THE PROBLEM OF CHINA BY BERTRAND RUSSELL O. M. , F. K. S. _London_GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTDRUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREETFIRST PUBLISHED IN 1922SECOND IMPRESSION 1966 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAINBY PHOTOLITHOGRAPHYUNWIN BROTHERS LIMITEDWOKING AND LONDON CONTENTS CHAPTER FOREWORD I. QUESTIONS II. CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY III. CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS IV. MODERN CHINA V. JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION VI. MODERN JAPAN VII. JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914VIII. JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR IX. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE X. PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST XI. CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED XII. THE CHINESE CHARACTERXIII. HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA XIV. INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA XV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA APPENDIX INDEX The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him. " Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died. --[_Chuang Tze_, Legge's translation. ] The Problem of China CHAPTER I QUESTIONS A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive andreflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of verypuzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europewill not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have importantaffinities with those of China, but they have also importantdifferences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of thehuman race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected bythe development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisivefactor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes itimportant, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that thereshould be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give. The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturallyinto three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of thesegroups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each isintimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think thecultural questions are the most important, both for China and formankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or lessequanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to thatend. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest forpractical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nationsas for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headedbusiness community has long been a commonplace of novelists andmoralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought upthe pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regardedas an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of theartist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful tooneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order tosurvive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and causemisery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by allforeign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all ofus? China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapidprocess of change. The traditional civilization of China had developedin almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demeritsquite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt tostrike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on thewhole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in theCelestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person wouldventure to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects inwhich we are better than old China, and to other respects in which weare worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to befruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of asuperior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right toexploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior"race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferiorto ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimateknowledge of China, would take the same view. In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to askoneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regardto home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that Iultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society moredesirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to seerealized in the world? Different people will answer these questionsdifferently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuadea man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore becontent merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope thatthe reader may feel likewise. The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and notmerely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctivehappiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak ofknowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of drylists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has noappreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be athing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may besaid, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge onthis topic would, however, take me too far from my theme. When I speakof art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I donot mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though ofcourse these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also thealmost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russianpeasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that createsfolk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of thePuritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joyof life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that wehave lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most ofus live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well ofChinese civilization. In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much ofgood or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it hasin promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the goodthings which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what weendeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespreadoppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are notstrong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoyby means of their own merits and exertions alone. These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant inconsidering the practical problems of China. Our industrial andcommercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause ofcertain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; inChina one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of asociety which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, forexample, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have comeunder Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we havesecured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until webrought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and alife full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these oppositeachievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; andunless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue theless familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomedalways make a stronger impression than those that we have learned totake as a matter of course. The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid changeis needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceableultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future oureconomic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, ifthe Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of ourcivilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be ableto achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce avery splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. Thefirst danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retainingnothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one moreto the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nationswhich now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is thatthey may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything exceptarmaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen inChina. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up withpolitical and economic questions; and it is through their influence thatdangers arise. China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, onthe one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In consideringthe effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japanmust count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility forJapan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and hasambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must thereforedistinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one ormore white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) Chinamay recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourthpossibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers maycontrol China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanesewill be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, Ibelieve that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If theJapanese had a different character this would not be the case; but thenature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and unneighbourly. Ishall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with therelations of China and Japan. To understand the problem of China, we must first know something ofChinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, thensomething of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomaticrelations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it ispossible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japanhad not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominantforeign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary tounderstand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nationthey were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influencethe West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has madepeople in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable toapprehend the meaning of what Japan has done. Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explainwhat is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almostmore important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainlythe most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether theresources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by thewhite races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not onlythe whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of powerin the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and thechances of development towards a better economic system in the advancednations. The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed theconflict for the possession of China between nations all of which haveguaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made itfar more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards FarEastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can Chinapreserve any shadow of independence without a great development ofnationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocatenationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say topatriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have foundonly one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world;it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It isessentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized"nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, theirbombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each otherwithin the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifismhas kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid beinggoaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, andleave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war andrapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps aslender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better thandespair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and sometolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many thatare worse. Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to apsychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, ourimperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring froma superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for itsown sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, hasbecome somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would havenever taken place if the Western nations had been slightly moreindolent. But in America this creed is still almost universallyaccepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who havebeen aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, likeChina, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it hasbeen governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished tointroduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I mighthave had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though notmany) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief thatWestern push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannotnow take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to mefar less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, thanthose produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness ofEurope and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong withour civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believethat those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. TheChinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way oflife which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all theworld happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiencydirected to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to thisconsummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn someof that wisdom for which it despises the East. It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized howprofound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviksare attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just asJapan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day afterday, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations ofeverything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understandand no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us layat death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and theindifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds ofloud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay agreat silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemedthat none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me soinsistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and theendless information of the well-informed. One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where therewere no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row ofpoplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, andfound on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddledtogether surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, otherssilently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted upgnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings theyundoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to growintimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knewthat they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until aboat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they hadheard--falsely perhaps--that the earth was more generous than in thecountry they had left. Some would die by the way, all would sufferhunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferingswould be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set ofWesternizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russiais so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planetare lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that thetheorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force theminto actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could notbelieve that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel ofindustrialism and forced labour. Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussionsof the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a trulypopular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen thesleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seenthem, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of thatpatient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely andunspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiarintellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics areinspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted totorture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power ortheory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what wehad to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time Iheard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but thesound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with aterrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. CHAPTER II CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their earlyhistory is known only from their own annals, which throw no light uponthe question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, notcomposed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts ofprinces whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification orwarning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B. C. "The ageof Yao and Shun, " in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age"mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, theChinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banksof the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached afairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any otherpart of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt uponits bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenlyalters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructivetorrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would haveinspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by humansacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace ofsuperstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were alloccupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those ofthe engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the stateof belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao showswhat was expected of an Emperor:-- He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were transformed. The result was universal concord. [1] The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese historyis that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B. C. [2] There is no reason todoubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earliertimes, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, theChou dynasty, which fell in 249 B. C. And is supposed to have begun in1122 B. C. , was already declining in power as compared with a number ofnominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at thistime, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King ofFrance during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was atits lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, eachstrong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control oversubordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lastingfor centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty whichtemporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historiansalways attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power ofeunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, whichfluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religiousprerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heavenat the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymouswith "The Supreme Ruler, " a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Gilesmaintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correcttranslation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God. " The word"Tien, " in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though thelatter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti, " which means"Supreme Ruler, " belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but bothterms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as theGod of the Old Testament. [4] As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven"remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. TheEmperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven, " and the ritescontinued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven inPeking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annualsacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole officialsurvival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could becalled religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have neverhad any connection with the State. The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B. C. , because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which isa chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official. One of the odd things about the history of China is that after theEmperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2, 000 years, onecomes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor, " Shih Huang Ti. Heacquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221B. C. , and died in 210 B. C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkablefor three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. Thedestruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated bymany subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow upagain whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih HuangTi was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over allChina in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with hisson, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China"is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chineseput the family name first. ) His Empire was roughly co-extensive withwhat is now China proper. The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, asappears from his calling himself "First Emperor, " disliked beingreminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; thereforehistory was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strongforce in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour ofthe preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was avigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and notof pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity andradicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that-- All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go before the local civil and military authorities so that they may be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ... , of agriculture and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 203. ) It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. TheChinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the otherhand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition ofold-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt todestroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6]says:-- No radical change can take place in China without encountering the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to support their contention and these they freely quoted to show that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the government to such an extent that something had to be done to silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was subsequently buried alive. This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which isanxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarshipof the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, hasa tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese haveexcelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has madeprogress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks witha favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionarypedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has comedown to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict wassomewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-twoyears, in 191. B. C. After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherithis capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206B. C. To A. D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactlycoeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns inNorthern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contactwith India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire. [7] Theirrelations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as wellas upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had littleimportance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A. D. 164a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire. [8]Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, whichstands for Antoninus. It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immenseprestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of Europeanarmies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted tothink that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost asephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The militarysuperiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we aretempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a meredelusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre ofthe universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier, [9] dealing withthe campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Handynasty, says:-- The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the history of the world when they have grouped around the people of Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who wrote the history of their little world while they believed that they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole. In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, isliable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for thecivilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, ifwe are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods ofdisorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A. D. 618-907). Under thisdynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatestextent, and art and poetry reached their highest point. [10] The Empireof Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained agreat part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghisand his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors inChina, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghisdestroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. WhenMerv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700, 000 peoplewere killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among thecorpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should havetheir heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, oneof women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might haveescaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to killany that might emerge. [11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow andKieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for thesemassacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times ofJenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods ofcausing death were more merciful than those that have been employedsince the Armistice. Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, throughMarco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and thefirst Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted theSung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhatabated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capitalfrom Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those whichstill surround the city, and established on the walls an observatorywhich is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomicalinstruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in thisobservatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after thesuppression of the Boxers. [12] I understand they have been restored inaccordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Ifso, this was probably the most important benefit which that treatysecured to the world. Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays inthe history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather twosuccessive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly bystorms, and partly by Japanese valour. After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted untilthe Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, havingcontributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except thepigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution. The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to beattributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering itsextent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak andincompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, andwere less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited abarren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting avery sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese aftercenturies of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to imposetheir ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them andwent on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survivedthe Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves ofbarbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was savedfrom this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since thewhite men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity islost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the nationalindependence. In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinesecivilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction ofBuddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted aslong, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in theworld. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, withan almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of theeighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it issaid to have sunk to about 17 millions. [13] A census has been taken atvarious times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not ofindividuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by amore or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that differentmethods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisonsbetween different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. PutnamWeale[14] says:-- The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million persons, which is less than the number given in the first census of the Han dynasty, A. D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294. ) Thus we are faced by the amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145 millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk to 261 millions. I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China YearBook for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):-- The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a Student Interpreter at the U. S. Legation, Peking.... It is pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not individuals were counted. The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) isgiven, on the basis of this census, as 329, 542, 000, while the populationof Tibet is estimated at 1, 500, 000. Estimates which have been made atvarious other dates are given as follows (p. 2): A. D. A. D. 1381 59, 850, 000 / 143, 125, 2251412 66, 377, 000 1760--203, 916, 4771580 60, 692, 000 1761 205, 293, 0531662 21, 068, 000 1762 198, 214, 5531668 25, 386, 209 1790 155, 249, 897 / 23, 312, 200 / 307, 467, 2001710 --27, 241, 129 1792- 333, 000, 0001711 28, 241, 129 / 362, 467, 1831736 125, 046, 245 1812--360, 440, 000 / 157, 343, 975 1842 413, 021, 0001743 149, 332, 730 1868 404, 946, 514 \ 150, 265, 475 1881 380, 000, 0001753 103, 050, 600 1882 381, 309, 000 1885 377, 636, 000 These figures suffice to show how little is known about the populationof China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year(_e. G. _ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. Butno one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increasedfrom 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing ordiminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, orany of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more thanguess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to beabout 900, 000, but it may be anywhere between 800, 000 and a million. Asfor the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assumethat it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likelythat it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeedcan be said with confidence as to the population of China in formertimes; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are tobe distrusted. There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilizationwhich give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to selectas the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabetin writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religionamong the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen byexamination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family systemdistinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents astage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which istherefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which Ihave enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all othercountries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about eachof the three. 1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, butsymbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: itmeans that, in learning to write, there are an immense number ofdifferent signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is nosuch thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, catalogues, etc. , are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible;that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot bewritten down by sound, as in European languages, but have to berepresented by some elaborate device. [15] For these reasons, there is amovement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers;and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is totake her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider thatthey have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no otherargument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, wherereading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient todecide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, themovement for phonetic writing deserves support. There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to whichsomething of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probablytraceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent asound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted theChinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922, " for example, canbe read in English, French, or any other language, with quite differentsounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinesecharacters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference ofdialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script inJapanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by anEnglishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although thespoken language must have changed as much as French has changed fromLatin. The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, whichenables it to be a means of communication between different places anddifferent times. But since the spoken language changes from place toplace and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing ismore fully attained by a script which does not aim at representingspoken sounds than by one which does. Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese methodof writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probablypassed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as asymbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptianhieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phoneticwriting can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation ofthe ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advancedcivilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the factthat the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full ofhomonyms. As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected thementality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections inan article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore), for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some AnthropologicalProblems of China. " He says (p. 327):-- Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do.... The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the spirit remains to be determined. Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, whichis impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit thatthe Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization"as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent tojudge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing thedistinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubtthat this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kindindicated in the above quotation. 2. Confucius (B. C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his socialinfluence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutionsand on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that ofBuddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, aboutwhose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth havebeen less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguisheshim from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very littlereligious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism inthe countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory andadministered the Empire. Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon thanto that of the great founders of religions. He was a practicalstatesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtueshe sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designedto secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to apeaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook wasessentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of formerages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphaticmonotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserveda shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants torender as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stressupon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave thefollowing definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towardsour neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintainingalways a due reserve. "[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one'sneighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except whenhe was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlikethe Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor wasjustified if he governed very badly. The following passage fromProfessor Giles[17] illustrates this point:-- The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under the year 558 B. C. We find the following narrative. One of the feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps the ruler himself, " was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and what can the people do but get rid of him?" This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughoutChinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent. Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps theweakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the systemdeparts seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militatedagainst public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased thetyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confrontedwith problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of theConfucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, andaccordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit Chinapraising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China toconstruct something more suited to modern needs. The way in whichConfucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spiritis illustrated by the following story:[18] One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us here, " he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him. " "In my part of the country, " replied Confucius, "there is a different standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found. " It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutusand his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up. Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary tofilial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve theindigence of one's aged parents. [19] This form of sin, however, is rarein China as in other countries. The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain withoutchildren, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have nodescendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine hasmade the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had greatbiological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar toChina, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In thisrespect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is thepreservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilizationhad been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from theChinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the familybecame less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happenuntil our own day. Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it iscertainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind tothe practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one'sloyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in avery primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily tomilitarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing theinterests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancingthe interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Thereforefamily feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne outby the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe. Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a codeof civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. Ittaught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moralcode was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe thatonly a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned withpersonal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. Itwas not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the moreimperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this hemust exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extensionof the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave. " Hemust not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must"save face, " and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries;he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive loveor hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of allhis actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and theguillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions haveoccurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making themless terrible for the participants, and making all who were notimmediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attackyour adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, andwon a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette;so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, andfought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles inChina are seldom bloody. ) In such a country, militarism is not thescourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucianethics. [20] Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth centuryA. D. , when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrustaside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze, [21] whose interpretation ofConfucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fallof the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favouredConfucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there werestruggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, andappealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died ofdrinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhistsof the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; butthe Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, wereultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for manycenturies, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religionbut not in morals, while the rest of the population believed andpractised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not thebelief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, allothers must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to bevery little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magiclingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there wasreligion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkablethat religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any correspondingethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe. 3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitiveexamination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary andunsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained itshold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by thepresent President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his bookon _China after the War_, pp. 59-60. [22] After considering theeducational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A. D. ), the Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public offices. College training and local elections supplemented each other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest emphasis. Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no fixed standard for the recommendation of public service candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic class from which alone were to be found eligible men. Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A. D. ) abolished the elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the competitive examination system in their place. The examinations were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in family education and in private schools. Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency inexaminations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc. , yet theChinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmfulthrough the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it waspurely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objectsof modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23]says: In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of Chinese composition, called the "Essay, " or the "Eight Legs, " which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, because after the introduction of the theme the writer was required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs, " China long ago reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have been so long venerated. These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and nodoubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard thingsthat he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when oneconsiders the practicable alternatives, one can see that there wasprobably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; thepossibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection ofadministrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and thepreservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept awayto meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have toperish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierceand cruel system which they miscall civilization. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King, _ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _AncientHistory of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which givesmuch useful critical information about early China. ] [Footnote 2: Hirth, op. Cit. P. 174. 775 is often wrongly given. ] [Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. Cit. , p. 100 ff. ] [Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism andits Rivals, _ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9. ] [Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, Paris, 1920, vol. I. P. 213. ] [Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1914), p. 61. ] [Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig andShanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There areallusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. Cit. , i. P. 271. ] [Footnote 8: Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 281. ] [Footnote 9: Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 237. ] [Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. I. P. 146), thusdescribes the greatness of the early Tang Empire: "In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established theillustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunesof China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reignof ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has everseen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront ofcivilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, themost progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but onthe face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confinesof Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, alongthese mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to theinner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around theHindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal andMagadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from theByzantine Empire and the Court of Persia. "] [Footnote 11: Cordier, op. Cit. Ii. P. 212. ] [Footnote 12: Cordier, op. Cit. Ii. P. 339. ] [Footnote 13: Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 484. ] [Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. , pp. 13, 14. ] [Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made inChinese to my own name was "Lo-Su. " There is a word "Lo, " and a word"Su, " for both of which there are characters; but no combination ofcharacters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name. ] [Footnote 16: Giles, op. Cit. , p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _à propos_of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve, " the followingfootnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them, ' which would beequivalent to 'have nothing to do with them. ' Confucius seems rather tohave meant 'no familiarity. '"] [Footnote 17: Op. Cit. , p. 21. ] [Footnote 18: Giles, op. Cit. P. 86. ] [Footnote 19: Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 167. ] [Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is evenmore emphatic. "The best soldiers, " says Lao-Tze, "do not fight. "(Giles, op. Cit. P. 150. ) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers. ] [Footnote 21: Giles, op. Cit. , Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incidentoccurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miraclesare impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet abovethe ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my reveredfather-in-law, " he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles areimpossible. " Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, andthe son-in-law's faith revived. ] [Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, 1920. ] [Footnote 23: Op. Cit. P. 233. ] CHAPTER III CHINA AND THE WESTERN POWERS In order to understand the international position of China, some factsconcerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China wasfor many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast andfertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before thebeginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands ofofficials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, asin England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chieflyreligious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism wasimported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to thatcountry to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journeypractically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in theseventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. (What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monumentdiscovered in Hsianfu in 1625. ) In the seventeenth and early eighteenthcenturies Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour atCourt, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help inrectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinesecalendar. [24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on thewalls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrelsbetween different orders, and were almost completely excluded from bothChina and Japan. In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived inChina, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of apermanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this timewas Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, apatron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimensof his writing in all sorts of places in China. ) His reply to KingGeorge III is given by Backhouse and Bland. [25] I wish I could quote itall, but some extracts must suffice. It begins: You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealingwith an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly begratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for: If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby. Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... Have no use for your country's manufactures. ... It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feelsthat they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange: "Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance andlacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need toimport the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our ownproduce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empireproduces are absolute necessities to European nations and toyourselves, " the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is tocontinue. He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forgetthe lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world byintervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance ofthe usages of our Celestial Empire. " He concludes with the injunction:"Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!" What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until thisdocument has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule theworld, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. TheEmpire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a largerpopulation; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and hadnot fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or byabsorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except theJapanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander theGreat, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard ofChina, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fiftyyears. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everythingneeded for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced tradeupon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only thingswhich they would do better without. Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was atleast the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe wouldnot have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There isa museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may beseen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished toimpress him with the splendour of _Le Roi Soleil_. Compared to theChinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The factthat Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, andall the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does notmake us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton andRobert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior bygiving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for anEnglishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lungis absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work todemonstrate this proposition. Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the ChineseGovernment endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended withthe cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America andScandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war onChina, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking, [26] a building whoseartistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have beenabout equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than thatof Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of thesuperiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and theriver Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory atHong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a Britishdiplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained anindemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, theFrench took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly underChinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading toJapan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitionswould have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germanyand Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our supportof Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance betweenChina and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all theimportant rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after theRusso-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries inShantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving ofit; for if they had lived they would probably have made very fewconverts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson inChristian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a navalbase there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance withthe Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanesepossession, though America at Washington has insisted upon itsrestitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization didnot, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in theGerman Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany andto hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on theBoxer rising, which is said to have begun as a movement against theGermans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans inevery respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in theYangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming thepolicy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeansknow about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack ofPeking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter ofPeking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by abare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It isadministered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have nopowers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt andtraitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in theJapanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of theircrimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter theAmericans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable ofcommunicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation ofChien Lung is completed. Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. TheAmericans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, theystill had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent onhigher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from thefriendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) isincalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly anysigns of following suit. To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government isfaced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties whichhave been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had noexperience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; inlater days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scrapsof paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--aprerogative which every single one of them exercises. The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff. [27] Atthe end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treatywhich provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. On all importsand not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of thewhole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up aschedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. Was to becalculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact onlybeen revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918. [28] Revision of theschedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change inthe tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff ispractically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treatiesinvolving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, withtwelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in thetariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers. When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, itmust be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinesethe usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereignStates. [29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has notime-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as othercommercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish tofind a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore nomotive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practisedfree trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy weforced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. Butno other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we haveabandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act. The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, forthe sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on allexports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue isdesperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities shouldconsider the tax indispensable. There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the timeof the Taiping rebellion, namely the erection of internal customsbarriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted withthe internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sendinggoods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by thepayment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this isgenerally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favoursforeign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system ofinternal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on theground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internalcustoms in return for certain uniform increases in the import and exporttariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. Butthere were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not allcould be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, notchiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It shouldbe added that internal customs are collected by the provincialauthorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armiesand civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strongenough to stop these abuses. The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of theChinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of theservice, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that ofany other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officialsis in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures)there were 7, 500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2, 000were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his dutiesexceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for thepresent system. The Chinese have the appointment of theInspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic totheir country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modernbureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to theChinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a usefuleducative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of anefficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practicaland intellectual training from the white nations without becoming theirslaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customshas much to recommend it during the early stages. [30] At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independencein the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the factthat the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenuederivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view ofChinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, theCustoms administration can exercise considerable control over Chinesepolitics by recognizing or not recognizing a given _de facto_Government. (There is no Government _de jure_, at any rate in theNorth. ) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and anartificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionaryinstincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internalreform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attemptingto introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way ofreconstruction. There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also wasaccepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make thesecurity acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon theemployment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of theCustoms, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regardsthe Customs. The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans toChina. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunitiesof interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by threetelegrams in _The Times_ which appeared during January of this year. On January 14, 1922, _The Times_ published the following in a telegramfrom its Peking correspondent: It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all records by £1, 000, 000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible prospect of the removal of this difficulty. I venture to think _The Times_ would regard the difficulty as removedif the Manchu Empire were restored. As to the "splendid salt surplus, " there are two telegrams from thePeking correspondent to _The Times_ (of January 12th and 23rd, respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Governmentartificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is asfollows:-- Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet faithful to the Central Government--the better half went over to the Canton Government long ago--has dispatched a squadron of gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if $3, 000, 000 (about £400, 000) arrears of pay were not immediately forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identic Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate. The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:-- The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The Reorganization Loan of £25, 000, 000 is secured on the salt revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, the local _Tuchuns_ (military governors) impound the collections and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any active form of intervention in this country. In view of the extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present interference with the salt negotiations, the $90, 000, 000 (£11, 000, 000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on January 28th remains unsolved. It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflictingpunishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that theWashington Conference should attempt to interfere! It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles uponthemselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon aman's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official isexpected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and thereforecan only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of thefamily system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young Chinarealizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level ofhonesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe--novery extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact withWestern nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinesenationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese willbegin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ forthe better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our power forgood in China will be at an end. I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers didto China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But inmodern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise ofmodern Japan--a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope isnot prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. Butbefore passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the socialand political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action inChina would be unintelligible. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 24: In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaininghis attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says:"As to the western doctrine which glorifies _Tien Chu_, the Lord of theSky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughlyconversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them--a pointwhich you soldiers and people should understand. " (Giles, op. Cit. P. 252. )] [Footnote 25: _Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking_, pp. 322 ff. ] [Footnote 26: The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chieflybuilt by the Empress Dowager. ] [Footnote 27: There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. Vii. Of Sih-Gung Cheng's _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, 1919. ] [Footnote 28: A new revision has been decided upon by the WashingtonConference. ] [Footnote 29: If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtainedpossession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon thepolicy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it whollysatisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers. ] [Footnote 30: _The Times_ of November 26, 1921, had a leading article onMr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to beallowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo didnot deal with the Customs _administration_, nevertheless _The Times_assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands ofthe Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruptionwhich it would afford. I wrote to _The Times_ pointing out that they hadconfused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo wasdealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did notprint either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we toconclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional?] CHAPTER IV MODERN CHINA The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, because in population and potential strength China is the greatestnation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one ofthe least. The international problems raised by this situation have beenbrought into the forefront of world-politics by the WashingtonConference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, itis as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad factsand principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall tryto give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but whichit may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economicdevelopment, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good asour own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which weshall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted uponChina a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuseshave been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reasonhas been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of theGreat Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worstis Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own largerinterests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japanand have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as Americastands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic dominationby foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powersbecome Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its veryessence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would bea disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the onlyultimate solution. After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, namely, the present internal condition of China. As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Manycauses led up to this result. Passing over the first 3, 700 years ofChinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when awarlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself uponthe Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtailsand Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlikecompromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet wererejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. Thischaracteristic compromise shows how much England and China have incommon. The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, butdifferences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from themore civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remainedinwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrousforeign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtfulpeople the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, whichlasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to havediminished the population by 150 millions, [31] and was almost asterrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtfulwhether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded(by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of Chinaby Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising(1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need fora better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years afterthe Boxer movement that the revolution broke out. The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spiritto ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of theCanton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was electedprovisional President. But the Nothern Army remained faithful to thedynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. ItsCommander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, oncondition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the Legations, being what iscalled a "strong man, " _i. E. _ a believer in blood and iron, not likelyto be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the Northhas always been more military and less liberal than the South, and YuanShih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed inthe way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, hehad every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomaticcorps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it mustbe admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour ofhis policy and methods. A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gaveplace to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determinethe permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with theParliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliamentwished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, buthe had the preponderance in military strength. Under thesecircumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soonoverthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament(which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) byunconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led toa revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. Afterthis, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler ofChina. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors ofprovinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime mighthave lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916--of a broken heart, it was said. Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The militarygovernors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Governmentwhen his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized thepopulations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has beencivil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply todetermine which of various rival generals should govern various groupsof provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, butthis has lost most of its constitutional significance. The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who arecalled Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commitdepredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected andadministered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominallyappointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of thesoldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by suchportions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent tosurrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, theJapanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might beprolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns metthere for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barelycivil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officiallyrepresent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominalGovernment was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupttreasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went toChang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a toolof Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition toMongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that hewould undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained atMukden ever since. [32] In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Governmentof a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of itsNorthern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Governmentunder the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces twoprovinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For amoment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it hasbeen checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in theneighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishesdesigns of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway. [33]In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves thesupport of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the_New Republic_, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmitywhich it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. Thisopposition is partly on general principles, because we dislike radicalreform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement--of acommon type in China--would have given us a virtual monopoly of therailways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concludedwith the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but thechange of Government has made ratification impossible. The newGovernment, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one ofthem, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more orless similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. TheAmerican Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas theBritish Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we havelost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely becausewe, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what isvigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreementlapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital. The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friendof China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be amistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable inmagnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared toa single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In _The Times_ ofNovember 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril ofChina. A dozen rival Governments. " But in Europe there are much morethan a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than thoseof China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than inChina, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons ofdestruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice hasbeen incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one thatyou will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, beingfought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for whichthey are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that theinhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on theaverage, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole. It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomespossible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowinga very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division intoprovinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After therevolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own wasattempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successfulworking of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous populationwithout much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience inIreland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, nowfavour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government notmuch except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficultyof getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. TheCentral Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot findthe money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroadenough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. Butit is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loanwithout exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chineseindependence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will finda way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreignassistance. It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way ofconsolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion hasgreat weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quitepossibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of theothers. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have beenalready mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong inJapanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He isan able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, heestablished his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing ablow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come toterms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itselfwith Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish hisauthority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (seeAppendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and abreathing-space is all that is needed. The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a fewregions where there are mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Pekinghas nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing tothe fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are builtround a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So faras I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys inthe whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Governmentemployment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite andthe work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are longand the pay infinitesimal. Seventy or eighty per cent. Of the population of China are engaged inagriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, whilewheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north. [34]The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is onlyjust sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrivedin China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing todrought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for theChinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even thosewho died of it shared this view. Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who dividetheir holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barelysufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when therainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. Itwould of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by morescientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods byafforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastlyimproved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usuallysupposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while theirfamilies continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory ofpopulation, according to many writers, finds full scope. [35] If so, thegood done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival ofmore children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in theend, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higherstandard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. Andpopular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until thereis a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from thesedifficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply ofcompetent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementaryeducation. Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditionallife of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never haveopened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if wehad not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of ourintercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background;one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreignersas such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view thatintercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, butapparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except whereunreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerableintellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimumof common decency is required to secure their friendship, whetherprivately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable ofenriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets. In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shopsfull of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinesepart of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and therich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes througha gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disorderedbeauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness andSunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding anddisease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions alwaysmade me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of lifewould not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions forthe poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese lifebrings more happiness to the Chinese than English life does to us. Atany rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I donot think it would be true. Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight ofShanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because thereis so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each ofwhich is a centre of European influence, exist practically all overChina, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China aredivided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the routefrom Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, whichhas long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. FromPeking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now ownedby the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southernbank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present itonly runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion ofthe railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase theimportance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong. In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lowerYangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings ofindustrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which aremostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain numberof cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for theemployer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in SouthernChina the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there isan inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very longhours for wages upon which an English working-man would find itliterally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it isnot the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and Chinawill not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods andeducation enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, inChina, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordidand cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horriblemethod by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none isin sight. The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike thatwhich it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has beenpractically extinct in China for about 2, 000 years, and for manycenturies the country has been governed by the successful candidates incompetitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind ofprestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although theold traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education nowteaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, andpublic opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who haveintellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, includingChang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands, [36] are, of course, mostlytoo stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makestheir régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China--_i. E. _ ofthose who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges athome--is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect forlearning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and theiroutlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they willprobably be strong enough to regenerate China--if only the Powers willallow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action. It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities ofYoung China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had amodern education, and I should like to give some idea of theirmentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish twogenerations: the older men, who had fought their way with greatdifficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucianprejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools andcolleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-mindedpeople ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fightagainst the family. The older men--men varying in age from 30 to50--have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that ofthe rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from thebeliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new scienceand a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades andmiraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will give yousome idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel inbecoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution theyhave achieved in their own minds. It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters ourculture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rateChinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happenamong the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilizationeven when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystalcandour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; theindustrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. Whenthey become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try tospread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hirethe front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardingsalong the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best. " In all this theydiffer greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly fromAmerica; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they weresoaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustlingactivity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over theprejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a newset, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able toconsider any proposition honestly on its merits. The younger men, however, have something more than the first generationof modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they haveretained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of thepioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. Thismay be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is morethan that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact withWestern ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated themwithout a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge withoutbeing torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learnWestern knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has madethe process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, stillhave reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than theirpredecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizingpractically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinesereverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men Isee the hope of China. When a little experience has taught thempractical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion inthe directions in which it ought to move. There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and thatis the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important thendetailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from theConfucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrialsociety. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, andbroadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technicalefficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may betaken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, ofsome new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane canexterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe tobe horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is ourgod; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee. " Andso it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have theopposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thingreally necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at theBritish Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestryin China. "[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant offorestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste aresuitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (_e. G_. Forrailway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and thatthe floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largelyprevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come werereafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the mostreforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subjectfor ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, becauseConfucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these willbe cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theoryas it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questionsas the utility of trees. After learning all about (say) the properrelations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find thatsome Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion notconsidered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true inthe West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally trueeverywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students aremost eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrialprocesses might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of ourtheoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industryis already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginningto be a marked improvement. It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlookand that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the mostmodern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maximsto replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men'smorals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as theydare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a differenceof morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, becausewe are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes _per diem_. What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims aboutgovernment, but science and technical skill. The real problem for theChinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiringthe mechanistic outlook. Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook. " I meansomething which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and theY. M. C. A. ; something which distinguishes all these from the Chineseoutlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean isthe habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by ourscientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual whohas this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense ofperception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force otherpeople to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectualis not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorouslyassailed by Bolshevism and the Y. M. C. A. , to one or other of which he istoo apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in theclass-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in themystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, intheir Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind exceptas potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in thespread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and alife against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, isas old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulentforms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book toprotest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into afable[38]:-- Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them. One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of horses. " So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them were dead. The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square. " The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line. " But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who _govern_ the Empire make the same mistake. Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze thechief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of thisfable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane andtolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of theWest. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, tosee whether they "drink water and fling up their heels over thechampaign, " and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. Unlike the Y. M. C. A. , they have no wish to alter the habits of theforeigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo intotrousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, asa rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead ofcutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him histitle, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600, 000), andhe remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and hisetiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking witha Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alteryou or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricatureor a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicateperception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number ofpictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawkswooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in hisclaws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. Allthese pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which onefeels also in their dealings with human beings--something which I canperhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doingtheir best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, ofwhich our Western world has far too little. Together with theirexquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quiteextraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wantonand cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sakeof the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poemstranslated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called _Business Men_, and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respectsin which the Chinese are our superiors:-- Business men boast of their skill and cunning But in philosophy they are like little children. Bragging to each other of successful depredations They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability? I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth"would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But asthat is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways ofsolving the Far Eastern question. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 31: _The Truth about China and Japan_, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. 14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (_Modern China_, p. 13) says thatit "killed twenty million people, " which is the more usual estimate, cf. _China of the Chinese_ by E. T. C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which thepopulation was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubtthat 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions. ] [Footnote 32: In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a moresubservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered byWu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix. ] [Footnote 33: The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said tohave made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the CantonGovernment was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General ChengChiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (_The Times_, April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. SeeAppendix. ] [Footnote 34: The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, especially in Manchuria. ] [Footnote 35: There are, however, no accurate statistics as to thebirth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whetherthe birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphletby my friend Mr. V. K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking UnionMedical College, from a careful study of 4, 000 families, found that theaverage number of children (dead and living) per family was 2. 1, whilethe infant mortality was 184. 1. Other investigations are quoted to showthat the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence ofstatistics, generalizations about the population question in China mustbe received with extreme caution. ] [Footnote 36: I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. Bland, _per contra_, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. Contrast p. 104 of his _China, Japan and Korea_ with pp. 143, 146 ofColeman's _The Far East Unveiled_, which gives the view of everybodyexcept Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-linreported in _The Times_ recently, but he was, of course, unable toestimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture. ] [Footnote 37: Printed in _China in 1918_, published by the _PekingLeader_. ] [Footnote 38: _Musings of a Chinese Mystic_, by Lionel Giles (Murray), p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his _Texts ofTaoism_ in _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XXXIX. ] [Footnote 39: Waley, 170 _Chinese Poems_, p. 96. ] CHAPTER V JAPAN BEFORE THE RESTORATION For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In orderto understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to knowsomething of that country, to which we must now turn our attention. In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is thepersistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout thecenturies. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" byno means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan fromKorea in 552 A. D. [40] At the same time and from the same source Chinesecivilization became much better known in Japan than it had been throughthe occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties wonfavour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went toChina in 608 A. D. , to master the civilization of that country. TheJapanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhismnationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than theadherents of the traditional Shinto religion. [41] After somevicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreignreligion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige thanShinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chiefreligion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkableto find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was ofpeasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods"(which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism. [42] Probably therevival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing beliefin that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of thepopulation. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto. The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, torestore the constitution of 645 A. D. The object of the constitution of645 A. D. Was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in thegood old days. What the object was of those who established thegovernment of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However thatmay be, the country before 645 A. D. Was given over to feudalism andinternal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very lowebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed greatfeudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil governmentfell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China madeintelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deservedimitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The ChineseEmperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended fromthe Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be avigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so. The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of645 A. D. And that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 isset forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:-- In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye--for they were two of this venturesome quartette--have often told of their rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. The two students who went to China in 608 A. D. "rendered even moreillustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye havedone. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harkedback to the 645-650 A. D. Period for a good deal of their inspiration, and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the twoNational Doctors. " Politically, what was done in 645 A. D. And the period immediatelyfollowing was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI andRichelieu--curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of thesovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probablywith about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, in 645 A. D. , what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was justthe opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curiousmixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seemsto see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from Chinaon the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that whichwent on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideasderived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling topreserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilizationover rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals inJapan. After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. Solong as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power)it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the studyof Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserverespect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (whoremained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) wereso degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that itwould have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by themand the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatlyfrom the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been evengreater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated thesecular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikadoand his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time ofthe Restoration. The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and thenominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance ofpower to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour oftheir infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from somemonastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who representedthe military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name ofthe Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title ofthe people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun, " which means"Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being theAinus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in theform which it had at most times until the Restoration was MinamotoYoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. Butbefore long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as theMikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and theactual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. Thislasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happenedthat Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to theMinamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogunhimself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolishedat the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to thepractice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Ministerand his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and theirsuccessors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what theTeutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aimingat the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They bothignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substitutedthe future life as what was of real importance. They were both religionsof peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had toundergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts ofwarlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teachingdoctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhismbecame national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries becameimportant feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which wasready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries andbattles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years'experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their countrycompletely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted andclosely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of thePortuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their finalexpulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates isinstructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese broughtwith them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese toleratedthe former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtuallyno Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo wereengaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existedthan were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island(containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed andwere throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringingmerchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on theirlarger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spreadof Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade andtheir guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. ThePortuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious tomake converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanesebegan to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither thePortuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helpingthe Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese hadbeen able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by aPapal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuitmonopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniardsfrom Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominicanand Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with theJesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelledfuriously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and theJapanese naturally believed the accusations that each side broughtagainst the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying theextent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for theirnational independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the _SanFelipe_, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coastof Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into hisharbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600, 000crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power inJapan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and hadthe Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, aftertrying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the sway of a single man.... "Our Kings, " said this outspoken seaman, "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer _religieux_ who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest. "[44] As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, thePortuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade withJapan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturallygave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As theJapanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christiannations. Meanwhile, a succession of three great men--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, andIyeyasu--had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying thequasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign ofinternal peace which lasted until the Restoration--period of nearly twoand a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the CentralGovernment to enforce whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard tothe foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars betweenthem had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about300, 000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region tobe subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on accountof their Christianity, but also on account of their geographicalposition. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun beganin 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has hadgreat power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except duringits rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs toChristianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in themovements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that maybe, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possiblewithout losing the foreign trade. His successors were even moreanti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited inthe most vigorous terms:-- So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads. [45] The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedinglycruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to politicalmotives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side withthe King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if noforeign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions ofChristians against the newly established central power. Economicexploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apartfrom political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade ifthere had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated thepower of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanesearmies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; theJapanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge ofstrategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largestcities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The populationof Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It wouldtherefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist anyexpedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even havebeen easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the worldshowing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into theinmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies ofEuropean Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid theirreports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. TheJapanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with thewhite men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feelconvinced that it was unwise. For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry'ssquadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peaceand almost complete stagnation--the only period of either in Japanesehistory, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use offire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policyuntil they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall seeanother period of isolation. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 40: The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's_History of Japan_, The volume dealing with the earlier period ispublished by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume waspublished earlier; its title is: _A History of Japan during the Centuryof Early Foreign Intercourse_ (1542--1651), by James Murdoch M. A. Incollaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the _Japan Chronicle_, 1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch IIrespectively. ] [Footnote 41: Murdoch I. Pp. 113 ff. ] [Footnote 42: Ibid. , II. Pp. 375 ff. ] [Footnote 43: Murdoch I. P. 147. ] [Footnote 44: Murdoch, II, p. 288. ] [Footnote 45: Murdoch II, p. 667. ] CHAPTER VI MODERN JAPAN The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in thehistory of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans wouldhave supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original planto a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists isalmost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restorationin 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American hasrisen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the GreatWar has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leadingstatesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at thebeginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them withever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leadersand followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. Torealize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combiningthe sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the timeof the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientificknowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews inthe Book of Joshua. The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have beenduly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such animmense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought solittle change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it hasbrought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite tothat which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed totend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan hassynchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the mostanachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, forsocial psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarilyinteresting country. The synthesis of East and West which has beeneffected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East thanappears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tendsto national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern andWestern elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the peoplesuggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, butthis may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are twoseparate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especiallypre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is moreanalogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It isno part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only togive an outline of the forces which control events and movements in thatcountry, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many goodbooks on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informativeis McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appearedin the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of courseinvaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawningrealization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after thecherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much tosay about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which theCentral Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head ofhis own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerfulof the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns atvarious times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had beenin the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except duringits first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern erawas inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of thecountry to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from theTokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governedJapan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politicsand possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forcesand their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will thereforefirst outline these internal movements, before coming to the part whichJapan has played in international affairs. What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored topower, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the endof the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems tohave been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holypersonage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated withcontempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and wasoften kept in great poverty. Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty, " and on their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the throne. In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the Heavenly Gods. [46] What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of verydifferent forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikadohad had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to theancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogunfor yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercialtreaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had neverwillingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLarenonce more (p. 33):-- The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japandown to the present day. The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in theWest, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, in his authoritative _History of Japan, _[47] says:-- In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and facile formula of "imitation. " But the Japanese still retain their own unit of social organization, which is not the individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central and local, to certain European systems is not the result of imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 A. D. , and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from China and established in the seventh century.... The present administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies. The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control ofthe Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to theforeigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), andsecured the support of the country by being the champions ofnationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adoptedwhich has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japanfrom being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of thegreatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the CentralGovernment was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and aprotectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry andcommerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; andworship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools andby professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creationof Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modernJapan, and a model to all other States as regards the method ofpreventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive littlepamphlet by Professor B. H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japaneseand philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which fewEuropeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a NewReligion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. Hepoints out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in veryancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered onobscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shintohas been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so asto suit modern requirements. [48] It is, of course, preferable toBuddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, notone which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it hasbeen developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for theMikado until some time after the Restoration:-- The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign (that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in another. This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcelycredible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread ofsuperstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and arevolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in themidst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, andinstantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although thereis a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereignever has been. The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copiedfrom Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A. D. , whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2, 000 B. C. , or at any rate tosomewhere in the second millennium B. C. This was galling to Japanesepride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory thatthe Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlainagain:-- The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. This question of fictitious early history might be consideredunimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend tobelieve the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part ofthe whole system, which has a political object, to which free thoughtand free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:-- Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the Imperial family, is to be alone honoured. All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanesepolitics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping ofthe Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, and has been in their keeping ever since. They were representedpolitically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimesmiscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have noconstitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear ofthe Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they areomnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against themthe Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they haveinvariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make theMikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselvestake office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War andMarine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. TheGenro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain sountil the Mikado is captured by some other clique. From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdomin the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan werea democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologistsof Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that thereis a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going todominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedlythere is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet andmaking the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that theMinisters of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet andthe Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly. [49] But democracyin Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist andanti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japaneseindustrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just asChauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeedthere have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, hassaved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committedif the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting ofthese occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, afterthe Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative ofJapanese politics. [50] In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear toimpartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The RussianGovernment was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulatedmen and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of theSiberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that ithad already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that itwould be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for aprolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealedsecretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for therestoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitationsto both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refusethe invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies ofneutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as toalienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to thepeace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that theywould absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in factresolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this wasknown to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. TheRussians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about theindemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanesedemands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packedup and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japaneseannounced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they acceptedthe Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thusthe Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it couldyield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latterin the belief that the Government would never give way about theindemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of thenominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be thereal power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decisionof the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view;there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan couldnot have been made without trickery. Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet inwhich the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least asdemocratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true thatMarquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in alltheir Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which GreatBritain has been copied. But there were many points in which theJapanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To beginwith, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japanthere is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small mattercompared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited thanthat of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ frompre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to theDiet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, notcollectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marinemust be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, ofcourse, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany theReichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Dietrefuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can beapplied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enactedtemporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in theGerman Constitution. The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it inconjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which wasissued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes theConstitution as follows[51]:-- Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. " "By reigned over and governed, " wrote Marquis Ito in his _Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects. " Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred and inviolate. " Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion. " Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and commutation of punishments. As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it. " Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions. "The Minister President of State is to make representations to the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, every branch of the administration being under control of the said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be approved of according to our Constitution. " In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the firstfour years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to theGovernment. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled byMarquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmenof the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly withintroducing modern education and modern social organization; they wishedto preserve Japanese independence _vis-à-vis_ the Western Powers, butdid not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their ownaccount. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany ofthe 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to anearlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. ThePrussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperousat the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it byglutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria andFrance. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on waragainst China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of thehitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Governmenthas never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as theTreaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundantinternational crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He wasafterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but waspowerless to prevent it. [52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, until at last he was murdered in Korea. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued aconsistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. Thenature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next twochapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existedtowards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportantas the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether thepresent system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existingsystem, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believethat Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberalregime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosiveelement in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japanto be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in facteverything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannotemigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to themainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Thereforethe only way to support a larger population is to absorb it intoindustrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasingfood abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, becauseJapan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannotobtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition withAmerica and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strongnavy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are verysimilar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policyrequires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral marketsrequires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and longhours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, mostof the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a dayand got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d. [53] Labour organizationis in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain tospread if the number of industrial workers increases without a verymarked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity ofthe Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapableof adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which arevigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialismand Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago ofmyth upon which the Japanese State depends. [55] There is therefore alikelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful andprosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflictbetween the proletarians on the one side and the employers andbureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize withagrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue. The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide forthe growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to developindustry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to controlChinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economicinterests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires alarge army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty forwage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earnersmeans growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filialpiety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore acontinually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on whichthe fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened withthe risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution. From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is adiminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrentto the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it isfundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of whichpatriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is toemerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, butideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be freethought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if thatremains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 46: McLaren, op. Cit. P. 19. ] [Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. I. P. 20. ] [Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its villagepriests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefullyselected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not trueaboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction ofBuddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments whichdisregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight. " (Murdoch, I, p. 173 n. )] [Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. Murdoch (op. Cit. I, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office andAdmiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance ontho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford toregard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme ofparty politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs ofthe Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, butare the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his ImperialMajesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan aretitles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emolumentsshowered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and thegreat sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the militaryman is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whompolicy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension. "] [Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. Cit. Chaps, xii. And xiii. ] [Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58. ] [Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. Cit. Pp. 227, 228, 289. ] [Footnote 53: Coleman, op. Cit. Chap. Xxxv. ] [Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and LabourMovements in Japan, " published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for anaccount of what is happening in this direction. ] [Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram fromits correspondent in Tokyo, _à propos_ of the funeral of PrinceYamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:-- "To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant ofexpenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, whichwas introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded asthe spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded lastyear, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did notrender true service to the State, and, although the recipient of thehighest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democraticinstitutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact thatthe introducer could obtain the necessary support to table theresolution formally was not the least interesting feature of theincident. "] CHAPTER VII JAPAN AND CHINA BEFORE 1914 Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it isnecessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinkingof the "Yellow Races, " as though China and Japan formed some kind ofunity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would leadone to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group incomparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, theChinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities;but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is verysmall. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in thescale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw ahairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admitthe Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryandescent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightestimportance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese andChinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely moreimportant than a common racial origin. It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derivedfrom China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same asChinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is ofthe sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, whichare the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, importedalong with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before theirruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such differenthistories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similarhad developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time ofthe First Emperor (_c. _ 200 B. C. ), a vast unified bureaucratic landempire, having much contact with foreign nations--Annamese, Burmese, Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was anisland kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Koreaand occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly atwar with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudalchivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrativeproblems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrinesof Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius Chinawas still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, inone of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. Butnaturally his doctrines underwent a different development from thatwhich befel them in their own country. In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtueone finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praisedwhere conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they werein feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, onthe contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast andimmemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred adifferent set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, andcompromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselvesplunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty indeveloping the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which thesituation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having beenschooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudalanarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuatedthe previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese likeour thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like ourmechanism but dislike our thought. From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as aunity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, andIndia contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they areeasily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; withmodern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securelythan in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, andinvulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strongas to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, ifRussia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by Germanorganizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order ofpossibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce forpower and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberalmentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent uponAsiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with itconflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of thosePowers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But bothare likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then theessential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent. It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have twosomewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose asthe champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on theother hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that areinefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly toChina and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy hasinspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation ofKorea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As amember of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and ofthe Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary GreatPowers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony inAsia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those whohappen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking inthe Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred millionnatives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of GreatBritain. "[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerableEnglishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derivedfrom the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supplyan intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates theintensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that maybe, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose beforethe Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57]quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving thefollowing list of white men's sins:-- (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization. (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors. (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession is made to them they demand and take more. (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races in greatness and wickedness. (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of everything, will adopt any measures to gain it. This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might havesupposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to beunlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. Theyargue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely aspossible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committedby Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not beenequalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in hiswildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although hewants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regardsJapan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire isto be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put thematter very simply in an address given in 1913:-- The white races regard the world as their property and all other races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, and woe to them. [58] It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect thatJapan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of theeminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of theJapanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internalaffairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere withoutfirst consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China hadinfringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a warcaused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily anddecisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured tooppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in theBoxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping thefruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany andFrance, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea forthemselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germanspresumably joined them because of William II's dread of the YellowPeril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanesewar inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinesehad established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would haveconstituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China fornothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now calledDairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built theChinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connectingPort Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Havingaccomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. TheRusso-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for theAnglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, thisAlliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been thecorner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance providedthat, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originallyinspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing theRussian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, fromcalling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France andRussia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty ofPortsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Allianceserved its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanesewar. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan toacquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thuscurbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude anEntente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concludedwith France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance whichdefeated Germany could not have been created. Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russiaalone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond herstrength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise togreatness was due to our support. The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced allinterference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since calledDairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then beencalled the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairenas the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purelynaval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly toWestern models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made atreaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalistswith every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to befully the equals of the white men. The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have amonopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this waspractically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in Chinaby means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident, [59] which shows howthe South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:-- "In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with MessrsPauling and Co. For an extension of the Imperial Chinese railwaysnorthwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital forthe work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japanprotested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocolannexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in theneighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor anybranch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of thatrailway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China andRussia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung withoutRussian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to theRussian rights, the projected line could not be built without herconsent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive intone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it wasobviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task! "The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on theclause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so toHsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right tobuild the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects werespecificially excluded from participation in railway construction northof the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-BritishNote the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British andChinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of theagreement. "Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities inManchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part ofthe bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain fromseeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, butwith no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the StateDepartment at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that heraction was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, whichassigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway(South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertainingthereto, ' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles IIIand IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it isdeclared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential orexclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereigntyor inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst thesecond is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstructany general measures common to all countries which China may take forthe development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria. ' "It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China tobuild a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment ofChinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was nota measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry ofManchuria. ' "It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feelingin China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of suchflagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises andpledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never sincerecovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support itssubjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world asthe protest from Tokio.... "The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-menrailway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of otherprojected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and theimportant Antung-Mukden line. [60] The same alleged secret protocol wasused equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of theNewchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement withRussia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 wasconstrued to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administrationwithin the railway zone. '" Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to coverthe whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter hasbeen nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, orby loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquiredvast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, andhave used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in theprovinces through which they run. After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, andagreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affectingManchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claimsat the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to thesupport of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the FarEastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all internationalquestions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary partyaiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. Theyhave continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening Chinapolitically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was severaltimes in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he wasobtaining financial support from some Japanese. [61] When the revolutionactually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but wasprevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seemsthat the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent theunion of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperorof China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss ofsome southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actionsof Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotationgives the gist[62]:-- It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East. " This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances would Japan recognize a republican form of government in China.... In connection with the peace conference held at Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied their authenticity. The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both theManchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won theday. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He wasstrongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed asstrongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to theinfluence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free tomake themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events woulddoubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the warcame, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be toldin a separate chapter. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 56: Quoted by A. M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policy_, Allen &Unwin, 1920, p. 18. ] [Footnote 57: Op. Cit. P. 16 n. ] [Footnote 58: Pooley, op. Cit. P. 17. ] [Footnote 59: A. M. Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51. ] [Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the Japanese. ] [Footnote 61: Pooley, op. Cit. , pp. 67-8. ] [Footnote 62: Page 66. ] CHAPTER VIII JAPAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers isJapanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, butafter 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teachin the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test theirnew armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. TheChinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears tohave been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question atissue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that timethere would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take oneside rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completelyvictorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining securepossession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly inManchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriendingChina. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired bythe Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest ofManchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapseafter the Great War. The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese havethe civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and militarycontrol. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he weredispleasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. (See Note A. ) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung. Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, Chinacould easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work toturn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chineseremaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, theypresented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave theChinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presentedin January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt withShantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever termsJapan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chineseprovince, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certainspecified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should beopened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be grantedto any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuriaand Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect aprotectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom forJapanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrialenterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and ironand steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze, [63] where we claima sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power exceptJapan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded thatJapanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employedby the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should beadministered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largelyJapanese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from Japan at least50 per cent. Of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanesearsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts andemploying Japanese material; that Japan should have the right toconstruct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japanshould have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); andfinally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propagandain China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics. These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chineseindependence, the closing of important areas to the commerce andindustry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the Britishposition in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that wehad no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demandsconstituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in anuproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic actionagainst them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they wereexplained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles. [64] He had notime to find out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secretagreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japanwanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference. [65] By theterms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate theTwenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japancommunicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thusdefinitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles. China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and securedcertain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by anultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines onthe Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifthgroup was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes. [67] Inthis form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The UnitedStates immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize theagreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was thereforestill able to do something to further the objects for which we weresupposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year theIshii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of theUnited States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous. " Therest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage. [68] I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war. [69]In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severingdiplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards thedeclaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke offdiplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon allneutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister inPeking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. Heinduced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note ofexpostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step ofdeclaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connectedwith these events deserve some study. In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinesehad not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (forreasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have beensome suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China shouldparticipate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition ofJapan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fearthat China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors inTokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as ofparamount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japancould not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficientChinese army such as would be required for her active participation inthe war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation ofthe economic activities of 400, 000, 000 people. "[70] Accordingly theproposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war theJapanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because theirsympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and theyfilled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusingthem of cowardice and military incompetence. [71] But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, thesituation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservienceto Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America hadalways been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willingto take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomaticrelations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no_promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The AmericanGovernment, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it wasignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies werebound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urgedChina to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, andGreat Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continuedsupport of Japan. In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany wasinviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japanconcluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to theassistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vitalinterests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of Chinafrom the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, havinghostile designs against Russia or Japan. " The last article provided that"the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both ofthe High Contracting Parties. "[72] That is to say, the treaty was notcommunicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite ofArticle 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The HighContracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consultingthe other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to theprejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement, "one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for allPowers in China and of the independence and integrity of the ChineseEmpire. On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China tosever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement withJapan containing the following words:-- His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator. The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated byNotes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo. [73] On February19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and RussianAmbassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial JapaneseGovernment proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peacenegotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and specialinterests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islandsbelonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean. "The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:-- The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and these islands. M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. The consequences in China should be the following: First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls; Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory; Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal; Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she possesses in certain ports of China. The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and RussianAmbassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:-- In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator. [74] It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no_quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in theprevious year. After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China'sparticipation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was thehope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hopebeing realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honestignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of theChinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the lastdays of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminishedby the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917. Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry intothe war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which hasbeen one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of therevolutionary movement. [75] If the Chinese had not been interfered withat this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding inestablishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and hissuccessor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuineconstitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan haddismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution wasresumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, TuanChih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and hisCabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the ChineseParliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomaticrelations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue. On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. Itwas President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breakingoff diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign;but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presenteda Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation ofnational unity was more important than entry into the war, andsuggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. Whathad happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might neverhave become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used bythe Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and toinstigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun YatSen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declarationof war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. LloydGeorge on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound. [76] The Cabinet, onMay 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declarationof war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted tocoerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this provedimpossible, they brought military force to bear on the President tocompel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of theMembers of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to actas a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source ofconstitutional government. After these various illegalities, themilitary autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of theirnumber, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the ManchuEmperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person moreagreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservientunconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free todeclare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy andagainst militarism. Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of thewar, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects ofthe European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. Wewished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans livingin China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of Germantrade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property wasduly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing tothe claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait tillafter the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics inovercrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree ofhardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authoritiesinsisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knewto be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after theArmistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often tookupon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the mercilesspersecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would havebeen much greater. The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty ofVersailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all thebelligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by sidetwo statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree tothe Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct ouroperations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe withproud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to befighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case forratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yetget very much of importance.... In violation of all international lawand treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars ofGerman-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that. "[77] TheEuropean Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China toenter the war for righteousness. We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declarationof war. What Japan gained was somewhat different. The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resistJapanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with thewar, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality--forJapan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture ofTsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberalelements in the North were against the clique which had seized theCentral Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements wereconcluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officiallypublished, is given by Millard. [78] By these agreements the Japanesewere enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria andMongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control ofthe Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, andgenerally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, theexcuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient. After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, theyplaced loans in China to the extent of Yen 246, 000, 000, [79] _i. E. , _about £25, 000, 000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides wereas willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake ofvictory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fightingin the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energiesof Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. Forvarious reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself untilafter the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peacenegotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, werecompelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificedeverything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not havejoined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter onthis subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of themost interesting in his book. [80] By Article 156 of the Treaty ofVersailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung. [81] AlthoughPresident Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raisethe issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versaillesresisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China, [82] refused to signthe Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a provinceas a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed toa proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we hadannexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us inthe war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext. Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese publicopinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forciblyejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of theYoung China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fuleaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the PekingGovernment has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping alwaysfor American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate herposition in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America mightre-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conferencewas announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with aview to having the question settled before the opening of theConference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusoryconcessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditionalevacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation ofEngland and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused theAmerican Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and Iunderstand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred withAmerica. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amountto much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the WashingtonConference. There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined notto concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of greatimportance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It wasconsidered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in aquarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselvesin unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russiahas been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of theCzecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but aftera time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of LakeBaikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far EasternRepublic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which ispractically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese havelaunched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in militaryoccupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire. In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost NorthernManchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partlyof Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate ofthe Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connectswith the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by railbetween Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extremeannoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means thatletters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks insteadof a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies withthe Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause isthe reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway andendeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those whichled to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia uponall Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in awar with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize theopportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former positionin Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germanycombined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda. The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the youngerChinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they havea good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people inAsia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. Asthey were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of theagreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upsetimpartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America. [83] ForAmerica, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they areeconomic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the FarEast, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of politicalfreedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondagebeneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but maybecome strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia istreated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. Butwhat part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yetimpossible to say. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think ofJapan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steelmills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form theUpper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1, 500, 000 people. The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eightymiles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. The ore is 67 per cent. Iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1, 000, 000 tons a year for 700years. [Probably an overstatement. ] Coal for the furnaces is obtainedfrom Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousandminers dug 690, 000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein iscapable of producing yearly a million tons for at least fivecenturies.... "Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heartof China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her specialtrade domain. " Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of thismatter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. X. -xiv. See below, pp. 232-3. ] [Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _Japan Weekly Chronicle_, October 20, 1921. ] [Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2. ] [Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador tothe United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent Chinaa Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England whatpurported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy onlycontained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which wasdirectly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievablyfoolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73). ] [Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with thenegotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracyand the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919. ] [Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantungquestion are printed in S. G. Cheng's _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iiiand ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. Cit. Pp. 214-6. ] [Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret andofficial history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat inChina_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co. , 1922; _Democracy andthe Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and_China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A. M. , D. D. Directorof International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922. ] [Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99. ] [Footnote 71: See Pooley, _Japan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff;Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v. , and Millard, chap. Iii. ] [Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66. ] [Footnote 73: Reid, op. Cit. Pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. Cit. , pp. 343-6. ] [Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng's _Modern China_, which containsthis note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to thenegotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal ofthe German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South SeaIslands north of the Equator. "] [Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China's declarationof war is admirably told in Reid, op. Cit. Pp. 88-109. ] [Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108. ] [Footnote 77: Reid, op. Cit. P. 161. Chap. Vii. Of this book, "Commercial Rivalries as affecting China, " should be read by anyone whostill thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anythingexcept money-grubbing. ] [Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4. ] [Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in anarticle on "China's Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, publishedearly in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of thecomments appear also in Putnam Weale's _The Truth about China andJapan_. ] [Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanesequestions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case, " League ofNations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda'sarguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese. ] [Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's_Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1. ] [Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M. T. Z. Tyau's_China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix. , "The Student Movement. "] [Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protestagainst the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East ChinaRailway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declaresthat it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compeldue deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to makedemands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, 1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russianlabouring masses, " but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. WhatRussia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find theBolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirsof the capitalists. ] CHAPTER IX THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, atWashington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified theFar Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will bedealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actualdecisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as theireffect upon the Japanese position in Siberia. In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently beenbrought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pactbetween America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this generalalliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping ofAmerica and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standingfor international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. Thesituation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree asregards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part inthe reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seemto have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy moreliberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration ofWei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressivebut for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By theterms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon asRussia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at thatdate. One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreementnot to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specifiedexceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war betweenAmerica and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bringnaval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention ofthe Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into afirst-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgothis intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preservethe peace with Japan. Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revisionof the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. Theforeign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese haveinsisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in theChinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that theydesired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously oneof the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have puttheir postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, asthey have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcelssent through their Post Office. The development of the Japaneseimportation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppyin Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister featureof their penetration of China. [84] Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence andintegrity of China, etc. Etc. , were reaffirmed at Washington; but theseare mere empty phrases devoid of meaning. From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington wasthe Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the endof 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port ofTsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of theShantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakingsin Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, andthrough it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excusewas needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress theresulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty ofVersailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. TheWashington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising thequestion afresh. At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things alltheir own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before theConference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiationwith China. This point was important, because, ever since theLansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers torecognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal JapaneseProtectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessaryto establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interferedwith in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed tothe Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come beforethe Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations betweenthe Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of adeadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were nolonger prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the olddays. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed somedisposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion wasroused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solutionmore or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate wouldprobably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the workof the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans stronglyurged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps lessstrongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty betweenChina and Japan. By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except theprivate property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions asregards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in thenegotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, theywould have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy backthe railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result ofa patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japaneserefused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese werecompelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaidin fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railwaywas valued at 53, 400, 000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairsor improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to behanded over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japaneseretain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese trafficmanager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and theother Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President. It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five yearshence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five yearshence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As bothMr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree tothis compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain havesome responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In thatcase, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire completecontrol of the Shantung railway. On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington thanmight have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the newinternational situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal withthem in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessaryto consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington, since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form. The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised atWashington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there issecure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or bothtogether, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, willnot raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (SeeAppendix. ) The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitionsin Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remainunchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to checkthem. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and theFar Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in anynear future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they havedecided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. Aconference between them and the Chita Government has been taking placeat Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to theeffect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _TheTimes_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian officialaccounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _TheTimes_ as follows:-- The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen Conference. It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place on August 26th last year. The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be met. The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that the preparations for the relief of the said division might be dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops. Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by Japan. Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government instructed its delegates to quit Dairen. The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately belowthe above. It is as follows:-- On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, but when the question of military evacuation was reached the Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued Japanese intervention. Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese military evacuation. On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen circumstances. " The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. Readers will believe one or other of these official statements accordingto their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartialwill assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiquéit is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japaneseunwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; allthat they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise toevacuate Egypt. It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until theSenate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanesefelt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt withat Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions willnaturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense ofthe Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by theassembled peacemakers. [85] It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalisticcapitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to theirarmaments as the chief source of their income, while England and Americalook rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting tocompute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recentyears by means of their armies. England and America already possessedcoal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegationfrom the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tendingto show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although theauthenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected thatFrance and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has becomeanything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoahave sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 84: See _e. G. _ chap. Viii. Of Millard's _Democracy and theEastern Question. _] [Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour ofthe Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomaticmission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a morehigh-minded set of men in any country. And although they werecommunists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, theyshowed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesieshave affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo. ] CHAPTER X PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult toguess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I willendeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifyingthe issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which Iregard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successivelythe interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with anattempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interestsand desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole. [86] I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and thedominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour ofpeace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wiseand virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. Thepessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but theoptimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, Americanpublic opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the mainingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in theFar East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought toexplain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscioushypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with WesternPowers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strengthof the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up hissleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has beensomewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like BernardShaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident asit was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such anattitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the Englandof the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this momentthan any other Power (except Russia). But the development fromGladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successorsis one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar developmentis bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish toestimate the desirability of extending the influence of the UnitedStates, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss ofidealism. Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. Itis apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice oflive-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its lesspugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or thecontemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practicalphilanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middleof a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning areuseful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched byany others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sortof world. All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the WashingtonConference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of thefriction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worstenemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Powerto promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war ifthere were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad tosee our Government making friends with America and abandoning themilitaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be donein a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon thefuture good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to stateJapan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker thanAmerica's. It should be observed, in the first place, that the present Americanpolicy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, whileclearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with Americaninterests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equalto our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understandthat it is out of the question to go to war with America, so thatAmerica will have as much control of the seas as there is any point inhaving. [87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but verypliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of theseas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases thecost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice ofAmerican interests. To take next the question of China: Americanambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole countryshould be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. Thepolicy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to sorich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy ofthe universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberalpolicy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expectinga liberal policy when it goes against self-interest. In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudicesare involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weightwhatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. Inthe matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not todiscriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passedby a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making adiscrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the Presidentultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at leasttwo-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's viewof treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led theway, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, andto this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against"shaking hands with murder. " It cannot therefore be said that America is_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is thatAmerica adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financialinterests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases. I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myselfwith one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an Americanweekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):-- On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an obligation of $5, 600, 000, due and payable to a large banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, together with other obligations already in arrears, and still others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had also received the full and energetic support of the Department of State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate. It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeatednegotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on theterms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were veryadequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_concludes:-- If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to take full advantage of the situation. There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the WashingtonConference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with theconnivance of the British but not of the American Government, toestablish, by means of the Conference, some measure of internationalcontrol over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, 1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China, " Ifind it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establishinternational control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to thesuggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterlyoppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid. " He adds:"International control will not do. China must be given time andopportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret orexaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passingthrough. " These are wise words, with which every true friend of Chinamust agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, bythe way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find thefollowing (p. 728):-- Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it. " Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny. " Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must bedue to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had hadnothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer andone of China's best friends as "this man Simpson. " I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any Europeanradical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want controlreads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to aGovernment which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it wouldbe impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropicas not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as thoughthis were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of theChinese. In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace, " which I fear isprophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it waswritten. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the FarEast, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreigncommerce and industry; a government which the West will consider goodsubstituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a graduallyincreasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, thechief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; thespread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilizationfor the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; thegradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and oneday, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white manthroughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secretsociety. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall betold that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. Thedefinition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "goodgovernment" is as easy as A. B. C. : it is government that yields fatdividends to capitalists. The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. Theyhave a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for humanhappiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, ifthey are allowed a little time, will revivify China and producesomething immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism thatwe call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans willbe able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soulof the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out hersalvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. WhenAmerica went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought ofintervening to insist on "good government, " but fortunately abstained. Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americansrecognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten withblindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them isthat they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thankGod that they are not as this publican. So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence ofJapan. Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all thatJapan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did notsuit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a UnitedStates squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware ofWestern aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were onlytwo ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or tofight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, anddeveloped a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelledon the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modernmorals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British washorrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys. " However, they beganto be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had capturedTsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality withthe other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them bythe West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other goodqualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers. " People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine theintensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when broughtinto contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of thehighest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasywhite men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Dukewould venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treatedin this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact thatwhite men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, is important as a beginning of better relations towards the colouredraces in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented fromretaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in generalwill suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will bere-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of thesurvival of civilizations of a different type from that of theindustrial West. The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that ofthe West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But inits mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly theAnglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popularsupport for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merelyeconomic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. Themorality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikadois the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind ofsuperstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-centurytheories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europethe Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrelspromoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined inone sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt. Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt aproposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it untilit is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the viewthat the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentiallynationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, theState religion, has been in the main invented since 1868, [88] andpropagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shintoreligion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new. ) It isnot a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended toappeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and isbelieved by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites formarriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism isconsidered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is auniversal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national, [89] likethe Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some templesthe priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly ofEnglish Archdeacons. The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose theirsense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, butthey have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste toindustrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautifulas Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism hashitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and anynation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves ourgratitude. The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hardworking, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of themhave the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, andincapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no meansuniversal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women ofquite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as awhole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highestrespect. The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth ofSocialism and the Labour movement. [90] In China, the intellectuals areoften theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labourorganizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. InJapan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every varietyof socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become apolitical force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialistsresemble those of other countries, in that they do not share thenational superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, butnot so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by anAmerican who is in a position to judge. The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directlyresponsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. Theytherefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by theForeign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise theevacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide tokeep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicablein this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish realParliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unlessthe existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If theWashington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantungbut also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internalgovernment of Japan would probably have been excellent. The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and thatthe Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that theGovernment regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. Theargument would be that the economic imperialism of the United Stateswill not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival inthe Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presentedwith the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. ThenBushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefieldin preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans willlead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will beincapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, andthe Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. Awar might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat ofJapan. One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germanyin the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonialempire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do theJapanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners;so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and rousedour hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing withAmerica in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled byour alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for Frenchsympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans hasbrought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrorslargely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; itis very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and consare so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate themfurther, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the caseof Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimedat hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony inEastern Asia. The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeperpassions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; Americabelieves in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried topersuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by anextension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attemptfutile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality andculture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as adelusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preservetheir own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; andin this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudiceis even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japaneseare determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of thewhite man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomaticconflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with theAmericans. Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrongthrough impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for Chinathe same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; thenthey could have become, what they constantly profess to be, thechampions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend tothem. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do;they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but onlyto be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have thereforebehaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And thissame behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as theworst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possiblefor them to win the affection of China and the respect of the bestAmericans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinesepolicy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do notachieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be agreat misfortune for mankind. A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing initself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It woulddestroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China toWestern culture, and launch America upon a career of world-widemilitaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan willonly become more liberal if the present régime is discredited byfailure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in theinterests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the jointdiplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not onlyShantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediateneighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short ofactual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur. ) Our Alliancewith Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been anencouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japanhas been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are onlypermitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japaneseat an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. OurAlliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and theending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform. We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendencyin Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does notmean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is stillable to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on theJapanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevikpropaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of theeffectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation fromEurope. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone exceptthe younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method ofdeveloping industry without passing through the stage of privatecapitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks aremore and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, asit has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more tofederalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a verygreat deal of government, and more control of individual lives by theauthorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developedpersonal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of allothers where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successfulpractical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which isthe breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For thesereasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make muchprogress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not thesame thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which provedsuccessful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia wereprobably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctivelyBolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and lesscorrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, likethe Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation ofmankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, andgives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soonspent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régimeunder some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and hislife. It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situationdevelops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regainManchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the controlof Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably beuseless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with Americaor with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in thesupposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, recover the position which she held in relation to China before theRusso-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have aninstinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward forcenturies. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of thelast seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long. The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any wayregrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize asmuch as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to beable to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding withAsiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speakingnations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strongfor defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably bedesirable In the interests of mankind as a whole. What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best forChina would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the endsome system suited to China would be established. The artificial endingof Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment ofsome system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probablyquite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English inthe seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans inthe nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed throughyears of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to theirdevelopment, and could not have been curtailed by outside interferencewithout grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, buthave not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficultone, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while theChinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and wedo not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solutionsuitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solutionslowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurelyimposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by theWashington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerablechance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have madeconcessions, the value of which only time can show. The FourPowers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed toexploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortiumas regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and willtherefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the onlypeople who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. Asthey consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will setto work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiersare the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China mustbe so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establishcolleges and hospitals and Y. M. C. A. 's throughout the length and breadthof the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of Chinafor sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that ofAmerica, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trustmagnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour ofradical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even bysome Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peaceand freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in sofar as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is thepeace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by nomeans always advantageous to those who have profited by the previouscompetition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringingthe principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that thedomination everywhere shall be American, because America is thestrongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America'sinterest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chineseinterests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, forthe sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stablegovernment in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they willnot wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their ownrailways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economicindependence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take theform of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They willkeep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under Americancontrol, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist orRadical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standardof hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited theUnited States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. Inshort, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to"God's own country, " except that it will not be allowed to keep thewealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to giveto the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as thatwhich they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the dominationof the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to beperfect. The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroycompetition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alivecompetition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeededin diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advancedindustrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict betweenworkers of different races, particularly between the white and yellowraces. [92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheapAsiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful towhite labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx ofindustrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be anobvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of anyperson who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to everyother individual in the community, since it increases the wealth perhead. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker whoeither produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of theothers; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates anopposition between the general interest and the individual interest ofthe wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the BritishDominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificialconflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This wholequestion of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble forcenturies to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, sinceSocialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in thismatter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world. The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, bymeans of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, isobviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured exceptthrough the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the handsof foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved intosubmission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannotsee, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a resultof the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expectthat, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, theMarxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia andthe West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia asthe champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would befighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctivecivilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of anysort would survive it. To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the bigfinanciers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is dueto popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. Butnot many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only afew are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in theinterests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiaticimmigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-socialinterests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing systemmakes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, tothe interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies alsoto nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest isseldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only byaccident. International peace might conceivably be secured under thepresent system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit theweak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome ofWashington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the littlefreedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of thepresent system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, isproduction for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nationproduces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both ininternal labour problems and in international relations. The developmentof Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for theChinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also thethings they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needsfor foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supplythese goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverishpursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production willbe regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of theconsumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling willcease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission toexploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is notpossible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the presentAmerican policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly notsecure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Onlyinternational Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation ofrevolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secureuntil international Socialism is established throughout the world. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question ofIndia, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, British interests are allied with American finance, as against thepacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West. ] [Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the WashingtonConference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio thereagreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on thenavy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navyis unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Governmenthas been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets ofreluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegramin _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22. ] [Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_, published by the Rationalist Press Association. ] [Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. Pp. 500 ff. ] [Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialistand Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published bythe _Japan Chronicle_. ] [Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_. ] [Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia isillustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ forApril 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation ofshipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the PrimeMinister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerpinstead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India byblack labour receiving eight annas (8d. ) a day. When the deputationreached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair andturned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go toblithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour. ' Hurrying fromthe room, he pushed his way through the deputation.... " I do notgenerally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as Ideplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer ablessing. ] CHAPTER XI CHINESE AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION CONTRASTED There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, aclose contact between our civilization and that which is native to theCelestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contactwill breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, orwhether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by thatof America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in thepast proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe fromthe Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of thesecases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case ofChina, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the caseagain. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they fromus, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat theChinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fearwe are unteachable. I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects ofthe questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the threefollowing chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internalcondition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to thehopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficultsituation. With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, Icannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contactafter such a long period of separate development as has marked those ofChina and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it issurprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese isnot more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worthwhile to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the twocivilizations. Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewishreligion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is anoutcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, andGalileo as representing these three elements, which have remainedsingularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we deriveliterature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the moreurbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanaticalbelief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with theconception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of ournationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive powerand the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justlybe, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derivealso the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has beenacquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of ourmentality. No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in thedevelopment of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinesepainting, sculpture, and music. [93] China belongs, in the dawn of itshistory, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babyloniacontributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon theGreeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible bythe rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, sothe original civilization of China was rendered possible by the YellowRiver. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretchfar either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of thissimilarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very littlein common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of theEgyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong tothe sixth century B. C. , have already the characteristics which we shouldregard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attributeeverything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for thedifferences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians andBabylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I donot think science can, at present, account wholly for nationalcharacter. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but notthe whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominantindividuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, Mahomet, and Confucius. The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "LaoTze" is not really a proper name, but means merely "the oldphilosopher. " He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary ofConfucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. Heheld that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain wayor manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and thatwe ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others toconform to it. "Tao" means "way, " but used in a more or less mysticalsense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life. " Ithink he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way, " andthat if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into meremagic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoistphilosophy from the first. Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, buthis ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is moreinteresting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was oneof freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferenceswith Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which theycontrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the puremen of old. " There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in somesense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strifein the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics ofhumour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated byChuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management ofhorses, " and trained them till five out of every ten died. [95] Theirrestraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared withWestern mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literatureand art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the presentday. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chanceof a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, sothat Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of theChinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day inPeking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested inthe theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statementat its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governorof a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is dueto the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise manshould always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments(being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuatethem in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analoguein their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim atbeing exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admirationfor the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression ofpassion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at firstall the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty anddignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners whohave lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best. The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted fromthe favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess thatI am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings arelargely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concernis to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. Whenone compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers ofsome other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, evenif they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise toa powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainlyhas succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite mannersand perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it isquite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has beenprovided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in thehumblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence ofwhite men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannotdemean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regardthis as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which theChinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors. There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditionalcivilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China fromIndia in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired adefinite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerantoutlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a manadopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianityand Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no mancan accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a manmay be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either isincompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are bothBuddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamentaldifference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause anyindividual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. Ithas mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has amessage to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards asnatural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctivepessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing ofall this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live atall. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical orreligious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence ofthese two religions in China has been that the more religious andcontemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the activeadministrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always theofficial teaching, in which candidates for the civil service wereexamined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China hasbeen in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has beenlacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Westernnations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed veryclosely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that thepopulation has been happy except where civil war brought misery; thatsubject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nationshave had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population andresources. Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds inChina most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the othertwo elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China ispractically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, butthroughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but itis not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin. "Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been noscience and no industrialism. What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilizationwith the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult todissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the culturalcontact with the West must be affected by the nature of the politicaland economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the culturalquestion as far as I can in isolation. There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, notsimply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resistWestern aggression, but because a very large number of people considerlearning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place ahigh value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was onlyof the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized thatWestern knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year touniversities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science oreconomics or law or political theory. These men, when they return toChina, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists orpoliticians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, especially in the educated classes. The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and hadceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. Thiswas not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lackof new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just thestimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarilykeen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence oflibraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest humanmaterial. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient inscience, it never contained anything hostile to science, and thereforethe spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as theChurch put in its way in Europe. I have no doubt that if the Chinesecould get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, withinthe next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. Itis quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come withfresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, theenthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of therenaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy. It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bringwealth or military strength, but rather those that have either anethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They arenot by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told methat they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made themthink there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. Thehabit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, andsome of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what theywere looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, andbefore long they will realize that they must work out their ownsalvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faultsand kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese willmake the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours. The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is thescientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a justconception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope tosee gradually uniting. Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production withoutpossession, action without self-assertion, development withoutdomination. " I think one could derive from these words a conception ofthe ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admittedthat they are very different from the ends which most white men setbefore themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerlysought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into aphilosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined toGermany. But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice withChinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinesepractice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one ofthe three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear tothe heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious ofmoney--not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than theEnglish or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerfulmen make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny. Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion anddomination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinesepractice. There is much less desire than among the white races totyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally isquite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so onwhich are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in theworld could ever be "too proud to fight, " that nation would be China. The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, theycould be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desirefreedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations maycompel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose theirvirtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they havebeen an imperial race for 2, 000 years, their love of empire isextraordinarily slight. Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of theChinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where apoet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated byMr. Waley, called by him _The Old Man with the Broken Arm_, to make ahero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Theirpacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact thatthey do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure--astheir pictures show--in observing characteristic manifestations ofdifferent kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to apreconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress whichdominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of ouractive impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even withus; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. Thecultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as theirearliest sages write. If one points out to them that this shows howlittle progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress whenyou already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seemsto a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's ownwisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we callprogress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirablegoal. It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the Westwith what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seekknowledge, in the hope--which I fear is usually vain--that knowledge mayprove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with threemotives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to ourreligion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, andthe missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon theworld; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinesehave no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions aremany, but reason is one, " and with that they are content to let us goour way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite differentfrom those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seekingconcessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to gettheir claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, goodsoldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are notworth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of theirreasonableness. I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything thatEuropeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagineourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But westill practise political and social persecution, and what is more, weare firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life areimmeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nationlike the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do tothem is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profoundmistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he ismiserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happierbecause the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlookthan our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment ofbeauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. Inthis respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; butfor that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely tobe fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensableminimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something ofthat contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while allthe other nations of antiquity have perished. When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed Ithought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learnfrom them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I foundthis attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or whogo only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinesedo not excel in the things we really value--military prowess andindustrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even thesimple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China thanin the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live wheresuch things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return forour scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large toleranceand contemplative peace of mind. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 93: See Cordier, op. Cit. I. P. 368, and Giles, op. Cit. P. 187. ] [Footnote 94: With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name isof doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or threecenturies after his death. Cf. Giles, op. Cit. , Lecture V. ] [Footnote 95: Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3. ] CHAPTER XII THE CHINESE CHARACTER There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may bethat a greater experience of China would have brought me to share thisopinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when Iwas working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should havetalked to English people, and they answered me much as English peoplewould have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and notwholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "SubtleOriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception anEnglishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But asmany comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, thegame is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man isdeceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be inLondon. One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power ofsecuring the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for manyyears. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly asingle Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as theChinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire theiroutlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils:the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, theanarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels atfirst a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought tobe reformed. But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventablemisfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of theforeigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence ofsoda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of thebewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubtall the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it reallywise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent tolose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters thatmay come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building amansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit? The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore haveto put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate forthese evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, thecapacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasurein sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted;they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softenedby a joke. I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills inchairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies verysevere. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutesto let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out theirpipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care inthe world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in orderto increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worryingwhether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether theuniverse moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or theymight have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his owninterest. One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusionthat China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgottenwhat constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams inPeking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there areplaces full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by diggingup coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writingpoetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence, will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he canconceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But aChinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he willtell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by anancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of theworld, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlookthat strikes the Westerner as barbaric. The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quietdignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; theirpride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's militaryweakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not considerefficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is thegreatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. AWesterner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based ontraditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes tofeel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typicalWesterner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in hisenvironment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and asdelicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of thecontrast between China and the English-speaking world. We in the West make a fetish of "progress, " which is the ethicalcamouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, thequestion strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes andtherefore great "progress. " What we believe to be a love of progress isreally, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of thefeeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake ofthis pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time hehas acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of thefeasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with thethought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as maysuit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations"progressive. " There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less commonthan among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not abetter form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespreadfailing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, thereforemoney is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as ameans to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (militarygovernors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the solepurpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at asuitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy lifequietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they losepower does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious thatsuch politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committedto their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruinwhole continents in order to win an election campaign. The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm thanone would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of theGreat Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than isdone by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activitiesof a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they areperformed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has beenwholly lost in the rest of the world. The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreignpressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as hemight be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as arule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speechand a free Press. [96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow theherd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Menstill think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce theconclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in theWest, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie inChina, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a fewleading financiers. The business of "saving face, " which often strikes foreigners in Chinaas ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignityin the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face, " even the humblestbeggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, ifyou are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to aChinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, becauseyour words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitutean offence. Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not asindustrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same wordsthat I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among themost modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we areaccustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (whatis more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If Iwere Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who sufferfrom the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shallnot venture to decide. The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and intheir habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed toits ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may betaken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, itis customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least tocause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor histitle, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income ofseveral million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceablyin the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he wasnominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put. Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. Itwas, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fuparty in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and wasaccepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and mostwidespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by thestudents in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a greatpreponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away whenthey came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Pekingand change the Government almost without firing a shot. The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers'strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. TheGovernment, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had leftits teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforcepayment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers andpolice, and many teachers and students were more or less severelywounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education inChina is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured forrevolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars incorrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital toextort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusingthe few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulatedin panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where theinterests of teachers would have roused the same degree of publicfeeling. Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realizeacutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They areaware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring tonaught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedyeyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially itscoal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, bydeveloping a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a newreactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lustsof "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submittamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but incenturies. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars andthen by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generationsthe invaders became more Chinese than their subjects. Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room forcolonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for theirsurplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed theJapanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political statusof Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can berecovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinesederive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness oftheir national customs, their power of passive resistance, and theirunrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, whichmerely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise militarymethods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shallhave exhausted itself in internecine combats. China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only onethat has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, theEgyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires haveperished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. Therehave been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science. But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western sciencewill not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew asmuch of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they hadnot been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readinessto oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--theysee to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially itsscience, they do wish to adopt. The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art andliterature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy thespiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese whohave had a European or American education realize that a new element, isneeded to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilizationto supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just likeours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they arenot goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely newcivilization, better than any that we in the West have been able tocreate. So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinesecharacter; but of course China, like every other nation, has its badsides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experiencedso much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I shouldprefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, aswell as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what isless admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on thebalance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of theGreat Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writerpressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice andcallousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possibleremedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one ofChina's greatest virtues. The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote oneper cent. Of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the otherninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding theAustrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the rawmaterials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except thosewhom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinesewould not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or thephilanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millionswere dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a fewdollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done bywhite men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, andthat little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that theefforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their ownconsciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the presentbirth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines arebound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alivethrough one famine are only too likely to perish in the next. Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods ofagriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to effortsto keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousnesshas a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness ofthe problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be soexplained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic painin the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, showthat they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty;but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must besaid that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to anextent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy. Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure thatthey are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles betweenrival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side thatfirst discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that theChinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance isinvolved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is aserious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chineseare said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageouspeople, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will enduretorture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious raceswould find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place ofstolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage, they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by theirreadiness to commit suicide. Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life ishard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, allexcept a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent riskof death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from thefact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. Ithink this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, anhonest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened aseconomic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in Chinathan it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of anyChinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician morecorrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely thatchanged industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as weare--which is not saying much. I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, whenthey appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhatsluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they arecapable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little ofthis myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising wasa case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. Buttheir history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is thiselement in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes itimpossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section ofthem becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, ordevoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. Isuppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spiteof their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. Andmany emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romanticlove, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in theWest. To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes theforeigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancientcivilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and Americanfinanciers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crudeimitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese whohave had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beautyin native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does notobey the laws of perspective. The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved;it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something maybe preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China issupreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among thesequalities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settledisputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to beseen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will forceit to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that towhich Japan has been driven. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establisha very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai PrintedMatter Bye-Law. " Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East, _ April 16, 1922. ] CHAPTER XIII HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons ofculture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancientbeauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is contentto be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tendto be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the Europeantourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, isapt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctiveand non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one whoregards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as acountry with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally donot view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquirewhat is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interestingsurvival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As thefirst step to this end, they do all they can to promote highereducation, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use andappreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Westernfollies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, andone of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch. There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote ofthe classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a moreintelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditionalstudy of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, inthe eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they havesecured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learningreading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still formthe majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of theclassical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat atthe same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one ofthese schools, so I can speak from experience. ) The number of people whoare taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large townsone finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (whichis very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probablythose who can both read and write form about five per cent, of thepopulation. The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers onmodern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the oldexamination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, hasdone much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementaryeducation. The following statistics showing the increase in the numberof schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's_China Awakened_, p. 4:-- 1910 1914 1917 1919 Number of Schools 42, 444 59, 796 128, 048 134, 000Number of Teachers 185, 566 200, 000 326, 417 326, 000Number of Students 1, 625, 534 3, 849, 554 4, 269, 197 4, 500, 000 Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civilwar, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures isvery remarkable. There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owingto the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it hasbeen impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a smallscale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stablegovernment. The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to beonly elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and theolder texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finestrenaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in Chinafor many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have theinnocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind onealmost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in theVacation--learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modernworld, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what someeleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for andagainst the type of higher education that they represent are exactly thesame as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and oneis driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence ofspecialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but thatthe ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take moreaccount of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modernlanguages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China. The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by themissionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. Aseveryone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquiredthrough the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if theirown account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actualloss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded(and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted thesurplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at Americanuniversities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of postsin China go to men who have come under American influence, and who havecome to believe that America is the one true friend of China among theGreat Powers. One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which Isaw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the RockefellerHospital), and the so-called Peking University. Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Westernhills, with a number of fine solid buildings, [97] in a good Americanstyle, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It hasan atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a(Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of theAmerican College President. The teachers are partly American, partlyChinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of thelatter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence ofevery virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of theteaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution wasthorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to Americaninstitutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with themost skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannotunderstand European ideas; therefore the learning of some Europeanlanguage is essential, and English is far the most familiar and usefulthroughout the Far East. The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science andphilosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what iscommonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwardsto America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to Chinathey become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contributegreatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honestyand technical intelligence. The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representingan interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty withEuropean utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the mostmodern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of theStandard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use toanyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical Collegeteaches many things besides medicine--English literature, forexample--and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in orderto produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the Europeanlevel, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessaryfor medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a soundknowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance toChina, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent. The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese haveto suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (soat least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But theMethodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" totheir schools, so the already existing university had to alter its nameto "Government University. " The case is exactly as if a collection ofold-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach thedoctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University toabandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the questionof extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can beabandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which itsometimes gives rise. Returned students (_i. E. _ students who have been at foreignuniversities) form a definite set in China. [98] There is in Peking a"Returned Students' Club, " a charming place. It is customary amongEuropeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; inparticular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite asequals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression wasthat America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any othercountry; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized thanthose returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinamanwho wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seemromantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions whichconservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared tothose of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that itis useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One isreminded of the conversation in _Eothen_ between the English countrygentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to therefrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels, " whilethe Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman isstill, thank God, the British yeoman. " Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the wholeadmirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy theneeds of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a nationaltemperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeansultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain alwaysmissionaries--not of Christianity, though they often think that is whatthey are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Cleanliving, clean thinking, and pep, " I think an American would reply. Thismeans, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanlinessfor beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (asbeing easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy forthe leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire--that hardenedold cynic--laid it down that the true ends of life are "_aimer etpenser_. " Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with"pep. " The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminateboth. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save thelives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worthsaving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogethersatisfactory. The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have establishedschools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. In these, a certain proportion of the teachers are European orAmerican, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y. M. C. A. Onecan never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled bywhite men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciouslyin the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetrationof China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: theyare not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any othercountry, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utilityto exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a reallybeautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I usedto have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the PekingGovernment University) could not have been surpassed anywhere forkeenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of theScience Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I cameacross them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquireWestern knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but notcapitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the bestamong their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purelyChinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking GovernmentUniversity, leave much to be desired from the point of view ofinstruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English isnot sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with theprofoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because theGovernment--loved by the Powers on account of its weakness--has to partwith all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other andplunder the country, as in Europe--for China must be compared withEurope, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe isunhappily divided. The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are apowerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement. " And what they did was notmerely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):-- Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures showing them the real situation, internally as well as externally; but especially by establishing free schools and maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regardsmodern education under Chinese control, there is complete equalitybetween men and women. The position of women in Peking GovernmentUniversity is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted toexaminations and degrees, and there are women teachers in theuniversity. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospectivewomen teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressiveinstitution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls wouldhorrify most British head mistresses. There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementaryeducation, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girlstend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school asthe boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquetin Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinnerspeeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adoptco-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the mattershould receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was notripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within thesphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and havingimagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on Irealized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carriedout in China. Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannotgive what Young China needs. After throwing off the native superstitionsof centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the Europeansuperstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control thatthere is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, andfor that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking tobuild a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in itsbest days. While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higherpay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for manymonths. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputationto the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, whoclubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. Theincident produced such universal fury that there was nearly arevolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with theteachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind themall that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang ofbandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money andEuropean intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One maysay broadly that the old traditional education, with the militarygovernors and the British and Japanese influence, stands forConservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutionsstand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practicallythough not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alonestands for intellectual freedom. The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression byforeigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquiremilitary strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order toadvance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world whoquite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. Thatis why the West regards them as uncivilized. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 97: It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings inpurely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University andNanking Teachers' Training College. ] [Footnote 98: Mr. Tyau (op. Cit. P. 27) quotes from _Who's Who ofAmerican Returned Students_, a classification of the occupations of 596Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger itemsare: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; inGovernment service, 129 in executive offices (there are also threemembers of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medicalpractitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social andreligious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chineseholding university degrees in America is 1, 700, and in Great Britain 400_(ib. ). _ This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of Americain the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chineseuniversity students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives aclassification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are:Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22;natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classifiedseparately), 19. ] CHAPTER XIV INDUSTRIALISM IN CHINA China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrialpossibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken asnearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout thenext few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of thisdevelopment as upon any other single factor; and China's difficultiesare very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I willtherefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider thepossibilities of the near future. We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation'sindustrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and thenthe mines, before going on to other matters. When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities ofOxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected tothem, and did all it could to keep them at a distance. [99] In 1875 ashort line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but theCentral Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much wasaccomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers thenthought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble forconcessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the importantline from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for aHankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as faras Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking withthe Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the ShantungRailway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in thesouth. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in theYangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners andmanaged by foreign officials of the respective countries which hadobtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe awarethat some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperatedbeyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to theChinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it ofmost of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come torealize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problemwas how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukowline and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by thehelp of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in thehands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankowline was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line wasconstructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of thebig main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside theManchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now beregarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strongenough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come moreor less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by theagreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China--fiveyears hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lostto China, the Chinese now have control of all their more importantrailways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature ofthe situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges--quite rightly, as Ithink--the great importance of nationalizing _all_ Chinese railways. AtWashington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, andto concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing earlyin 1919, he said[100]:-- _The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of the new Republican State is the railway key_.... The revolution of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left behind a more subtle weapon. _This weapon is the railway_. Russia with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign _enclave_, subversive of the Chinese State. _The especial evil to-day is that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new technique, _ which ... She will eventually extend into the very heart of intramural China ... And also into extramural Chihli and Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily arrested. _At all costs this must be stopped. _ The method of doing so is easy: _It is to have it laid down categorically, and accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board_. If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, thisreform--as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale--willhave been practically completed five years hence. But we must expectJapan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of herpromises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering ofJapanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of theShantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it. It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The KalganRailway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed byforeigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirablymanaged. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, whichrefer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincialrailways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3, 780 kilometres. Total, 10, 963 kilometres, or 6, 852 miles. (The concessioned railways aremainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must beregarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probablyrecovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longerthe importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreignrailway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in1918:-- Name of Line. Kilometres Year Per cent, earned Operated. Completed. On Investment. Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22. 7Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15. 8Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6. 2Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6. 2Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5. 6 Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been lessprosperous. I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railwayadministration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome theevils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructedby different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there wasno uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on toanother. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especiallyto open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit ofwhich would probably be enormous. Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allowsforeign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either itsindustries or its munitions to the point where they will be independentof foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present farfrom satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché atPeking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regardsChina's mineral resources:-- China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial development. To indicate how little China has developed its marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, 14, 000, 000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now 20, 000, 000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, produced 650, 000, 000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that China has 400, 000, 000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an additional 300, 000, 000 tons which might be worked by native methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of pig iron was 500, 000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's welfare. [102] The _China Year Book_ for 1919 gives the total Chinese production ofcoal for 1914 as 6, 315, 735 tons, and of iron ore at 468, 938 tons. [103]Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20, 000, 000tons of coal and 500, 000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evidentthat great progress was made during those three years, and there isevery reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has beenmaintained. The main problem for China, however, is not _rapid_development, but _national_ development. Japan is poor in minerals, andhas set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth ofChina. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, that only industrial development can support the growing population, which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on themainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite forimperialism. The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works atShanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity forshipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10, 000 tons eachfor the American Government. Mr. S. G. Cheng[104] says:-- For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home consumption). Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needsexplanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes tounderstand modern politics. The _China Year Book_ for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned withpolitics as _Whitaker's Almanack_) gives a list of the five principaliron mines in China, with some information about each. The first andmost important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron andCoal Co. , Ltd. , which, as the reader may remember, was the subject ofthe third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore insight is estimated by the _China Year Book_ at 50, 000, 000 tons, derivedchiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per cent. Ofiron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as603, 732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The _Year Book_proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by theagreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum whichenforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Governmentundertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor tocompel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources. " It shouldbe added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technicaladviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must besold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market. [106] The second item in the _China Year Book's_ list is the Tungkuan Shanmines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district onthe Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to workthese mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52, 000, and the mines weretransferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation. "These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what theircapacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they weresold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. Is$20, 000, 000, which is considerably more than £52, 000. This was the onlyone of the five iron mines mentioned in the _Year Book_ which was notin Japanese hands at the time when the _Year Book_ was published. Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession whichwas granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. Will beworked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain60, 000, 000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. Of pure iron. The planof operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of170, 000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100, 000 tons ofsteel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75, 000tons a year. " The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunctionwith the Hengshan Colliery by the railway. " I presume it is to be soldback to China along with the railway. The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the mostpromising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where theJapanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese andJapanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood ofPenhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine. " It will beobserved that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a resultof the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The _Year Book_ adds:"The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osakaironworks placed an order for 15, 000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal atOsaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron. " It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese haveallowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which theycan only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutelyimperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry oftheir own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve theirnational independence, their own civilization, or any of the things thatmake them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed thatthe chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in orderto be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinesedid not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they areawake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back laterto the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continueour survey of facts. It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainlyagricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc. , arecrops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is thethird country in the world, India being the first and the United Statesthe second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, and it is industry that is our present topic. To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands wasofficially estimated at 560, 000 and that of mine workers 406, 000. Sincethen no official returns for the whole country have been published ... But perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for thepresent number of factory operatives and mine workers. "[108] Of course, the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions asspecially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where thewages range from 15 to 45 cents a day. [109] (The cent varies in value, but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny. ) No doubt asindustry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extentto which he has come under American influence, as well as that ofconservative England (he is an LL. D. Of London). Most of the YoungChinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hopedthat the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness willmake the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments ofAmerica and Japan. There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterpriseis needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire. Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probablydevelop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry innative hands. The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200, 000, 000(630, 000, 000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It isbetter, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currencyfluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. Thetael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore itsvalue fluctuates with the value of silver. The _China Year Book_ givesimports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures inpounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124millions and 99, 900, 000. ) It will thus be seen that, although theforeign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it isincreasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find howlittle the economic life of China is affected by such incidents asrevolutions and civil wars. Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railwaysand mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if nationalindependence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization isobviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of newlines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquirea power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hopethat the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth actupon it. In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, anddevelopment by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. Itshould therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of anyinterest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on thesecurity of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view ofextra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners toaccept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit itsvalidity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fearChina, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but ifnot, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. Itwould be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinelyChinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geologicaland mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain theright (_a_) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (_b_) towork minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, inspite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powersshould be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the pointcompatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It isclear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon asopportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossibleto say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government establishedin China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreignaggression. This is a point to which, along with other general questionsconnected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my lastchapter. It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that theChinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such asmodern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbiallyhonest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. Buttheir successful businesses--so one gathers--do not usually extendbeyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner orlater through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak frommy own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is veryquickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected withConfucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained inbusiness methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosungand other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of thehighest education to devote themselves to industrial development. TheChinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited tocommerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidlyintroducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughoutthe next few decades. It is of vital importance that that developmentshould be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. Butthat is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chineseindependence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 99: For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. Cit. Pp. 183 ff. ] [Footnote 100: _China in_ 1918. Published by the _Peking Leader_, pp. 45-6. ] [Footnote 101: Op. Cit. Chap. Xi. ] [Footnote 102: _China in_ 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake inthe figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimatedby some to contain 700, 000, 000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op cit. P. 51. ] [Footnote 103: Page 63. The 1922 _Year Book_ gives 19, 500, 000 tons ofcoal production. ] [Footnote 104: _Modern China, _ p, 265. ] [Footnote 105: Pages 74-5. ] [Footnote 106: Coleman, op. Cit. Chap. Xiv. ] [Footnote 107: It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there isnothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divinepointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasurewhere moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through andsteal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth. " See UptonSinclair, _The Profits of Religion_, 1918, p. 175. ] [Footnote 108: Page 237. ] [Footnote 109: Page 218. ] CHAPTER XV THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpointof a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, in what order, I should advocate in that case. To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, Chinahas had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of TsaristRussia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance ofRussians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our owneconomic interests; the friction between Japan and America wasfortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in thelong run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willingto oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X. , unless Chinabecomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestionedascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous toChina; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All theGreat Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development ofChinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in theirown energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certaincultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show inthis book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and itwould not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they hadto descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as anation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless theyadopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, andthey will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object mustbe to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible withsafety. First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, thebigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitudewhich is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allowthem to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educatedChinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutaltuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it hasproved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn toforeign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, iscapable of being the greatest Power in the world after the UnitedStates. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strongenough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strongenough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be toostrongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutelynecessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Westernskill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, political independence will have little value. The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment ofan orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control;(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursuedconcurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in theabove order. We have already seen how large a part the State will haveto take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while thepolitical anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale arealso unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore goodgovernment is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism andeducation are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide thepriority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will haveacquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed tooust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems oughtto be taken in the above order. 1. _The establishment of an orderly government_. --At the moment ofwriting, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. Abattle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former isusually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ callshim "the Liberal leader, " may well prove no more satisfactory than"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if hewins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for allChina; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as todepend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressiveelements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the bestthing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a jointprogramme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation ofmilitary usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrificeof cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon whichall the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight inpublic opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to somepowerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon meremilitary force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales infavour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned thescales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Sucha policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorouspropaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbandedsoldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises thefinancial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers willnot lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants ofChinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X. , I do notaccept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan fromthem would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They maynot mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact itwould be. ) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is toraise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinesemerchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, richChinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control theGovernment. When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubtthat it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure ofautonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government fewthings except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generallyrecognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it morescope. While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreedupon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige ofConstitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It willbe necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the countryto unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collectivedecisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a veryrigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightestfailure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. Thesociety must make itself obviously the champion of the nationalinterests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies toforeign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend orcondemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even inthe army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism andhonesty to create such a society and to make it strong through therespect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism isorganized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the politicalproblems with which China is faced. Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereignrights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the TreatyPorts, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselvesfrom extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it wasin Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps theJapanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages ofChinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers ingeneral. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yetRussia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked bythe Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China'sresources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessionsby purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitableopportunity. 2. _Industrial development. _--On this subject I have already written inChap. XIV. ; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish toconsider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways oughtto be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought tobe purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are notState-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought tobe carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would notbe much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderlygovernment; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing tolend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such amonopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would bedesirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for StateSocialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any countrywhich is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in thesecond place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ theforeign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; inthe third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vitalindustries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What isperhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, byundertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can preventthe growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China canacquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to developChinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweeningpower of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now bothoppressed and misled. But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great changein Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the familyethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty whichalready exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is atpresent rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling theserequisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realizethat they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of StateSocialism must fail. For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese shouldlearn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. Ithink more has been done towards the former of these needs than towardsthe latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to importskilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction toChinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might bedesired to develop. 3. _Education. _--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressiveChinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of thepopulation cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is agood in itself, but is also essential for developing politicalconsciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present stateof the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementaryeducation. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated massescannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vastpopulation could be borne by the nation without a considerableindustrial development. Such industrial development as already exists ismainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships forthe Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and Americanmillionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chineseeducation, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason whyindustrial development must probably precede any complete scheme ofeducation. For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not besufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. Thereis, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers arebeing trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeeda great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chineseeducators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of educationas in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary tohave foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity willsoon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not toonumerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways andmines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in missionschools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend tobecome de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Westerncivilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the nationallife, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makesthem more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men andwomen who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeansin general are more conservative about China than the modern Chineseare, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And ofcourse their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militatesagainst national self-respect in those whom they teach. Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for sometime to come, need a period of residence in some European or Americanuniversity. But for the great majority of university students it is farbetter, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returnedstudents have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country fromwhich they have returned, particularly when that country is America. Asociety such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which allreally progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between studentsreturned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, thisdifficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese universityeducation, but at present the difficulty would be serious. To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiringleadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to beaimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. Asregards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers haveenormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skillcould carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with therequisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an examplepersonally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh. [110] He has great learning, wideculture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; hiswritings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, butby no means a slavish admirer of our ways. The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to beneeded would probably demand different gifts from those required in anintellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not becombined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and KarlMarx. The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to theworld. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it ispossible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, todevelop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: thepreservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacifictemper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with aknowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practicalproblems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: onedue to the internal condition of China, and the other to itsinternational situation. In the former class come education, democracy, the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention offamines. In the latter class come the establishment of a stronggovernment, the development of industrialism, the revision of treatiesand the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as amodel), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong todefend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demandWestern science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Westernphilosophy of life. If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat thecampaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhapsemulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit theirmaterial resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats athome and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which theWest achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray bythe lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, butwould have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the greatmilitary nations of the modern world will bring about their owndestruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. IfChina joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But ifChinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have madeChina capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step offoreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turnaside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, anddevote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a bettereconomic system--then China will have played the part in the world forwhich she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hopein the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to seeinspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it isrealizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every loverof mankind. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found inTyau, op. Cit. Pp. 40 ff. ] APPENDIX While the above pages were going through the Press, some importantdevelopments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeatedChang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreatedtowards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence ofManchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly tobe supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, notunlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor inChinese politics. For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and hisintentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing inour newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour ofthe reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to therestoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which theSouth could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has itin his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Pekingcorrespondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declaresthat if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in nationalinterests he will support it up to the limit, and fight anyobstructionists. " On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lendinghis support to the unification movements, and has found common groundfor action with Chen Chiung Ming, " who is Sun's colleague at Canton andis engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants toconquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given inthe same telegram as follows: Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall be elected by the people; District police shall be created under District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and _gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the people on the land. This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much ofit will ever be carried out. Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has beenstated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun andChang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and thatWu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputationthan Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hateSun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has apast record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that theCanton Government has been the best in China. What appears in ournewspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falselyunfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and opium-smoking are rife. Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army hadwon a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold inKiangsi, " together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrivedby mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through thevictory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and willbe strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hopedalso that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will notbe seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption ofthat country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate withhim; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it morelikely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. Thereis certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Changfor the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. Butit is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is stillproblematical. _June_ 21, 1922. INDEX Academy, Imperial, 44Adams, Will, 94Afghanistan, 175Ainu, 117America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff. , 159 ff and naval policy, 161-2 and trade with Russia, 162-3 and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244 and Japan, 167 ff. Americanism, 221Ancestor-worship, 39An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175Annam, 52Arnold, Julean, 231Art, 11, 12, 28, 189Australia, 181 Backhouse, 49Balfour, 152, 153Benthamites, 80Birth-rate-- in China, 73 in Japan, 116Bismarck, 112, 130Bland, 49, 77 n, 107Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff. , 175 ff. , 245Bolshevism, 82 in China, 175, 194, 204Books, burning of, 24 ff. Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227 indemnity, 54, 217Brailsford, 166Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190 in Japan, 86 ff. , 91, 105, 169Burma, 52Bushido, 172 Canada, 181Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207Capitalism, 179Cassel agreement, 69Chamberlain, Prof. B. H. , 103, 105Changchun, 124Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77, 242, 253Chao Ki, 40Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5Chen, Eugene, 133 n. Cheng, S. G. , 55 n. , 65, 134 n. , 139 n. , 232Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff. Chi Li, Mr. , 37China-- early history, 21 S ff. Derivation of name, 24 population, 31-4 Year Book, 32 produce, 72 influence on Japan, 86 ff. , 104 and the war, 134 ff. Post Offices, 150Chinese-- character of, 199-213 love of laughter, 188-9, 200 dignity, 202 pacifism, 195, 213 callousness, 209 cowardice, 210 avarice, 211 patience, 206 excitability, 212Chingkiang, 60Chinlingchen mine, 234Chita, 146, 154Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106Chou dynasty, 22Christianity in Japan, 92 ff. Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192Chu Fu Tze, 43Chu Hsi, 46Civilization-- alphabetical, 37 Chinese, 187 ff. European, 186Coal in China, 132 n. , 231 ff. Coleman, 77 n. , 110, 132 n. , 133 n. Colour prejudice, 168, 173 and labour, 181 ff. Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208Confucianism, 34, 38 ff. , 190 in Japan, 118Consortium, 14, 163 ff. , 179, 244Cordier, Henri, 24 n. , 25, 27 n. , 28, 30 n. , 31 n. , 187 n. Cotton, 76, 235 industry in Osaka, 114Customs-- Chinese, 55 ff. , on exports, 56 internal, 56-7 Dairen, 123 Conference at, 154 ff. Denison, 129Dewey, Professor, 69, 224 Mrs. , 224Diet, Japanese, 109 ff. Dutch in Japan, 94 ff. , 100 Education, 44 ff. , 76 ff. , 193, 214-225, 247 ff. Statistics of, 215 classical, 215-7 European and American, 217-21 modern Chinese, 221 ff. Of women, 223-4Efficiency, creed of, 17"Eight Legs, " 45, 46Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205 "First, " 24 ff. Empress Dowager, 52 n. Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76 "Face, " 204Famines in China, 72, 210Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154Federalism in China, 70, 244Feudalism-- in China, 24, 26 in Japan, 89 ff. Filial Piety, 39 ff. , 61 and patriotism, 41 in Japan, 118, 169Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7Forestry, 80Fourteen Points, 53France, 52, 53, 123 and Shantung, 137-8 and Japan, 157Fukien, 132 Galileo, 186Genoa Conference, 146Genro, the, 91, 106 ff. , 128George III, 49Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172 property in China during war, 141 ff. Giles, Lionel, 82 n. Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n. , 49 n. , 187 n. Gladstone, 157, 160Gleason, 132 n. , 134 n. Gobi desert, 31Gompers, 163Great Britain-- and China, 52 ff. And Shantung, 137Great Wall, 24Greeks, 186Guam, 150 Han dynasty, 27Hanyehping Co. , 132 n. , 232-3Hart, Sir Robert, 57Hayashi, 133 n. Hearn, Lafcadio, 99Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43 Temple of, 23, 24Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94Hirth, 22 n. , 23 n. , 27 n. Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44Hughes, Premier, 181 n. Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153Hung Wu, Emperor, 45Huns, 24, 27, 31Hu Suh, 250 Ichimura, Dr. , 121Ideograms, 34 ff. Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff. Imperialism. 82India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120Industrialism, 186 in China, 75, 76, 212, 226-39, 245 ff. In Japan, 114Inouye, 88Intelligentsia in China, 76Iron in China, 131, 132 n. , 231 ff. Japanese control of, 232 ff. Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Ito, 88. 109 fflyeyasu, 91, 94, 95 Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175 early history, 86 ff. Constitution, 109 ff. War with China, 113, 122, 130 war with Russia, 108, 123, 130 clan loyalty, 118 loyalty to Allies, 136 hegemony in Asia, 120 loans to China in 1918, 143 Socialism in, 114, 170Jenghis Khan, 28 ff. Jews, 186 Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n. Kara Korum, 30Kato, 133 n. Kiangnan Dock, 232Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151Kieff, 29Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n. , 164Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124Kublai Khan, 29, 30Kyoto, 96Kyushu, 92, 94 Lama Religion, 43Lamont, 165Lansing, 144Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194Legge, 22 n. , 39 n. , 82 n. Lenin, 180, 250, Lennox, Dr. , 73 n. Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff. Li Ung Bing, 26, 45Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff. Li Yuen, 28 n. Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157Louis XIV. , 51Louis, Saint, 29 Macao, 62Macartney, 49Malthus, 73Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207Manila, 93Marco Polo, 29Marcus Aurelius, 27Marx, 250Masuda, 93McLaren, 98, 103 n. Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff. Merv, 29Mikado, 87, 99, 106 worship of, 98, 103, 168-9Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n. Millard, 134 n. , 143, 151 n. Minamoto Yoritomo, 90Mines, 230 ff. Ming dynasty, 30Missionaries, 196 Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n. In Japan, 92 ff. Mongol dynasty, 28 ff. , 43Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154Morgan, J. P. , 157, 165Morphia, 150Moscow, 29Mukden, 130Murdoch, 28 n. , 86 n. , 101, 107 n. Nationalism, 16Nestorianism, 48Nicolaievsk, 155Nietzsche, 84, 194Nishapur, 29Nobunaga, 94Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n. Observatory, Peking, 30, 49Okuma, 120, 122Open Door, 55, 162, 179Opium, 52 Panama Tolls, 162Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72 Legation Quarter, 54 Union Medical College, 73, 219 Government University, 217 n. , 222 Girls' High Normal School, 224Penhsihu mine, 234Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167Persia, 27, 29, 175Phonetic writing, 35Plato, 186Po Chui, 195Po Lo, 83Pooley, 120 n. , 121, 124, 128, 133 n. Pope, The, 29, 169Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125Portuguese, 92 ff. Progress, 13, 196, 202Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n. , 165, 228 Railways, 226 ff. Nationalization of, 228 ff. Statistics of, 230 Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227 Fa-ku-Men, 124 Hankow-Canton, 227 Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229 Peking-Hankow, 227 Shantung, 151 ff. , 227 Siberian, 146, 227 South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126 Tientsin-Pukow, 227Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n. , 139 n. 142Reinsch, 134 n. , 135, 136Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8. Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff. And Japan, 128 ff. Rockefeller Hospital, 218Rome, 27, 51Roosevelt, 108Rousseau, 42Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff. , 175 ff. War with Japan, 108, 123, 130 secret treaty with Japan, 136 and Shantung, 138-9 Salt tax, 59, 60_San Felipe_, 93Sato, Admiral, 172Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193Shank, Mr. , 69Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff. , 178 secret treaties concerning, 137 in Versailles Treaty, 144 and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff. Shaw, Bernard, 160Sherfesee, 80Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First"Shi-King, 25Shinto, 87 ff. , 103, 105, 169Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff. Shu-King, 21, 22 n. , 25Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam WealeSocialism, 64, 181 ff. State, 180, 246 in Japan, 114, 170 in China, 222, 236Soyeda, 144 n. Spaniards in Japan, 93Student Movement, 223, 243Students-- returned, 17, 193, 219 statistics of, 220 n. Summer Palace, 52Sung dynasty, 30, 45Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65Tai-tsung, 28 n. Tang dynasty, 28, 44Taochung iron mine, 234Taoism, 43, 187 ff. Tartars, 27, 31Tayeh mines, 231 n. , 232-3Teachers' strike, 206, 225Tenny, Raymond P. , 33Tibet, 31, 43Ting, Mr. V. K. , 73 n. Tokugawa, 99Tong, Hollington K. , 143 n. , 204 n. Trade Unionism, 180-1 in Japan, 114-5Treaty Ports, 74Tsing-hua College, 217Tsing-tau, 131, 151Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff. Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff. , 233, 234Tyau, M. T. Z. , 144 n. , 215, 220 n. , 223, 226 n. , 230, 235 United States. _See_ America. Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144, 151Vladivostok, 146, 154Volga, 18Voltaire, 221 Waley, 84, 195War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff. Washington Conference, 16, 55 n. , 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff. , 178Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149White men, virtues of, 121William II. , 122Wilson, President, 140, 142Women, position of, in China, 223-4Woosung College, 239Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3 Yamagata, Prince, 115 n. Yangtze, 52, 132Yao and Shun, 21, 22Yellow River, 21, 187Y. M. C. A. , 82, 83, 222Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff. , 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250Yü, 22Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff. , 129, 135