. 

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United Statesnot to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so longas they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armedhostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of theirresidence. 

7. In general terms--the war to cease; a general amnesty, so faras the Executive of the United States can command, on condition ofthe disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of thearms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers andmen hitherto composing said armies. 

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfillthese terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves topromptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the aboveprogramme. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina. 

Major Hitchcock got off on the morning of the 20th, and I reckonedthat it would take him four or five days to go to Washington andback. During that time the repairs on all the railroads andtelegraph-lines were pushed with energy, and we also got possessionof the railroad and telegraph from Raleigh to Weldon, in thedirection of Norfolk. Meantime the troops remained statu quo, ourcavalry occupying Durham's Station and Chapel Hill. GeneralSlocum's head of column was at Aven's Ferry on Cape Fear River, andGeneral Howard's was strung along the railroad toward Hillsboro';the rest of the army was in and about Raleigh. 

On the 20th I reviewed the Tenth Corps, and was much pleased at theappearance of General Paines's division of black troops, the firstI had ever seen as a part of an organized army; and on the 21st Ireviewed the Twenty-third Corps, which had been with me to Atlanta, but had returned to Nashville had formed an essential part of thearmy which fought at Franklin, and with which General Thomas haddefeated General Hood in Tennessee. It had then been transferredrapidly by rail to Baltimore and Washington by General Grant'sorders, and thence by sea to North Carolina. Nothing of interesthappened at Raleigh till the evening of April 23d, when MajorHitchcock reported by telegraph his return to Morehead City, andthat he would come up by rail during the night. He arrived at 6a. M. , April 24th, accompanied by General Grant and one or twoofficers of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of theirbeing on the train, for prudential reasons. Of course, I was bothsurprised and pleased to see the general, soon learned that myterms with Johnston had been disapproved, was instructed by him togive the forty-eight hours' notice required by the terms of thetruce, and afterward to proceed to attack or follow him. Iimmediately telegraphed to General Kilpatrick, at Durham's, to havea mounted courier ready to carry the following message, then on itsway up by rail, to the rebel lines:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 24, 1865 6 A. M. 

General JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro':

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilitiesagreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this isreceived at your lines, under the first of the articles ofagreement. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

At the same time I wrote another short note to General Johnston, ofthe same date:

I have replies from Washington to my communications of April 18th. I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and not to attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand thesurrender of your army on the same terms as were given to GeneralLee at Appomattox, April 9th instant, purely and simply. 

Of course, both these papers were shown to General Grant at thetime, before they were sent, and he approved of them. 

At the same time orders were sent to all parts of the army to beready to resume the pursuit of the enemy on the expiration of theforty-eight hours' truce, and messages were sent to GeneralGillmore (at Hilton Head) to the same effect, with instructions toget a similar message through to General Wilson, at Macon, by somemeans. 

General Grant had brought with him, from Washington, writtenanswers from the Secretary of War, and of himself, to mycommunications of the 18th, which I still possess, and here givethe originals. They embrace the copy of a dispatch made by Mr. Stanton to General Grant, when he was pressing Lee at Appomattox, which dispatch, if sent me at the same time (as should have beendone), would have saved a world of trouble. I did not understandthat General Grant had come down to supersede me in command, nordid he intimate it, nor did I receive these communications as aserious reproof, but promptly acted on them, as is already shown;and in this connection I give my answer made to General Grant, atRaleigh, before I had received any answer from General Johnston tothe demand for the surrender of his own army, as well as my answerto Mr. Stanton's letter, of the same date, both written on thesupposition that I might have to start suddenly in pursuit ofJohnston, and have no other chance to explain. 

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 21, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General GRANT. 

GENERAL: The memorandum or basis agreed upon between GeneralSherman and General Johnston having been submitted to thePresident, they are disapproved. You will give notice of thedisapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resumehostilities at the earliest moment. 

The instructions given to you by the late President, AbrahamLincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date, addressed to you, express substantially the views of PresidentAndrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman. A copy isherewith appended. 

The President desires that you proceed immediately to theheadquarters of Major-General Sherman, and direct operationsagainst the enemy. 

Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

The following telegram was received 2 p. M. , City Point, March 4, 1865 (from Washington, 12 M. , March 3, 1865)

[CIPHER]

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to haveno conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulationof Lee's army or on solely minor and purely military matters. 

He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, orconfer upon any political question; such questions the Presidentholds in his own hands, and will submit them to no militaryconferences or conventions. 

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON, D. C. April 21, 1865. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: The basis of agreement entered into between yourself andGeneral J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of the Southern army, and the extension of the authority of the General Government overall the territory belonging to it, sent for the approval of thePresident, is received. 

I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the Presidentand Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possiblybe approved. My reason for these views I will give you at anothertime, in a more extended letter. 

Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importancethat, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War, notifying him of their receipt, and the importance of immediateaction by the President; and suggested, in view of theirimportance, that the entire Cabinet be called together, that allmight give an expression of their opinions upon the matter. Theresult was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; adisapproval of the negotiations altogether except for the surrenderof the army commanded by General Johnston, and directions to me tonotify you of this decision. I cannot do no better than by sendingyou the inclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President, though signed by the Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sendinga letter received from General Lee, proposing to meet me for thepurpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention ofofficers. 

Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, ofthe termination of the truce, and resume hostilities against hisarmy at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith. 

Very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, present. 

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, withinclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, asyou must have observed that I held the military control so as toadapt it to any phase the case might assume. 

It is but just I should record the fact that I made my terms withGeneral Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms youextended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House onthe 9th, and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced bythe call of the Virginia Legislature and Governor back to Richmond, under yours and President Lincoln's very eyes. 

It now appears this last act was done without any consultation withyou or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to aprevious policy well considered. 

I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of ourGovernment, but would shun it as something not to my liking; butoccasions do arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced onmilitary commanders not in immediate communication with the properauthority. It is probable that the terms signed by GeneralJohnston and myself were not clear enough on the point, wellunderstood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to anyparties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been remedied. 

No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonistwas ever made without "terms, " and these always define the militarystatus of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officersand men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so longas they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence. 

I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognitionof the State governments in actual existence, but will merely statemy conclusions, to await the solution of the future. 

Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment theso-called Confederate Government, or makes us liable for its debtsor acts. 

The laws and acts done by the several States during the period ofrebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by ourConstitution of the United States, which is a "conditionprecedent. "

We have a right to, use any sort of machinery to produce militaryresults; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders touse the civil governments in actual existence as a means to an end. I do believe we could and can use the present State governmentslawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means toproduce the object desired, viz. , entire and complete submission tothe lawful authority of the United States. 

As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, andcan in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as Ican, I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all thepersonal punishment prescribed by law, as also the civilliabilities arising from their past acts. 

What we now want is the new form of law by which common men mayregain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war. 

I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and, insteadof dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal withnumberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not fordanger and its consequences. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington. 

DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21stto General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on whichGeneral Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, oncondition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing in amilitary convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such isthe nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, andI understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of thecountry demanded military success, and would warrant a littlebending to policy. 

When I had my conference with General Johnston I had the publicexamples before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, andGeneral Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature toassemble at Richmond. 

I still believe the General Government of the United States hasmade a mistake; but that is none of my business--mine is adifferent task; and I had flattered myself that, by four years ofpatient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no remindersuch as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter toGeneral Grant. You may assure the President that I heed hissuggestion. I am truly, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

On the same day, but later, I received an answer from GeneralJohnston, agreeing to meet me again at Bennett's house the nextday, April 26th, at noon. He did not even know that General Grantwas in Raleigh. 

General Grant advised me to meet him, and to accept his surrenderon the same terms as his with General Lee; and on the 26th I againwent up to Durham's Station by rail, and rode out to Bennett'shouse, where we again met, and General Johnston, withouthesitation, agreed to, and we executed, the following final terms:

Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day ofApril, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station. , NorthCarolina, between General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, commanding theConfederate Army, and Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding theUnited States Army in North Carolina:

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under GeneralJohnston's command to cease from this date. 

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army. 

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; onecopy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the otherto be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writingnot to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly released from this obligation. 

4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses andbaggage, to be retained by them. 

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted toreturn to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United Statesauthorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the lawsin force where they may reside. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina. 

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request, GeneralGrant wrote on these terms his approval, and then I thought thematter was surely at an end. He took the original copy, on the27th returned to Newbern, and thence went back to Washington. 

I immediately made all the orders necessary to carry into effectthe terms of this convention, devolving on General Schofield thedetails of granting the parole and making the muster-rolls ofprisoners, inventories of property, etc. , of General Johnston'sarmy at and about Greensboro', North Carolina, and on GeneralWilson the same duties in Georgia; but, thus far, I had beencompelled to communicate with the latter through rebel sources, andGeneral Wilson was necessarily confused by the conflict of ordersand information. I deemed it of the utmost importance to establishfor him a more reliable base of information and supply, andaccordingly resolved to go in person to Savannah for that purpose. But, before starting, I received a New York Times, of April 24th, containing the following extraordinary communications:

[First Bulletin]

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, April 22, 1885. 

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from GeneralSherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and amemorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been enteredinto on the 18th inst. By General Sherman, with the rebel GeneralJohnston. Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at theconference. 

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, atwhich the action of General Sherman was disapproved by thePresident, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by everymember of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resumehostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructionsgiven by the late President, in the following telegram, which waspenned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and werereiterated to govern the action of military commanders. 

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and hiscabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant wasbrought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee hadrequested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement forterms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in aletter to Davis and to the rebel Congress. General Grant'stelegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a fewminutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the followingreply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretaryof War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed, by the Secretaryof War, and telegraphed to General Grant:

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865-12 P. M. 

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to haveno conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulationof General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, orconfer upon any political questions. Such questions the Presidentholds in his own hands, and will submit them to no militaryconferences or conventions. 

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw fromSalisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis toescape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported tobe very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmondbanks, but previous accumulations. 

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It isstated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specietaken south by Jeff. Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previousaccumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with GeneralSherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico orEurope. Johnston's negotiations look to this end. "

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started forNorth Carolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons forrejecting them. 

The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrage on me, for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in advance, as washis duty, the purpose of the Administration to limit ournegotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary, atSavannah he had authorized me to control all matters, civil andmilitary. 

By this bulletin, he implied that I had previously been furnishedwith a copy of his dispatch of March 3d to General Grant, which wasnot so; and he gave warrant to the impression, which was sownbroadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davisto escape. Under the influence of this, I wrote General Grant thefollowing letter of April 28th, which has been published in theProceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 

I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal and officialinsult, which I afterward publicly resented. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 28, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New YorkTimes of the 24th, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, Hon. E. M. Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public veryerroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis ofagreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, withcomments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or threeyears hence, after the Government has experimented a little more inthe machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of thevast country known as the "South. "

In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not pastservices) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of Warwould keep secret what was communicated for the use of none but thecabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of givingpublicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawingtherefrom inferences wide of the truth. I never saw or hadfurnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey tome its substance, or any thing like it. On the contrary, I hadseen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, madein Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any otherofficial hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculatedto allay the fears of the people of the South, after thedestruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave themwithout any government whatever. 

We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simplyimpossible for our military power to reach all the masses of theirunhappy country. 

I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army intobands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable onlyof infinite mischief. But you saw, on your arrival here, that Ihad my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in adisorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct militaryoperations in this quarter, " I inferred that you were satisfiedwith the military situation; at all events, the instant I learnedwhat was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I actedin such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston'swhole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to GeneralLee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power. 

Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman werelikely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe, "is in deep error. General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury, " but hadgone back to "Statesville. " Davis was between us, and thereforeStoneman was beyond him. By turning toward me he was approachingDavis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mountedforce greatly needed for Davis's capture, and for other purposes. Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and asmy official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to theworld, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done inthat regard. 

As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairlydrawn from this singular document the conclusion that I aminsubordinate, I can only deny the intention. 

I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, thoughmany and many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputation, in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans and purposes, notto my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me the plans andpolicy of Government (if any there be), and expect me to guess atthem; for facts and events appear quite different from differentstand-points. For four years I have been in camp dealing withsoldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which thecabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to thepoints involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they weresingularly unanimous in the other conclusion. They will learn withpain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting incommonsense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night, winter and summer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand menin magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemedimpassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the dayappointed, have brought discredit on our Government! I do not wishto boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesyof being consulted, before publishing to the world a propositionrightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and thenaccompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to belet loose upon me. It is true that non-combatants, men who sleepin comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines, arebetter able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see anewspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough todraw our pay. I envy not the task of "reconstruction, " and amdelighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it. 

As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs ofthis army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrivedat a different conclusion from that of the Secretary of War. Iwill therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and, when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civilauthorities the execution of the task of which they seem sojealous. But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to goback to Nashville and follow my path, for they will see some thingsand hear some things that may disturb their philosophy. 

With sincere respect, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

P. S. --As Mr. Stanton's most singular paper has been published, Idemand that this also be made public, though I am in no mannerresponsible to the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors. W. T. S. , Major-General. 

On the 28th I summoned all the army and corps commanders togetherat my quarters in the Governor's mansion at Raleigh, where everything was explained to them, and all orders for the future werecompleted. Generals Schofield, Terry, and Kilpatrick, were toremain on duty in the Department of North Carolina, alreadycommanded by General Schofield, and the right and left wings wereordered to march under their respective commanding generals Northby easy stages to Richmond, Virginia, there to await my returnfrom the South. 

On the 29th of April, with a part of my personal staff, I proceededby rail to Wilmington, North Carolina, where I found GeneralsHawley and Potter, and the little steamer Russia, Captain Smith, awaiting me. After a short pause in Wilmington, we embarked, andproceeded down the coast to Port Royal and the Savannah River, which we reached on the 1st of May. There Captain Hoses, who hadjust come from General Wilson at Macon, met us, bearing letters forme and General Grant, in which General Wilson gave a brief summaryof his operations up to date. He had marched from Eastport, Mississippi, five hundred miles in thirty days, took six thousandthree hundred prisoners, twenty-three colors, and one hundred andfifty-six guns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, anddestroying every railroad, iron establishment, and factory, inNorth Alabama and Georgia. 

He spoke in the highest terms of his cavalry, as "cavalry, "claiming that it could not be excelled, and he regarded his corpsas a model for modern cavalry in organization, armament, anddiscipline. Its strength was given at thirteen thousand fivehundred men and horses on reaching Macon. Of course I wasextremely gratified at his just confidence, and saw that all hewanted for efficient action was a sure base of supply, so that heneed no longer depend for clothing, ammunition, food, and forage, on the country, which, now that war had ceased, it was our solemnduty to protect, instead of plunder. I accordingly ordered thecaptured steamer Jeff. Davis to be loaded with stores, to proceedat once up the Savannah River to Augusta, with a small detachmentof troops to occupy the arsenal, and to open communication withGeneral Wilson at Macon; and on the next day, May 2d, this steamerwas followed by another with a fall cargo of clothing, sugar, coffee, and bread, sent from Hilton Head by the departmentcommander, General Gillmore, with a stronger guard commanded byGeneral Molineux. Leaving to General Gillmore, who was present, and in whose department General Wilson was, to keep up the suppliesat Augusta, and to facilitate as far as possible General Wilson'soperations inland, I began my return on the 2d of May. We wentinto Charleston Harbor, passing the ruins of old Forts Moultrie andSumter without landing. We reached the city of Charleston, whichwas held by part of the division of General John P. Hatch, thesame that we had left at Pocotaligo. We walked the old familiarstreets--Broad, King, Meeting, etc. --but desolation and ruin wereeverywhere. The heart of the city had been burned during thebombardment, and the rebel garrison at the time of its finalevacuation had fired the railroad-depots, which fire had spread, and was only subdued by our troops after they had reached the city. 

I inquired for many of my old friends, but they were dead or gone, and of them all I only saw a part of the family of Mrs. Pettigru. I doubt whether any city was ever more terribly punished thanCharleston, but, as her people had for years been agitating for warand discord, and had finally inaugurated the civil war by an attackon the small and devoted garrison of Major Anderson, sent there bythe General Government to defend them, the judgment of the worldwill be, that Charleston deserved the fate that befell her. Resuming our voyage, we passed into Cape Fear River by its mouth atFort Caswell and Smithville, and out by the new channel at FortFisher, and reached Morehead City on the 4th of May. We foundthere the revenue-cutter Wayanda, on board of which were the Chief-Justice, Mr. Chase, and his daughter Nettie, now Mrs. Hoyt. TheChief-Justice at that moment was absent on a visit to Newbern, butcame back the next day. Meantime, by means of the telegraph, I wasagain in correspondence with General Schofield at Raleigh. He hadmade great progress in paroling the officers and men of Johnston'sarmy at Greensboro', but was embarrassed by the utter confusion andanarchy that had resulted from a want of understanding on manyminor points, and on the political questions that had to be met atthe instant. In order to facilitate the return to their homes ofthe Confederate officers and men, he had been forced to make withGeneral Johnston the following supplemental terms, which were ofcourse ratified and approved:

MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865. SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS. 

1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for theirmarch to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrialpursuits. Artillery-horses may be used in field-transportation, ifnecessary. 

2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equalto one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troopsreach the capitals of their states, will be disposed of as thegeneral commanding the department may direct. 

3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers andmen, to be retained by them. 

4. The commanding general of the Military Division of WestMississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to givetransportation by water, from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troopsfrom Arkansas and Texas. 

5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by theirimmediate commanders. 

6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command tobe included in the terms of this convention. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General, Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina. 

The total number of prisoners of war parolled byGeneral Schofield, at Greensboro', North Carolina, as afterward officially reported, amounted to ........ 38, 817

And the total number who surrendered in Georgiaand Florida, as reported by General J. H. Wilson, was .................................................. 52, 458

Aggregate surrendered under the capitulation ofGeneral J. E. Johnston ............................... 89, 270

On the morning of the 5th I also received from General Schofieldthis dispatch:

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1866. 

To Major-General W: T. SHERMAN, Morehead City:

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he saidthe lines (for trade and intercourse) had been extended to embracethis and other States south. The order, it seems, has beenmodified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think itwould be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. 

I hope the Government will make known its policy as to the organsof State government without delay. Affairs must necessarily be ina very unsettled state until that is done. The people are now in amood to accept almost anything which promises a definitesettlement. "What is to be done with the freedmen?" is thequestion of all, and it is the all important question. It requiresprompt and wise notion to prevent the negroes from becoming a hugeelephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it isimportant for me to know it at once. If another is to be senthere, it cannot be done too soon, for he probably will undo themost that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from youfully, when you have time to write. I will send your message toGeneral Wilson at once. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. 

I was utterly without instructions from any source on the points ofGeneral Schofield's inquiry, and under the existing state of factscould not even advise him, for by this time I was in possession ofthe second bulletin of Mr. Stanton, published in all the Northernpapers, with comments that assumed that I was a common traitor anda public enemy; and high officials had even instructed my ownsubordinates to disobey my lawful orders. General Halleck, who hadso long been in Washington as the chief of staff, had been sent onthe 21st of April to Richmond, to command the armies of the Potomacand James, in place of General Grant, who had transferred hisheadquarters to the national capital, and he (General Halleck) wastherefore in supreme command in Virginia, while my command overNorth Carolina had never been revoked or modified. 

[Second Bulletin. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 27 9. 30 a. M. 

To Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James. Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago thatSherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by thePresident, and they were ordered to disregard it and push the enemyin every direction. 

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, April 26-9. 30 p. M. 

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, are acting under orders topay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respectinghostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind hiscommand only, and no other. 

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from anyone except from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat. 

Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new arrangement hasbeen made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps wasto be suspended until further orders. 

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to pushforward as rapidly as possible. 

The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specieis moving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible. 

I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, thatWilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures tointercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder. 

The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six tothirteen million dollars. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding. 

Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, inWashington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on this wholematter, and will abide the judgment of the country on thepatriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connection. General Halleck's measures to capture General Johnston's army, actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro', on the 26thof April, simply excited my contempt for a judgment such as he wassupposed to possess. The assertion that Jeff. Davis's specie-train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was reported to bemoving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast as possible, foundplenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand men hadbeen at Goldsboro' from March 22d to the date of his dispatch, April 26th; and such a train would have been composed of fromfifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie, even if it all were in gold. I suppose the exact amount oftreasure which Davis had with him is now known to a cent; some ofit was paid to his escort, when it disbanded at and nearWashington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a smallparcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars, which is now retained in the United States Treasury-vault atWashington, and shown to the curious. 

The thirteen millions of treasure, with which Jeff. Davis was tocorrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to thecontents of a hand-valise!

To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of thesepublished bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express thestate of my feelings. I was outraged beyond measure, and wasresolved to resent the insult, cost what it might. I went to theWayanda and showed them to Mr. Chase, with whom I had a long andfrank conversation, during which he explained to me the confusioncaused in Washington by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, thesudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson, who was then supposed tobe bitter and vindictive in his feelings toward the South, and thewild pressure of every class of politicians to enforce on the newPresident their pet schemes. He showed me a letter of his own, which was in print, dated Baltimore, April 11th, and another ofApril 12th, addressed to the President, urging him to recognize thefreedmen as equal in all respects to the whites. He was the firstman, of any authority or station, who ever informed me that theGovernment of the United States would insist on extending to theformer slaves of the South the elective franchise, and he gave as areason the fact that the slaves, grateful for their freedom, forwhich they were indebted to the armies and Government of the North, would, by their votes, offset the disaffected and rebel element ofthe white population of the South. At that time quite a storm wasprevailing at sea, outside, and our two vessels lay snug at thewharf at Morehead City. I saw a good deal of Mr. Chase, andseveral notes passed between us, of which I have the originals yet. Always claiming that the South had herself freed all her slaves byrebellion, and that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of freedom (ofSeptember 22, 1862) was binding on all officers of the GeneralGovernment, I doubted the wisdom of at once clothing them with theelective franchise, without some previous preparation andqualification; and then realized the national loss in the death atthat critical moment of Mr. Lincoln, who had long pondered over thedifficult questions involved, who, at all events, would have beenhonest and frank, and would not have withheld from his armycommanders at least a hint that would have been to them a guide. It was plain to me, therefore, that the manner of his assassinationhad stampeded the civil authorities in Washington, had unnervedthem, and that they were then undecided as to the measuresindispensably necessary to prevent anarchy at the South. 

On the 7th of May the storm subsided, and we put to sea, Mr. Chaseto the south, on his proposed tour as far as New Orleans, and I forJames River. I reached Fortress Monroe on the 8th, and thencetelegraphed my arrival to General Grant, asking for orders. Ifound at Fortress Monroe a dispatch from General Halleck, professing great friendship, and inviting me to accept hishospitality at Richmond. I answered by a cipher-dispatch that Ihad seen his dispatch to Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, embraced inthe second bulletin, which I regarded as insulting, declined hishospitality, and added that I preferred we should not meet as Ipassed through Richmond. I thence proceeded to City Point in theRussia, and on to Manchester, opposite Richmond, via Petersburg, byrail. I found that both wings of the army had arrived fromRaleigh, and were in camp in and around Manchester, whence I againtelegraphed General Grant, an the 9th of May, for orders, and alsoreported my arrival to General Halleck by letter. I found thatGeneral Halleck had ordered General Davis's corps (the Fourteenth)for review by himself. This I forbade. All the army knew of theinsult that had been made me by the Secretary of War and GeneralHalleck, and watched me closely to see if I would tamely submit. During the 9th I made a full and complete report of all theseevents, from the last report made at Goldsboro' up to date, and thenext day received orders to continue the march to Alexandria, nearWashington. 

On the morning of the 11th we crossed the pontoon-bridge atRichmond, marched through that city, and out on the Han overCourt House road, General Slocum's left wing leading. The right wing(General Logan) followed the next day, viz. , the 12th. Meantime, General O. O. Howard had been summoned to Washington to take chargeof the new Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and, from that time till the army was finally disbanded, General John A. Logan was in command of the right wing, and of the Army of theTennessee. The left wing marched through Hanover Court House, andthence took roads well to the left by Chilesburg; the FourteenthCorps by New Market and Culpepper, Manassas, etc. ; the TwentiethCorps by Spotsylvania Court-House and Chancellorsville. The rightwing followed the more direct road by Fredericksburg. On my waynorth I endeavored to see as much of the battle-fields of the Armyof the Potomac as I could, and therefore shifted from one column tothe other, visiting en route Hanover Court-House, Spotsylvania, Fredericksburg, Dumfries, etc. , reaching Alexandria during theafternoon of May 19th, and pitched my camp by the road side, abouthalf-way between Alexandria and the Long Bridge. During the sameand next day the whole army reached Alexandria, and camped roundabout it; General Meade's Army of the Potomac had possession of thecamps above, opposite Washington and Georgetown. The next day (byinvitation) I went over to Washington and met many friends--amongthem General Grant and President Johnson. The latter occupiedrooms in the house on the corner of Fifteenth and H Streets, belonging to Mr. Hooper. He was extremely cordial to me, andknowing that I was chafing under the censures of the WarDepartment, especially of the two war bulletins of Mr. Stanton, hevolunteered to say that he knew of neither of them till seen in thenewspapers, and that Mr. Stanton had shown neither to him nor toany of his associates in the cabinet till they were published. Nearly all the members of the cabinet made similar assurances to meafterward, and, as Mr. Stanton made no friendly advances, andoffered no word of explanation or apology, I declined GeneralGrant's friendly offices for a reconciliation, but, on thecontrary, resolved to resent what I considered an insult, aspublicly as it was made. My brother, Senator Sherman, who was Mr. Stanton's neighbor, always insisted that Mr. Stanton had beenfrightened by the intended assassination of himself, and had becomeembittered thereby. At all events, I found strong military guardsaround his house, as well as all the houses occupied by the cabinetand by the principal officers of Government; and a sense ofinsecurity pervaded Washington, for which no reason existed. 

On the 19th I received a copy of War Department Special Order No. 239, Adjutant-General's office, of May 18th, ordering a grandreview, by the President and cabinet, of all the armies then nearWashington; General Meade's to occur on Tuesday, May 23d, mine onWednesday, the 24th; and on the 20th I made the necessary ordersfor my part. Meantime I had also arranged (with General Grant'sapproval) to remove after the review, my armies from the south sideof the Potomac to the north; both for convenience and because ourmen had found that the grounds assigned them had been used so longfor camps that they were foul and unfit. 

By invitation I was on the reviewing-stand, and witnessed thereview of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), commanded byGeneral Meade in person. The day was beautiful, and the pageantwas superb. Washington was full of strangers, who filled thestreets in holiday-dress, and every house was decorated with flags. The army marched by divisions in close column around the Capitol, down Pennsylvania Avenue, past the President and cabinet, whooccupied a large stand prepared for the occasion, directly in frontof the White House. 

I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Sherman, who arrived thatday, accompanied by her father, the Hon. Thomas Ewing, and my sonTom, then eight years old. 

During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, crossed Long Bridge, bivouacked in thestreets about the Capitol, and the Fourteenth Corps closed up tothe bridge. The morning of the 24th was extremely beautiful, andthe ground was in splendid order for our review. The streets werefilled with people to see the pageant, armed with bouquets offlowers for their favorite regiments or heroes, and every thing waspropitious. Punctually at 9 A. M. The signal-gun was fired, when inperson, attended by General Howard and all my staff, I rode slowlydown Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children, densely lining the sidewalks, and almost obstructing the way. Wewere followed close by General Logan and the head of the FifteenthCorps. When I reached the Treasury-building, and looked back, thesight was simply magnificent. The column was compact, and theglittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving withthe regularity of a pendulum. We passed the Treasury building, infront of which and of the White House was an immense throng ofpeople, for whom extensive stands had been prepared on both sidesof the avenue. As I neared the brick-house opposite the lowercorner of Lafayette Square, some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward, who, still feeble and bandaged for his wounds, had been removedthere that he might behold the troops. I moved in that directionand took off my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window. Herecognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on steadilypast the President, saluting with our swords. All on his standarose and acknowledged the salute. Then, turning into the gate ofthe presidential grounds, we left our horses with orderlies, andwent upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sherman, with her fatherand son. Passing them, I shook hands with the President, GeneralGrant, and each member of the cabinet. As I approached Mr. Stanton, he offered me his hand, but I declined it publicly, andthe fact was universally noticed. I then took my post on the leftof the President, and for six hours and a half stood, while thearmy passed in the order of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Fourteenth Corps. It was, in my judgment, the most magnificentarmy in existence--sixty-five thousand men, in splendid physique, who had just completed a march of nearly two thousand miles in ahostile country, in good drill, and who realized that they werebeing closely scrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymenand by foreigners. Division after division passed, each commanderof an army corps or division coming on the stand during the passageof his command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, andspectators. The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the carefuldress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the companies, all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered and bullet-riddenflags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice. Many good people, up to that time, had looked upon our Western armyas a sort of mob; but the world then saw, and recognized the fact, that it was an army in the proper sense, well organized, wellcommanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it hadswept through the South like a tornado. For six hours and a halfthat strong tread of the Army of the West resounded alongPennsylvania Avenue; not a soul of that vast crowd of spectatorsleft his place; and, when the rear of the column had passed by, thousands of the spectators still lingered to express their senseof confidence in the strength of a Government which could claimsuch an army. 

Some little scenes enlivened the day, and called for the laughterand cheers of the crowd. Each division was followed by sixambulances, as a representative of its baggage-train. Some of thedivision commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch-cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry, hams, etc. , and some of them had the families of freed slavesalong, with the women leading their children. Each division waspreceded by its corps of black pioneers, armed with picks andspades. These marched abreast in double ranks, keeping perfectdress and step, and added much to the interest of the occasion. Onthe whole, the grand review was a splendid success, and was afitting conclusion to the campaign and the war. 

I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders taking leave ofthe army, which ended my connection with the war, though Iafterward visited and took a more formal leave of the officers andmen on July 4, 1865, at Louisville, Kentucky:

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 76]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D. C. May 30, 1865

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee andGeorgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to yourhomes, and others will be retained in military service till furtherorders. 

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civilworld, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situationof national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we weregathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the futurewas wrapped in doubt and uncertainty. 

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separatehistories, yet bound by one common cause--the union of our country, and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. Thereis no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-FaceMountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Daltonbehind. 

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, butdashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to theEtowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on thebanks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on asingle road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by anyobstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for thepossession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of ourhistory. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved theproblem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State ofGeorgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, andChristmas found us at Savannah. 

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began amarch which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with anyever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, theswamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks ofthe Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in theface of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles ofAverysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of thewilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro'. Even then we pausedonly long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, againpushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing forpeace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured lawsof his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, normountains nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checkedus; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offeredsubmission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in hissurrender. 

How far the operations of this army contributed to the finaloverthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done allthat men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and wehave a right to join in the universal joy that fills our landbecause the war is over, and our Government stands vindicatedbefore the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies andnavy of the United States. 

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind youthat success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, andthat the same work and discipline are equally important in thefuture. To such as go home, he will only say that our favoredcountry is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may find a home and occupationsuited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatiencesure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. Youwill be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to thetemptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment. 

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, asin war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make goodcitizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in ourcountry, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its oldarmor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of ourinheritance. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

List of the Average Number of Miles marched by the Different ArmyCorps of the United States Forces under Command of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, United States Army, during his Campaigns: 1863-'64-'65. 

 4th 14th 15th 16th 17th 20th Corps. Corps. Corps. Corps Corps. Corps. 

Miles: 110 1, 586 2, 289 508 2, 076 1, 525

CHAPTER XXV. 

CONCLUSION--MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. 

Having thus recorded a summary of events, mostly under my ownpersonal supervision, during the years from 1846 to 1865, it seemsproper that I should add an opinion of some of the useful militarylessons to be derived therefrom. 

That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, wasapprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half-centurypreceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety. General Scotttold me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, that thecountry was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern politiciansopenly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as a casusbelli the election of General Fremont in 1856; but, fortunately orunfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, which simplypostponed its occurrence for four years. Mr. Seward had alsopublicly declared that no government could possibly exist halfslave and half free; yet the Government made no militarypreparation, and the Northern people generally paid no attention, took no warning of its coming, and would not realize its existencetill Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries of artillery, handled bydeclared enemies, from the surrounding islands and from the city ofCharleston. 

General Bragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, inearly life, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, the threatsof the people of South Carolina to secede from the Federal Union, said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he was convincedthat the feeling between the slave and free States had become soembittered that it was better to part in peace; better to partanyhow; and, as a separation was inevitable, that the South shouldbegin at once, because the possibility of a successful effort wasyearly lessened by the rapid and increasing inequality between thetwo sections, from the fact that all the European immigrants werecoming to the Northern States and Territories, and none to theSouthern. 

The slave population m 1860 was near four millions, and the moneyvalue thereof not far from twenty-five hundred million dollars. Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, a cause thatendangered so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause ofanxiety and preparation, and the Northern leaders surely ought tohave foreseen the danger and prepared for it. After the electionof Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was no concealment of the declarationand preparation for war in the South. In Louisiana, as I haverelated, men were openly enlisted, officers were appointed, and warwas actually begun, in January, 1861. The forts at the mouth ofthe Mississippi were seized, and occupied by garrisons that hauleddown the United States flag and hoisted that of the State. TheUnited States Arsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleansmilitia, its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents ofthe arsenal distributed. These were as much acts of war as was thesubsequent firing on Fort Sumter, yet no public notice was takenthereof; and when, months afterward, I came North, I found not onesingle sign of preparation. It was for this reason, somewhat, thatthe people of the South became convinced that those of the Northwere pusillanimous and cowardly, and the Southern leaders werethereby enabled to commit their people to the war, nominally indefense of their slave property. Up to the hour of the firing onFort Sumter, in April, 1861, it does seem to me that our publicmen, our politicians, were blamable for not sounding the note ofalarm. 

Then, when war was actually begun, it was by a call for seventy-five thousand "ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward'sprophecy that the war would last but ninety days. 

The earlier steps by our political Government were extremelywavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the factthat many of the Southern representatives remained in Congress, sharing in the public councils, and influencing legislation. Butas soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was no longer anyreason why Congress and the cabinet should have hesitated. Theyshould have measured the cause, provided the means, and left theExecutive to apply the remedy. 

At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz. , March 4, 1861, theRegular Army, by law, consisted of two regiments of dragoons, tworegiments of cavalry, one regiment of mounted rifles, fourregiments of artillery, and ten regiments of infantry, admitting ofan aggregate strength of thirteen thousand and twenty-four officersand men. On the subsequent 4th of May the President, by his ownorders (afterward sanctioned by Congress), added a regiment ofcavalry, a regiment of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry, which, with the former army, admitted of a strength of thirty-ninethousand nine hundred and seventy-three; but at no time during thewar did the Regular Army attain a strength of twenty-five thousandmen. 

To the new regiments of infantry was given an organizationdiffering from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country--of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no time didmore than one of these regiments attain its full standard; nor inthe vast army of volunteers that was raised during the war were anyof the regiments of infantry formed on the three-battalion system, but these were universally single battalions of ten companies; sothat, on the reorganization of the Regular Army at the close of thewar, Congress adopted the form of twelve companies for theregiments of cavalry and artillery, and that of ten companies forthe infantry, which is the present standard. 

Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard oforganization for any increase or for new regiments of volunteers, it becomes important to study this subject in the light of pastexperience, and to select that form which is best for peace as wellas war. 

A cavalry regiment is now composed of twelve companies, usuallydivided into six squadrons, of two companies each, or bettersubdivided into three battalions of four companies each. This isan excellent form, easily admitting of subdivision as well as unioninto larger masses. 

A single battalion of four companies, with a field-officer, willcompose a good body for a garrison, for a separate expedition, orfor a detachment; and, in war, three regiments would compose a goodbrigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions a strongcavalry corps, such as was formed and fought by Generals Sheridanand Wilson during the war. 

In the artillery arm, the officers differ widely in their opinionof the true organization. A single company forms a battery, andhabitually each battery acts separately, though sometimes severalare united or "massed;" but these always act in concert withcavalry or infantry. 

Nevertheless, the regimental organization for artillery has alwaysbeen maintained in this country for classification and promotion. Twelve companies compose a regiment, and, though probably nocolonel ever commanded his full regiment in the form of twelvebatteries, yet in peace they occupy our heavy sea-coast forts oract as infantry; then the regimental organization is both necessaryand convenient. 

But the infantry composes the great mass of all armies, and thetrue form of the regiment or unit has been the subject of infinitediscussion; and, as I have stated, during the civil war theregiment was a single battalion of ten companies. In olden timesthe regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and twoflank companies. The first and tenth companies were armed withrifles, and were styled and used as "skirmishers;" but during 'thewar they were never used exclusively for that special purpose, andin fact no distinction existed between them and the other eightcompanies. 

The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I amsatisfied that the infantry regiment should have the same identicalorganization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz. , twelvecompanies, so as to be susceptible of division into threebattalions of four companies each. 

These companies should habitually be about a hundred one menstrong, giving twelve hundred to a regiment, which in practicewould settle down to about one thousand men. 

Three such regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades adivision, and three divisions a corps. Then, by allowing to aninfantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries offield-artillery, we would have an efficient corps d'armee ofthirty thousand men, whose organization would be simple and mostefficient, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall belowtwenty-five thousand men. 

The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle, shouldhave a full and perfect staff, and every thing requisite forseparate action, ready at all times to be detached and sent off forany nature of service. The general in command should have the rankof lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education, equal to any thing in war. Habitually with us he was a major-general, specially selected and assigned to the command by an orderof the President, constituting, in fact, a separate grade. 

The division is the unit of administration, and is the legitimatecommand of a major general. 

The brigade is the next subdivision, and is commanded by abrigadier-general. 

The regiment is the family. The colonel, as the father, shouldhave a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and shouldinstill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, so that hisofficers and men would naturally look to him for personal adviceand instruction. In war the regiment should never be subdivided, but should always be maintained entire. In peace this isimpossible. 

The company is the true unit of discipline, and the captain is thecompany. A good captain makes a good company, and he should havethe power to reward as well as punish. The fact that soldiersworld naturally like to have a good fellow for their captain is thebest reason why he should be appointed by the colonel, or by somesuperior authority, instead of being elected by the men. 

In the United States the people are the "sovereign, " all poweroriginally proceeds from them, and therefore the election ofofficers by the men is the common rule. This is wrong, because anarmy is not a popular organization, but an animated machine, aninstrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, andmaintaining the honor and dignity of the nation; and the President, as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy, should exercise the power of appointment (subject to theconfirmation of the Senate) of the officers of "volunteers, " aswell as of "regulars. "

No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and thepower must come from above, not from below: the President usuallydelegates his power to the commander-in-chief, and he to the next, and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, howeversmall the detachment. No matter how troops come together, whenonce united, the highest officer in rank is held responsible, andshould be consequently armed with the fullest power of theExecutive, subject only to law and existing orders. The moresimple the principle, the greater the likelihood of determinedaction; and the less a commanding officer is circumscribed bybounds or by precedent, the greater is the probability that he willmake the best use of his command and achieve the best results. 

The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point have in thepast provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an amplesupply of good officers for future wars; but, should their numbersbe insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number ofyoung men of education and force of character throughout thecountry, to supplement them. At the close of our civil war, lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals, as well as staff-officers, were from civil life; but I cannotrecall any of the most successful who did not express a regret thathe had not received in early life instruction in the elementaryprinciples of the art of war, instead of being forced to acquirethis knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war. 

But the vital difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain anadequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every systemknown to modern nations, all with more or less success--voluntaryenlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes--and I think that allofficers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men whovoluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the boughtsubstitute. When a regiment is once organized in a State, andmustered into the service of the United States, the officers andmen become subject to the same laws of discipline and government asthe regular troops. They are in no sense "militia, " but composea part of the Army of the United States, only retain their Statetitle for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited fromthe neighborhood of their original organization: Once organized, the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomesdifficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised byCongress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties. Ibelieve it would have been more economical to have raised the payof the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to haveheld out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollarsin the form of bounty. Toward the close of the war, I have oftenheard the soldiers complain that the "stay at-home" men got betterpay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed to all thedangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front. The feeling of the soldier should be that, in every event, thesympathy and preference of his government is for him who fights, rather than for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear, and, like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay. Ofcourse, the soldier must be trained to obedience, and should be"content with his wages;" but whoever has commanded an army in thefield knows the difference between a willing, contented mass ofmen, and one that feels a cause of grievance. There is a soul toan army as well as to the individual man, and no general canaccomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul ofhis men, as well as their bodies and legs. 

The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode ofrecruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by thenecessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up atthe bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from thebest noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise newregiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the oldand experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeletonorganizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was leftto the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept herregiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generallyfilled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that weestimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. Ibelieve that five hundred new men added to an old and experiencedregiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of anew regiment, for the former by association with good, experiencedcaptains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, soon becameveterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is nogood reason why we should not follow it substantially. 

On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered "goodorder" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps ofthirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the averagetrains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that itwould draw out to ten miles. On a long and regular march thedivisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leadingdivision should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march atthe rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles anhour, so as to reach camp by noon. Even then the rear divisionsand trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically, a marching column should preserve such order that by simply haltingand facing to the right or left, it would be in line of battle; butthis is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made"forward, " by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to theright or left to its approximate position in line of battle, andthere deployed. In such a line of battle, a brigade of threethousand infantry would occupy a mile of "front;" but for a strongline of battle five-thousand men with two batteries should beallowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute adouble line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of "front. "

The "feeding" of an army is a matter of the most vital importance, and demands the earliest attention of the general intrusted with acampaign. To be strong, healthy, and capable of the largestmeasure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three poundsgross of food per day, and the horse or mule about twenty pounds. When a general first estimates the quantity of food and forageneeded for an army of fifty or one hundred thousand men, he is aptto be dismayed, and here a good staff is indispensable, though thegeneral cannot throw off on them the responsibility. He must givethe subject his personal attention, for the army reposes in himalone, and should never doubt the fact that their existenceoverrides in importance all other considerations. Once satisfiedof this, and that all has been done that can be, the soldiers arealways willing to bear the largest measure of privation. Probablyno army ever had a more varied experience in this regard than theone I commanded in 1864'65. 

Our base of supply was at Nashville, supplied by railways and theCumberland River, thence by rail to Chattanooga, a "secondarybase, " and thence forward a single-track railroad. The stores cameforward daily, but I endeavored to have on hand a full supply fortwenty days in advance. These stores were habitually in thewagon-trains, distributed to corps, divisions, and regiments, incharge of experienced quartermasters and commissaries, and becamesubject to the orders of the generals commanding these bodies. They were generally issued on provision returns, but these had tobe closely scrutinized, for too often the colonels would makerequisitions for provisions for more men than they reported forbattle. Of course, there are always a good many non-combatantswith an army, but, after careful study, I limited their amount totwenty-five per cent. Of the "effective strength, " and that wasfound to be liberal. An ordinary army-wagon drawn by six mules maybe counted on to carry three thousand pounds net, equal to the foodof a full regiment for one day, but, by driving along beef-cattle, a commissary may safely count the contents of one wagon assufficient for two days' food for a regiment of a thousand men; andas a corps should have food on hand for twenty days ready fordetachment, it should have three hundred such wagons, as aprovision-train; and for forage, ammunition, clothing, and othernecessary stores, it was found necessary to have three hundred morewagons, or six hundred wagons in all, for a corps d'armee. 

These should be absolutely under the immediate control of the corpscommander, who will, however, find it economical to distribute themin due proportion to his divisions, brigades, and even regiments. Each regiment ought usually to have at least one wagon forconvenience to distribute stores, and each company two pack-mules, so that the regiment may always be certain of a meal on reachingcamp without waiting for the larger trains. 

On long marches the artillery and wagon-trains should always havethe right of way, and the troops should improvise roads to oneside, unless forced to use a bridge in common, and all trainsshould have escorts to protect them, and to assist them in badplaces. To this end there is nothing like actual experience, only, unless the officers in command give the subject their personalattention, they will find their wagon-trains loaded down withtents, personal baggage, and even the arms and knapsacks of theescort. Each soldier should, if not actually "sick or wounded, "carry his musket and equipments containing from forty to sixtyrounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, andan extra pair of pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf, worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack, and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt, and coffee. I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down toomuch, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he cancarry about fifty pounds without impairing his health or activity. A simple calculation will show that by such a distribution a corpswill-thus carry the equivalent of five hundred wagon-loads--animmense relief to the trains. 

Where an army is near one of our many large navigable rivers, orhas the safe use of a railway, it can usually be supplied with thefull army ration, which is by far the best furnished to any army inAmerica or Europe; but when it is compelled to operate away fromsuch a base, and is dependent on its own train of wagons, thecommanding officer must exercise a wise discretion in the selectionof his stores. In my opinion, there is no better food for man thanbeef-cattle driven on the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon, and bread. Coffee has also become almost indispensable, thoughmany substitutes were found for it, such as Indian-corn, roasted, ground, and boiled as coffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of theokra plant prepared in the same way. All these were used by thepeople of the South, who for years could procure no coffee, but Inoticed that the women always begged of us some real coffee, whichseems to satisfy a natural yearning or craving more powerful thancan be accounted for on the theory of habit. Therefore I wouldalways advise that the coffee and sugar ration be carried along, even at the expense of bread, for which there are many substitutes. Of these, Indian-corn is the best and most abundant. Parched in afrying-pan, it is excellent food, or if ground, or pounded andboiled with meat of any sort, it makes a most nutritious meal. Thepotato, both Irish and sweet, forms an excellent substitute forbread, and at Savannah we found that rice (was) also suitable, both formen and animals. For the former it should be cleaned of its huskin a hominy block, easily prepared out of a log, and sifted with acoarse corn bag; but for horses it should be fed in the straw. During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied by our regularcommissaries with all sorts of patent compounds, such as desiccatedvegetables, and concentrated milk, meat-biscuit, and sausages, butsomehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiar forms offood, and usually styled these "desecrated vegetables andconsecrated milk. " We were also supplied liberally withlime-juice, sauerkraut, and pickles, as an antidote to scurvy, andI now recall the extreme anxiety of my medical director, Dr. Kittoe, about the scurvy, which he reported at one time as spreading andimperiling the army. This occurred at a crisis about Kenesaw, whenthe railroad was taxed to its utmost capacity to provide thenecessary ammunition, food, and forage, and could not possiblybring us an adequate supply of potatoes and cabbage, the usualanti-scorbutics, when providentially the black berries ripened andproved an admirable antidote, and I have known the skirmish-line, without orders, to fight a respectable battle for the possession ofsome old fields that were full of blackberries. Soon, thereafter, the green corn or roasting-ear came into season, and I heard nomore of the scurvy. Our country abounds with plants which can beutilized for a prevention to the scurvy; besides the above are thepersimmon, the sassafras root and bud, the wild-mustard, the"agave, " turnip tops, the dandelion cooked as greens, and adecoction of the ordinary pine-leaf. 

For the more delicate and costly articles of food for the sick werelied mostly on the agents of the Sanitary Commission. I do notwish to doubt the value of these organizations, which gained somuch applause during our civil war, for no one can question themotives of these charitable and generous people; but to be honest Imust record an opinion that the Sanitary Commission should limitits operations to the hospitals at the rear, and should neverappear at the front. They were generally local in feeling, aimedto furnish their personal friends and neighbors with a better classof food than the Government supplied, and the consequence was, thatone regiment of a brigade would receive potatoes and fruit whichwould be denied another regiment close by: Jealousy would be theinevitable result, and in an army all parts should be equal; thereshould be no "partiality, favor, or affection. " The Governmentshould supply all essential wants, and in the hospitals to the rearwill be found abundant opportunities for the exercise of allpossible charity and generosity. During the war I several timesgained the ill-will of the agents of the Sanitary Commissionbecause I forbade their coming to the front unless they wouldconsent to distribute their stores equally among all, regardless ofthe parties who had contributed them. 

The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of thegreatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount of labor tothe well men. Each regiment in an active campaign should have asurgeon and two assistants always close at hand, and each brigadeand division should have an experienced surgeon as a medicaldirector. The great majority of wounds and of sickness should betreated by the regimental surgeon, on the ground, under the eye ofthe colonel. As few should be sent to the brigade or divisionhospital as possible, for the men always receive better care withtheir own regiment than with strangers, and as a rule the cure ismore certain; but when men receive disabling wounds, or havesickness likely to become permanent, the sooner they go far to therear the better for all. The tent or the shelter of a tree is abetter hospital than a house, whose walls absorb fetid andpoisonous emanations, and then give them back to the atmosphere. To men accustomed to the open air, who live on the plainest food, wounds seem to give less pain, and are attended with less danger tolife than to ordinary soldiers in barracks. 

Wounds which, in 1861, would have sent a man to the hospital formonths, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, rather the subjectof a joke than of sorrow. To new soldiers the sight of blood anddeath always has a sickening effect, but soon men become accustomedto it, and I have heard them exclaim on seeing a dead comrade borneto the rear, "Well, Bill has turned up his toes to the daisies. "Of course, during a skirmish or battle, armed men should neverleave their ranks to attend a dead or wounded comrade--this shouldbe seen to in advance by the colonel, who should designate hismusicians or company cooks as hospital attendants, with a white ragon their arm to indicate their office. A wounded man should gohimself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help, he should receive it from one of the attendants and not a comrade. It is wonderful how soon the men accustom themselves to thesesimple rules. In great battles these matters call for a moreenlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the divisiongeneral to see that proper stretchers and field hospitals are readyfor the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead. There shouldbe no real neglect of the dead, because it has a bad effect on theliving; for each soldier values himself and comrade as highly asthough he were living in a good house at home. 

The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials fromthe hospital, should make notes and communicate details to thecaptain of the company, and to the family at home. Of course it isusually impossible to mark the grave with names, dates, etc. , andconsequently the names of the "unknown" in our national cemeteriesequal about one-half of all the dead. 

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought asdescribed in European text-books, viz. , in great masses, in perfectorder, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We weregenerally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployedaccording to tactics, the men generally fought in strongskirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and ofevery cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded andbroken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the groundto their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had togrope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a clearedfield or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under aclose and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compactorder come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creekand Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men foughtindividually in every possible style, more frequently with themusket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the menclinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not alwaystake full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, thathabitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did notrealize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was alreadymiles away and was again intrenched, having left a mereskirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to thenew position. 

Our war was fought with the muzzle-loading rifle. Toward the closeI had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-loading "Spencer's;"the cavalry generally had breach-loading carbines, "Spencer's" and"Sharp's, " both of which were good arms. 

The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in theart and practice of war will be to increase the amount ofammunition to be expended, and necessarily to be carried along; tostill further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battlesto short, quick, decisive conflicts. It does not in the leastaffect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfectorganization, drill, and discipline. The, companies and battalionswill be more dispersed, and the men will be less under theimmediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order ofintelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldier willbe an element of strength. 

When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an openfield or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward fromtree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good generalalignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, forthey always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watchtheir comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or toolong to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and defeats thewhole object. Therefore, the more we improve the fire-arm the morewill be the necessity for good organization, good discipline andintelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer. There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which hasa value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war andits common attendants, and personal habit, are equally valuabletraits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have todeal in war. All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, andonly incur their risk from some higher motive, or from habit; sothat I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of themeasure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it, ratherthan that insensibility to danger of which I have heard far morethan I have seen. The most courageous men are generallyunconscious of possessing the quality; therefore, when oneprofesses it too openly, by words or bearing, there is reason tomistrust it. I would further illustrate my meaning by describing aman of true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties andsenses perfectly when serious danger is actually present. 

Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values orproportions of the several arms of service: infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers. If any thing, the infantry has beenincreased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to chargeinfantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated atSedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable has such a thingbecome that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recenttactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary toinfantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, asheretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Artillery is morevaluable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans. Inthe early stages of the war the field-guns often bore theproportion of six to a thousand men; but toward the close of thewar one gun; or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough. Sieges; such as characterized the wars of the last century, are tooslow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recentlyalmost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between theforts, and left a superior force "in observation, " to watch thegarrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of thewar ahead made further resistance useless; but earth-forts, andespecially field-works, will hereafter play an important part inwar, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one incheck for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars. It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful inwar as the musket, and to this I will add the axe. The habit ofintrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troopstimid. When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet, made by the engineers or by the labor of the men themselves, itdoes require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger;but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes absolutely necessaryto permit each brigade and division of the troops immediatelyopposed to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protectionin case of a sudden sally. We invariably did this in all ourrecent campaigns, and it had no ill effect, though sometimes ourtroops were a little too slow in leaving their well-covered linesto assail the enemy in position or on retreat. Even ourskirmishers were in the habit of rolling logs together, or ofmaking a lunette of rails, with dirt in front, to cover theirbodies; and, though it revealed their position, I cannot say thatit worked a bad effect; so that, as a rule, it may safely be leftto the men themselves: On the "defensive, " there is no doubt of thepropriety of fortifying; but in the assailing army the general mustwatch closely to see that his men do not neglect an opportunity todrop his precautionary defenses, and act promptly on the"offensive" at every chance. 

I have many a time crept forward to the skirmish-line to availmyself of the cover of the pickets "little fort, " to observe moreclosely some expected result; and always talked familiarly with themen, and was astonished to see how well they comprehended thegeneral object, and how accurately they were informed of the sateof facts existing miles away from their particular corps. Soldiersare very quick to catch the general drift and purpose of acampaign, and are always sensible when they are well commanded orwell cared for. Once impressed with this fact, and that they aremaking progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor andprivation. 

In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it ismuch easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time ofpeace. Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent, and the necessity for courts-martial far less. The captain canusually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonelshould always. The field-officers' court is the best form for war, viz. , one of the field-officers-the lieutenant-colonel or major--can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonelshould execute it. Of course, there are statutory offenses whichdemand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by thedivision or corps commander; but, the presence of one of ourregular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be afirst-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poordiscipline and inefficient officers. 

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a largespace of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, thoughhabitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal-service byflags and torches, though we always used them; because, almostinvariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off byintervening trees, or by mists and fogs. There was one notableinstance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message. Of vital importance over the heads of Hood's army, which hadinterposed between me and Allatoona, and had broken thetelegraph-wires--as recorded in Chapter XIX. ; but the value of themagnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustratedby the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia andGeorgia during 1864. Hardly a day intervened when General Grantdid not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteenhundred miles away as the wires ran. So on the field a thininsulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to treefor six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seenoperators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receivea message with their tongues from a distant station. As a matterof course, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways formthe usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easilyrepaired and extended as the army advances, but each army and wingshould have a small party of skilled men to put up the field-wire, and take it down when done. This is far better than thesignal-flags and torches. Our commercial telegraph-lines willalways supply for war enough skillful operators. 

The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as muchas, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign wouldsimply have been impossible without the use of the railroads fromLouisville to Nashville--one hundred and eighty-five miles--fromNashville to Chattanooga--one hundred and fifty-one miles--and fromChattanooga to Atlanta--one hundred and thirty-seven miles. Everymile of this "single track" was so delicate, that one man could ina minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usuallycarried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each importantbridge or trestle--the destruction of which would have necessitatedtime for rebuilding. For the protection of a bridge, one or twolog block houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and asmall infantry guard, usually sufficed. The block-house had asmall parapet and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot proofby earth piled on. These points could usually be reached only by adash of the enemy's cavalry, and many of these block housessuccessfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry andartillery. The only block-house that was actually captured on themain was the one described near Allatoona. Our trains fromNashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran aboutten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Foursuch groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of tentons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded theabsolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents thatwere common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that singlestem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-fivethousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz. , from May 1 to November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularlythat amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would haverequired thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six muleseach, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles eachday, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in thatregion of country. Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlantacampaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and onlythen, because we had the men and means to maintain and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy. Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with theirnecessary baggage. Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer thepurpose well enough, but they, should always have roughboard-seats. For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with strawor bushes were usually employed. Personally, I saw but little ofthe practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back onceas far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer incharge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to methe whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all theway from Nashville to Atlanta. I am convinced that the risk tolife to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled thaton the skirmish-line, called for as high an order of courage, andfully equaled it in importance. Still, I doubt if there be anynecessity in time of peace to organize a corps specially to workthe military railroads in time of war, because in peace these samemen gain all the necessary experience, possess all the daring andcourage of soldiers, and only need the occasional protection andassistance of the necessary train-guard, which may be composed ofthe furloughed men coming and going, or of details made from thelocal garrisons to the rear. 

For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre ofaction to another by the rear--the cases of the transfer of theEleventh and Twelfth Corps--General Hooker, twenty-three thousandmen--from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninety-twomiles in seven days, in the fall of 1863; and that of the Army ofthe Ohio--General Schofield, fifteen thousand men--from the valleyof the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in elevendays, en route to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the bestexamples of which I have any knowledge, and reference to these ismade in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, datedNovember 22, 1865. 

Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed insupervising the construction of forts or field works of a naturemore permanent than the lines need by the troops in motion, and inrepairing roads and making bridges. I had several regiments ofthis kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used theinfantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on thetrenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turnrested by day. Habitually the repair of the railroad and itsbridges was committed to hired laborers, like the English navies, under the supervision of Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who was in the military service at the time, and his successfullabors were frequently referred to in the official reports of thecampaign. 

For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train witha detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leadinginfantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down. Generally the single pontoon-train could provide for nine hundredfeet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very widetwo such trains would be brought together, or the single train wassupplemented by a trestle-bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, outof timber found near the place. The pontoons in general use wereskeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back andconstitute a wagon-body. In this same wagon were carried thecotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion ofthe balks, cheeses, and lashings. All the troops became veryfamiliar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayedby reason of a river, however broad. I saw, recently, inAldershot, England, a very complete pontoon-train; the boats weresheathed with wood and felt, made very light; but I think thesewere more liable to chafing and damage in rough handling than wereour less expensive and rougher boats. On the whole, I would preferthe skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of pontoon that Ihave ever seen. 

In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if anydiscoveries or improvements were made during our war, or in any ofthe modern wars in Europe. These precautions vary with the natureof the country and the situation of each army. When advancing orretreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutesthe picket-line, and may have "reserves, " but usually the main lineof battle constitutes the reserve; and in this connection I willstate that the recent innovation introduced into the new infantrytactics by General Upton is admirable, for by it each regiment, brigade, and division deployed, sends forward as "skirmishers" theone man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these canbe recalled or reenforced at pleasure by the bugle-signal. 

For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should bedetached under their own officers, instead of making up the guardby detailing men from the several companies. 

For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made accordingto existing army regulations; and all the guards should be postedearly in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette achance to study his ground before it becomes too dark. 

In like manner as to the staff. The more intimately it comes intocontact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes. The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as nowpractised by us, and hitherto by the French, has provedmischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with whichsome of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous. I don't believe in a chief of staff at all, and any generalcommanding an army, corps, or division, that has a staff-officerwho professes to know more than his chief, is to be pitied. Eachregiment should have a competent adjutant, quartermaster, andcommissary, with two or three medical officers. Each brigadecommander should have the same staff, with the addition of a coupleof young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the subalterns ofthe brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough togive and explain the orders of their general. 

The same staff will answer for a division. The general in commandof a separate army, and of a corps d'armee, should have the sameprofessional assistance, with two or more good engineers, and hisadjutant-general should exercise all the functions usually ascribedto a chief of staff, viz. , he should possess the ability tocomprehend the scope of operations, and to make verbally and inwriting all the orders and details necessary to carry into effectthe views of his general, as well as to keep the returns andrecords of events for the information of the next higher authority, and for history. A bulky staff implies a division ofresponsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a smallstaff implies activity and concentration of purpose. The smallnessof General Grant's staff throughout the civil war forms the bestmodel for future imitation. So of tents, officers furniture, etc. , etc. In real war these should all be discarded, and an army isefficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of itsimpedimenta. Tents should be omitted altogether, save one to aregiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital. Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles andshelter out of bushes. The tents d'abri, or shelter-tent, carriedby the soldier himself, is all-sufficient. Officers should neverseek for houses, but share the condition of their men. 

A recent message (July 18, 1874) made to the French Assembly byMarshal MacMahon, President of the French Republic, submits aprojet de loi, with a report prepared by a board of French generalson "army administration, " which is full of information, and is asapplicable to us as to the French. I quote from its verybeginning: "The misfortunes of the campaign of 1870 havedemonstrated the inferiority of our system.... Two separateorganizations existed with parallel functions--the 'general' moreoccupied in giving direction to his troops than in providing fortheir material wants, which he regarded as the special province ofthe staff, and the 'intendant' (staff) often working at random, taking on his shoulders a crushing burden of functions and duties, exhausting himself with useless efforts, and aiming to accomplishan insufficient service, to the disappointment of everybody. Thisseparation of the administration and command, this coexistence oftwo wills, each independent of the other, which paralyzed both andannulled the dualism, was condemned. It was decided by the boardthat this error should be "proscribed" in the new military system. The report then goes on at great length discussing the provisions. Of the "new law, " which is described to be a radical change fromthe old one on the same subject. While conceding to the Ministerof War in Paris the general control and supervision of the entiremilitary establishment primarily, especially of the annualestimates or budget, and the great depots of supply, it distributesto the commanders of the corps d'armee in time of peace, and to allarmy commanders generally in time of war, the absolute command ofthe money, provisions, and stores, with the necessary staff-officers to receive, issue, and account for them. I quote further:"The object of this law is to confer on the commander of troopswhatever liberty of action the case demands. He has the power evento go beyond the regulations, in circumstances of urgency andpressing necessity. The extraordinary measures he may take onthese occasions may require their execution without delay. Thestaff-officer has but one duty before obeying, and that is tosubmit his observations to the general, and to ask his orders inwriting. 

With this formality his responsibility ceases, and theresponsibility for the extraordinary act falls solely on thegeneral who gives the order. The officers and agents charged withsupplies are placed under the orders of the general in command ofthe troops, that is, they are obliged both in war and peace toobey, with the single qualification above named, of first makingtheir observations and securing the written order of the general. 

With us, to-day, the law and regulations are that, no matter whatmay be the emergency, the commanding general in Texas, New Mexico, and the remote frontiers, cannot draw from the arsenals a pistol-cartridge, or any sort of ordnance-stores, without first procuringan order of the Secretary of War in Washington. The commandinggeneral--though intrusted with the lives of his soldiers and withthe safety of a frontier in a condition of chronic war--cannottouch or be trusted with ordnance-stores or property, and that isdeclared to be the law! Every officer of the old army remembershow, in 1861, we were hampered with the old blue army regulations, which tied our hands, and that to do any thing positive andnecessary we had to tear it all to pieces--cut the red-tape, as itwas called, a dangerous thing for an army to do, for it wascalculated to bring the law and authority into contempt; but warwas upon us, and overwhelming necessity overrides all law. 

This French report is well worth the study of our army-officers, ofall grades and classes, and I will only refer again, casually, toanother part, wherein it discusses the subject of militarycorrespondence: whether the staff-officer should corresponddirectly with his chief in Paris, submitting to his general copies, or whether he should be required to carry on his correspondencethrough his general, so that the latter could promptly forward thecommunication, indorsed with his own remarks and opinions. Thelatter is declared by the board to be the only safe role, because"the general should never be ignorant of any thing that istranspiring that concerns his command. "

In this country, as in France, Congress controls the greatquestions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation andgovernment of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving tothe President to execute and apply these laws, especially theharder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to theamount of the annual appropriations. The executive power isfurther subdivided into the seven great departments, and to theSecretary of War is confided the general care of the militaryestablishment, and his powers are further subdivided into tendistinct and separate bureaus. 

The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of theSecretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from"his office, " but cannot do so "in the field"--an absurdity inmilitary if not civil law. 

The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selectedand chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and toocommonly construe themselves into the elite, as made of better claythan the common soldier. Thus they separate themselves more andmore from their comrades of the line, and in process of timerealize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thoughtthe army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were notfor the d-d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the younglord in "Henry IV. , " who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that "but forthese vile guns he would himself have been a soldier. " This is allwrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of governmentand of universal experience; and now that the French, from whom wehad copied the system, have utterly "proscribed" it, I hope thatour Congress will follow suit. I admit, in its fullest force, thestrength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to themilitary in time of peace; that the army should be at all timessubject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, fromthe formation of our Government to the present day, the RegularArmy has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority;but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so verysmall, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized andgoverned on true military principles, and that in time of peace weshould preserve the "habits and usages of war, " so that, when wardoes come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion, and disorder of 1861. 

The commanding officers of divisions, departments, and posts, should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops, but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of thestaff necessary to administer them, within the area of theircommand; and then with fairness they could be held to the mostperfect responsibility. The President and Secretary of War cancommand the army quite as well through these generals as throughthe subordinate staff-officers. Of course, the Secretary would, asnow, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, andreserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of thelarger arsenals and depots of supply. The error lies in the law, or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of armyregulations can be made that meets the case, until Congress, likethe French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and "proscribes"the old law and the system which has grown up under it. 

It is related of Napoleon that his last words were, "Tete d'armee!"Doubtless, as the shadow of death obscured his memory, the lastthought that remained for speech was of some event when he wasdirecting an important "head of column. " I believe that everygeneral who has handled armies in battle most recall from his ownexperience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, whenby a single command he had given the finishing stroke to somecomplicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthyof record, and may encourage others who are to follow us in ourprofession. I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle butI feared that some calamity had happened at the front the apparentconfusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead andmaimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and ageneral apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; allthese signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there thecontrast was complete--perfect order, men and horses--full ofconfidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketryclattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned ageneral feeling of strength and security that bore a markedcontrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear;therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at thefront than the rear line of battle. So also on the march, the headof a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternatelyhalting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sortsof rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear. Oldtroops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front--to be at the "head of column"--because experience has taught themthat it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger onlyadds zest and stimulus to this fact. 

The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position orbattery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or toguard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out ofdanger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps whichis too busy ahead to care for its own. 

To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution ofsome task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war--agrim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory thestrongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy's line; tobreak through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or todiscover some key-point and hold it with tenacity; or to do someother distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real causeof success. These all become matters that are never forgotten. Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are tomeasure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in themidst of conflict; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose atevery instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to thatend. 

To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and qualityof each part of his own army, as well as that of his opponent, andmust be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes, and judge with his own mind. No man can properly command an armyfrom the rear, he must be "at its front;" and when a detachment ismade, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to beaccomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his ownway; and when an army is divided up into several parts, thesuperior should always attend that one which he regards as mostimportant. Some men think that modern armies may be so regulatedthat a general can sit in an office and play on his several columnsas on the keys of a piano; this is a fearful mistake. Thedirecting mind must be at the very head of the army--must be seenthere, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be feltby every officer and man present with it, to secure the bestresults. Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result inhumiliation and disaster. 

Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible, that officers and men may receive and send letters to theirfriends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistanceto discipline. Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world's gossips, pick up and retailthe camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of somegeneral, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than withhis own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesyevents and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in timeto guard against it. Moreover, they are always bound to see factscolored by the partisan or political character of their ownpatrons, and thus bring army officers into the politicalcontroversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it isdoubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters, without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his ownsafety. Time and moderation must bring a just solution to thismodern difficulty. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

AFTER THE WAR

In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to describe the publicevents in which I was an actor or spectator before and during thecivil war of 1861-'65, and it now only remains for me to treat ofsimilar matters of general interest subsequent to the civil war. Within a few days of the grand review of May 24, 1865, I took leaveof the army at Washington, and with my family went to Chicago toattend a fair held in the interest of the families of soldiersimpoverished by the war. I remained there about two weeks; on the22d of June was at South Bend, Indiana, where two of my childrenwere at school, and reached my native place, Lancaster, Ohio, onthe 24th. On the 4th of July I visited at Louisville, Kentucky, the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps, which had come from Washington, under the command of General JohnA. Logan, for "muster out, " or "further orders. " I then made ashort visit to General George H. Thomas at Nashville, and returnedto Lancaster, where I remained with the family till the receipt ofGeneral Orders No. 118 of June 27, 1865, which divided the wholeterritory of the United States into nineteen departments and fivemilitary divisions, the second of which was the military divisionof the "Mississippi, " afterward changed to "Missouri, " Major-General W. T. Sherman to command, with, headquarters at St. Louis, to embrace the Departments of the Ohio, Missouri, and Arkansas. 

This territorial command included the States north of the OhioRiver, and the States and Territories north of Texas, as far westas the Rocky Mountains, including Montana, Utah, and New Mexico, but the part east of the Mississippi was soon transferred toanother division. The department commanders were General E. O. C. Ord, at Detroit; General John Pope, at Fort Leavenworth; andGeneral J. J. Reynolds, at Little Rock, but these also were soonchanged. I at once assumed command, and ordered my staff andheadquarters from Washington to St. Louis, Missouri, going there inperson on the 16th of July. 

My thoughts and feelings at once reverted to the construction ofthe great Pacific Railway, which had been chartered by Congress inthe midst of war, and was then in progress. I put myself incommunication with the parties engaged in the work, visiting themin person, and assured them that I would afford them all possibleassistance and encouragement. Dr. Durant, the leading man of theUnion Pacific, seemed to me a person of ardent nature, of greatability and energy, enthusiastic in his undertaking, and determinedto build the road from Omaha to San Francisco. He had an ablecorps of assistants, collecting materials, letting out contractsfor ties, grading, etc. , and I attended the celebration of thefirst completed division of sixteen and a half miles, from Omaha toPapillon. When the orators spoke so confidently of thedetermination to build two thousand miles of railway across theplains, mountains, and desert, devoid of timber, with nopopulation, but on the contrary raided by the bold and bloody Siouxand Cheyennes, who had almost successfully defied our power forhalf a century, I was disposed to treat it jocularly, because Icould not help recall our California experience of 1855-'56, whenwe celebrated the completion of twenty-two and a half miles of thesame road eastward of Sacramento; on which occasion Edward Bakerhad electrified us by his unequalled oratory, painting the gloriousthings which would result from uniting the Western coast with theEast by bands of iron. Baker then, with a poet's imagination, sawthe vision of the mighty future, but not the gulf which meantimewas destined to swallow up half a million of the brightest and bestyouth of our land, and that he himself would be one of the firstvictims far away on the banks of the Potomac (he was killed inbattle at Balls Bluff, October 21, 1861). 

The Kansas Pacific was designed to unite with the main branch aboutthe 100 deg. Meridian, near Fort Kearney. Mr. Shoemaker was itsgeneral superintendent and building contractor, and this branch in1865 was finished about forty miles to a point near Lawrence, Kansas. I may not be able to refer to these roads again exceptincidentally, and will, therefore, record here that the location ofthis branch afterward was changed from the Republican to the SmokyHill Fork of the Kansas River, and is now the main line to Denver. The Union and Central Railroads from the beginning were pushed witha skill, vigor, and courage which always commanded my admiration, the two meeting at Promontory Point, Utah, July 15, 1869, and in myjudgment constitute one of the greatest and most beneficentachievements of man on earth. 

The construction of the Union Pacific Railroad was deemed soimportant that the President, at my suggestion, constituted on the5th of March, 1866, the new Department of the Platte, General P. St. George Cooke commanding, succeeded by General C. C. Augur, headquarters at Omaha, with orders to give ample protection to theworking-parties, and to afford every possible assistance in theconstruction of the road; and subsequently in like manner theDepartment of Dakota was constituted, General A. H. Terrycommanding, with headquarters at St. Paul, to give similarprotection and encouragement to the Northern Pacific Railroad. These departments, with changed commanders, have continued up tothe present day, and have fulfilled perfectly the uses for whichthey were designed. 

During the years 1865 and 1866 the great plains remained almost ina state of nature, being the pasture-fields of about ten millionbuffalo, deer, elk, and antelope, and were in full possession ofthe Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas, a race of boldIndians, who saw plainly that the construction of two parallelrailroads right through their country would prove destructive tothe game on which they subsisted, and consequently fatal tothemselves. 

The troops were posted to the best advantage to protect the partiesengaged in building these roads, and in person I reconnoitred wellto the front, traversing the buffalo regions from south to north, and from east to west, often with a very small escort, minglingwith the Indians whenever safe, and thereby gained personalknowledge of matters which enabled me to use the troops to the bestadvantage. I am sure that without the courage and activity of thedepartment commanders with the small bodies of regular troops onthe plains during the years 1866-'69, the Pacific Railroads couldnot have been built; but once built and in full operation the fateof the buffalo and Indian was settled for all time to come. 

At the close of the civil war there were one million five hundredand sixteen names on the muster-rolls, of which seven hundred andninety-seven thousand eight hundred and seven were present, and twohundred and two thousand seven hundred and nine absent, of whichtwenty-two thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine were regulars, theothers were volunteers, colored troops, and veteran reserves. Theregulars consisted of six regiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and nineteen of infantry. By the act of July 28, 1866, the peaceestablishment was fixed at one general (Grant), one lieutenant-general (Sherman), five major-generals (Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock), ten brigadiers (McDowell, Cooke, Pope, Hooker, Schofield, Howard, Terry, Ord, Canby, and Rousseau), tenregiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and forty-five ofinfantry, admitting of an aggregate force of fifty-four thousandsix hundred and forty-one men. 

All others were mustered out, and thus were remanded to their homesnearly a million of strong, vigorous men who had imbibed thesomewhat erratic habits of the soldier; these were of everyprofession and trade in life, who, on regaining their homes, foundtheir places occupied by others, that their friends and neighborswere different, and that they themselves had changed. Theynaturally looked for new homes to the great West, to the newTerritories and States as far as the Pacific coast, and we realizeto-day that the vigorous men who control Kansas, Nebraska, Dakota, Montana, Colorado, etc. , etc. , were soldiers of the civil war. These men flocked to the plains, and were rather stimulated thanretarded by the danger of an Indian war. This was another potentagency in producing the result we enjoy to-day, in having in soshort a time replaced the wild buffaloes by more numerous herds oftame cattle, and by substituting for the useless Indians theintelligent owners of productive farms and cattle-ranches. 

While these great changes were being wrought at the West, in theEast politics had resumed full sway, and all the methods ofanti-war times had been renewed. President Johnson had differedwith his party as to the best method of reconstructing the Stategovernments of the South, which had been destroyed and impoverishedby the war, and the press began to agitate the question of the nextPresident. Of course, all Union men naturally turned to GeneralGrant, and the result was jealousy of him by the personal friendsof President Johnson and some of his cabinet. Mr. Johnson alwaysseemed very patriotic and friendly, and I believed him honest andsincere in his declared purpose to follow strictly the Constitutionof the United States in restoring the Southern States to theirnormal place in the Union; but the same cordial friendshipsubsisted between General Grant and myself, which was the outgrowthof personal relations dating back to 1839. So I resolved to keepout of this conflict. In September, 1866, I was in the mountainsof New Mexico, when a message reached me that I was wanted atWashington. I had with me a couple of officers and half a dozensoldiers as escort, and traveled down the Arkansas, through theKiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, all more or lessdisaffected, but reached St. Louis in safety, and proceeded toWashington, where I reported to General Grant. 

He explained to me that President Johnson wanted to see me. He didnot know the why or wherefore, but supposed it had some connectionwith an order he (General Grant) had received to escort the newlyappointed Minister, Hon. Lew Campbell, of Ohio, to the court ofJuarez, the President-elect of Mexico, which country was still inpossession of the Emperor Maximilian, supported by a corps ofFrench troops commanded by General Bazaine. General Grant deniedthe right of the President to order him on a diplomatic missionunattended by troops; said that he had thought the matter over, world disobey the order, and stand the consequences. He manifestedmuch feeling; and said it was a plot to get rid of him. I thenwent to President Johnson, who treated me with great cordiality, and said that he was very glad I had come; that General Grant wasabout to go to Mexico on business of importance, and he wanted meat Washington to command the army in General Grant's absence. Ithen informed him that General Grant would not go, and he seemedamazed; said that it was generally understood that General Grantconstrued the occupation of the territories of our neighbor, Mexico, by French troops, and the establishment of an empiretherein, with an Austrian prince at its head, as hostile torepublican America, and that the Administration had arranged withthe French Government for the withdrawal of Bazaine's troops, whichwould leave the country free for the President-elect Juarez toreoccupy the city of Mexico, etc. , etc. ; that Mr. Campbell had beenaccredited to Juarez, and the fact that he was accompanied by sodistinguished a soldier as General Grant would emphasize the act ofthe United States. I simply reiterated that General Grant wouldnot go, and that he, Mr. Johnson, could not afford to quarrel withhim at that time. I further argued that General Grant was at themoment engaged on the most delicate and difficult task ofreorganizing the army under the act of July 28, 1866; that if thereal object was to put Mr. Campbell in official communication withPresident Juarez, supposed to be at El Paso or Monterey, eitherGeneral Hancock, whose command embraced New Mexico, or GeneralSheridan, whose command included Texas, could fulfill the objectperfectly; or, in the event of neither of these alternates provingsatisfactory to the Secretary of State, that I could be easierspared than General Grant. "Certainly, " answered the President, "if you will go, that will answer perfectly. "

The instructions of the Secretary of State, W. H. Seward, to Hon. Lewis D. Campbell, Minister to Mexico, dated October 25, 1866; aletter from President Johnson to Secretary of War Stanton, datedOctober 26, 1866; and the letter of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary ofWar, to General Grant, dated October 27th, had been alreadyprepared and printed, and the originals or copies were furnishedme; but on the 30th of October, 1866, the following letter passed

EXECUTIVE MANSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. , October 30, 1866. 

SIR: General Ulysses S. Grant having found it inconvenient toassume the duties specified in my letter to you of the 26th inst. , you will please relieve him, and assign them in all respects toWilliam T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General of the Army of the UnitedStates. By way of guiding General Sherman in the performance ofhis duties, you will furnish him with a copy of your special ordersto General Grant made in compliance with my letter of the 26thinst. , together with a copy of the instructions of the Secretary ofState to Lewis D. Campbell, Esq. , therein mentioned. 

The lieutenant-general will proceed to the execution of his dutieswithout delay. 

Very respectfully yours, ANDREW JOHNSONTo the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

At the Navy Department I learned that the United States shipSusquehanna, Captain Alden, was fitting out in New York for the useof this mission, and that there would be time for me to return toSt. Louis to make arrangements for a prolonged absence, as also tocommunicate with Mr. Campbell, who was still at his home inHamilton, Ohio. By correspondence we agreed to meet in New York, November 8th, he accompanied by Mr. Plumb, secretary of legation, and I by my aide, Colonel Audenried. 

We embarked November 10th, and went to sea next day, making forHavana and Vera Cruz, and, as soon as we were outside of SandyHook, I explained to Captain Alden that my mission was ended, because I believed by substituting myself for General Grant I hadprevented a serious quarrel between him and the Administration, which was unnecessary. We reached Havana on the 18th, with nothingto vary the monotony of an ordinary sea-voyage, except off Hatteraswe picked up one woman and twenty men from open boats, who had justabandoned a propeller bound from Baltimore to Charleston whichfoundered. The sea was very rough, but by the personal skill andsupervision of Captain Alden every soul reached our deck safely, and was carried to our consul at Havana. At Havana we were veryhandsomely entertained, especially by Senor Aldama, who took us byrail to his sugar-estates at Santa Ross, and back by Matanzas. 

We took our departure thence on the 25th, and anchored under IslaVerde, off Vera Cruz, on the 29th. 

Everything about Vera Cruz indicated the purpose of the French towithdraw, and also that the Emperor Maximilian would precede them, for the Austrian frigate Dandolo was in port, and an Austrian bark, on which were received, according to the report of our consul, Mr. Lane, as many as eleven hundred packages of private furniture to betransferred to Miramar, Maximilian's home; and Lieutenant Clarin, of the French navy, who visited the Susquehanna from the Frenchcommodore, Clouet, told me, without reserve, that, if we haddelayed eight days more, we would have found Maximilian gone. General Bazaine was reported to be in the city of Mexico with abouttwenty-eight thousand French troops; but instead of leaving Mexicoin three detachments, viz. , November, 1866, March, 1867, andNovember, 1867, as described in Mr. Seward's letter to Mr. Campbell, of October 25, 1866, it looked to me that, as a soldier, he would evacuate at some time before November, 1867, all at once, and not by detachments. Lieutenant Clarin telegraphed Bazaine atthe city of Mexico the fact of our arrival, and he sent me a mostcourteous and pressing invitation to come up to the city; but, aswe were accredited to the government of Juarez, it was consideredundiplomatic to establish friendly relations with the existingauthorities. Meantime we could not hear a word of Juarez, andconcluded to search for him along the coast northward. When I wasin Versailles, France, July, 1872, learning that General Bazainewas in arrest for the surrender of his army and post at Metz, in1870, I wanted to call on him to thank him for his courteousinvitation to me at Vera Cruz in 1866. I inquired of PresidentThiera if I could with propriety call on the marshal. He answeredthat it would be very acceptable, no doubt, but suggested forform's sake that I should consult the Minister of War, General deCissey, which I did, and he promptly assented. Accordingly, Icalled with my aide, Colonel Audenried, on Marshal Bazaine, whooccupied a small, two-story stone house at Versailles, in aninclosure with a high garden wall, at the front gate or door ofwhich was a lodge, in which was a military guard. We were shown toa good room on the second floor, where was seated the marshal inmilitary half-dress, with large head, full face, short neck, andevidently a man of strong physique. He did not speak English, butspoke Spanish perfectly. We managed to carry on a conversation inwhich I endeavored to convey my sense of his politeness in invitingme so cordially up to the city of Mexico, and my regret that thepeculiar duty on which I was engaged did not admit of a compliance, or even of an intelligent explanation, at the time. He spoke ofthe whole Mexican business as a "sad affair, " that the empirenecessarily fell with the result of our civil war, and that poorMaximilian was sacrificed to his own high sense of honor. 

While on board the Susquehanna, on the 1st day of December, 1866, we received the proclamation made by the Emperor Maximilian atOrizaba, in which, notwithstanding the near withdrawal of theFrench troops, he declared his purpose to remain and "shed the lastdrop of his blood in defense of his dear country. " Undoubtedlymany of the most substantial people of Mexico, having lost allfaith in the stability of the native government, had committedthemselves to what they considered the more stable government ofMaximilian, and Maximilian, a man of honor, concluded at the lastmoment he could not abandon them; the consequence was his death. 

Failing to hear of Juarez, we steamed up the coast to the Island ofLobos, and on to Tampico, off which we found the United Statessteamer Paul Jones, which, drawing less water than the Susquehanna, carried us over the bar to the city, then in possession of theLiberal party, which recognized Juarez as their constitutionalPresident, but of Juarez and his whereabout we could hear not aword; so we continued up the coast and anchored off BrazosSantiago, December 7th. Going ashore in small boats, we found arailroad, under the management of General J. R. West, now one ofthe commissioners of the city of Washington, who sent us up toBrownsville, Texas. We met on the way General Sheridan, returningfrom a tour of inspection of the Rio Grande frontier. On Sunday, December 9th, we were all at Matamoras, Mexico, where we metGeneral Escobedo, one of Juarez's trusty lieutenants, who developedto us the general plan agreed on for the overthrow of the empire, and the reestablishment of the republican government of Mexico. Heasked of us no assistance, except the loan of some arms, ammunition, clothing, and camp-equipage. It was agreed that Mr. Campbell should, as soon as he could get his baggage off theSusquehanna, return to Matamoras, and thence proceed to Monterey, to be received by Juarez in person as, the accredited Minister ofthe United States to the Republic of Mexico. Meantime the weatheroff the coast was stormy, and the Susquehanna parted a cable, sothat we were delayed some days at Brazos; but in due time Mr. Campbell got his baggage, and we regained the deck of theSusquehanna, which got up steam and started for New Orleans. Wereached New Orleans December 20th, whence I reported fullyeverything to General Grant, and on the 21st received the followingdispatch:

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1866. Lieutenant-General SHERMAN, New Orleans. 

Your telegram of yesterday has been submitted to the President. You are authorized to proceed to St. Louis at your convenience. Your proceedings in the special and delicate duties assigned youare cordially approved by the President and Cabinet and thisdepartment. EDWIN M. STANTON. 

And on the same day I received this dispatch

GALVESTON, December 21, 1866. To General SHERMAN, or General SHERIDAN. 

Will be in New Orleans to-morrow. Wish to see you both on arrival, on matters of importance. LEWIS D. CAMPBELL, Minister to Mexico. 

Mr. Campbell arrived on the 22d, but had nothing to tell of theleast importance, save that he was generally disgusted with thewhole thing, and had not found Juarez at all. I am sure this wholemovement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant awayfrom Washington, on the pretext of his known antagonism to theFrench occupation of Mexico, because he was looming up as acandidate for President, and nobody understood the animus andpurpose better than did Mr. Stanton. He himself was not then ongood terms with President Johnson, and with several of hisassociates in the Cabinet. By Christmas I was back in St. Louis. 

By this time the conflict between President Johnson and Congresshad become open and unconcealed. Congress passed the bill known asthe "Tenure of Civil Office" on the 2d of March, 1867 (over thePresident's veto), the first clause of which, now section 1767 ofthe Revised Statutes, reads thus: "Every person who holds any civiloffice to which he has been or hereafter may be appointed, by andwith the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall havebecome duly qualified to act therein, shall be entitled to holdsuch office during the term for which he was appointed, unlesssooner removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, orby the appointment with the like advice and consent of a successorin his place, except as herein otherwise provided. "

General E. D. Townsend, in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War, " statestersely and correctly the preliminary circumstances of which I musttreat. He says: "On Monday morning, August 5, 1867, PresidentJohnson invited Mr. Stanton to resign as Secretary of War. Underthe tenure-of-civil-office law, Mr. Stanton declined. The Presidenta week after suspended him, and appointed General Grant, General-in-Chief of the Army, to exercise the functions. This continueduntil January 13, 1868, when according to the law the Senate passeda resolution not sustaining the President's action. The nextmorning General Grant came to my office and handed me the key ofthe Secretary's room, saying: 'I am to be found over at my officeat army headquarters. I was served with a copy of the Senateresolution last evening. ' I then went up-stairs and delivered thekey of his room to Mr. Stanton. "

The mode and manner of Mr. Stanton's regaining his office, and ofGeneral Grant's surrendering it, were at the time subjects ofbitter controversy. Unhappily I was involved, and must beartestimony. In all January, 1868, I was a member of a board orderedto compile a code of articles of war and army regulations, of whichMajor-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General C. C. Augur wereassociate members. Our place of meeting was in the room of the oldWar Department, second floor, next to the corner room occupied bythe Secretary of War, with a door of communication. While we wereat work it was common for General Grant and, afterward, for Mr. Stanton to drop in and chat with us on the social gossip of thetime. 

On Saturday, January 11th, General Grant said that he had morecarefully read the law (tenure of civil office), and it wasdifferent from what he had supposed; that in case the Senate didnot consent to the removal of Secretary of War Stanton, and he(Grant) should hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousanddollars and five years' imprisonment. We all expected theresolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan, virtually restoring Mr. Stanton to his office, would pass the Senate, and knowing that thePresident expected General Grant to hold on, I inquired if he hadgiven notice of his change of purpose; he answered that there wasno hurry, because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him(Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him thepreceding August, viz. , would address him a letter claiming theoffice, and allow him a couple of days for the change. Still, hesaid he would go to the White House the same day and notify thePresident of his intended action. 

That afternoon I went over to the White House to present GeneralPope, who was on a visit to Washington, and we found the Presidentand General Grant together. We made our visit and withdrew, leaving them still together, and I always supposed the subject ofthis conference was the expected decision of the Senate, whichwould in effect restore Mr. Stanton to his civil office ofSecretary of War. That evening I dined with the Hon. ReverdyJohnson, Senator from Maryland, and suggested to him that the bestway to escape a conflict was for the President to nominate somegood man as Secretary of War whose confirmation by the Senate wouldfall within the provisions of the law, and named General J. D. Cox, then Governor of Ohio, whose term of office was drawing to a close, who would, I knew, be acceptable to General Grant and the armygenerally. Mr. Johnson was most favorably impressed with thissuggestion, and promised to call on the President the next day(Sunday), which he did, but President Johnson had made up his mindto meet the conflict boldly. I saw General Grant that afternoon athis house on I Street, and told him what I had done, and so anxiouswas he about it that he came to our room at the War Department thenext morning (Monday), the 13th, and asked me to go in person tothe White House to urge the President to send in the name ofGeneral Cox. I did so, saw the President, and inquired if he hadseen Mr. Reverdy Johnson the day before about General Cox. Heanswered that he had, and thought well of General Cox, but wouldsay no further. 

Tuesday, January 14, 1868, came, and with it Mr. Stanton. Heresumed possession of his former office; came into that whereGeneral Sheridan, General Augur, and I were at work, and greeted usvery cordially. He said he wanted to see me when at leisure, andat half-past 10 A. M. I went into his office and found him andGeneral Grant together. Supposing they had some special matters ofbusiness, I withdrew, with the remark that I was close at hand, andcould come in at any moment. In the afternoon I went again intoMr. Stanton's office, and we had a long and most friendlyconversation; but not one word was spoken about the"tenure-of-office" matter. I then crossed over Seventeenth Streetto the headquarters of the army, where I found General Grant, whoexpressed himself as by no means pleased with the manner in whichMr. Stanton had regained his office, saying that he had sent amessenger for him that morning as of old, with word that "he wantedto see him. " We then arranged to meet at his office the nextmorning at half-past nine, and go together to see the President. 

That morning the National Intelligencer published an articleaccusing General Grant of acting in bad faith to the President, andof having prevaricated in making his personal explanation to theCabinet, so that General Grant at first felt unwilling to go, butwe went. The President received us promptly and kindly. Beingseated, General Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the factsfor the article of the Intelligencer of this morning has made someserious mistakes. " The President: "General Grant, let me interruptyou just there. I have not seen the Intelligencer of this morning, and have no knowledge of the contents of any article therein"General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there that Ihave not kept faith with you. Now, Mr. President, I remember, whenyou spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say that, likethe case of the Baltimore police commissioners, I did suppose Mr. Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through thecourts. " To this the President assented, saying he "remembered thereference to the case of the Baltimore commissioners, " when GeneralGrant resumed: "I said if I changed my opinion I would give younotice, and put things as they were before my appointment asSecretary of War ad interim. "

We then entered into a general friendly conversation, both partiesprofessing to be satisfied, the President claiming that he hadalways been most friendly to General Grant, and the latterinsisting that he had taken the office, not for honor or profit, but in the general interests of the army. 

As we withdrew, at the very door, General Grant said, "Mr. President, you should make some order that we of the army are notbound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War, " whichthe President intimated he would do. 

No such "orders" were ever made; many conferences were held, andthe following letters are selected out of a great mass to show thegeneral feeling at the time:

1321 K STREET, WASHINGTON, January 28, 1868, Saturday. 

To the President:

I neglected this morning to say that I had agreed to go down toAnnapolis to spend Sunday with Admiral Porter. General Grant alsohas to leave for Richmond on Monday morning at 6 A. M. 

At a conversation with the General after our interview, wherein Ioffered to go with him on Monday morning to Mr. Stanton, and to saythat it was our joint opinion be should resign, it was foundimpossible by reason of his (General Grant) going to Richmond andmy going to Annapolis. The General proposed this course: He willcall on you to-morrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say, forthe good of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign. Thison Sunday. On Monday I will again call on you, and, if you thinkit necessary, I will do the same, viz. , go to Mr. Stanton and tellhim he should resign. 

If he will not, then it will be time to contrive ulterior measures. In the mean time it so happens that no necessity exists forprecipitating matters. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

DEAR GENERAL: On the point of starting, I have written the above, and will send a fair copy of it to the President. Please retainthis, that in case of necessity I may have a copy. The Presidentclearly stated to me that he relied on us in this category. 

Think of the propriety of your putting in writing what you have tosay tomorrow, even if you have to put it in the form of a letter tohand him in person, retaining a copy. I'm afraid that acting as ago-between for three persons, I may share the usual fate ofmeddlers, at last get kinks from all. We ought not to be involvedin politics, but for the sake of the Army we are justified intrying at least to cut this Gordian knot, which they do not appearto have any practicable plan to do. In haste as usual, W. T. SHERMAN. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, January 29, 1888. 

DEAR SHERMAN: I called on the President and Mr. Stanton to-day, butwithout any effect. 

I soon found that to recommend resignation to Mr. Stanton wouldhave no effect, unless it was to incur further his displeasure;and, therefore, did not directly suggest it to him. I explained tohim, however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what Iexpected to do in that case, namely, to notify the President of hisintentions, and thus leave him to violate the "Tenure-of-OfficeBill" if he chose, instead of having me do it. 

I would advise that you say nothing to Mr. Stanton on the subjectunless he asks your advice. It will do no good, and may embarrassyou. I did not mention your name to him, at least not inconnection with his position, or what you thought upon it. 

All that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising. While Ithink he wanted the constitutionality of the "Tenure Bill" tested, I think now he would be glad either to get the vacancy of Secretaryof War, or have the office just where it was during suspension. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

WASHINGTON D. C. , January 27, 1868. 

To the President. 

DEAR SIR: As I promised, I saw Mr. Ewing yesterday, and after along conversation asked him to put down his opinion in writing, which he has done and which I now inclose. 

I am now at work on these Army Regulations, and in the course ofpreparation have laid down the Constitution and laws now in force, clearer than I find them elsewhere; and beg leave herewith toinclose you three pages of printed matter for your perusal. Myopinion is, if you will adopt these rules and make them anexecutive order to General Grant, they will so clearly define theduties of all concerned that no conflict can arise. I hope to getthrough this task in the course of this week, and want very much togo to St. Louis. For eleven years I have been tossed about so muchthat I really do want to rest, study, and make the acquaintance ofmy family. I do not think, since 1857, I have averaged thirty daysout of three hundred and sixty-five at home. 

Next summer also, in fulfillment of our promise to the Sioux, Imust go to Fort Phil Kearney early in the spring, so that, unless Ican spend the next two months at home, I might as well break up myhouse at St. Louis, and give up all prospect of taking care of myfamily. 

For these reasons especially I shall soon ask leave to go to St. Louis, to resume my proper and legitimate command. With greatrespect, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[Inclosure]

WASHINGTON, D. C. , January 25, 1868. 

MY DEAR GENERAL: I am quite clear in the opinion that it is notexpedient for the President to take any action now in the case ofStanton. So far as he and his interests are concerned, things arein the best possible condition. Stanton is in the Department, gothis secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken uponthemselves his sins, and who place him there under a large salaryto annoy and obstruct the operations of the Executive. This thepeople well enough understand, and he is a stench in the nostrilsof their own party. 

I thought the nomination of Cox at the proper juncture would havebeen wise as a peace-offering, but perhaps it would have let offthe Senate too easily from the effect of their arbitrary act. Nowthe dislodging of Stanton and filling the office even temporarilywithout the consent of the Senate would raise a question as to thelegality of the President's acts, and he would belong to theattacked instead of the attacking party. If the war betweenCongress and the President is to go on, as I suppose it is, Stantonshould be ignored by the President, left to perform his clericalduties which the law requires him to perform, and let the partybear the odium which is already upon them for placing him where heis. So much for the President. 

As to yourself, I wish you as far as possible to keep clear ofpolitical complications. I do not think the President will requireyou to do an act of doubtful legality. Certainly he will notwithout sanction of the opinion of his Attorney-General; and youshould have time, in a questionable case, to consult with me beforecalled upon to act. The office of Secretary of War is a civiloffice, as completely so as that of Secretary of State; and you asa military officer cannot, I think, be required to assume orexercise it. This may, if necessary, be a subject for furtherconsideration. Such, however, will not, I think, be the case. The appeal is to the people, and it is better for the President topersist in the course he has for some time pursued--let theaggressions all come from the other side; and I think there is nodoubt he will do so. Affectionately, T. EWING. 

To--Lieutenant-General SHERMAN. 

LIBRARY ROOM, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. , January 31, 1868. 

To the President:

Since our interview of yesterday I have given the subject of ourconversation all my thoughts, and I beg you will pardon my reducingthe same to writing. 

My personal preferences, as expressed, were to be allowed to returnto St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command wasimportant, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because myfamily was well provided for there in house, facilities, schools, living, and agreeable society; while, on the other hand, Washingtonwas for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especiallybecause it is the political capital of the country; and focus ofintrigue, gossip, and slander. Your personal preferences were, asexpressed, to make a new department East, adequate to my rank, withheadquarters at Washington, and assign me to its command, to removemy family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc. ; to removeMr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me todischarge the duties. 

To effect this removal two modes were indicated: to simply causehim to quit the War-Office Building, and notify the TreasuryDepartment and the Army Staff Departments no longer to respect himas Secretary of War; or to remove him and submit my name to theSenate for confirmation. 

Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise bysaying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have noteven seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant, since I waswith you. 

It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organizationof the government, that the second officer of the army should be atthe second (in importance) command, and remote from generalheadquarters. To bring me to Washington world put three heads toan army, yourself, General Grant, and myself, and we would be morethan human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it world ruinthe army, and would be fatal to one or two of us. 

Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriotsin the field, but Washington was fatal to both. This city, and theinfluences that centre here, defeated every army that had itsheadquarters here from 1861 to 1864, and would have overwhelmedGeneral Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not beenfortified by a strong reputation, already hard-earned, and becauseno one then living coveted the place; whereas, in the West, we madeprogress from the start, because there was no political capitalnear enough to poison our minds, and kindle into life that craving, itching for fame which has killed more good men than bullets. Ihave been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughterwhen the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengerswere speeding to and from his army to Washington, bearing slanders, to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga, when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules tosatisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the"forlorn hope" to command the Army of the Potomac, so oftendefeated--and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he hasbeen in Washington, and been compelled to read himself a "sneak anddeceiver, " based on reports of four of the Cabinet, and apparentlywith your knowledge. If this political atmosphere can disturb theequanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will bethe result with me, so careless, so outspoken as I am? Therefore, with my consent, Washington never. 

As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold. As a Cabinetofficer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerfulassent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of everyfair-minded man. As the holder of a civil office, having thesupervision of moneys appropriated by Congress and of contracts forarmy supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegationfrom Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted. At all events, I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question. The law of Congress, of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner inwhich orders and instructions relating to "military movements"shall reach the army, gives you as constitutional Commander-in-Chief the very power you want to exercise, and enables you toprevent the Secretary from making any such orders and instructions;and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited andrestricted to a duty that an Auditor of the Treasury could perform. You certainly can afford to await the result. The Executive poweris not weakened, but rather strengthened. Surely he is not such anobstruction as would warrant violence, or even s show of force, which would produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes forto save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office "for thesafety of the country. "

This is so much as I ought to say, and more too, but if it producesthe result I will be more than satisfied, viz. , that I be simplyallowed to resume my proper post and duties in St. Louis. Withgreat respect, yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

On the 1st of February, the board of which I was the presidentsubmitted to the adjutant-general our draft of the "Articles of Warand Army Regulations, " condensed to a small compass, the result ofour war experience. But they did not suit the powers that were, and have ever since slept the sleep that knows no waking, to makeroom for the ponderous document now in vogue, which will not standthe strain of a week's campaign in real war. 

I hurried back to St. Louis to escape the political storm I sawbrewing. The President repeatedly said to me that he wanted me inWashington, and I as often answered that nothing could tempt me tolive in that center of intrigue and excitement; but soon came thefollowing:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have received at last the President's reply to mylast, letter. He attempts to substantiate his statements by hisCabinet. In this view it is important that I should have a letterfrom you, if you are willing to give it, of what I said to youabout the effect of the "Tenure-of-Office Bill, " and my object ingoing to see the President on Saturday before the installment ofMr. Stanton. What occurred after the meeting of the Cabinet on theTuesday following is not a subject under controversy now;therefore, if you choose to write down your recollection (and Iwould like to have it) on Wednesday, when you and I called on thePresident, and your conversation with him the last time you sawhim, make that a separate communication. 

Your order to come East was received several days ago, but thePresident withdrew it, I supposed to make some alteration, but ithas not been returned. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 18, 1868. 

Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis. 

The order is issued ordering you to Atlantic Division. 

U. S. GRANT, General. 

[TELEGRAM]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

Your dispatch is received informing me that the order for theAtlantic Division has been issued, and that I am assigned to itscommand. I was in hopes I had escaped the danger, and now were Iprepared I should resign on the spot, as it requires no foresightto predict such must be the inevitable result in the end. I willmake one more desperate effort by mail, which please await. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1868. Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis. 

I think it due to you that your letter of January 31st to thePresident of the United States should be published, to correctmisapprehension in the public mind about your willingness to cometo Washington. It will not be published against your will. 

(Sent in cipher. )

[TELEGRAM. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

Dispatch of to-day received. Please await a letter I address thisday through you to the President, which will in due time reach thepublic, covering the very point you make. 

I don't want to come to Washington at all. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Loins, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

Hon. John SHERMAN, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

Oppose confirmation of myself as brevet general, on ground that itis unprecedented, and that it is better not to extend the system ofbrevets above major-general. If I can't avoid coming toWashington, I may have to resign. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 12, 1868. 

The following orders are published for the information and guidanceof all concerned:

U. S. GRANT, General. 

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 12, 1868. 

GENERAL: You will please issue an order creating a militarydivision to be styled the Military Division of the Atlantic, to becomposed of the Department of the Lakes, the Department of theEast, and the Department of Washington, to be commanded byLieutenant-General W. T. Sherman, with his headquarters atWashington. Until further orders from the President, you willassign no officer to the permanent command of the Military Divisionof the Missouri. 

Respectfully yours, ANDREW JOHNSON. 

GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of The United States, Washington, D. C. 

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, the senior officer in the MilitaryDivision of the Missouri, will temporarily perform the duties ofcommander of the Military Division of the Missouri in addition tohis duties of department commander. By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

This order, if carried into effect, would have grouped inWashington:

1. The President, constitutional Commander-in-Chief. 

2. The Secretary of War, congressional Commander-in-Chief. 

3. The General of the Armies of the United States. 

4. The Lieutenant-General of the Army. 

5. The Commanding General of the Department of Washington. 

6. The commander of the post-of Washington. 

At that date the garrison of Washington was a brigade of infantryand a battery of artillery. I never doubted Mr. Johnson'ssincerity in wishing to befriend me, but this was the broadest kindof a farce, or meant mischief. I therefore appealed to him byletter to allow me to remain where I was, and where I could doservice, real service, and received his most satisfactory answer. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR GENERAL: Last evening, just before leaving my office, Ireceived your note of the 10th, and had intended answering itaccording to your request; but, after I got home, I got yourdispatch of yesterday, announcing that the order I dreaded so muchwas issued. I never felt so troubled in my life. Were it an orderto go to Sitka, to the devil, to battle with rebels or Indians, Ithink you would not hear a whimper from me, but it comes in such aquestionable form that, like Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my bloodand mars my judgment. My first thoughts were of resignation, and Ihad almost made up my mind to ask Dodge for some place on thePacific road, or on one of the Iowa roads, and then again variouscolleges ran through my memory, but hard times and an expensivefamily have brought me back to staring the proposition square inthe face, and I have just written a letter to the President, whichI herewith transmit through you, on which I will hang a hope ofrespite till you telegraph me its effect. The uncertainties aheadare too great to warrant my incurring the expense of breaking up myhouse and family here, and therefore in no event will I do thistill I can be assured of some permanence elsewhere. If it were atall certain that you would accept the nomination of President inMay, I would try and kill the intervening time, and then judge ofthe chances, but I do not want you to reveal your plans to me tillyou choose to do so. 

I have telegraphed to John Sherman to oppose the nomination whichthe papers announce has been made of me for brevet general. 

I have this minute received your cipher dispatch of to-day, which Ihave just answered and sent down to the telegraph-office, and theclerk is just engaged in copying my letter to the President to gowith this. If the President or his friends pretend that I seek togo to Washington, it will be fully rebutted by letters I havewritten to the President, to you, to John Sherman, to Mr. Ewing, and to Mr. Stanbery. You remember that in our last talk yousuggested I should write again to the President. I thought of it, and concluded my letter of January 31st, already delivered, wasfull and emphatic. Still, I did write again to Mr. Stanbery, asking him as a friend to interpose in my behalf. There are plentyof people who know my wishes, and I would avoid, if possible, thepublication of a letter so confidential as that of January 31st, inwhich I notice I allude to the President's purpose of removing Mr. Stanton by force, a fact that ought not to be drawn out through meif it be possible to avoid it. In the letter herewith I confinemyself to purely private matters, and will not object if it reachesthe public in any proper way. My opinion is, the President thinksMrs. Sherman would like to come to Washington by reason of herfather and brothers being there. This is true, for Mrs. Shermanhas an idea that St. Louis is unhealthy for our children, andbecause most of the Catholics here are tainted with the old seceshfeeling. But I know better what is to our common interest, andprefer to judge of the proprieties myself. What I do object to isthe false position I would occupy as between you and the President. Were there an actual army at or near Washington, I could bewithdrawn from the most unpleasant attitude of a "go-between, " butthere is no army there, nor any military duties which you with ahost of subordinates can not perform. Therefore I would be therewith naked, informal, and sinecure duties, and utterly out ofplace. This you understand well enough, and the army too, but thePresident and the politicians, who flatter themselves they aresaving the country, cannot and will not understand. My opinion is, the country is doctored to death, and if President and Congresswould go to sleep like Rip Van Winkle, the country would go onunder natural influences, and recover far faster than under theirjoint and several treatment. This doctrine would be accounted byCongress, and by the President too, as high treason, and thereforeI don't care about saying so to either of them, but I know you canhear anything, and give it just what thought or action it merits. 

Excuse this long letter, and telegraph me the result of my letterto the President as early as you can. If he holds my letter solong as to make it improper for me to await his answer, alsotelegraph me. 

The order, when received, will, I suppose, direct me as to whom andhow I am to turn over this command, which should, in my judgment, not be broken up, as the three departments composing the divisionshould be under one head. 

I expect my staff-officers to be making for me within the hour tolearn their fate, so advise me all you can as quick as possible. 

With great respect, yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

To the President. 

DEAR SIR: It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do mean unkindness unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty, or because you do not believe me sincere. I was in hopes, since myletter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded topass over that purpose of yours expressed more than once inconversation--to organize a new command for me in the East, withheadquarters in Washington; but a telegram from General Grant ofyesterday says that "the order was issued ordering you" (me) "toAtlantic Division"; and the newspapers of this morning contain thesame information, with the addition that I have been nominated asbrevet general. I have telegraphed my own brother in the Senate tooppose my confirmation, on the ground that the two higher grades inthe army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust youwill conceive my motives aright. If I could see my way clear tomaintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign mypresent commission, and seek some business wherein I would be freefrom these unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me, spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties myhands, and I must submit with the best grace I can till I makeother arrangements. 

In Washington are already the headquarters of a department, and ofthe army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can rendermilitary service there. Any staff-officer with the rank of majorcould surely fill any gap left between these two military officers;and, by being placed in Washington, I will be universally construedas a rival to the General-in-Chief, a position damaging to me inthe highest degree. Our relations have always been mostconfidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud ofdifferences should arise between us, my sense of personal dignityand duty would leave me no alternative but resignation. For this Iam not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it asrapidly as possible, so that when the time does come (as it surelywill if this plan is carried into effect) I may act promptly. 

Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a fullrevocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at NewYork, or any point you may name within the new military divisionother than Washington. This privilege is generally granted to allmilitary commanders, and I see no good reason why I too may not askfor it, and this simple concession, involving no public interest, will much soften the blow, which, right or wrong, I construe as oneof the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered withadversity. With great respects yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

WASHINGTON, D. C. , 2 p. M. , February 19, 1888. Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri:

I have just received, with General Grant's indorsement ofreference, your letter to me of the fourteenth (14th) inst. 

The order to which you refer was made in good faith, and with aview to the best interests of the country and the service; as, however, your assignment to a new military division seems soobjectionable, you will retain your present command. 

ANDREW JOHNSON. 

On that same 19th of February he appointed Adjutant, GeneralLorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim, which finallyresulted in the articles of impeachment and trial of PresidentJohnson before the Senate. I was a witness on that trial, but ofcourse the lawyers would not allow me to express any opinion of thePresident's motives or intentions, and restricted me to the factsset forth in the articles of impeachment, of which I was glad toknow nothing. The final test vote revealed less than two thirds, and the President was consequently acquitted. Mr. Stantonresigned. General Schofield, previously nominated, was confirmedas Secretary of War, thus putting an end to what ought never tohave happened at all. 

INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION. 

On the 20th of July, 1867, President Johnson approved an act toestablish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes, the firstsection of which reads as follows: "Be it enacted, etc. , that thePresident of the United States be and is hereby authorized toappoint a commission to consist of three (3) officers of the armynot below the rank of brigadier-general, who, together with N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John B. Henderson, chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Senate, S. F. Tappan, and John B. Sanborn, shall have power and authority tocall together the chiefs and head men of such bands or tribes ofIndians as are now waging war against the United States, orcommitting depredations on the people thereof, to ascertain thealleged reasons for their acts of hostility, and in theirdiscretion, under the direction of the President, to make andconclude with said bands or tribes such treaty stipulations, subject to the action of the Senate, as may remove all just causesof complaint on their part, and at the same time establish securityfor person and property along the lines of railroad now beingconstructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of travel to theWestern Territories, and such as will most likely insurecivilization for the Indians, and peace and safety for the whites. "

The President named as the military members Lieutenant-GeneralSherman, Brigadier-Generals A. H. Terry and W. S. Harney. Subsequently, to insure a full attendance, Brigadier-General C. C. Augur was added to the commission, and his name will be found onmost of the treaties. The commissioners met at St. Louis andelected N. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, president; J. B. Sanborn, treasurer; and A. S. H. White, Esq. , ofWashington, D. C. , secretary. The year 1867 was too far advancedto complete the task assigned during that season, and it was agreedthat a steamboat (St. John's) should be chartered to convey thecommission up the Missouri River, and we adjourned to meet atOmaha. In the St. John's the commission proceeded up the MissouriRiver, holding informal "talks" with the Santees at their agencynear the Niobrara, the Yanktonnais at Fort Thompson, and theOgallallas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, etc. , at Fort Sully. Fromthis point runners were sent out to the Sioux occupying the countrywest of the Missouri River, to meet us in council at the Forks ofthe Platte that fall, and to Sitting Bull's band of outlaw Sioux, and the Crows on the upper Yellowstone, to meet us in May, 1868, atFort Laramie. We proceeded up the river to the mouth of theCheyenne and turned back to Omaha, having ample time on thissteamboat to discuss and deliberate on the problems submitted toour charge. 

We all agreed that the nomad Indians should be removed from thevicinity of the two great railroads then in rapid construction, andbe localized on one or other of the two great reservations south ofKansas and north of Nebraska; that agreements not treaties, shouldbe made for their liberal maintenance as to food, clothing, schools, and farming implements for ten years, during which time webelieved that these Indians should become self-supporting. To thenorth we proposed to remove the various bands of Sioux, with suchothers as could be induced to locate near them; and to the south, on the Indian Territory already established, we proposed to removethe Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and such others as wecould prevail on to move thither. 

At that date the Union Pacific construction had reached the RockyMountains at Cheyenne, and the Kansas Pacific to about FortWallace. We held council with the Ogallallas at the Forks of thePlatte, and arranged to meet them all the next spring, 1868. Inthe spring of 1868 we met the Crows in council at Fort Laramie, theSioux at the North Platte, the Shoshones or Snakes at Fort Hall, the Navajos at Fort Sumner, on the Pecos, and the Cheyennes andArapahoes at Medicine Lodge. To accomplish these results thecommission divided up into committees, General Augur going to theShoshones, Mr. Tappan and I to the Navajos, and the remainder toMedicine Lodge. In that year we made treaties or arrangements withall the tribes which before had followed the buffalo in theirannual migrations, and which brought them into constant conflictwith the whites. 

Mr. Tappan and I found it impossible to prevail on the Navajos toremove to the Indian Territory, and had to consent to their returnto their former home, restricted to a limited reservation west ofSanta Fe, about old Fort Defiance, and there they continue untothis day, rich in the possession of herds of sheep and goats, withsome cattle and horses; and they have remained at peace ever since. 

A part of our general plan was to organize the two greatreservations into regular Territorial governments, with Governor, Council, courts, and civil officers. General Harney wastemporarily assigned to that of the Sioux at the north, and GeneralHazen to that of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, etc. , etc. , at the south, but the patronage of the Indian Bureau was toostrong for us, and that part of our labor failed. Still, theIndian Peace Commission of 1867-'68 did prepare the way for thegreat Pacific Railroads, which, for better or worse, have settledthe fate of the buffalo and Indian forever. There have been warsand conflicts since with these Indians up to a recent period toonumerous and complicated in their detail for me to unravel andrecord, but they have been the dying struggles of a singular raceof brave men fighting against destiny, each less and less violent, till now the wild game is gone, the whites too numerous andpowerful; so that the Indian question has become one of sentimentand charity, but not of war. 

The peace, or "Quaker" policy, of which so much has been said, originated about thus: By the act of Congress, approved March3, 1869, the forty-five regiments of infantry were reduced totwenty-five, and provision was made for the "muster out" of many ofthe surplus officers, and for retaining others to be absorbed bythe usual promotions and casualties. On the 7th of May of thatyear, by authority of an act of Congress approved June 30, 1834, nine field-officers and fifty-nine captains and subalterns weredetached and ordered to report to the Commissioner of IndianAffairs, to serve as Indian superintendents and agents. Thus by anold law surplus army officers were made to displace the usual civilappointees, undoubtedly a change for the better, but mostdistasteful to members of Congress, who looked to theseappointments as part of their proper patronage. The consequencewas the law of July 15, 1870, which vacated the military commissionof any officer who accepted or exercised the functions of a civilofficer. I was then told that certain politicians called onPresident Grant, informing him that this law was chiefly designedto prevent his using army officers for Indian agents, "civiloffices, " which he believed to be both judicious and wise; armyofficers, as a rule, being better qualified to deal with Indiansthan the average political appointees. The President then quietlyreplied: "Gentlemen, you have defeated my plan of Indianmanagement; but you shall not succeed in your purpose, for I willdivide these appointments up among the religious churches, withwhich you dare not contend. " The army officers were consequentlyrelieved of their "civil offices, " and the Indian agencies wereapportioned to the several religious churches in about theproportion of their--supposed strength--some to the Quakers, someto the Methodists, to the Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, etc. , etc. --and thus it remains to the present time, thesereligious communities selecting the agents to be appointed by theSecretary of the Interior. The Quakers, being first named, gavename to the policy, and it is called the "Quaker" policy to-day. Meantime railroads and settlements by hardy, bold pioneers havemade the character of Indian agents of small concern, and itmatters little who are the beneficiaries. 

As was clearly foreseen, General U. S. Grant was duly nominated, and on the 7th of November, 1868, was elected President of theUnited States for the four years beginning with March 4, 1869. 

On the 15th and 16th of December, 1868, the four societies of theArmies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Georgia, held ajoint reunion at Chicago, at which were present over two thousandof the surviving officers and soldiers of the war. The ceremoniesconsisted of the joint meeting in Crosby's magnificent opera-house, at which General George H. Thomas presided. General W. W. Belknapwas the orator for the Army of the Tennessee, General Charles Cruftfor the Army of the Cumberland, General J. D. Cox for the Army ofthe Ohio, and General William Cogswell for the Army of Georgia. The banquet was held in the vast Chamber of Commerce, at which Ipresided. General Grant, President-elect, General J. M. Schofield, Secretary of War, General H. W. Slocum, and nearly every generalofficer of note was present except General Sheridan, who at themoment was fighting the Cheyennes in Southern Kansas and the Indiancountry. 

At that time we discussed the army changes which would necessarilyoccur in the following March, and it was generally understood thatI was to succeed General Grant as general-in-chief, but as to mysuccessor, Meade, Thomas, and Sheridan were candidates. And here Iwill remark that General Grant, afterward famous as the "silentman, " used to be very gossipy, and no one was ever more fond thanhe of telling anecdotes of our West Point and early army life. Atthe Chicago reunion he told me that I would have to come toWashington, that he wanted me to effect a change as to the generalstaff, which he had long contemplated, and which was outlined inhis letter to Mr. Stanton of January 29, 1866, given hereafter, which had been repeatedly published, and was well known to themilitary world; that on being inaugurated President on the 4th ofMarch he would retain General Schofield as his Secretary of Waruntil the change had become habitual; that the modern custom of theSecretary of War giving military orders to the adjutant-general andother staff officers was positively wrong and should be stopped. Speaking of General Grant's personal characteristics at that periodof his life, I recall a conversation in his carriage, when, ridingdown Pennsylvania Avenue, he, inquired of me in a humorous way, "Sherman, what special hobby do you intend to adopt?" I inquiredwhat he meant, and he explained that all men had their specialweakness or vanity, and that it was wiser to choose one's own thanto leave the newspapers to affix one less acceptable, and that forhis part he had chosen the "horse, " so that when anyone tried topump him he would turn the conversation to his "horse. " I answeredthat I would stick to the "theatre and balls, " for I was alwaysfond of seeing young people happy, and did actually acquire areputation for "dancing, " though I had not attempted the waltz, oranything more than the ordinary cotillon, since the war. 

On the 24th of February, 1869, I was summoned to Washington, arriving on the 26th, taking along my aides, Lieutenant-ColonelsDayton and Audenried. 

On the 4th of March General Grant was duly inaugurated President ofthe United States, and I was nominated and confirmed as General ofthe Army. 

Major-General P. H. Sheridan was at the same time nominated andconfirmed as lieutenant-general, with orders to command theMilitary Division of the Missouri, which he did, moving theheadquarters from St. Louis to Chicago; and General Meade wasassigned to command the Military Division of the Atlantic, withheadquarters at Philadelphia. 

At that moment General Meade was in Atlanta, Georgia, commandingthe Third Military District under the "Reconstruction Act;" andGeneral Thomas, whose post was in Nashville, was in Washington on acourt of inquiry investigating certain allegations against GeneralA. B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance. He occupied the room of the secondfloor in the building on the corner of H and Fifteenth Streets, since become Wormley's Hotel. I at the time was staying with mybrother, Senator Sherman, at his residence, 1321 K Street, and itwas my habit each morning to stop at Thomas's room on my way to theoffice in the War Department to tell him the military news, and totalk over matters of common interest. We had been intimatelyassociated as "man and boy" for thirty-odd years, and I profess tohave had better opportunities to know him than any man then living. His fame as the "Rock of Chickamauga" was perfect, and by the worldat large he was considered as the embodiment of strength, calmness, and imperturbability. Yet of all my acquaintances Thomas worriedand fretted over what he construed neglects or acts of favoritismmore than any other. 

At that time he was much worried by what he supposed was injusticein the promotion of General Sheridan, and still more that GeneralMeade should have an Eastern station, which compelled him to remainat Nashville or go to the Pacific. General Thomas claimed that allhis life he had been stationed in the South or remote West, and hadnot had a fair share of Eastern posts, whereas that General Meadehad always been there. I tried to get him to go with me to seePresident Grant and talk the matter over frankly, but he would not, and I had to act as a friendly mediator. General Grant assured meat the time that he not only admired and respected General Thomas, but actually loved him as a man, and he authorized me in making upcommands for the general officers to do anything and everything tofavor him, only he could not recede from his former action inrespect to Generals Sheridan and Meade. 

Prior to General Grant's inauguration the army register showed asmajor-generals Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock. Therefore, the promotion of General Sheridan to be lieutenant-general did not "overslaugh" Thomas, but it did Meade and Halleck. The latter did not expect promotion; General Meade did, but waspartially, not wholly, reconciled by being stationed atPhiladelphia, the home of his family; and President Grant assuredme that he knew of his own knowledge that General Sheridan had beennominated major-general before General Meade, but had waived datesout of respect for his age and longer service, and that he hadnominated him as lieutenant-general by reason of his specialfitness to command the Military Division of the Missouri, embracingall the wild Indians, at that very moment in a state of hostility. I gave General Thomas the choice of every other command in thearmy, and of his own choice he went to San Francisco, California, where he died, March 28, 1870. The truth is, Congress should haveprovided by law for three lieutenant-generals for these threepre-eminent soldiers, and should have dated their commissions with"Gettysburg, " "Winchester, " and "Nashville. " It would have been agraceful act, and might have prolonged the lives of two mostpopular officers, who died soon after, feeling that they hadexperienced ingratitude and neglect. 

Soon after General Grant's inauguration as President, and, as Isupposed, in fulfilment of his plan divulged in Chicago theprevious December, were made the following:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, March 8, 1869. 

General Orders No. 11:

The following orders of the President of the United States arepublished for the information and government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, March 5, 1869. 

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman willassume command of the Army of the United States. 

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report toand act under the immediate orders of the general commanding thearmy. 

Any official business which by law or regulation requires theaction of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted bythe General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general allorders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of thearmy, line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of theArmy. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Secretary of War. 

By command of the General of the Army. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

On the same day I issued my General Orders No. 12, assuming commandand naming all the heads of staff departments and bureaus asmembers of my staff, adding to my then three aides, Colonels McCoy, Dayton, and Audenried, the names of Colonels Comstock, HoracePorter, and Dent, agreeing with President Grant that the two lattercould remain with him till I should need their personal services orask their resignations. 

I was soon made aware that the heads of several of the staff corpswere restive under this new order of things, for by long usage theyhad grown to believe themselves not officers of the army in atechnical sense, but a part of the War Department, the civil branchof the Government which connects the army with the President andCongress. 

In a short time General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's formerchief of staff, was nominated and confirmed as Secretary of War;and soon appeared this order:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, March 27, 1869. 

General Orders No. 28:

The following orders received for the War Department are publishedfor the government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, March 26, 1869. 

By direction of the President, the order of the Secretary of War, dated War Department, March 5, 1869, and published in GeneralOrders No. 11, headquarters of the army, Adjutant-General's Office, dated March 8, 1869, except so much as directs General W. T. Sherman to assume command of the Army of the United States, ishereby rescinded. 

All official business which by law or regulations requires theaction of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted bythe chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to theSecretary of War. 

All orders and instructions relating to military operations issuedby the President or Secretary of War will be issued through theGeneral of the Army. 

JOHN A. RAWLINS, Secretary of War. 

By command of General SHERMAN:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Thus we were thrown back on the old method in having a double--ifnot a treble-headed machine. Each head of a bureau in dailyconsultation with the Secretary of War, and the general to commandwithout an adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, or any staff excepthis own aides, often reading in the newspapers of military eventsand orders before he could be consulted or informed. This was thevery reverse of what General Grant, after four years' experience inWashington as general-in-chief, seemed to want, different from whathe had explained to me in Chicago, and totally different from thedemand he had made on Secretary of War Stanton in his completeletter of January 29, 1866. I went to him to know the cause: Hesaid he had been informed by members of Congress that his action, as defined by his order of March 5th, was regarded as a violationof laws making provision for the bureaus of the War Department;that he had repealed his own orders, but not mine, and that he hadno doubt that General Rawlins and I could draw the line ofseparation satisfactorily to us both. General Rawlins was veryconscientious, but a very sick man when appointed Secretary of War. Several times he made orders through the adjutant-general toindividuals of the army without notifying me, but always when hisattention was called to it he apologized, and repeatedly said to methat he understood from his experience on General Grant's staff howalmost insulting it was for orders to go to individuals of aregiment, brigade, division, or an army of any kind without thecommanding officer being consulted or even advised. This habit ismore common at Washington than any place on earth, unless it be inLondon, where nearly the same condition of facts exists. Membersof Congress daily appeal to the Secretary of War for the dischargeof some soldier on the application of a mother, or some youngofficer has to be dry-nursed, withdrawn from his company on theplains to be stationed near home. The Secretary of War, sometimesmoved by private reasons, or more likely to oblige the member ofCongress, grants the order, of which the commanding general knowsnothing till he reads it in the newspapers. Also, an Indian tribe, goaded by the pressure of white neighbors, breaks out in revolt. The general-in-chief must reenforce the local garrisons not onlywith men, but horses, wagons, ammunition, and food. All thenecessary information is in the staff bureaus in Washington, butthe general has no right to call for it, and generally finds itmore practicable to ask by telegraph of the distant division ordepartment commanders for the information before making the formalorders. The general in actual command of the army should have afull staff, subject to his own command. If not, he cannot be heldresponsible for results. 

General Rawlins sank away visibly, rapidly, and died in Washington, September 6, 1869, and I was appointed to perform the duties of hisoffice till a successor could be selected. I realized how mucheasier and better it was to have both offices conjoined. 

The army then had one constitutional commander-in-chief of botharmy and navy, and one actual commanding general, bringing allparts into real harmony. An army to be useful must be a unit, andout of this has grown the saying, attributed to Napoleon, butdoubtless spoken before the days of Alexander, that an army with aninefficient commander was better than one with two able heads. Ourpolitical system and methods, however, demanded a separateSecretary of War, and in October President Grant asked me to scanthe list of the volunteer generals of good record who had served inthe civil war, preferably from the "West. " I did so, and submittedto him in writing the names of W. W. Belknap, of Iowa; G. M. Dodge, the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific Railroad; and LuciusFairchild, of Madison, Wisconsin. I also named General John W. Sprague, then employed by the Northern Pacific Railroad inWashington Territory. General Grant knew them all personally, andsaid if General Dodge were not connected with the Union PacificRailroad, with which the Secretary of War must necessarily havelarge transactions, he would choose him, but as the case stood, andremembering the very excellent speech made by General Belknap atthe Chicago reunion of December, 1868, he authorized me tocommunicate with him to ascertain if he were willing to come toWashington as Secretary of War. General Belknap was then thecollector of internal revenue at Keokuk, Iowa. I telegraphed himand received a prompt and favorable answer. His name was sent tothe Senate, promptly confirmed, and he entered on his dutiesOctober 25, 1869. General Belknap surely had at that date as fair afame as any officer of volunteers of my personal acquaintance. Hetook up the business where it was left off, and gradually fell intothe current which led to the command of the army itself as of thelegal and financial matters which properly pertain to the WarDepartment. Orders granting leaves of absence to officers, transfers, discharges of soldiers for favor, and all the oldabuses, which had embittered the life of General Scott in the daysof Secretaries of War Marcy and Davis, were renewed. I called hisattention to these facts, but without sensible effect. My officewas under his in the old War Department, and one day I sent myaide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, up to him with some message, andwhen he returned red as a beet, very much agitated, he asked me asa personal favor never again to send him to General Belknap. Iinquired his reason, and he explained that he had been treated witha rudeness and discourtesy he had never seen displayed by anyofficer to a soldier. Colonel Audenried was one of the mostpolished gentlemen in the army, noted for his personal bearing anddeportment, and I had some trouble to impress on him the patiencenecessary for the occasion, but I promised on future occasions tosend some other or go myself. Things went on from bad to worse, till in 1870 I received from Mr. Hugh Campbell, of St. Louis, apersonal friend and an honorable gentleman, a telegraphic messagecomplaining that I had removed from his position Mr. Ward, posttrader at Fort Laramie, with only a month in which to dispose ofhis large stock of goods, to make room for his successor. 

It so happened that we of the Indian Peace Commission had been muchindebted to this same trader, Ward, for advances of flour, sugar, and coffee, to provide for the Crow Indians, who had come down fromtheir reservation on the Yellowstone to meet us in 1868, before ourown supplies had been received. For a time I could not-comprehendthe nature of Mr. Campbell's complaint, so I telegraphed to thedepartment commander, General C. C. Augur, at Omaha, to know if anysuch occurrence had happened, and the reasons therefor. I receiveda prompt answer that it was substantially true, and had beenordered by The Secretary of War. It so happened that duringGeneral Grant's command of the army Congress had given to thegeneral of the army the appointment of "post-traders. " He hadnaturally devolved it on the subordinate division and departmentcommanders, but the legal power remained with the general of thearmy. I went up to the Secretary of War, showed him thetelegraphic correspondence, and pointed out the existing law in theRevised Statutes. General Belknap was visibly taken aback, andexplained that he had supposed the right of appointment rested withhim, that Ward was an old rebel Democrat, etc. ; whereas Ward hadbeen in fact the sutler of Fort Laramie, a United States militarypost, throughout the civil war. I told him that I should revokehis orders, and leave the matter where it belonged, to the localcouncil of administration and commanding officers. Ward wasunanimously reelected and reinstated. He remained the trader ofthe post until Congress repealed the law, and gave back the powerof appointment to the Secretary of War, when of course he had togo. But meantime he was able to make the necessary businessarrangements which saved him and his partners the sacrifice whichwould have been necessary in the first instance. I never had anyknowledge whatever of General Belknap's transactions with thetraders at Fort Sill and Fort Lincoln which resulted in hisdownfall. I have never sought to ascertain his motives forbreaking with me, because he knew I had always befriended him whileunder my military command, and in securing him his office ofSecretary of War. I spoke frequently to President Grant of thegrowing tendency of his Secretary of War to usurp all the powers ofthe commanding general, which would surely result in driving meaway. He as frequently promised to bring us together to agree upona just line of separation of our respective offices, but never did. 

Determined to bring the matter to an issue, I wrote the followingletter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , August 17, 1870. 

General W. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. 

GENERAL: I must urgently and respectfully invite your attentionwhen at leisure to a matter of deep interest to future commandinggenerals of the army more than to myself, of the imperativenecessity of fixing and clearly defining the limits of the powersand duties of the general of the army or of whomsoever may succeedto the place of commander-in-chief. 

The case is well stated by General Grant in his letter of January29, 1866, to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, hereto appended, and though I find no official answer recorded, I remember thatGeneral Grant told me that the Secretary of War had promptlyassured him in conversation that he fully approved of his views asexpressed in this letter. 

At that time the subject was much discussed, and soon afterCongress enacted the bill reviving the grade of general, which billwas approved July 25, 1866, and provided that the general, whencommissioned, may be authorized under the direction and during thepleasure of the President to command the armies of the UnitedStates; and a few days after, viz. , July 28, 1866, was enacted thelaw which defined the military peace establishment. The enactingclause reads: "That the military peace establishment of the UnitedStates shall hereafter consist of five regiments of artillery, tenregiments of cavalry, forty-five regiments of infantry, theprofessors and Corps of Cadets of the United States MilitaryAcademy, and such other forces as shall be provided for by thisact, to be known as the army of the United States. "

The act then recites in great detail all the parts of the army, making no distinction between the line and staff, but clearly makeseach and every part an element of the whole. 

Section 37 provides for a board to revise the army regulations andreport; and declares that the regulations then in force, viz. , those of 1863, should remain until Congress "shall act on saidreport;" and section 38 and last enacts that all laws and parts oflaws inconsistent with the provisions of this act be and the sameare hereby repealed. 

Under the provisions of this law my predecessor, General Grant, didnot hesitate to command and make orders to all parts of the army, the Military Academy, and staff, and it was under his advice thatthe new regulations were compiled in 1868 that drew the line moreclearly between the high and responsible duties of the Secretary ofWar and the general of the army. He assured me many a time beforeI was called here to succeed him that he wanted me to perfect thedistinction, and it was by his express orders that on assuming thecommand of the army I specifically placed the heads of the staffcorps here in Washington in the exact relation to the army whichthey would bear to an army in the field. 

I am aware that subsequently, in his orders of March 26th, hemodified his former orders of March 5th, but only as to the headsof bureaus in Washington, who have, he told me, certain functionsof office imposed on them by special laws of Congress, which laws, of course, override all orders and regulations, but I did noteither understand from him in person, or from General Rawlins, atwhose instance this order was made, that it was designed in any wayto modify, alter, or change his purposes that division anddepartment commanders, as well as the general of the army, shouldexercise the same command of the staff as they did of the line ofthe army. 

I need not remind the Secretary that orders and reports are made toand from the Military Academy which the general does not even see, though the Military Academy is specifically named as a part of thatarmy which he is required to command. Leaves of absence aregranted, the stations of officers are changed, and other orders arenow made directly to the army, not through the general, but directthrough other officials and the adjutant-general. 

So long as this is the case I surely do not command the army of theUnited States, and am not responsible for it. 

I am aware that the confusion results from the fact that thethirty-seventh section of the act of July 28, 1866, clothes thearmy regulations of 1863 with the sanction of law, but the nextsection repeals all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with theprovisions of this act. The regulations of 1863 are but acompilation of orders made prior to the war, when such men as Davisand Floyd took pleasure in stripping General Scott of even thesemblance of power, and purposely reduced him to a cipher in thecommand of the army. 

Not one word can be found in those regulations speaking of theduties of the lieutenant-general commanding the army, or defining asingle act of authority rightfully devolving on him. Not a singlemention is made of the rights and duties of a commander-in-chief ofthe army. He is ignored, and purposely, too, as a part of theprogramme resulting in the rebellion, that the army without alegitimate head should pass into the anarchy which these men wereshaping for the whole country. 

I invite your attention to the army regulations of 1847, when ourbest soldiers lived, among whom was your own father, and seeparagraphs 48 and 49, page 8, and they are so important that Iquote them entire:

"48. The military establishment is placed under the orders of themajor-general commanding in chief in all that regards itsdiscipline and military control. Its fiscal arrangements properlybelong to the administrative departments of the staff and to theTreasury Department under the direction of the Secretary of War. 

"49. The general of the army will watch over the economy of theservice in all that relates to the expenditure of money, supply ofarms, ordnance and ordnance stores, clothing, equipments, camp-equipage, medical and hospital stores, barracks, quarters, transportation, Military Academy, pay, and subsistence: in short, everything which enters into the expenses of the militaryestablishment, whether personal or material. He will also see thatthe estimates for the military service are based on proper data, and made for the objects contemplated by law, and necessary to thedue support and useful employment of the army. In carrying intoeffect these important duties, he will call to his counsel andassistance the staff, and those officers proper, in his opinion, tobe employed in verifying and inspecting all the objects which mayrequire attention. The rules and regulations established for thegovernment of the army, and the laws relating to the militaryestablishment, are the guides to the commanding general in theperformance of his duties. "

Why was this, or why was all mention of any field of duty for thehead of the army left out of the army regulations? Simply becauseJefferson Davis had a purpose, and absorbed to himself, asSecretary of War, as General Grant well says, all the powers ofcommander-in-chief. Floyd succeeded him, and the last regulationsof 1863 were but a new compilation of their orders, hastilycollected and published to supply a vast army with a new edition. 

I contend that all parts of these regulations inconsistent with thelaw of July 28, 1866, are repealed. 

I surely do not ask for any power myself, but I hope and trust, nowwhen we have a military President and a military Secretary of War, that in the new regulations to be laid before Congress next sessionthe functions and duties of the commander-in-chief will be soclearly marked out and defined that they may be understood byhimself and the army at large. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

[Inclosure. ]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1866. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (nowLieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during theadministration of President Polk, the command of the army virtuallypassed into the hands of the Secretary of War. 

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion the general-in-chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not, consequently, with propriety resume his proper functions. Toadminister the affairs of the army properly, headquarters and theadjutant-general's office must be in the same place. 

During the war, while in the field, my functions as commander ofall the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in allessential matters by the Administration and by the War Department. Now, however, that the war is over, and I have brought my head-quarters to the city, I find my present position embarrassing and, I think, out of place. I have been intending, or did intend, tomake the beginning of the New Year the time to bring this matterbefore you, with the view of asking to have the old condition ofaffairs restored, but from diffidence about mentioning the matterhave delayed. In a few words I will state what I conceive to be myduties and my place, and ask respectfully to be restored to themand it. 

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entirecontrol of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should goto the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief. Such as require the action of the President would belaid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regardedas those of the President. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all officialmatters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through thegeneral-in-chief) and the President. 

I can very well conceive that a rule so long disregarded could not, or would not, be restored without the subject being presented, andI now do so respectfully for your consideration. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

General Belknap never answered that letter. 

In August, 1870, was held at Des Moines, Iowa, an encampment of oldsoldiers which I attended, en route to the Pacific, and at Omahareceived this letter:

LONG BRANCH, New Jersey, August 18, 1870. 

General W. T. SHERMAN. 

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 7th inst. Did not reach LongBranch until after I had left for St. Louis, and consequently isjust before me for the first time. I do not know what changesrecent laws, particularly the last army bill passed, make in therelations between the general of the army and the Secretary of War. 

Not having this law or other statutes here, I cannot examine thesubject now, nor would I want to without consultation with theSecretary of War. On our return to Washington I have no doubt butthat the relations between the Secretary and yourself can be madepleasant, and the duties of each be so clearly defined as to leaveno doubt where the authority of one leaves off and the othercommences. 

My own views, when commanding the army, were that orders to thearmy should go through the general. No changes should be made, however, either of the location of troops or officers, without theknowledge of the Secretary of War. 

In peace, the general commanded them without reporting to theSecretary farther than he chose the specific orders he gave fromtime to time, but subjected himself to orders from the Secretary, the latter deriving his authority to give orders from thePresident. As Congress has the right, however, to make rules andregulations for the government of the army, rules made by themwhether they are as they should be or not, will have to govern. Asbefore stated, I have not examined the recent law. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

To which I replied:

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, September 2, 1870. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your most acceptable letter of August18th, and assure you that I am perfectly willing to abide by anydecision you may make. We had a most enthusiastic meeting at DesMoines, and General Bellknap gave us a fine, finished address. Ihave concluded to go over to San Francisco to attend the annualcelebration of the Pioneers, to be held on the 9th instant; fromthere I will make a short tour, aiming to get back to St. Louis bythe 1st of October, and so on to Washington without unnecessarydelay. 

Conscious of the heavy burdens already on you, I should refrainfrom adding one ounce to your load of care, but it seems to me nowis the time to fix clearly and plainly the field of duty for theSecretary of War and the commanding general of the army, so that wemay escape the unpleasant controversy that gave so much scandal inGeneral Scott's time, and leave to our successors a clear field. 

No matter what the result, I promise to submit to whatever decisionyou may make. I also feel certain that General Belknap thinks heis simply executing the law as it now stands, but I am equallycertain that he does not interpret the law reviving the grade ofgeneral, and that fixing the "peace establishment" of 1868, as Iconstrue them. 

For instance, I am supposed to control the discipline of theMilitary Academy as a part of the army, whereas General Belknapordered a court of inquiry in the case of the colored cadet, madethe detail, reviewed the proceedings, and made his order, withoutmy knowing a word of it, except through the newspapers; and morerecently, when I went to Chicago to attend to some divisionbusiness, I found the inspector-general (Hardie) under orders fromthe Secretary of War to go to Montana on some claim business. 

All I ask is that such orders should go through me. If all thestaff-officers are subject to receive orders direct from theSecretary of War it will surely clash with the orders they may bein the act of executing from me, or from their immediatecommanders. 

I ask that General Belknap draw up some clear, well-defined rulesfor my action, that he show them to me before publication, that Imake on them my remarks, and then that you make a final decision. I promise faithfully to abide by it, or give up my commission. 

Please show this to General Belknap, and I will be back early inOctober. With great respect, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN

I did return about October 15th, saw President Grant, who saidnothing had been done in the premises, but that he would bringGeneral Belknap and me together and settle this matter. Matterswent along pretty much as usual till the month of August, 1871, when I dined at the Arlington with Admiral Alder and GeneralBelknap. The former said he had been promoted to rear-admiral andappointed to command the European squadron, then at Villa Franca, near Nice, and that he was going out in the frigate Wabash, inviting me to go along. I had never been to Europe, and theopportunity was too tempting to refuse. After some preliminaries Iagreed to go along, taking with me as aides-de-camp ColonelAudenried and Lieutenant Fred Grant. The Wabash was beingoverhauled at the Navy-Yard at Boston, and was not ready to sailtill November, when she came to New-York, where we all embarkedSaturday, November 11th. 

I have very full notes of the whole trip, and here need only statethat we went out to the Island of Madeira, and thence to Cadiz andGibraltar. Here my party landed, and the Wabash went on to VillaFranca. From Gibraltar we made the general tour of Spain toBordeaux, through the south of France to Marseilles, Toulon, etc. , to Nice, from which place we rejoined the Wabash and brought ashoreour baggage. 

From Nice we went to Genoa, Turin, the Mont Cenis Tunnel, Milan, Venice, etc. , to Rome. Thence to Naples, Messina, and Syracuse, where we took a steamer to Malta. From Malta to Egypt andConstantinople, to Sebastopol, Poti, and Tiflis. At Constantinopleand Sebastopol my party was increased by Governor Curtin, his son, and Mr. McGahan. 

It was my purpose to have reached the Caspian, and taken boats tothe Volga, and up that river as far as navigation would permit, butwe were dissuaded by the Grand-Duke Michael, Governor-General ofthe Caucasas, and took carriages six hundred miles to Taganrog, onthe Sea of Azof, to which point the railroad system of Russia wascompleted. From Taganrog we took cars to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Here Mr. Curtin and party remained, he being ourMinister at that court; also Fred Grant left us to visit his auntat Copenhagen. Colonel Audenried and I then completed the tour ofinterior Europe, taking in Warsaw, Berlin, Vienna, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland, and Ireland, embarking for home in thegood steamer Baltic, Saturday, September 7, 1872, reachingWashington, D. C. , September 22d. I refrain from dwelling on thistrip, because it would swell this chapter beyond my purpose. 

When I regained my office I found matters unchanged since mydeparture, the Secretary of War exercising all the functions ofcommander-in-chief, and I determined to allow things to run to theirnecessary conclusion. In 1873 my daughter Minnie also made a tripto Europe, and I resolved as soon as she returned that I wouldsimply move back to St. Louis to execute my office there as best Icould. But I was embarrassed by being the possessor of a largepiece of property in Washington on I Street, near the corner ofThird, which I could at the time neither sell nor give away. Itcame into my possession as a gift from friends in New York andBoston, who had purchased it of General Grant and transferred to meat the price of $65, 000. 

The house was very large, costly to light, heat, and maintain, andCongress had reduced my pay four or five thousand dollars a year, so that I was gradually being impoverished. Taxes, too, grewannually, from about four hundred dollars a year to fifteenhundred, besides all sorts of special taxes. 

Finding myself caught in a dilemma, I added a new hall, and madeout of it two houses, one of which I occupied, and the other Irented, and thus matters stood in 1873-'74. By the agency of Mr. Hall, a neighbor and broker, I effected a sale of the property tothe present owner, Mr. Emory, at a fair price, accepting about halfpayment in notes, and the other half in a piece of property on EStreet, which I afterward exchanged for a place in Cite Brilliante, a suburb of St. Louis, which I still own. Being thus foot-loose, and having repeatedly notified President Grant of my purpose, Iwrote the Secretary of War on the 8th day of May, 1874, asking theauthority of the President and the War Department to remove myheadquarters to St. Louis. 

On the 11th day of May General Belknap replied that I had theassent of the President and himself, inclosing the rough draft ofan order to accomplish this result, which I answered on the 15th, expressing my entire satisfaction, only requesting delay in thepublication of the orders till August or September, as I preferredto make the changes in the month of October. 

On the 3d of September these orders were made:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, September 8, 1874. 

General Orders No. 108. 

With the assent of the President, and at the request of theGeneral, the headquarters of the armies of the United States willbe established at St. Louis, Missouri, in the month of Octobernext. 

The regulations and orders now governing the functions of theGeneral of the Army, and those in relation to transactions ofbusiness with the War Department and its bureaus, will continue inforce. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General. 

Our daughter Minnie was married October 1, 1874, to Thomas W. Fitch, United States Navy, and we all forthwith packed up andregained our own house at St. Louis, taking an office on the cornerof Tenth and Locust Streets. The only staff I brought with me werethe aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of"command, " I realized that it was a farce, and it did not need aprophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy. We made ourselvesvery comfortable, made many pleasant excursions into the interior, had a large correspondence, and escaped the mortification of beingslighted by men in Washington who were using their temporary powerfor selfish ends. 

Early in March, 1676, appeared in all the newspapers of the day thesensational report from Washington that Secretary of War Belknaphad been detected in selling sutlerships in the army; that he hadconfessed it to Representative Blackburn, of Kentucky; that he hadtendered his resignation, which had been accepted by the President;and that he was still subject to impeachment, --would be impeachedand tried by the Senate. I was surprised to learn that GeneralBelknap was dishonest in money matters, for I believed him a bravesoldier, and I sorely thought him honest; but the truth was soonrevealed from Washington, and very soon after I received from JudgeAlphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, a letter informing me that he hadbeen appointed Secretary of War, and should insist on my immediatereturn to Washington. I answered that I was ready to go toWashington, or anywhere, if assured of decent treatment. 

I proceeded to Washington, when, on the 6th of April, werepublished these orders:

General Orders No. 28. 

The following orders of the President of the United States arehereby promulgated for the information and guidance of allconcerned:

The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at WashingtonCity, and all orders and instructions relative to militaryoperations or affecting the military control and discipline of thearmy issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall bepromulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments ofthe Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General shall report to him, and be under his control in all matters relating thereto. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General. 

This was all I had ever asked; accordingly my personal staff werebrought back to Washington, where we resumed our old places; only Idid not, for some time, bring back the family, and then only to arented house on Fifteenth Street, which we occupied till we leftWashington for good. During the period from 1876 to 1884 we had asSecretaries of War in succession, the Hon's. Alphonso Taft, J. D. Cameron, George W. McCrary, Alexander Ramsey, and R. T. Lincoln, with each and all of whom I was on terms of the most intimate andfriendly relations. 

And here I will record of Washington that I saw it, under the magichand of Alexander R. Shepherd, grow from a straggling, ill-pavedcity, to one of the cleanest, most beautiful, and attractive citiesof the whole world. Its climate is salubrious, with as muchsunshine as any city of America. The country immediately about itis naturally beautiful and romantic, especially up the Potomac, inthe region of the Great Falls; and, though the soil be poor ascompared with that of my present home, it is susceptible of easyimprovement and embellishment. The social advantages cannot besurpassed even in London, Paris, or Vienna; and among the residentpopulation, the members of the Supreme Court, Senate, House ofRepresentatives, army, navy, and the several executive departments, may be found an intellectual class one cannot encounter in ourcommercial and manufacturing cities. The student may, without taxand without price, have access, in the libraries of Congress and ofthe several departments, to books of every nature and kind; and themuseums of natural history are rapidly approaching a standard ofcomparison with the best of the world. Yet it is the usual andproper center of political intrigue, from which the army especiallyshould keep aloof, because the army must be true and faithful tothe powers that be, and not be subjected to a temptation to favorone or other of the great parties into which our people havedivided, and will continue to divide, it may be, with advantage tothe whole. 

It would be a labor of love for me, in this connection, to pay atribute of respect, by name, to the many able and most patrioticofficers with whom I was so long associated as the commandinggenerals of military divisions and departments, as well asstaff-officers; but I must forego the temptation, because of themagnitude of the subject, certain that each and all of them willfind biographers better posted and more capable than myself; and Iwould also like to make recognition of the hundreds of acts of mostgraceful hospitality on the part of the officers and families atour remote military posts in the days, of the "adobe, " the "jacal, "and "dug-out, " when a board floor and a shingle roof were luxuriesexpected by none except the commanding officer. I can see, inmemory, a beautiful young city-bred lady, who had married a poorsecond-lieutenant, and followed him to his post on the plains, whose quarters were in a "dug-out" ten feet by about fifteen, sevenfeet high, with a dirt roof; four feet of the walls were thenatural earth, the other three of sod, with holes for windows andcorn-sacks for curtains. This little lady had her Saratoga trunk, which was the chief article of furniture; yet, by means of a rug onthe ground-floor, a few candle-boxes covered with red cotton calicofor seats, a table improvised out of a barrel-head, and a fireplaceand chimney excavated in the back wall or bank, she had transformedher "hole in the ground" into a most attractive home for her youngwarrior husband; and she entertained me with a supper consisting ofthe best of coffee, fried ham, cakes, and jellies from thecommissary, which made on my mind an impression more lasting thanhave any one of the hundreds of magnificent banquets I have sinceattended in the palaces and mansions of our own and foreign lands. 

Still more would I like to go over again the many magnificent tripsmade across the interior plains, mountains, and deserts before thedays of the completed Pacific Railroad, with regular "Doughertys"drawn by four smart mules, one soldier with carbine or loadedmusket in hand seated alongside the driver; two in the back seatwith loaded rifles swung in the loops made for them; the lightestkind of baggage, and generally a bag of oats to supplement thegrass, and to attach the mules to their camp. With an outfit oftwo, three, or four of such, I have made journeys of as much aseighteen hundred miles in a single season, usually from post topost, averaging in distance about two hundred miles a week, with asmuch regularity as is done today by the steam-car its five hundredmiles a day; but those days are gone, and, though I recognize thegreat national advantages of the more rapid locomotion, I cannothelp occasionally regretting the change. One instance in 1866rises in my memory, which I must record: Returning eastward fromFort Garland, we ascended the Rocky Mountains to the Sangre-de-Cristo Pass. The road descending the mountain was very rough andsidling. I got out with my rifle, and walked ahead about fourmiles, where I awaited my "Dougherty. " After an hour or so I saw, coming down the road, a wagon; and did not recognize it as my owntill quite near. It had been upset, the top all mashed in, and nomeans at hand for repairs. I consequently turned aside from themain road to a camp of cavalry near the Spanish Peaks, where wewere most hospitably received by Major A---- and his accomplishedwife. They occupied a large hospital-tent, which about a dozenbeautiful greyhounds were free to enter at will. The ambulance wasrepaired, and the next morning we renewed our journey, escorted bythe major and his wife on their fine saddle-horses. 

They accompanied us about ten miles of the way; and, though age hassince begun to tell on them, I shall ever remember them in theirpride and strength as they galloped alongside our wagons down thelong slopes of the Spanish Peaks in a driving snow-storm. 

And yet again would it be a pleasant task to recall the manybanquets and feasts of the various associations of officers andsoldiers, who had fought the good battles of the civil war, inwhich I shared as a guest or host, when we could indulge in areasonable amount of glorification at deeds done and recorded, withwit, humor, and song; these when memory was fresh, and when the oldsoldiers were made welcome to the best of cheer and applause inevery city and town of the land. But no! I must hurry to myconclusion, for this journey has already been sufficientlyprolonged. 

I had always intended to divide time with my natural successor, General P. H. Sheridan, and early, notified him that I should aboutthe year 1884 retire from the command of the army, leaving himabout an equal period of time for the highest office in the army. It so happened that Congress had meantime by successive "enactments"cut down the army to twenty-five thousand men, the usual strengthof a corps d'armee, the legitimate command of a lieutenant-general. Up to 1882 officers not disabled by wounds or sickness could onlyavail themselves of the privileges of retirement on application, after thirty years of service, at sixty-two years of age; but onthe 30th of June, 1882, a bill was passed which, by operation ofthe law itself, compulsorily retired all army officers, regardlessof rank, at the age of sixty-four years. At the time this law wasdebated in Congress, I was consulted by Senators and others in themost friendly manner, representing that, if I wanted it, anexception could justly and easily be made in favor of the generaland lieutenant-general, whose commissions expired with their lives;but I invariably replied that I did not ask or expect an exceptionin my case, because no one could know or realize when his ownmental and physical powers began to decline. I remembered well theexperience of Gil Blas with the Bishop of Granada, and favored thepassage of the law fixing a positive period for retirement, toobviate in the future special cases of injustice such as I had seenin the recent past. The law was passed, and every officer then knewthe very day on which he must retire, and could make hispreparations accordingly. In my own case the law was liberal inthe extreme, being "without reduction in his current pay andallowances. "

I would be sixty-four years old on the 8th of February, 1884, adate inconvenient to move, and not suited to other incidents; so Iresolved to retire on the 1st day of November, 1883, to resume myformer home at St. Louis, and give my successor ample time to meetthe incoming Congress, But, preliminary thereto, I concluded tomake one more tour of the continent, going out to the Pacific bythe Northern route, and returning by that of the thirty-fifthparallel. This we accomplished, beginning at Buffalo, June 21st, and ending at St. Louis, Missouri, September 30, 1883, a full andmost excellent account of which can be found in Colonel Tidball's"Diary, " which forms part of the report of the General of the Armyfor the year 1883. 

Before retiring also, as was my duty, I desired that my aides-de-camp who had been so faithful and true to me should not sufferby my act. All were to retain the rank of colonels of cavalry tillthe last day, February 8, 1884; but meantime each secured places, as follows:

Colonel O. M. Poe was lieutenant-colonel of the Engineer CorpsUnited States Army, and was by his own choice assigned to Detroitin charge of the engineering works on the Upper Lakes, which dutywas most congenial to him. 

Colonel J. C. Tidball was assigned to command the Artillery Schoolat Fort Monroe, by virtue of his commission as lieutenant-colonel, Third Artillery, a station for which he was specially qualified. 

Colonel John E. Tourtelotte was then entitled to promotion tomajor of the Seventh Cavalry, a rank in which he could be certainof an honorable command. 

The only remaining aide-de-camp was Colonel John M. Bacon, whoutterly ignored self in his personal attachment to me. He was thena captain of the Ninth Cavalry, but with almost a certainty ofpromotion to be major of the Seventh before the date of my officialretirement, which actually resulted. The last two accompanied meto St. Louis, and remained with me to the end. Having previouslyaccomplished the removal of my family to St. Louis, and havingcompleted my last journey to the Pacific, I wrote the followingletter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , October 8, 1883. 

Hon. R. T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War. 

SIR: By the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882, allarmy-officers are retired on reaching the age of sixty-four years. If living, I will attain that age on the 8th day of February, 1884;but as that period of the year is not suited for the changesnecessary on my retirement, I have contemplated anticipating theevent by several months, to enable the President to meet thesechanges at a more convenient season of the year, and also to enablemy successor to be in office before the assembling of the nextCongress. 

I therefore request authority to turn over the command of the armyto Lieutenant-General Sheridan on the 1st day of November, 1883, and that I be ordered to my home at St. Louis, Missouri, there toawait the date of my legal retirement; and inasmuch as for a longtime I must have much correspondence about war and officialmatters, I also ask the favor to have with me for a time my twopresent aides-de-camp, Colonels J. E. Tourtelotte and J. M. Bacon. 

The others of my personal staff, viz. , Colonels O. M. Poe and J. C. Tidball, have already been assigned to appropriate duties intheir own branches of the military service, the engineers andartillery. All should retain the rank and pay as aides-de-campuntil February 8, 1884. By or before the 1st day of November I cancomplete all official reports, and believe I can surrender the armyto my successor in good shape and condition, well provided in allrespects, and distributed for the best interests of the country. 

I am grateful that my physical and mental-strength remainunimpaired by years, and am thankful for the liberal provision madeby Congress for my remaining years, which will enable me to respondpromptly to any call the President may make for my military serviceor judgment as long as I live. I have the honor to be yourobedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

The answer was:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, October 10, 1888. 

General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I have submitted to the President your letter of the 8thinstant, requesting that you be relieved of the command of the armyon the 1st of November next, as a more convenient time for makingthe changes in military commands which must follow your retirementfrom active service, than would be the date of your retirementunder the law. 

In signifying his approval of your request, the President directsme to express to you his earnest hope that there may be given youmany years of health and happiness in which to enjoy the gratitudeof your fellow-citizens, well earned by your most distinguishedpublic services. 

It will give me pleasure to comply with your wishes respecting youraides-de-camp, and the necessary orders will be duly issued. 

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant, ROBERT T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War. 

On the 27th day of October I submitted to the Secretary ofWar, the Hon. R. T. Lincoln, my last annual report, embracing amongother valuable matters the most interesting and condensed report ofColonel O. M. Poe, A. D. C. , of the "original conception, progress, and completion" of the four great transcontinental railways, whichhave in my judgment done more for the subjugation and civilizationof the Indians than all other causes combined, and have madepossible the utilization of the vast area of pasture lands andmineral regions which before were almost inaccessible, for myagency in which I feel as much pride as for my share in any of thebattles in which I took part. 

Promptly on the 1st of November were made the following generalorders, and the command of the Army of the United States passedfrom me to Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, with as littleceremony as would attend the succession of the lieutenant-colonelof a regiment to his colonel about to take a leave of absence:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, November 1, 1885. 

General Orders No. 77:

By and with the consent of the President, as contained in GeneralOrders No. 71, of October 13, 1883, the undersigned relinquishescommand of the Army of the United States. 

In thus severing relations which have hitherto existed between us, he thanks all officers and men for their fidelity to the high trustimposed on them during his official life, and will, in hisretirement, watch with parental solicitude their progress upward inthe noble profession to which they have devoted their lives. 

W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

Official: R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, November 1, 1885. 

General Orders No. 78:

In obedience to orders of the President, promulgated in GeneralOrders No. 71, October 13, 1883, from these headquarters, theundersigned hereby assumes command of the Army of the UnitedStates.... 

P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieutenant-General. 

Official: R. C. DRUM, adjutant-General. 

After a few days in which to complete my social visits, and after ashort visit to my daughter, Mrs. A. M. Thackara, at Philadelphia, Iquietly departed for St. Louis; and, as I hope, for "good and all, "the family was again reunited in the same place from which we weredriven by a cruel, unnecessary civil war initiated in CharlestonHarbor in April, 1861. 

On the 8th day of February, 1884; I was sixty-four years of age, and therefore retired by the operation of the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882; but the fact was gracefully noticed byPresident Arthur in the following general orders:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, February 8, 1984. 

The following order of the President is published to the army:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 8, 1884. 

General William T. Sherman, General of the Army, having this dayreached the age of sixty-four years, is, in accordance with thelaw, placed upon the retired list of the army, without reduction inhis current pay and allowances. 

The announcement of the severance from the command of the army ofone who has been for so many years its distinguished chief, can butawaken in the minds, not only of the army, but of the people of theUnited States, mingled emotions of regret and gratitude--regret atthe withdrawal from active military service of an officer whoselofty sense of duty has been a model for all soldiers since hefirst entered the army in July, 1840; and gratitude, freshlyawakened, for the services of incalculable value rendered by him inthe war for the Union, which his great military genius and daringdid so much to end. 

The President deems this a fitting occasion to give expression, inthis manner, to the gratitude felt toward General Sherman by hisfellow-citizens, and to the hope that Providence may grant him manyyears of health and happiness in the relief from the active dutiesof his profession. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

CHESTER A. ARTHUR. 

R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General. 

To which I replied:

St. Louis, February 9, 1884. 

His Excellency CHESTER A. ARTHUR, President of the United States. 

DEAR SIR: Permit me with a soldier's frankness to thank youpersonally for the handsome compliment bestowed in general ordersof yesterday, which are reported in the journals of the day. To meit was a surprise and a most agreeable one. I had supposed theactual date of my retirement would form a short paragraph in thecommon series of special orders of the War Department; but as thehonored Executive of our country has made it the occasion for hisown hand to pen a tribute of respect and affection to an officerpassing from the active stage of life to one of ease and rest, Ican only say I feel highly honored, and congratulate myself in thusrounding out my record of service in a manner most gratifying to myfamily and friends. Not only this, but I feel sure, when theorders of yesterday are read on parade to the regiments andgarrisons of the United States, many a young hero will tighten hisbelt, and resolve anew to be brave and true to the starry flag, which we of our day have carried safely through one epoch ofdanger, but which may yet be subjected to other trials, which maydemand similar sacrifices, equal fidelity and courage, and a largermeasure of intelligence. Again thanking you for so marked acompliment, and reciprocating the kind wishes for the future, I am, with profound respect, your friend and servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

This I construe as the end of my military career. In looking backupon the past I can only say, with millions of others, that I havedone many things I should not have done, and have left undone stillmore which ought to have been done; that I can see where hundredsof opportunities have been neglected, but on the whole am content;and feel sure that I can travel this broad country of ours, and beeach night the welcome guest in palace or cabin; and, as

 "all the world's stage, And all the men and women merely players, "

I claim the privilege to ring down the curtain. 

W. T. SHERMAN, General.