THE TRANSVAAL FROM WITHIN

A Private Record of Public Affairs

BYJ. P. FITZPATRICKAUTHOR OF 'THE OUTSPAN'

LONDONWILLIAM HEINEMANN1899

_Written August, 1896. Privately circulated June, 1899. Supplemented and published September 1899. _

PREFACE

It was originally designed to compile a statement of theoccurrences of 1895-6 in the Transvaal and of the conditionswhich led up to them, in the hope of removing the very gravemisunderstandings which existed. Everybody else had been heard andjudged, the Uitlander had only been judged. It therefore seemedproper that somebody should attempt to present the case for theUitlander. The writer, as a South African by birth, as a residentin the Transvaal since 1884, and lastly as Secretary of the ReformCommittee, felt impelled to do this, but suffered under thedisability of President Kruger's three years' ban; and although itmight possibly have been urged that a plain statement of facts andexplanations of past actions could not be fairly regarded as adeliberate interference in politics, the facts themselves when setout appeared to constitute an indictment so strong as to make itworth while considering whether the Government of the Transvaal wouldnot regard it as sufficient excuse to put in force the sentence ofbanishment. The postponement of publication which was then decidedupon for a period of three years appeared to be tantamount to theabandonment of the original purpose, and the work was continued withthe intention of making it a private record to be printed at theexpiry of the term of silence, and to be privately circulated amongthose who were personally concerned or interested; a record whichmight perhaps be of service some day in filling in a page of SouthAfrican history. 

The private circulation of that work during June of the presentyear led to suggestions from many quarters that it should besupplemented by a chapter or two dealing with later events andpublished; and the present volume is the outcome of thesesuggestions. 

It is realized that much of what might properly appear in a privaterecord will be considered rather superfluous in a book designed forwider circulation. For instance, a good deal of space is given todetails of the trial and the prison life of the Reformers, which areof no interest whatever to the public, although they form a recordwhich the men themselves may like to preserve. These might have beenomitted but that the writer desired to make no alterations in theoriginal text except in the nature of literary revision. 

The writer may be charged by the "peace" party with deliberatelyselecting a critical and anxious time as opportune to contribute anew factor to those already militating against a peaceful settlement. Two replies could be made to this: one an excuse and one an answer. It would be an excuse that the writer did not deliberately selectthe time of publication, but that the Transvaal Government in itswisdom chose to impose silence for three years, and that the projectwith which their action had interfered was resumed at the earliestpossible moment. The coincidence of another crisis with the date ofemancipation may be an unlucky coincidence, or it may be a result. But there is neither necessity nor intention to offer excuses. Theresponsibility is accepted and the answer is that a case so soundneeds only to be understood, that a recital of the facts must helpto dispel the mists of race prejudice and misunderstanding which areobscuring the judgment of many; and that a firm but strictly justand dignified handling of the question by the Imperial Governmentis the only possible way to avert a catastrophe in South Africa. Itis essential therefore that first of all the conditions as they areshould be understood; and this record is offered as a contributionto that end. Let the measure of its truth be the measure of itsusefulness!

The reader is not invited to believe that the case is presented insuch form as it might have been presented by an impartial historian. It is the Transvaal _from within_, by one who feels all theinjustice and indignity of the position. With the knowledge, however, that a good case is spoiled by overstatement and with the desire toavoid injustice to others an earnest attempt has been made to statethe facts fairly. In how far that attempt has been successful thereader must decide for himself. 

J. P. F. _July, 1899. _

NOTE

It has been impossible to avoid in this volume more or less pointedreference to certain nationalities in certain connections; forinstance such expressions as "the Boers, " "the Cape Dutch, " "theHollanders, " "the Germans, " are used. The writer desires to say onceand for all that unless the contrary is obviously and deliberatelyindicated, the distinctions between nationalities are intended in thepolitical sense only and not in the racial sense, and if by mischancethere should be found something in these pages which seems offensive, he begs the more indulgent interpretation on the ground of a veryearnest desire to remove and not to accentuate race distinctions. 

General references are also made to classes--"the civil service, ""the officials, " &c. There are officials in the Transvaal servicewho would earn the confidence and esteem of the public in anyadministration in the world. It is hardly necessary to say that thereis no intention to disparage them. 

CONTENTS

PART I. CHAPTER I. EARLIER DAYS 1 CHAPTER II. AFTER THE WAR 44 CHAPTER III. THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT 117 CHAPTER IV. THE REFORM COMMITTEE 137 CHAPTER V. THE COMMITTEE'S DILEMMA 151 CHAPTER VI. THE INVASION 173 CHAPTER VII. AFTER DOORNKOP 200 CHAPTER VIII. ARREST AND TRIAL OF THE REFORMERS 222 CHAPTER IX. LIFE IN GAOL 251

PART II. CHAPTER X. THREE YEARS' GRACE 285 CHAPTER XI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 333

APPENDICES. APPENDIX A. Pretoria Convention. 369 APPENDIX B. London Convention. 377 APPENDIX C. President Kruger's Affairs in the Raads. 385 APPENDIX D. Volksraad Debates. 387 APPENDIX E. Malaboch. 395 APPENDIX F. The Great Franchise Debate. 396 APPENDIX G. Terms of Dr. Jameson's Surrender. 404 APPENDIX H. Sir John Willoughby's Report to the War Office. 411 APPENDIX I. Manifesto. 422 APPENDIX K. The Case of the Chieftainess Toeremetsjani. 432 APPENDIX L. Report on the Letter written on a Torn Telegram Form signed "F. R. , " by Mr. T. H. Gurrin, Expert in Handwriting. 438

PART I. 

CHAPTER I. 

IN EARLIER DAYS. 

When, before resorting to extreme measures to obtain what theUitlanders deemed to be their bare rights, the final appeal ordeclaration was made on Boxing Day, 1895, in the form of themanifesto published by the Chairman of the National Union, PresidentKruger, after an attentive consideration of the document astranslated to him, remarked grimly: 'Their rights. Yes, they'll getthem--over my dead body!' And volumes of explanation could not betterillustrate the Boer attitude and policy towards the English-speakingimmigrants. 

'L'État c'est moi' is almost as true of the old Dopper President asit was of its originator; for in matters of external policy and inmatters which concern the Boer as a party the President has his wayas surely and as completely as any anointed autocrat. To anyone whohas studied the Boers and their ways and policy--who has given morethan passing consideration to the incidents and negotiations of thepresent year{01}--it must be clear that President Kruger doessomething more than represent the opinion of the people and executetheir policy: he moulds them in the form he wills. By the force ofhis own strong convictions and prejudices, and of his indomitablewill, he has made the Boers a people whom he regards as the germ ofthe Africander nation; a people chastened, selected, welded, andstrong enough to attract and assimilate all their kindred in SouthAfrica, and then to realize the dream of a Dutch Republic from theZambesi to Capetown. 

In the history of South Africa the figure of the grim old Presidentwill loom large and striking--picturesque, as the figure of one whoby his character and will made and held his people; magnificent, asone who in the face of the blackest fortune never wavered from hisaim or faltered in his effort; who, with a courage that seemed, andstill seems, fatuous, but which may well be called heroic, stood upagainst the might of the greatest empire in the world. And, it maybe, pathetic, too, as one whose limitations were great, one whosetraining and associations--whose very successes--had narrowed, andembittered and hardened him; as one who, when the greatness ofsuccess was his to take and to hold, turned his back on the supremeopportunity, and used his strength and qualities to fight against thespirit of progress, and all that the enlightenment of the agepronounces to be fitting and necessary to good government and ahealthy State. 

To an English nobleman, who, in the course of an interview, remarked, 'My father was a Minister of England, and twice Viceroy of Ireland, 'the old Dutchman answered, 'And my father was a shepherd!' It was notpride rebuking pride; it was the ever-present fact which would nothave been worth mentioning but for the suggestion of the antithesis. He too was a shepherd, and is--a peasant. It may be that he knowswhat would be right and good for his people, and it may be not; butit is sure that he realizes that to educate would be to emancipate, to broaden their views would be to break down the defences of theirprejudices, to let in the new leaven would be to spoil the old bread, to give unto all men the rights of men would be to swamp for ever theparty which is to him greater than the State. When one thinks on theone-century history of the people, much is seen that accounts fortheir extraordinary love of isolation, and their ingrained andpassionate aversion to control; much too that draws to them a worldof sympathy. And when one realizes the old Dopper President hemmed inonce more by the hurrying tide of civilization, from which his peoplehave fled for generations--trying to fight both fate andNature--standing up to stem a tide as resistless as the eternalsea--one sees the pathos of the picture. But this is as anothergeneration may see it. 

To-day we are too close--so close that the meaner details, theinsincerity, the injustice, the barbarity--all the unlovely touchesthat will by-and-by be forgotten--sponged away by the gentle hand oftime, when only the picturesque will remain. 

In order to understand the deep, ineradicable aversion to Englishrule which is in the heart and the blood and the bones of every Boer, and of a great many of their kindred who are themselves Britishsubjects, one must recall the conditions under which the Dutch cameunder British rule. When, in 1814, the Cape was finally ceded toEngland, it had been twice acquired and held by conquest. Thecolonists were practically all Dutch, or Huguenots who had adoptedDutch as their language, and South Africa as their home. In any casethey were people who, by tradition, teaching and experience, musthave regarded the English as their enemies; people in whom there musthave been roused bitter resentment against being handed over with theland to their traditional enemies. Were they serfs or subjects? hasbeen asked on their behalf. Had Holland the right, the power, overfreemen born, to say to them, 'You are our subjects, on our soil, andwe have transferred the soil and with it your allegiance to England, whose sovereignty you will not be free to repudiate. ' The Dutchcolonist said 'No. ' The English Government and the laws of the daysaid 'Yes. '

Early in the century the Boers began to trek away from the sphere ofBritish rule. They were trekkers before that, indeed. Even in thedays of Van Riebeck (1650) they had trekked away from the crowdedparts, and opened up with the rifle and the plough new reaches ofcountry; pioneering in a rough but most effective way, driving backthe savage races, and clearing the way for civilization. There is, however, a great difference to be noted between the early treks ofthe emigrants and the treks 'from British rule. ' In the former (withfew exceptions) they went, knowing that their Government would followthem, and even anxious to have its support and its representatives;and the people who formed their migrating parties were those who hadno or insufficient land in the settled parts, those who were startinglife on their own account, or those whose families could not belocated and provided for in the cramped circumstances of the moreoccupied parts. In the other case, rich and poor, old and young, went off as in the days and in the fashion of Moses or Abraham. Theywent without leave or help of the Government; secretly or openlythey went, and they asked nothing but to be left alone. They lefttheir homes, their people, the protection of an establishedGovernment and a rough civilization, and went out into the unknown. And they had, as it appeared to them, and as it will appear to manyothers, good reasons for taking so grave a step. For, although thecolonists of South Africa enjoyed better government, and infinitelymore liberty, under British rule, than they had under the tyrannical_régime_ of the Dutch East India Company twenty years before(against which the Boers had twice risen in rebellion) there weremany things which were not as they should have been. A generationhad grown up which knew nothing of the arbitrary and oppressive ruleof the old Dutch Company. Simple folks have long memories, and allthe world over injuries make a deeper and more lasting impressionthan benefits; and the older generation of Boers, which could recalla condition of things contrasting unpleasantly with British rule, also remembered the executions of Slagters Nek--a vindication of thelaw which, when all allowance has been made for disturbed times, andthe need of strong measures to stop rebellion in a newly-acquiredcountry, seems to us to-day to have been harsh, unnecessary, andunwise in policy, and truly terrible in the manner of fulfilment. 

The Boers have produced from their own ranks no literary champion toplead or defend their cause, and their earlier history is thereforelittle known, and often misunderstood; but to their aid has come Mr. George McCall Theal, the South African historian, whose years oflaborious research have rescued for South Africa much that wouldotherwise have been lost. In his 'History of the Boers' Mr. Thealrecords the causes of the great emigration, and shows how the Boersstood up for fair treatment, and fought the cause, not of Boersalone, but of all colonists. Boers and British were alike harshly andignorantly treated by high-handed Governors, and an ill-informed andprejudiced Colonial Office, who made no distinction on the groundsof nationality between the two; for we read that Englishmen had beenexpelled the country, thrown in gaol, had their propertyconfiscated, and their newspapers suppressed for asserting theirindependence, and for trifling breaches of harsh laws. The followingextract gives the best possible synopsis of the causes, and shouldwhet an appetite which can be gratified by the purchase of Mr. Theal's book:

Why, then, did these men abandon their homes, sacrifice whateverproperty could not be carried away, and flee from English rule asfrom the most hateful tyranny? The causes are stated in a great massof correspondence addressed by them to the Colonial Government, andnow preserved, with other colonial records, in declarations publishedby some of them before leaving, in letters to their relatives and tonewspapers, and in hundreds of pages of printed matter, prepared byfriendly and hostile hands. The declaration of one of the ablest menamong them assigns the following as the motives of himself and theparty that went with him:

 'GRAHAM'S TOWN, '_January 22, 1837_

'1. We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threatenit by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowedto infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect ofpeace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted byinternal commotions. 

'2. We complain of the severe losses which we have been forced tosustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious lawswhich have been enacted respecting them. 

'3. We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have foryears endured from the Kaffirs and other coloured classes, andparticularly by the last invasion of the colony, which has desolatedthe frontier districts, and ruined most of the inhabitants. 

'4. We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast uponus by interested and dishonest persons, under the name of religion, whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of allevidence in our favour; and we can foresee, as the result of thisprejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country. 

'5. We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the justprinciples of liberty; but, whilst we will take care that no one isbrought by us into a condition of slavery, we will establish suchregulations as may suppress crime, and preserve proper relationsbetween master and servant. 

'6. We solemnly declare that we leave this colony with a desire toenjoy a quieter life than we have hitherto had. We will not molestany people, nor deprive them of the smallest property; but, ifattacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defendingour persons and effects, to the utmost of our ability, against everyenemy. 

'7. We make known that when we shall have framed a code of laws forour guidance, copies shall be forwarded to this colony for generalinformation; but we take the opportunity of stating that it is ourfirm resolve to make provision for the summary punishment, even withdeath, of all traitors, without exception, who may be found amongstus. 

'8. We purpose, in the course of our journey, and on arrival at thecountry in which we shall permanently reside, to make known to thenative tribes our intentions, and our desire to live in peace andfriendly intercourse with them. 

'9. We quit this colony under the full assurance that the EnglishGovernment has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us togovern ourselves without its interference in future. 

'10. We are now leaving the fruitful land of our birth, in which wehave suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are aboutto enter a strange and dangerous territory; but we go with a firmreliance on an all-seeing, just, and merciful God, whom we shallalways fear, and humbly endeavour to obey. 

'In the name of all who leave the colony with me, 'P. RETIEF. '

But formal declarations such as the above are not in all instances tobe trusted. It is much safer to compare numerous documents written atdifferent times, by different persons, and under differentcircumstances. For our subject this means of information is ascomplete as can be desired. The correspondence of the emigrants withthe Cape Government was the work of many individuals, and extendedover many years. The letters are usually of great length, badlyconstructed, and badly spelt--the productions, in short, ofuneducated men; but so uniform is the vein of thought running throughthem all, that there is not the slightest difficulty in condensingthem into a dozen pages. When analyzed, the statements contained inthem are found to consist of two charges, one against the ImperialGovernment, the other against the agents in South Africa of theLondon Missionary Society. 

The Imperial Government was charged with exposing the whiteinhabitants of the colony, without protection, to robbery and murderby the blacks; with giving credence in every dispute to statementsmade by interested persons in favour of savages, while refusing tocredit the testimony, no matter how reliable, of colonists ofEuropean extraction; with liberating the slaves in an unjust manner;and generally with such undue partiality for persons with black skinsand savage habits, as to make it preferable to seek a new home in thewilderness than remain under the English flag. 

The missionaries of the London Society were charged with usurpingauthority that should properly belong to the civil magistrate; withmisrepresenting facts; and with advocating schemes directly hostileto the progress of civilization, and to the observance of order. Andit was asserted that the influence of these missionaries was allpowerful at the Colonial Office in London, by which the colony, without a voice in the management of its affairs, was then ruledabsolutely. 

In support of the charges against the Imperial Government, theemigrants dwelt largely upon the devastation of the eastern districtsby the Kaffirs' inroad of December, 1834, which was certainlyunprovoked by the colonists. Yet Lord Glenelg, who was then Secretaryof State for the Colonies, justified the Kaffirs, and not onlyrefused to punish them, but actually gave them a large slip of land, including the dense jungles along the Fish River, that had longbeen part of the colony; and made no other provision against therecurrence of a destructive invasion than a series of treaties with anumber of barbarous chiefs, who had no regard for their engagements. This event is the most prominent feature in the correspondence ofthe emigrants; it is fairly recorded, and the language used is ingeneral much more moderate than that employed by the Englishfrontier colonists when relating the same circumstance. 

Next stands the removal of all restraint from the coloured populationof the colony, without the protection to the whites of even a VagrantAct. Several of the colonial divisions had been for ten or twelveyears overrun by fugitives from the Basuto and Betshuana countries, who had been driven from their own homes by the troubles alreadyrecorded. These people were usually termed Mantatees or Makatees, from the supposition that they were all subjects of Ma Ntatisi. Towards the eastern frontiers Kaffirs, and after the war Fingos, wandered about practically wherever they chose. In the remainder ofthe colony Hottentots, free blacks, and mixed breeds came and went asthey pleased. How is it possible, said the farmers, for us tocultivate the ground, or breed cattle, with all these savages andsemi-savages constantly watching for opportunities to plunderus--with no police, and no law under which suspicious characters canbe arrested and made to account for their manner of living?

Much is said of the reproofs of Sir Benjamin D'Urban by the Secretaryof State, and, after 1838, of the dismissal of that Governor, (1) Theemigrants asserted that he was the best Governor the colony had hadsince it became subject to England; they dwelt upon his benevolence, his ability, his strict justice, his impartiality to white and black, his efforts to promote civilization; and then they complained, inwords more bitter than are to be found when they referred to anyother subject, that the good Governor had been reproved, and finallydeprived of his office, because he had told the plain truth, regardless of the London Missionary Society; and had endeavoured tomete out to black criminals the same justice that he would have metedout had they been white. There is now no one in South Africa who doesnot agree with the emigrants in this matter. Nearly half a centuryhas passed away since Sir Benjamin D'Urban was forced into retirementby Lord Glenelg; and during that period the principal measures whichhe proposed have been approved of and adopted, while the successorsof those missionaries who were his bitter opponents are at presentamong the strongest advocates of his system of dealing with thenatives. 

Sir Benjamin D'Urban remained in South Africa, after being deprivedof office, until the reversal of his policy towards the natives wasadmitted by most people even in England to have been a mistake. Hedid not leave the Cape until April, 1846, just after the commencementof the War of the Axe. 

Concerning the liberation of the slaves, there is less in thiscorrespondence than one might reasonably expect to find. Many scoresof pages can be examined without any allusion whatever to it. Nowhereis there a single word to be found in favour of slavery as aninstitution; the view of the emigrants, with hardly an exception, being fairly represented in the following sentence, taken from aletter of the Volksraad at Natal to Sir George Napier: 'A long andsad experience has sufficiently convinced us of the injury, loss, anddearness of slave labour, so that neither slavery nor the slave tradewill ever be permitted among us. '

[The allusions to the emancipation of slaves, and to slavery as aninstitution, will be considered by many to need some modification orexplanation. The Dutch even to-day speak of the emancipation as thereal cause of the great exodus; and the system of indenture, andthe treatment of natives generally by the Boers, cannot fairly beregarded as warranting the view expressed by Mr. Theal in connectionwith this letter to Sir George Napier. ]

It is alleged, however, that the emancipation, as it was carried out, was an act of confiscation. It is stated that most of the slaves werebrought to the colony in English ships, and sold by English subjects;that when, in 1795, the colony was invited by English officers ofhigh rank to place itself under the protection of England, one of theinducements held out was security in slave property; at the same timethose officers warning the colonists that if France obtainedpossession she would liberate the slaves, as she had done inMartinique, thereby ruining this colony as she had ruined thatisland; that the English Government had recently and suddenly changedits policy, and required them to conform to the change with equalalacrity, whereas they were convinced that gradual emancipation, withsecurities against vagrancy, was the only safe course. Theemancipation had been sudden, and the slaves had been placed upon aperfect political equality with their former proprietors. Themissionaries applauded this as a noble and generous act of theImperial Government, and they were told that by everyone in Englandit was so regarded. But at whose expense was this noble and generousact carried out? Agents of the Imperial Government had appraised theslaves, generally at less than their market value. Two-fifths of thisappraisement, being the share apportioned to the Cape out of thetwenty million pounds sterling voted by the Imperial Parliament, hadthen been offered to the proprietors as compensation, if they choseto go to London for it, otherwise they could only dispose of theirclaims at a heavy discount. Thus, in point of fact, only aboutone-third of the appraised amount had been received. To allslave-holders this had meant a great reduction of wealth, while tomany of those who were in debt it was equivalent to the utterdeprivation of all property. 

As regards the missionaries, a crusade was organized by some of theseworthies, who had themselves married Kaffir women, and who spared noeffort and showed no scruple in blackening the name of colonist. 

The views and interests of the colonists and of these men were sodifferent that concord was hardly possible. The missionaries desiredthat the blacks should be collected together in villages: thecolonists were unwilling that they should be thus withdrawn fromservice. 'Teach them the first step in civilization, to labourhonestly for their maintenance, and add to that oral instruction inthe doctrines of Christianity, ' said the colonists. 'Why should theybe debarred from learning to read and write? And as there can only beschools if they are brought together in villages, why should they notbe collected together?' replied the missionaries. 

Then came another and a larger question. By whom should the wasteplaces of the land, the vast areas which were without other occupantsthan a few roving Bushmen, be peopled? 'By the white man, ' said thecolonists; 'it is to the advantage of the world in all time to comethat the higher race should expand and be dominant here; it would betreason to humanity to prevent its growth where it can grow withoutwrong to others, or to plant an inferior stock where the superior cantake root and flourish. ' 'By Africans, ' said the missionaries; 'thisis African soil; and if mission stations are established on itsdesolate tracts, people will be drawn to them from the far interior, the community will grow rapidly, those enlightened by Christianityhere will desire in their turn to enlighten their friends beyond, andthus the Gospel teaching will spread until all Africa stretches outits hands to God. ' Coupled with such arguments, which were constantlyused by missionaries in the early part of this century, before theirenthusiasm was cooled by experience, were calculations that appealedstrongly to the commercial instincts of people in England. A dozencolonial farmers required something like a hundred square miles ofland for their cattle runs; on this same ground, under missionarysupervision, three or four hundred families of blacks could exist;these blacks would shortly need large quantities of manufacturedgoods; and thus it would be to the interest of trade to encouragethem rather than the colonists. 'Already, ' said they, 'after only afew years' training, many blacks can read as well or better than theordinary colonists, and are exhibiting a decided taste forcivilization. '

There was thus a broad line of demarcation between the colonists andsuch of the missionaries as held these views, and the tendency oneach side was to make it still broader. It was deepened into positiveantipathy towards those missionaries who, following Dr. Vanderkemp'sexample, united themselves in marriage with black women, andproclaimed themselves the champions of the black population againstthe white. Everyone acquainted with South African natives knows howready they are to please their friends by bringing forward chargesagainst anyone whom those friends dislike. Unfortunately themissionaries Vanderkemp and Read were deceived into believing a greatnumber of charges of cruelty made against various colonists, which alittle observation would have shown in most instances to begroundless; and thereupon they lodged accusations before the HighCourt of Justice. In 1811 between seventy and eighty such cases camebefore the Circuit Court for trial. There was hardly a family on thefrontier of which some relative was not brought as a criminal beforethe judges to answer to a charge of murder or violent assault. Several months were occupied in the trials, and more than a thousandwitnesses were examined, but in every instance the most seriouscharges were proved to be without foundation. Only a few convictions, and those of no very outrageous crimes, resulted from theseprosecutions, which kept the entire colony in a ferment until longafter the circuit was closed. 

Thus far everyone will approve of the sentiments of one party or theother according to his sympathy, but in what follows no unprejudicedperson who will take the trouble to study the matter thoroughly canacquit the anti-colonial missionaries of something more faulty thanmere error of judgment. For years their writings teemed with chargesagainst the colonists similar to those they had brought before theHigh Court of Justice. These writings were circulated widely inEurope, where the voice of the colonists was never heard, and theycreated impressions there which no refutation made in South Africacould ever counteract. The acts, the language, even the writtenpetitions of the colonists, were so distorted in accounts sent home, that these accounts cannot now be read by those who have madethemselves acquainted with the truth, without the liveliest feelingsof indignation being excited. 

The colonists learned that in England they were regarded as cruelbarbarians because they refused to permit Hottentot herds, swarmingwith vermin, to be seated in their front rooms at the time of familyprayer. They found themselves pictured as the harshest oftaskmasters, as unfeeling violators of native rights. And of lateyears it had become plain to them that the views of their opponentswere being acted upon at the Colonial Office, while their complaintswere wholly disregarded. 

Several causes of dissatisfaction, besides those above mentioned, contributed to the impulse of emigration, but all in a very slightdegree. Judge Cloete, in his 'Five Lectures, ' mentions the severepunishment inflicted upon the frontier insurgents of 1815 as one ofthem; and there is no doubt that it was so with some families, thoughno trace of it can be found in the correspondence of the emigrants. The substitution in 1827 of the English for the Dutch language in thecolonial courts of law was certainly generally felt as a grievance. The alteration in 1813 of the system of land tenure, the redemptionin 1825 of the paper currency at only thirty-six hundredths of itsnominal value, and the abolition in 1827 of the courts of landdrostand heemraden, unquestionably caused much dissatisfaction, though allof these measures are now admitted by everyone to have beenbeneficial. The long delay in issuing titles to farms, the cost ofwhich has been paid to Government years before, is mentioned as agrievance in some of the declarations. 

Two parties--men, women, and children--numbering ninety-eight in all, pioneered the great trek; of these twenty-six survived fever andfighting, loss of provisions, waggons, and cattle, and a long wearytramp from Zoutpansberg to Delagoa Bay, and were rescued and takenthence to Natal, and two children were carried off by the natives. The survivors were three women with their twelve children--sevenorphan children and four youths. Not a single grown man escaped. 

During the winter of 1836 preparations for emigration were being madeover the eastern and midland districts. The Governor was perfectlyhelpless in the matter. The Attorney-General, Mr. A. Oliphant, wasconsulted by the Governor, and gave his opinion that 'it seemed nextto an impossibility to prevent persons passing out of the colony bylaws in force, or by any which could be framed. ' On August 19 SirBenjamin D'Urban wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir AndriesStockenstrom, that 'he could see no means of stopping the emigration, except by persuasion, and attention to the wants and necessities ofthe farmers. ' In that direction the Governor had done all that was inhis power, but he could not act in opposition to the instructions ofthe Secretary of State. Sir Andries Stockenstrom himself, in replyingto an address from the inhabitants of Uitenhage, stated that 'hewas not aware of any law which prevented any of his Majesty'ssubjects from leaving his dominions and settling in another country;and such a law, if it did exist, would be tyrannical andoppressive. '

The story of the trekkers is one of surpassing interest, and mustenlist for them the sympathy and unbounded admiration of all. 

By the middle of the year 1837 there were over one thousand waggonsbetween the Caledon and Vaal rivers--truly a notable and alarmingexodus; and the Boers then began the work of carving out newcountries for themselves. Their history surpasses all fiction in itsvicissitudes, successes, and tragedies. They fought and worked andtrekked, onward, always onward--never returning--on beyond thefurthermost outposts of civilization. 

And so the story rolls on, gaining pathos, but losing no whit ofinterest from its eternal sameness. They fought, and worked, andstarved, and died for their land of promise, where they might hope tobe alone, like the simple people of their one Book; where they mightnever know the hated British rule; where they might never experiencethe forms and trammels, the restlessness and changes, the worries, the necessities or benefits, of progressing civilization. Theirquarrel had been with the abuses and blunders of one Government; buta narrow experience moved them to mistrust all but their own pastoralpatriarchal way, moulded on the records of the Bible, and to regardthe evidences of progress as warnings of coming oppression andcurtailment of liberty, and a departure from the simple and idealway. The abuses from which they suffered are no more; the methodswhich were unjust have been abandoned; the ignorance of the ruler hasbeen dispelled; in place of despotism there is autonomy; justicerules where ignorance and bias sat; liberty where there wasinterference; protection for oppression; progress and civilizationhave increased as in no other epoch; and the nation and Governmentfrom which they severed themselves have taken their place in the veryforefront of all. But the Boer sees with the eyes of sixty years ago!

The ideal was impossible, the struggle hopeless, the end certain. They trekked, and trekked and trekked again; but the flag ofEngland--emblem of all they hated--was close by; behind, beside, in front, or over them; and the something which they could notfight--the ever-advancing tide of civilization--lapped at theirfeet, and slowly, silently, and for ever blotted out the line wherethey had written, 'Thus far and no further. '

The South African Republic had been in existence as an independentState for twelve years when it reached that condition of insolvencywhich appeared to invite, or at least justify, annexation, as theonly alternative to complete ruin and chaos. And there are very few, even among the most uncompromising supporters of the Boers, whoseriously attempt to show that the Transvaal had any prospect ofprolonging its existence as an independent State for more than a fewmonths when Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed it in 1877. Thefollowing picture is from a book published by the late AlfredAylward, the Fenian, more anti-British than the Boer himself, who waspresent at the time, and wrote his book in order to enlist sympathyfor the movement then (1878) organized to obtain a cancellation ofthe annexation. The value of Aylward's testimony would not be fairlyappreciated without some explanation. 

Sir Bartle Frere describes him (and quotes Scotland Yard authoritieswho knew him well) as one of the party who murdered the policeman atManchester, and one of the worst and most active of the dynamitingIrishmen--a professional agitator, who boasted of his purpose topromote the Transvaal rebellion. Major Le Caron, too, stated on oathbefore the Parnell Commission that money was sent by the Irish RebelSocieties, through Aylward, to stir up the Transvaal rebellion. Thisis what Aylward says:

All South Africa was for the moment at rest, with the exception ofthe district of Utrecht, where an old-standing grievance withCetewayo was the cause of some little alarm and excitement (_i. E. _, Cetewayo's threatened invasion). Still, the Transvaal was disturbedthroughout its whole extent by the expectation of some pendingchange--a change coming from the outside, which had been invited byan active, discontented party, chiefly foreigners, dwellers in towns, non-producers, place-hunters, deserters, refugees, land-speculators, 'development-men, ' and pests of Transvaal society generally, whoopenly preached resistance to the law, refusal to pay taxes, andcontempt of the natural and guaranteed owners of the country inwhich they lived, in the distinctly expressed hope that foreignintervention would fill the country with British gold, and conduceto their own material prosperity. The Boers, spread over a countrylarger than France, were stunned into stupor by the demonstrativeloudness of the party of discontent. In some districts they (theBoers) were poor, and could not readily pay the taxes imposed uponthem by the wars and railway projects of the Government. TheirVolksraad was in Session, but its every action was paralyzed by thegloom of impending dissolution. 

The Republic owed £215, 000, which it had no immediate means ofpaying. Its creditors were clamorous; whilst the Executive, turn towhich side it would, found itself confronted by threats, reproaches, accusations of slavery and cruelty based upon hearsay, and which, like the annexation that steadily approached, could not be met, because neither of them had yet assumed the evidenced consistency ofactual fact. There was no public opinion to support the Government orto save the Republic. The Boers lived far apart from each other, whilst the annexationists and the party of disorder dwelt, in compactcommunities, in towns and mining villages. Into the midst of thisconfusion--into the capital of this bewildered State--entered SirTheophilus Shepstone and his staff. He had not come to seize thecountry--he had come as 'an adviser, as a helper, and as a friend';but his advent was a blight--an incubus which rendered additionallypowerless the unfortunate President and his Council. The coming ofSir Theophilus Shepstone was, to the minds of nearly all, but tooclearly the forerunner of change. In the face of this additionalwhet to the anticipations of the party of disturbance, somethingthat has been described as anarchy prevailed. Everyone waited; allfell into a state of expectation; no one attempted to save the State, or repel the danger. At the same time, there was no anarchy in theproper sense of the word. Justice sat on her seat; criminals werearrested and brought to trial; actions at law were heard anddetermined; and in no one place, save the goldfields, was authority, even for a moment, defied. There the law vindicated itself withouthaving used violence or shed one drop of blood. Not one singlepublic outrage, not one unpunished crime, marked this period ofsuspense, which is described by partizan writers as a time ofchaos and anarchy. 

Peace was granted to Secocoeni, and the quietness and gloom of thecountry became even more profound. 

Now, had a commission, royal or joint, been opened in Pretoria toinquire into the truth of the allegations made against theGovernment, history might perhaps be able to record that judgment, followed by justice, had overtaken the Transvaal. No commission wasopened. There was a banquet and a ball. The suspense increased inintensity. Understrappers, and agents of the discontented faction, filled the country with rumours of impending annexation, andsometimes of impending conquest. The Boers, the inhabitants of thecountry, asked day after day what was the mission of the EnglishCommissioner. They visited him in hundreds; but he knew the wonderfuladvantage to be gathered from the heightening of the mystery, and theintensifying of the excitement. He listened to everyone; but hemaintained a gloomy and impassive silence, neither checking theaspirations of the annexationists, nor dissipating the forebodings ofthe farmers. 

News arrived that troops were marching towards, and massing on, Theophilus sought not to alleviate the anxieties of the Government, nor to quell the now rising alarm amongst the people; he simply satstill and listened, watching the writhings and stragglings of thedoomed Volksraad, and awaiting a favourable moment to end itsexistence. 

At length someone determined to ask: 'Was it not possible to avertthis annexation which loomed before every mind, brooding like ashadow upon the country?' He went to Sir Theophilus; he asked hisquestion; and at length the oracle spoke. Without moving a muscle ofhis wonderfully impassive countenance, without even raising his eyesto look at the interlocutor, Sir Theophilus calmly murmured: 'It istoo late!--too late!' And so, without the authorization of the homeGovernment, without the consent of her Majesty's High Commissioner, without the concurrence of the Volksraad, against the will ofthirty-nine-fortieths of the people, and in defiance of the protestof their Executive, as Mr. Anthony Trollope puts it, Sir Theophilussaid: 'Then and from thenceforth the Transvaal shall be Britishproperty!' So he put up the Queen's flag. 

Now, it is impossible to conceive anything more admirable for itsdiscretion, more wisely calculated as to the moment of itsoccurrence, or more suavely and yet firmly done than this act. Therewas not a blow struck, not a shot fired; and the first impulse ofnearly every person in the country, whether in principle opposed toannexation or not, was to congratulate Sir Theophilus Shepstone onthe skill, tact, and good fortune with which he had put an end to theexcessive anxiety, the mental strain, the fears, hopes, andexpectations by which the whole country was paralyzed. Whether theannexation be now held to be right or wrong, its execution, so far asregards the act itself, was an unparalleled triumph of tact, modesty, and firmness. 

It was not discovered at the moment, and it never entered into anyman's mind to consider, that it was the presence in Pretoria of SirTheophilus himself that had created the anxiety, and caused theparalysis; and that it was his arts and presence that had tightenedand strung up into quivering intensity the mind of the country. Hehad broken the spell; he had introduced certainty in place ofuncertainty; and he was congratulated, and very properly so, for themanner in which he had brought to a conclusion his hazardous mission. 

Sir Theophilus Shepstone's despatches record his negotiations withPresident Burgers, and the arrangement which allowed him to make aformal protest against the annexation, so as to satisfy hisIrreconcilables, whilst he in reality not only assented to themeasure, but even assisted the completion of it, and discussed thedetails with Shepstone, who in turn had revised President Burgers''protest. '

On April 3, 1877, Shepstone had written to Frere:

Mr. Burgers, who had been all along, as far as his conversation andprofessions to me went, in full accord with me, had suddenly takenalarm; he made impossible proposals, all of which involved infinitedelay, and, of course, dangerous agitation. As far as I am concerned, leave the country, civil war would at once take place, as the nativeswould consider it the sunshine in which they could make hay in theTransvaal; the goldfields are in a state of rebellion against theTransvaal Government, and they are kept from overt acts only by mywarnings and entreaties. 

And eight days later he wrote to Mr. Robert Herbert enclosing hisletter under 'flying seal' to Frere:

There will be a protest against my act of annexation issued by theGovernment, but they will at the same time call upon the people tosubmit quietly, pending the issue; you need not be disquieted by suchaction, because it is taken merely to save appearances, and themembers of the Government from the violence of a faction that seemsfor years to have held Pretoria in terror when any act of theGovernment displeased it. 

You will better understand this when I tell you privately that thePresident has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity forthe change, and that most of the members of the Government haveexpressed themselves anxious for it; but none of them have had thecourage openly to express their opinions, so I have had to actapparently against them; and this I have felt bound to do, knowingthe state and danger of the country, and that three-fourths of thepeople will be thankful for the change when once it is made. 

Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the mattershould be done. I read to him the draft of my Proclamation, and heproposed the alteration of two words only, to which I agreed. Hebrought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert, which I have accepted, and have embodied in my Proclamation. He toldme that he could not help issuing a protest, to keep the noisyportion of the people quiet--and you will see grounds for thisprecaution when I tell you that there are only half a dozen nativeconstables to represent the power of the State in Pretoria, and aconsiderable number of the Boers in the neighbourhood are of thelowest and most ignorant class. Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draftof his protest, and asked me if I saw any objection to it, or thoughtit too strong. I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people toresist by-and-by; to which he replied that it was to tide over thedifficulty of the moment, seeing that my support, the troops, were afortnight's march distant, and that by the time the answer to theprotest came, all desire of opposition would have died out. Itherefore did not persuade him from his protest. 

You will see, when the proclamation reaches you, that I have takenhigh ground. Nothing but annexation will or can save the State, andnothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences. Allthe thinking and intelligent people know this, and will be thankfulto be delivered from the thraldom of petty factions, by which theyare perpetually kept in a state of excitement and unrest, because theGovernment, and everything connected with it, is a thorough sham. 

This arrangement with President Burgers was a most impropercompromise on both sides. Moreover, Shepstone received the protestsof the Executive Council and of the Volksraad before he issued hisproclamation. He had plenty of evidence to show that even if hisaction was approved by the majority, the Boers were sufficientlydivided to demand some delay. He knew that the members of theGovernment and of the Raad would not face the responsibility ofrelinquishing the State's independence, although he receivedprivate assurances and entreaties encouraging him to act. He hadrepresentations and deputations from the Boers themselves, sufficient in weight and number to warrant his belief that a largeproportion of the people desired annexation. He should not haveallowed the 'hedging' that was practised at his expense. The Boerleaders were 'between the devil and the deep sea. ' There can be nodoubt whatever that they dearly loved and prized their independence, and would have fought even then for it had they been in a positionto preserve and profit by it; but they were not. They dared neitherask for relief at the price of annexation, nor reject the profferedrelief at the price of continuing the hopeless struggle. So theycompromised. They took the relief, they accepted pay of the newGovernment, and entered a protest, so as to put themselves rightwith the records and stand well with untamed ones of the party. 

The Act of Annexation is so generally condemned by the friends andsympathizers of the Boers, and is so persistently quoted by them asthe cause of the Boer War, that it is only right to show clearly whatthe opinion was at that time; and if it be deemed that overmuch spaceis given to this matter, the answer is, that it is quoted now as thecrime which gave rise to the present hatred and mistrust of England, and it is all-important that the truth should be clear. 

This is what Mr. J. F. Celliers, the patriotic editor of the Boernewspaper, _De Volksstem_, wrote in reviewing the work of the specialsession of the Volksraad, convened to deal with the questions of LordCarnarvon's Federation Bill, and the rescuing of the country fromruin and chaos:--'During the session we have repeatedly had occasionto comment on the doings of the Raad. These comments have not beenfavourable, and we regret to say that we have found in the closingscenes of our Legislature no reason to alter our opinions. ' Thenfollows a scathing account of the 'work done, ' in which occur suchreferences as:--'With the exception of a couple of members, no one had the sense or manliness to go into the question ofconfederation'; and 'The most surprising feature of the wholeaffair was this--that most of the speakers seemed not to have thefaintest conception of the desperate condition in which the countrystood. . . . ' And again, under date of March 28: 'About three monthsago we said we would prefer confederation under the British flag ifthe state of anarchy then threatening were to continue. We know thata good and stable Government is better than anarchy any day. '

It is noteworthy that the writer of the above is the same Mr. Celliers who, two years later, was put in gaol by Colonel Lanyon on acharge of sedition, because he attacked the Administration for itsfailure to keep the promises made at the time of annexation. 

Three thousand out of eight thousand voters actually signed petitionsin favour of annexation. In the Raad, President Burgers openlyreproached members for proclaiming in public, and for improperreasons, views diametrically opposed to those privately expressed onthe confederation and annexation questions; and refused to consultwith three out of four members appointed as a deputation to conferwith him on these subjects, because they had not paid their taxes, and had so helped by example, not less than by the actual offence, tocause the ruin of the country and the loss of independence. And onMarch 3 President Burgers read an address to the Raad, in which thefollowing words occur:

'I would rather be a policeman under a strong Government than thePresident of such a State. It is you--you members of the Raad and theBoers--who have lost the country, who have sold your independence fora _soupe_ (a drink). You have ill-treated the natives, you have shotthem down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to paythe penalty. '

 * * * * * * *

'We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matterswould mend by-and-by. It would only be self-deceit. I tell youopenly, matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse. These are bitter truths, and people may perhaps turn their backs onme; but then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty. '

 * * * * * * *

'It is said here this or that man must be released from taxes, because the Kaffirs have driven them off their farms, and occupy thelatter. By this you proclaim to the world that the strongest man ismaster here, that the right of the strongest obtains here. ' [Mr. Mare: 'This is not true. '] 'Then it is not true what the honourablemember, Mr. Breytenbach, has told us about the state of the Lydenburgdistrict; then it is not true either what another member has saidabout the farms in Zoutpansberg, which are occupied by Kaffirs. Neither is it true, then, what I saw with my own eyes at Lydenburg, where the burghers had been driven off their farms by the Kaffirs, and where Johannes was ploughing and sowing on the land of a burgher. These are facts, and they show that the strongest man is the masterhere. The fourth point which we have to take into account affects ourrelations with our English neighbours. It is asked, What have theygot to do with our position? I tell you, as much as we have to dowith that of our Kaffir neighbours. As little as we can allowbarbarities among the Kaffirs on our borders, as little can theyallow that in a state on their borders anarchy and rebellion shouldprevail. '

 * * * * * * *

'Do you know what has recently happened in Turkey? Because nocivilized government was carried on there, the Great Powersinterfered and said, "Thus far, and no further. " And if this is doneto an empire, will a little republic be excused when it misbehaves?

 * * * * * * *

'Complain to other Powers, and seek justice there? Yes, thank God!justice is still to be found, even for the most insignificant; but itis precisely the justice which will convict us. If we want justice, we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands. '

 * * * * * * *

'Whence has arisen that urgency to make an appeal for interferenceelsewhere? Has that appeal been made only by enemies of the State? Ohno, gentlemen; it has arisen from real grievances. Our people havedegenerated from their former position; they have become demoralised; they are not what they ought to be. '

 * * * * * * *

'To-day a bill for £1, 100 was laid before me for signature; but Iwould sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for Ihave not the slightest ground to expect that when that bill becomesdue there will be a penny to pay it with. '

 * * * * * * *

The President added, and his statements remained uncontradicted:

The principal thing which had brought them to their present positionwas that to which they would not give attention. It was not this orthat thing which impeded their way, but they themselves stopped theway; and if they asked him what prevented the people from remainingobstruction, owing to the inherent incapacity and weakness of thepeople. But whence this weakness? Was it because they were deformed?because they were worse than other people? because they were too fewand too insignificant to occupy the country? Those arguments did notweigh with him. They were not true; he did not consider them of anyimportance. The people were as good as any other people, but theywere completely demoralized; they had lost faith in God, relianceupon themselves, or trust in each other. Hence he believed they wereinherently weak. 

 * * * * * * *

He did not believe that a new constitution would save them; for aslittle as the old constitution had brought them to ruin, so littlewould a new constitution bring them salvation. 

 * * * * * * *

The Great Powers, with all their greatness, all their thousands ofsoldiers, would fall as quickly as this State had fallen, and evenmore quickly, if their citizens were to do what the citizens of thisState had done; if the citizens of England had behaved towards theCrown as the burghers of this State had behaved to their Government, England would never have stood as long as she had, not even as longas this State had stood. This State owed obligations to othercountries; they knew that the fire which had nearly consumed thisState would, if felt by them, very soon consume them also. 

 * * * * * * *

In several of the cities of Holland there were people who hadsubscribed for only one debenture, because they thought men of theirown blood were living in South Africa. What was the consequence? Theinterest up to July last had been paid; in January of this year£2, 250 was due for interest, and there was not a penny to meet it. 

 * * * * * * *

To take up arms and fight was nonsense; to draw the sword would be todraw the sword against God, for it was God's judgment that the Statewas in the condition it was to-day; and it was their duty to inquirewhether they should immerse in blood the thousands of innocentinhabitants of this country, and if so, what for? For an idea--forsomething they had in their heads, but not in their hearts; for anindependence which was not prized. Let them make the best of thesituation, and get the best terms they possibly could; let them agreeto join their hands to those of their brethren in the south, and thenfrom the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great people. Yes, there was something grand in that--grander even than their idea of aRepublic--something which ministered to their national feeling. Andwould this be so miserable? Yes; this would be miserable for thosewho would not be under the law, for the rebel and revolutionist, butwelfare and prosperity for the men of law and order. 

 * * * * * * *

They must not underrate their real and many difficulties. He couldpoint to the south-western border, the Zulu, the goldfields, andother questions, and show them that it was their duty to come to anarrangement with the British Government, and to do so in a bold andmanly manner. An hon. Member on Saturday last had spoken with afervent patriotism; but he had failed to appreciate the reference, because it amounted to this--that they must shut their eyes toeverything, so as to keep their independence. 

President Burgers, who left the Transvaal broken-hearted, more by thecruel and mean intriguing and dissensions among, and disloyalty of, his own people, which made the annexation possible, than by the Actitself, when dying left a statement of the case. It is too long toreproduce in its entirety. He shows how the English faction workedfor annexation, and how the Dopper party, headed by Kruger, alliedthemselves with the former in intrigue against the Government, thwarting all effort at reform and organization, and encouraging therefusal to pay taxes. He states plainly that this course was pursuedby Kruger in order to oust him from power, and secure the Presidencyfor himself. He shows how he opposed 'that other element which hadformerly worked in secret, viz. , British interference, which got astrong support from the Boers themselves, and one of their chiefleaders, P. Kruger, who had betrayed me, after promising me his andhis party's support. ' He gives the final scene as follows:

The Volksraad had gone away, having done nothing but harm. Themembers of the Executive had gone home, as if all were safe, and Isat with a half-new Cabinet and part of an old one, half discharged. Yet I made one attempt more, and drafted a letter to Shepstone, intimating that I would oppose the annexation by force of arms, etc. ;and showed this to two members of the Executive. The response to myappeal, however, was so weak (one of them being in league with theEnglish) that I had to abandon the project, and try to prepare forthe worst. When, therefore, Shepstone's announcement came--that hecould wait no longer, that he had given us time enough to reform, andthat he must issue his proclamation--I could do no more than advise aprotest, and an appeal to foreign powers. This having been agreed toby my Government, I met Shepstone in presence of the Executive, andwhat could be saved for the country, such as its language, itslegislature, the position of its officials, etc. , was arranged. Before issuing his proclamation, Shepstone desired to see copies ofboth mine and the Government protest. This I promised, on conditionhe showed me his proclamation before publication: to which he agreed. To one clause I greatly objected, and protested--namely, the threatof confiscation of property for disobeying the proclamation. Ipointed out that this was barbarous, and would be punishing a man'sinnocent family for his actions. The clause was omitted. This isthe origin of the lie that I helped Shepstone in drawing up thisproclamation. In justice to Shepstone, I must say that I would notconsider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if hehad not done what Shepstone did; and if the act was wrong (whichundoubtedly it was), not he, but his Government, is to blame for it. 

Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen left within a month to protest in Englandagainst the annexation. 

Sir T. Shepstone wrote (May 9): 'Mr. Paul Kruger and his colleague, Dr. Jorissen, D. D. , the Commission to Europe, leave to-day. I do notthink that either of them wishes the Act of Annexation to becancelled; Dr. Jorissen certainly does not. ' And Mr. J. D. Barry, Recorder of Kimberley, wrote to Frere (May 15): 'The delegates, PaulKruger and Dr. Jorissen, left Pretoria on the 8th, and even they donot seem to have much faith in their mission. Dr. Jorissen thinksthat the reversal of Sir Theophilus's Act would not only beimpossible, but a great injury to the country. '

It is not necessary to seek hostile testimony to establish the factthat the Boers as a whole acquiesced in the annexation; theforegoing quotation from Aylward's book supplies all that isneeded--unintentionally, perhaps. The Zulu menace, which Aylward solightly dismisses, was a very serious matter; the danger a very realone. It has frequently been asserted by the Boers and their friendsthat the Zulu trouble was fomented by a section of the Natal people, and that Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, if he did not openlyencourage the Zulu King in his threats and encroachments on theTransvaal, at any rate refrained from using his unique influence andpower with the Zulus in the direction of peace, and that he made anone too scrupulous use of the Zulu question when he forced theannexation of the Transvaal. It is stated that, in the first place, there was no real danger, and in the next place, if there were, suchwas Sir Theophilus's power with the Zulus that he could have avertedit; and in support of the first point, and in demolition of Sir T. Shepstone's pro-annexation arguments, the following extract from thelatter's despatches is quoted by Aylward and others:

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH, DATED UTRECHT, TRANSVAAL, JANUARY 29, 1878. 

_Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer_. 

Par. 12. 'Although this question has existed for many years, and thesettlement of it has been long postponed, yet on no former occasionhas it assumed so serious an aspect, or included so wide an area ofterritory; never before has there existed any bar to the farmersoccupying their farms after an absence more or less temporary, causedby a temporary and local scare. Practically, the line of occupiedfarms has not been heretofore affected by the dispute about thebeaconed boundary, but now the prohibition to these has becomeabsolute by Zulu claims and action. Ruin is staring the farmers inthe face, and their position is, _for the time, worse under HerMajesty's Government than ever it was under the Republic_. '

Had Sir T. Shepstone's power been as great as represented, it is fairto suppose that it would have been exerted, and would have prevailedin support of his own administration; but it seems clear that hecould do nothing; and as to the reality of the danger, nothing couldbetter establish that than the unpleasant admissions in the foregoingextract and the initial disasters in the Zulu War a year later. TheBoers' protective power was not lessened by the annexation--quiteotherwise. It was supplemented by British money, arms, and soldiers, and the prestige of the British flag, and yet things happened asabove described. What would they have been under the old conditions?

The day before he issued the proclamation Sir T. Shepstone sent amessenger to Cetewayo, telling him that the Transvaal would be underBritish sovereignty, and warning him against aggression in thatdirection. Cetewayo replied: 'I thank my father Somtseu (Shepstone)for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutchhave tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once, and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana, you see my impis aregathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now Iwill send them back to their houses. ' (C. 1883, p. 19. )

Colonel A. W. Durnford; R. E. , in a memorandum of July 5, 1877, wrote:

About this time (April 10) Cetewayo had massed his forces in threecorps on the borders, and would undoubtedly have swept the Transvaal, country not been taken over by the English. In my opinion, he wouldhave cleared the country to Pretoria. 

'I am convinced, ' wrote Sir A. Cunynghame, June 12, from Pretoria, 'that had this country not been annexed, it would have been ravagedby the native tribes. Forty square miles of country had been overrunby natives, and every house burned, just before the annexation. ' Andhe wrote again, July 6: 'Every day convinces me that unless thiscountry had been annexed it would have been a prey to plunder andrapine from the natives on its border, joined by Secocoeni, Mapok, and other tribes in the Transvaal. Feeling the influence of theBritish Government, they are now tranquil. '

So much for the reality of the danger. As to the causes of it and thealleged responsibility of Natal, Sir Bartle Frere, in a letter toGeneral Ponsonby, made the following remarks:

The fact is, that while the Boer Republic was a rival andsemi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulusas one might a tame wolf, who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly; and now that both flocksbelong to us, we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf'sravages. 

Sir B. Frere realized fully the dangers, and gave his testimony as toBoer opinion. On December 15, 1877, he wrote, concerning his policytowards the Zulus:

My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I amsatisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is toshow that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state ofgreat apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontierdistricts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom to hold themselves inreadiness, should I find it necessary to call upon them for activeservice. 

Sir T. Shepstone also wrote, concerning the reality of the danger, under date December 25:

The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be abelt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad, in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolutedesolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischiefwhich Cetewayo's conduct has caused. 

And again (April 30, 1878):

I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetewayo. Hereceived directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are bySecocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal. 

Sir T. Shepstone rushed the annexation. He plucked the fruit thatwould have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waiteduntil the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. Thatmight have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have beenhumanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leadersat the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce anddetermined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems tobe that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of theannexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of theRepublic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of SirTheophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers werequite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and theprosecution of the Kaffir wars. The Treasury was empty--save for themuch-quoted 12s. 6d. The Government £1 bluebacks were selling at 1s. Civil servants' salaries were months in arrear. The Presidenthimself--the excitable, unstable, visionary, but truly enlightenedand patriotic Burgers--had not only drawn no salary, but had expendedhis private fortune, and incurred a very heavy liability, in theprosecution of the unsuccessful Secocoeni war. No amount of _ex postfacto_ evidence as to the supposed feelings and opinions of the Boerscan alter a single one of the very serious facts which, takentogether, seemed to Sir Theophilus to justify the annexation. But itall comes down to this: If the passive acquiescence in the annexationcoincided strangely with the Republic's failure to defeat its enemiesand pay its debts, it is no whit less odd that Lord Carnarvon'sanxiety for the Republic's safety synchronized with his attempt toconfederate South Africa. 

The real mistakes of the British Government began _after_ theannexation. The failure to fulfil promises; the deviation from oldways of government; the appointment of unsuitable officials, who didnot understand the people or their language; the neglect to convenethe Volksraad or to hold fresh elections, as definitely promised;the establishment of personal rule by military men, who treated theBoers with harshness and contempt, and would make no allowance fortheir simple, old-fashioned ways, their deep-seated prejudices, and, if you like, their stupid opposition to modern ideas: these thingsand others caused great dissatisfaction, and gave ample material forthe nucleus of irreconcilables to work with. 

During the occupation period Mr. Kruger took office under the BritishGovernment, as also did Dr. Jorissen and Chief Justice (then Judge)Kotzé, and indeed all the officials who had protested against theannexation, except Mr. Piet Joubert, who declined to do so, and who, if actions be the test and not words, was the only honest protestant. Mr. Kruger retained his office for some time after he had concernedhimself in the Repeal agitation, but finally resigned his post onbeing refused an increased remuneration, for which he had repeatedlyapplied. There can be but little doubt that had this inducement beenforthcoming, he would have remained a loyal British subject. 

The effect of the annexation was to start the wells of plentybubbling--with British gold. The country's debts were paid. Secocoeniand Cetewayo would be dealt with, and the responsibility for allthings was on other and broader shoulders. With the revival of trade, and the removal of responsibilities and burdens, came time to thinkand to talk. The wave of the magician's wand looked so very simplethat the price began to seem heavy. The eaten bread was forgotten. The dangers and difficulties that were past were of small account nowthat they _were_ past; and so the men who had remained passive, andrecorded formal protests when they should have resisted, and takensteps to show that they were in earnest, began their Repealagitation. All the benefits which the Boers hoped from the annexationhad now been reaped. Their pressing needs were relieved. Their debtshad been paid; their trade and credit restored; their enemies werebeing dealt with. Repeal would rob them of none of these; they would, in fact, eat their cake and still have it. The Zulu question had beentaken up, and could not now be left by the Imperial Government tosettle itself. The debts discharged for them and the outlays incurredmight, it is true, be charged to them. They could not be repaid, ofcourse, for the same reason that you cannot get blood from stone;and the amount would, therefore, be a National Debt, which wasexactly what they had been trying for years to incur, and thecondition of their credit had made it impossible to do. 

The causes of discontent before given were serious, but the failureto fulfil promises was not deliberate. Circumstances combined toprevent Sir Bartle Frere from visiting the Transvaal, as intended andpromised. Native wars (Gaika and Galeka), disagreements between theColonial and Imperial authorities, the obstructions and eventualdismissal of the Molteno-Merriman Ministry--the first underResponsible Government--Natal and Diamond-fields affairs, and, aboveall, the Zulu War, all combined to prevent Sir Bartle Frere fromfulfilling his obligations to settle Transvaal matters. 

In the meantime two deputations had been sent to England, representing the Boers' case against annexation. The active partyamong the Boers, _i. E. _, the Voortrekker party, the most anti-Britishand Republican, though small in itself, had now succeeded incompletely dominating the rest of the Boers, and galvanizing theminto something like national life and cohesion again--a resultachieved partly by earnest persuasion, but largely also by a kind ofterrorism. 

Sir Bartle Frere, who managed at last to visit the Transvaal, inApril, 1879, had evidence of this on his journey up, and in adespatch to Sir M. Hicks Beach from Standerton on the 6th of thatmonth he wrote:

I was particularly impressed by the replies of a very fine specimenof a Boer of the old school. He had been six weeks in an Englishprison, daily expecting execution as a rebel, and had been wounded byall the enemies against whom his countrymen had fought--English, Zulus, Basutos, Griquas, and Bushmen. 

'But, ' he said, 'that was in the days of my youth and inexperience. Had I known then what I know now, I would never have fought againstthe English, and I will never fight them again. Old as I am, I wouldnow gladly turn out against the Zulus, and take fifty friends of myown, who would follow me anywhere; but I dare not leave my home tillassured it will not be destroyed and my property carried off in myabsence, by the men who call me "rebel" because I will not join themagainst the Government. My wife, brought up like a civilized woman inthe Cape Colony, has had five times in her life to run from the houseand sleep in the veld when attacked by Zulus and Basutos. One of ourtwelve sons was assegaied in sight of our house, within the last tenit was surrounded by Basutos, my wife had to fly in the night byherself, leading one child and carrying another on her back. Shewalked nearly fifty miles through the Lion Veld, seeing three lionson the way, before she reached a place of safety. It is not likelythat we should forget such things, nor wish them to recur; but howcan I leave her on my farm and go to Zululand, when the malcontentleaders threaten me that if I go they will burn my house and driveoff all my stock? Assure me that we are not to be deserted by theEnglish Government, and left to the mercy of these malcontentadventurers, and I and my people will gladly turn out to assistColonel Wood. '

_I find that this idea that the English Government will give up theTransvaal, as it formerly did the Orange Free State, has beenindustriously propagated, and has taken a great hold on the minds ofthe well-disposed Boers, and is, I believe, one main cause ofreluctance to support the Government actively_. 

_They argue that what has been done before may be done again, andthey have no feeling of assurance that if they stand by the EnglishGovernment to-day they will not be left to bear the brunt of themalcontents' vengeance when a Republic is established_. 

And again on the 9th, from Heidelberg:

_The idea that we should somehow be compelled or induced to abandonthe country had taken great hold on the minds of some of the moreintelligent men that I met_. It has been seduously written up by aportion of the South African press, English as well as Dutch. Imarked its effect particularly on men who said they had come from theold Colony since the annexation, but would never have done so hadthey believed that English rule would be withdrawn, and the countryleft to its former state of anarchy. . . . 

_But there is great practical difficulty in conveying to the mass ofthe people any idea of the real power of Government_. 

It is not possible to pen a more severe and pregnant comment on theafter-policy of England than that suggested by the italicized lines, written as they were by England's Plenipotentiary--an idea reportedto headquarters, not as a feeler, but as a suggestion so absurd thatit called for no expression of opinion. But he lived to find that itwas not too absurd to be realized; and perhaps, after all, it waswritten as a warning, and the wise and cool-headed old statesman inhis inmost soul had a premonition of what eventually occurred. 

Sir Bartle Frere met the Boers in their camp, and discussed with themtheir grievances. He informed them that he had no power to revoke theannexation, nor would he recommend it, as, in his judgment, such acourse would be a reversion to chaos and ruin. The Boers pressedsteadily for nothing less than repeal. Sir Bartle Frere reportedthe historical meeting at Erasmus Farm to Sir M. Hicks Beach:

 _April 14, 1879. _

They were evidently much disappointed. . . . Our meeting separated withno more definite decision than that they must report to the 'people, 'and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done. 

If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, andothers of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting sincecoming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, menwho deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiablequalities as citizens and subjects. . . . 

Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say morethan that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides Ifthey have learnt anything as to the finality of the act ofannexation--that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe thatit will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will askit--I have, on the other hand, been shown the stubbornness of adetermination to be content with nothing else, for which I was notprepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer inthe country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of theBoers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of theirprofessed opinions. . . . I feel assured that the majority of theCommittee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great nationalwrong. . . . But my conviction is that the real malcontents are far frombeing a majority of the whole white population, or even of their ownclass of Boer farmers. 

I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position toassert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to thereign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minoritywould cease to agitate, and would soon cease to feel grievances whicha very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental; not theless keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survivethe prosperity and good government, with a fair measure ofself-government in its train, which are within their reach underBritish rule. 

And, again, he wrote to Lady Frere:

 PRETORIA, _April 20, 1879. _

My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express whenLanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actuallybroken up and the Boers dispersing. 

I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded wascivil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot, Ishould have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of adozen Piet Retiefs, or Uys, dying like heroes in the field of battlefor their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful Ifelt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected usthrough life. 

I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow, and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances--forthe present a phrase which they carefully put into all references totheir breaking up, and which they evidently mean. _It was clear to methat it was not the annexation, so much as the neglect to fulfil thepromises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he tookover the Government, that has stirred up the great mass of theBoers, and given a handle to agitators. _{02}

There it is in a single sentence! It was not the annexation whichcaused the war; for nine men in every ten admitted that it waswelcomed and justified by considerations of general South Africanpolicy, or else simply inevitable. No! It was the failure to fulfilthe conditions of annexation!

In 'A Narrative of the Boer War, ' Mr. Thomas Fortescue Carter hasgiven with admirable skill and impartiality a full account of thecauses which led to the outbreak. His history is, indeed, sodeterminedly just as to have met with considerable disapproval inquarters where feelings are hot on either side, and where plaintruths are not palatable. Mr. Carter resided in the country for yearsbefore the annexation, and went through the war as correspondent of awell-known London daily, and this is his opinion:

Anyone who knows the acquaintance Sir T. Shepstone had with the Boersof the Transvaal, years prior to the annexation, cannot doubt that, regarded as a friend and almost as one of themselves, no one betterthan he could have been selected for the task of ascertaining thedesires of the people; and no one who knows Sir T. Shepstone willbelieve that he did not take sufficient evidence to prove to any manthat the Boers were anxious to be extricated from the dilemma theywere in, and really willing at that time that their country should beannexed. Men who during the late war were our foes were at the timeof the annexation clamouring for it, welcoming Sir TheophilusShepstone as the deliverer and saviour of the country. I mentionSwart Dirk Uys, an eminent Boer, who fought against the English in1880-81, as one amongst the hundreds and thousands who went out tomeet Sir Theophilus Shepstone with palm branches in their hands. 

The natural aversion of the people to English rule was overcome forthe moment by their greater aversion to being wiped off the face ofthe Transvaal by the blacks; that was a contingency staring them inthe face, and yet not even that imminent common danger availed tosecure unity amongst them, or would rouse men individually to takeupon their shoulders the responsibility which rests upon every memberof a State. 

The Boer Volksraad, after promising to appeal to their constituentson the subject of the new constitution proposed, almost immediatelypassed a measure, which was familiarly styled by the people the 'Houjou smoel law. ' The literal translation of this term is 'Hold yourto discuss the question of either confederation or annexation. 

I come to the conclusion, then, that the cause of the annexation wasEngland's historical greed of territory, especially rich territory;and that, however unworthy the motive on the part of the visitingpower, the Boers did not at that time receive the visitor with otherfeelings than those of satisfaction, and practically surrenderedtheir country voluntarily and gladly to the ruler of a greater power, under the impression that Sir Theophilus Shepstone would be permittedto carry out, and that he therefore would carry out, the promises hemade them. As the programme was open before them, they had everythingto gain and nothing to lose, except the loss entailed by nominalgovernment by the British. No man, whether Boer or Britisher, who wasliving in the Transvaal, or knew the feelings of the Boers at thetime of annexation, would in 1877 have given any other account of thefeeling of the nation; and if I have formed too low an opinion of themotives of English statesmen at that time, and am not justified inattributing the annexation to greed instead of to the purer andnobler desire to protect England's colonies, or even the Transvaalitself, from the inroads of savages, then my excuse must be that thefailure of England to send out at that time a force equal to the taskof restraining those savages and maintaining peace, has helpedmaterially to lead me to the unwarrantable conclusion. {03}

And so came the war. The history of it is written that all may read;and it is not necessary here to refer at length to the details of it. The utterly unjust treatment of Bezuidenhout at Potchefstroom was theimmediate cause of the outbreak. The armed interference of thePotchefstroom burghers with the Imperial officials followed onDecember 16, to be in turn succeeded by the battle of BronkhorstSpruit on the 20th. 

The following account of the affair is taken from Mr. Carter's book:

All went well on this day till about 2. 30 p. M. , when the followingwas about the order of march: One mounted infantryman in advance ofthe main body next the band; of F company, forty men; of A company, forty men; then followed the quarter-guard, thirteen men; andprovost-escort and prisoners, twenty-three men. The remainder of theforce was posted along the string of waggons, with the exception ofthe rear-guard of about twenty men, which were some distance behind. Colonel Anstruther, Captains Nairne and Elliott, Lieutenant Hume, and Adjutant Harrison were riding just in front of the band, whensuddenly Boers appeared all round. The locality that the regiment hadreached at the time was one where stood several farms, and the treessurrounding these homesteads afforded cover under which a hostileforce could assemble without being perceived from a distance. On theright was a ravine with wood in it, and amongst that the Boers werelying in ambush. How unexpected was the appearance of a force ofBoers to the English may be judged from the fact that the bandof the regiment was playing at the time. Colonel Anstruther, immediately he caught sight of the enemy on the crest of a slightrise to the front, called a halt, and the order was passed to therear for the waggons to close up. Before this could be done amessenger from the enemy, carrying a white flag, came forward andhanded the Colonel a note signed by Piet Joubert, and countersignedby other Boer leaders, desiring him to halt where he was until areply had been received from Sir Owen Lanyon to the ultimatum theBoers had addressed to him. The message also contained the warningthat if the soldiers advanced beyond a small stream in front ofthem, it would be taken as a declaration of war. Colonel Anstruther, with Conductor Egerton, had ridden out in front of the advancedguard to meet this flag of truce; after he had read the message, thebearer of it informed him verbally that two minutes were allowed forhis decision. Colonel Anstruther verbally replied that he shouldmarch on to Pretoria, and, to use his own words, as published in hisdespatch written just before he died, the Boer messenger 'said thathe would take my message to the Commandant-General; and I asked himto let me know the result, to which he nodded assent. Almostimmediately, however, the enemy's line advanced. '

Whilst this short parley was going on, every effort was being made inthe rear to get the waggons up, but without much good result, becausewhen the Boers opened fire the rear-guard would be at least half amile behind the head of the column. Even those who were guarding thewaggons had not time to join the main body. When Colonel Anstruthersaw the Boers advancing, he gave the order to his men to extend inskirmishing order, but before they could open out to more than loosefiles they were met with a murderous volley, and at the same timeBoers on the right and left flank and in the rear, who had previouslymeasured and marked off the distances, picked off every man withinsight. Our men returned the fire as best they could, but in less thanten minutes 120 were either killed or wounded, besides a largeproportion of the oxen in the waggons shot. The officers who exposedthemselves were picked off almost immediately by the Boer marksmen. Captain Nairne, Lieutenant M'Sweeney, Lieutenant and AdjutantHarrison, Lieutenant Hume, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-GeneralBarter, Conductor Egerton, Surgeon Ward, were all wounded, besidesColonel Anstruther himself, who was shot in two or three places. 

It was useless to contend against such odds, and the 'cease fire' wassounded, and handkerchiefs waved to denote submission. During thisunequal struggle, Mrs. Smith, the widow of the bandmaster of theregiment, who, with the wife of Sergeant-Major Fox and some children, were riding in one of the foremost waggons, came fearlessly up towhere the wounded lay, and, tearing strips from her clothing, helpedthe surgeon to bandage the wounds. The sergeant-major's wife wasseverely wounded, as was also Fox himself. There was no lack ofheroism during those awful ten minutes, whilst men were being shotdown like dogs. Lieutenant Harrison was shot through the head whilecheering on his men; Lieutenant Hume was equally conspicuousfor his coolness. An orderly-room clerk named Maistre and theSergeant-Master-Tailor Pears quietly concealed the regimental coloursin a waggon-box when they saw the danger of them falling into thehands of the enemy; and their work was not in vain, as ConductorEgerton managed subsequently to wrap them round his body under histunic, and having obtained permission after the fight was over to walkto Pretoria for medical assistance, he carried them safely to thecapital, as well as the disastrous news of the engagement. Forty-twomiles traversed by a wounded man on foot in eleven hours is in itselfa feat worth mentioning, and one the value of which can only bereally estimated by those who know what South African roads are inthe rainy seasons. 

As soon as our force surrendered, Franz Joubert, who had been incommand of the Boers, and who, it is said, fired the first shot, withthe exclamation, 'What is the use of waiting?' came forward with someof his men, and on finding poor Colonel Anstruther severely woundedexpressed sorrow. 

Whether the affair of Bronkhorst Spruit can be called an act oftreachery on the part of the Boers is rather a nice question. ColonelAnstruther's words--the words of a dying man--rather go to prove thathe was unfairly treated, though he does not say so directly. He wasgiven to understand by the messenger who came with the flag of trucethat another communication would be made to him as soon as his replyto the request to halt had been reported to the Boer Commandant. Theonly reply given him was 'a murderous volley. ' The Boers cannot layclaim to much bravery or superiority (except in numbers) over oursoldiers in this fight. Theirs was a deliberately-planned ambush toentrap men who had no idea that they were marching in an enemy'scountry. Bronkhorst Spruit engagement is the one during the whole ofthe war which does not redound to the credit of the Dutch, even if itdoes not reflect great discredit upon them. If a reasonable time hadbeen allowed Colonel Anstruther to give his reply, the 94th could notthen say, as they do say and will say, that they were treacherouslysurprised. 'Two minutes' looks, under the circumstances, very muchlike an idle pretence of fair dealing to cover an intentional act ofcowardice which subsequent conduct could hardly palliate. The Boerssay that they had not more men than were marching with the 94th onthat occasion; that statement is worth very little, considering theevidence of our officers, and, above all, the harsh evidence of thefacts that the 94th was from advance-guard to rear-guard practicallysurrounded and outnumbered in every direction. 

The preparedness of the Boers and the precision of their fire may begathered from the testimony of Dr. Crow, of Pretoria, who attendedthe wounded, and vouched for an average of five wounds per man. Dr. Crow also wrote:

But as disastrous as the late war in the Transvaal had been toBritish prestige, thank God those at Bronkhorst Spruit did their dutyand died like men, a noble example to any army. If any stain has beencast on the British flag in the Transvaal, the gallant 94th did allthat was possible by their deeds at Bronkhorst Spruit to obliterateit. 

The news of this affair was received with horror, and the feelingsroused by the details of it have never been allayed. Race-hatred mayhave its origin in a hundred little incidents, but in the Transvaalthere were two which undoubtedly, whether justly or otherwise, gavea character to the Boers that has embittered feeling against themmore than any which had occurred in generations previous. Thesecond affair followed very closely on the Bronkhorst Spruitengagement--_i. E. , _ the infamous murder of Captain Elliott, the onlysurviving unwounded officer from Bronkhorst Spruit. Captains Elliottand Lambert were taken prisoners, and were offered the choice oftwo alternatives--either to remain prisoners of war during thehostilities in the Transvaal, or to be released on _paroled'honneur_ on condition that they should leave the Transvaal atonce, cross into the Free State under escort, and not bear armsagainst the Republican Government during the war. The secondalternative was chosen. They received an escort and free pass fromCommandant-General Piet Joubert. The following is extracted fromCaptain Lambert's Report to Sir George Colley on January 5:

We started about 1 p. M. From the Boer camp, passing through the townof Heidelberg. After going about six to eight miles, I noticed wewere not going the right road, and mentioned the fact to the escort, who said it was all right. Having been 'look-out' officer in theTransvaal, I knew the district well. I was certain we were goingwrong, but we had to obey orders. At nightfall we found ourselvesnowhere near the river drift, and were ordered to outspan for thenight, and next morning the escort told us they would look for thedrift. Inspanning at daybreak, we again started, but after drivingabout for some hours across country, I told the escort we would stopwhere we were while they went to search for the drift. Shortly afterthey returned and said they had found it, and we must come, which wedid, eventually arriving at the junction of two rivers (Vaal andKlip), where we found the Vaal impassable, but a small punt, capableof holding only two passengers at most, by which they said we mustcross. I pointed out that it was impossible to get my carriage orhorses over by it, and that it was not the punt the General said wewere to cross. The escort replied it was Pretorius's punt that theGeneral told them to take us, and we must cross; that we must leavethe carriage behind and swim the horses, which we refused to do, aswe then should have had no means of getting on. I asked them to showme their written instructions, which they did (written in Dutch), andI pointed out that the name of Pretorius was not in it. I then toldthem they must either take us back to the Boer camp again or on tothe proper drift. We turned back, and after going a few miles theescort disappeared. Not knowing where we were, I proposed to CaptainElliott we should go to the banks of the Vaal, and follow the rivertill we came to the proper punt. After travelling all Monday, Tuesday, and up till Wednesday about 1 p. M. , when we found ourselvesfour hours, or twenty-five miles, from Spencer's punt, we weresuddenly stopped by two armed Boers, who handed us an officialletter, which was opened, and found to be from the Secretary to theRepublican Government, stating that the members were surprised that, as officers and gentlemen, we had broken our _parole d'honneur_, andrefused to leave the Transvaal; that if we did not do so immediatelyby the nearest drift, which the bearers would show us, we mustreturn as prisoners of war; that as through our ignorance of thelanguage of the country there might be some misunderstanding, theywere loth to think we had willingly broken our promise. We explainedthat we should reply to the letter, and request them to take it totheir Government, and were prepared to go with them at once. Theytook us back to a farmhouse, where we were told to wait until theyfetched their commandant, who arrived about 6 p. M. , and repeated tous the same that was contained in our letter of that day. We toldhim we were ready to explain matters, and requested him to take ouranswer back to camp. He then ordered us to start at once for thedrift. I asked him, as it was then getting dark, if we could startearly next morning, but he refused. So we started, he having said weshould cross at Spencer's, being closest. As we left the farmhouse, I pointed out to him that we were going in the wrong direction; buthe said, 'Never mind; come on across a drift close at hand. ' When wegot opposite it, he kept straight on; I called to him, and said thatthis was where we were to cross. His reply was, 'Come on!' I thensaid to Captain Elliott, 'They intend taking us back to Pretoria, 'distant some forty miles. Suddenly the escort (which had all at onceincreased from two to eight men, which Captain Elliott pointed outto me; and I replied, 'I suppose they are determined we shall notescape, which they need not be afraid of, as we are too keen to getover the border') wheeled sharp down to the river, stopped, and, pointing to the banks, said, 'There is the drift--cross!' I drove myhorses into the river, when they immediately fell; lifted them, anddrove on about five or six yards, when we fell into a hole. Got themout with difficulty, and advanced another yard, when we got stuckagainst a rock. The current was now so strong and drift deep, mycart was turned over on to its side, and water rushed over the seat. I called out to the commandant on the bank that we were stuck and tosend assistance, or might we return, to which he replied, 'If youdo, we will shoot you. ' I then tried, but failed, to get the horsesto move. Turning to Captain Elliott, who was sitting beside me, Isaid, 'We must swim for it'; and asked could he swim, to which hereplied, 'Yes. ' I said, 'If you can't, I will stick to you, for Ican. ' While we were holding this conversation, a volley from thebank, ten or fifteen yards off, was fired into us, the bulletspassing through the tent of my cart, one of which must have mortallywounded poor Elliott, who only uttered the single word 'Oh!' andfell headlong into the river from the carriage. I immediately sprangin after him, but was swept down the river under the current someyards. On gaining the surface of the water, I could see nothing ofElliott, but I called out his name twice, but received no reply. Immediately another volley was fired at me, making the water hissaround where the bullets struck. I now struck out for the oppositebank, which I reached with difficulty in about ten minutes; but asit was deep, black mud, on landing I stuck fast, but eventuallyreached the top of the bank, and ran for about two hundred yardsunder a heavy fire the whole while. 

The Boers then invaded Natal and took up a position on Laing's Nek, four miles inside the Natal border, from which, on January 28, SirGeorge Colley endeavoured to oust them with a mounted force of 70 menand some 500 men of the 58th Regiment. The position is one difficultenough to climb unencumbered by military accoutrements, but thedisposition of the little mounted force covered the approach. By someunexplained mistake, however, half of the mounted infantry chargedand carried the Boer position before the 58th had climbed the hill, but were too weak to hold it and retired, leaving the 58th uncoveredin a terrible ascent. But few of the exhausted men reached the top ofthe hill, and those, led by Colonel Deane, only to be shot down. Ofthe mounted men, 17 were killed and wounded; of the 58th, 73 werekilled and 100 wounded. The result was absolute defeat of the Britishforces. The number of Boers engaged is not known, but the forcebehind the Nek consisted of several thousands, and no doubt a fairproportion engaged in the fight. 

On February 8 General Colley made a demonstration in force on theIngogo Heights. The force consisted of under 300 men, with 4 guns and38 mounted men. On the Boer side there were about 1, 000 men, and thefight lasted from morning until after dark. It was a drawn fight, inwhich both parties left the battlefield at night. There cannot be anydoubt, however, that the balance of advantage was with the Boers, since the loss on the British side was very severe: 76 men werekilled and 69 wounded. 

On February 27 came Majuba, when Sir George Colley designed toretrieve his fortunes and strike an effective blow without the aid ofhis second-in-command, Sir Evelyn Wood, whom he had sent to hurry upreinforcements. The scaling of the mountain at night was a fineperformance. The neglect to take the rocket apparatus or mountainguns, or to fortify the position in any way, or even to acquaint themembers of the force with the nature of the position which they hadtaken up in the dark, and the failure to use the bayonets, were theprincipal causes of disaster. The Boers attacked in force a positionwhich should have been absolutely impregnable, held as it was by aforce of 554 soldiers. The Boer force is not known, but probablyconsisted of upwards of 1, 000 men, since Christian Joubert after thefight offered to take a portion of the men, numbering, as he said, some 500, to attack a small British laager on one of the spurs ofthe mountain. The splendid feat of taking the hill-top, however, wasaccomplished by a small storming party of less than 200 men, thebalance of the Boer forces covering the approach of their comradesby an accurate and incessant long-range fire. The result, as isknown, was terrible disaster: 92 killed and 134 wounded, and anumber taken prisoners, represented the British loss, whilst theBoers lost 1 killed and 5 wounded. No attempt had been made tooccupy positions below the crown of the hill which commanded theapproaches, and the Boers were able to creep up under good coverfrom place to place by the exercise of their admirable tactics. Itis impossible to detract from the performance of the Boers, and aglance at the position leaves one more astonished than ever that asuccessful attack could ever have been made upon it. The Boersdisplayed on this day the finest fighting qualities. The generalshipof their fighting Commandant, Nikolas Smit, was of the highestorder. The cleverness of the attack, and the personal bravery andaudacity of the storming party are beyond praise. 

By the time Sir Evelyn Wood had ranged his forces for an effectiveand extended attack on the Boers, and by the time Sir FrederickRoberts with the command of about 10, 000 men had reached SouthAfrica, the administration of Mr. Gladstone had awakened to the factthat the war was an unjust--not to say costly--one. An armistice wasarranged and peace made without another blow. 

The terms of the settlement proposed by the Liberal Government fitlyillustrate the generosity of their motives. They proposed doing'simple justice' to the Boers, but at the same time retaining thedistricts of Lydenburg, Middelburg, Wakkerstroom, and Utrecht, not tomention handing back Zoutpansberg to the original native occupants. So anxious were the Boer leaders to effect a peaceful settlement, sofearful were they of the actions of their followers, that when theyarranged the long armistice they did not announce to their party theintentions of the British Government regarding the above districts. General Joubert did not communicate to his army the terms of peace, but simply stated that a Royal Commission was to settle everything. A month later, when some inkling of the terms reached the Boers, asolemn protest and warning was issued, and when the Royal Commissionactually sat, the British representatives were informed that anysuch curtailment of the territories would be followed by aresumption of hostilities. Needless to say the proposals wereabandoned and the Boers got their way. So ended the war. 

Ingogo has been called a drawn battle. Bronkhorst Spruit was--such asit was. At Laing's Nek and Majuba the Boers beat us, as Mr. Carterfairly puts it, 'when they were on the top of the hill and we were atthe bottom, and when we were on the top of the hill and they were atthe bottom. ' The narrative of these events is about as humiliating aone as an Englishman can read. Here and there it is redeemed by theheroic conduct of individuals in the midst of general disaster. Inthe smaller affairs, such as the particularly gallant defences ofStanderton, Potchefstroom, and Rustenberg, where little garrisonsheld their own with conspicuous ability and courage, there issomething to cheer the disheartened reader. The defence ofPotchefstroom by Colonel Winslow should be read in full for severalreasons. The siege of Standerton witnessed several acts of valour, but, above all, that of Hall the volunteer, who single handeddeliberately engaged a force of over 300 Boers, drawing their fire onhimself in order to warn his comrades of the danger of being cut offand to give them a chance of escape--a noble act in which the gallantfellow achieved his object but lost his life. It was in Rustenbergwhere Captain Auchinleck, with about seventy men armed only withrifles, held his laager against hundreds of the enemy, fighting dayand night for weeks; and eventually drove off the Boers who weretrenching towards his position by charging at night with from nine tofourteen of his men and clearing the enemy out of the trenches withthe bayonet. This performance he repeated three times, himself badlywounded on each occasion. The impression created on the enemy bythese tactics was such that they overcame their desire to get atclose quarters with him, and left him severely alone. 

It is not necessary to refer in great detail to the settlement Ineffect it was that the Boers gained nearly all that they required, but not until the haggling and threatening had robbed concessions ofall appearance of grace and justice. The natives were referred to inthe conventional spirit. The unfortunate loyalists were left to takecare of themselves. The men who had entered the Transvaal, andinvested their capital and expended their energies there upon themost positive and sacred assurances of the British Government thatthe Queen's authority would never be withdrawn, --assurances given inpublic by the Conservative Government and confirmed by Mr. Gladstone's Government, assurances published by Sir Bartle Frere andSir Garnet Wolseley, who said that 'as long as the sun would shinethe British flag would fly over the Transvaal, '--were heartlesslyabandoned, their protests were unheeded, the compensation allotted tothem, namely, £1, 400, 000, was amended by the elimination of themillion, their representations to Mr. Gladstone's Government werefinally left unanswered--unless it be that the sneering referencemade by that right honourable gentleman in the House of Commons to'interested contractors and landjobbers' may be considered anadequate answer to a protest as moderate, as able, as truthful, andas necessary as Mr. Gladstone's remark was the reverse. In verytruth, the position in which the British Premier had placed himselfthrough his intemperate speeches in the Midlothian campaign, and hissubsequent 'explaining away, ' was an extremely unpleasant one. InOpposition Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation and demanded arepeal. On accession to power he adopted the policy of hispredecessors, and affirmed that the annexation could never berevoked. On June 8, 1880, he had written to this effect to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, the Transvaal deputation. Later on, in answer toan appeal that he should allay the apprehensions of the loyalists, who feared the results of the Boer agitation, he referred them tothis very letter as a final expression of opinion, and authorized thepublication of this message. When, however, peace had been concluded, and the loyalists, amazed and heartbroken at their threateneddesertion, reminded him of his pledges and implored him to respectthem, he answered them in a letter which is surely without parallelin the record of self-respecting Governments. The wriggling, theequivocation, the distortion of phrases, the shameless 'explainingaway, ' are of a character that would again justify the remark ofLord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) in another matter many yearsbefore, that they were 'tactics worthy of a pettifogging attorney, 'and even the subsequent apology--to the attorney. But what answercould be made to a protest which reminded the right honourablegentlemen of the following deliberate and official expression of hisGovernment's policy?--

In your letter to me (wrote Mr. White for the loyalists) you claimthat the language of your letter does not justify the descriptiongiven. With the greatest respect I submit that it does, and I willquote the words on which I and also my colleagues base the opinionthat it does unequivocally pledge the Government to thenon-relinquishment of the Transvaal. 

The actual words of your letter are:

'Looking at all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the restof South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of thedisorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only tothe Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, _our judgment isthat the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the Transvaal_; but, consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire thatthe white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice tothe rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage theirlocal affairs. '

But your letter of the 8th of June not only contained this final andabsolute announcement of the policy of England, but it gave thereasons for arriving at it in words which so aptly express the caseof the loyalists that I quote them _in extenso_. They are as follows:

'It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since theannexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population ofDutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of thatterritory, _but it is impossible now to consider that question as ifit were presented for the first time_. We have to do with a state ofthings which has existed for a considerable period, _during whichobligations have been contracted_, especially, though notexclusively, towards the native population, _which cannot be setaside_. '

In your speech in the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. PeterRylands' motion condemning the annexation of the country and theenforcement of British supremacy in it, which was defeated by amajority of ninety-six, on the 21st of January in the current year, you used words of similar import. You are reported in the _Times_ ofthe 22nd of January as saying:

'To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandonthat annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blindourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexationobligations entailed by the annexation, and if in my opinion, and inthe opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by theannexation itself, _that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong by a disregard of the obligation whichthat annexation entailed_. These obligations have been referred to inthis debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a singlesentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards theEnglish and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including aminority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boersthemselves; secondly, there was the obligation to the native races;and thirdly, there was the obligation we entailed upon ourselves inrespect of the responsibility which was already incumbent upon us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the futurepeace and tranquillity of South Africa. '

Nor was this all. The loyalists proceeded to remind him that LordKimberley, his Secretary of State for the Colonies, had telegraphedin May, 1880, 'Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority inthe Transvaal be relinquished, ' and had confirmed the telegram in adespatch following; and that his lordship had also stated in theHouse of Lords on May 24 that '. . . After a careful consideration ofthe position, we have come to the conclusion that we could notrelinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate thanuncertainty in respect to such a matter. ' (Hansard, cclii. , p. 208. )

The effects of the settlement, and the exposures in connection withit, and the attitude of the Imperial Government were most deplorable. No credit was given by the Boers to a Government which was clearlymoved by the meanest considerations. No feeling but contempt, disgust, and even hatred, could be entertained by the loyalists forthe Government which had so shamelessly deserted them. The settlementhas left its indelible mark upon the sentiment of South Africa. Thewar, it will generally be admitted, was a most unfortunateoccurrence. Only one thing could have been more unfortunate, and thatwas such a settlement as actually was effected--a settlement whichsatisfied no one, which outraged all, which threw South Africa into astate of boiling discontent. In some quarters the defeats of Majubaand Laing's Nek rankled deeply; yet they were fair fights, and Timecan be trusted to allay the feelings of those who are worsted in afair fight; but there were other matters which roused a spirit inthe English-speaking people of South Africa that had never beenknown before. 

The former records of the Boers, favourable and unfavourable, areconsistent with the records established in the War of Independence. None dare belittle the spirit which moved them to take up armsagainst the greatest Power in the world. Their ignorance may havebeen great, but not so great as to blind them to the fact that theywere undertaking an unequal contest. It is not possible to say, withdue regard to their records, that they are not a courageous people. Individual bravery, of the kind which takes no heed of personal risk, reckless heroic dash, they have not, nor do they pretend to have. Their system is entirely otherwise. They do not seek fighting forfighting's sake. They do not like exposing themselves to risk anddanger. Their caution and their care for personal safety are suchthat, judged by the standard of other people's conduct in similarpositions, they are frequently considered to be wanting in personalcourage. It seems a hard thing to say of a people who have producedmen like the first Bezuidenhout, who fought and died single-handedagainst the British troops; men like Piet Retief, as gallant a man asever walked; men like Piet Uys, an example to all men for all time, and only one of many generations in one family of equally gallantDutchmen; but it would truly seem that such examples do not occurwith such frequency among the Boers as among nations with whom theyhave been compared. Where they have been able to choose their ownpositions, or where they have been stimulated by previous successes, they have done all that could possibly be asked of them; but theirparticular military system does not conduce to success undercircumstances where men are suddenly and unexpectedly called upon toexhibit the virtues of discipline, to make what to the individual mayappear a useless sacrifice of life, or, in cold blood and in the faceof previous defeat, to attempt to retrieve a lost position. 

The Boer military power has been called the biggest unpricked bubblein the world. Whether this be so or not--whether the early conflictsbetween the British troops and the Boers in the Cape Colony and Nataljustify the view that the Boers cannot take a beating and come upagain--is a matter for those to decide who will give their impartialattention to the records. 

Whilst conspicuous personal daring among the Boers may not beproverbial, it must be remembered to their everlasting credit thatthey, as did the Southerners in the American Civil War, robbed thecradle and the grave to defend their country. Boys who were merechildren bore rifles very nearly as long as themselves; old men, whohad surely earned by a life of hardship and exposure an immunity fromsuch calls, jumped on their horses and rode without hesitation andwithout provision to fight for their independence. 

There were, however, unfortunately, matters connected with the warwhich gave birth to a bitter and aching desire for revenge. Bronkhorst Spruit and the murder of Captain Elliott were among theearliest. Another was the shooting of Dr. Barbour (who was killedinstantly) and Mr. Walter Dyas (wounded) by their escort undercircumstances similar to those of the Elliott murder, with theexception that in this case the prisoners had been released on footand in daylight, and were then shot down. 

But there were others too. There was the murder of Green inLydenburg, who was called to the Boer camp, where he went unarmed andin good faith, only to have his brains blown out by the Boer withwhom he was conversing; there was the public flogging of anotherEnglishman by the notorious Abel Erasmus because he was an Englishmanand had British sympathies; and there were the various white flagincidents. At Ingogo the Boers raised the white flag, and when inresponse to this General Colley ordered the hoisting of a similarflag to indicate that it was seen, a perfect hail of lead was pouredon the position where the General stood; and it was obvious that thehoisting of the flag was merely a ruse to ascertain where the Generaland his staff were. There was the ambulance affair on Majuba, whenthe Boers came upon an unarmed party bearing the wounded with the redcross flying over them, and after asking who they were and getting areply, fired a volley into the group, killing Surgeon-Major Cornish. Under Commandant Cronjé were guilty of actions contrary to the usagesof civilized warfare. They are matters of history, and can easily beverified. Reference is made to them elsewhere in this volume inconnection with Commandant Cronjé's action on another occasion. 

And so the war left the country, as wars will, divided into twoparties, with feelings towards each other that are deplorable enoughin themselves, and not easily allayed. The curtain was rung down, andthe scene was lost to the view of the world, but the play went on allthe same behind the curtain. And this is what the new Government saidto the world on August 8, 1881, when they took over theadministration of the country:

To all inhabitants, without exception, we promise the protection ofthe law, and all the privileges attendant thereon. 

To inhabitants who are not burghers, and do not wish to become such, we notify that they have the right to report themselves to theResident as British subjects, according to Article 28 of the nowsettled Convention. But be it known to all, that all ordinary rightsof property, trade, and usages will still be accorded to everyone, burgher or not. 

We repeat solemnly that our motto is, 'Unity and reconciliation. '

Footnotes for Chapter I

{01} Written in 1896. 

{02} Several of the letters and despatches given in this volume arequoted from Mr. Martineau's excellent 'Life of Sir Bartle Frere, ' aportion of which book was lately published in cheaper form, underthe title of 'The Transvaal Trouble and How it Arose. '

{03} It is only fair to state that _at that time_ the Home Governmentbelieved the prestige of the Imperial authority to be sufficient forall purposes. 

CHAPTER II

AFTER THE WAR

In 1882 Sir Bartle Frere wrote, 'I have never been able to discoverany principle in our policy in South Africa except that of giving waywhenever any difficulty or opposition is encountered. ' The remark isstill as true as when it was penned, and South Africa--the 'Grave ofReputations, '{04} as it has long been called--must by this time beregarded with doubtful emotions by successive Colonial Secretaries. What is it about South Africa, one asks, that has upset so many menof capacity and experience? Who can say? Often--most often--it is theneglect to thoroughly study and know what are called the 'localconditions, ' and to pay due heed to local experience. Sometimes it isthe subordination of State policy to party considerations which hasruined the Proconsul: witness Sir Bartle Frere, whose decisiveaction, firm character, and wise and statesmanlike policy arenow--now that he is dead--recognised universally, as they have alwaysbeen in South Africa. Perhaps there is something in Africa itselfwhich makes it a huge exception to the rules of other lands; thesomething which is suggested in the 'rivers without water, flowerswithout scent, and birds without song'; a contrariness which puts thealluvial gold on the top of mountain ranges and leaves the valleysbarren; which mocked the experience of the world, and showed thewaterworn gravel deposit to be the biggest, richest, deepest, andmost reliable gold reef ever known; which placed diamonds in suchconditions that the greatest living authority, who had undertaken ahuge journey to report on the occurrence, could only say, in the faceof a successful wash-up, 'Well, there _may_ be diamonds here, but allI can say is they've no right to be'; the something which many, manycenturies ago prompted the old Roman to write, 'Ex Africâ semperaliquid novi affert, ' and which is in the mind of the South Africanto-day when he says, 'The impossible is always happening in Africa. '

There is this to be said for the Gladstone Ministry in 1881: that, having decided on a policy of scuttle and abandonment, they did itthoroughly, as though they enjoyed it. A feeble vote-catchingprovision, with no security attached, was inserted in the PretoriaConvention relative to the treatment of natives, but no thought orcare was given to the unfortunate British subject who happened to bea white man, and to have fought for his Queen and country. {05} Theabandonment was complete, without scruple, without shame. It has beenwritten that 'the care and forethought which would be lavished on afavourite horse or dog on changing masters were denied to Britishsubjects by the British Government. ' The intensity and bitterness ofthe resentment, the wrath and hatred--so much deeper because soimpotent--at the betrayal and desertion have left their traces onSouth African feeling; and the opinion of the might and honour ofEngland, as it may be gleaned in many parts of the Colonies as wellas everywhere in the Republics, would be an unpleasant revelation tothose who live in undisturbed portions of the Empire, comfortable inthe belief that to be a British subject carries the old-time magic of'Civis Romanus sum. '

The Transvaal State, as it was now to be called, was re-established, having had its trade restored, its enemies crushed--for Secocoeni andCetewayo were both defeated and broken--and its debts paid orconsolidated in the form of a debt to England, repayable whenpossible. For some time not even the interest on this debt was paid. 

Numbers of British subjects left the country in disgust and despair. Ruined in pocket and broken in spirit, they took what little theycould realize of their once considerable possessions, and left thecountry where they could no longer live and enjoy the rights of freemen. For some years the life of a Britisher among the Boers was farfrom happy. It is not surprising--indeed, not unnatural--that peopleunsoftened by education and the conditions of civilization, moved byfierce race prejudice, and intoxicated by unbroken and unexpectedsuccess, should in many cases make the vanquished feel theconqueror's heel. The position of men of British name or sympathiesin the country districts was very serious, and the injustice done tothose who had settled since the annexation, believing that they wereto live under the laws and protection of their own Government wasgrave indeed. 

The Government of the country was vested in a Triumvirate with Mr. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger as Vice-President during the periodimmediately following the war; but in 1882 the old form was restoredand Mr. Kruger was elected President, an office which he is nowholding for the third successive term. {06}

Prior to the war the population of the country was reckoned by bothDutch and English authorities to be about 40, 000 souls, the greatmajority of whom were Dutch. The memorial addressed to LordCarnarvon, dated January 7, 1878, praying for repeal of theannexation, was 'signed by 6, 591 qualified electors out of a possible8, 000, ' as is explained in the letter of the Transvaal delegates toSir M. Hicks-Beach dated July 10, 1878. The fact, already mentioned, that 3, 000 electors had petitioned for the annexation only means thatsome of them changed their minds under pressure or conviction, andhelped to swell the number of those who later on petitioned forrepeal. The signatories to the above memorial would includepractically all the Dutch electors in the country, and the remaining1, 400 or so would probably be the non-Boer party who preferredBritish rule, and could not be coerced into signing memorials againstit. These figures are useful as a check upon those now put forward bythe Transvaal Government to combat the assertion that the Uitlandersoutnumber the Boers. Recognizing the fact that the Boers are asingularly domestic and prolific people, one may allow thatthey numbered 35, 000 out of the total population, an estimate thatwill be seen to be extremely liberal. At the time that the abovefigures were quoted by the Transvaal delegates every Boer youth overthe age of twenty-one was a qualified voter, so that it would seemthat the qualified Boer voter had an _average_ of one wife and 4. 3children, a fair enough allowance in all conscience. These figuresshould be borne in mind, for the present Boer population consists ofwhat remains of these 35, 000 souls and their natural increase duringeighteen years. There are other Dutch immigrants from the CapeColony and Free State: these are aliens, who have the invaluablequalification of hating England and her sons and her ways andher works; but, as will be made clear when the Franchise Law isexplained, the present Boer electorate consists-or, without fraud orfavouritism, _should_ consist-of the 'possible 8, 000' and theirsons. 

Many a champion of liberty has lived to earn the stigma of tyrant, and the Boers who in 1835 had trekked for liberty and freedom fromoppressive rule, and who had fought for it in 1880, began nowthemselves to put in force the principles which they had so stoutlyresisted. In the Volksraad Session of 1882 the first of the measuresof exclusion was passed. The Franchise, which until then-inaccordance with Law No. 1 of 1876-had been granted to anyone holdingproperty or residing in the State, or, failing the propertyqualification, to anyone who had qualified by one year's residence, was now altered, and Law No. 7 of 1882 was passed which provided thataliens could become naturalized and enfranchised after five years'residence, thus attaining the status of the oldest Voortrekker. Thefeeling was now very strong against the Annexation Party, as they hadbeen called, that is to say, the men who had had the courage of theirconvictions, and had openly advocated annexation; and as usual thebitterest persecutors and vilifiers were found in the ranks of thosewho, having secretly supported them before, had become suspect, andhad now need to prove their loyalty by their zeal. The intention wasavowed to keep the party pure and undiluted, as it was maintainedby many of the Boers that former proselytes had used theirnewly-acquired privileges to vote away the independence of thecountry. The view was not unnatural under the circumstances, and thismeasure, had it not been a violation of pledges, might have founddefenders among impartial persons; but unfortunately it proved tobe not so much a stringently defensive measure which time andcircumstances might induce them to modify, as the first step in apolicy of absolute and perpetual exclusion. It was the firstdeliberate violation of the spirit of the settlement, and, althoughthere is no clause in the Pretoria Convention which it can be saidto contravene, it was, as Mr. Chamberlain has since styled it, 'aviolation of the _status quo_ as it was present to the minds of herMajesty's Ministers at the time the Convention was negotiated. ' Butthe Gladstone Ministry, which had paid so heavily to get rid of theTransvaal question, was certainly not going to re-open it for thesake of holding the Boers to the spirit of the settlement. 

Another precaution was taken to keep all the power in the hands ofthe Boers. The various towns which had formerly been entitled torepresentation in Parliament were deprived of this right, and haveremained disfranchised ever since. Mr. Kruger feared that theenlightened thought of the towns would hinder the growth of his'national policy. '

It was not too late even at this time to have bloodlessly settled theTransvaal question for ever by a fair but thoroughly firm attitudetowards the restored Republic. No doubt British Ministers, consciousof an act of supreme self-restraint and magnanimity, believed thatsome reciprocal justice would be evoked. At any rate, it is possiblethat this was the reason which guided them, and not continued callousindifference to the fate of British subjects and the future of SouthAfrica. In such case, however, they must have forgotten 'the fault ofthe Dutch'--which Andrew Marvell's couplet has recorded--of 'givingtoo little and asking too much. ' The Transvaal Boers are verypractical people, and no matter what they may receive or how they getit, whether by way of diplomacy or barter or the accident of goodluck or deed of gift, they never neglect to press and scheme formore. It is an unpleasant feature in the Boer character, prominentalike in personal and general relations, begotten, mayhap, of hardlife, constant struggle, and lack of education and its softeningand elevating influence. It is a feature which is common to alluneducated peoples who have suffered great hardships, and it will nodoubt disappear in time; but it is one which has to be reckoned withat the present day, and one which, when recognized at its true value, sustains the contention that the Boers, in dealing with those whomthey regard as not of them, will recognise no right and do no justiceunless compelled to do so. The considerations of a narrow and selfishpolicy are stronger than the sense of right and wrong. 

British Ministers and the British people when glowing with a mildlyenthusiastic satisfaction at their tolerant and even generousattitude towards a weaker opponent may imagine that they have sowngood seed which in time will bear ample fruit; but it is not so. Nothing but firmness and strict justice will avert a bloody day ofreckoning. Nothing but prompt and effective veto on every attempt tobreak or stretch the spirit of past undertakings will bring it hometo the Transvaal Government that all the give cannot be on the oneside and all the take on the other; that they cannot trade for everon the embarrassment of a big Power in dealing with a little one; andthat they must comport themselves with due regard to theirresponsibilities. 

Almost the first use made by the Transvaal Government of theirrecovered power was one which has wrought much mischief to the State. The Triumvirate who ruled the country in 1882 granted numbers ofconcessions, ostensibly for the purpose of opening up industries ordeveloping mining areas. The real reasons are generally considered tohave been personal, and the result was the crushing of buddingactivities, and the severe discouragement of those who were willingto expend capital and energies in legitimate work. Favouritism pureand simple dictated these grants. It is hardly too much to say thatthe system and spirit then introduced rule to this day, for althoughthe Volksraad has taken definite resolution condemning the principleof monopolies and contracts conferring preferential rights of anysort, the spirit of this resolution is violated whenever thePresident and Executive deem it fit to do so--witness, for instance, the monopoly granted in December, 1895, for the free importationof produce, which is disguised as a Government agency with a'commission' to the agent; but it is really a monopoly andnothing else!

The Boers were not satisfied with the Convention of 1881. Theydesired the removal of the Suzerainty, the cancellation of theclauses referring to natives, and the restoration of the title of theSouth African Republic in lieu of that of the Transvaal State. Theyalso desired (but did not expect to obtain) complete freedom inregard to their external relations, and they lost no time in tryinghow far they would be allowed to go in the direction of stretchingthe spirit of the Convention. Nothing in that ineffectual andmiserable document is clearer than the definition of certainboundaries, and the provision that no extension shall be allowed. This hemming of them in--or shutting them up in a kraal, as PresidentKruger has expressively put it--was intensely repugnant to them. Itcut into one of the most deeply-rooted habits of the Boer. His methodof trek and expansion has been, to begin by making small huntingexcursions into adjacent native territories, to follow up withgrazing his cattle there until he created in his own mind a right byprescription, and then to establish it either by force or else bywritten agreement, too often imperfectly translated. This wasoftentimes varied or supplemented by helping the weaker of two rivalchiefs, and so demolishing the power of a tribe. The expulsion of thenative followed as a natural result. 

In the Transvaal itself there was, and still is, an immense quantityof unoccupied land, and the Boers were quite unable to properlycontrol, utilize, and administer their own immense territory, but'land hunger' is theirs as a birth curse. The individual cannot bearto see the smoke of his neighbour's chimney; he will not cultivate 50acres, but wants 50, 000; the 'nation' wants Africa--no less. Theycoveted Swaziland, Zululand, Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and Tongaland, and set to work by devious methods to establish claimsto these countries. 

In Bechuanaland they took sides; that is to say, parties offreebooters from the Transvaal took up the cause of certain nativechiefs against certain others. The London Convention in 1884disposed of this quarrel by fixing the south-western boundariesof the Republic, and placing two of the disputing chiefs underthe Transvaal, and the other two under British protection. Notwithstanding this, however, the new Convention was no soonersigned than the scheming was resumed, and before a year had passed aparty of Transvaal Boers, several of them now holding high officialpositions under the Republic, raided the territory of the chiefs inthe British Protectorate, and even attacked the chief town Mafeking. This was followed by a proclamation by President Kruger placing theterritory under the protection of the Republic. Mr. Rhodes, who hadalready made himself conspicuous by his advocacy of holding thehighway to the interior open, was instrumental in inducing theImperial Government to make a determined stand against this. Anultimatum moved the Transvaal Government to withdraw the proclamationand forced the Boers to leave the country--only, however, when andbecause the demand was backed by the Warren expedition at a cost ofover a million and a half to the British taxpayer! This expeditionwas sent by Mr. Gladstone, the Boer benefactor--notwithstanding allhis anxiety to prove the Transvaal settlement a good one! The actionof the Transvaal, and the most brutal murder of Mr. Bethell by theindividuals above referred to as holding high official positionsunder the Republic, gave indications of the bent of the Boerauthorities which people in South Africa did not fail to take noteof. Bethell had been wounded in the invasion of the territory by theBoers, and as he lay helpless the 'prominent Transvaal official' cameup and, seeing a repeating rifle lying beside him, asked him to showthem how it worked. He did so, and the 'prominent official' taking itup under pretext of examining it shot Bethell dead with his ownweapon. 

In Zululand similar tactics were resorted to by the Republic. Transvaal Boers invaded Zululand and (1884) took up the cause ofDinizulu, a son of the dead Cetewayo, and established him as king, upsetting Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement. They then proceeded toseize the country, but the British Government intervening at thispoint, rescued some two-thirds for the Zulus. A glance at the mapwill show that the intention of the Boers was to get to the sea, andalso that the unlucky Zulus, who had been broken by the BritishGovernment--and very rightly too--because they were a menace to theTransvaal, even more than to Natal, were now deprived of the pick oftheir country, plundered and harried by the very people who had beenat their mercy until the Imperial Government stepped in. It is verynoteworthy that, with the splendid exception of the lion-hearted PietUys and his sons, who fought and died (father and one son) in theZulu war side by side with the Britishers whom he was keenly opposingon the annexation question, none of the Boers came forward to help inthe Secocoeni or Zulu wars, although these wars were undertaken, theone entirely, and the other mainly, on their account. But a greatmany were ready to raid and annex as soon as the Zulu power wasbroken. 

Swaziland became in turn the object of the Boer Government'sattentions. First, grazing concessions were obtained; and next, otherconcessions for the collection of Customs and Revenue dues, fortelegraphs, railways, banking, surveying, and goodness only knowswhat. One individual applied for and obtained a concession for thebalance of ungranted concessions, and another applied for a grant ofthe Chief Justiceship. What chance the unfortunate native had in sucha condition of things can be imagined. The Transvaal bought up allthe concessions necessary to make government of the countryabsolutely impossible, except with their cooperation. The secretservice fund of the Republic provided means for making therepresentatives of the Swazi nation see things in a reasonable light, so that when the time came to investigate the title to concessionsand to arrange for the future administration of the country theresult was a foregone conclusion. The judge appointed by the ImperialGovernment on the Special Joint Commission to inquire into theconcessions and matters in general let some light on the manner inwhich these concessions were acquired and granted, by pertinentquestions to the concessionaires and interpreters. He asked, forinstance, 'Do you swear that you interpreted this document verbatimto the king?'--'Yes. ' 'Will you kindly tell to the Court what is theor how you interpreted and explained the significance of the"survey, " "mint, " "revenue, " and "townships" concessions?'

The picture of the obese and drunken chief surrounded by fawningharpies was a shameful and disgusting one. One example is sufficientto show how the thing was done. A concession for gambling was appliedfor. The man who interpreted knew a smattering of 'kitchen' Kaffir, and his rendering of the 'monopoly for billiards, card playing, lotteries, and games of chance' was that he alone should be allowedto '_tchia ma-ball_ (hit the balls), _hlala ma-paper_ (play thepapers), and _tata zonki mali_ (and take all the money). ' The poordrunken king nodded sleepily to the first two clauses, but to thebald proposition of taking all the money, which he _could_understand, he violently objected. The concession was, however, subsequently granted on the representations of a more tactfulinterpreter. 

A very flagrant breach of the spirit of the London Convention, and avery daring attempt at land-grabbing, was the proposed last will andtestament of the Swazi King Umbandine, which provided that thegoverning powers should be assigned to Mr. Kruger as executor of theKing and trustee and administrator of the country. His project wasdefeated; but the aim of the Boer Government was ultimately achieved, nevertheless, and Swaziland has now been handed over to the controlof the Republic in spite of the prayers and protestations of theSwazis themselves, who had proved in the past with very practicalresults to be useful, ready, and loyal allies of the BritishGovernment. 

While Swaziland was being entoiled the Transvaal Government were notidle elsewhere. Matabeleland was looked upon as the heritage of theBoer, because of the 'old friendship' with the Matabele, --whom theyhad driven out of their country, now the Transvaal; and Mashonalandwas theirs because it was their ancient hunting-ground. That theBoers did not abandon their old schemes merely because they hadagreed by treaty to do so is shown by a letter which was found at LoBengula's kraal by Mr. F. Thompson when he went up to negotiate forMr. Rhodes. The stealthy grovelling of the Commandant-General beforea savage native chief, the unctuous phraseology, the hypocriticalassurances of an undying friendship between Boer and Matabele so longas there are living one of each race, throw a lurid light upon theconduct of Boer diplomacy with native tribes, and explain much of theineradicable fear and distrust which are felt on the native side inall dealings with the aggressive Boer. The letter reads:

 MARICO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, _March 9, 1882. _

_To the great ruler the Chief Lo Bengula, the son of Umzilikatse, thegreat King of the Matabili nation_. 

GREAT RULER, When this letter reaches you, then you will know that it comes from aman who very much desires to visit you, but who, being a man of thepeople, cannot get loose to make such a long journey. Therefore hemust now be satisfied with writing a letter to carry his regards tothe son of the late King of the Matabele, our old friend Umzilikatse. When I say that I desire to see you, it is not to ask for anything, but to talk of something, and to tell Lo Bengula of the affairs andthings of the world, because I know that there are many people whotalk and tell about these matters, whilst there are but few who tellthe truth. Now, when a man hears a thing wrong, it is worse than ifhe had never heard it at all. Now, I know that Lo Bengula has heardsome things wrongly, and for this reason would I tell him the realtruth. Now, you must have heard that the English--or as they arebetter known the Englishmen--took away our country, the Transvaal, or, as they say, annexed it. We then talked nicely for four years, and begged for our country. But no; when an Englishman once has yourproperty in his hand, then is he like a monkey that has its handsfull of pumpkin-seeds--if you don't beat him to death, he willnever let go--and then all our nice talk for four years did not helpus at all. Then the English commenced to arrest us because we weredissatisfied, and that caused the shooting and fighting. Then theEnglish first found that it would be better to give us back ourcountry. Now they are gone, and our country is free, and we will nowonce more live in friendship with Lo Bengula, as we lived infriendship with Umzilikatse, and such must be our friendship, that solong as there is one Boer and one Matabele living these two mustremain friends. On this account do I wish to see Lo Bengula, and if Imay live so long, and the country here become altogether settled, and_the stink which the English brought_ is first blown away altogether, then I will still ride so far to reach Lo Bengula, and if he stillhas this letter then he will hear the words from the mouth of the manwho now must speak with the pen upon paper, and who, therefore, cannot so easily tell him everything. The man is a brother's child ofthe three brothers that formerly--now thirty-two years ago--were atUmzilikatse's, and then made the peace with him which holds to thisday. He still remembers well when the first Boers, Franz Joubert, Jann Joubert, and Pieter Joubert, came there, and when they made thethe peace which is so strong that the vile evil-doers were never ableto destroy it, and never shall be able to destroy it as long as thereshall be one Boer that lives and Lo Bengula also lives. 

Now I wish to send something to give Lo Bengula a present as a tokenof our friendship. I send for Lo Bengula with the gentleman who willbring him this letter a blanket and a handkerchief for his greatwife, who is the mother of all the Matabele nation. I will one daycome to see their friendship. The gentleman who brings the letterwill tell you about all the work which I have to do here. Some badpeople have incited Kolahing, and so he thought he would makefortifications and fight with us, but he got frightened, and saw thathe would be killed, therefore I made him break down thefortifications and pack all the stones in one heap, and he had thento pay 5, 000 cattle and 4, 000 sheep and goats for his wickedness. Nowthere is another chief, Gatsizibe--he came upon our land and killedthree people and plundered them--he must also pay a fine, or else wewill punish him or shoot him, because we will have peace in ourcountry. Now greetings, great Chief Lo Bengula, from theCommandant-General of the South African Republic for the Governmentand Administration. 

 P. J. JOUBERT. 

A big trek (the Banjailand trek) was organized in 1890 and 1891 byGeneral Joubert and his relatives and supporters to occupy a portionof the territory already proclaimed as under British protection andthe administration of the Chartered Company. The trekkers were turnedback at Rhodes's Drift, stopped by the firmness and courage and tactof Dr. Jameson, who met them alone and unarmed; and also by theproclamation of President Kruger, to whom it had been plainlyintimated that the invasion would be forcibly resisted and wouldinevitably provoke war. The matter had gone so far that the officesof the Republic of Banjai had already been allotted. The President'sproclamation instead of being regarded as the barest fulfilment ofhis obligations--very grudgingly done under pressure of threats--wasvaunted as an act of supreme magnanimity and generosity, and was usedin the bargaining for the cession of Swaziland. 

In Tongaland Boer emissaries were not idle; but they failed, owing tothe fact that the Tonga Queen Regent, Zambili, a really fine specimenof the savage ruler, would have nothing to do with any power butEngland, whose suzerainty she accepted in 1887. Being shut off here, the Boer Government made another bid for seaward extension, and, through their emissaries, obtained certain rights from two pettychiefs, Zambaan and Umbegesa, whom they represented as independentkings; but Lord Rosebery annexed their territories in 1894, and soput a final stop to the Transvaal schemes to evade the Convention byintrigue with neighbouring native tribes. 

Nothing can better illustrate the Boers' deliberate evasion of theirtreaty obligations than their conduct in these matters. The PretoriaConvention defined the Transvaal boundaries and acknowledged theindependence of the Swazis, and yet the British Government's delay inconsenting to the annexation of Swaziland by the Republic wasregarded for years as an intolerable grievance, and was proclaimed assuch so insistently that nearly all South Africa came at last to soregard it. 

The Boers' consent to the Chartered Company's occupation ofMashonaland was looked upon as something calling for a _quid proquo_, and the annexation of Zambaan's land is now regarded as aninfamous act of piracy by England, and an infringement of theRepublic's rights, which the Dutch papers denounce most vehemently. The Boer Government made it clear, not less in their purely internalpolicy than in these matters of extensions of territory, that theyintended pursuing a line of their own. 

In 1882, the property known as 'Moodies, ' consisting of a number offarms bearing indications of gold, was thrown open to prospectors. The farms had been allotted to Mr. G. Piggott Moodie when he wasSurveyor-General, in lieu of salary which the Republic was unable topay. This was the beginning of the prospecting era which opened up DeKaap, Witwatersrand, and other fields; but it was a small beginning, and for some time nothing worth mentioning was discovered. TheRepublic was again in a bad way, and drifting backwards after itsfirst spurt. The greatest uncertainty prevailed amongst prospectorsas to their titles, for in Lydenburg, at Pilgrim's Rest, and on theDevil's Kantoor, concessions had been granted over the heads of theminers at work on their claims, and they had been turned off for thebenefit of men who contributed in no way to the welfare andprosperity of the State. It has been stated in the Volksraad that notone of those concessionaires has even paid the dues and rents, orcomplied with the other conditions stipulated in the contracts. District was practically locked up for fourteen years owing to theconcession policy, and has only lately been partly released from thebonds of monopoly. 

In 1884 Messrs. Kruger and Smit proceeded to Europe to endeavour toraise funds, which were badly needed, and also to obtain somemodifications of the Convention. The attempt to raise funds throughthe parties in Holland to whom the railway concession had just beengranted failed, but the delegates were more fortunate in their othernegotiations. They negotiated the London Convention which fixedcertain hitherto undefined boundaries; and in that document noreference was made to the suzerainty of Great Britain. They alsosecured the consent of the British Government to the alteration ofthe title of the country. Instead of Transvaal State it became oncemore the 'South African Republic. '{07} During this visit thereoccurred an incident which provides the answer to Mr. Kruger'soft--_too_ oft--repeated remark that 'the Uitlanders were never askedto settle in the Transvaal, and are not wanted there. ' Messrs. Krugerand Smit were staying at the Albemarle Hotel, where they foundthemselves, after some weeks' delay, in the uncomfortable position ofbeing unable to pay their hotel bill. In their extremity they appliedto one Baron Grant, at that time a bright particular star in theStock Exchange firmament. Baron Grant was largely interested in thegold concessions of Lydenburg, and he was willing to assist, but onterms. And the _quid pro quo_ which he asked was some publicassurance of goodwill, protection, and encouragement to Britishsettlers in the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger responded on behalf of theRepublic by publishing in the London press the cordial invitationand welcome and the promise of rights and protection to all whowould come, so frequently quoted against him of late. 

By this time Moodies had attracted a fair number of people, and theprospects of the country began, for the first time with some show ofreason, to look brighter. No results were felt, however, and thecondition of the Government officials was deplorable. Smuggling wascarried on systematically; in many cases officials 'stood in' withsmugglers. They were obliged either to do that or to enforce the lawsproperly and get what they could by seizing contraband goods. Therewere two objections to the latter course, however. One was that thecountry was large and detection difficult with men who were bothdaring and resourceful; and the other was that the officials were notsure of receiving their share of the spoil from a Government so hardpressed as this one was, and whose higher officials also haddifficulties about payment of salaries. In many cases salaries weresix months in arrear; and other cases could be quoted of officialswhose house-rent alone amounted to more than their nominalremuneration. Yet they continued to live, and it was not difficult tosurmise _how_. Another significant fact was that goods subject toheavy duties--such as spirits, hams, etc. --could be bought at anystore at a price which was less than original cost plus carriage andduty. Smuggling was a very palpable fact, and--quoth the public andthe officials--a very convenient and even necessary evil. 

The principle on which the Customs officials conducted the businessof their office was observed by other officials of the Republic, andin one department, at least, the abuses have had a very far-reachingand serious effect. The Field-cornets--district officials who act aspetty justices, registering, and pass officers, collectors ofpersonal taxes, captains of the burgher forces, etc. , etc. --are theofficers with whom each newcomer has to register. This is animportant matter, because the period of residence for the purpose ofnaturalization and enfranchisement is reckoned from the date ofregistration in the Field-cornet's books. As these officials werepractically turned loose on the public to make a living the bestway they could, many of them, notwithstanding that they collected thetaxes imposed by law, omitted to enter the names of new arrivals intheir books, thus securing themselves against having to make goodthese amounts in event of an inspection of the books. Many of theField-cornets were barely able to write; they had no 'offices, ' andwould accept taxes and registrations at any time and in any place. The chances of correct entry were therefore remote. The result ofthis is very serious. The records are either 'lost' when they mightprove embarrassing, or so incorrectly or imperfectly kept as to be ofno use whatever; and settlers in the Transvaal from 1882 to 1890 arein most cases unable to prove their registration as the law requires, and this through no fault of their own. 

In the country districts justice was not a commodity intended for theBritisher. Many cases of gross abuse, and several of actual murderoccurred; and in 1885 the case of Mr. Jas. Donaldson, then residingon a farm in Lydenburg--lately one of the Reform prisoners--wasmentioned in the House of Commons, and became the subject of a demandby the Imperial Government for reparation and punishment. He had beenordered by two Boers (one of whom was in the habit of boasting thathe had shot an unarmed Englishman in Lydenburg since the war, andwould shoot others) to abstain from collecting hut taxes on his ownfarm; and on refusing had been attacked by them. After beating themoff single-handed, he was later on again attacked by his formerassailants, reinforced by three others. They bound him with reims(thongs), kicked and beat him with sjamboks (raw-hide whips) andclubs, stoned him, and left him unconscious and so disfigured that hewas thought to be dead when found some hours later. On receipt of theImperial Government's representations, the men were arrested, triedand fined. The fines were stated to have been remitted at once byGovernment, but in the civil action which followed Mr. Donaldsonobtained £500 damages. The incident had a distinctly beneficialeffect, and nothing more was heard of the maltreatment of defencelessmen simply because they were Britishers. Moreover, with theimprovement in trade which followed the gold discoveries of 1885and 1886 at Moodies and Barberton, the relations between the tworaces also improved. Frequent intercourse and commercial relationsbegot a better knowledge of each other, and the fierce hatred of theBritisher began to disappear in the neighbourhood of the towns andthe goldfields. 

In 1886 the wonderful richness of the Sheba Mine in Barbertonattracted a good deal of attention, and drew a large number ofpersons--prospectors, speculators, traders, etc. --to the Transvaal. Before the end of 1887 ten or twelve thousand must have poured intothe country. The effect was magical. The revenue which had alreadyincreased by 50 per cent. In 1886, doubled itself in 1887, and thenthere came unto the Boer Government that which they had leastexpected--ample means to pursue their greater ambitions. But unmixedgood comes to few, and with the blessings of plenty came the cares ofGovernment, the problem of dealing with people whose habits, thoughts, ambitions, methods, language, and logic differed utterlyfrom their own. Father Abraham on the London Stock Exchange would notbe much more 'at sea' than the peasant farmers of the Volksraad werein dealing with the requirements of the new settlers. 

Agitations for reforms commenced early in Barberton. At first it wasonly roads and bridges that were wanted, or the remission of certaintaxes, or security of title for stands and claims. Later on apolitical association named the Transvaal Republican Union was formedin Barberton, having a constitution and programme much the same asthose of the Transvaal National Union, formed some five years laterin Johannesburg. The work of this body was looked on with muchdisfavour by the Government, and it was intimated to some of theprominent members that if they did not cease to concern themselveswith politics they would suffer in their business relations, andmight even be called upon to leave the country. Many reforms werespecified as desirable, and the franchise question was raised, withthe object of getting the Government to make some reasonableprovision in lieu of the registration clause, which was found in mostcases to be an absolute bar. 

The discovery of the Witwatersrand conglomerate formation soonhelped to swell the flowing tide of prosperity. In the middle of1887 the regular output of gold commenced, and the fields have never'looked back' since. Johannesburg--named after Mr. Johannes Rissik, the Surveyor-General of the Transvaal--was soon a far greater problemthan Barberton had been. The shareholders in the mines soon found itnecessary to have some organization to protect their interests andgive unison to their policy, and to preserve the records and collectinformation for the industry. The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines wasthen formed, a voluntary business association of unique interest andefficiency. The organization includes all the representative andinfluential men, and every company of any consequence connected withthe mining industry; and it has, through its committee and officials, for eight years represented to the Volksraad the existence of abusesand grievances, the remedies that are required, and the measureswhich are felt to be necessary or conducive to the progress of theindustry in particular, or the welfare of the State in general. ThePresident, Executive and Volksraad, by neglect of their obviousduties, by their ignorance of ordinary public affairs, by theirwilful disregard of the requirements of the Uitlanders, have givencohesion to a people about as heterogeneous as any community underthe sun, and have trained them to act and to care for themselves. Therefusal year after year to give a charter of incorporation to theChamber, on the grounds that it would be creating an _imperium inimperio_, and the comments of Volksraad members on the petition, havemade it clear that the Government view the Chamber with no friendlyeye. The facts that in order to get a workable pass law at all theChamber had to prepare it in every detail, together with plans forthe creation and working of a Government department; and that inorder to diminish the litigation under the gold law, and to make thatfearful and wonderful agglomeration of erratic, experimental, crude, involved, contradictory and truly incomprehensible enactments at allunderstandable, the Chamber had to codify it at its own expense andon its own initiative, illustrate both the indispensable character ofthe organization, and the ignorance and ineptitude of the Government. 

The records of the Volksraad for the last ten years may be searchedin vain for any measure calculated constructively to advance thecountry, or to better the conditions of the workers in it, with thefew--very few--exceptions of those proposed by the Chamber of Mines. The country has, in fact, run the Government, and the Government hasbeen unable to ruin it. 

Shortly after the discovery of the Rand conglomerates, it becameclear that a railway would have to be built between the coalfieldsand the mines--some forty miles. But it was a fixed principle of theBoers that no railways (with the exception of the Delagoa Bay line, which, as the means of diverting trade from British channels, wasregarded as a necessary evil) should be built, since they couldcompete successfully with the ox-waggon, and thus deprive the 'poorburgher' of his legitimate trade spoil; and great difficulty wasexperienced in getting the consent of the Raad. As a matter of fact, the permission to build it was only obtained by subterfuge; for itwas explained to the worthy law-makers that it was not a railway atall--only a _steam tram_. And the Rand Steam Tram it is called tothis day. 

The Delagoa Railway--the darling scheme of Presidents Burgers andKruger in turn--was taken seriously in hand as soon as it waspossible to raise money on almost any terms. The concession for allrailways in the State was granted on April 16, 1884, to a group ofHollander and German capitalists, and confirmed by the Volksraad onAugust 23 following. The President's excuse for granting andpreserving this iniquitous bond on the prosperity of the State is, that when the country was poor and its credit bad, friends in Hollandcame forward and generously helped it, and this must not be forgottento them. As a matter of fact, friends accepted the concession whenthe State was poor and its credit bad, but did nothing until theState's credit improved to such an extent as to be mortgageable. _Then_ the friends granted certain favourable terms under theirconcession to other friends, who built the first section of the lineat preposterous rates, and repaid themselves out of moneys raised onthe State's credit. 

A well-known South African politician, distinguished alike for hisability and integrity, who visited the Transvaal during the progressof the reformers' trial, and was anxious in the interests of allSouth Africa to find a solution of the differences, put the positionthus to some of the leading men of the Rand: 'You can see foryourselves that this is no time to ask for the franchise; for thetime being, Jameson's invasion has made such a suggestion impossible. Now, tell me in a word, Is there any one thing that you require morethan anything else, which we can help you to get?' The answer was:'The one thing which we must have--not for its own sake, but for thesecurity it offers for obtaining and retaining other reforms--_is_the franchise. No promise of reform, no reform itself, will be worthan hour's purchase unless we have the status of voters to make ourinfluence felt. But, if you want the chief economic grievances, theyare: the Netherlands Railway Concession, the dynamite monopoly, theliquor traffic, and native labour, which, together, constitute anunwarrantable burden of indirect taxation on the industry of _overtwo and a half millions sterling annually_. We petitioned until wewere jeered at; we agitated until we--well--came here [PretoriaGaol]; and we know that we shall get no remedy until we have the voteto enforce it. We are not a political but a working community, and ifwe were honestly and capably governed the majority of us would becontent to wait for the franchise for a considerable time yet inrecognition of the peculiar circumstances, and of the feelings of theolder inhabitants. That is the position in a nutshell. '

[Netherlands Railway Company. ]

The Netherlands Railway Company is then a very important factor. Itis unnecessary to go very fully into its history and the details ofits administration. As the holder of an absolute monopoly, as theenterprise which has involved the State in its National Debt, and asthe sole channel through which such money has been expended, theCompany has gradually worked itself into the position of being thefinancial department of the State; and the functions which areelsewhere exercised by the heads of the Government belong here, inpractice, entirely to this foreign corporation. Petitions for thecancellation of this concession were presented in 1888, when theprogressive element in the first Volksraad consisted of one man--Mr. Loveday, one of the loyalists in the war. The agitation begun andcarried on by him was taken up by others, but without further resultthan that of compelling the President to show his hand and stepforward as the champion of the monopoly on every occasion on which itwas assailed. During the years 1893-96 the President stoutly defendedthe Company in the Volksraad, and by his influence and the solid voteof his ignorant Dopper Party completely blocked all legislationtending to control the Company. Indeed at the end of the Session of1895, on receiving representations from the business communities ofthe Republic as to the desirability of removing this incubus from theovertaxed people, the President stated plainly that the NetherlandsRailway Concession was a matter of high politics and did not concernany but the burghers of the State, and that he would receive norepresentations from the Uitlanders on the subject nor would hepermit them to discuss it. 

Very shortly after the granting of this railway concession came theappointment of Dr. Leyds as State Attorney for the Republic, hehaving been recommended and pushed forward by the gentlemen inHolland to whom the concession had been granted. It is stated that hewas sent out as the agent of the concessionaires in order to protectand advance their interests, although at the same time in the serviceof the Republic. It is only necessary to add that Mr. Beelaerts vanBlokland, the Consul-General for the Republic in Holland, is theagent of the concessionaires in that country, and the accord withwhich these two gentlemen, as railway commissioners at theirrespective ends, have always acted becomes intelligible. Several ofthe vital conditions of the concession have been freely violated, thefirst being that a certain section of the line (Nelspruit) should becompleted within four years. It was not completed for eight. Theconcession really became void several times during the years prior to1890, but always found a stalwart champion in the President, whocontinued to defend the concessionaires for some two years after theyhad failed to get their capital subscribed. The Company wasfloated on June 21 1887 on the most peculiar terms, the capital of£166, 666 being in 2, 000 shares of 1, 000 guilders, or £83 6s. 8d. Each. The shares were subscribed for by the following groups:

 German 819 shares, carrying 30 votes. Hollander 581 " " 76 " The Republic 600 " " 6 "

The trust-deed, which limited the Republic to 6 out of 112 votes, although it subscribed about one-third of the capital, and gave tothe smallest holders, the Hollanders, twice as many votes as all theothers put together, was passed by Dr. Leyds, in his capacity oflegal adviser of the Government, having previously been prepared byhim in his other capacity. The sum of £124, 000 appears to have beenexpended on construction ten months before any contract was given outfor the same or any work begun, and fifteen months before anymaterial was shipped. 

The contract for the construction of the first sixty miles compelsadmiration, if only for its impudence. In the first place thecontractors, Van Hattum and Co. , were to build the line at a cost tobe mutually agreed upon by them and the railway company, and theywere to receive as remuneration 11 per cent. Upon the amount of thespecification. But should they exceed the contract price then the 11per cent. Was to be proportionately decreased by an arranged slidingscale, provided, however, that Van Hattum and Co. Did not _exceed thespecification by more than 100 per cent. _, in which latter case theCompany would have the right to cancel the contract. By thisprovision Messrs. Van Hattum and Co. Could increase the cost by 100per cent, provided they were willing to lose the 11 per cent. Profit, leaving them a net gain of 89 per cent. They did not neglect theopportunity. Whole sections of earthworks cost £23, 500 per mile, which should not have cost £8, 000. Close upon a thousand Hollanderswere brought out from Holland to work for a few months in each yearon the line and then be sent back to Holland again at the expense ofthe Republic. In a country which abounded in stone the Komati Bridgewas built of dressed stone which had been quarried and worked inHolland and exported some 7, 000 miles by ship and rail. 

These are a few instances out of many. The loss to the countrythrough the financing was of course far greater than any manipulationof the construction could bring about. In the creating of overdraftsand the raising of loans very large sums indeed were handled. Three-quarters of a million in one case and a million in anotheroffered opportunities which the Hollander-German gentlemen who weredoing business for the country out of love for it (as was frequentlyurged on their behalf in the Volksraad) were quick to perceive. The 5per cent. Debentures issued to raise the latter sum were sold at £9515s. ; but the financiers deducted £5 commission from even this, sothat the State has only benefited to the extent of £90 15s. Thistransaction was effected at a time when the State loan known as theTransvaal Fives--raised on exactly the same interest and preciselythe same guarantee--was quoted at over par. What, however, was feltto be worse than any detail of finance was that this corporation offoreigners had gradually obtained complete control of the finances ofthe State, and through the railway system it practically dictated therelations with the other Governments in South Africa, by suchmeasures for instance as the imposition of a charge of 8-1/2d. Perton per mile on goods travelling over their lines coming from theCape Colony, whilst the other lines are favoured by a charge of lessthan half that. The burdens placed upon the mining industry by theexcessive charges imposed for political purposes were, in the case ofthe poorer mines, ruinous. The right which the Company had to collectthe Customs dues for account of the State, to retain them as securityfor the payment of interest on their shares and debentures, and toimpose a charge for collection quite disproportionate to the cost, was another serious grievance. It was hopeless, however, to deal withthe whole question. The Government had set its face against anyreform in this quarter. It was not possible to obtain even ordinaryworking facilities such as any business corporation unprotected by anabsolute monopoly would be bound to concede of its own accord, inorder to catch a measure of trade. 

The Government have the right, under the agreement with theCompany, to take over the railway on certain conditions, of whichthe following are the most important:

(_a_) The Company shall receive one year's notice of the intention totake over. 

(_b_) The Company shall receive twenty times the amount of theaverage of the last three years' dividends. 

(_c_) The Company shall receive as a solatium for the unexpiredperiod of the concession an amount equal to one per cent. Of itsnominal capital for each year up to the year of expiring (1915). 

The Government can take over the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg-BoksburgTramway against payment of the cost of construction. 

If the Volksraad should not during this Session{08} decide tonationalize the railway no change can take place before 1898, so thatthe three years 1895 to 1897 would have to be taken as a basis andtherefore the 6 per cent. For 1894, the only low dividend, would notcome into the calculation. This would of course considerably increasethe purchase price--_e. G. _, 1895 9 per cent. 1896 14 " (estimate), 1897 14 " " -- Total 37 "

That is to say an average distribution of 12. 33 per cent. For thethree years. The purchase price would thus be:

 12. 33 X 20 = 246. 66 per cent. 17 years' premium 17 " ------ Total 263. 66 "

This has been clearly explained to the Volksraad but without avail, the President's influence on the other side being too strong. Duringthe Session of 1895 it was made clear that agitation against theCompany was as futile as beating the air. When the Hollander cliquefound that they could no longer convince the Boers as a whole of thesoundness of their business and the genuineness of their aims, andwhen they failed to combat the arguments and exposures of theircritics, they resorted to other tactics, and promulgated voluminousreports and statements of explanations which left the unfortunateVolksraad members absolutely stupefied where they had formerly onlybeen confused. {09}

The following is taken from an article in the Johannesburg _MiningJournal_, dealing with the burdens imposed by the railway companyupon the industry:

RAILWAY MONOPOLY. 

This is another carefully designed burden upon the mines and country. The issued capital and loans of the Netherlands Company now totalabout £7, 000, 000, upon which an average interest of about 5-1/3 percent. --guaranteed by the State--is paid, equal to £370, 000 per annum. Naturally the bonds are at a high premium. The Company and itsliabilities can be taken over by the State at a year's notice, andthe necessary funds for this purpose can be raised at 3 per cent. Anoffer was recently made to the Government to consolidate this andother liabilities, but the National Bank, which is anotherconcession, has the monopoly of all State loan business, and thiscircumstance effectually disposed of the proposal. At 3 per cent. Asaving of £160, 000 per annum would be made in this monopoly ininterest alone. The value represented by the Custom dues on thePortuguese border we are not in a position to estimate, but roughlythese collections and the 15 per cent. Of the profits paid to themanagement and shareholders must, with other leakages, represent atleast another £100, 000 per annum, which should be saved the country. As the revenue of the corporation now exceeds £2, 000, 000 a year, ofwhich only half is expended in working costs, the estimate we havetaken does not err upon the side of extravagance. By its neglect ofits duties towards the commercial and mining community enormouslosses are involved. Thus, in the coal traffic, the rate--which isnow to be somewhat reduced--has been 3d. Per ton per mile. Accordingto the returns of the Chamber of Mines, the coal production of theTransvaal for 1895 was 1, 045, 121 tons. This is carried an averagedistance of nearly thirty miles, but taking the distance attwenty-four miles the charges are 6s. Per ton. At 1-1/2d. Per ton permile--three times as much as the Cape railways charge--a saving uponthe coal rates of 3s. Per ton would follow, equal to £150, 000 perannum. Again, by the 'bagging' system, an additional cost of 2s. 3d. Per ton is incurred--details of this item have been recentlypublished in this paper--and if this monopoly were run upon ordinarybusiness lines, a further saving of £110, 000 would be made bycarrying coal in bulk. The interest upon the amount required toconstruct the necessary sidings for handling the coal, and thetram-lines required to transport it to the mines, would be a merefraction upon this amount; and as the coal trade in the course of ashort time is likely to see a 50 per cent. Increase, the estimate maybe allowed to stand at this figure without deduction. No data areavailable to fix the amount of the tax laid upon the people generallyby the vexatious delays and losses following upon inefficient railwayadministration, but the monthly meetings of the local Chamber ofCommerce throw some light upon these phases of a monopolisticmanagement. The savings to be made in dealing with the coal trafficmust not be taken as exhausting all possible reforms; the particularsgiven as to this traffic only indicate and suggest the wide areacovered by this monopoly, which hitherto has made but halting andfeeble efforts to keep pace with the requirements of the public. Dealing as it does with the imports of the whole country, which nowamount in value to £10, 000, 000, the figures we have given must servemerely to illustrate its invertebrate methods of handling traffic, aswell as its grasping greed in enforcing the rates fixed by the termsof its concession. Its forty miles of Rand steam tram-line andthirty-five miles of railway from the Vaal River, with some littleassistance from the Delagoa line and Customs, brought in a revenueof about £1, 250, 000 in 1895. Now that the Natal line is opened thereceipts will probably amount to nearly £3, 000, 000 per annum, all ofwhich should swell the ordinary revenue of the country, instead ofremaining in the hands of foreigners as a reservoir of wealth forindigent Hollanders to exploit. The total railway earnings of theCape and Natal together over all their lines amounted to £3, 916, 566in 1895, and the capital expenditure on railways by these coloniesamounts to £26, 000, 000. The greater portion of these receipts comefrom the Rand trade, which is compelled to pay an additional£2, 500, 000, carrying charges to the Netherlands Company, which has£7, 000, 000 of capital. Thus, railway receipts in South Africa amountnow to £7, 000, 000 per annum, of which the Rand contributes at least£5, 000, 000. 

The revenue of the company is now considerably over £3, 000, 000 perannum. The management claim that their expenses amount to but 40 percent. Of revenue, and this is regarded by them as a matter forgeneral congratulation. The Uitlanders contend that the concern isgrossly _mis_managed, and that the low cost of working is a fiction. It only appears low by contrast with a revenue swollen bypreposterously heavy rates and protected by a monopoly. The tariffcould be reduced by one-half; that is to say, a remission of taxationto the tune of one and a half million annually could be effectedwithout depriving the Company of a legitimate and indeed veryhandsome profit. 

[Selati Railway. ]

The Selati Railway Scheme! 'Conceived in iniquity, delivered inshame, died in disgrace!' might be its history, but for the fact thatit is not quite dead yet. But very nearly! The concession wasobtained during the Session of 1890 by a member of the FirstVolksraad, Mr. Barend J. Vorster, jun. , who himself took part in andguided the tone of the debate which decided the granting of theconcession. The Raad resolved to endeavour to obtain the favourableopinions of their constituents, but before doing so the generousMr. Vorster made what he was pleased to call 'presents' to themembers--American spiders, Cape carts, gold watches, shares in theCompany to be floated, and sums in cash--were the trifles by whichMr. Vorster won his way to favour. He placated the President bypresenting to the Volksraad a portrait of his Honour, executed by thelate Mr. Schroeder, South Africa's one artist. The picture cost £600. The affair was a notorious and shameless matter of bribery and theonly profit which the country gained from it was a candid confessionof personal principles on the part of Mr. Kruger himself, who whenthe exposure took place stated that he saw no harm in membersreceiving presents. Debentures to the amount of £500, 000 were issued, bearing Government guarantee of 4 per cent. The Company received £70for each £100 debenture. Comment is superfluous. A second issue of amillion was made, nominally at £93 10s. , but the Company onlyreceived £86--a commission to the brokers or agents of 8-3/4 percent. , at a time when the Company's previous issue of 4 per cents. Were standing at £97 in the market. The costs of flotation werecharged at upwards of £32, 000; the expenses of one gentleman'stravelling, etc. , £6, 000. 

But these are 'trifles light as air. ' This Selati Railway Company, which being guaranteed by Government is really a Governmentliability, arranged with a contractor to build the line at themaximum cost allowed in the concession, £9, 600 per mile. Two dayslater this contractor sub-let the contract for £7, 002 per mile. Asthe distance is 200 miles, the Republic was robbed by a stroke of thepen of £519, 600--one of the biggest 'steals' even in the Transvaal. During the two years for which Dr. Leyds was responsible as therepresentative of the Republic for the management of this affair, none of these peculiar transactions were detected--at any rate nonewere reported or exposed; but on the accession to office of anignorant old Boer the nest of swindles appears to have beendiscovered without any difficulty. And it is generally admitted thatDr. Leyds is not a fool. This exposure took place at the end of theSession of 1894, and, inured as the Uitlanders had become to jobs, this was an eyeopener even for them, and the startled communitytax-payers--who had to bear the brunt of it all. 

[Revenue. ]

Turning to the finances of the country, the following tables are asinstructive as anything can be:

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. {10}

 Fiscal period. Revenue. Expenditure. Remarks. £ £ Aug. 1, 1871 to July 31, 1872 . . . 40, 988 . . . 35, 714 " 1, 1872 " Jan. 31, 1873 . . . 43, 239 . . . 41, 813 Feb. 1, 1873 " " 31, 1874 . . . 49, 318 . . . 45, 482 Gold discovered in Lydenburg. " 1, 1874 " " 31, 1875 . . . 58, 553 . . . 61, 785 " 1, 1875 " " 31, 1876 . . . 64, 582 . . . 69, 394 " 1, 1876 " " 31, 1877 . . . 62, 762 . . . 64, 505 " 1, 1877 " April 12, 1877 . . . 25, 752 . . . 17, 235 April 12, 1877 " Dec. 31, 1877 . . . 54, 127 . . . 70, 003 Jan. 1, 1878 " " 31, 1878 . . . 76, 774 . . . 89, 063 " 1, 1879 " " 31, 1879 . . . 93, 409 . . . 177, 596 " 1, 1880 " " 31, 1880 . . . 174, 069 . . . 144, 943 " 1, 1881 " Oct. 14, 1881 . . . 25, 326 . . . 186, 707 British Govt. Aug. 8, 1881 " Dec. 31, 1881 . . . 37, 908 . . . 33, 442 Boer Govt. Jan. 1, 1882 " " 31, 1882 . . . 177, 407 . . . 114, 476 " 1, 1883 " " 31, 1883 . . . 143, 324 . . . 184, 344 " 1, 1884 " Mar. 31, 1884 . . . 44, 557 . . . 18, 922 April 1, 1884 " " 31, 1885 . . . 161, 596 . . . 184, 820 " 1, 1885 " " 31, 1886 . . . 177, 877 . . . 162, 709 Sheba floated. " 1, 1886 " Dec. 31, 1886 . . . 196, 236 . . . 154, 636 Rand proclaimed Sept. 8, 1886. Jan. 1, 1887 " " 31, 1887 . . . 637, 749 . . . 594, 834 Shares quoted Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Telegraph opened Johannesburg April 26, 1887. " 1, 1888 " " 31, 1888 . . . 884, 440 . . . 720, 492 Boom, Nov. 1888 " 1, 1889 " " 31, 1889 . . . 1, 577, 445 . . . 1, 201, 135 to Jan. 1889. Slump, Mar. 1889. " 1, 1890 " " 31, 1890 . . . 1, 229, 061 . . . 1, 386, 461 " 1, 1891 " " 31, 1891 . . . 967, 192 . . . 1, 350, 074 Baring Crisis. " 1, 1892 " " 31, 1892 . . . 1, 255, 830 . . . 1, 187, 766 Railway reached Johannesburg Sept. 15. " 1, 1893 " " 31, 1893 . . . 1, 702, 685 . . . 1, 302, 054 " 1, 1894 " " 31, 1894 . . . 2, 247, 728 . . . 1, 734, 728 " 1, 1895 " " 31, 1895 . . . 2, 923, 648 . . . 1, 948, 249 " 1, 1896 " " 31, 1896 . . . 3, 912, 095 . . . 3, 732, 492 " 1, 1897 " " 31, 1897 . . . 3, 956, 402 . . . 3, 898, 816 " 1, 1898 " " 31, 1898 . . . 3, 329, 958 . . . 3, 476, 844 " 1, 1899 " " 31, 1899 . . . 4, 087, 852 . . . 3, 951, 234 (Budget). 

The figures for the period from 1871 to the end of 1887 are takenfrom Jeppe's Transvaal Almanac for 1889. They represent theordinary Revenue and Expenditure arrived at after the deductionof the items 'Special Receipts, ' 'Special Deposits, ' 'DepositsWithdrawn, ' 'Advance Refunded, ' 'Advances made' and 'Fixed Deposits'from the totals given in the Official Government Returns. 

The figures for the years 1888 to 1899 are those of the publishedGovernment Returns after the deduction of--

Fixed deposits from 1888 to 1893 inclusive. 

The sale and purchase of explosives from 1895 to 1898 inclusive. 

The owner's share of claim licenses from 1895 to 1899 inclusive. 

Delagoa Bay Customs Dues paid to the Netherlands Railway for 1898 and1899. 

[Dynamite Monopoly. ]

The dynamite monopoly has always been a Monopoly very burningquestion with the Uitlanders. This concession was granted shortlyafter the Barberton Fields were discovered, when the prospects of anindustry in the manufacture of explosives were not really very great. The concessionaire himself has admitted that had he foreseen to whatproportions this monopoly would eventually grow he would not have hadthe audacity to apply for it. This, of course, is merely a personalquestion. The fact which concerned the industry was that the rightwas granted to one man to manufacture explosives and to sell them ata price nearly 200 per cent. Over that at which they could beimported. It was found upon investigation after some years ofagitation that the factory at which this 'manufacture' took place wasin reality merely a depot in which the already manufactured articlewas manipulated to a moderate extent so as to lend colour to thePresident's statement that a local industry was being fostered. Aninvestigation held by order of the Volksraad exposed the imposition. The President himself stated that he found he had been deceived andthat the terms of the concession had been broken, and he urged theRaad to cancel it--which the Raad did. The triumph was considerablefor the mining industry and it was the more appreciated in that itwas the solitary success to which the Uitlanders could point in theirlong series of agitations for reform. But the triumph was notdestined to be a lasting one. Within a few months the monopoly wasrevived in an infinitely more obnoxious form. It was now called aGovernment monopoly, but 'the agency' was bestowed upon a partner ofthe gentleman who had formerly owned the concession, the Presidenthimself vigorously defending this course and ignoring his ownjudgment on the case uttered a few months previously. _Land en Volk_, the Pretoria Dutch newspaper, exposed the whole of this transaction, including the system of bribery by which the concessionaries securedtheir renewal, and among other things made the charge which it hascontinued to repeat ever since that Mr. J. M. A. Wolmarans, memberof the Executive, received a commission of one shilling per caseon every case sold during the continuance of the agency as aconsideration for his support in the Executive Council, and that hecontinues to enjoy this remuneration, which is estimated now to benot far short of £10, 000 a year. Mr. Wolmarans, for reasons of prideor discretion, has declined to take any notice of the charge, although frequently pressed to take action in the matter. It iscalculated that the burden imposed upon the Witwatersrand Mines aloneamounts to £600, 000 per annum, and is, of course, daily increasing. 

[The Franchise Laws. ]

The question of the franchise, which has achieved the greatestprominence in the Uitlander agitation, is one with which few peopleeven in the Transvaal are familiar, so many and peculiar have beenthe changes effected in the law. Lawyers differ as to whether certainlaws revoke or merely supplement previous ones, and the Presidenthimself--to the grim amusement of the Uitlanders--frequently goesastray when he speaks on franchise. The first law on burgher andelectoral rights is No. 1 of 1876, which remained in force until1882. By it the possession of landed property or else residence forone year qualified the settler for full burgher privileges. Law No. 7of 1882 was the first attempt of the restored Republic to deal withthe question. It was then enacted that an alien could be naturalizedand enfranchised after five years' residence, such residence to beproved by the Field-cornet's books of registration. It has alreadybeen explained that these records in nine cases out of ten wereeither improperly kept or non-existent. 

In 1890 Law No. 4 was passed, creating the Second Volksraad andaltering the Grondwet (or constitution) accordingly. By this law thefranchise was indirectly altered without repealing those portionswhich may be at variance with or repugnant to the impliedalterations, and this was done by simply defining what class ofelectors should vote for members of the First Raad, and what classfor members of the Second. Thus, 'the members of the First Volksraadshall be elected by those enfranchised burghers who have obtained theright of voting before this law comes in force, or thereafter bybirth in the State, and on having attained the age of sixteen years. 'Secondly, all those who became naturalized and enfranchised afterthis law was passed could not vote for members of the FirstVolksraad, but a subsequent article in the law provides that thehigher rights can be obtained by those who shall have been eligiblefor ten years for election to the Second Volksraad; and it is thenexplained that, in order to be eligible for the Second Volksraad, it is necessary to be thirty years of age, to be a member of theProtestant Church, to live and have landed property in the Republic, and to have been a naturalized subject for two years. Thus the fullelectoral privileges were only obtainable after fourteen years'residence in the State, and the possession of the otherqualifications of religion, property, etc. 

Next came Law No. 13 of 1891, which was rather a codification than analteration of previous laws. In 1892 another law was passed againexplaining, but not materially altering the franchise. In 1893 LawNo. 14 was passed as an amendment of previous laws: further jugglingthe position--further hedging in the sacred preserve. As the law wassuperseded in the following year it is unnecessary to go intodetails; but note how the measure became law! It was not published inthe _Staats Courant_ for three months as required by law; it was notpublished at all; nor was any special resolution taken affirming thatit was a matter of extreme urgency and therefore to be held exemptfrom that rule of procedure; so that the High Court ought to be ableto declare it null and void. The circumstances of its introductioncould not be considered to warrant the plea of urgency. On the 29thand 30th June, 1893, memorials upon the franchise question were laidbefore the Raad. From Johannesburg came one memorial bearing 4, 507signatures out of the grand total of 6, 665 memorialists. It was infavour of _extension_ of the franchise. Another memorial from 103Free State burghers was in favour of _extension_, another fromBarberton from 40 burghers also for _extension_. Seven memorials, bearing 444 signatures, were _against_ extension. All the othersconcerned minor alterations in Law 13 of 1891, and did not affectthe franchise. The Raad appointed a commission and on the 8th ofSeptember received its report, together with a draft law which hadnot before seen the light of day. After a discussion lasting part ofone morning the law was passed provisionally; and to be of full forceand effect until confirmed by the Raad in the following year. Thusagain were the fundamental political conditions entirely altered bythe passing of a law which _two hours before_ had not been heard of. 

Law No. 3 of 1894 purports to supersede all other laws. Therein it islaid down that all persons born in the State, or who may haveestablished their domicile therein before May 29, 1876, are entitledto full political privileges. Those who have settled in the countrysince then can become naturalized after two years' residence datingfrom the time at which their names were registered in theField-cornet's books. This naturalization confers the privilege ofvoting for local officials, Field-cornets, landdrosts, {11} and formembers of the Second Raad. It is however stipulated that childrenborn in the country shall take the status of their fathers. Thenaturalized subject after having been qualified to vote in thismanner for two years becomes eligible for a seat in the SecondVolksraad--_i. E. _, four years after the registration of his name inthe Field-cornet's books. After he shall have been qualified to sitin the Second Volksraad for ten years (one of the conditions forwhich is that he must be thirty years of age) he may obtain the fullburgher rights or political privileges, provided the majority ofburghers in his Ward will signify _in writing their desire that heshould obtain them_ and provided the President and Executive shallsee no objection to granting the same. It is thus clear that, assuming the Field-cornet's records to be honestly and properlycompiled and to be available for reference (which they are not), theimmigrant, after fourteen years' probation during which he shallhave given up his own country and have been politically emasculated, privilege of obtaining burgher rights should he be willing and ableto induce the majority of a hostile clique to petition in writing onhis behalf and should he then escape the veto of the President andExecutive. 

This was the coping-stone to Mr. Kruger's Chinese wall. TheUitlanders and their children were disfranchised for ever, and as faras legislation could make it sure the country was preserved by entailto the families of the Voortrekkers. The measure was only carriedbecause of the strenuous support given by the President both withinthe Raad and at those private meetings which practically decide theimportant business of the country. The President threw off alldisguise when it came to proposing this measure of protection. Formany years he had been posing as the one progressive factor in theState and had induced the great majority of people to believe thatwhile he personally was willing and even anxious to accede to thereasonable requests of the new population his burghers wererestraining him. He had for a time succeeded in quelling allagitation by representing that demonstrations made by the tax-bearingsection only embarrassed him in his endeavour to relieve them andaggravated the position by raising the suspicions and opposition ofhis Conservative faction. 

In 1893 a petition signed by upwards of 13, 000 aliens in favour ofgranting the extension of the franchise was received by the Raad withgreat laughter. But notwithstanding this discouragement, during thefollowing year a monster petition was got up by the National Union. It was signed by 35, 483 Uitlanders--men of an age and of sufficienteducation to qualify them for a vote in any country. The discussionwhich took place on this petition was so important, and the decisionso pregnant with results, that copious notes of the Volksraad debateare published in this volume (Appendix). The only response made tothis appeal was a firmer riveting of the bonds. It is but just to saythat the President encountered determined opposition in his attemptto force his measure through the Raad. The progressive section(progressive being a purely relative term which the peculiarcircumstances of the country alone can justify) made a stand, state that two or three of the intelligent and liberal-minded farmersbelonging to this progressive party, men who were earnestly desirousof doing justice to all and furthering the interests of the State, declared at the close of the debate that this meant the loss ofindependence. 'Now, ' said one old Boer, 'our country is gone. Nothingcan settle this but righting, and there is only one end to the fight. Kruger and his Hollanders have taken our independence more surelythan ever Shepstone did. ' The passing of this measure was arevelation not only to the Uitlanders, who still believed thatreasonable representations would prevail, but to a section of thevoters of the country who had failed to realize Mr. Kruger's policy, and who honestly believed that he would carry some conciliatorymeasures tending to relieve the strain, and satisfy the large andever-increasing industrial population of aliens. The measure wasaccepted on all hands as an ultimatum--a declaration of war to theknife. There was only one redeeming feature about it: from that timeforward there could be no possibility of misunderstanding theposition, and no reason to place any credence in the assurances ofthe President. When remonstrated with on this subject of the refusalof the franchise, and when urged by a prominent man whose sympathiesare wholly with the Boer to consider the advisability of 'opening thedoor a little, ' the President, who was in his own house, stood up, and leading his adviser by the arm, walked into the middle of thestreet, and pointed to the Transvaal flag flying over the Governmentbuildings, saying, 'You see that flag. If I grant the franchise I mayas well pull it down. '

It is seldom possible to indicate the precise period at which apermanent change in the feeling of a people may be considered to havebeen effected, but the case of the Uitlanders undoubtedly presentsone instance in which this is possible. Up to the passing of this lawquite a considerable section of the people believed that thePresident and the Volksraad would listen to reason, and would even inthe near future make considerable concessions. A larger section, itis true, believed nothing of the sort, but at the same time were sofar from thinking that it would be necessary to resort to extrememeasures that they were content to remain passive, and allowtheir more sanguine comrades to put their convictions to the test. Itis not too much to say that not one person in a hundred seriouslycontemplated that an appeal to force would be necessary to obtain theconcessions which were being asked. It might be said that within anhour the scales dropped from the eyes of the too credulous community, and the gravity of the position was instantly realized. The passageof the Bill and the birth of the revolutionary idea were synchronous. 

In a brief sketch of events, such as this is, it is not possible withdue regard to simplicity to deal with matters in chronological order, and for this reason such questions as the franchise, the railway, dynamite, and others have been explained separately, regardless ofthe fact that it has thereby become necessary to allude to incidentsin the general history for which no explanation or context issupplied at the moment. This is particularly the case in the matterof the franchise, and for the purpose of throwing light on the policyof which the franchise enactments and the Netherlands Railway affairsand other matters formed a portion, some explanation should be givenof President Kruger's own part and history in the period underreview. 

Mr. Kruger was elected President in 1882, and re-elected in 1888without serious opposition, his one rival, General Joubert, receivingan insignificant number of votes. The period for which he was nowelected proved to be one of unexpected, unexampled prosperity, furnishing him with the means of completing plans which must haveseemed more or less visionary at their inception; but it was also aperiod of considerable trial. The development of the BarbertonGoldfields was a revelation to the peasant mind of what the power ofgold is. The influx of prospectors was very considerable, theincrease of the revenue of the State appeared simply colossal; and nosooner did the Boer rulers begin to realize the significance of theBarberton boom than they were confronted with the incomparablygreater discoveries of the Witwatersrand. The President did not likethe Uitlanders. He made no concealment of the fact. He could never beinduced to listen to the petitions of that community, nor to doanything in the way of roads and bridges in return for the veryheavy contributions which the little community sent to the Republic'streasury. In those days he used to plead that the distancewas great, and the time required for coach-travelling was tooconsiderable; but the development of the Witwatersrand and thegrowth of Johannesburg within thirty-two miles of the capital, whiledisposing of the pretexts which held good in the case of Barberton, found Mr. Kruger no more inclined to make the acquaintance of thenewcomers than he had been before. Notwithstanding that the lawprescribes that the President shall visit all the districts and townsof the State at least once during the year, notwithstanding, also, the proximity of Johannesburg, the President has only visited theindustrial capital of the Republic three times in nine years. Thefirst occasion was in the early days--a visit now remembered only asthe occasion of the banquet at which Mr. Cecil Rhodes, then one ofthe pioneers of the Rand, in proposing the President's health, appealed to him to make friends with the newcomers, and to extend theprivileges of the older residents to 'his young burghers--likemyself. ' That was before Mr. Rhodes had secured his concession, andlong before the Charter was thought of. 

There is an unreported incident which occurred a year or two later, concerning the two strong men of Africa--it was a 'meeting' whichdidn't take place, and only Mr. Rhodes can say how it might haveaffected the future of South Africa had it come off. The latterarrived by coach in Pretoria one Saturday morning, and, desiring tosee the President, asked Mr. Ewald Esselen to accompany him andinterpret for him. Mr. Rhodes, knowing the peculiar ways of Mr. Kruger, waited at the gate a few yards from the house while Mr. Esselen went in to inquire if the President would see him. Mr. Kruger's reply was that he would see Mr. Rhodes on Monday. Mr. Esselen urged that as Mr. Rhodes was obliged to leave on Sunday nightthe reply was tantamount to a refusal. The President answered thatthis was 'Nachtmaal' time and the town was full of his burghers, andthat he made it a rule, which he would violate for no one, to reservethe Saturdays of the Nachtmaal week for his burghers so as to hearwhat they had to say if any wished to speak to him, as his burgherswere more to him than anyone else in the world. 'I do no business onSunday, ' he concluded, 'so Rhodes can wait or go!' Mr. Rhodes did notwait. When he heard the answer he remarked to Mr. Esselen, 'The olddevil! I meant to work with him, but I'm not going on my knees tohim. I've got my concession however and he can do nothing. '

The second visit of Mr. Kruger to Johannesburg was the famous one of1890, when the collapse of the share market and the apparent failureof many of the mines left a thriftless and gambling community whollyruined and half starving, unable to bear the burden which the Stateimposed, almost wholly unappreciative of the possibilities of theMain Reef, and ignorant of what to do to create an industry andrestore prosperity. This, at least, the community did understand, that they were horribly overtaxed; that those things which might betheir salvation, and are necessary conditions for industrialprosperity--railways, cheap living, consistent and fairgovernment--were not theirs. The President visited Johannesburg withthe object of giving the assurance that railways would be built. Headdressed a crowd of many thousands of people from a platform at theWanderers' Club pavilion. He did not conceal his suspicions of thepeople, and his attempts to conceal his dislike were transparent andinstantly detected, the result being that there was no harmonybetween his Honour and the people of Johannesburg. Later in theevening the crowd, which had hourly become larger and more and moreexcited and dissatisfied, surrounded the house which the Presidentwas occupying, and, without desire to effect any violence, but bysimple pressure of numbers, swept in the railings and pillars whichenclosed the house. Most fortunately the Chief of Police hadwithdrawn all the Boer members of the force, and the crowd, to theirsurprise, were held back by Colonial, English, and Irish 'bobbies. 'This was probably the only thing that prevented a very seriousculmination. As it was, some excited individuals pulled down theTransvaal flag from the Government buildings, tore it in shreds andtrampled it under foot. The incident should have been ignored underthe exceptionally trying conditions of the time, but the Governmentdetermined to make much of it. Some arrests were effected, and menthrown into prison. Bail was refused; in fact, 'martyrs' were made, and the incident became indelibly stamped on the memory of both Boerand Uitlander. The President vowed that he would never visit theplace again, and without doubt made use of his experience toconsolidate the feeling of his burghers against the Uitlanders. 

At a meeting of burghers several months after this incident, hereferred to the agitation and constant complaining of the Uitlanders, and stated that they had only themselves to thank for all theirtroubles, and yet they would blame the Government. He then proceededto entertain his hearers with one of the inevitable illustrationsfrom life in the lower animal kingdom. 'They remind me, ' said hisHonour, 'of the old baboon that is chained up in my yard. When heburnt his tail in the Kaffir's fire the other day, he jumped roundand bit me, and that just after I had been feeding him. ' For fiveyears Mr. Kruger was as good as his word. He would not even passthrough Johannesburg when convenience suggested his doing so, butmade circuits by road to avoid the place of detestation. It was onone of these visits to Krugersdorp, a township within theWitwatersrand Fields, twenty miles from Johannesburg, that thePresident, appreciating the fact that besides his beloved burghersthere might, owing to the proximity of the fields, be someunregenerate aliens present, commenced his address as follows:'Burghers, friends, thieves, murderers, newcomers, and others. ' Thiswas not ill-judged and laborious humour; it was said in absoluteearnest. The references were repeated at various intervals in theaddress and here explained by allusions to the Scriptures and to theall-merciful God through Whom even the worst might hope to beredeemed, the inference clearly being that even the Uitlander, by thegrace of God (and, no doubt, Mr. Kruger), might hope in time toapproach the fitness of the burgher. 

In the meantime another affair occurred, which revived much of theold feeling expressed at the time of the flag affair. War wasdeclared against Malaboch, a native chief with a following of a fewhundreds, who had, it was alleged, refused to pay his taxes. Suchwars are of frequent occurrence in the Transvaal, the reasonsassigned being usually some failure to pay taxes or to submit to thediscipline of the native Commissioners. In this case British subjectswere commandeered--that is, requisitioned to fight or to find inmoney or in kind some contribution to the carrying on of the war. Itwas felt that the position of the Republic did not warrant at thattime a resort to commandeering, a measure which no doubt wasnecessary in the early days when the Republic had no cash; but with adeclared surplus of about £1, 000, 000 in the Treasury, it was deemedto be an uncivilized and wholly unnecessary measure, and one capableof the grossest abuse, to permit men of inferior intelligence andtraining, and of no education, such as the Field-cornets are, touse their discretion in levying contributions upon individuals. TheUitlanders were especially sensible of the injustice done to them. They had been definitely refused all voice in the affairs of theState, and they already contributed nine-tenths of the revenue. Theyreceived in return an infinitesimal portion in the shape of civiladministration and public works, and they were distinctly not inthe humour to be placed at the mercy of Boer officials, who wouldundoubtedly mulct them and spare the burghers. Protests were made;and five of the men commandeered in Pretoria, having point-blankrefused to comply with the orders, were placed under arrest. The HighCommissioner, Sir Henry (now Lord) Loch, was appealed to, and, actingon instructions from the Imperial Government, immediately proceededto Pretoria. The excitement was intense. In Johannesburg a number ofmen were prepared to make a dash on Pretoria to effect the forciblerelease of the prisoners, and had any steps been taken to enforce thecommandeering law within the Witwatersrand district, without doubt acollision would have taken place. The supply of arms in the town was, it is true, wholly inadequate for any resistance to the Boers, but inthe excitement of the time this was not considered. 

Sir Henry Loch's visit had the effect of suspending all action; butthe opinion in Pretoria was that should the High Commissioner proceedto Johannesburg there would be such an outburst of feeling that noone could foresee the results. Every effort was made to prevent himfrom going. Among other steps taken by the President was that ofsending over for the President of the Chamber of Mines, Mr. LionelPhillips, and requesting him, if he had the interests of the Stateand the welfare of the community at heart, to use his influence todissuade the High Commissioner from visiting the town in its thenexcited state. Sir Henry Loch, in deference to the opinion expressedon all sides, agreed not to visit Johannesburg, but to receivedeputations from Johannesburg people at his hotel in Pretoria. TheHigh Commissioner's visit was successful. The Government agreed toabsolve British subjects from the operation of the Commando Law; butthe men who had been arrested and already sent under guard to thefront were allowed to proceed and receive their discharge at thescene of war, and were compelled to find their own way back, receiving no consideration or compensation for the treatment to whichthey had been subjected. In this respect it is difficult to say thatSir Henry Loch achieved all that might have been expected from him. Possibly, to insist on more than he did would have left PresidentKruger no alternative but to refuse at all risks. The Volksraad beingthen in session, there may have been some diplomatic reasons for notpressing matters too hard. 

A trivial incident occurred which once more excited bad partyfeeling. The High Commissioner was met at the railway-station by thePresident in his carriage. The enthusiastic crowd of British subjectsshouldered aside the escorts provided by the Government, took thehorses from the carriage, and drew it down to the hotel. In thecourse of the journey an individual mounted the box-seat of thecarriage with the Union Jack fastened on a bamboo, and in theexcitement of the moment allowed the folds of England's flag togather round the President. His Honour rose very excitedly and struckat the flag with his walking-stick; but in blissful ignorance of whatwas going on behind him the standard-bearer continued to flip hisHonour with the flag until the hotel was reached. There it wasunderstood that the President would leave the carriage with the HighCommissioner, and under this misapprehension those who had drawnthe carriage down left their posts and joined the cheering crowdthe carriage with neither horses nor men to move him, and there hewas obliged to wait until a number of burghers were called up, who drew his Honour off to his own house. The affair was whollyunpremeditated and almost unobserved at the time, but it wasunfortunately construed by the President as a deliberate insult, and it increased, if possible, his dislike for the Uitlander. 

The difficulty of dealing with a man of Mr. Kruger's nature andtraining was further illustrated by another occurrence in thesenegotiations. During a meeting between the President and the HighCommissioner in the presence of their respective staffs the formerbecame very excited and proceeded to speak his mind very openly tohis friends, referring freely to certain matters which it wasundesirable to mention in the presence of the British party. Mr. Ewald Esselen, the late State Attorney, wrote in Dutch in a verylarge round schoolboy hand, 'Be careful! There is an interpreterpresent, ' and handed the slip of paper to the President. The latterstopped abruptly, looked at the slip of paper, first one way and thenanother, and after a long pause threw it on the table saying, 'Ewald, what does this mean? What do you _write_ things to me for? Why don'tyou _speak_ so that one can understand?'

Early in 1895 efforts were made by the Dutch officials inJohannesburg and a number of private individuals to induce thePresident to visit the place again, when it was thought that a betterreception would be accorded him than that which he had experienced onhis visit in 1890. Mr. Kruger steadily refused for some time, but waseventually persuaded to open in person the first agricultural showheld on the Witwatersrand. Every precaution was taken to insure him agood welcome, or, at least, to avoid any of those signs which wouldindicate that Johannesburg likes President Kruger no more than helikes Johannesburg; and even those who were most conscious of thePresident's malign influence did all in their power to make the visita success, believing themselves to be in duty bound to make anyeffort, even at the sacrifice of personal sympathies and opinions, toturn the current of feeling and to work for a peaceful settlement ofthe difficulties which unfortunately seemed to be thickening allround. The event passed off without a hitch. It would be too much tosay that great enthusiasm prevailed; but, at least, a respectful, andat times even cordial, greeting was accorded to the President, andhis address in the agricultural show grounds was particularly wellreceived. The President returned to Pretoria that night and was askedwhat he thought of the affair: 'Did he not consider it an _amende_for what had happened five years before? And was he not convincedfrom personal observation that the people of Johannesburg were loyal, law-abiding, and respectful to the head of the Government under whichthey lived?' Mr. Kruger's reply in the vernacular is unprintable; butthe polite equivalent is, 'Ugh! A pack of lick-spittles. ' In spite ofa subsequent promulgation it seems clear that there is no 'forget andforgive' in his Honour's attitude towards Johannesburg. The result ofthis interview became known and naturally created a very badimpression. 

During his second term of office Mr. Kruger lost much of his personalpopularity and influence with the Boers, and incurred bitteropposition on account of his policy of favouring members of his ownclique, of granting concessions, and of cultivating the Hollanderfaction and allowing it to dominate the State. 

Outside the Transvaal Mr. Kruger has the reputation of being freefrom the taint of corruption from which so many of his colleaguessuffer. Yet within the Republic and among his own people one of thegravest of the charges levelled against him is that by his exampleand connivance he has made himself responsible for much of theplundering that goes on. There are numbers of cases in which thePresident's nearest relatives have been proved to be concerned in themost flagrant jobs, only to be screened by his influence; such cases, for instance, as that of the Vaal River Water Supply Concession, inwhich Mr. Kruger's son-in-law 'hawked' about for the highest bid thevote of the Executive Council on a matter which had not yet comebefore it, and, moreover, sold and duly delivered the aforesaid vote. There is the famous libel case in which Mr. Eugene Marais, the editorof the Dutch paper _Land en Volk_, successfully sustained hisallegation that the President had defrauded the State by chargingheavy travelling expenses for a certain trip on which he was actuallythe guest of the Cape Colonial Government. {12}

The party in opposition to President Kruger, with General Joubert atits head, might, for purposes of nomenclature, be called theProgressive Party. It was really led by Mr. Ewald Esselen, ahighly-educated South African, born in the Cape Colony of Germanparentage, educated in Edinburgh, and practising as a barrister atthe Pretoria Bar. Mr. Esselen was a medical student at the time ofthe Boer War of Independence, and having then as he still hasenthusiastic Boer sympathies, volunteered for medical service duringthe war. He subsequently became attached to the President's staff, and finally, on completing his legal education, was appointed Judgeof the High Court in the Transvaal. Relinquishing his seat on theBench after some years of honourable service he returned to the Bar, and became an active factor in politics. Mr. Esselen, from being theclosest personal adherent of Mr. Kruger, became for a time his mostformidable opponent and his most dreaded critic. A campaign wasorganized for the presidential election and feeling ran extremelyhigh. To such lengths, indeed, did the Boer partisans go that forsome months the possibility of a resort to arms for the settlement oftheir differences was freely discussed by both parties. The electiontook place in 1893, and at the same time elections of members for theFirst Volksraad were in progress. Mr. Kruger made masterly use of hisposition in office and of his authority over the officials appointedduring his _régime_, and for the time being he converted the CivilService of the country into an election organization. Not even theenemies of the President will deny that he is both a practiseddiplomat and a determined fighter. By his energy, intrigue, personalinfluence, and intense determination, he not only compelled his partyto the highest effort, but to a large extent broke the spirit of theopposition before the real struggle began. There are two stages inthe Presidential election at which a fight can under certaincircumstances be made. There were certainly two stages in thiselection. The first is at the polls; the second is in the Volksraad, when objections have to be lodged against candidates and acommission of investigation appointed, and the steps necessary forthe installation of the new President have to be discussed. Mr. Kruger and his party took ample precautions. It has been statedopenly and without contradiction, and is accepted in the Transvaal asan unquestionable fact, that at least three properly elected membersof the Volksraad were 'jockeyed' out of their seats because they wereknown to have leanings towards General Joubert. A number of hissupporters among the prominent officials of the Civil Service weredisfranchised by the action of President Kruger because they hadfavoured his rival. In a country where the matters of Governmenthave been so loosely conducted it is no doubt fairly easy to findflaws, and the President experienced no difficulty in establishingsufficient case against General Joubert's supporters to satisfy thepersons appointed by him to investigate matters. On various pretextsnewly-elected members were debarred from taking their seats. In onecase, a strong supporter of General Joubert, who was returned by amajority of something like six to one, was kept out of his seatby the mere lodging of an objection by his opponent, the formerrepresentative of the constituency; there being a provision in thelaw that objections with regard to elections shall be heard by theVolksraad, and that, pending the return of a new member, the memberlast elected for the constituency shall continue to represent it. That the objection lodged in this case was ridiculous in the extremehad no bearing on the immediate result. The President, with admirablegravity, said, 'The law provides that all objections must be heard bythe Volksraad, and that pending the decision the old member (astrenuous supporter of his Honour) shall retain his seat; and beforeall things we must support the law. ' In the case of Mr. Esselen, whowas elected member for Potchefstroom, the most flagrant abuses wereproved to have been committed by the polling officer, the landdrost, dead and absent men having (according to him) rolled up freely tovote for the Krugerite candidate. Numbers of Mr. Esselen's supporterswere disqualified on various pretexts, and the voting being conductedopenly the moral suasion and close supervision of the official(Krugerite) party were very effective. Mr. Esselen was declared tohave lost his seat by seven votes. Scrutinies were demanded andobjections lodged, but without avail. The tactics above indicatedwere pursued in every case. The old Volksraad having been filled withMr. Kruger's creatures, it was, of course, his interest to supportthe return of old members. He was thus enabled by the law abovequoted to retain an old member in the Volksraad pending the decisionin a case of dispute. Mr. Esselen's defeat was a crushing blow to theJoubert party, as the want of a leader in the House itself completelydemoralized the General's followers. The election for Presidentproceeded, and General Joubert was, without any doubt whatever, elected by a very considerable majority. The tactics alreadydescribed were again followed, and the result was announced as:Kruger, 7, 881; Joubert, 7, 009. Objections were lodged by GeneralJoubert, but, deprived of the services of Mr. Esselen in the FirstRaad, and overawed by the fierce determination of his opponent, theGeneral, finding himself in for a struggle, lost heart as usual andcollapsed. 

The difference between the two men is remarkable. Mr. Kruger, to hiscredit be it said, has not the remotest conception of the meaning offear, and would not know how to begin to give in. Mr. Joubert, 'Slim(sly) Piet, ' as he is called, possessing a considerable share of thereal Africander cunning, is yet no match for his rival in diplomacy, and has none of his grit and courage. In later years this has beenproved a score of times, and it is, therefore, the more interestingto recall that at the time of the annexation General Joubert refusedto compromise his principles by taking office under Shepstone, whilstMr. Kruger was not so staunch; and both before and during the warGeneral Joubert refused to accept less than what he considered to behis rights, and steadily and frequently proclaimed his readiness tofight whilst Mr. Kruger was diplomatizing. 

The Commission appointed by the Raad to investigate matters wasconstituted chiefly of Mr. Kruger's supporters, and the result was aforegone conclusion. They confirmed the result of the election asdeclared; and Mr. Kruger, with the grim humour which upon occasionsdistinguishes him, seeing an opportunity for inexpensive magnanimitywhich would gratify himself and be approved by everyone--exceptthe recipients--appointed the most prominent supporters of his rivalin the Volksraad to be the official deputation to welcome the newPresident. 

The President did not neglect those who had stood by him in his hourof need. Mr. Kock, landdrost and polling-officer of Potchefstroom, who had deserved well of his patron, if for nothing more than theoverthrow of Mr. Esselen, was appointed member of the Executive tofill a position created purposely for him. The membership of theExecutive is expressly defined by the Grondwet; but his Honour is nottrammelled by such considerations. He created the position of MinuteKeeper to the Executive with a handsome salary and a right to vote, and bestowed this upon his worthy henchman. 

The Executive Council thus constituted consisted of six members; andhere again the President contrived to kill two birds with one stone, the expression of his gratitude being by no means unprofitable. Afterso bitter a struggle and the resort to such extreme measures as hehad been obliged to use, he anticipated no little opposition evenwithin the inner circle, and, in any case, he as usual deemed it wiseto provide against all contingencies. Dr. Leyds' vote he knew hecould count on, the interests of the party which the State Secretaryrepresents being such that they are obliged to work with Mr. Kruger. The appointment, therefore, of Mr. Kock gave his Honour one half ofthe Executive, and the casting-vote which pertains to his officeturned the scale in his favour. Whatever, therefore, might be histroubles with the Volksraad when, by process of justice, reform, ordeath his adherents should be gradually removed from that Chamber, his position was, humanly speaking, assured in the Executive Councilfor the term of his office. 

The opposition to Mr. Kock's appointment was extremely strong, culminating in the formulation of charges of theft against him by Mr. Eugene Marais, the spirited editor of the leading Dutch paper, _Landen Volk_. The charge alleged against Mr. Kock was that during histerm of office as landdrost at Potchefstroom he had appropriated thetelegraph-wires in order to fence his own farm. Feeling ran so highordinary courts was not permitted, but a Special Commissioner, onenot qualified by legal experience or official position to preside insuch a case, was selected. By a positively ludicrous exercise ofdiscretion in the matter of admission of evidence Mr. Kock wascleared. Mr. Marais, nothing daunted, continued his exposures, challenging that action should be taken against himself for libel, and finally producing photographs taken by competent witnessesshowing the _corpus delicti in situ_. The President and Mr. Kock werenot to be drawn, however, and, secure in their newly-acquiredpositions, they declined the offer of battle and rested on theirlaurels. 

For some time the Opposition, now called the Progressive Party, wascompletely demoralized, and it was not until the following year thatindividuals again endeavoured to give cohesion to the party. Appealswere made by them to prominent individuals and firms associated withthe mining industry for financial support in the manner in which itis contributed in England for electioneering purposes. A determinedand well-sustained effort was made to educate Boer opinion to betterthings, and to bring such influence to bear on the electorate aswould result in the return of a better class of men to the Volksraad. Newspapers conducted with this end in view were circulated throughoutthe country, and when the elections for the Volksraad took place, specially qualified agents were sent to ascertain the feeling of thedistricts, and to work up an opposition to the existing methods ofGovernment. In every case endeavours were made to select a popularresident within a district of more enlightened views and highercharacter than his fellows. A good many thousand pounds werecontributed and expended for this purpose. Absolutely no stipulationwas made by the contributors to this fund, except that the aim shouldbe for honest and decent government. The funds were placedunreservedly in the hands of well-known and highly respected men whowere themselves burghers of the State, and the Uitlanders laidthemselves out for one more effort to effect the reforms by peacefulmeans and pressure from within the State. The elections came off andwere regarded as a triumph for the Progressive Party, which it wasalleged had secured some sixteen out of twenty-six seats in the FirstVolksraad, and a similar majority in the Second. Hope revived andconfidence was restored among the Uitlanders, but old residents inthe country who knew the Boer character warned the alien communitynot to expect too much, as it was a question yet to be decided howmany of those who were Progressives at the time of the election wouldstand by their professions when brought face to face with thePresident and his party in battle array. 

The warning was too well warranted. The Volksraad so constituted wasthe one which rejected with sullen incivility (to apply no harsherterm) the petition of 40, 000 Uitlanders for some measure of franchisereform. This Progressive Raad was also the one which passed the Billscurtailing the liberty of the press, and prohibiting the holding ofpublic meetings and the organization of election committees, andwhich distinguished itself by an attempt to wrest from the High Courtthe decision of a matter still _sub judice_--the cyanide case. 

In this case the mining industry had combined to test the validity ofcertain patents. {13} In spite of attempts at reasonable compromise onbehalf of the mines, and these failing, in spite of every effortmade to expedite the hearing of the case, the question continuedto hang for some years, and in the meantime efforts were beingmade during two successive sessions of the Volksraad to obtainthe passage of some measure which would practically secure to theholders of the patents a monopoly for the use of cyanide, or anindefeasible title to the patents, whether valid in law and properlyacquired or not. These attempts to evade the issue were in themselvesa disgrace to a civilized nation. Failing the obtaining of anabsolute monopoly, an endeavour was made to pass a law that allpatents held without dispute for a certain period should beunassailable on any grounds. There was a thin attempt at disguisingthe purpose of this measure, but so thin, that not even theoriginators could keep up the pretence, and the struggle wasacknowledged to be one between the supporters of an independentcourt of justice and honest government on the one side, and a partyof would-be concessionaires--one might say 'pirates'--on theother. The judges made no secret of their intention to tender theirresignations should the measure pass; the President made no secretof his desire that it should pass. His party voted as one man infavour of it, and the coffee meetings on the Presidential stoep wereunanimously for it. The Raad was exactly divided on the measure, and it was eventually lost by the casting-vote of the chairman. Noabsolute harm was done, but the revelation of the shameful conditionsof affairs in a Raad of which so much good was expected did asmuch as anything could do to destroy all hope. It was a painfulexhibition, and the sordid details which came to light, theunblushing attempts to levy blackmail on those who were threatenedwith pillage by would-be concessionaires, the shameless conduct ofRaad members fighting as hirelings to impose a fresh burden on theirown country, sickened the overburdened community. 

The Bewaarplaatsen question also excited much discussion, but was nota subject of such close interest to the Uitlander community asothers, for the reason that but few companies were directlyconcerned. Bewaarplaatsen is a name given to areas granted for thepurpose of conservation of water, for depositing residues of crushedore, etc. --in fact, they are grants of the surface rights of certainareas at a lower rate of license than that paid upon claim or mineralareas. This variation in the licensed areas was a wholly unnecessarycomplication of the gold law, the difference in cost beinginconsiderable, and the difference in title affording untoldpossibilities of lawsuits. In some cases companies had taken outoriginally the more expensive claim-licenses for ground the surfaceonly of which it was intended to use. They had been compelled, byorder of the Government, to convert these claims at a later periodinto bewaarplaatsen. They were almost invariably situated on thesouth side of the Witwatersrand Main Reef, for the reason that, asthe ground sloped to the south, the water was found there, the millswould naturally be erected there, and the inclination of the groundoffered tempting facilities for the disposal of residues. After someyears of development on the Main Reef it became clear that thebanket beds, which were known to dip towards the south, becamegradually flatter at the lower levels, and, consequently, it wasclear that bodies of reef would be accessible vertically fromareas south of the reef which had formerly been regarded as quiteworthless as gold-bearing claims. The companies which owned thesebewaarplaatsen now contended that they should be allowed to convertthem into claims, as, by their enterprise, they had exploitedthe upper levels and revealed the conditions which made thebewaarplaatsen valuable. The companies had endeavoured to convertthese bewaarplaatsen into claims when they first discovered thatthere was a possibility of their becoming valuable, and that at atime when the areas themselves were of extremely little marketvalue to any except the holders of the surface rights. They wereunsuccessful in this through some lack of provision in the law, and year after year the subject was fought out and postponed, thedisputed ground all the time becoming more and more valuable, andconsequently a greater prize for the concessionaire and pirate, anda greater incentive to bribery on all hands, until it came to beregarded by the worthy members of the Volksraad as something verylike a special dispensation of Providence, intended to provideannuities for Volksraad members at the expense of the unfortunateowners. After a particularly fierce struggle, the Volksraad went sofar as to decide that those companies which had been obliged toconvert their original claim-holdings into bewaarplaatsen shouldbe allowed to re-convert them to claims and to retain them. Eventhis was only gained after the Minister of Mines had, on his ownresponsibility, issued the claim licenses, and so forced theVolksraad to face the issue of confirming or reversing his action!

In this matter the President again fought tooth and nail against theindustry, and most strenuous efforts were made by him and his partyto obtain a reversal of the decision, but without effect. This, however, only disposed of a small portion of the ground at stake. With regard to those areas which had never been held as claims, theissue lay between two parties known respectively as the companies, who were the surface-owners, and the applicants. The applicants, according to the polite fiction, were those who, having no claimsuperior to that of any other individual member of the public, hadhappened to have priority in order of application. As a matter offact, they were Government officials, political supporters andrelatives of the President, financed and guided by two or three ofthe professional concession-hunters and hangers-on of Mr. Kruger'sGovernment. Notwithstanding the existence of a law specificallyprohibiting Government servants from concerning themselves in otherbusiness and speculations, the parties to this arrangement enteredinto notarial contracts determining the apportionment of the plunder, and undertaking to use their influence in every way with thePresident and his party and with members of the Volksraad to securethe granting of the rights in dispute to themselves. With them wasassociated the originator and holder of another infamous monopoly, and it was stated by him in the Chamber of Mines, that should theyfail to obtain these rights for themselves they were prepared toco-operate with another party and force the Government to put them upfor public auction, so that at any rate the mines should not havethem. The object of this threat was to compel the mining companies tocome to terms with him and compromise matters. 

One of the notarial contracts referred to has been made public, andit contains the names of Mr. 'Koos' Smit, the Government RailwayCommissioner, and one of the highest officials in the State;Landdrost Schutte, Chief Magistrate of Pretoria, and Mr. HendrikSchoeman, one of the most prominent commandants in the Transvaal anda near relation of the President. Needless to say, all are members ofthe Kruger family party, and were most prominent supporters of hisHonour at the time of the 1893 election. They claim that they weredefinitely promised a concession for the bewaarplaatsen as a rewardfor their services in this election. The precedent quoted onbehalf of the companies in support of their claim is that of thebrickmaker's license under the Gold Law. Brickmakers have privilegesunder their license similar to those granted with bewaarplaatsen, butin their case it is provided that should gold be discovered or bebelieved to exist in the areas granted under their licenses, theholder of the license shall have the right to convert his area intoLaw. The companies urged that this reveals the intention of the law, and that such a condition was omitted in connection withbewaarplaatsen simply and solely through oversight, and because atthat time it never occurred to anyone to suppose that thegold-bearing deposits would shelve off and be accessible at suchgreat distances from the outcrop as where the bewaarplaatsen arelocated. The companies moreover pointed out that these areas were inevery case located in the middle of property held under mininglicenses, that they themselves owned the surface of the property andtherefore no one else could work on them, that the areas were inthemselves too small and too irregular in shape to be workedindependently of the surrounding ground, and that the granting ofthem to others could not be justified by any right on the part ofapplicants, and would merely be placing in their hands the means ofimposing on the owners of the surfaces and the adjacent claims anexcessive purchase price or the alternative of being blocked in thedevelopment of their own ground. After the Second Raad had decided inprinciple in favour of the surface-holders, action was taken by theFirst Raad, and a change of front was effected by a measurealteration, which hung the question up for another year. Everyonerealized that this was secured by the influence of the President inthe first place and by the pliability of Raad members in the second, on the ground that the matter was too profitable to them personallyto be disposed of until it became absolutely compulsory. {14}

One of the first concessions granted by the Boer Government after therestoration of the country to them was the liquor monopoly. Underthis grant a factory established within a few miles of Pretoria hasthe sole right to distil spirits. Time and very considerableexperience are in all countries necessary for the manufacture of goodliquor, and the natural conditions are not more favourable to theindustry in the Transvaal than elsewhere, consequently the product isnot regarded with great favour. The enterprise, however, is a veryprosperous one, being dependent almost entirely upon the sale ofliquor to natives. For a number of years representations were made bythe Chamber of Mines on behalf of the industry, by individuals and bypublic petitions, with the object of controlling the liquor trade andproperly enforcing the laws which already existed. The followingterse summary of the evils resulting from this sale of liquor istaken from the report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895. Unfortunatelythe remarks apply equally well to-day:

There is, indeed, no doubt that one of the greatest difficulties withwhich local employers have to deal is the question of the liquortrade. In very many cases the liquor supplied to the natives is ofthe vilest quality, quickly inflaming those who take it to madness, and causing the faction fights which sometimes have fatal results, and always lead to the, at any rate, temporary disablement of some ofthe combatants, and the damaging of property. Accidents, too, areoften attributable to the effects of drink, and altogether, as statedin the resolutions, a large percentage of the deaths among thenatives here is directly due to drink. In its bearing on the labourquestion, drink also plays an important part. The shortness in thesupply, as compared with the demand for labour, has been accentuatedby it. Where possible more natives are kept in the compounds than areactually required for the work to be done, to make allowance forthose who are disabled by drink. 

The granting of licenses to liquor houses was carried to such anextreme that at last the entire community rose against it, and theexpression of opinion was so strong that the Government was compelledto make a show of deferring to it. Involved in the liquor questionwas the matter of police, and arising out of this, again, was thequestion of dealing with crime in general, including the gold andamalgam stealing that was known to be carried on on a considerablescale at the expense of the companies. 

The Attorney-General, or State Attorney, as he is called in theTransvaal, is the responsible head of the Law Department, and untillately was the departmental head of the police. The gentleman thenoccupying the position of State Attorney was peculiarly unfit--in themidst of that world of unfitness--for the duties which he wassupposed to perform. He was removed from office, and afterconsiderable negotiation Mr. Esselen was prevailed upon at a greatmonetary sacrifice to accept the position of State Attorney, hestipulating that he should have a free hand in reorganizing thedetective and police forces. During the months in which Mr. Esselencontinued in office admirable reforms were introduced, and a veryappreciable influence was exercised on the condition of affairs inJohannesburg. It is inadvisable to state explicitly the nature of theobjections which existed against some of the officials employed underthe former _régime_; it is sufficient that they were proved to beparticipators in the offences which they were specially employed tosuppress. Mr. Esselen's first step was to appoint as chief detectivean officer borrowed from the Cape Colonial Government, Mr. AndrewTrimble, who in a very little while showed that courage and honestyof purpose could not only effect considerable reforms, but couldprovoke the undisguised and fierce hostility of a very large sectionof the community. The canteen keepers were up in arms; the illicitgold buyers left no stone unturned; the hangers-on of the Governmentlost no opportunity in their campaign against Mr. Esselen and hissubordinate and their reforms. The liveliest satisfaction however wasexpressed by all those whose interest it was to have mattersconducted decently and honestly, and who had no interest in crimeexcept so far as its suppression was concerned. Representation wassecured for the Chamber of Mines upon one of the licensing bodies, and here, too, a very appreciable result followed. During Mr. Esselen's term of office all went well as far as the public wereconcerned, but influences were soon at work to undermine the tworeforming officials. It was represented to the President that Mr. Trimble had once been in the British army; that he was even then asubject of the Queen, and entitled to a pension from the CapeGovernment. The canteen interest on the goldfields, playing upon theprejudices of the Boers, represented that this was unfitting thedignity of the Republic. The President, who was too shrewd to becaught with such chaff, was perfectly ready to support them for thesake of the liquor interest, which for him constitutes a very usefulelectioneering and political agency throughout the country. Mr. Esselen was sent for, and it was represented to him by the Presidentthat the employment of a British subject in such a responsible officeas that of chief detective was repugnant to the burghers. The replywas that it was competent for the Executive to naturalize Mr. Trimbleat once and so remove the objection, the Government having power inspecial cases to dispense with the conditions of the NaturalizationLaw--a power frequently exercised in the case of their Hollanderfriends. The President, in reply, stated that it could not be done, and he appealed to Mr. Esselen to select a man of anothernationality--'a Frenchman, German, or even an American'--this lastbeing a concession wrung from him by Mr. Esselen's soothingsuggestion that the Chief of Police should be familiar with thelanguage of the criminal classes. The hitch was maintained for somemonths, but finally the influences on the side of the Presidentbecame too strong, and when it became clear that the many monthsof laborious work and self-sacrifice which had been given in theinterests of reform were to be nullified by the appointment of acreature who would connive at every breach of the law, Mr. Esselendecided to stand or fall by his subordinate, the result being atriumph for the President. 

In Mr. Esselen's place there was appointed as State Attorney Dr. Coster, a Hollander, who however declined to have anything to do withthe organization of the police; and in Mr. Trimble's stead reappearedthe individual whom he had superseded and whose services had beendispensed with. {15} The triumph of the back-door influences was againcomplete and the blow was a very nasty one to the mining industry. 

Small wonder that at about this time the Uitlander community stoppedall agitation, and that a mood of sullen opposition and discontenttook its place. Hope was absolutely dead as abuse after abuse andscandal after scandal were showered upon them during the Session of1895. Some of the acts of the Volksraad cut at the foundation of allsecurity. In the early days of the Republic the Volksraad members hadtaken it upon themselves to reverse several of the decisions of theHigh Court, and in one case where the Government was being sued forthe fulfilment of a contract the Volksraad had passed a resolutionabsolving the Government from certain terms of the contract. Thedecision of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice Kotzé, was to theeffect that if the Volksraad should take a decision in conflict withan existing law, that law became _ipso facto_ so far modified. Inanother case (the Dom's case) a resolution was passed disabling theaggrieved individual from taking action against the Government; inanother, where the responsibility of the Government for themaintenance of roads had been indicated by a judgment for £1, 000damages, a law was passed in defiance of the conditions of theGrondwet, which stipulates for a period of notice and publication forproposed enactments, absolving the Government from all damages ofthis nature. 

More than once laws were passed with retroactive effect--truly one ofthe grossest abuses possible for a civilized Government. But perhapsthe most startling case of all was that concerning the proclamationof the farm Witfontein. This farm had been proclaimed a publicdigging open for pegging on a certain hour of a certain day. Anunprecedented rush of peggers took place. The Government, fearing ariot and ignoring their obvious duty in the matter of policeprotection and the maintenance of order, issued an illegal noticewithdrawing the proclamation, and decided to give out the claims bymeans of lottery. Numbers of prospectors pegged out claimsnotwithstanding this, and the prospect of legal difficulties beingimminent the Government submitted a measure to the Volksraad, passedalso in defiance of Grondwet provisions, which was broadly to theeffect that all persons who considered that they had claims fordamages against the Government in regard to the farm Witfontein andthe proclamation thereof, had none, and that the Government wasabsolved from all liability in this respect. This enactment was onlypassed after several persons had signified their intention to sue theGovernment. The Raad was in fact becoming familiar with the processof tampering with the Grondwet and members appeared ready to act onthe dictates of their own sweet will without regard to consequencesor laws. 

On several occasions the President and Executive had treated withcontempt the decisions of the High Court, and had practically andpublicly reversed them. There are many instances which it is notnecessary to quote but among the best-known and most instructive onesare the two cases known as the 'Rachmann' and 'April' cases. Rachmannwas an Indian and a British subject, well educated, far bettereducated indeed than the Boer of the country. In following a strayedhorse he had trespassed on the farm of one of the members of theFirst Raad. He was arrested and charged with intent to steal, triedby the owner's brother, who was a Field-cornet (district justice), and sentenced to receive twenty-five lashes and to pay a fine, thesame sentence being meted out to his Hottentot servant whoaccompanied him. Rachmann protested and noted an appeal, stating(which was the fact) that it was not within the power of aField-cornet to inflict lashes, and at the same time he offeredsecurity to the value of £40 pending the appeal. His protests weredisregarded and he was flogged. Not being a native in the sense inwhich the law uses the term--_i. E. _, a member of the aboriginalraces--he could plead that he was not within the jurisdiction of aField-cornet, and there is no doubt that the punishment was inflictedwith full knowledge of its illegality. Rachmann sued Mr. GeorgeMeyer, the Field-cornet in question, in the Circuit Court andobtained judgment and a considerable sum in damages, the presidingjudge, Dr. Jorissen, animadverting with severity upon the conduct ofthe official. Meyer shortly afterwards obtained from Government theamount of his pecuniary loss through the affair, the Presidentstating that he had acted in his official capacity and that theyshould protect him. 

The 'April' case was one in which an unfortunate native named April, having worked for a number of years for a farmer on promise ofcertain payment in cattle and having completed his term, applied forpayment and a permit to travel through the district. On some trivialpretext this was refused him, his cattle were seized, and himself andhis wives and children forcibly retained in the service of the Boer. He appealed to the nearest official, Field-cornet Prinsloo, who actedin a particularly barbarous and unjustifiable manner, so that theChief Justice before whom the case was heard (when April havingenlisted the sympathy of some white people was enabled to make anappeal) characterized Prinsloo's conduct as brutal in the extreme anda flagrant abuse of power perpetrated with the aim of establishingslavery. Judgment was given against Prinsloo with all costs. Within afew days of this decision being arrived at the President addressing ameeting of burghers publicly announced that the Government hadreimbursed Prinsloo, adding, 'Notwithstanding the judgment of theHigh Court, we consider Prinsloo to have been right. '

Actions of this kind have a distinct and very evil influence upon thesupply of native labour. No attempt is made to supply the industrywith natives, or to protect the natives whilst on their way to andfrom the mines. The position became so bad that the Chamber of Minesinstituted a department with a highly-paid official at its head toorganize supply. It would inadequately describe the position to saythat the Government have rendered the Chamber of Mines no assistance. Indeed, it appears as though the officials in the country had of setpurpose hindered in every way possible the work so necessary tothe working of the industry on profitable lines. Agencies wereestablished in all the neighbouring territories. Some of the tribesdeclined to work in the Transvaal on account of the risks ofhighway-robbery and personal violence which they ran _en route_. In one case an effort was made by certain mine-owners to meet thedifficulty by importing a whole tribe--men, women, and children--fromBasutoland and locating them upon an adjacent farm. There is howevera law known as the Plakkerswet, or Squatters' Law, which, framedwith that peculiar cunning for which the Transvaal Governmenthave achieved a reputation, has the appearance of aiming at theimprovement of the native labour supply whilst in effect it does theopposite. It provides that not more than five families may resideupon one farm, the 'family' being an adult male with or without womenand children. Ostensibly the law purports to prevent the squattingtogether of natives in large numbers and in idleness. As a matter offact however the law is not applied in the cases of Boer farmers. From the President downwards the Boers own farms on which hundredsof families are allowed to remain, paying their hut-taxes andcontributing largely to the prosperity of the land-owner. In the caseof the Uitlander however there seems to be a principle at stake, asthe mine-owners above referred to found to their cost. No sooner hadthey located their tribe and provided them with all the conditionsnecessary to comfort than an official came down to them, Plakkerswetin hand, and removed all except the five allowed by law anddistributed them among his friends and relations. The experiment hasnot been repeated. 

Early in 1894 the Chamber of Mines received assurances from theGovernment that if they would prepare a Pass Law which would includeprovisions for the protection of natives, for the regulation oftheir relations with employers, and for their right to travel withinthe country, the Government would give their support to the measureand would endeavour to have it adopted by the Volksraad. TheCommissioner for Native Affairs, General Joubert, admitted hisinability to deal with so complex an affair, and gratefully acceptedthe aid of the Chamber. Such a concession on the part of theGovernment was regarded as highly satisfactory; the law was prepared, everything was explained and agreed to, the support of the Governmentwas promised to the draft law, and it was anticipated that it wouldcome into force during the Session of 1894. Such was not the case. Itremained pigeon-holed throughout 1894 and 1895, and in the last daysof the latter Session the law was passed; but an important omissionoccurred. The Government forgot to create the department to carry outthe law, so that by the end of 1895 the men were no nearer having aworkable law than ever. But reforms when introduced by the TransvaalGovernment, are not usually without an object, although notnecessarily the declared one. An opportunity was here presented tothe President to recognize past services, and he appointed to anoffice which required the highest intelligence experience characterand zeal an individual who had been implicated in two disgracefulcharges and who, having failed to clear himself had been dismissedhis office by the Boer Government not two years previously. There wasbut one explanation forthcoming. The individual in question was apolitical supporter of the President and brother of a member of theExecutive Council. No department has yet been created; but a chiefhas been appointed at a good salary, and the Pass Law has beenproclaimed in one district of the Witwatersrand out of several; sothat a measure which was designed to effect an immense saving inexpense and convenience to the mining industry was by the appointmentof an improper man and the neglect to organize a department renderedquite useless, and by partial promulgation it was made evendetrimental. {16}

It has been aptly said of the Boers--and the present instanceillustrates the truth of the remark--that reform with them seems tobe impossible; because, in the first place, they do not know what todo; in the second place, if they did, they have not got the men to doit; and, in the third place, if they had the men, they show noconception of a duty higher than that of utilizing every opportunityfor personal advantage. {17} To the uninitiated it may well be apuzzle that President Kruger should encourage a system aiming sodirectly at the strangling of an industry which is the mainstay ofthe country; but in order to appreciate his motives it is necessaryto see things from his point of view. He and his party are notdesirous of cheapening the cost of production. He does not aim atenabling the ever-increasing alien population to work lower-grademines, and so double or treble the number of immigrants, even thoughit should profit the revenue of the country. A proposal was once madeto proclaim as a public field the town lands of Pretoria--that is tosay, to enable the public to prospect, and if results warranted, to open up mines on the lands--some thousands of acres inextent--surrounding the town. The President attended the debate inthe Second Raad and violently opposed the measure. The appeal at theend of his address is perhaps as instructive as anything Mr. Krugerhas said. 'Stop and think what you are doing, ' he exclaimed, 'beforeyou throw fresh fields open. Look at Johannesburg. See what a troubleand expense it is to us. We have enough gold and enough gold-seekersin the country already. For all you know there may be anotherWitwatersrand at your very feet. '

In January, 1891, the average wage for native labourers was £2 2s. Per head per month. In 1893 it had risen to £2 18s. 10d. , in 1895 to£3 3s. 6d. In other South African States wages rule from 15s. To 30s. Per month, and the failure to facilitate the introduction of nativesfrom outside and to protect them is largely responsible for the highfigures paid on the Rand. Unquestionably the ill-will of the BoerGovernment is to blame for the consistent neglect of this growingneed of the mines. If decent protection and facilities were given, the wage could be reduced to £1 15s. Per month. The Government has itin its power to give the mines labour at this price, but, as a matterof fact, there is no desire to see the lower-grade mines working. Areduction of £1 a month--that is, to £2 3s. 6d. --would mean anannual saving of £650, 000, and the main reason why nothing has beendone to obtain this reduction is that President Kruger holds that thegold fields are already big enough and that their further extensionwould be a calamity. 

Early in 1895 considerable suspicion and uneasiness werearoused by indications of the growth of the German policy. Thecommercial section of the community was disturbed by reports ofsecret arrangements favouring German importers. Facilities weregiven, and 'through rates' quoted from Hamburg to Johannesburg at areduction which appeared to be greater than any economies in seatransport, coupled with the complete elimination of agency charges, would warrant. The formal opening of the Delagoa Bay Railway by thePresident furnished him with an opportunity to express withsignificant emphasis his friendliness for all things German. At abanquet given in honour of the German Emperor's birthday, January 27, 1895, the President, after eulogizing the old Emperor William, thepresent Emperor, and the loyalty of the Germans in the Transvaal, continued:

The latter I experienced once again at the time of the Kaffir War. One day three or four Germans came to me and said: 'We are indeed notnaturalized, and are still subjects of our Emperor in Germany, but weenjoy the advantages of this country, and are ready to defend it inaccordance with its laws. If your Excellency requires our services, we are willing to march out. ' And they marched. That is the spiritwhich I admire. They were under the laws, they worked under the laws, they obeyed the laws, and they fell in war under the laws. All mysubjects are not so minded. The English, for instance, although theybehave themselves properly and are loyal to the State, always fallback upon England when it suits their purpose. Therefore I shall everpromote the interests of Germany, though it be but with the resourcesof a child, such as my land is considered. This child is now beingtrodden upon by one great Power, and the natural consequence is thatit seeks protection from another. The time has come to knit ties ofthe closest friendship between Germany and the South AfricanRepublic--ties such as are natural between father and child. 

The very considerable increase in the number of Germans, and thepositive statement that a great many men of military training werecoming out for service in the Transvaal, that officers were beingemployed to work up the artillery and to design forts, all tended toincrease the feeling of intense dissatisfaction and uneasiness whichculminated in the outbreak at the close of the year. Dr. Leyds, itwas well known, went on a political mission to Lisbon and to Berlin, and it was stated that large sums had been withdrawn from theTreasury and charged to the secret service fund, the handlingof which was entrusted to this gentleman. Dr. Leyds' personalpopularity, never very great, was at the lowest possible ebb. He wasregarded as the incarnation of Hollanderism--the 'head and front' ofthat detested influence. It was not credited to him in the Transvaal, as it has been elsewhere, that he designed or prompted the policyagainst the Uitlanders. There it is fully appreciated that there isbut one man in it, and that man President Kruger. Dr. Leyds andothers may be and are clever and willing tools. They may lend acidityor offensiveness to a hostile despatch, they may add a twist or twoto a tortuous policy, but the policy is President Kruger's own, themethods are his own, all but the minor details. Much as theHollander-German clique may profit by their alliance with Mr. Kruger, it is not to be believed that he is deceived. He regards them ashandy instruments and ready agents. If they profit by theassociation, they do so at the expense of the accursed Uitlander; butthere is no intention on Mr. Kruger's part to allow Germany orHolland to secure a permanent hold over the Republic, any more thanhe would allow England to increase hers. He has played off oneagainst another with consummate skill. 

Early in his official career Dr. Leyds was guilty of an indiscretionsuch as few would have suspected him of. Shortly after hisappointment as Attorney-General he wrote to a friend in Holland, giving his opinion of the Members of the Executive. His judgment wassound; except of one man. Unfortunately for Dr. Leyds, he quarrelledwith his correspondent; and the letter was of such a nature that, when published, it made extremely unpleasant reading. GeneralsJoubert and Smit, who had been described with admirable truth andcandour, were so enraged that they demanded the instant dismissal ofthe 'conceited young popinjay' who had dared to criticise hismasters. The President, however, who had been described as anignorant, narrow-minded, pig-headed, and irascible old Boerwhom--with the others thrown in--the writer could play with and twistround his finger as he chose, was not disturbed by the criticism. Inreply to appeals for forgiveness on the score of youth, and in spiteof the opposition of his colleagues, President Kruger agreed toretain Dr. Leyds in office, remarking that he was a capable youngfellow and would know better in course of time, and explaining tohim personally that he would keep him there just as long as it suitedhis (the President's) convenience. The association has lasted for tenyears, so it is to be presumed that Dr. Leyds has changed his opinionof President Kruger, and frankly realized his position. 

During the early part of 1896, when the question of the release onbail of the reform prisoners seemed to be of some moment, awell-known Pretoria man, friendly to the Government, called uponPresident Kruger and urged the advisability of allowing the prisonersout on bail, and with considerable lack of tact explained that it waswell known that the President's humane nature inclined him to belenient, but that the malign influence of others was believed to beswaying him in this matter. The old President jumped up in a huff andsaid, 'Ja, ja, ja! You always say it is somebody else! First, it wasJorissen who did everything; then it was Nellmapius; and then it wasLeyds. Well, Jorissen is done for; Nellmapius is dead; Leyds is inEurope--who is it now?'

The President's opinion of himself may be commended as food forreflection to those who think they know everything about the innerworkings of the Transvaal. 

Dr. Leyds' reputation, unfavourable as it had been, was not improvedby the Selati Railway exposure. Rightly or wrongly, in this matter, as in the jobs of the Netherlands Railway and several others ofconsiderable magnitude, he has been held responsible in the publicmind for the financial loss which the Republic sustained. When heleft, ostensibly on a recruiting trip, few--very few--believed thatthe illness was a physical one. It is alleged that a gentlemanon President Faure's staff, on hearing that Dr. Leyds had goneto Berlin to consult a physician, inquired what the ailment was?'Mal de gorge, ' was the reply. 'Ah, ' said the officer, 'mal degorge--diplomatique. ' And that was the opinion in the Transvaal, albeit differently expressed. 

It is impossible within the limits of this volume nor is it at allnecessary to review all the measures which have been passed by theVolksraad and pressed by the Government unnecessarily burdening theUitlanders and unjustifiably assailing their rights; such forinstance as the Election Law, which made it a crime to formCommittees or do any of those things which are regarded everywhere aspart of the legitimate business of elections--thus leaving Mr. Krugerthe sole master of electioneering machinery, namely, the Governmentofficials. The Public Meetings Act was another monstrous infringementof rights. By it a policeman has the right to disperse any gatheringof more than seven persons, if in his opinion it be desirable. Imagine it! Liberty of Speech against the Discretion of a Transvaalpoliceman! But the list would be long, and the tale monotonous. Andas long and equally monotonous would be the list of the measuresproposed or threatened, but fortunately not carried. However, thereview of the period prior to 1896, and the statement of the causesleading to the outbreak, may fitly be brought to a close by therecital of some of the measures under both the above headings whichgrace the records of the Session of 1895. 

As is well known, the Grondwet (the written constitution of thecountry) prescribes certain formalities for the introduction of newlaws. In order to evade the law, and so avoid hostile criticism ofproposed measures, in order, in fact, to prevent the public and eventhe Volksraad members from knowing and studying or explaining anddigesting the intended legislation, it has become the practice of theGovernment to propose and rush through the most radical and importantenactments in the form of amendments or explanations of existinglaws. Prior to 1895 the Transfer Law imposed a tax of 4 per cent. Upon the purchase-price of fixed property; and in the case of salesfor shares a valuation of the property was made by the Governmentdistrict officials, and transfer duty was paid on the amount of thevaluation. This was universally done in the case of claims, whichmust of necessity in most instances be transferred several timesbefore they become registered in the name of the company eventuallyworking them. It was admitted that to pay 4 per cent. Of full valueon every transfer, or to pay 4 per cent. On the nominal value ofground on which years of work would have to be done and large sums ofmoney expended before shareholders could reap one pennyworth ofprofit would be iniquitous. In 1895, however, the Raad thoughtotherwise, and amended the law by the insertion of the words 'in cashor shares' after the words 'purchase-price. ' The result is, thatowners who have acquired claims at great cost, who have paid licensescontinuously on their claims, and who have paid full transfer duty oneach nominal change of ownership, necessary to consolidation intoworkable blocks or groups, are now required to pay again in cash 4per cent. On the total capital allotted in respect of these claims inthe company formed to work them. Members of the Raad, in supportingthis measure, did not hesitate to argue that it was a good law, because the burghers did not sell their farms for shares, but forcash, and it was right to tax those people who deal in shares. 

The sense of insecurity which obtains during the Sessions of the Raadis due scarcely less to the threats which are not fulfilled andattempts which do not succeed, than to what is actually compassed. Adirect tax on gold has more than once been threatened; concessionsfor cyanide, jam, bread, biscuits, and woollen fabrics were allattempted. The revival of an obsolete provision by which theGovernment can claim a royalty on the gold from 'mynpachts, ' ormining leases, has been promised, and it is almost as much expectedas it is dreaded. 

With a monotony which is wearying, but which does not diminish theunfortunate Uitlanders' interest in the subject, the burden of everymeasure falls on the alien. One more instance will suffice. Itillustrates the Hollander-Boer genius for fulfilling the letter andbreaking the spirit of a covenant. It was notified that Governmentwere about to introduce a war tax, and that this tax was to be one of£20 per farm, to be levied in event of war if in the opinion of theGovernment it should be necessary. Much surprise was felt thatanything so unfavourable to the Boers as a tax on farms should beproposed. When the measure came on for discussion it was found tocontain provisions exempting the owner who personally resided on hisfarm, and especially and definitely taxing those farms which areowned by companies, associations, corporations, or partnerships. TheBoer, it is well known, takes no shares in companies, joins noassociations, and has partnership with no one. This law was shelvedin 1895, but has since been passed. {18} It is of a piece with therest. Having sold his farm to the Uitlander, the Boer now proceedsto plunder him: and 'plunder' is not too strong a word when it isrealized that the tax falls, not on the really valuable farms of thehigh veld, which are nearly all owned by individuals, and are alloccupied, but on the undeveloped outlying farms, the rentable valueof which would not on the average suffice to pay the tax! Indeed, onevery large land-owner stated to the Government at the time, that ifthis law were passed and put in force, they might take all hisrentals good and bad in lieu of the tax, as it would pay him better!

These were matters which more immediately concerned persons ofcertain means. There is another matter, however, which very directlyconcerned every individual who had any intention of remaining in thecountry; that is, the matter of education. A dead set had always beenmade by the Transvaal Government against any encouragement of liberaleducation which would involve the use or even recognition of theEnglish language. Indeed, some of the legislators have been known toexpress the opinion that education was not by any means desirable, asit taught the rising generation to look with contempt on the hardyVoortrekkers; and an interesting debate is on record, in whichmembers pointedly opposed the granting of facilities for theeducation of their own women-kind, on the ground that presently thewomen would be found reading books and newspapers instead of doingtheir work, and would soon get to know more than their fathers, husbands, and brothers, and would, as a consequence, quickly get outof hand. It did not seem to occur to these worthy gentlemen that theproper course would be to educate the men. But it would not be fairto take this view as the representative one. On the point of theEnglish language, however, and the refusal to give any facilities forthe education of Uitlander children, the Boer legislature ispractically unanimous. The appalling consequences of allowing theyoung population to grow up in absolute ignorance were realized bythe people of Johannesburg, and efforts were constantly made toinduce the Government to recognize the evil that was growing in theState. The efforts were so entirely unsuccessful that the Uitlandersfound in this as in other cases that nothing would be done unlessthey did it for themselves. A fund was opened, to which very liberaldonations were made. The services of a Director-General were secured, and an Educational Council was elected. A comprehensive scheme ofeducation--in the first place for the Rand district, but intended tobe extended ultimately for the benefit of the whole of the Uitlanderpopulation in the Transvaal--was devised, and it was calculated thatin the course of a few years a fund of close upon half a million ofmoney would be required, and would be raised, in order to placeeducational facilities within the reach of the people. Needless tosay, this did not at all square with the policy of the TransvaalGovernment, and the scheme was looked upon with the utmost disfavour. In order to defeat it, the Superintendent-General of Education, Dr. Mansvelt, a Hollander, who for six years had degraded his high officeto the level of a political engine, felt himself called upon to dosomething--something to trail the red herring across the too hotscent; and he intimated that more liberal measures would beintroduced during the Session of 1895, and in his report proposedcertain amendments to the existing law, which would (in appearance, but, alas! not in fact) improve the condition of the Uitlander. Thefollowing letter appearing in the London _Times_, on October 3, 1896, although dealing with a period some months later than that underreview, explains the position with authority and clearness--aposition which has not been materially altered, except for the worse, during Dr. Mansvelt's _régime_. It will be noted that the last-namedgentleman coupled with his 'liberal' provisions the suggestion thatall schools, except those of the State, should be suppressed. Such asuggestion reveals very clearly the aim of this 'Reform' measure. 

SIR, I trust you will allow me a little space with a view to enable me tocorrect, by the application of a little wholesome fact, the erroneousimpression which has been created in England with reference to theeducation of Uitlanders in the Transvaal by recent crude andill-considered expressions of opinion, notably by Mr. ReginaldStatham and Mr. Chamberlain. 

Mr. ----, in a letter addressed to one of your contemporaries, informed the British public that in view of a liberal Governmentgrant of £4 per head per annum, the Transvaal Uitlander had nothingto complain of in respect to education. As Mr. ---- claims to becompletely informed on Transvaal politics, he can only have beenguilty of a deliberate, if not malicious _suppressio veri_ when heomitted to say that, like most of the legislation of this country, which has for its ostensible object the amelioration of the conditionof the Uitlander, this measure, which looks like munificence at firstsight, has been rendered practically inoperative by the conditionswhich hedge it round. Take, for example, a school of 100 children. Strike out ten as being under age, ten as having been too short atime at school, twenty as suspected of being of Dutch parentage. Outof the sixty that remain suppose fifty satisfy the inspector in theDutch language and history, and you have as your allowance for theyear £200--a sum which is insufficient to pay the Dutch teacheremployed to bring the children up to the required standard in thatlanguage. It is small wonder, then, that most teachers prefer todispense with this Will-o'-the-wisp grant altogether, seeing that theefforts of some to earn it have resulted in pecuniary loss. Theactual sum expended on Uitlander schools last year amounted to £650, or 1s. 10d. A head out of a total expenditure for education of£63, 000, the expenditure per Dutch child amounting to £8 6s. 1d. 

Mr. Chamberlain considers the new educational law for Johannesburg asa subject for gratulation. I should have thought that his recentdealings with Pretoria would have suggested to him as a statesmanthat felicitations upon the passing of a vague and absolutelyundefined measure might possibly be a little too premature. AVolksraad, which only rejected the forcible closing of privateschools by a majority of two votes, is hardly likely to give theExecutive _carte blanche_ to deal with Uitlander education withoutsome understanding, tacit or declared, as to how this power is to bewielded. Be that as it may, nearly two months have elapsed since thepassing of a measure which was to come into operation at once, andnothing has been done. In the meantime, we can learn from theinspired press and other sources that English schools which desireaid under the new law must be prepared to give instruction inStandard V. And upwards, and entirely in the Dutch language. So far, the Superintendent of Education, whether acting under instructions oron his own initiative, has been absolutely immovable on this point, and the much-vaunted law promises to be as much a dead letter as the1s. 10d. Grant. The Johannesburg Council of Education has exerted itsinfluence to secure such an interpretation of the new law as wouldlead to the establishment of schools where Dutch and English childrenmight sit side by side, and so work towards establishing a bond ofsympathy and the eventual blending of the races. The Pretoriaauthorities however refuse to entertain the idea of meeting theUitlander in a conciliatory spirit on anything like equal terms, butwill only treat with us on the footing of master and servant. Acurious and almost inexplicable feature of the situation is the factthat hundreds of Boers are clamouring for the better instruction oftheir children in English, but which is steadfastly refused them. 

I might enlarge on what I have written, and point out the injusticeand the gross system of extortion practised by the Government inmaking Johannesburg pay something like £7 per head for the educationof Dutch children, whilst it has to pay from £5 to £15 per annumfor the education of each child of its own, meanwhile leavinghundreds growing up in the blackest ignorance and crime. Any commentwould, however, lay me open to the charge of bias and partisanship, and I therefore confine myself to the simple statement of a fewfacts, which I challenge anyone to controvert, leaving the reader todraw his own conclusions. 

 I am, sir, yours, etc. , JOHN ROBINSON, _Director-General Johannesburg Educational Council. _

Imagine it! £650 used for the children of those who contributednine-tenths of the £63, 000 spent on education!

The succession of flagrant jobs, the revelation of abusesunsuspected, the point-blank refusal to effect any reasonable reformshad filled the Uitlanders' cup perilously full, and during the latterhalf of 1895 the prospect of any change for the better, except at thecost of fighting, was generally realized to be very poor indeed. 

Trouble came to South Africa with the end of 1895. It very nearlycame earlier. Mention has been made that the Netherlands RailwayCompany practically dictates the relations of the Transvaal with theother States in South Africa by means of its tariffs. The competitionbetween the Cape, Natal and Delagoa lines having become very keen, and the Cape service by superior management and easier gradientshaving secured the largest share of the carrying trade, attempts weremade to effect a different division of profits. Negotiations failedto bring the various parties to terms, and owing to the policy of theNetherlands Railway Company, the Cape Colony and Free State, whoseinterests were common, were in spirit very hostile to the Transvaal, and bitterly resentful of the policy whereby a foreign corporationwas aided to profit enormously to the detriment of the sister SouthAfrican States. After all that the Colonial and Free State Dutch haddone for their Transvaal brethren in days of stress and adversity, itwas felt to be base ingratitude to hinder their trade and tax theirproducts. 

The Cape Colony-Free State line ends at the Vaal River. Thence allgoods are carried over the Netherlands Railway Company's section toJohannesburg, a distance of about fifty miles. In order to handicapthe southern line, an excessive rate was imposed for carriage on thissection. Even at the present time the tariff is 8-1/2d. Per ton permile, as against a rate of about 3d. With which the other two linesare favoured. Notwithstanding this, however, and the obstructionsplaced in the way by obnoxious regulations and deliberate blockingof the line with loaded trucks at Vereeniging, and also the blockingof Johannesburg stations by non-delivery of goods--measures whichresulted sometimes in a delay of months in delivery, and sometimes inthe destruction or loss of the goods--the Southern line more thanheld its own. The block was overcome by off-loading goods at the VaalRiver and transporting them to Johannesburg by mule and ox waggons. 

Mr. Kruger and his Hollander friends were almost beaten when thePresident played his last card. He intimated his intention to closethe Vaal River drifts against over-sea goods, and, by thus preventingthe use of waggons, to force all traffic on to _his_ railways upon_his_ terms; and as the threat did not bring the Colony and FreeState to the proper frame of mind, he closed them. This was aflagrant breach of the London Convention, and as such it was reportedby the High Commissioner to Mr. Chamberlain, and imperialintervention was asked. Mr. Chamberlain replied that it was a mattermost closely affecting the Colony, and he required, before dealingwith it, to have the assurance of the Colonial Government that, inthe event of war resulting, the cost of the campaign would be borne, share and share alike, by the Imperial and Colonial Governments, andthat the latter would transport troops over their lines free ofcharge. Such was the indignation in the Colony at the treatmentaccorded it that the terms were at once agreed to--a trulysignificant fact when it is realized that the Ministry undertakingthis responsibility had been put and was maintained in office by theDutch party, and included in its members the best and most pronouncedAfricander representatives. But Mr. Kruger is not easily 'cornered. 'His unfailing instinct told him that business was meant when hereceived Mr. Chamberlain's ultimatum to open the drifts. ThePresident 'climbed down' and opened them! He has several advantageswhich other leaders of men have not, and among them is that of havinglittle or no pride. He will bluster and bluff and bully whenoccasion seems to warrant it; but when his judgment warns him thathe has gone as far as he prudently can, he will alter his tactics aspromptly and dispassionately as one changes one's coat to suit thevarying conditions of the weather. Mr. Kruger climbed down! It didnot worry him, nor did he take shame that he had failed. He climbeddown, as he had done before in the Stellaland affair, the Banjailandtrek, the commandeering incident, and as he no doubt will do inothers; for he may bluff hard, but it will take a great deal to makehim fight. There is one matter upon which Mr. Kruger's judgment isperfect: he can judge the 'breaking strain' to a nicety. He climbsdown, but he is not beaten; for as surely as the dammed stream willseek its outlet, so surely will the old Dutchman pursue his settledaim. 

War is war, and always bad; but sometimes worse; for the cause isstill a mighty factor, as those may see who contrast the probableeffects upon the people of South Africa of war on the drifts questionwith the actual results of the Jameson raid. 

Footnotes for Chapter II

{04} Among the first notes which poor Colley--brave, wise, generous, and unlucky--wrote after taking office, was one containing thesewords: 'Whether I . . . Shall find that South Africa is to me, as it issaid to be in general, "the grave of all good reputations, " remainsto be seen. '

{05} See Appendix A for the full text of the Pretoria Convention. 

{06} In February, 1898, he was elected for the fourth time. 

{07} For full text of London Convention, see Appendix B. (July, 1899). A very extensive correspondence has passed on the subject ofthe suzerainty. The Transvaal Government now construe the omission ofthe Preamble to the 1881 Convention as the result of an agreement toabolish the suzerainty. Mr. Chamberlain points out that the LondonConvention contains specific and not implied amendments of thePretoria Convention; that the direct request for abolition of thesuzerainty was refused by Lord Derby; that the preamble as thefundamental declaration must be deemed to be in force; and that ifnot, the same reason which is adduced against the continued existenceof the suzerainty would hold good against the independence of theTransvaal, for in the preamble of the 1881 Convention alone is anymention made of either the grant or the reservation. 

{08} Written August, 1896. 

{09} To those who are not familiar with the conditions of thecountry, it will seem incredible that the legislative body could be'fooled' on such a subject. The extracts from the newspaper reportsof the Raad's proceedings, printed in Appendix D of this volume, willhelp them to understand and believe. 

{10} The above has been brought up to date for publication, July, 1899. 

{11} Except on the goldfields, where the appointments are madeby Government. 

{12} For Volksraad records on this subject see Appendix C. 

{13} The decision of the High Court was given in November, 1896, infavour of the combined companies on all points, and the patents werethus declared to be invalid!

{14} During the session of '96 the Volksraad decided to put thebewaarplaatsen up for public auction, the proceeds of the sale to bedivided equally between the Government and the original owners of thefarms on which the bewaarplaatsen had been granted. The _alleged_reason for this decision is that the areas in question are immenselyvaluable, and the State and the owners should profit by them, whilstthe companies should be afforded an opportunity of acquiring them ata fair price. The _real_ reason is that the companies had refusedto be blackmailed further; and the 'defence' funds not beingforthcoming, the gentlemen of the back-stairs had introduced theingenious arrangement safeguarding the original owners' rights, having previously 'arranged' with the same owners. The excuse thatthe areas are too valuable to be given away to the companies is asillogical and ridiculous as the excuse that the Uitlanders are toonumerous to justify the granting of the franchise now. When thequestions were first raised there were neither great values nor largenumbers in existence. They were questions of principle and justice;and the fact that 'values' and 'numbers' have grown during the yearsof struggle in no way justifies the course taken, but rather showsvery clearly the magnitude of the injustice done during the years ofunjustifiable denial. 

This decision shows with admirable clearness how the Uitlander faresat the hands of the Government. There were, in the last stage of theaffair, four parties concerned: the Government, who are by lawexpressly debarred from selling claims (except in case of overduelicenses), and are obliged to allot them for the consideration ofspecified license fees only; the owners of the farms, who aresimilarly debarred and are compensated in other ways for the throwingopen of their farms; the 'applicants, ' who have been describedelsewhere; and the surface-owners, the mining companies, who were inpossession. Only one of these parties had the slenderest claim tocompensation--namely, the companies, who must inevitably be disturbedin the possession of the surface by allowing others to work on orunder it. But they get nothing; whilst the Government and the 'owner'(both of whom had years before derived the fullest profit allowed bylaw from these areas in the form of licenses), and the 'applicants'(who have allied themselves with the 'owners'), divide ascompensation the proceeds of the auction!

{15} (July, 1899. ) This individual has been again removed--thistime by the present State Attorney, Mr. Smuts. 

{16} (July, 1899. ) Provision was made for the costs of thisdepartment by doubling the pass fee. In the early days ofJohannesburg as soon as it became evident that hospital accommodationwas necessary, application was made to the Government for a site(which was granted on the hill then outside the town), and for somemonetary assistance. A fund was also publicly subscribed and thehospital built. For the maintenance of the hospital two plans wereadopted: one, the collection of funds once a year, _i. E. _, HospitalSaturday, a source which has yielded steadily between £2, 000 and£3, 000; two, having in view the immense number of native cases whichrequired treatment and the extent to which a native is responsiblefor unsanitary conditions, it was proposed to impose upon them a feeof 1s. Per month for their passes, the proceeds of this to be devotedentirely to the hospital. For several years this continued to yieldsufficient for the purpose. The Transvaal Government, althoughaccepting the plan proposed by the Uitlanders and for a considerabletime carrying it out faithfully, did not establish the rightpermanently but adopted the formality of voting the proceeds of thepass-fee year by year. There came a year when the Raad in its wisdomdecided that this source of revenue was too precarious for so worthyan object as the hospital, and they decided to vote instead an annualsubsidy of £30, 000. It was then known that the fees of the past yearhad amounted to over £40, 000 and there was every prospect of steadyannual increase. This explains why a seemingly generous subsidy bythe Government does not meet with that hearty recognition to which itis apparently entitled. When a Pass Department was proposed, theGovernment inquired how it was suggested to maintain it. The Chamberof Mines proposed to raise the pass fee from 1s. To 2s. Per month, the extra shilling to be devoted entirely to the administration ofthe Pass Law. With the experience of the hospital shilling in mindparticular care was taken to have the agreement minuted and confirmedin writing. Nevertheless, it transpired in the evidence given at theIndustrial Commission that the department was being run at a cost ofslightly over £12, 000 a year, whilst the proceeds of the shillingreached the respectable total of £150, 000 a year. The Government, therefore, by a breach of agreement, make £138, 000 a year out of thepass fund, and £120, 000 a year out of the hospital fund; and themining industry suffers in the meantime through maladministration inthe department, and are doubly taxed in the sense that the companieshave been obliged to establish and maintain at their own cost otherhospitals all along the reef. It is not suggested that the companiesshould not provide hospitals, the point is that having established afund, which although nominally paid by the natives really has to bemade up to them in wages, they were entitled to the benefit of thatfund. 

{17} The story is told of two up-country Boers who applied to the

President for appointments, and received the reply, 'What _can_ Ido for you? All the important offices are filled, and you are noteducated enough to be clerks!'

{18} (July, 1899. ) The law has been declared by the law officersof the Crown to be a breach of the London Convention. 

CHAPTER III. 

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT. 

Having failed in their constitutional attempts to secure a reasonablevoice in the government, or any redress of their grievances, therecame the time when men's thoughts naturally turned to the lastexpedient--force. Up to and so late as the Volksraad Session of 1895a constitutional agitation for rights had been carried on by theTransvaal National Union, a body representing the unenfranchisedportion of the population. Of its members but few belonged to theclass of wealthy mine and land owners: they had so far abstained fromtaking any part in a political organization which was viewed withdislike and suspicion by the Government and the great majority of theBoers. It has been asserted by a few Progressive members of the Raadthat many of the Boers were themselves opposed to the policy adoptedtowards the newcomers; but, whilst this may be to some extent true, it is more than questionable whether any of the burghers were willingto concede a share in the power of government, although it is certainthat great numbers would not have taken active steps against theUitlanders but for the invasion by a foreign force. Any extending ofthe franchise means to the great majority of the Boers aproportionate loss of independence. 

When the matter of the Independence of the Republic is discussed itmust not be forgotten that independence conveys something to theBoers which is radically different from what it means to anyone else. That the State should continue for ever to be independent andprosperous--a true republic--would be mockery heaped on injury if theabsolute domination by the Boer party should cease; and when theparrot-like cry of 'The Independence of the State is threatened' israised again and again _à propos_ of the most trivial measures andincidents, this idea is the one that prompts it. Instancesinnumerable could be quoted seemingly illustrating the Boerlegislators' inability to distinguish between simple measures ofreform and justice, and measures aimed at undermining the State'sstability and independence. It is not stupidity! It is that the Boerrealizes at least one of the inevitable consequences of reform--thatthe ignorant and incapable must go under. Reform is the death-knellof his oligarchy, and therefore a danger to the independence of theState--as he sees it. Until the European people who have latelybecome so deeply concerned in Transvaal affairs realize how widelydivergent are the two interpretations of 'Independence, ' they willnot have begun to understand the Transvaal Question. 

The National Union did not represent any particular class in theUitlander community. It was formed of men drawn from all classes whofelt that the conditions of life were becoming intolerable, and thatsomething would have to be done by the community to bring aboutreforms which the legislature showed no signs of voluntarilyintroducing. 

When it is said that it consisted of men drawn from all classes, thequalification should be made that the richer classes, that is to say, the capitalists of the country, were very meagrely if at allrepresented. Many efforts had been made to enlist the sympathies ofthe capitalists, and to draw them into the movement, but the 'bigfirms, ' as they were styled, for a very long time refused to take anypart whatever, preferring to abstain entirely rather than associatethemselves with a definite agitation. They pleaded, and no doubtfairly, that in case of failure they with their vested interestswould be the ones to suffer, while in the event of success they wouldnot benefit in a greater degree than the individuals who had littleor no material stake. One by one however they were drawn into thepolitical movement to the extent of supplying funds for carrying onthe reform agitation, or of giving monetary support to those who werestimulating and organizing the Progressive party among the Boers. There can be no doubt that prior to 1895 the wealthier men withoutexception refused to consider the possibility of violent measures. It was only when they realized that the Boer party were determinedlyhostile--organizing very large encroachments upon the privileges ofthe Uitlanders and designing fresh burdens to be borne by them--andwhen it became clear that the dangers threatening as a result oftheir own supine attitude were worse than any disfavour with whichthey might be viewed on account of political action, that they beganto take an active part with others in the agitation for reform. Itwas not until the Volksraad in the Session of 1895 revealed theirreal policy and their fixed determination to effect no reform thatmen began to talk of the possibility of revolutionary measuresbecoming necessary. The subject once mooted was frequently discussed, and once discussed became familiar; and the thing which a few monthsbefore had been regarded as out of the bounds of possibility came tobe looked upon as a very probable contingency. The extraordinary boomin shares, land, and all kinds of property, which lasted throughoutthe year, no doubt operated against the maturing of this feeling, butit nevertheless continued to grow. The most dissatisfied section ofthe Rand was, naturally enough, that one which included the SouthAfrican Uitlander. These men, born in South Africa, or having spentthe best years of their lives there, felt extremely bitter againstthe Boer Government, and were moved by feelings which were not in anyway connected with considerations of material gain. With them wereclosely associated men of all nationalities who had determined tomake their homes in the Transvaal, and these formed the class whichhas been disparagingly referred to as 'the political element, ' butwhich the experience of every country shows to be the backbone of anation. They were in fact the men who meant to have a hand in thefuture of South Africa. After them came the much larger class whoseinterest in the reforms was based mainly upon the fact that theysuffered from the abuses and over-taxation of the Government. 

For several years a very strong feeling against the capitalists hadruled in Johannesburg. Men who thoroughly knew the Boer hadprophesied and continued throughout to prophesy that absolutelynothing would be done to improve the conditions, and that thecapitalists might as well throw in their lot with the general publicearly in the day as be forced to do so later, after spending theirthousands in fruitless efforts for reform, and after committingthemselves to a policy which would be regarded as selfish, pusillanimous, and foolish. The moneyed men no doubt occupied a veryprominent and powerful position. They were constantly besought bythe Reform leaders to side with them; they were looked to by theProgressive Party in the Boer camp to aid reform by peaceful measuresonly, to exercise all their influence towards preventing rash orviolent measures being taken by the more excited party, and to trustto time and patience to achieve those results which they were allhonestly desirous of bringing about; and they were approached, as hasbeen stated, by the President and his party when moments of dangerarrived, and when it was felt that their influence could be usedtowards the preservation of peace, --as witness the Loch incident. 

'It is no crime to be a capitalist, ' said one commentator on the lateevents, and neither is it necessary to attribute to this section ofthe community motives of patriotism to justify their association withthe Reform movement. It is not intended to suggest that the men whodid associate themselves eventually with it were not moved by anyhigher consideration than that of protecting their interests--in manycases a far larger view than this was taken; but it may beasked, --assuming that the capitalists were not moved by higherconsiderations, --What is there in their position which should debarthem from endeavouring to introduce the reforms which would benefitthem only equally with every other honest man in the community?

Most of the wealthy houses in the Transvaal are either offshoots ofor have supporting connections with firms in England or on theContinent. Between them and their principals much correspondence hadtaken place on the political situation. As far as these houses wereconcerned, it was impossible for them to enter upon any movementwithout the consent of their European associates. For this reason theReform movement, as it eventually took place, has in some waysthe appearance of and has very frequently been stigmatized as anorganization planned and promoted outside the Transvaal. The fact isthat Mr. Alfred Beit, of the firm of Wernher, Beit and Co. , London, and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, managing director of the ConsolidatedGoldfields, may be regarded as the chiefs to whom the ultimatedecision as to whether it was necessary from the capitalistic pointof view to resort to extreme measures was necessarily left. Each ofthese gentlemen controls in person and through his businessassociates many millions of money invested in the Transvaal; each ofthem was, of course, a heavy sufferer under the existing conditionsaffecting the mining industry, and each, as a business man, musthave been desirous of reform in the administration. Mr. Beit actedin concert with Mr. Lionel Phillips, of H. Eckstein and Co. , theJohannesburg representatives of Wernher, Beit and Co. Mr. Rhodes wasrepresented by his brother, Colonel Francis Rhodes, and Mr. J. H. Hammond, of the Consolidated Goldfields Company in Johannesburg. Mr. George Farrar, another very large mine-owner, who joined a littlelater than the others, with the gentlemen above named, may beconsidered to have represented the capitalist element in the earlierstages of the Reform movement. The other elements were represented byMr. Charles Leonard, the chairman of the National Union, and one ortwo other prominent members of that body. 

It is impossible to say with whom the idea of the movement, includingthe arrangement with Dr. Jameson, originated. Perhaps it germinatedwhen Dr. Jameson read the life of Clive! Probably it was the resultof discussion, and no one man's idea. At any rate arms and ammunitionwere purchased, and arrangements were made by which they should besmuggled into the country concealed in machinery or gold-miningappliances. During the month of November Messrs. Leonard and Phillipswent to Capetown to see Mr. Rhodes, in order to assure themselvesfinally as to the course which was to be pursued. The position of Mr. Rhodes in the matter was recognised by them to be a difficult one. Whilst as the managing director of the Consolidated Goldfields hehad as much right as any other man interested in the Transvaalwould have to concern himself in a movement of this nature, his rightto act in his capacity of managing director of the Chartered Companywould depend entirely on the nature of the part which he professedto play; but his position as Prime Minister of the Colony made thealready difficult position much more complicated. Realizing this, Messrs. Leonard and Phillips acting on behalf of the othersdetermined to have a perfectly clear understanding and to ascertainfrom Mr. Rhodes definitely what were his objects in associatinghimself with the movement. The matter was discussed at Mr. Rhodes'house, and the report given by the two deputies to their colleagueson their return was that Mr. Rhodes frankly admitted that he had twoobjects in view: one was to obtain an amelioration of the conditionssuch as he was entitled to claim as representing an enormous amountof capital invested in the Transvaal; the other object is bestdescribed by Mr. Leonard. 'We read to him, ' said that gentleman whenreporting to his comrades the result of his visit, 'the draft of ourdeclaration of rights. He was leaning against the mantelpiece smokinga cigarette, and when it came to that part of the document in whichwe refer to Free Trade in South African products he turned roundsuddenly, and said: "That is what I want. That is all I ask of you. The rest will come in time. We must have a beginning, and that willbe the beginning. If you people get your rights, the Customs Union, Railway Convention, and other things will all come in time. " He thenadded that we must take our own time about this movement, and that hewould keep Jameson on the frontier as long as it was necessary as amoral support, and also to come to our assistance should we getourselves into a tight place. We asked him how he hoped to recouphimself for his share of the expense in keeping Jameson's force onthe border, which should be borne by us jointly. He said that seeingthe extent of his interests in the country, he would be amply repaidby the improvement in the conditions which it was intended toeffect. '

It has since been suggested that the object of the movement was to'steal the country' and to annex it to Rhodesia, in order torehabilitate the Chartered Company. The suggestion is too ludicrousfor serious discussion. It must be obvious to anyone that thepersons most concerned in the movement, and whose interests lay inthe Rand, would be the very last to consent to any such scheme. Thereappears to be no conceivable basis upon which such an arrangementcould have been entered into, and it is quite clear that no sensiblebusiness man having interests in a rich country in a comparativelyadvanced state of development would consent to share that certaintywith a new country such as Rhodesia, the value of which, howeverpromising, has still to be proved. Notwithstanding the ludicrousnature of the charge, it is quite certain that the Boers have adeep-rooted conviction of its truth. 

The arrangements with Dr. Jameson were made with him in person. During the month of September he visited Johannesburg, and it wasthen agreed that he should maintain a force of some 1, 500 mounted menfully equipped, a number of Maxims, and some field artillery; that hewas, in addition to this, to have with him 1, 500 spare rifles and aquantity of spare ammunition; and that about 5, 000 rifles, threeMaxim guns, and 1, 000, 000 rounds of ammunition were to be smuggledinto Johannesburg. It was calculated that in the town itself therewould be, perhaps, 1, 000 rifles privately owned. Thus, in the eventof a junction of forces being effected, Johannesburg would be able tocommand about 9, 000 armed men, with a fair equipment of machine-gunsand cannon. Nor was this all, for on the original plan it wasintended to seize the fort and magazines at Pretoria. Andcircumstances favoured the plans of the Johannesburg men. Thesurrounding wall of the fort, a mere barrack, had been removed on oneside in order to effect some additions; there were only about 100 menstationed there, and all except half a dozen could be counted on asbeing asleep after 9 p. M. There never was a simpler sensational taskin the world than that of seizing the Pretoria fort--fifty men couldhave done it. But there was more to be done than the mere taking. Inthe fort there were known to be some 10, 000 rifles, ten or twelvefield-pieces, and 12, 000, 000 rounds of small-arm ammunition; and itwas designed to seize the fort and the railway on the night of theoutbreak and, by means of one or two trains, to carry off as much ofthe material as possible and destroy the rest. 

Association with Dr. Jameson as the leader of an invading force isthe one portion of their programme which the Reform leaders find itextremely difficult to justify. As long as the movement was confinedto the Uitlanders resident in the Transvaal the sympathy of SouthAfrica and indeed of the world was with them. It was the alliancewith the foreign invader which forfeited that sympathy. That theeventual intention of the Reformers was only to call upon Dr. Jamesonin case they found themselves attacked by and unable to cope with theBoers is a fact, but it is only fair to Dr. Jameson to note that thiswas a modification of the original arrangement by which both forceswere to act simultaneously and in concert, --when the signal should begiven from Johannesburg. 

On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's second visit to Johannesburg, towards the end of November, the following letter of invitation waswritten and handed to him:

_To Dr. Jameson. _

 JOHANNESBURG. {19}

DEAR SIR, The position of matters in this State has become so critical that weare assured that at no distant period there will be a conflictbetween the Government and the Uitlander population. It is scarcelynecessary for us to recapitulate what is now matter of history;suffice it to say that the position of thousands of Englishmen andothers is rapidly becoming intolerable. Not satisfied with making theUitlander population pay virtually the whole of the revenue of thecountry while denying them representation, the policy of theGovernment has been steadily to encroach upon the liberty of thesubject, and to undermine the security for property to such an extentas to cause a very deep-seated sense of discontent and danger. Aforeign corporation of Hollanders is to a considerable extentcontrolling our destinies, and in conjunction with the Boer leadersendeavouring to cast them in a mould which is wholly foreign to thegenius of the people. Every public act betrays the most positivehostility, not only to everything English, but to the neighbouringStates. 

Well in short the internal policy of the Government is such as tohave roused into antagonism to it, not only practically the wholebody of Uitlanders but a large number of the Boers; while itsexternal policy has exasperated the neighbouring States, causing thepossibility of great danger to the peace and independence of thisRepublic. Public feeling is in a condition of smouldering discontent. All the petitions of the people have been refused with a greater orless degree of contempt; and in the debate on the Franchise petition, signed by nearly 40, 000 people, one member challenged theUitlanders to fight for the rights they asked for, and not a singlemember spoke against him. Not to go into details, we may say that theGovernment has called into existence all the elements necessary forarmed conflict. The one desire of the people here is for fair play, the maintenance of their independence, and the preservation ofthose public liberties without which life is not worth living. TheGovernment denies these things, and violates the national sense ofEnglishmen at every turn. 

What we have to consider is, What will be the condition of thingshere in the event of a conflict? Thousands of unarmed men, women andchildren of our race will be at the mercy of well-armed Boers, whileproperty of enormous value will be in the greatest peril. We cannotcontemplate the future without the gravest apprehensions. All feelthat we are justified in taking any steps to prevent the shedding ofblood, and to insure the protection of our rights. 

It is under these circumstances that we feel constrained to call uponyou to come to our aid, {20} should a disturbance arise here. Thecircumstances are so extreme that we cannot but believe that you andthe men under you will not fail to come to the rescue of people whowill be so situated. We guarantee any expense that may reasonably beincurred by you in helping us, and ask you to believe that nothingbut the sternest necessity has prompted this appeal. 

 CHARLES LEONARD. LIONEL PHILLIPS. FRANCIS RHODES. JOHN HAYS HAMMOND. GEORGE FARRAR. 

The letter was drafted by Mr. Charles Leonard, and was signed then byfour out of the five signatories, the fifth signature being addedsome weeks later in Cape Town. It was not dated, and was to be usedonly privately and in case of necessity for the purpose of excusingDr. Jameson to the directors of the Chartered Company and theImperial authorities in the course which it was intended to take. 

Various plans were discussed, and even dates were provisionallyarranged. The first arrangement agreed to was that Dr. Jameson shouldstart two days before the intended outbreak in Johannesburg. Thiswas agreed to for the time being, but subsequent discussion convincedthe leaders that there were the gravest objections to such a course, and it was therefore decided that Dr. Jameson should be notifiedto start from his camp on the same night as the outbreak inJohannesburg. The dates of December 28 and January 4 were in turnprovisionally decided upon, but the primary condition of thesearrangements was that under no circumstances should Dr. Jameson movewithout receiving the word from the Johannesburg party. 

With reference to the question of going out to meet Dr. Jameson orgiving him assistance, the only thing that was discussed was that anofficers' patrol should be sent out to meet him, to escort him to hiscamp. There was no doubt entertained as to the ability of Dr. Jamesonand the force which it was believed he would command to come inwithout assistance or the arrangement would never have been made. Theidea of the association with him was, of course, that he shouldassist the Reformers--not they assist him; and the proposal regardingthe officers' patrol was one to which he only consented afterscouting the notion of any co-operation. 

During the weeks which followed the conclusion of the arrangementconsiderable dissatisfaction was felt at the very slow progress madein obtaining arms. The number originally agreed to was deemed to besufficient but no more; and when it was first found that it would notbe possible to obtain this number but that a few hundreds less wouldhave to be accepted, doubts were freely expressed as to the wisdom ofproceeding until a sufficient supply had been obtained. When on twosubsequent occasions it was again notified that still a few hundredless would have to be accepted, some members of the Reform Party werevery emphatic in their objections to proceeding any further untilthey should be satisfied that the undertakings upon the strength ofwhich they had entered upon the arrangement would be faithfullyadhered to. On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's last visit it had beenextracted from him that instead of 1, 500 men he would probably startwith from 800 to 1, 000. These discrepancies and alterations causedthe liveliest dissatisfaction in the minds of those who realizedthat they were entering upon a very serious undertaking; but althoughthe equipment seemed poor, reliance was always placed on the takingof Pretoria Fort. That at any rate was a certainty, and it wouldsettle the whole thing without a blow; for Johannesburg would haveeverything, and the Boers would have rifles, but neither ammunitionnor field-guns. Without doubt the Pretoria arsenal was the key of theposition, and it is admitted by Boer and alien alike that it laythere unguarded, ready to be picked up, and that nothing in the worldcould have saved it--except what did!

On or about December 19, Messrs. Woolls-Sampson and A. Bailey, twoJohannesburg men concerned in the movement, who had been incommunication with Mr. Rhodes and others in Cape Town, arrived inJohannesburg, and indicated clearly that the question as to whichflag was to be raised was either deemed to be a relativelyunimportant one or one concerning which some of the parties had notclearly and honestly expressed their intentions. In simple truth, itappeared to be the case that Dr. Jameson either thought that theJohannesburg reformers were quite indifferent on the subject of theflag, or assumed that the provisions for the maintenance of theTransvaal flag were merely talk, and that the Union Jack would behoisted at once. Nothing was further from the truth. The Reform Partyin Johannesburg included men to whom the Union Jack is as dear astheir own heart's blood, but it also included many others to whomthat flag does not appeal--men of other nationalities and otherassociations and other sympathies. It included--perhaps the strongestelement of all--those men whose sympathies were naturally and moststrongly all for British rule, which they believed to be the best inthe world, but whose judgment showed them that to proclaim that rulewould be to defeat the very objects they honestly had in view, andwho would have regarded the change of flag at the last moment as anunprincipled deception of those comrades who had been induced toco-operate for reform and not for annexation. It had been repeatedlyand emphatically stated that the object was not to deprive the Boerof his independence or the State of its autonomy, but to alter thesystem of government in such a way as, first to obtain betterment ofthe economic conditions which affect everyone, and afterwards toinduce a policy more in accordance with the general South Africansentiment--in fact to get the Transvaal into line with the otherSouth African States, in the same way for instance as the Free Statehad shown itself disposed to go. It is but poor work explainingfailure, yet it must surely be permissible that something shouldbe said for those who alone have had no hearing yet. And it is inthe minds of the Reformers that the professions of their 'realintentions' regarding the flag made by Dr. Jameson and Mr. Rhodesmight appropriately have been made before the raid, instead ofafterwards when all was over. The regard for definite pledges, whichin the Reformers was described as merely an excuse for backing out, would, if it had been observed by all, have made a sickening fiascoimpossible. 

No sooner had a doubt been raised on the subject of the flag than atrusted emissary was despatched to inquire from Mr. Rhodes themeaning of this tampering with one of the fundamental conditions ofthe agreement. The messenger returned on Christmas morning, and at alargely-attended meeting of the ringleaders stated that he had seenMr. Rhodes, and had received from him the assurance that it was allright about the flag: no question or doubt had been raised on thesubject. In returning to Capetown however in company with Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, he learned from that gentleman that it was by nomeans all right, and gathered that it was assumed that the provisionabout maintaining the Transvaal flag was so much talk necessary tosecure the adhesion of some doubtful people. The announcement wasreceived with the gravest dissatisfaction. Several of the leading menstated emphatically that nothing would induce them to take part inthe movement unless the original arrangement was loyally adhered to. In consequence of this it was resolved to despatch Messrs. CharlesLeonard and F. H. Hamilton to see Mr. Rhodes and to obtain from him adefinite guarantee that in the event of their availing themselves ofDr. Jameson's help under any conditions the latter would abide by thearrangements agreed upon. 

It was then thought that a week would be sufficient time in which toclear up the flag question and complete preparations. It wasdecided to call a big public meeting for the night of Monday, January6, not with the intention of holding the meeting, but as a blind tocover the simultaneous rising in Johannesburg and seizing of thearsenal in Pretoria on the night of Saturday, January 4. With this inmind it was arranged to publish, in the form of a manifesto, {21} theaddress which Mr. Charles Leonard had prepared for the meeting. 

Among the Reformers there had always been a considerable section whoregarded the alliance or arrangement with Dr. Jameson as a verydoubtful advantage. It was this section which strongly andsuccessfully opposed the suggestion that he should start before anactual outbreak. The difference of opinion was not such as to causedivision in the ranks, but yet sufficient to keep alive discussion asto how the common aim could be achieved without risk of thecomplications which external aid in the initial stages would be sureto cause. To this feeling of doubt was added a sense of distrust whenDr. Jameson's importunity and impatience became known; and when thequestion of the flag was raised there were few, if any, among thoseconcerned in the movement who did not feel that the tail was tryingto wag the dog. The feeling was so strong that many were prepared toabandon the whole scheme and start _de novo_ rather than continue anundertaking in which it looked as though they were being fooled. Hence the despatch of Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton on Christmas Day. 

Confidence in their power to control Dr. Jameson and direct themovement, as they considered they had the right and ability to do, had been so shaken in the reformers that as soon as Messrs. Leonardand Hamilton had been sent they began to discuss a complete change ofplans, and awaited only the reply from Capetown before taking thefirst steps in the prosecution of the new programme. The plan mostfavoured was that the importation and distribution of arms should becontinued as speedily and as secretly as possible, that, instead ofan invading force, as many armed and trained men as could be obtainedshould be brought in, nominally as mechanics or men seekingemployment on the mines, that the public meeting called forJanuary 6 should be held and made as large and demonstrative aspossible, and a demand made to the Volksraad to grant the redress ofthe grievances complained of, and, failing reasonable concessions, that they should rise in arms and at the same time appeal to England, as the paramount Power, or to the other South African Governments, to mediate and so avert civil war. It was believed, and with muchreason, that the Boers, knowing, as they then inevitably would, thata considerable quantity of arms and ammunition had been smuggled in, and knowing also that the sentiment of South Africa, including theFree State, was all in favour of considerable concessions to theUitlanders, would have hesitated to take the initiative againstJohannesburg, and would either have yielded to the pressure of thegeneral South African opinion and have accepted the mediation of theHigh Commissioner, or would have offered considerable reforms. TheKruger party, it was well known, would proceed to any extreme ratherthan concede anything to the Uitlanders; but at that time themajority of the Boers were opposed to the Kruger policy of favouringthe Hollanders and Germans to the exclusion of all other Uitlanders, and this majority would not have consented to measures calculated toembroil them with the people who had made their country prosperous, and even to imperil the very existence of the State, whilst analternative course so easy as the one presented lay open to them. 

On the day following the despatch of Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton toCapetown it was decided to send messengers to Dr. Jameson toemphatically prohibit any movement on his part, also to explain tohim the position of affairs in Johannesburg with reference to theflag, and above all to impress upon him the condition ofunpreparedness. Major Heany was sent by train viâ Kimberley, and inorder to facilitate his travelling a telegram was sent to Mr. Rhodesin Capetown asking him to arrange for a special train, andacquainting him with the purpose of the trip. Captain Holden was senton horseback across country to Pitsani. Both gentlemen carried themost definite instructions to Dr. Jameson on no account to move. Bothgentlemen have since stated that they delivered the messages inword and in spirit absolutely as they were given to them inJohannesburg, and that they carried no private messages whatever fromany individual member of the Committee in any way conflicting withthe purport of the official message with which they were charged. 

On the Thursday, Friday, and Saturday telegrams and messages werereceived from Dr. Jameson, all revealing impatience and a desire ifnot an intention to disregard the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Replies were sent to him and to the Capetown agents protestingagainst the tone adopted, urging him to desist from the endeavour torush the Johannesburg people as they were pushing matters on to thebest of their ability and hoped for a successful issue withoutrecourse to violent measures, and stating emphatically that thedecision must be left entirely in the hands of Johannesburg asagreed, otherwise there would be certain disaster. Besides what wouldbe regarded as the official expressions and messages of theJohannesburg people, several individual members of the partytelegraphed to Dr. Jameson informing him of the position and addingtheir personal advice and testimony. The probability of achievingsuccess without firing a shot was referred to in the sense of a mostsatisfactory prospect. It did not occur to any one among theJohannesburg party that it was this prospect that moved Dr. Jamesonto start. That idea is of later birth. 

On Sunday morning, at about ten o'clock, two telegrams of importancewere received. The first was from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard, tothe following effect: 'We have received perfectly satisfactoryassurance from Cecil Rhodes, but a misunderstanding undoubtedlyexists elsewhere. In our opinion, continue preparations, butcarefully, and without any sort of hurry, as entirely fresh departurewill be necessary. In view of changed condition Jameson has beenadvised accordingly. ' Portions of this message were in code. It leftCapetown at 2. 20 p. M. On Saturday, the 28th, and was received onSunday at about ten o'clock. The second telegram was one from Dr. Jameson to his brother, Mr. S. W. Jameson, and had been despatched atabout the same time. It was in the Bedford-McNeil Code, and was muchmutilated--so much so that it was thought to have been purposelydone in the telegraph office in order to obscure the meaning. Oneexpression was clear, however, and that was: 'I shall start withoutfail to-morrow night. ' It concluded with the words: 'Inform Dr. Wolff--distant cutting. He will understand. '

The words 'distant cutting' did not occur in any code-book. Dr. Jameson states that they were words privately agreed upon between himand Dr. Wolff. The telegram was shown to Dr. Wolff as soon as hecould be found, but he declared himself unable to throw any lightwhatever upon it. It was however clear from the message that onSaturday afternoon it had been Dr. Jameson's intention to disregardthe wishes of the Committee, and to start on Sunday night, and thetelegram impressed the recipients more than ever with the wisdom oftheir action in sending the messengers to Capetown and to Pitsani toinsist upon no further steps being taken. It is of little consequencewhat the words 'distant cutting' really meant, or whether they were, or should have been, understood by any of the parties. Major Heanyand Captain Holden, it was known, could not have reached Dr. Jamesonat the time the message was despatched, and therefore no moreimportance was attached to this than to the other impatienttelegrams. 

It was assumed that, on receiving the emphatic messages sent throughMajor Heany and Captain Holden, Dr. Jameson would realize theseriousness of the position, and would, in fact, abide by thearrangements made with him. Nor was this all. It was also clear thatthe telegram of Mr. Rhodes to which it was inferred reference wasmade in the concluding words of Messrs. Hamilton's and Leonard'swire--'Jameson has been advised accordingly'--could not have reachedDr. Jameson at the time his telegram to his brother was despatched. It was part of the instructions to Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard thatany communications which they might desire to make to Dr. Jamesonshould pass through Mr. Cecil Rhodes in order to ensure due regardbeing paid to them. There was therefore no doubt in the minds of theJohannesburg men that during Saturday afternoon--that is to say, morethan twenty-four hours before he proposed moving--he must havereceived a wire forbidding him to move. 

The facts here given were sufficient to warrant the belief that allthat was necessary had been done to prevent any movement. But morereassuring than all precautions was the conviction that Dr. Jameson, no matter how much he might 'bluff' in order to force immediateaction, would never be guilty of so gross a breach of faith as tostart in defiance of the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Extremedissatisfaction of course prevailed in the minds of a good many whenthey learned of the efforts made by him to force their hands, andthis feeling was intensified by the report brought in by Dr. Wolff, who had just returned from seeing Dr. Jameson at Pitsani. Dr. Wolffhad arrived at Pitsani on the previous Tuesday, and was then greetedby Dr. Jameson with the remark that he had 'as nearly as possiblestarted for Pretoria last night. ' It was felt that this might appearto be a very fine and dashing thing for a party of men well armed andtrained and able to take care of themselves, but that it betrayedgreat indifference to his pledges, as well as to the fate of hisassociates, who as he knew perfectly well had not even the arms todefend themselves from the consequences of any precipitate action onhis part, and who had moreover the responsibility for the control andprotection of unarmed Johannesburg. 

The feeling among the Reformers on Sunday, the 29th, was one ofconsiderable relief at having found out in time the intention oftheir reckless colleague, and at having taken the necessary steps tocontrol him. Secure in the belief that the messages from Capetown hadduly reached Dr. Jameson, and that either Major Heany or CaptainHolden had by that time also reached him, and that in the future themanagement of their affairs would be left in their own hands, theycontinued during Sunday and Monday, the 29th and 30th, to arrangeplans on the basis before indicated, awaiting in the meantime furthercommunications from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard. 

In the meanwhile it became generally known in Johannesburg that somemovement was afoot, and suppressed excitement and expectancy becameeverywhere manifest. On Saturday, December 28, the President returnedfrom his annual tour through certain of the outlying districts. Onhis journey he was met by a number of burghers at BronkhorstSpruit, the scene of the battle in the War of Independence, abouttwenty miles from Pretoria. One of the burghers, an old Boer namedHans Botha, who was the opponent of Mr. Woolls-Sampson in the 'duel'at the battle of Zwartkoppies, in addressing the President, said thathe had heard that there was some talk of a rising in Johannesburg, and added that although he had many bullets in him (It is stated thathe still has five!), he could find room for more if it was a questionof tackling the Britishers. The President replied that he had heardof the threatened rising, and did not believe it: he could not saywhat was likely to happen, but they must remember this--if theywanted to kill a tortoise they must wait until he put his head out ofthe shell. 

In an interview with a representative of the press immediately afterthis the President said that the position was full of gravity andmight lead to disagreeable consequences, especially to the miningindustry and commercial enterprise generally; but he was stillconfident that common-sense would prevail in Johannesburg, andexpressed the conviction that the law-abiding portion of thecommunity, which included the greater part of the English and othernationalities, would support all measures for the preservation of lawand order. He said that his endeavours hitherto to secure concessionsfor the Uitlander population had been frustrated by the publicutterances and actions of irresponsible and unscrupulous agitatorswhose methods had often a detrimental effect on the Volksraad and onthe burghers throughout the Republic. The first commotion created wasby the flag incident some years before (1890), which caused a greatshock to confidence; another sinister incident was the refusal of aportion of the British community to serve their adopted country inthe Malaboch War, when the union of Boer and Briton against thecommon enemy was nearly brought about. 'If wiser counselsunfortunately should not prevail, ' the President continued, 'then letthe storm arise, and the wind thereof will separate the chaff fromthe grain. The Government will give every opportunity for free speechand free ventilation of grievances, but it is fully prepared to put astop to any movement made for the upsetting of law and order. '

On the same day the President was interviewed by a deputation ofAmericans from Johannesburg. They were men of the highest positionand influence in the community and were earnestly desirous ofsecuring reforms, but they were impressed with the idea that peacefulmeans had not yet been exhausted and that the President and hisExecutive would listen to reason if they were convinced that seriousconsequences would follow the neglect to reform. The Presidentreceived them civilly, as he often does when he has a strong hand toplay: it is generally when his cards are poor that he gives way tothe paroxysms of rage and indulges in the personal abuse and violentbehaviour which have earned for him so unenviable a reputation. Helistened to all that had been advanced by the deputation, and thensaid that 'it was no time to talk when danger was at hand. That wasthe time for action. ' The deputation represented to him that therewas no danger at hand unless the President by his own actprecipitated matters and caused the trouble himself, that matterswere completely in his hands, and that if he would deal with thepeople in a liberal and statesmanlike way and grant the reforms whichwere universally acknowledged to be necessary there would not beanywhere in the world a more law-abiding and loyal community thanthat of Johannesburg. The President answered merely by the question:'If a crisis should occur, on which side shall I find the Americans?'The answer was, 'On the side of liberty and good government. ' ThePresident replied, 'You are all alike, tarred with the same brush;you are British in your hearts. '

In reply to another deputation, representing a section of thecommunity which was not by any means at one with the reformers, butthe leading members of which still urged the necessity for reforms, the President said, 'Either you are with me in the last extremity oryou are with the enemy; choose which course you will adopt. Call ameeting to repudiate the Manifesto in its entirety, or there is finalrupture between us. ' The gentlemen addressed declared emphaticallythat on the Manifesto there could be no retreat. On that Johannesburgwas absolutely at one. The President replied, 'Then, I shall know howto deal with Johannesburg, ' and left the room. 

The various business associations of Johannesburg and Pretoriaapproached the President at different hours in these threateningtimes, and did all that was possible to induce him to make reasonableconcessions. Although numbers of his followers and counsellors werestrongly in favour of doing something to avert the coming storm, thePresident himself seemed inclined to fight until the last ditch wasreached rather than concede anything. In reply to the MercantileAssociation he said that he was quite willing to give the franchise, but that it would be to those who were really worthy of it--those forinstance who rallied round the Government in this crisis and tookno part in the mischievous agitation and clamouring for so-calledreforms: all malcontents should be excluded. In fact he made itperfectly plain that the franchise would be treated as a huge briberyfund; and he himself was introducing the thin end of the wedge inthe suggestion made to the Association with a view to splittingup the Reform Party in Johannesburg. He however added that thespecial duties on food-stuffs would be immediately removed pendingconfirmation by the Volksraad, that equal subsidies would be grantedto Dutch and English schools alike, and that the Netherlands RailwayCompany would be approached with a view to having the tariffsreduced. The effect of this was however slightly marred by theconcluding sentence in which he stated that 'as he had kept hisformer promises, so he would do his best to keep this. '

In reply to a second deputation of Americans, the President in amoment of irritation said that it was impossible to grant thefranchise to the Uitlander--American, British, or other; he wouldlose his power if he did; the Government would no longer be his. Amember of the deputation said, 'Surely, if we take the oath ofallegiance, you will trust us?' The President hesitated for a moment, and then said, 'This is no time to talk about these things; I canpromise you nothing. '

Footnotes for Chapter III

{19} The date of 20th December, 1895, was filled in by Dr. Jamesonwhen he decided to start and to publish the letter. 

{20} When this letter was published by Dr. Jameson and cabled tothe London _Times_ the sense of it was very gravely--but doubtlessunintentionally--altered by terminating this sentence with the word'aid' and carrying the remaining words into the next sentence. 

(July, 1899. ) At the Westminster inquiry it transpired that onDecember 20 Mr. Rhodes instructed Dr. Harris to wire for a copy ofthe letter. Dr. Jameson forwarded it after filling in that day'sdate. On December 30, Dr. Harris, again acting on Mr. Rhodes'instructions, telegraphed the letter to the _Times_, having alteredthe date to 28th, and prefaced it with the statement that the letterhad been 'sent on Saturday (28) to Dr. Jameson, Mafeking. '

{21} See Appendix I. For the full text of Manifesto. 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE REFORM COMMITTEE. 

On Monday morning Mr. S. W. Jameson (a brother of Dr. Jameson, who, although suffering acutely from rheumatic fever, insisted on takinghis share of the work and worry during the days that followed)received a telegram addressed to Dr. Wolff, in his care. The latterbeing away on Monday Mr. Jameson translated the telegram and showedit at once to as many of his comrades as he could find. It was fromDr. Jameson, despatched from Pitsani at 9. 5 a. M. On Sunday, and ranas follows: 'Meet me as arranged before you left on Tuesday nightwhich will enable us to decide which is best destination. MakeAdvocate Leonard speak--make cutting to-night without fail. '

Every effort was made to find Dr. Wolff, but he--in common withothers--believing that there would be no move for a week, was away. This telegram was, to say the least of it, disquieting. It showed, soit was thought, that as late as Sunday morning Dr. Jameson could nothave received the countermands by Messrs. Heany and Holden, and itindicated that it must have been a near thing stopping him before heactually crossed the border. As a matter of fact Major Heany reachedDr. Jameson at noon on Sunday; but Capt. Holden had arrived the nightbefore. 

Shortly after noon Mr. Abe Bailey received and showed to others atelegram purporting to come from 'Godolphin, ' Capetown, to thefollowing effect: 'The veterinary surgeon says the horses are now allright; he started with them last night; will reach you on Wednesday;he says he can back himself for seven hundred. ' By the light ofsubsequent events the telegram is easily interpreted, but as Mr. Bailey said he could not even guess who 'Godolphin' might be, themessage remained a puzzle. That it had some reference to Dr. Jamesonwas at once guessed, indeed Mr. Bailey would not have shown it toothers concerned in the movement did he not himself think so. Theimportance and significance of the message entirely depended upon who'Godolphin' was, and it afterwards transpired that the sender was Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, who states that he took the first and safestmeans of conveying the news that Dr. Jameson had actually started inspite of all. Mysterious and unintelligible as it was the telegramcaused the greatest uneasiness among the few who saw it, for itseemed to show that an unknown someone in Capetown was under theimpression that Dr. Jameson had started. The Reformers however stillrejected the idea that he would do anything so mad and preposterous, and above all they were convinced that had he started they would notbe left to gather the fact from the ambiguous phrases of an unknownperson. 

All doubts however were set at rest when between four and half-pastfour on Monday afternoon Mr. A. L. Lawley came hurriedly into the roomwhere several of the leaders were met, saying, 'It is all up, boys. He has started in spite of everything. Read this!' and at the sametime throwing on the table the following telegram from Mafeking: 'Thecontractor has started on the earthworks with seven hundred boys;hopes to reach terminus on Wednesday. '

The Reformers realized perfectly well the full significance of Dr. Jameson's action; they realized that even if he succeeded in reachingJohannesburg, he, by taking the initiative, seriously impaired thejustice of the Uitlanders' cause--indeed, put them hopelessly in thewrong. Apart from the moral or political aspects of the questionthere was the fact that, either through mistake or by fatuousimpulse, Dr. Jameson had plunged them into a crisis for which as heknew they were insufficiently provided and prepared, and at the sametime destroyed the one chance--the one certainty--on which they hadalways counted for arms and ammunition; by starting first he knockedout the foundation of the whole scheme--he made the taking of thePretoria arsenal impossible. For a few minutes it was hoped thatthe chance of taking the arsenal still remained; but while discussionwas still proceeding and several of those present were protestingthat the news could not be true (among them Mr. S. W. Jameson, whostoutly maintained that his brother would never start in defiance ofhis pledges), authentic news of the invasion was received from theGovernment offices; and this was supplemented a few minutes later bythe information that the Government had known it at an early hour inthe morning, and that Pretoria was then full of armed burghers. Theposition then appeared fairly desperate. 

It is worth noting that even when Dr. Jameson decided to start inopposition to the Committee's wishes it was not deemed necessary totreat them with the candour which they were entitled to expect from acomrade. It is well known that Dr. Jameson never had 700 men, andthat he started with less than 500, and yet the Reformers were led tounderstand from the telegrams above quoted that he was starting with700, and not 800 as last promised. They were at first under theimpression that the 700 men did not include the Bechuanaland BorderPolice who were to join him after starting, so that it was stillthought that he had over 800 men. 

Before five o'clock messengers had been sent out in all directions tocall together those who had interested themselves in the movement, oras many of them as possible, for several prominent men knowing onlyof the steps taken to prevent any movement on the part of Dr. Jameson, were not at hand. As many as possible however gatheredtogether, and it was decided to take instant steps to put the town ina state of defence. In order that the subsequent actions and attitudeof the Reform Committee may be properly understood it is necessary toexplain somewhat fully the position of affairs on this Mondayevening. 

As soon as it was realized that the news was beyond all doubt truethe bitterest censure was expressed upon Dr. Jameson's action, and itwas at first stated by many that either Dr. Jameson or Mr. Rhodes orboth had deliberately and for the furtherance of their personal aimsdisregarded in treacherous and heartless fashion all theiragreements. Soon however a calmer view was taken, and a considerationof all the circumstances induced the Reformers to believe that Dr. Jameson had started in good faith, but under some misapprehension. They recalled the various reports that had been in circulation in thepress about conflicts between the Boers and Uitlanders at the Simmerand Jack and Jumpers mines, the reported arrest of Mr. LionelPhillips and the demand of £80, 000 bail--rumours which had beentreated by those on the spot as too ridiculous to gain credenceanywhere, but which they nevertheless thought might have reached Dr. Jameson in such guise as to induce him to take the step which he hadtaken. It was assumed that the telegrams sent from Johannesburg andCapetown to stop him had not reached him, and that Messrs. Heany andHolden had also failed to catch him before he started. Opinionshowever were still divided as to whether he had simply lost patienceand come in regardless of all consequences, or had been really misledand had dashed in to the assistance of Johannesburg. The position wasat best one of horrible uncertainty, and divided as the Committeewere in their opinions as to his motive they could only give him thebenefit of the doubt and assume that there was behind his action nopersonal aim and no deliberate disregard of his undertakings. Inorder to realize the perplexity of the position it must be understoodthat only the few who happened to meet on Sunday and Monday morningknew of the telegrams which had passed during the previoustwenty-four hours, many did not know of them until Pretoria prisongave them time to compare notes; to some they may be news even now. There was no time to argue then!

Knowing the poorness of the equipment of Johannesburg and theunpreparedness of the place and its inhabitants the more logical andcold-blooded course would have been to repudiate Dr. Jamesoninstantly and to have left him to his fate; but against this wasfirstly, the fact publicly admitted that he had remained on theborder by arrangement with the leaders in order to help them shouldthe necessity arise; next, that if he gave heed to the reports whichwere being circulated he might have thought that the necessity hadarisen; and finally, that the leaders had taken such steps in thesmuggling in of arms and the arming of men as would warrant theBoers, and indeed anybody else, in associating them with Dr. Jameson, so that they might confidently expect to be attacked as accomplicesbefore the true facts could become known. They realized quite wellthat they had a big responsibility to the unarmed population ofJohannesburg, and it was with the object of fulfilling thatobligation that they decided to arm as many men as possible and tofortify and defend the place if attacked, but, in view of theimpossibility of aggressive measures being successful, to take noinitiative against the Boers. It would in any case have been entirelyuseless to suggest the repudiation of Dr. Jameson at that moment. TheJohannesburg people would never have listened to such a suggestion, nor could anyone have been found to make it. 

In view of the fact that the Reform Committee have been charged withthe crime of plunging the country into civil war with a miserableequipment of less than 3, 000 rifles, it is only fair to give someheed to the conditions as they were at the time and to considerwhether any other course would have been practicable, and ifpracticable, whether it would have been in the interests of anyconsiderable section of the community. To the Committee the course tobe taken seemed perfectly clear. They determined to defend and holdthe town. They threw off all disguise, got in all the arms theypossibly could, organized the various military corps, and madearrangements for the maintenance of order in the town and on themines. Throughout Monday night all were engaged in getting in armsand ammunition and doing all that could be done to enable the town tohold its own against possible attack. 

During Monday night the Reform Committee came into existence. Thosewho had so far taken a prominent part in the agitation had been forconvenience utilizing Colonel Rhodes' office in the ConsolidatedGoldfields Company's building. Many prominent men came forwardvoluntarily to associate themselves with the movement, and as thenumbers increased and work had to be apportioned it became evidentthat some organization would be necessary. Those who had alreadytaken part in the movement formed themselves into a committee, andmany other prominent men joined immediately. The movement being anentirely public one it was open for anyone to join provided hecould secure the approval of the already elected members. The body soconstituted was then called the Reform Committee. 

The following is the first notice of the Reform Committee aspublished in the _Johannesburg Star_; and it indicates the positiontaken up:

Notice is hereby given that this Committee adheres to the NationalUnion manifesto, and reiterates its desire to maintain theindependence of the Republic. The fact that rumours are in course ofcirculation to the effect that a force has crossed the Bechuanalandborder renders it necessary to take active steps for the defence ofJohannesburg and the preservation of order. The Committee earnestlydesires that the inhabitants should refrain from taking any actionwhich can be considered as an overt act of hostility against theGovernment. 

Telegrams were sent to the High Commissioner and to the Premier ofCape Colony informing them that owing to the starting of Dr. Jamesonwith an armed force into the Transvaal Johannesburg had been placedin a position of extreme peril which they were utterly unprepared toguard against, and urging the High Commissioner to proceedimmediately to Johannesburg in order to settle matters and prevent acivil war. 

Sub-committees were at once appointed, partly chosen from members ofthe Reform Committee and partly from others who had interestedthemselves in the movement and had come forward to take part but hadnot actually joined the controlling body. The matters to be dealtwith were: The policing of the town; the control of the nativesthrown out of employment by the closing of the mines; thearrangements for the defence of the town; the commissariat for themen bearing arms and for others who were flocking into the town; theproviding for the women and children who had been brought in from themines and had neither food nor shelter. These matters were taken inhand on Tuesday morning, and before nightfall some 2, 000 men had beensupplied with arms; the Maxims had been brought in and placed inposition on the hills surrounding the town; various corps had beenformed; a commencement had been made in the throwing-up of earthworksaround the town; and food-supplies and such field equipment as couldbe got together had been provided for the men. As regards the town, the Government police having disappeared, it was necessary to takeenergetic steps to prevent actual chaos reigning. Ex-Chief DetectiveTrimble was appointed to organize a police force, and the work wasadmirably done. Before nightfall the Reform Committee's police hadtaken entire charge of the town, and from this time until thewithdrawal of the Committee's police after the laying down of arms, perfect order was maintained--indeed, the town has never before orsince been so efficiently controlled as during this period. 

Numbers of the mines stopped work. In some cases the miners remainedto protect the companies' property; in other cases the men came inand volunteered to carry arms in defence of the town. One of the mostserious difficulties with which the Committee had to deal was that ofsupplying arms. There were under 3, 000 rifles, and during the fewdays when the excitement was at its highest no less than 20, 000 mencame forward as volunteers and demanded to be armed. Not unnaturallya great deal of feeling was roused among these men against theCommittee on account of their inability to arm them. It was believedfor a long time that the Committee was wholly responsible for theincursion by Dr. Jameson; that they had precipitated matters withoutregard to the safety of the unarmed population, and had actuallycourted civil war with a paltry equipment of some 3, 000 rifles. Forseveral days a huge crowd surrounded the Committee's officesclamouring for guns. It is difficult to say what the feeling wouldhave been and what would have been done had it been known then thatthere were less than 3, 000 rifles. Not more than a dozen men knew theactual number, and they decided to take the responsibility ofwithholding this information, for they realized that panic and riotmight ensue if it were known, whilst the only hope for a successfulissue now lay in Johannesburg presenting a bold, confident, andunited front. 

All the well-known medical men in the town came forward at once, andorganized and equipped an ambulance corps which within the day was inperfect working order. 

Perhaps the most arduous task of all was that of the CommissariatDepartment, who were called upon to supply at a few hours' notice themen bearing arms in various positions outside the town and thevarious depots within the town which were organized for the reliefof those who had flocked in unprovided for. It would have beenimpossible, except in a community where the great majority of men hadbeen trained by the nature of their own business in the habit oforganization, to cope with the difficulties which here presentedthemselves, and it is impossible to pay too high tribute to those whoorganized the relief of the women and children from the surroundingdistricts. Not less than 2, 000 women and children were housed and fedon Tuesday night; offices were taken possession of in different partsof the town and converted into barracks, where sleeping accommodationwas provided under excellent sanitary conditions; and abundance offood, as good as could be expected at an ordinary hotel, was suppliedto these people who had come in expecting to sleep in the streets. 

In order to carry into effect the scheme of relief above referred toit was found necessary to form what was called the Relief Committee. A fund was opened to provide this Committee with the necessary means, and members of the Reform Committee subscribed upwards of £80, 000within a few minutes of the opening of the lists. 

The native liquor question also called for prompt and determinedhandling. A deputation from the Committee called upon the Landdrost, the official head of the Licensing Board, and requested theco-operation of the Government in dealing with this matter, and anorder was obtained from him compulsorily closing the canteens untilfurther notice. Armed with this the officials appointed by theCommittee visited the various liquor-houses along the mines and gavedue notice, with the further warning that if any breach of the newregulation took place it would be followed by the confiscation of theentire stock of liquor. The measure generally had a very salutaryeffect, but in the lowest quarters it was not sufficient. TheCommittee had realized in the very beginning that nothing but theremoval of the liquor would prevent the Kaffir canteen-keepers fromsupplying the natives with drink, and patrols were accordingly sentout to seize the entire stock in those drinking-hells, to paycompensation at value agreed upon, and to destroy the liquor. Thestep was no doubt a high-handed one, and before it was taken noticewas given to the Government officials of the intention. The Committeewere warned that this action could not be authorized by Government, as it was both high-handed and illegal, but they decided to take theresponsibility upon themselves. It is not too much to say that therewere fewer cases of drunkenness or violence reported during theperiod of trouble than during any other fortnight in the history ofthe place. 

The following proclamation had been issued by the President at a verylate hour on Monday night in Pretoria, and was received inJohannesburg on Tuesday morning:

PROCLAMATION BY HIS HONOUR THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICANREPUBLIC. 

Whereas it has appeared to the Government of the South AfricanRepublic that there are rumours in circulation to the effect thatearnest endeavours are being made to endanger the public safety ofJohannesburg, and whereas the Government is convinced that, in casesuch rumours may contain any truth, such endeavours can only emanatefrom a small portion of the inhabitants, and that the greater portionof the Johannesburg inhabitants are peaceful, and are prepared tosupport the Government in its endeavours to maintain law and order, Now, know you that I, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, StatePresident of the South African Republic, with the advice and consentof the Executive Council, according to Article 913 of itsminutes, dated the 30th of December, 1895, do hereby warn thoseevil-intentioned persons (as I do hereby urge all such persons to do)to remain within the pale of the law, and all such persons notheeding this warning shall do so on their own responsibility; and Ido further make known that life and property shall be protectedagainst which attempts may be made, and that every peacefulinhabitant of Johannesburg, of whatsoever nationality he may be, iscalled upon to support me herein, and to assist the officials chargedtherewith; and further be it made known that the Government is stillprepared to take into consideration all grievances that may be laidbefore it in a proper manner, and to submit the same to the people ofthe land without delay for treatment. 

The Government in Pretoria were no doubt perfectly well aware of allthat was going on; the Committee could not possibly observe anysecrecy, nor did it appear desirable, since the position taken up andmaintained by them to the end was that they were not responsible forDr. Jameson's incursion and were simply prepared to defend the townagainst attack. 

During the four or five days preceding this the evidences ofexcitement in Johannesburg had been unmistakable, and on Saturdaythe 28th, the day before Dr. Jameson started, several prominentofficials and two or three members of the Volksraad visitedJohannesburg from Pretoria and openly discussed the seriousnessof the position. At that time they were strongly of opinion thatthe Government had brought the trouble on themselves by theirwrong-headed and corrupt action. The visitors were men who althoughofficially associated with the Government were not at all in sympathywith the policy of the Krugerite party, and they were sincerelyanxious for a peaceful settlement and desirous of liberal reforms, but their influence with the Government was nil. Unfortunately it hasalways been the case that intelligent and upright men associated withthe Pretoria Government (and there are some as bright examples as canbe found in any country) never have, and never will have, any weightwith the party now dominating the State. Their services are not usedas they might be, and their counsels are not regarded as they shouldbe in times when they would be of value; in fact, it would seem thatthey are only used when it appears to Mr. Kruger and his party thatthey present opportunities for playing upon the credulity of theUitlanders with whose progressive notions they are known to be insympathy. It is unnecessary to say that these gentlemen do notconsciously take part in the deception which is practised, but it isnevertheless a fact that whenever the Pretoria clique desire to trailthe red herring they do it by the employment in seeming good faith ofone or other of those gentlemen whose character and sympathiesentitle them to the respect and confidence of the Uitlander. 

On Tuesday Mr. Eugene Marais, the editor of the leading Dutch paper_Land en Volk_, a gentleman who has worked consistently andhonourably both for his people, the Transvaal Dutch, and for thecause of pure and enlightened government, visited Johannesburg, beingconvinced that there was serious trouble in store for the countryunless prompt and decisive steps were taken to remedy the conditionsunder which the Rand community were suffering. No one in the countryhas fought harder against the abuses which exist in Pretoria nor hasanyone risked more, nor yet is there a more loyal champion of theBoer; and Mr. Marais, having on his own initiative investigated thecondition of affairs in Johannesburg and reported the result to someof the leading members of the Government, telegraphed to a memberof the Committee on Tuesday morning beseeching that body to make astrenuous effort to avert bloodshed, using the words, 'For God'ssake, let us meet and settle things like men!' and further statingthat he and Mr. Malan, son-in-law of General Joubert, were bringingover a message from the Government, and that he hoped the Committeewould meet them in a reasonable spirit. 

A full meeting of the Committee was at once called to receive the twodelegates. The meeting took place at 9 p. M. And lasted until 12 p. M. On Tuesday night. Mr. Marais's evidence during the course of thetrial detailed the events which led up to this meeting. He statedthat in consequence of what he had observed in Johannesburg on Mondayand Tuesday he returned to Pretoria, convinced that unless somethingwas done by Government to relieve the position there would mostinevitably be a civil war. He reported the condition of things toGeneral Joubert, who deemed it of sufficient importance to have thematter brought before the Executive. Messrs. Marais and Malan werethereupon received by the Executive and authorized to meet the ReformCommittee on behalf of the Government. With reference to the nowfamous 'olive branch' phrase, Mr. Marais states that the expressionwas first used by a member of the Committee in Johannesburg onTuesday morning. The condition of things was being discussed and thismember commented severely upon the action of the Government. Mr. Marais urged that things were not so bad as to justify a determinedattempt to provoke civil war, and stated that he believed that theexcitement prevailing would convince the Government that they had nowgone too far and that when they realized the seriousness of theposition they would be willing to make proper concessions, and hesaid in conclusion that the people of Johannesburg, if they were asgood as their professions and desired reform and not revolution, would even at the eleventh hour be willing to meet the Government. The member of the Reform Committee replied that this was undoubtedlythe attitude of the Johannesburg people, but that it wasabsolutely useless to keep on patiently waiting for the fulfilment ofpromises which were only made to be broken; that if Johannesburg hadany evidence that the Government meant honestly by them they would ofcourse treat and endeavour to avert bloodshed; that the Uitlandershad so far always offered the olive branch and sought to establishharmony. That however was all over, and let the Government now takethe first steps if they were in earnest. 

Mr. Marais reported the whole of this conversation to the ExecutiveCouncil and, upon his making use of the expression 'olive branch, 'the President exclaimed excitedly, 'What are they talking about? Whatis an olive branch?' When this was explained to him he nodded andsaid, 'Yes, that is what we will do, ' and Mr. Wolmarans anothermember of the Executive exclaimed, 'Go back to the Johannesburgpeople and tell them that we have already offered the olive branch byvoluntarily withdrawing our police from the town in order to avoidconflict, thus leaving them in entire possession. It is for them tosay whether they will accept it. '

The meeting at which Messrs. Marais and Malan were commissioned tonegotiate with the Johannesburg people was, with the exception ofGeneral Smit (then dying and since dead), attended by every member ofthe Executive Council, and there is no truth in the suggestion madeon behalf of the Government that it was an informal meeting of a fewmen who were not acting on behalf of the State, nor is there anyjustification for the statement made by Judge Ameshof in thewitness-box that Messrs. Marais and Malan were not officiallyauthorized to negotiate with the Reform Committee. 

Messrs. Marais and Malan met the Reform Committee in the generalcommittee-room, and both gentlemen addressed the meeting severaltimes, going fully into the grievances complained of by theUitlanders and explaining very fully the position of the Governmentand their attitude during the meeting of the Executive Council whichthey had been called upon to attend. They stated that they had beensent by a full meeting of the Executive to ask the Reform Committeeto send a deputation to Pretoria in order to meet a Commission tobe appointed by Government with a view to effecting a peacefulsettlement and the redress of grievances; that the Commission wouldconsist of Chief Justice Kotzé, Judge Ameshof, and another, probablya member of the Executive Council; that the Government were willingto consider and redress the grievances, and were, above all things, anxious to avoid conflict with their own subjects. 

Then came the much-quoted expression: 'We come in fact to offer youthe olive branch; it is for you to say if you will take it; if youare sincere in your professions, you will. ' A great deal ofdiscussion took place, many members of the Committee maintainingthat, although they placed full confidence in the gentlemen who hadbeen sent by Government, they were nevertheless convinced that therewas treachery at the bottom of it, and they stated in plain languagewhat has become more or less an article of faith with the Uitlander:'Whenever the Government are earnestly intent upon deceiving us theyselect emissaries in whose character and good faith we have completetrust, and by deceiving them ensure that we shall be misled. ' Bothgentlemen repeatedly assured the meeting that the Government weremost anxious to remove the causes of discontent, and stated moreoverthat Johannesburg would get practically all that was asked for in theManifesto. When asked what was meant by 'practically all, ' theyexplained that there would be some minor points of course on whichJohannesburg would have to give way in order to meet the Government, as their position was also a very difficult one, and there were inparticular two matters on which there would be some difficulty, butby no means insurmountable. When asked if the two matters were theremoval of religious disabilities and the franchise, one of the twogentlemen replied that he had been told that there would be somedifficulty on these two points, but that they were quite open todiscussion as to the details and he was convinced that there wouldsurely be a means of coming to an understanding by compromise even onthese two. Messrs. Marais and Malan also informed the meeting thatthe High Commissioner had issued a proclamation calling upon Dr. Jameson to desist from the invasion and to return to Britishterritory at once; that the proclamation had been duly forwardedto him from several points; and that there was no doubt that he wouldturn back. Messrs. Marais and Malan both stated that they werethemselves proceeding with the commando against Dr. Jameson should hefail to obey the High Commissioner's mandate, and stated also thatalthough they were making every effort that was humanly possible toavert conflict it must be clearly understood that if from theunreasonable action of Johannesburg fighting took place between theGovernment forces and a revolutionary force from Johannesburg, theyas in duty bound would fight for their Government, and that in theGovernment ranks would be found those men who had been the mostarduous workers in the cause of reform. They were assured that therewas no such feeling as desire for revenge actuating the people whohad taken up arms, that it was simply a desire for fair treatment anddecent government, that the present demand was what had been alreadydetailed in the Manifesto, and that the Committee stood by thatdocument, but would nevertheless accept as sufficient for the timebeing any reasonable proportion of the redress demanded. 

In spite of differences as to the motives of the Government inholding out the olive branch it was decided unanimously that therequest as conveyed by Messrs. Marais and Malan should be compliedwith, and that a deputation should be sent over early on thefollowing morning to meet the Government Commission. Under thecircumstances it was quite useless to discuss whether the Governmentdesigned these negotiations merely as a ruse in order to gain time, or whether they were actually dealing with the Committee in goodfaith and intending to effect the redress promised. At that timeJohannesburg itself had not been protected by earthworks, and theunpacking of the Maxims and rifles had only just been completed. Throughout Tuesday night and Wednesday earthworks were being thrownup, and every effort was being directed towards placing the town in astate of defence. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE COMMITTEE'S DILEMMA. 

With the best will in the world it would have been quite impossibleto render any assistance to Dr. Jameson's forces, but apart from thisthere never was the slightest doubt of his ability to get intoJohannesburg without assistance should he decide to attempt it. Inconversation with the leaders of the movement he had always scoutedthe idea of requiring assistance from Johannesburg, nor would anyonehave believed that with a well-equipped and perfectly trained forceof 800 men (as it was believed he had) it was possible for the Boersto get together a force sufficiently strong to stop him in his dashon Johannesburg. 

In the absence of Mr. Charles Leonard, who had been recognized as theleader of the movement, Mr. Lionel Phillips was elected Chairman ofthe Reform Committee, and he and Messrs. J. G. Auret, A. Bailey, andM. Langermann were chosen as the Committee's deputation to proceed toPretoria and meet the Commission appointed by the Government. Theyleft at an early hour on Wednesday morning, and were givenpractically a free hand to act on behalf of the Reform Committee. Theposition having been so thoroughly discussed there was no possibilityof misunderstanding; there was no division in the Committee as to theattitude to be taken up. The deputation were to negotiate with theGovernment for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Manifesto, accepting what they might consider to be a reasonable instalment ofthe reforms demanded. They were to deal with the Government in aconciliatory spirit and to avoid all provocation to civil strife, butat the same time to insist upon the recognition of rights and theredress of the grievances, to avow the association with Dr. Jameson'sforces so far as it had existed, and to include him in any settlementthat might be made. It was impossible to lay down any definitelines on which to negotiate on behalf of Dr. Jameson, as the ReformCommittee were still in complete ignorance of his reasons forstarting; but it was considered fairer and more reasonable to assumethat he had started in good faith and that the two messengers who hadbeen sent to stop him had not reached him, and to act accordingly. However awkward a predicament he had placed the Johannesburg peoplein, they accepted a certain moral responsibility for him and hisactions and decided to make his safety the first consideration. 

Late on Tuesday night the Collector of Customs at Johannesburginformed members of the Reform Committee that he had received atelegraphic despatch from the Pretoria head office notifying thesuspension of all duties on various articles of food. It will beremembered that this relief was prayed for by the representativebodies of mining and commerce on the Rand several weeks before theoutbreak and that the Government had replied that they were unableduring the recess to deal with the matter as the legislative powerand the power of levying and remitting duties had been taken from theExecutive by the Volksraad some time previously. It will also beremembered that the Government acted on this hint as to thenecessities of the community in a wholly unexpected way by granting amonopoly for the free importation of grain to a favoured individualof their party in Pretoria. It is not wonderful therefore that thenotification conveyed by the Collector of Customs was received withconsiderable derision, and the opinion was expressed that it wouldhave redounded more to the credit of the Government's honesty andintelligence had they remitted the duties when first petitionedinstead of doing so at the last moment hastily and ungracefully--soto speak, at the point of the bayonet. 

On Wednesday morning, whilst the deputation were engaged innegotiations with the Government Commission, a telegram was receivedby the Reform Committee in Johannesburg from Sir Jacobus de Wet, the British agent, conveying the following proclamation of the HighCommissioner:

Whereas it has come to my knowledge that certain British subjects, said to be under the leadership of Dr. Jameson, have violatedthe territory of the South African Republic, and have cuttelegraph-wires, and done various other illegal acts; and whereas theSouth African Republic is a friendly State, in amity with HerMajesty's Government; and whereas it is my desire to respect theindependence of the said State;

Now, therefore, I hereby command the said Dr. Jameson and all personsaccompanying him to immediately retire from the territory of theSouth African Republic, on pain of the penalties attached to theirillegal proceedings; and I do further hereby call upon all Britishsubjects in the South African Republic to abstain from giving thesaid Dr. Jameson any countenance or assistance in his armed violationof the territory of a friendly State. 

A reply was immediately sent to the British Agent stating that theReform Committee were not aware of the reasons which prompted Dr. Jameson to start, but that as he was coming to their assistance, presumably in good faith, they felt morally bound to provide for him, and they therefore urged the British Agent most strongly to spare noeffort in forwarding the proclamation to Dr. Jameson so that he mightbe aware of the action taken by the Imperial Government and mightturn back before any conflict should take place between his and theBoer forces. The Committee offered to forward the despatch themselvesif facilities of passport were given. 

A full meeting of the Committee was immediately convened in order toconsider this new complication of the case, and the followingtelegram was approved and sent at 11. 15 a. M. , addressed to theDeputation of the Reform Committee, care of Her Majesty's Agent, Pretoria:

Meeting has been held since you started to consider telegram fromBritish Agent, and it was unanimously resolved to authorize you tomake following offer to Government. Begins: 'In order to avertbloodshed on grounds of Dr. Jameson's action, if Government willallow Dr. Jameson to come in unmolested, the Committee will guaranteewith their persons if necessary that he shall leave again peacefullywithin as little delay as possible. '{22}

The Committee well realized the fatal results of Dr. Jameson'sinvasion under the circumstances, and much as their position had beeninjured and complicated by his action, it was felt that it wouldstill be better to get rid of the foreign element which herepresented and to fight the battle out under such conditions asmight arise without any assistance than to let things go from bad toworse through further action on Dr. Jameson's part. 

No reply had been received from the High Commissioner to thetelegrams urging him to come up in person. Mr. Cecil Rhodes hadtelegraphed that he was urgently pressing the High Commissioner tocome, but that he had received no assurances as yet from him. DuringWednesday Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton telegraphed that the formerhad seen the High Commissioner, who had declined to move unlessinvited by the other side; they were using every effort to induce himto move but no reliance could be placed upon him. They furtheradvised that in their strong opinion a reasonable compromise shouldbe effected, and that it was most vital to avoid offence. Mr. F. H. Hamilton, who was one of the first associated with the movement, finding then that nothing more could be done and feeling that hisproper place was with his comrades, refused to remain longer andreturned to Johannesburg, arriving there after Dr. Jameson'ssurrender. 

Two and a half days had now elapsed since Dr. Jameson started, andthe Committee were still without word or sign from him as to hishaving started or the reason which prompted him to do so. None knewbetter than Dr. Jameson himself the difficulties and magnitude of thetask which he had set the Reform Committee when he struck his camp atPitsani and marched into the Transvaal. None knew better than he thatwith the best luck and all the will and energy in the world it wouldhardly be possible to do as much as place the town in a position ofdefence. Every hour some explanation or some message was expectedfrom him, something to throw a little light on his action; butnothing ever came, and the Committee were left to act in the dark astheir judgment or good fortune might lead them. 

The deputation which had been sent to Pretoria met the GovernmentCommission at noon on Wednesday. The Commission consisted of ChiefJustice Kotzé (Chairman), Judge Ameshof, and Executive Member Kock. There was a Government shorthand clerk present. Before the businessof the meeting was gone into, at the request of the Chief Justicethe deputation consented to minutes of the interview being taken, remarking that as they were dealing with the Government in good faiththey had nothing to conceal. It may be well to mention that at themeeting of Messrs. Malan and Marais with the Reform Committee thequestion was raised as to the attitude of the Government towards thedeputation which it was suggested should be sent to Pretoria. Someoneremarked that the Government were quite capable of inducing thedeputation to go to Pretoria, having them arrested as soon as theygot there, and holding them as hostages. Messrs. Marais and Malanboth scouted the idea and stated positively that the ExecutiveCouncil had formally acknowledged to them that they were negotiatingwith the Reform Committee in good faith, and that negotiations wouldof course be carried on in a decent manner as between two civilizedparties in arms. These little incidents have a peculiar interest nowin view of the treachery practised by the Government by means of thenegotiations with the deputation. 

Mr. Lionel Phillips as spokesman detailed at length the position ofaffairs in Johannesburg, citing the grievances and disabilities underwhich the Uitlander population existed. He pointed out that yearafter year the Uitlanders had been begging and petitioning forredress of these grievances, for some amelioration of theircondition, for fair and uniform treatment of all the white subjectsof the State, and for some representation in the Legislature of thecountry, as they were entitled by their numbers and their work andtheir property to have; yet not only had a deaf ear been turned toall their petitions, but the conditions were actually aggravated yearby year and, instead of obtaining relief, there was a marked increasein the burdens and disabilities imposed. He informed the Commissionthat the Manifesto fairly represented the views of the ReformCommittee and the people of Johannesburg; that, whilst they weredetermined to have their rights, they recognised that it might notbe possible to obtain complete redress at once, and they wereprepared to accept what they might consider a reasonable instalmentof redress. He stated that Dr. Jameson had remained on the bordersof the Transvaal with an armed force by a written arrangement withcertain of the leaders, and that he was there to render activeassistance should the community be driven to extremes and require hisassistance; but as to his present action the Committee could throw nofurther light upon it, as they were in ignorance of his reason forstarting; they could only assume that he had done so in good faith, probably misled by rumours of trouble in Johannesburg which hethought he had sufficient reason to believe. He added that so farfrom being invited by the Committee, messengers had actually beensent to prevent him from moving, but that it was not known to theCommittee if these messengers had reached him or if the telegramswhich had been sent with a like purpose had ever been delivered tohim, and that consequently the Committee preferred to believe that hehad come in in good faith and thinking the community to be in direneed, and for this reason the people of Johannesburg were resolved tostand by him. 

In the course of the discussion, Executive Member Kock remarked: 'Ifyou have erected fortifications and have taken up arms, you arenothing but rebels. ' Mr. Phillips replied: 'You can call us rebels ifyou like. All we want is justice, decent treatment, and honestgovernment; that is what we have come to ask of you. ' Mr. Kockthereupon remarked that the deputation spoke as though theyrepresented Johannesburg, whereas for all the Government knew theReform Committee might be but a few individuals of no influence; andhe asked if they could be informed as to who constituted that body. The deputation gave certain names from memory and offered totelegraph for a full list. The reply came in time to be handed to theGovernment and it constituted the sole piece of evidence everobtained as to who were members of the Reform Committee. Afterhearing the statement of Mr. Phillips the Chief Justice informed thedeputation that the Commission were not empowered to arrangeterms, but were merely authorized to hear what the deputation had tosay, to ascertain their grievances and the proposed remedies, and toreport this discussion to the Government. Taking up certain pointsreferred to by Mr. Phillips, the Chief Justice asked whether theJohannesburg people would consent to lay down their arms if theGovernment granted practically all the reforms that were asked. Mr. Phillips replied in the affirmative, adding that afterenfranchisement the community would naturally be privileged to takeup arms again as burghers of the State. The Chief Justice asked onwhat lines it was proposed that the franchise should be granted. Thedeputation replied that the community would be quite content if theGovernment would accept the principle, leaving the settlement ofdetails to a Commission of three persons--one to be appointed byeach party, and the third to be mutually agreed upon. 

The meeting was adjourned at noon until 5 p. M. , and in the meantimethe deputation telegraphed to the Reform Committee in Johannesburgthe substance of what had taken place, stating among other thingsthat they had explained the arrangements with Dr. Jameson. That sucha message should be sent through the Government telegraph-office at atime when every telegram was read for the purpose of obtaininginformation as to what was on foot is further proof (if proof beneeded) that the 'revelations' as to the connection between Dr. Jameson and the Reformers, which were brought out with theatricaleffect later on, were not by any means a startling surprise to theGovernment, and were in fact well known to them in all essentialdetails before the first encounter between the Boers and Dr. Jamesonhad taken place. The significance of this fact in its bearing uponDr. Jameson's surrender and the after-treatment of the Reformprisoners should not be lost sight of. 

The adjourned meeting between the Government Commission and theReform Committee deputation took place at 5 p. M. , when the ChiefJustice intimated to the deputation that they had reported to a fullmeeting of the Executive Council all that had taken place at themorning meeting, and that the Executive had authorized them to handto the deputation in answer a resolution, the substance of whichis given hereunder:

The High Commissioner has offered his services with a view to apeaceful settlement. The Government of the South African Republichave accepted his offer. Pending his arrival, no hostile step will betaken against Johannesburg provided Johannesburg takes no hostilestep against the Government. In terms of a certain proclamationrecently issued by the State President the grievances will beearnestly considered. 

It is impossible to give the exact wording of the minute because theoriginal document was inadvertently destroyed and all applications toGovernment for a copy were met at first by evasions and finally bypoint-blank refusal. The document was required as evidence in thetrial of the Reform prisoners and every effort was made to secure anexact copy. As a last resource the above version, as sworn to by anumber of men who had seen the original document, was put in. TheGovernment were informed that if a true copy of the originalresolution as recorded in the Minute Book of the Executive Councilwere not supplied for the purposes of evidence in the trial theprisoners would hand in the version given above. No reply wasreceived to this, and the State Attorney acting on behalf of theGovernment admitted the version here given in the statement put in bythe prisoners. It is clear therefore that if this version errs in anyrespect it cannot at all events be to the disadvantage of theGovernment or they would assuredly have objected to it and haveproduced the resolution itself. 

On receipt of the above resolution the deputation inquired whetherthis offer of the Government's was intended to include Dr. Jameson. The Chief Justice replied that the Government declined to treat abouthim as he was a foreign invader and would have to be turned out ofthe country. The deputation thereupon handed in the telegram from theReform Committee, already quoted, offering their persons as security, and pointed out that this was the most earnest and substantialguarantee that it was possible to offer that the Committee had notinvited Dr. Jameson and had no desire to destroy the independence ofthe State. The Commission in reply stated that the proclamation ofthe High Commissioner was being forwarded to Dr. Jameson fromvarious quarters, and that he would inevitably be stopped. In replyto the statement by the deputation that they were not empowered toaccept terms which did not explicitly include Dr. Jameson but wouldreport to headquarters and reply later on, the Chief Justice statedthat the Government required no answer to the resolution handed tothem. This was in fact _their_ answer, and if the people ofJohannesburg observed the conditions mentioned therein there wouldbe no further trouble, but if they disregarded them they would beheld responsible for whatever followed. The deputation returned toJohannesburg fully convinced that the grievances would be redressedand a peaceful settlement arrived at through the mediation of theHigh Commissioner, and that Dr. Jameson would inevitably obeythe latter's proclamation and leave the country peacefully onascertaining that there was no necessity for his intervention onbehalf of the Uitlanders. 

Not only did the Government supply the deputation with the minute inwriting already quoted, but they also instructed the local officersof Johannesburg to make public their decision to avail themselves ofSir Hercules Robinson's services. It will be observed that thenotification published in Johannesburg is not so full as theExecutive minute handed to the deputation in Pretoria, but the spiritin which it was given and accepted is shown by the following noticeissued by the Reform Committee embodying the official statement:

REFORM COMMITTEE. 

NOTICE. 

The Government have handed us a written reply this afternoon (January1), stating they have agreed to accept the offer of the HighCommissioner to go to Pretoria to assist the Government in preventingbloodshed, and then the representations of the Committee will betaken into serious consideration. The communication referred to is asfollows:

'The Government of the South African Republic have accepted the offerof the High Commissioner to come to Pretoria. 

 (Signed) J. L. VAN DER MERWE, _Mining Commissioner. _ J. F. DE BEER, _Judicial Commissioner. _ CARL JEPPE, _Member of the First Volksraad, _ _Johannesburg. _ A. H. BLECKSLEY, _Commandant Volunteers. _

Desirous as the Committee has always been to obtain its objectswithout the shedding of blood and incurring the horrors of civil war, the opportunity of achieving its aims by peaceful means is welcome. 

The Reform Committee desires that the public will aid them with theloyalty and enthusiasm which they have shown so far in themaintenance of its organization, and will stand firm in the cause oflaw and order and the establishment of their rights. 

By order of the Committee. 

This notice was published in the local press, and also distributed asa leaflet in Johannesburg. 

More than this! At one o'clock on Wednesday President Kruger had sentfor Sir Jacobus de Wet and requested him to transmit to the ReformCommittee the following message: 'I desire again to invite yourserious attention to the fact that negotiations are going on betweenMr. Chamberlain and His Honour the President. I am convinced theGovernment is prepared to meet any committee or deputation at anytime to discuss matters. In view of this and of negotiations with Mr. Chamberlain I advise you to follow a constitutional course. ' Thattelegram was framed at President Kruger's request and approved by himbefore being transmitted. 

A great deal has been said about the impolicy, and even the badfaith, of the Johannesburg people in concluding an armistice whichdid not include Dr. Jameson. From the above account it is clear inthe first place that every effort was made to provide for his safety, and in the next place that no armistice was concluded. Certain termswere offered by the Government which it was open to the Committee toeither accept or reject or ignore, as they might decide later on. Inplain English, the Committee were as free after the negotiations asthey had been before. They gave no undertaking to abstain fromhostile action; they simply received the offer of the Government. Whether they complied with those conditions as a matter ofcold-blooded selfish policy, whether they simply selected an easy wayout of a difficult position, or whether they complied with theconditions solely because they were not in a position to do anythingelse, it is open to every man to decide for himself; but it does notseem fair, in face of the fact that they were _not_ able to doanything else, to impute the worst motives of all for the coursewhich they eventually took. 

On the return of the deputation to Johannesburg a report of what hadtaken place was given to a full meeting of the Reform Committee. Divers opinions were expressed as to what was the right course totake, but eventually all were agreed that, as the first duty of theCommittee was undoubtedly to protect the town and the unarmed sectionof the community, as they could not afford to send a single man outof the place, as there was no reason to suppose that Dr. Jamesonrequired or would welcome any assistance, and as it seemed certainthat he would be stopped by the High Commissioner's proclamation andturned back, it would be nothing short of criminal madness to adoptany aggressive measures at that stage. 

It does not appear to have occurred to many of the hostile critics ofthe Reform Committee to consider what might have happened when theyare judging what actually took place. Dr. Jameson had invaded thecountry with less than 500 men. It must be clear from this that itwas not his intention to conquer the Transvaal. It must have been andindeed it was his idea that it would be impossible for the ImperialGovernment to stand passively by and witness the struggle between itsown subjects preferring legitimate and moderate claims and a corruptand incompetent Boer Government. Intervention of one sort or anotherhe certainly expected--either material help in the shape of Britishtroops, or the intervention of the High Commissioner to effect apeaceful settlement. By the false step which evoked the HighCommissioner's proclamation he had forfeited all claim to the supporton which he reckoned. It was reasonable to suppose therefore that, onthe receipt of the proclamation ordering him to return and calling onall British subjects to abstain from assisting him, he would realizethe consequences of his mistake. He would also learn from the ReformCommittee's messengers (that is, assuming that he did not know italready) that the Johannesburg people neither required nor wished forhis intervention, and he would elect to leave the country inaccordance with the High Commissioner's mandate rather than continuea course which, with the opposition of the British Government addedto that of the Boer Government, must inevitably end in disgrace anddisaster. This was the conclusion arrived at in the ReformCommittee room; and it was then considered what would be the positionof the Johannesburg people if, in defiance of the High Commissioner'sproclamation and in violation of the terms offered by the TransvaalGovernment, they should adopt aggressive and wholly futile measuresin aid of Dr. Jameson, only to find that he himself had obeyed theproclamation and had turned back. 

No man in his senses would have anticipated Dr. Jameson's continuinghis march after receipt of the proclamation and full information asto the wishes and position of the Johannesburg people. But, apartfrom this, it was the opinion of military men, such as ColonelHeyman, who had been sent in by Dr. Jameson, and who were present atthe meetings of the Reform Committee, that it would not be possiblefor the Boers to stop him, and that it would require a very largeforce indeed to cope with a body of men so well trained, wellequipped, and well led as his were thought to be. It would moreoverneed extraordinary luck and management on the Boers' side to gettogether any considerable force in time to intercept him before heshould reach Johannesburg. It may be added that the opinion expressedby these gentlemen is still adhered to. They say that, properly led, Jameson's force should have got in without firing a shot, and that, properly handled, they should not have been stopped by a much greaternumber of Boers. However this is as it may be. 

It has been stated, and the statement has gained considerablecredence, that the very train which brought the deputation back toJohannesburg after their negotiations with the Government alsobrought a detachment of the State artillery with field-pieces anda plentiful supply of ammunition to reinforce the Boers, who werethen in position to intercept Dr. Jameson, and it has further beensuggested that the obvious course for the Reform Committee to havetaken was to break up the line and to stop trains passing out towardsKrugersdorp, also to seize the telegraph and railway offices. Suchaction would have been perfectly futile. As a matter of fact theartillery and ammunition were sent direct from Pretoria by waggon, and not through Johannesburg at all. {23} Any such action as theseizing of the telegraph and railway offices would have been uselessin itself, if intended to aid Jameson's force, and would of coursehave been a declaration of war on the part of the Committee againstthe Transvaal Government, a declaration which they were not able toback up by any effective measures. A partially successful attemptwas made to blow up the line between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp byindividuals who thought that they would be rendering a service to thecause, and who did not stop to calculate the full effects of theiraction. 

During the afternoon of Wednesday, while the deputation were stillengaged in negotiation with the Government Commission, the messengerdespatched by Sir Jacobus de Wet, British Agent in Pretoria, todeliver the High Commissioner's proclamation to Dr. Jameson, arrivedin Johannesburg, and applied at the Reform Committee rooms for anescort through the lines of defence, showing at the same time thepassport given him by the Commandant-General to pass him through theBoer lines. It was immediately decided to take advantage of theopportunity in order to bring further pressure to bear upon Dr. Jameson to induce him to leave the country peacefully, and to makefinally and absolutely sure that he should realize the true positionof affairs. Mr. J. J. Lace, a member of the Reform Committee, volunteered to accompany the messenger to explain to Dr. Jameson thestate of affairs in Johannesburg and to induce him to return whilethere was yet a chance of retrieving the position. On the return ofthe deputation this action of the rest of the Committee was cordiallyapproved and was found to be in entire accord with the attitude takenup by them in their dealings with the Government. 

If any evidence were needed as to the sincerity and singleness ofpurpose of the Committee, the action taken by the deputation inPretoria and the rest of the Committee in Johannesburg, whilstacting independently of each other and without any opportunity ofdiscussing matters and deciding upon a common line, should besufficient. If the Committee as a whole had not been following anhonest and clearly-defined policy they would have inevitably come togrief under such trying circumstances. As a matter of fact, the stepstaken during Wednesday by the two sections acting independently werewholly in accord. 

In the course of the day it became known that Dr. Jameson had causedto be published the letter of invitation quoted in another chapter, and from this it was clear to those who knew the circumstances underwhich the letter was given that he had deliberately started inviolation of the agreement entered into, that he had throwndiscretion to the winds, and decided to force the hands of theJohannesburg people. The result of this was that among the leaders itwas realized that Dr. Jameson was playing his own hand with completeindifference to the consequences for others; but the vast majority ofthe Rand community could not possibly realize this, and were firmlyconvinced that the invading force had come in in good faith, believing the community to be in extreme peril. 

In sensational matters of this kind it is very often the case that asingle phrase will illustrate the position more aptly than chaptersof description. It is unfortunately also the case that phrases areused and catch the ear and survive the circumstances of the time, carrying with them meanings which they were never intended to convey. In the course of the events which took place in the early part of theyear many such expressions were seized on and continually quoted. Among them, and belonging to the second description above referredto, is the phrase 'Stand by Jameson. ' It was never used in the senseof sending out an armed force to the assistance of Dr. Jameson, because it was recognized from the beginning that such a course wasnot within the range of possibility. The phrase was first used inthe Executive Council Chamber when the deputation from the ReformCommittee met the Government Commission and Mr. Lionel Phillipsexplained the nature of the connection between the Johannesburgpeople and the invading force. After showing that the Rand communitywere not responsible for his immediate action, and afteracknowledging that he was on the border with the intention ofrendering assistance if it should be necessary, he said that theUitlanders nevertheless believed that, owing to circumstances ofwhich they were ignorant, Dr. Jameson had started in absolute goodfaith to come to their assistance, and for that reason they weredetermined to stand by him. For that reason they offered theirpersons as security for his peaceful evacuation of the country--acourse which was then, and is still, deemed to be 'standing by him'in as effective and practical a manner as it was possible for men intheir position to do. 

The reproach levelled at the Reform Committee by members of theTransvaal Government ever since the surrender of Dr. Jameson isthat, whilst professing not to support hostile action against theState, and whilst avowing loyalty to the Republic, the people ofJohannesburg did not give the logical and practical proof of suchloyalty that the Government were entitled to expect; that is, theydid not take up arms to fight against the invaders. It is scarcelynecessary to say that such a preposterous idea never entered theminds of any of the Uitlanders. When all is said and done, blood isthicker than water, alike with the Uitlanders as with the Boers. TheBoers have shown on many occasions that they elect to side with theirkin on the promptings of their heart rather than support those whomtheir judgment shows them to be worthy of their assistance. Had theUitlanders been sufficiently armed there can be no question thatrightly or wrongly they would have sided with Jameson, and would havegiven him effective support had they known that he needed it. Had heever reached Johannesburg the enthusiasm would have been wild andunbounded, and, however much the cooler heads among the communitymight realize that such a partial success might have proved amore serious misfortune than the total failure has been, no suchconsiderations would have weighed with the community in general; andthe men who were aiming at practical and lasting good results, ratherthan cultivating popular enthusiasm, would have been swept aside, andothers, more in accord with the humour of the moment, would havetaken their places. 

It is useless to speculate as to what would have happened had Dr. Jameson reached Johannesburg. The prestige of success might haveenabled him, as it has enabled many others, to achieve the apparentlyimpossible and compel the acceptance of terms which would haveinsured a lasting peace; but as Johannesburg had neither armsnor ammunition, especially the latter, commensurate with therequirements of anything like severe fighting, even for a single day, and as the invading force had not more than enough for its ownrequirements, it is difficult to conceive that anything but disastercould have followed. 

Throughout the troubles which followed the invasion it was not thepersonal suffering or loss which fell to the lot of the Johannesburgpeople that touched them so nearly as the taunts which were unjustlylevelled at them for not rendering assistance to Dr. Jameson. Theterms, 'cowards, ' 'poltroons, ' and 'traitors, ' and the name of'Judasburg, ' absolutely undeserved as they were known to be, rankledin the hearts of all, and it was only by the exercise of muchself-denial and restraint that it was possible for men to remainsilent during the period preceding Dr. Jameson's trial. Extremelybitter feeling was roused by the tacit approval given to thesecensures by the officers of the invading force, for their continuedsilence was naturally construed to be tacit approval. 'Not once, 'said one of the Reformers, 'has a single member of Dr. Jameson'sparty come forward and stated that the imputations on the Reformerswere undeserved; yet we gave them the benefit of every doubt, andtried throughout to screen them, whilst all the time the Doctor andat least three of his companions knew that they had started to "maketheir own flotation. " That is not cricket. '

It has been urged on behalf of Dr. Jameson that he could not havebeen asked to state prior to his trial that he never expected orarranged for help from Johannesburg--that his case was already asufficiently difficult one without embarrassing it with otherpeople's affairs. Yet it was noted in Johannesburg that, when areport was circulated to the effect that he had started the invasionon the instructions of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, he and another officer ofhis force wrote jointly to the English papers to say that there wasno truth whatever in the statement. The consequences of taking uponhimself the responsibility for initiative in this way, while hehad yet to undergo his trial, were far more serious than would havefollowed a simple statement to the effect that injustice was beingdone to the Rand community in the charges of cowardice laid againstit. It was felt then, and the feeling has not in any way abated, that Dr. Jameson regarded the fate and interests of the people ofJohannesburg with indifference, looking upon them merely as pawnsin a game that he was playing. It was only Mr. Rhodes who took anopportunity to say that 'the Johannesburg people are not cowards;they were rushed. '

The general public did not know the circumstances under which Dr. Jameson had agreed to remain on the frontier. They did not know thattelegrams and messengers had been despatched to stop him, nor was itfelt advisable to inform them of these steps at a time when mattershad seemingly gone too far to be stopped. It was considered that anystatement of that kind put forth at that particular juncture wouldsimply tend to create a panic from which no good results couldaccrue, and that, as Dr Jameson had cast the die and crossed hisRubicon, as little as possible should be done needlessly to embarrasshim. Suggestions were continually being made, and have been and arestill being frequently quoted, to the effect that a force should besent out to create a diversion among the Boer commandoes in Jameson'sfavour. Suggestions were made by men who had not the remotest idea ofthe resources at the command of the Committee, or who did not stop tothink of what might have happened had Johannesburg been depleted ofits armed force, and so left at the mercy of a few hundred Boers. There were always, as there will always be, men prepared for anyreckless gamble, but this course was most earnestly considered timeafter time by the Committee when some fresh suggestion or developmentseemed to warrant a reconsideration of the decision already arrivedat not to attempt any aggressive measures. Finally the matter was bycommon consent left in the hands of Colonel Heyman, an officer whohas rendered distinguished service in South Africa, and whosereputation and judgment were acknowledged by all. This course was themore readily agreed to since Colonel Heyman was by none morehighly thought of than by Dr. Jameson himself. The decision given byhim was that the invading force, properly led, drilled and equippedas it was, was a far stronger body than the entire force enrolledunder the Reform Committee, and that it would require a very largeforce indeed of burghers to stop it. If Dr. Jameson had thought thathe would need help there had been ample time for him to send a fastmounted messenger to Johannesburg. He had not done so; and it wastherefore to be presumed that as he had taken upon himself theresponsibility of invasion he was prepared for all contingencies;but, apart from this, the force available in Johannesburg, whichwould be in a few days a very good one behind earthworks, was at thatmoment utterly unfit to march out in the open. It would in its thencondition, and with no equipment of field-pieces, be liable to beannihilated by a relatively small number of Boers before it shouldreach Dr. Jameson. It was decided, however, that, should fightingtake place within such distance from the town that men could be takenfrom the defences without endangering the safety of the town, a forceshould be taken out at once. 

Fault has repeatedly been found with the military organization inJohannesburg for not having been well served by an IntelligenceDepartment, and for not knowing from day to day what the whereaboutsand position of Dr. Jameson's forces were. 

The reply to this is that the Johannesburg people had only two daysin which to look after themselves and protect themselves in thecrisis in which Dr. Jameson's action had plunged them; that as amatter of fact strenuous efforts were made to establish communicationwith the invading force; that the Intelligence Department--which, considering how short a time was available for its organization, wasby no means unsatisfactory--was employed in many directions besidesthat in which Dr. Jameson was moving; that some success was achievedin communicating with him, but that the risks to be taken, owing tothe imperative necessity of saving time at almost any cost, weregreater than usual and resulted in the capture of eight or ten of themen employed in the endeavour to communicate with Dr. Jameson alone;and finally, that since he had seen fit to violate all thearrangements entered into and dash into the country in defiance ofthe expressed wishes of the people, whom he was bent on rescuingwhether they wished to be rescued or not, the least that could beexpected of him and of his force was that they should acquaintthemselves with the road which they proposed to travel and take thenecessary steps to keep the Johannesburg people posted as to theirmovements. 

It has been urged by a prominent member of the invading force--notDr. Jameson--that since the force had been kept on the border forsome weeks with the sole object of assisting Johannesburg people whenthey should require assistance, the very least that they wereentitled to expect was that someone should be sent out to show themthe road and not leave them to go astray for want of a guide. To thisit was replied that a force which had been, as they stated, on theborder for several weeks with the sole object of invading the countryby a certain road, had ample time, and might certainly have beenexpected to know the road; and as for relieving Johannesburg in itsnecessity, the argument might have applied had this 'necessity' everarisen; but since the idea was to force the hands of the Reformers, the latter might fairly regard themselves as absolved from everyundertaking, specific or implied, which might ever have been made inconnection with the business. But at that time the excuse had notbeen devised that there had ever been an undertaking to assistJameson, on the contrary it was readily admitted that such an ideawas never entertained for a moment; nor can one understand how anyonecognizant of the telegram from Dr. Jameson to Dr. RutherfoordHarris--'We will make our own flotation by the aid of the letterwhich I shall publish'--can set up any defence at the expense ofothers. 

By Wednesday night it was known that Major Heany had passed throughMafeking in time to join Dr. Jameson's force, and that, bar someextraordinary accident, Captain Holden must have met Dr. Jameson onhis way, since he had been despatched along the road which Dr. Jameson would take in marching on Johannesburg; and if all otherreasons did not suffice to assure the Committee that Dr. Jamesonwould not be relying on any assistance from Johannesburg thepresence of one or other of the two officers above mentioned wouldenable him to know that he should not count upon Johannesburg to givehim active support. Both were thoroughly well acquainted with theposition and were able to inform him, and have since admitted thatthey did inform him, that he should not count upon a single mangoing out to meet him. Captain Holden--who prior to the trial ofDr. Jameson and his comrades, prompted by loyalty to his chief, abstained from making any statement which could possibly embarrasshim--immediately after the trial expressed his regret at the unjustcensure upon the Johannesburg people and the charges of cowardice andbad faith which had been levelled against them, and stated that hereached Pitsani the night before Dr. Jameson started, and that hefaithfully and fully delivered the messages which he was charged todeliver and earnestly impressed upon Dr. Jameson the position inwhich the Johannesburg people were placed, and their desire that heshould not embarrass them by any precipitate action. 

Before daybreak on Thursday, January 2, Bugler Vallé, of Dr. Jameson's force, arrived in the Reform Committee room and reportedhimself as having been sent by the Doctor at about midnight after thebattle at Krugersdorp on Wednesday. He stated that the Doctor hadsupplied him with the best horse in the troop and sent him on toinform Colonel Rhodes where he was. He described the battle at theQueen's Mine, Krugersdorp, and stated that the force had been obligedto retreat from the position in which they had fought in order totake up a better one on higher ground, but that the position in whichthey had camped for the night was not a very good one. Whenquestioned as to the exact message that he had been told to deliverhe replied, 'The Doctor says, "Tell them that I am getting along allright, but they must send out to meet me. "' He was asked what wasmeant by 'sending out to meet him. ' Did it mean to send a force out?Did he want help? His reply was, 'No; the Doctor says he is gettingalong all right, but you must send out to meet him. ' The messengerwas keenly questioned upon this point, but adhered to the statementthat the force was getting along all right and would be in early inthe morning. Colonel Rhodes, who was the first to see themessenger, was however dissatisfied with the grudging admissions andthe ambiguous message, and expressed the belief that 'the Doctorwants help, but is ashamed to say so. ' Acting promptly on thisconviction, he despatched all the mounted men available (about 100)under command of Colonel Bettington, with instructions to ascertainthe whereabouts of Dr. Jameson's force, and if possible to join them. 

This was done without the authority of the Committee and in directopposition to the line already decided upon. It was moreoverconsidered to be taking a wholly unnecessary risk, in view of thefact that an attack upon the town was threatened by burgher forces onthe north-west side, and it was immediately decided by a number ofmembers who heard of Colonel Rhodes' action to despatch a messengerordering the troop not to proceed more than ten miles from the town, but to reconnoitre and ascertain what Dr. Jameson's position was, with the reservation that, should it be found that he actually neededhelp, such assistance as was possible should of course be given him. As a matter of hard fact it would not have been possible for thetroop to reach Dr. Jameson before his surrender, so that the actiontaken upon the only message received from the invading force had nopractical bearing upon the results. 

At daybreak on Thursday morning Mr. Lace and the despatch rider sentby the British Agent to deliver the High Commissioner's proclamationand the covering despatch were passed through the Dutch lines underthe authority of the Commandant-General, and they delivered thedocuments to Dr. Jameson in person. In reply to Sir Jacobus de Wet'sappeal Dr. Jameson said, 'Tell Sir Jacobus de Wet that I havereceived his despatch; and that I shall see him in Pretoriato-morrow. ' Mr. Lace briefly informed him of the position, as he hadundertaken to do. The presence of a Boer escort and the shortness ofthe time allowed for the delivery of the messages prevented anylengthy conversation. Dr. Jameson made no comment further than tosay, 'It is too late now, ' and then asked the question, 'Where arethe troops?' to which Mr. Lace replied, 'What troops do you mean? Weknow nothing about troops. ' It did not occur to Mr. Lace or toanyone else that he could have meant 'troops' from Johannesburg. Withthe receipt of Dr. Jameson's verbal reply to the British Agent'sdespatch-carrier the business was concluded, and the escort from theBoer lines insisted on leaving, taking with them Mr. Lace and thedespatch-rider. He offered no further remark. 

Footnotes for Chapter V

{22} The telegram originally read 'within twenty-four hours, ' butit was considered impossible to guarantee the time exactly, and thealteration as above given was made, the word 'within' beinginadvertently left standing instead of 'with. '

{23} Captain Ferreira, at one time in command of the guard over theReformers, informed the writer that he had formed one of the cavalryescort. 'It is a good story, ' he said, 'but what fools we would havebeen to send our guns shut up in trucks through a hostile camp of20, 000 armed men--as we thought--round two sides of a triangleinstead of going by the shorter and safe road. '

CHAPTER VI. 

THE INVASION. 

From the evidence on the trial at bar of Dr. Jameson and hiscomrades, it appears that about 20th October, 1895, orders were givento the Matabeleland Border Police to move southward. After this, further mobilization of other bodies took place and during the firstweek in December there collected at Pitsani Potlogo the body of menfrom whom Dr. Jameson's invading column was afterwards selected. Forthree weeks the men were continuously drilled and practised in allwarlike exercises and thoroughly prepared for the enterprise whichtheir leaders had in view. On Sunday, December 29, at about three inthe afternoon, the little force was paraded and Dr. Jameson read tothem the letter of invitation quoted in a previous chapter. He isalleged by certain witnesses to have said that he had just receivedthis and that they could not refuse to go to the assistance of theircountrymen in distress, and he confidently appealed to the men tosupport him. He said that he did not anticipate any bloodshed at all. They would proceed by forced marching straight through toJohannesburg, and would reach that town before the Boers were awareof his movements, and certainly before they could concentrate to stophim. It has been alleged by some witnesses that the men of theBechuanaland Border Police who advanced from Mafeking under thecommand of Colonel Grey and Major Coventry were not so fully informedas to their destination and the reasons for the movement until theywere actually in marching order to start. It would appear howeverfrom the general summary of the evidence and from the reports ofthe men who took part in the expedition, that they were informed thatthe destination of the force was Johannesburg, that the object was torender assistance to their countrymen in that town who were beinggrossly misruled by the Transvaal Government and were at that time ingrievous straits and peril through having endeavoured to assert theirrights and obtain the reforms for which they had so long beenagitating, and that the immediate reason for marching was the receiptof an urgent appeal from Johannesburg citizens, which appeal (theletter of invitation) was duly read to them. In reply to questions asto whether they were fighting under the Queen's orders, they wereinformed that they were going to fight for the supremacy of theBritish flag in South Africa. A considerable proportion of the mendeclined to take part in the enterprise, and it is probably largelydue to defections at the last moment that the statement was made that700 men had started with Dr. Jameson, whereas it appears that only480 ever left the Protectorate. 

The following is a portion of the Majority Report of the SelectCommittee on the Jameson Raid appointed by the Cape House ofAssembly:

On the 26th December there was a sudden check. On the afternoon ofthat day Colonel Rhodes telegraphs to Charter, Capetown, 'It isabsolutely necessary to postpone flotation. Charles Leonard left lastnight for Capetown. ' Messages to the same effect were sent from Mr. S. W. Jameson to his brother, and from Dr. Harris for the CharteredCompany to Dr. Jameson, the latter concluding: 'So you must not movetill you hear from us again. Too awful. Very sorry. '

As to the nature of the hitch that occurred, there is some lightthrown on it by the statement from Mr. S. W. Jameson to his brotherthat any movement must be postponed 'until we have C. J. Rhodes'absolute pledge that authority of Imperial Government will not beinsisted on, ' a point that is further alluded to in Telegram No. 6, 537 of Appendix QQ of the 28th December. 

Whatever the exact nature of the obstacle was, there can be no doubtthat some at least of the Johannesburg confederates were much alarmedand took all possible steps to stay proceedings. 

In addition to urgent telegrams special messengers were sent toimpress on Dr. Jameson the necessity for delay. One of these, CaptainHolden, made his way across country. 

According to Mr. Hammond's evidence Holden arrived at Mafeking on the28th December, and went in with the column. 

The other messenger was Captain Maurice Heany, who left Johannesburgon the 26th December, and on the 27th telegraphed from Bloemfonteinto Charter, Capetown, informing them that 'Zebrawood' (ColonelRhodes) had asked him to 'stop "Zahlbar" (Dr. Jameson) till Heanysees him, ' and asking that a special train might be arranged for him. Dr. Harris replied to Kimberley on the 28th informing him that aspecial train was arranged, and added, 'lose no time or you will belate. '

It is in evidence that this special train was provided by theChartered Company, that Heany left by it, caught up the ordinarytrain at Vryburg, and that he reached Mafeking at 4. 30 a. M. OnSunday, the 29th. 

The evidence is that he was coming with an urgent message to stop Dr. Jameson; that on his arrival at Mafeking he waked up Mr. Isaacs, alocal storekeeper, and purchased a pair of field boots and akit-bag, and proceeded by special cart to Pitsani; and that hesubsequently on the same evening accompanied Dr. Jameson on hisinroad and was captured at Doornkop. {24}

On the 27th, after receiving the discouraging telegrams mentionedabove from Johannesburg, Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown, 'I am afraid of Bechuanaland Police for cutting wire. Theyhave now all gone forward, but will endeavour to put a stop to it. Therefore expect to receive telegram from you nine to-morrow morningauthorizing movements. Surely Col. F. W. Rhodes advisable to come toterms at once. Give guarantee, or you can telegraph before CharlesLeonard arrived. ' This doubtless alludes to the necessity forguarantee mentioned in the message from S. W. Jameson, and thealternative suggestion was that authority to proceed should be givenbefore the arrival of the Johannesburg delegate at Capetown. 

Two hours later on the same day he sends another message of theutmost importance. He informs Harris, Charter, Capetown, as follows:'If I cannot, as I expect, communicate with Bechuanaland BorderPolice cutting, then we must carry into effect original plans. Theyhave then two days for flotation. If they do not, we will make ourown flotation with help of letter, which I will publish. '

On the same day Dr. Jameson telegraphed to his brother inJohannesburg as follows: 'Guarantee already given, therefore let J. H. Hammond telegraph instantly all right. '

To this Mr. Hammond sent a most positive reply absolutely condemninghis proposed action. 

As bearing upon the attitude of the force at Pitsani, it may be notedthat on the same day that the foregoing correspondence was takingplace, Mr. A. Bates was despatched from Mafeking into the Transvaalwith instructions from Major Raleigh Grey to collect information andmeet Dr. Jameson _en route. _ He was supplied with a horse and money, and seems to have done his best to carry out instructions. 

Early the next day Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'There will be no flotation if left to themselves; firstdelay was races, which did not exist; second policies, alreadyarranged. All mean fear. {25} You had better go as quickly as possibleand report fully, or tell Hon. C. J. Rhodes to allow me. '

The reply to this was: 'It is all right if you will only wait. Captain Maurice Heany comes to you from Col. F. W. Rhodes by specialtrain to-day. ' And, again, two hours later, Dr. Harris for theChartered Company telegraphs: 'Goold Adams arrives Mafeking Monday, and Heany, I think, arrives to-night; after seeing him, you and wemust judge regarding flotation, but all our foreign friends are nowdead against it and say public will not subscribe one penny towardseven with you as a director--Ichabod. '

Still on the same day two further telegrams to Dr. Jameson were sentfrom Capetown, almost together, of a strongly discouraging tenour. One of them concludes by saying 'we cannot have fiasco, ' and theother informs Dr. Jameson that Lionel Phillips anticipates completefailure of any premature action. 

On the same day Dr. Harris informs Colonel Rhodes at Johannesburgthat, 'Have arranged for Captain Maurice Heany; Dr. Jameson awaitingCapt. Maurice Heany's arrival. Keep market firm. '

And later:

'Charles Leonard says flotation not popular, and England's buntingwill be resisted by public. Is it true? Consult all our friends andlet me know, as Dr. Jameson is quite ready to move resolution and isonly waiting for Captain Heany's arrival. '

A few hours later Dr. Jameson telegraphs to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'Received your telegram Ichabod _re_ Capt. Maurice Heany. Have no further news. I require to know. Unless I hear definitely tothe contrary, shall leave to-morrow evening and carry into effect mysecond telegram (Appendix QQ, No. 06365) of yesterday to you, and itwill be all right. '

On the next morning, Sunday the 29th, Heany arrived at Mafeking, andafter making the purchases detailed above, left by special cart forthe camp at Pitsani, where he probably arrived about eight o'clocka. M. At five minutes past nine Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'Shall leave to-night for the Transvaal. My reasonis the final arrangement with writers of letter was that, withoutfurther reference to them, in case I should hear at some future timethat suspicions have been aroused as to their intention among theTransvaal authorities, I was to start immediately to prevent loss oflives, as letter states. Reuter only just received. Even without myown information of meeting in the Transvaal, compel immediate moveto fulfil promise made. We are simply going to protect everybodywhile they change the present dishonest Government and take vote fromthe whole country as to form of Government required by the whole. '

The force took with them provisions for one day only, relying on thecommissariat arrangements made on their behalf by Dr. Wolff _enroute. _ They were well mounted and armed with Lee-Metford carbines, and took with them eight Maxims, two seven-pounders and onetwelve-pounder. In order to facilitate quick movement no heavyequipment was taken, and but little spare ammunition. The vehiclesattending the column were six Scotch carts and one Cape cart. Thetotal distance to be covered was about 170 miles to Johannesburg, or150 miles to Krugersdorp. The start was made from Pitsani shortlyafter 5 p. M. , and marching was continued throughout the night. Theforce consisted of about 350 of the Chartered forces under ColonelSir John Willoughby, Major in the Royal Horse Guards; the Hon. H. F. White, Major 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards; Hon. R. White, CaptainRoyal Welsh Fusiliers; Major J. B. Tracey, 2nd Battalion ScotsGuards; Captain C. H. Villiers, Royal Horse Guards; and 120 of theBechuanaland Border Police under Major Raleigh Grey, Captain 6thInniskillen Dragoons, and the Hon. C. J. Coventry, Captain 3rdMilitia Battalion Worcester Regiment. The two contingents met atMalmani at about sunrise on Monday morning, December 30. They marchedthroughout that day and night and the following day, Tuesday. Therewere half-hour rests about every twenty miles for rationing the menand feeding and watering the horses, the fodder being ready for thehorses at various stores. Provisions for the men consisted of tinnedmeats and biscuits. There was no lack of provisions at all; but themen complained afterwards that they were so overcome with fatiguefrom continuous marching that when they reached the resting-placesthey generally lay down where they dismounted, and slept, instead oftaking the food which was ready for them. A serious fault in theconduct of the expedition appears to have been the lack ofopportunity for rest and food afforded the men. It was contended thatthe same or a higher average of speed might have been attained bypressing on faster for spells of a few hours and allowing reasonableintervals for rest and refreshment. Only about 130 miles had beencovered by the column during the seventy hours that they were on themarch before they were first checked by any serious opposition fromthe Boers. 

On Monday, December 30, at about 1 p. M. , Mr. F. J. Newton, ResidentCommissioner at Mafeking, received the following telegram from theHigh Commissioner, Capetown, dated the same day:

It is rumoured here that Dr. Jameson has entered the Transvaal withan armed force. Is this so? If so, send special messenger on fasthorse directing him to return immediately. A copy of this telegramshould be sent to the officers with him, and they should be told thatthis violation of the territory of a friendly State is repudiated byHer Majesty's Government, and that they are rendering themselvesliable to severe penalties. 

Mr. Newton at once addressed to Dr. Jameson and each of the chiefofficers with him the following letter:

SIR, I have the honour to enclose copy of a telegram which I have receivedfrom His Excellency the High Commissioner, and I have accordingly torequest that you will immediately comply with His Excellency'sinstructions. 

Trooper J. T. White was despatched as soon as possible with the fiveletters, enclosed in waterproof, with instructions to ride until hecaught up to Dr. Jameson and delivered the letters. He was stopped bya party of armed Boers and taken before Landdrost Marais at Malmani, where the despatches were opened and read. He was delayed for fourhours, and then allowed to proceed with an escort. On Tuesday morninghe crossed the Elands River and caught up the column at about 11 a. M. He had ridden all night, covering about eighty miles. He alleges thatat first the officers would not take the letters, but eventually SirJohn Willoughby accepted and read his and the others followed suit. He stated that he had been instructed to deliver the letterspersonally, and to get a reply. Sir John Willoughby sent a message byhim stating that the despatches would be attended to. Shortly afterthis Dr. Jameson also received a protest from the Commandant of theMarico district against his invasion of the State, to which hesent the following reply:

 _December 30, 1895. _

SIR, I am in receipt of your protest of the above date, and have to informyou that I intend proceeding with my original plans, which have nohostile intention against the people of the Transvaal; but we arehere in reply to an invitation from the principal residents of theRand to assist them in their demand for justice and the ordinaryrights of every citizen of a civilized State. 

 Yours faithfully L. S. JAMESON. 

White states that this was about noon, and 'then the bugle soundedand the column moved off. ' The force continued advancing in much thesame way throughout Tuesday, and at 6 p. M. A skirmisher of theadvanced guard met Lieutenant Eloff of the Krugersdorp DistrictPolice, who had been instructed by his Government to ride toMafeking, presumably for the purpose of getting information. He hadcome with a guard of nine men, whom he had left some distance off;advancing alone to meet the column. He states that when releasedafter two hours' delay he left the forces, and passing along theRustenburg road met a commando of some 300 Boers with whom he made acircuit to avoid the column, and reached Krugersdorp before it did. From this it is clear that the Boers were collecting in considerablenumbers to meet the invading force, and were moving with much greaterrapidity than their enemies. 

On Wednesday morning, at about 5. 30, Messrs. Theron and Bouwer(despatch riders), who had been sent by Sir Jacobus de Wet, BritishAgent at Pretoria, at 1. 30 p. M. On the previous day with a despatchfor Dr. Jameson, reached the column and delivered their letters, andstated that they had been instructed to take back a reply as soon aspossible. Dr. Jameson said, 'All right; I'll give you a reply, ' andwithin a few minutes he handed to them the following letter:

 _January 1. _

DEAR SIR, I am in receipt of the message you sent from His Excellency the HighCommissioner, and beg to reply, for His Excellency's information, that I should, of course, desire to obey his instructions, but, as Ihave a very large force of both men and horses to feed, and havingfinished all my supplies in the rear, must perforce proceed toKrugersdorp or Johannesburg this morning for this purpose. At thesame time I must acknowledge I am anxious to fulfil my promise on thepetition of the principal residents of the Rand, to come to the aidof my fellow-men in their extremity. I have molested no one, and haveexplained to all Dutchmen met that the above is my sole object, andthat I shall desire to return at once to the Protectorate. I am, etc. , (Signed) L. S. JAMESON. 

At about 10. 30 a. M. On the same day (January 1) two cyclists, Messrs. Celliers and Rowland, carrying despatches from members of the ReformCommittee, met the column. The letters were received by Dr. Jameson, and taken with him as far as Doornkop, where, upon surrender of theforce, they appear to have been torn up. With that good fortune whichseems to have followed the Boers throughout this business, these tornfragments were picked up on the battle-field by a Boer official fourmonths later, having remained undisturbed during the severe rain andwind storms of the wet season. Some portions were missing, but theothers were pieced together and produced in evidence against theReform prisoners. The letters are printed hereunder as they werewritten, as testified by the writers, and, in the case of the firstone, by others who read it before it was despatched. The italicsrepresent the fragments of the letters which were never found:{26}

DEAR DR. 

The rumour of massa_cre in_ Johannesburg that started yo_u to_ ourrelief was not true. We a_re all_ right, feeling intense. We havearmed a lot of men. Shall be very glad to see you. _We are_ not inpossess_ion of the_ town. _I shall send out some_ men to_You are a fine_ fellow. Yours ever

F. R. {27}

We will all drink a glass along _o_' you. 

L. P. {28}

31st, 11. 30. Kruger has asked for _some of us to_ go over and treat:armistice for _24 hours agreed_ to. My view is that they are in afunk at Pretoria, and they were wrong to agree from here. 

F. R. {27}

DR. JAMESON. 

[Illustration. Caption: The above are reproductions of photographs ofthe documents now in possession of the Transvaal Government. For thereport of the expert, Mr. T. H. Gurrin, as submitted to the SelectCommittee of the House of Commons, see Appendix L. ]

It may be noted that the tone of this correspondence does not appearto be in accord with the attitude taken up by the ReformCommittee. The letters however were written on Tuesday the 31st, whenthere was a general belief that Dr. Jameson had started in goodfaith, misled by some false reports. In the second letter ColonelRhodes expresses the opinion that it was wrong to agree to send ina deputation to meet the Government. This was written before thedeputation had gone to Pretoria, and clearly implies that the moraleffect of treating would be bad. The phrasing also shows that theso-called armistice was for the purpose of treating, and not thetreating for the purpose of securing an armistice: in other words, that the armistice would expire, and not commence, with the treating. 

From the evidence given by the cyclist Rowland, it appears that hestated to Dr. Jameson that he could get 2, 000{29} armed men to go outto his assistance; and Rowland in evidence alleged further that therewas some offer of assistance in one of the despatches, and that Dr. Jameson, in reply, said he did not need any assistance, but that if2, 000 men should come out probably the Boers would draw off. Thiswitness in his evidence at Bow Street also alleged that one of thedespatches expressed surprise at Dr. Jameson's movement. There is nowa complete record of these despatches. They make no allusions togiving assistance, and the Johannesburg leaders are very clear on thepoint that no promise or offer of assistance was ever made. The replywhich Dr. Jameson caused to be sent was concealed in one of thebicycles, which were seized by the Boer authorities on the returnride of the despatch-carriers, and was not brought to light until thefollowing March, when a mechanic who was repairing the broken bicyclediscovered it. 

The much-debated question of whether assistance was ever promised orexpected should be finally disposed of by the publication of twodocuments which have not heretofore appeared in print. They are _(a)_the reply of Dr. Jameson to Colonel Rhodes' letters, and _(b)_ thereport of Mr. Celliers, the cyclist despatch-rider who took theletter and received the reply, which report was taken down inshorthand by the clerks in the Reform Committee room as it wasmade verbally by him immediately on his return. Both these recordsdispose of Mr. Rowland's statement about 2, 000 men; and apart fromthis it should be observed that Mr. Celliers was the messenger sentby Colonel Rhodes and not Mr. Rowland; the latter having been lateron picked up 'for company, ' was presumably less qualified to speakabout the instructions and messages than Celliers, from whom indeedhe learned all that he knew. 

The letter was written by Col. H. F. White in the presence of thecyclists, and partly at the dictation of Dr. Jameson. It was in theform of a memorandum from Col. H. F. White to Col. Frank Rhodes, andbore no signature; but the last line was in Dr. Jameson'shandwriting, and was initialed by him. It ran as follows:

As you may imagine, we are all well pleased by your letter. We havehad some fighting, and hope to reach Johannesburg to-night, but ofcourse it will depend on the amount of fighting we have. Of course weshall be pleased to have 200 men meet us at Krugersdorp, as it willgreatly encourage the men, who are in great heart although a bittired. Love to Sam, Phillips, and rest, L. S. J. 

Mr. Celliers' report--after detailing the incidents of the rideout--runs:

. . . I reached the column between 9 and 10 o'clock. I saw Dr. Jamesonpersonally. He received us very well, and was very glad with the newsI brought him. He read the despatch, and asked me for full details. Itold him the strength of the Boers and the dangers he was in. I toldhim that they had no guns, and all that I saw and heard that they hadduring my travels. I explained to him everything in detail. TheDoctor seemed to be very brave. He told me that he had twoscrimmages, and that no damage had been done. I said to him whetherit would not be well for him to halt until we got through and senthim some help. The Doctor said he did not think there was anything tofear, and at the same time he did not want to go to Johannesburg as apirate, and it would be well for them to send some men to meet him. Ialso made inquiries as to whether I could return by any other road, but found it was impossible, and that we had to come back the sameway. I got his despatch, shook hands with him, wished us well, andset on our journey back. 

The report, which is given above literally as transcribed from theshorthand notes, concludes with an account of the return journey. Mr. Celliers in a subsequent statement confirmed the above, and added:

The impression which the Doctor gave me most certainly was that hehad never expected help and did not want it. {30}

The march continued on towards Krugersdorp. At one or two places afew shots were fired by Boer pickets, and on one occasion the Maximsof the invading force were turned on a party of some fifty Boersensconced in a good position. No casualties however occurred untilKrugersdorp was reached at 3 p. M. On Wednesday. A message was sent bySir John Willoughby to the authorities at Krugersdorp that if heencountered any opposition he would shell the town, and he warnedthem to have their women and children removed. 

Shortly after mid-day positions were taken up on the hills pearKrugersdorp, and at three o'clock severe fighting took place whichlasted well on into the night. An ambush at the crushing mill andworks of the Queen's Mine was shelled and an attempt was made tostorm it by a small party of the invaders. It was unsuccessfulhowever, and after nightfall Dr. Jameson's force was obliged toretreat from its position and seek a more advantageous one on higherground. 

They had suffered a reverse at the hands of a somewhat larger forceof Boers who had selected a very strong position. Firing did notcease until 11 p. M. Here it is alleged the fatal military mistake ofthe expedition was committed. No precautions had been taken toascertain the road. Instead of being well acquainted with thedirection to be taken the force was dependent upon a guide picked upon the spot, a man who was never seen after the events of thefollowing day and is freely alleged to have been a Boer agent. It isstated by competent judges that, had Dr. Jameson's force pushed onduring the night on the main road to Johannesburg, they would havesucceeded in reaching that town without difficulty. As it was howeverthey camped for the night in the direction of Randfontein and in theearly morning struck away south, attempting a big detour to avoid theroad which they had tried to force the previous night. There is butlittle doubt that they were shepherded into the position in whichthey were called upon to fight at Doornkop. The following descriptionof the Doornkop fight was written by Captain Frank Younghusband, thecorrespondent of the London _Times_, who was an eye-witness:

Galloping over the rolling open grassy downs in search of Dr. Jameson's force which was expected to arrive at Johannesburg at anymoment, my companion Heygate and myself saw between us two forces, both stationary. Then one began to move away and from the regularityof its movement we recognized that this must be Dr. Jameson's tryingto round the opposing Boer forces. We found a Boer guard holding theonly ford across the stream; so going up to the Commander we askedfor news. He, after questioning us, told us all that had occurred. 

He was a field-cornet from Potchefstroom, and leader of one divisionof the Boers. He said that yesterday, January 1, Dr. Jameson hadattacked the Boer force at the George and May Mine, two milesnorth-west of Krugersdorp, a small mining township twenty-one mileswest of Johannesburg. Fighting took place from three in the afternoonto eleven at night, Dr. Jameson making three principal attacks, anddoing great damage with his artillery, which the Boers, having thenno guns, were unable to reply to. 

My informant, the Boer leader, said that both then and to-day Dr. Jameson's men behaved with great gallantry, and he also said thatadmirable arrangements had been made at Krugersdorp for nursing thewounded on both sides. 

This morning the Boers took up a position at Vlakfontein, eight mileson the Johannesburg side of Krugersdorp, on a circuitous road to thesouth by which Dr. Jameson was marching. The Boers in the night hadbeen reinforced by men and with artillery and Maxims. Their positionwas an exceedingly strong one on an open slope, but along a ridge ofrocks cropping out of it. It was a right-angled position and Dr. Jameson attacked them in the re-entering angle, thus having fire onhis front and flank. 

To attack this position his men had to advance over a perfectly opengently-sloping grassy down, while the Boers lay hid behind rocks andfired with rifles, Maxims, and artillery upon their assailants. TheBoers numbered from 1, 200 to 1, 500, Dr. Jameson's force about 500, and the position was practically unassailable. 

Dr. Jameson, after making a desperate effort to get through, surrendered, and as we stood we saw his brave little band ridingdejectedly back again to Krugersdorp without their arms andsurrounded by a Boer escort. 

We were allowed to ride close up, but were refused permission to seeDr. Jameson. It is therefore impossible to state his full reasons, but it is known that he was made aware that it was impossible to sendassistance from here, and this may have influenced him in givingup the contest when he found the enemy's position so strong thatin any case it would have been no disgrace to have been beaten bysuperior numbers of such a brave foe as that Boer force which Isaw in the very position they had fought in. It was evident thatprobably no one had ever started on a more desperate venture thanhad this daring little force, and they gained by their gallantry theadoration, not only of the Boer burghers who spoke to me, but of thewhole town of Johannesburg. 

These Boers--rough, simple men, dressed in ordinary civilian clothes, with merely a rifle slung over the shoulder to show they weresoldiers--spoke in feeling terms of the splendid bravery shown bytheir assailants. They were perfectly calm and spoke without anyboastfulness in a self-reliant way. They said, pointing to theground, that the thing was impossible, and hence the present result. 

The total loss of Dr. Jameson's force is about twenty. Major Greywas, they said, the principal military officer, and they thought thatno officer was killed, and that the report that Sir John Willoughbyhad been killed was unfounded. He and Dr. Jameson have been taken toPretoria. 

At 9. 15 o'clock the white flag was put up. Sir J. Willoughby, theofficer in command of the force, then sent the following noteaddressed to the Commandant of the Transvaal Forces:

We surrender, provided that you guarantee us safe conduct out of thecountry for every member of the force. 

 JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY. 

A reply was sent within fifteen minutes, of which the following is aliteral translation:

OFFICER, --Please take note that I shall immediately assemble ourofficers to decide upon your communication. 

 COMMANDANT. 

Twenty or thirty minutes later a second note was received by thesurrendering force, addressed 'John C. Willoughby':

I acknowledge your letter. The answer is that, if you will undertaketo pay the expense which you have caused the South African Republic, and if you will surrender with your arms, then I shall spare thelives of you and yours. Please send me a reply to this within thirtyminutes. 

 P. A. CRONJÉ. _Commandant, Potchefstroom. _

Within fifteen minutes of the receipt of this letter, Sir J. Willoughby replied, accepting the conditions in the following terms:

I accept the terms on the guarantee that the lives of all will bespared. I now await your instructions as to how and where we are tolay down our arms. At the same time I would ask you to remember thatmy men have been without food for the last twenty-four hours. 

'The flag sent with the first message (to quote the statement made onbehalf of Sir J. Willoughby by his solicitor, Mr. B. F. Hawksley) wassent perhaps a little earlier than 9. 15. Dr. Jameson's force ceasedfiring as soon as the flag was hoisted, except on the extreme right. Messengers were sent to stop that firing, and all firing ceasedwithin five minutes. The Boers continued to fire for some tenminutes, and for some time after Jameson's force had ceased. AfterSir J. Willoughby had received the first answer the State Artilleryopened fire and continued firing for at least fifteen minutes. Sir J. Willoughby sent Colonel the Hon. H. White and Captain Grenfell to theCommandant with a note requesting to know the reason for firing on aflag of truce, and requesting that it might cease. Sir J. Willoughbyhas no copy of the letter he wrote accepting the conditions offeredby Cronjé, but it was to the effect above given. 'Besides Cronjé, Commandant Malan was acquainted with the terms of surrender, for_after Jameson's force had given up their arms_ Commandant Malan cameup and repudiated part of the terms, saying he would not guaranteethe lives of Jameson and the leaders, and that they would be handedover to General Joubert, who would decide their fate. '

The decision having been announced to the forces, and many of the menhaving stacked their arms and dropped off to sleep where they lay inthe veld, several other commandants joined Cronjé, and an altercationtook place in the presence of the surrendered officers, CommandantMalan of Rustenburg violently proclaiming that Cronjé had noright to spare the lives of the force, and that it lay with theCommandant-General and Krijgsraad (or War Council) to decide whatshould be done with the prisoners. Commandant Cronjé replied thatthey had surrendered to him upon certain conditions, and thoseconditions had been accepted by him. In the course of the discussion, in which several other prominent Boers joined, disapproval wasgenerally expressed of Cronjé's acceptance of the terms and threatswere used to Dr. Jameson in person. Eye-witnesses on the Boerside state that Dr. Jameson declined to discuss the matter further;he merely bowed and walked away. It may be remarked that it is not byany means unusual for the Boers to seek to stretch to their advantageterms which they have previously agreed upon. There can now be noquestion as to the conditions of the surrender. The officer incommand on the field agreed to spare the lives of the entire force, and it was not competent for anyone to reverse that decision or toreopen the question. The incident is instructive, and also importantsince the lives of Dr. Jameson and his men were made to play aconsiderable part in President Kruger's game of magnanimity lateron. {31}

The Johannesburg _Star_ correspondent, describing the surrender, says:

There were upwards of 400 altogether, and the poor fellows made asorry sight--tired from their long march, their privations, and thetremendous strain of continuous engagements for nearly twenty-fourhours. Some almost slept in their saddles as they were beingescorted; and when they arrived on Krugersdorp Market Square thescene will not soon be forgotten. 

The Boers freely mixed with them and talked with them. Provisionswere brought, and devoured with ravenous hunger. In many cases theBoers gave from their own scant stock of provisions to the starvingmen, for whom they expressed the utmost admiration for theirpluckiness and determination. 

Dr. Jameson and his principal officers, including Sir JohnWilloughby, were brought in separately from the main body of thecaptured troops. Although the Boers treated most of the prisonerswith consideration, they jeered somewhat when Dr. Jameson was broughtforward; but this was promptly suppressed by the Commandants. Dr. Jameson and the officers were temporarily housed in the Court-house, together with the other officers captured previously. 

A mule-waggon was brought up, fitted with mattresses. The chiefofficers were despatched to Pretoria under a strong escort of Boers. About half an hour later the rest of the prisoners were also escortedout of the town to Pretoria, most of them on their own horses. Bothmen and horses were extremely emaciated. 

The burgher losses were reported to have been 4 killed and 5 wounded. The losses of Dr. Jameson's force were 18 killed and about 40wounded. 

There were also taken: 400 magazine and Lee-Metford rifles, 8 Maxims(one spiked, or with the breach-piece gone), 4 field-pieces, 33, 000rifle cartridges, 10 cases of Maxim cartridges, 10 cases ofprojectiles, 2 sacks of projectiles, 300 cartridge-belts, 13revolvers, 4 mule-waggons, 5 Scotch carts, 742 horses (in which wereincluded the 250 horses which were captured in charge of two troopersnear Blaaubank), a full-blooded stallion (the property of Dr. Jameson), 400 saddles, bridles etc. , 38 mules with harness, 1telegraph instrument (probably to tap wires with), harness and otheraccoutrements and instruments of war. 

The prisoners were treated with every consideration by their captors, with the exception perhaps of Dr. Jameson himself, who was threatenedby some of the unruly ones and freely hissed and hooted, but wasprotected by the officers in charge. It must be said of the Boersthat they acted with admirable self-restraint and dignity in aposition such as very few are called upon to face. However politictheir actions may have been in their fear of provoking conflict withJohannesburg and the Imperial Government, however the juggling withDr. Jameson's life afterwards and the spurious magnanimity so freelyadvertized, may detract from what they did and may tend to bringridicule and suspicion upon them, one cannot review the broad factsof the Jameson invasion, and realize a position which, if only forthe moment, gave the aggrieved party unlimited scope for revenge uponan aggressor who had not the semblance of personal wrong or interestnor the pretext of duty to justify his action, without allowing tothe Boers that they behaved in such a manner as, for a time, tosilence even that criticism which is logically justifiable andultimately imperative. In so far as the invading force are concerned, the words of Mr. A. J. Balfour aptly sum up the position: 'PresidentKruger has shown himself to possess a generosity which is not theless to be admired because it is coincident with the highestpolitical wisdom. '

With reference to the surrender of the force, it is reasonable tobelieve that the Transvaal Government, knowing how serious thecomplications would be if civil war actually took place, andbelieving as they undoubtedly did that Johannesburg contained upwardsof 20, 000 armed men, were quite willing--indeed anxious--to securethe surrender of Dr. Jameson's force on any terms, and that theconditions made by Cronjé were quite in accordance with what thehighest Boer authorities would have accepted. It seems to be beyondquestion also that the conditions of surrender were purposelysuppressed in order to enable the President to bargain withJohannesburg; and, as has already been stated, such actionmaterially detracted from the credit due to the Transvaal Government. This is their characteristic diplomacy--the fruit of generations ofsharpening wits against savages; and the same is called Kaffircunning, and is not understood at first by European people. But whenall such considerations are weighed, there is still a large balanceof credit due to the Boers for the manner in which they treatedDr. Jameson and his invading force. It is difficult to conceive ofany people behaving better to a foe vanquished under such conditions;indeed, it would be quite impossible. 

The Boers when under control of their leaders have generally behavedin an admirable manner. It is only when the individuals, unrestrainedby those in authority, are left to exercise their power at thedictates of their own uncurbed passions, that the horrible sceneshave occurred which have undoubtedly blemished their reputation. 

In connection with the Jameson raid there was one such incident--theshooting of Trooper Black. The unfortunate man fell into the hands ofthe Boers while out scouting and was taken as a prisoner to afarmhouse near Blaaubank. There he was tied up and beaten, and it isstated by a woman who gave him water when he was half mad withthirst, that his face had been smashed by a blow from a rifle butt. When unable to bear the treatment any longer Black stood up and, tearing his shirt open, cried out, 'Don't shoot me in the back! Shoothere! My heart's in the right place. ' He was then untied and (asalleged by Dutch witnesses) given an opportunity to escape. Hemounted his horse, but before he had gone far was shot dead. On theappeal of Sir Jacobus de Wet the Government consented to investigatethe matter; but the Commandant in charge, Piet Grobler, whenquestioned on the subject, merely replied, 'Oh, he [Black] was a veryinsolent fellow. We could do nothing with him. ' The man who fired theshot despatching Black, a half-caste Boer named Graham, stated on hisreturn from Pretoria that he was asked no questions at the so-calledinquiry. 

A somewhat similar incident took place, but fortunately with lessserious results, on the way from the battle of Krugersdorp. Awell-known resident of Johannesburg had ridden out to ascertain newsof Dr. Jameson, and, arriving as the surrender took place, thrust hisway among the Boers until he reached the Doctor, where he wasarrested by the Boer authorities as a spy. Being a burgher of theState who had been resident in the Transvaal for some sixteen orseventeen years, he was recognized and rather harshly treated. He wasattached by a leather thong to the saddle of one of the BoerCommandants and made to run, keeping pace with the horse. After aspell of this treatment he was released, and the Commandant inquestion offered to make a bet with him that he would not be able torace him on horseback to the ambulance waggons a few hundred yardsoff, the prisoner to take a short cut across a swamp and theCommandant to ride round by the road. The prisoner thereupon replied, 'No, thank you, Commandant. I was in the Boer War myself and sawseveral men shot by that dodge, on the pretence that they wereescaping. ' The worthy Commandant thereupon drew his stirrup from thesaddle, and thrashed his prisoner with the stirrup end. After someten days' imprisonment under exceptionally hard conditions thegentleman in question was released without trial. 

The complete success of the Boer forces against Dr. Jameson's bandhas been accounted for in many ways, but undoubtedly the one reason, if one can be selected, which enabled them to deal with the invaders, was their ability to mobilize at short notice. And in this connectionarises the question: Did the Boers know beforehand of the intendedinvasion, and were they waiting until Dr. Jameson should walk intothe trap? On behalf of the Boers it is strenuously maintained thatthey had not the remotest notion of what was brewing, and that hadsuch an idea occurred to them they would of course have reportedmatters to the High Commissioner. The President's unyielding moodbefore he heard of Dr. Jameson's start, and his change afterwards, the state of demoralization in Pretoria, the unpreparedness of theState Artillery, and the vacillation of General Joubert, thecondition of alarm in which the President was during that night ofsuspense before the surrender, when Chief Justice Kotzé sat with himto aid and cheer, and when the old white horse stood saddled in thestable in case Johannesburg should attack Pretoria; all point to theconclusion that it was not all cut and dried. With a singularunanimity, the Boers and their friends and the majority of theUitlanders in the Transvaal support this view; but there are onrecord certain facts which are not to be ignored. Apart altogetherfrom the hearsay evidence of telegraphists and Boer officials indifferent parts of the country, who state that they were underorders from Government to remain at their posts day and night--thatis to say to sleep in their offices--a fortnight before the Jamesonraid took place, a significant piece of evidence is that supplied bythe Transvaal Consul in London, Mr. Montagu White, who in a letter tothe London Press stated that on December 16 he received informationas to the plot against the independence of the Republic, and that heon that date cabled fully to President Kruger warning him of what wasin contemplation, and that the President took the necessaryprecautions. Now, on December 14 it was announced in Pretoria thatthe President, being greatly in need of a rest and change, was aboutto undertake a tour through the country to visit his faithfulburghers. Perusal of the newspapers of the time shows that among theUitlanders no significance was attached to this visit. Indeed, theUitlander press agreed that it had become painfully evident that HisHonour required a change in order to restore his nervous system. Asnothing can better represent the opinions of the time than thecurrent comments of the Press, the following extracts from theJohannesburg _Star_ are given:

In short, His Honour is developing an ungovernable irritability and atendency to choleric obsessions, when the word 'Uitlander' is barelymentioned in his presence, that are causing the greatest concern tothose around him. Only on some such grounds are explicable the ragingexclamations he is reported to have permitted himself to lately usetowards Johannesburg and the cause of reform upon which it is soearnestly engaged. That His Honour should have been generallycredited with indulging in unconventional vernacular terms concerningthe pronouncedly loyal and hearty reception accorded to him on hisvisit to the Rand Agricultural Show, seems to argue a lapse into thehabits of his youngest days, which has a direct significance in thecase of ordinary individuals, and is known by a very familiar name. That he should tragically declare that only across his bleedingcorpse will the Uitlander ever come into his own, is merely theextravagant and regrettable melodrama of an overheated mind. Thegeneral desire is quite averse to encountering any stepping-stones ofthat kind, and most of all averse to Mr. Kruger's taking any suchplace. Our quarrel is with principles and systems, and never yet hasa note of personal vengeance been sounded whilst we have endeavouredto compass their destruction. It is quite obvious that a littlerelaxation from the cares of State, or reversion to more primitiveconditions, a freer communion with Nature--viewed from anox-waggon--are eminently desirable to restore His Honour's shatterednerves. --_December 14, 1895. _

AT HIS POST. 

His Honour the President has returned to the seat of Government. Theitinerary appears to have been somewhat prematurely cut short; but noone is likely to so ridiculously underestimate the sterling qualitiesof His Honour as to conceive the possibility of his absence whendifficulty and danger imperatively command his presence at the headof public affairs. The conclusions which Mr. Kruger has derived fromconverse with his faithful burghers are likely to remain buried inhis own breast. The outward and ostensible object of his recent tourhas been fulfilled in much the accustomed manner; that is to say, hehas discussed with apparent interest the necessity for a pont here ora bridge there; the desirability of Government aid for tree-planting, the trouble which the farmers experience in getting native labour, and so forth, and so on; but we must not derive from all thisperipatetic fustian the erroneous impression that His Honour has beenvacuously fiddling on the eve of a conflagration. The real businesswhich took him to Lydenburg and Middelburg has no doubt beensatisfactorily accomplished. Boer sentiment has been tested insecret, and the usual professions of fervid patriotism and ofreadiness for target practice with the Uitlander as the mark havebeen profusely evoked. This sub-official aspect of the itinerary hasbeen discreetly veiled in all the reports which have been permittedto transpire, and the censorship thereof has been more than normallyexacting and severe; but we are from private sources left in nomanner of doubt that Mr. Kruger has been canvassing and stimulatingthe Boers to be ready for any emergency, and has been metaphoricallyplanting a war-beacon on every hill. All scrutiny and inquiry fail todiscover that he has uttered one single word which can be describedas an emollient to the present critical situation. He has panderedrather to the worst racial passions of the Boer, instead of using theenormous responsibility resting upon him in the direction ofmediation. Old patriarchs--whom we cannot but respect and admirewhilst we deplore their immitigable and hopeless rancour against thecause of the newcomer--have been permitted, apparently withoutrebuke, to show their wounds to the younger and more malleablegeneration in His Honour's presence, and to boast of their readinessto receive as much more lead as they can conveniently find room for. The tour, indeed, has been a _wapenschouwing_, with oratory of themost dangerous and pernicious type for its accompaniment. HisHonour's contribution to this interesting display of martial ardourhas been couched, as usual, in the enigmatic form. He has spokenanother parable. A mind so fertile in image and in simile cannot havelost much of its wonted vigour. The one he has chosen to employ onthis occasion is full of instruction, and is derived, as Mr. Kruger'simages frequently are, from the arena of natural history. When youwant to kill your tortoise, he must be artfully induced toimprudently protrude his head beyond his thick and impregnable shell, and then the task becomes a very easy one. This little parable wasconsidered good for use on more than one occasion, varied by theaddition that, if the tortoise be up to the trick, it is necessary tosit down and wait until he does make the fatal mistake. The onlydrawback to our profound intellectual delight in the parable is thequestion, 'Who will be the tortoise?'--_December 27, 1895. _

A perusal of the German White Book shows that

On December 24 the German Consul in Pretoria telegraphed to theForeign Office that 'news from Johannesburg points to the preparationof disturbances by the English party there, and the Government istaking precautionary measures. ' Baron von Marschall communicated thisto Sir Frank Lascelles, and, after pointing out the possibleconsequence of bloodshed, emphasized once again the necessity formaintaining the _status quo_. In reply to the German Consul inPretoria, the Secretary of State telegraphed a similar statement, adding: 'Impress energetically upon the Transvaal Government that itmust most scrupulously avoid any provocation if it wishes to retainGerman sympathy. '

Another little light on the inside history is that afforded by Mr. J. C. Bodenstein, Field-cornet of the Krugersdorp district, who in thecourse of an interview accorded to the _Standard and Diggers' News_, the Johannesburg Government organ, stated how he came to know ofJameson's intended invasion. He heard that a certain young lady whoresided at Luipaardsvlei, near Krugersdorp, whose _fiancé_ occupied agood position in the Bechuanaland Border Police, had received aletter from him at Mafeking to the effect that he intended paying hera visit about the New Year, and that he would not be alone, as thewhole force was coming to Johannesburg. The lady proved no exceptionto the alleged rule concerning secrets, and Field-cornet Bodensteinpersonally assured himself of the authenticity of the report he hadheard. 

On Friday, December 27, a German gentleman from the Free State alsoinformed the Field-cornet that Dr. Jameson and his troopers might beexpected at any time. 'On hearing this confirmation of the letter, 'said Mr. Bodenstein, 'I went at once to Pretoria. I arrived there ateleven o'clock at night, and early the next morning I saw thePresident and informed him about the letter and what I had been told. He remarked quietly: "Yes, I have heard all about it" The General(Joubert) then said: "All right; I will send you the ammunition yourequire. "'

In the report of the Select Committee of the Cape House of Assembly(Blue Book A 6 of 1896, page 76) there is the evidence of the Hon. J. A. Faure, M. L. C. , which shows that he and Sir Thomas Upington, theAttorney-General of Cape Colony, were on a visit to Johannesburg onDecember 27, and heard it publicly stated that Dr. Jameson with 800men was on the border for the purpose of invading the Transvaal. Mr. Faure testifies that he learned this from a very prominent FreeState Dutchman. Among others, one would suppose that the TransvaalGovernment must also have heard something of it. 

Dr. Veale, a well-known Pretoria doctor, states that at daybreak onThursday, January 2, Commandant Hendrik Schoeman called on him tosecure his professional attendance for a member of his family who wasvery ill. The Commandant said that he had been sent out on Monday towatch the invading force and to ascertain their numbers, and alsostated that he had been following the troop with others for aconsiderable time and that he was sure Jameson had not 800 butbetween 450 and 500, as he had repeatedly counted them; that theforce was being delayed by small parties drawing it into uselessfighting and so losing time; that he himself had been obliged to comeon ahead, having been recalled on account of his wife's seriousillness, but that it made little difference as there were others totake his place, and they had arranged not to tackle Jameson untilthey had drawn him among the kopjes at Doornkop, where it would bequite impossible for him ever to get through. This statement itshould be noted was made in Pretoria some hours before the Jamesonforce surrendered at Doornkop. 

So certain do the Boers appear to have been, and so confident oftheir ability to carry out their plans, that they stated to areporter of the Government newspaper that they intended to stopJameson at Rietspruit (Doornkop), and this statement was published ina Johannesburg paper on the morning of January 1, but was of courseregarded as mere gossip of a piece with that which flooded thenewspapers at the time. It is only right to add that there werenumbers of other announcements at the same time which by no meansagreed with this one, and it is stated that the editor was as muchsurprised as the public to find that he had been right. 

In reviewing the whole of the circumstances of the raid, not the mostbiased and most interested of persons can withhold a tribute ofadmiration to the President's presence of mind, skill, and courage indealing with circumstances wholly without precedent; and in quietmoments, when recalling all that has happened, if human at all, hisHonour must indulge in a chuckle now and then to think how completelyhe jockeyed everybody. {32} Not the least amusing recollection must bethat of the 'great trek' (Banjailand Trek), which his burghersthreatened to make into Mashonaland viâ Rhodes' Drift when Sir JohnWilloughby gained his first experience of Oom Paul. The militarycommander of Dr. Jameson's force had called on the President to addweight to the remonstrances which were being made against the actionof the burghers in invading the Chartered territory, and thePresident, playing his cards for a favourable settlement ofSwaziland, had replied that he had done all that he could, and eventsmust take their course. 'Tell him, ' said Sir John to Dr. Leyds whowas interpreting, 'that if the trek is not stopped of course theresult will be war!' 'If it must be, let it be, ' the old gentlemananswered quietly. 'Then tell him, ' Sir John replied, 'that in thatcase he will have to reckon with the British Army. ' 'And tell _him_', said the President, pointing placidly at his interviewer with his bigpipe, 'that I have reckoned with the British Army once before. ' Ifthe recollection occurred to both men on January 2, it must have beenwith different emotions. 

In dealing with President Kruger's personal attitude it is notperhaps pertinent but, it is interesting, to recall an incident ofhis earlier career--a parallel between the prisoner and thePresident. Oddly enough President Kruger was a rebel and a filibusterhimself in the days of his hot youth, and one of his earliestdiplomatic successes was in securing the release and pardon ofmen who, in 1857, stood in exactly the same position as theUitlanders whom he imprisoned. 

The story of the Potchefstroom revolt is little known in England, butit is told in Theal's 'Standard History of South Africa, ' and veryinstructive reading it is. Dr. Hillier, of Johannesburg, one of theReformers, called attention just before the outbreak to theextraordinary parallel between the revolt of Potchefstroom in 1857against the dominance of Lydenburg and the condition of Johannesburgin 1895 under the despotism of Pretoria. Dr. Hillier in his pamphletsaid:

In 1857 the Republic north of the Vaal attained its twentieth year. It had increased in population, and had taken on, to some extent, thehabits and mode of life of a settled community. Mr. Pretorius and hisfollowers began to feel that in the altered circumstances of theState the time had arrived for a remodelling of the Constitution. Among these followers of Pretorius, these advocates of reform, it isinteresting to find was Mr. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger. 

Mr. Theal says:

'During the months of September and October, 1856, Commandant-GeneralM. W. Pretorius made a tour through the districts of Rutsenburg, Pretoria and Potchefstroom, and called public meetings at all thecentres of population. At these meetings there was an expression by alarge majority in favour of immediate adoption of a Constitutionwhich should provide for an efficient Government and an independentChurch. '

And again, later on, we have in the words of South Africa's historianthe gist of the complaint against the then existing state of things:

'The community of Lydenburg was accused of attempting to domineerover the whole country, without any other right to preeminence thanthat of being composed of the earliest inhabitants, a right which ithad forfeited by its opposition to the general weal. '

Such was the shocking state of things in this country in 1856. It wasa great deal too bad for such champion reformers as Mr. Pretorius andhis lieutenant, Mr. S. J. P. Kruger, as we shall see later. Shortlyafter these meetings were held, a Representative Assembly, consistingof twenty-four members, one for each field-cornetcy, was elected forthe special purpose of framing a Constitution and installing theofficials whom it should decide to appoint. 

On January 5, 1857, the Representative Assembly appointed Mr. Martinus Wessels Pretorius President, and also appointed members ofan Executive Council. The oaths of office were then taken, thePresident and Executive installed, and the flag hoisted. Whenintelligence of these proceedings reached Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg, there was a violent outburst of indignation. At a public meeting atZoutpansberg the acts and resolutions of the Representative Assemblyat Potchefstroom were almost unanimously repudiated, and a manifestodisowning the new Constitution and everything connected with it wasdrawn up. Mr. Pretorius then issued a proclamation, deposingCommandant-General Schoeman from all authority, declaringZoutpansberg in a state of blockade, and prohibiting traders fromsupplying 'the rebels' with ammunition or anything else. This conducton the part of the new Government under Mr. Pretorius appears to medistinctly adroit. Having taken upon themselves to remodel the entireConstitution of the country, they turn round on the adherents of theolder Government, whom, by-the-by, they had not thought it worthwhile to consult, and promptly call them 'rebels. ' And so you havethis striking political phenomenon of a revolutionary party turningon the adherents of the Government of the State, and denouncing them, forsooth, as 'rebels. '

The 'Republic of Lydenburg' then declared itself into a sovereign andindependent State. And thus two Republics, two Volksraads, twoGovernments, were formed and existed simultaneously in the Transvaal. And all this without a shot being fired, each party findingsufficient relief to its feelings by calling the other party'rebels. ' In order to strengthen its position, the party of Pretoriusnow determined on a bold stroke. They sent emissaries to endeavour toarrange for union with the Free State. The Free State Governmentrejected their overtures, but Pretorius was led to believe that somany of the Free State burghers were anxious for this union that allthat was necessary for him to do, in order to effect it, was to marchin with an armed force. He therefore placed himself at the head of acommando, and crossed the Vaal, where he was joined by a certainnumber of Free State burghers. 

But Pretorius, with whom was Paul Kruger, found, like Dr. Jameson, that he had reckoned without his host. When intelligence of thisinvasion reached Bloemfontein, President Boshoff issued aproclamation declaring martial law in force throughout the FreeState, and calling out burghers for the defence of the country. Itsoon appeared that the majority of the people were ready to supportthe President, and from all quarters men repaired to Kroonstad. Atthis stage the Free State President received an offer of assistancefrom General Schoeman, of Zoutpansberg, against Pretorius, in whichobject he believed Lydenburg would also join. 

On May 25 the two commandoes were drawn up facing each other onopposite banks of the Rhenoster River, and remained in that positionfor three hours. Threatened from the north as well as the southPretorius felt his chance of success was small, and he therefore sentout Commandant Paul Kruger with a flag of truce to propose that apacific settlement should be made. 

Here indeed is a very close parallel, but the climax is still tocome. The treaty arrived at was practically an apology on the part ofthe South African Republic. Many citizens of the Free State who hadjoined the northern forces moved over the Vaal after this event. Those who remained and those who had been previously arrested werebrought to trial for high treason. One man was sentenced to death, but the sentence was mitigated subsequently to a fine; others werefined. These fines were again still further mitigated at thesolicitation of Messrs. Paul Kruger and Steyn, until it came tolittle more than a ten-pound note apiece. 

There we have the story of President Kruger and his friends playingexactly the part Dr. Jameson and the Johannesburg Reformers tried todo. As Potchefstroom rose under Mr. Kruger against the oligarchicalrule of Lydenburg, so Johannesburg was to rise against Pretoria. ThePotchefstroom Republic under Pretorius and Kruger made a raid _à la_Jameson into the Orange Free State for political purposes, toencourage those who were believed to be anxious to effect aunion. And just as Jameson failed against the Government of Pretoria, so Pretorius failed against the Government of the Orange Free State. In 1857 it was Paul Kruger not Dr. Jameson who hoisted the whiteflag. The Free Staters who had tried to help Kruger's raid werearrested just as the Johannesburgers were; but although one of themwas condemned to death all of them were released, by the interventionof Mr. Kruger himself, on paying a slight fine. 

History has repeated itself indeed; but the offence of Dr. Jameson issurely less than that of Mr. Kruger, if we are to pay heed to therecords of the Free State Volksraad, wherein it is written that on acertain day the President stated in open Raad that proof had beenobtained of a proposed combined attack on the Free State by theTransvaal Boers, led by Pretorius and Kruger on the one side, and theBasutos under Moshesh on the other--a horrible and unnatural alliancewhich was not effected only because Moshesh could not trust hisprofessed allies. The Raad thereupon publicly gave thanks to theAlmighty, Who had revealed and frustrated this 'hideous complot. '

Footnotes for Chapter VI

{24} In the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commonsthe following questions and answers occur, Mr. Blake questioning andMajor Heany replying:

'Having got the message you went off with it and you got in, as wesee by the evidence, as quickly as you could, and you just gave themessage as accurately as you could to Dr. Jameson?--I read themessage from my note-book absolutely accurately to Dr. Jameson. 

'And he did not lose much time in making up his mind?--No; he wentoutside his tent. He was in a bell-tent when I arrived and he wentoutside and walked up and down for about twenty minutes, and then hecame in and announced his determination. '

{25} In the course of the Inquiry at Westminster, Dr. Jamesonhimself took occasion to explain this reference, when answering aquestion put by Mr. Sidney Buxton. 

Knowing what you do now of the position at Johannesburg, do you thinkit was within their power to send out 300 mounted men?--I cannot givean opinion upon that; I think all their actions were perfectly _bonâfide_. There is one telegram here which has been brought up againstme very unpleasantly, which I wish I had never sent, where 'fear' isimputed in the telegram as it stands here. My explanation is that Iwas irritated at the time at the trouble going on, and that I used itinadvertently, or possibly there is a mistake in deciphering the codeword; as to that I cannot tell, but I am sorry that it should appearso in the telegram, because I never imputed fear or cowardice toanyone in connection with anything. 

{26} July 1899. The originals have since been photographed andare here reproduced. 

{27} Colonel Francis Rhodes. 

{28} Lionel Phillips. 

{29} (July, 1899. ) Is it not probable that the deleted figures'2, 000' in Colonel Rhodes' letter (see photograph) may accountfor some of the talk about 2, 000 armed men?

{30} After the arrival in England of the officers of Dr. Jameson'sforce, a report dealing with the military aspect of the expeditionwas sent by Sir John Willoughby to the War Office. It has beenprinted and--to a certain extent--circulated, and cannot thereforebe regarded as private. But apart from this it is a document sopeculiar--so marked by mishandling of notorious facts--that itdeserves no consideration other than it may earn on merits. It isprinted _in extenso_ with notes by a member of the Reform Committee. See Appendix H. 

{31} See Appendix G. It will be noted that in his declarationsCommandant Cronjé modifies his terms very considerably. It wasimpossible for any reasonable person to accept the explanationpreferred by him, that the promise to spare the lives of thesurrendered force was only to hold good until they could be handedover to the Commandant-General. In fact, it is well known thatCommandant Cronjé only took up this attitude after an extremelyacrimonious discussion had taken place between him and CommandantMalan--a quarrel in which they went the length of making chargesagainst each other in the public press of treachery and neglect ofduty whilst in the field. The Commandant Cronjé referred to here isthe same gentleman who commanded the Boer forces at Potchefstroom inthe War of Independence, and his record is an extremely unpleasantone, his conduct of operations having earned for the Potchefstroomcommando the worst reputation of any. Apart from the executionof several British subjects who were suspected and, on whollyinsufficient grounds, summarily shot as spies, there are theunpleasant facts that he caused prisoners of war to be placed in theforefront of the besieging operations and compelled them to work inthe trenches in exposed positions so that they should be--andactually were--shot by their own comrades. There was also theincident in which he refused to allow one or two of the ladies whowere among the beleaguered garrison, and who were then in extremelybad health, to leave the fort to obtain such food and medicalattendance as would enable them to live. One of the ladies died inconsequence. But the incident which has more bearing on Jameson'ssurrender than any other is that connected with the armistice, whenCommandant Cronjé, in defiance of treaty obligations, withheld fromColonel Winslow and the besieged garrison the news that an armisticehad been arranged between the Boer and British forces, and continuedthe siege until the garrison, in order to save the lives of thewounded and the women and children refugees, were obliged tosurrender. It will be remembered that this incident was too much evenfor Mr. Gladstone, and that on its becoming known after the terms ofpeace had been settled, the Transvaal Government were required by SirEvelyn Wood to allow a British force to march up from Natal andre-occupy Potchefstroom as a formal acknowledgment of Cronjé'streachery. Mr. Kruger and his party, who were in the greatest fearthat the settlement would not be effected, and that Sir Evelyn Wood'saction might provoke a renewal of hostilities, agreed to the terms, but with grave apprehensions as to the results. However, no_contretemps_ occurred. 

{32} Once when out hunting on foot--a young man then--Mr. Kruger, after climbing to the top of a kopje, found that he had been seen bya number of hostile natives who were then running towards him, someto climb the hill, others branching out to surround it. He knew thatthose on the flat could cut him off before he could descend and thathis only chance lay in 'bluff. ' Stepping on to the outermost ledge infull view of the enemy he calmly laid down his rifle, drew off firstone and then the other of his velschoens (home-made hide shoes, inthose poorer days worn without socks) and after quietly knocking thesand out of them drew them on again. By this time the natives hadstopped to observe him. He then picked up his rifle again, andturning to an imaginary force behind the kopje waved to the right andthen to the left, as though directing them to charge round each endof the hill. The next instant the Kaffirs were in full retreat. 

CHAPTER VII. 

AFTER DOORNKOP. 

The news of Dr. Jameson's surrender was received in Johannesburgtowards mid-day, at first with derision, but as report after reportcame in, each confirming and supplementing the other, no room fordoubt was left and a scene of the wildest excitement ensued. It isnot too much to say that not one person in a hundred, no matter whathis political leanings were, had doubted for a moment Dr. Jameson'sability to force his way into Johannesburg. There is not theslightest indication in the newspapers of the time, which withoutdoubt reflected every varying mood and repeated every rumour which itwas possible to catch from an excited people, that there was in anyman's mind a suspicion that the Boers would be able to stop theinvader. In the first place no one believed that they could mobilizesufficiently quickly to oppose him, and in the second place, he wasunderstood to have a force of 800 men so admirably equipped andtrained that it would not be possible for 5, 000 Boers hurriedlycalled together to intercept him. All this, however, was forgottenwhen it came to accounting for the disaster; or rather, the previousconvictions only added strength to the rage of disappointment. Thepublic by that time knew of the letter of invitation; it had beentaken on the battle-field and news of it was telegraphed in, andapart from this the writers had made no secret of it. But what thepublic did not know, and what, if they had known it, would not haveappealed with similar force, was the efforts made to stop Jameson andthe practical withdrawal of the letter before he had started. Itwas sufficient for them during the few remaining hours of that day torecall that Jameson had come in, that he had fought against greatodds, and that when almost reaching his goal he had been takenprisoner for want of assistance. It is perfectly true that in theirrage of grief and disappointment men were willing to march out withpick-handles to rescue him, if there were not rifles enough to armthem. While the excitement lasted this was the mood, and the ReformCommittee were the scapegoats. The attitude of the crowd was due toignorance of the circumstances and natural emotion which could not beotherwise vented. The excitement had greatly abated by the followingmorning, and it was realized then that the position was practicallybut little worse than that which the Reform Committee had offeredto take up when they tendered their persons as security for theevacuation of the country by the invading force, and had proposed tocontinue the struggle without their aid. 

The reports received by the Johannesburg people were to the effectthat the surrender had been conditional upon the sparing of the livesof the force. Indeed the first reports agreed that Jameson uponreceipt of the High Commissioner's proclamation, had laid down hisarms; but upon the return of Mr. Lace (whose mission has beenexplained) it was realized that this was not the case. A lateraccount showed that Jameson had surrendered to Commandant Cronjé onthe condition that the lives of all should be spared, and thisversion of the surrender was published in the Johannesburgnewspapers. When further accounts were received from Pretoria andKrugersdorp, stating that the surrender had been unconditional andthat there was grave doubt as to what would be done with Dr. Jameson, it was surmised as an explanation that he had declined to bargain forhis own life and had merely stipulated that those of his followersshould be spared. 

On Friday the news that it was contemplated to shoot Dr. Jamesoncaused a frenzy of horror and excitement in the town. Every effortwas made by the Reform Committee and its supporters to maintainstrictly the position which the Government had suggested throughtheir Commission on Wednesday, lest some untoward incident shouldturn the trembling balance against Dr. Jameson and his men; nor werethe Committee alone in the desire to maintain that position. OnFriday and on Saturday communications were received from the localGovernment officials, and from Commandant-General Joubert through theBritish Agent, drawing the attention of the Committee to allegedbreaches of the arrangement. The allegations were satisfactorilydisproved; but the communications clearly indicated that theGovernment were most desirous of maintaining the position in relationto Johannesburg which they had laid down before the first battle withDr. Jameson's forces. 

Information was received on Thursday that the High Commissioner wouldleave Capetown for Pretoria at 9 p. M. That night. It had been amatter of surprise that, the arrangement having been entered intowith him early on Wednesday, he had not found it convenient to startfor some thirty-six hours. Considering how seriously he hadinterfered with the movement--first by his proclamation, and next byconcerted action with the Government for a peaceful settlement--ithad been naturally assumed that he would not lose a moment in leavingCapetown for the scene of trouble. Such however was not the case. 

It has been alleged that the arrangement made between the TransvaalGovernment and the High Commissioner with a view to a peacefulsettlement bore only upon Dr. Jameson's action, and that it was notcontemplated that there should be any interference between theGovernment and its own subjects in Johannesburg. In answer to this itmay be noted that the High Commissioner had in the first placeoffered his services, and that those services had been declined bythe Transvaal Government; but that the latter, on realizing theseriousness of the position which they were called upon to face, andacting, it is stated, upon the advice of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, therecognized leader of the Dutch Africanders in the Cape Colony, reconsidered this refusal and urgently besought the High Commissionerto go up to Pretoria and use his influence to effect a peacefulsettlement. This arrangement, together with the promise of theredress of grievances, had been made known to the deputation of theReform Committee by the Government Commission in Pretoria, as hasalready been stated--the Government well knowing that Johannesburgwas in arms and a party to the arrangement with Dr. Jameson. 

Dr. Jameson surrendered at 9. 30 a. M. On Thursday. The HighCommissioner did not leave Capetown until 9 p. M. The same day. Therehad therefore been ample time for the Government to intimate to himtheir opinion that matters had been satisfactorily settled and thatthey did not need his services any longer, had they held such anopinion. As a matter of fact, that was by no means their opinion. They considered that they had yet to deal with 20, 000 armed men inJohannesburg, and that they had to do that, if possible, withoutprovoking a civil war, which would inevitably result in the long-runto their disadvantage, however great their success might be over theJohannesburg people in the meantime. They not only allowed the HighCommissioner to proceed to Pretoria on the understanding originallyeffected, but they took steps to remind the Reform Committee onseveral occasions that they were expected to adhere to thearrangement entered into. And such was the position when the HighCommissioner arrived on the night of Saturday, the 4th. 

Sir Hercules Robinson proceeded direct to Pretoria, but did nottransact any business until Monday, abstaining, in deference to thefeelings of the Boers, from any discussion of business matters on theSabbath. On Sunday, however, he received information from the ReformCommittee as to the arrangements entered into with the Government. Hewas also informed that threats had been made by persons who withoutdoubt were speaking the mind of the Government, that if any troubleshould take place with Johannesburg Dr. Jameson and probably many ofhis comrades would be shot. It was not stated that the TransvaalGovernment or authorities would officially countenance any such actor would authorize it even as the result of a trial; but thestatement which was made by everyone from the President downward wasthat, in the event of any fighting in Johannesburg, the burgherswould be so much enraged and so beyond control that the prisoners whohad caused all the trouble would inevitably be shot. It is a partof Boer diplomacy to make as much use as possible of every weaponthat comes to hand without too great a regard for the decencies ofgovernment as they occur to the minds of every civilized people, andit is not at all unusual to find the President proclaiming at onemoment that some course must be taken to prevent disaster, for thereason that he cannot be answerable for his burghers in their excitedstate, and at another moment indignantly repudiating the suggestionthat they would be guilty of any step that could be consideredunworthy of the most civilized of peoples. In fact such exhibitionswere repeatedly given by him at a later stage when dealing with theReform prisoners. 

Before any communication was received from the High Commissioner onMonday messages had been received by the members of the ReformCommittee to the effect that the laying down of arms would beabsolutely necessary to ensure the safety of Jameson and his men. TheReform Committee had then learnt that the two messengers sent to stopDr. Jameson--Major Heany and Captain Holden--had reached him, and hadcome in with him, and were at that moment prisoners with him inPretoria. They had also heard of the reception accorded to SirJacobus de Wet's despatch and the High Commissioner's proclamation, so that it was abundantly clear that the incursion had been made indefiance of the wishes of the leaders, whatever other reasons theremight have been to prompt it. But the public who constituted themovement were still under the impression that Dr. Jameson was a veryfine fellow who had come in in a chivalrous manner to help those whomhe had believed to be in distress. There was however no division ofopinion as to what should be done; even those who felt most soreabout the position in which they had been placed did not hesitate fora moment. The first and for the time being the only consideration wasthe safety of Dr. Jameson and his comrades. 

The events and negotiations of the days preceding the arrest of theReformers have been the subject of so much discussion and so muchmisunderstanding that it will be better as far as possible to compilethe history from original documents or the published and properlyauthenticated copies. In Blue Book [C. 7, 933] the following ispublished:

SIR HERCULES ROBINSON (Pretoria) to MR. CHAMBERLAIN. 

(_Telegraphic. Received 1. 8 a. M. , 6th January, 1896. _)

_5th January_. No. 3. --Arrived here last night. Position of affairsvery critical. On side of Government of South African Republic and ofOrange Free State there is a desire to show moderation, but Boersshow tendency to get out of hand and to demand execution of Jameson. I am told that Government of South African Republic will demanddisarmament of Johannesburg as a condition precedent to negotiations. Their military preparations are now practically complete, andJohannesburg, if besieged, could not hold out, as they are short ofwater and coal. On side of Johannesburg leaders desire to bemoderate, but men make safety of Jameson and concession of items inmanifesto issued conditions precedent to disarmament. If these arerefused, they assert they will elect their own leaders and fight itout in their own way. As the matter now stands, I see greatdifficulty in avoiding civil war; but I will do my best, andtelegraph result of my official interview to-morrow. It is said thatPresident of South African Republic intends to make some demands withrespect to Article No. 4 of the London Convention of 1884. 

MR. CHAMBERLAIN to SIR HERCULES ROBINSON. 

(_Telegraphic. January 6, 1896. _)

_6th January_. No. 3. --It is reported in the press telegrams thePresident of the South African Republic on December 30 held outdefinite hopes that concessions would be proposed in regard toeducation and the franchise. No overt act of hostility appears tohave been committed by the Johannesburg people since the overthrow ofJameson. The statement that arms and ammunition are stored in thattown in large quantities may be only one of many boasts withoutfoundation. Under these circumstances, active measures against thetown do not seem to be urgently required at the present moment, and Ihope no step will be taken by the President of the South AfricanRepublic liable to cause more bloodshed and excite civil war in theRepublic. 

These are followed in the same volume by No. 89:

SIR HERCULES ROBINSON (Pretoria) to MR. CHAMBERLAIN. 

(_Telegraphic. Received 7th January, 1896. _)

_6th January_. No. 2. --Met President South African Republic andExecutive Council to-day. Before opening proceedings, I expressed onbehalf of Her Majesty's Government my sincere regret at theunwarrantable raid made by Jameson; also thanked Government of SouthAfrican Republic for the moderation shown under trying circumstances. With regard to Johannesburg, President of South African Republicannounced decision of Government to be that Johannesburg must laydown its arms unconditionally as a precedent to any discussion andconsideration of grievances. I endeavoured to obtain some indicationof the steps that would be taken in the event of disarmament, butwithout success, it being intimated that Government of South AfricanRepublic had nothing more to say on this subject than had beenalready embodied in proclamation of President of South AfricanRepublic. I inquired as to whether any decision had been come to asregards disposal of prisoners, and received a reply in the negative. President of South African Republic said that, as his burghers, tonumber of 8, 000, had been collected, and could not be asked to remainindefinitely, he must request a reply, 'Yes' or 'No, ' to thisultimatum within twenty-four hours. I have communicated decision ofSouth African Republic to Reform Committee at Johannesburg throughBritish Agent in South African Republic. 

The burgher levies are in such an excited state over the invasion oftheir country that I believe President of South African Republiccould not control them except in the event of unconditionalsurrender. I have privately recommended them to accept ultimatum. Proclamation of President of South African Republic refers to promiseto consider all grievances which are properly submitted, and to laythe same before the Legislature without delay. 

On January 7 Mr. Chamberlain replied:

No. 1. --I approve of your advice to Johannesburg. Kruger will be wisenot to proceed to extremities at Johannesburg or elsewhere; otherwisethe evil animosities already aroused may be dangerously excited. 

And on the same day Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphed:

No. 1. --Your telegram of January 6, No. 2. It would be mostinexpedient to send troops to Mafeking at this moment, and there isnot the slightest necessity for such a step, as there is no dangerfrom Kimberley volunteer corps or from Mafeking. I have sent De Wetwith ultimatum this morning to Johannesburg, and believe arms will belaid down unconditionally. I understand in such case Jameson and allprisoners will be handed over to me. Prospect now very hopeful if noinjudicious steps are taken. Please leave matter in my hands. 

On Monday Sir Jacobus de Wet, acting under the instructions of theHigh Commissioner, telegraphed from Pretoria to the Reform Committee, Johannesburg, informing them that the High Commissioner had seen thePresident and Executive that morning, that he had been informed thatas a condition precedent to the discussion and consideration ofgrievances the Government required that the Johannesburg peopleshould lay down their arms; and that the Government gave themtwenty-four hours--from 4 p. M. That day--in which to accept or rejectthat ultimatum. The Committee replied that it would receive theirearnest consideration. 

Notwithstanding the fact that such a condition had been anticipatedthe ultimatum was very unfavourably received, a large number of thosepresent protesting that the Uitlanders were being led little bylittle into a trap, that the Boers as was their wont would never keepfaith with them, that in the end they would find themselvesbetrayed, and that it would be better at no matter what cost to makea fight for it and attempt to rescue Dr. Jameson and his party. Thelast suggestion was a mad one, and after some consideration, andhearing the representations of Sir Sidney Shippard and Mr. SeymourFort, who had been in communication with the High Commissioner on theprevious day in Pretoria and were used by him as unofficial agents, the matter was more calmly considered by the Committee. It was verywell realized that a struggle between Johannesburg and the Boerforces would have been an absolutely hopeless one for those who tookpart in it, but there was a determination to secure the objects forthe attainment of which the agitation had been started, and it wasbelieved that if a firm stand were taken, such was the justice of thecause of the Uitlanders that the Government would not be able torefuse definite terms as to what reforms they would introduce, besides assuring the safety of Dr. Jameson. 

While the discussion was proceeding another telegram was receivedfrom the British Agent saying that, under instructions from the HighCommissioner, he was proceeding in person to Johannesburg to meet theReform Committee and explain matters to them. The meeting took placeon the morning of Tuesday, and Sir Jacobus de Wet pointed out to theCommittee the perilous position in which Dr. Jameson and his comradeswere placed, owing to the hesitation of the Uitlanders to accept theultimatum of the Government. He read again and again the followingtelegram from the High Commissioner, which had been despatched fromPretoria early that morning and received by the British Agent inJohannesburg when on his way to meet the Reform Committee:

_Urgent_. --You should inform the Johannesburg people that I considerthat if they lay down their arms they will be acting loyally andhonourably, and that if they do not comply with my request theyforfeit all claim to sympathy from Her Majesty's Government and fromBritish subjects throughout the world, as the lives of Jameson andthe prisoners are now practically in their hands. 

In reply to remarks about grievances, Sir Jacobus de Wet stated thatthe Uitlanders could not expect under the circumstances anythingmore favourable than the discussion and consideration of thegrievances with the High Commissioner, as had been promised, andadded that, if there were any spirit of reason in the community atall, they would be content to leave their case in the hands of soexperienced a statesman as Sir Hercules Robinson, a man whoseinstinct and training were towards fair and decent government. 

In the course of a very long discussion, Sir Jacobus de Wet was askedif he did not consider the Boer Government capable of an act oftreachery such as disarming the community and then proceeding towreak their vengeance upon those whom they might consider responsiblefor the agitation. According to the evidence of a number of those whowere present, his reply was that 'not a hair of the head of any manin Johannesburg would be touched. ' The discussion was resumed atvarious times and in various forms, when different groups of men hadopportunities of questioning the British Agent themselves. Whenquestioned again more definitely as to whether this immunity would beextended to the leaders--those who had signed the letter--Sir Jacobusde Wet replied again in the affirmative. To another member, who hadasked the same question in another form, he said 'Not one among youwill lose his personal liberty for a single hour. John Bull wouldnever allow it. ' In reply to the remark, 'John Bull has had to put upwith a good deal in this country. What do you mean by "John Bull"?'he answered, 'I mean the British Government could not possibly allowsuch a thing. '

It would have been an easy and no doubt a proper and reasonableprecaution had the Reformers insisted upon a statement in writing ofthe terms upon which they laid down their arms. There were howevertwo considerations which weighed against any bargain of this sort. The first was the overwhelming and paramount consideration ofinsuring Dr. Jameson's safety; and the other was the belief (notseriously shaken by suggestions to the contrary) that the Governmentwould be obliged to abide by the spirit of the terms arranged onJanuary 1, because the High Commissioner would insist upon it as thevital condition under which he was endeavouring to effect thedisarmament of Johannesburg. That Sir Hercules Robinson wellrealized his responsibility to the Uitlander, but found itinconvenient or impossible to accept it at a later stage, is shown byhis own reports. On January 7 he telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain asfollows:

_Your telegram No. 3 of January 6. I need now only say that I havejust received a message from Reform Committee resolving to complywith demand of South African Republic to lay down their arms; thepeople placing themselves (? and) their interests unreservedly in myhands in the fullest confidence that I will see justice done to them. I have received also the following from British agent, dated 7thJanuary:_

_Begins:_ I have sent the following telegram to His Honour thePresident:

I have met the Reform Committee. Am gratified with the spirit shownin the discussion of the all-important present position. TheCommittee handed me the following resolution--_Begins:_ The ReformCommittee in Johannesburg, having seriously considered the ultimatumof the Government of the South African Republic communicated to themthrough Her Majesty's Agent at Pretoria, in a telegram dated 6thinstant, to the effect that Johannesburg must lay down its arms as acondition precedent to a discussion and consideration of grievances, have unanimously decided to comply with this demand, and have giveninstructions to the citizens employed by this Committee formaintaining good order to lay down their arms. In coming to thisdetermination, the Committee rely upon the Government that it willmaintain law and order, and protect life and property in this town atthis critical juncture. The Committee have been actuated by aparamount desire to do everything possible to ensure the safety ofDr. Jameson and his men, _to advance the amicable discussion of termsof settlement with the Government, and to support the HighCommissioner in his efforts in this respect_. The Committee woulddraw the attention of the Government of the Republic to the presenceof armed burgher forces in the immediate vicinity of this town, andwould earnestly desire that these forces be removed in order to avoidall risk of any disturbance of the public peace. _Resolution ends_. Iwish to add to my above remarks that I feel convinced there will beno further difficulty in connection with the laying down of theirarms. I would suggest that the Government co-operate with the ReformCommittee for a day or two for the purpose of restoring the town toits normal state. This will only take a day or two, and those who areexcited among the people will by that time have calmed down, and thepolice can resume their ordinary duties. The Committee willco-operate in this matter. This course will very much facilitate thetask of your Government if it meets with your approval. _Ends_. 

The High Commissioner concluded the above telegram with the followingsignificant sentence:

_I hope now to be able to confer with President of the South AfricanRepublic and Executive Council as to prisoners and the redress ofJohannesburg grievances_. 

On the 8th he again telegraphed:

Referring to your telegram of the 7th inst. , No. 1, I consider thatso far throughout this matter Kruger has behaved very well. Hesuspended hostilities pending my arrival, when Johannesburg was athis mercy; and in opposition to a very general feeling of theExecutive Council and of the burghers who have been clamouring forJameson's life, he has now determined to hand over Jameson and theother prisoners. If Jameson had been tried here there can be no doubtthat he would have been shot, and perhaps some of his colleaguesalso. The excitement of the public is now calmed down. 

I shall try to-day to make arrangements with Kruger as to taking overthe prisoners, and _I will confer with him as to redressing thegrievances of the residents of Johannesburg on the basis of yourtelegram of the 4th inst. I have given Kruger a copy of thattelegram. _'

And later on the same day:

Since my telegram No. 1 of this morning, matters have not been goingso smoothly. When the Executive Council met, I received a messagethat only 1, 814 rifles and three Maxim guns had been surrendered, which the Government of the South African Republic did not consider afulfilment of the ultimatum, and orders would be immediately issuedto a commando to attack Johannesburg. I at once replied that theultimatum required the surrender of guns and ammunition for which nopermit of importation had been obtained, and that onus rested withTransvaal Government to show that guns and ammunition were concealedfor which no permit had been issued. If before this was done anyhostile step were taken against Johannesburg, I should consider it tobe a violation of the undertaking for which I had made myselfpersonally responsible to the people of Johannesburg, and I shouldleave the issue in hands of Her Majesty's Government. This had asobering effect, and the order for the attack on Johannesburg wascountermanded, and it was arranged that the Transvaal officialsshould accompany Her Majesty's Agent to Johannesburg and point out tohim if they could where arms were concealed. Her Majesty's Agent leftat 1 p. M. To-day for Johannesburg for this purpose. 

The explanation of the change, I take it, is that Kruger has greatdifficulties to contend with among his own people. The apparentobject is to prove that people of Johannesburg have not fulfilled theconditions which were to precede the handing over of the prisonersand consideration of grievances. I should not be surprised if, beforereleasing the prisoners or redressing grievances, an attempt were nowmade to extort an alteration of the London Convention of 1884, andthe abrogation of Article No. 4 of that instrument. _I intend, if Ifind that the Johannesburg people have substantially complied withthe ultimatum, to insist on the fulfilment of promises as regardsprisoners and consideration of grievances_, and will not allow atthis stage the introduction of any fresh conditions as regards theLondon Convention of 1884. Do you approve?

The Reform Committee published the following official notice onTuesday afternoon:

The Reform Committee notify hereby that all rifles issued for thedefence of life and property in town and the mines are to be returnedat once to the Central Office in order to enable the Committee tocarry out the agreement with the Government, upon the faithfulobservance of which so much is dependent. 

The Committee desire to make it known that late last night theyreceived an intimation from Her Majesty's Agent in Pretoria to theeffect that the decision of the Government was that Johannesburg mustlay down its arms as a condition precedent to the discussion andconsideration of grievances. 

The Committee met this morning to consider the position, and it wasunanimously resolved to accept the ultimatum of the Government forreasons which the following communications sufficiently explain:

Here followed the High Commissioner's telegram to Sir Jacobus de Wet, urging disarmament, already given, and the following memorandum:

Sir Jacobus de Wet, Her Majesty's Agent at Pretoria, has notified tothe Committee that he has been officially informed by the Governmentin Pretoria that upon Johannesburg laying down its arms Dr. Jamesonwill be handed over to Her Majesty's High Commissioner. 

 By Order. 

 Johannesburg, _7th January. _ The above is correct. J. A. DE WET, H. B. M. Agent. 

The Committee can add nothing to the above, and feel that there willnot be one man among the thousands who have joined the Reformmovement who will not find it consistent with honour and humanity toco-operate loyally in the carrying out of the Committee's decision. 

 By order of the Committee. 

On Wednesday the investigations effected by the Government, with theaid of the Reform Committee, established the fact that the ultimatumhad been complied with; but the juggling with Dr. Jameson's lifecontinued for some days. On Thursday the 9th the High Commissionerreceived a communication from the President in which occurred thefollowing sentence: 'As I had already caused your Excellency to beinformed, it is really my intention to act in this sense (_i. E. _, hand over Dr. Jameson and men), so that Dr. Jameson and the Britishsubjects who were under his command may then be punished by herMajesty's Government, and I will make known to your Excellency thefinal decision in this matter _as soon as Johannesburg shall havereverted to a condition of quietness and order_. '

In the face of this and many other significant messages andexpressions which reached Sir Hercules Robinson, it is not to bewondered at that he considered Dr. Jameson's life to be in peril, andthat he regarded, as he distinctly said he did, disarmament byJohannesburg as the only means of saving him; but what is lesspardonable is, that he did not pin President Kruger to this, anddemand an explanation when it became known that Jameson and his menwere secured by the conditions of the surrender. The truth is thatthe wily old Boer President, by a species of diplomacy which does notnow commend itself to civilized people, managed to jockey everybodywith whom he had any dealings. He is much in the position of acertain financier who, after a vain effort to justify hisproceedings, turned at last in desperation upon his critics and said:'Well, I don't care what view you hold of it. You can have themorality, but I've got the cash. '

Late in the evening of the 9th the following proclamation waspublished:

Whereas by resolution of the Government of the South AfricanRepublic, dated Monday, the 6th of January, 1896, whereby to allpersons at Johannesburg and suburbs twenty-four hours were granted tohand over and to lay down to the Government unconditionally all armsand ammunition for which no permit could be shown, and

Whereas the said period of twenty-four hours has already expired onTuesday, the 7th of January, 1896, and whereas the so-called ReformCommittee and other British subjects have consented and decided tocomply unconditionally with the resolution of the Government, and

Whereas sundry persons already have laid down their arms andammunition, and have handed them over to the Government, and

Whereas the laying down and giving over of the said arms andammunition is still proceeding, and

Whereas it is desirable and proper that this be done as soon aspossible, and in a proper way, and that a term be fixed thereto, Now I, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, State President of the SouthAfrican Republic, with the advice and consent of the ExecutiveCouncil, by virtue of Article 5 of their minutes, dated 9th January, 1896, proclaim that further time will be given for that purpose untilFRIDAY, the 10th JANUARY, 1896, at 6 p. M. 

All persons or corporations with whom, after the expiration of thatperiod, arms or ammunition will be found, for which no permit grantedby Government can be shown, will be dealt with according to law; and

Whereas the laying down and handing over of the said arms andammunition should have been effected unconditionally, Now I further proclaim that all persons who have already laid downand given over the said arms and ammunition, or who shall have doneso before Friday, the 10th January, 1896, at 6 p. M. , shall beexempted from all prosecution, and will be forgiven for the misdeedsthat have taken place at Johannesburg and suburbs, _except allpersons and corporations who will appear to be the chiefoffenders, ringleaders, leaders, instigators, and those who havecaused the rebellion at Johannesburg and suburbs_. 

Such persons and corporations shall have to answer for their deedsbefore the legal and competent courts of this Republic. 

I further proclaim that I will address the inhabitants ofJohannesburg to-morrow by a separate proclamation. 

_God save Land and People. _

Given under my hand at the Government Office at Pretoria on thisNinth Day of January, in the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred andNinety-six. 

 S. J. P. KRUGER, _State President_. C. VAN BOESCHOTEN, _Acting State Secretary_. 

The grim, cautious method of the President was never betterillustrated than by these proclamations and the concurrent actions. In no part of his diplomatic career has he better stage-managed thebusiness than he did here. To the world at large these addressescommend themselves no doubt as reasonable and moderate, and theyestablish a record which will always speak for him when thechronology of events is lost; but the true worth of it all is onlyappreciated when one realizes that the first proclamation extendingthe time for disarmament, and promising amnesty to all except theleaders, was not issued until two days after the Government hadsatisfied themselves that the disarmament had been completed, andthat it was deliberately held back until the police and burghers werein the outskirts of the town ready to pounce upon the men with whomthey had been treating. It is an absolute fact that the ReformCommittee-men, who had offered to effect the peaceful settlementseemingly desired by all parties, who had used every means in theirpower to convince the Government that disarming was being effected ina _bonâ fide_ and complete manner, and who had themselves suppliedthe Government in good faith with any documents they had showing thenumber of guns and the amount of ammunition which had been at thedisposal of the Reform Committee, had not the remotest suspicion thatan act of treachery was in contemplation, nor any hint that theGovernment did not regard them as amnestied by virtue of thenegotiations; and it is a fact that when the proclamation of the 9thwas issued the detectives were waiting at the clubs, hotels andhouses to arrest the members of the Reform Committee, and thatthe Reformers did not know of the proclamation exempting them fromthe 'Forgive and Forget' until after they had been seized. 

On the 10th the address promised to the inhabitants of Johannesburgduly appeared. 

After reviewing recent events, it concluded with this appeal:

Now I address you with full confidence! Strengthen the hands of theGovernment, and work together with them to make this Republic acountry where all inhabitants, so to say, live fraternally together. For months and months I have thought which alterations andemendations would be desirable in the Government of this State, butthe unwarrantable instigations, especially of the Press, have kept meback. The same men who now appear in public as the leaders havedemanded amendments from me in a time and manner which they shouldnot have dared to use in their own country out of fear of the penallaw. Through this it was made impossible for me and my burghers, thefounders of this Republic, to take your proposals into consideration. It is my intention to submit a draft law at the first ordinarysession of the Volksraad, whereby a municipality with a Mayor at itshead will be appointed for Johannesburg, to whom the whole municipalgovernment of this town will be entrusted. According to allconstitutional principles, such a municipal council should beappointed by the election of the inhabitants. I ask you earnestly, with your hand upon your heart, to answer me this question: Dare I, and should I, after all that has happened, propose such to theVolksraad? What I myself answer to this question is, I know thatthere are thousands in Johannesburg to whom I can with confidenceentrust this right to vote in municipal matters. Inhabitants ofJohannesburg, make it possible for the Government to appear beforethe Volksraad with the motto, 'Forget and Forgive. '

 (Signed) S. J. P. KRUGER, _State President_. 

One would think that anyone gifted with even a moderate sense ofhumour would have been restrained by it from issuing a secondproclamation on top of the elaborate fooling of the first. Is itpossible to imagine any other community or any other Government inthe world in which the ruler could seriously set to work topromulgate two such proclamations, sandwiching as they did those actswhich may be regarded as the practical expression--diametricallyopposed to the published expression--of his intentions?

In the meantime the negotiations concerning Dr. Jameson were draggingon. After securing the disarmament of Johannesburg and getting rid ofthe troublesome question of the disposal of Jameson, and afterrefusing for several days (to quote the gist of the HighCommissioner's telegram, Blue Book No. 125 [C-7933]) to allow thenecessary arrangements for the deportation of the men to be made, Mr. Kruger suddenly called upon the High Commissioner to have themremoved at once, intimating at the same time that it was the decisionof the Executive that all the prisoners, except the Transvaal andFree State subjects, whom he would retain, should be sent to Englandto be tried according to English law. It was pointed out that it wasonly contemplated to send the officers for trial. To this Mr. Krugerreplied: 'In such case the whole question must be reconsidered. 'The High Commissioner at once telegraphed for the decision of HerMajesty's Government, stating that it was the opinion of Sir Jacobusde Wet and Sir Graham Bower, who had represented him at the interviewwith the Transvaal Government, that, if the whole lot were not senthome to be dealt with according to English law, they would be triedin Pretoria, with a result which he feared would be deplorable. Tothis Mr. Chamberlain replied:

Astonished that Council should hesitate to fulfil the engagementwhich we understood was made by President with you, and confirmed bythe Queen, on the faith of which you secured disarmament ofJohannesburg. Any delay will produce worst impression here, and maylead to serious consequences. I have already promised that all theleaders shall be brought to trial immediately; but it would be absurdto try the rank and file, who only obeyed orders which they could notrefuse. If desired we may however engage to bring to England all whoare not domiciled in South Africa; but we cannot undertake to bringall the rank and file to trial, for that would make a farce of thewhole proceedings, and is contrary to the practice of all civilizedGovernments. As regards a pledge that they shall be punished, thePresident will see on consideration that although a Government canorder a prosecution, it cannot in any free country compel aconviction. You may remind him that the murderers of Major Elliott, who were tried in the Transvaal in 1881, were acquitted by a jury ofburghers. Compare also the treatment by us of Stellaland and otherfreebooters. 

The result of this communication was that the President drew in hishorns and agreed that if the prisoners were deported to England hewould be satisfied to let the British Government decide which of themshould be prosecuted. 

The success of his diplomatic methods had whetted his appetite, itwould appear. He was not content with the conditional surrender ofDr. Jameson, nor--having suppressed the fact that it wasconditional--with having used him for the purpose of disarmingJohannesburg; but, having achieved both purposes, Mr. Kruger wasstill desirous of keeping him in hand. This however was a length towhich the British Government did not see fit to go; but there is noevidence in the correspondence which has passed tending to show thateven then Sir Hercules Robinson perceived how he was being made useof and played with by the President. 

On the night of the 9th and the morning of the 10th, the members ofthe Reform Committee to the number of about sixty were arrested andlodged in gaol; and from this moment the High Commissioner appears tohave erased them from the tablets of his memory. On January 14 hetelegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain as follows:

I have received a letter from Government of South African Republic, stating that, in their opinion, every reason exists for assuming thatthe complications at Johannesburg are approaching to an end, and thatthere need be no longer any fear of further bloodshed. The Presidentof the South African Republic and Executive Council tender to me thewarmest thanks of the Government of the South African Republic forthe assistance I have been able to render in preventing furtherbloodshed, and their congratulations on the manner in which my objectin coming has been fulfilled. They tender also their cordialacknowledgment of the services rendered by the British Agent atPretoria, which I think is fully deserved. The Volksraad metyesterday, and adjourned until May, the only business transactedbeing a vote of thanks to the Orange Free State and the HighCommissioner for their efforts in promoting a peaceful settlement, which was carried by acclamation. I now only await settlement ofprisoners' difficulty to leave for Capetown, where my presence isurgently needed in consequence of change of Ministers. Governor ofNatal and General Cox are here, to whom I will give instructions asto reception and disposal of prisoners as soon as I hear from you. 

To this Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed a most important reply on January15:

I am left in great perplexity by your telegram No. 3, of the 14thinst. , and fear that some previous telegrams must have miscarried. (Here follow directions to refer to a number of telegrams in whichMr. Chamberlain had indicated the settlement which he anticipated, the nature of the reforms which Sir Hercules Robinson was to secure, and many inquiries as to the reason for the arrests of the reformersas reported in the English papers. ) I have received no reply to anyof these telegrams, but have assumed that negotiations were inprogress between the President and yourself. 

There can be no settlement until the questions raised by thesetelegrams are disposed of. The people of Johannesburg laid down theirarms in the belief that reasonable concessions would be arranged byyour intervention; and until these are granted, or are definitelypromised to you by the President, the root-causes of the recenttroubles will remain. 

The President has again and again promised reform, and especially onthe 30th December last, when he promised reforms in education andfranchise; and grave dissatisfaction would be excited if you leftPretoria without a clear understanding on these points. Her Majesty'sGovernment invite President Kruger, in the interests of the SouthAfrican Republic and of peace, to make a full declaration on thesematters. I am also awaiting a reply respecting the alleged wholesalearrests of English, Americans and other nationalities, made after thesurrender of Johannesburg. 

It will be your duty to use firm language, and to tell the Presidentthat neglect to meet the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders bygiving a definite promise to propose reasonable concessions wouldhave a disastrous effect upon the prospects of a lasting andsatisfactory settlement. 

Send me a full report of the steps that you have already taken withregard to this matter, and of the further action that you propose. 

In the meantime Sir Hercules Robinson left Pretoria, satisfied thathe had done all that was necessary, and telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain as follows:

FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER _en route_ TO CAPETOWN. 

_15th January_, 1896. No. 1. --Your telegram 13 January, No. 1, onlyreached me last night, after I had left Pretoria. I could if youconsider it desirable, communicate purport to President of SouthAfrican Republic by letter, but I myself think such action would beinopportune at this moment. Nearly all leading Johannesburg men arenow in gaol, charged with treason against the State, and it isrumoured that Government has written evidence of a long-standing andwidespread conspiracy to seize government of country on the plea ofdenial of political privileges, and to incorporate the country withthat of British South Africa Company. The truth of these reports willbe tested in the trials to take place shortly in the High Court, andmeanwhile to urge claim for extended political privileges for thevery men so charged would be ineffectual and impolitic. President ofSouth African Republic has already promised municipal government toJohannesburg, and has stated in a proclamation that all grievancesadvanced in a constitutional manner will be carefully considered andbrought before the Volksraad without loss of time; but until resultof trials is known nothing of course will now be done. 

Mr. Chamberlain replied to the above:

_15th January_. No. 5. --Referring to your telegram, No. 1, of the15th January, see my telegram No. 1 of to-day, which was sent beforereceipt of yours. I recognize that the actual moment is not opportunefor a settlement of the Uitlanders' grievances, and that the positionof the President of the South African Republic may be an embarrassingone, but I do not consider that the arrest of a few score individualsout of a population of 70, 000 or more, or the supposed existence of aplot amongst that small minority, is a reason for denying to theoverwhelming majority of innocent persons reforms which are just inthemselves and expedient in the interests of the Republic. Whatevermay be said about the conduct of a few individuals, nothing can beplainer than that the sober and industrious majority refused tocountenance any resort to violence, and proved their readiness toobey the law and your authority. I hope, therefore, to hear at anearly date that you propose to resume discussion with President ofSouth African Republic on lines laid down in my previous telegrams. Ido not see that the matter need wait until the conclusion of thetrial of the supposed plotters. I am anxious to receive theinformation asked for in my telegram No. 1 of the 14th January. Please communicate at once with the President on this matter. 

The following is the telegram to which allusion is made above:

_14th January_. No. 1. --Press telegrams state numerous arrests ofleading residents on the Rand, including many Americans, Germans, andother nationalities. Fear that number of these arrests of activemanagers, representatives, may disorganize industry on the Rand. Wishto know of what accused, when brought to trial, whether bail allowed, and what penalities prescribed by law. Shall be glad to learn fromPresident of South African Republic what his intentions are in thismatter, which affects the subjects of so many States. Propose tocommunicate President's reply to American and Belgian Governments, which have already asked us to take charge of interests of theirrespective citizens. 

Sir Hercules Robinson, replied:

_15th January_. No. 2. --Your telegram of 14th January, No. 1. Theaccused are between fifty and sixty in number, and are mostly membersof the Reform Committee. They have been arrested on charge oftreason, and of seeking to subvert the State by inviting theco-operation and entrance into it of an armed force. The proceedingsare based, I understand, on sworn information, and the trials willtake place before High Court. The accused are being well treated, andare represented by able counsel. It is alleged that Government hasdocumentary evidence of a widespread conspiracy to seize uponGovernment, and make use of the wealth of the country to rehabilitatefinances of British South Africa Company. On taking leave ofPresident of South African Republic, I urged on him moderation asregards the accused, so as not to alienate the sympathy he now enjoysof all right-minded persons. Bail is a matter entirely in the handsof Attorney-General. The Government seem acting within their legalrights, and I do not see how I can interfere. Mines are at work, andindustry does not seem to be disorganized. 

While still on his way to Capetown, the High Commissioner telegraphedto Mr. Chamberlain again in a manner indicating his completeabandonment of the position taken up by him in relation toJohannesburg--in fact, his repudiation of what his own words haverecorded against him:

_16th January_. No. I. --Your telegram of 15th January, No. 1, received. I cannot at this moment follow the complications arisingfrom supposed missing and crossing telegrams, but can only say thatno telegram which has reached me from you has remained unanswered. 

No promise was made to Johannesburg by me as an inducement to disarm, except that the promises made in the President's previousproclamation would be adhered to, and that Jameson and the otherprisoners would not be transferred until Johannesburg hadunconditionally laid down its arms and surrendered. I sent your longtelegram of 4th January to President; _but the question ofconcessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between us_. Pending result of coming trials, and the extent to which Johannesburgis implicated in the alleged conspiracy to subvert the State is madeclear, the question of political privileges would not be entertainedby Government of the South African Republic. 

He justified the change of policy in another communication addressedto Mr. Chamberlain before he reached Capetown:

_16th January_. No. 3. --Your telegram of the 15th January, No. 5. Ifyou will leave the matter in my hands, I will _resume_ advocacy ofUitlanders' claims at the first moment I think it can be done withadvantage; the present moment is most inopportune, as the strongestfeeling of irritation and indignation against the Uitlanders existsboth amongst the Burghers and Members of Volksraad of both Republics. Any attempt to dictate in regard to the internal affairs of SouthAfrican Republic at this moment would be resisted by all parties inSouth Africa, and would do great harm. 

I have already replied in my telegram of 15th January, No. 2, inanswer to your telegram of 14th January, No. 1, and I do not think itpossible to obtain further information at this stage, the matterbeing _sub judice_. 

Sir Hercules Robinson left Pretoria on the 14th, having residedwithin a few hundred yards of Dr. Jameson and his comrades for aweek, and of the Reform prisoners for four days, without making anyattempt whatever to ascertain their circumstances or story. Duringthat time his military secretary called upon Dr. Jameson for thepurpose of finding out details of the prisoners and wounded of theforce, but made no further inquiries. Dr. Jameson's solicitor wroteto the Colonial Office on March 5:

MY DEAR FAIRFIELD, You have probably seen the cable that has come to the _Diggers'News_, giving the lie direct to Sir John Willoughby's statementrespecting terms of surrender. 

I have seen Sir John again, and am authorized by him to state, withregard to the criticism that it is incredible that nothing shouldhave been said by the officers when in prison at Pretoria to anybodyabout the terms of surrender, that it must be remembered that fromthe time of the surrender until they left Africa none of them wereallowed to make any communication. While in gaol they were notallowed to see newspapers or to receive any news of what was going onin Pretoria or elsewhere. 

Sir J. Willoughby made a statement to the head gaoler and otherofficials at the time of his arrival at the gaol when he was searchedand all his papers taken from him. He requested to be allowed to keepthe document signed by Cronjé, as it contained the terms of thesurrender, but received as answer that all papers must be taken andthat they would be returned afterwards. They were in fact taken andonly returned when the officers were removed from the gaol to go toDurban. 

My clients did try to get a note through to Johannesburg concealed ina matchbox. They paid twenty-five pounds to get it through, and sentit within thirty-six hours of their arrival in gaol, but they havenever been able to ascertain whether it reached its destination. 

The gist of it was that they were all right. It never occurred to theprisoners that neither the British Resident nor the High Commissionerwould be informed of the terms of the surrender, or that they wouldnot satisfy themselves on this point. 

Sir Hercules Robinson might urge, in so far as Dr. Jameson's affairis concerned, that he could not be expected to suspect a deceptionsuch as was practised upon him; yet it does seem extraordinary that, being in Pretoria for the purpose of negotiating for the disposal ofDr. Jameson and his comrades, he should not have taken steps toascertain what there was to be said on their behalf, especially as onhis own showing it was for the greater part of the time a question oflife and death for the leaders of the force. It is even moredifficult to understand why no effort should have been made tocommunicate with the Reformers. The High Commissioner was thoroughlywell aware of the negotiations between them and the Government onJanuary 1. He had received communications by telegraph from theReformers before he left Capetown; he came up avowedly to settletheir business; he negotiated on their behalf and induced them todisarm; he witnessed their arrest and confinement in gaol; yet notonly did he not visit them himself, nor send an accredited member ofhis staff to inquire into their case and conditions, but Sir Jacobusde Wet alleges that he actually, in deference to the wish of thePresident, desired the British Agent not to hold any communicationwhatever with the prisoners during his (Sir Hercules Robinson's)stay in Pretoria. Truly we have had many examples of PresidentKruger's audacity, and of the success of it; but nothing to equalthis. That he demanded from Sir Hercules Robinson information as tothe objects of the Flying Squadron and the movements of Britishtroops in British territory, and succeeded in getting it, was atriumph; but surely not on a par with that of desiring the HighCommissioner not to hold communication with the British subjects whomhe, as the official representative of their sovereign, had travelleda thousand miles to disarm, and on whose behalf--ostensibly--he wasthere to negotiate. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

ARREST AND TRIAL OF THE REFORMERS. 

About half of the members of the Reform Committee were arrested andtaken through to Pretoria on the night of the 9th. Others werearrested at various times during the evening and night, were detainedin the lock-up at Johannesburg as ordinary felons, and escorted tothe Pretoria gaol on the following morning. The scene on theirarrival at Pretoria railway station and during their march to thegaol was not creditable to the Boers. A howling mob surrounded theprisoners, hustling them, striking them, and hurling abuse at themincessantly. The mounted burghers acting as an escort forced theirhorses at the unfortunate men on foot, jostling them and threateningto ride them down. One of the prisoners, a man close on sixty yearsof age, was thrown by an excited patriot and kicked and trampled onbefore he was rescued by some of his comrades. 

Once within the gaol, the men were searched and locked up in thecells, and treated exactly as black or white felons of the lowestdescription. In many cases four or five men were incarcerated insingle cells 9 feet long by 5 feet 6 inches wide, with one smallgrating for ventilation. At night they were obliged to lie on the mudfloor, or in some cases on filthy straw mattresses left in the cellsby former occupants. No provision was made by which they could obtainblankets or other covering--indeed at first it was not necessary, asthe overcrowding and lack of ventilation very nearly resulted inasphyxiation. With an inhumanity almost incredible, in one instanceone of the prisoners, suffering from fever and dysentery, was lockedup for twelve hours with four others in such a cell without anysanitary provisions whatever. Friends in Pretoria induced theauthorities, by means not unpopular in that place, to admit a betterclass of food than that allowed to the ordinary prisoners; and it isstated that the first meal enjoyed by the Reformers cost close upon£100 for introduction. Day by day fresh concessions were obtained ina similar manner, with the result that before long the prisoners wereallowed to have their own clothing and beds and such food as theychose to order. Nothing however could alter the indescribablesanitary conditions, nor compensate for the fact that the cellsoccupied by these men were in many cases swarming with vermin. 

The climate in Pretoria in January is almost tropical, and thesufferings of many of the older and less robust men under suchcircumstances were very considerable. On the eleventh day ofincarceration the majority of the prisoners were let out on bail of£2, 000 each; in the cases of two or three bail of £4, 000 each wasrequired; but bail was refused to Colonel Rhodes, Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, Hammond (the signatories to the letter), and J. P. FitzPatrick, the secretary of the Reform Committee. These fivecontinued to occupy the undesirable premises for four weeks more, atthe end of which time, owing to the serious effect upon their healthwhich imprisonment under these conditions had produced, and owing tothe repeated representations within the Transvaal and from theBritish Government as well, an alteration was made under somewhatnovel conditions. 

It was notified to the public that the Government had graciouslyconsented to admit the prisoners to bail. The terms, however, werenot at the time publicly announced. First and foremost it wasrequired of them that they should deposit £10, 000 in sovereigns eachas security that they would not break the conditions of their alteredimprisonment. They were to reside in a cottage in Pretoria understrong guard, and they were to pay the whole of the costs of theirdetention, including the salary and living expenses of the officerand guard placed over them. The cost, including interest upon themoney deposited, was upwards of £1, 000 a month. 

The preliminary examination into the charges against the Reformersbegan on February 3, and lasted about a month. It resulted in thecommittal for trial, on the charge of high treason, of all thosearrested. The Imperial Government having decided to send arepresentative to watch the trial on behalf of the British, Americanand Belgian subjects, Mr. J. Rose Innes, Q. C. , the leader of the Barin Cape Colony, attended on their behalf. It was intimated to theTransvaal Government that Mr. Innes would represent the ImperialGovernment; but objection was made to this on the grounds that he hadbeen admitted to the Pretoria Bar during the British administration, and had failed to comply with a subsequent rule of Court whichrequired some sort of registration; and permission was refused to himto address the Court. The objection was maintained, and Mr. Innes wasobliged to limit his participation in the affair to sitting at thecounsels' table and consulting and advising with the Pretoriabarristers employed to defend the prisoners. 

The examination was, as Dr. Coster the State Attorney announced, ofthe nature of a fishing examination, and he claimed to be permittedto conduct it in a manner which, he alleged, is popular in Holland, but which is entirely unknown in the Transvaal, and certainly doesnot obtain in any British possession. The chief feature of thissystem appears to be a total disregard of the rules applying toevidence. A few instances will suffice. One of the first witnessescalled was Judge Ameshof, who with Chief-Justice Kotzé and Mr. Kockformed the Government Commission appointed to meet the deputationfrom the Reform Committee on January 1. Judge Ameshof was duly sworn, and was asked to identify a list of the members of the ReformCommittee. He did so. He stated that it was the list supplied to theGovernment Commission at the meeting of January 1 by the deputationof the Reform Committee, and he regarded it therefore as authentic. The deputation had stated to the Commission that it was so. 

This was the first revelation of the tactics about to be pursued bythe Government, in using information which had been given underprivilege and in good faith by the prisoners themselves, whennegotiating with the Government prior to any question of arrest beingraised. Mr. Wessels, counsel for the accused, rose to obtain fromJudge Ameshof the official account of the meeting, desiring to provethis very important negotiation by means of witnesses on theGovernment side. He got no further however than saying to thewitness, 'You said you were a member of the Government Commission?'when Judge Ameshof replied, 'Yes, but if you are going to ask meabout anything that took place at that meeting, I cannot answer, because the meeting was a privileged one. ' Mr. Wessels did not losehis opportunity, 'You have stated, ' he said, 'that you are a Judge ofthe High Court?' The witness signified assent. 'And you mean to tellme, ' Mr. Wessels continued, 'that you feel yourself free to divulgeso much as it suits the Government to reveal, but that as soon as Iwish to prove something to my clients' advantage the interviewbecomes privileged?' The witness did not answer, and Mr. Wesselsappealed to the Court. Judicial Commissioner Zeiler, however, upheldthe witness's contention. Mr. Wessels urged in reply that if it was aprivileged interview he objected to any evidence whatever being givenin connection with it, and protested vehemently against the admissionof the list of members just sworn to. The objection was overruled, and it was thus laid down that the interview was privileged as far asthe Government was concerned, but not in so far as it could benefitthe Reformers. 

Another case was that of Mr. Schumacher, a witness who testified, _inter alia_, that he did not know what the objects of a certainDevelopment Syndicate were. His evidence showed that he had not beeninformed upon this point. He was very hard pressed by the StateAttorney, but he adhered to his first answer. Dr. Coster then alteredhis tactics and asked, 'Had you no opinions on the subject? Did younot guess at all?' The witness replied that he might have thought andconjectured at various times, but that he had nothing in the natureof information or knowledge on the point. This did not satisfy Dr. Coster, who then pressed the question, 'Well, what did you think?What were your thoughts?' The witness objected to state what histhoughts were, as they could have no bearing on the fact, and mightbe absolutely wide of the mark. He could only repeat that he had noknowledge. The witness appealed to the Bench for protection. Mr. Wessels urged that it was an unheard-of proceeding to compel awitness to state what he thought and to use it as evidence. Theobjections were again overruled, and the witness was ordered bythe Court to answer. His reply afforded no satisfaction to theGovernment, being to the effect that he could not then remember whathis thoughts were at various times. On the application of the StateAttorney the Judicial Commissioner sent him to gaol for twelve hoursfor contempt of court. 

Mr. Wessels strenuously objected to the decision and applied to theCourt to stay imprisonment to enable him to appeal to a judge inchambers, but even this was refused. Mr. Wessels in the course of hisaddress received a reprimand from the Bench for stating that he nowrecognized the force of the State Attorney's contention that the lawof evidence as obtaining in South Africa was not sufficiently wide;for, he added, he thought it would suit the purpose of the Governmentbetter if they reverted to an older system under which racks andthumbscrews were popular. 

The witness was sent to gaol. Some hours later an appeal was heard byJudge de Korté in chambers, and the decision of the JudicialCommissioner was reversed, but the prisoner had already completedseven hours' imprisonment in a dirty cell. Judge de Korté stated thathe had reversed the decision after consultation with Chief JusticeKotzé, and it was felt that something at least had been achieved byMr. Schumacher, and the rights of a witness would be recognized. Butthe end is not always in sight in dealing with the TransvaalGovernment. The State Attorney in turn appealed from the singlejudge's decision to the full Bench. Judge Morice, a Scotchman, manyyears a judge of the High Court, supported the decision of Judge deKorté. The Chief Justice, who had advised Judge de Korté in hisdecision however in a most extraordinary judgment now reversed it, and in this view he was supported by Judge Ameshof--himself a witnessin the case against the Reformers. 

Thus the majority judgment of the High Court against the Reformers onthis principle of evidence happened to be formulated by the twojudges who had been appointed to negotiate with the Reformers'deputation on behalf of the Government. 

The impossibility of obtaining justice in the Courts of the Transvaalunder the then conditions was thus brought home to the prisoners. Anappeal from the decision of the Lower Court on Judge Ameshof'sinterpretation of privilege, which had been seriously discussed, wasthen abandoned as being worse than useless, and calculated only toprovoke more extreme measures against the prisoners by placing theBench in a ridiculous position. It could not be expected that theChief Justice, who was himself a member of the Government Commissionwhich Judge Ameshof had claimed to be privileged, would take anyother view than that favouring the policy and convenience of theGovernment which he showed himself so ready to befriend. 

In the Schumacher appeal case before the full Court, Dr. Coster hadmade no secret that he intended to disregard the rules and precedentsgoverning the treatment of witnesses, and even claimed that he shouldreceive no opposition from the prisoners' counsel, since he was only'_fishing_' for evidence and not actually accumulating it against theprisoners, and had no intention of using the evidence given at thisexamination. Mr. Wessels asked him whether he would pledge himself tothis effect, and what, for instance, would be done in case a witnesswho had been heard at the preliminary examination should die beforethe main trial came off. The reply was, that in such a case of coursethe Government would be bound to use some of the evidence, but woulduse it with discretion and not unfairly. This undertaking provokedsmiles even in court. The wisdom and fairness of Mr. Wessels'contention were fully justified when the trial actually did takeplace, for the whole of the evidence of the preliminary examinationwas handed in for the guidance of the judge in determining hissentences against the accused. It may be added that each witness wascalled upon to sign the notes of his evidence as taken down in Dutch. When required, the official reporter read a free translation of thenotes to the witness before they were signed. 

At the conclusion of the examination all the prisoners were committedon the same charge--that of high treason--no distinction whateverbeing made in the references to them from the Bench. By this time Mr. Hammond, who had been ill, was released on bail of £20, 000 in orderto go to the seaside. 

Application was made on behalf of Colonel Rhodes, Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, and FitzPatrick for release on bail, upon the grounds that nodistinction whatever had been made between them and the otherprisoners who had already been released, but this was refused afterthe point had been reserved for consideration by the State Attorneyin consultation with the Chief Justice, and the four men returned totheir former conditions of imprisonment. Mr. Chamberlain continued tomake representations on behalf of these men, and at one time itappeared as though the restrictions would be removed, Dr. Costerhaving pledged himself to accept bail, and having actually drawn outthe bail-bonds and submitted them to the solicitors of the accusedfor approval, and every arrangement having been completed--even tothe finding of the additional security. They were however at the lastmoment curtly informed that bail would not be allowed. On this beingreported to Mr. Chamberlain, he at once replied to the effect that hecould not believe that a Government would revoke a promise made ontheir behalf by the State Attorney. Dr. Leyds, on behalf of hisGovernment, stated that the matter was in the hands of the StateAttorney alone and did not concern the Executive, and that on inquiryhe found that no such promise had been made and no undertaking given. The incident is more or less trivial, but again shows the readinesswith which the Boer Government repudiate a promise when it is totheir convenience to do so. Dr. Coster on his side admitted withexpressions of regret that there had been a breach of undertaking, and stated that it had been done by order of the Executive Council. 

Communications between Mr. Chamberlain and the Pretoria Governmentwere of great frequency during this period. The phantom of Mr. Kruger's visit to England was chased with great assiduity. The wilyold President seized on Mr. Chamberlain's suggestions as an excellentpretext for delay to enable him to spread his nets, and he used thetime to great advantage. But this was not the worst! Mr. Chamberlain's new diplomacy and his stupid or treacherous advisersled him into blunders; as when, for instance, he tried to bouncewithout the intention of making good his implied threats; and whenhe sent his 4th of February despatch (publishing it in London beforeit reached Pretoria), strongly and ably reviewing the position, butspoiling all by a proposal which, whilst it had not been suggested toor discussed by the Rand people, and would not have been acceptableto them in lieu of what they had demanded, was also an interferencein the internal affairs of the Transvaal. It gave the PretoriaGovernment an opportunity, which they did not miss, of severelysnubbing Mr. Chamberlain. When the latter in turn peremptorilyrefused their demands, he was informed that the cancellation of theLondon Convention would not be pressed '_at present_, ' but mightremain in abeyance. 

Throughout the period prior to the main trial, President Krugercontinued to use with great effect 'the wishes and intentions of hisburghers. ' When bail was first refused to the leaders this course wasjustified on the grounds that the burghers were strongly against it, and that the President could not act against their wishes. When at alater stage a petition was presented by a number of burghers more orless in touch with the Uitlander community, who felt that thetreatment of the leaders was having a bad effect, counter petitionscame in within a day or two urging the Government on no account toextend the privilege of bail to these men. Oddly enough, thesepetitions were got up and signed by relatives and near connexions ofthe President himself. 

During this period another petition was presented which is surelywithout parallel in a civilized state; but it illustrates admirablythe Boer idea of right and liberty. Fifty burghers in the district ofStanderton addressed the Government, pointing out the undesirabilityof allowing a 'certain Advocate Wessels to defend the Jamesonrebels, ' and praying that the Government would put him over theborder, 'which is the slightest punishment that can be inflicted uponhim. ' The receipt of this petition was announced in the Governmentorgan, the _Press_, on March 25. 

At about this time another incident occurred which excitedconsiderable feeling. Commandant Henning Pretorius, one of the mostprominent Boer officials, having paid a visit to his native districtin the Cape Colony shortly after the Jameson raid, purchased fromthe owner of a farm at Cookhouse Drift the beam from which the fiveBoers had been hanged at Slagter's Nek for rebellion in the year1816. Reference has already been made in the first chapter to thisdeplorable affair. The beam (which had been built into the house) wasbrought up by the purchaser to Pretoria. He states, and no doubttruly, that he obtained the historical relic for the purpose ofadding it to the National Museum; but it must be added that the timewas not well chosen unless the intention was to rouse feeling. The_Volksstem_, the Hollander-Boer organ, in an extremely violentarticle, described in detail the Slagter's Nek executions, and calledupon the burghers to avenge on the persons of the Reformers theirmurdered countrymen; and it is a fact vouched for by persons by nomeans friendly to the Uitlander that certain Boers approachedPresident Kruger, intimating to him that the beam had arrived, thatit would not be necessary to bother about a trial, but that the fourmen should be hanged out of hand from the same scaffold which hadserved for their compatriots. It is but right to say that PresidentKruger's reply was a severe reprimand, and a reminder that they werenot a barbarous people, but should comply with the law. The matterhaving been brought to the notice of Mr. Chamberlain, strongrepresentations were made upon the subject, to which the TransvaalGovernment replied (forgetful apparently of the fact that thePresident had frequently urged his inability to control his burghers)that the Transvaal was a civilized State, that the burghers werelaw-abiding and peaceful people, and that their Government was at alltimes able to control them. It was interesting to see the argument ofthe burghers getting out of hand, which was used with such effect inthe case of Dr. Jameson and quoted by Sir Hercules Robinson, recoilupon the head of its originator. 

A final effort was made by the people of Johannesburg to obtain therelease on bail of the four prisoners. A petition bearing thesignatures of 20, 000 persons was presented; the gentlemen bearing thepetition were informed that it could not be received; that they mustcall again. Having called again and again, the petition was at lastaccepted and placed before the Government; but no reply was evervouchsafed. The treatment of this memorial is in sharp contrastwith that accorded to the one presented by a score or so of thePresident's relatives and supporters--objecting to the release. 

From the time of the arrests until just before the trial speculationwas rife as to which judge would preside. The Chief Justice and JudgeAmeshof could hardly sit (even allowing for the precedents alreadyestablished by them), since they had both acted on the GovernmentCommission in negotiating with the prisoners, and one of them hadalready given evidence against the accused. There remained JusticesJorissen, De Korté and Morice. Mr. De Korté was then threatened withsuspension owing to pecuniary embarrassments, and would evidently notbe allowed to preside. The fifth judge, Mr. Jorissen, had expressedhimself so violently against the Reformers that he had himselfrecognized the impossibility of attaining an impartial attitude, andhad refused to sit. The only judge available was therefore Mr. Justice Morice, against whom there was no valid objection whatever. Moreover, in the ordinary routine it so happened that it was his turnto preside at the forthcoming trial; but he was known to hold Liberalviews and to be strongly in sympathy with internal reform. 

At this time Chief-Justice Kotzé undertook several journeys to theFree State and Cape Colony, ostensibly to rid himself of insomnia, but in reality, as results proved, in order to employ a judge forthis trial. His choice eventually fell upon Mr. Gregorowski, formerlya judge in the Free State, and at that time State-Attorney to thatcountry. 

Mr. Gregorowski was noted on the Bench for the peculiar severity ofhis sentences on all except Boers. He had moreover expressed openlyin Bloemfontein his wish that he might have the trying of 'thoseReformers; he would give them what for. ' These things were not knownat the time of the trial; nor had the fact yet come out that beforetaking the oath of office he had endeavoured to borrow from at leastone of his colleagues a black cap for the forthcoming trial. Hisattitude at the time is sufficiently indicated by what he wroteshortly after the trial, in defence of his action, '_I came up to putdown rebellion. _ I have done so with a strong hand, and I believethat my judgment will bear good fruit in the future. ' The prisonerscould not but contrast the action of the Government in employing andappointing, on approval, a judge who had no status whatever in thecountry, with their action in declining to allow Mr. Rose Innes toappear at the Bar on the pretext of his previous qualification notbeing in order; and it was felt to be ominous that an independent andupright judge, against whom there could be no objection, should bepassed over, and another specially imported for the occasion. 

The trial was at last fixed to take place on April 27, and theindictments were served upon the accused six days before that date. The following is the list of those who were committed for trial:

 Lionel Phillips Colonel F. W. Rhodes George Farrar J. H. Hammond J. P. FitzPatrick S. W. Jameson G. Richards J. L. Williams G. Sandilands F. Spencer R. A. Bettington J. G. Auret E. P. Solomon J. W. Leonard W. H. S. Bell W. E. Hudson D. F. Gilfillan C. H. Mullins E. O. Hutchinson W. Van Hulsteyn A. Woolls-Sampson H. C. Hull Alf. Brown C. L. Andersson M. Langermann W. Hosken W. St. John Carr H. F. Strange C. Garland Fred Gray{33} A. Mackie Niven Dr. W. T. F. Davies Dr. R. P. Mitchell Dr. Hans Sauer Dr. A. P. Hillier Dr. D. P. Duirs Dr. W. Brodie H. J. King A. Bailey Sir Drummond Dunbar H. E. Becher F. Mosenthal H. A. Rogers C. Butters Walter D. Davies H. Bettelheim F. R. Lingham A. L. Lawley W. B. Head V. M. Clement W. Goddard J. J. Lace C. A. Tremeer R. G. Fricker J. M. Buckland J. Donaldson F. H. Hamilton P. Du Bois H. B. Marshall S. B. Joel A. R. Goldring J. A. Roger Thomas Mein J. S. Curtis{34}

The indictment served on all alike was as follows:

H. J. Coster, State Attorney of the South African Republic, who, onbehalf of the State, prosecutes, brings to the notice of the Court:

That they (citing the accused), all and each or one or more of them, are guilty of the crime of High Treason:

Firstly: In that in or about the months of November and December inthe year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, theexact dates being unknown to the State Attorney, they, the saidaccused, at Johannesburg, Witwatersrand Goldfields, South AfricanRepublic, being citizens of, or residing in, this Republic, all andeach or one or more of them wrongfully, unlawfully, and with ahostile intention to disturb, injure, or bring into danger theindependence or safety of this Republic, treated, conspired, agreedwith and urged Leander Starr Jameson, an alien, residing without theboundaries of this Republic, to come into the territory of thisRepublic at the head of and with an armed and hostile troop, and tomake a hostile invasion and to march through to Johannesburgaforesaid. 

Secondly: In that they (the said accused), being citizens of, orresiding in, this Republic, all and each or one or more of them, there and then in conjunction with Charles Leonard and Dr. H. Wolff, now fugitives, and other persons unknown to the State Attorney, appearing and acting as a committee, by them named the 'ReformCommittee, ' after the above-mentioned Leander Starr Jameson, on orabout December 29, in the year aforesaid, had come from without theRepublic, at the head of and with an armed and hostile troop, in theneighbourhood of Ottoshoop, district Marico, into the territory ofthis Republic, and had made a hostile invasion, and had violentlyattempted to penetrate through to Johannesburg aforesaid, wrongfully, unlawfully, and with a hostile intention to disturb, injure, or bringinto danger the independence or safety of this Republic, gave, orattempted to give, the aforementioned Leander Starr Jameson duringhis hostile invasion aforesaid information about the state of thedefences at Johannesburg, and had armed troops ready to assist, andsent assistance to him, and subsequently by seditious speeches made, or caused to be made, in public, with the object to persuade andinduce the people there to stand by the aforementioned Jameson in hishostile invasion, and further have assisted him, the aforementionedJameson, during his hostile invasion above mentioned, by providinghim with provisions, forage, and horses. 

Thirdly: That in or about the month of December, in the yearaforesaid, and in the month of January in the year one thousand eighthundred and ninety-six, exact dates not known to the State Attorney, at Johannesburg aforesaid, they (the said accused), being inhabitantsof, and residing in, this Republic, all and each or one or more ofthem, then and there, in conjunction with Charles Leonard and Dr. H. Wolff, now fugitives, and other persons unknown to the StateAttorney, appearing and acting as a committee named by them the'Reform Committee, ' wrongfully and unlawfully, and with a hostileintention to disturb, injure, or bring into danger the independenceor safety of this Republic, have distributed, or caused to bedistributed, amongst the population there, and in the neighbourhoodthereof, Maxim guns, other weapons, arms, and ammunition; further, have enrolled men, or have caused them to be enrolled, and haveformed them, or have caused them to be formed, into military corps;have erected there, or caused to be erected, earthworks and otherfortifications. 

Fourthly: In that in or about the month of December and the month ofJanuary, the exact dates being unknown to the State Attorney, and atJohannesburg aforesaid they (the said accused), being citizens of, and residing in, this Republic, all and each or one or more of them, then and there, in conjunction with Charles Leonard and Dr. H. Wolff, now fugitives, and other persons unknown to the State Attorney, appearing and acting as a committee called by them the 'ReformCommittee, ' wrongfully and unlawfully, with hostile intention todisturb, injure, or bring into danger the independence or safety ofthis Republic, have arrogated to themselves, and have exercised andcaused to be exercised, the functions, and powers belonging to theauthorities of this Republic; by violence, or by threats of violence, have compelled, or caused to be compelled, the police of thisRepublic stationed at Johannesburg aforesaid to leave the publicsquares and streets; have formed, or caused to be formed, their ownpolice corps, and have provided that corps, or caused it to beprovided, with guns and other arms; and further have appointed, orcaused to be appointed, as head of that corps, Andrew Trimble, andhave entrusted him with jurisdiction in police cases, in virtuewhereof the aforementioned Andrew Trimble has passed sentence andcaused it to be carried out. 

In consequence of all which acts abovementioned the independence ofthis country was brought into danger, and its safety disturbed andimpaired. 

Wherefore the State Attorney, after due proof and conviction thereof, requests the judgment of this Court against said accused, accordingto law. 

The general opinion based upon the character of the evidence adducedat the preliminary examination was that it would be impossible tosustain the charge of high treason; but the disclosure of thedocuments in the possession of the State Attorney put a differentcomplexion upon the case. Then for the first time the members of theReform Committee became aware of that factor in their case which hassince become famous as 'de trommel van Bobby White'--Major RobertWhite's despatch-box--a veritable conjurer's hat, from which Mr. Kruger produced to an admiring and astonished world the politicalequivalents of eggs and goldfish, pigeons and white mice. In this box(which was taken with the invading force at Doornkop) it appearsMajor White had brought as much of his previous correspondence as hecould conveniently carry, together with diaries, notebooks, code-books, cipher-keys, etc. Nor was this all. He had brought a copyof the letter of invitation, certified by himself as magistrate inthe Bechuanaland Protectorate. Revelations at and subsequent to thetrial show that the State Attorney, on discovering this copy andfinding that as a copy it would not be admitted and that he mightexperience some difficulty in proving it, prevailed upon Major Whitewhile in the Pretoria gaol to confirm his previous certificate, andto make an affidavit to the effect that he had compared the letterwith the original, that it was a true copy, and that he had examinedthe signatures, and believed them to be the signatures of the personsindicated. The State Attorney alleges that he bargained with MajorWhite for this affidavit, and in return surrendered to him certainprivate documents which had also been taken in the despatch-box. Major White on the other hand stated to the writer and to anothermember of the Reform Committee--Mr. H. C. Hull--that there is no truthin the allegation that he received a _quid pro quo_; but has noexcuse to offer for making the affidavit, except that he--_'does notremember having done it. '_

The Reform prisoners, who, animated by a desire not to give any oftheir comrades away, had for a period of close upon four months borneall the abuse which could be heaped upon them, and had abstained frommaking any defence in public, or any of those revelations such ashave since been made through the exertion of the Transvaalauthorities, the Select Committee of the Cape House of Assembly, andthe Bow Street officers, found to their inexpressible disgust thatthe efforts which they had made were rendered futile by the captureof these documents; and they were highly incensed at the action ofone of the very men whose lives they believed they had saved bysurrendering on January 7. The affidavit was looked upon asunpardonable, and the unnecessary statement regarding the genuinenessof the signatures was interpreted in a very unpleasant sense. 

Consultations now took place between Mr. Advocate Wessels and Mr. Richard Solomon, Q. C. , of Kimberley, who had also been retained onbehalf of the accused; and endeavours were made to obtain from theState Attorney details of the evidence which it was proposed tobring, but with only partial success. From the facts already known tothem it was clear that the Government were determined to stretchevery point in law to their own advantage and to indulge in fewscruples as to the means to be employed to secure a conviction. TheJudge, it was known, had been specially imported for this trial, and provisionally appointed to a seat on the Bench. As theconfirmation of his appointment was to take place when the Volksraadshould meet, or at any rate at some period subsequent to the trial, it was not unnatural to regard his as a case in which a judge wasappointed on approval, the appointment to be either confirmed orcancelled according to the satisfaction which he should give. 

Appeal to the full bench of the High Court had already been proved tobe entirely useless; since the only judges to whom appeal could bemade were those who had in the earlier stages associated themselveswith the Government against the Reform Committee, and later on intheir judicial capacities confirmed the attitude taken up by them aspatriots. 

The options before the prisoners were therefore three in number. Onecourse would be to enter upon a protracted trial before a Boer juryand a specially-appointed judge, with the certainty for the majorityof an adverse verdict in any case. In such a trial numberlessoccasions would arise for the exercise of discretion in the admissionor rejection of evidence, and any defence of the prisoners mustnecessarily partake of the character of an indictment against theGovernment and the faction which both judge and jury avowedlyrepresented, and tend only to aggravate the penalty. They wouldmoreover have to face that trial as a body of over sixty men, many ofwhom could have reasonably set up special defences, many of whom werenot even mentioned in any evidence which the Government had yetsecured (with the exception of course of Judge Ameshof's _privileged_list), and could therefore reasonably expect to be discharged onmaking individual defences. The second alternative was to decline toplead at all, on the ground that they had negotiated with theGovernment in good faith, and that a treacherous arrest and breach ofunderstandings arrived at would not be recognised in any way bythem--in fact, to refuse to condone treachery or take a hand in afarce. The third course was to plead guilty, and take a short cut onthe best terms possible to what was realized to be a pre-arrangedconclusion. 

The second alternative was rejected, because it was found to beimpossible to secure unanimity of action. In the course of thediscussions upon the other alternatives, certain negotiations tookplace between the State Attorney Dr. Coster and Mr. Wessels, theresult of which was that Dr. Coster made the following offer: If theleaders (the signatories to the letter of invitation) would consentto plead guilty to count 1 of the indictment, he would agree towithdraw as against them counts 2, 3, and 4; and in such case hewould agree that the rank and file should plead guilty to counts 3and 4 only, he withdrawing as against them counts 1 and 2. The matterwas discussed by the prisoners, and objection was taken to that partof the indictment in which it was stated that the Reform Committeehad acted 'with a hostile intention to disturb, injure or bring intodanger the independence or safety of this Republic. '

Another meeting took place between the State Attorney and Mr. Wessels, at which Dr. Coster agreed to eliminate from the indictmentagainst the rank and file the words objected to, provided that theleaders would plead guilty to count 1. Having arrived at this--tohim--satisfactory conclusion, Dr. Coster remarked that they (_i. E. , _all except the four) were now charged with a merely nominal offence. Mr. Wessels endeavoured to obtain the same alteration in theindictment of the leaders, but this was refused on the ground that itwould make the indictment ridiculous; and, _apropos_ of theconcession to the rank and file, Dr. Coster even expressed doubts asto whether, if the hostile intention were eliminated, any crime couldbe said to remain under the indictment. He however agreed to allowthe four leaders to qualify their plea by a statement in writingwhich they were to put in at the same time. He stated that he wouldhave _pro forma_ to put in some evidence of the offence, butundertook not to press for exemplary punishment, and moreoverpromised that he would not dispute or question the statement to beput in, provided that it contained no material error in fact. 

A discussion then followed as to the law under which the trial wouldtake place. Mr. Wessels urged that, as there was specific provisionin the statute law for cases of this nature, the statute law would ofcourse apply in preference to Roman-Dutch law. Dr. Coster said hepresumed that this would be the case, but that he was not quite surewhether Roman-Dutch law would not apply. He added however thatanything he could say would not be binding upon the judge, who couldalone decide as to the question of law. 

Mr. Wessels's report to his clients induced the rank and file toagree under the altered circumstances to the third alternative, namely, pleading guilty, and they agreed to this under theimpression, which without doubt had been suggested and deliberatelyfostered by the Government, that they were pleading guilty to anominal offence, and would incur a monetary penalty in proportion. 

In consultation with the leaders, Mr. Wessels reported thediscussions with Dr. Coster as above given. Both he and Mr. Solomonrepresented to them the gravity of the plea, and said that there wasthe possibility that the judge would invoke Roman-Dutch law andignore the laws of the country, in which case it would be in hispower to pass sentence of death. In their opinion, they added, and inthe opinion of Mr. Rose Innes and others, this would be a monstrousstraining of the law, yet they felt bound to indicate thepossibility. 

The course before the prisoners was not indeed an attractive one, butit was not without its recommendations. It would have been infinitelypreferable to fight it out had there been a chance of a good fight, if even a losing one; but, apart from a verdict of guilty being anabsolute certainty, the circumstances were against any possibility ofeffecting anything like a strong impeachment of the Government. Moreover, the course now proposed would prevent any 'giving away' ofDr. Jameson, who had yet to be tried, and of others; and it alsoremoved the necessity for individual defences by those among theprisoners who had been involved in a less degree than others. Thematter at that time appeared in one way to concern the leaders only. If they were willing to take upon themselves the burden of the chargeand secure the acquittal of others by accepting the fullresponsibility, it could only be regarded as a chivalrous act. Butthere were some among the other the prisoners--'Irreconcilables, 'as they were called--who considered themselves equally responsiblewith the leaders, who strongly objected to shifting any portion oftheir responsibility upon others, and who desired to stand with thosewho were prepared to bear the brunt of the charge. To them thesuggestion to plead guilty was as gall and wormwood, and was regardedas another humiliation which they were required to endure, anotherclimbing-down similar to the disarmament, and attended, like it, withexasperating and baffling complications and involvements that maderefusal an impossibility. The one call to which these men wouldrespond was the call to stand together and have no divisions--a causefor which they were still to make many sacrifices. The irony of itwas that in order to 'stand together' they had to agree tosegregation. 

Dr. Coster would accept no further modification or variation of histerms--there was no option to individuals to plead not guilty andfight it out, except at the cost of involving all the others, nor wasthere any option to them to plead with the leaders. One other factorin the determination of this policy remains to be noted. Thecommunications already recorded as having passed between some of themembers of the Reform Committee and Dr. Jameson, after the latter hadactually invaded the country, and some evidence as to thearrangements made for the reception and camping of his force, were inthe hands of the Government, and these were sufficient to convictevery member of the Reform Committee under count 2 of the indictmentin a trial before a Boer jury and by a special judge. Convictionunder count 1 was assured by the letter of invitation and theadmissions in the 'privileged' meeting with the GovernmentCommission. Conviction under count 2 would be a distinct aggravationof the position of the four--or so it seemed then--whilst it would bea most serious thing for the rank and file; and it was finallydecided to plead in accordance with the suggestion of the StateAttorney. The decision was conveyed to this gentleman and by him tothe President, who expressed his 'satisfaction' at a course whichwould enable him to 'deal magnanimously with the prisoners, ' no doubtin pursuance of the policy of 'Forget and Forgive. ' When, as aconvincing proof of the wisdom of the decision to plead guilty, the 'satisfaction' of the President was made known to theIrreconcilables, they remarked that this was the worst sign thatthey had yet detected, but others were more hopeful. 

As to the soundness of the advice on which the prisoners pleaded, itmay be observed that Messrs. Gregorowski and Coster have both sincethen expressed the opinion that there was sufficient evidence toconvict one and all of high treason, and they should know what wouldhave been considered 'sufficient. ' The latter added that the primemovers were of course guilty; but they at any rate had tried to stopJameson, whilst those who joined the Reform Committee in the laterstages were morally worse, since they had only joined when andbecause they knew that he had invaded the country. Mr. Gregorowski, at a later stage, defended his sentence on the leaders, but feared hehad been 'far too lenient with the others. ' It would be unfairtherefore to suggest that the advice on which the prisoners haddecided to act was other than sound wise and proper in thecircumstances. That it should afterwards appear that the otherparties to the arrangement had acted with deliberate duplicity andbad faith cannot be laid as a charge against the gentlemen who gavethis advice, and whose only fault, if fault it be, was that theirinstincts, their principles, and their training precluded thesuspicion of treachery. 

The trial commenced on April 24, when the prisoners were arraigned, after which an adjournment was made until the 27th, in order to allowthree of the prisoners who were then travelling up to take theirtrial to arrive. On the latter date, all being present, and pleas ofguilty having been recorded, the State Attorney put in the ciphertelegrams, the minutes of the 'privileged' meeting between theGovernment Commission and the deputation of the Reform Committee, none of which had been produced in evidence, and the record ofevidence taken at the preliminary examination. Mr. Wessels then readand put in the following statement of the four leaders:

For a number of years endeavours have been made to obtain byconstitutional means the redress of the grievances under which theUitlander population labours. The new-comer asked for no more than isconceded to emigrants by all the other Governments in SouthAfrica, under which every man may, on reasonable conditions, become acitizen of the State; whilst here alone a policy is pursued by whichthe first settlers retain the exclusive right of government. 

Petitions supported by the signatures of some 40, 000 men wereignored; and when it was found that we could not get a fair andreasonable hearing, that provisions already deemed obnoxious andunfair were being made more stringent, and that we were beingdebarred for ever from obtaining the rights which in other countriesare freely granted, it was realized that we would never get redressuntil we should make a demonstration of force to support our claims. 

Certain provision was made regarding arms and ammunition, and aletter was written to Dr. Jameson, in which he was asked to come toour aid under certain circumstances. 

On December 26 the Uitlanders' Manifesto was published, and it wasthen our intention to make a final appeal for redress at the publicmeeting which was to have been held on January 6. In consequence ofmatters that came to our knowledge we sent on December 26 Major Heany(by train via Kimberley), and Captain Holden across country, toforbid any movement on Dr. Jameson's part. 

On the afternoon of Monday, December 30, we learnt from Governmentsources that Dr. Jameson had crossed the frontier. We assumed that hehad come in good faith to help us, probably misled by some of theexaggerated rumours which were then in circulation. We wereconvinced, however, that the Government and the burghers would not inthe excitement of the moment believe that we had not invited Dr. Jameson in, and there was no course open to us but to prepare todefend ourselves if we were attacked, and at the same time to spareno effort to effect a peaceful settlement. 

It became necessary to form some organization for the protection ofthe town and the maintenance of order; since, in the excitementcaused by the news of Dr. Jameson's coming, serious disturbanceswould be likely to occur, and it was evident that the Governmentorganization could not deal with the people without serious risks ofconflict. 

The Reform Committee was formed on Monday night, December 30, and itwas intended to include such men of influence as cared to associatethemselves with the movement. The object with which it was formed isbest shown by its first notice, viz. :

'Notice is hereby given that this Committee adheres to the NationalUnion Manifesto, and reiterates its desire to maintain theindependence of the Republic. The fact that rumours are in course ofcirculation to the effect that a force has crossed the Bechuanalandborder renders it necessary to take active steps for the defenceof Johannesburg and preservation of order. The Committee earnestlydesire that the inhabitants should refrain from taking any actionwhich can be construed as an overt act of hostility against theGovernment. By order of the Committee, 'J. PERCY FITZPATRICK, '_Secretary_. '

The evidence taken at the preliminary examination will show thatorder was maintained by this Committee during a time of intenseexcitement, and through the action of the Committee no aggressivesteps whatever were taken against the Government, but on thecontrary, the property of the Government was protected, and itsofficials were not interfered with. 

It is our firm belief that had no such Committee been formed, theintense excitement caused by Dr. Jameson's entry would have broughtabout utter chaos in Johannesburg. 

It has been alleged that we armed natives. This is absolutely untrue, and is disposed of by the fact that during the crisis upwards of20, 000 white men applied to us for arms and were unable to get them. 

On Tuesday morning, December 31, we hoisted the flag of the Z. A. R. , and every man bound himself to maintain the independence of theRepublic. On the same day the Government withdrew its policevoluntarily from the town and we preserved perfect order. 

During the evening of that day, Messrs. Marais and Malan presentedthemselves as delegates from the Executive Council. They came (to usetheir own words) to 'offer us the olive branch, ' and they told usthat if we would send a deputation to Pretoria to meet a Commissionappointed by the Government, we should probably obtain 'practicallyall that we asked for in the Manifesto. '

Our deputation met the Government Commission, consisting of ChiefJustice Kotzé, Judge Ameshof, and Mr. Kock, member of the Executive. 

On our behalf our deputation frankly avowed knowledge of Jameson'spresence on the border, and of his intention, by written arrangementwith us, to assist us in case of extremity. 

With the full knowledge of this arrangement, with the knowledge thatwe were in arms and agitating for our rights, the GovernmentCommission handed to us a resolution by the Executive Council, ofwhich the following is the purport:

'The High Commissioner has offered his services with a view to apeaceful settlement. The Government of the South African Republic hasaccepted his offer. Pending his arrival, no hostile step will betaken against Johannesburg, provided Johannesburg takes no hostileaction against the Government. In terms of a certain proclamationrecently issued by the President, the grievances will be earnestlyconsidered. '

We acted in perfect good faith with the Government, believing it tobe their desire, as it was ours, to avert bloodshed, and believing itto be their intention to give us the redress which was implied in the'earnest consideration of grievances. '

There can be no better evidence of our earnest endeavour to repairwhat we regarded as a mistake on the part of Dr. Jameson than thefollowing offer which our deputation, authorized by resolution of theCommittee, laid before the Government Commission:

'If the Government will permit Dr. Jameson to come into Johannesburgunmolested, the Committee will guarantee, with their persons ifnecessary, that he will leave again peacefully as soon as possible. '

We faithfully carried out the agreement that we should commit no actof hostility against the Government; we ceased all active operationsfor the defence of the town against any attack, and we did everythingin our power to prevent any collision with the burghers--an attemptin which our efforts were happily successful. 

On the telegraphic advice of the result of the interview of thedeputation with the Government Commission, we despatched Mr. Lace, amember of our Committee, as an escort to the courier carrying theHigh Commissioner's despatch to Dr. Jameson, in order to assureourselves that the despatch would reach its destination. 

On the following Saturday, January 4, the High Commissioner arrivedin Pretoria. On Monday, the sixth, the following telegram was sent tous:

 'Pretoria, _January 6, 1896. _

'_From_ H. M. 's AGENT _to_ REFORM COMMITTEE, _Johannesburg. _

'_January 6. _--I am directed to inform you that the High Commissionermet the President, the Executive, and the Judges to-day. The Presidentannounced the decision of the Government to be that Johannesburg mustlay down its arms unconditionally as a [condition] precedent to adiscussion and consideration of grievances. The High Commissionerendeavoured to obtain some indication of the steps which would betaken in the event of disarmament, but without success, it beingintimated that the Government had nothing more to say on this subjectthan had already been embodied in the President's proclamation. TheHigh Commissioner inquired whether any decision had been come to asregards the disposal of the prisoners, and received a reply in thenegative. The President said that as his burghers, to the number of8, 000, had been collected and could not be asked to remainindefinitely, he must request a reply "Yes" or "No" to this ultimatumwithin twenty-four hours. '

On the following day Sir Jacobus de Wet, H. M. 's Agent, met us incommittee, and handed to us the following wire from his Excellencythe High Commissioner:

'HIGH COMMISSIONER, _Pretoria, to_ SIR J. DE WET, _Johannesburg. _

'_Received Johannesburg 7. 36 a. M. , January 7, 1896. _

'_Urgent_--You should inform the Johannesburg people that I considerthat if they lay down their arms they will be acting loyally andhonourably, and that if they do not comply with my request theyforfeit all claim to sympathy from Her Majesty's Government, and fromBritish subjects throughout the world, as the lives of Jameson andprisoners are practically in their hands. '

On this, and the assurance given in the Executive Council resolution, we laid down our arms on January 6, 7, and 8; on the 9th we werearrested, and have since been under arrest at Pretoria, a period ofthree and a half months. 

We admit responsibility for the action taken by us. We frankly avowedit at the time of the negotiations with the Government, when we wereinformed that the services of the High Commissioner had been acceptedwith a view to a peaceful settlement. 

We submit that we kept faith in every detail in the arrangement withthe Government; that we did all that was humanly possible to protectboth the State and Dr. Jameson from the consequence of his action;that we have committed no breach of the law which was not known tothe Government at the time that the earnest consideration of ourgrievances was promised. 

We can only now lay the bare facts before the Court, and submit tothe judgment that may be passed upon us. 

 (Signed) LIONEL PHILLIPS. FRANCIS RHODES. GEORGE FARRAR. 

Pretoria, April 24, 1896. 

I entirely concur with the above statement. 

 (Signed) JOHN HAYS HAMMOND. 

Pretoria, April 27, 1896. 

An incident which occurred during the reading of this statementenabled the prisoners to realize how poor would have been theirchance of a fair trial before a Boer jury. On the right hand of thejudge seats had been reserved for higher officials. Several membersof the Executive were present in this quarter, and amongst them in avery prominent position and facing the quarter reserved for theburghers sat Mr. Wolmarans, a member of the Executive Council. WhenMr. Wessels came to that portion of the statement referring to thenegotiations with the Executive Council, Mr. Wolmarans at firstsmiled superciliously, then turned and addressed a remark to one ofhis colleagues, shrugging his shoulder at the same time, and at theconclusion of the reference looked across the room to where thejurymen sat, still smiling and shaking his head slowly andcontinuously for half a minute. To men accustomed to the decencies ofBritish Courts of Justice this incident was rather revolting. When itis remembered that the Government refused to produce the minutereferred to, and that through their representatives they claimed'privilege' for the interview at which it was given, in order toabsolve themselves from appearing in Court, and that Mr. Wolmaranshimself sent the message to the Rand that the Government by thewithdrawal of its police gave practical evidence of holding out theolive-branch, his conduct appears the more unprincipled. 

The State Attorney in a purely formal address, in consonance with hispromise to Mr. Wessels not to seek exemplary punishment, asked forpunishment according to law. Mr. Wessels in reply made an eloquentappeal on behalf of the accused and recited the circumstances whichled to their seeking redress in the manner in which they did. Hereferred to the negotiations with the Government, to the part playedby the Reform Committee in the maintenance of order, to the fidelitywith which they had fulfilled their undertakings with the Government, and to their attitude towards Dr. Jameson. His references to theGovernment and to the existing abuses were made as judiciously aspossible. He referred candidly to the relationship with Dr. Jameson, especially alluding to the efforts made to protect him from theresults of his own action and to stand by him even at the cost ofpersonal sacrifice, and claimed that such action towards their formercolleague within the limits set by them did not necessarily implytreason against the independence of the State, but should fairlyentitle the prisoners to sympathy for their efforts to save a quondamcolleague, however wrong he might have been. On the point of law, Mr. Wessels claimed that the Thirty-three Articles formed the basis ofthe State's law, that there was specific provision for such cases asthis in those Articles, and that the punishment to be meted out tothe prisoners should be in accordance with these statutes, modifiedas the Court in its judgment might deem fit. No sooner had Mr. Wessels resumed his seat than Dr. Coster, as was then thought, repenting the fulfilment of his promise and casting off all disguise, or, as is more probable, carried away by an over-mastering excitementand strong personal and racial feeling and stimulated byconcentration upon one aspect only of the case, claimed the right toaddress the Court again after the advocate for the defence hadspoken. Dr. Coster has the reputation among those who know him ofbeing a thoroughly honourable and straight-forward gentleman. As aHollander no doubt he felt deeply in a matter in which Hollanderismwas the _casus belli_; as public prosecutor it was his duty toprosecute, not to judge; and one prefers to think that in peculiarand trying circumstances he forgot the pledge he had given andremembered only the cause of his party. In a short but very violentspeech he depicted in the blackest terms the actions of the menagainst whom he had agreed not to seek exemplary punishment, andpointing out the provisions of the Roman-Dutch law, claimed that theCourt should apply it in this case in preference to the statutes ofthe country, and demanded from the Court the severest possiblepenalty which could be imposed under that law and under theThirty-three Articles and the Gold Law as well. With reference to thelast-named, Dr. Coster having mentioned the provision regarding theconfiscation of property, said that upon this point he would notspeak but would leave the matter to the judgment of the Court. TheCourt was then adjourned until the morning of the 28th, ostensibly inorder to enable the judge to consider the evidence and make up hismind. 

The majority of the prisoners, utterly unsuspicious of what laybefore them, made all necessary arrangements to return to their homesand avocations upon the conclusion of the trial, believing that anominal fine would be the penalty imposed. Many of them had takenreturn tickets from Johannesburg available for two days. The publicthroughout the Transvaal and South Africa anticipated nothing morethan a nominal punishment upon the majority and a fine of a fewthousand pounds upon the signatories to the letter of invitation. 

Some of the prisoners however were better informed. News had beenobtained some days before the trial commenced that extraaccommodation was being prepared in the gaol, avowedly to provide forthe Reformers. Two of the accused visited the gaol and verified this. Others of the accused, few in number, were informed by personalfriends who had special means of getting information in Pretoria thatimprisonment would be the lot of all and that the punishment on theleaders would be extremely severe; and they provided for thiscontingency accordingly. The manager of the Government newspaper inPretoria informed two or three of those interested that the sentenceof death would be passed upon the four leaders, as this had beenarranged; and men closely associated with the leaders themselves hadbeen confidentially informed beforehand that it was the intention ofthe Government to pass sentence of death, and that the matter was acut-and-dried one. The information was given with a view to preparingthe prisoners for what awaited them. 

On approaching the temporary Court-house (the Pretoria MarketBuildings having been altered for this purpose) on the morning of thesentence, it was perfectly evident that some serious development wasafoot. The town was thronged with mounted burghers, State artillery, and mounted and foot police. Every approach to the Court was guardedand the streets were patrolled. Most of the population of Pretoriawere gathered in the Market Square, endeavouring to gain admittanceto the Court. The prisoners were arranged in their former places in aspecial quarter of the building railed off for the purpose, with theexception of Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, Rhodes and Hammond, whowere separated from the rest and placed in a special movable dock, which had been carried in over the heads of the people after the hourappointed for the sitting of the Court. The appearance of this dockwas recognized by all to be ominous, but some relief from the feelingof foreboding was experienced when Judge Gregorowski after taking hisseat was observed to smile several times and to make some jocularremark to one of the officials of the Court. The faces of theofficials however damped any hopes that were built upon the judge'sgenial appearance. 

Many of these gentlemen were personal and intimate friends of theprisoners: some were connected by closer ties; and one of the mosttrying experiences for the prisoners was to witness the completebreakdown of the minor officials employed in the carrying out of thistragic farce. The judge's first order was for the removal of allladies. The wives and relatives of many of the prisoners had beenwarned by them beforehand of what was likely to happen and hadaccordingly absented themselves, but there were nevertheless a goodnumber of ladies present. Judge Gregorowski then took the case inhand, passed in review the circumstances, and dealt with much of theevidence, including that taken at the preliminary examination and thedocuments put in by Government which had not yet been seen by theprisoners' advisers. He made no reference to the statement of theprincipal accused, subject to which their plea of guilty had beenmade and accepted. He reviewed the law, and by a method of reasoningwhich has not commended itself to others he justified himself forsetting aside special statutes and applying the Roman-Dutch lawinstead. In conclusion, he stated that he held the signatories of theletter to be directly responsible for the shedding of the burghers'blood at Doornkop, that he would therefore pass upon them the _onlypunishment possible_ under Roman-Dutch law--namely death, and thatwhatever hope there might be in the merciful hearts of the ExecutiveCouncil and in the President's great magnanimity, they shouldremember that in no other country would they have the slightestgrounds for hope. The usual question as to whether there were anyreasons why sentence of death should not be passed upon them havingbeen put and the usual reply in the negative having been received, inthe midst of silence that was only disturbed by the breaking down ofpersons in various parts of the hall--officials, burghers, and in thegeneral public--sentence of death was passed, first on Mr. LionelPhillips, next on Colonel Rhodes, then on Mr. George Farrar, andlastly on Mr. Hammond. The bearing of the four men won for themuniversal sympathy and approval, especially under the conditionsimmediately following the death sentence, when a most painful scenetook place in Court. Evidences of feeling came from all parts of theroom and from all classes of people: from those who conducted thedefence and from the Boers who were to have constituted the jury. Theinterpreter translating the sentence broke down. Many of the minorofficials lost control of themselves, and feelings were furtherstrained by the incident of one man falling insensible. 

Sentence was next passed upon the other prisoners. They werecondemned to suffer two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of £2, 000each, or as an alternative suffer another year's imprisonment, andthereafter to be banished from the State for a period of three years. It was added that the question of confiscation of their propertywould be one for the Executive to deal with. 

The action of Mr. Gregorowski has been variously described, but at notime more graphically than at the time of the sentence, when asergeant of police who was guarding the prisoners exclaimed in thepeculiar Dutch idiom: 'My God! he is like a dog: he has bitten andchewed and guzzled!'

After passing the minor sentences the judge gave a short address tothe burghers, in which he thanked them for their attendance and madeallusion with evident signs of satisfaction to the manner in whichthe trial had been brought to a conclusion. A long delay followedduring which the judge proceeded to note his judgments. Once hisattention was drawn by a remark of an official to which he repliedpromptly, at the same time breaking into a broad smile, but suddenlyrecollecting the circumstances and the presence of the men sentencedto death, placed his hand over his mouth and wiped the smile away. The incident was of course noticed by many people in Court and helpedto strengthen the impression which a limited but sufficientexperience of Mr. Gregorowski had already created. 

If the belief which now obtains, that the Reformers were enticed toplead guilty and misled as to the probable consequences of that plea, should outlive personal feelings and leave a permanent mark in SouthAfrican history, it will be because it survives a searching test. InSouth Africa--as in many other countries--it is the invariablepractice of the Courts to decline to accept the plea of guilty to acapital charge. The prisoner is informed that as the plea involvescapital punishment it will not be accepted; and a formal trial andsufficient evidence of the crime are required by the Court. That isdone even in cases where the prisoner knows what the punishment willbe! In the case of the Reformers the State Attorney had, it is true, informed Mr. Wessels that he would be obliged _pro forma_ to put incertain evidence, but the reason was not given, and Mr. Wesselsregarded it merely as the _quid pro quo_ for accepting unquestionedthe written statement of the four accused! Mr. Gregorowski indefending his sentence has stated that under Roman-Dutch law he hadno option but to pass sentence of death. Yet contrary to the customwith which seventeen years' practice had made him familiar heaccepted the plea of guilty--and accepted it without a word ofexplanation or of warning! Is it surprising that people should wantto know why?

The men were removed from Court under very heavy escort, thecondemned men being conveyed in a closed carriage and the rest of theprisoners being marched through the streets to the gaol, the wholeparty moving at a foot pace. A little incident at the start did notfail to attract attention. The officer commanding a section of theguard having issued his orders in Dutch and some confusion havingensued, the orders were repeated _in German_, with a satisfactoryresult. 

One more incident--trifling perhaps in itself but leaving anineffaceable impression--occurred during the march to the gaol. Asthe prisoners slowly approached the Government buildings, Dr. Leydsaccompanied by one friend walked out until within a few yards of theprocession of sentenced men (a great proportion of whom werepersonally well known to him) and stood there with his hands in hispockets smiling at them as they went past. The action was soremarkable, the expression on the State Secretary's face sounmistakable, that the Dutch guards accompanying the prisonersexpressed their disgust. His triumph no doubt was considerable; butthe enjoyment must have been short-lived if the accounts given byother members of the Executive of his behaviour a month later areto be credited. The man who stood in safety and smiled in the facesof his victims was the same Dr. Leyds who within a month becameseriously ill because some fiery and impetuous friend of theprisoners sent him an anonymous letter with a death's head andcross-bones; who as a result obtained from Government a guard overhis private house; and who thereafter proceeded about his duties inPretoria under armed escort. 

It is stated that the death sentence was commuted the same afternoon, but no intimation of this was given to the prisoners and no publicannouncement was made until twenty-four hours later. In spite of thevindictive urgings of the Hollander newspaper, the _Volksstem_, fewcould believe that the death sentence would be carried out and mostpeople recognized that the ebullitions of that organ expressed thefeelings of only a few rabid and witless individuals among theHollanders themselves and were viewed with disgust by the greatmajority of them. At the same time the scene in court had been suchas to show that the Government party--the officials and Boers thenpresent--had not regarded the death sentence as a mere formality, buthad, on the contrary, viewed it as a deliberate and final judgment. In such circumstances therefore it can be believed that the prisonersthemselves were not without misgivings. 

Footnotes for Chapter VIII

{33} Died in prison. 

{34} Unable, owing to illness, to stand trialwith the others. On recovery, Mr. Curtis returned to the Transvaal, and decided to plead 'not guilty, ' whereupon proceedings weredropped. 

CHAPTER IX. 

LIFE IN GAOL. 

In the Transvaal no distinction is made between ordinary criminalsand those who in other countries are recognized as first-classmisdemeanants. Consequently the Reformers, without regard to thenature of their offence, their habits, health, age, or condition, were handed over to the gaoler, Du Plessis, a relative of PresidentKruger, to be dealt with at his kind discretion. For two days theprisoners existed on the ordinary prison fare. The majority being menin the early prime of life and in excellent health, suffered no illeffects, preferring to do with little or no food rather than touchthat which was doled out to them; but to the others it was a ratherserious thing. There were several men between fifty and sixty yearsof age whose lives had been spent under favourable conditions. Therewere some suffering from consumption, one from diabetes, one fromfever, one from dysentery, and several others from less dangerous butsufficiently serious complaints. All alike were compelled to sleepupon the floor, with two thin blankets for protection. They werelocked in at 6 p. M. , and allowed out at 6 a. M. Sanitary accommodationwas represented by the presence of a couple of buckets in thesleeping room. The air-space per man worked out at 145 cubic feet asagainst 900 feet prescribed by English prison regulations. Ventilation was afforded on the one side by square holes cut in thecorrugated iron walls of the shed, {35} and on the other (thebuildings being lean-to's against the permanent prison buildings)by grated windows opening into the native cells. Needless to say, these grated windows were originally intended to afford ventilationto the native cells, but the buildings to accommodate the Reformershad been erected against the side-walls of the Kaffir quarters. Thestench was indescribable. At 6 a. M. The prisoners were allowed outinto the yard, where they had the option of exercising throughout theday. The lavatories and bathing arrangements consisted of a tap inthe yard and an open furrow through which the town water ran, thelower end of which was used as a wash-place by prisoners, white andblack alike. Within a foot or two of the furrow where alone washingof the person or of clothing was allowed stood the gaol urinals. There was neither adequate provision in this department nor anyattempt at proper supervision, the result being that throughirregularities, neglect, and defective arrangement the ground on bothsides of the water-furrow for six or eight yards was horribly stainedand saturated by leakage. Many of the prisoners could not approachthis quarter without being physically ill. Without further detail itmay be stated that there were at that time over 250 prisoners, about100 of whom were white. There were three closets and six buckets forthe accommodation of all, and removals took place sometimes once aday, sometimes once in every four days. Nothing but the horror ofsuch conditions, and the fact that they prevail still in PretoriaGaol, and presumably in other gaols more removed from criticalsupervision, could warrant allusions to such a disgusting state ofaffairs. 

At 6. 15 breakfast was served. A number of tin dishes, containing onepound of mealie-meal porridge (ground maize) each were placed in arow on the ground in the yard in the same manner as a dog's foodmight be set out. A bucket near by contained some coarse salt in thecondition in which it was collected in the natural salt pans, thecubes varying from the size of peas to the size of acorns. No sugar, milk, tea, or coffee, was allowed. In order to utilize the salt theprisoners were obliged to crush it with rough stones on the cementsteps. Needless to say, but few partook of this food. To those whohad not tasted it before in the course of prospecting or up-countrytravelling where conditions are sometimes very hard, it was nomore possible to swallow it than to eat sawdust. 

Dinner was at twelve o'clock, and it consisted of coarse meat boiledto that degree which was calculated to qualify the water in which itwas boiled to be called soup, without depriving the meat of all titleto be considered a separate dish. With this meal was also served halfa pound of bread. Supper, which was provided at five o'clock, wasexactly the same as breakfast. 

Two days of this fare told very severely upon those whose physicalcondition was not of the best. By the third day several of the oldermen and those in ill-health had broken down and were placed onhospital fare. Matters were sufficiently serious to induce theauthorities to allow gradual amelioration of the conditions, and bydegrees food of a better class was introduced. Mattresses and otherarticles of bedding were allowed, but stretchers although providedfor in the prison regulations were denied to the men until a fewhours before their release a month later, when the prisoners werepermitted by the gaoler to purchase them, no doubt with an eye toreversion to him in the course of a few hours. From time to time theregulations as to food were varied at the whim of the gaoler. On oneday only cooked food would be allowed in; on another only raw food;on a third nothing but tinned stuff; on a fourth all was turned backat the gates with the exception of that obtained by a few individualsat a heavy premium. 

A day or two after the passing of sentence representations were madeto the prisoners, excluding the four death-sentence men, that itwould be advisable to appeal to the clemency of the Government forsome mitigation. In that case, it was stated, there was every reasonto believe that the sentence of imprisonment would be entirelyremitted and that the sentence of banishment would also be commuted. The individuals from whom this suggestion first came were of theclass which habitually trades between the Government and thepublic--the gentlemen of the backstairs. For this reason some of theprisoners gave considerable credence to the reports, whilst othersfor the very same reason would have nothing whatever to do with them. Hence arose a condition of things very like a deadlock among theprisoners themselves. It was represented by these agents that itwould be worse than useless for some of the prisoners to petition ifmany others refused to do so and stood out. Some of the prisoners didactually petition--a course of action which was strongly condemned byothers; but it should be borne in mind that there were among theprisoners many men who were in bad health and poor circumstances, whohad heavy responsibilities in private life, and who were not onlyunable to pay their fines, but even unable to make any provision fortheir families during incarceration. Such conditions would tend toshake the nerve of most men. 

With this nucleus to work upon the Government through their agentsbegan a system of terrorism by which they hoped to establishconditions under which their 'magnanimity by inches' would appear inthe most favourable possible light. The first petition presented forthe signature of the prisoners was one in which they were asked toadmit the justice of their sentences, to express regret for what theyhad done and to promise to behave themselves in the future. Thedocument closed with an obsequious and humiliating appeal to the'proved magnanimity of the Government. ' The reception accorded tothis was distinctly unfavourable, copies of the petitions being insome instances torn up and flung in the faces of those who presentedthem. The great majority of the prisoners refused to have anything todo with them, and on representing the view that any appeal so couchedwas not consistent with their self-respect, they were informed thatthe petition had already been shown to the President and members ofthe Executive Council and had been approved by them and that it wouldnot look well to alter it now. 

Every effort was made for some days to induce the prisoners to signthis document, but they refused. A certain number of the men wereopposed to signing anything whatever, even the most formal appeal tothe Executive Council for a revision of sentence. They based theirrefusal upon two reasons: 1st, that they had been arrested by an actof treachery and tried by a packed Court, and if the Executiverecognized the injustice of the sentence they might actspontaneously without petition from the prisoners; 2nd, that theybelieved that any document however moderate which they might signwould only be the thin end of the wedge by which the Government hopedto introduce the principle of individual statements and pleas--thatis to say each one to excuse himself at the expense of his neighbour, and thus enable the authorities to establish by the prisoners' ownconfessions the extent of the guilt and complicity which they hadbeen unable to prove. 

Under such conditions an appeal was made to Messrs. Rose Innes, Q. C. , and Solomon, Q. C. These gentlemen had remained in Pretoria anddevoted their time and energies to obtaining some amelioration of theconditions of imprisonment and some mitigation of the sentencesimposed upon the Reformers. The petition as presented by theGovernment was shown to Mr. Innes, who indignantly rejected thesuggestion of signing any such document. As the strongest reasonadduced in favour of signing petitions was the statement thataccording to law and custom it was impossible for the Government totake cognizance of the prisoners' case even with every desire tomitigate the punishment unless it was brought before them by directappeal, Mr. Innes undertook to see the President and Chief-JusticeKotzé on the subject. By this time further suggestions had been madeon the subject of petitions, and the prisoners were being urged amongother things to name in plain terms the extent and manner in whichthey would like their sentences commuted. This proposal was regardedas a preposterous and ridiculous one; but nothing is too ridiculousfor Pretoria and it was necessary to deal seriously with it. 

In these circumstances, Mr. Rose Innes interviewed the Chief Justice, in order to get the highest authority in the country as a guide. Mr. Kotzé would not at first express an opinion as to whether petitionsshould be sent in, but he was evidently inclined to recommend them aspolitic, 'But, ' said Mr. Innes, 'it is not a question of policy; itis a matter of law. Is there anything in the law which renders itnecessary for a prisoner to petition before his sentence may berevised by the Executive--anything which debars the Executive fromdealing with his case if he does not petition?' Mr. Kotzé's answerwas clear: 'No, certainly not--nothing whatever!'

In the interview with the President which took place immediatelyafter this Mr. Innes was brusquely informed that petitions from theprisoners were of no value, and would receive no consideration; thatthe President did not want any of their petitions; and that he wasguided solely by his burghers, who had already petitioned in thematter. 'I would pay more heed, ' said Mr. Kruger, 'to a petition fromfifty of my burghers than to one from the whole of Johannesburg. ' Atthe conclusion of an unpleasant interview, which called for all thetact and good temper at the command of the gentleman who wasinteresting himself on behalf of the prisoners, the President addedin an offhand manner, 'The petitions can do no harm and mightstrengthen my hands in dealing with the rest of the Executive; sothey can send them in if they like. '

With this answer Messrs. Innes and Solomon returned to the gaol, andafter informing the prisoners of what had taken place advised them, under the circumstances, to make a formal but respectful appeal for arevision of the sentences. It was their opinion, based upon theinformation which they had at great pains gathered, and it was alsothe opinion of the Chief Justice, that no petition was necessary, andthat the sentences would be brought under the consideration of theExecutive by the memorials of the burghers; but they considered thatas interested persons or indiscreet friends had already suggested theidea of petitions, and as a refusal now to sign anything might have avery unfavourable effect upon persons with the disposition andcharacter of those with whom they had to deal, it would be advisableto make an appeal so worded as to formally comply with therequirements of the extreme party in the Executive; one which wouldsatisfy those of the prisoners who were in favour of appealing, andwould not be offensive to those who were against petitions at anycost. 

The strongest reason for urging this was to preserve unanimity ofaction among the prisoners. The course was in fact a compromisedesigned to satisfy those who considered a petition of some sort tobe necessary, and those who would not as they expressed it'sacrifice their self-respect' by asking for anything from thepeople who had treated them in what they deemed to be a dishonestand treacherous manner. 

All the prisoners except Messrs. A. Woolls-Sampson and W. D. (Karri)Davies agreed to this: many did so much against their own wishesbecause of the appeal to stand together, and because it was stronglyurged that their obstinacy would affect not only themselves but wouldprevent the liberation of others whose circumstances were almostdesperate. They yielded--it is true--but remained unconvinced. ToMessrs. Sampson and Davies the answers of the Chief Justice and thePresident are now of considerable importance, since the reason givenfor their detention involves the repudiation of the assurances givenby the President and Chief Justice. 

Those who had not signed any other form of appeal now made a formalapplication to have their sentences brought into review by theExecutive Council. They stated then their belief that it was only thebeginning of the petition business that it would be whollyineffective and that it was to be understood that they would sign nomore under any circumstances. This application was deemed by theemissaries of the Government to be sufficient to comply with therequirements, and promises were conveyed to the prisoners that thesentences would be at once taken into consideration and commutationsannounced. In the course of a day or two however further demands weremade, and the prisoners were informed that they would be dressed inprison garb under severer regulations specially passed for themunless they at once petitioned against this course. 

Again Mr. Innes represented their case to the Government at thedictate of his own feelings of humanity, and not prompted thereto bythe prisoners themselves, most of whom would have been glad to seethe Government wreak their vengeance in petty and vindictiveprovisions. The proposed alterations were however abandoned withoutprotest from the prisoners after the supply of convict garb had beensent up to the gaol. So matters went on day by day, each day bringingits fresh instalment of threats promises and cajoleries, eachmorning its batch of disappointments. It was at first difficult tosay what object the Government had in view in endeavouring to compelthe Reformers to sign petitions, unless it were the unworthy one ofdesiring to humiliate men who were already down, or the perhapsmore contemptible one of forcing them to turn informers by a processof self-excusing and thus enable them to differentiate in thecommutations. The fact remained that repeated efforts were made andpressure brought to bear upon the men to induce them to sign. Onepretext after another was used. Finally the naked truth came out: theGovernment required each man to state in an individual declarationthe extent of his guilt the extenuating facts and the circumstancesunder which he became associated with the Reform movement. This wasexactly what had been foretold by men who understood Boer methods. 

The means resorted to by the gaol officials to enforce thispetition-signing were characteristic. The gaoler (Du Plessis) is oneof the most unfavourable specimens of his race. Unscrupulous andbrutal in his methods, untrustworthy as to his undertakings, andviolent and uncertain in his temper, he singled out those among theprisoners whom he considered to be the leaders of the 'stiff-necked'party as he termed it, and treated them with as much severity as hecould. These men found themselves unable to obtain those facilitieswhich were regarded as the right of all the prisoners. Upon occasiontheir food was stopped at the gates, and visitors--their wives andfamilies--were refused admission, although provided with permits fromthe proper authorities and complying with the gaol regulations; andon more than one occasion he informed individual members of thisparty that the 'petitions would have to be signed, ' that they wouldhave to 'go down on their knees to the Government, ' otherwise theywould 'rot in gaol. ' All this undisguised eagerness to obtain thesignatures naturally only strengthened the resolution of the men whostood out. They had already against their wishes and judgment signedone application, and more than that they refused to do. When it wasfound to be impossible to induce the men to inform against eachother, some modification was made in the demands of thepetition-hunters and some prisoners were asked and induced to makestatements concerning their own part in the late movement, making noallusion to the part played by others, and, for reasons which it isimpossible to divine unless it was designed to lead to somethingmore, this was regarded by the Government as a desirable step. 

The suspense and disappointment added to the original sentence upon aman who was never even mentioned in evidence and who took no part inthe Reform movement, beyond associating himself with theorganizations for the protection of property in Johannesburg, told soseverely upon one of the prisoners that his mind became unhinged, andin the course of the following period he developed marked signs ofhomicidal and suicidal mania. His condition was so serious thatstrong representations were made to all the officials connected withthe gaol--the gaoler himself, the district surgeon, the commissionerof police, and the landdrost of Pretoria. The prisoners themselvesorganized a system of guards or watches over their comrade, pendingthe result of their representations to the officials. On the fourthday however the unfortunate man, driven out of his mind by theconstant and cruel disappointment of purposely raised hopes, eludingthe watchfulness of his friends took his own life. 

The news of this event was received with horror throughout SouthAfrica, the more so as for some days previously the newspapers hadhinted at some such impending catastrophe. In the course of theinquiry which was held evidence was given showing that the gaolsurgeon had reported the state of affairs to the proper authoritiessome days before, but in a formal and half-hearted way. Evidencehowever was forthcoming that four of the prisoners (themselvesmedical men) had forcibly represented the extreme seriousness of thecase to the gaoler, the gaol surgeon and the landdrost of Pretoria, and had induced the assistant-gaoler and warders to support theirrepresentations, but all without avail. The result of the inquiry wasto lay partial blame upon the doctor and to acquit everybody else--aresult which the public have been used to expect in the Transvaal. Itis somewhat difficult to see how the decision was arrived at, seeingthat in the offices there was the record of a special pass grantedto the unfortunate man's wife to visit him and remain with him for aconsiderable period on the previous day in order to cheer him upand avert serious consequences. The incident told severely upon thenerves of those who were not themselves in the best of health, andit was found necessary immediately to release or remove others amongthe prisoners for fear of similar results. 

The Government seemed to realize that it was incumbent upon them todo something in order to allay the feeling of indignation which wasbeing roused throughout South Africa at their manner of treating theprisoners, so a further instalment of magnanimity was decided upon. On the day of the unfortunate affair the manager of the Governmentnewspaper, _The Press_, was authorized by President Kruger and othermembers of the Executive to inform the prisoners that they would haveto make modified personal statements of the nature previouslyindicated, and if these petitions were presented to the ExecutiveCouncil by 8 a. M. On the following Monday (the prisoners would thenhave been three weeks in gaol) orders for their release would beissued by Monday night. In order to secure a favourable reception ofthis suggestion it was arranged that the clergyman who was to conductDivine service on Sunday in the gaol would deliver this message fromthe President to the prisoners at the conclusion of the service, andurge the men for their own sakes and for the sake of their familiesand of their friends to abandon the position which they had taken upand to sign declarations of the nature required, and so secure theirrelease. Nor was this all. Outside the gaol the wives of those menwho stood out against the petition movement were informed byGovernment officials that unless the demands of the Government werecomplied with by their husbands they would serve the full period oftheir sentence. Pressure was brought to bear upon these ladies andspecial facilities were given them to visit the gaol, avowedly inorder to bring about the desired end. 

Eleven of the prisoners--apart from the four whose punishment insubstitution for death had not been decided upon, and who weretherefore not concerned in the petitions--declined to reconsidertheir decision, and elected rather to serve their term of two years;and they expressed the conviction at the same time that thesepromises of the President would not be kept any more than othershad been. The result justified their judgment. After a postponementof two days on some flimsy pretext the official intimation of thecommutations was given to the prisoners on Wednesday, May 20. Insteadof the release positively and definitely promised the term ofimprisonment was reduced in the following degree: Ten men werereleased, twenty-four men were condemned to three months', eighteento five months', and four to one year's imprisonment; and theclemency of the Government towards the four leaders was indicated bya sentence of fifteen years each. 

Even a short period of imprisonment under the existing conditionsmeant certain death to a proportion of the men sentenced, and it isnot to be wondered at that the 'magnanimity' displayed by theGovernment after the disappointments and delays seriously affectedthe health of a number of the men, following as it did closely uponthe tragic affair already alluded to. 

With regard to Messrs. Sampson and Davies no decision was announced, it being intimated by Dr. Leyds that, as they had made no petition, their case had not been brought before the Government, and theExecutive had therefore no official knowledge of their existence. Butthe extent of the Government's magnanimity was even then not fullyknown. On the following day it was announced to the prisoners thatthey had been misinformed with regard to the five and twelve months'commutations--that the intention and resolution of the Executive wasmerely to grant these men permission to appeal at the end of theperiods named to the aforesaid magnanimity. 

Some prominence has been given to the cases of those prisoners whowere unable for physical or other special reasons to withstand thestrain; and it should therefore be made equally clear that in manycases the men regarded with contemptuous amusement the cat and mousepolicy and the stage-managed magnanimity displayed towards them. Theywere perfectly well able and willing to endure the sentence passedupon them, and they were not misled by Boer promises in which theyhad never had any faith at all. There are good reasons to be assignedfor the willingness of many of the men to make appeals to theGovernment: sheer hard necessity and the sufferings of thosedependent upon them were among these reasons; and it is unfair toconsider these appeals to have been due to loss of nerve. 

There were among the prisoners twenty-three Englishmen, sixteen SouthAfricans, nine Scotchmen, six Americans, two Welshmen, one Irishman, one Australian, one Hollander, one Bavarian, one German, oneCanadian, one Swiss, and one Turk. This variety of nationalitiesshould receive due consideration when questions such as for instancethat of the flag are considered. In this matter of petitions it wasnot to be expected that men whose associations with the country hadbeen limited to a few years should experience the same depth offeeling and bitterness of resentment as the South Africans born wholook upon the country as their native land and who view with keenresentment the attitude of the Boers towards them in the Transvaal, so much at variance with their attitude towards the Boers in theneighbouring colonies. Nothing could illustrate this difference infeeling better than the fact that of the eleven men who throughoutdeclined to sign petitions eight were South African born, oneAustralian, one English, and one Scotch. There is nothingdiscreditable to others in these figures; they simply indicate thedifference of feeling which did and indeed naturally must exist. TheSouth African born men consider themselves to have been robbed of aportion of their birthright; the others have not the same reason forthinking this. 

With men of so many nationalities the position of the BritishResident would in any case have been one of difficulty, especiallyafter the part played by the High Commissioner. In the case of SirJacobus de Wet very little satisfaction was given. What caused themost comment and annoyance among the prisoners was that officialrepresentatives of other countries appeared to have unusualfacilities offered them to visit the subjects of their Government--atleast, they could command the ordinary courtesies--whereas in thecase of the British Agent nothing of this sort existed. Frequently hewas observed standing outside the gaol in the worst of weatherwithout shelter, patiently waiting until the gaoler would deem fit tosee him. In the meantime that official would stroll through the yard, making remarks to his subordinates indicative of the satisfaction heexperienced in keeping the representative of Her Majesty outside inthe rain and mud. Upon occasions when he was afforded admission hewas hustled through the yard by a warder and not allowed to holdprivate conversation with any of the prisoners. On several occasionshe complained that he was refused admission by order of the gaoler, and the spectacle of England's representative being turned away by anignorant and ill-conditioned official like Du Plessis was not anedifying one. It is only necessary to say that upon an occasion whenDu Plessis adopted the same tactics towards the Portuguese Consulthat gentleman proceeded at once to the Presidency and demanded ashis right free admission to the gaol whenever he chose to go, and theright was promptly recognized although there was no subject of hisGovernment at the time within the precincts. Indeed the PortugueseConsul stated openly that he called for the purpose of visiting as afriend one of the Reform prisoners, giving the name of one of therecalcitrants most objectionable to the Government. The AmericanConsul too carried matters with a high hand on the occasion of hisvisit to Pretoria, and it seemed as though the Paramount Power wasthe only one which the Transvaal Government could afford or cared totreat with contempt. 

The period of gaol life afforded the Reformers some opportunity ofstudying a department of the Transvaal Administration which they hadnot before realized to be so badly in need of reform. The system--ifsystem it can be called--upon which the gaol was conducted may begathered from the gaoler's own words. When one of the prisoners hadinquired of him whether a certain treatment to which a white convicthad been subjected was in accordance with the rules of the gaol andhad received an answer in the affirmative, he remarked that he didnot think many of the Reformers could exist under such conditions. DuPlessis replied: 'Oh no! Not one of you would be alive a monthif the rules were enforced. No white man could stand them. Indeed, 'he added, 'if the rules were _properly_ enforced, not even a niggercould stand them!'

Some subsequent experience of gaol-life induced the Reformers toaccept this view as tolerably correct. It is known for instance thatafter the Malaboch war sixty-four of the tribe were incarcerated inPretoria Gaol. Some twenty were subsequently released, but of theremainder twenty-six died within the year. Bad food vile sanitaryarrangements and want of clothing and shelter contributed to thisend. Malaboch was a petty chief against whom an expedition wasorganized, ostensibly because he had refused to pay his taxes. Theexpedition is chiefly notorious on account of the commandeering ofBritish subjects which led to the visit of Sir Henry Loch alreadydescribed. It resulted--as these expeditions inevitably do--in theworsting of the natives, the capture of the chief and his headmen, and the parcelling out of his tribe as indentured servants among theBoers. 

Considerable sympathy was felt with Malaboch among the Uitlanders, not because of his refusal to pay taxes but because the opinionprevailed that this refusal was due only to the tyrannical andimproper conduct of the Boer native commissioners; and a number ofJohannesburg men resolved in the interests of the native and also ofthe native labour supply on the Rand to have the matter cleared up atthe forthcoming trial of the chief. Funds were provided and counselemployed, nominally to defend Malaboch, but really to impeach thenative commissioners, who in many cases were and continue to be aperfect curse to the country. No sooner had this intended course ofaction become known than the Government decided to treat theirprisoners under the provisions of martial law--to treat them, infact, as prisoners of war, who were liable to be indefinitelydetained without further trial. Under these conditions they wereplaced in the Pretoria Gaol, and with the exception of a fewsubordinates there they have lived--or died--since. The offences ofthese natives, for all anyone knows, may have been similar to thoseof Langalibalele, Dinizulu, Secocoeni, Cetewayo, and other nativechiefs whom the British Government have also disposed of withouttrial. But it is urged that these men are entitled to a trial, because it is well known that the provocation under which theycommitted their offences against the law--if indeed any werecommitted--was such as, in the minds of most people, would justifytheir action. {36}

The position of a native in the Pretoria Gaol is indeed an unhappyone. Sleeping accommodation--that is to say, shed accommodation--isprovided for about one-quarter of the number confined there. Duringfine weather it is no hardship upon the natives to sleep in the openyard provided that they have some covering. The blankets doled out tothem are however in many cases such as one would not allow to remainin one's kennels; and in wet or cold weather (and the fact is thatduring at least one quarter of the year the nights are cold, whilstduring the five months' wet season rain may fall at any time) thesufferings of these unfortunates many of whom have no blankets at allare very severe. Of course the stronger fight their way into theshed, and even fill the little covered passage-way; the others crouchor lie about in the open yard like wild beasts without a vestige ofshelter. 

On behalf of the native political prisoners representations were madeby the gaol doctor that they were dying in numbers from scurvy andfever, for want of vegetable food. A special effort on his partsecured for a few days some allowance of this nature, but the matterhaving been brought to the notice of General Joubert, theSuperintendent-General of natives, peremptory orders were issued todiscontinue this; and this although the wretched creatures might havebeen sufficiently supplied from the gardens attached to the gaolwhich are cultivated by the prisoners, and the product of which wasused by the gaoler to feed his pigs. For a little while longer thedoctor continued the vegetable diet at his own expense, but beingunable to afford this it was discontinued and the former death-ratewas resumed. 

Floggings are quite common. In many instances white men have beenflogged there. It is not intended to suggest that this should nothave been done, but cases occurred in the Pretoria Gaol which aresurely difficult to justify. Du Plessis stated to the Reformprisoners that he had with the sanction of the Landdrost inflictedupon one prisoner named Thompson, who was undoubtedly refractory anddisobedient, _upwards of eighty lashes within three weeks. _ He addedthat this was as good as a death-sentence, because neither white norblack could stand two inflictions of twenty-five lashes, as they weregiven in Pretoria Gaol, without permanent injury to the constitution. The effect, he observed, of this severe punishment upon the back wasto cause the blood to rush and settle on the lungs, and in every caseit resulted in fatal lung mischief. 

During the period of imprisonment the Reformers witnessed aconsiderable number of floggings. These when inflicted by theassistant-gaoler or warders were usually marked by some kind ofmoderation and consideration for the prisoner's physical condition, and some regard for official decencies. The same cannot be said ofthose in which Du Plessis himself took a prominent part. Upon oneoccasion when a native had been released from the triangle, aftertwenty strokes from the cat had been borne without a murmur, DuPlessis suddenly became infuriated at the stoicism of his victim, andstepping towards him knocked the released man down with his fist andspurned him with his foot. Upon another occasion a boy of ten ortwelve years of age (under what circumstances is not known) was takenby Du Plessis into the open yard, stretched in mid air by two wardersgripping his wrists and ankles, and flogged with a cane by Du Plessishimself. The screams of the child were heart-rending and the sightcaused one lady who happened to be visiting in the gaol to faint. When the wretched urchin was released by the two warders and stoodcowering before Du Plessis the latter repeated his former performanceof knocking his victim down with his closed fist. 

Mr. Du Plessis it should be remembered is a sample of a certain classonly of the Boers--not by any means of all. He is a man with atreacherous and vindictive temper, distinctly unpleasant inappearance, being coarsely and powerfully built, and enjoying anexpression of countenance which varies between cunning andinsincerity on one hand and undisguised malevolence on the other. Some idea of the general kindliness of his disposition may begathered from his actions. On one occasion, when specialrelaxation of the rules was authorized by the Landdrost of Pretoriain order to enable a number of the Johannesburg friends of theprisoners to see them, and when about one hundred permits had beenissued by that official to men travelling over from Johannesburgspecially for the purpose, Du Plessis devised means to defeat thisact of consideration, and issued orders to his guards to admit onlythree visitors at a time to the gaol. As a consequence, more thanhalf failed to gain admittance. Nor was he satisfied with this; heinformed the prisoners themselves that he wished the Landdrost hadissued two hundred passes instead of one hundred, so that he mightlet those Johannesburg people know who was 'baas' there. Possibly thefact that on the previous day he had been severely rebuffed in hispetition campaign may have provoked this act of retaliation. 

Another instance of Mr. Du Plessis' system was afforded by the caseof an old schoolmaster, an Englishman named Grant. He had been ateacher upon the farm of a Boer near Pretoria. Through somedifference with his employer he was dismissed; and his own version ofthe affair indicates that he suffered considerable injustice. Fromthe evidence given in the case in which he subsequently figured itappeared that in order to urge his grievance he returned to theBoer's farm and even re-entered the house which he had formerlyoccupied. He was arrested and charged with trespass, or threateningto molest his late employer and members of his family, and was boundover to keep the peace for six months and to find £50 surety for thesame, failing which he should go to gaol for that period. This seemedto be rather a harsh sentence to pass upon a man who was over fiftyyears of age, entirely destitute of means, of very inferior physique, and who had been charged at the instance of an individual who couldcertainly have protected himself against five such men as Grant. Nodoubt the accused was an eccentric man, and probably a nuisance, and it is even possible that his conduct left the magistrate noalternative but to pass the sentence which he did: it is not intendedto question the justice of this part of the affair. Having beensent to gaol, however, because he could not deposit £50, Grant wastreated as the commonest malefactor in all respects but one--he wasallowed to retain his own clothing. The unfortunate old man made apathetic picture with his seedy clothes, tail coat, tall white hat, and worn gloves, which he punctiliously wore whenever called upon toface the authorities--and it happened rather frequently. He objectedto being classed and herded with the thieves and murderers and otherswhose crimes were even more repulsive. He protested against the classof food that was served to him. For these remonstrances he at firstreceived solitary confinement and even poorer diet; and later with abrutality which one can surely only find in a Du Plessis theunfortunate old man was placed in the Kaffir stocks, thrown out inthe middle of the yard that he might be humiliated in the sight ofall, and kept there in the fierce heat of a tropical sun for half aday. The sole excuse for this was that he had been unruly inprotesting against the treatment which he was receiving. Thespectacle excited the pity of the Reform prisoners to such an extentthat even with the certainty of an insulting rebuff from the gaolerthey endeavoured to represent the man's case so as to have himreleased, but without success. It need only be added that theunfortunate man did not serve his entire term, the first act of thefirst released Reformers being to pay up the surety required andprovide him with funds to leave the country. Grant may have been asguilty and offensive as eccentricity can make a man, but nothing canjustify the manner in which he was treated. 

The stocks in the hands of Du Plessis were not the mild correctiveinstrument which they are sometimes considered to be. According tothis authority the stocks can be made to inflict various degrees ofpunishment. Du Plessis states that when he took over the gaol hefound that the custom was to place men in the stocks within a celland to trust to the irksomeness of the position and the solitaryconfinement to bring about a better frame of mind; but he soon foundthat this system was capable of improvement. His first act was toplace the prisoners white or black in the stocks in the middle of theyard, so that they should be exposed to the observation and remarksof all the officials and visitors and their fellow-prisoners. Inexplaining the reasons for this change, he said that he found thatin a cool cell a man could be tolerably comfortable and that even themost hardened of them preferred not to be seen in the stocks byothers; whereas in the yard they were obliged to sit on the unevengravel and to endure the heat of the sun as well as being 'thecynosure of every eye. ' But this did not satisfy the ingenious DuPlessis. The yard of the Pretoria gaol inclines from south to northabout one foot in four, and Du Plessis' observant eye detected thatthe prisoners invariably sat facing down the slope--for of coursethey were not allowed to lie down while in the stocks, this being toocomfortable a position. Upon studying the question he found that inthis way much more ease was experienced owing to the more obtuseangle thus formed by the body and the legs. This did not suit him andhe issued further orders that in future all prisoners in the stocksshould be obliged to sit facing uphill, and that they should not beallowed to hold on to the stocks in order to maintain themselves inthis position but should have to preserve the upright posture of thebody by means of the exertion of the muscles of the back alone. Needless to say the maintenance of such a position for hours at atime caused an agony of aches which many prisoners were quite unableto endure, and frequently the men were seen to throw themselves backand lie down at the risk of being kicked up by the vigilant DuPlessis and confined in the stocks for a longer period than wasoriginally intended. Nor did this complete the list of Mr. DuPlessis' ingenuities. The stocks had been built to accommodateseveral persons at the same time, and he found that by inserting thelegs in the alternate holes, instead of in the pair as designed bythe architect of the stocks, the increased spread of the legs causedstill greater strain upon his victim. This was reserved for specialcases--say one in every four or five. 

The incidents here given illustrating the methods of this delectableindividual were all witnessed by the Reformers. The account of DuPlessis may serve the purpose of showing the methods practised undera Government whose officials are appointed whenever possible from thefamily circle and not because of fitness. It is more especiallydesigned to show the character of the man in whose hands theprisoners were placed with almost absolute discretion; the man whoenjoys the privilege of discussing with his relative PresidentKruger, at any hour at which he may choose to visit the Presidency, the treatment to be accorded to his victims; the man who is retainedin his position in spite of repeated exposures by his superiors, andwho is credited with exercising very considerable influence with Mr. Kruger; but, above all, the man in whose charge remain up to thepresent time{37} the two Reformers, Messrs. Sampson and Davies, whodeclined to sign any petition, and concerning whom Du Plessis statedopenly: 'Wait until the others have gone, and if the Government leavethem in my hands, I'll make them ready to sign anything. ' Sufficienthas been said concerning this individual to warrant the descriptionpublicly given of him by Colonel Rhodes{38}--'A brutal and inhumanwretch!' Like most bullies the man is also a coward. When hewitnessed the outburst of feeling among the prisoners in consequenceof the death of their comrade, he would not venture into theprecincts of the gaol for two days, until assured that the men hadagain become capable of self-control. 

So much for the details of gaol life. 

In the meantime sympathy with the prisoners began to take practicalform, and the unanimity of feeling on their behalf throughout SouthAfrica, which was quite unexpected and which greatly embarrassedthe Boer Government, tended to bring matters to a head. Mr. RoseInnes, who had so generously and constantly exerted himself inPretoria in order to obtain some amelioration of the condition of theprisoners, and who had in his official capacity as watching the casefor the Imperial Government made a very strong report to the ColonialOffice, did not content himself with these exertions. Upon his returnto Capetown he suggested and organized the getting up of a monsterpetition to the President and Executive, urging upon them in theinterests of the peace of South Africa to release the imprisoned men. The petitions were to represent the views of every town and villagein South Africa, and were to be presented by the mayors or municipalheads of the communities. In this movement Mr. Rose Innes was mostably seconded by Mr. Edmund Garrett, the editor of the _Cape Times, _and other prominent men. A movement of this nature naturally excitedconsiderable attention in Pretoria; but the success of it was whollyunexpected. The President and his party had played to the SouthAfrican gallery, and they had not yet realized that they had in anyway overdone the theatrical part. They had no suspicion of the realfeeling with which the sentences were regarded, nor of the extent towhich they had alienated sympathy by that and the subsequent'magnanimous' action. 'Magnanimity by inches' had been placardedthroughout South Africa, and the whole game was characterized as oneof cat and mouse, in which the President was playing with his victimswith indifference to the demands of justice and humanity, partly witha view to wringing concessions from the British Government, andpartly from a mistaken idea that by such a course he would obtaincredit at each step afresh for dealing generously with those who wereat his mercy. 

The movement had been well organized. The resolution had been passedin every town in South Africa, even including the towns of the FreeState. The mayors (over 200 in number) were on their way to Pretoria, when the President, with his back against the wall, realized for thefirst time that he had overshot the mark and that unless he releasedthe men before the arrival of the deputies he would either have todo so apparently at their instance, or refuse to do so and riskrousing a dangerous feeling. He chose the former course; he releasedall the imprisoned men with the exception of the four who had beensentenced to death and the two who had refused to appeal. Pretoriaand Johannesburg were already full of deputies and visitors from CapeColony, Natal, and the Free State, all bound on the same errand ofmercy. The feelings of these men, brought many hundreds of miles fromtheir homes, sacrificing their own business and personal conveniencein order to approach the President and to support a measure whichthey felt to be imperatively necessary to the allaying of feeling inSouth Africa may be imagined, but were not expressed, when they heardthat they had been allowed to undertake this journey as part of thePresident's game, only to receive a slap in the face from His Honourby the carrying out of the measure before they were permitted tointerview him. This at least was what was felt to be the case uponthe release of the majority. Absolute proof of it was forthcomingwithin the week, when the President refused to receive thedeputations and kept them waiting in Pretoria until he had releasedthe four leaders as well, without allowing the delegates thesatisfaction of a courteous recognition of their mission. He admittedthem it is true to an informal interview, in the course of which hemanaged to insult and outrage the feelings of a good many bylecturing them and giving vent to very candid opinions as to theirpersonal action and duties; but he would not receive theirrepresentatives officially. 

On May 30 the prisoners with the exception of the six alreadyreferred to were released, the terms being that their fines should bepaid at once, and the unexpired term of imprisonment remitted. Eachone as released was required to bind himself for the term of threeyears, reckoned from the 30th day of May, 1896, neither directly norindirectly to meddle in the internal or external politics of theSouth African Republic, and to conduct himself as a law-abidingcitizen of the State. 

In some cases the provision was added that if in the opinion of theExecutive Council the terms of this undertaking should be broken, the sentence of banishment which was held in suspense would come intoforce, and the men were required to sign this addendum to the aboveundertaking. The resolution of the Executive Council, which dealswith the mitigation of the sentences, states that the imprisonmentportions of the sentences are remitted; that the fines (£2, 000 in allcases) must be paid at once; and that the banishment shall remain inabeyance subject to the faithful observance of the above undertaking;but that should any action be taken by any of the prisonersconstituting in the opinion of the Executive Council a breach of theabove undertaking, the sentence of banishment shall come into force. 

There is no definition of the phrase 'meddle in politics, ' nor isthere any indication of what in the opinion of the Executive Councilconstitutes politics. There is of course on record the President'sown statement in public that he would not permit any discussion onthe dynamite and railway questions because they are matters of 'highpolitics'; and if haply the Executive should also hold this view, itis difficult to see how any of the prisoners will be able to followtheir ordinary business and attend to those commercial affairs inwhich they are concerned without committing some breach of thisridiculous provision. 

No answer was received to the many representations made on behalf ofthe four leaders, except that the Government were busy with thematter. Upon the release of the other prisoners it was suggested tothem by friends outside that it would be a proper and politic courseto proceed in a body to the Presidency and thank the President forthe action he had taken in their respect, and at the same time to begof him to extend a similar clemency to the four leaders who werestill left in gaol. Most of the men were dead against taking any suchaction. They held very strongly to the opinion that they had beenarrested by treachery, condemned by arrangement, and played with ascounters in an unscrupulous manner. They recognized no obligationtowards the President. They could see no magnanimity in a policywhich had secured their arrest under the circumstances describedwhich inveigled them into pleading guilty to a nominal offence, and which imposed upon them a sentence such as that passed. Theyconsidered the enormous fine which they were then called upon topay to say nothing of the imprisonment which they had alreadysuffered wholly disproportionate to the offence, and their naturalimpulse was to avoid the man who was directly responsible for it all, or at least not to meet him under circumstances so unequal, when theywould be sure to be insulted, and would be obliged to suffer theinsult in silence. 

Some of them however yielded to the representations of their friends, who considered that it should be done for the sake of the men whowere not yet released; whilst there were others who expressed theview that they would rather go back and do their imprisonment thansuffer the humiliation which it was proposed to inflict; that theywould not do it for themselves, and they could not bring themselvesto do it for anybody else. A considerable number of the prisonerscalled upon His Honour; and this was the 'dog' interview. Afterhearing the address of the men the President proceeded to pat himselfand his people on the back, saying that he knew he had behaved withgreat magnanimity and moderation, and that he hoped that suchgenerosity would not be entirely thrown away. 

'You must know, ' he said, 'that I sometimes have to punish my dogs;and I find that there are dogs of two kinds. Some of them who aregood come back and lick my boots. Others get away at a distance andsnarl at me. I see that some are still snarling. I am glad that youare not like them. '

Those among his hearers who could understand His Honour's remarks, although they had been prepared for much, were certainly not preparedfor this. The interpreter stood for a moment without rendering intoEnglish the metaphor chosen by the worthy President, and even HisHonour--slow to perceive where he has transgressed the limits ofetiquette and good breeding--gathered from the expressions upon thefaces that something was wrong, and turning to the interpreter, said:

'Oh, that's only my joke! Don't interpret that to them. '

But those who witnessed it say that there was no joke in his voice orhis eye as he said it. Proceeding then with more circumspection hewalked out his dog in another form, and said that it was very well topunish the little dogs as he had punished them, but somebody shouldalso punish the big dog--evidently referring to Mr. Rhodes--and inthe course of a homily he again mixed his parable, sticking all thetime to his dog however, remarking in conclusion that it was verywell to punish the dogs, but what was to happen to the owner of thedogs, who stood by urging them on and crying 'Tsaa!'?

Throughout the week His Honour continued to make the homely dog workto good purpose, but the interview with the released Reformers was, it is believed, the first occasion upon which he made use of it. Certainly on no other occasion did the President do such amplejustice to his reputation as a finished diplomat. 

In the mean time negotiations had been proceeding for obtaining therelease of the leaders. The friends and representatives of the fourprisoners had become subject to all manner of attentions from numbersof people in Pretoria; near relations of the President himself, high-placed Government officials, their relatives, hangers-on, prominent Boers, and persons of all sorts and descriptions, alloffered their services and indicated means by which the thing couldbe arranged. All wanted money--personal bribes. The prisonersthemselves were similarly approached, and they who a month previouslyhad been condemned to death witnessed with disgust a keen competitionamong their enemies for the privilege of effecting--at a price--theirrelease. Day after day they were subjected to the disgustingimportunities of these men--men who a little while before had beenvaunting their patriotism and loudly expressing a desire to prove itby hanging these same Reformers. 

The gaoler Du Plessis, representing himself as having been sent bythe President, suggested to the four men that they should 'make apetition. ' They declined to do so. Du Plessis was then reinforced bythe Chief Commissioner of Police, and the two officials again urgedthis course but stated that they did not wish it to be known thatthey had been sent by the Executive and therefore could notconsent to their names being used. Upon these terms the prisonersagain declined. They said that if they were to hold any communicationwith the Government they required to have it on record that they didso at the suggestion of the two responsible gaol officials whorepresented themselves as expressing the wish of the ExecutiveCouncil. After further delay and consultations with the President andothers the two officials above named consented to allow their namesto be used in the manner indicated. Not content with this theprisoners demanded that they should be allowed to send an independentmessenger to the President to ascertain whether he really required awritten appeal for revision of sentence. Having received confirmationin this manner the four men addressed a letter to the ExecutiveCouncil. In this letter they stated that they had been sentenced todeath; that the death-sentence had been commuted; and that theyunderstood--but had received no authoritative information on thesubject--that they were to suffer instead a term of fifteen years'imprisonment. They suggested the imposition of a monetary penalty inplace of the imprisonment; they stated that they held and representedimportant interests in the State and that they believed their releasewould tend to the restoration of confidence and favourable conditionsin the business community of the Rand; and they concluded by sayingthat, if the Executive saw fit to adopt this suggestion, they theprisoners would return to their business in good faith. 

It had frequently been intimated to these men that it would beimpossible for the Government to impose a fine in place of thedeath-sentence because money so obtained would be blood-money. Reference had been made in the Executive Council to Biblicalprecedents, notably the case of Judas, and the opinion was held thatif blood-money were taken the Lord would visit His wrath upon thepeople. 

The Boers are in their way a very religious people. But they are alsoessentially practical; and it is difficult to find an instance inwhich the religious principle has operated to their commercialdisadvantage. This at any rate was not one. The train of reasoningwhich led them to justify the imposition of a fine was somewhat inthis wise: To _impose a fine_ would be to take blood-money, andwould be immoral and iniquitous: to _accept the offer of a present_on condition that the sentence should be entirely remitted howeverwould be quite another thing. 

So negotiations were set on foot to induce the prisoners to make thenecessary offer; and the prisoners, as has been shown, did so. Thissatisfied the religious scruple of the Boer, but the terms of theoffer were not satisfactory to his commercial requirements. It becamenecessary to make a definite offer. Further negotiations followed, and the prisoners gathered that an offer of £10, 000 apiece would beviewed with favour by the President and his advisers; and it wasstated by members of the Volksraad and prominent officials who werein the confidence of and in communication with the Government that, in the event of such a contingency arising as the prisoners making anoffer of cash, the Executive would not take the money for the benefitof the State but would accept it for charitable purposes--aneducational institute or a hospital or some such object. 

This was communicated to the prisoners by the personages referred to, and an offer was accordingly made of £10, 000 apiece. The matter wasdiscussed in the Executive Council, and the Boer, true to hisinstinct and record, perceived an opportunity to improve hisposition. The religious gentlemen who would not take blood-money nowobjected that the amount proposed was altogether too small, and thePresident with that readiness so characteristic of him observed thathe thought the prisoners must have made a mistake, and meant £40, 000apiece instead of £40, 000 for the lot. 

Another delay ensued, and in the meanwhile more and more deputiesflocked to Pretoria, and stronger grew the feeling, and more angry, disappointed, and disgusted grew the communities of Johannesburg andPretoria. The President, however, played his game unmoved by any suchconsiderations. 

The next announcement from the Executive was a wholly unexpected one. It was that they felt it necessary to consult Judge Gregorowski as tothe amount of money which ought to be taken as a donation tocharities. The matter of assessing the value of a death-sentence incash might perhaps be deemed a perplexing and a difficult one fromlack of precedent, yet nobody supposed the Executive Council to beunequal to the task. It might also seem unfair to impose this furtherburden of responsibility upon a judge; but Mr. Gregorowski had provedhimself superior to precedent and untrammelled by custom; and therewas much to be said in favour of continuing an association which hadworked very satisfactorily so far. 

When however the President, with that resolute determination to begenerous which was so well advertised, at last overcame all obstaclesand succeeded in holding a meeting of his advisers to receive Mr. Gregorowski's report, and when it was found that that gentlemanassessed capital punishment at £25, 000 per head, the ExecutiveCouncil with one accord avowed themselves to be so utterly taken bysurprise by the announcement that they required time to think thematter over and decide upon a course of action. 

No doubt this opinion of Mr. Gregorowski's took them quite as much bysurprise as did his original sentences. However in the course of aday or two they had recovered sufficiently to intimate to theprisoners that, if they would amend their first offer of £40, 000 forthe four and make it one of £40, 000 apiece, the Executive woulddecline to accept so large a sum, as being greater than theyconsidered equitable and would reply that in the opinion of theGovernment £25, 000 apiece would be sufficient. It was quite plainlyintimated that this procedure presented certain attractions to thePresident, who desired for political purposes to exhibit furthermagnanimity. The prisoners who by this time had gained some insightinto Mr. Kruger's methods, who knew from past experience the value ofhis promises, and who could find no record in history to encouragethem in participating to this extent in the confidence trick, point-blank refused to have anything to do with it. 

They agreed to make a formal offer of a 'reasonable' fine, leavingthe interpretation of this to the Government, but only on thedistinct understanding that the amount should not exceed £25, 000each. They had learned that Mr. Gregorowski had fixed this amount andthat the Executive had agreed to accept it, and they would not offera penny more for magnanimity or anything else. They stated inplain terms that they looked upon this matter simply as a bargain;that if they should get out they were paying their way out, and thatin so far as their release from the position was concerned thetransaction was closed upon business terms and there should be noquestion afterwards as to gratitude or magnanimity. The fines werepaid, {39} and on July 11 the leaders were released. 

Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, and Hammond, who were compelled throughtheir business ties to continue their association with the Transvaal, signed the same undertaking concerning politics as that given by therest of the prisoners--with the difference that in their case itoperates for a period of fifteen years. Colonel Rhodes howeverdeclined to give the required undertaking and elected to take hissentence of fifteen years' banishment. On the night of June 11therefore he was sent across the border under escort, and passingthrough the Free State proceeded at once to Matabeleland to renderwhat assistance he could to his brother in the suppression of therebellion. As though the excitement of the past few months had notbeen sufficient, it may be added that in the first engagement inwhich he took part on his arrival at Buluwayo his horse was shot, andhe narrowly escaped the same fate himself. 

From time to time adverse comment has been made on the subject ofthis undertaking of the Reformers to abstain from furtherparticipation in politics. The position of the Reformers was this:They had entered upon the movement to obtain the redress of certainmatters closely affecting their feelings as men and their interestsand business as settlers in the country. They were disarmed andplaced at the mercy of the Boer Government by the action of England'sRepresentative. To decline to give the pledge required would entailbanishment, which would in many cases mean ruin to them and in allcases would remove them from the sphere in which they might yetcontribute to the attainment of the ends they had in view. The onlycompensating consideration possible in such a course would be thatthe redress desired would be effected through the influence of theImperial Government; but since the Imperial Government had shownthat under the circumstances they were neither willing nor able tomaintain to a logical conclusion the position which they took up whenthey secured disarmament, the Reformers concluded that their obviouscourse was to give the required undertaking. It is true that severalamong them did decline to give this undertaking, saying that theywould prefer to serve their terms of imprisonment; but they receivedthe answer that after the term of two years' imprisonment theGovernment would still require the undertaking or enforce thebanishment clause, so that it appeared to them there was no way outof it but to sign what was required and wait patiently. 

It is perfectly obvious that one of two alternatives will presentitself. Either the Government will come to regard this provision as adead letter, and wholly ignore it; or some of the men, in the courseof their business and in dealing with economic questions such as theyare morally entitled to discuss will fall foul of the 'opinion of theExecutive. ' The issue will then be a very clear one, and many ofthose who were strongly opposed to the Reformers on the premisses onwhich they started will find themselves in cordial agreement withthem in later developments. {40}

The Reform movement closed for the time being with the release of theleaders. Sixty-four men had been committed for trial. From four ofthem the Government had received £100, 000, and from fifty-six others£112, 000. One was dead; one had fallen so seriously ill before thetrial that he was unable to present himself with the rest, but onrecovering and announcing his intention to plead 'Not guilty' andfight it out, the case against him was withdrawn. 

There remained two men, Messrs. Sampson and Davies, whose case theGovernment had refused to consider because they declined to appeal. They had been sentenced on April 28 to two years' imprisonment and£2, 000 fine, or failing payment to another year's imprisonment, andto three years' banishment; and under that sentence do they lie atthe present moment in the Pretoria gaol, at the mercy of the BoerGovernment and its very competent representative Mr. Du Plessis. {41}

Much _kudos_ has accrued to Mr. Kruger for his magnanimity and muchprofit for his astuteness! Great credit is also given to Mr. Chamberlain for his prompt impartiality. And surely some day atribute of sympathy and admiration will go out from a people who likepluck and who love fair play to two Englishmen who hold that a solemnpledge is something which even a Boer should hold to, whilstself-respect is more than liberty and beyond all price. 

Footnotes for Chapter IX

{35} This was done on the second day--after a night without anyventilation at all. 

{36} See Appendix E. 

{37} (July, 1899. ) They were released in June, 1897. 

{38} Du Plessis' threats regarding Messrs. Sampson and Davies weremade so openly and vengefully that Colonel F. W. Rhodes deemed it tobe his duty as soon as he was released to report the matter to theHigh Commissioner, with a view to ensuring some measure of protectionfor the two gentlemen above referred to. After the release ofthe other prisoners, Du Plessis was for a time suspended, owingto charges laid against him by the Inspector of Prisons. Noinvestigation appears however to have been made, and the man wasreinstated. During the month of September, after Messrs. Sampson andDavies had already done five months of their sentence in PretoriaGaol, this man, finding himself unable to break their spirit by othermeans, made a proposal to the Government to separate the two and toplace them in two small country gaols at wide distances apart and farremoved from the friendly offices and watchful eyes of their friends, and thus deprive them of such benefit as they may be able _in thefuture_ to get from proximity to the official representative ofEngland. In the past they have certainly derived none. 

{39} It seems like reflecting on the reader's intelligence to addthat nothing more has been heard of the 'charities. '

{40} (July, 1899. ) A clear indication of the Government's dispositiontowards the Reformers was given by the treatment accorded to Mr. Lionel Phillips. In consequence of a publication by Sir JohnWilloughby of an article on the subject of the Raid, which failed toaccurately represent the facts as they were present to the minds ofthe Reformers, Mr. Phillips wrote an article in the _NineteenthCentury_ magazine, which was purely historical, moderate in tone, andobviously designed only as an answer to the allegations which hadbeen made. The Executive Council arrived at the conclusion that itwas a breach of his undertaking to abstain from interference inpolitics, and they issued a decree of banishment against him. As Mr. Phillips had taken up his residence permanently in Europe, and as itwas well known that it would be extremely inconvenient for him toreturn to South Africa in order to dispute this action it wasgenerally considered that the object of the move was to establisha precedent, so to say, on the cheap, and in the same spirit tointimidate others among the Reformers who were believed not to havelost their interest in the cause of reform nor to have abandonedtheir intention to begin again as soon as they were free to do so. Itis no exaggeration to say that scarcely a week could have passedduring the last two and a half years in which some or all of the halfdozen Uitlanders most prominent in the cause of reform have not beenin receipt of a warning of one kind or another, ranging fromapparently friendly advice not to take too keen an interest incertain matters, up to the giddy eminence of being black listed inthe Dutch papers as one of those to be dragged out and shot withouttrial as a traitor and a rebel. Such are the conditions under whichthe unarmed Uitlanders labour for reform. 

{41} (July, 1899. ) Du Plessis was promoted to be Chief Inspector ofPrisons shortly after the release of Messrs. Sampson and Davies, and still holds that post!

PART II. 

A POSTSCRIPT. 

CHAPTER X. 

THREE YEARS' GRACE. 

Very seldom has any community been in a position so unsatisfactory asthat in which the people of Johannesburg found themselves in the year1896. Judgments passed in the heat of the moment upon matters whichhad not been properly explained, and which in many cases werecompletely obscured by deliberate misrepresentation, had incurred forthe community dislike contempt and mistrust which were whollyundeserved. Those who knew the facts and who were able and willing tospeak, the Reformers themselves, were bonded to abstain from politicsfor three years under penalty of banishment. Betrayed, deserted, muzzled, helpless, hopeless, and divided, no community could havebeen in a more unsatisfactory condition. It was abundantly clear thatthe time had been allowed to pass when the Imperial Government mighthave insisted upon reforms and the fulfilment of the President'spromises--not in the spirit in which they had been made, but in thespirit in which the President himself had intended the world toconstrue them. The impact of the revelations was too great to permitof public judgment quickly recovering its balance. It was realizedthat Mr. Kruger's effects had been admirably stage-managed and thatfor the time being, and possibly for a very considerable time, theUitlanders were completely out of court. There were a few--but howfew!--whose faith was great and whose conviction that the truth mustprevail was abiding, who realized that there was nothing for it butto begin all over again--to begin and to persevere upon sound lines;and they took heart of such signs as there were and started afresh. 

It has been an article of faith with them that Mr. Kruger missedhis supreme chance at the time of the trial of the Reformers, andthat from the date of the death-sentence his judgment and his luckhave failed him. He abused his good fortune and the luck turned, sothey say; and the events of the last three years go to support thatimpression. To his most faithful ally amongst the Uitlanders thePresident, in the latter days of 1896, commented adversely upon theingratitude of those Reformers who had not called to thank him forhis magnanimity; and this man replied: 'You must stop talking aboutthat, President, because people are laughing at you. You made abargain with them and they paid the price you asked, so now they oweyou nothing. ' But his Honour angrily repudiated that construction:nothing will convert him to that view. 

It has been said that Dr. Jameson is the best friend Paul Kruger everhad, and with equal truth it may be said that, in 1896, PresidentKruger proved himself to be the best friend of the Reformers. Noteven the most sanguine of his enemies could have expected to witnessthe impolitic and unjust acts by which the President revealedhimself, vindicated the Reformers, and undermined a position ofunparalleled strength in an incredibly short time. The bargaining andthe bad grace which marked the release of the Reformers had preparedthe world to view Mr. Kruger's action and attitude a little morecritically than it had hitherto been disposed to do. The realconditions of Dr. Jameson's surrender had also become known, andalthough the action of the Boer leaders was regarded as far tootrifling a matter to be seriously considered as against the Raiditself, nevertheless a residuum of impression was left which helpedto form opinion at a later stage. There followed, too, an irritatingcorrespondence between the Transvaal and Imperial Governments, in thecourse of which Dr. Leyds successfully established his skill as asmart letter writer and his limitations as a statesman. TheMunicipal Law, the first product of the 'forget and forgive'proclamation--which proclamation, by-the-bye, had already begun toprove itself an awkward weapon placed in the hands of his enemies byPresident Kruger himself--had been exposed and denounced as farcical, and it now required but little to convince the once admiring world ofthe President's real character and intentions. That little wasforthcoming in a touch of ridicule more potent than all arguments. 

The Transvaal Government formulated their demand for damages for theRaid in a form which made everyone smile--£677, 938 3s. 3d. For actualoutlay, and £1, 000, 000 for 'Moral and Intellectual Damages. ' Whatwith the fines of the Reformers, and the seizure of the provisions ofall sorts acquired by them for the purposes of the Reform movement, which latter must have exceeded £50, 000 in value, the Boer Governmenthad already received upwards of a quarter of a million, and had, infact, made a profit on the Raid; so that this demand came as asurprise even to the Uitlanders, as much perhaps due to theextraordinary phrasing of the demand as to the amount claimed. 

It may be wondered why, under provocation so great as that ofcomplete abandonment by the country whose representative had placedthem in their then hopeless position, no distinct movement tookplace--no tendency even developed itself--among the Uitlandersgenerally to unite with the Boers in favour of a Republican movementthroughout South Africa, to the exclusion of the Imperial power. Inanswer to this it must be said that such an idea undoubtedly did takestrong hold of the non-British portion of the Uitlander population, as witness the manner in which the Cape Colony Dutchmen, Hollanders, Germans, and individuals of other European nationalities associatedthemselves with the Boer party, almost invariably by opendeclaration, and in many cases even by naturalization, thusforfeiting their own national rights and obtaining nothing but vaguepromises and the liability to military service in return. But theRepublican movement made no further headway than this because Britishsubjects formed the large majority of the Uitlanders. They had, it istrue, a great grievance against the Imperial Government; but againstthe Transvaal Government they had one greater still; and it wouldtake a great deal to kill the passionate loyalty of the British SouthAfrican. It would be idle to discuss what might have happened had Mr. Kruger seized his opportunity and let in a considerable section ofthe then unenfranchised to strengthen the ranks of the Republicanparty; that can only be a matter of individual conjecture. What iscertain, however, is that he did not do so and never intended to doso; wherein his lack of statesmanship is again made manifest. 

Mr. Kruger has carried out in its fullest (its best or its worst) thecharacteristic principle of his people already referred to, that ofgiving too little and asking too much. It is doing only bare justiceto the determination with which he adheres to the policy of his lifeto say that he gives nothing to anybody. From the most distant to thenearest he deals alike with all. With the people of Europe, he hastaxed their investments, disregarded their interests, and floutedtheir advice; but nevertheless he has for years commanded their moralsupport. In his dealings with the British Government, pushed as theyhave been some half a dozen times to the very verge of war, he hasinvariably come off with something for nothing. In his dealings withthe Uitlanders he has bartered promises and in return--_circumspice_!In the matter of the events of 1895-6 he came out with a quarter of amillion in cash, a claim for £1, 677, 938 3s. 3d. Odd (including Moraland Intellectual Damages), and a balance of injured innocence whichmay not be expressed in figures. In his dealings with Cape Colony hehas taxed the products of their land and industry, he went to theverge of war to destroy their trade in the case of the closing of theVaal River drifts, he has permitted the Netherlands Railway to soarrange its tariffs as to divert traffic from them to other parts, hehas refused to their people (his own flesh and blood, among whom hewas born) the most elementary rights when they settle in his country!And yet in his need he calls upon them, and they come! His treatmentof the Orange Free State has been exactly the same. Their grievanceagainst him is incomparably worse, because of their liability tobecome involved in the consequences of a policy which they are notallowed to influence. But President Kruger is, above all things, practical. Everything is gauged by the measure of the advantage whichit can bring to him; and his treatment of the Free State isdetermined by their utility to him and his power over them, and isnot influenced by their moral claims upon his good will. Natal andPortugal have their experience of broken agreements and strainedinterpretations, of intrigues with native subjects and neighboursfor the extension of rights or boundaries, all designed to benefitthe Transvaal and to undermine them. All, all with the same result!Something for nothing! Within the borders of the Transvaal the policyis the same. Moral rights and the claims of justice are unrecognized. For services rendered there may be some return; a privilege, acontract, an appointment. But this cannot be properly regarded as aneglect of principle upon Mr. Kruger's part, for after all the rewardis at the expense of the Uitlanders. It is usually the least price atwhich the service could be secured; and it is generally in suchform as to give the recipient a profit in which the members of theGovernment party largely share, but it never confers a power towhich the President himself is not superior; indeed, it is almostinvariably hedged about by such conditions as to make its continuancedependent upon the President's good will. If any one shouldthink this description of conditions in the Transvaal and of thePresident's policy to be unduly harsh, let him satisfy himself by aninvestigation of those matters which appear on merely superficialexamination to support opinions contrary to those expressed by thewriter. Let him examine the terms of the closer union with the FreeState, the circumstances leading to the closing of the Vaal Riverdrifts, the condition of the Dutch subjects of Cape Colony and of theOrange Free State in the Transvaal, the Netherlands Railway tariffsas they operate against Cape Colony and the Free State, the RailwayAgreement with Natal, the disputes with Portugal, the attempts toacquire native territory on the East Coast, the terms of theNetherlands Railway Concession, Selati Railway Concession, DynamiteConcession--in fact, all other concessions, monopolies, contracts, privileges, appointments, and rights, made, granted, or enteredinto by President Kruger to or with his friends. Let him recall thetreatment and the fate of some of those to whom ampler referencewill be made later on; for instance, Chief Justice Kotzé andJudge Ameshof, who in the dealings with the Reformers renderedvaluable--but perhaps injudicious and unjudicial--service, as alreadysufficiently described; the treatment of Dr. Coster, the StateAttorney, who also deserved better of the President; the publicrepudiation of Mr. J. B. Robinson, whose friendship for PresidentKruger had been frequently and amply evidenced to the gravedissatisfaction of the Uitlander population; the public and insultingrepudiation of Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of CapeColony, after he had served his purpose! The result of any suchinquiry must confirm the conclusion that 'something for nothing' isthe President's policy and achievement. 

A policy or a movement which is to involve the cooperation ofthousands of intelligent men cannot be carried out upon such terms, and this may be regarded as the main reason why the spirit ofRepublicanism did not generally itself develop under circumstancesapparently so favourable to it. The President's policy may beconsidered astute or unwise according to the point of view from whichit is regarded. Viewed from the standpoint of the State itself, undoubtedly it fails lamentably in statesmanship. In the interests ofthe Boer party, however, or of the man Paul Kruger, it may well bedoubted whether the policy may not be a token of remarkable sagacity. He knows his own limitations and the limitations of his people. Heknows that to freely admit to a share in the Government a number ofintelligent people, would make a continuance of himself or his partyin absolute power for any length of time a matter of utterimpossibility. In these circumstances the problem which PresidentKruger had set himself was a remarkably difficult one. Torepublicanize South Africa, to secure the support of the majority ofthe white inhabitants, and yet to yield no whit of power to those bywhose aid he would achieve his object, would indeed be carrying tosublime heights the policy of 'something for nothing. '

Many years before the Raid Mr. Kruger had a well-defined policy torepublicanize South Africa, and the Uitlanders of the Transvaal werequite alive to it, as may be gathered by reference to theirnewspapers. But the voice was as a voice crying in the wilderness inthose days, and, as has been said, it required the Jameson Raid toadvertize the conditions in the Transvaal and to direct attention towhat had been proclaimed unheeded for many years. Immediately priorto the Raid Mr. Kruger was floundering in a morass of difficulties. The policy of 'something for nothing' had been exposed, and it wasseen through by all the Dutchmen in South Africa and was resented byall save his own little party in the Transvaal; but the Jameson Raidgave the President a jumping-off place on solid ground, and he wasnot slow to take advantage of it. 

It is not too much to say that the vast majority of people in Europeand America are indebted to Dr. Jameson for any knowledge which theymay have acquired of the Transvaal and its Uitlander problem. Theirsis a disordered knowledge, and perhaps it is not unnatural that theyshould in a manner share the illusion of the worthy sailor who, afterattending divine service, assaulted the first Israelite he metbecause he had only just heard of the Crucifixion. A number of worthypeople are still disposed to excuse many things in the Transvaalbecause of the extreme provocation given by the Jameson Raid. Therestrictions upon English education are considered to be 'notunnatural when one remembers the violent attempt to swamp the Dutch. 'The excessive armaments are held to be 'entirely justifiableconsidering what has happened. ' The building of forts is 'an ordinaryprecaution. ' The prohibiting of public meetings is 'quite wrong, ofcourse, but can you wonder at it?' Many of these worthy people will, no doubt, learn with pained surprise that all these things were amongthe causes which led to the Reform movement of 1895-6, and are notthe consequences of that movement as they erroneously suppose. ThePress Law and Public Meetings Act had been passed; arms had beenimported and ordered in tens of thousands; machine guns andquantities of ammunition also; forts were being built;{42} thesuppression of all private schools had been advocated by Dr. Mansvelt--all long, long before the Jameson Raid. So also had therepublican propaganda been at work, but it had not caught on outsidethe two Republics. 

Difficult as his task might appear, Mr. Kruger had now command of thetwo great persuasive forces--money and sentiment. With the money hepushed on the forts, and imported immense quantities of big guns, small arms, and ammunition--far in excess of what could possibly beused by the whole of the Boer population of the Transvaal aftermaking every allowance for spare arms in reserve; and such anextraordinary supply was not unnaturally believed to be designed forthe use of others outside the Transvaal. More than this, an army ofemissaries, agents, and spies in the pay of the Transvaal Governmentwere spread about the Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal. Newspaperswere supported in different parts of South Africa and a considerableamount of money was spent upon the Press in France and Germany. 

It would be absurd to suggest and it would be unjust to let it beinferred that all those who were drawn into sympathy with the Boerssupported or were even cognizant of President Kruger's ultimate aim. It is an everyday experience that the scope of work and ambitionexpands as one progresses. Whether the strong man really sees hisultimate goal and tackles with magnificent courage the innumerableand seemingly insurmountable obstacles which lie between him and it, or whether in the wisdom and mercy of Providence there is such anadjustment of courage and foresight as prevents him from seeing morethan he is able to face, who can say? But what is beyond all doubt isthat, given the one strong man who does know his mind, he will leadas the Pied Piper led, and there is no thought in his following toask the whither and the why. 

Given the sympathy and the means, the difficulty of PresidentKruger's self-imposed task was not so great as at first appeared. Tosome it was advisable to do no more than point to the Jameson Raidand say: 'We only wish to live in peace and to be left alone. ' Tosome again that act is construed as a sign that the British peoplewish to upset the two Republics, therefore they must strengthen andbe prepared. To others the appeal is made: 'We Dutch are the settlersand owners of the country, we wish for peace, of course, but we mustdominate--you under your form of government, we under ours. 'To others again it is further advanced: 'Let us negotiate theelimination of the Imperial power; we do not suggest fight, but if wepresent a united front they must retire peacefully and concede ourdemands. ' And lastly comes the appeal to those who are in sympathywith the advanced republicans: 'Arm and prepare. Some day we shallfind England in a difficulty, divided by party or hampered byexternal complications; it has often happened before and we havealways profited. That will be our time to drive them out. '

It would be very unjust to some of the most prominent men on theDutch side in Cape Colony to leave the slenderest grounds for theinference that they are to be associated with the extreme andactively disloyal aim. All that it is intended to do is to indicatethe fine gradations in arguments by which a number are drawntogether--under a leadership which they do not realize, and goingthey know not where! The strongest of these arguments and appeals areparticularly popular with the younger generation of Dutch SouthAfricans who entertain a visionary scheme of independence suggestedby the history of the United States. But there is something moreserious in it than this, as may be deduced from the fact that inDecember, 1896, the writer was approached by Mr. D. P. Graaff, formerly a prominent member of the Cape Legislative Council and nowas always a prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the suggestion thatall the South African born should combine in the effort to create theUnited States of South Africa, 'upon friendly terms with England, butconfining the direct Imperial right in South Africa to a navalbase at Simonstown and possibly a position in Natal. ' Thisconcession--from South Africa to England--would not, it was argued, involve disadvantage to the former, because for a considerable timeit would be necessary to preserve friendly relations with England andto have the protection of her fleet for the coast. 

It is of course quite easy to attach too much importance to theopinions of individual politicians of this class, who are as a rulemerely shouters with the biggest crowd; but the prominent associationof such an apostle of republicanism with the Bond, and the fact thathe should have gone so far with a Reformer of known strong Britishsympathies seem to warrant the attaching of some importance to thesuggestion. {43} A similar suggestion was made to several of theReformers at the time of the judicial crisis by one of the judges ofthe Transvaal High Court, when it was hoped to enlist the sympathiesof the Uitlanders with a movement to curtail President Kruger's powerand to establish republicanism on a firmer basis in South Africa. Inorder to forestall an obvious comment, it may be said that discussionwas in both cases declined on the ground that it would beparticipating in politics in the sense forbidden by PresidentKruger's three years' ban. 

The year 1896 was a very bad one for the whole of South Africa. Besides the Raid and the suspense and disorganization entailed by theprolonged trial, the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg, {44}the still more terrible rebellion and massacre in Rhodesia, and thecrushing visitation of the great cattle scourge, the Rinderpest, helped to produce a deplorable state of affairs in the Transvaal. 

Then there was another thing which rankled badly: Messrs. Sampson andDavies were still in gaol. {45} The feeling throughout South Africawas reflected in the monotonous announcement which appeared in the_Cape Times_ week by week for thirteen months:--'To-day Messrs. Sampson and Davies complete the--week of their imprisonment inPretoria gaol for the crime of not signing a petition. ' It seemedscarcely credible that the President should still harbour anyillusions about his magnanimity; nevertheless, for some weeks beforethe celebration of the Queen's Record reign it was rumoured that thetwo prisoners were to be released upon that occasion as a mark of hisHonour's sympathy. Opinion had not been unanimous upon the attitudeof either the President or the prisoners; but an ugly incidentsilenced most of the President's apologists. Gold stealing and thepurchase of stolen gold were being carried on such a scale and withsuch impunity that at last, in desperation, the directors andofficials of one of the big mining companies (the City and SuburbanG. M. Co. ), at the risk of being shot by desperadoes, took uponthemselves the functions of the detectives and police. They caught'red-handed' two notorious characters and delivered them over, withthe gold in their possession, to the authorities. The thievesactually boasted then that nothing would happen to them as they had'made it all right;' and a few days later one of them was allowed toescape out of the Court-house buildings which stand in the middle ofa large square. The other was convicted and sentenced to six months'imprisonment. He was a criminal of a bad and dangerous type, the headof a gang known to be concerned in gold stealing and burglary as aprofession. The penalty was regarded by all parties as mostinadequate and the judge himself commented adversely upon thedrafting of the law which tended to screen the prisoner. Not onemitigating circumstance was forthcoming! And yet, whilst ignoring afresh outburst of protest against the detention of Messrs. Sampsonand Davies, and whilst the Industrial Commission was exposing thegold thefts and denouncing the complicity of the police, Mr. Krugerdecided to remit three-fourths of the sentence and to dischargethe thief unconditionally. Is it to be wondered that such ill-advisedaction called to mind the prisoners' boast, and that it wascontrasted prominently with the treatment of the two Reformers?

Three events of importance marked the year 1897 in the history of theTransvaal. The first was the High Court crisis in February; thesecond, the appointment of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry; thethird, the Queen's Record Reign celebration. 

The High Court crisis arose out of the case of Brown _v. _ The State, already referred to. {46} Brown had acted within his legal rightsaccording to the terms of a proclamation. That proclamation had beenillegally withdrawn, and the Government realizing that they wouldhave to stand the consequences of their action in the courts of thecountry, introduced a law which was immediately passed by theVolksraad, absolving them from all liability, and practicallynon-suiting all claimants. Mr. Kotzé in his judgment declared thislaw to be improper and in conflict with the Constitution, and gavejudgment in favour of Brown, but left the amount of damages to bedetermined later after hearing further evidence. {47}

The first Volksraad was then in special session, and the Presidentpromptly introduced a law known as Law 1 of 1897, which empowered himto exact assurances from the judges that they would respect allresolutions of the Volksraad as having the force of law and declarethemselves not entitled to test the validity of a law by itsagreement or conflict with the Constitution; and it further empoweredthe President in the event of his not being satisfied with thecharacter of the replies to summarily dismiss the judges. The judgesprotested in a body that they would not submit to such treatment. TheHigh Court was adjourned and all legal business was stopped. Particularly emphatic was Mr. Justice Gregorowski. He stated thatno honourable man could possibly sit upon the Transvaal Bench as longas Law 1 of 1897 remained upon the Statute Book. At this juncture SirHenry de Villiers, Chief Justice of Cape Colony, came to Pretoria forthe purpose of effecting a compromise and averting a crisis. Thecompromise was practically an armistice. The judges promised not toexercise the testing right pending the speedy introduction of ameasure safeguarding the independence of the courts. Mr. Kruger onhis side promised to refrain from enforcing the provisions of Law 1of 1897, and undertook to introduce as speedily as possible therequired new law. 

The position in which the President found himself was undoubtedly oneof some difficulty, but he chose a very bad way out of it. High-handed arbitrary methods cannot effect a permanent andsatisfactory solution of a question of that character, but Mr. Krugerwas unwilling to go to the root of the evil and to admit what Mr. Kotzé's judgment had brought home with perhaps too sudden force, namely, that the laws and system of Government were in a condition ofcomplete chaos. The sequel can be told in a few words. In February, 1898, Mr. Kotzé considered that ample time had been allowed by himfor the fulfilment of President Kruger's promise. Sir Henry deVilliers thought it proper to allow more time. The point ofdifference between Mr. Kotzé and Sir Henry de Villiers was theinterpretation to be placed upon the expression 'this session, ' whichhad been used in the previous February when the President had saidthat if he did not introduce the proposed measures this session, thejudges might consider that he had failed to keep his promise. Mr. Kotzé contended that as the Raad was then in session it meant _thatSession_, and that in any case that session and another had passed, and a third was in progress and there was still no sign of thepromised measures. Sir Henry de Villiers stated that in his opinionthe reasonable construction would be that Mr. Kruger meant thefollowing _ordinary_ session, and that only ordinary sessions couldbe considered (for in each year there are one special and oneordinary session), so that the President might be entitled to claimthe whole of the year 1898 within which to fulfil his promise, butthat this would be the extreme limit of forbearance, after whichfailure could only be regarded as a breach of faith. Sir Henry deVilliers in fact defended Mr. Kruger. Mr. Kotzé, however, held to hisopinion; he wrote to the President reminding him of the undertaking, charged him with failure to keep his promise and withdrew the pledgewhich he had given. The President promptly exercised his right underLaw 1 of 1897, and dismissed Mr. Kotzé, who had served the country asjudge and chief justice for over twenty years. Whatever the merits ofthe particular case may be it appeared to be a shocking exhibitionof arbitrary power to dismiss without compensation, pension, orprovision of any sort, a man no longer young, whose services had beengiven for nearly a quarter of a century, who in the extreme dilemmaof the Raid had stood by the President, and who, from some points ofview, must be admitted to have served him 'not wisely but too well. '

Mr. Kotzé was not at that time popular among the Uitlanders onaccount of his action in the matter of the Reformers, and especiallybecause he had acted on behalf of the Government in securing theservices of Mr. Gregorowski for the Reform trial; but thecircumstances of his dismissal and the fact that he was known to bedependent upon his salary as judge, taken in conjunction with thecourageous stand which he had made against the President's arbitrarywill, enlisted public sympathy on his behalf, and a purse amountingin all to about £6, 000 was presented to him as a mark of appreciationfor his past services. But then followed the 'most unkindest cut ofall. ' Mr. Gregorowski, who had resigned a judgeship in order to fillthe post of State Attorney when Dr. Coster, in consequence of aninsulting reference of the President's to his countrymen, relinquished it, --Mr. Gregorowski, who had been foremost to declarethat no honourable man could possibly accept the position of judgewhile Law 1 of 1897 stood on the Statute Book, became Chief Justice_vice_ Mr. Kotzé dismissed. And by way of finally disposing of thesubject, the President when questioned in the Raad as to theexplanation of his apologist, denied that he had ever made anypromise of any sort or description to Sir Henry de Villiers oranybody else!

Mr. Justice Ameshof, who with Mr. Kotzé had made a stand against thePresident in this matter, was also obliged to relinquish hisjudgeship. Thus it will be seen that at one swoop Mr. Kruger disposedof three reputable intermediaries whom he had used to great advantageat one time or another. 'Something for nothing, ' for Mr. Kruger!Whether Mr. Kotzé acted in haste or whether Sir Henry de Villiers'plea for more time was justified are questions which it is no longernecessary to discuss, not alone because Mr. Kruger denied ever havingmade the promise out of which the disagreement arose, but becauseeven up to the present time no measure safeguarding the High Courthas been introduced or foreshadowed in the legislature. And Law 1 of1897, which according to Mr. Gregorowski made it impossible for anyhonourable man to sit upon the Bench, is still upon the Statute Bookand Mr. Gregorowski sits as Chief Justice subject to its provisions. 

No one disputes that the position of the High Court as determined byLaw 1 of 1897 is a very unsatisfactory one, but the apologists forPresident Kruger frequently say that there has been no actual case ofhardship, and that the Uitlanders are crying out before they arehurt. They maintain that it was a measure passed under greatprovocation for a particular purpose, and that the power grantedunder it, although very undesirable in principle, has never beenused. This is incorrect; the power has been used, and injustice hasbeen suffered. Two cases of actual hardship are those of Brown _v. _Government, the case out of which the whole matter arose, and thecase of the Pretoria Waterworks Company. But there are other casestoo which have never been brought into court having been eithercompromised or abandoned because of the hopelessness of the position, for it is obvious that there would be great reluctance on the part ofbusiness men to make a fight merely for the purpose of showing thatthey suffered under a disability when the result of such a fightwould inevitably be to antagonize the only tribunal to which theycould appeal. 

The case of the Pretoria Waterworks Company is rather a bad one. TheGovernment in 1889 gave a contract for the water supply of Pretoria. It was a permission, but not an exclusive right, to supply thetown from springs on Government ground. The President, finding thatthe contractor was not in a position to undertake the work, requestedcertain business houses to form a company to acquire this right andto supply the town with water. After inquiry into the localconditions and the probable costs, these people represented thatunless they received the exclusive right they would be unable toundertake the work, as the cost of importing pipes and machinerytransported from Natal by bullock waggon and the then expensiveconditions of working would make the work so costly that at a laterperiod, after the introduction of railways, it would be possible forcompetitors, such for instance as the projected Municipality ofPretoria, to establish a system of water supply at probably half thecost of the first one and thus compete to their disadvantage. Forthese reasons the contractor and his friends declined to proceed withthe formation of the company. The President, however, was verydesirous of having a good water supply, and after some months ofnegotiations the original contract was supplemented by a grant fromthe Executive Council, who then held plenary powers from theVolksraad, giving the proposed company the exclusive right. Immediately after the receipt of this grant the company was formed, the capital subscribed and the machinery and other materialpurchased. In 1898, after nine years of work, during whichshareholders had received dividends averaging 2-2/3 per cent. Perannum, some differences occurred between the Company and theconsumers, and the latter combined and subscribed the necessary fundsto take action in the High Court, the object being to challenge theexclusive right and to enable the town through its Municipality toprovide its own supply. At the same time the Government at theinstance of the townspeople opened negotiations with the Company witha view to expropriation in accordance with the terms stipulated inthe original contract. While matters were in this position, however, certain members of the Volksraad prominently concerned in the actionagainst the Company, introduced a measure in the Volksraad cancellingthe second or exclusive grant made by the Government nine yearsbefore and recommending that the Government should either buy outthe Waterworks Company upon suitable terms or should give thenecessary facilities to the Town Council to introduce another systemof supply. The application of the Company to be allowed to state itscase was ignored, and after a short discussion the resolution waspassed and the measure became law. By the action of the Volksraad theCompany was deprived of that principal asset upon the security ofwhich the capital had been subscribed, and the Government wererescued from an awkward position. The Government took no steps todefend their action in granting the right or to protest against theaction of the Volksraad, and became, therefore, parties to an act ofpiracy. The Company were thus placed entirely at the mercy of theGovernment, for under the provisions of Law 1 of 1897, the Volksraadresolution put them out of court both as to upholding their title andclaiming damages. All doubts as to the Government's complicity inthis action were removed when upon negotiations being opened for theexpropriation of the Company the Government refused to follow theprocedure prescribed in the contract on the ground that as theCompany had now lost the exclusive right they must accept a less sumin compensation, otherwise the Government would authorise the rivalMunicipal scheme. Under these circumstances the shareholders havingno other power to appeal to adopted the common-sense course of takingwhat they could get. The result can only be expressed in figures. Theshares, which had been purchased at over 40s. At the time of theVolksraad's action were worth less than 28s. In liquidation. Theinquiry into the Raid by the Select Committee of the House ofCommons, early in 1897, was productive of a result which is notalways traced to its real cause. The greatest dissatisfaction wasexpressed in the Transvaal and among all the Boers in South Africawith one feature of the Westminster inquiry, viz. , the investigationof the causes which made the Raid possible. Mr. Kruger and hisfriends had enjoyed such a run of luck and so much indulgence, andhad been so successful in presenting their side of the case only, that it seemed to them improper that anyone should wish to inquireinto all the circumstances. It would even appear from whatfollowed that the President had convinced himself that there were nogrievances, that he was an entirely innocent party deeply injured bythe Reformers and the British Government, and that the Westminsterinquiry had been authorized and conducted for the sole purpose ofexposing him and justifying the Reform movement. 

As the months dragged on and no improvement in the conditions of theUitlanders took place, as indeed the complaints grew louder and thestate of affairs grew worse, the President again began to hear thevoices calling for reform. Timid whispers they were, perhaps, and farbetween, for the great bulk of the Uitlanders were in a morose andsullen mood. Having tried and failed on stronger lines they wereincapable as yet of returning with any heart to the old fruitless andalready rejected constitutional methods. The suggestions for reform, consequently, came principally from those who were on friendly termswith the Boer party and believed themselves to carry some weight. They have by this time learned that nobody carries weight withPresident Kruger unless he has power to back his suggestions. Manyyears before, the late Mr. W. Y. Campbell as spokesman of a deputationfrom Johannesburg, addressing President Kruger, stated in the courseof his remarks that the people of Johannesburg 'protested' against acertain measure. The President jumped up in one of his characteristicmoods and said: 'Protest! Protest!! what is the good of protesting?You have not got the guns! I have. ' And Mr. Campbell, in reportingthis in Johannesburg, remarked: 'That man is sensible; he knows theposition. I claim to be sensible also, and I know he is right: youcan take my name off any other deputations, for we'll get nothing byasking. '

It is stated, and the statement comes from one who claims to havebeen the father of the suggestion, that the President was induced toappoint a commission of inquiry by the argument that if, as hebelieved, the wretched state of affairs in Johannesburg was due notto the action of the Government but to the greed, machinations, andmismanagement of the capitalists, nothing could suit the latter worsethan to be taken at their word and to have a commission appointed totake evidence on oath and to publicly inquire into the state ofaffairs; in fact to copy the Westminster inquiry. It isconceivable that the resolute refusal to investigate matters or tolisten to complaints or explanations which the President hadthroughout maintained may have been the means of preserving ablissful faith in the strength of his own case and the rottenness ofthe Uitlanders'; at any rate, it seems to be an undoubted fact thatthe Industrial Commission of Inquiry, which was appointed by theExecutive at the request of the President, was appointed in theconfident belief that it would shift the burden of responsibilityfrom his shoulders to those of the capitalists. This construction ofhis motives may appear to be severe and perhaps even unfair, but itis entirely borne out by the manner in which he dealt with the reportof the Industrial Commission, fighting against its acceptance, ignoring the recommendations of relief, and even imposing freshburdens. There is, nevertheless, one thing to be deduced which is ina manner to Mr. Kruger's credit, and that is that he really must havebelieved that the case would--from his point of view--bear inquiringinto. 

The members of the Commission with power to vote were Messrs. SchalkW. Burger, Member of the Executive Council (Chairman); J. S. Smit, Government Railway Commissioner; Christiaan Joubert, Minister ofMines; Schmitz-Dumont, Acting State Mining Engineer; and J. F. DeBeer, first special Judicial Commissioner, Johannesburg. Mr. Thos. Hugo, the General Manager of the National Bank, was appointedfinancial adviser, and certain advisory members were arbitrarilyselected by the Government. The complete exclusion of all those whohad had any direct or indirect association with the late Reformmovement or with those in any way connected with it strengthened theconviction that the Government designed the Commission to be awhitewashing one; but whatever the design may have been it would bedoing an injustice both to the Government officials and to theadvisory members to have it supposed that they were parties to suchan idea. They were not; they did their work admirably, and no inquirycould have been conducted in a better spirit. This, however, was notforeseen, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the Uitlanderswere induced to view the thing seriously and to realize that, nomatter how it had occurred, this was a supreme opportunity forproving to the world the soundness of their case. The report andproceedings are published by the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines in avolume containing over 700 pages of printed matter and a number ofdiagrams. The whole constitutes a damning indictment of theGovernment, as the following extracts from the report of theCommission testify:--

Your Commission are pleased to state that at present there exist allthe indications of an honest administration, and the State, as wellas the Mining Industry, must be congratulated upon the fact that mostof the mines are controlled and directed by financial and practicalmen who devote their time, energy, and knowledge to the miningindustry, and who have not only introduced the most up-to-datemachinery and mining appliances, but also the greatest perfection ofmethod and process known to science. But for these a good many of themines now producing gold would not have reached that stage. . . . 

To avoid such a calamity (viz. , the closing down of the mines) yourCommission are of opinion that it is the duty of the Government toco-operate with the mining industry, and to devise means in order tomake it possible for lower-grade mines to work at a profit, andgenerally to lighten the burdens of the mining industry. This and thedevelopment and equipment of the new mines are a few examples amongothers where it is desirable that the Government shall take an activepart, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that uptill now the mining industry must be held as the financial basis, support, and mainstay of the State. 

The question, therefore, becomes one of national economy, and it isincumbent upon the Government, considering the rapid growth andprogress of the country, to so alter its fiscal laws and systems ofadministration as to meet the requirements of its principalindustry. . . . 

Your Commission entirely disapprove of concessions, through which theindustrial prosperity of the country is hampered. Such might havebeen expedient in the past, but the country has now arrived at astate of development that will only admit of free competitionaccording to republican principles. This applies more especially tothe gold industry, which has to face its own economical problemswithout being further burdened with concessions that are irksome andinjurious to the industry and will always remain a source ofirritation and dissatisfaction. 

As to white labour:--

Your Commission are of opinion that wages are not excessive, regardbeing had to the high cost of living at the mines. In fact, they areonly sufficient to satisfy daily wants, and, consequently, it cannotbe expected that white labourers will establish their permanent abodein this Republic unless conditions are made by which their positionwill be ameliorated. . . . 

Your Commission are of opinion that as long as the cost of livingcannot be considerably reduced it will be almost impossible to reducethe wages of white labourers, and they would strongly recommend that, as far as possible, necessaries of life should be imported free ofduty and conveyed to the mines as cheaply as possible. 

As to the sale of liquor:--

It has been proved to your Commission that the Liquor Law is notcarried out properly, and that the mining industry has realgrievances in connection therewith, owing to the illicit sale ofstrong drink to the natives at the mines, and they wish especiallyand strongly to insist that the stipulations of article 16 of the lawshall be strictly enforced. The evidence given on this point provesthat a miserable state of affairs exists, and a much strongerapplication of the law is required. 

Following this there is a long criticism with recommendations indetail. 

As to import duties:--

With reference to this matter, your Commission can only recommendthat, if possible, foodstuffs ought to be entirely free fromtaxation, as at the present moment it is impossible to supply thepopulation of the Republic from the products of local agriculture andconsequently importation is absolutely necessary. 

As to explosives:--

Before entering on this subject, we wish to put on record ourdisappointment with the evidence tendered on behalf of the SouthAfrican Explosives Company, Ltd. We expected, and we think notunreasonably, that they would be able to give reliable informationfor our guidance respecting the cost of importation, as well as oflocal manufacture, of the principal explosives used for miningpurposes; but, though persistently questioned on these points, fewfacts were elicited and we regret to say that they entirely failed tosatisfy us in this important respect. . . . 

That the principal explosives used here can be purchased in Europe, and delivered here at a price far below the present cost to themines, has been proved to us by the evidence of many witnessescompetent to speak on the subject, and when we bear in mind that theexcess charge of 40s. To 45s. Per case does not benefit the State, but serves to enrich individuals for the most part resident inEurope, the injustice of such a tax on the staple industry becomesmore apparent and demands immediate removal. 

After showing that the dynamite monopolists make a profit of 47s. 6d. Per case on No. 1 dynamite, and 55s. On blasting gelatine, over andabove the price at which the mines could buy explosives if there wereno monopoly or protection, the report goes on:--

The Mining Industry has thus to bear a burden which does not enrichthe State or bring any benefit in return, and this fact must alwaysprove a source of irritation and annoyance to those who, whilewilling to contribute to just taxation for the general good, cannotacquiesce in an impost of the nature complained of. . . . 

Your Commission inspected the factory at Modderfontein, and it mustbe admitted that the construction of the works and general equipmentare in many respects admirable, and it appears to us greatly to beregretted that so much money should have been invested in anundertaking for the manufacture of any article whereof theingredients have to be imported at a great cost, four tons of rawmaterial being required to produce one ton of the manufacturedarticle. 

It has been proved to our satisfaction that none of the raw materialused is found in this country, or only in such small quantities as tomake it practically valueless for the purpose required. . . . All thesedrawbacks, which make it almost impossible to establish a bonâ-fideindustry, fall on the mines and render their task, especially that ofthe low-grade mines, extremely difficult and discouraging. Anotherpoint that has been brought to the notice of your Commission is theprejudicial effect exercised by this monopoly in practicallyexcluding from the country all new inventions in connection withexplosives, and, in view of the numerous dynamite accidents that havetaken place from time to time, it is to be regretted that it is notpossible to make satisfactory trials of other and less dangerousexplosives for the working of the mines. These questions havereceived the careful consideration of your Commission, who are forcedto the conclusion that the factory has not attained the object forwhich it was established, and that there is no reasonable prospect ofit doing so. Further, that there are good grounds for believing thatthe contractors have failed to comply with the conditions of theircontract. 

For the aforesaid reasons, and in view of the opinion expressed bythe Volksraad Dynamite Commission, that the legal position of theGovernment against the contractors is undoubtedly strong, yourCommission desire to recommend that the case be placed in the handsof the legal advisers of the State, with a view to ascertainingwhether the contract cannot be cancelled. 

Meanwhile your Commission recommend that the Government avail itselfforthwith of its right under Article 15 of the Regulations, to takeaway the agency of trading in gunpowder, dynamite, cartridges, andother explosives from the above-mentioned persons and at once takeinto its own hands the importation of dynamite and other explosivesfor the benefit of the mining industry, subject to a duty of not morethan 20s. Per case or such other less sum as may be determined fromtime to time. 

This protective duty, while considerably increasing the revenue ofthe State, will at the same time offer ample protection to anyindustry of this description in the Republic. In the event ofcancellation being advised to be possible, free trade in explosivesto be at once established, subject to a duty of 20s. Per case or suchother less duty as may be determined upon from time to time, andmanufacturing of other explosives in the Republic to be allowed, andalso to be protected by the same import duty. . . . 

Your Commission desire further to observe that it is not clear tothem, judging from the published accounts of the South AfricanExplosives Company for 1895 and 1896, that the Government receivesthe proportion of surplus profit secured to it under the contract, viz. , 20 per cent. , and would strongly recommend, in accordancewith Article 6 of the contract, an immediate investigation of theCompany's accounts by qualified accountants, in conjunction with thefinancial adviser of the Commission, in order to find out what amountis still due to the Government under this head. 

As to railways:--

Your Commission have followed with great attention and interest theevidence and statistics submitted on this point. From those itappears that not only are the tariffs charged by the NetherlandsRailway Company such that by the reduction of the same the industrywould be considerably benefited, but that such a reduction wouldnecessitate that the neighbouring States and Colonies would also haveto reduce their tariffs considerably. 

Your Commission have come to the conclusion that, taking intoconsideration the evidence submitted to them, and taking the grossrevenue of traffic of goods at about £2, 000, 000 (as in 1896) it wouldbe desirable to recommend so to regulate the tariff that the grossrevenue for 1896 would have been reduced by £500, 000, equivalent toan average reduction of 25 per cent. Further, your Commission deem itdesirable that the Government shall make such arrangement as willsecure to them in the future a voice in the fixing of the tariffs ofthe N. Z. A. S. M. , and express their confidence that as soon asprosperous times will warrant such a course a further reduction intariffs will be effected. Your Commission wish to recommend that thereduction will be chiefly applied to traffic of coal, timber, miningmachinery, and foodstuffs, according to a scale to be agreed uponbetween the Government and the N. Z. A. S. M. Your Commission are ofopinion that in this manner the industry will be met in a very fairway. Your Commission wish to express the opinion that it isabsolutely necessary that the reduction in all local tariffs will bebrought about as speedily as possible, while they express the hopethat where the co-operation of the neighbouring States and Coloniesis required, negotiations will be initiated and carried out sospeedily that the reductions to be so initiated will come into forcenot later than 1st January next. Several witnesses and some of theCommission have urged the expropriation of the N. Z. A. S. M. By theGovernment. Your Commission, however, for several reasons known tothem, and after same have been communicated to those members of theCommission who wished to urge the expropriation of the N. Z. A. S. M. , donot at the present moment desire to urge expropriation provided bythe other means terms can be secured from the Company so as to obtainthe reduction at present urgently required on the basis as above setforth. Your Commission have been informed that the Company haveproposed to adopt the dividends of the three years 1895, 1896, and1897 as a basis for the expropriation price, and your Commission canagree to such proposal. The expropriation price being thus fixed, theCompany will have all the more reason to co-operate towards thelowering of the tariffs. Further, it appears from the evidence of themanaging director of the N. Z. A. S. M. , that in consideration of thereduction of tariffs, he wished to have secured to the Company acertain period of existence. Your Commission cannot recommend thiscourse, because they do not deem the same to be in the interests ofthe State, and it would be contrary to the wishes of the public. 

As to gold thefts:--

According to the evidence submitted to your Commission, gold theftsare on the increase, and although the Volksraad has given the mattertheir favourable consideration, and have, at the instance of theMining Industry, so amended the Gold Law as to provide for thepunishment of the sale and being in possession of raw gold, still ithas been stated to your Commission in evidence, that the gold theftsamount to about 10 per cent. Of the output, equivalent to an amountof £750, 000 per annum. It follows that the administration of the lawmust be faulty, because there are only very few instances where thecrime has been detected and punished. If those figures are notexaggerated, and your Commission have no reason to suppose so, thenthis matter deserves the serious consideration of the Government. Thesuppression of this crime can be considered as a real saving to theindustry, and this amount of three-quarters of a million would, especially in times of depression, exercise a large influence on theyield and financial position of the mines. The industry ask that thepenal clauses regarding this matter shall be eliminated from the GoldLaw, and that a separate law be passed, more or less on the basis ofthe I. D. B. Law of Kimberley, Cape Colony, and that measures shall betaken by which the injured parties shall be enabled to exercisecontrol, and have supervision over any department to be establishedfor the detection and suppression of thefts of new gold. YourCommission are of opinion that the Government could grant thisrequest without injuring their dignity, on the basis hereinaftermentioned. On the contrary, it would remove the blame from thepresent administration, viz. , that these thefts can be practicallycarried on with impunity. 

As to the Local Board:--

The evidence which has been laid before your Commission has containedsuggestions to establish a Board on which Government nominees andrepresentatives of the mining industry and of the commercialcommunity of the Witwatersrand should sit, so that the Governmentrepresentatives should have the benefit of the experience of menwhose daily occupation it is to look closely into all the affairsappertaining to the mines, &c. Your Commission is of opinion that itis advisable that these suggestions should be acted upon. The scopeof this Board should consist of the supervision of the administrationof the following laws, viz. :--

The Liquor Law as far as it concerns the proclaimed goldfields, thePass Law, and the Law relating to Gold Thefts; and the Board willfurther have an advisory voice in the supply of natives to the mines, which your Commission has recommended your Government to take intoits own hands. The area under the surveillance of the Board shouldinclude the Heidelberg, Witwatersrand, and Klerksdorp districts, andother goldfields as may be found desirable hereafter. Your Commissionsuggests that the Board consists of the following: Five members to beappointed by the Government, and four delegates to be appointed bythe following bodies, with the consent of the Government, viz. , onedelegate of the Chamber of Mines, one of the Association of Mines (orin case of an amalgamation, two representatives of the new Chamber), a nominee of the Mine Managers' Association, and a nominee of thecommercial community of Johannesburg. Your Commission would advisethat a separate detective force be placed under the department, whoseduty it should be to detect any infringements of the above-mentionedlaws, and to bring the offenders to justice in the ordinary course oflaw. It should also be in the sphere of the Board's work to report tothe proper authorities any laxity on the part of the officials whohave to administer the above-mentioned laws. The Board is to reportto the Executive Council upon the working of the laws referred to, and to suggest alterations. It must be well understood that the powerof this Board must in no way clash with the sphere of the Minister ofthe Mines department and the Licensing Board, but co-operate with thesame. We should adduce as a reason the more for the creation of sucha Board that Government could depute to them the right to receivedeputations, hear their arguments, and report to the Government onthe subject, whereby a great saving of time would be the result. Wewould recommend that the Commission be appointed at once, and thatthey shall frame their proposals for regulations and submit them atonce to the Government. 

The establishment of a local mining board has been strongly urged bywitnesses. From an industrial and financial point of view thiscountry must be considered as still in its infancy, and, without lossof dignity or prestige, the Government may accede to the aboverequest. Experience in these matters can only be attained after thelapse of long years, and by coming in contact with experts from othercountries the State will reap the benefit of the knowledge obtainedin their country, where these problems have for decades exercised theminds of their leading citizens. 

In conclusion, your Commission fervently hope that they have trulyand faithfully interpreted the object of the inquiry, and that theirsuggestions and recommendations, if acted upon, will confer a lastingbenefit on the country and people. 

The evidence, as has been stated, was all given on oath, and somevery interesting details came out. In one case Dr. Leyds's system ofmisrepresentation was exposed. Whilst the Commission was actuallytaking evidence the then State Secretary in an interview with theParis _Temps_ strongly supported the dynamite monopoly, and statedthat the price charged, namely, 90s. Per case, was the same at whichthe Chamber of Mines had offered to enter into a sixteen years'contract with Nobel's factory. A witness questioned on this pointexplained that this was quite true as regards price, but that Dr. Leyds had suppressed the essential fact that whereas out of the 90s. Paid to the monopolists the Government only receive 5s. By way ofduty, they would out of the 90s. Which it was proposed to pay forNobel's dynamite receive no less than 38s. Per case as duty, and thatif the contract proposed by the Chamber had been made the Governmentwould have profited during the previous four years to the extent of£1, 200, 000 instead of £150, 000. Upon another occasion light wasthrown on dark places in a rather disconcerting fashion. Mr. Christiaan Joubert, Minister of Mines, took one of the witnesses inhand with the object of showing that the people of Johannesburg hadonly themselves to thank for the loss of confidence in this business. The following questions and answers are from the official report:--

Should not the Chamber of Mines co-operate with the Department ofMines to get a law protecting European shareholders from beingdefrauded by swindlers?--I don't know if such a law could be framedwithout interfering with what, in other countries, is considered tobe personal liberty. You have to come to the point whether the manintended to swindle, and that can only be settled by the Court, as amatter of personal judgment. If a good law could be devised it wouldbe beneficial. 

Is there no possibility for the Chamber of Mines to work with theDepartment for the passing of such a law?--I don't know if laws existin France, Germany, England, or America, to that specific effect; butif so, I would be guided by the wisdom and immense experience of thelaw makers of those countries, otherwise we might be rushing in whereangels fear to tread. 

Is it then possible? Are you willing to discuss the matter withus?--Oh, yes; but I do not think that that is exactly what is wantedin order to restore confidence. Lots of things combine to shake theconfidence of investors. For instance, to deal with some small andhomely matters, I was told by a member of the Sanitary Boardyesterday that an application for the underground rights of theMarket Square, had been made by Mr. Jan Meyer, a leading member ofthe Volksraad. That does not help to restore confidence. The SanitaryBoard applied for a portion of the Telephone Tower Park in order toerect a Town Hall. They were refused. Now, some one has made anapplication for the right to erect swimming baths. That does notrestore confidence. I hope the mere publication of these things willprevent them from succeeding. The Sanitary Board applied for theUnion Ground, also for public purposes, but it was granted to privateapplicants on the quiet. They have hawked it about and borrowed moneyon it. It was offered to many of the big capitalists here, but theywould not touch it. The Sanitary Board are told that a building is tobe put up, in which fifty rooms will be set aside for them, but theyare not satisfied that the authorities should do good by stealth andblush to find it fame. 

I cannot understand how mere applications can shakeconfidence?--Well, they do, because they are only made when there isa chance of their being granted. But, if you want facts, I will tellyou what shook the investor's confidence as much as anything that hashappened for years--that was the Ferreira claim-jumping raid, whichit was sworn to in Court had been suggested by you yourself, Mr. Joubert. 

Not 'suggested' by me--

The Chairman said the witness was straying away from the originalquestion. 

Witness said that the Minister of Mines had wanted examples of whatshook confidence, so he was obliged to give them. 

The report of the Commission created a very favourable impression. The majority of people believed that although it might not beentirely acted upon, yet it would be quite impossible for thePresident and the Volksraad to disregard suggestions made by soinfluential a group of officials as those forming the Commission, andthat at any rate most of the recommendations would be accepted. Theunbelieving few who knew their President Kruger, however, waited forsomething to be _done_. Presently ominous rumours went round aboutdifferences in the Executive. Then came the scenes in the Volksraad, when the President revealed himself and charged Mr. Schalk Burgerwith being a traitor to his country for having signed such a report, followed by the usual fight and the usual victory for the President, and the usual Committee constituted mainly of extreme Conservativesappointed to report upon the other Commission's report; and then theusual result: Something for nothing. The Netherlands Railway made aninconsiderable reduction in rates, which it appears was designed tobuy off, and did succeed in buying off, further scrutiny of itsaffairs. With regard to the two big monopolies, Dynamite and Railway, it appears that the Volksraad Commission accepted the privateassurances of the monopolists as sufficient warrant for reversing theconclusions of the Industrial Commission. The proposed Local Boardfor the goldfields was promptly ruled out as an unthinkableproposition, a government within a government, and was so denouncedby the President himself. But the report of the VolksraadCommittee contained one supreme stroke of humour. It adopted therecommendations of the Industrial Commission to remit the duties uponcertain articles of consumption so as to make living cheaper, but asa condition it stipulated that in order that the State revenue shouldnot suffer, the duty upon other articles of consumption should beincreased so as to rather more than counterbalance the loss. That wasone result which the Uitlanders had in the beginning confidentlyexpected: Something for nothing. But the other result upon which theyhad also calculated was a valuable one. They had put their case onrecord and for the future the task of justifying the Uitlanders'cause was to be reduced to the formality of pointing to theIndustrial Commission's report. 

The third event of importance, and an event of much greaterimportance than has generally been recognised, was the Queen's RecordReign celebration in Johannesburg. 'Britons, hold up your heads !'was the watchword with which the late Mr. W. Y. Campbell started toorganize what he eventually carried out as the biggest and mostenthusiastic demonstration ever made in the country. No moreunselfish and loyal subject of her Majesty ever set foot in SouthAfrica than Mr. Campbell, whose organization and example to 'RandBritons, ' as he called them, did more to hearten up British subjectsin the Transvaal than has ever been fully realized or properlyacknowledged. The celebration was an immense success in itself, andbesides restoring the hopes and spirits of British subjects itpromoted generally a better feeling and a disposition to forget pastdifferences. 

One of the consequences of the Raid and Reform had been a split inthe Chamber of Mines caused by the secession of a minority who heldviews strongly opposed to those of the Reform party. It has alwaysbeen the policy of the Government to endeavour to divide the Randcommunity. This is no vague general charge: many instances can begiven extending over a number of years. The accidental revelations ina police court showed that in 1891 the Government were supportingfrom the Secret Service Funds certain individuals with the object ofarranging labour unions to coerce employers upon various points. Themovement was a hopeless failure because the working men declined tohave anything to do with the so-called leaders. When the split tookplace in the Chamber of Mines, it became the business of Dr. Leydsand the President to keep the rift open. This was done persistentlyand in a very open manner--the seceders being informed upon severaloccasions that a fusion of the two Chambers would not be welcome tothe Government. Both before and since that time the same policy hasfound expression in the misleading statement made on behalf of theGovernment upon the compound question (namely, that the companieswere aiming at compounding all the natives and monopolizing allthe trade of the Rand), a statement made to divide the mercantilefrom the mining community. The fostering of the liquor industry withits thousands of disreputable hangers-on is another example; theanti-capitalist campaign carried on by the Government press another. And the most flagrant of all of course is the incitement to racehatred. _Divide et impera_, is a principle which they apply withunfailing regularity whether in their relations with other countries, in the government of their own State, or in their dealings withprivate individuals. Happily for the Rand community the effort tosettle their internal differences was successful; towards the end of1897 the fusion of the two mining chambers took place, and theunanimity thus restored has not since been disturbed. 

By this time even the most enthusiastic and sanguine friends of theGovernment had to some extent realized the meaning of the 'somethingfor nothing' policy. They began to take count of all that they haddone to please Mr. Kruger, and were endeavouring to find out whatthey had got in return. The result, as they were disposed to admit, was that for all the good it had done them they might as well havehad the satisfaction of speaking their minds frankly as the othershad done. The Raad's treatment of the Industrial Commission reporthad estranged all those who had taken part in the deliberations ofthe Commission, and as Mr. Kruger had been careful to select onlythose whom he believed to be friendly to him he suffered more in therecoil than he would otherwise have done. He fell into the pit whichhe had himself dug. 

Mr. Kruger was fast losing his friends, and another affair whichoccurred about this time helped to open the eyes of those who stillwished to view him in a favourable light. Mr. Chamberlain in thecourse of some remarks had stated that the President had failed tofulfil the promises which he had made at the time of the Raid. HisHonour took an early opportunity to denounce Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. J. B. Robinson and the manager of the then Government newspaper inPretoria. 'I would like Mr. Chamberlain to quote, ' he said, 'anyinstances of my failure to keep my promises, and I will know how toanswer him. ' The challenge was published and Mr. Chamberlainpromptly cabled instructions to the British Agent to ask PresidentKruger whether he had said this and if so whether he really diddesire a statement by Mr. Chamberlain of the character indicated. Mr. Kruger took his own peculiar way out of the dilemma; he repudiatedthe intermediaries, denounced the statement as untrue, and saidthat he was not in the habit of conveying his requests throughirresponsible nobodies. The result was the immediate resignation ofthe newspaper man and final rupture between the President and Mr. Robinson. Thus were two more thick-and-thin supporters cast off atconvenience and without an instant's hesitation, and thus wereprovided two more witnesses to the 'something for nothing' policy. This incident was the immediate cause of the fusion of the Chambers. 

It had all along been realized that while Lord Rosmead continued toact as High Commissioner in South Africa there would be nopossibility of the Uitlanders' grievances being again taken up by herMajesty's Government. The High Commissioner had committed himself tothe opinion that it would be unsuitable and indeed improper to makeany representations on the subject for a considerable time. Moreover, his age and ill-health rendered him unfit for so arduous a task. Manyhard things have been said and written about the late HighCommissioner, but it must be admitted that with age and infirmityweighing him down he was confronted by one of the most desperateemergencies which have ever arisen to try the nerve of a proconsul. It is true that the responsibilities of Government are not to be metby excuses: the supports of the Empire must stand the strain or becondemned. But it is also true that those who regard themselves asvictims may not lightly assume the functions of independent judges:and thus it was that in a mood of sympathy and regret, with perhapssome tinge of remorse, the news of Lord Rosmead's death was acceptedas evidence unanswerable of the burden which in the autumn of hisdays he was called upon to bear. 

When the name of Sir Alfred Milner was mentioned as the coming HighCommissioner all South Africa stood to attention. Seldom surely has arepresentative of the Queen been put through such an ordeal ofexamination and inquiry as that to which Sir Alfred Milner's recordwas subjected by the people of South Africa. Not one man in athousand had heard his name before; it was as some one coming out ofthe great unknown. The first feeling was that another experiment wasbeing made at the expense of South Africa; but almost before thethought had formed itself came the testimony of one and another andanother, representing all parties and all opinions in England; andthe Uitlanders in the Transvaal began to hope and finally to believethat at last they were to have a man to deal with who would exhibitthose qualities of intelligence, fairness, and firmness, which theyregarded as the essentials. Every word that was said or written aboutthe new High Commissioner was read and studied in South Africa. Everyreference made to him by the representatives of the various politicalparties was weighed and scrutinized, and the verdict was that it wasgood! Fair firm and able. There had not been a discordant note nor avoice lacking in the chorus which greeted the appointment; and thejudgment was, 'They have given one of England's very best. '

The impression had somehow gained ground in South Africa that thefirst act of Sir Alfred Milner would be to visit the Transvaal andendeavour to arrange matters. The hearts of the Uitlanders sank atthe thought of even the ablest and best-intentioned of men tacklingso complicated a problem without any opportunity of studying thelocal conditions and the details. It was therefore with undisguisedsatisfaction that they received the new High Commissioner's assurancethat as the representative of her Majesty he had plenty of workbefore him in visiting and making himself acquainted with theconditions and requirements of her Majesty's dominions in SouthAfrica, the people of which had the first call upon his services. Thestatement cleared the political atmosphere and had a distinctlycooling effect upon the overheated brain of the Boer party, who hadby this time convinced themselves that Pretoria was firmlyestablished as the hub of the universe and that an expectant worldwas waiting breathlessly to know what President Kruger would do next. 

Mr. Conyngham Greene, an experienced member of the Diplomatic Corps, who had been appointed towards the end of 1896 to succeed Sir Jacobusde Wet as British Agent in Pretoria, had by this time gained someexperience of the ways of Pretoria. Probably few servants of theCrown have been called upon to perform a service more exacting orless grateful than that which fell to the British Agent during theperiod in which Mr. Conyngham Greene has held the post. Consciousthat his Government was prevented by the acts of others fromvindicating its own position, hampered by the knowledge of immensesuperiority of strength, dealing with people who advanced at everyturn and under every circumstance their one grievance as ajustification for all the acts of hostility which had preceded thatgrievance or had been deliberately perpetrated since, he wascompelled to suffer snubs and annoyances on behalf of his Government, with no relief but such as he could find in the office of recordingthem. A good deal had been done by Mr. Conyngham Greene to establishvisible and tangible evidence of the desire of her Majesty'sGovernment to interest themselves in the condition of Britishsubjects and--as far as the exigencies of a very peculiar case wouldfor the time permit--to protect them from at least the moreoutrageous acts of injustice; but the strength of the chain is thestrength of the weakest link, and it was always felt that until thelink in Cape Town was strengthened there was not much reliance to beplaced upon the chain. 

Very frequently surprise has been expressed that, after the fortunateescape from a very bad position which the Jameson Raid afforded toPresident Kruger's party, the Boers should not have learned wisdomand have voluntarily undertaken the task of putting their house inorder. But having in mind the Boer character is it not more naturalto suppose that, inflated and misled by a misconceived sense ofsuccess and strength, they should rather persist in and exaggeratethe ways which they had formerly affected? So at least the Uitlandersthought and predicted, and their apprehensions were amply justified. In each successive year the Raad has been relied upon to better itsprevious best, to produce something more glaring and sensational inthe way of improper laws and scandalous measures or revelationsthan anything which it had before done. One would imagine that itwould pass the wit of man to devise a means of exploiting theUitlanders which had not already been tried, but it would trulyappear that the First Volksraad may be confidently relied upon todo it. 

In the year 1897 some things were exposed which appeared, even to theUitlanders, absolutely incredible. What is now known as the 'donkeysand mealies scandal' was one of them. For the ostensible purpose ofhelping burghers who had been ruined by the rinderpest the Presidentarranged for the purchase of large numbers of donkeys to be usedinstead of oxen for draught purposes, and he also arranged for theimportation of quantities of mealies to be distributed among thosewho were supposed to be starving. Inquiries instituted by order ofthe Volksraad revealed the fact that Volksraad members and Governmentofficials were interested in these contracts. The notorious Mr. Barend Vorster, who had bribed Volksraad members with gold watches, money, and spiders, in order to secure the Selati Railway Concession, and who although denounced as a thief in the Volksraad itselfdeclined to take action to clear himself and was defended by thePresident, again played a prominent part. This gentleman and hispartners contracted with the Government to supply donkeys at acertain figure apiece, the Government taking all risk of loss fromthe date of purchase. The donkeys were purchased in Ireland and inSouth America at one-sixth of the contract price. The contractorsalleged that they had not sufficient means of their own and receivedan advance equal to three-quarters of the total amount payable tothem; that is to say for every £100 which they had to expend theyreceived £450 as an unsecured advance against their profits. It isbelieved that not 10 per cent. Of the animals were ever delivered tothe farmers for whom they were ostensibly bought. An attempt was madein the Volksraad to have the matter thoroughly investigated and tohave action taken against the contractors, but the affair was hushedup and, as far as it is possible to ascertain, every penny payableunder the contract has been paid and lost. 

In the matter of the mealies (maize, the ordinary native food), large quantities were bought in South America. It was alleged inthe Volksraad that the amount was far more than was necessary andthat the quality was inferior, the result being that the Governmentwere swindled and that the State, being obliged to sell what itdid not require, was entering unfairly into competition with themerchants and producers in the country. But the real character ofthis mealie swindle can only be appreciated when it is known how thecontract originated. The contractors having bargained to deliverdonkeys, approached the President with the explanation that donkeysbeing live-stock, would have to be accommodated upon an upper deckwhere there was ample ventilation; the result of which, they said, would be that the ship would be top-heavy and would be obliged totake in ballast. Surely, it was argued, it would be folly to carryworthless ballast when good mealies, which were in any case badlyneeded in the country, would serve the purpose of ballasting equallywell and would, of course, show a very large profit. A contract formealies was therefore entered into. When the inquiry was institutedin the Volksraad certain awkward facts came to light, and it devolvedupon Mr. Barend Vorster to explain how it happened that the mealie'ballast' arrived and was paid for before the donkeys were shipped. That worthy gentleman may still be thinking out the explanation, butas the money has been paid it cannot be a cause of great anxiety. 

In order to preserve a true perspective the reader should realizethat the President defended both these affairs and that the exposurestook place while the recommendations of the Industrial Commissionwere being discussed in the Raad and fiercely combated by thePresident himself. 

The matter of the Selati Railway was again brought into prominence in1897. It is quite impossible as yet to get at all the facts, but itis very generally believed that a swindle of unusual dimensions andaudacity remains to be exposed, and that a real exposure wouldunpleasantly involve some very prominent people. At any rate thefacts which became public in 1898 would warrant that suspicion. TheSelati Railway Company alleged that they had been unjustly deprivedof their rights, and the Government admitting repudiation ofcontract took refuge in the plea that in making the contract theyhad acted _ultra vires_. It was, in fact, an exemplary case of'thieves falling out' and when the case got into the law courts apoint of real interest to the public came out; for the Company'slawyers filed their pleadings! The following account of the case istaken from the newspapers of the time. The plea of the Selati RailwayCompany states that--

the Government was very desirous that the railways should be built, and that for the purpose the business should be taken in hand byinfluential capitalists, and that, having full knowledge of the sumsasked for by the original concessionaires they insisted upon the saidcapitalists coming to an agreement with the concessionaires andpaying them the amounts asked; that it was thus understood betweenthe said capitalists and the Government of the South African Republicthat the sum named in the concession as the price to be paid to theconcessionaires for the formation of the Company was whollyinsufficient under the altered conditions, and that further sums hadto be expended to cover not only the increased amount demanded by theoriginal concessionaires, but _also other sums of money which wereasked by and paid to different members of the Executive Council andVolksraad of the South African Republic and their relatives andfriends as the price for granting the concession. _

The matter came before the High Court, and several of the exceptionsput forward on behalf of the Government were sustained. Regarding theaccusation mentioned, Mr. Advocate Esselen, who was counsel for theState, excepted that names and particulars should be inserted, andalso that the State was not bound by the action of the Government orExecutive. He quoted the Volksraad resolution or _besluit_ upon whichthe concession was granted, showing that £10, 000 was mentioned as thesum to be received by the concessionaires, and then proceeded:--

'Now, I say that the Government could not contract with the Companyat a higher figure than is above set forth. The measure of authoritygranted to the Government is set forth in the Volksraad _besluit_which I have read, and the Government could not exceed its authority. Second, the defendant Company makes allegations which are tantamountto fraudulent dealing on the part of the agents of the State. But itwill be said that it is the State which sues, and that it cannot beheard to avail itself of the wrongful acts of its agents. In thismatter, however, it is the State Secretary who sues on behalf of theState. The State is not bound in any event by the acts of individualmembers of the Government. It was the Government which was entrustedwith a power of attorney on behalf of the State. '

This doctrine, so fatal to concessionaires and their methods, led tothe following interesting colloquy:--

Mr. Justice JORISSEN: Do you persist in this exception, Mr. Esselen?

Mr. ESSELEN: Certainly I do. 

Mr. Justice JORISSEN: You have been very fortunate in succeedingon two exceptions. Without pressing you in the least, I am inclinedto suggest that you withdraw this exception. 

Mr. ESSELEN: I cannot possibly withdraw it, but I am willing to allowit to stand as a special plea and to argue it at a later stage. 

Mr. Justice JORISSEN: As I said, I don't wish to press you, but itseems to me that this is a very dangerous question. 

Mr. ESSELEN: It is a very important question. 

Mr. Justice JORISSEN: It is not only an important but a perilousquestion. 

In an amended plea filed by the Selati Railway Company they give thenames of persons to whom the Company had to pay certain sums of moneyor give presents--in other words, bribes--in order to obtain theSelati contract. The following are the names filed by Baron EugeneOppenheim:--To W. E. Bok, then member and minute keeper of theExecutive Council, on August 12, 1890, in cash £50; the late N. J. Smit, sen. , then Vice-president of the South African Republic, andmember of the Executive Council, on August 12, 1890, in cash, £500;F. C. Eloff, son-in-law of the President and then Private Secretary tohis Honour, on August 12, £50 in cash. By De Jongh and Stegmann, onbehalf of Baron Oppenheim, to C. Van Boeschoten, then Secretary ofthe Volksraad, on October 6, 1893, in cash, £100. By B. J. Vorster, jun. , one of the concessionaires, on behalf of Eugene Oppenheim, onor about August, 1890, the following: To Jan du Plessis de Beer, member of the Volksraad for Waterberg, £100; Schalk W. Burger, memberof the Volksraad for Lydenburg, now member of the Executive Council, £100; P. L. Bezuidenhout, member of the Volksraad for Potchefstroom, £100; J. Van der Merwe, member of the Volksraad for Lydenburg, £100;A. A. Stoop, member of the Volksraad for Wakkerstroom, £50; F. G. H. Wolmarans, member of the Volksraad for Rustenburg, £50; J. M. Malan, member of the Volksraad for Rustenburg, Chairman of the firstVolksraad, £50; N. M. S. Prinsloo, member of the Volksraad forPotchefstroom, £50; J. J. Spies, member of the Volksraad for Utrecht, £70; B. H. Klopper, Chairman of the Volksraad, £125; C. VanBoeschoten, Secretary of the Volksraad, £180. By J. N. De Jongh, onbehalf of Baron Eugene Oppenheim, about the end of 1892 or thebeginning of 1893, to the late N. J. Smit, sen. , then Vice-Presidentof the South African Republic, and member of the Executive Council, shares in the defendant Company to the value of £1, 000; F. C. Eloff, son-in-law of and then Private Secretary to the State President, shares in the defendant Company to the value of £2, 000; P. G. Mare, then member of the Volksraad for Utrecht, now Landdrost of Boksburg, shares in the defendant Company to the value of £500. By B. J. Vorster, jun. , on behalf of Baron Eugene Oppenheim, about July orAugust, 1890, to C. C. Van Heerden, member of the Volksraad forWakkerstroom, one spider; A. A. Stoop, member of the Volksraad forWakkerstroom, one spider; F. G. H. Wolmarans, member of the Volksraadfor Rustenburg, one spider; B. W. J. Steenkamp, member of the Volksraadfor Piet Relief, one spider; J. P. L. Lombard, member of the Volksraadfor Standerton, one spider; H. F. Grobler, member of the Volksraadfor Middelburg, one spider; W. L. De la Rey, member of the Volksraadfor Bloemhof, one spider; D. W. Taljaard, member of the Volksraad forStanderton, one spider; J. C. Van Zyl, member of the Volksraad forHeidelburg, one spider; J. P. Botha, member of the Volksraad forPretoria, one spider; H. P. Beukes, member of the Volksraad forMarico, one spider; J. F. Van Staden, member of the Volksraad forVryheid, one spider; J. M. Malan, member of the Volksraad forRustenburg, one spider; N. M. S. Prinsloo, member of the Volksraad forPotchefstroom, one cart; T. C. Greyling, member of the Volksraad forHeidelberg, one cart. Total value, £1, 440. 

Twenty-one members of the First Volksraad out of twenty-five!The Vice-President! The son-in-law and Private Secretary of thePresident! The Secretary of the Volksraad and the Minute Keeperof the Executive!

The Volksraad, one would think, would be bound to take cognizance ofsuch a statement and to cause an investigation to be held. They didtake cognizance of it after the manner peculiar to them. But the lastthing in the world to be expected from them was an impartialinvestigation: nothing so foolish was ever contemplated. There weretoo many in it, and an investigation into the conduct of officialsand Raad members would be establishing a most inconvenient precedent. Some members contented themselves with a simple denial, othersscorned to take notice of such charges, and others tried to explainthem away. No opinion need be expressed upon the methods of theconcessionaires; nor does it matter whether the company, by itsneglect or default, had justified the act of the Government. Thepoint which is offered for consideration is that the indisputablefact of bribes having been taken wholesale was ignored, whilst thedisputed question of liability to cancellation was arbitrarilysettled by the Government in its own favour. 

The crop of scandals in 1897 was as the rolling snowball. It isunnecessary to refer to them all in detail. The Union Ground, one ofthe public squares of Johannesburg, was granted to a syndicate ofprivate individuals upon such terms that they were enabled to sellthe right, or portion of it, at once for £25, 000 in cash. TheMinister of Mines, in his official capacity, strongly recommended thetransaction, and was afterwards obliged to admit that he himself hadan interest in it. The Volksraad however refused to confirm it, andthe purchaser of the concession fell back upon the President forprotection. The latter advised him to remain quiet until thepresidential election, which was about to take place, should be over, and gave the assurance that then he would see that the grant wasconfirmed by the Raad. In the session of 1898 his Honour stronglysupported the proposal and it was duly carried. 

The Eloff location scandal was another which greatly disturbed eventhe Volksraad. Mr. Frickie Eloff is President Kruger's son-in-law andenjoys the unsavoury reputation of being interested in every swindlewhich is worth being in the Transvaal. A piece of ground lying to thenorth-west of Johannesburg close up to the town had originally beenproclaimed as a goldfield, but no reefs having been found there andthe ground not having been pegged, it was afterwards withdrawn fromproclamation. The Mining Commissioner of Johannesburg in the courseof his duties discovered some flaw in the second or withdrawingproclamation. He advised the head office in Pretoria of thisdiscovery and stated that it might be contended that thede-proclamation was invalid, and that great loss and inconveniencewould follow if the ground were pegged and the title upheld. Withintwenty-four hours the ground was pegged by Mr. Eloff, but it is notknown whence he derived the inspiration. His claim was stronglyopposed by the local officials. They reported that the ground wasknown to be of no value, and advised that as the cost of licenseswould be very considerable the obvious policy of the Government wouldbe--if the title could not be upset--to wait until Mr. Eloff shouldtire of paying licenses on valueless ground. The Government, however, decided otherwise: they converted Mr. Eloff's claims into residentialstands; that is to say, they made him a present of an immenselyvaluable piece of property and gave him title under which he couldcut it up into small plots and readily sell it. This action of theGovernment, however, required confirmation by the Raad. The mattercame before the Volksraad in due course and that body deliberatelyrevoked the decision of the Government and refused Mr. Eloff anytitle except what he could claim according to law. But Mr. Kruger isnot so easily beaten. He soon discovered that the piece of groundacquired by Mr. Eloff was exactly the piece which it was necessaryfor the Government to have for a coolie location, and without moreado the Government bought it from Mr. Eloff for £25, 000. 

The ingenuity of the Boer mind in getting the last possiblefraction of value out of any transaction, is well exemplified in thismatter. One would naturally conclude that a deal so profitable wouldsatisfy anybody. But not so! The piece of ground commands theapproach to many valuable private plots and residences, and it wassoon found that apart from intrinsic worth it might have ablackmailing value; thus towards the end of 1898, after the deal hadbeen completed, the owners of these residences and estates wereprivately approached with the information that the coolie location, consisting of shelters built of scraps of iron, paraffin tins, andold pieces of wood, was to be removed to this site (probably tofacilitate the transference of the present location site, which isalso very valuable, to some other favourite), but that if sufficientinducement were offered by landowners in the neighbourhood, thedecision would be reconsidered!

The grant of a Municipality to Johannesburg has often been quoted asan example of something done by Mr. Kruger in the interests of theUitlanders. The principal conditions of that grant are that allburghers of the State, whether they have property or not, shall beentitled to vote for the election of councillors; that each wardshall be represented by two councillors, one of whom must be aburgher; and that the chairman, or burgomaster, shall be appointed byGovernment and shall have the right of veto. The elections in atleast two of the wards are completely at the mercy of the police andof the poor Boers who have no interest whatever in the town. Theburghers in Johannesburg--police, Boers, and officials--who maynumber a couple of thousand, including the naturalized lot, havetherefore a permanent and considerable majority over the Uitlanders, who probably number over 40, 000 adult white males. 

The scope and value of this grant were made manifest when the nownotorious sewerage concession came under discussion. The Municipalityhad upon several occasions endeavoured to get the right to introducea scheme for the disposal of the sewage of the town, and had appliedfor authority to raise the necessary funds, but had been refused. Suddenly a concession was granted by the Government--they called it acontract--to Mr. Emmanuel Mendelssohn, the proprietor of the_Standard and Diggers News_, the Government organ in Johannesburg. He said that he got it for nothing--possibly a reward for loyalservices; but he also stated that he was not the sole owner. Thevalue of the grant was estimated by the concessionaire himself to beabout £1, 000, 000 sterling, and in the lately published proposalswhich he made to one of the big firms interested in the Transvaal heindicated how a profit of £100, 000 a year could be made out of it. The Town Council unanimously and vigorously protested; but theGovernment took no notice of their protest. They then decided toapply to the Court for an order restraining the Government frommaking this grant, on the ground that they had no power to alienate aright which belonged to the town itself. In order to make theapplication to Court it was necessary, in terms of the constitutionof the municipality, to obtain the signature of the Burgomaster. Thatofficial as representing the Government refused point blank toauthorize the council to dispute the Government's action in a Courtof Law, and the council were obliged to apply for an Order of Courtcompelling the Burgomaster to sign the documents necessary to enablethem to contest in the Courts of the country the validity of an actof the Government which was deemed to be infringement upon the rightsof the town. In the face of this the President capitulated for thetime being; but neither he nor the concessionaire makes any secret ofthe determination to find a _quid pro quo_. 

The year 1898 brought in its turn its full share of freshencroachments and exactions. The bare enumeration of the concessions, privileges, and contracts, proposed or agreed to, is sufficient toindicate what must be the condition of mind of one whose interestsare at stake under such a _régime_. Not all 'concessions, ''contracts, ' and 'protected factories' confer exclusive rights, butmany might easily in effect do so and all are infringements upon therights of the public. Here are some from the official list of1899;--Dynamite, Railways, Spirits, Iron, Sugar, Wool, Bricks, Earthenware, Paper, Candles, Soap, Calcium Carbide, Oil, Matches, Cocoa, Bottles, Jam, &c. 

A large loan had been constantly talked of throughout the year, butno one knew for what purpose it could be required. The Governmentvouchsafed no information at all but negotiations were carried onboth in Pretoria and in Europe. Month after month went by, but themillions were not forthcoming, and the Government believed oraffected to believe that their failure was due to a conspiracy amongthe capitalists, and in retaliation they directed and subsidised afierce anti-capitalist campaign in their press. The explanation offailure, which did not occur to them, may have been that investorsbelieved that the course pursued by the Transvaal Government mustinevitably lead to conflict with the paramount power, and they had nofaith and no assurance that in the event of such a conflict takingplace the British Government would take over loans which must havebeen contracted only for the purposes of war against England. 

The juggling with the dynamite question continued throughout theyear. The President had successfully defeated the aim of theVolksraad, and the investigation and reports which had been orderedby that body in 1897 to be made by lawyers and auditors, althoughduly handed into the Government, were suppressed by the President andnot permitted to be shown to the Raad. On the contrary, theastounding proposition was made that in return for a veryinconsiderable reduction in the cost of dynamite (half of which wasto be made up by the Government sacrificing its share of profits) anda possible further reduction of 5s. Per case under certainconditions, the monopoly should be renewed for a period of fifteenyears, all breaches in the past to be condoned, and cancellation onthe ground of breach of contract in the future to be impossible. Thisproposal, it was publicly notified, would be laid before the Raadduring the first session of 1899. The existence of the dynamitemonopoly was at this time costing the industry £600, 000 a year, andon every possible occasion it was represented to the Government that, if they really did need further revenue, in no way could it be moreeasily or more properly raised than by exercising their undoubtedright to cancel the monopoly and by imposing a duty of such amount asmight be deemed necessary upon imported dynamite. It was also pointedout that the proposed reduction in the cost of dynamite would offerno relief whatever since it was far more than counterbalanced by thetaxes upon mynpachts and profits which were then being imposed. 

During this year the Volksraad instructed the Government toenforce their right to collect 2-1/2 per cent. Of the grossproduction from mynpachts (mining leases). All mynpachts titlesgranted by the Government contained a clause giving the Governmentthis power, so that they were acting strictly within their legalrights; but the right had never before been exercised. For twelveyears investors had been allowed to frame their estimates of profitupon a certain basis, and suddenly without a day's warning thistax was sprung upon them. It was indisputably the right of theGovernment, but equally indisputably was it most unwise; both becauseof the manner in which it was done and because there was no necessitywhatever for the doing of it, as the revenue of the country wasalready greatly in excess of the legitimate requirements. Immediatelyfollowing this came a resolution to impose a tax of 5 per cent. Uponthe profits of all companies working mining ground other than thatcovered by mynpacht. The same objections applied to this tax with theadditional one, that no clause existed in the titles indicating thatit could be done and no warning had ever been given that it would bedone. The proposal was introduced one morning and adopted at once;the first notice to investors was the accomplished fact. Thesemeasures were particularly keenly resented in France and Germany. 

The grievance of hasty legislation was in these cases aggravated bythe evidence that the taxes were quite unnecessary. President Krugerstill fought against cancellation of the Dynamite Monopoly, by whichthe State revenue would have benefited to the extent of £600, 000 ayear, if he had accepted the proposal of the Uitlanders, to allowimportation of dynamite subject to a duty of £2 per case--a taxwhich represented the monopolists' profit, and would not thereforehave increased the cost of the article to the mines. He stillpersisted in squandering and misapplying the public funds. Hestill openly followed the policy of satisfying his burghers at theUitlanders' expense; but the burghers have a growing appetite, andnothing shows the headlong policy of 'squaring'--nothing betterillustrates the Uitlanders' grievance of reckless extravagance inadministration--than the list of fixed salaries as it has grown yearby year since the goldfields became a factor. 

 TRANSVAAL FIXED SALARIES. 

 £ s. D. 1886 51, 831 3 7 1887 99, 083 12 8 1888 164, 466 4 10 1889 249, 641 10 10 1890 324, 520 8 10 1891 332, 888 13 9 1892 323, 608 0 0 1893 361, 275 6 11 1894 419, 775 13 10 1895 570, 047 12 7 1896 813, 029 7 5 1897 996, 959 19 11 1898 1, 080, 382 3 0 1899 (Budget) 1, 216, 394 5 0

That is to say, the Salary List is now twenty-four times as great asit was when the Uitlanders began to come in in numbers. It amounts tonearly five times as much as the total revenue amounted to then. Itis now sufficient if equally distributed to pay £40 per head perannum to the total male Boer population. 

The liquor curse has grown to such dimensions and the illicit liquororganization has secured such a firm hold that even the stoutestchampions of law and order doubt at times whether it will ever bepossible to combat the evil. The facts of the case reflect moreunfavourably upon the President than perhaps any other single thing. These are the facts: The law prohibits the sale of liquor to natives;yet from a fifth to a third of the natives on the Rand are habituallydrunk. The fault rests with a corrupt and incompetent administration. That administration is in the hands of the President's relations andpersonal following. The remedy urged by the State Secretary, StateAttorney, some members of the Executive, the general public, and theunited petition of all the ministers of religion in the country, isto entrust the administration to the State Attorney's department andto maintain the existing law. In the face of this President Krugerhas fought hard to have the total prohibition law abolished and hassuccessfully maintained his nepotism--to apply no worse construction!In replying to a deputation of liquor dealers he denounced theexisting law as an 'immoral' one, because by restricting thesale of liquor it deprived a number of honest people of theirlivelihood--and President Kruger is a total abstainer!

The effect of this liquor trade is indescribable; the loss in moneyalthough enormous is a minor consideration compared with the crimescommitted and the accidents in the mines traceable to it; and theeffect upon the native character is simply appalling. 

Much could be said about this native question apart from the subjectof drink, for it is one which is very difficult of just appreciationby any but those who have had considerable experience of and personalcontact with the natives. It is one upon which there is a greatdivergence of views between the people of Europe and the people ofSouth Africa. South Africans believe that they view it from therational standpoint, they believe also that Europeans as a rule viewit more from the sentimental. The people who form their opinions fromthe writings and reports of missionaries only, or who have in theirmind's eye the picturesque savage in his war apparel as seen atEarl's Court, or the idealized native of the novelist, cannotpossibly understand the real native. The writer holds South Africanviews upon the native question, that is to say that the natives areto all intents and purposes a race of children, and should be treatedas such, with strict justice and absolute fidelity to promise, whether it be of punishment or reward: a simple consistent policywhich the native mind can grasp and will consequently respect. 

With this in mind it will, perhaps, be believed that the recital ofcertain instances of injustice is not made with the object ofappealing to sentimentalism, or of obliquely influencing opinionswhich might otherwise be unfavourable or indifferent. The casesquoted in this volume are those which have been decided by thecourts, or the evidence in support of them is given, and they arepresented because they are typical cases, and not, except in thematter of public exposure, isolated ones. The report of the case ofToeremetsjani, the native chieftainess, {48} is taken verbatim fromone of the newspapers of the time. The woman is the head of theSecocoeni tribe, whose successful resistance to the TransvaalGovernment was one of the alleged causes of the annexation. A gooddeal could be said about the ways of Native Commissioners in suchmatters. Much also could be said about the case of the BritishIndians and the effect upon the population of India which is producedby the coming and going of thousands of these annually between Indiaand the Transvaal, and their recital of the treatment to whichthey are subjected, their tales of appeals to the great BritishGovernment, and their account of the latter's inability to protectthem. Much also could be said of the Cape Boy question, butsufficient prominence has been given to these matters by thepublication of the official documents and the report of the inquiryinto Field-Cornet Lombaard's conduct, which was held at the instanceof the British Government. 

It is not suggested that if the Government in the Transvaal wereinfluenced by the vote of the white British subjects, or if it wereentirely dominated by such vote, any encouragement would be given tothe Indian hawkers and traders, or that there would be anydisposition whatever to give voting rights to coloured people of anykind, but it _is_ suggested that a more enlightened and a more justsystem of treatment would be adopted; and in any case it is to bepresumed that there would be no appeals to the British Government, involving exhibitions of impotency on the part of the Empire toprotect its subjects, followed by the deliberate repetition oftreatment which might become the subject of remonstrance. Theuntutored mind is not given to subtleties and sophistries; directcause and effect are as much as it can grasp. These it does grasp andfirmly hold, and the simple inferences are not to be removed by anyamount of argument or explanation, however plausible. There isscarcely an Uitlander in the Transvaal who would not view with dismaythe raising of the big question upon such grounds as the treatment ofthe natives, the Cape boys, or the Indians; and the fact that theTransvaal Government know this may account for much of theprovocation on these questions. It is nevertheless undeniable thatwhite British subjects in the Transvaal do suffer fresh humiliationand are substantially lowered in the eyes of the coloured races, because appeals are made on their behalf to the British Government, and those appeals are useless. The condition of affairs should bethat such appeals would be unnecessary, and would thereforebecome--in practice--impossible. Such a condition of affairs wouldobtain under a friendly and more enlightened government, and theonly security for the voluntary continuance of such conditions isthe enfranchisement of the Uitlander population. 

In the midst of all that was gloomy unfavourable and unpromisingthere came to the Uitlanders one bright ray of sunshine. Dr. Leydswho had been re-elected State Secretary on the understanding that hewould resign immediately in order to take up the post ofplenipotentiary in Europe, and whom the Boers with a growinganti-Hollander and pro-Afrikander feeling would no longer tolerate, relinquished his office. In his stead was appointed Mr. F. W. Reitzformerly President of the Free State, a kindly, honourable, andcultured gentleman, whose individual sympathies were naturally andstrongly progressive but who, unfortunately, has not proved himselfto be sufficiently strong to cope with President Kruger or to riseabove division upon race lines in critical times. Shortly afterwardsMr. Christiaan Joubert, the Minister of Mines, a man totally unfitfrom any point of view to hold any office of responsibility ordignity, was compelled by resolution of the Second Volksraad to handin his resignation. His place was filled by a Hollander official inthe Mining Department who commanded and still commands the confidenceand respect of all parties. The elevation of the Acting StateAttorney to the Bench left yet another highly responsible post openand the Government choice fell upon Mr. J. C. Smuts, an able andconscientious young barrister, and an earnest worker for reform. AnAfrikander by birth and educated in the Cape Colony, he had taken hishigher degrees with great distinction at Cambridge and had beencalled to the English Bar. 

But there came at the same time another appointment which was not sofavourably viewed. There was still another vacancy on the Bench, andit became known that, in accordance with the recommendation expressedby the Raad that all appointments should whenever possible be firstoffered to sons of the soil, _i. E. _, born Transvaalers, it wasintended to appoint to this judgeship a young man of twenty-fouryears of age lately called to the bar, the son of the ExecutiveMember Kock already referred to in this volume. The strongestobjection was made to this proposal by all parties, including thefriends of the Government; the most prominent of all objectors weresome of the leading members of the bar who, it was believed, carriedinfluence and were in sympathy with the Government. A delay tookplace and it was at one time believed that President Kruger hadabandoned his intention, but it is understood that pressure wasbrought to bear upon the President by a considerable party of hisfollowers, and in the course of a few days the appointment was dulygazetted. 

The selection of educated and intelligent Afrikanders, sincerelydesirous of purifying the administration, for such responsibleoffices as those of State Secretary and State Attorney, wasgratefully welcomed by the Uitlander community, who believed thatonly through the influence of such men consistently and determinedlyexerted could a peaceful solution of many difficult questions befound. It is but bare justice to these gentlemen to state that neverwere they found wanting in good intention or honest endeavour, readyat all times to inquire into subjects of complaint, anxious at alltimes to redress any legitimate grievances. To them and to many otherless prominent but no less worthy officials of the Transvaal CivilService, whom it is impossible to name and to whom it might prove tobe no good turn if they were named, is due an expression of regretthat they may perhaps suffer by references which are not directedagainst them but which are justified by a rotten system and arecalled for by the action of others over whom these men have nocontrol. Nobody but one intimately concerned in Transvaal affairs canappreciate the unpleasant and undeserved lot of the honest officialwho necessarily, but most unjustly, suffers by association with thosewho deserve all that can be said against them. 

It is very well known that the gentlemen above referred to would, ifit were in their power, readily accord the terms asked for in thefranchise memorandum recently submitted by the Uitlanders, but theyare unfortunately entirely without influence over the President andhis party. It is true that--although British subjects bybirth--they have chosen to associate themselves with the TransvaalGovernment and are now uncompromising republicans; but there is nofault to be found with that. It may be true also that they aspire torepublicanize the whole of South Africa, and free it of the Imperialinfluence; that would be a cause of enmity as between them and thosewho desire to preserve the Imperial connection, but it is no groundfor reproach. There is one point, however, upon which they in commonwith nearly all the enlightened Afrikanders throughout South Africamay be adjudged to have fallen short in their duty; it is this, thatwhilst nine times out of ten they divide upon sound principles, theywill not follow that policy to a conclusion; for upon the tenthoccasion they will subordinate principle and, at the call of one whomay use it unscrupulously, will rally upon race lines alone. It isonly too true of only too many that they cannot be got to see that ifthey would really divide upon principles all danger of conflict woulddisappear and the solution would be both speedy and peaceful; for itis the division upon race lines that alone raises the distractingprospect of war. 

For those who are in this position in the Transvaal it may be allowedthat their difficulties are great. They cannot, it is true, complainof lack of warning. They did not, it is also true, after trying theirinfluence and finding it of no avail, cut adrift when they might havedone so, and by their example have so stripped the reactionaries ofall support that there could now be no question of their standingout; but they may have honestly believed that they would in timesucceed, whilst the Uitlanders, judging from a long and bitterexperience, felt that they would not and could not. They may say thatthis is no time to part from those with whom they associatedthemselves in times of peace. Such reasoning may provide an excuse inthe Transvaal, but no such plea will avail for those without theTransvaal who have let the day of opportunity go past, and who cryout their frightened protest now that the night of disaster is uponus. 

Footnotes for Chapter X

{42} That President Kruger always contemplated controlling theUitlander population by arbitrary methods was proved by the choice ofthe site for the Johannesburg fort. This site, on a hill commandingthe town, had been reserved by Government from the commencement, andwhen the accommodation in the old gaol proved insufficient and a newgaol was required it was located on this spot, then a favouriteresidential quarter of the town. A deputation of officials waitedupon the President to urge the placing of the new gaol in a moreconvenient locality elsewhere. His Honour replied, 'that he did notcare about the convenience. He was going to build the gaol there, because some day the town would be troublesome and he would want toconvert the gaol into a fort and put guns there before that timecame. ' That was at least four years before the Raid. 

{43} The writer has since learned from Mr. Alfred Beit that the same proposal was made to him by Mr. Graaff inJanuary, 1896, immediately after the Raid, and that it was baitedwith the promise that if he and Mr. Rhodes would agree to support itthe threatened 'consequences' of their association with the Raidwould be averted. But they preferred the 'consequences. '

{44} About the middle of 1895 a bad explosion of dynamite occurredin Germany under circumstances very similar to those of theJohannesburg accident. An inquiry held by the German authoritiesresulted in the finding that the explosion must have been due tosome fault in the dynamite, and an order was issued to destroy theremainder. The officials charged with this duty found, however, thatthe owners, anticipating some such result, had removed it. It waseventually traced as having been shipped from Antwerp to PortElizabeth and thence consigned to the Transvaal in November, 1895. The Johannesburg explosion occurred in February, 1896. No competentor independent inquiry was held, although about 100 people werekilled and many more injured. 

{45} The gaoler--Du Plessis--in the fulfilment of his promise lostno opportunity to harass them into submission, by depriving them ofone thing after another, knowing that they would ask for nothingexcept as a right. As an instance, the spirit-lamp with whichthey made their tea was taken from them on the pretext that nocombustibles were allowed under the prison regulations, and upon aremonstrance being made by Mr. Conyngham Greene to Dr. Leyds thelatter replied that it was necessary on account of the risk of fire. For about eight months, therefore, water was to be--and of coursewas--their only drink. Only once during the thirteen months did DuPlessis appear to 'get home. ' It was when he proposed that the twoshould be separated and sent to out-of-the-way gaols, widely apartand distant from all friends. Without doubt the conditions toldseriously upon their health, but as both men were endowed withexceptional physique and any amount of grit they were still able totake it smiling. 

{46} It is described as the Witfontein case. See page 100. 

{47} When the case came up again in due course a decision was givenby Mr. Gregorowski, the new Chief Justice, which was regarded by theplaintiff's advisers as a reversal of the first judgment, and thepractical effect of which was to bring the case under the operationsof Law 1 of 1897--that is to say, to put the plaintiff 'out of court. 'Mr. Brown has appealed to the United States Government for redress. 

{48} See Appendix K. 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE BEGINNING OF THE END. 

So the year dragged on with its one little glimmer of light and itsbig black clouds of disappointment, and it was Christmas-time whenthe spark came to the waiting tinder. What a bloody bill could theholidays and holy days of the world tot up! On the Sunday nightbefore Christmas a British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar was shotdead in his own house by a Boer policeman. Edgar, who was a man ofsingularly fine physique and both able and accustomed to take care ofhimself, was returning home at about midnight when one of three menstanding by, who as it afterwards transpired was both ill andintoxicated, made an offensive remark. Edgar resented it with a blowwhich dropped the other insensible to the ground. The man's friendscalled for the police and Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house afew yards off. There was no attempt at concealment or escape; Edgarwas an old resident and perfectly well known. Four policemen came, who in any circumstances were surely sufficient to capture him. Moreover, if that had been considered difficult, other assistancecould have been obtained and the house from which there could havebeen no escape might have been watched. In any case Edgar wasadmitted by the police to have sat on the bed talking to his wife, and to have been thus watched by them through the window. It is notstated that they called upon him to come out or surrender himself, but they proceeded immediately to burst in his door. Hearing thenoise he came out into the passage. He may or may not have known thatthey were police: he may or may not have believed them to be thethree men by one of whom he had been insulted. There is not a word oftruth in the statement since made that Edgar had been drinking. Itwas not alleged even in defence of the police, and the post-mortemexamination showed that it was not so. A Boer policeman namedJones (There are scores of Boers unable to speak a word ofEnglish, who nevertheless own very characteristic English, Scotch, and Irish names--many of them being children of deserters from theBritish army!) revolver in hand burst the door open. It is allegedby the prisoner and one of the police that as the door was burstopen, Edgar from the passage struck the constable on the headtwice with an iron-shod stick which was afterwards producedin Court. On the other hand Mrs. Edgar and other independentwitnesses--spectators--testified that Edgar did not strike a blowat all and could not possibly have done so in the time. The fact, however, upon which all witnesses agree is that as the policeburst open the door Constable Jones fired at Edgar and dropped himdead in the arms of his wife, who was standing in the passage afoot or so behind him. On the following morning, the policeman wasformally arrested on the charge of manslaughter and immediatelyreleased upon his comrades' sureties of £200. 

As gunpowder answers to the spark so the indignation of the Uitlandercommunity broke out. The State Attorney to whom the facts wererepresented by the British Agent in Pretoria immediately ordered there-arrest of the policeman on the charge of murder. The feeling ofindignation was such among British subjects generally, but moreespecially among Edgar's fellow-workmen, that it was decided topresent a petition to her Majesty praying for protection. Britishsubjects were invited to gather in the Market Square in order toproceed in a body to the office of the British Vice-Consul and therepresent the petition, but in order to avoid any breach of the PublicMeetings Act they were requested to avoid speech making and torefrain in every way from any provocation to disorder. Some four orfive thousand persons gathered together. They listened to the readingof the petition and marched in an orderly manner to the office ofthe British Vice-Consul where the petition was read and accepted. 

This was the first direct appeal to her Majesty made by Britishsubjects since the protests against the retrocession eighteen yearsbefore. Not very many realized at the time the importance of thechange in procedure. There could be no "As you were" after the directappeal: either it would be accepted, in which event the case of theUitlanders would be in the hands of an advocate more powerful thanthey had ever proved themselves to be, or it would be declined, acourse which would have been regarded as sounding the death-knell ofthe Empire in South Africa. The time was one of the most intenseanxiety; for the future of the Uitlanders hung upon the turn of thescale. 

It was late one night when those who had been called to Pretoria toreceive the reply of her Majesty's Government returned to the Rand. The real reply then was known only to three men; it was simply, pointblank refusal to accept the petition. There were no reasons and noexplanations. It was done on the authority of Sir William Butler, theCommander-in-Chief in South Africa and acting High Commissioner; forSir Alfred Milner was at that time in England, as also was Mr. Conyngham Greene. But the faith was in these men that it could not betrue, that it could not have happened had Sir Alfred Milner not beenabsent, and thus came the suggestion to 'explain it away. ' On thefollowing day British subjects on the Rand learned that a breach ofdiplomatic etiquette had been committed, that the petition shouldnever have been published before being formally presented to herMajesty, and that thus it would be necessary to prepare and presentanother in proper form. The petition was redrawn and in the course ofthe following weeks upwards of 21, 000 signatures were obtained bythat loyal and enthusiastic little band of British subjects who formthe Johannesburg branch of the South African League. 

In the meantime other things had been happening. Messrs. Thomas R. Dodd and Clement Davies Webb had been arrested under the PublicMeetings Act for having organized an illegal meeting in the MarketSquare, Johannesburg, for the purpose of presenting the petition tothe British Vice-Consul. They were released upon bail of £1, 000each. Whether this was a fair example of the judicial perspective inthe Transvaal, or whether it was a concession to the feelings of theBoers it is impossible to say, nor does it much matter. The fact isthat for the crime of killing a British subject the bail was £200;and for the crime of objecting to it the bail was £1, 000. This actiononly added fuel to the fire and a public meeting was immediatelyconvened to be held in a circus building known as the Amphitheatre. Meetings are permitted under the Act provided they are held in anenclosed building. The object of the meeting was to record a protestagainst the arrest of Messrs. Dodd and Webb. A great many of the moreardent among the British subjects were of opinion that the time forprotests and petitions was past, and they would not attend themeeting. A great many others feeling that it was more or less aformality leading to nothing else, did not trouble to attend. Not oneof those who did attend had the least suspicion of any organizedopposition. The following dispatch from the High Commissioner to theSecretary of State for the Colonies sufficiently describes thesequel:--

 GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPE TOWN, _April 5, 1899_. 

SIR, --I have the honour to forward herewith the certified andattested copies of affidavits which form an enclosure to Mr. Wyberg'sletter, transmitted to you in my dispatch of the 28th March, butwhich did not reach me in time to catch the last mail steamer. 

From these affidavits, the number of which and the manner in whichthey confirm one another seem to me to leave no doubt of theirgeneral trustworthiness, it appears:

1. That early on the morning of Saturday, the 14th January, theforemen in charge of the various camps along the Main Reef Road wereinstructed to tell a certain number of their workmen to be at theAmphitheatre in Johannesburg at 2 p. M. , where they would be addressedby an official of the Public Works Department, Mr. P. J. Malan (Hoofdvan Afdeeling Wegen). 

2. That the affair had been planned beforehand, and that Acting RoadInspector Papenfus and others systematically visited the variouscamps on that morning in order to beat up recruits, and that inquirywas made in some cases to ensure that the persons sent should be'treu, ' _i. E. _, Boer or Afrikander workmen who might be expected totake the side of the Government. The Russian workmen were not askedto go. 

3. That the men were paid two hours earlier than usual, and thatthose men who were ordered to go were told, if they could not getGovernment carts, they should hire and recover afterwards. 

4. That in some cases, as that of the Boksburg section, the men wereconveyed the greater part of the way by Government carts. 

5. That when the men arrived at the Amphitheatre, about 2 p. M. , a manwho was either Mr. Bosman, Second Landdrost's Clerk, or Mr. Boshof, Registrar of the Second Criminal Court, and perhaps both of them, told them to go to the Police Station. 

6. That on arriving at the Police Station, they were addressed by Mr. Broeksma, Third Public Prosecutor, and told they were there to breakup the meeting when he gave them certain signals. 

7. That they then went into the Amphitheatre, and that there werepresent, besides Mr. Broeksma, Mr. Papenfus, Mr. Jacobs, Special RoadInspector, Mr. De Villiers, Second Public Prosecutor, and Mr. Burgers, also an official, as well as several prominent members ofthe Town and Special Police in plain clothes. 

8. That the different sections of the Road party men were placed invarious parts of the building, under their respective foremen, andthat several Government officials assisted in locating them. 

9. That a number of the men did not understand what they were therefor. 

10. That the proceedings on the part of the promoters of the meeting, which, as you are aware, had been sanctioned by the Government, wereperfectly regular. 

11. That on the first appearance of the promoters of the meetingthere was a concerted disturbance, which rendered it totallyimpossible to go on with the proceedings. 

12. That in the riot which followed several people were seriouslyinjured, the sufferers in every case being _bonâ fide_ sympathizerswith the object of the meeting, and the aggressors being persons whohad come there with the object of breaking it up. 

13. That the Police did not make the smallest effort to check thedisturbances though it would have been easy to do so, and that, whenappealed to, they maintained an attitude of indifference. 

14. That Broeksma, Third Public Prosecutor, and Lieutenant Murphy, ofthe Morality Police, actually assisted in breaking chairs, andencouraged the rioters. 

 I have, &c. , A. MILNER, _Governor and High Commissioner. _

With affairs of this kind stirring up race hatred and feeling amongthe class from whom the juries have to be selected, what chance wasthere of securing an impartial trial of the policeman charged withthe murder of Edgar? The Acting British Agent Mr. Edmund Fraser inhis dispatch of December 23 tells what he thought of the prospectbefore these affairs took place. 'As to the ultimate charge to bebrought against the policeman, the State Attorney was doubtfulwhether the charge had not better be one of culpable homicide, forthe reason that in the presence of a Boer jury his counsel would havea much easier task in getting him off under a charge of murder thanfor culpable homicide. But the chances of a Boer jury convictinghim at all are so small that I said I should not assent to eithercharge until I had seen what rebutting evidence the Public Prosecutorbrought. '

But this was not all. Immediately after the murder of Edgar, Mr. J. S. Dunn the editor of the _Critic_ newspaper, recited the facts of thecase as they were known to him and passed some severe strictures uponDr. Krause, the First Public Prosecutor, who was responsible fordetermining the charge against policeman Jones and fixing his bail inthe first instance. The steps now taken by Dr. Krause no doubt werewithin his legal rights, but they do not appear to a laymancalculated to ensure justice being done. Before proceeding with themurder trial Dr. Krause took criminal action against Mr. Dunn forlibel, and in order to prove the libel he, whose duty it was toprosecute Jones for murder, entered the witness-box and swore thatunder the circumstances as known to him he did not consider thatJones had been guilty of murder, and had therefore faithfullyperformed his duty in charging him with the minor offence andreleasing him on bail. Further, he called upon the Second PublicProsecutor to testify in a similar strain; and finally he directlyand deliberately associated with himself as witness on his side theman Jones himself who was charged with the murder. All thisostensibly to prove a paltry libel which could have been dealt withquite as effectively and infinitely more properly after the trial formurder had taken place; indeed it is incontestable that the verdictin the murder trial should properly have been relied upon to a largeextent to determine the gravity of Mr. Dunn's offence. It hadappeared to the British population that the chance of an impartialtrial, with the jury drawn exclusively from the burgher class, wassufficiently remote without any proceedings so ill considered asthese. The result fulfilled anticipations. In due course theconstable Jones was indicted for culpable homicide and acquitted; andthe presiding judge (Mr. Kock, who as already described had claimed ajudgeship as a 'son of the soil') when discharging the prisoner said, 'With that verdict I concur and I hope that the police underdifficult circumstances will always know how to do their duty. '

After the preliminary examination of Jones the Acting British Agenthad written to the Acting High Commissioner (December 30, 1898): 'Iwill only remark that the enclosed report . . . Seems to show that thePublic Prosecutor (Krause), who has been deeply offended by the slurcast upon his judgment through the orders from Pretoria to keep theaccused in prison instead of out on bail, was more inclined to defendthan to prosecute and showed an extraordinary desire to incriminateeither the British Vice-Consul or the South African League for whathe termed contempt of court in connection with the publication ofcertain affidavits in the _Star_. '

That was indeed the position. In this as in the Cape Boys case (theLombaard inquiry) the aim of the prosecution appeared to be to provethat the British Vice-Consul had investigated and reported cases ofinjustice suffered by British subjects; and the establishment of suchproof seemed to be considered a sufficient and triumphant answer tothe original complaint. Such action drew the following spiritedprotest from Mr. Emrys Evans to the British Agent: 'He (Krause) seemsgenerally to suppose that I have no right to do anything in the wayof assisting British subjects, and that my action as Vice-Consul isnothing more nor less than officious meddling. ' That well describesthe position of Great Britain's representative in the Transvaal, andit has been the same for so many years that among the Uitlanders itcreates no feeling of surprise; but imagine the representativeof--let us say--the United States being so treated!

While these matters were proceeding an opportunity occurred to raisefresh funds for the Uitlander Education Council. The scheme had beenperilously near collapse on several occasions, but by a littlegenerous and timely help actual abandonment had been averted. Thepossibility of a return of better times had been foreseen by some ofthose interested in education, and the appeals which were made in themonths of February and March resulted in raising a fund of over£100, 000. The companies were also applied to for assistance in theform of annual grants for maintenance; and guarantees were givenamounting in all to about £16, 000 a year. A final effort was made bythe Government party and the allies of Dr. Mansvelt, theSuperintendent of Education, to show that the Government had madeample provision for the education of English-speaking children, andthat the Uitlanders' scheme was unnecessary. Even Mr. Reitz, theState Secretary, it is to be regretted, undertook a public defence ofthe system which he has frequently expressed his disapproval of; butthe more favourable construction which he endeavoured to place uponthe law was immediately removed by a plain statement from thePresident to the exact contrary effect. 

The Uitlanders consider that, if the intentions of the Governmentwere as good as they desire them to be thought, firstly, they shouldnot object to have the conditions permanently established and notleave them liable to alteration at the sweet will of theSuperintendent, as they are to-day; and secondly, as there has beennothing to hinder the carrying out of benevolent intentions--had theyexisted--there is no reason why there should be five or six thousandUitlander children without any facilities for education in their ownlanguage except such as are provided by private enterprise orcharity. And this is so; notwithstanding the expenditure by the Stateof nearly a quarter of a million per annum, ostensibly uponeducation, nine-tenths of which sum is contributed by the Uitlanderpopulation. 

The spirit in which the State aid is given and the aim which theGovernment have in view are entirely revealed in the conditions, abrief reference to which will be sufficient. 

The Government capitation grant of £4 per annum may be earned on theconditions:--

(a) That the child be over six years of age. 

(b) That it shall have a sufficient knowledge of the Dutch languageand South African history. 

(c) That it be not the child of Dutch or Hollander parents. 

(d) That a qualified Dutch teacher must be retained by the school. 

The first condition excludes all the children of the kindergartenschools, and also a class who form a considerable percentage in theelementary schools. The third condition excludes all those who havein early years any chance of satisfying the inspectors under thesecond condition. Obviously the amount earned by the few who wouldsatisfy all the conditions could not possibly pay for the salary ofa Dutch teacher. It was an actual experience in several schools thatthe acceptance of State aid involved a direct loss; a good example ofthe 'something for nothing' policy. 

English is permitted to be the medium of instruction in Governmentschools on the conditions, among others--

That Dutch be taught for one hour a day during the first year, twohours a day during the second year, three hours a day during thethird year; and that in the fourth year Dutch shall become the solemedium of instruction. 

The characteristic trickery and cunning which mark so many of theBoer-Hollander enactments are again apparent here. The proposal ismade to appear reasonable, but it is clearly impossible for a childto attain within the time named such proficiency in a foreignlanguage as to be able to receive all instruction in it. The effectand the design are to place English-speaking children at a gravedisadvantage compared with Dutch-speaking children; either they wouldhave to devote a great deal more time to the study of Dutch in thefirst three years so as to be able to receive all instruction in thattongue, or they would suffer in the higher standards through theirimperfect knowledge of the medium of instruction. It was not to besupposed that the Uitlanders, after an experience extending over adecade and a half of all sorts of promises, not one of which had beenkept in the spirit in which it was intended to be construed, wouldconsent to abandon their scheme at the behest of Dr. Mansvelt and themisguided few who judged his proposals by appearances. PresidentKruger speaking at Rustenburg as lately as March last laid particularemphasis upon the stipulation in the Law that in the fourth yearDutch should be the sole medium of instruction, and explained thathis determination was to make Dutch the dominant language. 

In the month of February the Transvaal Government received a dispatchfrom her Majesty's Government with reference to the dynamiteconcession. It referred to the announcement already recorded, that inthe course of the coming session of the Raad a proposal would besubmitted for the extension of the monopoly for fifteen years. Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that her Majesty's Government wereadvised that the dynamite monopoly in its present form constitutes abreach of the Convention; he expressed the hope that the TransvaalGovernment might see its way voluntarily either to cancel themonopoly or to so amend it as to make it in the true sense a Statemonopoly operating for the benefit of the State; and he suggestedthat in any case no attempt should be made to extend the presentconcession, as such a proposal would compel her Majesty's Governmentto take steps which they had hitherto abstained from taking in thehope and belief that the Transvaal Government would itself dealsatisfactorily with the matter. It was with this despatch, so to sayin his pocket, that the President introduced and endeavoured to forcethrough the Raad the proposal to grant a fifteen years' extension ofthe monopoly. 

That representations had been made by the British Government on thesubject of the dynamite monopoly, had been known for some time beforethe Peace Negotiations (as they have been called) between theGovernment and the Capitalists were proposed. On February 27{49} Mr. Edouard Lippert, the original dynamite concessionaire, who it wasknown would receive the further sum of £150, 000 if the monopolyremained uncancelled for five years, opened negotiations on behalf ofthe Government with certain representatives of the capitalist groupson the Rand; and it was immediately seen that the main--one mightalmost say sole--object of the negotiations was to safeguard thedynamite monopoly. The Government had, in fact, been placed in a veryawkward position. One of the excuses for not expropriating themonopoly had been that the State had not been successful in raising aloan. In order to deal with this objection the Chamber of Mines had, in the month of February, 1899, made an offer, guaranteed by all theprincipal firms on the Rand, to provide the sum of £600, 000 tocompensate the monopolists for their actual expenditure up to dateupon buildings, plant, machinery, &c. , so that there should be nosemblance of injustice in the treatment meted out to them. Theconditions of the offer were that the dynamite monopoly should becancelled and importation of explosives permitted under an importduty which would give the State a very large revenue at once andwhich in the course of a few years would provide a sinking fundsufficient to extinguish the loan of £600, 000. The offer was sofavourable to the State that it placed the Government in aquandary. {50} The attitude of the Volksraad, too, was distinctlyhostile to the dynamite monopoly; and on top of all came therepresentations of the Imperial Government upon the subject. Itbecame necessary to do something to save the threatened'cornerstone'; hence the Peace negotiations between the Governmentand the capitalists. 

This was another and one of the clearest examples of the 'somethingfor nothing' policy, for it will be observed that of all the thingsmentioned dynamite alone was the matter to be definitely settled--andthat to the satisfaction of Mr. Kruger. Long years of experiencehad taught the Uitlanders to examine any proposals coming from theGovernment with the utmost care; and the representatives of themining industry were soon of one mind in regarding these negotiationsas nothing but a trap. 

Of the five men who represented the Government, viz. , the President, the State Secretary (Mr. Reitz), the State Attorney (Mr. Smuts), theForeign Plenipotentiary (Dr. Leyds), and the 'disinterestedintermediary, ' Mr. Lippert, it was easy enough to account for three. The President had frequently pledged himself to maintain themonopoly, and always referred to it as the corner-stone of theindependence. Dr. Leyds had chosen to associate himself with thedefence of the concessionaires upon all occasions, and had even goneso far, as evidence given at the Industrial Commission showed, as tomisrepresent the facts in their defence. The difficulty was how toexplain the association of the State Attorney and State Secretary, inwhose good intentions and integrity there was a general belief. Thesolution was to be found in the illusory promises of reform under theheading of franchise and reorganization of the finances and othermatters. These proposals, it was believed by Mr. Kruger and hisparty, would secure the support of the two above-named officials, aswell as entice the capitalists into the trap set for them. But therewere other points of advantage for Mr. Kruger. The whole scheme wasin accordance with the _divide et impera_ policy. The firstimpression, if the scheme were accepted, would be that thecapitalists had secured something for themselves by bartering awaythe rights of the public; so there would have been a division inJohannesburg. Another effect to be brought about by the proposedaction regarding the Indians would have been to divide the Uitlandersfrom the Imperial Government, and the net result of it all would havebeen that neither the public nor the capitalists would have gotanything but illusory promises and Mr. Kruger would have secured hisdynamite; for had he been able to extract from the Industry anexpression of approval or acquiescence, it would have given him hismajority in the Volksraad in favour of the monopoly. 

The following is the correspondence which passed:--

 JOHANNESBURG, S. A. R. , _27th March, 1899. _

_To the Honourable the State Secretary, Pretoria. _

HONOURABLE SIR, Before communicating to you and the representatives of the Governmentwhom we met the expression of our opinion and that of our Londonfriends on the proposals submitted to us by Mr. Lippert on behalf ofthe Government of the S. A. R. , we deem it advisable to recite shortlyhow we have arrived at the present position. 

On the 27th of February Mr. E. Lippert called together Messrs. A. Brakhan, E. Birkenruth, and G. Rouliot, to whom he submitted acertain programme concerning the settlement of some pending questionsforming the subject of grave differences between the Government ofthe S. A. R. , on the one part, and the whole Uitlander population andthe mining industry on the other part, with a view to ascertainwhether these gentlemen were willing to open negotiations on thebasis suggested, in order to try to come to a settlement. Upon theaffirmative answer of these gentlemen, Mr. Lippert obtained an equalexpression of approval from Dr. Leyds, the State Secretary, the StateAttorney, and also of President Kruger. The preliminary programme atMr. Lippert's request was then communicated by cable to our Londonfriends. Upon receipt of a reply to the effect that our Londonfriends were in favour of any arrangement which would produce harmonyand secure administrative and financial reform, which wascommunicated to Mr. E. Lippert, a meeting was arranged with Dr. Leyds, Messrs. Reitz, Smuts, and Lippert, as representing theGovernment, on the 9th of March; but as Messrs. Brakhan, Birkenruth, and Rouliot had repeatedly mentioned that they did not considerthemselves qualified to discuss matters on behalf of the general bodyof Uitlanders, and seeing that the programme submitted was to beconsidered as a whole, and either adopted or rejected as such, therefore it would be necessary to obtain the views, on the franchisequestion, of prominent citizens more able to express the wishes ofUitlanders on this subject; Mr. Lippert, on behalf of the Government, invited in addition Messrs. Pierce and Pistorious to be present atthe meeting. 

At this meeting several points were discussed, but as no definiteproposal regarding franchise could be submitted, no decision wasarrived at, it being made clear, however, that this was only apreliminary conversation with the object of exchanging views, andthat in any case the opinion of the Uitlander population, and alsothat of our friends in Europe, would have to be fully ascertained. 

On the 12th instant, at the request of Mr. Lippert, Messrs. Brakhan, Birkenruth, Rouliot, Pierce, Pistorious and Fitzpatrick met, and Mr. Lippert communicated to us the definite proposals of the S. A. R. Government, which were duly cabled the same day to our friends, requesting a reply before the end of the week, as the Governmentwould have to submit the whole matter to the Raad, and we wererequested to sign an agreement with the Government, and a declarationbinding on ourselves and our London friends. 

Their answer, suggesting a further conference with Dr. Leyds inLondon, was duly communicated to his Honour the State President. HisHonour's reply, stating that the exchange of views had better takeplace here, was communicated to our European friends. 

Now they have cabled us a full _précis_ of the proceedings andresolutions passed at the meeting held in London on the 16thinstant, and the following is therefore the expression of our opinionas well as that of our European friends, upon the subjects which havealready been discussed between the representatives of the S. A. R. Government, and ourselves. 

It having been stipulated by the Government that the various mattersherein dealt with shall be taken as parts of one whole plan, we havebowed to that decision, and we beg now to reply under the variousheads on the understanding that no one portion may be judged as apartfrom the whole. 

BEWAARPLAATSEN. 

In furtherance of the general settlement, those of us directlyconcerned in the mining industry would be prepared to recommend amodification of the claims of the surface holder and a finalsettlement of the question on the lines suggested as preferable tothe continued uncertainty, on the understanding that the basis forvaluation should be arrived at by fixing, after consultation, amaximum price upon the best situated bewaarplaatsen or water-right, and that the price of all other mining rights under bewaarplaatsen, machine stands or water-rights be valued by competent engineers onthe basis and in relation to the above maximum value, taking intoconsideration the comparative value of the outcrop claims and thediminishing value in depth; the surface holder having the preferentright to acquire the undermining rights at the price thus arrived at. 

FINANCIER AND AUDITOR. 

The appointment of a suitable man with efficient control and assuredstatus would undoubtedly meet one of the most serious of thegrievances, and would be universally accepted as satisfactory. Thefinancier, in order to enjoy the confidence of all concerned, andwith a view to avoid as far as possible ulterior discussion of hisrecommendations, should be approved of by some person belonging to afirm of well-known independent standing, such as Lord Rothschild, forinstance. The financier to be a member of the Executive Council, andto formulate and approve every scheme of taxation should further orother taxation become necessary. 

LOAN. 

Any loan offered at reasonable rates and approved by the FinanceMinister for the common good would undoubtedly receive our support;we understanding, on the other hand, that no new taxation will beimposed on the general population or the mining industry pending theappointment of the financier. 

PRESS AGITATION. 

There having been, as far as we know, no organized press agitation, it is impossible for us to deal with this matter, but it is clearthat the criticism which has been provoked by a certain condition ofaffairs here would necessarily cease upon the causes of complaintbeing removed, and we would be prepared, in case of our coming to asettlement with the Government, to declare that the solution of thequestions arrived at meets with our approval as a whole, so as todiscourage further agitation in newspapers on these subjects. 

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

We shall at all times be willing to publicly discourage and repudiateany political organization having for its object the stirring up ofstrife or promoting dissension between the different nationalitiesinhabiting this State, and we would and will in any case do thisfreely and upon principle, and entirely apart from otherconsiderations connected with this Conference, but it should beclearly understood that this declaration must not be construed asrepudiating or deprecating any legitimate representations which thecommunity or any section of them may see fit to make in matters whichconcern them as inhabitants of this State. 

COOLIE QUESTION. 

We well appreciate the dangers of uncontrolled, indiscriminateimmigration of the lower class Indians, Chinese, and other colouredraces, and the necessity for provision for sanitary control, andshall be most willing to aid the Government in the above objects; butwe consider it impossible for us to intervene in this matter, whichis governed by the London Convention with the British Government. Wesuggest that for the purpose of guarding against the dangers abovereferred to, this matter be explained to the Imperial Government aspart of the whole scheme for the settlement of differences, and claimtherefore an especially favourable consideration, for, in the successof this scheme, all who desire peace and prosperity in this countrymust be deeply concerned and willing to co-operate on generous lines. We suggest that this representation be made in such manner as may bedeemed less calculated to provoke unfavourable comment, or offendsusceptibilities in any quarter, and that the suggestion be viewed byall parties in its true proportions as one part of the whole schemeof settlement. Unless so viewed we should be unable to put ourselvesforward in a matter at issue between the two Governments, nor ofcourse could the proposals of the Government be taken to suggestthis. 

DYNAMITE. 

With the principle of granting a monopoly to individuals, agencies, or corporations it is impossible for us to agree, and whateverarrangement be effected, we should have to make it clear that in thisinstance we are viewing the question solely as a burden--a tax whichthe mines are asked to definitely accept in order that anamelioration of the general conditions affecting the whole Uitlanderpopulation may be secured. 

The difference between the cost at which dynamite could be imported(exclusive of Transvaal duty) and the price we are now compelled topay amounts to over £600, 000 per annum on the present rate ofconsumption, a sum which will increase steadily and largely in theimmediate future. 

Whether the mining industry should voluntarily accept such an immenseburden as a set-off against terms which, whilst they would doubtlesseventually favourably affect the industry, are in their immediateeffects designed to satisfy the Uitlander population in theirpersonal rights as distinct from the mining industry as a business, is a matter which would in the first place have to be submitted tothe recognized elected representatives of the mining industry, andwould in the second place depend upon whether the people in whoseinterest such sacrifice is required would accept the terms which theGovernment would be willing to concede as satisfying their reasonableaspirations. 

It is also a matter of grave and general concern that a sum soenormous, when compared with the revenue requirements of the State, should be taken annually from the mines with little, if any, benefitto the country, when it might be utilized in part or entirely insupplementing the State revenue, and thus afford relief in otherdirections to every taxpayer in the country. 

Notwithstanding the above considerations, however, we feel that agreat monetary sacrifice might be made to secure a peaceful andpermanent solution of vexed questions, and that the subject ofdynamite should be submitted to the Chamber of Mines and discussed inthat spirit. 

Whilst we are willing, in order to bring about a general settlementof all pending questions, to recommend such a heavy sacrifice to bemade, and adopt the proposal made by the Government, it would be acondition that there shall not be any extension of the concession, and that the terms of the contract shall be rigidly enforced; thatthe Dynamite Company shall reduce the price of dynamite to 70s. Percase, giving to the Government the 5s. Per case and the share of theprofits to which it is entitled; and that at the end of the presentagency the factory shall be taken over at a valuation which shall notinclude compensation for goodwill or for loss of future business. 

FRANCHISE. 

This is the vital point upon which a permanent and peacefulsettlement must hinge, and if a satisfactory solution can be arrivedat on this point, as well as on the others raised, we shall beprepared to recommend to the Industry to make the sacrifices involvedin accepting the Government proposals. 

We note that--

_(a)_ the proposals do not include a substantial recognition of pastresidence;

_(b)_ that the period is seven years;

_(c)_ that it is proposed that those who acquire citizenship underthe law, if changed as proposed, shall not have the vote for theoffice of President, and that the oath of allegiance would berequired seven years before the acquisition of limited burgherrights;

_(d)_ that the proposed new law would have to be published for a yearand receive the assent of two-thirds of the enfranchised burghers ofthe Republic. 

Whilst declaring ourselves willing to accept and recommend theacceptance of any fair scheme on constitutional reforms, we considerthat such a scheme must first be laid before, and approved by, theunenfranchised community, as the rights, liberties, and privileges ofthe community would depend absolutely on the nature of the reform. 

We have repeated on many occasions that business houses are notqualified to discuss this question on behalf of the general body ofUitlanders, and that we would not presume that we were appointed bythe whole community to discuss it on their behalf. It will thereforebe necessary to find means to bring the whole question before thosedirectly affected, who are the only ones entitled to finally disposeof the matter, their acquiescence to the scheme having to be firstobtained before we recommend the sacrifices which we contemplate inorder to ensure a general permanent and peaceful settlement. 

For your guidance we enclose an expression of opinion which has beenfurnished to us by some of the most prominent Uitlanders, andplaces before you the views of a very large and influential sectionof the community. 

The above subjects are only those which have been discussed betweenthe Government representatives and ourselves, but, in order to arriveat a final permanent settlement, we think that we ought to endeavourto remove all other causes of disagreement, and treat as well severalother important questions left untouched; and we would beg that theGovernment will take the necessary steps, as far as lies in theirpower, to assist the industry by bringing native labourers to thegoldfields, and to this end will be willing to confer with theChamber of Mines as to the best means to be adopted; that the lawrelating to the sale of intoxicating liquor at present in force shallbe maintained and strictly enforced. We may further state that wehave every confidence in the probity and honour of the Judges of theS. A. R. , and wish to place on record our desire that the independenceof the Bench should be assured and maintained inviolate in thehighest interests of all the inhabitants of the Republic. 

We enclose copy of the cable which we sent, embodying the proposalsof the Government of the S. A. R. As communicated to us by Mr. Lippert, and copy of the _précis_ and resolution passed at the meeting held inLondon, when the above cable was considered. 

This letter conveys to you our opinion as well as that of our friendsin Europe, and we should be most happy to arrange a meeting with youand any other representatives of the Government to consider anddiscuss the points contained therein. 

We beg to assure you once more that we, as well as our Europeanfriends, are most sincerely desirous to arrive at a satisfactorysettlement, securing a peaceful future and promoting the welfare ofthe country and the people, and trust that you will regard theexpression of our opinion in that light. 

 We remain, honourable Sir, Yours obediently, G. ROULIOT. H. F. E. PISTORIUS. E. BIRKENRUTH. JOHN M. PIERCE. A. BRAKHAN

The foregoing embodies our views as well as that of our Londonhouses. 

 (Signed) J. G. HAMILTON. W. DALRYMPLE. 

The following memorandum--the one referred to in the aboveletter--was prepared by well-known Uitlanders whom the Government, owing to the refusal of the capitalists to deal with the franchise, had been obliged to select in order to get some pronouncement uponthat question. The little ironies of life have two properties: thehumour for the winner, and the hurt for the worsted. The Uitlandershad for three years enjoyed a singularly monotonous experience inironies, but a turning came in the long lane when it became necessaryfor the President to suspend the operation of his three years' banon two of the Reformers in order to get their advice upon thefranchise question. 

 JOHANNESBURG, S. A. R. , _24th March, 1899. _

GENTLEMEN, In response to the invitation from the Government of the SouthAfrican Republic conveyed to us by Mr. E. Lippert, we beg to submitthe enclosed memorandum upon the franchise question. 

 Yours faithfully, J. PERCY FITZPATRICK. H. C. HULL. W. DALRYMPLE. W. A. MARTIN. THOS. MACKENZIE. R. STORE. J. G. HAMILTON. T. J. BRITTEN. H. R. SKINNER. 

 _To Messrs. G. Rouliot, E. Birkenruth, A. Brakhan, J. M. Pierce, H. F. E. Pistorius Johannesburg_. 

MEMORANDUM _RE_ FRANCHISE. 

After such investigation as the restrictions imposed have permitted, we are of opinion that it would be quite useless to approach theUitlander population with the Government proposal in its presentform, chiefly for the following reasons:--

1. No consideration is given to the term of residence alreadycompleted. 

2. The alteration of the franchise law according to lately prescribedprocedure, whereby two-thirds of the burghers must signify approval, is a practical impossibility, --witness the fact that at the lastPresidential election, surpassing in excitement and interest allother occasions of general voting, with the three recognized leadersin the field, and every agency at work to stimulate activity, lessthan two-thirds of the burghers on the register recorded their votes. 

3. The present form of oath would be regarded as humiliating andunnecessary, in support of which view we instance that quite recentlythe Volksraad of the Orange Free State rejected upon the same groundsthe proposed introduction of the same oath of allegiance. 

4. The period of disqualification, during which the Uitlander wouldhave given up his own citizenship by naturalizing and have acquirednothing in return, would be found most objectionable--especiallywith the experience that rights have in the past been legislated awayas they were on the point of maturing. 

5. In view of the unique conditions of this country, extension of thefranchise without some approach to equitable redistribution ofrepresentatives would be regarded as no solution of the question andmight even provoke doubts as to the _bonâ fides_ of the proposal, which would be a deplorable beginning, yet one easily to be avoided. 

Regard being had to the points raised in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, we consider that as restrictive franchise legislation, apparentlydesigned to exclude for ever the great bulk of the Uitlanderpopulation, dates its beginning from the Session of 1890, and as thevarious enactments bearing upon this question have been passed bysuccessive Volksraads exercising their power to alter, add to, orrevoke, previous enactments, and as the same powers are to the fullenjoyed by the present Volksraad, it would be both possible andproper for the present Volksraad to annul all the legislation uponthis subject from that date, and to restore and confirm the statusprior to 1890, and thus satisfy the indisputable claims of those whosettled in this country under certain conditions from the benefits ofwhich they could not properly be excluded. 

With regard to paragraph 5, a moderate proposal designed to give amore equitable distribution of representatives in the Volksraad wouldbe necessary. 

The above suggestions are not put forward as the irreducible minimum, nor are they designed for public use, nor intended as a proposalacceptable to the eye but impossible in fact, and thus sure ofrejection. They are put forward in good faith as indicating in ouropinion the lines upon which it would be possible to work towards asettlement with a reasonable prospect of success. 

If the difficulties appear great the more reason there is not to putforward an unalterable proposal foredoomed to failure, but rather totry and find points of agreement which, however few and small tobegin with, would surely make for eventual and complete settlement. In any case it is clear that the mere fact of a proposal to extendthe franchise having been made by the Government, thus franklyrecognizing the need to deal with the subject, will be hailed as agood omen and a good beginning by all fair-minded men. 

The determination of the negotiators to have the position clearlystated in writing, and their fear that the use of intermediarieswould end in the usual unhappy and unpleasant result--namely, repudiation of the intermediary in part or entirely--were not longwanting justification. The following is a translation of Mr. F. W. Reitz's reply:--

 PRETORIA, _8th April, 1899. _

_Messrs. G. Rouliot, H. F. E. Pistorius, A. Brakhan, E. Birkenruth, and John M. Pierce, Johannesburg_. 

DEAR SIRS, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 27thMarch last, referring to certain proposals to the Government fromrepresentatives of the mining industry. 

In order to understand the natural position it is necessary to statethe facts more extensively than given in your letter. 

It is wrong to say, as you do in the first paragraph of yourcommunication, that Mr. Lippert came to you with certain proposalsfrom the Government. 

It appears also from the second paragraph of the same that Mr. Lippert came to you _suo motu_ with the object, as he informed meafterwards, to see 'if it was not possible to obtain a betterunderstanding between the Government on the one side and the miningindustry on the other. ' He acted in no wise as the agent of theGovernment, or in the name of the Government, to make any proposalsto you, but only as a friendly mediator to see how far unnecessarydifferences and misunderstandings could be removed. 

When Mr. Lippert came to Dr. Leyds and myself, and informed us thatyou and other gentlemen were agreeable to his mediation, we at onceagreed with his plan, being aware that there was a warm desire andcontinued struggle on the part of this Government to remove out ofthe way all friction and trouble, and that in this case especially itwas our object to leave no stone unturned to get all differencessettled. We were the more anxious to meet you, because his Honour theState President had decided to lay before the Volksraad certainproposals of law, which are of great importance not only for thepeople of the Republic, but especially for the mining population andindustry. We gave Mr. Lippert to understand that should the leadersof the mining industry have no objection to his mediation, we wouldnot be unwilling to make use of his good services in this matter. 

Mr. Lippert then went to Johannesburg, and returned to us with theassurance that there was no objection to his acting as mediator, andgave us some of the subjects on which it appeared to him that it waspossible to arrive at a friendly understanding. 

In consequence of this, and acting on our own initiative, and not asrepresentatives of the Government, Dr. Leyds, Mr. Smuts, and myself, met some of your leading men, as set forth in your letter. 

At this meeting we informed you of the intention of the President toalter certain laws for the general good. Only with reference to thefranchise we gave you no definite proposal, the matter being thenstill under consideration. From your side we requested only a morefriendly attitude from the Press, as we were convinced that theexcessive Press campaign carried on by the newspapers, which aregenerally considered to be owned by you, or influenced by you, however much they may forward certain interests, still, in the end, did infinite harm to the existing interests of all sections of thepopulation. Through the continual and incessant agitation andcreation of suspicion on the part of the papers, the public mind wasconstantly in a state of insecurity, and the fanning of the racehatred made it impossible for the Government as well as thelegislature to improve the relations between the so-called Uitlandersand the old population. 

We requested your friendly assistance also in the settlement of thecoolie question, not because we wanted to cause friction between youand other foreign governments, but only because the policy whichrefers to the native and coloured questions is of the utmostimportance to South Africa. 

Mr. Lippert had in his programme the granting of a promise on yourside that you would support the Government in the obtaining of a loanwhich the Government may deem necessary, and that you should bindyourselves in writing to abstain from all political organizationsinimical to the Government. 

These matters we did not discuss, as we considered them unnecessaryand inadvisable. From your side you deemed it necessary, beforeanswering us, first to receive the instructions of your foreignprincipals. Before you could give us the result the Presidentexplained his intentions at Heidelberg, and afterwards at Rustenburgand Johannesburg. 

Your letter, now under consideration, contains practically a definiteanswer to our communication to you. I shall now consider the pointsof your answer separately. 

BEWAARPLAATSEN. 

With reference to this matter, we think that the undermining rightsunder bewaarplaatsen, machine stands, and water-rights should bevalued on a reasonable basis, independently by the Government, and bythe owner of the surface rights (should there be a difference whichcannot be settled amicably, then the value can be fixed byarbitration), and that the surface owner shall have the preferentright to purchase the affected under-mining right at such avaluation. From your communication I understand that you suggest aspecial method of valuation. That is a detail which can be settledwhen the valuation is actually commenced, and which experts arebetter able to judge over than I am. Therefore I shall say no more onthis subject. 

FINANCIER AND AUDITOR. 

On this subject our opinion was that the auditor should beindependent of the Government, and alone responsible to the Volksraadto appoint as financier a man of standing, with a seat in theExecutive Council, to advise on all matters affecting finances. 

I am glad to see that you are with us, and that it gives you greatsatisfaction. I must express my surprise, however, over your proposalthat previous to the appointment this Government must first get theapproval of Lord Rothschild or any other capitalist. I can onlyanswer that it is in no wise the intention of the Government to framethe future financial policy of this State on a capitalistic basis, and thus your request cannot be agreed to. It is quite possible tomake such an appointment which will carry general approval withoutbeing subjected to such a mutual condition. 

LOAN, PRESS AGITATION, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. 

With reference to these matters, I have already made it plain to youthat in following the proposals of Mr. Lippert by cabling to yourprincipals, you acted under a misunderstanding. We requested nobinding declaration from you, only a moral understanding, which wouldbe easy for you to maintain, if it was in the interests of theUitlanders as well as the burghers of the Republic. I regret that themistake has arisen, otherwise I cannot see that any objection cancome from your side to approve of the plans of the President. 

DYNAMITE. 

On this question there is a small difference between the proposedpolicy of the President and your answer. 

I only wish to add that his Honour goes further than you do, as hehas declared his readiness to expropriate the Dynamite Company, underagreement with its representatives, as soon as possible. If theexpropriation takes place after the expiration of the presentconcession then it will naturally not be on the basis of a goingconcern. 

FRANCHISE. 

On this subject I can well understand that you do not wish to takeupon your shoulders the responsibility of speaking and acting for thewhole of the new population. It was more your personal opinions asmen of position that we wished to know. Then again, according to yourassurance at the aforementioned meeting, you do not take any personalinterest in the franchise question, and that you would rather leavethe question to the public; your answer is therefore perfectly fair. His Honour has therefore already acted in accordance with your idea, for he has brought the question of the franchise very prominentlybefore the public, not only at Heidelberg and Rustenburg, but also atJohannesburg. 

In conclusion, I wish to refer to one matter which has caused me muchpain. It was clearly and distinctly agreed and understood by you allas well as by us that both sides would treat this matter asconfidential and secret, as discussions of such important matterscannot be carried on with any results on the tops of houses. What hashappened? On the 28th of March I received your letter, and on the 3rdof April, whilst I was yet giving it earnest consideration and hadtaken all the measures to keep it secret, the contents of the sameappeared in the London _Times_, while some days later your answerappeared in full in the _Cape Times_, the _Diamond FieldsAdvertiser_, and other papers under the influence of the capitalists. The manner in which these papers favourable to you, or controlled byyou, have dealt with me in this matter has caused me (I admit it withregret) to doubt for one moment your good faith. Thinking, however, of the great interest as it were in the balance, and believing, moreover, that you never for private or party purposes intended toplay with the true and lasting interests of all sections of thecommunity, I cannot help thinking that the reply has been publishedthrough one of your subordinates, and regret that the publication hasnot been immediately repudiated by you publicly as a grave breach offaith. I would regret it, while there exists so few points ofdifference between us, that these things should bar the way throughcareless and wrong tactics to a permanent understanding, and trustthat the hand extended to the Industry in absolute good faith willnot be slighted purposely and wilfully. Owing to the publication ofyour reply, there exists no further reason for secrecy, and I shallhand my reply to the press. 

 Your obedient servant, F. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_. 

The repudiation of Mr. Lippert's "official" character; the contentionthat the State Secretary, State Attorney, and Dr. Leyds could divestthemselves of all responsibility in negotiations such as these, andclaim to have been acting in their private capacity only; and theextraordinary anxiety to keep secret matters which deeply affectedthe public, and to the settlement of which the Government designedthat the public should be committed, compelled the negotiators toproduce evidence that the statements and conclusions of theGovernment were not warranted by the facts. The following letter, which was formally acknowledged but never answered, practicallyconcluded the negotiations:--

 JOHANNESBURG, S. A. R. , _April 14, 1899. _

_To the Honourable the State Secretary, Pretoria. _

HONOURABLE SIR, --

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communicationof the 8th April, 1899. 

Certain of our statements being doubted and described as erroneous inyour letter, we deem it advisable to go more fully into the factswhich have preceded and led to this correspondence. 

It may be that communications exchanged through an intermediary havebeen transmitted in a manner liable to convey a different impressionfrom what was actually meant, and in order to clear any possiblemisunderstanding, we beg to enclose copies of all documents suppliedto us by Mr. Lippert, whom we, at all times, considered as yourauthorized agent. 

From these it will be apparent that during the negotiations we actedin perfect good faith, communicating and discussing what we justlyconsidered were the wishes and proposals of the Government, and itwill also be clear to you that every one of our statements is basedon documents which we had every reason to believe were approved of bythe Government. 

On February 27th Mr. Lippert called together Messrs. E. Birkenruth, A. Brakhan, and G. Rouliot, to whom he stated that a settlement ofcertain pending questions could probably be arrived at. He said thathe had ascertained the views of Dr. Leyds, Messrs. Reitz and Smuts, who had agreed to a certain programme, and he wanted to know whetherwe would be willing to open negotiations on that basis, in which casethe three officials mentioned would see the State President andascertain whether he would be prepared to adopt their views. 

If the State President's approval could be obtained, Mr. Lippertsuggested that a conference should be held to discuss the subjectsmentioned in his memorandum. 

This memorandum (Annexure 'A'), as explained to us by Mr. Lippert, enumerates under Clauses 1 to 5 inclusive the points which theGovernment expected us to concede, and the other clauses are what theGovernment proposed doing in return. 

We were then informed that the programme must be considered as awhole, and either adopted or rejected as such, no question beingconsidered separately, and that the matter must be kept absolutelysecret. 

Upon our statement that we personally would be willing to opennegotiations on the basis suggested, Mr. Lippert went to Pretoria andinformed the high officials above-named. 

On March 1st Mr. Lippert informed us that the State President wasviewing the matter favourably, and requested us to acquaint ourfriends by cable. 

Our replies having been communicated to Mr. Lippert, a meeting wasarranged on March 9th, as recited in our previous letter, at which, Mr. Lippert informed us, no new subject outside of those mentioned inhis memorandum could be discussed. 

Messrs. Pistorius and Pierce, being invited by Mr. Lippert to attendthe meeting, were each supplied by him with a list of the questionsto be discussed, forming part of the proposed settlement (Annexure'B'). 

On March 12th Mr. Lippert communicated to us what he termed thedefinite proposals of the Government of the S. A. R. , which were dulycabled to our friends in Europe (a copy of this cable has alreadybeen sent to you). 

He also read to us the declaration, which he suggested we should signon behalf of ourselves and our European friends (Annexure 'C'). 

A speedy reply to our cable was asked for, as Mr. Lippert hadinformed us that, if any settlement could be arrived at, theagreement had to be submitted to the Honourable the First Volksraadbefore the closing of the extraordinary session which was drawingnear. 

We beg to point out to you that by cabling these proposals to Europe, we could not possibly conceive that we were acting under amisconception, as the day on which they were made to us, the 12th ofMarch, being a Sunday, the Telegraph Office was specially keptopen for the purpose of dispatching the cables, which were dulyreceived and forwarded upon production of an order from Mr. Lippert. 

In our letter of March 17th to his Honour the State President, conveying the nature of our friends' reply, we mentioned the factthat the communication made to us by Mr. Lippert on behalf of theGovernment had been fully cabled; we stated that our friends no doubtbased their suggestion to further discuss the whole of the proposalswith Dr. Leyds upon the fact that the Government had stipulated thatthey should become parties to the proposed settlement. 

In your reply of March 18th, no exception is taken to thesestatements; you tell us, on behalf of his Honour the State President, 'that the exchange of views can best take place direct with theGovernment, and here, within the Republic, ' pointing out the fact'that the session of the Volksraad was close at hand, and thattherefore further delay is undesirable. '

You will thus see that we were perfectly justified in thinking thatthe communications made to our European friends, embodied theproposals of the Government of the South African Republic, werecabled with the knowledge and approval of the Government, and thatwe were requested to sign a declaration on behalf of ourselves andour friends, which declaration had to be made public. 

Our letter of the 27th March conveyed to you our opinion and that ofour friends, upon the subjects comprised in the programme which wassubmitted to us, and it is unnecessary to go over them in detailagain. We beg only to offer a few remarks upon certain points raisedin your letter of 8th April:--Bewaarplaatsen: We suggest a basis forthe valuation of bewaarplaatsen, machine stands, and water-rights, which in our opinion ought to be adopted, in order to have a uniformand easy method of valuing these places. 

Financier: Being fully aware of the complexity of financial problemsand questions of taxation in this State, we are anxious that thefinancier appointed should be of such a standing as to command theconfidence of all, so that his recommendations cannot raise anyulterior discussion. For that reason we expressed the opinion that, before making the appointment, the Government should be guided in itschoice by someone belonging to a firm of well-known independentstanding. We have no desire to see this Government base its futurefinancial policy on any particular line, in the interest of, ordirected against, any special section of the people. We only wish tosee the financial policy established on sound recognized economicprinciples, with fair and equitable taxation calculated according tothe proper requirements of the State. 

Press Agitation--Political Organizations: We have already informedyou, that so far as we know, there has been no organized pressagitation, and that we should be willing at all times to deprecatethe stirring up of strife between nationalities caused by any agencywhatsoever. We consider it desirable to see that feeling moregeneral, as we are convinced that exaggerated press campaignsconducted by newspapers generally reported to be influenced by theGovernment, and tending to create dissension amongst the variousclasses of the community, are calculated to cause an infinite amountof harm to the vested interests of all sections of the population. 

Dynamite: In your letter of the 8th April, you appear to have lostsight of the fact that the proposed settlement was submitted to us asa whole. Mr. Lippert made it clear that, in consideration of theGovernment granting the measures enumerated in his memorandum, it wasexpected that we should abandon our present contentions, and declareourselves satisfied with the settlement proposed by the Government. Under ordinary circumstances this would be far from meeting ourdesires, but we intimated to you that we should be willing torecommend to the mining industry the adoption of the proposals madeto us on this subject, if by so doing we could promote a permanentsatisfactory solution of all pending questions. 

In conclusion, we beg to refer to the publication of our previousletter to you. It took place here on the 6th inst. , in the afternoon;we immediately instituted an inquiry, and on the 8th inst. , in themorning, we wrote that we were in a position to assure you that wecould in no way be held responsible for the publication. We never fora moment doubted your good faith, nor that of the other gentlemen forwhom the letter was meant, but thought that possibly thecommunication could have been made through one of your subordinates. However, not being certain of the fact, we merely repudiated anyresponsibility on our part, and regret that you should have publiclylaid the blame on our side, without having communicated with us, asking for an explanation, if you had any suspicion. 

We beg to assure you that we are as willing as ever to co-operatewith you in arriving at a settlement of all pending differences inorder to secure peace and prosperity in this country, and we shall beready at all times to meet and discuss with you, or any otherdelegates of the Government, any matter likely to bring about aspeedy and permanent solution of all questions, still bearing in mindwhat we mentioned in our previous correspondence, that we are notqualified to speak on behalf of the whole community. 

As you have informed us that you have no objection to it, we shallgive a copy of this letter to the press. 

We have the honour to be, honourable Sir, Your obedient servants, G. ROULIOT, JOHN M. PIERCE, A. BRAKHAN, E. BIRKENRUTH. 

(Mr. Pistorius, being absent from town, could not sign this letter. )

ANNEXURE 'A'

MR. E. LIPPERT'S MEMORANDUM. 

1. Cessation of press agitation here and in Europe. 

2. Support on the coolie question. 

3. Settlement of the dynamite question. 

4. Loan (if required). 

5. Severance from the S. A. League. 

6. Appointment of State Financier and State Auditor, of Europeanreputation, with a seat and vote on the Executive in all questions offinance. 

7. No new taxation of mines until submitted by Minister ofFinance. 

8. Moderate valuation of bewaarplaatsen. 

9. Burgher rights--five years--property test. 

ANNEXURE 'B. '

Cessation of press agitation here and in Europe. 

Support to the Government in its treatment of the cooliequestion. 

Settlement of the dynamite question. 

Deprecate the objects of the S. A. League. 

Support the placing of a loan if Government wishes it. 

Appointment of a financial adviser to the Government, of Europeanreputation, and of an Auditor, both with seats and votes in theExecutive Council on all financial matters. (This has been amended bythe Government, so far as the Auditor is concerned, to retain thepresent Auditor, and to give him, _re_ dismissal, the same status asa Judge, and to make him directly responsible to the Volksraad. )

No fresh taxation to be levied on the mines until the FinancialAdviser has laid his proposals before the Government. 

Sale of the undermining rights to the holders of surface rights(bewaarplaatsen, &c. ), at a moderate valuation. 

Extension of the franchise by granting burgher rights after . . . Yearsof registration, coupled with a property test. 

ANNEXURE 'C. '

DRAFT OF DECLARATION TO FOLLOW PROTOCOL EMBODYING THE RESOLUTIONSAGREED UPON. 

. . . Thereupon the subscribed parties from Johannesburg, forthemselves, and for the parties they represent here and in Europe, declared:--

'The passing by the Volksraad of the laws to be submitted by theGovernment during this session, --

'For the appointment during the present year of a Financial Adviserto the Government, of European reputation, who shall have a seat anda vote in the Executive Council on all financial matters. 

'For placing the Auditor-General on the same status _re_ dismissal asthe Judges, and for making him responsible directly to the Volksraad, it being agreed that until such Financial Adviser has laid his budgetproposals before the Government, no fresh taxation shall be laid uponthe mining industry, nor any other direct taxation. 

'For granting the undermining rights under bewaarplaatsen, machinestands, and water-rights, to the present holders of the licences, covering such reserved areas at a moderate valuation; such valuationto be arrived at in the following manner: The Government to appoint avaluator, with instructions to value these rights at a fair andmoderate valuation, the holder of the surface licence to appoint avaluator; if they agree, then the surface licence holder shall havethe first right to the undermining rights at such valuation; if thetwo valuators cannot agree about a valuation, they shall appointtogether an umpire; if they cannot agree about an umpire, the Chiefjustice of the High Court shall be asked to appoint an umpire; thedecision of such umpire shall be final as to the value of the areaunder arbitration. If the holder of the surface licence refuses topurchase at the said valuation, the Government shall be at liberty todispose of it elsewhere. 

'For a permanent settlement of the dynamite question on one or theother bases following, namely, that the _status quo_ remain in forcetill the end of the contract period, the Government making use of itsright to revise the prices under the terms of the agreement or thatthe Dynamite Company reduce the price by 5s. To 70s. For No. 1 and to90s. For blasting gelatine, the Government undertaking to take overthe works of the Dynamite Company at the end of the agreement at avaluation as provided by the offer now before the Volksraad. 

'For an extension of the franchise to all white aliens in this State, in the following manner: That naturalization be granted to allseeking it, who have resided in the State for two years and who areof good behaviour and who have not suffered any dishonourablesentence by any Court, upon taking the oath of allegiance asprescribed by the existing law; upon such naturalization he shall beentitled to elect a member to the Second Volksraad, and two yearsafter shall be entitled to be elected as a member of the SecondVolksraad. A period of seven years having elapsed afternaturalization, he shall by virtue of that lapse of time and withoutfurther hindrance obtain full burgher rights, the Government, however, reserve to themselves the right (in order to secure thepassing of such law through the Volksraad of this and that of thesession of 1900) to extend the period of naturalization for the rightof voting for the election of a President. Children of naturalizedaliens, who attain their majority when their father has obtained fullburgher rights, have _ipso facto_ the same rights as the father. TheGovernment shall also have the right to attach a moderate propertyqualification to the obtaining of these extended franchise rights. Itis understood that by the laws of the State, this extended franchisecan only finally be granted by the Volksraad in session 1900, afterthe law has been submitted to the people for twelve months, but thatthe period of 9 resp. 7 years shall date from the passing of theresolution to be passed by the Volksraad now in session. 

will be hailed by us with great satisfaction as removing allobstacles to a friendly and peaceful development of mutualunderstanding and co-operation; it is our wish, and in the interestof those we represent, that the public in Europe and in South Africabe made fully aware hereof by means of the press, and that hostileagitation by means of the press here and elsewhere shall be avoidedin future. 

'We deprecate all attempts that may be made by political agencies tostir up strife between the different nationalities inhabiting thisState, and shall not be parties to any such organizations. 

'Seeing the many evils springing from indiscriminate immigration ofcoloured races, and having been assured that the Government will doall in its power to facilitate in other ways the supply of labour, wesupport the Government in its contention that the regulationsconcerning the treatment of "coolies and other coloured races" hadbest be left to them as a matter of internal concern. 

'We will support the placing of a State loan recommended by theFinancier in the European markets at reasonable rates, if theGovernment should desire us to do so in the common interest. 

'Seeing the great value the Government evidently sets upon a friendlyand permanent settlement of the dynamite question, which hascontributed so much to disturbing the good relations, we declareourselves satisfied with the final settlement arrived at. 

'And should, after the passing of the above proposals of law as awhole by the Volksraad, the Government desire us to give publicity tothis our declaration for the promotion of peace and goodwill, suchpublicity as the Government may desire shall be given thereto. '

While the negotiations were actually in progress, and while theImperial Government were awaiting a reply to their dispatch, thePresident made two determined attempts to rush the confirmation ofthe dynamite monopoly through the Raad. The first proposal was forthe fifteen years' extension, and the second provided for condonationof all breaches of the concession in the past and for compensationupon the expiry of the concession. 

The Uitlanders had not failed to perceive that the pit dug for themmight conceivably serve another purpose. They ignored these twobreaches of faith on the part of the President, and pursued thenegotiations; and Mr. Kruger overreached himself. Having failed withJohannesburg, and having failed in the Raad, he appealed to hisburghers with the scheme of mock reform. His hope was to get suchsupport in the country that the Volksraad in its May session wouldhave to spare the monopoly. He did not realize that he would have tomake good the things which he had offered as shams. His greed hadgiven the opening: his hand had provided the weapon. It is not goodto be too clever; and the luck had turned. 

The publication of the correspondence between the Government and thecapitalists created a profound impression. The series of speechesdelivered by the President in support of his sham reforms onlydeepened that impression by providing more and more convincingevidence as to who the real intriguers and mischief-makers were. Tothe Uitlander public one thing became quite clear, and that was thatit was the Government who wished to barter their rights away and thecapitalists--the abused capitalists--who refused to do so. An attemptwas immediately made to hold a large public meeting for the purposeof endorsing the attitude taken by the negotiators, but theGovernment refused permission to hold an open-air meeting. In theirattempt to hold a meeting indoors, the Uitlanders were defeated bythe building being condemned as unsafe. The Government yielded, however, before the storm of disapproval which followed theirprohibition, and the State Secretary, Mr. Reitz, suggested that theUitlanders should hold a series of small indoor meetings in differentlocalities. The meetings were accordingly held, and they providedunmistakable evidence of the gravity of the position. By theirnumbers, their unanimity, their enthusiasm, and their moderation, the Uitlanders carried conviction to some and roused the graveapprehension of others. Among the latter, it is fair to infer, werePresident Kruger and his sympathizers in the Free State and CapeColony. 

There is one disability the existence of which the advocates of theUitlander cause are always painfully conscious of. They know as wellas any of their critics that it is no picture which is allblack--that you get no perspective, no effects, without contrasts!Yet it has not been believed that they were willing to acknowledgethe good that there was, and that a politic instinct no less than asense of justice prompted a diligent effort to discover and make muchof the genuinely hopeful signs. The monotony was none of theirmaking; it was in the nature of the facts, and not of the recital;but monotony there was, and it was productive of one very bad result. The conditions, admittedly bad, came to be regarded by a good many asbeing only as bad as they had for a long time been known to be, leaving little hope except through the long slow influence of time, but causing no immediate anxiety or alarm. Someday a grubbinghistorian may read the back files of South African newspapers andmarvel that such warnings should have passed unheeded, but the factis that the Transvaal Government and its sympathizers had becomeindifferent to warnings followed by no results and accustomed toprophecies unfulfilled. To say that they were 'fiddling while Romeburned' is to a great extent true of those of the South African Dutchwho were sincerely desirous that the Transvaal Government shouldreform its ways and who were not consciously aiding in therepublicanizing movement; but even of them it is not an adequatedescription, --as the answers given to two questioners by the mostprominent and one of the most prominent Bondsmen indicate. Both ofthem had in private conversation on different occasions acknowledgedthe soundness of the Uitlander cause. To the suggestion, 'Then whynot say so publicly?' the less important of the two replied, 'Peoplewould only say that I am climbing down and ratting on my party. ' Andthe more important of the two, answering a similar question, said, 'Yes, the Rev. S. J. Du Toit did that. He was the founder of theBond; and to-day he is--nothing! If I did it, I should fall as hedid. ' 'Then, ' said his British friend, 'what is influence worth if itcannot be used for good? Can there be said to be influence when itcannot be used at all?' 'No, ' was the reply, 'I have no influence asagainst the cry of race: blood is thicker than water; and I have noinfluence at all with Kruger. ' The answer to this contained the cruxof the question. 'Indeed you have; but you have not the courage toexercise it. The influence of advice has failed, dare you try theinfluence of repudiation?' The answer was a shake of the head and'Blood is thicker than water. ' That is it! The Piper pipes and thechildren follow. 

It is too much to believe that the conference between the HighCommissioner and President Kruger was a suggestion to which thelatter had to be won over either by President Steyn or Mr. Hofmeyr. It is, indeed, well-known that the idea of a meeting for the purposeof discussing matters at issue between the two Governments had beenconsidered in Pretoria for some months before it actually tookplace. {51}

The news that, upon the invitation of President Steyn, the HighCommissioner and President Kruger had agreed to meet at Bloemfontein, was received by the Uitlanders with relief; not hope, because it wasbelieved that the President's object was to get something, not togive something; but sheer relief, because, come what might, theposition could never again be the same as it was before theconference. Something must change; someone must yield; the unbearablestrain must cease. Sir Alfred Milner--wise and just andstrong--commanded the entire confidence of the Uitlanders. It was nothoped that he would succeed in effecting a settlement at such ameeting, because in the circumstances such an achievement wasbelieved not to be humanly possible; but it was not feared that hewould fail in his duty to his country and to his trust. 

It is no part of the object of this volume to deal with thenegotiations which took place at Bloemfontein or with the terms ofsettlement at the present moment under discussion; the object is torecite the circumstances and conditions which made these negotiationsnecessary, and which, if they fail, must lead to bloodshed. 

With a barrier of insurmountable race feeling before them, theUitlanders are hopeless of effecting a peaceful redress of theirgrievances except by the aid of the Suzerain power. The President andhis party will not yield one iota except upon the advice of those whohave the will and the power to see that that advice is followed. Suchpower rests in two quarters. It rests with the progressive Dutch ofSouth Africa. They have the power, but unfortunately they have not asyet the will or they have not the courage to use it. Time after timehave they been stultified by rallying to the cry of race anddefending Mr. Kruger's attitude on certain points, only to find thePresident abandoning as untenable the position which they haveproclaimed to be proper. To them have been addressed most earnest andmost solemn appeals to be up and doing whilst there was yet time. From them have been extracted--in times of peace--the amplestadmissions of the justice of the Uitlander case. But there is a pointbeyond which they will not go. They will not say to the President andhis party: 'We cannot extol in you what we would condemn inourselves. The claim of kindred cannot for ever be the stalking-horsefor injustice. ' That they cannot do; and thus are they bonded to theone who will raise the race cry without scruple. There is no morehopeless feature for the peaceful settlement of the Transvaalquestion from within than the unanimity which marks the publicutterances of those who are claimed as representing Afrikandersentiment in the present crisis. Those expressions, ranging from themost violent denunciations by politicians and ministers of the gospeldown to the most illogical and hysterical appeals of public writers, all, all are directed against the injured. Not a warning, not ahint--not a prayer even--addressed to the offender. They have not thesense of justice to see or they have not the courage to denounce theperpetrators of evil, but direct all their efforts to hushing thecomplaints of the victims. Truly it would almost appear that thereis some guiding principle running through it all; something whichrecognizes the real sinner in the victim who complains and not inthe villain who perpetrates; the something which found a concreteexpression when bail was fixed at £200 for the murder of a Britishsubject and at £1, 000 for the crime of objecting to it. 

No civilized body of men ever had more just cause for complaint thanthe Uitlanders of the Transvaal have, but they carry on their reformmovement under very difficult and discouraging conditions. Those whohave petitioned their Sovereign to secure for them some ameliorationof their lot are branded by the head of the State as rebels for sodoing, and his example is followed by all his party. Those men whoorganized or addressed the public meetings which were suggested byMr. Reitz, the State Secretary, and held for the purpose ofdiscussing a proposal publicly made by the Government, are the menwhom Messrs. Dieperink and Viljoen, the members representingJohannesburg in the First and Second Volksraads, denounced astraitors who should be summarily dealt with by the Government. British subjects associated with the Uitlander cause who venture tocall upon the British Agent in Pretoria or the High Commissioner inCape Town are regarded as conspirators and are watched by spies andall their movements are reported to the Transvaal Government. {52} Therecognized leaders among the Uitlanders are black-listed in the Dutchpress, their names, addresses, and occupations given so that they maybe identified, --marked down in the newspapers supported by theGovernment--as men to be dragged out and shot without trial. Uitlander newspapers have been suppressed for mere political reasons, without even the allegation that there was incitement to violence ordisorder, and it is therefore not unreasonable that the impunitywith which the Dutch newspapers continue this campaign month aftermonth should be taken as the measure of the Government's complicity. 

It is in these circumstances that appeal has been made to England, the only other quarter in which there rests the power to see thatjustice shall be done. It is an appeal which might well be based uponthe broad and acknowledged right of a subject to claim in case ofinjustice the good offices of his own Government. But here it isbased upon a special right. It is the _spirit_{53} of the PretoriaConvention which the Uitlander has invoked for many years, only to betold that the spirit is as it may be interpreted from the letter. Butit is not so! Will it be suggested that the British Governmentcontemplated such license when they granted the charter ofself-government to the Transvaal or that they would have grantedit had they foreseen the interpretation? Can it be said that Mr. Kruger and his colleagues contemplated it or would have dared to avowthe intention if it were ever entertained? No! And he will be abolder man than Mr. Kruger who will dispute that answer; for thePresident's own defence is, not that he had the intention or has theright to differentiate between races and between classes; but--thathe does not differentiate. So that the issue is narrowed to this, that it is merely a question of fact!

But the appeal of British subjects in the Transvaal will claim ahearing for other reasons too! Only the blindest can fail to realizehow much is at stake, materially and morally, or can fail to see whatis the real issue, and how the Mother Country stands on trial beforeall her children, who are the Empire. Only those who do not countwill refuse to face the responsibility in all seriousness, or willfail to receive in the best spirit the timely reminder of pastneglect. If the reproaching truth be a hard thing to hear, it is, forthose whose every impulse jumps towards championing the great HomeLand, a far, far harder thing to say. Unpleasant it may be, but notwithout good, that England's record in South Africa--of subjectsabandoned and of rights ignored, of duty neglected and of pledgeunkept, of lost prestige and slipping Empire--should speak to quickena memory and rouse the native sense of right, so that a nation'sconscience will say 'Be just before you are generous! Be just toall--even to your own!'

Footnotes for Chapter XI

{49} It is stated that President Kruger, ever since the signing ofthe London Convention on Majuba Day--February 27--1884, has believedin certain lucky days, and has a kind of superstitious regard foranniversaries. If that be so, the incidence of events has given himsomething to ponder over during the last three years. Three notableschemes conceived by himself and carefully designed to strengthen hisposition, have by a curious coincidence matured upon dates of certaininterest in Transvaal history. All three have failed disastrously. The first anniversary of the Reformers' sentence day was the occasionof the Reformers giving evidence before the Industrial Commission, which so strongly justified their case. The Peace Negotiations withthe Capitalists were opened by Mr. Lippert upon the anniversary ofMajuba. The Bloemfontein Conference was opened upon the Reformers'emancipation day, the expiry of the three years' silence. That hisHonour really attaches importance to these things was shown when overtwo hundred ministers representing the Dutch Reformed Church in theTransvaal met in Pretoria to urge upon him the suppression of theIllicit Liquor trade. In all innocence they had chosen May 24 onwhich to present their address. Their astonishment was great when Mr. Kruger, passing lightly by the liquor question, gave the assembledpastors a thorough wigging for finding fault with his administrationat all, but chiefly for their unpatriotic conduct in selecting theQueen's birthday of all days on which to expose internal differencesin their country. 

{50} In addressing a meeting of burghers in Heidelburg three monthslater the President showed to what lengths he was prepared to go indefending the monopoly when in reply to a question he denied that anysuch offer had been received '_by the Executive. '_ The explanation, which he did not give, is that the _Government, i. E. , _ the Presidentand State Secretary, had received it--and withheld it from theExecutive!

{51} In March the writer made the suggestion to a representative ofthe Pretoria Government in the hope of getting rid by a 'square talk'of the many and ever-increasing differences, and was informed thatthe idea had often been discussed and as often abandoned, because itcontained the objectionable feature of establishing a precedent forEngland's interference in internal affairs. 

{52} When on a visit to Cape Town in April, the writer calledseveral times upon the High Commissioner, and learning by privateadvice that his movements were being reported in detail through theSecret Service Department, he informed Sir Alfred Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret agents in Britishterritory and spies round or in Government House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that such things should not deter those whowished to call on him, as he was there as the representative of herMajesty for the benefit of British subjects and very desirous ofascertaining for himself the facts of the case. 

{53} Since this was written, Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the Houseof Commons on July 28, 1899, has thus disposed of the question:--

'It has been broken in the spirit more than it has been broken in theletter. The whole spirit of the convention is the preservation ofequality as between all the white inhabitants of the Transvaal, andthe whole policy of the Transvaal has been to promote a position ofinferiority on the part of certain classes. There is something evenmore striking than that. The conventions were, of course, the resultof a previous conference. At that conference definite promises weremade which made it impossible to doubt with what object theconvention was signed. On May 10, 1881, at a conference betweenrepresentatives of her Majesty and representatives of the Transvaalthe President, Sir Hercules Robinson, asked this question:--

'"Before annexation had British subjects complete freedom of tradethroughout the Transvaal? Were they on the same footing as citizensof the Transvaal?

'"Mr. Kruger replied: They were on the same footing as the burghers. There was not the slightest difference in accordance with the SandRiver Convention. 

'"Sir Hercules Robinson: I presume you will not object to thatcontinuing?

'"Mr. Kruger: No. There will be equal protection for everybody. 

'"Sir Evelyn Wood: And equal privileges. 

'"Mr. Kruger: We make no difference so far as burgher rights areconcerned. There may, perhaps, be some slight difference in the caseof a young person who has just come into the country. "

(Cheers. ) 'Now, there is a distinct promise given by the man who isnow President of the Transvaal State that, so far as burgher rightswere concerned, they made and would make no difference whateverbetween burghers and those who came in. The root of the difficultywhich I have been describing lies in the fact that this promise hasnot been kept. '

APPENDICES. 

APPENDIX A. 

PRETORIA CONVENTION. 

CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL TERRITORY. 

 _August, 1881. _

PREAMBLE. 

Her Majesty's Commissioners for the Settlement of the Transvaalterritory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under theRoyal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April, 1881, dohereby undertake and guarantee on behalf of Her Majesty that, fromand after the 8th day of August, 1881, complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal territory, uponthe following terms and conditions, and subject to the followingreservations and limitations:--

ARTICLE I. 

The said territory, to be hereinafter called the Transvaal State, will embrace the land lying between the following boundaries, to wit:[here follow three pages in print defining boundaries. ]

ARTICLE II. 

Her Majesty reserves to herself, her heirs and successors, (_a_) theright from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for thesaid State, with such duties and functions as are hereinafterdefined; (_b_) the right to move troops through the said State intime of war, or in case of the apprehension of immediate war betweenthe Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or Native tribe in SouthAfrica; and (_c_) the control of the external relations of the saidState, including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct ofdiplomatic intercourse with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to becarried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular officersabroad. 

ARTICLE III. 

Until altered by the Volksraad, or other competent authority, alllaws, whether passed before or after the annexation of the Transvaalterritory to Her Majesty's dominions, shall, except in so far as theyare inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of thisConvention, be and remain in force in the said State in so far asthey shall be applicable thereto, provided that no futureenactment especially affecting the interest of natives shall haveany force or effect in the said State, without the consent of HerMajesty, her heirs and successors, first had and obtained andsignified to the Government of the said State through the BritishResident, provided further that in no case will the repeal oramendment of any laws enacted since the annexation have aretrospective effect, so as to invalidate any acts done orliabilities incurred by virtue of such laws. 

ARTICLE IV. 

On the 8th day of August, 1881, the Government of the said State, together with all rights and obligations thereto appertaining, andall State property taken over at the time of annexation, save andexcept munitions of war, will be handed over to Messrs. StephanusJohannes Paulus Kruger, Martinus Wessel Pretorius, and Petrus JacobusJoubert, or the survivor or survivors of them, who will forthwithcause a Volksraad to be elected and convened, and the Volksraad, thuselected and convened, will decide as to the further administration ofthe Government of the said State. 

ARTICLE V. 

All sentences passed upon persons who may be convicted of offencescontrary to the rules of civilized warfare committed during therecent hostilities will be duly carried out, and no alteration ormitigation of such sentences will be made or allowed by theGovernment of the Transvaal State without Her Majesty's consentconveyed through the British Resident. In case there shall be anyprisoners in any of the gaols of the Transvaal State whose respectivesentences of imprisonment have been remitted in part by Her Majesty'sAdministrator or other officer administering the Government, suchremission will be recognized and acted upon by the future Governmentof the said State. 

ARTICLE VI. 

Her Majesty's Government will make due compensation for all losses ordamage sustained by reason of such acts as are in the 8th Articlehereinafter specified, which may have been committed by Her Majesty'sforces during the recent hostilities, except for such losses ordamage as may already have been compensated for, and the Governmentof the Transvaal State will make due compensation for all losses ordamage sustained by reason of such acts as are in the 8th Articlehereinafter specified which may have been committed by the people whowere in arms against Her Majesty during the recent hostilities, except for such losses or damages as may already have beencompensated for. 

ARTICLE VII. 

The decision of all claims for compensation, as in the last precedingArticle mentioned, will be referred to a Sub-Commission, consistingof the Honourable George Hudson, the Honourable Jacobus Petrus deWet, and the Honourable John Gilbert Kotzé. In case one or more ofsuch Sub-Commissioners shall be unable or unwilling to act, theremaining Sub-Commissioner or Sub-Commissioners will, afterconsultation with the Government of the Transvaal State, submit forthe approval of Her Majesty's High Commissioners the names of one ormore persons to be appointed by them to fill the place or places thusvacated. The decision of the said Sub-Commissioners, or of a majorityof them, will be final. The said Sub-Commissioners will enter uponand perform their duties with all convenient speed. They will, beforetaking evidence or ordering evidence to be taken in respect of anyclaim, decide whether such claim can be entertained at all under therules laid down in the next succeeding Article. In regard to claimswhich can be so entertained, the Sub-Commissioners will in the firstinstance afford every facility for an amicable arrangement as to theamount payable in respect of any claim, and only in cases in whichthere is no reasonable ground for believing that an immediateamicable arrangement can be arrived at will they take evidence ororder evidence to be taken. For the purpose of taking evidence andreporting thereon, the Sub-Commissioners may appoint Deputies, whowill, without delay, submit records of the evidence and their reportsto the Sub-Commissioners. The Sub-Commissioners will arrange theirsittings and the sittings of their Deputies in such a manner as toafford the earliest convenience to the parties concerned and theirwitnesses. In no case will costs be allowed to either side other thanthe actual and reasonable expenses of witnesses whose evidence iscertified by the Sub-Commissioners to have been necessary. Interestwill not run on the amount of any claim, except as is hereinafterprovided for. The said Sub-Commissioners will forthwith, afterdeciding upon any claim, announce their decision to the Governmentagainst which the award is made and to the claimant. The amount ofremuneration payable to the Sub-Commissioners and their Deputies willbe determined by the High Commissioners. After all the claims havebeen decided upon, the British Government and the Government ofthe Transvaal State will pay proportionate shares of the saidremuneration and of the expenses of the Sub-Commissioners and theirDeputies, according to the amount awarded against them respectively. 

ARTICLE VIII. 

For the purpose of distinguishing claims to be accepted from those tobe rejected, the Sub-Commissioners will be guided by the followingrules, viz. :--Compensation will be allowed for losses or damagesustained by reason of the following acts committed during the recenthostilities, viz. : _(a)_ commandeering, seizure, confiscation, ordestruction of property, or damage done to property; _(b)_ violencedone or threats used by persons in arms. In regard to acts under_(a)_, compensation will be allowed for direct losses only. In regardto acts falling under _(b)_, compensation will be allowed for actuallosses of property, or actual injury to the same proved to have beencaused by its enforced abandonment. No claims for indirect losses, except such as are in this Article especially provided for, will beentertained. No claims which have been handed in to the Secretary ofthe Royal Commission after the 1st day of July, 1881, will beentertained, unless the Sub-Commissioners shall be satisfied thatthe delay was reasonable. When claims for loss of property areconsidered, the Sub-Commissioners will require distinct proof of theexistence of the property, and that it neither has reverted nor willrevert to the claimant. 

ARTICLE IX. 

The Government of the Transvaal State will pay and satisfy the amountof every claim awarded against it within one month after theSub-Commissioners shall have notified their decision to the saidGovernment, and in default of such payment the said Government willpay interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum from the date ofsuch default; but Her Majesty's Government may at any time beforesuch payment pay the amount, with interest, if any, to the claimantin satisfaction of his claim, and may add the sum thus paid to anydebt which may be due by the Transvaal State to Her Majesty'sGovernment, as hereinafter provided for. 

ARTICLE X. 

The Transvaal State will be liable for the balance of the debts forwhich the South African Republic was liable at the date ofannexation, to wit, the sum of £48, 000 in respect of the CapeCommercial Bank Loan, and £85, 667 in respect of the Railway Loan, together with the amount due on 8th August, 1881, on account of theOrphan Chamber Debt, which now stands at £22, 200, which debts will bea first charge upon the revenues of the State. The Transvaal Statewill, moreover, be liable for the lawful expenditure lawfullyincurred for the necessary expenses of the Province since theannexation, to wit, the sum of £265, 000, which debt, together withsuch debts as may be incurred by virtue of the 9th Article, will be asecond charge upon the revenues of the State. 

ARTICLE XI. 

The debts due as aforesaid by the Transvaal State to Her Majesty'sGovernment will bear interest at the rate of three and a half percent. , and any portion of such debt which may remain unpaid at theexpiration of twelve months from the 8th August, 1881, shall berepayable by a payment for interest and sinking fund of six poundsand nine pence per cent, per annum, which will extinguish the debt intwenty-live years. The said payment of six pounds and nine pence per£100 shall be payable half yearly in British currency on the 8thFebruary and 8th August in each year. Provided always that theTransvaal State shall pay in reduction of the said debt the sum of£100, 000 within twelve months of the 8th August, 1881, and shall beat liberty at the close of any half-year to pay off the whole or anyportion of the outstanding debt. 

ARTICLE XII. 

All persons holding property in the said State on the 8th day ofAugust, 1881, will continue after the said date to enjoy the rightsof property which they have enjoyed since the annexation. No personwho has remained loyal to Her Majesty during the recent hostilitiesshall suffer any molestation by reason of his loyalty, or be liableto any criminal prosecution or civil action for any part taken inconnection with such hostilities, and all such persons will have fullliberty to reside in the country, with enjoyment of all civil rights, and protection for their persons and property. 

ARTICLE XIII. 

Natives will be allowed to acquire land, but the grant or transfer ofsuch land will, in every case, be made to and registered in the nameof the Native Location Commission, hereinafter mentioned, in trustfor such natives. 

ARTICLE XIV. 

Natives will be allowed to move as freely within the country as maybe consistent with the requirements of public order, and to leave itfor the purpose of seeking employment elsewhere or for other lawfulpurposes, subject always to the pass laws of the said State, asamended by the Legislature of the Province, or as may hereafter beenacted under the provisions of the Third Article of this Convention. 

ARTICLE XV. 

There will continue to be complete freedom of religion and protectionfrom molestation for all denominations, provided the same be notinconsistent with morality and good order, and no disability shallattach to any person in regard to rights of property by reason of thereligious opinions which he holds. 

ARTICLE XVI. 

The provisions of the Fourth Article of the Sand River Convention arehereby reaffirmed, and no slavery or apprenticeship partaking ofslavery will be tolerated by the Government of the said State. 

ARTICLE XVII. 

The British Resident will receive from the Government of theTransvaal State such assistance and support as can by law be given tohim for the due discharge of his functions; he will also receiveevery assistance for the proper care and preservation of the gravesof such of Her Majesty's forces as have died in the Transvaal, and ifneed be for the expropriation of land for the purpose. 

ARTICLE XVIII. 

The following will be the duties and functions of the BritishResident:

_Sub-section_ 1. --He will perform duties and functions analogous tothose discharged by a Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General. 

_Sub-section_ 2. --In regard to natives within the Transvaal State, hewill (_a_) report to the High Commissioner, as representative of theSuzerain, as to the working and observance of the provisions of thisConvention; (_b_) report to the Transvaal authorities any cases ofill-treatment of natives or attempts to incite natives to rebellionthat may come to his knowledge; (_c_) use his influence with thenatives in favour of law and order; and (_d_) generally perform suchother duties as are by this Convention entrusted to him, and takesuch steps for the protection of the person and property of nativesas are consistent with the laws of the land. 

_Sub-section_ 3. --In regard to natives not residing in the Transvaal, (_a_) he will report to the High Commissioner and the TransvaalGovernment any encroachments reported to him as having been made byTransvaal residents upon the land of such natives, and in case ofdisagreement between the Transvaal Government and the BritishResident as to whether an encroachment had been made, the decision ofthe Suzerain will be final (_b_) the British Resident will be themedium of communication with native chiefs outside the Transvaal, and, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, asrepresenting the Suzerain, he will control the conclusion of treatieswith them; and (_c_) he will arbitrate upon every dispute betweenTransvaal residents and natives outside the Transvaal (us to actscommitted beyond the boundaries of the Transvaal) which may bereferred to him by the parties interested. 

_Sub-section_ 4. --In regard to communications with foreign Powers, the Transvaal Government will correspond with Her Majesty'sGovernment through the British Resident and the High Commissioner. 

ARTICLE XIX. 

The Government of the Transvaal State will strictly adhere to theboundaries defined in the First Article of this Convention, and willdo its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making anyencroachment upon lands beyond the said State. The Royal Commissionwill forthwith appoint a person who will beacon off the boundary linebetween Ramatlabama and the point where such line first touchesGriqualand West boundary, midway between the Vaal and Hart rivers;the person so appointed will be instructed to make an arrangementbetween the owners of the farms Grootfontein and Valleifontein on theone hand, and the Barolong authorities on the other, by which a fairshare of the water supply of the said farms shall be allowed to flowundisturbed to the said Barolongs. 

ARTICLE XX. 

All grants or titles issued at any time by the Transvaal Governmentin respect of land outside the boundary of Transvaal State, asdefined, Article I. , shall be considered invalid and of no effect, except in so far as any such grant or title relates to land thatfalls within the boundary of the Transvaal State, and all personsholding any such grant so considered invalid and of no effect willreceive from the Government of the Transvaal State such compensationeither in land or in money as the Volksraad shall determine. In allcases in which any native chiefs or other authorities outside thesaid boundaries have received any adequate consideration from theGovernment of the former South African Republic for land excludedfrom the Transvaal by the First Article of this Convention, or wherepermanent improvements have been made on the land, the BritishResident will, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, usehis influence to recover from the native authorities faircompensation for the loss of the land thus excluded, and of thepermanent improvement thereon. 

ARTICLE XXI. 

Forthwith, after the taking effect of this Convention, a NativeLocation Commission will be constituted, consisting of the President, or in his absence the Vice-President of the State, or some onedeputed by him, the Resident, or some one deputed by him, and a thirdperson to be agreed upon by the President or the Vice-President, asthe case may be, and the Resident, and such Commission will be astanding body for the performance of the duties hereinaftermentioned. 

ARTICLE XXII. 

The Native Location Commission will reserve to the native tribes ofthe State such locations as they may be fairly and equitably entitledto, due regard being had to the actual occupation of such tribes. TheNative Location Commission will clearly define the boundaries of suchlocations, and for that purpose will, in every instance, first of allascertain the wishes of the parties interested in such land. In caseland already granted in individual titles shall be required for thepurpose of any location, the owners will receive such compensationeither in other land or in money as the Volksraad shall determine. After the boundaries of any location have been fixed, no fresh grantof land within such location will be made, nor will the boundaries bealtered without the consent of the Location Commission. No freshgrants of land will be made in the districts of Waterberg, Zoutpansberg, and Lydenburg until the locations in the said districtsrespectively shall have been defined by the said Commission. 

ARTICLE XXIII. 

If not released before the taking effect of this Convention, Sikukuni, and those of his followers who have been imprisoned withhim, will be forthwith released, and the boundaries of his locationwill be defined by the Native Location Commission in the mannerindicated in the last preceding Article. 

ARTICLE XXIV. 

The independence of the Swazies within the boundary line ofSwaziland, as indicated in the First Article of this Convention, willbe fully recognized. 

ARTICLE XXV. 

No other or higher duties will be imposed on the importation into theTransvaal State of any article the produce or manufacture of thedominions and possessions of Her Majesty, from whatever placearriving, than are or may be payable on the like article the produceor manufacture of any other country, nor will any prohibition bemaintained or imposed on the importation of any article the produceor manufacture of the dominions and possessions of Her Majesty, whichshall not equally extend to the importation of the like articlesbeing the produce or manufacture of any other country. 

ARTICLE XXVI. 

All persons other than natives conforming themselves to the laws ofthe Transvaal State (_a_) will have full liberty with their familiesto enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Transvaal State; (_b_)they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactures, warehouses, shops, and premises; (_c_) they may carry on theircommerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think toemploy; (_d_) they will not be subject in respect of their persons orproperty, or in respect of their commerce or industry to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may beimposed upon Transvaal citizens. 

ARTICLE XXVII. 

All inhabitants of the Transvaal shall have free access to the Courtsof Justice for the protection and defence of their rights. 

ARTICLE XXVIII. 

All persons other than natives who established their domicile in theTransvaal between the 12th day of April, 1877, and the date when thisConvention comes into effect, and who shall within twelve monthsafter such last-mentioned date have their names registered by theBritish Resident, shall be exempt from all compulsory militaryservice whatever. The Resident shall notify such registration to theGovernment of the Transvaal State. 

ARTICLE XXIX. 

Provision shall hereafter be made by a separate instrument for themutual extradition of criminals, and also for the surrender ofdeserters from Her Majesty's forces. 

ARTICLE XXX. 

All debts contracted since the annexation will be payable in the samecurrency in which they may have been contracted; all uncancelledpostage and other revenue stamps issued by the Government since theannexation will remain valid, and will be accepted at their presentvalue by the future Government of the State; all licenses duly issuedsince the annexation will remain in force during the period for whichthey may have been issued. 

ARTICLE XXXI. 

No grants of land which may have been made, and no transfer ofmortgage which may have been passed since the annexation, will beinvalidated by reason merely of their having been made or passedsince that date. All transfers to the British Secretary for NativeAffairs in trust for natives will remain in force, the NativeLocation Commission taking the place of such Secretary for NativeAffairs. 

ARTICLE XXXII. 

This Convention will be ratified by a newly-elected Volksraad withinthe period of three months after its execution, and in default ofsuch ratification this Convention shall be null and void. 

ARTICLE XXXIII. 

Forthwith, after the ratification of this Convention, as in the lastpreceding Article mentioned, all British troops in Transvaalterritory will leave the same, and the mutual delivery of munitionsof war will be carried out. Articles end. Here will follow signaturesof Royal Commissioners, then the following to precede signatures oftriumvirate. 

We, the undersigned, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, MartinusWessel Pretorius, and Petrus Jacobus Joubert, as representatives ofthe Transvaal Burghers, do hereby agree to all the above conditions, reservations, and limitations under which self-government has beenrestored to the inhabitants of the Transvaal territory, subject tothe suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, and we agreeto accept the Government of the said territory, with all rights andobligations thereto appertaining, on the 8th day of August; and wepromise and undertake that this Convention shall be ratified by anewly-elected Volksraad of the Transvaal State within three monthsfrom this date. 

APPENDIX B. 

LONDON CONVENTION. 

A CONVENTION BETWEEN HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OFGREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 

_February, 1884. _

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its Delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the saidState, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, Superintendent of Education, andNicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have representedthat the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 3rd day of August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25thOctober, 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State isdesirous to be relieved, and that the south-western boundaries fixedby the said Convention should be amended, with a view to promote thepeace and good order of the said State, and of the countries adjacentthereto; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Ireland, has been pleased to take the saidrepresentations into consideration: Now, therefore, Her Majesty hasbeen pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that the followingarticles of a new Convention, signed on behalf of Her Majesty by HerMajesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, the Right Honourable SirHercules George Robert Robinson, Knight Grand Cross of the MostDistinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor of theColony of the Cape of Good Hope, and on behalf of the Transvaal State(which shall hereinafter be called the South African Republic) by theabove-named Delegates, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, StephanusJacobus Du Toit, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, shall, when ratified bythe Volksraad of the South African Republic, be substituted for thearticles embodied in the Convention of 3rd August, 1881; whichlatter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force andeffect. 

ARTICLES. 

ARTICLE I. 

The Territory of the South African Republic will embrace the landlying between the following boundaries, to wit:

Beginning from the point where the north-eastern boundary line ofGriqualand West meets the Vaal River, up the course of the Vaal Riverto the point of junction with it of the Klip River; thence up thecourse of the Klip River to the point of junction with it of thestream called Gansvlei; thence up the Gansvlei stream to its sourcein the Drakensberg; thence to a beacon in the boundary of Natal, situated immediately opposite and close to the source of the Gansvleistream; thence in a north-easterly direction along the ridge of theDrakensberg, dividing the waters flowing into the Gansvlei streamfrom the waters flowing into the sources of the Buffalo, to a beaconon a point where this mountain ceases to be a continuous chain;thence to a beacon on a plain to the north-east of the last describedbeacon; thence to the nearest source of a small stream called'Division Stream'; thence down this division stream, which forms thesouthern boundary of the farm Sandfontein, the property of Messrs. Meek, to its junction with the Coldstream; thence down the Coldstreamto its junction with the Buffalo or Umzinyati River; thence down thecourse of the Buffalo River to the junction with it of the BloodRiver; thence up the course of the Blood River to the junctionwith it of Lyn Spruit or Dudusi; thence up the Dudusi to itssource; thence 80 yards to Bea. I. , situated on a spur of theN'Qaba-Ka-hawana Mountains; thence 80 yards to the N'Sonto River;thence down the N'Sonto River to its junction with the White UmvuloziRiver; thence up the White Umvulozi River to a white rock where itrises; thence 800 yards to Kambula Hill (Bea. II. ); thence to thesource of the Pemvana River, where the road from Kambula Camp toBurgers' Lager crosses; thence down the Pemvana River to its junctionwith the Bivana River; thence down the Bivana River to its junctionwith the Pongolo River; thence down the Pongolo River to where itpasses through the Libombo Range; thence along the summits of theLibombo Range to the northern point of the N'Yawos Hill in that range(Bea. XVI); thence to the northern peak of the Inkwakweni Hills(Bea. XV. ); thence to Sefunda, a rocky knoll detached from and to thenorth-east end of the White Koppies, and to the south of the MusanaRiver (Bea. XIX. ); thence to a point on the slope near the crest ofMatanjeni, which is the name given to the south-eastern portionof the Mahamba Hills (Bea. XIII. ); thence to the N'gwangwana, adouble-pointed hill (one point is bare, the other wooded, the beaconbeing on the former) on the left bank of the Assegai River andupstream of the Dadusa Spruit (Bea. XII. ); thence to the southernpoint of Bendita, a rocky knoll in a plain between the Little Hlozaneand Assegai Rivers (Bea. XI. ); thence to the highest point of SulukaHill, round the eastern slopes of which flows the Little Hlozane, also called Ludaka or Mudspruit (Bea. X. ); thence to the beacon knownas 'Viljoen's, ' or N'Duko Hill; thence to a point north-east of DerbyHouse, known as Magwazidili's Beacon; thence to the Igaba, a smallknoll on the Ungwempisi River, also called 'Joubert's Beacon, ' andknown to the natives as 'Piet's Beacon' (Bea. IX. ); thence to thehighest point of the N'Dhlovudwalili or Houtbosch, a hill on thenorthern bank of the Umqwempisi River (Bea. VIII. ); thence to abeacon on the only flat-topped rock, about 10 feet high and about 30yards in circumference at its base, situated on the south side of theLamsamane range of hills, and overlooking the valley of the greatUsuto River; this rock being 45 yards north of the road from Camdenand Lake Banagher to the forests on the Usuto River (sometimescalled Sandhlanas Beacon) (Bea. VII. ); thence to the Gulungwanaor Ibubulundi, four smooth bare hills, the highest in thatneighbourhood, situated to the south of the Umtuli River (Bea. VI. ), thence to a flat-topped rock, 8 feet high, on the crest of theBusuku, a low rocky range south-west of the Impulazi River (Bea. V. ); thence to a low bare hill on the north-east of, and overlookingthe Impulazi River, to the south of it being a tributary of theImpulazi, with a considerable waterfall, and the road from the riverpassing 200 yards to the north-west of the beacon (Bea. IV. ); thenceto the highest point of the Mapumula range, the water-shed of theLittle Usuto River on the north, and the Umpulazi River on the south, the hill, the top of which is a bare rock, falling abruptly towardsthe Little Usuto (Bea. III. ); thence to the western point of adouble-pointed rocky hill, precipitous on all sides, called Makwana, its top being a bare rock (Bea. II. ); thence to the top of a ruggedhill of considerable height falling abruptly to the Komati River, this hill being the northern extremity of the Isilotwani range, andseparated from the highest peak of the range Inkomokazi (a sharpcone) by a deep neck (Bea. I. ). (On a ridge in the straight linebetween Beacons I. And II. Is an intermediate beacon. ) From Beacon I. The boundary runs to a hill across the Komati River, and thence alongthe crest of the range of hills known as the Makongwa, which runsnorth-east and south-west, to Kamhlubana Peak; thence in a straightline to Mananga, a point in the Libombo range, and thence to thenearest point in the Portuguese frontier on the Libombo range; thencealong the summits of the Libombo range to the middle of the poortwhere the Komati River passes through it, called the lowest KomatiPoort; thence in a north by easterly direction to Pokioens Kop, situated on the north side of the Olifant's River, where it passesthrough the ridges; thence about north-north-west to the nearestpoint of Serra di Chicundo; and thence to the junction of the PaforiRiver with the Limpopo or Crocodile River; thence up the course ofthe Limpopo River to the point where the Marique River falls into it. Thence up the course of the Marique River to 'Derde Poort, ' where itpasses through a low range of hills, called Sikwane, a beacon (No. 10) being erected on the spur of said range near to, and westward of, the banks of the river; thence, in a straight line, through thisbeacon to a beacon (No. 9), erected on the top of the same range, about 1, 700 yards distant from beacon No. 10; thence, in a straightline, to a beacon (No. 8) erected on the highest point of an isolatedhill, called Dikgagong, or 'Wildebeest Kop, ' situated south-eastwardof, and about 3-1/3 miles distant from a high hill, called Moripe;thence, in a straight line, to a beacon (No. 7) erected on the summitof an isolated hill or 'koppie' forming the eastern extremity of therange of hills called Moshweu, situated to the northward of, andabout two miles distant from, a large isolated hill calledChukudu-Chochwa; thence, in a straight line, to a beacon (No. 6)erected on the summit of a hill forming part of the same range, Moshweu; thence, in a straight line, to a beacon (No. 5) erected onthe summit of a pointed hill in the same range; thence, in a straightline, to a beacon (No. 4) erected on the summit of the westernextremity of the same range; thence, in a straight line, to a beacon(No. 3) erected on the summit of the northern extremity of a low, bushy hill, or 'koppie, ' near to and eastward of the Notwane River;thence, in a straight line, to the junction of the stream calledMetsi-Mashware with the Notwane River (No. 2); thence up the courseof the Notwane River to Sengoma, being the poort where the riverpasses through the Dwarsberg range; thence, as described in the Awardgiven by Lieutenant-Governor Keate, dated October 17, 1871, byPitlanganyane (narrow place), Deboaganka or Schaapkuil, Sibatoul(bare place), and Maclase, to Ramatlabama, a pool on a spruit northof the Molopo River. From Ramatlabama the boundary shall run to thesummit of an isolated hill called Leganka; thence, in a straightline, passing north-east of a Native Station, near 'Buurman's Drift, 'on the Molopo River, to that point on the road from Mosiega to theold drift, where a road turns out through the Native Station to thenew drift below; thence to 'Buurman's Old Drift'; thence, in astraight line, to a marked and isolated clump of trees near to andnorth-west of the dwelling-house of C. Austin, a tenant on the farm'Vleifontein, ' No. 117; thence, in a straight line, to thenorth-western corner beacon of the farm 'Mooimeisjesfontein, ' No 30;thence, along the western line of the said farm 'Mooimeisjesfontein, 'and in prolongation thereof, as far as the road leading from'Ludik's Drift, ' on the Molopo River, past the homestead of'Mooimeisjesfontein, ' towards the Salt Pans near Harts River; thence, along the said road, crossing the direct road from Polfontein toSehuba, and until the direct road from Polfontein to Lotlakane orPietfontein is reached; thence, along the southern edge of thelast-named road towards Lotlakane, until the first garden ground ofthat station is reached; thence, in a south-westerly direction, skirting Lotlakane, so as to leave it and all its garden ground innative territory, until the road from Lotlakane to Kunana is reached;thence along the east side, and clear of that road towards Kunana, until the garden grounds of that station are reached; thence, skirting Kunana, so as to include it and all its garden ground, butno more, in the Transvaal, until the road from Kunana to Mamusa isreached; thence, along the eastern side and clear of the road towardsMamusa, until a road turns out towards Taungs; thence, along theeastern side and clear of the road towards Taungs, till the line ofthe district known as 'Stellaland' is reached, about 11 miles fromTaungs; thence, along the line of the district Stellaland, to theHarts River, about 24 miles below Mamusa; thence, across Harts River, to the junction of the roads from Monthe and Phokwane; thence, alongthe western side and clear of the nearest road towards 'KoppieEnkel, ' an isolated hill about 36 miles from Mamusa, and about 18miles north of Christiana, and to the summit of the said hill;thence, in a straight line, to that point on the north-east boundaryof Griqualand West as beaconed by Mr. Surveyor Ford, where two farms, registered as Nos. 72 and 75, do meet, about midway between the Vaaland Harts Rivers, measured along the said boundary of GriqualandWest; thence to the first point where the north-east boundary ofGriqualand West meets the Vaal River. 

ARTICLE II. 

The Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere tothe boundaries defined in the first Article of this Convention, andwill do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making anyencroachments upon lands beyond the said boundaries. The Governmentof the South African Republic will appoint Commissioners upon theeastern and western borders, whose duty it will be strictly to guardagainst irregularities and all trespassing over the boundaries. HerMajesty's Government will if necessary appoint Commissioners in thenative territories outside the eastern and western borders of theSouth African Republic to maintain order and prevent encroachments. 

Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South AfricanRepublic will each appoint a person to proceed together to beacon offthe amended south-west boundary as described in Article I of thisConvention; and the President of the Orange Free State shall berequested to appoint a referee to whom the said persons shall referany questions on which they may disagree respecting theinterpretation of the said Article, and the decision of suchreferee thereon shall be final. The arrangement already made, underthe terms of Article 19 of the Convention of Pretoria, of the 3rdAugust, 1881, between the owners of the farms Grootfontein andValleifontein on the one hand, and the Barolong authorities on theother, by which a fair share of the water supply of the said farmsshall be allowed to flow undisturbed to the said Barolongs, shallcontinue in force. 

ARTICLE III. 

If a British officer is appointed to reside at Pretoria or elsewherewithin the South African Republic to discharge functions analogous tothose of a Consular officer, he will receive the protection andassistance of the Republic. 

ARTICLE IV. 

The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement withany State or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with anynative tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until thesame has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen. 

Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if HerMajesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving acopy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediatelyupon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of suchtreaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or of anyof Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa. 

ARTICLE V. 

The South African Republic will be liable for any balance which maystill remain due of the debts for which it was liable at the date ofAnnexation--to wit, the Cape Commercial Bank Loan, the Railway Loan, and the Orphan Chamber Debt--which debts will be a first charge uponthe revenues of the Republic. The South African Republic willmoreover be liable to her Majesty's Government for £250, 000, whichwill be a second charge upon the revenues of the Republic. 

ARTICLE VI. 

The debt due as aforesaid by the South African Republic to HerMajesty's Government will bear interest at the rate of three and ahalf per cent, from the date of the ratification of this Convention, and shall be repayable by a payment for interest and Sinking Fund ofsix pounds and ninepence per £100 per annum, which will extinguishthe debt in twenty-five years. The said payment of six pounds andninepence per £100 shall be payable half-yearly in British currencyat the close of each half-year from the date of such ratification:Provided always that the South African Republic shall be at libertyat the close of any half-year to pay off the whole or any portion ofthe outstanding debt. 

Interest at the rate of three and a half per cent, on the debt asstanding under the Convention of Pretoria shall as heretofore be paidto the date of the ratification of this Convention. 

ARTICLE VII. 

All persons who held property in the Transvaal on the 8th day ofAugust 1881 and still hold the same, will continue to enjoy therights of property which they have enjoyed since the 12th April, 1877. No person who has remained loyal to Her Majesty during thelate hostilities shall suffer any molestation by reason of hisloyalty; or be liable to any criminal prosecution or civil actionfor any part taken in connection with such hostilities; and allsuch persons will have full liberty to reside in the country, withenjoyment of all civil rights, and protection for their persons andproperty. 

ARTICLE VIII. 

The South African Republic renews the declaration made in the SandRiver Convention, and in the Convention of Pretoria, that no slaveryor apprenticeship partaking of slavery will be tolerated by theGovernment of the said Republic. 

ARTICLE IX. 

There will continue to be complete freedom of religion and protectionfrom molestation for all denominations, provided the same be notinconsistent with morality and good order; and no disability shallattach to any person in regard to rights of property by reason of thereligious opinions which he holds. 

ARTICLE X. 

The British Officer appointed to reside in the South African Republicwill receive every assistance from the Government of the saidRepublic in making due provision for the proper care and preservationof the graves of such of Her Majesty's Forces as have died in theTransvaal; and, if need be, for the appropriation of land for thepurpose. 

ARTICLE XI. 

All grants or titles issued at any time by the Transvaal Governmentin respect of land outside the boundary of the South AfricanRepublic, as defined in Article I, shall be considered invalid and ofno effect, except in so far as any such grant or title relates toland that falls within the boundary of the South African Republic;and all persons holding any such grant so considered invalid and ofno effect will receive from the Government of the South AfricanRepublic such compensation, either in land or in money, as theVolksraad shall determine. In all cases in which any Native Chiefs orother authorities outside the said boundaries have received anyadequate consideration from the Government of the South AfricanRepublic for land excluded from the Transvaal by the first Article ofthis Convention, or where permanent improvements have been made onthe land, the High Commissioner will recover from the nativeauthorities fair compensation for the loss of the land thus excluded, or of the permanent improvements thereon. 

ARTICLE XII. 

The independence of the Swazis, within the boundary line ofSwaziland, as indicated in the first Article of this Convention, willbe fully recognized. 

ARTICLE XIII. 

Except in pursuance of any treaty or engagement made as provided inArticle 4 of this Convention, no other or higher duties shall beimposed on the importation into the South African Republic of anyarticle coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions than are ormay be imposed on the like article coming from any other place orcountry; nor will any prohibition be maintained or imposed on theimportation into the South African Republic of any article comingfrom any part of Her Majesty's dominions which shall not equallyextend to the like article coming from any other place or country. And in like manner the same treatment shall be given to any articlecoming to Great Britain from the South African Republic as to thelike article coming from any other place or country. 

These provisions do not preclude the consideration of specialarrangements as to import duties and commercial relations between theSouth African Republic and any of Her Majesty's colonies orpossessions. 

ARTICLE XIV. 

All persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws ofthe South African Republic _(a)_ will have full liberty, with theirfamilies, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the SouthAfrican Republic; _(b)_ they will be entitled to hire or possesshouses, manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises; _(c)_ theymay carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whomthey may think fit to employ; _(d)_ they will not be subject, inrespect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerceor industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than thosewhich are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic. 

ARTICLE XV. 

All persons, other than natives, who established their domicile inthe Transvaal between the 12th day of April, 1877, and the 8thAugust, 1881, and who within twelve months after such last-mentioneddate have had their names registered by the British Resident, shallbe exempt from all compulsory military service whatever. 

ARTICLE XVI. 

Provision shall hereafter be made by a separate instrument for themutual extradition of criminals, and also for the surrender ofdeserters from Her Majesty's Forces. 

ARTICLE XVII. 

All debts contracted between the 12th April, 1877, and the 8thAugust, 1881, will be payable in the same currency in which they mayhave been contracted. 

ARTICLE XVIII. 

No grants of land which may have been made, and no transfers ormortgages which may have been passed between the 12th April, 1877, and the 8th August, 1881, will be invalidated by reason merely oftheir having been made or passed between such dates. 

All transfers to the British Secretary for Native Affairs in trustfor natives will remain in force, an officer of the South AfricanRepublic taking the place of such Secretary for Native Affairs. 

ARTICLE XIX. 

The Government of the South African Republic will engage faithfullyto fulfil the assurances given, in accordance with the laws of theSouth African Republic, to the natives at the Pretoria Pitso by theRoyal Commission in the presence of the Triumvirate and with theirentire assent, (1) as to the freedom of the natives to buy orotherwise acquire land under certain conditions, (2) as to theappointment of a commission to mark out native locations, (3) as tothe access of the natives to the courts of law, and (4) as to theirbeing allowed to move freely within the country, or to leave it forany legal purpose, under a pass system. 

ARTICLE XX. 

This Convention will be ratified by a Volksraad of the South AfricanRepublic within the period of six months after its execution, and indefault of such ratification this Convention shall be null and void. 

Signed in duplicate in London this 27th day of February, 1884. 

 HERCULES ROBINSON. S. J. P. KRUGER. S. J. DU TOIT. N. J. SMIT. 

APPENDIX C. 

PRESIDENT KRUGER'S AFFAIRS IN THE RAADS. 

1889. 

PRESIDENT. 

_July_. --His Honour accepts a loan of £7, 000 from the State funds at2-1/2 per cent. Interest (current rate being about 6 per cent. ). 

1890. 

_July 4_. --The PRESIDENT said: Mr. Taljaard yesterday threw in myteeth that I took advantage of my position to benefit my ownrelations. I assure you that I have not done anything of the kind. Unfortunately, one of my relatives who is a speculator has got aconcession, which I am in duty bound to carry out. But I am deeplygrieved that Mr. Taljaard said what he did say. In future, I canassure you not a single member of my family shall receive a singleoffice. I will not even make one of them a constable. I have childrenmyself, but I have left them on the farm rather than put them inoffice to draw money from the State. 

1891. 

_May_. --In answer to a request that President Kruger would allow hisname to be used as patron of a ball in honour of Her Majesty'sbirthday:

SIR, In reply to your favour of the 12th instant, requesting me to ask HisHonour the State President to consent to his name being used as apatron of a ball to be given at Johannesburg on the 26th inst. , Ihave been instructed to inform you that His Honour considers a ballas Baal's service, for which reason the Lord ordered Moses to killall offenders; and as it is therefore contrary to His Honour'sprinciples, His Honour cannot consent to the misuse of his name insuch connection. 

 I have, etc. , F. ELOFF, _Pr. Secretary. _

1892. 

FIRST RAAD. 

PRESIDENT. 

_May 24_. --It was resolved that a dam be constructed on thePresident's farm 'Geduld' at a cost of £4, 500, at the expense of theTreasury. 

SECOND RAAD. 

The Public Works Department report that the road across thePresident's farm 'Geduld, ' estimated to cost £1, 500, had actuallycost £5, 000. Mr. MEYER stated that this road was of absolutely no useto anyone but the owner of the farm!

FIRST RAAD. 

_June 15_. --Letter from Mr. Mare, Deacon, on behalf of the UnitedChurch, Pretoria, complaining that of the twelve erven given byGovernment to the Church, they had been deprived of four, which hadbeen handed over to the President's Church, the Gerevoormede orDopper, and two of these had again been transferred to the Presidenthimself. 

_June 16_. --After a lengthy discussion it was resolved that thePresident is entirely exonerated. The Raad further expressed itsdisapproval of this conduct of a Christian Church, whose duty itshould be to foster Christian love, and set an example to theburghers. 

FIRST RAAD. 

_August 2_. --A memorial was read from Lichtenburg, praying for astringent investigation into the Report of the Estimates Committee of1890, in which it was stated that of £140, 000 spent on the Pretoriastreets, vouchers for £22, 000 were missing. The Raad decided on thePresident's stating that nothing was wrong with the accounts to sendthe memorialists a copy of the resolution of last year. 

1893. 

_July 17_. --The PRESIDENT said it was simply murdering the erectionof factories to say there should be no concessions. He denied thatfactories could be erected without concessions. If the Raad wished tothrow out all concessions, well and good. That simply meant thefostering of industries in other countries. 

STANDS SCANDAL. {54}

_August 3_. --The PRESIDENT said that speculation, when fairlyconducted, was justifiable, and the Government had acted according tothe circumstances, and in the interests of the State. The Governmenthad no private interests in view, but thought the sale was quitejustifiable. 

The Minister of Mines was then attacked for granting stands to Raadofficials when higher offers had been made. 

Footnote for Appendix C

{54} By this name is known the series of transactions in whichGovernment land in Johannesburg was sold out of hand to certainprivate individuals at a nominal figure, many thousands of poundsbelow the then market value. 

APPENDIX D. 

VOLKSRAAD DEBATES. 

_Extracts from the Published Reports. _

1889. 

_May 8_. --On the application of the Sheba G. M. Co. For permission toerect an aërial tram from the mine to the mill, Mr. GROBLAAR asked whether an aërial tram was a balloon or whether itcould fly through the air. 

The only objection that the Chairman had to urge against granting thetram was that the Company had an English name, and that with so manyDutch ones available. 

Mr. TALJAARD objected to the word 'participeeren' (participate) asnot being Dutch, and to him unintelligible: 'I can't believe the wordis Dutch; why have I never come across it in the Bible if it is?'

_June 18_. --On the application for a concession to treat tailings, Mr. TALJAARD wished to know if the words 'pyrites' and 'concentrates'could not be translated into the Dutch language. He could notunderstand what it meant. He had gone to night-school as long as hehad been in Pretoria, and even now he could not explain everything tohis burghers. He thought it a shame that big hills should be made onground under which there might be rich reefs, and which in futuremight be required for a market or outspan. He would support therecommendation on condition that the name of the quartz should betranslated into Dutch, as there might be more in this than some ofthem imagined. 

REDUCTION OF IMPORT DUTIES ON EATABLES. 

_June 20_. --Mr. WOLMARANS said the diggers simply did not want to buyfrom the Boers; there was plenty of meat and bread in the land, andthe Boers could not get good prices for their cattle. 

Mr. VAN HEERDEN could not see how the inhabitants of the State wouldbenefit in the least by lowering the tariff. 

Messrs. LOMBAARD and WOLMARANS both declared that when duties were attheir highest groceries etc. Were at their cheapest. 

Mr. TALJAARD thought that members who were in favour of lowering thetariff did not act for the benefit of the country. 

1890. 

_May 29_. --A discussion of considerable length took place on apetition from burghers of Gatsrand, Potchefstroom district, prayingthat at least two-thirds of the Government money now lying idle inthe banks should be given out to agriculturists as loans, and theremainder for other purposes. 

_July 2_. --His Honour was asked why he did not suppress allsweepstakes and races. 

The PRESIDENT said gambling and lotteries were in conflict with theWord of God, but it was also the duty of man to have exercise and toexercise his horses. For that reason an exception had been made inthe Bill as to horse-races, etc. 

INCREASE OF OFFICIALS' SALARIES. 

_July 7_. --The PRESIDENT supported the increase. He promised theRaad--and he had done this before--that whenever there was a fallingoff in the revenue, he would at once reduce the salaries. He had saidthis before, and if members did not believe him let them call him aliar at once. 

1891. 

SECOND RAAD. 

_June 5_. --Mr. ESSELEN objected to minutes not being full enough. 

Mr. TALJAARD accused Mr. Esselen of insulting the Raad. 

A discussion ensued on minutes, in which certain proposals which hadbeen rejected had not been incorporated. Several members said thatthe incorporation of proposals that had been rejected would entailsome members being held up to the scorn of the public. 

ESTIMATES. 

_June 24_. --Two hundred vouchers were found to be missing from theyearly accounts, and no explanation could be given. Also £13, 000 hadbeen given on loan to the Boeren Winkel (Boer General Store--aprivate mercantile venture). 

_July 27_. --Mr. MARE maintained that the Public Works were badlyadministered. 

The PRESIDENT dashed down the papers in front of him and stalked outof the Raad, after emphatically denying that money had been wasted. 

_July 27_. --At the debate on the question of appointing a Statefinancier, who could among other things be held responsible for thedisappearance of vouchers, the Auditor-General said that he did notwant an official of that nature, who would be always snivelling abouthis books. 

CLAUSE TWENTY-THREE OF THE GOLD LAW. 

_August 5_. --The PRESIDENT said that owners of properties had quitesufficient privileges already, and he did not want to give them more. 

Mr. LOMBAARD said the Gold Fields wanted too much. The revenue fromthe Gold Fields was already less than the expenditure. He was ofopinion that the best course would be to let the Gold Fields go tothe devil and look after themselves. 

1892

SECOND RAAD. 

_May 6. _--Protracted discussion arose on the Postal Report, theConservatives being opposed to erecting pillar-boxes in Pretoria onthe ground that they were extravagant and effeminate. 

OOM DYLE (Mr. TALJAARD) said that he could not see why people wantedto be always writing letters. He wrote none himself. In the days ofhis youth he had written a letter, and had not been afraid to travelfifty miles and more on horseback and by wagon to post it; and nowpeople complained if they had to go one mile. 

FIRST RAAD. 

_May 21_. --On the question of abolishing the post of Minute-Keeper tothe Executive the President fell into a passion with Mr. Loveday whothought a Minute-Keeper unnecessary, and left the Raad in a temper. 

_June 13_. --The PRESIDENT said the reason why he did not subsidizesome papers by giving them advertisements was that they did notdefend the Government. It was the rule everywhere to giveadvertisements to papers which supported the Government. 

PRESIDENT AND GENERAL. 

_July 21_. --General JOUBERT tenders his resignation as Chairman ofthe Chicago Exhibition Committee. He had written again and again tothe President and State Secretary for an intimation of theGovernment's intention with regard to the amount on the Estimates, but his communications were treated with silent contempt. 

The PRESIDENT made a long speech, in which he said he felt greatgrief at being thus falsely charged by the General, who was also amember of the Executive. Still he would only bless those whospitefully used him and would not blacken the General. 

SECOND RAAD. 

_July 21_. --After the resolution had been taken on Mr. Van Niekerk'sproposition regarding compensation for claims not yet worked out(Clause 60 of Gold Law), the PRESIDENT was still speaking, andobjecting to the recording of Van Niekerk's objection to the passingof the Gold Law Clause Amendment, when Mr. ESSELEN called 'Order, Order!' several times. 

The PRESIDENT said he was insulted by Mr. Esselen and would withdrawunless he apologized. 

The Raad adjourned, as Mr. Esselen refused. 

FIRST RAAD. 

LOCUST EXTERMINATION. 

_July 21_. --Mr. Roos said locusts were a plague, as in the days ofKing Pharaoh, sent by God, and the country would assuredly be loadedwith shame and obloquy if it tried to raise its hand against themighty hand of the Almighty. 

Messrs. DECLERQ and STEENKAMP spoke in the same strain, quotinglargely from the Scriptures. 

The CHAIRMAN related a true story of a man whose farm was alwaysspared by the locusts, until one day he caused some to be killed. Hisfarm was then devastated. 

Mr. STOOP conjured the members not to constitute themselvesterrestrial gods and oppose the Almighty. 

Mr. LUCAS MEYER raised a storm by ridiculing the arguments of theformer speakers, and comparing the locusts to beasts of prey whichthey destroyed. 

Mr. LABUSCHAGNE was violent. He said the locusts were quite differentfrom beasts of prey. They were a special plague sent by God for theirsinfulness. 

_July 26_. --Mr. DE BEER attacking the railways said they were alreadybeginning to eat the bitter fruits of them. He was thinking oftrekking to Damaraland, and his children would trek still furtherinto the wilderness out of the reach of the iron horse. 

_August 16_. --Mr. DE BEER said he saw where all the opposition toduties came from. It was English blood boiling to protect Englishmanufacture. 

1893. 

_June 21_. --A memorial was read from certain burghers of Waterbergabout children beating their parents, and praying that such childrenshould not be allowed to become officials of the State or sit inVolksraad!

Mr. DE BEER--the Member for Waterberg--who in the days of his hotyouth is said to have given his father a sound thrashing, and is theone aimed at by the memorialists, denied all knowledge of thememorial. 

CHARLESTOWN EXTENSION. 

_August 24_. --Mr. WOLMARANS opposed the line, as it would competewith the Delagoa Bay Railway, for which the State was responsible. 

Mr. LE CLERQ maintained that the Cape Free State line was against theinterests of the burghers, as a tremendous number of cattle werebrought into the State from outside countries. 

Mr. MALAN said he would never vote for this line. 

Mr. ROOS referred to the sacred voice of the people, which he saidwas against railways. 

The extension was eventually approved of. 

1894. 

FIRST RAAD. 

_May 14_. --A debate took place upon the clause that members shouldappear in the House clad in broadcloth and having white neckties. 

Mr. JAN DE BEER complained of the lack of uniformity in neckties. Some wore a Tom Thumb variety, and others wore scarves. This was astate of things to be deplored, and he considered that the Raadshould put its foot down and define the size and shape of neckties. 

JAM CONCESSION. 

_August 28_. --The PRESIDENT said he was against concessions generallyspeaking, but there were cases where exceptions should be made. Therewas for instance the Jam Concession. The manufacture of jam ought tobe protected. 

REDUCTION OF POSTAGE FROM TWOPENCE TO ONE PENNY THROUGHOUT THEREPUBLIC. 

_August 22_. --Mr. WOLMARANS opposed the reduction, saying the PostalDepartment would probably show a deficit at the end of the year. Andbesides who would benefit? Certainly not the farmers. 

Mr. LOMBAARD also was against the reduction. 

Mr. DE LA REY said speculators could afford to pay the present ratesof postage, and as the reduction would only benefit the townspeople, let matters remain unaltered. If he resided in a town and speculatedhe would be able to pay twopence. 

Mr. SCHUTTE said the Postal Department was run at a loss at present, and if they further reduced the tariff things would go very badlywith them. 

Reduction rejected, 13 to 9. 

INCREASE OF REPRESENTATION. 

_September 6_. --The PRESIDENT throughout the debate maintained thatthere was no advantage to be gained by increased representation, andthat business could be more quickly transacted with a small number ofmembers. He disagreed with those members who wished to give big townsrepresentatives as the Raad would be swamped with town members. 

After the rejection of various proposals the PRESIDENT rose andpointed out it would mean ruination to the country if the Raadresolved to increase the number of the members, and amidst someconfusion he left, declining to occupy the Presidential chair, muttering that the Raad was large enough already and if it wereincreased it would be a shame. 

EDUCATION QUESTION. 

_September 7_. --The Committee reported that a number of memorials hadbeen received, praying that more hours weekly should be devoted tothe English language. Counter memorials had also been received. TheCommittee advised the Raad not to grant the request of more hours forEnglish. 

Mr. LOMBAARD thought the Raad was bound to refuse the request, and itwould be useless to discuss the matter. 

Mr. DE BEER could see no harm in granting the request, in fact it wastheir duty to do so. 

Mr. SPIES considered there was no necessity to teach English in theState. Trade did not require it, and they could get on very wellwithout English. Let the English remain in their own country. 

The PRESIDENT was opposed to extending the hours. He did not objectto English being taught, but then it must not interfere with thelanguage of the country to the prejudice of the latter language. Hehad schools upon his farm, and parents objected to their childrenbeing taught English in those schools. After a very little while theycould write English as well as or better than their own language, andneglected Dutch for English. _The Dutch language could not bemaintained against English in competition. _

Mr. WOLMARANS also spoke against the English language saying that ifthey went through the list of those who had signed the memorial forthe annexation of the Transvaal by the English, they would findwithout exception that those who signed were English-speaking. He was against children being taught English so early, as when theywere taught young their minds became poisoned with English views. 

Mr. OTTO agreed with the spirit of the Committee's report. This was aDutch country, with Dutch laws, and why should they be asked toexchange the Dutch language for the English? What had the Englishdone for the country that this should be asked?

The CHAIRMAN thought many members made too much of the Englishlanguage already. One language was sufficient, and if a man wasproperly educated in his own tongue that should suffice. 

Mr. LE CLERQ and Mr. PRINSLOO both cautioned the Raad against foreignlanguages in their schools. 

Mr. LOVEDAY pointed out the absurdity of saying that the NationalIndependence depended upon one language only being used, and pointedto the American and Swiss Republics as examples. 

Mr. LOMBAARD in the course of a violent speech said those people whowanted English taught in the State-aided schools were aiming at theindependence of the State. They wanted to bring dissension in themidst of the burghers by teaching new and wrong ideas, and theybecame indignant because the burghers would not allow it. He wasashamed that members should argue in favour of injuring theirindependence: English should not be taught in the State-aidedschools. 

The law remained unaltered by 12 to 10. 

1895. 

_July 26_. --The matter of purchasing diamond drills cropping up, thePRESIDENT said it was true that the two industries mining andagriculture went hand in hand, but it must be remembered that everyfresh goldfield opened meant a fresh stream of people and extraexpenses. He hoped the Raad would excuse him referring to it, but theRaad took away the revenue and still asked for money. There was thereduction of postage; now it was asked to spend money on boringmachines, when each new field meant so much extra expense. Machinesfor water boring were cheap and not fitted with diamonds like thosefor mining, which required to be handled by experts. It must beremembered that money voted for agricultural purposes was spent here, while for the gold industry it was sent away. The Raad must becareful how the money was voted. 

FIRST RAAD. 

FIRING AT THE CLOUDS TO BRING DOWN RAIN CONSIDERED IMPIOUS. 

_August 5_. --A memorial was read from Krugersdorp praying that theRaad would pass a law to prohibit the sending up of bombs into theclouds to bring down rain, as it was a defiance of God and would mostlikely bring down a visitation from the Almighty. 

The Memorial Committee reported that they disapproved of such athing, but at the same time they did not consider they could make alaw on the subject. 

Mr. A. D. WOLMARANS said he was astonished at this advice, and heexpected better from the Commission. If one of their children firedtowards the clouds with a revolver they would thrash him. Why shouldthey permit people to mock at the Almighty in this manner? It wasterrible to contemplate. He hoped that the Raad would take steps toprevent such things happening. 

The CHAIRMAN (who is also a member of the Memorial Commission) saidthe Commission thought that such things were only done for a wager. 

Mr. ERASMUS said they were not done for a wager but in real earnest. People at Johannesburg actually thought that they could bring downthe rain from the clouds by firing cannons at them. 

Mr. JAN MEYER said such things were actually done in Johannesburg. Last year during the drought men were engaged to send charges ofdynamite into the clouds. They fired from the Wanderers' Ground andfrom elsewhere, but without result. Then some one went to Germistonand fired at a passing cloud; but there was no rain. The cloud sailedaway, and the heavens became clear and beautifully blue. He hadreported the matter to the Government. 

Mr. DU TOIT (Carolina) said he had heard that there were companies inEurope which employed numbers of men to do nothing but shoot at theclouds simply to bring down rain. It was wonderful that men couldthink of doing such things; they ought to be prohibited here. He didnot consider that the Raad would be justified in passing a law on thesubject, however; but he thought all the same that they shouldexpress their strongest disapproval of such practices. 

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK ridiculed the idea of people forcing rain from theclouds. In some of the Kaffir countries they had witch-doctors whotried to bring down rain; whether they succeeded or not was adifferent matter. Still, if people were foolish enough to try andforce the clouds to discharge rain, the Legislature ought not tointerfere to prevent them. He did not agree with the idea of firingat the clouds, but did not consider that an Act should be passed toprevent it. 

The CHAIRMAN said if such things were actually done--and he wasunaware of it--those who did it ought to be prevented from repeatingit. 

After a further discussion, Mr. A. D. WOLMARANS moved: 'That thisRaad, considering the memorial now on the Order, resolves to agreewith the same, and instructs the Government to take the necessarysteps to prevent a repetition of the occurrences referred to. '

SECOND RAAD. 

BARMAIDS. 

The article for the abolition of barmaids was dealt with. 

Mr. WATKINS declared himself strongly against such an article. Hecould not see why females should be prevented from dispensing liquor. Such a clause would prevent many respectable young women from makinga living. 

Mr. PRETORIUS said there were many memorials on this subject, and incompliance with the wish expressed therein the article was insertedin the Liquor Law. Of course, it was for the Raad to decide. 

Mr. RENSBURG spoke strongly against the clause. According to it theproprietor's wife would be prevented from going behind the counter. He would not deny that there were some barmaids who were not strictlyvirtuous, but to accuse them as a class of being dangerous wasgoing too far. Many of the memorials were signed by women. Thesememorials were drawn by men whom he considered were hypocrites, andthey ought to be ashamed of themselves for their narrow-mindedness. 

Mr. VAN STADEN said he did not like to take the bread out of themouths of a great many women. 

Mr. KOENIG suggested that they could become chambermaids. 

APPENDIX E. 

MALABOCH. 

_September 4_. --An Executive resolution was read, stating that theExecutive had decided to deprive Malaboch of his rights ofchieftainship, and keep him in the custody of the Government, andthat his tribe be broken up and apprenticed out to burghers, eachburgher applying to have one or two families upon payment of £3 perfamily per annum. The Executive wished the Raad to approve of this;the Government had the right to do this according to law. This waswithout prejudice to the trial before the High Court. Perhaps whenthe Krijgsraad assembled it would be decided to try him before theHigh Court on charges of murder and rebellion. 

Mr. JEPPE thought this was a matter for the High Court, andcounselled the Raad to adopt that course, giving the chief a publictrial. 

The PRESIDENT said the Executive acted strictly in accordance withthe law; it was not necessary for the Government to send the case tothe High Court, as it had the power to decide native cases. Forinstance, in the case of Lo Bengula and his headmen, they were nottried by any High Court. 

Mr. MEYER thought they should give Malaboch a fair trial. 

Finally Mr. MEYER moved, and Mr. JEPPE seconded, that Executiveresolution be accepted for notice. 

APPENDIX F. 

THE GREAT FRANCHISE DEBATE. 

The following extract is made from the Report of the great FranchiseDebate, published in the Johannesburg _Star_, August 17, 1895:

EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE. --MONSTER UITLANDER PETITIONS. --WHAT THEBURGHERS WISH. 

Petitions were read praying for the extension of the franchise. Thepetitioners pointed out that they were all residents in the Republic, that the increase of the wealth of the country and the status of thecountry were due to their energy and wealth, that the number of thenon-enfranchised far exceeded the number of the burghers, thattaxation was so arranged that the non-enfranchised bore four-fifthsof the taxes. The memorialists pointed out that one of the Republicanprinciples was equality, but that notwithstanding the numerouslysigned memorials the Raad decided last year to make the Franchise Lawso stringent that a new-comer could never obtain the franchise, andhis children could only obtain it under severe conditions. Theypointed out the danger of this, and prayed for admission underreasonable conditions. 

The petitions came from every part of the country, including all theBoer strongholds, and some were signed by influential officials. Onepetition from Johannesburg was signed by 32, 479 persons, and thetotal signatures amounted to 35, 483. 

Memorials to the same effect were read from a large number of farmingdistricts, signed by 993 full burghers, who were anxious that thefranchise should be extended to law-abiding citizens. These memorialscontained the names of prominent farmers. There were nineteen ofthese last-named memorials, four of which came from different partsof the Pretoria district and three from Potchefstroom. 

A memorial was read from Lydenburg, suggesting that ten years'residence in the country and obedience to the law be thequalification. This was signed by about a hundred burghers. 

A number of memorials were read from Rustenberg, Waterberg, PietRetief, Utrecht, Middelberg, Zoutpansberg, and Krugersdorp, signed byabout 500 burghers, stating that while they valued the friendship ofthe peace-abiding Uitlanders they petitioned the Raad not to extendthe franchise or alter last year's law. 

A memorial from Krugersdorp was to the effect that the franchiseshould not be extended until absolutely necessary, and then only interms of Art. 4 of the Franchise Law of 1894. This was signed bythirteen persons. 

One was read from the Apies River and Standerton, praying that thechildren of Uitlanders born here should not be granted the franchise. 

Memorials from other places, with 523 signatures, prayed that theexisting Franchise Law should be strictly enforced. 

Several petitions against the prohibition of the Election Committeewere read. 

A further memorial from the Rand was read, containing 5, 152signatures, pointing out that they objected to the memorial issued bythe National Union, and they wanted the system of one-man-one-voteand the ballot system adopted before they asked for the franchise. 

THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS. 

The Memorial Committee recommended that the law remain unaltered, because the memorials signed by full burghers requested no extensionto take place. 

Mr. LUCAS MEYER, who was chairman of the Memorial Commission, submitted a report, stating that he was in the minority and differedfrom his fellow-committeemen. There was not a single member of theRaad who would use his powers more towards maintaining theindependence of the country than himself, but he was fully convincedthat the Raad had as bounden duty to propose an alteration to lastyear's law. Proposals to do so had to emanate from the Raad. A largemajority of memorialists who prayed for the extension were notburghers, but even those burghers who petitioned the Raad against theextension asked the Raad not to do so at present. That showed thatthey were convinced that sooner or later the extension would have totake place--cautiously perhaps, but the extension would come. Eventhe committee, the majority of whom were against him, recognisedthis. He repeated that it was his opinion that the time would come. Let the Raad then submit the proposal to the country, and if themajority of the burghers were against it, the Raad would have tostand or fall with the burghers; but at any rate they would be actingaccording to the will of the country, and could not be blamed forpossible consequences. Recently the President said something had tobe done to admit a portion of the people who were behind the dam, before the stream became so strong that the walls would be washedaway and the country immersed in water. He hoped the Raad wouldfavourably consider his proposal. 

Mr. TOSEN said that when the proposals came to extend the franchise, such proposals had to come from old burghers, and so far the oldburghers had not signified their willingness that this should bedone. On the contrary, a large number of them were against it. Theydid not wish to exclude the new-comers for all eternity, but just nowthey should make no concession. It stood to reason that thenew-comers could not have so much interest in the country as the oldinhabitants. He cautioned the Raad against accepting therecommendations of Mr. Meyer. _It would be contrary to Republicanprinciples_. Yes, he repeated it would be contrary to the principlesof Republicanism, and were newcomers admitted to the franchise theold burghers would be deprived of all their rights. They would notdare to vote or exercise any of their privileges. Those persons whosigned the petition for the franchise said they were peaceful andlaw-abiding citizens, _but they gave a sign that they were notlaw-abiding, because they were against the law. The Election Law wasthere, and they should abide by it. _

The CHAIRMAN called the speaker to order and advised him to keep tothe point, whether it was desirable to extend the franchise or not. 

Mr. TOSEN said he was cut short, but in a few words he would say thathe would resist to the bitter end any attempt to alter the law as itat present stood. He spoke on behalf of his constituents and himself. 

Mr. JEPPE, in the course of his speech, said: Who are the people whonow demand from us a reasonable extension of the franchise? There areto begin with almost a thousand old burghers who consent to suchextension. There are in addition 890 petitioners, also old burghers, who complain that the franchise has been narrowed by recentlegislation. There are 5, 100, chiefly from the Rand, who ask forextension subject to the ballot, the principle of which has alreadybeen adopted by you, and there is lastly a monster petition, bearing35, 700 names, chiefly from the Rand goldfields: and in passing I maymention that I have convinced myself that the signatures to it, withvery few exceptions perhaps are undoubtedly genuine. Well, thispetition has been practically signed by the entire population of theRand. There are not three hundred people of any standing whose namesdo not appear there. It contains the name of the millionairecapitalist on the same page as that of the carrier or miner, that ofthe owner of half a district next to that of a clerk, and thesignature of the merchant who possesses stores in more than one townof this Republic next to that of the official. It embraces also allnationalities: the German merchant, the doctor from Capetown, theEnglish director, the teacher from the Paarl--they all have signedit. So have--and that is significant--old burghers from the FreeState, whose fathers with yours reclaimed this country; and it bearstoo the signatures of some who have been born in this country, whoknow no other fatherland than this Republic, but whom the law regardsas strangers. Then too there are the newcomers. They have settled forgood: they have built Johannesburg, one of the wonders of the age, now valued at many millions sterling, and which, in a few shortyears, will contain from a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousandsouls; they own half the soil, they pay at least three-quarters ofthe taxes. Nor are they persons who belong to a subservient race. They come from countries where they freely exercised political rightswhich can never be long denied to free-born men. They are, in short, men who in capital, energy and education are at least our equals. Allthese persons are gathered together, thanks to our law, into onecamp. Through our own act this multitude, which contains elementswhich even the most suspicious amongst us would not hesitate totrust, is compelled to stand together, and so to stand in this mostfatal of all questions in antagonism to us. Is that fact alone notsufficient to warn us and to prove how unstatesmanlike our policy is?What will we do with them now? Shall we convert them into friends orshall we send them away empty, dissatisfied, embittered? What willour answer be? Dare we refer them to the present law, which firstexpects them to wait for fourteen years and even then pledges itselfto nothing, but leaves everything to a Volksraad which cannot decideuntil 1905? It is a law which denies all political rights even totheir children born in this country. Can they gather any hope fromthat? Is not the fate of the petition of Mr. Justice Morice, whoserequest, however reasonable, could not be granted except by thealteration of the law published for twelve months and consented to bytwo-thirds of the entire burgher population, a convincing proof howuntenable is the position which we have assumed? Well, should weresolve now to refuse this request, what will we do when as we wellknow must happen it is repeated by two hundred thousand one day. Youwill all admit the doors must be opened. What will become of us orour children on that day, when we shall find ourselves in a minorityof perhaps one in twenty, without a single friend amongst the othernineteen, amongst those who will then tell us they wished to bebrothers, but that we by our own act made them strangers to theRepublic? Old as the world is, has an attempt like ours eversucceeded for long? Shall we say as a French king did that thingswill last our time, and after that we reck not the deluge? Again Iask what account is to be given to our descendants and what can beour hope in the future?

Mr. DE CLERCQ opposed the extension. 

Mr. JAN DE BEER said he could not agree to the prayer for extension. The burghers would decide time enough when the dam was too full, orwhen fresh water was wanted. He had gone through the memorials, andsome that wished an extension were unknown to him, even those whosigned from his district. Very few persons were in favour of theextension. If the burghers wished it he would give it, he would agreeto it. The people coolly asked the Raad to extend the franchise to80, 000 persons, men who were not naturalized and had nothing to lose. He did not mind extending the franchise to a few. When it was a smallcase he did not object, but when it came to giving away theirbirthright wholesale he kicked. He did not object to give the burgherright to _persons who shot Kaffirs_, or he had better say, personswho went into the native wars on behalf of the Transvaal, becausethey shed their blood for the country; but people who came here onlyto make money and that only did not deserve the franchise. Let themlook at that book of signatures on the table with the 70, 000 names. Who were they? (Laughter, and cries of 'Too much. ') Well, 38, 000then. He had 'too much. ' They were the persons, the millionaires sideby side with mining workers whom Mr. Jeppe spoke of, but where didthey find these people side by side? Nowhere! No, he would not grantan extension of the franchise. 

The PRESIDENT said he wished to say a few words on the subject, andthe first thing he had to say was that those persons who signed themonster petition were unfaithful and not law-abiding. 

Mr. JEPPE: I deny that. 

The PRESIDENT: Yes--I repeat unfaithful. 

Mr. JEPPE (excitedly): I say they are not!

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order!

The PRESIDENT then endeavoured to qualify his remarks by reassertingthat these people were disrespectful and disobedient to the law, because they were not naturalized. 'Now, ' asked His Honourtriumphantly, 'can you contradict that? No, you cannot. No one can. The law says that they must be naturalized, and they are not. 'Speeches had been made that afternoon, His Honour proceeded, urgingthat the rich should be made burghers and not the poor. Why not thepoor as well as the rich, if that were the case? But he was againstgranting any extension, saving in cases like that he mentioned theother day. Those who went on commando were entitled to it, but noothers. Those persons who showed they loved the country by makingsuch sacrifices were entitled to the franchise, and they should getit. These memorials were being sent in year by year, and yearlythreats were made to them if they did not open the flood-gates. Ifthe dam was full before the walls were washed over, a certain portionof the water had to be drained off. Well, this had been done inthe case of commando men. They were the clean water which was drainedoff and taken into the inner dam which consisted of clean water, buthe did not wish to take in the dirty water also. No, it had to remainin the outer dam until it was cleaned and purified. The Raad mightjust as well give away the independence of the country as give allthese new-comers, these disobedient persons, the franchise. Thesepersons knew there was a law, but they wished to evade it; theywished to climb the wall instead of going along the road quietly, andthese persons should be kept back. He earnestly cautioned the Raadagainst adopting Mr. L. Meyer's proposal. 

Mr. D. JOUBERT said excitement would not avail them. They had to becalm and deliberate. Now, what struck him was first who would givethem the assurance, were they to admit the 35, 000 persons whopetitioned them for the franchise, that they would maintain theindependence of the country inviolate and as a sacred heritage? Theyhad no guarantee. He could not agree with the request of the petition(here the speaker became excited, and gesticulating violently, continued), and he would never grant the request if the decision wasin his hands. 

Mr. A. J. WOLMARANS said that his position on this question was thathe would not budge an inch. 

Mr. JAN MEYER impugned the genuineness of the petition, and said hehad represented Johannesburg in the Raad for some time, and couldtell them how those things were worked. They were nearly allforgeries. He stated that as there were only 40, 000 people inJohannesburg it was impossible that 38, 000 of them signed. Thereforethey were forgeries. The speaker concluded by saying that as long ashe lived he would never risk the independence of the country bygranting the franchise, _except in accordance with the law_. It wasunreasonable to ask him to give up his precious birthright in thisthoughtless manner. He could not do it--he would not do it!

Mr. PRINSLOO said that he had gone through the petitions fromPotchefstroom, and certainly he had to admit that many of thesignatures were not genuine, for he found on these petitions thenames of his next-door neighbours, who had never told him a wordabout their signing such petitions. 

Mr. OTTO again addressed the Raad, endeavouring to prove thatmemorials from Ottos Hoop contained many forgeries. He said that hedid not consider the Johannesburg people who signed in that wonderfuland fat book on the table to be law-abiding, and he would have noneof them. The Raad had frequently heard that if the franchise were notextended there would be trouble. He was tired of these constantthreats. He would say, 'Come on and fight! Come on!' (Cries of'Order!')

Mr. OTTO (proceeding): I say, 'Come on and have it out; and thesooner the better. ' I cannot help it, Mr. Chairman, I must speak out. I say I am prepared to fight them, and I think every burgher of theSouth African Republic is with me. 

The CHAIRMAN (rapping violently): Order, order!

Mr. OTTO: Yes, this poor South African Republic, which they say theyown three-fourths of. They took it from us, and we fought for it andgot it back. 

The CHAIRMAN: Order!

Mr. OTTO: They called us rebels then. I say they are rebels. 

Loud cries of 'Order!'

Mr. OTTO: I will say to-day, those persons who signed the memorialsin that book are rebels. 

The CHAIRMAN: Will you keep order? You have no right to say suchthings. We are not considering the question of powers, but thepeaceful question of the extension of the franchise to-day; and keepto the point. 

Mr. OTTO: Very well I will; but I call the whole country to witnessthat you silenced me, and would not allow me to speak out my mind. 

The PRESIDENT said they had to distinguish between trustworthypersons and untrustworthy, and one proof was their going on commando, and the other was their becoming naturalized. People who werenaturalized were more or less worthy, and if they separatedthemselves from the others who would not get naturalized, andpetitioned the Raad themselves, the Raad would give ear to theirpetition. He strongly disapproved of the Raad being deceived in themanner it had been by the forged signatures. 

Mr. R. K. LOVEDAY, in the course of an address dealing exhaustivelywith the subject, said: The President uses the argument that theyshould naturalize, and thus give evidence of their desire to becomecitizens. I have used the same argument, but what becomes of sucharguments when met with the objections that the law requires suchpersons to undergo a probationary period extending from fourteen totwenty-four years before they are admitted to full rights ofcitizenship, and even after one has undergone that probationaryperiod, he can only be admitted to full rights by resolution of theFirst Raad? Law 4 of 1890, being the Act of the two Volksraads, laysdown clearly and distinctly that those who have been eligible for tenyears for the Second Raad _can_ be admitted to full citizenship. Sothat, in any case, the naturalized citizen cannot obtain full rightsuntil he reaches the age of forty years, he not being eligible forthe Second Raad until he is thirty years. The child born ofnon-naturalized parents must therefore wait until he is fortyyears-of age, although at the age of sixteen he may be called upon todo military service, and may fall in the defence of the land of hisbirth. When such arguments are hurled at me by our own flesh andblood--our kinsmen from all parts of South Africa--I must confessthat I am not surprised that these persons indignantly refuse toaccept citizenship upon such unreasonable terms. The element I havejust referred to--namely, the Africander element--is veryconsiderable, and numbers thousands hundreds of whom at the time thiscountry was struggling for its independence, accorded it moral andfinancial support, and yet these very persons are subjected to a termof probation extending from fourteen to twenty-four years. It isuseless for me to ask you whether such a policy is just andreasonable or Republican, for there can be but one answer, and thatis 'No!' Is there one man in this Raad who would accept the franchiseon the same terms? Let me impress upon you the grave nature of thisquestion, and the absolute necessity of going to the burghers withouta moment's delay, and consulting and advising them. Let us keepnothing from them regarding the true position, and I am sure we shallhave their hearty co-operation in any reasonable scheme we maysuggest. This is a duty we owe them, for we must not leave them underthe impression that the Uitlanders are satisfied to remain aliens, asstated by some of the journals. I move amongst these people, andlearn to know their true feelings, and when public journals tell youthat these people are satisfied with their lot, they tell you thatwhich they know to be false. Such journals are amongst the greatestsources of danger that the country has. We are informed by certainmembers that a proposition for the extension of the franchise mustcome from the burghers, but according to the Franchise Law theproposition must come from the Raad, and the public must consent. Themember for Rustenberg says that there are 9, 338 burghers who havedeclared that they are opposed to the extension of the franchise. Upon reference to the Report, he will find that there are only 1, 564opposed to the extension. Members appear afraid to touch upon thereal question at issue, but try to discredit the memorials by vaguestatements that some of the signatures are not genuine, and theformer member for Johannesburg, Mr. J. Meyer, seems just as anxiousto discredit the people of Johannesburg as formerly he was to defendthem. 

The CHAIRMAN advanced many arguments in favour of granting thefranchise to the Uitlander, but nevertheless concluded by statingthat as the Raad with few exceptions were against the extension, hewould go with the majority. He was not, he said, averse to thepublication of Mr. Meyer's proposition, because the country wouldhave to decide upon it; still he could not favour the extension ofthe franchise in the face of what had been said during the debate. Let the Raad endeavour to lighten the burden of the alien in otherrespects. Let the alien come to the Raad with his grievances, and letthe Raad give a patient ear unto him, but he really was not entitledto the franchise. 

The PRESIDENT again counselled the Raad not to consent to thepublication of Mr. Meyer's proposal. He did not want it put to thecountry. This business had been repeated from year to year until hewas tired of it. And why should they worry and weary the burghersonce more by asking them to decide upon Mr. Meyer's motion? There wasno need for it. There was no uncertainty about it. The burghers knewtheir minds, and their will, which was supreme, was known. The waywas open for aliens to become burghers; let them follow that road andnot try to jump over the wall. They had the privilege of voting forthe Second Raad if they became naturalized, and could vote forofficials, and that was more than they could do in the Cape Colony. In the Colony they could not vote for a President or any official. They were all appointed. They could only vote for Raad members there. And why should they want more power here all at once? What was thecause of all this commotion? What were they clamouring for? He knew. They wanted to get leave to vote for members of the First Raad, whichhad the independence of the country under its control. He had beentold by these people that 'if you take us on the same van with you, we cannot overturn the van without hurting ourselves as well as you. ''_Ja_, ' that was true, '_maar_, ' the PRESIDENT continued, they couldpull away the reins and drive the van along a different route. 

Mr. JEPPE, again speaking, said there was one matter he must referto. That was his Honour's remarks about the petitioners, calling themdisobedient and unfaithful. The law compels no one to naturalizehimself. How then could these petitioners have disobeyed it? Ofcourse we should prefer them to naturalize. But can we be surprisedif they hesitate to do so? Mr. Loveday has told you whatnaturalization means to them. 

The PRESIDENT agreed that these people were not obliged by law tonaturalize, but if they wanted burgher rights they should do so, whenthey would get the franchise for the Second Raad; and upon theirbeing naturalized let them come nicely to the Raad and the Raad wouldhave something to go to the country with, and they would receivefair treatment; but, if they refused naturalization and rejected theTransvaal laws, could they expect the franchise? No. Let Mr. Jeppe goback and give his people good advice, and if they were obedient tothe law and became naturalized they would not regret it; but hecould not expect his people to be made full burghers if they weredisobedient and refused naturalization. Let them do as he advised, and he (the President) would stand by them and support them. 

Mr. JEPPE said: His Honour has again asked me to advise the people ofJohannesburg what to do regarding the extension of the franchise. Hesays they must first naturalize and then come again. Then he holdsout hopes that their wishes will be met. Why then does he not supportMr. Meyer's proposal, which affects naturalized people only? Whatis it I am to advise the people of Johannesburg? I have had manysuggestions from different members. You, Mr. Chairman, seem tosupport the hundred men from Lydenburg who suggest ten years'residence as a qualification. Mr. Jan Meyer suggests that those whocame early to the goldfields should memorialize separately, and hewould support them. Others say that only those who are naturalizedshould petition, and that if a few hundreds petitioned instead of35, 000, their reception would be different. Well, we have had onepetition here wherein all these conditions were complied with. It wasnot signed by anyone who had not been here ten years, or who is notnaturalized, or who could at all be suspected of being unfaithful, nor could any exception be taken to it on the ground of numbers, since it was signed by one man only, Mr. Justice Morice, and yet itwas rejected. Gentlemen, I am anxiously groping for the light; butwhat, in the face of this, am I to advise my people?

Mr. JAN DE BEER endeavoured to refute Messrs. Jeppe's and Loveday'sstatements, when they said a man could not become a full member untilhe was forty. They were out of their reckoning, because a man did notlive until he was sixteen. He was out of the country. In the eyes ofthe law he was a foreigner until he was sixteen. (Laughter. ) Themember adduced other similar arguments to refute those of Messrs. Jeppe and Loveday, causing much laughter. 

Mr. LOVEDAY replied to the President, especially referring to hisHonour's statement that he (Mr. Loveday) was wrong when he said thata person would have to wait until he was forty before he could obtainthe full rights. He (Mr. Loveday) repeated and emphasized hisstatements of yesterday. 

The CHAIRMAN said there was no doubt about it. What Mr. Loveday saidregarding the qualifications and how long a man would have to waituntil he was qualified to become a full burgher was absolutelycorrect. It could not be contradicted. The law was clear on thatpoint. There was no doubt about it. 

Mr. JAN DE BEER: Yes; I see now Mr. Loveday is right, and I am wrong. The law does say what Mr. Loveday said. It must be altered. 

The debate was closed on the third day, and Mr. Otto's motion toaccept the report of the majority of the Committee, to refuse therequest of the memoralists, and to refer them to the existing laws, was carried by sixteen votes to eight. 

APPENDIX G. 

TERMS OF DR. JAMESON'S SURRENDER. 

_Sir Hercules Robinson to Mr. Chamberlain. _

Received April 6, 1896. 

 _Government House, Capetown, March 16, 1896. _

SIR, I have the honour to transmit for your information a copy of adespatch from Her Majesty's Acting Agent at Pretoria, enclosing acommunication from the Government of the South African Republic, accompanied by sworn declarations, respecting the terms of thesurrender of Dr. Jameson's force, a summary of which documents Itelegraphed to you on the 12th instant. 

At my request, Lieutenant-General Goodenough has perused these sworndeclarations, and informs me 'that, ' in his opinion, 'Jameson'ssurrender was unconditional, except that his and his people's liveswere to be safe so far as their immediate captors were concerned. '

 I have, etc. , HERCULES ROBINSON, _Governor and High Commissioner. _

Enclosed in above letter. 

_From H. Cloete, Pretoria, to the High Commissioner, Capetown. _

 _Pretoria, March 11th, 1896. _

SIR, I have the honour to enclose for the information of your Excellency aletter this day received from the Government, a summary of which Ihave already sent your Excellency by telegraph. 

 I have, etc. , H. CLOETE. 

 _Department of Foreign Affairs, Government Office, Pretoria, March 10, 1896. _

Division A. , R. A. , 1056/1896, B. , 395/96. 

HONOURABLE SIR, I am instructed to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram from hisExcellency the High Commissioner to you, dated 6th instant, forwardedon by you to his Honour the State President, and I am now instructedto complete with further data my letter to you of 4th instant, B. B. , 257/96, which I herewith confirm, containing the information whichthe Government then had before it respecting the surrender, and whichwas furnished in view of your urgent request for an immediate reply. 

In order to leave no room for the slightest misunderstanding, and toput an end to all false representations, the Government has summonednot only Commandant Cronjé, but also Commandant Potgieter, CommandantMalan, Field-Cornet Maartens, Assistant Field-Cornet Van Vuuren, andothers, whose evidence appears to be of the greatest importance, andplaces the matter in a clear and plain light. 

The information which the Government has found published in thepapers is of the following purport:

'THE DOORNKOP SURRENDER: ALLEGED CORRESPONDENCE. 

 '_London, Monday, _ 11. 15 _a. M. _

'Mr. Hawksley, the Chartered solicitor, who is defending Dr. Jameson, published the following letter to-day, which passed between Sir JohnWilloughby and Mr. Cronjé, the Dutch Commandant at the time of theKrugersdorp surrender:

'_From Willoughby to Commandant. _

'"We surrender, providing you guarantee a safe conduct out of thecountry for every member of the force. "

'_From Cronjé to Willoughby. _

'"Please take notice, I shall immediately let our officers cometogether to decide upon your communication. "

'_From Cronjé to Willoughby. _

'"I acknowledge your letter. The answer is, If you will undertake topay the expenses you have caused to the Transvaal, and will lay downyour arms, then I will spare the lives of you and yours. Please sendme reply to this within thirty minutes. "'

I have now the honour to enclose for the information of HisExcellency the High Commissioner and the British Government sworndeclarations of:

1. Commandant Cronjé, substantiated by Field-Cornet Maartens andAssistant Field-Cornet Van Vuuren. 

2. Commandant Potgieter. 

3. Commandant Malan. 

4. J. S. Colliers, substantiated by B. J. Viljoen, and the interpreter, M. J. Adendorff. 

These sworn declarations given before the State Attorney agree in allthe principal points, and give a clear summary of all the incidentsof the surrender, and from the main points thereof it appears, _interalia_:

That the second letter, as published above, and which is alleged tobe from Cronjé to Willoughby, was not issued from Cronjé, but fromCommandant Potgieter, who has undoubtedly taken up the properstandpoint, and has followed the general rule in matters of urgency, such as the one in hand, and where the Commandant-General was notpresent in person on the field of battle, first and before treatingwishing to consult with his co-commandants in as far as was possible. 

That a note such as appears in his declaration was sent by CommandantCronjé. 

That neither Commandant Malan nor Commandant Potgieter were presentat the despatch of it. 

That the reply thereon from Willoughby was received by CommandantCronjé, as appears in that declaration. 

That Commandant Cronjé then, in compliance with the note sent byCommandant Potgieter, as well as the other commandants and officersmentioned in the declaration of Cronjé, rode up. 

That Commandant Cronjé then explained his own note. 

That thereupon also Commandant Malan joined his co-commandants andofficers, and at this time Commandants Malan, Cronjé, and Potgieterwere present. 

That after consultation, and with the approval of Commandants Cronjéand Potgieter, Commandant Malan, by means of the interpreterAdendorff, had the following said to Dr. Jameson:

'This is Commandant Malan. He wishes you distinctly to understandthat no terms can be made here. We have no right to make terms here. Terms will be made by the Government of the South African Republic. He can only secure your lives to Pretoria, until you are handed overto Commandant-General at Pretoria. '

That Dr. Jameson agreed to these terms and accepted them. 

That thereupon by order of Dr. Jameson the arms were then also laiddown. 

That Commandant Trichardt then appeared with the orders of theCommandant-General to himself. 

It now appears that these orders are those which were contained inthe telegram of which I already sent you a copy by my above-quotedletter of the 4th March, 1896, and which, after the final regulationof matters such as had then taken place, was not further acted uponbecause as regards the surrender negotiations were in fact carried onin accordance with the orders of the Commandant-General. 

While putting aside the question of the surrender there is little tobe said about the other points contained in the telegram under reply, there is one which is considered of sufficient importance by thisGovernment to even still draw the attention of His Excellency theHigh Commissioner thereto. His Excellency says: 'I may thereforeexplain that an armistice had been agreed to pending my arrival. '

The Government here can only think of one other misunderstanding, they having at the time of the disturbances at Johannesburg neverrecognized any acting party, for which reason therefore theconcluding of an armistice was an impossibility. 

In conclusion, I have to tender thanks both to His Honour theSecretary of State and His Excellency the High Commissioner for theunprejudiced manner in which they, as against insinuations of a lowcharacter, have made known their feelings with respect to the goodfaith shown by His Honour the State President in his negotiations inconnection with the question of the surrender of Dr. Jameson's force. 

 I have, etc. , C. VAN BOESCHOTEN, _Acting State Secretary_. 

 _His Honour H. Cloete, Acting British Agent, Pretoria. _

_Appeared before me, _ HERMANUS JACOB COSTER, _State Attorney andex-officio J. P. Of the South African Republic_, PIETER ARNOLDUSCRONJÉ, _Commandant of the Potchefstroom District, who makes oath andstates:_

I was, together with H. P. Malan (Commandant of the RustenburgDistrict), and F. J. Potgieter (Commandant of the KrugersdorpDistrict), one of the commanding officers of the burgher forcesin the fights against Jameson. When I noticed the white flag, Iinstantly ordered De la Rey to approach the enemy. Instead of De laRey, Hans Klopper, one of the men of Commandant Potgieter, went. Hebrought back a note from Willoughby to me. The contents of the notewere that if we left them to themselves he promised to withdraw overthe boundary. In reply I sent him per Hans Klopper the followingnote:

'John Willoughby, --I acknowledge your note, and this serves as reply, that if you guarantee the payment of the expenses which you haveoccasioned the South African Republic and surrender your flagtogether with your weapons I will spare the life of you and yours. Please send reply within thirty minutes. '

When this reply was written by me neither Malan nor Potgieter werepresent. Thereupon he answered that he accepted the terms, andsurrendered himself fully with all his arms into my hands. Afterreceiving Willoughby's answer, I rode to Jameson's troops in order tomeet the other commandants, in accordance with a note sent byCommandant Potgieter to the enemy. I went with Field-Cornets Maartensand Van Vuuren to Jameson's troops, and met Jameson. When I met himI gave him to clearly understand our agreement namely that he mustplainly understand that the last clause was that I guaranteed hislife and that of his men until I had handed him over to GeneralJoubert. Thereupon I asked him if he was willing to lay down his flagand his arms, to which he replied, 'I have no flag; I am willing tolay down my arms. ' Thereupon I asked him if he could declare uponoath that he had no flag, whereupon he declared under oath that hehad no flag. Then Commandant Malan arrived, and then the threecommanding officers, Malan, Potgieter and I, were present on thespot. 

Before I began speaking to Malan, Jameson called Willoughby to bepresent. Thereupon Malan and I spoke together about the surrenderof Jameson. Whereupon Malan said, 'We can't decide anything here. Jameson must surrender unconditionally, and he must be plainly givento understand that we cannot guarantee his life any longer than tillwe have handed him over to General Joubert. ' I fully agreed withMalan, and the interpreter Adendorff was then instructed by the threecommandants jointly to convey plainly in English to Jameson what thethree commandants had agreed upon. After this had been done, Jamesonbowed, took his hat off, and said in English that he agreed to theterms. Thereupon he issued orders to Willoughby to command thesubordinate officers to lay down their arms. Then the arms were laiddown. Later on, after the arms had been laid down, CommandantTrichardt arrived with orders from the Commandant-General, and histerms were the same as those we had already laid down. 

 P. A. CRONJÉ. 

Sworn before me on this 7th day of March, 1896. 

H. J. COSTER, _State Attorney and Ex-officio J. P. _

 * * * * * * *

We, the undersigned, Jan. Thos. Maartens, Field-Cornet of the WardGatsrand, District Potchefstroom, and Daniel Johannes Jansen vanVuuren, Assistant Field-Cornet of the Ward Bovenschoonspruit, declareunder oath that we were present at everything stated in the foregoingsworn declaration of Commandant P. A. Cronjé, and that thatdeclaration is correct and in accordance with the truth. 

 JAN. MAARTENS, D. J. J. VAN VUUREN. 

Sworn before me on this the 7th day of March, 1896. 

 H. J. COSTER, _State-Attorney and ex-officio J. P. _

 * * * * * * *

_Appeared before me_, HERMANUS JACOB COSTER, _State Attorney andex-officio J. P. Of the South African Republic_, FREDERICK JACOBUSPOTGIETER, _Commandant of the Krugersdorp District, who makes oathand states:_

On the morning of January 2, I received a written report from theenemy in which was stated that he would surrender, but that he mustbe allowed to go back over the line. I answered thereon in writingthat I would call the officers together and would then immediatelynotify him. The report received by me I immediately transmitted toCommandant Cronjé. A short time after I saw Commandant Cronjé withthe burghers going towards the enemy. I thereupon also went towardsthe enemy and met Commandant Cronjé there. I then attended thediscussion as set forth in the declaration given by J. T. Celliers, dated March 6, 1896, and confirmed by Messrs. Michiel JosephAdendorff and Benjamin Johannes Vilgoen. 

The purport of that discussion is correctly rendered. 

 F. J. POTGIETER, _Commandant, Krugersdorp_. 

This sworn before me on this the 6th day of March, 1896. 

 H. J. COSTER, _State Attorney and ex-officio J. P. _

 * * * * * * *

_Appeared before me_, HERMANUS JACOB COSTER, _State Attorney andex-officio J. P. Of the South African Republic_, HERCULES PHILIPPUSMALAN, _who makes oath and states:_

I was together with P. A. Cronjé, Commandant of the KrugersdorpDistrict, one of the commanding forces in the fights against Jameson. On the morning of January 2, a despatch rider from CommandantPotgieter came up and informed me that Jameson had hoisted the whiteflag, and that I must quickly attend a meeting with the othercommandants. When I came up to Jameson I found Cronjé and Potgieterthere; and, as I saw that Cronjé had been speaking to Jameson, Iasked Cronjé 'What is the subject you have been speaking about? Ialso wish to know it. ' Cronjé told me that he had agreed with Jamesonthat Jameson would pay the expenses incurred by the State, and thathe (Cronjé) would spare the lives of Jameson and his people tillPretoria was reached. 

Thereupon I answered, 'We cannot make any terms here. We have not thepower to do so. Jameson must surrender unconditionally, and we canonly guarantee his life until he is delivered over by us into thehands of the Commandant-General. Then he will have to submit to thedecision of the Commandant-General and the Government. ' When I hadsaid this, Commandant Potgieter answered, 'I agree with that. 'And Commandant Cronjé said, 'So be it, brothers. ' Thereupon theinterpreter (Adendorff) was instructed to translate to Jamesonwhat had been spoken. He did so. Jameson thereupon took off his hat, bowed, and replied in English that he agreed thereto. Jameson thenordered Willoughby, who was present from the moment that I arrived, to command the subordinate officers to disarm the men, and thereuponthe arms were given up. 

H. P. MALAN, _Commandant. _

Sworn before me on this the 9th day of March, 1896. 

 H. J. COSTER, _State Attorney and ex-oficio J. P. _

 * * * * * * *

_Appeared before me_, HERMANUS JACOB COSTER, _State Attorney andex-officio J. P. Of the South African Republic_, JAN STEPHANOSCELLIERS, _of Pretoria, who makes oath and states:_

I came up to Jameson and his troops on the second of January (afterJameson had hoisted the white flag), together with B. G. Viljoen, Krugersdorp, and another Viljoen, whose place of residence is unknownto me. I asked one of Jameson's troopers where he was. He showed methe direction and the place where Jameson was. Jameson thereuponapproached me, and I greeted him. While this took place CommandantCronjé, the interpreter (Adendorff), and another man whose name isunknown to me, came. Cronjé was thereupon introduced by Adendorff, who spoke English, to Jameson. Thereupon Cronjé said to Jameson, 'Iunderstand that you and your men will surrender yourselves with yourflag and everything you possess?' Jameson said thereupon, 'I fightunder no flag. '

Cronjé then replied, 'Then I must believe you upon your word thatyou have no flag?' Jameson then said, 'I declare under oath that Ipossess no flag. ' This conversation was interpreted word for word byAdendorff. Shortly afterwards Commandant Malan also arrived there. Heasked, 'What is up here? Tell me the news also. ' Then Cronjé toldMalan that Jameson would surrender conditionally, whereupon Malansaid in effect, 'There can be no question of a conditional surrenderhere, because we have no right to make terms. The surrender must takeplace unconditionally. If terms must be made, it must take place atPretoria. We can only guarantee his life and that of his men as longas they are under us, and until the moment when they are handed overto the Commandant. '

General Cronjé answered thereupon, 'So be it, brother. ' ThenAdendorff asked if he had to interpret this to Jameson, whereuponMalan said, 'Yes, ' and thereupon said in English to Jameson, 'Thisis Commandant Malan. He wishes you to distinctly understand that noterms can be made here. We have no right to make terms here. Termswill be made by the Government of the South African Republic. He canonly secure your lives to Pretoria, until you are handed over to theCommandant-General at Pretoria. '

In reply, Jameson took off his hat, bowed, stepped backwards andsaid, 'I accept your terms. ' Thereupon Jameson ordered Willoughby tocommand the subordinate officers that the troopers should lay downtheir arms. The arms were then laid down. 

J. S. CELLIERS. 

Sworn before me on the 6th March, 1896. 

 H. J. COSTER, _State-Attorney and ex-officio J. P. _

We, the undersigned, Benjamin Johannes Viljoen and Michiel JosephAdendorff, the persons mentioned in the preceding declaration, declare under oath that the facts stated therein, which we witnessed, as stated above, are true and correct. 

 B. J. VILJOEN. M. J. ADENDORFF. 

Sworn before me on the 6th March, 1896. 

 H. J. COSTER, _State-Attorney and ex-officio J. P. _

 * * * * * * *

COLONIAL OFFICE TO WAR OFFICE. 

_Downing Street, April 21, 1896. _

SIR, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to request that you willlay before the Marquis of Lansdowne the undermentioned papers on thesubject of the surrender of Dr. Jameson's force to the Boers. 

1. A despatch from Sir Hercules Robinson, enclosing sworndeclarations taken by the Government of the South African Republic. A telegraphic summary of these declarations was laid before Dr. Jameson, whose observations are contained in--

2. A letter from the solicitor for Dr. Jameson and his fellowdefendants. 

3. A despatch from Sir Hercules Robinson, enclosing a swornstatement. 

Lord Lansdowne will observe from Sir H. Robinson's despatch of the16th March that the declarations taken by the Government of the SouthAfrican Republic were submitted to the General Officer commanding atthe Cape, who gave his opinion that the surrender was unconditional. 

Mr. Chamberlain would be obliged if Lord Lansdowne would submit thesepapers to his military advisers, and obtain from them their opinionas to the terms of the surrender, which Mr. Chamberlain thinks wascompleted on Sir John Willoughby's acceptance of Commandant Cronjé'sterms, and was therefore subject to these terms and conditions. 

 I am, etc. , R. H. MEADE. 

 * * * * * * *

WAR OFFICE TO COLONIAL OFFICE. 

Received April 28, 1896. 

 _War Office, London, S. W. , April 27, 1896. _

SIR, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledgereceipt of your letter of the 21st inst. , on the subject of thesurrender of Dr. Jameson's force to the Boers. 

In reply, the Marquis of Lansdowne, having consulted with hismilitary adviser, desires me to observe that, whatever position Mr. Cronjé may hold in the Transvaal army, he decidedly on the occasionin question acted as an officer in authority, and guaranteed thelives of Dr. Jameson and all his men if they at once laid down theirarms. 

The terms prescribed were accepted by Dr. Jameson's force, and theysurrendered and laid down their arms, and no subsequent discussionamongst the Transvaal officers could retract the terms of thissurrender. 

I am therefore to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretaryof State for the Colonies, that the Secretary of State for Warconcurs with Mr. Chamberlain in considering that the surrender wascompleted on Sir John Willoughby's acceptance of Commandant Cronjé'sterms, and was subject to these terms and conditions. 

 I am, etc, ARTHUR L. HALIBURTON. 

APPENDIX H. 

SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY'S REPORT TO THE WAR OFFICE. 

The subjoined document is printed in the form in which it wassupplied to the author by a journalist, to whom it had been given asa fair statement of the case. The marginal remarks are the notes madeby a member of the Reform Committee to whom it was shown. 

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE EXPEDITION THAT LEFT THE PROTECTORATE AT THEURGENT REQUEST OF THE LEADING CITIZENS OF JOHANNESBURG WITH THEOBJECT OF STANDING BY THEM AND MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER WHILST THEYWERE DEMANDING JUSTICE FROM THE TRANSVAAL AUTHORITIES. By SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART. , Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Dr. Jameson'sForces. 

[After they had dated the 'urgent' letter, and had wired to Dr. Harris (December 27): 'We will make our own notation by the aidof the letter which I shall publish. ']

On Saturday, December 28, 1895, Dr. Jameson received a Reuter'stelegram showing that the situation at Johannesburg had become acute. At the same time reliable information was received that the Boers inthe Zeerust and Lichtenburg districts were assembling, and had beensummoned to march on Johannesburg. 

[The same time as he got the telegrams from Johannesburg andmessages by Heany and Holden on no account to move. ]

Preparations were at once made to act on the terms of the letterdated December 20, and already published, and also in accordance withverbal arrangements with the signatories of that letter--viz. , thatshould Dr. Jameson hear that the Boers were collecting, and that theintentions of the Johannesburg people had become generally known, he was at once to come to the aid of the latter with whatever forcehe had available, and without further reference to them, the objectbeing that such force should reach Johannesburg without any conflict. 

[Twaddle--in the face of Hammond's, Phillips's and Sam Jameson'swire not to move]

At 3 p. M. On Sunday afternoon, December 29, everything was inreadiness at Pitsani Camp. 

The troops were paraded, and Dr. Jameson read the letter ofinvitation from Johannesburg. 

He then explained to the force _(a)_ that no hostilities wereintended; _(b)_ that we should only fight if forced to do so inself-defence; _(c)_ that neither the persons nor property ofinhabitants of the Transvaal were to be molested; _(d)_ that our soleobject was to help our fellow-men in their extremity, and to ensuretheir obtaining attention to their just demands. 

Dr. Jameson's speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm by themen, who cheered most heartily. 

The above programme was strictly adhered to until the column wasfired upon on the night of the 31st. 

Many Boers, singly and in small parties, were encountered on the lineof march; to one and all of these the pacific nature of theexpedition was carefully explained. 

[Start from Pitsani. ]

The force left Pitsani Camp at 6. 30 p. M. , December 29, and marchedthrough the night. 

At 5. 15 a. M. On the morning of the 30th the column reached thevillage of Malmani (39 miles distant from Pitsani). 

[Junction effected at Malmani with B. B. P. ]

Precisely at the same moment the advanced guard of the MafekingColumn (under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and the junction waseffected between the two bodies. 

For details of the composition of the combined force, as also forgeneral particulars of the march to Krugersdorp, see sketch of theroute and schedule attached (marked A. And B. Respectively). 

[Defile at lead-mines passed. ]

From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross indaylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place, distant71 miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5. 30 p. M. , December 30. 

I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers, sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, misseddoing so by three hours only. 

[Letter from Commandant-General. ]

At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from theCommandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason ofour advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sentto this, explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as thoseused to the force at Pitsani. 

[Letter from High Commissioner. ]

At Doornport (91 miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle' early onTuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook us, andpresented a letter from the High Commissioner, which contained anorder to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to Mafeking andPitsani. 

[Reasons for not retreating. ]

A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with theseinstructions an impossibility. In the first place, there wasabsolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we hadrecently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessaryfor our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the roadahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man andbeast. Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of thetotal distance; a large force of Boers was known to be interceptingour retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement wouldbring on an attack of Boers from all sides. 

It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our littleforce, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to ourfriends, who we were confident would be awaiting our arrival there. 

Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible toeffect a retreat from Doornport, we knew that Johannesburg had risen, and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully deserting thosecoming to meet us. 

[They could not possibly _know_ it, because the rising--_i. E. _the public arming and moving of men--only began at the very hourthey claim to have _known_ it, and because the first news fromJohannesburg only reached them 24 hours later by the two cyclists'Oh what a tangled web we weave, when--']

Finally, it appeared to us impossible to turn back, in view of thefact that we had been urgently called in to avert a massacre, whichwe had been assured would be imminent in the event of a crisis suchas had now occurred. 

[_Vide_ the telegrams and messages to stop! How noble!]

[Boer scouts. ]

Near Boon's store, on the evening of the 31st, an advanced patrolfell in with Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp Volunteers. Thisofficer, in charge of a party of 15 scouts, had come out to gainintelligence of our movements. He was detained whilst our intentionswere fully explained to him, and then released at Dr. Jameson'srequest. 

[First skirmish New Year's Eve. ]

At midnight (New Year's Eve), while the advanced scouts were crossinga rocky wooded ridge at right angles to and barring the line ofadvance, they were fired on by a party of 40 Boers, who had postedthemselves in this position. The scouts, reinforced by the advancedguard, under Inspector Straker, drove off their assailants after ashort skirmish, during which one trooper of the M. M. P. Was wounded. 

At Van Oudtshoorn's, early on the following morning (January 1), Dr. Jameson received a second letter from the High Commissioner, to whichhe replied in writing. 

At 9. 30 a. M. The march was resumed in the usual day formation. Aftermarching two miles, the column got clear of the hills and emergedinto open country. 

[10. 15 a. M. ]

About this time Inspector Drury, in command of the rearguard, sentword that a force of about 100 Boers was following him about one milein rear. I thereupon reinforced the rearguard, hitherto consisting ofa troop and one Maxim, by an additional half-troop and another Maxim. 

[11 a. M. ]

About 5 miles beyond Van Oudtshoorn's store the column was met by twocyclists bearing letters from several leaders of the JohannesburgReform Committee. These letters expressed the liveliest approval anddelight at our speedy approach, and finally contained a renewal oftheir promise to meet the column with a force at Krugersdorp. {55} Themessengers also reported that only 300 armed Boers were in the town. 

This news was communicated to the troops, who received it with loudcheers. 

When within two miles of Hind's store, the column was delayed byextensive wire-fencing, which ran for one and a half miles on eitherside of the road, and practically constituted a defile. 

While the column was halted and the wire being cut, the country forsome distance on both sides was carefully scouted. 

By this means it was ascertained that there was a considerable forceof Boers (1) on the left front, (2) in the immediate front(retreating hastily on Krugersdorp), (3) a third party on the rightflank. 

The force which had been following the column from Van Oudtshoorn'scontinued to hover in the rear. 

Lieutenant-Colonel White, in command of the advanced guard, sent backa request for guns to be pushed forward as a precaution in case ofan attack from the Boers in front. By the time these guns reached theadvanced guard, the Boers were still retreating some two miles off. Afew rounds were then fired in their direction. Had Colonel White, inthe first instance, opened fire with his Maxims on the Boers, whom hesurprised watering their horses close to Hind's store, considerableloss would have been inflicted; but this was not our object, for withthe exception of the small skirmish on the previous night, the Boershad not as yet molested the column, whose sole aim was to reachJohannesburg if possible without fighting. 

[1. 30 p. M. ]

At this hour Hind's store was reached. 

Here the troops rested for one and a half hours. 

Unfortunately, hardly any provisions for men and horses wereavailable. 

[3 p. M. ]

An officers' patrol, consisting of Major Villiers (Royal HorseGuards) and Lieutenant Grenfell (1st Life Guards) and six men, movedoff for the purpose of reconnoitring the left flank of the Boerposition, while Captain Lindsell, with his permanent force ofadvanced scouts, pushed on as usual to reconnoitre the approach bythe main road. At the same time I forwarded a note to the Commandantof the forces in Krugersdorp to the effect that, in the event of myfriendly force meeting with opposition on its approach, I should beforced to shell the town, and that therefore I gave him this warningin order that the women and children might be moved out of danger. 

[Friendly!]

To this note, which was despatched by a Boer who had been detained atVan Oudtshoorn, I received no reply. 

At Hind's store we were informed that the force in our front hadincreased during the forenoon to about 800 men, of whom a largenumber were entrenched on the hillside. 

[4. 30 p. M. ]

Four miles beyond Hind's store, the column following the scouts, which met with no opposition, ascended a steep rise of some 400 feet, and came full in view of the Boer position on the opposite side ofa deep valley, traversed by a broad "sluit" or muddy water course. 

Standing on the plateau or spur, on which our force was forming upfor action, the view to our front was as follows:

Passing through our position to the west ran the Hind'sstore--Krugersdorp Road traversing the valley and the Boer positionalmost at right angles to both lines. 

Immediately to the north of this road, at the point where itdisappeared over the sky-line on the opposite slope, lay the Queen'sBattery House and earthworks, completely commanding the valley on allsides and distant 1, 900 yards from our standpoint. 

Some 1, 000 yards down the valley to the north stood a farmhouse, surrounded by a dense plantation, which flanked the valley. 

Half-way up the opposite slope, and adjacent to the road, stood aniron house which commanded the drift where the road crossed theabove-mentioned watercourse. 

On the south side of the road, and immediately opposite thelast-named iron house, an extensive rectangular stone wall enclosurewith high trees formed an excellent advanced central defensiveposition. Further up the slope, some 500 yards to the south of thisenclosure, stretched a line of rifle-pits, which were again flankedto the south by 'prospecting' trenches. On the sky-line numbers ofBoers were apparent to our front and right front. 

Before reaching the plateau we had observed small parties of Boershurrying towards Krugersdorp, and immediately on reaching the highground the rearguard was attacked by the Boer force which hadfollowed the column during the whole morning. 

I therefore had no further hesitation in opening fire on theKrugersdorp position. 

[4. 30 p. M. ]

The two seven-pounders and the 12-1/2 pounder opened on the Boerline, making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and CaptainGosling at 1, 900 yards. 

[It must have been here that the waggon-loads of dead Boersweren't found. ]

[5 p. M. ]

This fire was kept up until 5 p. M. The Boers made practically noreply, but lay quiet in the trenches and battery. 

Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated, thefirst line consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100 men), under Colonel White advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this force; astrong troop with a Maxim formed the right and left supports oneither flank. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B. B. P. And one Maxim, hadbeen previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left. 

The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve andrearguard. 

The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of thewatercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy cross-firefrom all points of the defence. 

Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond thewatercourse. 

The left support under Inspector Dykes then advanced to prolong thefirst line to the left, but, diverging too much to his left thisofficer experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse andplantation, and was driven back with some loss. 

Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and comeinto action. 

[5. 30 p. M. ]

About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that thecountry to our right was open, and that we could easily move round inthat direction. 

It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intendedholding their position. 

Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of theBoers--an event which I had been momentarily expecting--I did notfeel justified in pushing a general attack, which would havecertainly entailed heavy losses on my small force. 

[When Celliers and Rowlands left them at 11 a. M. They had notexpected anyone. _Vide_ Cellier's report and Colonel H. E. White'sletter. ]

[6. 15 p. M. ]

I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim tokeep in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateauto our left, and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B. B. P. , one12-1/2 pounder, and one Maxim to cover our left flank and continuefiring on the battery and trenches south of the road. 

I then made a general flank movement to the right with the remainingtroops. 

Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advancedposition during the next half-hour, and blew up the battery house. 

[Flank movement. ]

Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first housesof the Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt tointercept the movement. 

Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of thepromised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to pushon with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting in thedarkness to slip through any intervening opposition. 

Two guides were obtained, the column formed in the prescribed nightorder of march, and we started off along a road leading direct toJohannesburg. 

At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from thedirection of Krugersdorp, which lay 1-1/2 miles to the left rear. 

We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of thelong-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg hadMaxims, and that the Staats'-Artillerie were not expected to arriveuntil the following morning. To leave our supposed friends in thelurch was out of the question. I determined at once to move to theirsupport. 

[Long awaited! Why, this was only 6 hours since the cyclists left. ]

Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road I advancedrapidly across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction ofthe firing, in the formation shown in the accompanying sketch. 

After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and weperceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. Theflankers on the right reported another force threatening that flank. 

Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from theammunition carts, I ordered a retreat on them. 

It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the causethereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force fromJohannesburg. 

[This is really magnificent!]

Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our friendsat all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could not failto carry out their repeated promises, {56} renewed to us by letter solately as 11 a. M. This same day. It was now very nearly dark. Inthe dusk the Boers could be seen closing in on three sides--viz. , north, east, and south. The road to Johannesburg appeared completelybarred, and the last opportunity of slipping through, which hadpresented itself an hour ago when the renewed firing was heard, wasgone not to return. 

[Bivouac, January 1. ]

Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available. 

But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which weafterwards heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at thearrival of large reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column wouldhave been by this time (7 p. M. ) at least four or five miles furtheron the road to Johannesburg, with an excellent chance of reachingthat town without further opposition. 

I moved the column to the edge of a wide vley to the right of theroad, and formed the horses in quarter-column under cover of theslope. The carts were formed up in rear and on both flanks, and fiveMaxims were placed along the front so as to sweep the plateau. 

The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear andflank faces. 

The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on theside; sentries and cossack posts were posted on each face. Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches andcuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards. 

[9 p. M. ]

At 9 p. M. A heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm ofbullets swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sidesexcept the south-west. 

The troops were protected by their position on the slope below thelevel of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, whichlasted about twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable. 

The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery aspossible, although very tired and hungry and without water. 

We were then left unmolested for two or three hours. 

[Midnight. ]

About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp, but the firing was not kept up for long. 

Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to getour range. 

[Thursday, January 2. ]

At 3. 30 a. M. Patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force assilently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off. 

At 4 a. M. A heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and thepatrols driven in from the north and east sides. 

Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by LieutenantJesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope. 

Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the southreturned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in thatdirection. 

The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in forcewere occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankmentfor a distance of one and a half miles right across the direct roadto Johannesburg. 

I covered the movements of the main body with the B. B. P. And twoMaxims under Colonel Grey along the original left front of thebivouac, and two troops M. M. P. , under Major K. White on the rightfront. 

During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however themain body was partially sheltered by the slope. 

Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley withoutcasualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic Mine, was subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White hereuponvery judiciously threw out one troop to the left to cover the furtheradvance of the main body. 

This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by thedisappearance of our volunteer guide of the previous night. 

Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained. 

In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and thecovering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M. M. P. Covering troops, and rejoined the main body. 

[5 a. M. ]

At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but mostgallantly insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of theaction. 

Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in actionuntil he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop. 

While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavyfire, and several men and horses were lost here. 

I detailed a rearguard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R. White, to cover our rear and left flank, and move the remainder ofthe troops in the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward aspossible. 

In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept upfor ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a standwas made by various small detachments of the rear and flank guard. In this manner the Boers were successfully kept a distance of 500yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flankof the main body. 

In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfonteinwe met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the miningpopulation, who professed a desire to help if only they had arms. 

[8 a. M. ]

Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey, at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near theSpeitfontein mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our lineof advance. 

I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with therear-guard. 

On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling aridge which our guide stated was Doornkop. 

The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey werethen carried out. 

The B. B. P. , under Major Coventry, who I regret to say was severelywounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridgein most gallant style and pushed on beyond it. 

About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which we havelearnt with grief has subsequently proved fatal. 

Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M. M. P. , charged, and drove off the field a large force of Boers threateningour left flank. 

The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill wasimpassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left. 

This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained thatwithout storming the Boer position there was no road open toJohannesburg except by a wide detour of many miles to the right. 

[8. 30 a. M. ]

At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the HighCommissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jamesoninformed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz. , that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would notor could not come to our assistance, and that we must fight our waythrough unaided. 

Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we againpushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge anothersteep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundredsof Boers completely covered from our fire. 

This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column mustadvance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was noway of getting round this hill. 

Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out, outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed tokeep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numericallyby one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified insacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me. 

[Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked thelives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started. ]

As previously explained, our object in coming had been to renderassistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants ofJohannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopelessattempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and uselessslaughter. 

[9. 15 a. M. ]

With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to theCommandant that we would surrender provided that he would give aguarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of theforce. 

To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses. 

In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malansubsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that hewould not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not untilour arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers. 

I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure toloss of time from the following causes:

(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front ofKrugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction withthe Johannesburg force. 

(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides tothe Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previouslypromised by Johannesburg. 

(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposedJohannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening. 

[How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland;nothing in the Letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which theywrote at 11 a. M. Wednesday; nothing in the message sent by BuglerVallé, who was despatched on Thursday before daybreak _after_ theKrugersdorp light? How is it that if the forces were to meet atKrugersdorp Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Dr. Wolff to meet him_en route, _ so as to decide whether to turn off _20 miles beforereaching Krugersdorp_ and march direct on Pretoria or go intoJohannesburg first?]

I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp, marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under 70hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 milesbetween Pitsani and Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of whichthe men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically withoutfood or water, having had their last meal at 8 a. M. On the morning ofthe 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17 miles from Krugersdorp. 

The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone. 

(2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of theforce marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of494 men and officers (exclusive of staff). 

(3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of thebivouac on the night of January 1st. 

I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very greatgallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers under my command in the field and on the march undermost trying circumstances. 

COMPOSITION OF FORCE. 

 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Royal Horse Guards Commanding. Major Hon. Robert White, Royal Welsh Fusiliers Senior Staff Officer. Major C. Hyde Villiers, Royal Horse Guards Staff Officer. Captain Kincaid-Smith, Royal Artillery Artillery Staff Officer. Captain Kennedy, B. S. A. C. 's Service Quartermaster. Captain E. Holden, Derbyshire Yeomanry Assistant Quarter-Master. Surgeon Captain Farmer, B. S. A. Co. } Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life } Medical Officers. Guards } Lieutenant Grenfell, 1st Life Guards Remount Officer. Lieutenant Jesser-Coope, B. S. A. Co. Transport Officer. Captain Lindsell, late Royal Scots Fusiliers In charge Scouts. Major J. B. Stracey, Scots Guards } Major Heany, B. S. A. Co. } Officers temporarily Captain Foley } attached to Staff. Lieutenant Harry R. Holden, late Grenadier } Guards }

OFFICERS OF MASHONALAND MOUNTED POLICE. 

 Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H. F. White, Grenadier Guards Commanding. Inspector Bodle (late 6th Dragoons) 2nd in command. Inspector Straker, commanding A Troop. Inspector Dykes, commanding B Troop. Inspector Barry, commanding C Troop. Inspector Drury, commanding D Troop. Sub-Inspectors Scott and Cashel, A Troop. Sub-Inspectors Tomlinson and Chawner, B Troop. Sub-Inspectors Cazalet and Williams, C Troop. Sub-Inspectors Murray and Constable, D Troop. Artillery Troop--Inspector Bowden and Sub-Inspector Spain. Regimental Sergeant--Major Abbott. 

BECHUANALAND BORDER POLICE. 

 Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons Commanding. Major Hon. Charles Coventry 2nd in command. Captain Gosling, commanding G Troop. Sub-Lieutenants Hoare and Wood, commanding G Troop. Captain Munroe, commanding K Troop. Sub-Lieutenant McQueen, commanding K Troop. Medical Officer Surgeon Garraway. Veterinary Surgeon Lakie. M. M. Police officers and men 372 Pitsani Staff 13 camp. Colony boys (leading horses, etc. ) 65 Horses 480 Mules 128 One 12-1/2-pounder, 6 Maxims, 6 Scotch carts, 1 Cape cart, 2 grain waggons. B. B. Police officers and men 122 Mafeking Staff 1 column. Drivers and leaders 10 Horses 160 Mules 30 Two 7-pounders, 2 Maxims, 2 Scotch carts, 2 Cape carts. 

 Officers and men 494 Totals. Staff 14 Drivers, leaders, etc. 75 Horses 640 Mules 158 M. H. Maxims 8 12-1/2-pounder 1 7-pounder 2 Scotch carts 8 Cape carts 3

AMMUNITION. 

 Rounds. Carried by men and natives 50, 000 Lee-Met. Carried in Scotch carts and Cape carts 54, 000 rifle. ------- Total 104, 000 =======

 On the guns 17, 000 Maxim. In carts 28, 000 ------- Total 45, 000 =======

 On limber 44 12-1/2 On one Scotch cart 80 pounders. ------- Total 124 =======

 On limbers 70 7-pounders. In Scotch carts 172 ------- Total 242 =======

The rifle ammunition used was that supplied by the Maxim firm fortheir guns and also pellet powder. 

The powder used with the 12-1/2-pounder was that known as'ballistite. ' Rocket signals and limelights were carried, butnot used. 

EQUIPMENT CARRIED. 

 On the Person. (a) Rifle (10 rounds). (b) Bandolier (60 rounds). (c) Haversack (1/2 day's ration). (d) Water-bottle filled. 

 On the Saddle. (a) Nosebag (5 lb. Grain). (b) Cloak on wallet. (c) Rifle bucket. (d) Patrol tin (with grocery ration). (e) Leather axe-holder (every fourth man). 

Near-side wallet, 30 rounds and 1/2 day's rations. 

Off-side wallet, 20 rounds, tin dubbin, hold-all, and towel. 

Average weight carried by horse = 16 stone. 

Average weight carried by Scotch carts = 1, 600 lb. 

Footnotes for Appendix H

{55} The letters are published in their proper place, and readers cansatisfy themselves as to whether they justify the above inference. 

{56} Note. July, 1899. In the Report of the Select Committee of theHouse of Commons (No. 311 of 1897), page 298, are the following:--

Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman: "Did you understand that you were tomeet a considerable force at Krugersdorp coming from Johannesburg?"

Sir John Willoughby: _Not when we started_ from Pitsani, butcertainly after the letters received from the cyclists. 

APPENDIX I. 

MANIFESTO. 

If I am deeply sensible of the honour conferred upon me by beingelected chairman of the National Union, I am profoundly impressedwith the responsibilities attached to the position. The issues to befaced in this country are so momentous in character that it has beendecided that prior to the holding of a public meeting a review of thecondition of affairs should be placed in your hands, in order thatyou may consider matters quietly in your homes. It has also beendecided that it will be wise to postpone the meeting which was tohave taken place on the 27th December until the 6th day of Januarynext. 

On that day you will have made up your minds on the various pointssubmitted to you, and we will ask you for direction as to our futurecourse of action. It is almost unnecessary to recount all the stepswhich have been taken by the National Union, and I shall thereforeconfine myself to a very short review of what has been done. 

THE THREE PLANKS. 

The constitution of the National Union is very simple. The threeobjects which we set before ourselves are: (1) The maintenance ofthe independence of the Republic, (2) the securing of equal rights, and (3) the redress of grievances. This brief but comprehensiveprogramme has never been lost sight of, and I think we maychallenge contradiction fearlessly when we assert that we haveconstitutionally, respectfully, and steadily prosecuted our purpose. Last year you will remember a respectful petition, praying for thefranchise, signed by 13, 000 men, was received with contemptuouslaughter and jeers in the Volksraad. This year the Union, apartfrom smaller matters, endeavoured to do three things. 

THE RAAD ELECTIONS. 

First we were told that a Progressive spirit was abroad, that twelveout of twenty-four members of the First Volksraad had to be elected, and we might reasonably hope for reform by the type of broad-mindedmen who would be elected. It was therefore resolved that we should doeverything in our power to assist in the election of the best men whowere put up by the constituencies, and everything that the lawpermitted us to do in this direction was done. 

DISAPPOINTED HOPES. 

The result has been only too disappointing, as the record of thedebates and the division list in the Volksraad prove. We weremoreover told that public speeches in Johannesburg prevented theProgressive members from getting a majority of the Raad to listen toour requests, that angry passions were inflamed, and that if we wouldonly hold our tongues reform would be brought about. We thereforeresolved in all loyalty to abstain from inflaming angry passions, although we never admitted we had by act or speech given reason forlegislators to refuse justice to all. Hence our silence for a longtime. 

THE RAILWAY CONCESSION NEXT. 

We used all our influence to get the Volksraad to take over therailway concession, but, alas! the President declared with tears inhis voice that the independence of the country was wrapped up in thisquestion, and a submissive Raad swept the petitions from the table. 

THE FRANCHISE PETITION. 

Our great effort however was the petition for the franchise, with themoderate terms of which you are all acquainted. This petition wassigned by more than 38, 000 persons. What was the result? We werecalled unfaithful for not naturalizing ourselves, when naturalizationmeans only that we should give up our original citizenship and getnothing in return, and become subject to disabilities. Members hadthe calm assurance to state, without any grounds whatever, thatthe signatures were forgeries; and, worst of all, one member in aninflammatory speech challenged us openly to fight for our rights, andhis sentiment seemed to meet with considerable approval. This is thedisappointing result of our honest endeavours to bring about a fusionbetween the people of this State, and the true union and equalitywhich alone can be the basis of prosperity and peace. You all knowthat as the law now stands we are virtually excluded for ever fromgetting the franchise, and by a malignant ingenuity our children bornhere are deprived of the rights of citizenship unless their fatherstake an oath of allegiance, which brings them nothing butdisabilities. 

THE BITTER CRY OF THE 'UITLANDER. '

We are the vast majority in this State. We own more than half theland, and, taken in the aggregate, we own at least nine-tenths of theproperty in this country; yet in all matters affecting our lives, ourliberties, and our properties, we have absolutely no voice. Dealingnow first with the legislature, we find taxation is imposed uponus without any representation whatever, that taxation is whollyinequitable, _(a)_ because a much greater amount is levied from thepeople than is required for the needs of Government; _(b)_ because itis either class taxation pure and simple, or by the selection of thesubjects, though nominally universal, it is made to fall upon ourshoulders; and _(c)_ because the necessaries of life are undulyburdened. 

ABUSE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. 

Expenditure is not controlled by any public official independent ofthe Government. Vast sums are squandered, while the Secret ServiceFund is a dark mystery to everybody. But, essential as the power tocontrol taxation and expenditure is to a free people, there are othermatters of the gravest importance which are equally precious. The Legislature in this country is the supreme power, apparentlyuncontrolled by any fixed Constitution. The chance will of a majorityin a Legislature elected by one-third of the people is capable ofdominating us in every relation of life, and when we remember thatthose who hold power belong to a different race, speak a differentlanguage, and have different pursuits from ourselves, that theyregard us with suspicion, and even hostility; that, as a rule, theyare not educated men, and that their passions are played upon byunscrupulous adventurers, it must be admitted that we are in verygrave danger. 

TRIBUTE TO THE MODERATES. 

I think it is but just to bear tribute to the patriotic endeavours ofa small band of enlightened men in the Volksraad who have earnestlycondemned the policy of the Government and warned them of its danger. To Mr. Jeppe, Mr. Lucas Meyer, the De Jagers, Mr. Loveday, and a fewothers in the First Raad, leaving out the second Raad, we owe ourbest thanks, for they have fought our battle and confirmed thejustice of our cause. But when we look to the debates of the lastfew years, what do we find? All through a spirit of hostility, allthrough an endeavour not to meet the just wants of the people, notto remove grievances, not to establish the claim to our loyalty byjust treatment and equal laws, but to repress the publication ofthe truth, however much it might be required in the public interest, to prevent us from holding public meetings, to interfere with theCourts, and to keep us in awe by force. 

THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE. 

There is now threatened a danger even graver than those which havepreceded it. The Government is seeking to get through the Legislaturean Act which will vest in the Executive the power to decide whethermen have been guilty of sedition, and to deport them and confiscatetheir goods. The Volksraad has by resolution affirmed the principle, and has instructed the Government to bring up a Bill accordingly nextsession. To-day this power rests justly with the courts of law, and Ican only say that if this Bill becomes law the power of the ExecutiveGovernment of this country would be as absolute as the power of theCzar of Russia. We shall have said goodbye finally to the lastprinciple of liberty. 

PRESIDENT KRUGER INDICTED. 

Coming to the Executive Government, we find that there is no trueresponsibility to the people, none of the great departments of Stateare controlled by Ministerial officers in the proper sense, thePresident's will is virtually supreme, and he, with his uniqueinfluence over the legislators of the House, State-aided by an ableif hostile State Secretary, has been the author of every act directedagainst the liberties of the people. It is well that this should berecognized. It is well that President Kruger should be known for whathe is, and that once for all the false pedestal on which he has solong stood should be destroyed. I challenge contradiction when Istate that no important Act has found a place on the Statute-bookduring the last ten years without the seal of President Kruger's willupon it; nay, he is the father of every such Act. Remember thatall legislation is initiated by the Government, and, moreover, President Kruger has expressly supported every Act by which we andour children have been deprived by progressive steps of the right toacquire franchise, by which taxation has been imposed upon us almostexclusively, and by which the right and the liberty of the Press andthe right of public meeting have been attacked. 

THE JUDGES AND THE LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT. 

Now we come to the judicial system. The High Court of this countryhas, in the absence of representation, been the sole guardian ofour liberties. Although it has on the whole done its work ably, affairs are in a very unsatisfactory position. The judges havebeen underpaid, their salaries have never been secure, the mostundignified treatment has been meted out to them, and the statusand independence of the Bench have on more than one occasion beenattacked. A deliberate attempt was made two years ago by PresidentKruger and the Government to reduce the bench to a positionsubordinate to the Executive Government, and only recently we had inthe Witfontein matter the last of the cases in which the Legislatureinterfered with vested rights of action. The administration ofjustice by minor officials, by native commissioners, and byfield-cornets, has produced, and is producing, the gravest unrest inthe country; and, lastly, gentlemen, THE GREAT BULWARK OF LIBERTY, the right to trial by jurymen who are our peers, is denied to us. Only the burgher or naturalized burgher is entitled to be a juryman;or, in other words, anyone of us is liable to be tried upon thegravest charge possible by jurymen who are in no sense our peers, whobelong to a different race, who regard us with a greater or lesserdegree of hostility, and whose passions, if inflamed, might promptthem, as weak human creatures, to inflict the gravest injustice, evento deprive men of their lives. Supposing, in the present tensecondition of political feeling, any one of us were tried before aBoer jury on any charge having a political flavour about it, shouldwe be tried by our peers, and should we have a chance of receivingeven-handed justice?

THE SECRET SERVICE FUND. 

When we come to the Administration, we find that there is thegrossest extravagance, that Secret Service moneys are squandered, that votes are exceeded, that the public credit is pledged, as it waspledged in the case of the Netherlands Railway Company, and laterstill in the case of the Selati Railway, in a manner which is whollyinconsistent with the best interests of the people. 

SQUANDERING THE PUBLIC REVENUE. 

The Delagoa Bay festivities are an instance of a reckless disregardof a Parliamentary vote; £20, 000 was voted for those uselessfestivities--about £60, 000 was really expended, and I believe certainfavoured gentlemen hailing from Holland derived the principalbenefit. It is said that £400, 000 of our money has been transferredfor some extraordinary purpose to Holland. Recently £17, 000 is saidto have been sent out of the country with Dr. Leyds for SecretService purposes, and the public audit seems a farce. When theProgressive members endeavoured to get an explanation about largesums of money they were silenced by a vote of the majorityprompted by President Kruger. The administration of the publicservice is in a scandalous condition. 

A CORRUPT LEGISLATURE. 

Bribery and corruption are rampant. We have had members of the Raadaccepting presents of imported spiders and watches wholesale from menwho were applying for concessions, and we have the singular fact thatin every instance the recipient of the gift voted for the concession. We have the President openly stating that such acceptance of presentswas wholly moral. We have a condition of affairs in which the timeof the meeting of the Volksraad is looked upon as the period of thegreatest danger to our interests, and it is an open secret that aclass of man has sprung up who is in constant attendance upon themembers of the Volksraad, and whose special business appears to bethe 'influencing' of members one way or the other. It is openlystated that enormous sums of money have been spent, some to produceillegitimate results, some to guard against fresh attacks upon vestedrights. The Legislature passed an Act solemnly denouncing corruptionin the public service. One man, not an official, was punished underthe law, but nothing has ever been done since to eradicate the evil. 

AND A TAINTED CIVIL SERVICE. 

I think thousands of you are satisfied of the venality of many of ourpublic servants. I wish to guard against the assumption that allpublic servants are corrupt. Thank God there are many who are ableand honourable men, and it must be gall and wormwood to these men tofind the whole tone of the service destroyed, and to have themselvesmade liable to be included under one general denunciation. But therecan be no health in an administration, and the public morals must besapped also, when such things as the Smit case, and the recentStiemens case, go unnoticed and unpunished. 

TWO GLARING CASES. 

I think it right to state openly what those cases are. N. J. Smitis the son of a member of the Government. He absented himself formonths without leave. He was meantime charged in the newspaperswith embezzlement. He returned, was fined £25 for being absentwithout leave, and was reinstated in office. He is now the MiningCommissioner of Klerksdorp. He has been charged in at least twonewspapers--one of them a Dutch newspaper, _Land en Volk_, publishedwithin a stone's throw of the Government Office--with being an'unpunished thief, ' and yet the Government have taken no notice ofit, nor has he thought fit to bring an action to clear himself. Inthe Stiemens case two officials in the Mining Department admitted inthe witness-box that they had agreed to further the application of arelative for the grant of a piece of public land at Johannesburg oncondition that they were each to receive one quarter of the proceeds. A third official, the Landdrost of Pretoria, admitted that he hadreceived £300 for his 'influence' in furthering the application;yet no notice had been taken by the Government of their scandalousconduct, and sad to say the judges who heard the case did not thinkit their duty to comment strongly upon the matter. I have in mypossession now a notarial deed which proves that the RailwayCommissioner, the Landdrost, and the Commandant of Pretoria aremembers of a syndicate whose avowed object is, or was, to wrest fromthe companies their right to the 'bewaarplaatsen. ' This shows whatis going on, and what is the measure of safety of title to property. Those who should guard our rights are our worst enemies. In a lawintroduced by the present Government, the Government, instead of theCourts, are the final judges in cases of disputed elections. NoElection Committees are allowed. This operates against candidatesopposed to the Government, because the Government has virtually avast standing army of committee men, henchmen, officials beingallowed openly to take part in swaying elections, and the Governmentbeing in a position, by the distribution of contracts, appointments, purchase of concessions, the expenditure of Secret Service money andotherwise, to bring into existence and maintain a large number ofsupporters who act as canvassers always on the right side in timesof elections. 

NATIVE AFFAIRS. 

The administration of native affairs is a gross scandal and a sourceof immense loss and danger to the community. Native Commissionershave been permitted to practise extortion, injustice, and crueltyupon the natives under their jurisdiction. The Government has allowedpetty tribes to be goaded into rebellion. We have had to pay thecosts of the 'wars, ' while the wretched victims of their policy havehad their tribes broken up, sources of native labour have beendestroyed, and large numbers of prisoners have been kept in goalfor something like eighteen months without trial. It was statedin the newspapers that, out of 63 men imprisoned, 31 had died inthat period, while the rest were languishing to death for want ofvegetable food. We have had revelations of repulsive cruelty on thepart of field-cornets. We all remember the Rachman case, and theApril case, in which the judges found field-cornets guilty of brutalconduct to unfortunate natives; but the worst features about thesecases is that the Government has set the seal of its approval uponthe acts of these officials by paying the costs of the actions outof public funds, and the President of the State a few days ago madethe astounding statement in regard to the April case, that, notwithstanding the judgment of the High Court, the Governmentthought that Prinsloo was right in his action, and therefore paidthe costs. The Government is enforcing the 'plakkerswet, ' whichforbids the locating of more than five families on one farm. Thefield-cornets in various districts have recently broken up homes oflarge numbers of natives settled on 'Uitlanders'' lands, just at thetime when they had sown their crops to provide the next winter'sfood. The application of this law is most uneven, as large numbersof natives are left on the farms of the Boers. Quite recently awell-known citizen brought into the country at great expense somehundreds of families, provided them with land, helped them to startlife, stipulating only that he should be able to draw from amongstthem labour at a fair wage to develop his properties. Scarcely hadthey been settled when the field-cornet came down and scattered thepeople, distributing them among Boer farms. The sources of the nativelabour supply have been seriously interfered with at the borders byGovernment measures, and difficulties have been placed in the way oftransport of natives by railway to the mines. These things are all adrain upon us as a State, and many of them are a burning disgrace tous as a people. 

THE EDUCATION SCANDAL. 

The great public that subscribes the bulk of the revenue is virtuallydenied all benefit of State aid in education. There has been adeliberate attempt to Hollanderise the Republic, and to kill theEnglish language. Thousands of children are growing up in this landin ignorance, unfitted to run the race of life, and there is thepossibility that a large number of them will develop into criminals. We have had to tax ourselves privately to guard against thesedangers, and the iniquity of denying education to the children ofmen who are paying taxes is so manifest that I pass on with mingledfeelings of anger and disgust. 

RAILWAYS. 

This important branch of the public service is entirely in the handsof a corporation domiciled in Holland. This corporation holds aconcession, of course under which not only was there no adequatecontrol over expenditure in construction, but it is entitled tocharge and is charging us outrageous tariffs. How outrageous theseare will be seen from the admission made by Mr. Middelberg that theshort section of 10 miles between Boksburg and Krugersdorp is payingmore than the interest on the cost of the construction of the wholeline of railway to Delagoa Bay. To add these to its general revenue, of which 10 per cent, is set aside as a sinking fund, and then totake for itself 15 per cent. Of the balance, the Company reportsannually to the Raad from Amsterdam in a language which ispractically foreign to it, and makes up its accounts in guelders, acoinage which our legislators I venture to say know nothing of; andthis is independence. We are liable as guarantors for the whole ofthe debt. Lines have been built entirely on our credit, and yet wehave no say and no control over these important public works beyondthe show of control which is supposed to be exercised by the presentRailway Commissioner. The Company in conjunction with the ExecutiveGovernment is in a position to control our destinies to an enormousextent, to influence our relations internally and externally, tobring about such friction with the neighbouring States as to set thewhole of South Africa in tumult. Petitions have been presented to theRaad, but the President has constantly brushed these aside with thewell-worn argument that the independence of the State is involved inthe matter. It is involved in the matter, as all who remember therecent Drifts question will admit. I have been told that it isdangerous for the country to take over the railway, because it wouldafford such an immense field for corruption. Surely this is thestrongest condemnation of the Government by its friends, for if it isnot fit to run a railway, how can it be fit to manage a whole State?The powers controlling this railway are flooding the public servicewith Hollanders to the exclusion of our own people, and I may heresay that in the most important departments of the State we are beingcontrolled by the gentlemen from the Low Country. While the innocentBoer hugs to himself the delusion that he is preserving hisindependence, they control us politically through Dr. Leyds, financially through the Netherlands Railway, educationally throughDr. Mansvelt, and in the Department of Justice through Dr. Coster. 

CUSTOMS AND TRADE. 

The policy of the Government in regard to taxation may be practicallydescribed as protection without production. The most monstroushardships result to consumers, and merchants can scarcely say fromday to day where they are. Twice now has the Government entered intocompetition with traders who have paid their licences and rents andwho keep staffs. Recently grain became scarce. The Governmentwere petitioned to suspend the duties, which are cruelly high, inorder to assist the mining industry to feed its labourers. TheGovernment refused this request on the plea that it was not in aposition to suspend duties without the permission of the Volksraad, and yet within a few days we find that the Government has granted aconcession to one of its friends to import grain free of duty and tosell it in competition with the merchants who have had to pay duties. I do not attempt to deal with this important question adequately, butgive this example to show how the Government regards the rights oftraders. 

MONOPOLIES. 

It has been the steady policy of the Government to grant concessions. No sooner does any commodity become absolutely essential to thecommunity than some harpy endeavours to get a concession for itssupply. There is scarcely a commodity or a right which has not beenmade the subject of an application for the grant of a concession. Weall remember the bread and jam concession, the water concession, theelectric lighting concession, and many others, but I need only pointto the dynamite concession to show how these monopolies tend toparalyse our industries. There may be some of you who have not yetheard and some who have forgotten the facts connected with thisoutrage upon public rights. 

STORY OF THE DYNAMITE CONCESSION. 

Some years ago, Mr. Lippert got a concession for the sole right tomanufacture and sell dynamite and all other explosives. He was tomanufacture the dynamite in this country. For years he importeddynamite under the name of Guhr Impregne duty free. He nevermanufactured dynamite in the country, and upon public exposure, theGovernment was compelled to cancel the concession, the Presidenthimself denouncing the action of the concessionnaire as fraudulent. For a time we breathed freely, thinking we were rid of this incubus, but within a few months the Government granted virtually to the samepeople another concession, under which they are now taking from thepockets of the public £600, 000 per annum, and this is a charge whichwill go on growing should the mining industry survive the persistentattempts to strangle it. How a body charged with the public interestscould be parties to this scandalous fleecing of the public passescomprehension. Then, the curious feature about the matter is that theGovernment gets some petty fraction of this vast sum, and theconcessionnaires have on this plea obtained enormous advances ofpublic moneys from the Government, without security, to carry ontheir trade. Shortly, the concessionnaires are entitled to charge90s. A case for dynamite, while it could be bought if there were noconcession for about 30s. A case. It may be stated incidentally, thatMr. Wolmarans, a member of the Government, has been for yearschallenged to deny that he is enjoying a royalty of 2s. On every caseof dynamite sold, and that he has up to the present moment neglectedto take up the challenge. Proper municipal government is denied tous, and we all know how much this means with regard to health, comfort, and the value of property. The Statute Books are disfiguredwith enactments imposing religious disabilities; and the Englishlanguage, the language spoken by the great bulk of the people, isdenied all official recognition. The natural result of the existingcondition of things is that the true owners of the mines are thosewho have invested no capital in them--the Government, the railwayconcessionnaires, the dynamite concessionnaires, and others. Thecountry is rich, and under proper government could be developedmarvellously, but it cannot stand the drain of the present exactions. We have lived largely upon foreign capital, and the total amount ofthe dividends available for shareholders in companies is ridiculouslysmall as compared with the aggregate amount of capital invested inmining ventures. Some day the inevitable result upon our credit andupon our trade will be forced upon us. 

HATRED OF THE SAXON. 

There is no disguising the fact that the original policy of theGovernment is based upon intense hostility to the English-speakingpopulation, and that even against the enfranchised burgher of thisState there is the determination to retain all power in the hands ofthose who are enjoying the sweets of office now, and naturally thegrateful crowd of relations and friends and henchmen ardently supportthe existing _régime_; but there are unmistakable signs, and thePresident fears that the policy which he has hitherto adopted willnot be sufficient to keep in check the growing population. It seemsthe set purpose of the Government to repress the growth of theindustry, to tax it at every turn, to prevent the working classesfrom settling here and making their homes and surrounding themselveswith their families, and there is no mistaking the significance ofthe action of the President when he opposed the throwing open of thetown lands of Pretoria on the ground that 'he might have a secondJohannesburg there, ' nor that of his speech upon the motion for theemployment of diamond drills to prospect Government lands, which heopposed hotly on the ground that 'there is too much gold herealready. '

THE POLICY OF FORCE. 

We now have openly the policy of force revealed to us. £250, 000 is tobe spent upon the completing of a fort at Pretoria, £100, 000 is to bespend upon a fort to terrorize the inhabitants of Johannesburg, largeorders are sent to Krupp's for big guns, Maxims have been ordered, and we are even told that German officers are coming out to drill theburghers. Are these things necessary or are they calculated toirritate the feeling to breaking point? What necessity is there forforts in peaceful inland towns? Why should the Government endeavourto keep us in subjection to unjust laws by the power of the swordinstead of making themselves live in the heart of the people by abroad policy of justice? What can be said of a policy whichdeliberately divides the two great sections of the people from eachother, instead of uniting them under equal laws, or the policy whichkeeps us in eternal turmoil with the neighbouring States? What shallbe said of the statecraft, every act of which sows torments, discontent, or race hatred, and reveals a conception of republicanismunder which the only privilege of the majority of the people is toprovide the revenue, and to bear insult, while only those areconsidered Republicans who speak a certain language, and in greateror less degree share the prejudices of the ruling classes?

A STIRRING PERORATION. 

I think this policy can never succeed, unless men are absolutelybereft of every quality which made their forefathers free men; unlesswe have fallen so low that we are prepared to forget honour, self-respect, and our duty to our children. Once more, I wish tostate again in unmistakable language what has been so frequentlystated in perfect sincerity before, that we desire an independentrepublic which shall be a true republic, in which every man who isprepared to take the oath of allegiance to the State shall have equalrights, in which our children shall be brought up side by side asunited members of a strong commonwealth; that we are animated by norace hatred, that we desire to deprive no man, be his nationalitywhat it may, of any right. 

THE CHARTER OF THE UNION. 

We have now only two questions to consider: _(a)_ What do we want?_(b)_ how shall we get it? I have stated plainly what our grievancesare, and I shall answer with equal directness the question, 'What dowe want?' We want: (1) the establishment of this Republic as a trueRepublic; (2) a Grondwet or Constitution which shall be framed bycompetent persons selected by representatives of the whole people andframed on lines laid down by them--a Constitution which shall besafe-guarded against hasty alteration; (3) an equitable franchiselaw, and fair representation; (4) equality of the Dutch and Englishlanguages; (5) responsibility of the Legislature to the heads ofthe great departments; (6) removal of religious disabilities; (7)independence of the courts of justice, with adequate and securedremuneration of the judges; (8) liberal and comprehensive education;(9) efficient civil service, with adequate provision for pay andpension; (10) free trade in South African products. That is what wewant. There now remains the question which is to be put before you atthe meeting of the 6th January, viz. , How shall we get it? To thisquestion I shall expect from you an answer in plain terms accordingto your deliberate judgment. 

 CHARLES LEONARD, _Chairman of the Transvaal National Union. _

APPENDIX K. 

THE CASE OF THE CHIEFTAINESS TOEREMETSJANI

On the reports which have appeared the case or cases of Toeremetsjani_v_. P. A. Cronjé, Jesaja _v_. P. A. Cronjé and D. J. Schoeman, Segole_v_. P. A. Cronjé and J. A. Erasmus, have attracted, as well theymight, a good deal of attention. The following _résumé_ andcommentary were compiled by a legal gentleman who was present duringthe trial, but not professionally employed in it. 

The facts revealed in the evidence (writes our correspondent) speakpretty well for themselves, but they were brought out into luridprominence in the cross-examination of Commandant Cronjé by Mr. Justice Jorissen. In order to make the case quite clear, it is aswell to state for the benefit of those who are not intimatelyacquainted with things in the Transvaal that this Mr. Cronjé, whois now the Superintendent-General of Natives, is the same Cronjéconcerning whose action in regard to Jameson's surrender there was somuch discussion. After the Jameson Raid, President Kruger, pursuinghis policy of packing the Executive with his own friends, decided toput Cronjé upon the Executive, for which purpose he induced GeneralJoubert to resign his position as Superintendent-General of Natives. The President's intention becoming known to Raad members, thestrongest possible objection was expressed to this course as beingwholly unconstitutional and in direct conflict with the Grondwet; thePresident in the first place having no right to add to the number ofExecutive members and no authority for appointing any person to filla vacancy if there were one. Notice of motion was promptly given inthe Raad to instruct the Executive not to take the proposed course, as the Raad felt that the privilege and power of appointing memberson the Executive rested with them alone. Twenty-four hours' noticewas requisite to bring a matter up for discussion before the Raad. President Kruger hearing that notice had been given promptly called ameeting of the Executive and appointed Mr. Cronjé in defiance of thenotice of motion, so that when the motion came on for discussion onthe following day he replied to the Raad's instruction that it wastoo late to discuss the matter, the appointment having been made. Mr. Cronjé, therefore, appears on the scene on this occasion without muchto prejudice the unbiassed reader in his favour. The circumstances ofthe surrender of the Potchefstroom garrison, which was secured bytreacherously suppressing the news of the armistice between the twoforces (a treachery for which public reparation was afterwardsexacted by Sir Evelyn Wood), the treatment of certain prisoners ofwar (compelled to work for the Boers exposed to the fire and beingshot down by their own friends in the garrison), the summaryexecution of other prisoners, the refusal to allow certain of thewomen to leave the British garrison, resulting in the death of atleast one, are matters which although sixteen years old are quitefresh in the memory of the people in the Transvaal. The condition ofDr. Jameson's surrender revived the feeling that Mr. Cronjé has needto do something remarkable in another direction in order to encouragethat confidence in him as an impartial and fair-minded man which hispast career unfortunately does not warrant. Commandant Trichard, mentioned in this connection as a witness, was one of the commandantswho refused to confirm the terms accorded by Cronjé to Jameson. Mr. Abel Erasmus is a gentleman so notorious that it would be quiteunnecessary to further describe him. He is the one whom Lord Wolseleydescribed as a fiend in human form, and threatened to "hang as highas Haman. " Abel Erasmus is the man who had desolated the Lydenburgdistrict; the hero of the cave affair in which men, women, andchildren were closed up in a cave and burnt to death or suffocated; aman who is the living terror of a whole countryside, the mere mentionof whose name is sufficient to cow any native. Mr. Schoeman is theunderstudy of Abel Erasmus, and is the hero of the satchel case, inwhich an unfortunate native was flogged well-nigh to death andtortured in order to wring evidence from him who, it was afterwardsdiscovered, knew absolutely nothing about the affair. The Queen, orChieftainess, Toeremetsjani, is the present head of the Secocoenitribe and the head wife of the late chief, Secocoeni. This tribe, itwill be remembered, was the one which successfully resisted the Boersunder President Burger and Commandant Paul Kruger--a successfulresistance which was one of the troubles leading directly to theabortive annexation of the Transvaal. The Secocoeni tribe wereafterwards conquered by British troops, and handed over to the tendermercies of the Boer Government upon the restoration of itsindependence. 

It is necessary to bear these facts in mind in order to realise thehideous significance of the unvarnished tale. 

Now to the trial. 

Mr. Advocate WESSELS, who acted for the natives, gauging prettyaccurately what the defence would be, called two witnesses to provethe _prima facie_ case. Jesaja, one of the indunas flogged, whosecase was first on the roll, proved that he was flogged by order ofCommandant Cronjé without any form of trial, and without any chargeor indictment being made against him, and that he received twenty-sixlashes, the extra one being given because he declined to say 'Thankyou' for the twenty-five. Commandant Trichard next gave evidence, andfrom him Mr. WESSELS elicited that Cronjé had gone through no form oftrial, but handed over Jesaja and the other twelve indunas to beflogged by Erasmus and Schoeman. 

Advocate: Do you positively swear that Commandant Cronjé specifiedthe sentence of twenty-five lashes each?

Witness: Yes. 

Which answer was quite in accordance with the pleas of Erasmus andSchoeman, who stated specifically that they administered the lashesin accordance with the orders and sentence given by CommandantCronjé. The Court held that a sufficient _prima facie_ case had beenmade out by the plaintiff, and that the onus now lay on thedefendants to prove their case. The witnesses called were CommandantCronjé and Mr. Stiemens, secretary to the former. Mr. Stiemens in hisevidence fully corroborated Trichard's evidence as to the passing ofthe sentence by Cronjé upon the indunas and the absence of anyform of trial; and nothing more need be said about this witness. WithMr. Cronjé's evidence, however, it is necessary to deal at length. Mr. Cronjé admitted under cross-examination that he had not observedany particular form of trial, although, as was pointed out, the lawdealing with native trials stated specifically 'that the rules whichgovern procedure in civilized courts shall be followed as closely aspossible. ' He stated that as regards the Chieftainess, he called herup and read over to her 'point by point' 'the indictment underwhich she was charged, ' which indictment, however, as he admitted, consisted merely of a letter of complaint written by Field-cornetSchoeman to him as Superintendent-General of Natives. He claimedthat no form of trial was necessary, inasmuch as he acted under theauthority of the President, who has supreme power over natives, andwas not obliged to observe any particular form of trial. 'Point bypoint I read the charge, ' to use his own words, 'against the woman, and point by point I could see by her demeanour that she was guilty. 'As regards the thirteen indunas, Mr. Cronjé admitted that he did notknow whether these were indunas. He considered them guilty, notbecause they had done anything, but because in their position asadvisers of the Chieftainess they ought to have advised her betterthan they appeared to have done. Instructions had therefore beengiven to arrest these indunas, and they had caught as many as theycould. There was no evidence to show that they were indunas, or thatthey were ever in a position to advise or had advised theChieftainess; in fact, it was admitted that they were a lot ofthirteen caught out of a tribe as one might catch so many sheep outof a flock. Mr. Cronjé denied that he had sentenced these men, andrepeatedly stated that he had handed them over to Erasmus andSchoeman, to be dealt with according to law. 

Mr. WESSELS cross-examined the witness upon this point as follows:--

Advocate: I believe Commandant Trichard accompanied you on thiscommission?

Witness: Yes. 

Advocate: He was present throughout the whole proceeding?

Witness: Yes. 

Advocate: He had every opportunity of knowing what took place andwhat was said?

Witness: Yes. 

Advocate: You will be surprised to hear that Mr. Trichard states thatyou actually passed sentence upon the thirteen indunas in such wordsas, 'I hand you over to the Native Commissioner and Field-cornet tobe dealt with according to law. And you instigators will gettwenty-five lashes each between the shoulders. ' Do you positivelydeny that you said anything about twenty-five lashes?

Witness: Yes, I deny it. 

Advocate: Do you deny that you gave any indication or opinion as towhat ought to be done with these men?

Witness: Yes. 

Advocate: Well, Mr. Cronjé, I want to know which of you two the Courtis to believe, you or Commandant Trichard?

Witness: Commandant Trichard has made a mistake. 

Advocate: No, no, no, Mr. Cronjé, that won't do; there are nomistakes in this business. I want you to tell the Court which of youtwo men under oath is lying and which is telling the truth. 

Witness: Commandant Trichard is lying. 

(At this point there was some commotion in Court caused by CommandantTrichard jumping up and making use of some expressions towards thewitness. The matter ended in a rather fierce altercation after theCourt adjourned. ) It is only necessary to add that Mr. Stiemans, whofollowed Cronjé, fully corroborated Trichard's evidence. There weremany other interesting points brought out by Mr. WESSELS in hiscross-examination, but it is unnecessary to further detail this partof the proceedings, as the same ground was covered by Mr. JusticeJorissen, who took the witness in hand and whose cross-examinationbrought out the salient features of the case with extreme vividnessand dramatic effect. The Judge first dealt with that portion of theevidence relating to the so-called 'trial' of the Chieftainess. 

Judge: Mr. Cronjé, in your evidence just now you said that you readover to this woman the charge that was laid against her. 'Point bypoint' you say you read it to her, and 'point by point you could seeby her demeanour that she was guilty. ' Is that so?

Witness: Yes. 

Judge: Very well, Mr. Cronjé, I will take the indictment, 'point bypoint, ' as you did. Point the first, Mr. Cronjé. (The Judge here readthe first of the seven clauses in Schoeman's letter which formed theindictment. ) Now kindly explain to me what there was in the woman'sdemeanour which conveyed to you the idea that she was guilty on thispoint. 

The witness became considerably embarrassed and did not answer. 

Judge: No answer, Mr. Cronjé? Well, we will take point No. 2. (Thejudge dealt with all the seven clauses in a similar manner, thewitness failing to make any answer throughout. After the last pointhad been dealt with and remained unanswered, the Judge addressed thewitness again amid a most impressive silence in Court). 

Judge: Mr. Cronjé, 'point by point' I have read to you the indictmentas you read it to the woman; 'point by point' I have asked you togive me certain information; 'point by point' you have failed to makeany answer. Well, Mr. Cronjé, I can only tell you this, 'point bypoint' I shall set that down in my notes. (After an interval, duringwhich the Judge filled in his notes, the examination was resumed. )

Judge: Now, Mr. Cronjé, as I understand it, it was in consequence ofField-cornet Schoeman's complaint to you as Superintendent-General ofNatives that you were sent by the Government to investigate thematter?

Witness: Yes. 

Judge: You called the woman up before you and read to her thecharges. 

Witness: Yes. 

Judge: You brought no evidence against her?

Witness: No. 

Judge: You did not call upon Schoeman to produce any evidence againsther?

Witness: No. 

Judge: His letter of complaint to you seemed sufficient?

Witness: Yes. 

Judge: You did not give her any opportunity to bring evidence?

Witness: It was not necessary. 

Judge: Oh, dear no; I quite understand that 'you could tell from herdemeanour that she was guilty. ' But as a matter of form you did nothear any evidence on her behalf?

Witness: No. 

Judge: You just sentenced her out of hand. 

Witness: I sentenced her to pay a fine. 

Judge: And then as regards the thirteen indunas, if they wereindunas, as you deny sentencing them we need not refer further tothat point, but I put this to you--there was no evidence broughtagainst them?

Witness: No. 

Judge: There was nothing to show that these men had ever advised thewoman or were in a position to advise her; in fact, as far as theevidence goes, there was nothing to show that they even belonged tothe tribe, but in your opinion they ought to have advised herdifferently, and you therefore sentenced them to twenty-five lasheseach. 

Witness: I did not sentence them, but handed them over to the properauthorities to be dealt with according to law. 

Judge: Oh, no, Mr. Cronjé, that is not how the case appears to me. You came up to these people in the capacity of Judge, to do justiceas between man and man according to your lights, to follow theprocedure that is observed in civilized courts, to represent thestrength, the rights, and the responsibilities of this Republic, andif we are to accept your evidence as true, you did not try the menwhom you were to have tried. You heard evidence neither for noragainst them, but you handed them over to--to whom, Mr. Cronjé? Notto the proper authorities, but to Erasmus and Schoeman, the otherparties in the case which you were sent up to try. It seems to me, Mr. Cronjé, that this is a case without parallel. 

There was no answer from the witness. 

Judge: One point more, Mr. Cronjé, and I have finished. When youhanded over these men to be dealt with, did you notify them that theyhad the right of appeal from any sentence that might be imposed uponthem?

Witness: Yes, I did. 

Judge: Right! Now, Mr. Cronjé, did you notify Erasmus and Schoemanthat they should stay execution of the sentence pending the hearingof any appeal?

After considerable pause the witness was understood to say "No. "

Judge: You did not tell these officials to stay execution?

Witness: No. 

Judge: Then you merely gave these natives the right to appeal againstthe sentence of lashes after they should have received the lashes?

There was no answer from the witness. 

Judge: That will do, Mr. Cronjé. I do not think that these peoplehave much reason to thank you for the leave to appeal. 

Cronjé was followed in the witness-box by Stiemens, whose evidence isalready referred to, and the Court then adjourned. 

The next morning, shortly before the opening of the Court, the StateAttorney came down on behalf of the Government and arranged withPlaintiffs' Counsel to adjourn for the day to enable parties to tryand settle the three cases out of Court. The Court thereuponadjourned at the request of parties, and during the day the threecases were settled on the following basis: The Government refundsToeremetsjani the £147 10s. With interest at 6 per cent, from thedate of payment by her to Erasmus, and pays her costs, to be taxed asbetween attorney and client. 

The Defendants Cronjé, Erasmus, and Schoeman, pay each of thethirteen indunas who were flogged £25 as compensation, and pay thecosts of Jesaja and Segole, to be taxed as between attorney andclient. 

POSTSCRIPT. 

One last touch of irony is needed to complete the story of the suitsbrought by the Chieftainess Toeremetsjani and her indunas againstMessrs. Erasmus, Schoeman, and the rest. It seems that these samegentlemen have actually been appointed by the Government to'investigate matters' in the district where these Kaffirs live. PoorToeremetsjani and the unfortunate indunas, as a contemporary remarks, may be expected to give a grovelling welcome. No more High Court forthem. 

The natives, by the way, interviewed since their return to thekraals, state that they have not yet received the settlementarranged. 

In connection with the above sample of justice to the natives it isas well to recall another recent incident which has lately takenplace. Some natives being severely mishandled by the localauthorities, and being in consequence destitute of means to proceedagainst them in law, applied to Court for leave to sue _in formapauperis_. This leave was granted. Immediately upon this becomingknown petitions were got up among the Boers, with the result that theVolksraad some six weeks ago took a resolution instructing theGovernment to immediately bring in a law forbidding the judges togrant such leave, and making it impossible for a native to sueGovernment or any white person _in forma pauperis_. Comment(concludes the correspondent who sets out these various facts) issuperfluous. 

APPENDIX L. 

 59, HOLBORN VIADUCT, LONDON, E. C. _6th May, 1897. _

REPORT ON THE LETTER WRITTEN ON A TORN TELEGRAM FORM SIGNED "F. R. ", BY MR. T. H. GURRIN, EXPERT IN HANDWRITING. 

Mr. THOMAS HENRY GURRIN, of 59, Holborn Viaduct, London, E. C. , is aprofessional expert in handwriting, recognized and employed by theDirector of Public Prosecutions, the Home Office, and the authoritiesat Scotland Yard, and is constantly engaged by them in that capacity. He is also frequently engaged in the same capacity by the Bank ofEngland and other public bodies. 

He has acted as handwriting expert in a very large number of civiland criminal cases at sessions, assizes, and before the High Courts, for over twelve years past, and can conscientiously say that hisexperience in the identification of genuine handwriting and thedetection of forged and altered documents is very extensive. 

Mr. Gurrin begs respectfully to submit the following report:--

'Having been instructed by Mr. Braunstein, solicitor, of 27, GreatGeorge Street, Westminster, I have examined a photograph of tornportions of a letter written on a telegram form of the South AfricanRepublic. 

'My attention has been directed to the evidence of Major Sir J. C. Willoughby, appearing at page 302 of the Minutes, in which he hasgiven his version of the missing portions of this document. 

'I have compared this version of the missing words with the vacantspaces, and I find that the words supplied in question 5, 571 wouldoccupy, as near as can be estimated, the missing spaces, judging fromthe other writing in the document. 

'I read the first portion of the document as follows:--

 '"Dear Dr. , "The rumour of massacre in" "Johannesburg that started you to our" "relief was not true. We are all right;" "feeling intense; we have armed" "a lot of men. Shall (not 'I shall') be very glad" "to see you. We are not in possession of" "town. "

'Major Sir J. C. Willoughby reads line 6, "We (or the Boers). " Itcannot possibly be "the Boers, " as the first letter is clearly aportion of a capital "W, " and corresponds with the first portion ofthe "W" as made at line 3; and further, there would be no room forthe two words "the Boers, " between the portion of the letter "W" andthe word "not. "

'Again, I am of opinion that the last word in line 6 was "of, " asthere is still visible an ascending curved stroke corresponding tothat with which the writer terminates the letter "f. "

'With reference to the rest of the version as contained in question5, 573, I respectfully submit that the missing words supplied areabsolutely inconsistent with the spaces which these words wouldoccupy if written naturally by the same writer. 

'The words "I will bring at least three hundred" do not correspondwith the still existing marks on line 7. The portion of a letterappearing in the middle of the line would not, as far as I can judge, be a part of any of the words suggested which would come at thecentre of that line. It might be a part of a capital "W, " or aninitial "p, " or it might be a final "d" turned back to the left, andthe last letter in the line looks as though it was intended for an"e. " In support of this theory, I compare it with the "e" at the endof the word "true" in line 3, and the "e" at the end of "intense, "line 4. The writer, when making a final "d, " makes the latterportion of the letter something like this, but in the instances inthis document he exerts more pressure than we find here, see, forinstance, the "d" in "started, " at line 2, the "d" in "glad, " inline 5, and "d" in "armed, " line 4. Besides, I cannot think that thiscan be the end of the word "hundred, " as, judging from the length ofthe word "started, " the word "hundred" would have occupied from thethird vertical line, and this would certainly leave no room forthe other words suggested in the version given by Major Sir J. C. Willoughby, viz. : "We will bring at least, or about three. " If thewords "will send out some, " or "we will send out some, " are writtenin line 7 after the word "town, " adopting, as nearly as possible, thespace that would have been occupied by the writer for these words, they will just fill the line. In like manner, with regard to line 8, there is just room after the words "men to" for the two words "meetyou, " and the small mark appearing before the full stop mighthave been the terminal of the letter "u, " but it would have beenimpossible to get into this small space the words "meet you atKrugersdorp, " and even if the words "meet you at" were omitted, andif it be assumed that the word which originally stood there was"Krugersdorp, " then the mark appearing before the full stop couldnot by any theory be construed as having been a portion of theletter "p, " as I have examined various specimens of Colonel Rhodes'handwriting, and have seen him write specimens containing the letter"p" and find that he does not terminate a "p" with any stroke of thisdescription, but that he terminates it inside the oval portion of theletter near the downstroke. With regard to the rest of the line, thelast two letters appear to have been "ne, " and there is a dot just inthe position that would apparently have been occupied by the dot hadthe previous letter been "i. " Consequently, I am of opinion that thetheory that the words "will send, " or "we will send out some men tomeet you, " "you are a fine fellow, " is perfectly consistent with thespaces left in the torn document, but that the theory that the wordswhich were originally in the spaces were "I will bring at least orabout three hundred men to meet you at Krugersdorp, you are a gallantfellow, " is not only inconsistent with the amount of space available, but does not fit in with the letters and portions of letters stillvisible. 

 'T. H. GURRIN. '

Contents of the letter according to a statement signed by Dr. Jameson, Sir John Willoughby, Major Robert White and Colonel RaleighGrey:--

'The rumour of massacre in Johannesburg that started you to ourrelief was not true. We are all right, feeling intense. We have armeda lot of men. I shall be very glad to see you. We (or the Boers) arenot in possession of the town. I will bring at least, or about, 300men to meet you at Krugersdorp. You are a gallant fellow. '

According to Colonel Francis Rhodes and Mr. Lionel Phillips, thecontents are as follows:--

'The rumour of massacre in Johannesburg that started you to ourrelief was not true. We are all right, feeling intense. We have armeda lot of men. Shall be very glad to see you. We are not in possessionof the town. We will send out some men to meet you. You are a finefellow. '

'We, the undersigned, were present in the Reform Committee's roomwhen Colonel Rhodes despatched the letter to Dr. Jameson, whichcommences, "Dear Dr. --The rumour of massacre. " We read the letter, but cannot now recall the exact words on the missing fragments; butwe do hereby declare on oath that there was no offer of 300 men, norof any other specific number of men, nor was the word Krugersdorpmentioned. The spirit of the letter was to suggest that a few menshould or would be sent in the character of a complimentary escort toshow Dr. Jameson his camp. 

 'GEO. W. FARRAR. 'S. W. JAMESON. 

 'As witness-- 'J. Percy FitzPatrick. 'Johannesburg, _10th April, 1897_. '