THE STORY OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE

AN EPISODE OF FRONTIER WAR

By Sir Winston S. Churchill

 "They (Frontier Wars) are but the surf that marks the edge and the advance of the wave of civilisation. "

 LORD SALISBURY, Guildhall, 1892

CONTENTS

 Preface Chapter I: The Theatre of War Chapter II: The Malakand Camps Chapter III: The Outbreak Chapter IV: The Attack on the Malakand Chapter V: The Relief of Chakdara Chapter VI: The Defence of Chakdara Chapter VII: The Gate of Swat Chapter VIII: The Advance Against the Mohmands Chapter IX: Reconnaissance Chapter X: The March to Nawagai Chapter XI: The Action of the Mamund Valley, 16th September Chapter XII: At Inayat Kila Chapter XIII: Nawagai Chapter XIV: Back to the Mamund Valley Chapter XV: The Work of the Cavalry Chapter XVI: Submission Chapter XVII: Military Observations Chapter XVIII: The Riddle of the Frontier Appendix

 THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K. C. B. UNDER WHOSE COMMAND THE OPERATIONS THEREIN RECORDED WERE CARRIED OUT; BY WHOSE GENERALSHIP THEY WERE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION; AND TO WHOSE KINDNESS THE AUTHOR IS INDEBTED FOR THE MOST VALUABLE AND FASCINATING EXPERIENCE OF HIS LIFE. 

PREFACE

 "According to the fair play of the world, Let me have an audience. "

 "King John, " Act v. , Sc. 2. 

On general grounds I deprecate prefaces. I have always thought that ifan author cannot make friends with the reader, and explain his objects, in two or three hundred pages, he is not likely to do so in fifty lines. And yet the temptation of speaking a few words behind the scenes, as itwere, is so strong that few writers are able to resist it. I shall nottry. 

While I was attached to the Malakand Field Force I wrote a series ofletters for the London Daily Telegraph. The favourable manner in whichthese letters were received, encouraged me to attempt a more substantialwork. This volume is the result. 

The original letters have been broken up, and I have freely availedmyself of all passages, phrases, and facts, that seemed appropriate. Theviews they contained have not been altered, though several opinions andexpressions, which seemed mild in the invigorating atmosphere of a camp, have been modified, to suit the more temperate climate of peace. 

I have to thank many gallant officers for the assistance they have givenme in the collection of material. They have all asked me not to mentiontheir names, but to accede to this request would be to rob the story ofthe Malakand Field Force of all its bravest deeds and finest characters. 

The book does not pretend to deal with the complications of the frontierquestion, nor to present a complete summary of its phases and features. In the opening chapter I have tried to describe the general characterof the numerous and powerful tribes of the Indian Frontier. In the lastchapter I have attempted to apply the intelligence of a plain man to thevast mass of expert evidence, which on this subject is so great that itbaffles memory and exhausts patience. The rest is narrative, and in it Ihave only desired to show the reader what it looked like. 

As I have not been able to describe in the text all the instances ofconduct and courage which occurred, I have included in an appendix theofficial despatches. 

The impartial critic will at least admit that I have not insulted theBritish public by writing a party pamphlet on a great Imperial question. I have recorded the facts as they occurred, and the impressions asthey arose, without attempting to make a case against any person or anypolicy. Indeed, I fear that assailing none, I may have offended all. Neutrality may degenerate into an ignominious isolation. An honest andunprejudiced attempt to discern the truth is my sole defence, as thegood opinion of the reader has been throughout my chief aspiration, andcan be in the end my only support. 

 Winston S. Churchill

 Cavalry Barracks, Bangalore, 30th December, 1897

CHAPTER I: THE THEATRE OF WAR

 The Ghilzaie chief wrote answer: "Our paths are narrow and steep. The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep; . . . . . . . . . . 

 So a stranger needs safe escort, and the oath of a valiant friend. "

 "The Amir's Message, " SIR A. LYALL. 

All along the north and north-west frontiers of India lie the Himalayas, the greatest disturbance of the earth's surface that the convulsions ofchaotic periods have produced. Nearly four hundred miles in breadth andmore than sixteen hundred in length, this mountainous region dividesthe great plains of the south from those of Central Asia, and parts asa channel separates opposing shores, the Eastern Empire of Great Britainfrom that of Russia. The western end of this tumult of ground is formedby the peaks of the Hindu Kush, to the south of which is the scene ofthe story these pages contain. The Himalayas are not a line, but a greatcountry of mountains. By one who stands on some lofty pass or commandingpoint in Dir, Swat or Bajaur, range after range is seen as the longsurges of an Atlantic swell, and in the distance some glitteringsnow peak suggests a white-crested roller, higher than the rest. Thedrenching rains which fall each year have washed the soil from the sidesof the hills until they have become strangely grooved by numberlesswater-courses, and the black primeval rock is everywhere exposed. Thesilt and sediment have filled the valleys which lie between, and madetheir surface sandy, level and broad. Again the rain has cut wide, deep and constantly-changing channels through this soft deposit; greatgutters, which are sometimes seventy feet deep and two or three hundredyards across. These are the nullahs. Usually the smaller ones are dry, and the larger occupied only by streams; but in the season of the rains, abundant water pours down all, and in a few hours the brook has becomean impassable torrent, and the river swelled into a rolling flood whichcaves the banks round which it swirls, and cuts the channel deeper yearby year. 

From the level plain of the valleys the hills rise abruptly. Their steepand rugged slopes are thickly strewn with great rocks, and covered withcoarse, rank grass. Scattered pines grow on the higher ridges. In thewater-courses the chenar, the beautiful eastern variety of the planetree of the London squares and Paris boulevards, is occasionally found, and when found, is, for its pleasant shade, regarded with gratefulrespect. Reaching far up the sides of the hills are tiers of narrowterraces, chiefly the work of long-forgotten peoples, which catch thesoil that the rain brings down, and support crops of barley and maize. The rice fields along both banks of the stream display a broad, windingstrip of vivid green, which gives the eye its only relief from thesombre colours of the mountains. 

In the spring, indeed, the valleys are brightened by many flowers--wildtulips, peonies, crocuses and several kinds of polyanthus; and among thefruits the water melon, some small grapes and mulberries are excellent, although in their production, nature is unaided by culture. But duringthe campaign, which these pages describe, the hot sun of the summer hadburnt up all the flowers, and only a few splendid butterflies, whosewings of blue and green change colour in the light, like shot silk, contrasted with the sternness of the landscape. 

The valleys are nevertheless by no means barren. The soil is fertile, the rains plentiful, and a considerable proportion of ground is occupiedby cultivation, and amply supplies the wants of the inhabitants. 

The streams are full of fish, both trout and mahseer. By the banks teal, widgeon and wild duck, and in some places, snipe, are plentiful. Chikor, a variety of partridge, and several sorts of pheasants, are to beobtained on the hills. 

Among the wild animals of the region the hunter may pursue the blackor brown mountain bear, an occasional leopard, markhor, and severalvarieties of wild goat, sheep and antelope. The smaller quadrupedsinclude hares and red foxes, not unlike the British breed, only withmuch brighter coats, and several kinds of rats, some of which are verycurious and rare. Destitute of beauty but not without use, the scalyant-eater is frequently seen; but the most common of all the beastsis an odious species of large lizard, nearly three feet long, whichresembles a flabby-skinned crocodile and feeds on carrion. Domesticfowls, goats, sheep and oxen, with the inevitable vulture, and anoccasional eagle, complete the fauna. 

Over all is a bright blue sky and powerful sun. Such is the scenery ofthe theatre of war. 

The inhabitants of these wild but wealthy valleys are of many tribes, but of similar character and condition. The abundant crops which a warmsun and copious rains raise from a fertile soil, support a numerouspopulation in a state of warlike leisure. Except at the times of sowingand of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughoutthe land. Tribe wars with tribe. The people of one valley fight withthose of the next. To the quarrels of communities are added the combatsof individuals. Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbor. Every man's hand isagainst the other, and all against the stranger. 

Nor are these struggles conducted with the weapons which usually belongto the races of such development. To the ferocity of the Zulu are addedthe craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. The worldis presented with that grim spectacle, "the strength of civilisationwithout its mercy. " At a thousand yards the traveller falls woundedby the well-aimed bullet of a breech-loading rifle. His assailant, approaching, hacks him to death with the ferocity of a South-SeaIslander. The weapons of the nineteenth century are in the hands of thesavages of the Stone Age. 

Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder amongmen, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence. Thestrong aboriginal propensity to kill, inherit in all human beings, hasin these valleys been preserved in unexampled strength and vigour. That religion, which above all others was founded and propagated by thesword--the tenets and principles of which are instinct with incentivesto slaughter and which in three continents has produced fighting breedsof men--stimulates a wild and merciless fanaticism. The love of plunder, always a characteristic of hill tribes, is fostered by the spectacle ofopulence and luxury which, to their eyes, the cities and plains of thesouth display. A code of honour not less punctilious than that of oldSpain, is supported by vendettas as implacable as those of Corsica. 

In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier. Either he is the retainer of some khan--theman-at-arms of some feudal baron as it were--or he is a unit in thearmed force of his village--the burgher of mediaeval history. In suchsurroundings we may without difficulty trace the rise and fall ofan ambitious Pathan. At first he toils with zeal and thrift as anagriculturist on that plot of ground which his family have held sincethey expelled some former owner. He accumulates in secret a sum ofmoney. With this he buys a rifle from some daring thief, who has riskedhis life to snatch it from a frontier guard-house. He becomes a man tobe feared. Then he builds a tower to his house and overawes those aroundhim in the village. Gradually they submit to his authority. He might nowrule the village; but he aspires still higher. He persuades or compelshis neighbors to join him in an attack on the castle of a local khan. The attack succeeds. The khan flies or is killed; the castle captured. The retainers make terms with the conqueror. The land tenure is feudal. In return for their acres they follow their new chief to war. Were he totreat them worse than the other khans treated their servants, they wouldsell their strong arms elsewhere. He treats them well. Others resort tohim. He buys more rifles. He conquers two or three neighboring khans. Hehas now become a power. 

Many, perhaps all, states have been founded in a similar way, and it isby such steps that civilisation painfully stumbles through her earlierstages. But in these valleys the warlike nature of the people and theirhatred of control, arrest the further progress of development. Wehave watched a man, able, thrifty, brave, fighting his way to power, absorbing, amalgamating, laying the foundations of a more complexand interdependent state of society. He has so far succeeded. Buthis success is now his ruin. A combination is formed against him. Thesurrounding chiefs and their adherents are assisted by the villagepopulations. The ambitious Pathan, oppressed by numbers, is destroyed. The victors quarrel over the spoil, and the story closes, as it began, in bloodshed and strife. 

The conditions of existence, that have been thus indicated, havenaturally led to the dwelling-places of these tribes being fortified. Ifthey are in the valley, they are protected by towers and walls loopholedfor musketry. If in the hollows of the hills, they are strong by theirnatural position. In either case they are guarded by a hardy and martialpeople, well armed, brave, and trained by constant war. 

This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which reckslittle of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with carelesslevity, and the tribesmen of the Afghan border afford the spectacle of apeople, who fight without passion, and kill one another without loss oftemper. Such a disposition, combined with an absolute lack of reverencefor all forms of law and authority, and a complete assurance ofequality, is the cause of their frequent quarrels with the Britishpower. A trifle rouses their animosity. They make a sudden attack onsome frontier post. They are repulsed. From their point of view theincident is closed. There has been a fair fight in which they have hadthe worst fortune. What puzzles them is that "the Sirkar" should regardso small an affair in a serious light. Thus the Mohmands cross thefrontier and the action of Shabkadr is fought. They are surprised andaggrieved that the Government are not content with the victory, but mustneeds invade their territories, and impose punishment. Or again, theMamunds, because a village has been burnt, assail the camp of the SecondBrigade by night. It is a drawn game. They are astounded that the troopsdo not take it in good part. 

They, when they fight among themselves, bear little malice, and thecombatants not infrequently make friends over the corpses of theircomrades or suspend operations for a festival or a horse race. At theend of the contest cordial relations are at once re-established. And yetso full of contradictions is their character, that all this is withoutprejudice to what has been written of their family vendettas andprivate blood feuds. Their system of ethics, which regards treachery andviolence as virtues rather than vices, has produced a code of honour sostrange and inconsistent, that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind. I have been told that if a white man could grasp it fully, and were tounderstand their mental impulses--if he knew, when it was their honourto stand by him, and when it was their honour to betray him; when theywere bound to protect and when to kill him--he might, by judging histimes and opportunities, pass safely from one end of the mountains tothe other. But a civilised European is as little able to accomplishthis, as to appreciate the feelings of those strange creatures, which, when a drop of water is examined under a microscope, are revealedamiably gobbling each other up, and being themselves complacentlydevoured. 

I remark with pleasure, as an agreeable trait in the character of thePathans, the immunity, dictated by a rude spirit of chivalry, which intheir ceaseless brawling, their women enjoy. Many forts are built atsome distance from any pool or spring. When these are besieged, thewomen are allowed by the assailants to carry water to the foot of thewalls by night. In the morning the defenders come out and fetch it--ofcourse under fire--and are enabled to continue their resistance. Butpassing from the military to the social aspect of their lives, thepicture assumes an even darker shade, and is unrelieved by any redeemingvirtue. We see them in their squalid, loopholed hovels, amid dirt andignorance, as degraded a race as any on the fringe of humanity: fierceas the tiger, but less cleanly; as dangerous, not so graceful. Thosesimple family virtues, which idealists usually ascribe to primitivepeoples, are conspicuously absent. Their wives and their womenkindgenerally, have no position but that of animals. They are freely boughtand sold, and are not infrequently bartered for rifles. Truth is unknownamong them. A single typical incident displays the standpoint fromwhich they regard an oath. In any dispute about a field boundary, it iscustomary for both claimants to walk round the boundary he claims, witha Koran in his hand, swearing that all the time he is walking on his ownland. To meet the difficulty of a false oath, while he is walking overhis neighbor's land, he puts a little dust from his own field into hisshoes. As both sides are acquainted with the trick, the dismal farce ofswearing is usually soon abandoned, in favor of an appeal to force. 

All are held in the grip of miserable superstition. The power of theziarat, or sacred tomb, is wonderful. Sick children are carried on thebacks of buffaloes, sometimes sixty or seventy miles, to be depositedin front of such a shrine, after which they are carried back--if theysurvive the journey--in the same way. It is painful even to think ofwhat the wretched child suffers in being thus jolted over the cattletracks. But the tribesmen consider the treatment much more efficaciousthan any infidel prescription. To go to a ziarat and put a stick inthe ground is sufficient to ensure the fulfillment of a wish. To sitswinging a stone or coloured glass ball, suspended by a string from atree, and tied there by some fakir, is a sure method of securing a finemale heir. To make a cow give good milk, a little should be plasteredon some favorite stone near the tomb of a holy man. These are but a fewinstances; but they may suffice to reveal a state of mental developmentat which civilisation hardly knows whether to laugh or weep. 

Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny ofa numerous priesthood--"Mullahs, " "Sahibzadas, " "Akhundzadas, ""Fakirs, "--and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who correspond withthe theological students in Turkey, and live free at the expense of thepeople. More than this, they enjoy a sort of "droit du seigneur, " and noman's wife or daughter is safe from them. Of some of their manners andmorals it is impossible to write. As Macaulay has said of Wycherley'splays, "they are protected against the critics as a skunk is protectedagainst the hunters. " They are "safe, because they are too filthy tohandle, and too noisome even to approach. "

Yet the life even of these barbarous people is not without momentswhen the lover of the picturesque might sympathise with their hopesand fears. In the cool of the evening, when the sun has sunk behind themountains of Afghanistan, and the valleys are filled with a delicioustwilight, the elders of the village lead the way to the chenar trees bythe water's side, and there, while the men are cleaning their rifles, or smoking their hookas, and the women are making rude ornaments frombeads, and cloves, and nuts, the Mullah drones the evening prayer. Fewwhite men have seen, and returned to tell the tale. But we may imaginethe conversation passing from the prices of arms and cattle, theprospects of the harvest, or the village gossip, to the great Power, that lies to the southward, and comes nearer year by year. Perhaps someformer Sepoy, of Beluchis or Pathans, will recount his adventures in thebazaars of Peshawar, or tell of the white officers he has followed andfought for in the past. He will speak of their careless bravery andtheir strange sports; of the far-reaching power of the Government, thatnever forgets to send his pension regularly as the months pass by; andhe may even predict to the listening circle the day when their valleyswill be involved in the comprehensive grasp of that great machine, andjudges, collectors and commissioners shall ride to sessions at Ambeyla, or value the land tax on the soil of Nawagai. Then the Mullah will raisehis voice and remind them of other days when the sons of the prophetdrove the infidel from the plains of India, and ruled at Delhi, aswide an Empire as the Kafir holds to-day: when the true religion strodeproudly through the earth and scorned to lie hidden and neglected amongthe hills: when mighty princes ruled in Bagdad, and all men knew thatthere was one God, and Mahomet was His prophet. And the young menhearing these things will grip their Martinis, and pray to Allah, thatone day He will bring some Sahib--best prize of all--across their lineof sight at seven hundred yards so that, at least, they may strike ablow for insulted and threatened Islam. 

The general aspect of the country and character of its inhabitantshave thus been briefly described. At this stage it is not necessary ordesirable to descend to detail. As the account proceeds the reader mayderive a more lively impression of the sombre mountains, and of thepeoples who dwell beneath their shadow. 

The tale that I have to tell is one of frontier war. Neither theimportance of the issues, nor the numbers of the combatants, are on anEuropean scale. The fate of empires does not hang on the result. Yet thenarrative may not be without interest, or material for reflection. Inthe quarrels of civilised nations, great armies, many thousands strong, collide. Brigades and battalions are hurried forward, and come perhapswithin some fire zone, swept by concentrated batteries, or massedmusketry. Hundreds or thousands fall killed and wounded. The survivorsstruggle on blindly, dazed and dumfoundered, to the nearest cover. Freshtroops are continuously poured on from behind. At length one side orthe other gives way. In all this tumult, this wholesale slaughter, theindividual and his feelings are utterly lost. Only the army has a taleto tell. With events on such a scale, the hopes and fears, the strengthand weakness, of man are alike indistinguishable. Amid the din and dustlittle but destruction can be discerned. But on the frontier, in theclear light of morning, when the mountain side is dotted with smokepuffs, and every ridge sparkles with bright sword blades, the spectatormay observe and accurately appreciate all grades of human courage--thewild fanaticism of the Ghazi, the composed fatalism of the Sikh, thestubbornness of the British soldier, and the jaunty daring of hisofficers. He may remark occasions of devotion and self-sacrifice, ofcool cynicism and stern resolve. He may participate in moments of wildenthusiasm, or of savage anger and dismay. The skill of the general, thequality of the troops, the eternal principles of the art of war, willbe as clearly displayed as on historic fields. Only the scale of thestatistics is reduced. 

A single glass of champagne imparts a feeling of exhilaration. Thenerves are braced, the imagination is agreeably stirred, the witsbecome more nimble. A bottle produces a contrary effect. Excess causesa comatose insensibility. So it is with war, and the quality of both isbest discovered by sipping. 

I propose to chronicle the military operations of the Malakand FieldForce, to trace their political results, and to give, if possible, somepicture of the scenery and people of the Indian Highlands. These pagesmay serve to record the actions of brave and skilful men. They may throwa sidelight on the great drama of frontier war. They may describe anepisode in that ceaseless struggle for Empire which seems to be theperpetual inheritance of our race. They may amuse an idle hour. But theambition I shall associate with them is, that in some measure, howeversmall, they may stimulate that growing interest which the ImperialDemocracy of England is beginning to take, in their great estates thatlie beyond the seas. 

CHAPTER II: THE MALAKAND CAMPS

 Ibam forte via sacra. --HORACE. 

The town and cantonment of Nowshera was the base from which all theoperations of the Malakand Field Force were conducted. It is situatedon the India side of the Cabul River and is six hours by rail from RawalPindi. In times of peace its garrison consists of one native cavalryregiment, one British, and one native infantry battalion. During thewar these troops were employed at the front. The barracks became greathospitals. The whole place was crowded with transport and militarystores; and only a slender force remained under the orders of ColonelSchalch, the Base Commandant. 

The road from Nowshera to the Malakand Pass and camps is forty-sevenmiles long, and divided into four stages. Usually there is an excellenttonga service, and the distance is covered in about six hours; butwhile the Field Force was mobilised so much traffic and so many officerspassed up and down the line, that the tonga ponies were soon reduced toa terrible condition of sores and emaciation, and could hardly drag thejourney out in nine, ten, or even twelve hours. After leaving Nowshera, and crossing the Cabul River, a stage of fifteen miles brings thetraveller to Mardan. This place--pronounced "Merdane"--is the permanentstation of the Corps of Guides. It is shady and agreeable, thoughterribly hot in the summer months. It boasts an excellent polo groundand a comfortable rest-house. The passer-by should pause to see theGuides' cemetery, perhaps the only regimental cemetery in the world. Tothis last resting-place under the palm trees, close to the fields wherethey have played, and the barracks in which they lived, have been bornethe bodies of successive generations of these wardens of the marches, killed in action across the frontier line. It is a green and pleasantspot. Nor is there any place in the world where a soldier might lie inbraver company. 

After Mardan the road becomes more dusty, and the surrounding countrybarren and arid. [This description applies to the autumn season. In thewinter and spring the country for a time is green and the air cold. ]The mountains are approached, and as the tonga advances their shapes andcolours are more distinctly seen. A few knolls and ridges risingfrom the level plain, mark the outposts of that great array of hills. Crossing a shallow stream--a tributary of the Cabul River, Jalala, thesecond stage is reached. In peace time a small mud fort is theonly indication, but this is expanded by the proximity of war to aconsiderable camp, with an entrenchment around it. Stopping only tochange ponies, for it is a forsaken spot, the journey is resumed. Theavenue of trees on either side has ceased. The road is seen simply asa white streak stretching towards the mountains. It is traversed in asweltering heat and choking dust. All around the country is red, sterileand burnt up. In front the great wall of hills rises dark and ominous. At length Dargai at the foot of the pass is reached. It is anothermud fort, swelled during the operations into an entrenched camp, andsurrounded by a network of barbed wire entanglement. The Malakand Passcan now be seen--a great cleft in the line of mountains--and far up thegorge, the outline of the fort that guards it, is distinguishable. 

The graded road winds up, with many a turn, the long ascent from Dargaito the top of the pass. The driver flogs the wretched, sore-backedponies tirelessly. At length the summit is neared. The view is one worthstopping to look at. Behind and below, under the haze of the heat, isthe wide expanse of open country--smooth, level, stretching away to thedim horizon. The tonga turns the corner and enters a new world. Acooler breeze is blowing. A single step has led from peace to war; fromcivilisation to savagery; from India to the mountains. On all sides thelandscape is wild and rugged. Ridge succeeds ridge. Valley opens intovalley. As far as the eye can reach in every direction are ragged peaksand spurs. The country of the plains is left, and we have entered astrange land, as tangled as the maze at Hampton Court, with mountainsinstead of hedges. So broken and so confused is the ground, that Idespair of conveying a clear impression of it. 

The Malakand is like a great cup, of which the rim is broken intonumerous clefts and jagged points. At the bottom of this cup is the"crater" camp. The deepest cleft is the Malakand Pass. The highest ofthe jagged points is Guides Hill, on a spur of which the fort stands. It needs no technical knowledge to see, that to defend such a place, therim of the cup must be held. But in the Malakand, the bottom of the cupis too small to contain the necessary garrison. The whole position istherefore, from the military point of view, bad and indefensible. In therevised and improved scheme of defence, arrangements have been made, to command the available approaches, and to block such as cannot becommanded with barbed wire entanglements and other obstructions; and bya judicious system of works much of the rim is now held. But even nowI am told by competent judges that the place is a bad one for defence;that the pass could be held by the fort alone, and that the brigadestationed there would be safer and equally useful, if withdrawn toDargai. At the time this story opens the Malakand South Camp was animpossible place to put troops in. It was easy of access. It was crampedand commanded by neighbouring heights. [Under the arrangements whichhave been made since the war, the Malakand position and the works atChakdara and Dargai will be held by two battalions and some details. These will be supported by a flying column, the exact location andcomposition of which are as yet undetermined. ]

The small area of the camp on the Kotal necessitated the formation of asecond encampment in the plain of Khar. This was close under thenorth outer edge of the cup. It was called for political reasons NorthMalakand. As a military position it, also, was radically bad. It waseverywhere commanded, and surrounded by ravines and nullahs, which madeit easy for an enemy to get in, and difficult for troops to get out. It was, of course, of no strategic value, and was merely used as ahabitation for the troops intended to hold Malakand, for whom there wasno room in the crater and fort. The north camp has now been definitelyabandoned. 

Nobody, however--least of all those who selected the site--would seemto have contemplated the possibility of an attack. Indeed the wholesituation was regarded as purely temporary. The vacillation, causedby the change of parties and policies in England, led to the Malakandgarrison remaining for two years in a position which could not be welldefended either on paper or in reality. At first, after the Chitralcampaign of 1895, it was thought that the retention of the brigade inthis advanced post, was only a matter of a few weeks. But as the monthspassed by the camp began, in spite of the uncertainty, to assume anappearance of permanency. The officers built themselves huts and messrooms. A good polo ground was discovered near Khar, and under carefulmanagement rapidly improved. A race-course was projected. Many officerswho were married brought their wives and families to the camp amongthe mountains, and the whole place was rapidly becoming a regularcantonment. No cases of Ghazi outrage broke the tranquillity. Therevolvers, which all persons leaving camp were by regulations obligedto take, were either unloaded or carried by a native groom. Shootingparties were organised to the hills. A well-contested polo tournamentwas held in Christmas week. Distinguished travellers--even a member ofParliament--visited this outpost of empire, and observed with interestthe swiftness and ease with which the Anglo-Saxon adapts every situationto his sports and habits. 

At the same time the station of the Malakand Brigade was far from beinga comfortable one. For two years they lived under canvas or in rudehuts. They were exposed to extremes of climate. They were withoutpunkahs or ice in the hot weather. They were nearly fifty miles fromthe railway, and in respect of companionship and amusements were thrownentirely on their own resources. When the British cavalry officersucceeds, in spite of official opposition, expense and discouragement, in getting on service across the frontier, he is apt to look withenvious eyes at the officers of the Frontier Force, who are taken as amatter of course and compelled to do by command, what he would solicitas a favour. But he must remember that this is their compensation forlong months of discomfort and monotony in lonely and out-of-the-waystations, and for undergoing hardships which, though honourable andwelcome in the face of the enemy, become obnoxious in times of peace. 

After crossing the Malakand Pass the first turning to the right leadsto the Swat Valley. The traveller is now within the mountains. In everydirection the view is restricted or terminated by walls of rock. Thevalley itself is broad, level and fertile. The river flows swiftlythrough the middle. On either side of it, is a broad strip of ricefields. Other crops occupy the drier ground. Numerous villages, some ofwhich contain large populations, are scattered about. It is a beautifulscene. The cool breezes of the mountains temper the heat of the sun. Theabundant rains preserve the verdure of the earth. 

In ancient times this region was the seat of a Buddhistic kingdom, and was known as Woo-Chang or "Udyana, " which means "the Park, " andproclaims the appreciation which its former possessors had of theirpleasant valley. "The people, " says the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien, whovisited the country in the fifth century, "all use the language ofCentral India, 'Central India' being what we should call the 'MiddleKingdom. ' The food and clothes of the common people are the same asin that Central Kingdom. The law of Buddha is very flourishing inWoo-Chang. " "The Park, " which includes all the country on both banks ofthe Swat River--then called the Subhavastu--but which perhaps appliesmore particularly to the upper end of the valley, was famous for itsforests, flowers and fruit. But though the valley retains much of itsbeauty, its forests have been destroyed by the improvidence, and itsflowers and fruit have declined through the ignorance, of the fierceconquerors into whose hands it fell. 

The reputation which its present inhabitants enjoy is evil. Theirtreacherous character has distinguished them even among peoplesnotoriously faithless and cruel. Among Pathans it is a common saying:"Swat is heaven, but the Swatis are hell-fiends. " For many years theyhad lain under the stigma of cowardice, and were despised as well asdistrusted by the tribes of the border; but their conduct in the recentfighting has cleared them at least from this imputation. 

Several minor chieftains now divide authority in the Swat Valley, buttill 1870 it was governed by a single ruler. The Ahkund of Swat was byorigin a cowherd, an office considered most honourable in India. Thecow is a sacred beast. His service is acceptable to the Gods and men. Princes glory in the name--though they do not usually carry theirenthusiasm further. "Guicowar" translated literally means "cowherd. "From such employment the future Ahkund received his inspiration. He satfor many years by the banks of the Indus, and meditated. Thus he becamea saint. The longer his riparian reflections were continued, the greaterhis sanctity became. The fame of his holiness spread throughout all theregion. The Swatis besought him to come and live in their valley. Afterdignified and diplomatic reluctance, he consented to exchange the banksof the Indus for those of the Swat. For some years, he lived in thegreen valley, and enjoyed the reverence of its people. At the time ofthe great mutiny, Said Akbar, the King of Swat, died, and the saintsucceeded to the temporal as well as the spiritual authority. In 1863he preached the Jehad against the British, and headed the Swatisand Bunerwals in the Ambeyla campaign. The power which the Sirkar soextravagantly displayed to bring the war to an end, evidently impressedthe old man, for at its close he made friends with the Government andreceived from them many tokens of respect. 

Before he died in 1870, he summoned his people around him and declaredto them that one day their valley would be the scene of a strugglebetween the Russians and the British. When that came to pass he chargedthem to fight on our side. The saying is firmly fixed in the hearts ofthe tribesmen, and is associated with the memory of their famous priest, known to English minds chiefly through the medium of the "Bab Ballads. "

His two sons are dead, but his two grandsons, [the Mianguls of Swat]both quite young, live on in the valley, and are the owners of theAhkund's freeholds, which are in every section of the Swat country. Theyhave very little political influence; but their persons and propertyare respected by the people and by the British for the sake of theirgrandfather, who sleeps in an odour of sanctity at Saidu, near Mingaora. 

From the Malakand the signal tower of Chakdara can be seen eight milesaway to the eastward. Thither the broad graded road runs like a ribbonacross the plain. Seven miles from the Kotal Camp, it crosses theAmandara Pass, a gap in a considerable underfeature, which juts from thesouthern mountains. After this it turns more to the north and leads tothe fortified bridge across the river. I invite the reader to remarkthis road, for it is historic. It is not only the route by which theMalakand Field Force was able to advance, but it is the very reason oftheir existence. Without this road there would have been no MalakandCamps, no fighting, no Malakand Field Force, no story. It is the road toChitral. 

Here then, at once, the whole vast question of frontier policy israised. We hold the Malakand Pass to keep the Chitral road open. Wekeep the Chitral road open because we have retained Chitral. We retainChitral in accordance with the "Forward Policy. " I am thus confronted atthe very outset of this book, which was intended to be devoted chieflyto the narration of military events and small incidents, with that widepolitical question, on which the keenest intellects in England are indoubt, and the most valuable expert evidence in India is divided. The reader must not think me pusillanimous or weak if I postpone thediscussion of so great and controversial a matter till a later chapter, when I may perhaps enjoy a larger measure of his sympathy and agreement. After the story has been told, it may not be inappropriate to point themoral. 

Prudence encourages procrastination. But while the consideration of theadvisability of the retention of Chitral may be deferred, a descriptionof the means is convenient, if not necessary, to the present chapter. 

Nowshera is the railway base of the road. Thence we have followed itto Mardan and across the frontier. Here the new and disputed portionbegins. Passing at first through the Lower Ranizai country, it climbsthe Malakand Pass, descends into the valley beyond and runs thencethrough Upper Ranizai territory and Lower Swat to Chakdara. Here itcrosses the Swat River by the fine suspension bridge which the fortguards. The three spans of this bridge are together nearly 1500 feetlong. It was constructed in 1895, during the operations, in about sixweeks, and is a very remarkable piece of military engineering. Beyondthe Swat the road runs through the territories of the Khan of Dir, northand east to Sadu, an obscure village thirty-five miles from Malakand. This marks the end of the first section, and further than this wheeledtraffic cannot go. The road, now become a camel track, winds along theleft bank of the Panjkora River to within five miles of Dir, whereit crosses to the right bank by another suspension bridge. Thence itcontinues to the junction of the Dir stream, along which it finds itsway to Dir itself, some fifty miles from Sadu. Beyond Dir camels cannotproceed, and here begins the third section--a path practicable only formules, and about sixty miles long. From Dir the road is a triumph ofengineering. In many places it is carried on wooden galleries perched onthe faces of steep and tremendous cliffs, and at others it works roundspurs by astounding zig-zags, or is scarped from the mountain side. Atthe end of the road is Fort Chitral with a garrison of two battalions, one company of sappers, and two mountain guns. 

The road is maintained and protected by the tribes through whoseterritories it passes; but the two principal points where it might beclosed are held by Imperial garrisons. The Malakand Fort guards thepassage of the mountains. Chakdara holds the bridge across the river. The rest is left to the tribal levies. The Ranizai tribe receive anannual subsidy from the Indian Government of 30, 000 rupees, out of whichthey maintain 200 irregulars armed with Sniders, and irreverentlycalled by the British officers, "Catch-'em-alive-Os. " These drive awaymarauders and discourage outrage and murder. The Khan of Dir, throughwhose territory the road runs for seventy-three miles, also receives asubsidy from Government of 60, 000 rupees, in consideration of which heprovides 400 irregulars for its service. 

Until the great rising these arrangements worked admirably. Thetribesmen interested in the maintenance of the route, were mostreluctant to engage in hostilities against the Government. The LowerRanizais, south of Malakand, abstained altogether. The elders of thetribe collected all the arms of their hot-headed youths, and forbadethem to attack the troops. The Upper Ranizais were nearer the scene ofthe disturbance, and were induced by superstition and fear to jointhe Mullah; but very half-heartedly. The Swatis were carried awayby fanaticism. The Khan of Dir throughout behaved loyally, as he isentirely dependent on British support, and his people realise theadvantages of the subsidy. 

If the road is interesting its story is more so, and a summary of theevents and causes which have led to its construction, may also throwsome light on the political history and methods of the border tribes. 

The uncertainty and insecurity of their power, has always led pettychiefs to seek the support of some powerful suzerain. In 1876 the Mehtarof Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk, was encouraged to seek the protection, andbecome the vassal of our vassal, the Maharaja of Cashmere. In accordancewith the general scheme of advance, then already adopted by the IndianGovernment, a British agency was at once established at Gilgit on theChitral-Cashmere frontier. Aman-ul-Mulk was presented with a certainsupply of arms and ammunition, and an annual subsidy of 6000 rupees, afterwards raised to 12, 000 rupees. The British thus obtained aninterest in Chitral, and a point of observation on its borders. In 1881the agency was withdrawn, but the influence remained, and in 1889 it wasre-established with a much larger garrison. Meanwhile Aman-ul-Mulk ruledin Chitral, showing great respect to the wishes of the Government, andin the enjoyment of his subsidy and comparative peace. But in 1892he died, leaving many sons, all equally ferocious, ambitious andunscrupulous. One of these, Afzal by name, though not the eldest oracknowledged heir, had the good fortune to be on the spot. He seized thereins of power, and having murdered as many if his brothers as he couldcatch, proclaimed himself Mehtar, and invited the recognition of theIndian Government. He was acknowledged chief, as he seemed to be "aman of courage and determination, " and his rule afforded a prospect ofsettled government. Surviving brothers fled to neighbouring states. 

Nizam, the eldest, came to Gilgit and appealed to the British. He gotno help. The blessing had already been bestowed. But in November, 1892, Sher Afzul, a brother of the late Aman, returned by stealth to Chitral, whence fraternal affection had driven him, and killed the new Mehtar andanother brother, both of whom were his nephews. The "wicked uncle" thenascended the throne, or its equivalent. He was, however, opposed. TheIndian Government refused to recognise him. Nizam, at Gilgit, urged hisclaims, and was finally allowed to go and try to regain his inheritance. The moral support of 250 Cashmere rifles brought him many adherents. Hewas joined by the people. It was the landing of William of Orange on areduced scale, and with Cashmere troops instead of Dutch Guards. Twelvehundred men sent by Sher Afzul to oppose him, deserted to his side. Theavuncular usurper, realising that it might be dangerous to wait longer, fled to Afghanistan, as James II had fled to France, was received by theruler with hospitality, and carefully preserved as an element of futuredisorder. 

Nizam now became Mehtar according to his desire. But he did not greatlyenjoy his power, and may have evolved some trite reflections on thevanity of earthly ambition. From the first he was poor and unpopular. With the support of the Government of India, however, he managed tomaintain a weak, squalid rule for a space. To give him countenance, and in accordance with the Policy, Captain Younghusband was sent to thecountry with a hundred bayonets. The Gilgit garrison was increased bya battalion, and several posts were established between that place andMastuj. 

Thus the Imperial forces had entered Chitral. Their position was soon tobecome one of danger. They were separated from Gilgit by many miles ofbad road, and warlike tribesmen. To move troops from Gilgit would alwaysbe slow and difficult. Another route was however possible, the route Ihave described--a route northwards from Peshawar through Dir--shorterand easier, starting from British territory and the railway. Towardsthis line of communication the Indian Government now looked. If Britishtroops or agents were to be retained in Chitral, if in other words theirrecognised policy was to be continued, this route must be opened up. They sounded the Home Government. Lord Kimberley replied, deprecatingincrease of responsibilities, of territory and expenditure, anddeclining to pledge himself to support such a scheme. At the same timehe sanctioned the temporary retention of the troops, and the agent, inthe hopes of strengthening Nizam. [Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 34, 1st Sept. , 1893. ]

At this point Umra Khan must enter the story. The Gilgit agency report, dated 28th April, 1890, speaks of this chief, who was the Khan ofJandul, but whose influence pervaded the whole of Bajaur as "the mostimportant man between Chitral and Pashawar. " To this powerful ruler, another of the sons of Aman, named Amir, had fled from the familymassacre which followed his father's death. Umra Khan protected himand determined to turn him to his own advantage. In May, 1894, thisyouth--he was about twenty years of age--returned to Chitral, professingto have escaped from the hands of Umra Khan. He was kindly received byNizam, who seems to have been much hampered throughout his career by hisvirtue. On 1st January, 1895, Amir availed himself of his welcome, tomurder his brother, and the principal members of the Chitral Cabinet. He proclaimed himself Mentar and asked for recognition. The Imperialofficers, though used to frontier politics, refused to commit themselvesto any arrangement with such a villain, until the matter had beenconsidered in India. 

Umra Khan now advanced with a large force to the head of the ChitralValley, nominally to assist his dear friend and ally, Amir, toconsolidate his rule, really in the hopes of extending his ownterritories. But Amir, knowing Umra well, and having won his kingdom, did not desire to share it. Fighting ensued. The Chitrals were beaten. As he could not make any use of Amir, Umra Khan invited the wicked uncleto return. Sher Afzul accepted. A bargain was struck. Sher Afzul claimedto be made Mehtar, Umra supported his claims. Both threatened force inthe event of opposition. 

But the Imperial Government rose in wrath, refused to have anythingto do with the new claimant, informed him that his language wasimpertinent, and warned Umra Khan to leave Chitral territory forthwithor take the consequences. The answer was war. The scanty garrisons andscattered parties of British troops were attacked. A company of the14th Sikhs was cut to pieces. Lieutenants Fowler and Edwards were takenprisoners. Fort Chitral, into which the rest of the Chitral mission andtheir escort had thrown themselves, was closely and fiercely besieged. To rescue them was imperative. The 1st Division of the Field Army wasmobilised. A force of nearly 16, 000 men crossed the frontier on the 1stApril, from Mardan, to advance to the relief by the shortest route--theroute through Swat and Dir--the line of the present Chitral road. Thecommand of the expedition was confided to Sir Robert Low. Sir BindonBlood was Chief of the Staff. 

So far the tale has been of the steady increase of British influence, inaccordance with an avowed and consistent policy--primarily in Chitral, and ultimately throughout the border tribes. One movement has beenfollowed by another. All have been aimed at a common end. Now suddenlywe are confronted with an act by which the Government of India with openeyes placed an obstacle in the path, which they had so long pursued, tofollow which they had made so many efforts themselves and demandedso many sacrifices from their subjects. Perhaps from compunction, butprobably to soothe the Liberal Government, by appearing to localise thedisturbances, and disclaiming any further acquisition of territory, they issued a proclamation to "all the people of Swat and the peopleof Bajaur, who do not side with Umra Khan, " in which they declared thatthey had "no intention of permanently occupying any territory throughwhich Umra Khan's misconduct" might "force them to pass, or ofinterfering with the independence of the tribes. " [Proclamation, 14thMarch, 1895. ]

If this proclamation was intended for political purposes in England, it, from one point of view, succeeded most admirably, for there has beennearly as much written about it as about all the soldiers who havebeen killed and wounded in the war. It had, however, no effect upon thetribesmen, who were infuriated by the sight if the troops and paid noattention to the protestations of the Government. Had they watchedwith care the long, steady, deliberate advance, which I have so brieflysummarised; had they read the avowed and recorded determination of theIndian Administration "to extend and, by degrees, to consolidate theirinfluence" [Letter from Government of India, No. 407, 28th February, 1879. ] in the whole drainage system of the Indus, they might haveeven doubted their sincerity. Instead, and being unable to make finedistinctions, they saw only invasion in the military movements. 

They gathered accordingly, to oppose the advance of the troops. To thenumber of 12, 000 they occupied the Malakand Pass--a tremendous position. From this they were driven with great slaughter on the 3rd of April, bythe two leading brigades of Sir Robert Low's force. Further operationsresulted in the passage of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers being effected. The road to Chitral was open. The besiegers of the fort fled, and asmall relieving force was able to push through from Gilgit under ColonelKelly. Umra Khan fled to Afghanistan, and the question of future policycame before the Government of India. 

Two alternatives presented themselves: either they must "abandon theattempt to keep up any effective control" over Chitral, or they must puta sufficient garrison there. In pursuance of their recognised policy, the Council decided unanimously that to maintain British influence inChitral was "a matter of first importance. " In a despatch [Despatch ofGovernment of India, No. 240, 8th May, 1895. ] to the Home Government theyset forth all their reasons, and at the same time declared that itwas impossible to garrison Chitral without keeping up the road fromPeshawar, by which the Relief force had advanced. 

On the 13th of June Lord Rosebery's Cabinet replied decisively, withcourage if not with wisdom, that "no military force or European agentshould be kept at Chitral, that Chitral should not be fortified, andthat no road should be made between Peshawar and Chitral. " By this theydefinitely and finally repudiated the policy which had been consistentlyfollowed since 1876. They left Chitral to stew in its own juice. Theyover-ruled the Government of India. It was a bold and desperate attemptto return to the old frontier line. The Indian Government replied: "Wedeeply regret but loyally accept decision, " and began to gather up thesevered strings of their policy and weave another web. 

But in the nick of time the Liberal Administration fell, and LordSalisbury's Cabinet reversed their decision. It is interesting, inreading the Blue Books on Indian questions, to watch the emotionsof party principles, stirring beneath the uniform mask of officialresponsibility--which the most reckless of men are compelled to wear assoon as they become ministers. The language, the style, the tone of thecorrespondence is the same. It is always a great people addressing andinstructing their pro-consuls and administrators. But the influenceinclines backwards and forwards as the pendulum of politics swings. Andas the swing in 1895 was a very great one, a proportionate impulse wasgiven to the policy of advance. "It seemed" to the new ministry "thatthe policy. .. Continuously pursued by successive Governments oughtnot to be lightly abandoned unless its maintenance had become clearlyimpossible. " [Despatch, Secretary of State, No. 30, 16th Aug. , 1895. ]Thus the retention of Chitral was sanctioned, and the road which thatretention necessitated was completed. 

I approach with nervousness so great a matter as the "Breach of Faith"question. In a book devoted chiefly to the deeds of soldiers it seemsalmost presumptuous to discuss an affair which involves the politicalhonour of statesmen. In their unnecessary and gratuitous proclamationthe Government of India declared, that they had no intention ofinterfering with the tribes, or of permanently occupying any territory, the troops might march through; whereas now they do interfere withthe tribesmen, and have established garrisons at Dargai, Malakand andChakdara, all of which are in the territory through which the troopspassed. But it takes two to make a bargain or a breach of faith. Thetribes took no notice of the proclamation. They did not understand it. They did not believe it. Where there is no faith there can be nobreach of faith. The border peoples resisted the advance. That positionannulled the proclamation, and proved that it was not credited by thetribesmen. They do not think they have been tricked. They do not regardthe road as a "breach of faith. " What they do regard it as, is a menaceto their independence, and a prelude to annexation. Nor are they wrong. Looking at the road, as I have seen it, and have tried to describe it, running broad and white across the valley; at the soldiers movingalong it; at the political officers extending their influence in alldirections; at the bridge and fort of Chakdara; and at the growingcantonment on the Malakand Pass, it needs no education to appreciate itssignificance. Nor can any sophistry obscure it. 

CHAPTER III: THE OUTBREAK

 Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. 

 LUCRETIUS. 

The historian of great events is always oppressed by the difficulty oftracing the silent, subtle influences, which in all communities precedeand prepare the way for violent outbursts and uprisings. He may discovermany causes and record them duly, but he will always be sensible thatothers have escaped him. The changing tides of public opinion, theundercurrents of interest, partisanship and caprice, the whirlpools ofillogical sentiment or ignorant prejudice, exert forces so complex andnumerous, that to observe and appreciate them all, and to estimate theeffect of each in raising the storm, is a task beyond the intellect andindustry of man. The chronicler of small things lies under even greaterdisabilities. He has fewer facts to guide his judgment, nor is it aseasy to read small print as capital letters. 

In an attempt to state the causes of the great tribal upheaval of 1897, these difficulties are increased by the fact that no European can gaugethe motives or assume the points of view of Asiatics. It is, however, impossible to pass the question by, and ignoring the detail, I shallendeavour to indicate some at least of the most important and apparentforces, which have led to the formidable combination with which theBritish power in India has been confronted. 

The most marked incident in the "Forward Policy" has been the retentionof Chitral. The garrisons, the road, the tribal levies have made thetribesmen realise the proximity and the advance of civilisation. It ispossible--even probable--that with all their love of independence, themajority of the inhabitants of the mountains would have been willing, until their liberties were actually curtailed, to remain in passivesubmission, soothed by the increase of material prosperity. Duringthe two years that the British flag had floated over Chakdara and theMalakand the trade of the Swat Valley had nearly doubled. As the sunof civilisation rose above the hills, the fair flowers of commerceunfolded, and the streams of supply and demand, hitherto congealed bythe frost of barbarism, were thawed. Most of the native population werecontent to bask in the genial warmth and enjoy the new-found riches andcomforts. For two years reliefs had gone to and from Chitral withouta shot being fired. Not a post-bag had been stolen, not a messengermurdered. The political officers riding about freely among the fiercehill men were invited to settle many disputes, which would formerly havebeen left to armed force. 

But a single class had viewed with quick intelligence and intensehostility the approach of the British power. The priesthood of theAfghan border instantly recognised the full meaning of the Chitralroad. The cause of their antagonism is not hard to discern. Contact withcivilisation assails the ignorance, and credulity, on which the wealthand influence of the Mullah depend. A general combination of thereligious forces of India against that civilising, educating rule, whichunconsciously saps the strength of superstition, is one of the dangersof the future. Here Mahommedanism was threatened and resisted. A vast, but silent agitation was begun. Messengers passed to and fro among thetribes. Whispers of war, a holy war, were breathed to a race intenselypassionate and fanatical. Vast and mysterious agencies, the force ofwhich is incomprehensible to rational minds, were employed. Moreastute brains than the wild valleys of the North produce conductedthe preparations. Secret encouragement came from the South--from Indiaitself. Actual support and assistance was given from Cabul. 

In that strange half light of ignorance and superstition, assailed bysupernatural terrors and doubts, and lured by hopes of celestial glory, the tribes were taught to expect prodigious events. Something wascoming. A great day for their race and faith was at hand. Presently themoment would arrive. They must watch and be ready. The mountains becameas full of explosives as a magazine. Yet the spark was lacking. 

At length the time came. A strange combination of circumstances operatedto improve the opportunity. The victory of the Turks over the Greeks;the circulation of the Amir's book on "Jehad"; his assumption of theposition of a Caliph of Islam, and much indiscreet writing in theAnglo-Indian press, [Articles in Anglo-Indian papers on such subjects as"The Recrudescence if Mahommedanism" produce more effect on the educatednative mind than the most seditious frothings of the vernacular press. ]united to produce a "boom" in Mahommedanism. 

The moment was propitious; nor was the man wanting. What Peter theHermit was to the regular bishops and cardinals of the Church, theMad Mullah was to the ordinary priesthood of the Afghan border. A wildenthusiast, convinced alike of his Divine mission and miraculous powers, preached a crusade, or Jehad, against the infidel. The mine was fired. The flame ran along the ground. The explosions burst forth in alldirections. The reverberations have not yet died away. 

Great and widespread as the preparations were, they were not visibleto the watchful diplomatic agents who maintained the relations of theGovernment with the tribesmen. So extraordinary is the inversion ofideas and motives among those people that it may be said that those whoknow them best, know them least, and the more logical the mind of thestudent the less he is able to understand of the subject. In any caseamong these able men who diligently collected information and observedthe state of feeling, there were none who realised the latent forcesthat were being accumulated on all sides. The strange treachery atMaizar in June was a flash in the pan. Still no one saw the danger. Itwas not until the early days of July that it was noticed that therewas a fanatical movement in Upper Swat. Even then its significance wasdisregarded and its importance underrated. That a Mad Fakir had arrivedwas known. His power was still a secret. It did not long remain so. 

It is, thank heaven, difficult if not impossible for the modern Europeanto fully appreciate the force which fanaticism exercises among anignorant, warlike and Oriental population. Several generations haveelapsed since the nations of the West have drawn the sword in religiouscontroversy, and the evil memories of the gloomy past have soon faded inthe strong, clear light of Rationalism and human sympathy. Indeed it isevident that Christianity, however degraded and distorted by cruelty andintolerance, must always exert a modifying influence on men's passions, and protect them from the more violent forms of fanatical fever, as weare protected from smallpox by vaccination. But the Mahommedan religionincreases, instead of lessening, the fury of intolerance. It wasoriginally propagated by the sword, and ever since, its votaries havebeen subject, above the people of all other creeds, to this form ofmadness. In a moment the fruits of patient toil, the prospects ofmaterial prosperity, the fear of death itself, are flung aside. The moreemotional Pathans are powerless to resist. All rational considerationsare forgotten. Seizing their weapons, they become Ghazis--as dangerousand as sensible as mad dogs: fit only to be treated as such. While themore generous spirits among the tribesmen become convulsed in an ecstasyof religious bloodthirstiness, poorer and more material souls deriveadditional impulses from the influence of others, the hopes of plunderand the joy of fighting. Thus whole nations are roused to arms. Thusthe Turks repel their enemies, the Arabs of the Soudan break the Britishsquares, and the rising on the Indian frontier spreads far and wide. Ineach case civilisation is confronted with militant Mahommedanism. Theforces of progress clash with those of reaction. The religion of bloodand war is face to face with that of peace. Luckily the religion ofpeace is usually the better armed. 

The extraordinary credulity of the people is hardly conceivable. Had theMad Mullah called on them to follow him to attack Malakand and Chakdarathey would have refused. Instead he worked miracles. He sat at hishouse, and all who came to visit him, brought him a small offering offood or money, in return for which he gave them a little rice. Ashis stores were continually replenished, he might claim to have fedthousands. He asserted that he was invisible at night. Looking intohis room, they saw no one. At these things they marvelled. Finally hedeclared he would destroy the infidel. He wanted no help. No one shouldshare the honours. The heavens would open and an army would descend. Themore he protested he did not want them, the more exceedingly they came. Incidentally he mentioned that they would be invulnerable; other agentsadded arguments. I was shown a captured scroll, upon which the tomb ofthe Ghazi--he who has killed an infidel--is depicted in heaven, no fewerthan seven degrees above the Caaba itself. Even after the fighting--whenthe tribesmen reeled back from the terrible army they had assailed, leaving a quarter of their number on the field--the faith of thesurvivors was unshaken. Only those who had doubted had perished, saidthe Mullah, and displayed a bruise which was, he informed them, the soleeffect of a twelve-pound shrapnel shell on his sacred person. 

I pass with relief from the tossing sea of Cause and Theory to the firmground of Result and Fact. The rumours and reports which reached theMalakand of the agitation in Upper Swat and among the surrounding tribeswere fully appreciated by the Pathan Sepoys of the garrison. As Julyadvanced, several commanding officers were warned by their men, thatgreat events were impending. Major Deane, the political agent, watchedwith great anxiety the daily progress of the fanatical movement. No onedesires to be thought an alarmist, least of all on the frontier wherethere is always danger. At length, however, he felt compelled toofficially report the disquieting signs. Warnings were then issuedto the officers in charge of the various posts, and the troops werepractised in taking up alarm stations. By the 23rd of July all had beeninformed that the aspect of affairs was threatening, and ordered toobserve every precaution. But to the last everybody doubted that therewould be a rising, nor did any one imagine that even should one occur, it would lead to more than a skirmish. The natives were friendly andrespectful. The valley smiled in fertile prosperity. It was not strange, that none could foresee the changes a week would bring, or guess that ina few days they would be fighting for their lives; that they would carryfire and sword through the peaceful landscape; that the polo groundwould be the scene of a cavalry charge, or that the cheery barbariansamong whom they had lived quietly for so many months would becomemaddened and ferocious savages. Never was transformation of scene morecomplete, or more rapid. 

And all the while the rumours of coming war grew stronger and stronger. The bazaars of India, like the London coffee-houses of the last century, are always full of marvellous tales--the invention of fertile brains. Asingle unimportant fact is exaggerated, and distorted, till it becomesunrecognisable. From it, a thousand wild, illogical, and fantasticconclusions are drawn. These again are circulated as facts. So the gamegoes on. But amid all this falsehood, and idle report, there often liesimportant information. The bazaar stories not only indicate the stateof native opinion, but not infrequently contain the germ of truth. In Eastern lands, news travels by strange channels, and often withunaccountable rapidity. As July advanced the bazaar at Malakand becamefull of tales of the Mad Fakir. His miracles passed from mouth to mouth, with suitable additions. 

A great day for Islam was at hand. A mighty man had arisen to lead them. The English would be swept away. By the time of the new moon, not onewould remain. The Great Fakir had mighty armies concealed among themountains. When the moment came these would sally forth--horse, foot andartillery--and destroy the infidel. It was even stated that the Mullahhad ordered that no one should go near a certain hill, lest the heavenlyhosts should be prematurely revealed. So ran the talk. But among allthese frothy fabrications there lay a solemn warning. 

Though the British military and political officers were compelled totake official notice of the reports received with reference to thetribal gathering, and to make arrangements for the safety of theirposts, they privately scouted the idea that any serious events wereimpending. 

On the afternoon of the 26th July the subalterns and younger officers ofthe Malakand garrison proceeded to Khar to play polo. Thither also cameLieutenant Rattray, riding over from Chakdara fort. The game was a goodone, and the tribesmen of the neighbouring village watched it as usualin little groups, with a keen interest. Nothing in their demeanourbetrayed their thoughts or intentions. The young soldiers saw nothing, knew nothing, and had they known would have cared less. There would beno rising. If there was, so much the better. They were ready for it. Thegame ended and the officers cantered back to their camps and posts. 

It was then that a strange incident occurred--an incident eminentlycharacteristic of the frontier tribes. As the syces were putting therugs and clothing on the polo ponies, and loitering about the groundafter the game, the watching natives drew near and advised them to beoff home at once, for that there was going to be a fight. They knew, these Pathans, what was coming. The wave of fanaticism was sweeping downthe valley. It would carry them away. They were powerless to resist. Like one who feels a fit coming on, they waited. Nor did they carevery much. When the Mad Fakir arrived, they would fight and kill theinfidels. In the meantime there was no necessity to deprive them oftheir ponies. And so with motives, partly callous, partly sportsmanlike, and not without some faint suspicion of chivalry, they warned the nativegrooms, and these taking the hint reached the camp in safety. 

Late on this same afternoon Major Deane reported to Brigadier-GeneralMeiklejohn, who commanded the Malakand garrison, that matters hadassumed a very grave aspect; that a great armed gathering had collectedaround the Mad Mullah's standard, and that an attack was probable. Headvised that the Guides should be called up to reinforce the brigade. A telegram was immediately despatched to Mardan ordering them to marchwithout delay. At 8. 30 Lieutenant P. Eliott-Lockhart, who was the seniorofficer then with the regiment, received the order. At 1. 30 A. M. Theybegan their now famous march. 

After sending for the Guides, the brigadier, at about seven o'clock, interviewed his different commanding officers, and instructed them tobe prepared to turn out at any moment. Major Deane now reported thatthe Mad Mullah and his gathering were advancing down the valley, andrecommended that the Amandara Pass, four miles away, should be held. General Meiklejohn accordingly issued orders for a movable column, to beformed as follows:--

 45th Sikhs. 2 Cos. 31st Punjaub Infantry. 2 Guns No. 8 Mountain Battery. 1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers. 

This force, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, 45th Sikhs, wasto start at midnight and would be supported by the rest of the troopsunder command of the brigadier at 3 A. M. 

All preparations were swiftly made. At 9. 45 a telegram fromChakdara--which got through just before the wire was cut--reported thatlarge forces of Pathans were rapidly moving towards the camps. A quarterof an hour later a Jemadar of the Levies galloped in with the newsthat, to quote the official despatch: "The Fakir had passed Khar and wasadvancing on Malakand, that neither Levies nor people would act againsthim, and that the hills to the east of the camp were covered withPathans. "

As soon as the officers had returned from polo, they found plenty ofwork waiting for them. Bandsmen and boys incapable of carrying arms hadto be hurried up to the fort. Indents had to be made out for transport, rations and ammunition. There was much to do, and little time to do itin. At length all was finished, and the troops were in readiness fortheir early morning start. At 9. 30 the officers sat down to dinner, still in their polo kit, which there had been no time to change. At 10o'clock they were discussing the prospects of the approaching march, andeagerly weighing the chances of a skirmish. The more sanguine assertedthat there would be a fight--a small one, it was true--but stilla skirmish. Many of those who had never been in action beforecongratulated themselves on the unlooked-for opportunity. The older andmore experienced regarded the matter in the light of a riot. They mighthave to fire on the tribesmen, but Swatis were such cowards that theywould never stand up to the troops. Still it was a chance. 

Suddenly in the stillness of the night a bugle-call sounded on theparade ground of the "crater" camp. Everyone sprang up. It was the"Assembly. " For a moment there was silence while the officers seizedtheir swords and belts and hurriedly fastened them on. Several, thinkingthat it was merely the warning for the movable column to fall in, waitedto light their cigarettes. Then from many quarters the loud explosion ofmusketry burst forth, a sound which for six days and nights was to knowno intermission. 

The attack on the Malakand and the great frontier war had begun. 

The noise of firing echoed among the hills. Its echoes are ringingstill. One valley caught the waves of sound and passed them to the next, till the whole wide mountain region rocked with the confusion of thetumult. Slender wires and long-drawn cables carried the vibrations tothe far-off countries of the West. Distant populations on the Continentof Europe thought that in them they detected the dull, discordanttones of decline and fall. Families in English homes feared that thedetonations marked the death of those they loved--sons, brothers orhusbands. Diplomatists looked wise, economists anxious, stupid peoplemysterious and knowledgeable. All turned to have the noise stopped. Butthat was a task which could not be accomplished until thousands of liveshad been sacrificed and millions of money spent. 

CHAPTER IV: THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND

 Cry "Havoc" and let slip the dogs of war. 

 "JULIUS CAESAR, " Act iii. , Sc. I. 

It has long been recognised by soldiers of every nation that, to resista vigorous onslaught by night, is almost the hardest task that troopscan be called upon to perform. Panics, against which few brave men areproof, arise in a moment from such situations. Many a gallant soldierhas lost his head. Many an experienced officer has been bornedown unheeded by a crowd of fugitives. Regiments that have marchedunflinchingly to almost certain death on the battlefield, become in aninstant terrified and useless. 

In the attack on the Malakand camp, all the elements of danger anddisorder were displayed. The surprise, the darkness, the confused andbroken nature of the ground; the unknown numbers of the enemy; theirmerciless ferocity; every appalling circumstance was present. But therewere men who were equal to the occasion. As soon as the alarm soundedLieutenant-Colonel McRae of the 45th Sikhs, a holder of the Gold Medalof the Royal Humane Society and of long experience in Afghanistan and onthe Indian frontier, ran to the Quarter Guard, and collecting sevenor eight men, sent them under command of Major Taylor, of the sameregiment, down the Buddhist road to try and check the enemy's advance. Hurriedly assembling another dozen men, and leaving the Adjutant, Lieutenant Barff, with directions to bring on more, he ran with hislittle party after Taylor in the direction of the entrance gorge of theKotal camp. Two roads give access to the Malakand camp, from the plainof Khar. At one point the Buddhist road, the higher of the two, passesthrough a narrow defile then turns a sharp corner. Here, if anywhere, the enemy might be held or at least delayed until the troops got underarms. Overtaking Major Taylor, Colonel McRae led the party, which thenamounted to perhaps twenty men, swiftly down the road, It was a raceon which the lives of hundreds depended. If the enemy could turn thecorner, nothing could check their rush, and the few men who tried tooppose them would be cut to pieces. The Sikhs arrived first, but by avery little. As they turned the corner they met the mass of the enemy, nearly a thousand strong, armed chiefly with swords and knives, creepingsilently and stealthily up the gorge, in the hope and assurance ofrushing the camp and massacring every soul in it. The whole road wascrowded with the wild figures. McRae opened fire at once. Volley aftervolley was poured into the dense mass, at deadly range. At length theSikhs fired independently. This checked the enemy, who shouted andyelled in fury at being thus stopped. The small party of soldiers thenfell back, pace by pace, firing incessantly, and took up a position in acutting about fifty yards behind the corner. Their flanks were protectedon the left by high rocks, and on the right by boulders and roughground, over which in the darkness it was impossible to move. The roadwas about five yards wide. As fast as the tribesmen turned the cornerthey were shot down. It was a strong position. 

 In that strait path a thousand Might well be stopped by three

Being thus effectively checked in their direct advance, the tribesmenbegan climbing up the hill to the left and throwing down rocks andstones on those who barred their path. They also fired their riflesround the corner, but as they were unable to see the soldiers withoutexposing themselves, most of their bullets went to the right. 

The band of Sikhs were closely packed in the cutting, the front rankkneeling to fire. Nearly all were struck by stones and rocks. MajorTaylor, displaying great gallantry, was mortally wounded. Several of theSepoys were killed. Colonel McRae himself was accidentally stabbed inthe neck by a bayonet and became covered with blood. But he called uponthe men to maintain the good name of "Rattray's Sikhs, " and to holdtheir position till death or till the regiment came up. And the soldiersreplied by loudly shouting the Sikh warcry, and defying the enemy toadvance. 

After twenty minutes of desperate fighting, Lieutenant Barff arrivedwith thirty more men. He was only just in time. The enemy had alreadyworked round Colonel McRae's right, and the destruction of the fewsoldiers left alive could not long have been delayed. The reinforcement, climbing up the hillside, drove the enemy back and protected the flank. But the remainder of the regiment was now at hand. Colonel McRae thenfell back to a more extended position along a ridge about fifty yardsfurther up the road, and reinforcing Lieutenant Barff's party, repulsedall attacks during the night. About 2 A. M. The tribesmen, finding theycould make no progress, drew off, leaving many dead. 

The presence of mind, tactical knowledge and bravery displayed inthis affair are thus noticed in the official despatches by GeneralMeiklejohn:--

"There is no doubt that the gallant resistance made by this small bodyin the gorge, against vastly superior numbers, till the arrival of therest of the regiment, saved the camp from being rushed on that side, andI cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of Lieutenant-Colonel McRaeand Major Taylor on this occasion. "

While these things were passing on the right, the other attacks of theenemy had met with more success. The camp was assaulted simultaneouslyon the three sides. The glow of the star shells showed that the northcamp was also engaged. The enemy had been checked on the Buddhist road, by Colonel McRae and the 45th Sikhs, but another great mass of menforced their way along the Graded road in the centre of the position. On the first sound of firing the inlying picket of the 24th PunjaubInfantry doubled out to reinforce the pickets on the road, and in thewater-gorge. They only arrived in time to find these being driven in byoverpowering numbers of the enemy. Hundreds of fierce swordsmen swarmedunto the bazaar and into the serai, a small enclosure which adjoined. Sharpshooters scrambled up the surrounding hills, and particularly fromone ragged, rock-strewn peak called Gibraltar, kept up a tremendousfire. 

The defence of the left and centre or the camp was confided to the 24thPunjaub Infantry. One company of this regiment under Lieutenant Climo, charging across the football ground, cleared the bazaar at the point ofthe bayonet. The scene at this moment was vivid and terrible. The bazaarwas crowded with tribesmen. The soldiers rushing forward amid loudcheers, plunged their bayonets into their furious adversaries. The soundof the hacking of swords, the screams of the unfortunate shopkeepers, the yells of the Ghazis were plainly heard above the ceaseless roll ofmusketry. The enemy now tried to force their way back into the bazaar, but the entrance was guarded by the troops and held against all assaultstill about 10. 45. The left flank of the company was then turned, and thepressure became so severe that they were withdrawn to a more interiorline of defence, and took up a position along the edge of the "Sappers'and Miners' enclosure. " Another company held the approaches from thenorth camp. The remainder of the regiment and No. 5 company Sappers andMiners, were kept in readiness to reinforce any part of the line. 

It is necessary to record the actual movements of the troops in detail, but I am anxious above all things to give the reader a general idea. Theenemy had attacked in tremendous strength along the two roads that gaveaccess on the eastern side to the great cup of the Malakand. On theright road, they were checked by the brilliant movement of Colonel McRaeand the courage of his regiment. Pouring in overwhelming force alongthe left road, they had burst into the camp itself, bearing down allopposition. The defenders, unable to hold the extended line of the rim, had been driven to take up a central position in the bottom of the cup. This central position comprised the "Sappers' and Miners' enclosure, "the commissariat lines and the Field Engineer Park. It was commandedon every side by the fire from the rim. But the defenders stood at bay, determined at all costs to hold their ground, bad though it was. 

Meanwhile the enemy rushed to the attack with wild courage and recklessfury. Careless of life, they charged the slender line of defence. Twicethey broke through and penetrated the enclosure. They were met by men asbold as they. The fighting became desperate. The general himself hurriedfrom point to point, animating the soldiers and joining in thedefence with sword and revolver. As soon as the enemy broke into thecommissariat lines they rushed into the huts and sheds eager for plunderand victims. 

Lieutenant Manley, the Brigade Commissariat Officer, stuck stubbornlyto his post, and with Sergeant Harrington endeavoured to hold the hut inwhich he lived. The savage tribesmen burst in the door and crowded intothe room. What followed reads like a romance. 

The officer opened fire at once with his revolver. He was instantly cutdown and hacked to pieces. In the struggle the lamp was smashed. Theroom became pitch dark. The sergeant, knocking down his assailants, gotfree for a moment and stood against the wall motionless. Having killedManley, the tribesmen now began to search for the sergeant, feeling withtheir hands along the wall and groping in the darkness. At last, findingno one, they concluded he had escaped, and hurried out to look forothers. Sergeant Harrington remained in the hut till it was retaken somehours later, and so saved his life. 

Another vigorous attack was made upon the Quarter Guard. LieutenantWatling, who met it with his company of sappers, transfixed a Ghazi withhis sword, but such was the fury of the fanatic that as he fell deadhe cut at the officer and wounded him severely. The company were drivenback. The Quarter Guard was captured, and with it the reserve ammunitionof the sappers. Lieutenant Watling was carried in by his men, and, as soon as he reached the dressing station, reported the loss of thisimportant post. 

Brigadier-General Meiklejohn at once ordered a party of the 24th toretake it from the enemy. Few men could be spared from the line ofdefence. At length a small but devoted band collected. It consistedof Captain Holland, Lieutenant Climo, Lieutenant Manley, R. E. , thegeneral's orderly, a Sepoy of the 45th Sikhs, two or three sappers andthree men of the 24th; in all about a dozen. 

The general placed himself at their head. The officers drew theirrevolvers. The men were instructed to use the bayonet only. Thenthey advanced. The ground is by nature broken and confused to anextraordinary degree. Great rocks, undulations and trees rendered allmovements difficult. Frequent tents, sheds and other buildings increasedthe intricacies. Amidst such surroundings were the enemy, numerous andwell armed. The twelve men charged. The tribesmen advanced to meet them. The officers shot down man after man with their pistols. The soldiersbayoneted others. The enemy drew off discomfited, but half the partywere killed or wounded. The orderly was shot dead. A sapper and ahavildar of the 24th were severely wounded. The general himselfwas struck by a sword on the neck. Luckily the weapon turned in hisassailant's hand, and only caused a bruise. Captain Holland was shotthrough the back at close quarters by a man concealed in a tent. Thebullet, which caused four wounds, grazed his spine. The party were nowtoo few to effect anything. The survivors halted. Lieutenant Climo tookthe wounded officer back, and collecting a dozen more men of the 24th, returned to the attack. The second attempt to regain the Quarter Guardwas also unsuccessful, and the soldiers recoiled with further loss; butwith that undaunted spirit which refuses to admit defeat they continuedtheir efforts, and at the third charge dashed across the open space, bowling over and crushing back the enemy, and the post was recovered. All the ammunition had, however, been carried off by the enemy, andas the expenditure of that night had already been enormous, it wasa serious loss. The commissariat lines were at length cleared of thetribesmen, and such of the garrison as could be spared were employed inputting up a hasty defence across the south entrance of the enclosure, and clearing away the cook-houses and other shelters, which might beseized by the enemy. 

The next morning no fewer than twenty-nine corpses of tribesmen werefound round the cookhouse, and in the open space over which the threecharges had taken place. This, when it is remembered that perhaps twiceas many had been wounded and had crawled away, enables an estimate to beformed of the desperate nature of the fight for the Quarter Guard. 

All this time the fire from rim into the cup had been causing severe andcontinual losses. The enemy surrounding the enclosure on three sides, brought a cross fire to bear on its defenders, and made frequent chargesright up to the breastwork. Bullets were flying in all directions, andthere was no question of shelter. Major Herbert, D. A. A. G. , was hit earlyin the night. Later on Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb received the dangerouswound in his thigh which caused his death a few days afterwards. ManySepoys were also killed and wounded. The command of the 24th PunjaubInfantry devolved upon a subaltern officer, Lieutenant Climo. Theregiment, however, will never be in better hands. 

At about one o'clock, during a lull in the firing, the company whichwas lining the east face of the enclosure heard feeble cries of help. Awounded havildar of the 24th was lying near the bazaar. He had fallen inthe first attack, shot in the shoulder. The tribesmen, giving him twoor three deep sword cuts to finish him, had left him for dead. He nowappealed for help. The football ground on which he lay was swept by thefire of the troops, and overrun by the enemy's swordsmen, yet the cryfor help did not pass unheeded. Taking two Sepoys with him, LieutenantE. W. Costello, 24th Punjaub Infantry, ran out into the deadly space, and, in spite of the heavy fire, brought the wounded soldier in safety. For this heroic action he has since received the Victoria Cross. 

As the night wore on, the attack of the enemy became so vigorous, thatthe brigadier decided to call for a reinforcement of a hundred menfrom the garrison of the fort. This work stood high on a hill, and wasimpregnable to an enemy unprovided with field guns. Lieutenant Rawlinsvolunteered to try and reach it with the order. Accompanied by threeorderlies, he started. He had to make his way through much broken groundinfested by the enemy. One man sprang at him and struck him on the wristwith a sword, but the subaltern, firing his revolver, shot himdead, reached the fort in safety, and brought back the sorely-neededreinforcement. 

It was thought that the enemy would make a final effort to capturethe enclosure before dawn, that being the hour which Afghan tribesmenusually select. But they had lost heavily, and at about 3. 30 A. M. Beganto carry away their dead and wounded. The firing did not, however, lessen until 4. 15 A. M. , when the sharpshooters withdrew to the heights, and the fusillade dwindled to "sniping" at long range. 

The first night of the defence of the Malakand camp was over. The enemy, with all the advantages of surprise, position and great numbers, hadfailed to overcome the slender garrison. Everywhere they had beenrepulsed with slaughter. But the British losses had been severe. 

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Killed--Hon. Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat Department. Wounded dangerously--Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs. Wounded severely--Lieut. -Colonel J. Lamb, 24th P. I. " " Major L. Herbert, D. A. A. G. " " Captain H. F. Holland, 24th P. I. " " Lieutenant F. W. Watling, Q. O. Sappers and Miners. 

 Of these Lieut. -Colonel Lamb and Major Taylor died of their wounds. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. .. .. . 21 Wounded. .. .. 31

As soon as the first light of morning began to grow in the valley, twocompanies of the 24th advanced and cleared the bazaar of such of theenemy as had remained behind to plunder. The whole place had beenthoroughly ransacked, and everything of value destroyed or carried off. The native manager had had a strange experience, and one which few menwould envy. He had remained hidden in the back of a tent during thewhole night in equal danger and terror of the bullets of the soldiersand the swords of the enemy. Hearing the friendly voices, he emergeduninjured from his retreat. 

Desultory firing was maintained by the tribesmen all day. 

While the close and desperate fighting, which has been described, was raging in the south camp, the north camp had not been seriouslyinvolved, and had spent a quiet, though anxious night. On the sound ofthe firing on the Kotal being heard, four guns of No. 8 Mountain Batterywere moved over to the south-east side of the camp, and several starshells were fired. No large body of the enemy was however discovered. Twice during the night the camp was approached by the tribesmen, but afew rounds of shrapnel were sufficient to drive these away. 

When General Meiklejohn found that the garrison of the north camp hadnot been severely engaged, he ordered a force consisting of two guns andthe 31st Punjaub Infantry, under Major Gibbs, covered by forty sowarsof the 11th Bengal Lancers, and supported by a wing of the 24th, to moveout, reconnoitre the valley and clear it, as much as possible, of theenemy. The column advanced in pursuit as far as Bedford Hill. Here theycame upon a large gathering of tribesmen, and as it was now evident thata great tribal rising had broken out, Major Gibbs was ordered to returnand to bring his stores and troops into the Kotal camp without delay. The infantry and guns thereupon retired and fell back on the camp, covered by the 24th Punjaub Infantry. 

As this regiment was being withdrawn, a sudden attack was made from thehigh ground above the Buddhist road, and directed against the left flankof the troops. A front was immediately shown, and the 24th advancedto meet their assailants. Lieutenant Climo, who commanded, detacheda company to the right, and by this turning movement drove them off, inflicting some loss and capturing a standard. This officer's skilland conduct in this retirement was again the subject of commendationin despatches. The troops reached their respective camps at about 11o'clock. Meanwhile the cavalry had been ordered to push on, if possible, to Chakdara and reinforce the garrison at that post. The task was one ofconsiderable danger, but by crossing and recrossing the Swat River, thesquadron managed to cut their way through the tribesmen and reachedthe fort with slight loss. This brilliant ride will receive a fullerdescription in a later chapter. 

The evacuation of the north camp proceeded very slowly. The troopspacked up their kits with great deliberation, and applications weremade for transport. None was, however, available. All the camels wereat Dargai, on the Indian side of the mountains. Repeated orders to hurrywere sent from the Kotal. All hated leaving their belongings behind, having no confidence in the liberality of a paternal Government. As theafternoon passed, the aspect of the enemy became very threatening andformidable. Great numbers drew near to the camp, and the guns werecompelled to fire a good many rounds. At length, at 4 o'clock, imperative orders were sent that the north camp was to be at onceabandoned, that the force there was to march to the Kotal, and that allbaggage and stores, not yet removed, were to be left where they were. 

All the tents were struck, but nothing else could be done, and to thedeep disgust of all--officers and men--their property was left to themercies of the enemy. During the night it was all looted and burnt. Manyof the officers thus lost every stitch of clothing they possessed. Theflames rising from the scene of destruction were visible far and wide, and the tribesmen in the most distant valleys were encouraged to hurryto complete the slaughter of the accursed infidels. 

It cannot be doubted, however, that the concentration of the troops wasa wise and judicious step. The garrison of the Kotal and south camp wasinsufficient, and, whatever happened, it was better for the troopsto stand or fall together. The situation was also aggravated by theappearance of large numbers of tribesmen from the Utman Khel country, who crowded the hills to the west of the camp, and thus compelled thedefenders to hold a greatly extended line. The abandonment of the northcamp was carried out none too soon, for the enemy pressed the withdrawalof the troops, and they reached the south camp under cover of the fireof the 24th Punjaub Infantry, and the Guides Cavalry. These latter hadarrived in camp at 8. 30 that morning after marching all night. Theyfound plenty of employment. 

The telegraph had carried the news of the events of the night to allparts of the world. In England those returning from Goodwood Races readthe first details of the fighting on the posters of the evening papers. At Simla, the Government of India awoke to find themselves confrontedwith another heavy task. Other messages recalled all officers to theirregiments, and summoned reinforcements to the scene by road and rail. Inthe small hours of the 27th, the officers of the 11th Bengal Lancers atNowshera were aroused by a frantic telegraph operator, who was astoundedby the news his machine was clicking out. This man in his shirt sleeves, with a wild eye, and holding an unloaded revolver by the muzzle, ranround waking everyone. The whole country was up. The Malakand garrisonwas being overwhelmed by thousands of tribesmen. All the troops were tomarch at once. He brandished copies of the wires he had received. In afew moments official instructions arrived. The 11th Bengal Lancers, the38th Dogras and the 35th Sikhs started at dawn. No. 1 and No. 7 BritishMountain Batteries were also ordered up. The Guides Cavalry had alreadyarrived. Their infantry under Lieutenant Lockhart reached the Kotal at7. 30 P. M. On the 27th, having, in spite of the intense heat and chokingdust, covered thirty-two miles in seventeen and a half hours. Thiswonderful feat was accomplished without impairing the efficiency of thesoldiers, who were sent into the picket line, and became engaged as soonas they arrived. An officer who commanded the Dargai post told me, that, as they passed the guard there, they shouldered arms with paradeprecision, as if to show that twenty-six miles under the hottest sun inthe world would not take the polish off the Corps of Guides. Then theybreasted the long ascent to the top of the pass, encouraged by the soundof the firing, which grew louder at every step. 

Help in plenty was thus approaching as fast as eager men could march, but meanwhile the garrison had to face the danger as best they couldalone. As the 31st Punjaub Infantry, who had been the last to leave thenorth camp, were arriving at the Kotal, about 1000 tribesmen descendedin broad daylight and with the greatest boldness, and threatened theirleft flank. They drove in two pickets of the 24th, and pressed forwardvigorously. Lieutenant Climo with two companies advanced up the hill tomeet them, supported by the fire of two guns of the Mountain Battery. Abayonet charge was completely successful. The officers were close enoughto make effective use of their revolvers. Nine bodies of the enemy wereleft on the ground, and a standard was captured. The tribesmen then drewoff, and the garrison prepared for the attack, which they knew wouldcome with the dark. 

As the evening drew on the enemy were observed assembling inever-increasing numbers. Great crowds of them could be seen streamingalong the Chakdara road, and thickly dotting the hills with spots ofwhite. They all wore white as yet. The news had not reached Buner, andthe sombre-clad warriors of Ambeyla were still absent. The glare ofthe flames from the north camp was soon to summon them to the attack oftheir ancient enemies. The spectacle as night fell was strange, ominous, but not unpicturesque. Gay banners of every colour, shape and device, waved from the surrounding hills. The sunset caught the flashing ofswordblades behind the spurs and ridges. The numerous figures of theenemy moved busily about preparing for the attack. A dropping fire fromthe sharpshooters added an appropriate accompaniment. In the middle, atthe bottom of the cup, was the "crater" camp and the main enclosure withthe smoke of the evening meal rising in the air. The troops moved totheir stations, and, as the shadows grew, the firing swelled into aloud, incessant roar. 

The disposition of the troops on the night of the 27th was as follows:--

1. On the right Colonel McRae, with 45th Sikhs and two guns supportedby 100 men of the Guides Infantry, held almost the same position astridethe Buddhist road as before. 

2. In the centre the enclosure and Graded road were defended by--

 31st Punjaub Infantry. No. 5 Company Q. O. Sappers and Miners. The Guides. Two Guns. 

3. On the left the 24th Punjaub Infantry, with the two remaining gunsunder Lieutenant Climo, held the approaches from the abandoned northcamp and the fort. 

Most of this extended line, which occupied a great part of the rim, wasformed by a chain of pickets, detached from one another, and fortifiedby stone breastworks, with supports in rear. But in the centre the oldline of the "Sappers' and Miners' enclosure" was adhered to. The bazaarwas left to the enemy, but the serai, about a hundred yards in front ofthe main entrenchment, was held by a picket of twenty-four men of the31st Punjaub Infantry, under Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah. Here it was thatthe tragedy of the night occurred. 

At eight o'clock, the tribesmen attacked in tremendous force allalong the line. The firing at once became intense and continuous. The expenditure of ammunition by the troops was very great, and manythousands of rounds were discharged. On the right Colonel McRae and hisSikhs were repeatedly charged by the swordsmen, many of whom succeededin forcing their way into the pickets and perished by the bayonet. Others reached the two guns and were cut down while attacking thegunners. All assaults were however beaten off. The tribesmen sufferedterrible losses. The casualties among the Sikhs were also severe. In themorning Colonel McRae advanced from his defences, and, covered by thefire of his two guns, cleared the ground in his front of the enemy. 

The centre was again the scene of severe fighting. The tribesmen pouredinto the bazaar and attacked the serai on all sides. This post was amud-walled enclosure about fifty yards square. It was loopholed formusketry, but had no flank defences. The enemy made determined effortsto capture the place for several hours. Meanwhile, so tremendous was thefire of the troops in the main enclosure, that the attack upon the seraiwas hardly noticed. For six hours the picket there held out against allassaults, but the absence of flank defences enabled the enemy to comeclose up to the walls. They then began to make holes through them, andto burrow underneath. The little garrison rushed from place to placerepelling these attacks. But it was like caulking a sieve. At length thetribesmen burst in from several quarters, and the sheds inside caughtfire. When all the defenders except four were killed or wounded, theSubadar, himself struck by a bullet, ordered the place to be evacuated, and the survivors escaped by a ladder over the back wall, carrying theirwounded with them. The bodies of the killed were found next morning, extraordinarily mutilated. 

The defence of this post to the bitter end must be regarded as a finefeat of arms. Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah was originally promoted to acommission for an act of conspicuous bravery, and his gallant conduct onthis occasion is the subject of a special paragraph in despatches. [The Subadar and the surviving Sepoys have since received the "Order ofMerit. "]

On the left, the 24th Punjaub Infantry were also hotly engaged, andLieutenant Costello received his first severe wound from a bullet, whichpassed through his back and arm. Towards morning the enemy began topress severely. Whereupon Lieutenant Climo, always inclined to bold andvigorous action, advanced from the breastworks to meet them with twocompanies. The tribesmen held their ground and maintained a continualfire from Martini-Henry rifles. They also rolled down great stones uponthe companies. The 24th continued to advance, and drove the enemy frompoint to point, and position to position, pursuing them for a distanceof two miles. "Gallows Tree" hill, against which the first charge of thecounter attack was delivered, was held by nearly 1000 tribesmen. On suchcrowded masses, the fire of the troops was deadly. The enemy left fortydead in the path of Lieutenant Climo's counter attack, and were observedcarrying off many wounded. As they retreated, many took refuge in thevillage of Jalalkot. The guns were hurried up, and ten shells werethrown into their midst, causing great slaughter. The result ofthis bold stroke was, that the enemy during the rest of the fightinginvariably evacuated the hills before daylight enabled the troops toassume the offensive. 

Thus the onslaught of the tribesmen had again been successfully repelledby the Malakand garrison. Many had been killed and wounded, but all thetribes for a hundred miles around were hurrying to the attack, and theirnumber momentarily increased. The following casualties occurred on thenight of the 27th:--

 BRITISH OFFICER. Wounded--Lieutenant E. W. Costello. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. .. .. . 12 Wounded. .. .. 29

During the day the enemy retired to the plain of Khar to refreshthemselves. Great numbers of Bunerwals now joined the gathering. Thegarrison were able to distinguish these new-comers from the Swatis, Utman Khels, Mamunds, Salarzais and others, by the black or dark-blueclothes they wore. The troops were employed in strengthening thedefences, and improving the shelters. The tribesmen kept up a harassingand annoying long-range fire, killing several horses of the GuidesCavalry. Towards evening they advanced to renew the attack, carryinghundreds of standards. 

As darkness fell, heavy firing recommenced along the whole front. Theenemy had apparently plenty of ammunition, and replied with effect tothe heavy fire of the troops. The arrangement of the regiments was thesame as on the previous night. On the right, Colonel McRae once moreheld his own against all attacks. In the centre, severe fighting ensued. The enemy charged again and again up to the breastwork of the enclosure. They did not succeed in penetrating. Three officers and several men werehowever wounded by the fire. Lieutenant Maclean, of the Guides Cavalry, who was attached temporarily to the 31st Punjaub Infantry, had awonderful escape. A bullet entered his mouth and passed through hischeek without injuring the bone in any way. He continued on duty, andthese pages will record his tragic but glorious death a few weeks laterat Landakai. 

Lieutenant Ford was dangerously wounded in the shoulder. The bullet cutthe artery, and he was bleeding to death when Surgeon-Lieutenant J. H. Hugo came to his aid. The fire was too hot to allow of lights beingused. There was no cover of any sort. It was at the bottom of the cup. Nevertheless the surgeon struck a match at the peril of his life andexamined the wound. The match went out amid a splutter of bullets, whichkicked up the dust all around, but by its uncertain light he saw thenature of the injury. The officer had already fainted from the lossof blood. The doctor seized the artery, and, as no other ligature wasforthcoming, he remained under fire for three hours holding a man'slife, between his finger and thumb. When at length it seemed thatthe enemy had broken into the camp he picked up the still unconsciousofficer in his arms, and, without relaxing his hold, bore him to a placeof safety. His arm was for many hours paralysed with cramp from theeffects of the exertion of compressing the artery. 

I think there are few, whatever may be their views or interests, whowill not applaud this splendid act of devotion. The profession ofmedicine, and surgery, must always rank as the most noble that men canadopt. The spectacle of a doctor in action among soldiers, in equaldanger and with equal courage, saving life where all others are takingit, allaying pain where all others are causing it, is one which mustalways seem glorious, whether to God or man. It is impossible to imagineany situation from which a human being might better leave this world, and embark on the hazards of the Unknown. 

All through the night, the enemy continued their attacks. They oftensucceeded in reaching the breastworks--only to die on the bayonets ofthe defenders. The guns fired case shot, with terrible effect, and whenmorning dawned the position was still held by the Imperial Forces. Thecasualties of the night were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Wounded severely--Lieutenant H. B. Ford, 31st Punjaub Infantry. " H. L. S. Maclean, the Guides. Wounded slightly--Lieutenant G. Swinley, 31st Punjaub Infantry. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. .. .. .. 2 Wounded. .. .. . 13

On the morning of the 29th signalling communication with Chakdara wasfor a few moments re-established. The garrison of that post announcedtheir safety, and that all attacks had been repulsed with heavy loss, but they reported that ammunition and food were both running short. During the day the enemy again retired to the plain to rest, and preparefor the great attack, which they intended making that night. The hourwould be propitious. It was Jumarat, on which day the prophet watcheswith especial care over the interests of those who die for the faith. Besides, the moon was full, and had not the Great Fakir declared thatthis should be the moment of victory? The Mullah exhorted them allto the greatest efforts, and declared that he would himself lead theassault. To-night the infidels would be utterly destroyed. 

Meanwhile the troops were busily employed, in spite of their terriblefatigues, in strengthening the defences. The bazaar and the serai werelevelled. Trees were blown up, and a clear field of fire was obtained infront of the central enclosure. Great bonfires were also prepared on theapproaches, to enable the soldiers to take good aim at their assailants, while they were silhouetted against the light. In such occupations theday passed. 

The tribesmen continued to fire at long range and shot several horsesand mules. These sharpshooters enjoyed themselves immensely. Afterthe relief of Chakdara, it was found that many of them had mademost comfortable and effective shelters among the rocks. One man, inparticular, had ensconced himself behind an enormous boulder, and hadbuilt a little wall of stone, conveniently loopholed, to protect himselfwhen firing. The overhanging rock sheltered him from the heat of thesun. By his side were his food and a large box of cartridges. Here forthe whole week he had lived, steadily dropping bullets unto the camp andfiring at what an officer described as all "objects of interest. " Whatcould be more attractive?

At four o'clock in the afternoon Major Stuart Beatsen, commanding the11th Bengal Lancers, arrived with his leading squadron. He brought asmall supply of ammunition, which the garrison was in sore need of, theexpenditure each night being tremendous, some regiments firing as muchas 30, 000 rounds. The 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras under Colonel Reidarrived at Dargai, at the foot of the pass, in the evening. They hadmarched all day in the most intense heat. How terrible that marchmust have been, may be judged from the fact, that in the 35th Sikhstwenty-one men actually died on the road of heat apoplexy. The factthat these men marched till they dropped dead, is another proof ofthe soldierly eagerness displayed by all ranks to get to the front. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, feeling confidence in his ability to holdhis own with the troops he had, ordered them to remain halted at Dargai, and rest the next day. 

The attack came with the night, but the defences in the centre hadbeen much improved, and the tribesmen were utterly unable to cross thecleared glacis, which now stretched in front of the enclosure. They, however, assailed both flanks with determination, and the firingeverywhere became heavy. At 2 A. M. The great attack was delivered. Alongthe whole front and from every side enormous numbers swarmed to theassault. On the right and left, hand-to-hand fighting took place. Colonel McRae again held his position, but many of the tribesmen diedunder the very muzzles of the rifles. The 24th Punjaub Infantry on theleft were the most severely engaged. The enemy succeeded in breakinginto the breastworks, and close fighting ensued, in which LieutenantCostello was again severely wounded. But the fire of the troops was toohot for anything to live in their front. At 2. 30 the Mad Mullah beingwounded, another Mullah killed and several hundreds of tribesmen slain, the whole attack collapsed. Nor was it renewed again with vigor. Theenemy recognised that their chance of taking the Malakand had passed. 

The casualties were as follows on the night of the 29th:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Wounded severely--Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 24th P. I. , who had already been severely wounded, but continued to do duty. " " Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R. A. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. .. .. . 1 Wounded. .. .. 17

All the next day the enemy could be seen dragging the dead away, andcarrying the wounded over the hills to their villages. Reinforcements, however, joined them, and they renewed their attack, but without muchspirit, at 9. 30 P. M. They were again repulsed with loss. Once, duringa thunderstorm that broke over the camp, they charged the 45th Sikhs'position, and were driven off with the bayonet. Only two men werewounded during the night. 

In the morning the 38th Dogras and 35th Sikhs marched into the camp. Theenemy continued firing into the entrenchments at long range, but withouteffect. They had evidently realised that the Malakand was too strong tobe taken. The troops had a quiet night, and the weary, worn-out mengot a little needed sleep. Thus the long and persistent attack onthe British frontier station of Malakand languished and ceased. Thetribesmen, sick of the slaughter at this point, concentrated theirenergies on Chakdara, which they believed must fall into their hands. To relieve this hard-pressed post now became the duty of the garrison ofMalakand. 

The chapter, which may now appropriately end, has described in detail, and, necessarily, at length, the defence of an outpost of our Empire. Asurprise, followed by a sustained attack, has been resisted. The enemy, repulsed at every point, have abandoned the attempt, but surround andclosely watch the defences. The troops will now assume the offensive, and the hour of reprisals will commence. 

The casualties sustained by the Malakand garrison between 26th July and1st August were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS--3. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjaub Infantry. Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs. Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat. 

 WOUNDED--10. Major L. Herbert, D. A. A. G. Captain G. Baldwin, D. S. O. , Guides Cavalry. Captain H. F. Holland, 24th Punjaub Infantry. Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R. A. " F. W. Watling, R. E. " E. W. Costello, 24th Punjaub Infantry. " H. B. Ford, 31st Punjaub Infantry. " H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry. 2nd Lieutenant G. Swinley, 31st Punjaub Infantry. " C. V. Keyes, Guides Cavalry. 

 NATIVE OFFICERS WOUNDED--7. 

 TOTAL OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED--20. 

 BRITISH NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER KILLED. Sergeant F. Byrne, R. E. 

 NATIVE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES. Killed. Wounded. No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery . . 0 5 11th Bengal Lancers . . . 0 3 No. 5 Company Q. O. Sappers and Miners. 3 18 24th Punjaub Infantry . . . 3 14 31st " " . . . . 12 32 38th Dogras . . . . . 0 1 45th Sikhs . . . . . 4 28 Q. O. Corps of Guides. . . . 3 27

 TOTAL NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN KILLED AND WOUNDED--153. 

CHAPTER V: THE RELIEF OF CHAKDARA

While the events described in the last chapter had been watched withinterest and attention in all parts of the world, they were the subjectof anxious consultation in the Council of the Governor-General. It wasonly natural that the Viceroy, himself, should view with abhorrence theprospect of military operations on a large scale, which must inevitablylead to closer and more involved relations with the tribes of theAfghan border. He belonged to that party in the State which has clungpassionately, vainly, and often unwisely to a policy of peace andretrenchment. He was supported in his reluctance to embark on warlikeenterprises by the whole force of the economic situation. No momentcould have been less fitting: no man more disinclined. That Lord Elgin'sViceroyalty and the Famine year should have been marked by the greatestFrontier War in the history of the British Empire in India, vividlydisplays how little an individual, however earnest his motives, howevergreat his authority, can really control the course of public affairs. 

The Council were called upon to decide on matters, which at once raisedthe widest and most intricate questions of frontier policy; which mightinvolve great expense; which might well influence the development andprogress of the great populations committed to their charge. It wouldbe desirable to consider such matters from the most lofty and commandingstandpoints; to reduce detail to its just proportions; to examine thepast, and to peer into the future. And yet, those who sought to lookthus on the whole situation, were immediately confronted with thepicture of the rock of Chakdara, fringed and dotted with the white smokeof musketry, encircled by thousands of fierce assailants, its garrisonfighting for their lives, but confident they would not be deserted. Itwas impossible to see further than this. All Governments, all Rulers, meet the same difficulties. Wide considerations of principle, of policy, of consequences or of economics are brushed aside by an impetuousemergency. They have to decide off-hand. The statesman has to deal withevents. The historian, who has merely to record them, may amuse hisleisure by constructing policies, to explain instances of successfulopportunism. 

On the 30th of July the following order was officially published: "TheGovernor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force, tobe styled the Malakand Field Force, for the purpose of holdingthe Malakand, and the adjacent posts, and of operating against theneighbouring tribes as may be required. "

The force was composed as follows:--

 1st Brigade. Commanding--Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn, C. B. , C. M. G. , with the local rank of Brigadier-General. 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment. 24th Punjaub Infantry. 31st Punjaub Infantry. 45th (Rattray's) Sikhs. Sections A and B of No. 1 British Field Hospital. No. 38 Native Field Hospital. Sections A and B of No. 50 Native Field Hospital. 

 2nd Brigade. Commanding--Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C. B. 1st Battalion East Kent Regiment (the Buffs). 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry. Sections C and D of No. 1 British Field Hospital. No. 37 Native Field Hospital. Sections C and D of No. 50 Native Field Hospital. 

 Divisional Troops. 4 Squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers. 1 " 10th " " 2 " Guides Cavalry. 22nd Punjaub Infantry. 2 Companies 21st Punjaub Infantry. 10th Field Battery. 6 Guns No. 1 British Mountain Battery. 6 " No. 7 " " " 6 " No. 8 Bengal " " No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. No. 3 " Bombay " " " Section B of No. 13 British Field Hospital. Sections A and B of No. 35 Native Field Hospital. 

 Line of Communications. No. 34 Native Field Hospital. Section B of No. 1 Native Field Hospital. 

[This complete division amounted to a total available field strength of6800 bayonets, 700 lances or sabres, with 24 guns. ]

The command of this powerful force was entrusted to Brigadier-GeneralSir Bindon Blood, K. C. B. , who was granted the local rank ofMajor-General. 

As this officer is the principal character in the tale I have to tell, a digression is necessary to introduce him to the reader. Born of an oldIrish family, a clan that has been settled in the west of Irelandfor 300 years, and of which he is now the head, Sir Bindon Blood waseducated privately, and at the Indian Military College at Addiscombe, and obtained a commission in the Royal Engineers in December, 1860. Forthe first eleven years he was stationed in England, and it was not until1871 that he proceeded to India, where he first saw active service inthe Jawaki Afridi Expedition (medal with clasp). In 1878 he returnedhome, but the next year was ordered to the Zulu War. On the conclusionof hostilities, for which he received a second medal and clasp, he againsailed for India and served throughout the Afghan war of 1880, being forsome time with the troops at Cabul. In 1882 he accompanied the Army toEgypt, and was with the Highland Brigade, which was the most severelyengaged at Tel-el-Kebir. He received the medal and clasp, Khedive's starand the 3rd class of the Medjidie. After the campaign he went home fortwo years, and in 1885 made another voyage to the East, over which theRussian war-cloud was then hanging. Since then the general has served inIndia, at first with the Sappers and Miners, with whose reorganisationhe was closely associated, and latterly in command of the Agra District. In 1895 he was appointed Chief of the Staff to Sir Robert Low in theChitral Expedition, and was present at all the actions, including thestorming of the Malakand Pass. For his services he received a degree ofknighthood of the Military Order of the Bath and the Chitral medal andclasp. He was now marked as a man for high command on the frontier atthe first opportunity. That opportunity the great rising of 1897 haspresented. 

Thirty-seven years of soldering, of war in many lands, of sport of everykind, have steeled alike muscle and nerve. Sir Bindon Blood, himself, till warned by the march of time, a keen polo player, is one of thosefew officers of high rank in the army, who recognise the advantages tosoldiers of that splendid game. He has pursued all kinds of wild animalsin varied jungles, has killed many pig with the spear and shot everyspecies of Indian game, including thirty tigers to his own rifle. 

It would not be fitting for me, a subaltern of horse, to offer anycriticism, though eulogistic, on the commander under whom I have had thehonour to serve in the field. I shall content myself with saying, thatthe general is one of that type of soldiers and administrators, whichthe responsibilities and dangers of an Empire produce, a type, which hasnot been, perhaps, possessed by any nation except the British, since thedays when the Senate and the Roman people sent their proconsuls to allparts of the world. 

Sir Bindon Blood was at Agra, when, on the evening of the 28th of July, he received the telegram from the Adjutant-General in India, appointinghim to the command of the Malakand Field Force, and instructing him toproceed at once to assume it. He started immediately, and on the31st formally took command at Nowshera. At Mardan he halted to makearrangements for the onward march of the troops. Here, at 3 A. M. On the1st of August, he received a telegram from Army Headquarters informinghim, that Chakdara Fort was hard pressed, and directing him to hurry onto Malakand, and attempt its relief at all costs. The great numbers ofthe enemy, and the shortness of ammunition and supplies from which thegarrison were suffering, made the task difficult and the urgency great. Indeed I have been told, that at Simla on the 1st of August it wasfeared, that Chakdara was doomed, and that sufficient troops to fighttheir way to its relief could not be concentrated in time. The greatestanxiety prevailed. Sir Bindon Blood replied telegraphically that"knowing the ground" as he did, he "felt serenely confident. " He hurriedon at once, and, in spite of the disturbed state of the country, reachedthe Malakand about noon on the 1st of August. 

The desperate position of the garrison of Chaldara was fully appreciatedby their comrades at the Malakand. As the night of the 31st had beencomparatively quiet, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn determined to attemptto force his way to their relief the next day. He accordingly formed acolumn as follows:--

 45th Sikhs. 24th Punjaub Infantry. No. 5 Company Sappers and Miners. 4 Guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery. 

At 11 A. M. He sent the cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams of theGuides, to make a dash for the Amandara Pass, and if it were unoccupiedto seize it. The three squadrons started by the short road to the northcamp. As soon as the enemy saw what was going on, they assembled ingreat numbers to oppose the advance. The ground was most unsuitablefor cavalry. Great boulders strewed the surface. Frequent nullahsintersected the plain, and cramped the action of the horsemen. Thesquadrons soon became hotly engaged. The Guides made several charges. The broken nature of the ground favoured the enemy. Many of them were, however, speared or cut down. In one of these charges Lieutenant Keyeswas wounded. While he was attacking one tribesman, another came up frombehind, and struck him a heavy blow on the shoulder with a sword. Thoughthese Swatis keep their swords at razor edge, and though the blow wassufficiently severe to render the officer's arm useless for some days, it raised only a thin weal, as if from a cut of a whip. It was a strangeand almost an inexplicable escape. 

The enemy in increasing numbers pressed upon the cavalry, who began toget seriously involved. The tribesmen displayed the greatest boldnessand determination. At length Lieut. -Colonel Adams had to order aretirement. It was none too soon. The tribesmen were already workinground the left flank and thus threatening the only line of retreat. Thesquadrons fell back, covering each other by dismounted fire. The 24thPunjaub Infantry protected their flank as they reached the camp. Thecavalry losses were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Wounded severely--Captain G. M. Baldwin, the Guides. " slightly--Lieutenant C. V. Keyes, the Guides. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed Wounded 11th Bengal Lancers. .. . 0 3 Horses. .. .. .. . 1 4 Guides Cavalry. .. .. . 1 10 Horses. .. .. .. . 3 18

 Total casualties--16 men and 26 horses. 

The vigorous resistance which the cavalry had encountered, and the greatnumbers and confidence that the enemy had displayed, effectually put anend to any idea of relieving Chakdara that day. The tribesmen were muchelated by their temporary success, and the garrison, worn and weariedby the incessant strain, both mental and physical, were proportionatelycast down. Every one anticipated tremendous fighting on the next day. Make the attempt, they must at all hazards. But there were not wantingthose who spoke of "forlorn hopes" and "last chances. " Want of sleep andrest had told on all ranks. For a week they had grappled with a savagefoe. They were the victors, but they were out of breath. 

It was at this moment, that Sir Bindon Blood arrived and assumed thecommand. He found General Meiklejohn busily engaged in organising aforce of all arms, which was to move to the relief of Chakdara on thefollowing day. As it was dangerous to denude the Malakand position oftroops, this force could not exceed 1000 rifles, the available cavalryand four guns. Of these arrangements Sir Bindon Blood approved. Herelieved Brigadier-General Meiklejohn of the charge of the Malakandposition, and gave him the command of the relieving column. Colonel Reidwas then placed in command of Malakand, and instructed to strengthen thepickets at Castle Rock, as far as possible, and to be ready with a forcetaken from them, to clear the high ground on the right of the Gradedroad. The relieving column was composed as follows:--

 400 Rifles 24th Punjaub Infantry. 400 " 45th Sikhs. 200 " Guides Infantry. 2 Squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers (under Lieut. -Col. R. B. Adams. ) 2 " Guides Cavalry " " " 4 Guns No. 8 Mountain Battery. 50 Sappers of No. 5 Company. Hospital details. 

Sir Bindon Blood ordered General Meiklejohn to assemble this forcebefore dark near the centre of the camp at a grove of trees called"Gretna Green, " to bivouac there for the night, and to be ready tostart with the first light of morning. During the afternoon the enemy, encouraged by their success with the cavalry in the morning, advancedboldly to the pickets and the firing was continuous. So heavy indeed didit become between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, that the forceat "Gretna Green" got under arms. But towards morning the tribesmenretired. 

The reader may, perhaps, have in his mind the description of theMalakand as a great cup with jagged clefts in the rim. Much of this rimwas still held by the enemy. It was necessary for any force trying toget out of the cup, to fight their way along the narrow roads throughthe clefts, which were commanded by the heights on either side. Fora considerable distance it was impossible to deploy. Therein lay thedifficulty of the operation, which the General had now to perform. Therelieving column was exposed to the danger of being stopped, just asColonel McRae had stopped the first attack of the tribesmen alongthe Buddhist road. On the 1st of August the cavalry had avoided thesedifficulties by going down the road to the North camp, and making aconsiderable detour. But they thus became involved in bad ground and hadto retire. The "Graded" road, if any, was the road by which Chakdara wasto be relieved. Looking at the tangled, rugged nature of the country, it seems extraordinary to an untrained eye, that among so many peaks andpoints, one should be of more importance than another. Yet it is so. On the high ground, in front of the position that Colonel McRae andthe 45th Sikhs had held so well, was a prominent spur. This was the keywhich would unlock the gate and set free the troops, who were cramped upwithin. Every one realised afterwards how obvious this was and wonderedthey had not thought of it before. Sir Bindon Blood selected the pointas the object of his first attack, and it was against this that hedirected Colonel Goldney with a force of about 300 men to move, as soonas he should give the signal to advance. 

At half-past four in the morning of the 2nd of August he proceeded to"Gretna Green" and found the relieving column fallen in, and ready tomarch at daybreak. All expected a severe action. Oppressed withfatigue and sleeplessness, there were many who doubted that it wouldbe successful. But though tired, they were determined, and bracedthemselves for a desperate struggle. The General-in-chief was, as hehad said, confident and serene. He summoned the different commandingofficers, explained his plans, and shook hands all round. It was amoment of stern and high resolve. Slowly the first faint light of dawngrew in the eastern sky. The brightness of the stars began to pale. Behind the mountains was the promise of the sun. Then the word was givento advance. Immediately the relieving column set off, four deep, downthe "Graded" road. Colonel Goldney simultaneously advanced to the attackof the spur, which now bears his name, with 250 men of the 35th Sikhsand 50 of the 38th Dogras. He moved silently towards the stone shelters, that the tribesmen had erected on the crest. He got to within a hundredyards unperceived. The enemy, surprised, opened an irregular andineffective fire. The Sikhs shouted and dashed forward. The ridge wascaptured without loss of any kind. The enemy fled in disorder, leavingseven dead and one prisoner on the ground. 

Then the full significance of the movement was apparent alike to friendand foe. The point now gained, commanded the whole of the "Graded"road, right down to its junction with the road to the North camp. Therelieving column, moving down the road, were enabled to deploy withoutloss or delay. The door was open. The enemy, utterly surprised anddumfoundered by this manoeuvre, were seen running to and fro in thegreatest confusion: in the graphic words of Sir Bindon Blood's despatch, "like ants in a disturbed ant-hill. " At length they seemed to realisethe situation, and, descending from the high ground, took up a positionnear Bedford Hill in General Meiklejohn's front, and opened a heavy fireat close range. But the troops were now deployed and able to bring theirnumbers to bear. Without wasting time in firing, they advanced with thebayonet. The leading company of the Guides stormed the hill in theirfront with a loss of two killed and six wounded. The rest of the troopscharged with even less loss. The enemy, thoroughly panic-stricken, beganto fly, literally by thousands, along the heights to the right. Theyleft seventy dead behind them. The troops, maddened by the remembranceof their fatigues and sufferings, and inspired by the impulse ofvictory, pursued them with a merciless vigour. 

Sir Bindon Blood had with his staff ascended the Castle Rock, tosuperintend the operations generally. From this position the whole fieldwas visible. On every side, and from every rock, the white figures ofthe enemy could be seen in full flight. The way was open. The passagewas forced. Chakdara was saved. A great and brilliant success had beenobtained. A thrill of exultation convulsed every one. In that momentthe general, who watched the triumphant issue of his plans, must haveexperienced as fine an emotion as is given to man on earth. In thatmoment, we may imagine that the weary years of routine, the long ascentof the lower grades of the service, the frequent subordination toincompetence, the fatigues and dangers of five campaigns, received theircompensation. Perhaps, such is the contrariness of circumstances, therewas no time for the enjoyment of these reflections. The victory had beengained. It remained to profit by it. The enemy would be compelled toretire across the plain. There at last was the chance of the cavalry. The four squadrons were hurried to the scene. 

The 11th Bengal Lancers, forming line across the plain, began amerciless pursuit up the valley. The Guides pushed on to seize theAmandara Pass and relieve Chakdara. All among the rice fields and therocks, the strong horsemen hunted the flying enemy. No quarter was askedor given, and every tribesman caught, was speared or cut down at once. Their bodies lay thickly strewn about the fields, spotting with blackand green patches, the bright green of the rice crop. It was a terriblelesson, and one which the inhabitants of Swat and Bajaur will neverforget. Since then their terror of Lancers has been extraordinary. Afew sowars have frequently been sufficient to drive a hundred of thesevaliant savages in disorder to the hills, or prevent them descendinginto the plain for hours. 

Meanwhile the infantry had been advancing swiftly. The 45th Sikhsstormed the fortified village of Batkhela near the Amandara Pass, whichthe enemy held desperately. Lieut. -Colonel McRae, who had been relievedfrom the command of the regiment by the arrival of Colonel Sawyer, wasthe first man to enter the village. Eighty of the enemy were bayonetedin Batkheka alone. It was a terrible reckoning. 

I am anxious to finish with this scene of carnage. The spectator, whomay gaze unmoved on the bloodshed of the battle, must avert his eyesfrom the horrors of the pursuit, unless, indeed, joining in it himself, he flings all scruples to the winds, and, carried away by the impetusof the moment, indulges to the full those deep-seated instincts ofsavagery, over which civilisation has but cast a veil of doubtfulthickness. 

The casualties in the relief of Chakdara were as follows:--

 11th Bengal Lancers--killed and died from wounds, 3; wounded, 3. Killed. Wounded. Guides Infantry. .. .. .. 2 7 35th Sikhs. .. .. .. .. 2 3 45th Sikhs. .. .. .. .. 0 7 24th Punjaub Infantry. .. .. 0 5 No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. .. 0 1 Total Casualties--33

The news of the relief of Chakdara was received with feelings ofprofound thankfulness throughout India. And in England, in the House ofCommons, when the Secretary of State read out the telegram, there werefew among the members who did not join in the cheers. Nor need we paymuch attention to those few. 

CHAPTER VI: THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARA

 . .. That tower of strength Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew. 

 TENNYSON. 

The episode with which this chapter is concerned is one that has oftenoccurred on the out-post line of civilisation, and which is peculiarlyfrequent in the history of a people whose widespread Empire is fringedwith savage tribes. A small band of soldiers or settlers, armed with theresources of science, and strengthened by the cohesion of mutualtrust, are assailed in some isolated post, by thousands of warlike andmerciless enemies. Usually the courage and equipment of the garrisonenable them to hold out until a relieving force arrives, as at Rorke'sDrift, Fort Chitral, Chakdara or Gulistan. But sometimes the defendersare overwhelmed, and, as at Saraghari or Khartoum, none are left to tellthe tale. There is something strangely terrible in the spectacle of men, who fight--not for political or patriotic reasons, not for the sake ofduty or glory--but for dear life itself; not because they want to, butbecause they have to. They hold the dykes of social progress against arising deluge of barbarism, which threatens every moment to overflow thebanks and drown them all. The situation is one which will make a cowardvalorous, and affords to brave men opportunities for the most sublimeforms of heroism and devotion. 

Chakdara holds the passage of the Swat River--a rapid, broad, and atmost seasons of the year an unfordable torrent. It is built on a rockyknoll that rises abruptly from the plain about a hundred yards fromthe mountains. Sketches and photographs usually show only the knolland buildings on it, and any one looking at them will be struck by thepicturesque and impregnable aspect of the little fort, without observingthat its proportions are dwarfed, and its defences commanded, bythe frowning cliffs, under which it stands. In its construction theprinciples of defilade have been completely ignored. Standing on themountain ridge, occupied by the signal tower, it is possible to look orfire right into the fort. Every open space is commanded. Every parapetis exposed. Against an enemy unprovided with artillery, however, it could be held indefinitely; but the fact that all interiorcommunications are open to fire, makes its defence painful to thegarrison, and might, by gradually weakening their numbers, lead to itscapture. 

The narrow, swinging, wire bridge across the Swat is nearly 500 yardslong. At the southern end it is closed by a massive iron door, loopholedfor musketry, and flanked by two stone towers, in one of which a Maximgun is mounted. On the further side is the fort itself, which consistsof the fortified knoll, a strong stone horn-work, an enclosure forhorses, protected by a loopholed wall and much tangled barbed wire, andthe signal tower, a detached post 200 yards up the cliff. 

The garrison of the place consisted at the time of the outbreak oftwenty sowars of the 11th Bengal Lancers and two strong companies of the45th Sikhs, in all about 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant H. B. Rattray. [The actual strength was as follows: 11th Bengal Lancers, 20sabres; 45th Sikhs, 180 rifles; 2 British telegraphists; 1 HospitalHavildar; 1 Provost Naick (24th Punjaub Infantry); 1 Jemadar (DirLevies). British officers--45th Sikhs, Lieutenants Rattray and Wheatley;Surgeon-Captain V. Hugo; Political Agent, Lieutenant Minchin. ] As therumours of an impending rising grew stronger and stronger, and the endof July approached, this officer practised his men in taking stationsin the event of an alarm, and made such preparations as he thoughtnecessary for eventualities. On the 23rd he received an official warningfrom the D. A. A. G. [Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General. Surelythis astounding title, with that of theDeputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, might be replaced withadvantage by the more sensible and appropriate terms "Brigade Adjutant"and "Brigade Quartermaster"!], Major Herbert, that a tribal rising was"possible but not probable. " Every precaution was henceforth taken inthe fort. On the 26th, a Sepoy, who was out sketching, hurried in withthe news that a large body of tribesmen were advancing down the valley, and that he himself had been robbed of his compass, his field-glassesand some money. 

But, in spite of the disturbed and threatening situation, the Britishofficers of the Malakand garrison, though they took all militaryprecautions for the defence of their posts, did not abandon theirpractice of riding freely about the valley, armed only with revolvers. Nor did they cease from their amusements. On the evening of the 26th, Lieutenant Rattray went over to Khar as usual to play polo. Just as thegame was ended, he received a letter, brought in haste by two sowars, from Lieutenant Wheatley, the other subaltern at Chakdara, warning himthat a great number of Pathans with flags were advancing on the fort. He at once galloped back at full speed, passing close to one largegathering of tribesmen, who for some reason of their own took no noticeof him, and so reached the fort in safety, and just in time. Formidablemasses of men were then closing in on it. He telegraphed to the staffofficer at the Malakand reporting the impending attack. Immediatelyafterwards the wire was cut by the enemy and the little garrison gotunder arms. 

A havildar of the Khan of Dir's Levies had promised the politicalagent to give warning of any actual assault, by lighting a fire on theopposite hills. At 10. 15 a solitary flame shot up. It was the signal. The alarm was sounded. The garrison went to their posts. For a spacethere was silence, and then out of the darkness began a fusillade, whichdid not stop until the 2nd of August. Immediately the figures of thetribesmen, as they advanced to the attack on the western face of thefort, became visible. The defenders opened fire with effect. Theenemy pressed on vigorously. Their losses were severe. At length theyretreated repulsed. 

A second attack was immediately delivered against the north-east cornerand again beaten off by the garrison. At 4 A. M. A third assault was madeupon the cavalry enclosure. The tribesmen, carrying scaling ladders, advanced with great determination. They were received with a deadlyfire. They then drew off, and the first night of the siege wasterminated by desultory firing. The garrison remained at their posts allnight, and when it became day the enemy were seen to have retired, tothe hills to the north-west, whence they maintained a ceaseless fire. Although the defenders were protected by their stone walls, many hadstrange escapes from the bullets, which fell incessantly into theinterior. 

Meanwhile, in spite of the vigorous attack that was being made on theMalakand, it had been decided to send some assistance to the little bandat Chakdara. Captain Wright and forty sowars of the 11th Bengal Lancerswith Captain Baker of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers and transport officerat the Malakand, started at dawn on the 27th, by the road from the northcamp. Before they had gone very far they came under the fire of theenemy on the hills. These did not dare to venture into the plain, butavailed themselves of the broken nature of the country. As the squadronreached the road leading to the polo ground, Captain Wright receivedinformation that the enemy were collected on the plain and immediatelythe pace was quickened in the hopes of a charge being possible. But thetribesmen ran to the hills at the sight of the Lancers, and maintaineda constant, though luckily, an ill-aimed fire. At length the villageof Batkhela was reached, and beyond it the Amandara Pass came in sight. This is a gap in a long spur, which runs from the southern side of thevalley to the rapid river in the middle. As the river was then in fullflood and unfordable, the only road to Chakdara lay over or through thespur. But the pass was held by the enemy. 

Captain Wright had by this time realised, what probably no one at theMalakand then knew, that the enemy's numbers were enormous. The wholeway from Malakand to Amandara--every ridge and hill was crowned withtheir banners. Wherever the ground protected them from the horsementhey gathered thickly. Cemeteries [Cemeteries are frequent and prominentfeatures of Frontier landscapes. Some of them are of great extent: allof remarkable sanctity. ], nullahs and villages swarmed with men. Theirfigures could be seen in all directions. Far beyond the Amandara Passbands of tribesmen, of varying strengths, could be observed hurryingwith their standards to the attack. But these formidable signs, far fromdeterring the cavalry soldier, only added, by displaying how great wasthe need of Chakdara, to his determination to force his way through atall costs. 

Under a dropping fire from the cemetery on the right of the road, abrief consultation was held. The Amandara defile was occupied on bothsides by the enemy. With the loss of perhaps a dozen men the squadronmight gallop through. But this meant leaving all who fell, to perishmiserably, by torture and mutilation. To attempt to pick up the wounded, would lead to the annihilation of the squadron. Any alternative waspreferable, though if there were no other way, the dash would have to bemade, and the wounded left. A Sowar now said there was a path round therock by the bank of the river. Captain Wright determined to take it. 

The path was bad. After about half the spur had been passed, it endedabruptly in a steep white rock. It was, in fact, a path leading to apoint where the natives were in the habit of floating across the riverupon "mussucks" (inflated skins). To go back now was to fail. Withouthesitation, the horsemen turned to the right up the hill and among therocks, trusting to get through somehow. After passing over ground whichwould be difficult to move across on foot, they saw a gorge to theirleft which appeared as if it would lead to the open plain, on the otherside of the ridge. Down this gorge forty horses huddled together, withno room to pick their way, were scrambling and jumping from rock torock, apparently as conscious as their riders that their lives dependedon their cleverness--when, suddenly, the enemy appeared. 

As soon as the tribesmen, who were holding the pass, saw the squadrontrot off to their right towards the river, they realised that theyintended to make a desperate effort to get through to Chakdara. Theyknew what the ground was like, and confident they would kill them all, if they could get there soon enough, ran swiftly along the spur. It wasa race. The leading tribesmen arrived in time to fire on the cavalry, while they were in the gorge. So close were they, that the officersused their revolvers. But the Pathans were out of breath and shot badly. Several horses were hit, including Captain Wright's, but though thelarge thigh bone was penetrated, the gallant beast held on, and carriedhis rider to Chakdara safely. 

By the extraordinary activity of the horses the rocks were clearedbefore the enemy could collect in any strength. But, to the dismay ofall, the gorge was found to lead, not to the plain, but to a branch ofthe river. A broad, swift channel of water of unknown depth confrontedthe cavalry. To go back was now, however, out of the question. Theyplunged in. The 11th Bengal Lancers are perhaps better mounted than anynative cavalry regiment in India. Their strong horses just held theirown against the current. Several were nearly swept away. CaptainWright was the last to cross. All this time the enemy were firing andapproaching. At length the passage was made and the squadron collectedon an island of flooded rice fields, in which the horses sank up totheir hocks. Beyond this ran another arm of the river about fifty yardswide, and apparently almost as deep as the first. The bullets of theenemy made "watery flashes" on all sides. After passing this secondtorrent the squadron found themselves again on the same bank ofthe river as the enemy. They were in swampy ground. Captain Wrightdismounted his men and returned the fire. Then he turned back himself, and riding into the stream again, rescued the hospital assistant, whosepony, smaller than the other horses, was being carried off its legs bythe force of the water. After this the march was resumed. The squadronkept in the heavy ground, struggling along painfully. The enemy, runningalong the edge of the rice fields, maintained a continual fire, kneelingdown to take good aim. A sowar threw up his hands and fell, shot throughthe back. Several more horses were hit. Then another man reeled in hissaddle and collapsed on the ground. A halt was made. Dismounted fire wasopened upon the enemy. The wounded were picked up, and by slow degreesChakdara was approached, when the Bridgehead Maxim gun compelled thetribesmen to draw off. [For the particulars of this affair I am indebtedto Captain Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, who shared its perils. ]

Thus the garrison of the fort received a needed reinforcement. I havegiven a somewhat long description of this gallant ride, because it showsthat there are few obstacles that can stop brave men and good horses. Captain Wright now assumed command of Chakdara, but the direction ofthe defense he still confided to Lieutenant Rattray, as fighting behindwalls is a phase of warfare with which the cavalry soldier is littleacquainted. 

At 11. 30, in the heat of the day the tribesmen attacked again. Theysurrounded the north and east sides of the fort, and made strenuousefforts to get in. They suffered heavy losses from the musketry of thedefence, and their dead lay scattered thickly on the approaches. Norwere they removed till nightfall. Many Ghazis, mad with fanaticism, pressed on carrying standards, heedless of the fire, until they fellriddled with bullets under the very walls. 

To communicate with the Malakand was now almost impossible. Toheliograph, it was necessary that the operator should be exposed to aterrible fire. In the evening the signal tower was surrounded by menin stone sungars, who kept up an incessant fusillade, and made allexposure, even for an instant, perilous. 

At midday, after the repulse of the main attack, the guard of the signaltower was reinforced by six men, and food and water were also sent up. This difficult operation was protected by the fire of both the Maxims, and of all the garrison who could be spared from other points. Until the1st of August, water was sent up daily to the signal tower in thisway. The distance was long and the road steep. The enemy's fire waspersistent. Looking at the ground it seems wonderful that supplies couldhave been got through at all. 

As night approached, the defenders prepared to meet a fresh attack. Lieutenant Wheatley, observing the points behind which the enemy usuallyassembled, trained the fort Maxim and the 9-pounder gun on them, whiledaylight lasted. At 11 P. M. The tribesmen advanced with shouts, yellsand the beating of drums. The gun and the Maxims were fired, and it issaid that no fewer than seventy men perished by the single discharge. At any rate the assault was delayed for an hour and a half. All day longthe garrison had remained at their posts. It was hoped they wouldnow get a little rest. But at 1 o'clock the attack was renewed onthe north-east corner. Again the enemy brought up scaling ladders andcharged with desperate ferocity. They were shot down. 

Meanwhile every spare moment was devoted to improving the cover of thegarrison. Captain Baker applied himself to this task, and used everyexpedient. Logs, sand bags, stones, boxes filled with earth were piledupon the walls. It is due to these precautions that the loss of life wasno larger. 

Continuous firing occupied the 28th, and at 5. 30 P. M. The enemy againassaulted. As in previous attacks, they at first advanced by twos andthrees, making little dashes over the open ground, for bits of naturalcover, and for the stone sungars they had built all round the fort undercover of darkness. Some of these were within 200 yards of the wall. Asthey advanced the fire became intense. Then the main rush was delivered. In a great semi-circle round the face of the fort held by thecavalry, and displaying nearly 200 standards whose gay colours wererepresentative of every tribe on the border, they charged right up tothe walls. Some of them actually got across the tangled barbed wire andwere destroyed in the enclosure. But all efforts were defeated by thegarrison, and towards morning the attack melted away, and only the usualsharpshooters remained. Some of these displayed a singular recklessness. One man climbed up into the barbed wire and fired three shots at thedefenders at close quarters before he was killed. 

Thursday morning dawned on similar scenes. The garrison employed suchintervals as occurred in strengthening their defences and improvingtheir cover, particularly in the approaches to the Maxim and fieldgun platforms. At 3 P. M. The enemy came out of Chakdara village, and, carrying ladders to scale the walls, and bundles of grass to throw onthe barbed wire, made a formidable effort. They directed the attackmainly against the signal station. This building is a strong, square, stone tower. Its entrance is above six feet from the ground. All aroundthe top runs a machiconlis gallery, a kind of narrow balcony, with holesin the floor to fire through. It is well provided with loopholes. At4 o'clock it was closely assailed. The garrison of the fort aided thetower guard by their fire. So bold were the enemy in their efforts, thatthey rushed in under the musketry of the defence, and lighted a greatheap of grass about three yards from the doorway. The flames sprangup. A howl of ferocious delight arose. But the tribesmen relapsed intosilence, when they saw that no real harm was done. At sunset thefore sight of the fort Maxim was shot away, and the defenders weretemporarily deprived of the service of that powerful weapon. They soonmanaged, however, to rig up a makeshift, which answered all practicalpurposes. At 8 P. M. The enemy wearied of the struggle, and the firingdied away to desultory skirmishing. They toiled all night carrying awaytheir dead, but next morning over fifty bodies were still lying aroundthe signal tower. Their losses had been enormous. 

The morning of the 30th brought no cessation of the fighting, but theenemy, disheartened by their losses of the previous night, did notattack until 7 P. M. At that hour they advanced and made a fresh effort. They were again repulsed. Perhaps the reader is tired of the longrecital of the monotonous succession of assaults and repulses. Whatmust the garrison have been by the reality? Until this day--when theysnatched a few hours' sleep--they had been continually fighting andwatching for ninety-six hours. Like men in a leaking ship, who toil atthe pumps ceaselessly and find their fatigues increasing and the shipsinking hour by hour, they cast anxious, weary eyes in the directionwhence help might be expected. But none came. And there are worse deathsthan by drowning. 

Men fell asleep at the loopholes and at the service of the field gun. Even during the progress of the attacks, insulted nature asserteditself, and the soldiers drifted away from the roar of the musketry, and the savage figures of the enemy, to the peaceful unconsciousnessof utter exhaustion. The officers, haggard but tireless, aroused themfrequently. 

At other times the brave Sepoys would despair. The fort was ringed withthe enemy. The Malakand, too, was assailed. Perhaps it was the sameelsewhere. The whole British Raj seemed passing away in a singlecataclysm. The officers encouraged them. The Government of theQueen-Empress would never desert them. If they could hold out, theywould be relieved. If not, they would be avenged. Trust in the youngwhite men who led them, and perhaps some dim half-idolatrous faith in amysterious Sovereign across the seas, whose soldiers they were, andwho would surely protect them, restored their fainting strength. Thefighting continued. 

During the whole time of the siege the difficulty of maintainingsignalling communication with the Malakand was extreme. But for theheroism of the signallers, it would have been insuperable. One man inparticular, Sepoy Prem Singh, used every day at the risk of his life tocome out through a porthole of the tower, establish his heliograph, and, under a terrible fire from short range, flash urgent messages tothe main force. The extreme danger, the delicacy of the operation ofobtaining connection with a helio, the time consumed, the composurerequired, these things combined to make the action as brave as any whichthese or other pages record. [A proposal has recently been made, to givethe Victoria Cross to native soldiers who shall deserve it. It wouldseem that the value of such a decoration must be enhanced by making itopen to all British subjects. The keener the competition, the greaterthe honor of success. In sport, in courage, and in the sight of heaven, all men meet on equal terms. ] Early on Saturday morning a supply ofwater was sent to the guard of the signal tower. It was the last theygot until 4. 30 on Monday afternoon. 

When the attack on the fort began, the enemy numbered perhaps 1500 men. Since then they had been increasing every day, until on the 1st and2nd, they are estimated to have been between 12, 000 and 14, 000 strong. Matters now began to assume a still graver aspect. At 5 o'clock on theevening of the 31st a renewed attack was made in tremendous force onthe east side of the fort. But it was beaten back with great loss bythe Maxims and the field gun. All night long the firing continued, andSunday morning displayed the enemy in far larger numbers than hitherto. They now captured the Civil Hospital, a detached building, the wallsof which they loopholed, and from which they maintained a galling fire. They also occupied the ridge, leading to the signal tower, thus cuttingoff all communication with its guard. No water reached those unfortunatemen that day. The weather was intensely hot. The fire from the ridgemade all interior communication difficult and dangerous. The enemyappeared armed to a great extent with Martini-Henry rifles and Sniders, and their musketry was most harassing. The party in the tower keptsending by signal pressing requests for water, which could not besupplied. The situation became critical. I quote the simple words ofLieutenant Rattray's official report:--

"Matters now looked so serious that we decided to send an urgent appealfor help, but owing to the difficulty and danger of signalling wecould not send a long message, and made it as short as possible, merelysending the two words, 'Help us. '"

Still the garrison displayed a determined aspect, and though thetribesmen occupied the ridge, the Civil Hospital and an adjoiningnullah, none set foot within the defences. 

At length the last day of the struggle came. At daybreak the enemy intremendous numbers came on to the assault, as if resolute to take theplace at any cost. They carried scaling ladders and bundles of grass. The firing became intense. In spite of the cover of the garrison severalmen were killed and wounded by the hail of bullets which was directedagainst the fort, and which splashed and scarred the walls in everydirection. 

Then suddenly, as matters were approaching a crisis, the cavalry of therelieving column appeared over the Amandara ridge. The strong horsemenmercilessly pursued and cut down all who opposed them. When they reachedthe Bridgehead on the side of the river remote from the fort, theenemy began to turn and run. The garrison had held out stubbornlyand desperately throughout the siege. Now that relief was at hand, Lieutenant Rattray flung open the gate, and followed by half a dozenmen charged the Civil Hospital. Captain Baker and Lieutenant Wheatleyfollowed with a few more. The hospital was recaptured. The enemyoccupying it, some thirty in number, were bayoneted. It was a finish instyle. Returning, the sallying party found the cavalry--the 11th BengalLancers--checked by a sungar full of tribesmen. This they charged inflank, killing most of its occupants, and driving the rest aftertheir comrades in rout and ruin. The last man to leave the sungar shotLieutenant Rattray in the neck, but that officer, as distinguished forphysical prowess as for military conduct, cut him down. This ended thefighting. It is not possible to think of a more fitting conclusion. 

The casualties in the siege were as follows:--

 Killed Wounded 11th B. L. .. .. . 1 1 45th Sikhs. .. .. 4 10 Dir Levies. .. .. 1 0 Followers. .. .. 1 2 Total, all ranks--20

This was the loss; but every man in the fort had held death at arm'slength, for seven nights, and seven days. 

It is a significant fact, that, though the cavalry horses were exposedto the enemy's fire the whole time, hardly any were killed or wounded. The tribesmen, feeling sure that the place was theirs, and hoping thatthese fine beasts would fall unto their hands alive, had abstained fromshooting them. 

As far as could be ascertained by careful official inquiries the enemylost over 2000 men in the attack upon Chakdara. 

[The following statistics as to the expenditure of ammunition may be ofinterest:--

 Rounds. 28th July. Maxim. .. .. . 843 " Martini-Henry. .. 7170 29th July. Maxim. .. .. . 667 " Martini-Henry. .. 4020 30th July. Maxim. .. .. . 1200 " Martini-Henry. .. 5530 31st July. Maxim. .. .. . 180 " Martini-Henry. .. 2700

This is approximately twenty rounds per man per diem. The fire controlmust have been excellent. ]

CHAPTER VII: THE GATE OF SWAT

The Malakand Pass gives access to the valley of the Swat, a long andwide trough running east and west, among the mountains. Six milesfurther to the east, at Chakdara, the valley bifurcates. One branch runsnorthward towards Uch, and, turning again to the west, ultimately leadsto the Panjkora River and beyond to the great valley of Nawagai. Forsome distance along this branch lies the road to Chitral, and along itthe Malakand Field Force will presently advance against the Mohmands. The other branch prolongs the valley to the eastward. A few miles beyondChakdara a long spur, jutting from the southern mountains, blocks thevalley. Round its base the river has cut a channel. The road passesalong a narrow stone causeway between the river and the spur. Here isthe Landakai position, or as the tribesmen have for centuries calledit, the "Gate of Swat. " Beyond this gate is Upper Swat, the ancient, beautiful and mysterious "Udyana. " This chapter will describe theforcing of the gate and the expedition to the head of the valley. 

The severe fighting at the Malakand and Chakdara had shown howformidable was the combination, which had been raised against theBritish among the hill tribes. The most distant and solitary valleys, the most remote villages, had sent their armed men to join in thedestruction of the infidels. All the Banjaur tribes had been wellrepresented in the enemy's ranks. The Bunerwals and the Utman Khels hadrisen to a man. All Swat had been involved. Instead of the two or threethousand men that had been estimated as the extreme number, who wouldfollow the Mad Fakir, it was now known that over 12, 000 were in arms. In consequence of the serious aspect which the military and politicalsituation had assumed, it was decided to mobilise a 3rd and ReserveBrigade composed as follows:--

 3rd Brigade. Commanding--Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C. B. , C. M. G. 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry. 1st " Gordon Highlanders. 21st Punjaub Infantry. 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas. No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. " 14 British Field Hospital. " 45 Native " " " 1 Field Medical Depot. 

The fighting of the preceding fortnight had left significant andterrible marks on the once smiling landscape. The rice crops weretrampled down in all directions. The ruins of the villages which hadbeen burned looked from a distance like blots of ink. The fearful losseswhich the enemy had sustained, had made an appreciable diminution, not of an army, but of a population. In the attacks upon the Malakandposition, about 700 tribesmen had perished. In the siege of Chakdara, where the open ground had afforded opportunity to the modern weaponsand Maxim guns, over 2000 had been killed and wounded. Many others hadfallen in the relief of Chakdara and in the cavalry pursuit. For daystheir bodies lay scattered about the country. In the standing crops, inthe ruins of villages, and among the rocks, festering bodies lay in theblazing sun, filling the valley with a dreadful smell. To devour thesegreat numbers of vultures quickly assembled and disputed the abundantprey with the odious lizards, which I have mentioned in an earlierchapter, and which emerged from holes and corners to attack the corpses. Although every consideration of decency and health stimulated the energyof the victors in interring the bodies of their enemies, it wassome days before this task could be accomplished, and even then, inout-of-the-way places, there remained a good many that had escaped theburying parties. 

Meanwhile the punishment that the tribesmen of the Swat Valley hadreceived, and their heavy losses, had broken the spirit of many, andseveral deputations came to make their submission. The Lower Swatissurrendered unconditionally, and were allowed to return to theirvillages. Of this permission they at once availed themselves, and theirfigures could be seen moving about their ruined homes and endeavouringto repair the damage. Others sat by the roadside and watched in sullendespair the steady accumulation of troops in their valley, which hadbeen the only result of their appeal to arms. 

It is no exaggeration to say, that perhaps half the tribesmen whoattacked the Malakand, had thought that the soldiers there, were theonly troops that the Sirkar [The Government] possessed. "Kill these, "they said, "and all is done. " What did they know of the distantregiments which the telegraph wires were drawing, from far down in thesouth of India? Little did they realise they had set the world humming;that military officers were hurrying 7000 miles by sea and land fromEngland, to the camps among the mountains; that long trains werecarrying ammunition, material and supplies from distant depots to thefront; that astute financiers were considering in what degree theiraction had affected the ratio between silver and gold, or that sharppoliticians were wondering how the outbreak in Swat might be made toinfluence the impending bye-elections. These ignorant tribesmen had noconception of the sensitiveness of modern civilisation, which thrillsand quivers in every part of its vast and complex system at theslightest touch. 

They only saw the forts and camps on the Malakand Pass and the swingingbridge across the river. 

While the people of Lower Swat, deserted by the Mad Mullah, andconfronted with the two brigades, were completely humbled and subdued, the Upper Swatis, encouraged by their priests, and, as they believed, safe behind their "gate, " assumed a much more independent air. They sentto inquire what terms the Government would offer, and said they wouldconsider the matter. Their contumacious attitude, induced the politicalofficers to recommend the movement of troops through their country, toimpress them with the determination and power of the Sirkar. 

The expedition into the Upper Swat Valley was accordingly sanctioned, and Sir Bindon Blood began making the necessary preparations for theadvance. The prospects of further fighting were eagerly welcomed by thetroops, and especially by those who had arrived too late for the reliefof Chakdara, and had had thus far, only long and dusty marches toperform. There was much speculation and excitement as to what unitswould be selected, every one asserting that his regiment was sure to go;that it was their turn; and that if they were not taken it would be agreat shame. 

Sir Bindon Blood had however already decided. He had concentrated aconsiderable force at Amandara in view of a possible advance, and assoon as the movement was sanctioned organised the column as follows:--

 1st Brigade. Commanding--Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. Royal West Kent Regiment. 24th Punjaub Infantry. 31st " " 45th Sikhs

 With the following divisional troops:-- 10th Field Battery. No. 7 British Mountain Battery. " 8 Bengal " " " 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. 2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry. 4 " 11th Bengal Lancers. 

This force amounted to an available fighting strength of 3500 rifles andsabres, with eighteen guns. Supplies for twelve days were carried, andthe troops proceeded on "the 80 lb. Scale" of baggage, which means, thatthey did not take tents, and a few other comforts and conveniences. 

Before the force started, a sad event occurred. On the 12th of August, Lieut. -Colonel J. Lamb, who had been wounded on the night of the 26th ofJuly, died. An early amputation might have saved his life; but thiswas postponed in the expectation that the Rontgen Rays would enable thebullet to be extracted. The Rays arrived from India after some delay. When they reached Malakand, the experiment was at once made. It wasfound, however, that the apparatus had been damaged in coming up, and noresult was obtained. Meanwhile mortification had set in, and the gallantsoldier died on the Sunday, from the effects of an amputation which hewas then too weak to stand. His thigh bone had been completely shatteredby the bullet. He had seen service in Afghanistan and the Zhob Valleyand had been twice mentioned in despatches. 

On the 14th Sir Bindon Blood joined the special force, and moved it onthe 16th to Thana, a few miles further up the valley. At the same timehe ordered Brigadier-General Wodehouse to detach a small column in thedirection of the southern passes of Buner. The Highland Light Infantry, No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, and one squadron of the 10thBengal Lancers accordingly marched from Mardan, where the 3rd Brigadethen was, to Rustum. By this move they threatened the Bunerwals anddistracted their attention from the Upper Swat Valley. Having thusweakened the enemy, Sir Bindon Blood proceeded to force the "Gate ofSwat. "

On the evening of the 16th, a reconnaissance by the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major Beatson, revealed the fact, that the Landakai position wasstrongly held by the enemy. Many standards were displayed, and onthe approach of the cavalry, shots were fired all along the line. Thesquadron retired at once, and reported the state of affairs. The generaldecided to attack at day-break. 

At 6. 30 A. M. On the 17th, the cavalry moved off, and soon came incontact with the tribesmen in some Buddhist ruins near a village, calledJalala. A skirmish ensued. Meanwhile the infantry were approaching. Themain position of the enemy was displayed. All along the crest of thespur of Landakai could be seen a fringe of standards, dark againstthe sky. Beneath them the sword blades of the tribesmen glinted in thesunlight. A long line of stone sungars crowned the ridge, and behind theenemy clustered thickly. It is estimated that over 5000 were present. 

It is not difficult to realise what a strong position this was. On theleft of the troops was an unfordable river. On their right the mountainsrose steeply. In front was the long ridge held by the enemy. The onlyroad up the valley was along the causeway, between the ridge and theriver. To advance further, it was necessary to dislodge the enemy fromthe ridge. Sir Bindon Blood rode forward, reconnoitered the ground, andmade his dispositions. 

To capture the position by a frontal attack would involve heavy loss. The enemy were strongly posted, and the troops would be exposed to aheavy fire in advancing. On the other hand, if the ridge could once becaptured, the destruction of the tribesmen was assured. Their positionwas good, only as long as they held it. The moment of defeat would bethe moment of ruin. The reason was this. The ground behind the ridgewas occupied by swampy rice fields, and the enemy could only retire veryslowly over it. Their safe line of retreat lay up the spur, and on tothe main line of hills. They were thus formed with their line of retreatin prolongation of their front. This is, of course, tactically one ofthe worst situations that people can get into. 

Sir Bindon Blood, who knew what the ground behind the ridge was like, perceived at once how matters stood, and made his plans accordingly. Hedetermined to strike at the enemy's left, thus not only turning theirflank, but cutting off their proper line of retreat. If once his troopsheld the point, where the long ridge ran into the main hills, all thetribesmen who had remained on the ridge would be caught. He accordinglyissued orders as follows:--

The Royal West Kent were to mask the front and occupy the attentionof the enemy. The rest of the infantry, viz. , 24th and 31st PunjaubInfantry and the 45th Sikhs, were to ascend the hills to the right, anddeliver a flank attack on the head of the ridge. The cavalry were to beheld in readiness to dash forward along the causeway--to repair which acompany of sappers was posted--as soon as the enemy were driven off theridge which commanded it, and pursue them across the rice fields intothe open country beyond. The whole of the powerful artillery was to comeinto action at once. 

The troops then advanced. The Royal West Kent Regiment began the fight, by driving some of the enemy from the Buddhist ruins on a small spur inadvance of the main position. The 10th Field Battery had been leftin rear in case the guns might stick in the narrow roads near Thanavillage. It had, however, arrived safely, and now trotted up, and at8. 50 A. M. Opened fire on the enemy's position and at a stone fort, whichthey occupied strongly. A few minutes later No. 7 Mountain Battery cameinto action from the spur, which the Royal West Kent had taken. A heavyartillery fire thus prepared the way for the attack. The great shellsof the Field Artillery astounded the tribesmen, who had never beforewitnessed the explosion of a twelve-pound projectile. The two mountainbatteries added to their discomfiture. Many fled during the firstquarter of an hour of the bombardment. All the rest took cover on thereverse slope and behind their sungars. 

Meanwhile the flank attack was developing. General Meiklejohn andhis infantry were climbing up the steep hillside, and moving steadilytowards the junction of the ridge with the main hill. At length thetribesmen on the spur perceived the danger that was threatening them. They felt the grip on their line of retreat. They had imagined that thewhite troops would try and force their path along the causeway, and hadmassed considerable reserves at the lower end of the ridge. All thesenow realised that they were in great danger of being cut off. Theywere on a peninsula, as it were, while the soldiers were securing theisthmus. They accordingly began streaming along the ridge towards theleft, at first with an idea of meeting the flank attack, but afterwards, as the shell fire grew hotter, and the musketry increased, only in thehope of retreat. Owing to the great speed with which the mountaineersmove about the hills, most of them were able to escape before the flankattack could cut them off. Many however, were shot down as they fled, or were killed by the artillery fire. A few brave men charged the 31stPunjaub Infantry, but were all destroyed. 

Seeing the enemy in full flight, Sir Bindon Blood ordered the Royal WestKent to advance against the front of the now almost deserted ridge. TheBritish infantry hurrying forward climbed the steep hill and capturedthe stone sungars. From this position they established touch with theflank attack, and the whole force pursued the flying tribesmen withlong-range fire. 

The "Gate of Swat" had been forced. It was now possible for troops toadvance along the causeway. This had, however, been broken in variousplaces by the enemy. The sappers and miners hastened forward torepair it. While this was being done, the cavalry had to wait in madimpatience, knowing that their chance lay in the plains beyond. As soonas the road was sufficiently repaired to allow them to pass in singlefile, they began struggling along it, and emerged at the other end ofthe causeway in twos and threes. 

An incident now ensued, which, though it afforded an opportunity for asplendid act of courage, yet involved an unnecessary loss of life, and must be called disastrous. As the cavalry got clear of the brokenground, the leading horsemen saw the tribesmen swiftly running towardsthe hills, about a mile distant. Carried away by the excitement ofthe pursuit, and despising the enemy for their slight resistance, theydashed impetuously forward in the hope of catching them before theycould reach the hills. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, on entering the plain, saw at once that if hecould seize a small clump of trees near a cemetery, he would be able tobring effective dismounted fire to bear on the retreating tribesmen. He therefore collected as many men as possible, and with LieutenantMaclean, and Lord Fincastle, the Times correspondent, rode in thedirection of these points. Meanwhile Captain Palmer, who commanded theleading squadron, and Lieutenant Greaves of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who was acting war correspondent of the Times of India, galloped acrossthe rice fields after the enemy. The squadron, unable to keep up, straggled out in a long string, in the swampy ground. 

At the foot of the hills the ground was firmer, and reaching this, thetwo officers recklessly dashed in among the enemy. It is the spirit thatloses the Empire many lives, but has gained it many battles. But thetribesmen, who had been outmanoeuvred rather than outfought, turnedsavagely on their pursuers. The whole scene was witnessed by the troopson the ridge. Captain Palmer cut down a standard-bearer. Another manattacked him. Raising his arm for a fresh stroke, his wrist was smashedby a bullet. Another killed his horse. Lieutenant Greaves, shot throughthe body, fell at the same moment to the ground. The enemy closed aroundand began hacking him, as he lay, with their swords. Captain Palmertried to draw his revolver. At this moment two sowars got clear ofthe swampy rice fields, and at once galloped, shouting, to the rescue, cutting and slashing at the tribesmen. All would have been cut to piecesor shot down. The hillside was covered with the enemy. The woundedofficers lay at the foot. They were surrounded. Seeing thisLieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle, with Lieutenant Macleanand two or three sowars, dashed to their assistance. At their chargethe tribesmen fell back a little way and opened a heavy fire. LordFincastle's horse was immediately shot and he fell to the ground. Rising, he endeavoured to lift the wounded Greaves on to Colonel Adams'saddle, but at this instant a second bullet struck that unfortunateofficer, killing him instantly. Colonel Adams was slightly, andLieutenant Maclean mortally, wounded while giving assistance, and allthe horses but two were shot. In spite of the terrible fire, the body ofLieutenant Greaves and the other two wounded officers were rescued andcarried to the little clump of trees. 

For this gallant feat of arms both the surviving officers, Colonel Adamsand Lord Fincastle, were recommended for, and have since received, the Victoria Cross. It was also officially announced, that LieutenantMaclean would have received it, had he not been killed. There are many, especially on the frontier, where he was known as a fine soldier anda good sportsman, who think that the accident of death should not havebeen allowed to interfere with the reward of valour. 

The extremes of fortune, which befell Lord Fincastle and LieutenantGreaves, may well claim a moment's consideration. Neither officer wasemployed officially with the force. Both had travelled up at their ownexpense, evading and overcoming all obstacles in an endeavour to seesomething of war. Knights of the sword and pen, they had nothing tooffer but their lives, no troops to lead, no duties to perform, nowatchful commanding officer to report their conduct. They played forhigh stakes, and Fortune never so capricious as on the field of battle, dealt to the one the greatest honour that a soldier can hope for, assome think, the greatest in the gift of the Crown, and to the otherDeath. 

The flight of the enemy terminated the action of Landakai. Thus in a fewhours and with hardly any loss, the "Gate of Swat, " which the tribesmenhad regarded as impregnable, had been forced. One squadron of theGuides cavalry, under Captain Brasier Creagh, pursuing the enemy hada successful skirmish near the village of Abueh, and returned to campabout 6. 30 in the evening. [This officer was mentioned in despatchesfor his skill and judgment in this affair; but he is better known on thefrontier for his brilliant reconnaissance towards Mamani, a month later, in which in spite of heavy loss he succeeded in carrying out GeneralHammond's orders and obtained most valuable information. ] During thefight about 1000 tribesmen had threatened the baggage column, but thesewere but poor-spirited fellows, for they retired after a short skirmishwith two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, with a loss of twentykilled and wounded. The total casualties of the day were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Killed--Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancs. Fusiliers. " " H. L. S. Maclean, Guides. Wounded severely--Captain M. E. Palmer, Guides. Wounded slightly--Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Guides. NATIVE RANKS--Wounded--5. FOLLOWERS--Wounded--2. Total Casualties--11. 

It must be remembered, that but for the incident which resulted in thedeaths of the officers, and which Sir Bindon Blood described in hisofficial despatch as an "unfortunate contretemps, " the total casualtieswould have only been seven wounded. That so strong a position shouldhave been captured with so little loss, is due, firstly, to thedispositions of the general; and secondly, to the power of the artillerywhich he had concentrated. The account of the first attempt to stormthe Dargai position on the 20th of October, before it had been shakenby artillery fire, when the Dorsetshire Regiment suffered severe loss, roused many reflections among those who had witnessed the action ofLandakai. 

The next morning, the 18th, the force continued their march up thevalley of the Upper Swat. The natives, thoroughly cowed, offered nofurther opposition and sued for peace. Their losses at Landakai wereascertained to have exceeded 500, and they realised that they had nochance against the regular troops, when these were enabled to use theirpowerful weapons. 

As the troops advanced up the fertile and beautiful valley, all werestruck by the numerous ruins of the ancient Buddhists. Here in formertimes were thriving cities, and civilised men. Here, we learn fromFa-hien, [Record Of Buddhistic Kingdoms. Translated by James Legge, M. A. , LL. D. ] were "in all 500 Sangharamas, " or monasteries. At thesemonasteries the law of hospitality was thus carried out: "When strangerbhikshus (begging monks) arrive at one of them, their wants are suppliedfor three days, after which they are told to find a resting-place forthemselves. " All this is changed by time. The cities are but ruins. Savages have replaced the civilised, bland-looking Buddhists, and thetraveller who should apply for hospitality, would be speedily shown"a resting-place, " which would relieve his hosts from further troubleconcerning him. 

"There is a tradition, " continues the intrepid monk, who travelledthrough some of the wildest countries of the earth in the darkest agesof its history, "that when Buddha came to North India, he came to thiscountry, and that he left a print of his foot, which is long or shortaccording to the ideas of the beholder. " Although the learned Fa-hienasserts that "it exists, and the same thing is true about it at thepresent day, " the various cavalry reconnaissances failed to discover it, and we must regretfully conclude that it has also been obliterated bythe tides of time. Here too, says this Buddhistic Baedeker, is still tobe seen the rock on which "He dried his clothes; and the place where Heconverted the wicked dragon (Naga). " "The rock is fourteen cubits highand more than twenty broad, with one side of it smooth. " This may wellbe believed; but there are so many rocks of all dimensions that thesoldiers were unable to make certain which was the scene of the dragon'srepentance, and Buddha's desiccation. 

His companions went on ahead towards Jellalabad, or some city in thatlocality, but Fa-hien, charmed with the green and fertile beautiesof "the park, " remained in the pleasant valley and "kept the summerretreat. " Then he descended into the land of So-hoo-to, which is perhapsBuner. 

Even in these busy, practical, matter-of-fact, modern times, wherenothing is desirable unless economically sound, it is not unprofitablefor a moment to raise the veil of the past, and take a glimpse of theworld as it was in other days. The fifth century of the Christian erawas one of the most gloomy and dismal periods in the history of mankind. The Great Roman Empire was collapsing before the strokes of such asAlaric the Goth, Attila the Hun, and Genseric the Vandal. The art andvalour of a classical age had sunk in that deluge of barbarism whichsubmerged Europe. The Church was convulsed by the Arian controversy. That pure religion, which it should have guarded, was defiled with theblood of persecution and degraded by the fears of superstition. Yet, while all these things afflicted the nations of the West, and seemedto foreshadow the decline or destruction of the human species, the wildmountains of Northern India, now overrun by savages more fierce thanthose who sacked Rome, were occupied by a placid people, thriving, industrious, and intelligent; devoting their lives to the attainmentof that serene annihilation which the word nirvana expresses. When wereflect on the revolutions which time effects, and observe how the homeof learning and progress changes as the years pass by, it is impossibleto avoid the conclusion, perhaps a mournful one, that the sun ofcivilisation can never shine all over the world at once. 

On the 19th, the force reached Mingaora, and here for five days theywaited in an agreeable camp, to enable Major Deane to receive thesubmission of the tribes. These appeared much humbled by their defeats, and sought to propitiate the troops by bringing in supplies of grain andforage. Over 800 arms of different descriptions were surrendered duringthe halt. A few shots were fired into the camp on the night of thearrival at Mingaora, but the villagers, fearing lest they should suffer, turned out and drove the "snipers" away. On the 21st a reconnaissanceas far as the Kotke Pass afforded much valuable information as to thenature of the country. All were struck with the beauty of the scenery, and when on the 24th the force marched back to Barikot, they carriedaway with them the memory of a beautiful valley, where the green of therice fields was separated from the blue of the sky by the glitteringsnow peaks of the Himalayas. 

While the troops rested at Barikot, Sir Bindon Blood personallyreconnoitred the Karakar Pass, which leads from the Swat Valley into thecountry of the Bunerwals. The Bunerwals belong to the Yusaf section, ofthe Yusafzai tribe. They are a warlike and turbulent people. To theirvalley, after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, many of the Sepoysand native officers who had been in revolt fled for refuge. Here, partlyby force and partly by persuasion, they established themselves. They married women of the country and made a settlement. In 1863 theBunerwals came into collision with the British Government and muchsevere fighting ensued, known to history as the Ambeyla Campaign. Therefugees from India renewed their quarrel with the white troops witheagerness, and by their extraordinary courage and ferocity gained thename of the "Hindustani Fanatics. " At the cost of thirty-six officersand eight hundred men Buner was subdued. The "Crag Picket" was takenfor the last time by the 101st Fusiliers, and held till the end of theoperations. Elephants, brought at great expense from India, trampled thecrops. Most of the "Hindustani Fanatics" perished in the fighting. TheBunerwals accepted the Government terms, and the troops retired. Sincethen, in 1868, in 1877 and again in 1884 they raided border villages, but on the threat of an expedition paid a fine and made good the damage. The reputation they have enjoyed since their stout resistance in 1863, has enabled them to take a leading position among the frontier tribes;and they have availed themselves of this to foment and aggravate severaloutbreaks against the British. Their black and dark-blue clothes haddistinguished them from the other assailants of Malakand and Chakdara. They had now withdrawn to their valley and thence defied the Governmentand refused all terms. 

As Sir Bindon Blood and his escort approached the top of the pass, a fewshots were fired by the watchers there, but there was no opposition. Allthe Bunerwals had hurried over to defend the southern entrances totheir country, which they conceived were in danger of attack fromBrigadier-General Wodehouse's force at Rustum. The general reached theKotal, and saw the whole valley beneath him. Great villages dotted theplains and the aspect was fertile and prosperous. 

The unguarded Karakar Pass was practicable for troops, and if theGovernment would give their consent, Buner might be reduced in afortnight without difficulty, almost without fighting. 

Telegrams were despatched to India on the subject, and after much delayand hesitation the Viceroy decided against the recommendation ofhis victorious general. Though the desirability of settling with theBunerwals was fully admitted, the Government shrank from the risk. TheMalakand Field Force thus remained idle for nearly a fortnight. Thenews, that the Sirkar had feared to attack Buner, spread like wildfirealong the frontier, and revived the spirits of the tribes. They fanciedthey detected a sign of weakness. Nor were they altogether wrong. Butthe weakness was moral rather than physical. 

It is now asserted, that the punishment of Buner is only postponed, and that a few months may see its consummation. [Written in 1897. ] Theopportunity of entering the country without having to force the passesmay not, however, recur. 

On the 26th of August the force returned to Thana, and the expeditioninto Upper Swat terminated. 

[The following is the most trustworthy estimate obtainable of loss oflife among the tribesmen in the fighting in the Swat Valley from 26thJuly to 17th August. The figures include wounded, who have since died, and are more than double those killed outright in the actions:--

 1. Lower Swat Pathans. .. 700 Buried in the graveyards. 2. Upper " " . .. 600 " " " " 3. Buner proper . . .. 500 " " " " 4. Utman Khel . . .. 80 5. Yusafzai. . . .. 50 6. Other tribes . . .. 150 Total--2080. 

 1, 2 and 3 are the result of recent inquiry on the spot. 4, 5 and 6 are estimates based on native information. 

The proportion of killed and died of wounds to wounded would be veryhigh, as the tribes have little surgical or medical knowledge andrefused all offers of aid. Assuming that only an equal number werewounded and recovered, the total loss would be approximately 4000. Acheck is obtained by comparing these figures with the separate estimatesfor each action:--

 Malakand. .. . 700 Siege of Chakdara. . 2000 Relief " " . . 500 Action of Landakai. . 500 Total--3700. 

CHAPTER VIII: THE ADVANCE AGAINST THE MOHMANDS

The beginning of this chapter must mark a change in the standpoint fromwhich the story is told. Hitherto the course of events has been recordedin the impersonal style of history. But henceforward I am able to relyon my own memory as well as on other people's evidence. [I do notdesire to bore the reader or depreciate the story by the introductionof personal matters. It will be sufficient if, in the interests ofcoherency, I explain my connection with the Malakand Field Force. Havingrealised, that if a British cavalry officer waits till he is ordered onactive service, he is likely to wait a considerable time, I obtained sixweeks' leave of absence from my regiment, and on the 2nd of Septemberarrived at Malakand as press correspondent of the PIONEER and DAILYTELEGRAPH, and in the hope of being sooner or later attached to theforce in a military capacity. ] It may be doubtful whether an historicalrecord gains or loses value when described by an eye-witness. From thepersonal point of view, all things appear in a gradual perspective, according to the degree in which they affect the individual; and we areso prone to exaggerate the relative importance of incidents, which wesee, over those we hear about, that what the narrative gains in accuracyof detail, it may lose in justness of proportion. In so nice a questionI shall not pronounce. I remember that the original object with whichthis book was undertaken, was to present a picture of the war on theNorth-West Frontier to the Englishmen at home; a picture which shouldnot only exist, but be looked at; and I am inclined to think, that thisend will be more easily attained by the adoption of a style of personalnarrative. Many facts, too local, too specialised, too insignificant, for an historical record, and yet which may help the reader to form atrue impression of the scene and situation, are thus brought withinthe compass of these pages. The account becomes more graphic if lessimposing, more vivid if less judicial. As long as each step down fromthe "dignity of history" is accompanied by a corresponding increasein interest, we may pursue without compunction that pleasant, ifdescending, path. 

The ninth chapter also introduces a new phase of the operations of theforce. The Mohmands now become the enemy and the scene is changed fromSwat to Bajaur. Before marching into their country, it will be desirableto consider briefly those causes and events which induced the Governmentof India to despatch an expedition against this powerful and warliketribe. 

The tidal wave of fanaticism, which had swept the frontier, hadinfluenced the Mohmands, as all other border peoples. Their situationwas, however, in several important respects, different from that of thenatives of the Swat Valley. These Mohmands had neither been irritatednor interfered with in any way. No military road ran through theirterritory. No fortified posts stirred their animosity or threatenedtheir independence. Had they respected in others the isolation whichthey themselves have so long enjoyed, they might have remained for anindefinite period in that state of degraded barbarism which seems toappeal so strongly to certain people in England. They became, however, the aggressors. 

In the heart of the wild and dismal mountain region, in which thesefierce tribesmen dwell, are the temple and village of Jarobi: the onea consecrated hovel, the other a fortified slum. This obscure andundisturbed retreat was the residence of a priest of great age andof peculiar holiness, known to fame as the Hadda Mullah. His name isNajb-ud-din, but as respect has prevented it being mentioned by thetribesmen for nearly fifty years, it is only preserved in infidelmemories and records. The Government of India have, however, had thisman's personality brought vividly before them on several occasions. About thirteen years ago he quarrelled with the Amir and raised theMohmands against him. The Amir replied by summoning his rebellioussubject--for Hadda, the Mullah's home and birthplace, is a village ofAfghanistan--to answer for his conduct at Cabul. But the crafty priest, who was well acquainted with Afghan legal procedure, declined theinvitation, and retired to the independent Mohmand territory, where hehas lived ever since. 

Content with thus inflicting the punishment of exile, the Amir wasdisposed to forget the offence. In a letter to his Commander-in-Chief, the "Sipah Salar, " a great friend of the Mullah, he described him as a"light of Islam. " So powerful a light, indeed, he did not desire to havein his own dominions; but across the border it was fitting that respectshould be shown to so holy a man. He therefore directed his officials tocherish and honour him. Thus he retained a powerful weapon--to be usedwhen desirable. Whether by instigation or from personal motives, theHadda Mullah has long been a bitter foe to the British power. In 1895he sent the fighting men of the Mohmands to resist the Chitral ReliefForce. Since then he has been actively engaged, by preaching and bycorrespondence with other Mullahs, in raising a great combinationagainst the advancing civilisation. 

In 1896 he terminated a long religious controversy with the Manki Mullahof Nowshera and Spinkhara--a comparatively tame Mullah, who now supportsthe Indian Government--by publishing a book setting forth his views, anddemolishing those of his antagonist. This work was printed in Delhi andhad an extensive sale among Mahommedans all over India. Complimentarycopies were sent to the "Sipah Salar" and other Afghan notabilities, and the fame of the Hadda Mullah was known throughout the land. Besidesincreasing his influence, his literary success stimulated his efforts. 

While the Mad Fakir was rousing Swat and Buner, this powerful priestincited the Mohmands. Though he was known to be a physical coward, hissanctity and the fact that he was their own particular holy man, notless than his eloquence, powerfully moved this savage tribe. A Jehadwas proclaimed. How long should Islam be insulted? How long should itsfollowers lurk in the barren lands of the North? He urged them to riseand join in the destruction of the white invaders. Those who fell shouldbecome saints; those who lived would be rich, for these Kafirs had moneyand many other things besides, for which a true believer might find ause. 

The combined allurements of plunder and paradise proved irresistible. On the 8th of August a great gathering, nearly 6000 strong, crossedthe frontier line, invaded British territory, burned the villageof Shankargarh, and attacked the fort of Shabkadr. This place is anadvanced post in the defensive system of the frontier, and is situatedsome nineteen miles to the north-west of Peshawar. Its ordinary garrisonconsists of about fifty Border Police. It is strongly built, andis intended to attract the attention and delay the advance of araiding-party, until the Peshawar garrison has had time to take thefield. Both of these objects it admirably fulfilled in this case. 

As soon as the news of the incursion of the Mohmands was received inPeshawar, a flying column was mobilised and proceeded under the commandof Lieut. -Colonel J. B. Woon, 20th Punjaub Infantry, in the direction ofthe fort. At dawn on the 9th of August they found the tribesmen in forcein a strong position near Shabdakr. The force at Colonel Woon's disposalwas small. It consisted of:--

 4 Guns 51st Field Battery. 2 squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers. .. .. 151 lances. 2 Companies Somersetshire Light Infantry. . 186 rifles. 20th Punjaub Infantry . .. .. . 400 "

A total of about 750 men. The enemy numbered 6000. Nevertheless it wasdecided to attack at once. 

As the action which followed is but remotely connected with the fortunesof the Malakand Field Force, I do not intend to describe it in detail. The infantry in advancing could only attack on a front of 600 yards. Theenemy's line, being much longer, quickly turned both flanks. The firebecame severe. Numerous casualties occurred. A retirement was ordered. As is usual in Asiatic warfare, it was considerably pressed. Thesituation at about nine o'clock appeared critical. At this pointBrigadier-General Ellis, commanding the Peshawar District, arrived onthe field. He immediately ordered the two squadrons of the 13th BengalLancers to move well to the right flank, to charge across the front andcheck the enemy's advance. The "cease fire" sounded as on a field day. Then there was a pause. The movements of the cavalry were concealedfrom most of the troops, but suddenly all noticed the slackening ofthe enemy's fire. Then the tribesmen were seen to be in retreat anddisorder. The power of cavalry had been strikingly displayed. The twosquadrons, ably led, had executed a fine charge over what theoristswould call impossible ground for a distance of one and a half milesalong the bed of a great nullah, and among rocks and stones that reducedthe pace to a trot. The enemy were driven from the field. Sixty wereactually speared by the Lancers, and the rest retreated in gloom anddisorder to their hills across the frontier. 

The casualties were as follows:--

 British Officers. Wounded severely--Major A. Lumb, Somersetshire Light Infantry. " " Captain S. W. Blacker, R. A. " " 2nd Lieut. E Drummond, Somersetshire Light Infantry. Wounded slightly--Lieut. A. V. Cheyne, 13th Bengal Lancers. 

 British N. C. O. 's and Soldiers. Killed. Wounded. 51st Field Battery, R. A. .. .. 0 2 Somersetshire Light Infantry. .. 3 9

 Native Ranks. 

 13th Bengal Lancers . .. .. 1 12 20th Punjaub Infantry. .. .. 5 35 Followers . .. .. .. 0 1

 Total Casualties, all ranks--72. 

That such an outrage, as the deliberate violation of British territoryby these savages, should remain unpunished, "Forward Policy" or no"Forward Policy, " was of course impossible. Yet the vacillation andhesitancy which the Government of India had displayed in the matter ofthe Bunerwals, and the shocking and disgraceful desertion of the fortsin the Khyber Pass, were so fresh in all men's minds, that the order toadvance against the Mohmands was received with feelings of the greatestrelief throughout the forces. The general plan of the operations asarranged by the Commander-in-Chief was as follows:--

1. Sir Bindon Blood with two brigades of the Malakand Field Force anddue proportions of cavalry and guns was to move through South Bajaur toNawagai, and on the 15th of September invade the Mohmand country fromthat place. 

2. On the same date Major-General Elles with an equal force wouldleave Shabkadr, and entering the mountains march northeast to effect ajunction. 

3. This having been done, the combined forces under the supremecommand of Sir Bindon Blood would be brought back through the Mohmands'territories to Shabkadr. Incidentally they would deal with the HaddaMullah's village of Jarobi, and inflict such punishment on the tribesmenas might be necessary to ensure their submission. The troops would thenbe available for the Tirah Expedition, which it had by this time beendecided to organise. 

The fact that after leaving Nawagai, nothing was known of theconfiguration of the country, of which no maps existed; nor of thesupplies of food, forage and water available by the way, made thepreparations for, and the execution of, these operations somewhatdifficult. Wide margins had to be allowed in the matter of rations, and in order to be prepared for all contingencies and obstructions ofground, Sir Bindon Blood equipped his 2nd Brigade entirely with muletransport. The 3rd Brigade with camels would follow if the road waspassable. 

The following was the composition of the forces employed:--

 I. MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. 

 Commanding--Major-General Sir Bindon Blood. 

 2nd Brigade. 

 Brigadier-General Jeffries, C. B. The Buffs. 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry. No. 4 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners. No. 7 Mountain Battery. 

 3rd Brigade. 

 Brigadier-General Wodehouse. The Queen's Regiment. [This regiment had replaced the Gordon Highlanders in the 3rd Brigade. ] 22nd Punjaub Infantry. 39th Punjaub Infantry. No. 3 Company (Bombay) Sappers and Miners. No. 1 Mountain Battery, R. A. 

 Cavalry--11th Bengal Lancers. 

 Line of Communications. 1st Brigade. 

 Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. Royal West Kent. Highland Light Infantry. 31st Punjaub Infantry. 24th Punjaub Infantry. 45th Sikhs. No. 7 British Mountain Battery. And the following additional troops:-- 1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers. 2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry. 

 II. THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE. 

 1st Brigade. 

 1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry. Maxim Gun Detachment, 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment. 20th Punjaub Infantry. 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas. Sections A and B No. 5 British Field Hospital. Three Sections No. 31 Native " " Section A No. 45 " " "

 2nd Brigade. 

 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry. 9th Gurkha Rifles. 37th Dogras. Sections C and D No. 5 British Field Hospital. No. 44 Native Field Hospital. 

 Divisional Troops. 

 13th Bengal Lancers. No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. No. 5 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners. 28th Bombay Pioneers. 1st Patiala Infantry. Sections C and D No. 63 Native Field Hospital. 

To record the actual movements of troops in a campaign, is among themost important duties of one who undertakes to tell its tale. For thesake of clearness, of brevity, and that the reader who is not interestedmay find convenience in skipping, I shall at once describe the whole ofthe marches and manoeuvres, by which Sir Bindon Blood moved his brigadesacross the Panjkora River, and after the Malakand Field Force is safelycamped at Ghosam, the reader will be invited to return to examine thescenery, and remark the incidents of the way. 

During the end of August, the 2nd Brigade, equipped with mule transport, was at Khar in the Swat Valley. The 3rd Brigade was at Uch. On the 2ndof September, definite orders to advance were received from Simla. In pursuance of these instructions, Sir Bindon Blood orderedBrigadier-General Wodehouse with the 3rd Brigade, which in anticipationhad been moved from Uch a few days previously, to take over the bridgeacross the Panjkora from the Khan of Dir's Levies, and secure thepassage. On the 6th, the 3rd Brigade marched from Sarai to Panjkora, and obtained possession of the bridge just in time to prevent it fallinginto the hands of the enemy, who had already gathered to seize it. The 12-pounder guns of the 10th Field Battery were placed in a strongposition commanding the passage, and the brigade camped on the leftbank. On the same day, Brigadier-General Jeffries with headquartersmarched from Khar to Chakdara. On the 7th he proceeded to Sarai, and onthe 8th effected the passage of the Panjkora, and camped on the furtherbank at Kotkai. On the 10th, both brigades marched to Ghosam, where theyconcentrated. On the line of communications to the Malakand, stageswere established at Chakdara and Sarai, with accommodation for sickand wounded. An advanced depot was formed behind the Panjkora, to guardwhich and to hold the passage, an additional force was moved from theSwat Valley. 

This concentration at Ghosam, of which the details had worked out somechanically, had been necessitated by the attitude of the tribesmen ofBajaur and the adjoining valleys. Great gatherings had collected, andup to the 7th of September there had been every sign of determinedopposition. So formidable did the combination appear, that Sir BindonBlood arranged to have at his disposal a force of six squadrons, ninebattalions and three batteries, in the expectation of an action at ornear Ghosam, which would perhaps have been on a larger scale than anyBritish engagement since Tel-el-Kebir. [As so many misconceptions existas to the British casualties in this victory, it is necessary to statethat in the twenty minutes' fighting 11 officers and 43 men were killedand 22 officers and 320 men were wounded. ]

These anticipations were however doomed to disappointment. Themethodical, remorseless advance of powerful forces filled the tribesmenwith alarm. They made a half-hearted attempt to capture the Panjkorabridge, and finding themselves forestalled, fell again to discussingterms. In this scene of indecision the political officers employed alltheir arts. And then suddenly the whole huge combination, which had beenraised in our path, collapsed as an iceberg, when southern waters havemelted its base. 

Whatever the philanthropist may say, it would appear to have been betterpolicy to have encouraged the tribesmen to oppose the advance in theopen, on some well-defined position. Had they done so, there can be nodoubt that the two fine brigades, backed by a powerful artillery, andunder a victorious commander, who knew and had fought over every inch ofthe ground, would have defeated them with severe loss. Bajaur would havebeen settled at a single blow and probably at a far less cost in livesthan was afterwards incurred. Instead of this, it was the aim of ourdiplomacy to dissipate the opposition. The inflammation, which shouldhave been brought to a head and then operated on, was now dispersedthroughout the whole system, with what results future chapters willshow. 

Having thus brought the brigades peacefully to Gosham, I ask the readerto return to the Malakand and ride thence with the Headquarters Staffalong the line of march. On the 5th of September, Sir Bindon Blood andhis staff, which I had the pleasure to accompany, started from the KotalCamp and proceeded across the plain of Khar to Chakdara. Here we haltedfor the night, and as the scenery and situation of this picturesque forthave already been described, the march may be continued without delaynext morning. From Chakdara to Sarai is a stage of twelve miles. Theroad runs steadily up the valley until the summit of the Catgalla Passis reached. "Catgalla" means "Cut-throat, " and, indeed, it is not hardto believe that this gloomy defile has been the scene of dark and horriddeeds. Thence a descent of two miles leads to Sarai. On the way, we fellin with the 2nd Brigade, and had to leave the road to avoid the longlines of mules and marching men who toiled along it. 

The valley at Sarai is about two miles wide, and the mountains risesteeply from it. On every ridge it is possible to distinguish the redbrick ruins which were the dwellings of the ancient Buddhists. Theserelics of an early civilisation, long since overthrown and forgotten, cannot fail to excite interest and awaken reflection. They carry themind back to the times "when the smoke of sacrifice rose from thePantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavianamphitheatre. " And they also lead us to speculations of the future, tillwe wonder whether the traveller shall some day inspect, with unconcernedcomposure, the few scraps of stone and iron which may indicate theBritish occupation of India. Few, indeed, the remains would be--for webuild for immediate use, not future ostentation in these days, and ifwe should ever cease to be a force in the world, all traces of us wouldsoon be obliterated by time. Yet, perhaps, if that unborn critic ofremote posterity would remember that "in the days of the old British, "the rice crop had been more abundant, the number of acres undercultivation greater, the population larger and the death rate lower, than at any period in the history of India--we should not be without amonument more glorious than the pyramids. 

We camped with the 2nd Brigade on the night of the 6th, and nextmorning, while the stars were still shining, resumed the march. Fivemiles from Sarai the road dwindles to a mule track, and henceforward isnot fit for wheeled traffic. In spite of this, the 10th Field Batteryhad succeeded in getting their guns along it, and had brought themsafely to Panjkora. But soldiers will accomplish a good deal to getnearer the enemy. The scenery before the gorge of the river is reachedis gloomy, but grand. Great cliffs tower up precipitously on the furtherbank and the path is cut in the face of the rock. The river, which flowsswiftly by, plunges into a narrow cleft about a mile below the bridge, and disappears among the mountains. It abounds in fish, but is rapid anddangerous, and while the troops were encamped near it, two gunners losttheir lives by falling in, and being carried down. Indeed, watching thedead bodies of several camels being swept along, swirled around, and buffeted against the rocks, it was not hard to understand theseaccidents. 

At length, the bridge is reached. It is a frail structure, supportedon wire ropes. At each end are gates, flanked by little mud towers. Thebattery was established on a knoll to the right, and the long muzzles ofthe guns peered through stone embrasures at the opposite hills. It wasround the bases of these hills that much hard fighting took place in theChitral campaign. About half a mile beyond the bridge, I was shown theplace where the Guides had been so hard pressed, and for a whole nighthad had to stand at bay, their colonel killed, the bridge broken, andthe river in flood, against the tribesmen in overwhelming numbers. 

The field telegraph stopped at the bridge-head, and a small tent with ahalf-dozen military operators marked the breaking of the slender threadthat connected us, across thousands of miles of sea and land, withLondon. Henceforward a line of signal stations with their flickeringhelios would be the only links. We were at the end of the wire. I haveoften stood at the other and watched the tape machine click off the newsas it arrives; the movements of the troops; the prospects of action; thefighting; the casualties. How different are the scenes. The club onan autumn evening--its members grouped anxiously around, discussing, wondering, asserting; the noise of the traffic outside; the cigarettesmoke and electric lights within. And, only an hour away along thewire, the field, with the bright sunlight shining on the swirling muddywaters; the black forbidding rocks; the white tents of the brigade amile up the valley; the long streak of vivid green rice crop by theriver; and in the foreground the brown-clad armed men. I can never doubtwhich is the right end to be at. It is better to be making the news thantaking it; to be an actor rather than a critic. 

To cross the bridge, it was necessary to dismount and lead the horsesover in single file. Even then the swinging of the whole structure madeit difficult to walk. The passage of the transport under such conditionsoccupied all the day, and the unfortunate officers in charge of the muletrains were working incessantly. The staff passed quickly, however, andriding on about a mile forded the tributary stream of the Jandol, and reached the camp at Kotkai about noon. Thence we proceeded on thefollowing day to Ghosam, but as the road is uninteresting, and I ambeginning to think the reader will readily excuse further description, we need not toil along it in the dust and the heat. The narration of thedaily movements of troops, unmarked by variety of incident, is dull andwearying. Yet he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life onservice, must mentally share the fatigues of the march and the monotonyof the camp. The fine deeds, the thrilling moments of war, are but thehigh lights in a picture, of which the background is routine, hard work, and discomfort. 

At Ghosam the 2nd Brigade remained until joined by the 3rd and pendingnegotiations between the political officers and the tribal Jirgahs. 

The use of purely local terms in all writing is to be deprecated. Perhaps the reason that no popular history of India exists, is tobe found in the outlandish names of the characters, and the otherexpressions with which the pages are sprinkled. In this account I havezealously tried to avoid the ugly jargon of a degraded language, and tominimise the use of native names. The term just employed has, however, been so freely used in the newspapers recently, that it is perhaps aswell to explain its meaning. A Jirgah is a deputation of tribesmen. Itdoes not necessarily represent the tribe. It may present--and very oftendoes--a minority report. Occasionally it expresses the opinion only ofits own members. What has been settled one day is therefore very oftenoverruled the next. The Jirgah may accept terms of peace in the morning, and the camp may be rushed that night. These were, however, genuine, and spoke in the name and with the authority of the tribes. All day theykept arriving and squatting in rows before Major Deane's tent, to hearthe Government terms. The chief condition imposed, was the surrender ofrifles. A fixed number, based on calculation of wealth and population, was demanded from each clan. This method of punishment is peculiarlygalling to people whose life is so full of war. No other course was, however, open but submission, and, promising that the terms should becomplied with, the deputations departed. To stimulate their efforts andzeal in collecting their arms, the combined movements were delayed forthree days, and the forces remained encamped at Ghosam, near Manda. 

I avail myself of this halt to touch, albeit with no little trepidation, the tangled and obscure subject of tribal politics in Dir and Bajaur. All the people, incited by their priests, are bitterly hostile to theBritish Government, except those benefited by the subsidies paid. Theywere now anxious to fight, and were only restrained by a fear whichfury or fanaticism might at any moment overcome. Four principal khansexercise an authority which varies locally, from absolute dominion toa shadowy suzerainty, over the whole region. The Khan of Dir, the mostimportant, is a Government nominee. He is supported by the Britishinfluence, and is, as I have already noticed, entrusted with the raisingof Levies to protect and keep in repair the Chitral road. Forthese services he receives pay, and a certain allowance of arms andammunition. His own subjects are strongly opposed to his rule fromdislike of his British sympathies, and he only maintains himself by theassistance which the Government gives him in arms and money. In otherwords he is a puppet. 

The Khan of Nawagai is constrained by fear to display a friendlyattitude towards the Sirkar. His subjects resent this and his positionis insecure. He receives some moral support from the British agents, andas his people are uncertain how far the Government would go to upholdhim, and also as they partly realise his difficult position, they havehitherto submitted sullenly to his rule. 

The position and attitude of the Khan of Jar are similar, but he isa less influential chief. The fourth potentate, the Khan of Khar, isperhaps the most honest and trustworthy. He will appear in a laterchapter, and the reader will have the opportunity of judging of hischaracter from his conduct. Thus in these valleys, while the peopleare all hostile, their rulers find it expedient to preserve a friendlydemeanour to the British, and for this they are hated by their subjects. 

At this stage, the leader of the popular party claims attention. As isusual, he is out of office. After the Chitral expedition of 1895, UmraKhan was expelled from his territories, and escaped to Cabul. There hehas remained. The Amir is under an obligation to the British Governmentto prevent his raising trouble in Bajaur. If the Amir desired war hewould send Umra Khan back. This would create a strong faction throughoutthe whole country--but particularly in the Jandol, Salarzai and MamundValleys--hostile to the British and the friendly khans. The Amir hintedat this in a recent letter to the Government of India; and such a stepwould probably precede his declaration of war, or follow ours. TheAfghan sovereign is, however, well aware that he has at present nothingto gain, and many things to lose, by provoking a war with the greatpower which gave him his throne and has since increased his revenue bysubsidies. In the meanwhile, anxious to preserve his influence with theborder tribes, and to impress the Indian Government with the fact thathe could be a powerful foe, he keeps Umra Khan as a trump card, to beplayed when the occasion arises. That he may maintain his authority inBajaur, the exiled khan is well supplied with funds, with which to armand pay his retainers. 

The situation I have thus briefly described has been little altered bythe operations with which future chapters are concerned. The friendlykhans have been fortified in their allegiance and position by themilitary demonstration and by the severe punishment inflicted on thosetribes who resisted. On the other hand, the hostility of the people hasbeen not unnaturally increased by war, and one tribe in particular hasgained a reputation for courage, which will give them the power to causetrouble in the future. I shall not, however, anticipate the tale. 

CHAPTER IX: RECONNAISSANCE

While the infantry of both brigades remained halted at Ghosam, nearManda, the cavalry made daily reconnaissances in all directions. Sometimes the object in view was topographical, sometimes military, and at others diplomatic, or to use the Indian application of the term, "political. "

On the 10th, Major Deane visited the various chiefs in the JandulValley. I asked and obtained permission to accompany him. A change fromthe hot and dusty camp was agreeable to all who could be spared, andquite a party was formed, among whom were some whose names have occurredpreviously in these pages--Major Beatson, Major Hobday, and LordFincastle. A squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers acted as escort. 

The valley of the Jandul is about eight miles long and perhaps half asbroad. It opens out of the main valley, which extends from the Panjkorato Nawagai, and is on all other sides surrounded by high and precipitousmountains. The bed of the river, although at the time of our visitoccupied only by a small stream, is nearly half a mile broad andbordered by rice fields, to which the water is conducted by manyartfully contrived dykes and conduits. The plain itself is arid andsandy, but at the winter season yields a moderate crop. The presence ofwater below the surface is attested by numerous groves of chenar trees. 

This valley may, in natural and political features, be taken as typicalof the Afghan valleys. Seven separate castles formed the strongholds ofseven separate khans. Some of these potentates had been implicated inthe attack on the Malakand, and our visit to their fastnesses was notwholly of an amicable nature. They had all four days before beenbound by the most sacred oaths to fight to the death. The great tribalcombination had, however, broken up, and at the last moment they haddecided upon peace. But the Pathan does nothing by halves. No blacklooks, no sullen reserve, marred the geniality of their welcome. As weapproached the first fortified village the sovereign and his army rodeout to meet us, and with many protestations of fidelity, expressed hisjoy at our safe arrival. He was a fine-looking man and sat well on astamping roan stallion. His dress was imposing. A waistcoat of gorgeouscrimson, thickly covered with gold lace, displayed flowing sleeves ofwhite linen, buttoned at the wrist. Long, loose, baggy, linen trousers, also fastened above the ankle, and curiously pointed shoes clothed hisnether limbs. This striking costume was completed by a small skull-cap, richly embroidered, and an ornamental sabre. 

He sprang from his horse with grace and agility, to offer his sword toMajor Deane, who bade him mount and ride with him. The army, four orfive rascally-looking men on shaggy ponies, and armed with rifles ofwidely different patterns, followed at a distance. The fort was anenclosure about a hundred yards square. Its walls were perhaps twentyfeet high and built of rough stones plastered together with mud andinterspersed with courses of timber. All along the top was a rowof loopholes. At each corner a tall flanking tower enfiladed theapproaches. At the gate of this warlike residence some twenty or thirtytribesmen were gathered, headed by the khan's own cousin, an elderly mandressed in long white robes. All saluted us gravely. The escort closedup. A troop trotted off to the right out of the line fire of the fort. The advance scouts, passing round the walls, formed on the fartherside. These matters of detail complied with, conversation began. It wasconducted in Pushtu, and was naturally unintelligible to every one ofour party except the two political officers. Apparently Major Deanereproached the two chiefs for their conduct. He accused them of havingseized the bridge across the Panjkora and delivered the passage tothe fanatic crowds that had gathered to attack the Malakand. This theyadmitted readily enough. "Well, why not?" said they; "there was a goodfair fight. " Now they would make peace. They bore no malice, why shouldthe Sirkar?

It was not, however, possible to accept this sportsmanlike view of thesituation. They were asked where were the rifles they had been orderedto surrender. At this they looked blank. There were no rifles. Therenever had been any rifles. Let the soldiers search the fort and seefor themselves. The order was given; three or four sowars drew theircarbines, dismounted and entered the great and heavy gate, which hadbeen suspiciously opened a little way. 

The gate gave access to a small courtyard, commanded on every side by aninterior defence. In front was a large low room of uncertain dimensions:a kind of guard-house. It simply hummed with men. The outer walls werenearly five feet thick and would have resisted the fire of mountainguns. It was a strong place. 

The Lancers, accustomed to the operation of hunting for arms, hurriedlysearched the likely and usual places, but without success. One thing, however, they noticed, which they immediately reported. There were nowomen and children in the fort. This had a sinister aspect. Our visitwas unexpected and had taken them by surprise, but they were preparedfor all emergencies. They had hidden their rifles and cleared foraction. 

The two chiefs smiled in superior virtue. Of course there were norifles. But matters took, for them, an unexpected turn. They had norifles--said Major Deane--very well, they should come themselves. He turned to an officer of the Lancers; a section rode forward andsurrounded both men. Resistance was useless. Flight was impossible. They were prisoners. Yet they behaved with Oriental composure and calmlyaccepted the inevitable. They ordered their ponies and, mounting, rodebehind us under escort. 

We pursued our way up the valley. As we approached each fort, a khanand his retainers advanced and greeted us. Against these there was nodefinite charge, and the relations throughout were amicable. At thehead of the valley is Barwa, the home of the most powerful of theseprincelets. This fort had belonged to Umra Khan, and attested, bysuperiority of construction, the intellectual development of thatremarkable man. After the Chitral expedition it had been given bythe Government to its present owner, who, bitterly hated by the otherchieftains of the valley, his near relatives mostly, had no choice butloyalty to the British. He received us with courtesy and invited us toenter and see the fort. This, after taking all precautions and postingsentries, we did. It was the best specimen of Afghan architecture I haveseen. In this very fort Lieutenants Fowler and Edwards were confined in1895, when the prisoners of Umra Khan. The new chief showed their roomwhich opened on a balcony, whence a fine view of the whole valleycould be obtained. There are many worse places of durance. The fortis carefully defended and completely commands the various approaches. Judicious arrangements of loopholes and towers cover all dead ground. Inside the walls galleries of brushwood enabled the defenders to firewithout exposing themselves. In the middle is the keep, which, ifFortune were adverse, would be the last stronghold of the garrison. 

What a strange system of society is disclosed by all this! Here was thisman, his back against the mountains, maintaining himself against therest of the valley, against all his kin, with the fear of death and thechances of war ever in his mind, and holding his own, partly by forceof arms, partly by the support of the British agents, and partly throughthe incessant feuds of his adversaries. 

It is "all against all, " in these valleys. The two khans who hadbeen arrested would have fled to the hills. They knew they were to bepunished. Still they dared not leave their stronghold. A neighbour, arelation, a brother perhaps, would step into the unguarded keep andhold it for his own. Every stone of these forts is blood-stained withtreachery; each acre of ground the scene of a murder. In Barwa itself, Umra Khan slew his brother, not in hot anger or open war, but coldly anddeliberately from behind. Thus he obtained power, and the moralistmight observe with a shudder, that but for the "Forward Policy" he wouldprobably be in full enjoyment to-day. This Umra Khan was a man of muchtalent, a man intellectually a head and shoulders above his countrymen. He was a great man, which on the frontier means that he was a greatmurderer, and might have accomplished much with the quick-firing gunshe was negotiating for, and the troops he was drilling "on the Europeanmodel. " The career of this Afghan Napoleon was cut short, however, bythe intervention of Providence in the guise or disguise of the IndianGovernment. He might have been made use of. People who know the frontierwell, say that a strong man who has felt the grip of the British poweris the best tool to work with, and that if Umra Khan, humbled andoverawed, had been reinstated, he might have done much to maintain lawand order. As long as they fight, these Afghans do not mind much onwhich side they fight. There are worse men and worse allies helpingus to-day. The unpractical may wonder why we, a people who fill someconsiderable place in the world, should mix in the petty intrigues ofthese border chieftains, or soil our hands by using such tools at all. Is it fitting that Great Britain should play off one brutal khan againsthis neighbours, or balance one barbarous tribe against another? It isas much below our Imperial dignity, as it would be for a millionaire tocount the lumps in the sugar-basin. If it be necessary for the safety ofour possessions that these territories should be occupied, it wouldbe more agreeable to our self-respect that we should take them with astrong hand. It would be more dignified, but nothing costs more to keepup than dignity, and it is perhaps because we have always been guidedby sound commercial principles in this respect that we have attained ourpresent proud position. 

After looking round the fortress and admiring the skill and knowledgewith which it was built, we were conducted by the khan to the shade ofsome beautiful chenar trees, which grew near a little spring not farfrom the walls of the fort. Here were a number of charpoys, or nativebedsteads, very comfortable, but usually full of bugs, and on these wesat. 

Remembering Maizar, and many other incidents of frontier hospitality, sentries were posted on all the approaches and a sufficient guard keptunder arms. Then we had breakfast--a most excellent breakfast. 

The arrangements for the comfort and convenience of the troops of theFrontier Force are unequalled. They live more pleasantly and withless discomfort on active service than does a British regiment at theAldershot manoeuvres. Whether the march be long or short, peacefulor opposed, whether the action be successful or the reverse, theircommissariat never fails. In fact it is only just to say that they havealways lances and bullets for an enemy, and sandwiches and "pegs" for afriend. 

On this occasion, our provisions were supplemented by the hospitality ofthe khan. A long row of men appeared, each laden with food. Some carriedfruit, --pears or apples; others piles of chupatties, or dishes ofpillau. 

Nor were our troopers forgotten. The Mahommedans among them eagerlyaccepted the proffered food. But the Sikhs maintained a remorsefulsilence and declined it. They could not eat what had been prepared byMussulman hands, and so they sat gazing wistfully at the appetisingdishes, and contented themselves with a little fruit. 

Very austere and admirable they looked, almost painfully conscious oftheir superior virtue. But I could not help thinking that had we notbeen spectators the chenar trees might have witnessed the triumph ofreason over religious prejudice. 

During the heat of the day we rested in this pleasant grove, and withsleep and conversation passed the hours away, while the sentries pacingto and fro alone disturbed the illusion that this was some picnic partyin a more propitious land. Then, as the shadows lengthened, we startedupon our return to camp. 

On arriving, the political officers were pleased, and the soldiersdisappointed, to find that the tribesmen were determined to accept theGovernment terms. A hundred rifles from the Utman Khels had already beensurrendered, and now lay outside Major Deane's tent, surrounded by acrowd of officers, who were busily engaged in examining them. 

Opinion is divided, and practice has followed opinion as to whether, in a tale of travel or of war, it is preferable to intersperse thenarrative with conclusions and discussions, or to collect them all ina final chapter. I shall unhesitatingly embrace the former method. Thestory shall be told as it happened, and the reader's attention will bedirected to such considerations and reflections as arise by the way. Itwill therefore be convenient to make a digression into the questionof the supply of arms to the frontier tribes, while a hundred rifles, probably a representative hundred, are piled in the main street of thecamp at Ghosam. 

The perpetual state of intestine war, in which the border peoples live, naturally creates a keen demand for deadly weapons. A good Martini-Henryrifle will always command a price in these parts of Rs. 400 or about25 British pounds. As the actual value of such a rifle does not exceedRs. 50, it is evident that a very large margin of profit accrues to theenterprising trader. All along the frontier, and from far down intoIndia, rifles are stolen by expert and cunning thieves. One tribe, theUt Khels, who live in the Laghman Valley, have made the traffic in armstheir especial business. Their thieves are the most daring and theiragents the most cunning. Some of their methods are highly ingenious. Onestory is worth repeating. A coffin was presented for railway transport. The relatives of the deceased accompanied it. The dead man, they said, had desired to be buried across the frontier. The smell proclaimedthe corpse to be in an advanced state of decomposition. The railwayofficials afforded every facility for the passage of so unpleasant anobject. No one checked its progress. It was unapproachable. It was onlywhen coffin and mourners were safe across the frontier that the policewere informed that a dozen rifles had been concealed in the coffin, andthat the corpse was represented by a quarter of "well hung" beef!

I regret to have to state, that theft is not the only means by whichthe frontier tribes obtain weapons. Of a hundred rifles, which theUtman Khels had surrendered, nearly a third were condemned GovernmentMartinis, and displayed the Government stamp. Now no such riflesare supposed to exist. As soon as they are condemned, the arsenalauthorities are responsible that they are destroyed, and this is inevery case carried out under European supervision. The fact, thatsuch rifles are not destroyed and are found in the possession oftrans-frontier tribesmen, points to a very grave instance of dishonestand illegal traffic being carried on by some person connected with thearsenal. It need hardly be said that a searching inquiry was instituted. 

Another point connected with these rifles is that even when theyhave been officially destroyed, by cutting them in three pieces, thefractions have a marketable value. Several were shown me which had beenrejoined by the tribesmen. These were, of course, very dangerous weaponsindeed. The rest of the hundred had strange tales to tell. Two or threewere Russian military rifles, stolen probably from the distant posts inCentral Asia. One was a Snider, taken at Maiwand, and bearing the numberof the ill-fated regiment to which it had belonged. Some had come fromEurope, perhaps overland through Arabia and Persia; others from the armsfactory at Cabul. It was a strange instance of the tireless efforts ofSupply to meet Demand. 

The importance of the arms question cannot be exaggerated. Thelong-range rifle fire, which has characterised the great frontierwar, is a new feature. Hitherto our troops have had to face bold swordcharges but comparatively little firing. Against the former, modernweapons are effective. But no discipline and no efficiency can stopbullets hitting men. This is a small part of the question. In the matterof fighting, what is good enough for the tribesmen should be good enoughfor the soldier. A more serious consideration is raised than that ofcasualties, which are after all only the inseparable concomitant ofglory. Transport in mountainous countries depends entirely on mules andcamels. A great number are needed even to supply one brigade. At nightthese animals have to be packed closely in an entrenched camp. It is notpossible to find camping grounds in the valleys which are not commandedby some hill or assailable from some nullah. It is dangerous to put outpickets, as they may be "rushed" or, in the event of a severe attack, shot down, by the fire of their main body. [This applies to Swat andBajaur, where the sword charge is still to be apprehended. ] The resultis that the transport animals must be exposed to long-range fire atnight. The reader will observe, as the account proceeds, that on twooccasions a large number of transport mules were killed in thisway. When a certain number are killed, a brigade is as helpless as alocomotive without coal. It cannot move. Unless it be assisted it muststarve. Every year the tribesmen will become better marksmen, morecompletely armed with better rifles. If they recognise the policy ofcontinually firing at our animals, they may bring all operations to astandstill. And so by this road I reach the conclusion that whatever isto be done on the frontier, should be done as quickly as possible. Butto return to the story. 

The next day, the 11th of September, the troops remained halted atGhosam, and another squadron was ordered to escort the IntelligenceOfficer, Captain H. E. Stanton, D. S. O. , while making a topographicalreconnaissance of the passes into the Utman Khel country. Theopportunity of making fresh maps and of adding to and correcting thedetail of existing maps only occurs when troops are passing through thecountry, and must not be neglected. The route lay up the main valleywhich leads to Nawagei. We started early, but the way was long and thesun high before we reached the entrance of the pass. The landscape wasone of the strangest I shall ever see. On the opposite bank of the riverwere the dwellings of the Utman Khels, and in an area seven miles bythree, I counted forty-six separate castles, complete with moats, towersand turrets. The impression produced was extraordinary. It suggestedGrimm's fairy tales. It almost seemed as if we had left the naturalearth and strayed into some strange domain of fancy, the resort ofgiants or ogres. 

To reach the pass, we were compelled to traverse a large village, andas the situation in the narrow, winding streets was about as awkwardfor cavalry as could be imagined, every possible precaution was taken toguard against attack. At length the squadron passed safely through andformed up on the farther side. The steep ascent to the passes becamevisible. As there were two routes to be reconnoitered, the party wasdivided, and after a hasty breakfast we commenced the climb. For aconsiderable distance it was possible to ride. At every difficult turnof the track sowars were posted to secure the retreat, if it should benecessary to come back in a hurry. The head man of the village furnisheda guide, a cheery and amusing fellow, who professed much solicitude forour safety. But no reliance could be placed on these people, and on theopposite side of the valley numerous figures could be seen moving alongand keeping pace with our advancing party. At length the horses and thegreater part of the escort had to be abandoned. I accompanied CaptainStanton, and Captain Cole, who commanded the squadron and was alsoReuter's correspondent, with a couple of troopers to the top of thepass. The day was intensely hot, and the arduous climb excited a thirstwhich there was nothing to allay. At length we gained the summit, andstood on the Kotal. 

Far below us was a valley, into which perhaps no white man had lookedsince Alexander crossed the mountains on his march to India. Numerousvillages lay dotted about in its depths, while others nestled againstthe hills. Isolated forts were distinguishable, while large trees showedthere was no lack of water. It was a view that repaid the exertions ofthe climb, even if it did not quench the thirst they had excited. 

While Captain Stanton was making his sketch, --one of those usefulview-sketches, now taking the place of all others, in rapid cavalryreconnaissance, we amused our fancy by naming the drinks we shouldorder, were a nice, clean European waiter at hand to get them. I forgetwhat my selection was, but it was something very long and very cold. Alas! how far imagination lags behind reality. The vivid impressionswhich we conjured up--the deep glasses, and the clinking ice--did littleto dissipate the feelings of discomfort. 

Our guide meanwhile squatted on the ground and pronounced the names ofall the villages, as each one was pointed at. To make sure there was nomistake, the series of questions was repeated. This time he gave to eachan entirely different name with an appearance of great confidence andpride. However, one unpronounceable name is as good as another, and thevillages of the valley will go down to official history, christenedat the caprice of a peasant. But perhaps many records, now accepted asbeyond dispute, are derived from such a slender authority. 

The sketch finished, we commenced the descent and reached our horseswithout incident. The squadron concentrated near the village, and weheard that the other sketching party had met with more adventures thanhad fallen to our lot. 

It was commanded by Lieutenant Hesketh, a young officer, who wasseverely wounded at the storming of the Malakand Pass in 1895, and who, having again volunteered for active service, was attached to the 11thBengal Lancers. At the foot of the pass he dismounted his troop and, taking a few men with him, began the climb. The pass was occupied bytribesmen, who threatened to fire on the party if they advanced farther. The subaltern replied, that he only wished to see the country on theother side and did not intend to harm any one. At the same time hepursued his way and the tribesmen, not wishing to bring matters to acrisis, fell back slowly, repeatedly taking aim, but never daring tofire. He reached the top of the pass and Captain Walters, the AssistantIntelligence Officer, was able to make a most valuable sketch ofthe country beyond. It was a bold act and succeeded more through itsboldness than from any other cause; for, had the tribesmen once openedfire, very few of the party could have got down alive. Making a detourto avoid the village, which it was undesirable to traverse a secondtime, the squadron returned and arrived at the camp at Ghosam as the sunwas setting. 

The service camp of an Anglo-Indian brigade is arranged on regularprinciples. The infantry and guns are extended in the form of a square. The animals and cavalry are placed inside. In the middle is the camp ofthe Headquarters staff, with the tent of the brigadier facing that ofthe general commanding the division. All around the perimeter a parapetis built, varying in height according to the proximity and activity ofthe enemy. This parapet not only affords cover from random shots, butalso makes a line for the men to form on in case of a sudden attack. Behind it the infantry lie down to sleep, a section of each company, asan inlying picket, dressed and accoutred. Their rifles are often laidalong the low wall with the bayonets ready fixed. If cavalry have to beused in holding part of the defences, their lances can be arranged inthe same way. Sentries every twenty-five yards surround the camp with aline of watchers. 

To view the scene by moonlight is alone an experience which wouldrepay much travelling. The fires have sunk to red, glowing specks. Thebayonets glisten in a regular line of blue-white points. The silence ofweariness is broken by the incessant and uneasy shuffling of the animalsand the occasional neighing of the horses. All the valley is plunged ingloom and the mountains rise high and black around. Far up their sides, the twinkling watch-fires of the tribesmen can be seen. Overhead is thestarry sky, bathed in the pale radiance of the moon. It is a spectaclethat may inspire the philosopher no less than the artist. The camp isfull of subdued noises. Here is no place for reflection, for quiet orsolemn thought. The day may have been an exciting one. The morrow maybring an action. Some may be killed, but in war-time life is only livedin the present. It is sufficient to be tired and to have time to rest, and the camp, if all the various items that compose it can be said tohave a personality, shrugs its shoulders and, regarding the past withoutregret, contemplates the future without alarm. 

CHAPTER X: THE MARCH TO NAWAGAI

After considering such maps and information as to the nature of thecountry as were available, Sir Bindon Blood decided to enter theterritories of the Mohmands by two routes. (1) The 3rd Brigade throughthe pass of Nawagai. (2) The 2nd Brigade over the Rambat Pass. Thiswould sweep the country more thoroughly, and afford increased facilitiesfor drawing supplies. As the 3rd Brigade had a greater distance tocover, it passed in front of the 2nd, and on the 12th of September, bya march of twelve miles, reached Shumshuk. The 2nd Brigade, which hadhitherto been leading, moved by an easy stage of seven miles to Jar, andthere camped within supporting distance. 

The Headquarters staff was now transferred to the 3rd Brigade andmarched with them. The road lay for the first five or six miles over theground, which the cavalry had reconnoitered the day before. Again allwere struck by the great array of castles on the Utman Khel side of thevalley. Many eager spirits would have liked to stop and blow up some ofthese fine places. But the Government terms had been complied with andthe columns moved slowly by, eyeing the forts, which were covered withthe white and blue clad figures of their defenders, with a sour disdain. 

After riding for a couple of hours, the staff halted for breakfast undera shady tree by the banks of a clear and rapid stream. 

Two hundred yards away we observed a large flight of teal sitting tamelyon the water. Every one became interested. Rifles there were in plenty;but where could a gun be found? Rigorous and hasty search was made. Thepolitical officer of the force, Mr. Davis, being consulted, eventuallyproduced a friendly khan, who was the owner of a shot gun. After furtherdelay this weapon was brought. The teal still floated unconcernedly onthe water. A gun awakened no sense of danger. Shots in plenty theyhad heard in the valley, but they were not usually fired at birds. Theexciting moment now arrived. Who should shoot? The responsibility wasgreat. Many refused. At length Veterinary-Captain Mann, who was woundeda few days later at Nawagai, volunteered. He took the gun and began apainful stalk. He crawled along cautiously. We watched with suppressedemotion. Suddenly two shots rang out. They were to be the first of many. The men in the marching column 200 yards away became wide awake. Theteal rose hurriedly and flew away, but four remained behind, killed orwounded. These birds we picked up with a satisfaction which was fullyjustified by their excellence that night at dinner. 

Another mile or so brought us to the Watelai River, a stream aboutthirty yards broad, which flows into the Jandul, and thence into thePanjkora. Crossing this and climbing the opposite bank, the troopsdebouched on to the wide level plateau of Khar, perhaps ten miles acrossand sixteen in length. Standing on the high ground, the great dimensionsof the valley were displayed. Looking westward it was possible to seethe hills behind the Panjkora, the sites of the former camps, andthe entrance of the subsidiary valley of the Jandul. In front, atthe further end, an opening in the mountain range showed the pass ofNawagai. Towering on the left was the great mass of the Koh-i-mohr, or"Mountain of Peacocks"--a splendid peak, some 8000 feet high, the top ofwhich is visible from both Peshawar and Malakand. Its name is possiblya corruption. Arrian calls it Mount Meros. At its base the city of Nysastood in former times, and among many others fell before the arms ofAlexander. Its inhabitants, in begging for peace, boasted that theyconducted their government "with constitutional order, " and that "ivy, which did not grow in the rest of India, grew among them. " City, ivy, and constitutional order have alike disappeared. The mountain aloneremains. A little to the northward the Ramlat Pass was distinguishable. On the right the smooth plain appeared to flow into the hill country, and a wide bay in the mountains, roughly circular in shape and nearlytwelve miles across, opened out of the valley. The prominent spurs whichran from the hills formed many dark ravines and deep hollows, as it weregulfs and inlets of the sea. The entrance was perhaps a mile broad. Iremember that, when I first looked into the valley, the black cloudsof a passing storm hung gloomily over all, and filled it with a hazyhalf-light that contrasted with the brilliant sunshine outside. It wasthe Watelai, or as we got to call it later--the Mamund Valley. 

The Khan of Khar met the general on the farther bank of the river. Hewas a tall, fine-looking man with bright eyes, bushy black whiskers andwhite teeth, which his frequent smiles displayed. He was richly dressed, attended by a dozen horsemen and mounted on a handsome, though viciousdun horse. He saluted Sir Bindon Blood with great respect and ceremony. Some conversation took place, conducted, as the khan only spoke Pushtu, through the political officer. The khan asserted his loyalty and thatof his neighbour the Khan of Jar. He would, he said, do his utmost tosecure the peaceful passage of the troops. Such supplies as they mightneed, he would provide, as far as his resources would go. He looked withsome alarm at the long lines of marching men and animals. The generalreassured him. If the forces were not interfered with or opposed, if thecamps were not fired into at night, if stragglers were not cut off andcut up by his people, payment in cash would be made for all the grainand wood it was necessary to requisition. 

The khan accepted this promise with gratitude and relief, and henceforthduring the operations which took place at Nawagai and in the MamundValley, he preserved a loyal and honourable behaviour. To the best ofhis power he restrained his young bloods. As much as he was able, heused his influence to discourage the other tribes from joining therevolt. Every night his pickets watched our camps, and much good sleepwas obtained by weary men in consequence. At the end of the fighting hewas the intermediary between the Government and the Mamund tribesmen. And on one occasion he rendered a signal service, though one whichshould hardly have been entrusted to him, by escorting with his ownretainers an ammunition convoy to the 2nd Brigade, when troops andcartridges were alike few and sorely needed. Had he proved treacherousin this instance the consequences might have been most grave. Throughout, however, he kept his word with the general, and that in theface of opposition from his own people, and threats of vengeance fromhis neighbours. 

He on his part will not complain of British good faith. Although thefighting was continued in the district for nearly a month, not one ofhis villages was burnt, while all damage done to his crops was liberallycompensated. He was guaranteed against reprisals, and at the end of theoperations the gift of a considerable sum of money proved to him thatthe Sirkar could reward its friends, as well as punish its enemies. 

The camel transport of the 3rd Brigade lagged on the road, and thetroops, tired after their long march, had to wait in the blazing sun fora couple of hours without shelter until the baggage came up. At lengthit arrived, and we proceeded to camp as far as is possible withouttents. Shelters were improvised from blankets, from waterproof sheetssupported on sticks, or from the green boughs of some adjacent trees. Beneath these scanty coverings the soldiers lay, and waited for theevening. 

Every one has read of the sufferings of the British troops in having tocampaign in the hot weather during the Indian Mutiny. September in thesevalleys is as hot as it is easy to imagine or elegant to describe, andthe exposure to the sun tells severely on the British battalions, asthe hospital returns show. Of course, since Mutiny days, many salutarychanges have been made in the dress and equipment of the soldier. Thesmall cap with its insufficient puggaree is replaced by the pith helmet, the shade of which is increased by a long quilted covering. The highstock and thick, tight uniforms are gone, and a cool and comfortablekhaki kit has been substituted. A spine protector covers the back, andin other ways rational improvements have been effected. But the sunremains unchanged, and all precautions only minimise, without preventingthe evils. 

Slowly the hours pass away. The heat is intense. The air glitters overthe scorched plain, as over the funnel of an engine. The wind blows witha fierce warmth, and instead of bringing relief, raises only whirlingdust devils, which scatter the shelters and half-choke their occupants. The water is tepid, and fails to quench the thirst. At last the shadowsbegin to lengthen, as the sun sinks towards the western mountains. Every one revives. Even the animals seem to share the general feeling ofrelief. The camp turns out to see the sunset and enjoy the twilight. Thefeelings of savage hatred against the orb of day fade from our minds, and we strive to forget that he will be ready at five o'clock nextmorning to begin the torment over again. 

As there were still several days to spare before the Malakand FieldForce was due to enter the Mohmand country, Sir Bindon Blood orderedboth brigades to remain halted on the 13th: the 3rd Brigade at Shumshuk;the 2nd at Jar. Meanwhile two reconnaissances were to be sent, one tothe summit of the Rambat Pass, and the other up the Watelai Valley. 

The night of the 12th was the first occasion of "sniping, " since theadvance against the Mohmands had begun. About half a dozen shots werefired into camp, without other result than to disturb light sleepers. Still it marked a beginning. 

The reconnaissances started next morning. The general accompanied theone to the Rambat pass, to satisfy himself as to the nature of theunexplored country on the other side. Two companies of infantry wereordered to clear the way, and two others remained in support half-wayup the pass. Sir Bindon Blood started at six o'clock accompanied byhis escort, whose gay pennons combined, with the Union Jack of theHeadquarters staff, to add a dash of colour to the scene. After ridingfor a couple of miles we caught up the infantry and had to halt, to letthem get on ahead and work through the broken ground and scrub. A milefurther it was necessary to dismount and proceed on foot. No oppositionwas encountered, though the attitude and demeanour of the natives wasmost unfriendly. The younger ones retired to the hills. The elderstayed to scowl at, and even curse us. The village cemetery was fullof property of all kinds, beds, pitchers, and bags of grain, whichthe inhabitants had deposited there under the double delusion, that wewanted to plunder, and that in so sacred a spot it would be safe--weresuch our intention. In spite of their black looks, they were eventuallyall made to stand up and salute respectfully. 

The climb was a stiff one and took at least an hour. But the track waseverywhere passable, or capable of easily being made passable for mules. The general, trained and hardened by years of shooting of all kinds inthe jungles, arrived at the top first, followed by Brigadier-GeneralWodehouse, and a panting staff. A fine view of the Ambasar Valley wasdisplayed. It was of arid aspect. Villages in plenty could be seen, but no sign of water. This was serious, as information as to wells wasunreliable, and it was desirable to see some tanks and streams, beforeallowing a column to plunge into the unknown dangers of the valley. After some consideration Sir Bindon Blood decided to modify the originalplan and send only two battalions of the 2nd Brigade with one squadronover the pass, while the rest were to march to join him at Nawagai. Wethen returned, reaching camp in time for luncheon. 

Meanwhile the reconnaissance up the Watelai or Mamund Valley had beenof a more interesting nature. Two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major Beatson, and with Mr. Davis, the political officer, weresent to put some pressure on the Mamunds, to make them carry out theterms agreed upon. They had promised to surrender fifty rifles. Thisthey now showed no intention of doing. They had realised, that thebrigades were only marching through the country, and that they had notime to stop, and they were determined to keep their arms as long aspossible. 

As the cavalry approached the first village, about 300 men gatheredand, displaying standards, called on the Lancers to stop. An altercationensued. They were given half an hour to remove their women and children. Then the squadrons advanced. The tribesmen, still menacing, retiredslowly towards the hills. Then a small party came up and informed MajorBeatson, that in the next village was a troop-horse, which had beencaptured in the fighting in the Swat Valley. This admission, thatthe Mamunds had been implicated in the attack on the Malakand, wassufficiently naive. The cavalry rode on to the village. The horse wasnot to be found, but the officious informers from the first villageeagerly pointed out where it had been stabled. In consequence of thisinformation, and to stimulate the tribesmen to carry out the originalterms, Mr. Davis decided to make an example and authorised Major Beatsonto destroy the house of the owner of the stolen property. This wasaccordingly done. As soon as the smoke began to rise, the tribesmen, whohad waited, half a mile away, opened a dropping fire from Martini-Henryrifles on the cavalry. These, not wishing to engage, retired at a trot. They were followed up, but though the fire was well directed, the rangewas too great for accurate shooting and the bullets whizzed harmlesslyoverhead. 

As the Lancers left the valley, an incident occurred which illustrateswhat has been said in an earlier chapter, and is characteristic of thedaily life of the natives. The people of the first village had directedthe attention of the cavalry to the second. Part of the second had beenin consequence burnt. The inhabitants of both turned out to discuss thematter with rifles and, when last seen that night, were engaged ina lively skirmish. Apparently, however, they soon forgot theirdifferences. 

The rumour that the cavalry had been fired on preceded them to camp, and the prospects of some opposition were everywhere hailed withsatisfaction. Many had begun to think that the Mohmand expedition wasgoing to be a mere parade, and that the tribesmen were overawed by thepowerful forces employed. They were soon to be undeceived. I watched thesquadrons return. Behind them the Mamund Valley was already dark withthe shadows of the evening and the heavy clouds that had hung over itall day. They were vastly pleased with themselves. Nothing in life isso exhilarating as to be shot at without result. The sowars sat theirhorses with conscious pride. Some of the younger officers still showedthe flush of excitement on their cheeks. But they pretended excellentlywell to have forgotten all about the matter. They believed a few fellowshad "sniped" at them; that was all. 

But it was by no means all. Whatever is the Afhgan equivalent of the"Fiery Cross" was circulated among the tribes. There was no time forthem to gather to attack that night, and the situation of the camp inthe open was unsuited to night firing. The other brigade was coming. They would wait. They therefore contented themselves with firingoccasional shots, beginning while we were at dinner, and continuing atintervals until daylight. No one was hurt, but we may imagine that thetribesmen, who spent the night prowling about the nullahs, and firingfrom time to time, returned to their countrymen next morning boastingof what they had done. "Alone, while ye all slumbered and slept, inthe night, in the darkness, I, even I, have attacked the camp of theaccursed ones and have slain a Sahib. Is it not so, my brothers?"Whereupon the brothers, hoping he would some day corroborate a lie forthem, replied, that it was undoubtedly so, and that he had deserved wellof the tribe. Such is the reward of the "sniper. "

Early next morning the 3rd Brigade and three squadrons of the 11thBengal Lancers moved on to Nawagai and crossed the pass withoutopposition. The general and Headquarters staff accompanied them, and wefound ourselves in a wide and extensive valley, on the far side of whichthe Bedmanai Pass could be plainly seen. Here, at last, we got definiteinformation of the Mohmands' intentions. The Hadda Mullah with 1000tribesmen had gathered to oppose the further advance. After all therewould be a fight. In the evening Sir Bindon Blood, taking a squadronof cavalry, rode out to reconnoitre the approaches to the pass and thegeneral configuration of the ground. On his return he sent a despatchto the Government of India, that he would force it on the 18th. Thesoldiers, especially the British troops, who had not yet been engaged, eagerly looked forward to the approaching action. But events weredestined to a different course. 

It was already dusk when we returned from the reconnaissance. Theevening was pleasant and we dined in the open air. Still the valley wasvery dark. The mountains showed a velvet black. Presently the moon rose. I repress the inclination to try to describe the beauty of the scene, as the valley was swiftly flooded with that mysterious light. Allthe suitable words have probably been employed many times by numerouswriters and skipped by countless readers. Indeed I am inclined to think, that these elaborate descriptions convey little to those who have notseen, and are unnecessary to those who have. Nature will not be admiredby proxy. In times of war, however, especially of frontier war, theimportance of the moon is brought home to everybody. "What time does itrise to-night?" is the question that recurs; for other things--attacks, "sniping, " rushes, --besides the tides are influenced by its movements. 

Meanwhile, as at Nawagai, at a peaceful camp and a quiet dinner wewatched the "silvery maiden" swiftly appear over the eastern mountains. She was gazing on a different scene eleven miles away, in the valley wehad left. 

The 2nd Brigade had marched that morning from Jar to the foot ofthe Rambat Pass, which it was intended to cross the next day. Brigadier-General Jefferys, in anticipation of this movement, sent theBuffs up to hold the Kotal, and camped at the foot with the rest of hisforce. The situation of the camp, which had been adopted with a view tothe advance at daybreak, favored the approach of an enemy. The groundwas broken and intersected by numerous small and tortuous nullahs, andstrewn with rocks. Any other site would, however, have necessitated along march the next day, and no attack was thought likely. 

At 8. 15, as the officers were finishing dinner, three shots rang out inthe silence. They were a signal. Instantly brisk firing broke out fromthe nullahs on the face of the square occupied by the Guides Infantry. Bullets whistled all about the camp, ripping through the tents andkilling and wounding the animals. 

The Guides returned the fire with steadiness, and, as the shelter trenchthey had dug in front of their section of the line was higher than atother parts, no officers or men were hit. At ten o'clock a bugler amongthe enemy sounded the "Retire, " and the fire dwindled to a few droppingshots. All were congratulating themselves on a termination of the event, when at 10. 30 the attack was renewed with vigour on the opposite side ofthe camp, occupied by the 38th Dogras. The enemy, who were largely armedwith Martini-Henry rifles, crept up to within 100 yards of the trenches. These were only about eighteen inches high, but afforded sufficientcover to the soldiers. The officers, with a splendid disregard of thedanger, exposed themselves freely. Walking coolly up and down in thebrilliant moonlight they were excellent targets. The brigadier proceededhimself to the threatened side of the camp, to control the firing andprevent the waste of ammunition. A good many thousand rounds were, however, fired away without much result. Several star shells were alsofired by the battery. The ground was so broken that they revealed verylittle, but the tribesmen were alarmed by the smell they made, thinkingit a poisonous gas. The officers were directed to take cover, but thenecessity of sending messages and regulating the fire involved a greatdeal of exposure. And to all who showed above the trench the danger wasgreat. Captain Tomkins of the 38th Dogras was shot through the heart, and a few minutes later the adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Bailey, was also killed. In assisting to take these officers to the hospital, where a rough shelter of boxes had been improvised, LieutenantHarington, an officer attached to the Dogras, received a bullet in theback of the head, which penetrated his brain and inflicted injuries fromwhich he died subsequently. All tents were struck and as much cover ascould be made from grain-bags and biscuit-boxes was arranged. At 2. 15the firing ceased and the enemy drew off, taking their killed andwounded with them. They had no mind to be surprised by daylight, awayfrom their hills. But they had already remained a little too long. 

As soon as the light allowed, the cavalry squadron under Captain Colestarted in pursuit. After a long gallop down the valley, he caught oneparty making for the mountains. Charging immediately, he succeeded inspearing twenty-one of these before they could reach the rocks. Thesquadron then dismounted and opened fire with their carbines. But thetribesmen turned at once and made a dash in the direction of theled horses. A sowar was wounded and a couple of horses killed. Thecavalrymen, threatened in a vital point, ran hurriedly back, and justgot into their saddles in time. In the haste of mounting four horses gotloose and galloped away, leaving six dismounted men. Captain Cole placedone of them before him on the saddle, and the troopers followed hisexample. The squadron thus encumbered, retired, and after getting out ofrange, succeeded in catching their loose horses again. The enemy, seeingthe cavalry mounted once more, took refuge on the hills. But it wasevident, they were eager for fighting. 

The casualties in the night attack of Markhanai were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Killed--Capt. W. E. Tomkins, 38th Dogras. " Lieut. A. W. Bailey, 38th Dogras. Died of wounds--Lieut. H. A. Harington, attd. 38th Dogras. 

 NATIVE OFFICER. Wounded. .. .. .. .. 1

 NATIVE SOLDIERS. Killed. Wounded. No. 8 Mountain Battery. .. . 1 1 35th Sikhs. .. .. .. 1 3 38th Dogras. .. .. .. 1 0 Guides Infantry. .. .. . 0 1 Followers. .. .. .. 2 2 Total Casualties, 16; and 98 horses and mules. 

Meanwhile, the 3rd Brigade had passed a tranquil night at Nawagai. Nextmorning, however, at about six o'clock, a message was heliographed fromthe Buffs on the Rambat Pass, to the effect that an attack had been madeon General Jeffreys' camp; that heavy firing had continued all night, and that several officers were among the casualties. This news set everyone agog. While we were breakfasting, a native officer and ten sowars ofthe 11th Bengal Lancers arrived at speed with full details: six hours'fighting with the Mamunds: three officers killed or mortally wounded;and nearly a hundred animals hit. In consequence of this information, Sir Bindon Blood cancelled the orders for the passage of the RambatPass and instructed General Jeffreys to enter the Mamund Valley andthoroughly chastise the tribesmen. 

I was allowed to go back with the native officer's escort to the 2ndBrigade, in order to witness the operations which had been ordered. Judiciously selecting a few things, which could be carried on thesaddle, of which the most important were a cloak, some chocolate and atooth-brush, I hurried after the escort, who had already started, andovertook them just as they had got through the pass of Nawagai. 

For the first six miles the road lay through a network of deep ravines, through which the troopers picked their way very carefully. It wouldhave been a bad place for a small party to have been attacked in, butfortunately, though several armed tribesmen were seen, they did not fireat us. At one point the route lay through a deep nullah, along whichsome of the assailants of the night before had retired. These wereprobably from the Charmanga Valley. They had evidently suffered losses. Several native beds on which wounded men had been carried lay scatteredabout. At this place they had probably found some oxen, to which theyhad transferred their bodies. At length we got clear of the difficultground, and entering the smooth plain of Nawagai looked out eagerly forthe brigade. Seven miles away across the valley was a long brown streak. It was the troops marching from Markhanai to the entrance of the MamundValley. The smoke of five burning villages rose in a tall column intothe air--blue against the mountains, brown against the sky. An hour'sriding brought us to the brigade. Every one was full of the events ofthe night, and all looked worn from having had no sleep. "You were verylucky to be out of it, " they said. "There's plenty more coming. "

The cavalry soon returned from their pursuit. The points of their lanceswere covered with dark smears. A sowar displayed his weapon proudly tosome Sikhs, who grinned in appreciation. "How many?" was the questionasked on all sides. "Twenty-one, " replied the officer. "But they're fullof fight. "

Orders were now issued for the brigade to camp on the open ground nearInayat Kila, which, translated, means Fort Grant, and is the name of aconsiderable stone stronghold belonging to the Khan of Khar. Althoughthe troops were very tired from their march, and the fighting of thepreceding night, they began entrenching with alacrity. Besides makingan outer wall to the camp, about three and a half feet high, everybodyscratched a little hole for himself. In these occupations the afternoonpassed. 

The Buffs came in at sunset, having marched from the top of the RambatPass. They had heard the firing of the night and were disappointed athaving been absent. It was "just their luck, " they said. During theChitral campaign of 1895, they had had the ill-fortune to miss everyengagement. It would be the same now. All tried to reassure them. Assoon as it was dark an attack was probable. 

A dropping fire began after dinner from the great nullah to the northof the camp, and all lights were put out and the tents struck. Every oneretired to the soup-plate he had scooped in the earth. But no attackwas made. The enemy had informed the political officer through thefriendlies, that they were weary and would rest that night. They senta few "snipers" to fire into the camp, and these kept up a desultoryfusillade until about two o'clock, when they drew off. 

Those who had been deprived of their rest the night before soon droppedoff to sleep, in spite of the firing. Others, not overpowered byweariness, found no occupation but to lie in their holes and contemplatethe stars--those impartial stars which shine as calmly on PiccadillyCircus as on Inayat Kila. 

CHAPTER XI: THE ACTION OF THE MAMUND VALLEY, 16TH SEPTEMBER

 Sound as of bugle in camp, how it rings through the chill air of morning, Bidding the soldier arise, he must wake and be armed ere the light. Firm be your faith and your feet, when the sun's burning rays shall be o'er you. When the rifles are ranging in line, and the clear note of battle is blown. 

 "A Sermon in Lower Bengal, " SIR A. LYALL. 

The story has now reached a point which I cannot help regarding as itsclimax. The action of the Mamund Valley is recalled to me by so manyvivid incidents and enduring memories, that it assumes an importancewhich is perhaps beyond its true historic proportions. Throughoutthe reader must make allowances for what I have called the personalperspective. Throughout he must remember, how small is the scale ofoperations. The panorama is not filled with masses of troops. He willnot hear the thunder of a hundred guns. No cavalry brigades whirl bywith flashing swords. No infantry divisions are applied at criticalpoints. The looker-on will see only the hillside, and may, if he watcheswith care, distinguish a few brown clad men moving slowly about it, dwarfed almost to invisibility by the size of the landscape. I hope totake him close enough, to see what these men are doing and suffering;what their conduct is and what their fortunes are. But I would ask himto observe that, in what is written, I rigidly adhere to my role of aspectator. If by any phrase or sentence I am found to depart from this, I shall submit to whatever evil things the ingenuity of malice maysuggest. 

On the morning of the 16th, in pursuance of Sir Bindon Blood's orders, Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved out of his entrenched camp at InayatKila, and entered the Mamund Valley. His intentions were, to chastisethe tribesmen by burning and blowing up all defensible villages withinreach of the troops. It was hoped, that this might be accomplished in asingle day, and that the brigade, having asserted its strength, would beable to march on the 17th to Nawagai and take part in the attack on theBedmanai Pass, which had been fixed for the 18th. Events proved thishope to be vain, but it must be remembered, that up to this time noserious opposition had been offered by the tribesmen to the columns, and that no news of any gathering had been reported to the general. The valley appeared deserted. The villages looked insignificant anddefenceless. It was everywhere asserted that the enemy would not stand. 

Reveille sounded at half-past five, and at six o'clock the brigademarched out. In order to deal with the whole valley at once, the forcewas divided into three columns, to which were assigned the followingtasks:--

I. The right column, under Lieut. -Col. Vivian, consisting of the 38thDogras and some sappers, was ordered to attack the village of Domodoloh. II. The centre column, under Colonel Goldney, consisting of sixcompanies Buffs, six companies 35th Sikhs, a half-company sappers, four guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery and the squadron of the 11th BengalLancers, was ordered to proceed to the head of the valley, and destroythe villages of Badelai and Shahi-Tangi (pronounced Shytungy). III. Theleft column, under Major Campbell, consisting of five companies of theGuides Infantry, and some sappers, was directed against several villagesat the western end of the valley. 

Two guns and two companies from each battalion were left to protectthe camp, and a third company of the Guides was detached to protect thesurvey party. This reduced the strength of the infantry in the field totwenty-three companies, or slightly over 1200 men. Deducting the 300 menof the 38th Dogras who were not engaged, the total force employed in theaction was about 1000 men of all arms. 

It will be convenient to deal with the fortunes of the right columnfirst. Lieut. -Colonel Vivian, after a march of six miles, arrived beforethe village of Domodoloh at about 9 A. M. He found it strongly held bythe enemy, whose aspect was so formidable, that he did not considerhimself strong enough to attack without artillery and supports, and withprudence returned to camp, which he reached about 4 P. M. Two men werewounded by long-range fire. 

The centre column advanced covered by Captain Cole's squadron ofLancers, to which I attached myself. At about seven o'clock we observedthe enemy on a conical hill on the northern slopes of the valley. Through the telescope, an instrument often far more useful to cavalrythan field-glasses, it was possible to distinguish their figures. Longlines of men clad in blue or white, each with his weapon upright besidehim, were squatting on the terraces. Information was immediately sentback to Colonel Goldney. The infantry, eager for action, hurried theirmarch. The cavalry advanced to within 1000 yards of the hills. For sometime the tribesmen sat and watched the gradual deployment of the troops, which was developing in the plain below them. Then, as the guns andinfantry approached, they turned and began slowly to climb the face ofthe mountain. 

In hopes of delaying them or inducing them to fight, the cavalry nowtrotted to within closer range, and dismounting, opened fire at 7. 30precisely. It was immediately returned. From high up the hillside, fromthe cornfields at the base, and from the towers of the villages, littlepuffs of smoke darted. The skirmish continued for an hour without muchdamage to either side, as the enemy were well covered by the brokenground and the soldiers by the gravestones and trees of a cemetery. Thenthe infantry began to arrive. The Buffs had been detached from ColonelGoldney's column and were moving against the village of Badelai. The35th Sikhs proceeded towards the long ridge, round the corner ofwhich Shahi-Tangi stands. As they crossed our front slowly--and ratherwearily, for they were fatigued by the rapid marching--the cavalrymounted and rode off in quest of more congenial work with thecavalryman's weapon--the lance. I followed the fortunes of the Sikhs. Very little opposition was encountered. A few daring sharpshooters firedat the leading companies from the high corn. Others fired long-rangeshots from the mountains. Neither caused any loss. Colonel Goldney nowordered one and a half companies, under Captain Ryder, to clear theconical hill, and protect the right of the regiment from the fire--fromthe mountains. These men, about seventy-five in number, began climbingthe steep slope; nor did I see them again till much later in the day. The remaining four and a half companies continued to advance. The linelay through high crops on terraces, rising one above the other. Thetroops toiled up these, clearing the enemy out of a few towers theytried to hold. Half a company was left with the dressing station nearthe cemetery, and two more were posted as supports at the bottom of thehills. The other two commenced the ascent of the long spur which leadsto Shahi-Tangi. 

It is impossible to realise without seeing, how very slowly troops moveon hillsides. It was eleven o'clock before the village was reached. The enemy fell back "sniping, " and doing hardly any damage. Everybodycondemned their pusillanimity in making off without a fight. Part of thevillage and some stacks of bhoosa, a kind of chopped straw, were set onfire, and the two companies prepared to return to camp. 

But at about eight the cavalry patrols had reported the enemy in greatstrength at the northwest end of the valley. In consequence of thisBrigadier-General Jeffreys ordered the Guides Infantry to join the maincolumn. [Copy of message showing the time:--"To Officer, CommandingGuides Infantry. --Despatched 8. 15 A. M. Received 8. 57 A. M. Enemycollecting at Kanra; come up at once on Colonel Goldney's left. C. Powell, Major, D. A. Q. M. G. "] Major Campbell at once collected his men, who were engaged in foraging, and hurried towards Colonel Goldney'sforce. After a march of five miles, he came in contact with the enemyin strength on his left front, and firing at once became heavy. Atthe sound of the musketry the Buffs were recalled from the village ofBadelai and also marched to support the 35th Sikhs. 

While both these regiments were hurrying to the scene, the sound of loudfiring first made us realise that our position at the head of the spurnear Shahi-Tangi was one of increasing danger. The pressure on the leftthreatened the line of retreat, and no supports were available within amile. A retirement was at once ordered. Up to this moment hardly any ofthe tribesmen had been seen. It appeared as if the retirement of thetwo companies was the signal for their attack. I am inclined to think, however, that this was part of the general advance of the enemy, andthat even had no retirement been ordered the advanced companies wouldhave been assailed. In any case the aspect of affairs immediatelychanged. From far up the hillsides men came running swiftly down, dropping from ledge to ledge, and dodging from rock to rock. Thefiring increased on every hand. Half a company was left to cover thewithdrawal. The Sikhs made excellent practice on the advancing enemy, who approached by twos and threes, making little rushes from one patchof cover to another. At length a considerable number had accumulatedbehind some rocks about a hundred yards away. The firing now becameheavy and the half-company, finding its flank threatened, fell back tothe next position. 

A digression is necessary to explain the peculiar configuration of theground. 

The spur, at the top of which the village stands, consists of threerocky knolls, each one higher than the other, as the main hill isapproached. These are connected by open necks of ground, which arecommanded by fire from both flanks. In section the ground resembles aswitchback railway. 

The first of these knolls was evacuated without loss, and the open spaceto the next quickly traversed. I think a couple of men fell here, andwere safely carried away. The second knoll was commanded by the first, on to which the enemy climbed, and from which they began firing. Againthe companies retired. Lieutenant Cassells remained behind with abouteight men, to hold the knoll until the rest had crossed the open space. As soon as they were clear they shouted to him to retire. He gave theorder. 

Till this time the skirmishing of the morning might have affordedpleasure to the neuropath, experience to the soldier, "copy" to thejournalist. Now suddenly black tragedy burst upon the scene, and allexcitement died out amid a multitude of vivid trifles. As LieutenantCassells rose to leave the knoll, he turned sharply and fell on theground. Two Sepoys immediately caught hold of him. One fell shot throughthe leg. A soldier who had continued firing sprang into the air, and, falling, began to bleed with strange and terrible rapidity from hismouth and chest. Another turned on his back kicking and twisting. Afourth lay quite still. Thus in the time it takes to write half thelittle party were killed or wounded. The enemy had worked round bothflanks and had also the command. Their fire was accurate. 

Two officers, the subadar major, by name Mangol Singh, and three orfour Sepoys ran forward from the second knoll, to help in carrying thewounded off. Before they reached the spot, two more men were hit. Thesubadar major seized Lieutenant Cassells, who was covered with blood andunable to stand, but anxious to remain in the firing line. The otherscaught hold of the injured and began dragging them roughly over thesharp rocks in spite of their screams and groans. Before we had gonethirty yards from the knoll, the enemy rushed on to it, and beganfiring. Lieutenant Hughes, the adjutant of the regiment, and one of themost popular officers on the frontier, was killed. The bullets passed inthe air with a curious sucking noise, like that produced by drawing theair between the lips. Several men also fell. Lieut. -Colonel Bradshawordered two Sepoys to carry the officer's body away. This they began todo. Suddenly a scattered crowd of tribesmen rushed over the crest ofthe hill and charged sword in hand, hurling great stones. It becameimpossible to remain an impassive spectator. Several of the wounded weredropped. The subadar major stuck to Lieutenant Cassells, and it is tohim the lieutenant owes his life. The men carrying the other officer, dropped him and fled. The body sprawled upon the ground. A tall man indirty white linen pounced down upon it with a curved sword. It was ahorrible sight. 

Had the swordsmen charged home, they would have cut everybody down. Butthey did not. These wild men of the mountains were afraid of closing. The retirement continued. Five or six times the two companies, nowconcentrated, endeavoured to stand. Each time the tribesmen pressedround both flanks. They had the whole advantage of ground, andcommanded, as well as out-flanked the Sikhs. At length the bottom of thespur was reached, and the remainder of the two companies turned to bayin the nullah with fixed bayonets. The tribesmen came on impetuously, but stopped thirty yards away, howling, firing and waving their swords. 

No other troops were in sight, except our cavalry, who could be seenretiring in loose squadron column--probably after their charge. Theycould give no assistance. The Buffs were nearly a mile away. Thingslooked grave. Colonel Goldney himself tried to re-form the men. TheSikhs, who now numbered perhaps sixty, were hard pressed, and firedwithout effect. Then some one--who it was is uncertain--ordered thebugler to sound the "charge. " The shrill notes rang out not once but adozen times. Every one began to shout. The officers waved their swordsfrantically. Then the Sikhs commenced to move slowly forward towardsthe enemy, cheering. It was a supreme moment. The tribesmen turned, andbegan to retreat. Instantly the soldiers opened a steady fire, shootingdown their late persecutors with savage energy. 

Then for the first time, I perceived that the repulse was general alongthe whole front. What I have described was only an incident. But thereader may learn from the account the explanation of many of our lossesin the frontier war. The troops, brave and well-armed, but encumberedwith wounded, exhausted by climbing and overpowered by superior force, had been ordered to retire. This is an operation too difficult for aweak force to accomplish. Unless supports are at hand, they must bepunished severely, and the small covering parties, who remain to checkthe enemy, will very often be cut to pieces, or shot down. Afterwardsin the Mamund Valley whole battalions were employed to do what these twoSikh companies had attempted. But Sikhs need no one to bear witness totheir courage. 

During the retirement down the spur, I was unable to observe the generalaspect of the action, and now in describing it, I have dealt only withthe misadventures of one insignificant unit. It is due to the personalperspective. While the two advanced companies were being driven downthe hill, a general attack was made along the whole left front ofthe brigade, by at least 2000 tribesmen, most of whom were armed withrifles. To resist this attack there were the cavalry, the two supportingcompanies of the 35th Sikhs and five of the Guides Infantry, who werearriving. All became engaged. Displaying their standards, the enemyadvanced with great courage in the face of a heavy fire. Many werekilled and wounded, but they continued to advance, in a long skirmishline, on the troops. One company of the 35th became seriously involved. Seeing this, Captain Cole moved his squadron forward, and thoughthe ground was broken, charged. The enemy took refuge in the nullah, tumbling into it standards and all, and opened a sharp fire on thecavalry at close range, hitting several horses and men. The squadronfell back. But the moral effect of their advance had been tremendous. The whole attack came to a standstill. The infantry fire continued. Thenthe tribesmen began to retire, and they were finally repulsed at abouttwelve o'clock. 

An opportunity was now presented of breaking off the action. The brigadehad started from camp divided, and in expectation that no seriousresistance would be offered. It had advanced incautiously. The leadingtroops had been roughly handled. The enemy had delivered a vigorouscounter attack. That attack had been repulsed with slaughter, and thebrigade was concentrated. Considering the fatigues to which the infantryhad been exposed, it would perhaps have been more prudent to return tocamp and begin again next morning. But Brigadier-General Jeffries wasdetermined to complete the destruction of Shahi-Tangi, and to recoverthe body of Lieutenant Hughes, which remained in the hands of the enemy. It was a bold course. But it was approved by every officer in the force. 

A second attack was ordered. The Guides were to hold the enemy in checkon the left. The Buffs, supported by the 35th Sikhs, were to take thevillage. Orders were signalled back to camp for all the availabletroops to reinforce the column in the field, and six fresh companiesconsequently started. At one o'clock the advance recommenced, the gunscame into action on a ridge on the right of the brigade, and shelled thevillage continuously. 

Again the enemy fell back "sniping, " and very few of them were tobe seen. But to climb the hill alone took two hours. The village wasoccupied at three o'clock, and completely destroyed by the Buffs. At3. 30 orders reached them to return to camp, and the second withdrawalbegan. Again the enemy pressed with vigour, but this time there wereten companies on the spur instead of two, and the Buffs, who becamerear-guard, held everything at a distance with their Lee-Metford rifles. At a quarter to five the troops were clear of the hills and we lookedabout us. 

While this second attack was being carried out, the afternoon hadslipped away. At about two o'clock Major Campbell and Captain Cole, bothofficers of great experience on the frontier, had realised the fact, that the debate with the tribesmen could not be carried to a conclusionthat day. At their suggestion a message was heliographed up to theGeneral's staff officer on the spur near the guns, as follows: "Itis now 2. 30. Remember we shall have to fight our way home. " But thebrigadier had already foreseen this possibility, and had, as described, issued orders for the return march. These orders did not reach CaptainRyder's company on the extreme right until they had become hard pressedby the increasing attack of the enemy. Their wounded delayed theirretirement. They had pushed far up the mountain side, apparently withthe idea they were to crown the heights, and we now saw them two milesaway on the sky line hotly engaged. 

While I was taking advantage of a temporary halt, to feed and water mypony, Lieutenant MacNaghten of the 16th Lancers pointed them out to me, and we watched them through our glasses. It was a strange sight. Littlefigures running about confusedly, tiny puffs of smoke, a miniatureofficer silhouetted against the sky waving his sword. It seemedimpossible to believe that they were fighting for their lives, or indeedin any danger. It all looked so small and unreal. They were, however, hard pressed, and had signalled that they were running out ofcartridges. It was then five o'clock, and the approach of darkness wasaccelerated by the heavy thunderclouds which were gathering over thenorthern mountains. 

At about 3. 30 the brigadier had ordered the Guides to proceed to Ryder'sassistance and endeavour to extricate his company. He directed MajorCampbell to use his own discretion. It was a difficult problem, but theGuides and their leader were equal to it. They had begun the day on theextreme left. They had hurried to the centre. Now they were ordered tothe extreme right. They had already marched sixteen miles, but they werestill fresh. We watched them defiling across the front, with admiration. Meanwhile, the retirement of the brigade was delayed. It was necessarythat all units should support each other, and the troops had to waittill the Guides had succeeded in extricating Ryder. The enemy now cameon in great strength from the north-western end of the valley, which hadbeen swarming with them all day, so that for the first time the actionpresented a fine spectacle. 

Across the broad plain the whole of the brigade was in echelon. On theextreme right Ryder's company and the Guides Infantry were both severelyengaged. Half a mile away to the left rear the battery, the sappers andtwo companies of the 35th Sikhs were slowly retiring. Still farther tothe left were the remainder of the 35th, and, at an interval of half amile, the Buffs. The cavalry protected the extreme left flank. This longline of troops, who were visible to each other but divided by the deepbroad nullahs which intersected the whole plain, fell back slowly, halting frequently to keep touch. Seven hundred yards away were theenemy, coming on in a great half-moon nearly three miles long and firingcontinually. Their fire was effective, and among other casualties atthis time Lieutenant Crawford, R. A. , was killed. Their figures showedin rows of little white dots. The darkness fell swiftly. The smokepuffs became fire flashes. Great black clouds overspread the valleyand thunder began to roll. The daylight died away. The picture becameobscured, and presently it was pitch dark. All communication, all mutualsupport, all general control now ceased. Each body of troops closed upand made the best of their way to the camp, which was about seven milesoff. A severe thunderstorm broke overhead. The vivid lightning displayedthe marching columns and enabled the enemy to aim. Individual tribesmenran up, shouting insults, to within fifty yards of the Buffs anddischarged their rifles. They were answered with such taunts as thelimited Pushtu of the British soldier allows and careful volleys. Thetroops displayed the greatest steadiness. The men were determined, theofficers cheery, the shooting accurate. At half-past eight the enemyceased to worry us. We thought we had driven them off, but they hadfound a better quarry. 

The last two miles to camp were painful. After the cessation of thefiring the fatigue of the soldiers asserted itself. The Buffs had beenmarching and fighting continuously for thirteen hours. They had had nofood, except their early morning biscuit, since the preceding night. The older and more seasoned amongst them laughed at their troubles, declaring they would have breakfast, dinner and tea together when theygot home. The younger ones collapsed in all directions. 

The officers carried their rifles. Such ponies and mules as wereavailable were laden with exhausted soldiers. Nor was this all. Othertroops had passed before us, and more than a dozen Sepoys of differentregiments were lying senseless by the roadside. All these wereeventually carried in by the rear-guard, and the Buffs reached camp atnine o'clock. 

Meanwhile, the Guides had performed a brilliant feat of arms, and hadrescued the remnants of the isolated company from the clutches of theenemy. After a hurried march they arrived at the foot of the hill downwhich Ryder's men were retiring. The Sikhs, utterly exhausted by theexertions of the day, were in disorder, and in many cases unable fromextreme fatigue even to use their weapons. The tribesmen hung in a crowdon the flanks and rear of the struggling company, firing incessantly andeven dashing in and cutting down individual soldiers. Both officers werewounded. Lieutenant Gunning staggered down the hill unaided, struck inthree places by bullets and with two deep sword cuts besides. Weary, outnumbered, surrounded on three sides, without unwounded officers orcartridges, the end was only a matter of moments. All must have been cutto pieces. But help was now at hand. 

The Guides formed line, fixed bayonets and advanced at the doubletowards the hill. At a short distance from its foot they halted andopened a terrible and crushing fire upon the exulting enemy. The louddetonations of their company volleys were heard and the smoke seen allover the field, and on the left we wondered what was happening. Thetribesmen, sharply checked, wavered. The company continued its retreat. Many brave deeds were done as the night closed in. Havildar Ali Gul, ofthe Afridi Company of the Guides, seized a canvas cartridge carrier, asort of loose jacket with large pockets, filled it with ammunitionfrom his men's pouches, and rushing across the fire-swept space, whichseparated the regiment from the Sikhs, distributed the precious packetsto the struggling men. Returning he carried a wounded native officeron his back. Seeing this several Afridis in the Guides ran forward, shouting and cheering, to the rescue, and other wounded Sikhs were savedby their gallantry from a fearful fate. At last Ryder's company reachedthe bottom of the hill and the survivors re-formed under cover of theGuides. 

These, thrown on their own resources, separated from the rest of thebrigade by darkness and distance and assailed on three sides bythe enemy, calmly proceeded to fight their way back to camp. Thoughencumbered with many wounded and amid broken ground, they repulsedevery attack, and bore down all the efforts which the tribesmen made tointercept their line of retreat. They reached camp at 9. 30 in safety, and not without honour. The skill and experience of their officers, theendurance and spirit of the men, had enabled them to accomplish a taskwhich many had believed impossible, and their conduct in the action ofthe Mamund Valley fills a brilliant page in the history of the finestand most famous frontier regiment. [The gallantry of the two officers, Captain Hodson and Lieut. Codrington, who commanded the two most exposedcompanies, was the subject of a special mention in despatches, andthe whole regiment were afterwards complimented by Brigadier-GeneralJeffreys on their fine performance. ]

As the Buffs reached the camp the rain which had hitherto held off camedown. It poured. The darkness was intense. The camp became a sea ofmud. In expectation that the enemy would attack it, General Jeffreys hadsignalled in an order to reduce the perimeter. The camp was thereforeclosed up to half its original size. 

Most of the tents had been struck and lay with the baggage piled inconfused heaps on the ground. Many of the transport animals were looseand wandering about the crowded space. Dinner or shelter there was none. The soldiers, thoroughly exhausted, lay down supperless in the slush. The condition of the wounded was particularly painful. Among the tentswhich had been struck were several of the field hospitals. In thedarkness and rain it was impossible to do more for the poor fellows thanto improve the preliminary dressings and give morphia injections, norwas it till four o'clock on the next afternoon that the last were takenout of the doolies. 

After about an hour the rain stopped, and while the officers werebustling about making their men get some food before they went to sleep, it was realised that all the troops were not in camp. The general, thebattery, the sappers and four companies of infantry were still inthe valley. Presently we heard the firing of guns. They were beingattacked, --overwhelmed perhaps. To send them assistance was to risk moretroops being cut off. The Buffs who were dead beat, the Sikhs who hadsuffered most severe losses, and the Guides who had been marching andfighting all day, were not to be thought of. The 38th Dogras were, however, tolerably fresh, and Colonel Goldney, who commanded in theabsence of the General, at once ordered four companies to parade andmarch to the relief. Captain Cole volunteered to accompany them with adozen sowars. The horses were saddled. But the order was countermanded, and no troops left the camp that night. 

Whether this decision was justified or not the reader shall decide. In the darkness and the broken ground it was probable the relief wouldnever have found the general. It was possible that getting involvedamong the nullahs they would have been destroyed. The defenders of thecamp itself were none too many. The numbers of the enemy were unknown. These were weighty reasons. On the other hand it seemed unsoldierly tolie down to sleep while at intervals the booming of the guns remindedus, that comrades were fighting for their lives a few miles away in thevalley. 

CHAPTER XII: AT INAYAT KILA

 "Two thousand pounds of education Drops to a ten-rupee jezail. . . . . . . Strike hard who cares. Shoot straight who can. The odds are on the cheaper man. "

 RUDYARD KIPLING. 

Half an hour before dawn on the 17th, the cavalry were mounted, and assoon as the light was strong enough to find a way through the brokenground, the squadron started in search of the missing troops. We hadheard no more of their guns since about two o'clock. We thereforeconcluded they had beaten off the enemy. There might, of course, beanother reason for their silence. As we drew near Bilot, it was possibleto distinguish the figures of men moving about the walls and houses. Theadvanced files rode cautiously forward. Suddenly they cantered up to thewall and we knew some at least were alive. Captain Cole, turning to hissquadron, lifted his hand. The sowars, actuated by a common impulse, rose in their stirrups and began to cheer. But there was no response. Nor was this strange. The village was a shambles. In an angle of theoutside wall, protected on the third side by a shallow trench, were thesurvivors of the fight. All around lay the corpses of men and mules. Thebodies of five or six native soldiers were being buried in a hurriedlydug grave. It was thought that, as they were Mahommedans, theirresting-place would be respected by the tribesmen. [These bodies wereafterwards dug up and mutilated by the natives: a foul act which excitedthe fury and indignation of soldiers of every creed in the force. I drawthe reader's attention to this unpleasant subject, only to justify whatI have said in an earlier chapter of the degradation of mind in whichthe savages of the mountains are sunk. ] Eighteen wounded men lay side byside in a roofless hut. Their faces, drawn by pain and anxiety, lookedghastly in the pale light of the early morning. Two officers, one withhis left hand smashed, the other shot through both legs, were patientlywaiting for the moment when the improvised tourniquets could be removedand some relief afforded to their sufferings. The brigadier, his khakicoat stained with the blood from a wound on his head, was talking tohis only staff-officer, whose helmet displayed a bullet-hole. The mostardent lover of realism would have been satisfied. Food, doolies, anddoctors soon arrived. The wounded were brought to the field hospitals tobe attended to. The unwounded hurried back to camp to get breakfast anda bath. In half an hour, the ill-omened spot was occupied only by thefew sowars engaged in shooting the wounded mules, and by the vultureswho watched the proceedings with an expectant interest. 

Gradually we learnt the story of the night. The battery, about thirtysappers and half the 35th Sikhs, were returning to camp. At about seveno'clock an order was sent for them to halt and remain out all night, toassist the Guides Infantry, whose firing could be heard and for whosesafety the brigadier was above all things anxious. This order reachedthe battery, and with the sappers as an escort they turned back, recrossed a nullah and met the general with two companies of Sikhsoutside the village of Bilot. The half-battalion of the 35th did notapparently receive the order, for they continued their march. LieutenantWynter, R. A. , was sent back to look for them. He did not find them, but fell in with four fresh companies, two of the Guides and two of the35th, who, under Major Worlledge, had been sent from camp in response tothe general's demand for reinforcements. Lieutenant Wynter brought theseback, as an escort to the guns. On arrival at the village, the brigadierat once sent them to the assistance of the Guides. He counted on his owntwo companies of Sikhs. But when Worlledge had moved off and hadalready vanished in the night, it was found that these two companies haddisappeared. They had lost touch in the darkness, and, not perceivingthat the general had halted, had gone on towards camp. Thus the batterywas left with no other escort than thirty sappers. 

A party of twelve men of the Buffs now arrived, and the circumstanceswhich led them to the guns are worth recording. When the Buffs wereretiring through the villages, they held a Mahommedan cemetery fora little while, in order to check the enemy's advance. Whilst there, Lieutenant Byron, Orderly Officer to General Jeffreys, rode up and toldMajor Moody, who commanded the rear companies, that a wounded officerwas lying in a dooly a hundred yards up the road, without any escort. Heasked for a few men. Moody issued an order, and a dozen soldiers undera corporal started to look for the dooly. They missed it, but whilesearching, found the general and the battery outside the village. Thepresence of these twelve brave men--for they fully maintained the honourof their regiment--with their magazine rifles, just turned the scale. Had not the luck of the British army led them to the village, it canhardly be doubted, and certainly was not doubted by any who were there, that the guns would have been captured and the general killed. Fortune, especially in war, uses tiny fulcra for her powerful lever. 

The general now ordered the battery and sappers to go into the village, but it was so full of burning bhoosa, that this was found to beimpossible, and they set to work to entrench themselves outside. Thevillage was soon full of the enemy. From the walls and houses, whichon two sides commanded the space occupied by the battery, they began tofire at about thirty yards' range. The troops were as much exposed as ifthey had been in a racket court, of which the enemy held the walls. Theycould not move, because they would have had to desert either the guns orthe wounded. Fortunately, not many of the tribesmen at this point werearmed with rifles. The others threw stones and burning bhoosa into themidst of the little garrison. By its light they took good aim. Everybodygot under such cover as was available. There was not much. GunnerNihala, a gallant native soldier, repeatedly extinguished the burningbhoosa with his cloak at the imminent peril of his life. LieutenantsWatson and Colvin, with their sappers and the twelve men of the Buffs, forced their way into the village, and tried to expel the enemy with thebayonet. The village was too large for so small a party to clear. Thetribesmen moved from one part to another, repeatedly firing. They killedand wounded several of the soldiers, and a bullet smashed LieutenantWatson's hand. He however continued his efforts and did not cease untilagain shot, this time so severely as to be unable to stand. His mencarried him from the village, and it was felt that it would be uselessto try again. 

The attention of the reader is directed to the bravery of this officer. After a long day of marching, and fighting, in the dark, withoutfood and with small numbers, the man who will go on, unshaken andunflinching, after he has received a severe and painful wound, has inrespect of personal courage few equals and no superior in the world. It is perhaps as high a form of valour to endure as to dare. Thecombination of both is sublime. [Both officers have received theVictoria Cross for their conduct on this occasion. ]

At nine o'clock the rain stopped the firing, as the tribesmen wereafraid of wetting their powder, but at about ten they opened again. Theynow made a great hole in the wall of the village, through which about adozen men fired with terrible effect. Others began loopholing thewalls. The guns fired case shot at twenty yards' range at these fiercepioneers, smashing the walls to pieces and killing many. The enemyreplied with bullets, burning bhoosa and showers of stones. 

So the hours dragged away. The general and Captain Birch were bothwounded, early in the night. Lieutenant Wynter, while behaving withdistinguished gallantry, was shot through both legs at about 11. 30. Hewas thus twice severely wounded within forty-five days. He now continuedto command his guns, until he fainted from loss of blood. A nativegunner then shielded him with his body, until he also was hit. The wholescene, the close, desperate fighting, the carcasses of the mules, theofficers and men crouching behind them, the flaming stacks of bhoosa, the flashes of the rifles, and over all and around all, the darkness ofthe night--is worthy of the pencil of De Neuville. 

At length, at about midnight, help arrived. Worlledge's two companieshad gone in search of the Guides, but had not found them. They nowreturned and, hearing the firing at Bilot, sent an orderly of the 11thBengal Lancers to ask if the general wanted assistance. This pluckyboy--he was only a young recruit--rode coolly up to the village althoughthe enemy were all around, and he stood an almost equal chance of beingshot by our own men. He soon brought the two companies to the rescue, and the enemy, balked of their prey, presently drew off in the gloom. How much longer the battery and its defenders could have held out isuncertain. They were losing men steadily, and their numbers were sosmall that they might have been rushed at any moment. Such was the tale. 

No operations took place on the 17th. The soldiers rested, casualtieswere counted, wounds were dressed, confidence was restored. The funeralsof the British officers and men, killed the day before, took placeat noon. Every one who could, attended; but all the pomp of militaryobsequies was omitted, and there were no Union Jacks to cover thebodies, nor were volleys fired over the graves, lest the wounded shouldbe disturbed. Somewhere in the camp--exactly where, is now purposelyforgotten--the remains of those who had lost, in fighting for theircountry, all that men can be sure of, were silently interred. Nomonument marked the spot. The only assurance that it should beundisturbed is, that it remains unknown. Nevertheless, the funerals wereimpressive. To some the game of war brings prizes, honour, advancement, or experience; to some the consciousness of duty well discharged; and toothers--spectators, perhaps--the pleasure of the play and theknowledge of men and things. But here were those who had drawn the evilnumbers--who had lost their all, to gain only a soldier's grave. Lookingat these shapeless forms, coffined in a regulation blanket, the prideof race, the pomp of empire, the glory of war appeared but the faintand unsubstantial fabric of a dream; and I could not help realising withBurke: "What shadows we are and what shadows we pursue. "

The actual casualties were, in proportion to the numbers engaged, greater than in any action of the British army in India for manyyears. Out of a force which at no time exceeded 1000 men, nine Britishofficers, four native officers, and 136 soldiers were either killed orwounded. The following is the full return:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Killed--Lieutenant and Adjutant V. Hughes, 35th Sikhs. " " A. T. Crawford, R. A. Wounded severely--Captain W. I. Ryder, attd. 35th Sikhs. " " Lieutenant O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs. " " " O. R. Cassells, 35th Sikhs. " " " T. C. Watson, R. E. " " " F. A. Wynter, R. A. Wounded slightly--Brigadier-General Jeffreys, Commanding 2nd Bde. M. F. F. " " Captain Birch, R. A. BRITISH SOLDIERS. Killed. Wounded. The Buffs . . . . 2 9 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. Wounded. 11th Bengal Lancers . . 0 2 No. 8 Mountain Battery. . 6 21 Guides Infantry. . . 2 10 35th Sikhs. . . . 22 45 38th Dogras. . . . 0 2 Sappers. . . . . 4 15 Total Casualties, 149; with 48 horses and mules. 

The action of the 16th September is considered by some to have been areverse. I do not think this view is justified by the facts. The troopsaccomplished every task they were set. They burned the village ofShahi-Tangi most completely, in spite of all opposition, and theyinflicted on the tribesmen a loss of over 200 men. The enemy, thoughelated by the capture of twenty-two rifles from the bodies of thekilled, were impressed by the bravery of the troops. "If, " they arereported to have said, "they fight like this when they are divided, we can do nothing. " Our losses were undoubtedly heavy and out of allproportion to the advantages gained. They were due to an ignorance, shared by all in the force, of the numbers and fighting power of theMamunds. No one knew, though there were many who were wise after theevent, that these tribesmen were as well armed as the troops, or thatthey were the brave and formidable adversaries they proved themselves. "Never despise your enemy" is an old lesson, but it has to be learntafresh, year after year, by every nation that is warlike and brave. Ourlosses were also due to the isolation of Captain Ryder's company, toextricate which the whole force had to wait till overtaken by darkness. It has been said that war cannot be made without running risks, norcan operations be carried out in the face of an enemy armed withbreech-loaders without loss. No tactics can altogether shield menfrom bullets. Those serene critics who note the errors, and forget thedifficulties, who judge in safety of what was done in danger, andfrom the security of peace, pronounce upon the conduct of war, shouldremember that the spectacle of a General, wounded, his horse shot, remaining on the field with the last unit, anxious only for the safetyof his soldiers, is a spectacle not unworthy of the pages of ourmilitary history. 

The depression, caused by the loss of amiable and gallant comrades, wasdispelled by the prospects of immediate action. Sir Bindon Blood, whoseposition at Nawagai was now one of danger, sent the brigadier, insteadof reinforcements, orders to vigorously prosecute the operations againstthe tribesmen, and on the morning of the 18th the force moved to attackthe village of Domodoloh, which the 38th Dogras had found so stronglyoccupied on the 16th. Again the enemy were numerous. Again they adoptedtheir effective tactics; but this time no chances were given them. Thewhole brigade marched concentrated to the attack, and formed up on thelevel ground just out of shot. The general and his staff rode forwardand reconnoitered. 

The village lay in a re-entrant of the hills, from which two longspurs projected like the piers of a harbour. Behind, the mountains roseabruptly to a height of 5000 feet. The ground, embraced by the spurs, was filled with crops of maize and barley. A fort and watch-towerguarded the entrance. At 8. 30 the advance was ordered. The enemy did notattempt to hold the fort, and it was promptly seized and blown up. The explosion was a strange, though, during the fighting in the MamundValley, not an uncommon sight. A great cloud of thick brown-red dustsprang suddenly into the air, bulging out in all directions. The towerbroke in half and toppled over. A series of muffled bangs followed. Thedust-cloud cleared away, and nothing but a few ruins remained. 

The enemy now opened fire from the spurs, both of which became crownedwith little circles of white smoke. The 35th Sikhs advancing cleared theright ridge: the 38th Dogras the left. The Guides moved on the village, and up the main re-entrant itself. The Buffs were in reserve. Thebattery came into action on the left, and began shelling the crests ofthe opposite hills. Taking the range with their instruments, they firedtwo shots in rapid succession, each time at slightly different ranges. The little guns exploded with a loud report. Then, far up the mountainside, two balls of smoke appeared, one above the other, and after a fewseconds the noise of the bursting shells came faintly back. Usually onewould be a little short of--and the other a little over--the point aimedat. The next shot, by dividing the error, would go home, and the dustof the splinters and bullets would show on the peak, from which thetribesmen were firing, and it would become silent and deserted--thescene of an unregarded tragedy. Gradually the spurs were cleared of theenemy and the Guides, passing through the village, climbed up the faceof the mountain and established themselves among the great rocks of thesteep water-course. Isolated sharpshooters maintained a dropping fire. The company whose operations I watched, --Lieutenant Lockhart's, --killedone of these with a volley, and we found him sitting by a little pool, propped against a stone. He had been an ugly man originally, but nowthat the bones of his jaw and face were broken in pieces by the bullet, he was hideous to look upon. His only garment was a ragged bluelinen cloak fastened at the waist. There he sat--a typical tribesman, ignorant, degraded, and squalid, yet brave and warlike; his onlyproperty, his weapon, and that his countrymen had carried off. I couldnot help contrasting his intrinsic value as a social organism, with thatof the officers who had been killed during the week, and those lines ofKipling which appear at the beginning of this chapter were recalled tomind with a strange significance. Indeed I often heard them quoted inthe Watelai Valley. 

The sappers had now entered the village, and were engaged in preparingthe hovels of which it consisted for destruction. Their flat roofs arecovered with earth, and will not burn properly, unless a hole is madefirst in each. This took time. Meanwhile the troops held on to thepositions they had seized, and maintained a desultory fire with theenemy. At about noon the place was lighted up, and a dense cloud ofsmoke rose in a high column into the still air. Then the withdrawalof the troops was ordered. Immediately the enemy began their counterattack. But the Guides were handled with much skill. The retirementof each company was covered by the fire of others, judiciously postedfarther down the hill. No opportunity was offered to the enemy. Byone o'clock all the troops were clear of the broken ground. The Buffsassumed the duty of rear-guard, and were delighted to have a brisklittle skirmish--fortunately unattended with loss of life--with thetribesmen, who soon reoccupied the burning village. This continued for, perhaps, half an hour, and meanwhile the rest of the brigade returned tocamp. 

The casualties in this highly successful affair were small. It was thefirst of six such enterprises, by which Brigadier-General Jeffreys, withstubborn perseverance, broke the spirit of the Mamund tribesmen. 

 Killed. Wounded. 35th Sikhs. .. .. .. 2 3 Guides Infantry. .. .. . 0 1 38th Dogras. .. .. .. 0 2 Total casualties, 8. 

The enemy's losses were considerable, but no reliable details could beobtained. 

On the 19th the troops rested, and only foraging parties left the camp. On the 20th, fighting was renewed. From the position at the entranceto the valley it was possible to see all the villages that lay in thehollows of the hills, and to distinguish not only the scenes of past butalso of future actions. The particular village which was selected forchastisement was never mentioned by name, and it was not until thebrigade had marched some miles from the camp, that the objective becameevident. The tribesmen therefore continued in a state of "gloriousuncertainty, " and were unable to gather in really large numbers. At 5. 30A. M. The brigade started, and, preceded by the cavalry, marched up thevalley--a long brown stream of men. Arrived nearly at the centre, thetroops closed up into a more compact formation. Then suddenly thehead wheeled to the left, and began marching on the village of Zagai. Immediately from high up on the face of the mountain a long column ofsmoke shot into the air. It was a signal fire. Other hills answeredit. The affair now became a question of time. If the village could becaptured and destroyed before the clans had time to gather, then therewould be little fighting. But if the force were delayed or becameinvolved, it was impossible to say on what scale the action would be. 

The village of Zagai stands in a similar situation to that of Domodoloh. On either side long spurs advance into the valley, and the houses arebuilt in terraces on the sides of the hollow so formed. Great chenartrees, growing in all their luxuriant beauty out of the rocky ground bythe water-course, mark the hillside with a patch of green in contrast tothe background of sombre brown. As the troops approached in fine array, the sound of incessant drumming was faintly heard, varied from time totime by the notes of a bugle. The cavalry reconnoitered and trotted offto watch the flank, after reporting the place strongly occupied. Theenemy displayed standards on the crests of the spurs. The advancecontinued: the Guides on the left, the 38th Dogras in the centre, theBuffs on the right, and the 35th Sikhs in reserve. Firing began on theleft at about nine o'clock, and a quarter of an hour later the guns cameinto action near the centre. The Guides and Buffs now climbed the ridgesto the right and left. The enemy fell back according to their custom, "sniping. " Then the 38th pushed forward and occupied the village, which was handed over to the sappers to destroy. This they did mostthoroughly, and at eleven o'clock a dense white smoke was rising fromthe houses and the stacks of bhoosa. Then the troops were orderedto withdraw. "Facilis ascensus Averni sed. .. ;" without allowing thequotation to lead me into difficulties, I will explain that while it isusually easy to advance against an Asiatic, all retirements are mattersof danger. While the village was being destroyed the enemy had beencollecting. Their figures could be distinguished on the top of themountain--a numerous line of dark dots against the sky; others had triedto come, from the adjoining valleys on the left and right. Those on theright succeeded, and the Buffs were soon sharply engaged. On the leftthe cavalry again demonstrated the power of their arm. A large force oftribesmen, numbering at least 600 men, endeavoured to reach the sceneof action. To get there, however, they had to cross the open ground, and this, in face of the Lancers, they would not do. Many of these sametribesmen had joined in the attack on the Malakand, and had been chasedall across the plain of Khar by the fierce Indian horsemen. They werenot ambitious to repeat the experience. Every time they tried to crossthe space, which separated them from their friends, Captain Cole trottedforward with his squadron, which was only about fifty strong, and thetribesmen immediately scurried back to the hills. For a long time theywere delayed, and contented themselves by howling out to the sowars, that they would soon "make mincemeat of them, " to which the latterreplied that they were welcome to try. At length, realising that theycould not escape the cavalry, if they left the hills, they made a longcircuit and arrived about half an hour after the village was destroyedand the troops had departed. 

Nevertheless, as soon as the retirement was seen to be in progress, ageneral attack was made all along the line. On the left, the Guideswere threatened by a force of about 500 men, who advanced displayingstandards, and waving swords. They dispersed these and drove them awayby a steady long-range fire, killing and wounding a large number. Onthe right, the Buffs were harassed by being commanded by another spur. Lieutenant Hasler's company, which I accompanied, was protected fromthis flanking fire by the ground. A great many bullets, however, hummed overhead, and being anxious to see whence these were coming, thelieutenant walked across the crest to the far side. The half-companyhere was briskly engaged. From a point high up the mountain an accuratefire was directed upon them. We tried to get the range of this pointwith the Lee-Metford rifles. It was, as nearly as could be determined, 1400 yards. The tribesmen were only armed with Martini-Henrys. Theynevertheless made excellent practice. Lieutenant R. E. Power was shotthrough the arm and, almost immediately afterwards, Lieutenant Keene wasseverely wounded in the body. Luckily, the bullet struck his sword-hiltfirst or he would have been killed. Two or three men were also woundedhere. Those who know the range and power of the Martini-Henry rifle willappreciate the skill and marksmanship which can inflict loss even at sogreat a range. 

As the retirement proceeded, the tribesmen came to closer quarters. The Buffs, however, used their formidable weapon with great effect. I witnessed one striking demonstration of its power. Lieutenant F. S. Reeves remained behind with a dozen men to cover the withdrawal of hiscompany, and in hopes of bringing effective fire to bear on the enemy, who at this time were pressing forward boldly. Three hundred yards awaywas a nullah, and along this they began running, in hopes of cutting offthe small party. At one point, however, the line of their advance wascommanded by our fire. Presently a man ran into the open. The sectionfired immediately. The great advantage of the rifle was that there wasno difficulty about guessing the exact range, as the fixed sight couldbe used. The man dropped--a spot of white. Four others rushed forward. Again there was a volley. All four fell and remained motionless. Afterthis we made good our retreat almost unmolested. 

As soon as the troops were clear of the hills, the enemy occupied therocks and ridges, and fired at the retreating soldiers. The Buffs' lineof retirement lay over smooth, open ground. For ten minutes the fire washot. Another officer and seven or eight men dropped. The ground was wetand deep, and the bullets cutting into the soft mud, made strange andcurious noises. As soon as the troops got out of range, the firingceased, as the tribesmen did not dare follow into the open. 

On the extreme left, considerable bodies of the enemy appeared, and fora moment it seemed that they would leave the hills and come into theplain. The cavalry, however, trotted forward, and they ran back inconfusion, bunching together as they did so. The battery immediatelyexploded two shrapnel shells in their midst with great effect. Thisended the affair, and the troops returned to camp. The casualties wereas follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Wounded severely--2nd Lieutenant G. N. S. Keene. " slightly--Captain L. I. B. Hulke. " " --Lieutenant R. E. Power. 

 BRITISH SOLDIERS. Killed. Wounded. Buffs. . . . . 1 10 (Died of wounds). 

 Native Ranks. Wounded. 38th Dogras . . . . 2 Total casualties, 16. 

I shall make the reader no apology for having described at such length, what was after all only a skirmish. The picture of the war on thefrontier is essentially one of detail, and it is by the study of thedetails alone that a true impression can be obtained. 

On the 22nd and 23rd the villages of Dag and Tangi were respectivelycaptured and destroyed, but as the resistance was slight and theoperations were unmarked by any new features, I shall not weary thereader by further description. The casualties were:--

 BRITISH OFFICER. Wounded--Major S. Moody, the Buffs. 

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. Wounded. Guides Infantry. . . 1 2 38th Dogras. . . . 0 2

By these operations the tribesmen of the Mamund Valley had been severelypunished. Any exultation which they might have felt over the action ofthe 16th was completely effaced. The brigade had demonstrated its powerto take and burn any village that might be selected, and had inflictedsevere loss on all who attempted to impede its action. The tribesmenwere now thoroughly disheartened, and on the 21st began to sue forpeace. 

The situation was, however, complicated by the proximity of the Afghanfrontier. The western side of the Mamund Valley is bounded by themountains of the Hindu Raj range, along the summits of which is theDurand line of demarcation with the Amir. On the farther side of thisrange Gholam Hyder, the Afghan commander-in-chief, lay with a powerfulforce, which, at the time of the actions I have described, amounted tonine battalions, six squadrons and fourteen mountain guns. During theattack upon Zagai, numerous figures in khaki uniform had been observedon the higher slopes of the hills, and it was alleged that oneparticular group appeared to be directing the movements of thetribesmen. At any rate, I cannot doubt, nor did any one who was presentduring the fighting in the Mamund Valley, that the natives were aided byregular soldiers from the Afghan army, and to a greater extent by Afghantribesmen, not only by the supply of arms and ammunition but by actualintervention. 

I am not in possession of sufficient evidence to pronounce on thequestion of the Amir's complicity in the frontier risings. It iscertain, that for many years the Afghan policy has consistently been tocollect and preserve agents, who might be used in raising a revolt amongthe Pathan tribes. But the advantages which the Amir would derive from aquarrel with the British are not apparent. It would seem more probable, that he has only tried throughout to make his friendship a matter ofmore importance to the Indian Government, with a view to the continuanceor perhaps the increase of his subsidy. It is possible, that he has thisyear tested and displayed his power; and that he has desired to showus what a dangerous foe he might be, were he not so useful an ally. The question is a delicate and difficult one. Most of the evidence iscontained in Secret State Papers. The inquiry would be profitless; theresult possibly unwelcome. Patriotic discretion is a virtue which shouldat all times be zealously cultivated. 

I do not see that the facts I have stated diminish or increase theprobability of the Amir's complicity. As the American filibusterssympathise with the Cuban insurgents; as the Jameson raiders supportedthe outlanders of the Transvaal, so also the soldiers and tribesmenof Afghanistan sympathised with and aided their countrymen andcoreligionists across the border. Probably the Afghan Colonial Officewould have been vindicated by any inquiry. 

It is no disparagement but rather to the honour of men, that they shouldbe prepared to back with their lives causes which claim their sympathy. It is indeed to such men that human advancement has been due. I do notallude to this matter, to raise hostile feelings against the Afghantribesmen or their ruler, but only to explain the difficultiesencountered in the Mamund Valley by the 2nd Brigade of the MalakandField Force: to explain how it was that defenders of obscure villageswere numbered by thousands, and why the weapons of poverty-strickenagriculturists were excellent Martini-Henry rifles. 

The Mamunds themselves were now genuinely anxious for peace. Theirvalley was in our hands; their villages and crops were at our mercy; buttheir allies, who suffered none of these things, were eager to continuethe struggle. They had captured most of the rifles of the dead soldierson the 16th, and they had no intention of giving them up. On the otherhand, it was obvious that the British Raj could not afford to be defiedin this matter. We had insisted on the rifles being surrendered, andthat expensive factor, Imperial prestige, demanded that we shouldprosecute operations till we got them, no matter what the cost might be. The rifles were worth little. The men and officers we lost were wortha great deal. It was unsound economics, but Imperialism and economicsclash as often as honesty and self-interest. We were therefore committedto the policy of throwing good money after bad in order to keep up ourcredit; as a man who cannot pay his tradesmen, sends them fresh ordersin lieu of settlement. Under these unsatisfactory conditions, thenegotiations opened. They did not, however, interfere with the militarysituation, and the troops continued to forage daily in the valley, andthe tribesmen to fire nightly into the camp. 

At the end of the week a message from the Queen, expressing sympathywith the sufferings of the wounded, and satisfaction at the conduct ofthe troops, was published in Brigade orders. It caused the most livelypleasure to all, but particularly to the native soldiers, who heard withpride and exultation that their deeds and dangers were not unnoticed bythat august Sovereign before whom they know all their princes bow, andto whom the Sirkar itself is but a servant. The cynic and the socialistmay sneer after their kind; yet the patriot, who examines with anxiouscare those forces which tend to the cohesion or disruption of greatcommunities, will observe how much the influence of a loyal sentimentpromotes the solidarity of the Empire. 

The reader must now accompany me to the camp of the 3rd Brigade, twelvemiles away, at Nawagai. We shall return to the Mamund Valley and have afurther opportunity of studying its people and natural features. 

CHAPTER XIII: NAWAGAI

 "When the wild Bajaur mountain men lay choking with their blood, And the Kafirs held their footing. .. "

 "A Sermon in Lower Bengal, " SIR A. LYALL. 

Few spectacles in nature are so mournful and so sinister as theimplacable cruelty with which a wounded animal is pursued by itsfellows. Perhaps it is due to a cold and bracing climate, perhaps to aChristian civilisation, that the Western peoples of the world have toa great extent risen above this low original instinct. Among Europeanspower provokes antagonism, and weakness excites pity. All is differentin the East. Beyond Suez the bent of men's minds is such, that safetylies only in success, and peace in prosperity. All desert the falling. All turn upon the fallen. 

The reader may have been struck, in the account of the fighting in theMamund Valley, with the vigour with which the tribesmen follow up aretreating enemy and press an isolated party. In war this is sound, practical policy. But the hillmen adopt it rather from a naturalpropensity, than from military knowledge. Their tactics are the outcomeof their natures. All their actions, moral, political, strategic, areguided by the same principle. The powerful tribes, who had watched thepassage of the troops in sullen fear, only waited for a sign of weaknessto rise behind them. As long as the brigades dominated the country, and appeared confident and successful, their communications would berespected, and the risings localised; but a check, a reverse, a retreatwould raise tremendous combinations on every side. 

If the reader will bear this in mind, it will enable him to appreciatethe position with which this chapter deals, and may explain many othermatters which are beyond the scope of these pages. For it might be wellalso to remember, that the great drama of frontier war is played beforea vast, silent but attentive audience, who fill a theatre, that reachesfrom Peshawar to Colombo, and from Kurrachee to Rangoon. 

The strategic and political situation, with which Sir Bindon Blood wasconfronted at Nawagai on the 17th of September, was one of difficultyand danger. He had advanced into a hostile country. In his front theMohmands had gathered at the Hadda Mullah's call to oppose his furtherprogress. The single brigade he had with him was not strong enough toforce the Bedmanai Pass, which the enemy held. The 2nd Brigade, onwhich he had counted, was fully employed twelve miles away in the MamundValley. The 1st Brigade, nearly four marches distant on the PanjkoraRiver, had not sufficient transport to move. Meanwhile General Elles'sdivision was toiling painfully through the difficult country north-eastof Shabkadr, and could not arrive for several days. He was thereforeisolated, and behind him was the "network of ravines, " through which aretirement would be a matter of the greatest danger and difficulty. 

Besides this, his line of communications, stretching away through sixtymiles of hostile country, or country that at any moment might becomehostile, was seriously threatened by the unexpected outbreak in theMamund Valley. He was between two fires. Nor was this all. The Khan ofNawagai, a chief of great power and influence, was only kept loyal bythe presence of Sir Bindon Blood's brigade. Had that brigade marched, aswas advocated by the Government of India, back to join Brigadier-GeneralJeffreys in the Mamund Valley, this powerful chief would have thrownhis whole weight against the British. The flame in the Mamund Valley, joining the flame in the Bedmanai Pass, would have produced a mightyconflagration, and have spread far and wide among the inflammabletribesmen. Bajaur would have risen to a man. Swat, in spite of itsrecent punishment, would have stirred ominously. Dir would haverepudiated its ruler and joined the combination. The whole mountainregion would have been ablaze. Every valley would have poured fortharmed men. General Elles, arriving at Lakarai, would have found, insteadof a supporting brigade, a hostile gathering, and might even have had toreturn to Shabkadr without accomplishing anything. 

Sir Bindon Blood decided to remain at Nawagai; to cut the Hadda Mullah'sgathering from the tribesmen in the Mamund Valley; to hold out a hand toGeneral Elles; to keep the pass open and the khan loyal. Nawagai wasthe key of the situation. But that key could not be held without muchdanger. It was a bold course to take, but it succeeded, as bold courses, soundly conceived, usually do. He therefore sent orders to Jeffreysto press operations against the Mamund tribesmen; assured the Khan ofNawagai of the confidence of the Government, and of their determinationto "protect" him from all enemies; heliographed to General Elles that hewould meet him at Nawagai; entrenched his camp and waited. 

He did not wait long in peace. The tribesmen, whose tactical instinctshave been evolved by centuries of ceaseless war, were not slow torealise that the presence of the 3rd Brigade at Nawagai was fatal totheir hopes. They accordingly resolved to attack it. The Suffi andHadda Mullahs exerted the whole of their influence upon their credulousfollowers. The former appealed to the hopes of future happiness. EveryGhazi who fell fighting should sit above the Caaba at the very footstoolof the throne, and in that exalted situation and august presence shouldbe solaced for his sufferings by the charms of a double allowance ofcelestial beauty. Mullah Hadda used even more concrete inducements. Themuzzles of the guns should be stopped for those who charged home. Nobullet should harm them. They should be invulnerable. They should notgo to Paradise yet. They should continue to live honoured and respectedupon earth. This promise appears to have carried more weight, as theHadda Mullah's followers had three times as many killed and wounded asthe candidates for the pleasures of the world to come. It would almostseem, that in the undeveloped minds of these wild and superstitioussons of the mountains, there lie the embryonic germs of economics andpractical philosophy, pledges of latent possibilities of progress. 

 Some for the pleasures of this world, and some Sigh for the prophet's paradise to come. Ah! take the cash and let the credit go, Nor heed the rumble of a distant drum. 

 OMAR KHAYYAM

It is the practice of wise commanders in all warfare, to push theircavalry out every evening along the lines of possible attack, to makesure that no enemy has concentrated near the camp in the hopes ofattacking at nightfall. On the 18th, Captain Delamain's squadron of the11th Bengal Lancers came in contact with scattered parties of the enemycoming from the direction of the Bedmanai Pass. Desultory skirmishingensued, and the cavalry retired to camp. Some firing took place thatnight, and a soldier of the Queen's Regiment who strayed about fiftyyards from his picket, was pulled down and murdered by the savageenemies, who were lurking all around. The next evening the cavalryreconnoitered as usual. The squadron pushed forward protected by itsline of advanced scouts across the plain towards the Bedmanai Pass. Suddenly from a nullah a long line of tribesmen rose and fired a volley. A horse was shot. The squadron wheeled about and cantered off, havingsucceeded in what is technically called "establishing contact. "

A great gathering of the enemy, some 3000 strong, now appeared in theplain. For about half an hour before sunset they danced, shouted anddischarged their rifles. The mountain battery fired a few shells, butthe distance was too great to do much good, or shall I say harm? Then itbecame dark. The whole brigade remained that night in the expectationof an attack, but only a very half-hearted attempt was made. This waseasily repulsed, one man in the Queen's Regiment being killed among thetroops. 

On the 20th, however, definite information was received from the Khan ofNawagai, that a determined assault would be made on the camp thatnight. The cavalry reconnaissance again came in touch with the enemyat nightfall. The officers had dinner an hour earlier, and had justfinished, when, at about 8. 30, firing began. The position of the campwas commanded, though at long ranges, by the surrounding heights. Fromthese a searching rifle fire was now opened. All the tents were struck. The officers and men not employed in the trenches were directed tolie down. The majority of the bullets, clearing the parapets of theentrenchment on one side, whizzed across without doing any harm to theprostrate figures; but all walking about was perilous, and besides thisthe plunging fire from the heights was galling to every one. 

Determined and vigorous sword charges were now delivered on all sidesof the camp. The enemy, who numbered about 4000, displayed the greatestvalour. They rushed right up to the trenches and fell dead and dying, under the very bayonets of the troops. The brunt of the attack fell uponthe British Infantry Regiment, the Queen's. This was fortunate, as manywho were in camp that night say, that such was the determination of theenemy in their charges, that had they not been confronted with magazinerifles, they might have got into the entrenchments. 

The fire of the British was, however, crushing. Their discipline wasadmirable, and the terrible weapon with which they were armed, with itsmore terrible bullet, stopped every rush. The soldiers, confident intheir power, were under perfect control. When the enemy charged, theorder to employ magazine fire was passed along the ranks. The guns firedstar shell. These great rockets, bursting into stars in the air, slowlyfell to the ground shedding a pale and ghastly light on the swarmingfigures of the tribesmen as they ran swiftly forward. Then the poppingof the musketry became one intense roar as the ten cartridges, whichthe magazine of the rifle holds, were discharged almost instantaneously. Nothing could live in front of such a fire. Valour, ferocity, fanaticism, availed nothing. All were swept away. The whistles sounded. The independent firing stopped, with machine-like precision, and thesteady section volleys were resumed. This happened not once, but a dozentimes during the six hours that the attack was maintained. The 20thPunjaub Infantry, and the cavalry also, sustained and repulsed theattacks delivered against their fronts with steadiness. At length thetribesmen sickened of the slaughter, and retired to their hills in gloomand disorder. 

The experience of all in the camp that night was most unpleasant. Thosewho were in the trenches were the best off. The others, with nothing todo and nothing to look at, remained for six hours lying down wonderingwhether the next bullet would hit them or not. Some idea of the severityof the fire may be obtained from the fact that a single tent showedsixteen bullet holes. 

Brigadier-General Wodehouse was wounded at about eleven o'clock. He hadwalked round the trenches and conferred with his commanding officers asto the progress of the attack and the expenditure of ammunition, and hadjust left Sir Bindon Blood's side, after reporting, when a bullet struckhim in the leg, inflicting a severe and painful, though fortunately nota dangerous, wound. 

Considering the great number of bullets that had fallen in the camp, theBritish loss was surprisingly small. The full return is as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Wounded severely--Brigadier-General Wodehouse. " slightly--Veterinary-Captain Mann. 

 BRITISH SOLDIERS. Killed. Wounded. Queen's Regiment. .. 1 3 NATIVE RANKS--Wounded, 20. FOLLOWERS-- " 6. Total, 32 of all ranks. 

The casualties among the cavalry horses and transport animals were mostsevere. Over 120 were killed and wounded. 

The enemy drew off, carrying their dead with them, for the most part, but numerous bodies lying outside the shelter trench attested the valourand vigour of their attack. One man was found the next morning, whosehead had been half blown off, by a discharge of case shot from one ofthe mountain guns. He lay within a yard of the muzzle, the muzzle hehad believed would be stopped, a victim to that blind credulity andfanaticism, now happily passing away from the earth, under the combinedinfluences of Rationalism and machine guns. 

It was of course very difficult to obtain any accurate estimate of theenemy's losses. It was proved, however, that 200 corpses were buried onthe following day in the neighbourhood, and large numbers of wounded menwere reported to have been carried through the various villages. A roughestimate should place their loss at about 700. 

The situation was now cleared. The back of the Hadda Mullah's gatheringwas broken, and it dispersed rapidly. The Khan of Nawagai feverishlyprotested his unswerving loyalty to the Government. The Mamunds weredisheartened. The next day General Elles's leading brigade appeared inthe valley. Sir Bindon Blood rode out with his cavalry. The two generalsmet at Lakarai. It was decided that General Elles should be reinforcedby the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, and should clear theBedmanai Pass and complete the discomfiture of the Hadda Mullah. SirBindon Blood with the cavalry would join Jeffreys' force in the MamundValley, and deal with the situation there. The original plan of takingtwo brigades from the Malakand to Peshawar was thus discarded; andsuch troops of Sir Bindon Blood's force as were required for the Tirahexpedition would, with the exception of the 3rd Brigade, reach theirpoints of concentration via Nowshera. As will be seen, this plan wasstill further modified to meet the progress of events. 

I had rejoined the 3rd Brigade on the morning of the 21st, and in theevening availed myself of an escort, which was proceeding across thevalley, to ride over and see General Elles's brigade. The mobilisationof the Mohmand Field Force was marked by the employment, for the firsttime, of the Imperial Service Troops. The Maharaja of Patiala, and SirPertab Singh, were both with the force. The latter was sitting outsidehis tent, ill with fever, but cheery and brave as ever. The spectacleof this splendid Indian prince, whose magnificent uniform in the Jubileeprocession had attracted the attention of all beholders, now clothed inbusiness-like khaki, and on service at the head of his regiment, arousedthe most pleasing reflections. With all its cost in men and money, andall its military and political mistakes, the great Frontier War of 1897has at least shown on what foundations the British rule in India rests, and made clear who are our friends and who our enemies. 

I could not help thinking, that polo has had a good deal to do withstrengthening the good relations of the Indian princes and the Britishofficers. It may seem strange to speak of polo as an Imperial factor, but it would not be the first time in history that national games haveplayed a part in high politics. Polo has been the common ground on whichEnglish and Indian gentlemen have met on equal terms, and it is to thatmeeting that much mutual esteem and respect is due. Besides this, polohas been the salvation of the subaltern in India, and the young officerno longer, as heretofore, has a "centre piece" of brandy on his tablenight and day. The pony and polo stick have drawn him from his bungalowand mess-room, to play a game which must improve his nerve, his judgmentand his temper. The author of the Indian Polity asserts that the daywill come when British and native officers will serve together inordinary seniority, and on the same footing. From what I know of theBritish officer, I do not myself believe that this is possible; but ifit should ever came to pass, the way will have been prepared on the pologround. 

The camp of the 3rd Brigade was not attacked again. The tribesmen hadlearnt a bitter lesson from their experiences of the night before. Thetrenches were, however, lined at dark, and as small parties of the enemywere said to be moving about across the front, occupied by the Queen's, there was some very excellent volley firing at intervals throughout thenight. A few dropping shots came back out of the darkness, but no onewas the worse, and the majority of the force made up for the sleep theyhad lost the night before. 

The next morning Sir Bindon Blood, his staff and three squadrons of the11th Bengal Lancers, rode back through the pass of Nawagai, and joinedGeneral Jeffreys at Inayat Kila. The 3rd Brigade now left the MalakandField Force, and passed under the command of General Elles and beyondthe proper limits of this chronicle; but for the sake of completeness, and as the reader may be anxious to hear more of the fine regiment, whose astonishing fire relieved the strategic situation at Nawagai, andinflicted such terrible losses on the Hadda Mullah's adherents, I shallbriefly trace their further fortunes. 

After General Wodehouse was wounded the command of the 3rd Brigadedevolved upon Colonel Graves. They were present at the forcing of theBedmanai Pass on the 29th of September, and on the two following daysthey were employed in destroying the fortified villages in the Mitai andSuran valleys; but as these operations were unattended by much loss oflife, the whole brigade reached Shabkadr with only three casualties. Thence the Queen's were despatched to Peshawar to take part in the Tirahexpedition, in which they have added to the high reputation they hadacquired in the Malakand and Mohmand Field Forces. 

CHAPTER XIV: BACK TO THE MAMUND VALLEY

 "Again I revisit the hills where we sported, The streams where we swam, and the fields where we fought. "

 "On a Distant View of Harrow, " BYRON. 

It is with a vague and undefined feeling of satisfaction that I conductthe reader back to the entrenched camp of Inayat Kila at the entranceof the Mamund Valley, where so much happened, and with which so manymemories and experiences are associated. Now that the troops are gone, the scene of life and activity has become solitary and silent. Thegraves of the officers and men who fell there are lost in the level ofthe plain. Yet the name is still remembered in not a few English homes, nor will the tribesmen, looking at the deserted entrenchment, easilyforget the visit of the 2nd Brigade. 

When, on the afternoon of the 15th, the camp had first been pitched, only a small and hasty shelter-trench surrounded it. But as the weekspassed, the parapets grew higher, the ditches deeper, and the pits morenumerous, until the whole place became a redoubt. Traverses were builtalong the perimeter to protect the defenders from flanking fire. Greatwalls of earth and stone sheltered the horses and mules. Fifty yardsout, round the whole camp, a wire trip was carefully laid, to breaka rush, and the paths and tracks leading to the entrances had becomebeaten, level roads. The aspect of permanency was comforting. 

Since the action of the 16th September, the 2nd Brigade had been unableto move. Transport--the life and soul of an army--is an even morevital factor here than in less undeveloped countries. The mobility ofa brigade depends entirely on its pack animals. On the 14th many muleswere killed. On the 16th the field hospitals were filled with wounded. It now became impossible for the camp to move, because the woundedcould not be carried. It was impossible to leave them behind, because, deducting an adequate guard, the rest of the brigade would have been toofew for fighting. The 2nd Brigade was therefore a fixture. Its strikingpower was limited to out and home marches. The first step taken by SirBindon Blood was to restore its mobility by getting the wounded sentdown to the base. Some changes in the constitution of the force werealso made. The 11th Bengal Lancers, who now joined the Mohmand FieldForce, were succeeded by the Guides Cavalry. The 35th Sikhs, who hadsuffered such severe losses, were replaced by the 31st Punjaub Infantryfrom Panjkora. The Buffs, who were full of fever, were exchanged for theRoyal West Kent from the Malakand. No. 7 British Mountain Battery tookthe place of No. 8, which was now reduced to four guns, having lostin the week's fighting half its officers, a third of its mules, and aquarter of its men. 

Camels to carry the wounded were sent up from Panjkora. The Buffsescorted the long convoy down the line of communications. Every one incamp was sorry to see the last of them. In the fighting of the week theyhad made it clear that the British Infantry battalion is the backboneof every mixed brigade, and they shared with the Guides Infantry one ofthose enviable reputations for steadiness which are so hard to gain andso easy to lose on active service. 

On the 24th of September Sir Bindon Blood received despatches appointinghim to the command of the First Division of the Tirah ExpeditionaryForce, and as the negotiations with the Mamund Jirgahs were then inprogress, and it seemed that a settlement might be reached, he proceededwith his staff to Panjkora. Here he was on the telegraph wire, and couldcommunicate easily and quickly with India, and at the same timewatch the progress of events at Inayat Kila. Mr. Davis conducted thediplomatic relations with the Mamunds. On the 26th a Jirgah fromthe tribe came into camp. They deposited 4000 rupees as a token ofsubmission, and brought in fifty firearms. These, however, were of theoldest and most antiquated types, and were obviously not the weaponswith which so many soldiers had been killed and wounded. This waspointed out to the tribal representatives. They protested that they hadno others. They were poor men, they said, and their property was at themercy of the Government. But they had no other arms. 

The political officer was firm, and his terms were explicit. Either theymust give up the twenty-two rifles captured from the 35th Sikhs, onthe 16th, or their villages would be destroyed. No other terms would heaccept. To this they replied, that they had not got the rifles. Theyhad all been taken, they said, and I think with truth, by the Afghantribesmen from the Kunar Valley. These would not give them up. Besides--this also with truth--they had been taken in "fair war. "

One man, who had lived some years in Calcutta, was especially eloquenton the subject, and argued the case with much skill. He was however, crushed by Mr. Davies asking whether there were "no greybeards in thetribe, " and why they were "led by a babu" [a native clerk--the Orientalembodiment of Red Tape]. The discussion was extended to the wholequestion of their quarrel with the British power. They admitted havingsent their young men to attack the Malakand and Chakdara. "All the worldwas going ghaza, " they said. They could not stay behind. They alsoowned to having gone five miles from their valley to attack the camp atMarkhanai. Why had the Sirkar burnt their village? they asked. They hadonly tried to get even--for the sake of their honour. All this showed amost unsatisfactory spirit from the Government point of view, and it wasevident that the brigade could not leave the valley until the tribesmenadopted a more submissive attitude. The matter reverted to the crucialpoint. Would they give up their rifles or not? To this they repliedevasively, that they would consult their fellow-tribesmen and return ananswer on the next day. This practically amounted to a refusal, and asno reply was received on the 27th, the negotiations ceased. 

In consequence of this and of the threatening attitude of the tribesmenthroughout Dir and Bajaur, Sir Bindon Blood telegraphed to theGovernment of India and recommended the retention of a large force inthese territories. By so doing he virtually resigned the command whichawaited him in the Tirah expedition. This disinterested decision causedthe liveliest satisfaction throughout the force. The Government acceptedthe advice of their general. The Tirah force was reconstituted, andMajor-General W. P. Symons received the command of its first division. A force of eleven battalions, seven squadrons and three batteries wasplaced at Sir Bindon Blood's disposal, and he was directed to deal withthe local situation as he should see fit. He immediately ordered GeneralJeffreys to resume the punitive operations against the Mamunds. 

In pursuance of these orders, the 2nd Brigade, on the 29th, destroyedall the villages in the centre of the valley, some twelve or fourteenin number, and blew up with dynamite upwards of thirty towers and forts. The whole valley was filled with the smoke, which curled upwards indense and numerous columns, and hung like a cloud over the scene ofdestruction. The continued explosions of the demolitions resembled abombardment. The tribesmen, unable to contend with the troops in theopen, remained sullenly on the hillsides, and contented themselves withfiring from long range at the cavalry patrols. 

I feel that this is a fitting moment to discuss the questions whichvillage-burning raises. I have described with independent impartialitythe progress of the quarrel between the British and the tribesmen. Ina similar spirit I approach the examination of the methods ofoffence employed. Many misconceptions, some of which are caused by anextraordinary ignorance, exist on this subject in England. One memberof the House of Commons asked the Secretary of State whether, in thepunishment of villages, care was taken that only the houses of theguilty parties should be destroyed. He was gravely told that great carewas taken. The spectacle of troops, who have perhaps carried a villagewith the bayonet and are holding it against a vigorous counter-attack, when every moment means loss of life and increase of danger, goinground and carefully discriminating which houses are occupied by "guiltyparties, " and which by unoffending people, is sufficiently ridiculous. Another member asked, "Whether the villages were destroyed or onlythe fortifications. " "Only the fortifications, " replied the ministerguilelessly. What is the actual fact? All along the Afghan border everyman's house is his castle. The villages are the fortifications, thefortifications are the villages. Every house is loopholed, and whetherit has a tower or not depends only on its owner's wealth. A thirdlegislator, in the columns of his amusing weekly journal, discussed thequestion at some length, and commented on the barbarity of such tactics. They were not only barbarous, he affirmed, but senseless. Where did theinhabitants of the villages go? To the enemy of course! This reveals, perhaps, the most remarkable misconception of the actual facts. Thewriter seemed to imagine that the tribesmen consisted of a regular army, who fought, and a peaceful, law-abiding population, who remained attheir business, and perhaps protested against the excessive militaryexpenditure from time to time. Whereas in reality, throughout theseregions, every inhabitant is a soldier from the first day he is oldenough to hurl a stone, till the last day he has strength to pull atrigger, after which he is probably murdered as an encumbrance to thecommunity. 

Equipped with these corrected facts, I invite the reader to examine thequestion of the legitimacy of village-burning for himself. A camp of aBritish brigade, moving at the order of the Indian Government and underthe acquiescence of the people of the United Kingdom, is attacked atnight. Several valuable and expensive officers, soldiers and transportanimals are killed and wounded. The assailants retire to the hills. Thither it is impossible to follow them. They cannot be caught. Theycannot be punished. Only one remedy remains--their property must bedestroyed. [It may be of interest, to consider for a moment the contrastbetween the effects of village-burning on the Indian Frontier and inCuba. In Cuba a small section of the population are in revolt; theremainder are sympathisers. To screw these lukewarm partisans up tothe fighting-point, the insurgents destroy their villages and burn thesugar-came. This, by placing the alternative of "fight or starve" beforethe inhabitants, has the effect of driving them to take up arms againstthe Spaniards, whom they all hate, and join the rebels in the field. Thus in Cuba it is the endeavour of the Government to protect property, and of the rebels to destroy it. It was with the aim of keeping thewavering population loyal, that General Weyler collected them all intothe towns, with such painful results. His policy was cruel but sound, and, had it been accompanied by vigorous military operations, mighthave been successful. ] Their villages are made hostages for their goodbehavior. They are fully aware of this, and when they make an attack ona camp or convoy, they do it because they have considered the costand think it worth while. Of course, it is cruel and barbarous, as iseverything else in war, but it is only an unphilosophic mind that willhold it legitimate to take a man's life, and illegitimate to destroy hisproperty. The burning of mud hovels cannot at any rate be condemnedby nations whose customs of war justify the bombardment of thedwelling-houses of a city like Paris, to induce the garrison tosurrender by the sufferings of the non-combatants. 

In official parlance the burning of villages is usually expressedeuphemistically as "So many villages were visited and punished, " or, again, "The fortifications were demolished. " I do not believe in allthis circumlocution. The lack of confidence in the good sense of theBritish democracy, which the Indian Government displays, is one of itsleast admirable characteristics. Exeter Hall is not all England; and thepeople of our islands only require to have the matter put fairly beforethem to arrive at sound, practical conclusions. If this were not so, weshould not occupy our present position in the world. 

To return to the Mamund Valley. The difference between villages in theplains and those in the hills was forcibly demonstrated. On the 29thover a dozen villages in the plains were destroyed without the loss of asingle life. On the 30th the tale ran somewhat differently. The villageof Agrah adjoins the village of Zagai, the capture of which has alreadybeen recorded. It stood in a broad re-entrant of the mountains, and amidground so tangled and broken, that to move over it is difficult, and todescribe it impossible. On the steep face of the mountain great rocks, sometimes thirty feet high, lay tossed about: interspersed with thesewere huts or narrow terraces, covered with crops, and rising one abovethe other by great steps of ten or twelve feet each. The attack on sucha place was further complicated by the fact that the same re-entrantcontained another village called Gat, which had to be occupied at thesame time. This compelled the brigade to attack on a broader front thantheir numbers allowed. It was evident, as the Guides Cavalry approachedthe hills, that resistance was contemplated. Several red standardswere visible to the naked eye, and the field-glasses disclosed numerousfigures lining the ridges and spurs. The squadrons, advancing as far asthe scrub would allow them, soon drew the fire of isolated skirmishers. Several troops dismounted, and returned the salute with their carbines, and at 8. 45 a dropping fire began. The brigade now came into action inthe following formation. The cavalry, on the extreme left, covered thehead of a considerable valley, from which the flank was threatened; theGuides Infantry and the Royal West Kent Regiment prolonged the line tothe centre of the attack; the 31st Punjaub Infantry moved against thespurs to the right of the village, and the 38th Dogras were in reserve. The action was begun by the Guides Infantry storming the ridges to theleft of the enemy's position. These were strongly held and fortified bysungars, behind which the defenders were sheltered. The Guides advancedat a brisk pace, and without much firing, across the open ground tothe foot of the hills. The tribesmen, shooting from excellent cover, maintained a hot fire. The bullets kicked up the dust in all directions, or whistled viciously through the air; but the distance was short, andit was soon apparent that the enemy did not mean to abide the assault. When the troops got within 100 yards and fixed bayonets, a dozendetermined men were still firing from the sungars. The Afridi andPathan companies of the Guides, uttering shrill cries of exultation, culminating in an extraordinary yell, dashed forward, climbed the hillas only hillmen can climb, and cleared the crest. On the side of thenext hill the figures of the retreating tribesmen were visible, and manywere shot down before they could find shelter. 

It was a strange thing, to watch these conspicuous forms toiling up thehillside, dodging this way and that way, as the bullets cut into theearth around them; but with the experience of the previous ten minutesfresh in the memory, pity was not one of the emotions it aroused. A goodmany fell, subsiding peacefully, and lying quite still. Their fall wasgreeted by strange little yells of pleasure from the native soldiers. These Afridi and Pathan companies of the Guides Infantry suggest nothingso much as a well-trained pack of hounds. Their cries, their movements, and their natures are similar. 

The West Kents had now come into line on the Guides' right, and whilethe latter held the long ridge they had taken, the British regimentmoved upon the village. Here the resistance became very severe. Thetangled and broken ground, rising in terraces, sometimes ten feet high, and covered with high crops, led to fighting at close quarters withloss on both sides. Loud and continuous grew the musketry fire. The 31stPunjaub Infantry, who had ascended the spur on the right, soon joinedhands with the West Kents, and both regiments became hotly engaged. Meantime the Mountain Battery, which had come into action near thecentre, began to throw its shells over the heads of the infantry onto the higher slopes, from which the enemy were firing. It soon becameevident that the troops were too few for the work. On the left theGuides Infantry were unable to leave the ridge they had captured, lest it should be reoccupied by the enemy, who were showing in greatstrength. A gap opened in consequence, between the Guides and Royal WestKents, and this enabled the tribesmen to get round the left flank of theBritish regiment, while the 31st Punjaub Infantry, on the right, werealso turned by the enveloping enemy. It is to these circumstances thatmost of the losses were due. 

The British regiment forced its way through the village, and encounteredthe enemy strongly posted in sungars among the rocks above it. Herethey were sharply checked. The leading company had stormed one of thesefortifications, and the enemy at once retired higher up the hill. Aboutfifteen men were inside the work, and perhaps thirty more just below it. The whole place was commanded by the higher ground. The enemy's fire wasaccurate and intense. 

Of those inside, four or five were instantly killed or wounded. Thesungar was a regular trap, and the company were ordered to retire. Lieutenant Browne-Clayton remained till the last, to watch thewithdrawal, and in so doing was shot dead, the bullet severing theblood-vessels near the heart. The two or three men who remained werehanding down his body over the rock wall, when they were charged byabout thirty Ghazis and driven down the hill. A hundred and fifty yardsaway, Major Western had three companies of the West Kents in support. Heimmediately ordered Captain Styles to retake the sungar, and recoverthe body. The company charged. Captain Styles was the first to reach thestone wall, and with Lieutenant Jackson cleared it of such of the enemyas remained. Five or six men were wounded in the charge, and others fellin the sungar. The advanced position of this company was soon seen tobe untenable, and they were ordered to fall back to the edge of thevillage, where the whole regiment was hotly engaged. 

Meanwhile the 31st Punjaub Infantry, who had advanced under ColonelO'Bryen on the right, were exposed to a severe fire from a rocky ridgeon their flank. Their attack was directed against a great mass ofboulders, some of them of enormous size, which were tenaciously held bythe enemy. The fighting soon became close. The two advanced companieswere engaged at a distance of under 100 yards. Besides this the crossfire from their right flank added to their difficulties. In such aposition the presence of Colonel O'Bryen was invaluable. Moving swiftlyfrom point to point, he directed the fire and animated the spirit ofthe men, who were devoted to him. It was not long before the enemy'smarksmen began to take aim at this prominent figure. But for aconsiderable period, although bullets struck the ground everywherearound him, he remained unhurt. At last, however, he was shot throughthe body, and carried mortally wounded from the action. 

I pause to consider for a moment the conditions, and circumstances, by which the pursuit of a military career differs from all others. Inpolitical life, in art, in engineering, the man with talents who behaveswith wisdom may steadily improve his position in the world. If he makesno mistakes he will probably achieve success. But the soldier is moredependent upon external influences. The only way he can hope to riseabove the others, is by risking his life in frequent campaigns. Allhis fortunes, whatever they may be, all his position and weight in theworld, all his accumulated capital, as it were, must be staked afresheach time he goes into action. He may have seen twenty engagements, andbe covered with decorations and medals. He may be marked as a risingsoldier. And yet each time he comes under fire his chances of beingkilled are as great as, and perhaps greater than, those of the youngestsubaltern, whose luck is fresh. The statesman, who has put his powerto the test, and made a great miscalculation, may yet retrieve hisfortunes. But the indiscriminating bullet settles everything. As thepoet somewhat grimly has it:--

Stone-dead hath no better. 

Colonel O'Bryen had been specially selected, while still a young man, for the command of a battalion. He had made several campaigns. Alreadyhe had passed through the drudgery of the lower ranks of the service, and all the bigger prizes of the military profession appeared in view:and though the death in action of a colonel at the head of his regimentis as fine an end as a soldier can desire, it is mournful to record theabrupt termination of an honourable career at a point when it might havebeen of much value to the State. 

The pressure now became so strong along the whole line that thebrigadier, fearing that the troops might get seriously involved, orderedthe withdrawal to commence. The village was however burning, and theenemy, who had also suffered severely from the close fighting, did notfollow up with their usual vigour. The battery advanced to within 600yards of the enemy's line, and opened a rapid fire of shrapnel to clearthose spurs that commanded the line of retirement. The shells screamedover the heads of the West Kent Regiment, who were now clear of thehills and in front of the guns, and burst in little white puffs of smokealong the crest of the ridge, tearing up the ground into a thick cloudof dust by the hundreds of bullets they contained. 

A continuous stream of doolies and stretchers commenced to flow from thefighting line. Soon all available conveyances were exhausted, and thebodies of the wounded had to be carried over the rough ground in thearms of their comrades--a very painful process, which extorted many agroan from the suffering men. At length the withdrawal was completed, and the brigade returned to camp. The presence of the cavalry, whocovered the rear, deterred the enemy from leaving the hills. 

Riding back, I observed a gruesome sight. At the head of the column ofdoolies and stretchers were the bodies of the killed, each tied withcords upon a mule. Their heads dangled on one side and their legs onthe other. The long black hair of the Sikhs, which streamed down to theground, and was draggled with dust and blood, imparted a hideous aspectto these figures. There was no other way, however, and it was betterthan leaving their remains to be insulted and defiled by the savageswith whom we were fighting. At the entrance to the camp a large groupof surgeons--their sleeves rolled up--awaited the wounded. Two operatingtables, made of medical boxes, and covered with water-proof sheets, werealso prepared. There is a side to warfare browner than khaki. 

The casualties in the attack upon Agrah were as follows:--

 BRITISH OFFICERS. Killed--Lieut. -Col. J. L. O'Bryen, 31st Punjaub Infantry. " 2nd Lieut. W. C. Brown-Clayton, Royal West Kent. Wounded severely--Lieutenant H. Isacke, Royal West Kent. " " " E. B. Peacock, 31st Punjaub Infantry. Wounded slightly--Major W. G. B. Western, Royal West Kent. " " Captain R. C. Styles, Royal West Kent. " " " N. H. S. Lowe, Royal West Kent. " " 2nd Lieut. F. A. Jackson, Royal West Kent. 

 BRITISH SOLDIERS. Killed. Wounded. Royal West Kent. .. 3 20

 NATIVE RANKS. Killed. Wounded. Guides Cavalry. .. 0 4 31st Punjaub Infantry . 7 15 38th Dogras . .. 0 4 Total casualties, 61. 

As soon as Sir Bindon Blood, at his camp on the Panjkora, received thenews of the sharp fighting of the 30th, [After the action of the 30thof September, Lieut. -Colonel McRae, of the 45th Sikhs, was sent upto command the 31st Punjaub Infantry in the place of Lieut. -ColonelO'Bryen, and I was myself attached as a temporary measure to fillanother of the vacancies. This is, I believe, the first time a BritishCavalry officer has been attached to a native infantry regiment. Afterthe kindness and courtesy with which I was treated, I can only hope itwill not be the last. ] he decided to proceed himself to Inayat Kila withreinforcements. He arrived on the 2nd October, bringing No. 8 MountainBattery; a wing of the 24th Punjaub Infantry; and two troops of theGuides Cavalry; and having also sent orders for the Highland LightInfantry and four guns of the 10th Field Battery to follow him at once. He was determined to make a fresh attack on Agrah, and burn the villageof Gat, which had only been partially destroyed. And this attack wasfixed for the 5th. By that date the big 12-pounder guns of the FieldBattery were to have arrived, and the fire of fourteen pieces wouldhave been concentrated on the enemy's position. Every one was anxious tocarry matters to a conclusion with the tribesmen at all costs. 

On the 3rd, the force was ordered to take and burn the village ofBadelai, against which, it may be remembered, the Buffs had advanced onthe 16th, and from which they had been recalled in a hurry to supportthe 35th Sikhs. The attack and destruction of the village presentedno new features; the tribesmen offered little resistance, and retiredbefore the troops. But as soon as the brigade began its homeward march, they appeared in much larger numbers than had hitherto been seen. Asthe cavalry could not work among the nullahs and the broken ground, theenemy advanced boldly into the plain. In a great crescent, nearly fourmiles long, they followed the retiring troops. A brisk skirmish began atabout 800 yards. Both batteries came into action, each firing about90 shells. The Royal West Kent Regiment made good shooting with theirLee-Metford rifles. All the battalions of the brigade were engaged. Theenemy, whose strength was estimated to be over 3000, lost heavily, anddrew off at 2. 30, when the force returned to camp. Sir Bindon Bloodand his staff watched the operations and reconnoitered the valley. Thecasualties were as follows:--

 Royal West Kent--dangerously wounded, 1. Guides Cavalry--wounded, 2. 31st Punjaub Infantry--killed, 1; wounded, 5. Guides Infantry--wounded, 3. 38th Dogras--killed, 1; wounded, 3. Total casualties, 16. 

The next day the Highland Light Infantry and the field guns arrived. Theformer marched in over 700 strong, and made a fine appearance. They werenearly equal in numbers to any two battalions in the brigade. Sicknessand war soon reduce the fighting strength. The guns had accomplished agreat feat in getting over the difficult and roadless country. They hadhad to make their own track, and in many places the guns had been drawnby hand. The 10th Field Battery had thus gone sixty miles furtherinto the hill country than any other wheeled traffic. They had quitea reception when they arrived. The whole camp turned out to look withsatisfaction on the long polished tubes, which could throw twelve poundsa thousand yards further than the mountain guns could throw seven. Theywere, however, not destined to display their power. The Mamunds hadagain sued for peace. They were weary of the struggle. Their valley wasdesolate. The season of sowing the autumn crops approached. The arrivalof reinforcements convinced them that the Government were determinedto get their terms. Major Deane came up himself to conduct thenegotiations. Meanwhile all important operations were suspended, thoughthe foraging and "sniping" continued as usual. 

The force was now large enough for two brigades to be formed, and onthe arrival of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn it was reconstituted asfollows:--

 1st Brigade. Commanding--Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, C. B. , C. M. G. Highland Light Infantry. 31st Punjaub Infantry. 4 Cos. 24th Punjaub Infantry. 10th Field Battery. No. 7 British Mountain Battery. 

 2nd Brigade. Commanding--Brigadier-General Jeffries, C. B. The Royal West Kent. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry. No. 8 Mountain Battery. The Guides Cavalry. 

The camp was greatly extended and covered a large area of ground. In theevenings, the main street presented an animated appearance. Before thesun went down, the officers of the different regiments, distinguishedby their brightly-coloured field caps, would assemble to listen to thepipes of the Scottish Infantry, or stroll up and down discussing theevents of the day and speculating on the chances of the morrow. As theclear atmosphere of the valley became darkened by the shadows of thenight, and the colours of the hills faded into an uniform black, thegroups would gather round the various mess tents, and with vermuth, cigarettes and conversation pass away the pleasant half-hour beforedinner and "sniping" began. 

I would that it were in my power to convey to the reader, who has nothad the fortune to live with troops on service, some just appreciationof the compensations of war. The healthy, open-air life, the vividincidents, the excitement, not only of realisation, but of anticipation, the generous and cheery friendships, the chances of distinction whichare open to all, invest life with keener interests and rarer pleasures. The uncertainty and importance of the present, reduce the past andfuture to comparative insignificance, and clear the mind of minorworries. And when all is over, memories remain, which few men do nothold precious. As to the hardships, these though severe may be endured. Ascetics and recluses have in their endeavours to look beyond the gravesuffered worse things. Nor will the soldier in the pursuit of fame andthe enjoyment of the pleasures of war, be exposed to greater discomfortsthan Diogenes in his tub, or the Trappists in their monastery. Besidesall this, his chances of learning about the next world are infinitelygreater. And yet, when all has been said, we are confronted with amournful but stubborn fact. In this contrary life, so prosaic is themind of man, so material his soul, so poor his spirit, that there is noone who has been six months on active duty who is not delighted to getsafe home again, to the comfortable monotonies of peace. 

CHAPTER XV: THE WORK OF THE CAVALRY

The negotiations of the Mamunds had this time opened under morepropitious circumstances. The tribesmen were convinced by the arrival ofthe large reinforcements that the Government were in earnest. The returnof "the big general, " as they called Sir Bindon Blood, to distinguishhim from the brigadiers, impressed them with the fact that theoperations would be at once renewed, if they continued recalcitrant. They had still a few villages unburned, and these they were anxious tosave. Besides, they disliked the look of the long topes, or field guns, of whose powers they were uncertain. They therefore displayed a muchmore humble spirit. 

On the other hand, every one in the force had realised that there were"more kicks than ha'pence" to be got out of the Mamund Valley. All thevillages in the plain had been destroyed. Only a few of those in thehollows of the hills remained. To these the enemy had retired. InArrian's History of Alexander's Conquests we read the following passage:"The men in Bazira [Bazira is the same as Bajaur], despairing of theirown affairs, abandoned the city. .. And fled to the rock, as the otherbarbarians were doing. For all the inhabitants deserted the cities, and began to fly to the rock which is in their land. " Then it was thatAlexander's difficulties began. Nor need we wonder, when the historiangravely asserts that "so stupendous is the rock in this land. .. That itwas found impregnable even by Heracles, the son of Zeus. " Thus historyrepeats itself, and the people of Bajaur their tactics. There was, however, no doubt as to the ability of the brigades to take and burnany village they might select. At the same time it was certain that theywould encounter relays of Afghan tribesmen, and regular soldiers fromthe Amir's army, and that they would lose officers and men in theoperation. The matter had to be carried to a conclusion at whatevercost, but the sooner the end was reached, the better. 

But in spite of the auguries of peace, the foraging parties were usuallyfired upon, and this furnished several opportunities for the display ofthe value of the cavalry. I shall avail myself of the occasion to reviewthe performances of the mounted arm during the operations. As soon asthe brigades entered Bajaur, the 11th Bengal Lancers were employedmore and more in that legitimate duty of cavalry--reconnaissance. MajorBeatson made daily expeditions towards the various valleys and passesabout which information was needed. This use of cavalry is an entirelynew one on the frontier--it having been thought that it was dangerous toemploy them in this way. Though horsemen need good ground to fight onto advantage, they can easily move over any country, however broken, and where they are boldly used, can collect as much information as isnecessary. 

Reconnaissance is by no means the only opportunity for cavalryemployment on the frontier. They are as formidable in offensive tacticsas they are useful in collecting intelligence. 

The task which is usually confided to them in these mountain actions isto protect one of the flanks. The ground hardly ever admits of chargingin any formation, and it is necessary for the men to use their carbines. On 30th September the cavalry were so employed. On the left of thehostile position was a wide valley full of scrubby trees, and stonewalls, and occupied by large numbers of the enemy. Had these tribesmenbeen able to debouch from this valley, they would have fallen on theflank of the brigade, and the situation would have become one of danger. For five hours two weak squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were sufficientto hold them in check. 

The methods they employed are worth noticing. Little groups of six orseven men were dismounted, and these with their carbines replied to theenemy's fire. Other little groups of mounted men remained concealed innullahs or hollows, or behind obstacles. Whenever the enemy tried torush one of the dismounted parties, and to do so advanced from the badground, the mounted patrols galloped forward and chased them back tocover. The terror that these tribesmen have of cavalry contrasts withtheir general character. It was a beautiful display of cavalry tacticsin this kind of warfare, and, considering the enormous numbers of theenemy, who were thus kept from participating in the main action, itdemonstrated the power and value of the mounted arm with convincingforce. 

On the 6th of October, I witnessed some very similar work, though on asmaller scale. A squadron was engaged in covering the operations ofa foraging party. A line of patrols, moving rapidly about, presenteddifficult targets to the enemy's sharpshooters. I found the remainder ofthe squadron dismounted in rear of a large bank of stones. Twentysowars with their carbines were engaged in firing at the enemy, who hadoccupied a morcha--a small stone fort--some 300 yards away. Desultoryskirmishing continued for some time, shots being fired from the hills, half a mile away, as well as from the morcha. Bullets kept falling nearthe bank, but the cover it afforded was good and no one was hurt. Atlength word was brought that the foraging was finished and that thesquadron was to retire under cover of the infantry. Now came a moment ofsome excitement. The officer in command knew well that the instant hismen were mounted they would be fired at from every point which the enemyheld. He ordered the first troop to mount, and the second to cover theretirement. The men scrambled into their saddles, and spreading out intoan extended line cantered away towards a hollow about 300 yards distant. Immediately there was an outburst of firing. The dust rose in spurtsnear the horsemen, and the bullets whistled about their ears. No one washowever hit. Meanwhile, the remaining troop had been keeping up a rapidfire on the enemy to cover their retirement. It now became their turnto go. Firing a parting volley the men ran to their horses, mounted, andfollowed the first troop at a hand-gallop, extending into a long lineas they did so. Again the enemy opened fire, and again the dusty groundshowed that the bullets were well directed. Again, however, nobody washurt, and the sowars reached the hollow, laughing and talking in highglee. The morning's skirmish had, nevertheless, cost the squadron a manand a horse, both severely wounded. 

Such affairs as these were of almost daily occurrence during the timethat the 2nd Brigade occupied the camp at Inayat Kila. They were of thegreatest value in training the soldiers. The Guides Cavalry know allthere is to know of frontier war, but there are many other regiments whowould be made infinitely more powerful fighting organisations if theywere afforded the opportunity for such experience. 

The great feature which the war of 1897 on the Indian Frontier hasdisplayed is the extraordinary value of cavalry. At Shabkadr a chargeof the 13th Bengal Lancers was more than successful. In the Swat Valley, during the relief of Chakdara, the Guides Cavalry and 11th BengalLancers inflicted the most terrible loss on the enemy. To quote thewords of Sir Bindon Blood's official report to the Adjutant-General, these regiments, "eager for vengeance, pursued, cut up and spearedthem in every direction, leaving their bodies thickly strewn over thefields. " Again, after the action of Landakai, the cavalry made a mostvigorous pursuit and killed large numbers of the enemy. While I was withthe Malakand Field Force, I was a witness of the constant employmentof the cavalry, and was several times informed by general officers thatthey would gladly have a larger number at their disposal. The reader mayrecall some of the numerous instances which these pages have recorded ofcavalry work. On the morning of the 15th September, it was the cavalrywho were able to catch up the enemy before they could reach the hills, and take some revenge for the losses of the night. In the action of the16th, the charge of Captain Cole's squadron brought the whole attackof the enemy to a standstill, and enabled the infantry by their fire toconvert the hesitation of the tribesmen into a retreat. Indeed, in everyfight in the Mamund Valley, the cavalry were the first in, and the lastout. In the official despatches Sir Bindon Blood thus alludes to thework of the cavalry:--"I would now wish to invite attention to theinvaluable nature of the services rendered by the cavalry. At Nawagai, three squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers swept the country everywherethat cavalry could go, carrying out reconnaissances, protectingsignalling parties and watching every movement of the enemy. In theMamund Valley a squadron of the same regiment, under Captain E. H. Cole, took part in every engagement that occurred while they were there, establishing such a reputation that the enemy, even when in greatlysuperior numbers, never dared to face them in the open. Afterwards, whenCaptain Cole and his men left the Mamund Valley, the Guides Cavalry, under Lieut. -Col. Adams, being in greater strength, acted still moreeffectually in the same manner, showing tactical skill of a high order, combined with conspicuous gallantry. "--Official Despatches. From Gazetteof India, 3rd December, 1897. 

There has been a boom in cavalry. But one section, and that the mostimportant, has been deprived of its share in the good fortune. Theauthorities have steadily refused to allow any British cavalry to crossthe frontier. Of course this is defended on the ground of expense. "British cavalry costs so much, " it is said, "and natives do the workjust as well. " "Better, " say some. But it is a poor kind of economy thusto discourage a most expensive and important branch of the service. Theambition that a young officer entering the army ought to set before him, is to lead his own men in action. This ought to inspire his life, andanimate his effort. "Stables" will no longer be dull, when he realisesthat on the fitness of his horses, his life and honour may one daydepend. If he thinks that his men may soon be asked to stand beside himat a pinch, he will no longer be bored by their interests and affairs. But when he realises that all is empty display, and that his regiment isa sword too costly to be drawn, he naturally loses keenness and betakeshimself to polo as a consolation. It is a good one. 

It was my fortune to meet many young men in frontier regiments, bothcavalry and infantry, who had already served in three, and even four, campaigns. Daring, intelligent and capable, they are proofs of the valueof their training, and are fit to lead their men under any conditions, and in any country. Subalterns in British cavalry regiments dooccasionally manage to see a little active service as transportofficers, signalling officers, war correspondents, or on the staff;but to lead in the field the men they have trained in peace, is apossibility which is never worth contemplating. To the young man whowants to enjoy himself, to spend a few years agreeably in a militarycompanionship, to have an occupation--the British cavalry will besuited. But to the youth who means to make himself a professionalsoldier, an expert in war, a specialist in practical tactics, whodesires a hard life of adventure and a true comradeship in arms, I wouldrecommend the choice of some regiment on the frontier, like those fineones I have seen, the Guides and the 11th Bengal Lancers. 

I am aware that those who criticise an existing state of things oughtto be prepared with some constructive legislation which would remedy theevils they denounce. Though it is unlikely that the Government of Indiawill take my advice, either wholly or in good part, I hereby exhort themto quit the folly of a "penny wise" policy, and to adhere consistentlyto the principles of employing British and native troops in India ina regular proportion. That is to say, that when two native cavalryregiments have been sent on service across the frontier, the thirdcavalry regiment so sent shall be British. 

Besides this, in order to give cavalry officers as many opportunitiesof seeing active service as possible, subalterns should be allowed tovolunteer for emergency employment with native cavalry. I have talked toseveral officers who command native cavalry regiments, and they tell methat such an arrangement would work excellently, and that, as they arealways short of officers, it would supply a want. I would suggest thatsubalterns should, with the approval of their colonels, be attached tothe native regiment, and after passing in Hindustani and being reportedas qualified to serve with the native troops, be considered availablefor employment as described. I shall be told there are financialdifficulties. I do not believe this. There are plenty of cavalrysubalterns whose eagerness to see service is so strong, that they wouldsubmit to any arrangement that the rapacity of Government might impose. Indeed there is no reason that an actual economy should not be effected. The sums of money that the Indian Government offer, as rewards forofficers who can speak Hindustani, have not hitherto tempted manycavalry officers to make a study of the language. Here is an incentive, more powerful and costing nothing. 

To be technical is, I am aware, a serious offence, and I realise that ifthis book ever obtained so evil a reputation it would be shunned, as theHouse of Commons is shunned on a Service night. I have strayed faraway from the Malakand Field Force into the tangled paths of militarycontroversy, and I must beg the reader to forgive, as he will surelyforget, what has been written. 

The fighting described in the last chapter, and the continual drain ofdisease, had again filled the field hospitals, and in order to preservethe mobility of the force, it was decided to send all sick and woundeddown to the base at once. The journey--over 100 miles by road--wouldtake nearly a fortnight, and the jolting and heat made such anexperience a painful and weary one to injured men. But the sternnecessities of war render these things inevitable, and the desire of themen to get nearer home soothes much of their suffering. The convoy ofsick and wounded was to be escorted as far as the Panjkora River by theRoyal West Kent, who were themselves in need of some recuperation. Tocampaign in India without tents is always a trial to a British regiment;and when it is moved to the front from some unhealthy station likePeshawar, Delhi, or Mian Mir, and the men are saturated with fever andweakened by the summer heats, the sick list becomes long and serious. Typhoid from drinking surface water, and the other various kinds offever which follow exposure to the heats of the day or the chills ofthe night, soon take a hundred men from the fighting strength, and thegeneral of an Indian frontier force has to watch with equal care themovements of the enemy and the fluctuations of the hospital returns. Assoon, therefore, as Sir Bindon Blood saw that the Mamunds were desirousof peace, and that no further operations against them were probable, hesent one of his British regiments to their tents near the Panjkora. 

About sixty wounded men from the actions of 30th September and 3rdOctober, and the same number of sick, formed the bulk of the convoy. Theslight cases are carried on camels, in cradles made by cutting a nativebedstead in two, and called "Kajawas. " The more serious cases arecarried in doolies or litters, protected from the sun by white curtains, and borne by four natives. Those who are well enough ride on mules. Theinfantry escort is disposed along the line with every precaution thatcan be suggested, but the danger of an attack upon the long stragglingstring of doolies and animals in difficult and broken ground is a veryreal and terrible one. 

The cheeriness and patience of the wounded men exceeds belief. Perhapsit is due to a realisation of the proximity in which they have stood todeath; perhaps partly to that feeling of relief with which a man turnsfor a spell from war to peace. In any case it is remarkable. A poorfellow--a private in the Buffs--was hit at Zagai, and had his armamputated at the shoulder. I expressed my sympathy, and he replied, philosophically: "You can't make omelettes without breaking eggs, " andafter a pause added, with much satisfaction, "The regiment did well thatday. " He came of a fighting stock, but I could not help speculating onthe possible future which awaited him. Discharge from the service asmedically unfit, some miserable pension insufficient to command anypleasures but those of drink, a loafer's life, and a pauper's grave. Perhaps the regiment--the officers, that is to say--would succeed ingetting him work, and would from their own resources supplement hispension. But what a wretched and discreditable system is that, by whichthe richest nation in the world neglects the soldiers who have served itwell, and which leaves to newspaper philanthropy, to local institutions, and to private charity, a burden which ought to be proudly borne by theState. 

Starting at six, the column reached Jar, a march of eight miles, atabout ten o'clock. Here we were joined by a wing of the 24th PunjaubInfantry, who were coming up to relieve the Royal West Kents. The campat Jar has the disadvantage of being commanded by a hill to the north, and the Salarzais, another pestilent tribe, whose name alone is aninfliction, delight to show their valour by firing at the troops duringthe night. Of course this could be prevented by moving the camp out ofrange of this hill. But then, unfortunately, it would be commanded byanother hill to the south, from which the Shamozai section of the UtmanKhels--to whom my former remarks also apply--would be able to amusethemselves. The inconvenience of the situation had therefore to befaced. 

We had not been long in camp before the eldest son of the Khan of Jar, who had been comparatively loyal during the operations, came to informthe colonel in command that there would be "sniping" that night. Certainevil men, he said, had declared their intention of destroying the force, but he, the heir-apparent to the Khanate of Jar, and the ally of theEmpress, would protect us. Four pickets of his own regular army shouldwatch the camp, that our slumbers might not be disturbed, and whenchallenged by the sentries, they would reply, "chokidar" (watchman). This all seemed very satisfactory, but we entrenched ourselves as usual, not, as we explained, because we doubted our protector's powers orinclinations, buy merely as a matter of form. 

At midnight precisely, the camp was awakened by a dozen shots in rapidsuccession. The khan's pickets could be heard expostulating with theenemy, who replied by jeers and bitter remarks. 

The firing continued for an hour, when the "snipers, " having satisfiedtheir honour, relieved their feelings and expended their cartridges, went away rejoicing. The troops throughout remained silent, andvouchsafed no reply. 

It may seem difficult to believe that fifty bullets could fall in acamp, only 100 yards square--crowded with animals and men--without anyother result than to hit a single mule in the tail. Such was, however, the fact. This shows of what value, a little active service is to thesoldier. The first time he is under fire, he imagines himself to be ingreat danger. He thinks that every bullet is going to hit him, and thatevery shot is aimed at him. Assuredly he will be killed in a moment. Ifhe goes through this ordeal once or twice, he begins to get some idea ofthe odds in his favour. He has heard lots of bullets and they have nothurt him. He will get home safely to his tea this evening, just ashe did the last time. He becomes a very much more effective fightingmachine. 

From a military point of view, the perpetual frontier wars in one corneror other of the Empire are of the greatest value. This fact may one daybe proved, should our soldiers ever be brought into contact with somepeace-trained, conscript army, in anything like equal numbers. 

Though the firing produced very little effect on the troops--most ofwhom had been through the experience several times before--it wasa severe trial to the wounded, whose nerves, shattered by pain andweakness, were unable to bear the strain. The surgeon in charge--MajorTyrell--told me that the poor fellows quivered at every shot as if inanticipation of a blow. A bullet in the leg will made a brave man acoward. A blow on the head will make a wise man a fool. Indeed I haveread that a sufficiency of absinthe can make a good man a knave. Thetriumph of mind over matter does not seem to be quite complete as yet. 

I saw a strange thing happen, while the firing was going on, whichmay amuse those who take an interest in the habits and development ofanimals. Just in front of my tent, which was open, was a clear space, occupied by a flock of goats and sheep. The brilliant moonlight madeeverything plainly visible. Every time a bullet whistled over them orstruck the ground near, they ducked and bobbed in evident terror. Anofficer, who also noticed this, told me it was the first time they hadbeen under fire; and I have been wondering ever since, whether thisexplains their fear, or makes it more inexplicable. 

I have devoted a good deal in this chapter to the account of the"sniping" at Jar on the night of the 9th of October, and, perhaps, acritic may inquire, why so much should be written about so common anincident. It is, however, because this night firing is so common afeature, that I feel no picture of the war on the Indian frontier wouldbe complete without some account of it. 

The next day we crossed the Panjkora River, and I started to ride downthe line of communications to the base at Nowshera. At each stage someof the comforts of civilisation and peace reappeared. At Panjkora wetouched the telegraph wire; at Sarai were fresh potatoes; ice was to behad at Chakdara; a comfortable bed at the Malakand; and at length, atNowshera, the railway. But how little these things matter after all. When they are at hand, they seem indispensable, but when they cannot beobtained, they are hardly missed. A little plain food, and a philosophictemperament, are the only necessities of life. 

I shall not take the reader farther from the scene of action. He is freeand his imagination may lead him back to the highland valleys, where hemay continue for a space among camps and men, and observe the conclusionof the drama. 

CHAPTER XVI: SUBMISSION

 "Their eyes were sunken and weary With a sort of listless woe, And they looked from their desolate eyrie Over the plains below. 

 "Two had wounds from a sabre, And one from an Enfield Ball. "

 "Rajpoot Rebels, " LYALL. 

At last the negotiations with the Mamunds began to reach a conclusion. The tribe were really desirous of peace, and prepared to make anysacrifices to induce the brigades to leave the valley. The Khan of Kharnow proved of valuable assistance. He consistently urged them to makepeace with the Sirkar, and assured them that the troops would not goaway until they had their rifles back. Finally the Mamunds said theywould get the rifles. But the path of repentance was a stony one. On thevery night that the tribesmen decided for peace at any price, a thousandwarlike Afghans, spoiling for a fight, arrived from the Kunar Valley, on the other side of the mountains, and announced their intention ofattacking the camp at once. The Mamunds expostulated with them. Theretainers of the Khan of Khar implored them not to be so rash. In theend these unwelcome allies were persuaded to depart. But that night thecamp was warned that an attack was probable. The inlying pickets wereaccordingly doubled, and every man slept in his clothes, so as to beready. The pathos of the situation was provided by the fact, that theMamunds were guarding us from our enemies. The wretched tribe, ratherthan face a renewal of hostilities, had posted pickets all round thecamp to drive away "snipers" and other assailants. Their sincerity wasbeyond suspicion. 

The next day the first instalment of rifles was surrendered. FifteenMartini-Henrys taken on the 16th from the 35th Sikhs were brought intocamp, by the Khan of Khar's men, and deposited in front of the general'stent. Nearly all were hacked and marked by sword cuts, showing thattheir owners, the Sikhs, had perished fighting to the last. Perhaps, these firearms had cost more in blood and treasure than any others evermade. The remainder of the twenty-one were promised later, and havesince all been surrendered. But the rifles as they lay on the groundwere a bitter comment on the economic aspect of the "Forward Policy. "These tribes have nothing to surrender but their arms. To extort thesefew, had taken a month, had cost many lives, and thousands of pounds. Ithad been as bad a bargain as was ever made. People talk glibly of "thetotal disarmament of the frontier tribes" as being the obvious policy. No doubt such a result would be most desirable. But to obtain it wouldbe as painful and as tedious an undertaking, as to extract the stings ofa swarm of hornets, with naked fingers. 

After the surrender of the rifles, the discussion of terms proceededwith smoothness. Full jirgahs were sent to the camp from the tribe, andgradually a definite understanding was reached. The tribesmen bewailedthe losses they had sustained. Why, they asked, had the Sirkar visitedthem so heavily? Why, replied Major Deane, had they broken the peace andattacked the camp? The elders of the tribe, following the practice ofall communities, threw the blame on their "young men. " These had donethe evil, they declared. All had paid the penalty. At length definiteterms were agreed to, and a full durbar was arranged for the 11th of themonth for their ratification. 

Accordingly on that date, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, a largeand representative jirgah of Mamunds, accompanied by the Khans of Khar, Jar and Nawagai, arrived at the village of Nawa Kila, about half a milefrom the camp. At three o'clock Sir Bindon Blood, with Major Deane, Chief Political Officer; Mr. Davis, Assistant Political Officer; most ofthe Headquarters staff, and a few other officers, started, escorted bya troop of the Guides Cavalry, for the durbar. The general on arrivalshook hands with the friendly khans, much to their satisfaction, andtook a seat which had been provided. The tribesmen formed three sides ofa square. The friendly khans were on the left with their retainers. The Mamund jirgahs filled two other sides. Sir Bindon Blood, with MajorDeane on his left and his officers around him, occupied the fourth side. 

Then the Mamunds solemnly tendered their submission. They expressedtheir deep regret at their action, and deplored the disasters that hadbefallen them. They declared, they had only fought because they fearedannexation. They agreed to expel the followers of Umra Khan fromthe valley. They gave security for the rifles that had not yet beensurrendered. They were then informed that as they had suffered severepunishment and had submitted, the Sirkar would exact no fine or furtherpenalty from them. At this they showed signs of gratification. Thedurbar, which had lasted fifteen minutes, was ended by the whole of thetribesmen swearing with uplifted hands to adhere to the terms and keepthe peace. They were then dismissed. 

The losses sustained by the Mamunds in the fighting were ascertained tobe 350 killed, besides the wounded, with whom the hill villages were allcrowded, and who probably amounted to 700 or 800. This estimate takes noaccount of the casualties among the transfrontier tribesmen, which werepresumably considerable, but regarding which no reliable informationcould be obtained. Sir Bindon Blood offered them medical aid for theirwounded, but this they declined. They could not understand the motive, and feared a stratagem. What the sufferings of these wretched men musthave been, without antiseptics or anaesthetics, is terrible to thinkof. Perhaps, however, vigorous constitutions and the keen air of themountains were Nature's substitutes. 

Thus the episode of the Mamund Valley came to an end. On the morning ofthe 12th, the troops moved out of the camp at Inayat Kila for the lasttime, and the long line of men, guns and transport animals, trailedslowly away across the plain of Khar. The tribesmen gathered on thehills to watch the departure of their enemies, but whatever feelings ofsatisfaction they may have felt at the spectacle, were dissipated whenthey turned their eyes towards their valley. Not a tower, not a fortwas to be seen. The villages were destroyed. The crops had been trampleddown. They had lost heavily in killed and wounded, and the winter wasat hand. No defiant shots pursued the retiring column. The ferociousMamunds were weary of war. 

And as the soldiers marched away, their reflections could not have beenwholly triumphant. For a month they had held Inayat Kila, and duringthat month they had been constantly fighting. The Mamunds were crushed. The Imperial power had been asserted, but the cost was heavy. Thirty-oneofficers and 251 men had been killed and wounded out of a fighting forcethat had on no occasion exceeded 1200 men. 

The casualties of General Jeffrey's brigade in the Mamund Valley were asfollows:--

 British Officers. .. . Killed or died of wounds 7 " " . .. . Wounded. .. . 17 " Soldiers. .. . Killed . .. . 7 " " . .. . Wounded. .. . 41 Native Officers . .. . Killed . .. . 0 " " . .. . Wounded. .. . 7 " Soldiers . .. . Killed . .. . 48 " " . .. . Wounded. .. . 147 Followers . .. .. . . .. .. 8 ---- Total. .. .. 282

 Horses and mules. .. .. . .. .. 150

The main cause of this long list of casualties was, as I have alreadywritten, the proximity of the Afghan border. But it would be unjust andungenerous to deny to the people of the Mamund Valley that reputationfor courage, tactical skill and marksmanship, which they have so welldeserved. During an indefinite period they had brawled and fought inthe unpenetrated gloom of barbarism. At length they struck a blow atcivilisation, and civilisation, though compelled to record the odiousvices that the fierce light of scientific war exposed, will yetungrudgingly admit that they are a brave and warlike race. Their namewill live in the minds of men for some years, even in this busy century, and there are families in England who will never forget it. But perhapsthe tribesmen, sitting sullenly on the hillsides and contemplating theruin of their habitations, did not realise all this, or if they did, still felt regret at having tried conclusions with the British Raj. Their fame had cost them dear. Indeed, as we have been told, "nothing isso expensive as glory. "

The troops camped on the night of the 12th at Jar, and on the followingday moved up the Salarzai Valley to Matashah. Here they remained fornearly a week. This tribe, terrified by the punishment of the Mamunds, made no regular opposition, though the camp was fired into regularlyevery night by a few hot-blooded "snipers. " Several horses andmules were hit, and a sowar in the Guides Cavalry was wounded. Thereconnaissances in force, which were sent out daily to the farther endof the valley, were not resisted in any way, and the tribal jirgahsused every effort to collect the rifles which they had been ordered tosurrender. By the 19th all were given up, and on the 20th the troopsmoved back to Jar. There Sir Bindon Blood received the submission of theUtman Khels, who brought in the weapons demanded from them, and paid afine as an indemnity for attacking the Malakand and Chakdara. 

The soldiers, who were still in a fighting mood, watched with impatiencethe political negotiations which produced so peaceful a triumph. 

All Indian military commanders, from Lord Clive and Lord Clive's timesdownwards, have inveighed against the practice of attaching civilofficers to field forces. It has been said, frequently with truth, that they hamper the military operations, and by interfering with thegenerals, infuse a spirit of vacillation into the plans. Although thepolitical officers of the Malakand Field Force were always personallypopular with their military comrades, there were many who criticisedtheir official actions, and disapproved of their presence. The duties ofthe civil officers, in a campaign, are twofold: firstly, to negotiate, and secondly, to collect information. It would seem that for the firstof these duties they are indispensable. The difficult language andpeculiar characters of the tribesmen are the study of a lifetime. Aknowledge of the local conditions, of the power and influence ofthe khans, or other rulers of the people; of the general history andtraditions of the country, is a task which must be entirely specialised. Rough and ready methods are excellent while the tribes resist, butsomething more is required when they are anxious to submit. Men areneeded who understand the whole question, and all the details of thequarrel, between the natives and the Government, and who can in somemeasure appreciate both points of view. I do not believe that such areto be found in the army. The military profession is alone sufficient toengross the attention of the most able and accomplished man. 

Besides this I cannot forget how many quiet nights the 2nd Brigadeenjoyed at Inayat Kila when the "snipers" were driven away by thefriendly pickets; how many fresh eggs and water melons were procured, and how easily letters and messages were carried about the country [Ascorrespondent of the Pioneer, I invariably availed myself of this methodof sending the press telegrams to the telegraph office at Panjkora, andthough the route lay through twenty miles of the enemy's country, thesemessages not only never miscarried, but on several occasions arrivedbefore the official despatches or any heliographed news. By similaragency the bodies of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Bryen and LieutenantBrowne-Clayton, killed in the attack upon Agrah on the 30th ofSeptember, were safely and swiftly conveyed to Malakand for burial. ]through the relations which the political officers, Mr. Davis and Mr. Gunter, maintained, under very difficult circumstances, with thesetribesmen, who were not actually fighting us. 

Respecting the second duty, it is difficult to believe that thecollection of information as to the numbers and intentions of theenemy would not be better and more appropriately carried out by theIntelligence Department and the cavalry. Civil officers should notbe expected to understand what kind of military information a generalrequires. It is not their business. I am aware that Mr. Davis procuredthe most correct intelligence about the great night attack at Nawagai, and thus gave ample warning to Sir Bindon Blood. But on the other handthe scanty information available about the Mamunds, previous to theaction of the 16th, was the main cause of the severe loss sustained onthat day. Besides, the incessant rumours of a night attack on InayatKila, kept the whole force in their boots about three nights each week. Civil officers should discharge diplomatic duties, and military officersthe conduct of war. And the collection of information is one of themost important of military duties. Our Pathan Sepoys, the IntelligenceBranch, and an enterprising cavalry, should obtain all the facts thata general requires to use in his plans. At least the responsibility canthus be definitely assigned. 

On one point, however, I have no doubts. The political officers must beunder the control of the General directing the operations. There must beno "Imperium in imperio. " In a Field Force one man only can command--andall in it must be under his authority. Differences, creatingdifficulties and leading to disasters, will arise whenever the politicalofficers are empowered to make arrangements with the tribesmen, withoutconsulting and sometimes without even informing the man on whosedecisions the success of the war and the lives of the soldiers directlydepend. 

The subject is a difficult one to discuss, without wounding the feelingsof those gallant men, who take all the risks of war, while the campaignlasts, and, when it is over, live in equal peril of their lives amongthe savage populations, whose dispositions they study, and whose tempersthey watch. I am glad to have done with it. 

During the stay of the brigades in Bajaur, there had been several casesof desertion among the Afridi Sepoys. On one occasion five men of the24th Punjaub Infantry, who were out on picket, departed in a body, andtaking their arms with them set off towards Tirah and the Khyber Pass. As I have recorded several instances of gallantry and conduct among theAfridis and Pathans in our ranks, it is only fitting that the reverseof the medal should be shown. The reader, who may be interested inthe characters of the subject races of the Empire, and of the nativesoldiers, on whom so much depends, will perhaps pardon a somewhat longdigression on the subject of Pathans and Sikhs. 

It should not be forgotten by those who make wholesale assertions oftreachery and untrustworthiness against the Afridi and Pathan soldiers, that these men are placed in a very strange and false position. They areasked to fight against their countrymen and co-religionists. On theone side are accumulated all the forces of fanaticism, patriotism andnatural ties. On the other military associations stand alone. It is nodoubt a grievous thing to be false to an oath of allegiance, but thereare other obligations not less sacred. To respect an oath is a dutywhich the individual owes to society. Yet, who would by his evidencesend a brother to the gallows? The ties of nature are older and takeprecedence of all other human laws. When the Pathan is invited tosuppress his fellow-countrymen, or even to remain a spectator of theirsuppression, he finds himself in a situation at which, in the wordsof Burke, "Morality is perplexed, reason staggered, and from whichaffrighted nature recoils. "

There are many on the frontier who realise these things, and whosympathise with the Afridi soldier in his dilemma. An officer of theGuides Infantry, of long experience and considerable distinction, whocommands both Sikhs and Afridis, and has led both many times in action, writes as follows: "Personally, I don't blame any Afridis who desertto go and defend their own country, now that we have invaded it, and Ithink it is only natural and proper that they should want to do so. "

Such an opinion may be taken as typical of the views of a great numberof officers, who have some title to speak on the subject, as it is oneon which their lives might at any moment depend. 

The Sikh is the guardian of the Marches. He was originally invented tocombat the Pathan. His religion was designed to be diametrically opposedto Mahommedanism. It was a shrewd act of policy. Fanaticism was met byfanaticism. Religious abhorrence was added to racial hatred. The Pathaninvaders were rolled back to the mountains, and the Sikhs establishedthemselves at Lahore and Peshawar. The strong contrast, and much of theanimosity, remain to-day. The Sikh wears his hair down to his waist; thePathan shaves his head. The Sikh drinks what he will; the Pathan isan abstainer. The Sikh is burnt after death; the Pathan would be thusdeprived of Paradise. As a soldier the Pathan is a finer shot, a hardierman, a better marcher, especially on the hillside, and possibly an evenmore brilliant fighter. He relies more on instinct than education: waris in his blood; he is a born marksman, but he is dirty, lazy and aspendthrift. 

In the Sikh the more civilised man appears. He does not shoot naturally, but he learns by patient practice. He is not so tough as the Pathan, buthe delights in feats of strength--wrestling, running, or swimming. He isa much cleaner soldier and more careful. He is frequently parsimonious, and always thrifty, and does not generally feed himself as well as thePathan. [Indeed in some regiments the pay of very thin Sikhs is giventhem in the form of food, and they have to be carefully watched by theirofficers till they get fat and strong. ]

There are some who say that the Sikh will go on under circumstanceswhich will dishearten and discourage his rival, and that if the latterhas more dash he has less stamina. The assertion is not supported byfacts. In 1895, when Lieut. -Colonel Battye was killed near the PanjkoraRiver and the Guides were hard pressed, the subadar of the Afridicompany, turning to his countrymen, shouted: "Now, then, Afridi folk ofthe Corps of Guides, the Commanding Officer's killed, now's the timeto charge!" and the British officers had the greatest difficulty inrestraining these impetuous soldiers from leaving their position, andrushing to certain death. The story recalls the speech of the famouscavalry colonel at the action of Tamai, when the squares were seen to bebroken, and an excited and demoralised correspondent galloped wildly upto the squadrons, declaring that all was lost. "How do you mean, 'all'slost'? Don't you see the 10th Hussars are here?" There are men in theworld who derive as stern an exultation from the proximity of disasterand ruin as others from success, and who are more magnificent in defeatthan others are in victory. Such spirits are undoubtedly to be foundamong the Afridis and Pathans. 

I will quote, in concluding this discussion, the opinion of an oldGurkha subadar who had seen much fighting. He said that he liked theSikhs better, but would sooner have Afridis with him at a pinch than anyother breed of men in India. It is comfortable to reflect, that both areamong the soldiers of the Queen. 

Although there were no Gurkhas in the Malakand Field Force, it isimpossible to consider Indian fighting races without alluding to thesewicked little men. In appearance they resemble a bronze Japanese. Small, active and fierce, ever with a cheery grin on their broad faces, theycombine the dash of the Pathan with the discipline of the Sikh. Theyspend all their money on food, and, unhampered by religion, drink, smokeand swear like the British soldier, in whose eyes they find more favourthan any other--as he regards them--breed of "niggers. " They are puremercenaries, and, while they welcome the dangers, they dislike theprolongation of a campaign, being equally eager to get back to theirwives and to the big meat meals of peace time. 

After the Utman Khels had been induced to comply with the terms, thebrigades recrossed the Panjkora River, and then marching by easy stagesdown the line of communications, returned to the Malakand. The Guides, moving back to Mardan, went into cantonments again, and turned in amoment from war to peace. The Buffs, bitterly disappointed at havinglost their chance of joining in the Tirah expedition, remained atMalakand in garrison. A considerable force was retained near Jalala, toawait the issue of the operations against the Afridis, and to be readyto move against the Bunerwals, should an expedition be necessary. 

Here we leave the Malakand Field Force. It may be that there is yetanother chapter of its history which remains to be written, and thatthe fine regiments of which it is composed will, under their trustedcommander, have other opportunities of playing the great game of war. If that be so, the reader shall decide whether the account shall prolongthe tale I have told, or whether the task shall fall to another hand. [It is an excellent instance of the capricious and haphazard manner inwhich honours and rewards are bestowed in the army, that the operationsin the Mamund Valley and throughout Bajaur are commemorated by nodistinctive clasp. The losses sustained by the Brigade were indisputablymost severe. The result was successful. The conduct of the troops hasbeen officially commended. Yet the soldiers who were engaged in all therough fighting I have described in the last eight chapters have beenexcluded from any of the special clasps which have been struck. Theyshare the general clasp with every man who crossed the frontier and withsome thousands who never saw a shot fired. ]

CHAPTER XVII: MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

 ". .. And thou hast talk'd Of sallies and retires, of trenches, tents, Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets, Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin. "

 "Henry IV. , " Part I. , Act ii. , Sc. 3. 

It may at first seem that a chapter wholly devoted to militaryconsiderations is inappropriate to a book which, if it is to enjoy anymeasure of success, must be read by many unconnected with the army. ButI remember that in these days it is necessary for every one, who meansto be well informed, to have a superficial knowledge of every one else'sbusiness. Encouraged also by what Mr. Gladstone has called "the growingmilitarism of the times, " I hope that, avoiding technicalities, it maybe of some general interest to glance for a moment at the frontier warfrom a purely professional point of view. My observations must be takenas applying to the theatre of the war I have described, but I do notdoubt that many of them will be applicable to the whole frontier. 

The first and most important consideration is transport. Nobody who hasnot seen for himself can realise what a great matter this is. I wellrecall my amazement, when watching a camel convoy more than a mile and ahalf long, escorted by half a battalion of infantry. I was informedthat it contained only two days' supplies for one brigade. People talklightly of moving columns hither and thither, as if they were mobilegroups of men, who had only to march about the country and fightthe enemy wherever found, and very few understand that an army is aponderous mass which drags painfully after it a long chain of advanceddepots, stages, rest camps, and communications, by which it is securelyfastened to a stationary base. In these valleys, where wheeled trafficis impossible, the difficulties and cost of moving supplies areenormous; and as none, or very few, are to be obtained within thecountry, the consideration is paramount. Mule transport is for manyreasons superior to camel transport. The mule moves faster and cantraverse more difficult ground. He is also more hardy and keeps inbetter condition. When Sir Bindon Blood began his advance against theMohmands he equipped his 2nd Brigade entirely with mules. It was thusfar more mobile, and was available for any rapid movement that mightbecome necessary. To mix the two--camels and mules--appears to combinethe disadvantages of both, and destroy the superiority of either. 

I have already described the Indian service camp and the "sniping"without which no night across the frontier could be complete. I shalltherefore only notice two points, which were previously omitted, as theylooked suspiciously technical. As the night firing is sometimes variedby more serious attacks, and even actual assaults and sword rushes, itis thought advisable to have the ditch of the entrenchment towards theenemy. Modern weapons notwithstanding, the ultimate appeal is tothe bayonet, and the advantage of being on the higher ground is thenconsiderable. 

When a battery forms part of the line round a camp, infantry soldiersshould be placed between the guns. Artillery officers do not like this;but, though they are very good fellows, there are some things in whichit is not well to give way to them. Every one is prone to over-estimatethe power of his arm. 

In the Mamund Valley all the fighting occurred in capturing villages, which lay in rocky and broken ground in the hollows of the mountains, and were defended by a swarm of active riflemen. Against the quicklymoving figures of the enemy it proved almost useless to fire volleys. The tribesmen would dart from rock to rock, exposing themselves only foran instant, and before the attention of a section could be directed tothem and the rifles aimed, the chance and the target would have vanishedtogether. Better results were obtained by picking out good shots andgiving them permission to fire when they saw their opportunity, withoutwaiting for the word of command. But speaking generally, infantry shouldpush on to the attack with the bayonet without wasting much time infiring, which can only result in their being delayed under the fire of awell-posted enemy. 

After the capture and destruction of the village, the troops had alwaysto return to camp, and a retirement became necessary. The difficulty ofexecuting such an operation in the face of an active and numerous enemy, armed with modern rifles, was great. I had the opportunity of witnessingsix of these retirements from the rear companies. Five were fortunateand one was disastrous, but all were attended with loss, and asexperienced officers have informed me, with danger. As long as no one ishit everything is successful, but as soon as a few men are wounded, thedifficulties begin. No sooner has a point been left--a knoll, a patch ofcorn, some rocks, or any other incident of ground--than it is seized bythe enemy. With their excellent rifles, they kill or wound two or threeof the retiring company, whose somewhat close formation makes them agood mark. Now, in civilised war these wounded would be left on theground, and matters arranged next day by parley. But on the frontier, where no quarter is asked or given, to carry away the wounded is asacred duty. It is also the strenuous endeavour of every regimentto carry away their dead. The vile and horrid mutilations which thetribesmen inflict on all bodies that fall into their hands, and theinsults to which they expose them, add, to unphilosophic minds, anotherterror to death. Now, it takes at least four men, and very often more, to carry away a body. Observe the result. Every man hit, means fiverifles withdrawn from the firing line. Ten men hit, puts a company outof action, as far as fighting power is concerned. The watchful enemypress. The groups of men bearing the injured are excellent targets. Presently the rear-guard is encumbered with wounded. Then a vigorouscharge with swords is pushed home. Thus, a disaster occurs. 

Watching the progress of events, sometimes from one regiment, sometimesfrom another, I observed several ways by which these difficulties couldbe avoided. The Guides, long skilled in frontier war, were the mostvaluable instructors. As the enemy seize every point as soon as itis left, all retirements should be masked by leaving two or three menbehind from each company. These keep up a brisk fire, and after thewhole company have taken up a new position, or have nearly done so, they run back and join them. Besides this, the fire of one company inretiring should always be arranged to cover another, and at no moment ina withdrawal should the firing ever cease. The covering company shouldbe actually in position before the rear company begins to move, andshould open fire at once. I was particularly struck on 18th September bythe retirement of the Guides Infantry. These principles were carriedout with such skill and thoroughness that, though the enemy pressedseverely, only one man was wounded. The way in which Major Campbell, thecommanding officer, availed himself of the advantages of retiring downtwo spurs and bringing a cross fire to bear to cover the alternateretirements, resembled some intricate chess problem, rather than amilitary evolution. 

The power of the new Lee-Metford rifle with the new Dum-Dum bullet--itis now called, though not officially, the "ek-dum" [Hindustani for "atonce. "] bullet--is tremendous. The soldiers who have used it havethe utmost confidence in their weapon. Up to 500 yards there is nodifficulty about judging the range, as it shoots quite straight, or, technically speaking, has a flat trajectory. This is of the greatestvalue. Of the bullet it may be said, that its stopping power is allthat could be desired. The Dum-Dum bullet, though not explosive, isexpansive. The original Lee-Metford bullet was a pellet of lead coveredby a nickel case with an opening at the base. In the improved bulletthis outer case has been drawn backward, making the hole in the base alittle smaller and leaving the lead at the tip exposed. The result is awonderful and from the technical point of view a beautiful machine. Onstriking a bone this causes the bullet to "set up" or spread out, and itthen tears and splinters everything before it, causing wounds whichin the body must be generally mortal and in any limb necessitateamputation. Continental critics have asked whether such a bullet is nota violation of the Geneva or St. Petersburg Conventions; but no clauseof these international agreements forbids expansive bullets, and theonly provision on the subject is that shells less than a certain sizeshall not be employed. I would observe that bullets are primarilyintended to kill, and that these bullets do their duty most effectually, without causing any more pain to those struck by them, than the ordinarylead variety. As the enemy obtained some Lee-Metford rifles and Dum-Dumammunition during the progress of the fighting, information on thislatter point is forthcoming. The sensation is described as similar tothat produced by any bullet--a violent numbing blow, followed by a senseof injury and weakness, but little actual pain at the time. Indeed, now-a-days, very few people are so unfortunate as to suffer much painfrom wounds, except during the period of recovery. A man is hit. In aquarter of an hour, that is to say, before the shock has passed away andthe pain begins, he is usually at the dressing station. Here he is givenmorphia injections, which reduce all sensations to a uniform dullness. In this state he remains until he is placed under chloroform andoperated on. 

The necessity for having the officers in the same dress as the men, wasapparent to all who watched the operations. The conspicuous figure whicha British officer in his helmet presented in contrast to the nativesoldiers in their turbans, drew a well-aimed fire in his direction. Ofcourse, in British regiments, the difference is not nearly so marked. Nevertheless, at close quarters the keen-eyed tribesmen always made anespecial mark of the officers, distinguishing them chiefly, I think, bythe fact that they do not carry rifles. The following story may show howevident this was:--

When the Buffs were marching down to Panjkora, they passed the RoyalWest Kent coming up to relieve them at Inayat Kila. A private in theup-going regiment asked a friend in the Buffs what it was like at thefront. "Oh, " replied the latter, "you'll be all right so long as youdon't go near no officers, nor no white stones. " Whether the advicewas taken is not recorded, but it was certainly sound, for three dayslater--on 30th September--in those companies of the Royal West Kentregiment that were engaged in the village of Agrah, eight out of elevenofficers were hit or grazed by bullets. 

The fatigues experienced by troops in mountain warfare are so great, that every effort has to be made to lighten the soldier's load. At thesame time the more ammunition he carries on his person the better. Mulesladen with cartridge-boxes are very likely to be shot, and fall intothe hands of the enemy. In this manner over 6000 rounds were lost on the16th of September by the two companies of Sikhs whose retirement I havedescribed. 

The thick leather belts, pouches, and valise equipment of Britishinfantry are unnecessarily heavy. I have heard many officers suggesthaving them made of web. The argument against this is that the webwears out. That objection could be met by having a large supply of theseequipments at the base and issuing fresh ones as soon as the old wereunfit for use. It is cheaper to wear out belts than soldiers. 

Great efforts should be made to give the soldier a piece of chocolate, asmall sausage, or something portable and nutritious to carry with himto the field. In a war of long marches, of uncertain fortunes, ofretirements often delayed and always pressed, there have been manyoccasions when regiments and companies have unexpectedly had to stop outall night without food. It is well to remember that the stomach governsthe world. 

The principle of concentrating artillery has long been admitted inEurope. Sir Bindon Blood is the first general who has applied it tomountain warfare in India. It had formerly been the custom to use theguns by twos and threes. As we have seen, at the action of Landakai, theMalakand Field Force had eighteen guns in action, of which twelve werein one line. The fire of this artillery drove the enemy, who were ingreat strength and an excellent position, from the ground. The infantryattack was accomplished with hardly any loss, and a success was obtainedat a cost of a dozen lives which would have been cheap at a hundred. 

After this, it may seem strange if I say that the artillery fire in theMamund Valley did very little execution. It is nevertheless a fact. TheMamunds are a puny tribe, but they build their houses in the rocks;and against sharpshooters in broken ground, guns can do little. Throughfield-glasses it was possible to see the enemy dodging behind theirrocks, whenever the puffs of smoke from the guns told them that a shellwas on its way. Perhaps smokeless powder would have put a stop to this. But in any case, the targets presented to the artillery were extremelybad. 

Where they really were of great service, was not so much in killing theenemy, but in keeping them from occupying certain spurs and knolls. On30th September, when the Royal West Kent and the 31st Punjaub Infantrywere retiring under considerable pressure, the British Mountain Batterymoved to within 700 yards of the enemy, and opened a rapid fire ofshrapnel on the high ground which commanded the line of retreat, killingsuch of the tribesmen as were there, and absolutely forbidding the hillto their companions. 

In all rearguard actions among the mountains the employment of artilleryis imperative. Even two guns may materially assist the extrication ofthe infantry from the peaks and crags of the hillside, and prevent bytimely shells the tribesmen from seizing each point as soon as it isevacuated. But there is no reason why the artillery should be stinted, and at least two batteries, if available, should accompany a brigade tothe attack. 

Signalling by heliograph was throughout the operations of the greatestvalue. I had always realised the advantages of a semi-permanent lineof signal stations along the communications to the telegraph, but I haddoubted the practicability of using such complicated arrangements inaction. In this torrid country, where the sun is always shining, the heliograph is always useful. As soon as any hill was taken, communication was established with the brigadier, and no difficultyseemed to be met with, even while the attack was in progress, in sendingmessages quickly and clearly. In a country intersected by frequentravines, over which a horse can move but slowly and painfully, it is thesurest, the quickest, and indeed the only means of intercommunication. I am delighted to testify to these things, because I had formerly been ascoffer. 

I have touched on infantry and artillery, and, though a previous chapterhas been almost wholly devoted to the cavalry, I cannot resist thedesire to get back to the horses and the lances again. The question ofsword or lance as the cavalryman's weapon has long been argued, andit may be of interest to consider what are the views of those whoseexperience is the most recent. Though I have had no opportunity ofwitnessing the use of the lance, I have heard the opinions of manyofficers both of the Guides and the 11th Bengal Lancers. All admit orassert that the lance is in this warfare the better weapon. It killswith more certainty and convenience, and there is less danger of thehorseman being cut down. As to length, the general opinion seems to bein favour of a shorter spear. This, with a counter poise at the butt, gives as good a reach and is much more useful for close quarters. MajorBeatson, one of the most distinguished cavalry officers on the frontier, is a strong advocate of this. Either the pennon should be knotted, or aboss of some sort affixed about eighteen inches below the point. Unlessthis be done there is a danger of the lance penetrating too far, whenit either gets broken or allows the enemy to wriggle up and strike thelancer. This last actually happened on several occasions. 

Now, in considering the question to what extent a squadron should bearmed with lances, the system adopted by the Guides may be of interest. In this warfare it is very often necessary for the cavalryman todismount and use his carbine. The lance then gets in the way and has tobe tied to the saddle. This takes time, and there is usually not muchtime to spare in cavalry skirmishing. The Guides compromise mattersby giving one man in every four a lance. This man, when the othersdismount, stays in the saddle and holds their horses. They also give theouter sections of each squadron lances, and these, too, remain mounted, as the drill-book enjoins. But I become too technical. 

I pass for a moment to combined tactics. In frontier warfare Providenceis on the side of the good band-o-bust [arrangements]. There are noscenic effects or great opportunities, and the Brigadier who leavesthe mountains with as good a reputation as he entered them has provedhimself an able, sensible man. The general who avoids all "dash, " whonever starts in the morning looking for a fight and without any definiteintention, who does not attempt heroic achievements, and who keeps hiseye on his watch, will have few casualties and little glory. For theenemy do not become formidable until a mistake has been made. The publicwho do not believe in military operations without bloodshed may beunattentive. His subordinate officers may complain that they have had nofighting. But in the consciousness of duty skillfully performed and ofhuman life preserved he will find a high reward. 

A general review of the frontier war will, I think, show the greatdisadvantages to which regular troops are exposed in fighting an activeenterprising enemy that can move faster and shoot better, who knows thecountry and who knows the ranges. The terrible losses inflicted on thetribesmen in the Swat Valley show how easily disciplined troops canbrush away the bravest savages in the open. But on the hillside all ischanged, and the observer will be struck by the weakness rather than thestrength of modern weapons. Daring riflemen, individually superior tothe soldiers, and able to support the greatest fatigues, can alwaysinflict loss, although they cannot bar their path. 

The military problem with which the Spaniards are confronted in Cubais in many points similar to that presented in the Afghan valleys; aroadless, broken and undeveloped country; an absence of any strategicpoints; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, whoadopts guerilla tactics. The results in either case are, that the troopscan march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy; and thatall their movements must be attended with loss. 

If the question of subduing the tribes be regarded from a purelymilitary standpoint, if time were no object, and there was no danger ofa lengthy operation being interrupted by a change of policy at home, it would appear that the efforts of commanders should be, to induce thetribesmen to assume the offensive. On this point I must limit my remarksto the flat-bottomed valleys of Swat and Bajaur. To coerce a tribe likethe Mamunds, a mixed brigade might camp at the entrance to the valley, and as at Inayat Kila, entrench itself very strongly. The squadronof cavalry could patrol the valley daily in complete security, as thetribesmen would not dare to leave the hills. All sowing of crops andagricultural work would be stopped. The natives would retaliate byfiring into the camp at night. This would cause loss; but if every onewere to dig a good hole to sleep in, and if the officers were made tohave dinner before sundown, and forbidden to walk about except on dutyafter dark, there is no reason why the loss should be severe. At lengththe tribesmen, infuriated by the occupation of their valley, and perhapsrendered desperate by the approach of famine and winter, would make atremendous attempt to storm the camp. With a strong entrenchment, a wiretrip to break a rush, and modern rifles, they would be driven off withgreat slaughter, and once severely punished would probably beg forterms. If not, the process would be continued until they did so. 

Such a military policy would cost about the same in money as thevigorous methods I have described, as though smaller numbers of troopsmight be employed, they would have to remain mobilised and in the fieldfor a longer period. But the loss in personnel would be much less. As good an example of the success of this method as can be found, isprovided by Sir Bindon Blood's tactics at Nawagai, when, being too weakto attack the enemy himself, he encouraged them to attack him, and thenbeat them off with great loss. 

From the point which we have now reached, it is possible, and perhapsnot undesirable, to take a rapid yet sweeping glance of the largermilitary problems of the day. We have for some years adopted the "shortservice" system. It is a continental system. It has many disadvantages. Troops raised under it suffer from youth, want of training and lack ofregimental associations. But on the Continent it has this one, paramountrecommendation: it provides enormous numbers. The active army is merelya machine for manufacturing soldiers quickly, and passing them into thereserves, to be stored until they are wanted. European nations deal withsoldiers only in masses. Great armies of men, not necessarily of a highstandard of courage and training, but armed with deadly weapons, aredirected against one another, under varying strategical conditions. Before they can rebound, thousands are slaughtered and a great battlehas been won or lost. The average courage of the two nations may perhapshave been decided. The essence of the continental system is its giganticscale. 

We have adopted this system in all respects but one, and that the vitalone. We have got the poor quality, without the great quantity. Wehave, by the short service system, increased our numbers a little, anddecreased our standard a good deal. The reason that this system, whichis so well adapted to continental requirements, confers no advantagesupon us is obvious. Our army is recruited by a voluntary system. Shortservice and conscription are inseparable. For this reason, several sternsoldiers advocate conscription. But many words will have to be spoken, many votes voted, and perhaps many blows struck before the Britishpeople would submit to such an abridgment of their liberties, or such adrag upon their commerce. It will be time to make such sacrifices whenthe English Channel runs dry. 

Without conscription we cannot have great numbers. It should thereforebe our endeavour to have those we possess of the best quality; and oursituation and needs enforce this view. Our soldiers are not requiredto operate in great masses, but very often to fight hand to hand. Theircampaigns are not fought in temperate climates and civilised countries. They are sent beyond the seas to Africa or the Indian frontier, andthere, under a hot sun and in a pestilential land, they are engaged inindividual combat with athletic savages. They are not old enough for thework. 

Young as they are, their superior weapons and the prestige of thedominant race enable them to maintain their superiority over thenative troops. But in the present war several incidents have occurred, unimportant, insignificant, it is true, but which, in the interests ofImperial expediency, are better forgotten. The native regiments areten years older than the British regiments. Many of their men have seenservice and have been under fire. Some of them have several medals. All, of course, are habituated to the natural conditions. It is evident howmany advantages they enjoy. It is also apparent how very serious theconsequences would be if they imagined they possessed any superiority. That such an assumption should even be possible is a menace to our veryexistence in India. Intrinsic merit is the only title of a dominant raceto its possessions. If we fail in this it is not because our spiritis old and grown weak, but because our soldiers are young, and not yetgrown strong. 

Boys of twenty-one and twenty-two are expected to compete on equal termswith Sikhs and Gurkhas of thirty, fully developed and in the prime oflife. It is an unfair test. That they should have held their own is asplendid tribute to the vigour of our race. The experiment is dangerous, and it is also expensive. We continue to make it because the idea isstill cherished that British armies will one day again play a partin continental war. When the people of the United Kingdom are foolishenough to allow their little army to be ground to fragments betweencontinental myriads, they will deserve all the misfortunes that willinevitably come upon them. 

I am aware that these arguments are neither original nor new. I havemerely arranged them. I am also aware that there are able, brilliant menwho have spent their lives in the service of the State, who do not takethe views I have quoted. The question has been regarded from an Indianpoint of view. There is probably no colonel in India, who commands aBritish regiment, who would not like to see his men five years older. Itmay be that the Indian opinion on the subject is based only on partialinformation, and warped by local circumstances. Still I have thought itright to submit it to the consideration of the public, at a time whenthe army has been filling such a prominent position, not only in theJubilee procession and the frontier war, but also in the estimatespresented to the House of Commons. 

Passing from the concrete to the abstract, it may not be unfitting thatthese pages, which have recorded so many valiant deeds, should containsome brief inquiry into the nature of those motives which induce mento expose themselves to great hazards, and to remain in situations ofdanger. The circumstances of war contain every element that can shakethe nerves. The whizzing of the projectiles; the shouts and yells of anumerous and savage enemy; the piteous aspect of the wounded, coveredwith blood and sometimes crying out in pain; the spurts of dust which onall sides show where Fate is stepping--these are the sights and soundswhich assail soldiers, whose development and education enable them tofully appreciate their significance. And yet the courage of the soldieris the commonest of virtues. Thousands of men, drawn at random from thepopulation, are found to control the instinct of self-preservation. Noris this courage peculiar to any particular nation. Courage is not onlycommon, but cosmopolitan. But such are the apparent contradictions oflife, that this virtue, which so many seem to possess, all hold thehighest. There is probably no man, however miserable, who would notwrithe at being exposed a coward. Why should the common be precious?What is the explanation?

It appears to be this. The courage of the soldier is not really contemptfor physical evils and indifference to danger. It is a more or lesssuccessful attempt to simulate these habits of mind. Most men aspire tobe good actors in the play. There are a few who are so perfect that theydo not seem to be actors at all. This is the ideal after which the restare striving. It is one very rarely attained. 

Three principal influences combine to assist men in their attempts:preparation, vanity and sentiment. The first includes all the forceof discipline and training. The soldier has for years contemplated thepossibility of being under fire. He has wondered vaguely what kind ofan experience it would be. He has seen many who have gone through it andreturned safely. His curiosity is excited. Presently comes the occasion. By road and railway he approaches daily nearer to the scene. Hismind becomes familiar with the prospect. His comrades are in the samesituation. Habit, behind which force of circumstances is concealed, makes him conform. At length the hour arrives. He observes the dartingpuffs of smoke in the distance. He listens to the sounds that are in theair. Perhaps he hears something strike with a thud and sees a soldiernear him collapse like a shot pheasant. He realises that it may be histurn next. Fear grips him by the throat. 

Then vanity, the vice which promotes so many virtues, asserts itself. He looks at his comrades and they at him. So far he has shown no sign ofweakness. He thinks, they are thinking him brave. The dearly longed-forreputation glitters before his eyes. He executes the orders he receives. 

But something else is needed to made a hero. Some other influence musthelp him through the harder trials and more severe ordeals which maybefall him. It is sentiment which makes the difference in the end. Thosewho doubt should stroll to the camp fire one night and listen to thesoldiers' songs. Every one clings to something that he thinks is highand noble, or that raises him above the rest of the world in the hour ofneed. Perhaps he remembers that he is sprung from an ancient stock, and of a race that has always known how to die; or more probably itis something smaller and more intimate; the regiment, whatever it iscalled--"The Gordons, " "The Buffs, " "The Queen's, "--and so nursing thename--only the unofficial name of an infantry battalion after all--heaccomplishes great things and maintains the honour and the Empire of theBritish people. 

It may be worth while, in the matter of names, to observe the advantagesto a regiment of a monosyllabic appellation. Every one will rememberLieut. -Colonel Mathias' speech to the Gordons. Imagine for a moment thatspeech addressed to some regiment saddled with a fantastic title on theterritorial system, as, for instance, Mr. Kipling's famous regiment, "The Princess Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen-Anspach's Merthyr Tydvilshire OwnRoyal Loyal Light Infantry. " With the old numbers all started on equalterms. 

This has been perhaps a cold-blooded chapter. We have considered menas targets; tribesmen, fighting for their homes and hills, have beenregarded only as the objective of an attack; killed and wounded humanbeings, merely as the waste of war. We have even attempted to analysethe high and noble virtue of courage, in the hopes of learning how itmay be manufactured. 

The philosopher may observe with pity, and the philanthropist deplorewith pain, that the attention of so many minds should be directed to thescientific destruction of the human species; but practical people in abusiness-like age will remember that they live in a world of men--notangels--and regulate their conduct accordingly. 

CHAPTER XVIII. AND LAST. : THE RIDDLE OF THE FRONTIER

 "Myself when young did eagerly frequent Doctor and saint, and heard great argument About it and about, but evermore Came out by the same door wherein I went. "

 OMAR KHAYYAM. 

These pages, which have chronicled a variety of small incidents, havehitherto concerned themselves little with the great matters out ofwhich those incidents have arisen. As an opening chapter should leadthe reader to expect the considerations that the book contains, so theconclusion should express the opinion he might form from the perusal. When, at an earlier period, I refrained from discussing the question offrontier policy, I declared that its consideration was only postponeduntil a more propitious moment. That moment now presents itself. Therewill not be wanting those who will remind me, that in this matter myopinion is not supported by age or experience. To such I shall reply, that if what is written is false or foolish, neither age nor experienceshould fortify it; and if it is true, it needs no such support. The propositions of Euclid would be no less indisputable were theypropounded by an infant or an idiot. 

The inquirer sees the vast question unfold itself with feelings likethose with which the fisherman in the old story watched the genius hehad unwittingly released, rise from the bottle in clouds of smoke, whichoverspread the whole sky. Every moment the subject appears not onlywider but deeper. When I reflect on the great number of diverseand often conflicting facts which may be assembled under everyhead--military, economic, political or moral--and consider theaccumulations of specialised and technical knowledge necessary for theirproper appreciation, I am convinced that to compass the whole is beyondthe mind and memory of man. Of such a question it is difficult to takebroad views, and dangerous to generalise. Still less is it possible, asmany people appear to imagine, to settle it with a phrase or an epigram. A point is reached where all relation between detail and proportionis lost. It is a picture of such great size that to see it all, itis necessary to stand so far off that neither colours nor figures aredistinguishable. By constantly changing the point of view, some trueperspective is possible, and even then the conception must be twistedand distorted, by the imperfections of the mental mirror. 

Sensible of the magnitude of the task, and conscious of my own weakness, I propose to examine in a spirit of cautious inquiry and of tolerancethe present "Forward Policy, " and thence to approach the main question, to the answer of which that policy is only a guess. 

I must revert to a period when the British power, having conquered theplains of India and subdued its sovereigns, paused at the foot ofthe Himalayas and turned its tireless energy to internal progress anddevelopment. The "line of the mountains" formed a frontier as plain andintelligible as that which defines the limits of the sea. To the southlay the British Empire in India; to the north were warlike tribes, barbarous, unapproachable, irreclaimable; and far beyond these, lay theother great Power of Asia. 

It was long the wisdom of Anglo-Indian statesmen to preserve a situationwhich contained so many elements of finality, and so many guarantees ofpeace. When the northern savages, impelled by fanaticism or allured byplunder, descended from the mountains and invaded the plains, they weremet by equal courage and superior discipline, and driven in disorder totheir confines. But this was found to be an inadequate deterrent, andthe purely defensive principle had to be modified in favor of thatsystem of punitive expeditions which has been derided as the policy of"Butcher and Bolt. "

Gradually, as the circumstances altered, the methods of dealing withthem changed. The punitive expeditions had awakened an intense hostilityamong the tribesmen. The intrigues of Russia had for some time beenwatched with alarm by the Indian Government. As long as the border couldremain a "No-man's land"--as it were a "great gulf fixed"--all was well;but if any power was to be supreme, that power must neither be Russianor Afghanistan. ["We shall consider it from the first incumbent uponthe Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishmentwithin this outlying country of the political preponderance of any otherpower. "--Letter from Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. 49, 28th February, 1879. ] The predominance of Russian influence inthese territories would give them the power to invade India at theirdiscretion, with what chances of success need not be here discussed. The predominance of Afghan influence would make the Amir master ofthe situation, and enable him to blackmail the Indian Governmentindefinitely. A change of policy, a departure from the old frontierline, presented itself with increasing force to responsible men. To-daywe see the evils that have resulted from that change. The dangers thatinspired it have been modified. 

For some years the opinion in favour of an advance grew steadily amongthose in power in India. In 1876 a decisive step was taken. Roused bythe efforts of the Amir to obtain the suzerainty of the Pathan tribes, Lord Lytton's Government stretched a hand through Cashmere towardsChitral, and the Mehtar of that State became the vassal, nominally ofthe Maharaja of Cashmere, but practically of the Imperial Government. The avowed object was to ultimately secure the effectual command of thepasses of the Hindu Kush. [Despatch No. 17, 11th June, 1877. ] The BritishMinistry, the famous ministry of Lord Beaconsfield, approved the actionand endorsed the policy. Again, in 1879, the Vice-regal Government, inan official despatch, declared their intention of acquiring, "throughthe ruler of Cashmere, the power of making such political and militaryarrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush. "[Despatch No. 49, 28th February, 1879. ] "If, " so runs the despatch, "we*extend and by degrees consolidate our influence* [The italics are mine]over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can bepermitted on this side of the mountains or within the drainage system ofthe Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier, whichis distinct, intelligible and likely to be respected. " [Despatch No. 49, 28th February, 1879. ]

No declaration of policy or intention could have been more explicit. The words to "extend and consolidate our influence" can, when applied tobarbarous peoples, have no other meaning than ultimate annexation. Thusthe scheme of an advance from the plains of India into the mountainregion, which had long been maturing in men's minds and which was shapedand outlined by many small emergencies and expedients, was clearlyproclaimed. The forward movement had begun. A fresh and powerful impulsewas imparted after the termination of Lord Ripon's viceroyalty. The openaggression which characterised the Russian frontier policy of '84 and'85 had been met by a supine apathy and indifference to the interestsof the State, which deserved, and which, had the issues been lessimportant, might have received actual punishment. It was natural thathis immediate successors should strive to dissociate themselves from thefollies and the blunders of those years. The spirit of reaction ledto the final abandonment of the venerable policy of non-intervention. Instead of the "line of the mountains, " it was now maintained thatthe passes through them must be held. This is the so-called "ForwardPolicy. " It is a policy which aims at obtaining the frontier--Gilgit, Chitral, Jelalabad, Kandahar. 

In pursuance of that policy we have been led to build many frontierforts, to construct roads, to annex territories, and to enter upon moreintimate relations with the border tribes. The most marked incident inthat policy has been the retention of Chitral. This act was regarded bythe tribesmen as a menace to their independence, and by the priesthoodas the prelude to a general annexation. Nor were they wrong, for such isthe avowed aim of the "Forward Policy. " The result of the retentionof Chitral has been, as I have already described, that the priesthood, knowing that their authority would be weakened by civilisation, haveused their religious influence on the people to foment a general rising. 

It is useless to discuss the Chitral question independently. If the"Forward Policy" be justified, then the annexation of Chitral, itslogical outcome, is also justified. The bye and the main plots stand orfall together. 

So far then we have advanced and have been resisted. The "ForwardPolicy" has brought an increase of territory, a nearer approach to whatis presumably a better frontier line and--war. All this was to have beenexpected. It may be said of the present system that it precludes thepossibility of peace. Isolated posts have been formed in the midst ofraces notoriously passionate, reckless and warlike. They are challenges. When they are assailed by the tribesmen, relieving and punitiveexpeditions become necessary. All this is the outcome of a recognisedpolicy, and was doubtless foreseen by those who initiated it. Whatmay be called strange is that the forts should be badlyconstructed--cramped, as the Malakand positions; commanded, likeChakdara; without flank defences, as at Saraghari; without propergarrisons, as in the Khyber. This is a side issue and accidental. Therest of the situation has been deliberately created. 

The possibility of a great combination among the border tribes wasindeed not contemplated. Separated by distance, and divided by faction, it was anticipated they could be dealt with in detail. On this point wehave been undeceived. 

That period of war and disturbance which was the inevitable firstconsequence of the "Forward Policy" must in any case have been disturbedand expensive. Regarded from an economic standpoint, the trade of thefrontier valleys will never pay a shilling in the pound on the militaryexpenditure necessary to preserve order. Morally, it is unfortunate forthe tribesmen that our spheres of influence clash with their spheres ofexistence. Even on the military question, a purely technical question, as to whether an advanced frontier line is desirable or not, opinion isdivided. Lord Roberts says one thing; Mr. Morley another. 

There is no lack of arguments against the "Forward Policy. " There aremany who opposed its initiation. There are many who oppose it now; whothink that nothing should have lured the Government of India beyondtheir natural frontier line, and who maintain that it would have beenboth practical and philosophic had they said: "Over all the plainsof India will we cast our rule. There we will place our governors andmagistrates; our words shall be respected and our laws obeyed. But thatregion, where the land rises like the waves of a sea, shall serve us asa channel of stormy waters to divide us from our foes and rivals. "

But it is futile to engage in the controversies of the past. There aresufficient in the present, and it is with the present we are concerned. 

We have crossed the Rubicon. In the opinion of all those who know mostabout the case, the forward movement is now beyond recall. Indeed, whenthe intense hostility of the Border tribes, the uncertain attitude ofthe Amir, the possibilities of further Russian aggression and the stateof feeling in India are considered, it is difficult to dispute thisjudgment. Successive Indian Administrations have urged, successiveEnglish Cabinets have admitted, the necessity of finding a definite anda defensible frontier. The old line has been left, and between thatline and an advanced line continuous with Afghan territory, and south ofwhich all shall be reduced to law and order, there does not appear to beany prospect of a peaceful and permanent settlement. 

The responsibility of placing us in this position rests with thosewho first forsook the old frontier policy of holding the "line of themountains. " The historian of the future, with impartial pen and a morecomplete knowledge, must pronounce on the wisdom of their act. In themeantime it should be remembered of these great men, that theyleft their public offices amid the applause and admiration of theircontemporaries, and, "in the full tide of successful experiment. " Norcan so much be said of all those who have assailed them. Those whodecided, have accepted the responsibility, and have defended theiraction. But I am inclined to think that the rulers of India, ten yearsago or a hundred years ago, were as much the sport of circumstances astheir successors are to-day. 

Let us return to the present and our own affairs. We have embarked onstormy and perilous waters. The strong current of events forbids return. The sooner the farther shore is reached, the sooner will the dangers anddiscomforts of the voyage be over. All are anxious to make the land. The suggestions as to the course are numerous. There are some, bad andnervous sailors perhaps, who insist upon returning, although they aretold it is impossible, and who would sink the ship sooner than go on, were they not outnumbered by their shipmates. While they are delaying, the current bears us towards more disturbed waters and more rockylanding places. 

There are others who call out for "Full steam ahead, " and wouldaccomplish the passage at once, whatever the risks. But alas! The shipis run out of coal and can only spread its sails to the varying breezes, take advantage of favorable tides, and must needs lie to when the wavesare high. 

But the sensible passenger may, though he knows the difficulties of thevoyage and the dangers of the sea, fairly ask the man at the wheel tokeep a true and constant course. He may with reason and justice insistthat, whatever the delays which the storms or accidents may cause, thehead of the vessel shall be consistently pointed towards the distantport, and that come what will she shall not be allowed to driftaimlessly hither and thither on the chance of fetching up somewhere someday. 

The "Full steam ahead" method would be undoubtedly the most desirable. This is the military view. Mobilise, it is urged, a nice field force, and operate at leisure in the frontier valleys, until they are as safeand civilised as Hyde Park. Nor need this course necessarily involve theextermination of the inhabitants. Military rule is the rule best suitedto the character and comprehension of the tribesmen. They will soonrecognise the futility of resistance, and will gradually welcome theincrease of wealth and comfort that will follow a stable government. Besides this, we shall obtain a definite frontier almost immediately. Only one real objection has been advanced against this plan. But it isa crushing one, and it constitutes the most serious argument against thewhole "Forward Policy. " It is this: we have neither the troops nor themoney to carry it out. 

The inevitable alternative is the present system, a system which the warhas interrupted, but to which we must return at its close; a system ofgradual advance, of political intrigue among the tribes, of subsidiesand small expeditions. 

Though this policy is slow, painful and somewhat undignified, thereis no reason that it should not be sure and strong. But it must beconsistently pursued. Dynamite in the hands of a child is not moredangerous than a strong policy weakly carried out. The reproach whichmay be justly laid upon the rulers of India, whether at home or abroad, is that while they recognise the facts, they shrink from the legitimateconclusions. 

They know they cannot turn back. They fully intend to go on. Yet theyfear to admit the situation, to frankly lay their case before thecountry, and trust to the good sense and courage of an ancientdemocracy. The result is, that they tie their hands by ridiculous andunnecessary proclamations, such as that which preceded the Chitralexpedition of 1895. The political officers who watch the frontier tribesare expected to obtain authority by force of personal character, yetstrictly according to regulations, and to combine individuality withuniformity. And sometimes this timidity leads to such dismal acts offolly as the desertion of the Khyber forts. 

But in spite of all obstacles and errors there is a steady advance, which may be accelerated, and made easier, by many small reforms. Thesequestions of detail approach so near the province of the specialist, that I shall not attempt to enumerate or discuss them. It is suggestedamong other things that wider powers should be given to the politicalofficers, in their ordinary duties of peace. Others advocate occasionaldemonstrations of troops, to impress the tribesmen with the fact thatthose they see are not the full strength of the Sirkar. Bolder mindshave hinted at transplanting young Pathans, and educating them in Indiaafter the custom of the Romans. But this last appears to be suitable toa classic rather than a Christian age. 

From a general survey of the people and the country, it would seem thatsilver makes a better weapon than steel. A system of subsidies must tendto improve our relations with the tribes, enlist their interests onthe side of law and order, and by increasing their wealth, lessen theirbarbarism. In the matter of the supply of arms the Government would findit cheaper to enter the market as a purchaser, and have agents to outbidthe tribesmen, rather than to employ soldiers. As water finds its ownlevel, so the laws of economics will infallibly bring commodities to thehighest bidder. Doubtless there are many other lessons which the presentwar will have taught. These may lighten a task which, though long andheavy, is not beyond the powers or pluck of the British people. 

We are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasionof the end in sight. Still this is no time to despair. I have oftennoticed in these Afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirelysurrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. But as the column hasadvanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. Sometimesit is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must beforced, but I have never seen a valley that had not a way out. That waywe shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent step ofmen who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise. Insuch a spirit I would leave the subject, with one farewell glance. 

Looking on the story of the great frontier war; at all that has beentold, and all that others may tell, there must be many who to-day willonly deplore the losses of brave soldiers and hard-earned money. Butthose who from some future age shall, by steady light of history, dispassionately review the whole situation, its causes, results andoccasion, may find other reflections, as serious perhaps, but lessmournful. The year 1897, in the annals of the British people, wasmarked by a declaration to the whole world of their faith in the higherdestinies of their race. If a strong man, when the wine sparkles at thefeast and the lights are bright, boasts of his prowess, it is wellhe should have an opportunity of showing in the cold and grey of themorning that he is no idle braggart. And unborn arbiters, with a widerknowledge, and more developed brains, may trace in recent events theinfluence of that mysterious Power which, directing the progress of ourspecies, and regulating the rise and fall of Empires, has afforded thatopportunity to a people, of whom at least it may be said, that they haveadded to the happiness, the learning and the liberties of mankind. 

 APPENDIX. 

 EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES. 

 THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND. 26th July -- 1st August, 1897. 

 FROM THE DESPATCH OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. MEIKLEJOHN, C. B. , C. M. G. 

 FORWARDED TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA BY SIR BINDON BLOOD. 

43. All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellencyfor favorable consideration the following names of officers and men:--

 24th Punjaub Infantry. 

Lieut. -Colonel J. Lamb, who, on the first alarm being sounded on thenight of the 26th July, had taken prompt action in reinforcing theoutpost line held by his regiment, and later was of great assistancein directing the defence of the central enclosure, till he was severelywounded. 

Captain H. F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a numberof the enemy out of the central enclosure, and was severely wounded indoing so. 

I would especially wish to mention Lieutenant S. H. Climo, who commandedthe 24th Punjaub Infantry after Lieut. -Colonel Lamb and Captain Hollandhad been wounded. This officer has shown soldierly qualities and abilityof the highest order. He has commanded the regiment with dash andenterprise, and shown a spirit and example which has been followed byall ranks. I trust His Excellency will be pleased to favourably noticeLieutenant Climo, who has proved himself an officer who will do well inany position, and is well worthy of promotion. 

Lieutenant A. K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommendhim to His Excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort onthe 26th July to bring reinforcements, and again for the dash he showedin leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of which Lieutenant Climospeaks most highly. 

Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 22nd Punjaub Infantry, temporarily attachedto the 24th Punjaub Infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is thesubject of a separate recommendation. 

 31st Punjaub Infantry. 

Major M. I. Gibbs, who commanded the regiment in the absence of MajorO'Bryen, with skill and in every way to my satisfaction. 

Lieutenant H. B. Ford, Acting-Adjutant, 31st Punjaub Infantry, renderedvaluable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded Sepoy during thewithdrawal from north camp. He also behaved with courage in resistingan attack of the enemy on the night of the 28th, when he was severelywounded. 

Surgeon-Lieutenant J. H. Hugo, attached to 31st Punjaub Infantry, rendered valuable service on the night of the 28th in saving LieutenantH. B. Ford from bleeding to death. Lieutenant Ford was wounded and abranch of an artery was cut. There were no means of securing the artery, and Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding bycompressing the artery with his fingers. Had he not had the strength todo so, Lieutenant Ford must have died. Early in the morning, thinkingthat the enemy had effected an entrance into camp, Surgeon-LieutenantHugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one arm, and, still holding theartery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place ofsafety. 

 45th (Rattray's) Sikhs. 

Colonel H. A. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, buthe returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment fromLieut. -Colonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance. 

I would specially bring to the notice of His Excellency theCommander-in-chief the name of Lieut. -Colonel H. N. McRae, who commandedthe regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizingthe gorge at the top of the Buddhist road on the night of the 26th, andthe gallant way in which he held it, undoubtedly saved the camp frombeing rushed on that side. For this, and for the able way in which hecommanded the regiment during the first three days of the fighting, Iwould commend him to His Excellency's favorable consideration. 

Also Lieutenant R. M. Barff, Officiating-Adjutant of the regiment, who, Lieut. -Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and renderedhim valuable assistance. 

 The Guides. 

I also wish to bring the name of Lieut. -Colonel R. B. Adams of the Guidesto His Excellency's notice. The prompt way in which the corps mobilised, and their grand march, reflect great credit on him and the corps. Sincearrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the1st August, Lieut. -Colonel Adams was in command of the lower camp, i. E. , that occupied by central and left position, and in the execution of thiscommand, and the arrangements he made for improving the defenses, hegave me every satisfaction. I have also to express my appreciation ofthe way in which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1stAugust, on which occasion his horse was shot under him. 

Great credit is due to Lieutenant P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, who was incommand of the Guides Infantry, for bringing up the regiment from Mardanto Malakand in such good condition after their trying march. 

Captain G. M. Baldwin, D. S. O. , behaved with great courage and coolnessduring the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely woundedby a sword cut on the head, he remained on the ground and continued tolead his men. 

Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed anexcellent example on the night of the 28th July, when he was severelywounded. 

 11th Bengal Lancers. 

Major S. Beatson commanded the squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, whicharrived at Malakand on the 29th, and led them with great skill and dashon the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 1st August. 

 No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. 

Lieutenant F. A. Wynter was the only officer with No. 8 Bengal MountainBattery from the 26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it duringthat time, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, withgreat ability, and has proved himself a good soldier. I should likeespecially to mention him for His Excellency's consideration. Thebattery did excellent work all through. 

 No. 5 Company Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners. 

Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R. E. , commanded the company from the 27thJuly till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction. His services instrengthening the defences were invaluable. 

Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R. E. , was in command of the company in theabsence of Captain Johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until hewas wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. AfterLieutenant Watling was wounded the command of the company for theremainder of the night of the 26th, and till Lieutenant Winsloe returnedon the 27th, devolved on Lieutenant E. N. Manley, R. E. He performed hisduties with great credit, and afterwards was of great assistance, by hiszeal and his exertions, to Lieutenant Winsloe. 

 Medical Staff. 

Brigade-Surgeon-Lieut. -Colonel F. A. Smyth was most zealous, andperformed his duties to my satisfaction. He volunteered to performthe duties of Provost Marshal, and did so for a short time during theillness of Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill. 

The arrangements made by Surgeon-Major S. Hassand, Senior MedicalOfficer, 38th Native Field Hospital, and the indefatigable attention andcare with which he devoted himself to the wounded, deserve great praise. The list of casualties is large, and Surgeon-Major Hassand has beenuntiring in his exertions for their relief. I hope His Excellency willthink fit to consider his services favourably. 

Surgeon-Captain T. A. O. Langston, 38th Native Field Hospital, renderedvaluable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire onthe night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved withcourage and devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptionalcircumstances. Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Carr has worked night and day inthe hospitals, in trying to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, andhas most ably and efficiently aided Surgeon-Major Hassand. 

 Brigade Staff. 

Major L. Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant andQuartermaster-General, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zealand energy with which he performed his duties from the moment the newsof the approach of the enemy was received till he was severely woundedwhile standing next to me in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners'camp on the night of the 26th. Since being wounded, he has carried onall his office duties on his bed. I would wish to commend his gallantconduct for the favorable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. 

Although Major H. A. Deane is in no way under my authority, I feel I amunder a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he renderedme with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposalwith the object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy AssistantAdjutant-General, when Major Herbert was wounded. He was indefatigablein assisting me in every way he could, and I am anxious to put on recordmy grateful appreciation of the services he rendered me. 

44. The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but I wouldpoint out that the fighting was almost constant for a week, and was ofsuch a close nature as to demand incessant exertion from every officerin the force, and to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant examplewhich cannot be overlooked. 

45. I would not like to close this despatch without paying a tributeto the memory of a fine soldier, and charming companion whose death thewhole force deplores. 

Major W. W. Taylor had behaved with the greatest gallantry and dash inmeeting the enemy's first charge with Lieut. -Colonel McRae, and, hadhe lived, he would undoubtedly distinguished himself in his career. Hisloss in a heavy one to his regiment, and to the Service, and there is noone in the brigade who does not mourn him as a friend. 

I have also to deplore the death of Honorary-Lieutenant L. Manley, whoas my Commissariat Officer had rendered me great assistance, and whodied fighting manfully. His loss is a very serious one to the brigade. 

46. I attach separately, for favorable consideration, a list of nativeofficers, non-commissioned officers and men, who have done especiallygood service; some of whom I have therein recommended for the order ofmerit. 

I trust these recommendations will meet with the favorable considerationof His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. 

 THE RELIEF OF CHAKDARA 2ND AUGUST, 1897

 FROM THE DESPATCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K. C. B. 

19. I have the honour to invite the special attention of His Excellencythe Commander-in-Chief in India to the good services of the followingofficers during the operations described above, namely:--

Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C. B. , C. M. G. , carried out hisduties in command of the force which relieved Chakdara Fort with greatgallantry and judgment. 

Colonel A. J. F. Reid, Officiating Colonel on the Staff, Malakand Brigade, afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the rearrangement of thedefensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August, after the RelievingForce had been drawn from them, and in making the preparations forColonel T. H. Goldney's attack on the 2nd. 

Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, disposed and led the troops on themorning of the 2nd in the successful attack on the hill, since namedafter him, in a most judicious and satisfactory manner. 

Major E. A. P. Hobday, R. A. , was most energetic and indefatigable inassisting Colonel A. J. F. Reid and me in carrying out the multifariouswork which had to be done at the Malakand, and in the Swat Valley on the1st, 2nd and 3rd. 

Brigadier-General Meiklejohn reports favourably on the followingofficers who were under his command during the operations abovedetailed, viz:--

Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, who acted as Staff Officer to theRelieving Force, showed great readiness and resource, and his assistancewas of the utmost value. 

Lieutenants C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer, and E. Christian, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Signalling Officer, carried out theirduties most satisfactorily. 

Lieut. -Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, commanded thecavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force in the most gallantand judicious manner. 

The following officers commanding units and detachments of the RelivingForce are stated by Brigidier-General Meiklejohn to have carried outtheir duties in a thoroughly capable and satisfactory manner, viz. :--

Colonel H. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs. 

Major Stuart Beatson, 11th Bengal Lancers. 

Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A. (8th Bengal Mountain Battery). 

Lieutenant G. De H. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, attachedto Queen's Own Corps of Guides (cavalry). 

Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R. E. (No. 5 Company Queen's Own Sapper's andMiners). 

Lieutenant P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (infantry). 

Surgeon-General H. F. Whitchurch, V. C. , attended to the wounded underfire throughout the fighting. 

The following officers under Colonel T. H. Goldney's command led theirdetachments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, viz. :--

Lieut. -Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs. 

Captain L. C. H. Stainforth, 38th Dogras. 

Jemader Nawab, who commanded two guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Batteryin support of Colonel Goldney's attack, attracted my favorable notice byhis smartness, quickness and thorough knowledge of his work. 

I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good workdone by Major H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General;Major H. Wharry, D. S. O. , Chief Commissariat Officer, and Captain A. B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment, my Aide-de-Camp; theonly officers of the Divisional Staff of my force who had arrived at theMalakand on the 2nd August. These officers worked very hard and were ofgreat use to me. 

20. Major H. A. Deane, C. S. I. , Political Agent, Dir and Swat, was notin any way under my orders during the operations above described, butnotwithstanding, I hope I may be permitted to express the obligationsunder which I lie to him for valuable information and general assistancewhich he gave me. 

 THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARA. 26TH JULY--2ND AUGUST, 1897. 

 FROM THE DESPATCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K. C. B. 

15. During the fighting above described, the conduct of the whole of thegarrison, whether fighting men, departmental details, or followers, is reported to have been most gallant. Not the least marked displayof courage and constancy was that made by the small detachment in thesignal tower, who were without water for the last eighteen hours of thesiege. The signallers, under No. 2729, Lance-Naik Vir Singh, 45th Sikhs, who set a brilliant example, behaved throughout in a most courageousmanner; one of them, No. 2829, Sepoy Prem Singh, climbing several timesout of a window in the tower with a heliograph, and signaling outside tothe Malakand under a hot fire from sungars in every direction. 

16. I would beg to recommend all the British and native officerswho took part in the defence I have described for the favorableconsideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as under, viz. :--

Captain H. Wright, 11th Bengal Lancers, who, with his detachment offorty sabres of his regiment, made the gallant ride through the enemyfrom the Malakand to Chakdara Fort, on the morning of the 27th July, and commanded the garrison from that morning till its relief on the 2ndAugust. 

Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Infantry, who rode to Chakdara Fort withCaptain Wright, and made himself most useful. Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, 45th Sikhs, who commanded the garrison from the commencement of theattack on the 26th July till the arrival of Captain Wright the next day, and is reported by that officer to have been the life and soul of thedefence. 2nd Lieutenant J. L. Wheatley, 45th Sikhs, had charge of the gunand Maxim detachments, and it was largely owing to his care and judgmentthat these weapons were so effective in the defence. 

Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, 25th Punjaub Infantry, Assistant PoliticalAgent, was in the fort throughout the siege, and was most useful. 

Ressaidar Tilok Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, accompanied Captain Wrightin his ride of the 27th July, and is very favorably mentioned by thatofficer. 

Jemadar Sudama commanded the detachment of the 21st Bengal Lancers whowere at Chakdara Fort on the 26th July, and was present throughout thesiege, and is also very favorably reported on. 

Subadar Jwala Singh, 45th Sikhs, was present throughout the siege, andshowed great intelligence and readiness of resource, as well as courageand coolness, under fire. 

Jemadar Ala Singh, 45th Sikhs, had command of the sections on theparapet of the river fort, and showed conspicuous courage and coolnessunder heavy fire. 

Lieutenant Rattray reports that No. 522 Hospital Assistant Piara Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, rendered valuable assistance, not only in thesortie on the 2nd, and at other times in bringing up ammunition, etc. , to the men on the parapets under fire. 

17. I shall further have the honor, in a separate communication, to submit, for the favorable consideration of His Excellency theCommander-in-Chief, the names of several non-commissioned officers andmen who distinguished themselves during the siege of Chakdara Fort, inview of their being granted the order of merit, should His Excellencythink them deserving of that distinction. 

 From Major-General Sir B. Blood, K. C. B. , Commanding the Malakand Field Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, --No. 5, "Despatches, Malakand Field Force, "--Dated 27th October, 1897. 

I regret to find that in my report, "Despatches, Malakand Field Force, "No. 3, of the 20th August, 1897, I omitted to include the name ofSurgeon-Captain E. V. Hugo, Indian Medical Service, amongst those of theofficers recommended to the favorable consideration of His Excellencythe Commander-in-Chief for their services during the recent defence ofChakdara Fort. I now have great pleasure in stating that Surgeon-GeneralHugo served with distinction throughout the defence in question, and inrecommending him for favorable consideration accordingly. 

 ACTION OF LANDAKAI AND EXPEDITION INTO UPPER SWAT. AUGUST, 1987. 

 FROM THE DESPATCHES OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K. C. B. 

32. In concluding this part of my report, I would wish to express myadmiration of the fine soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks ofthe special force which I led into Upper Swat. They fought the action atLandakai in a brilliant manner, working over high hills, under a burningsun, with the greatest alacrity, and showing everywhere the greatestkeenness to close with the enemy. They carried out admirably the tryingduties necessitated by marching in hot weather with a transport trainof more than 2000 mules, and they endured with perfect cheerfulness thediscomforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. The officers ofthe Divisional Staff and of by personal staff who were with me, [Major H. H. Burney, Assistant Adjutant-General (Gordon Highlanders);Lieut. -Colonel A. Masters, Assistant Quartermaster-General (2ndRegiment Central India Horse); Captain H. E. Stanton, Deputy AssistantQuartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch (Royal Artillery); ColonelW. Aitken, Colonel on the Staff, Royal Artillery; Captain H. D. Grier, Adjutant, R. A. ; Major E. Blunt, Senior Officer of Royal Engineers;Captain E. W. M. Norie, Superintendent, Army Signalling (MiddlesexRegiment); Captain C. G. F. Edwards, Provost Marshal (5th PunjaubCavalry); Captain A. B. Dunsterville, A. D. C. (1st Battalion East SurreyRegiment); Captain A. R. Dick, Orderly Officer. BRIGADE STAFF. --MajorE. A. P. Hobday, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General (Royal Artillery);Captain G. F. H. Dillon, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (40thBengal Infantry); Captain C. H. Beville, Commissariat TransportDepartment; Captain J. M. Camilleri, in charge of Transport (13th BengalInfantry); Surgeon-Lieut. -Colonel J. T. B. Bookey, I. M. S. ; LieutenantC. R. Gaunt, Orderly officer, 4th Dragoon Guards. COMMANDING OFFICERSOF DIVISIONAL TROOPS. --Lieut. -Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own Corps ofGuides; Major C. A. Anderson, 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery; MajorM. F. Fegan, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; Captain A. H. C. Birch, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery; Captain E. P. Johnson, No. 5 CompanyQueen's Own Sappers and Miners. ] Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C. B. , C. M. G. , and his staff, and the several heads of departments andcommanding officers of Divisional Troops, all carried out their dutiesin an entirely satisfactory manner. 

Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent, and his assistant, LieutenantA. B. Minchin, gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence andsupplies. 

33. While the operations above described were in progress, a diversionwas made towards the southern border of the Buner country from Mardan bythe 1st Reserve Brigade, which, on its headquarters leaving Mardan, cameunder my command as the 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force. 

34. A force [1st Battalion Highland Light Infantry, under Lieut. -ColonelR. D. B. Rutherford; 39th Garhwal Rifles, under Lieut. -Colonel B. C. Greaves; No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E. Baddeley, R. E. ; one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, under CaptainW. L. Maxwell; two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, underLieutenant H. L. N. Beynon, R. A. ] under Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, C. B. , C. M. G. , was concentrated on the 17th August at Rustum, eighteenmiles north-east of Mardan, and about four miles from the Buner border, with the object of acting as a containing force, and so preventing thesections of the Bunerwhals who had not already committed themselvesagainst us from joining in opposition to our advance into Upper Swat. 

35. The presence of this force had the desired effect, andBrigadier-General Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time theyspent at Rustum in acquiring valuable information about several of thepasses in the neighborhood. 

36. Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations ofhis force, which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heatand rain, the spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. He makesspecial mention of the work of No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E. Baddeley, R. E. He also reports very favourably on theassistance given him by Lieutenant C. P. Down, Assistant Commissioner, and has expressed to me a high opinion of that officer's abilities andacquirements, particularly of his proficiency in the local vernacular. 

 THE ACTION OF 16TH SEPTEMBER. 

 FROM SIR BINDON BLOOD'S DESPATCH CONTAINING THE SUMMARY OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JEFFREY'S REPORT OF THE ACTION

27. The behavior of the troops throughout this trying day was very good. The steadiness and discipline shown by the 1st Battalion of the Buffs, under Lieu. -Colonel Ommnanney, were admirable, while Brigadier-GeneralJeffreys has specially commended the gallantry with which the GuidesInfantry, under Major Campbell, brought off Captain Ryder's detachmentof the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavyfire. He has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's favourablemention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. B. Hodson, andLieutenant H. W. Codrington, of the Guides, who commanded the companiesof the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; thegallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher, Indian Medical Service, who madea most determined, though unsuccessful, attempt to take medical aidto the wounded of Captain Ryder's detachment through a hot fire; ofSurgeon-Lieutenant E. L. Perry, Indian Medical Service; of JemadarSikander Khan of the Guides, and of several non-commissioned officersand Sepoys of the same corps, regarding whom I have had the honour tomake a separate communication. 

28. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also described in very favorableterms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain Cole andhis squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. He has commended the conductof Captain W. I. Ryder and Lieutenant O. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs, who wereboth wounded, and of Jemadar Narayan Singh, Havildar Ram Singh andSepoy Karram Singh [This man's case has formed the subject of a separatecommunication. ] of the same regiment. He has also brought to noticea gallant act of Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A. , commanding No. 8 BengalMountain Battery, and his trumpeter, Jiwan, in rescuing a wounded Sepoyof the 35th Sikhs, as well as the distinguished gallantry of JemadarsNawab and Ishar Singh and several non-commissioned officers and men ofthe same battery, in regard to which I have made separate communicationsto you. 

29. Brigadier-General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms ofcommendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants T. C. Watson [twicewounded in attempting to clear the village] and J. M. C. Colvin, R. E. , andof the handful of men of the Buffs and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers andMiners, who spent the night of the 16th-17th with him in the village ofBilot. The conduct of these officers and men [of whom six were killedand eighteen wounded on this occasion, out of a total of fifty-four] inentering the village several times in the dark in face of a heavy firedirected upon them at close quarters, seems deserving of the highestrecognition, and I have consequently made a special communication toyou on the subject. Brigadier-General Jeffreys has also commended thegallant conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, [The remainderof Brigadier-General Jeffrey's staff was with the main body when it gotseparated from them. ] Major E. O. F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion the Queen'sRoyal West Surrey Regiment; and finally, he has praised the courageand resolution of Lieutenant W. L. S. Churchill, 4th Hussars, thecorrespondent of the Pioneer Newspaper with the force, who made himselfuseful at a critical moment. 

 OPERATIONS OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE

 FROM THE CONCLUDING DESPATCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K. C. B. 

58. The commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D. S. O. , weremost successful. The rations were always abundant, and of uniformly goodquality; and I may here observe that in five previous campaigns I havenever seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good, as ithas been throughout the operations of the Malakand Field Force. No doubtthe excellence of the commissariat arrangements has had a great deal todo with the good state of health of the troops, which I have remarkedupon. 

59. The transport was most efficient throughout the operations underreference, and its management, under the direction of Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Divisional Transport Officer, who was most ably andenergetically assisted by Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, SeniorVeterinary Officer, was most successful. In proof of this I will cite areport just made to me by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, commanding the2nd Brigade of my force, that this morning, on inspecting 1265 mulesattached his brigade, which have just returned from seven weeks in thefield, he found fourteen sore backs, and four animals otherwise unfitfor work, or a total of only eighteen disabled animals in all. 

60. The medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Some difficulties arose on the transfer of officers and material to theTirah Expeditionary Force on its formation, especially as large convoysof sick and wounded were on the line of this force at the time, butthese difficulties were successfully overcome by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, commanding the Malakand Brigade, who was in charge of the Line, andmatters were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival ofSurgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, who is nowPrincipal Medical Officer of the Force. 

61. The telegraph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W. Robertson, R. E. , under the direction of Mr. C. E. Pitman, C. I. E. Thepostal service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan was also satisfactory. 

62. The working of the several departments of the Headquarters' staffwas most satisfactory and successful. The heads of departments were:--

Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Regiment Central India Horse, Assistant Quartermaster-General. 

Captain H. E. Stanton, D. S. O. , R. A. , Deputy AssistantQuartermaster-General (Intelligence). 

Captain E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment, Superintendent, ArmySignalling. 

Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, PrincipalMedical Officer. 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C. B. , R. A. , Commanding Royal Artillery. 

Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R. E. , Commanding Royal Engineers--relieved earlyin October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C. M. G. , R. E. 

Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry, Field Treasure ChestOfficer. 

Captain W. W. Cookson, R. A. , Ordnance Officer. 

Major H. Wharry, D. S. O. , Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer. 

Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann, [Wounded in action, 20th September, 1897. ] Army Veterinary Department, Senior Veterinary Officer. 

Captain C. L. Robertson, R. E. , Survey officer. 

Captain C. G. F. Edwards, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Provost Marshal. 

The Rev. L. Klogh, Chaplain. 

Lieutenant W. Robertson, R. E. , in charge of Telegraphs. 

63. I am under great obligations to my personal staff--Captain A. B. Dunsterville, 1st Battalion East Suttey Regiment, Aide-de-Camp; CaptainA. R. Dick, 2nd Punjaub Cavalry, and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th(The Queen's) Lancers. 

64. It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that thethree brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-GeneralsW. H. Meiklejohn, C. B. , C. M. G. , 1st Brigade; P. D. Jeffreys, [Wounded inaction, 16th September, 1897. ] C. B. , 2nd Brigade, and J. H. Wodehouse, C. B. , C. M. G. , [Wounded in action, 20th September, 1897. ] 3rdBrigade, who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. The Line ofCommunications and the Base were also most efficiently managedby Colonel A. J. F. Reid, Commanding the Malakand Brigade, and byLieut. -Colonel A. V. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, the Base Commandant, and their respective staffs. 

65. In my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the force, I shall have the honour to bring the services of the officers abovebriefly referred to more fully to the notice of His Excellency theCommander-in-Chief. 

66. Major H. A. Deane, C. S. I. , Political Agent, Dur, Chitral and Swat, was in separate and independent charge of the political arrangementsconnected with the operations I have described, as far as Nawagai. Heaccompanied my headquarters to Ghosam, where I left him on the 12thSeptember, and rejoined me at Inayat Kila on the 4th October. He gavemuch assistance in arranging for the collection of local supplies. 

67. Mr. W. S. Davis was my political officer throughout the operationsbeyond Nawagai, and in the Mamund Valley prior to Major Deane's returnto my headquarters on the 4th October. He carried out his duties to mycomplete satisfaction. His native assistant, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Kham, also made himself very useful. 

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